Illegality

ACUM v. EMI

Case/docket number: 
CA 5365/11
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, September 3, 2013
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

In 2004 the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority determined that the activity of ACUM (a corporation that operates to manage its members’ copyrights in musical works in Israel) constitutes a monopoly on managing copyright over musical works. In 2011 the Antitrust Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) approved the activity of ACUM as a cartel, subject to a series of requirements (“the permanent requirements”), which would be in force for five years starting from the date of their approval. The disputes at the center of the appeals related to the requirement that at least a third of ACUM’s board of directors consist of external directors (the ACUM appeal) and the requirement regarding the exclusion of rights in a work from management by ACUM. It was argued that the mechanism was overly narrow, as consent of all joint owners of a work is necessary for exclusion, or for segmentation under the four specific categories that permit partial exclusion of the rights (the EMI Israel appeal).

 

The Supreme Court (opinion written by Justice D. Barak-Erez, Justice Z. Zylbertal and Justice E. Rubinstein concurring) dismissed both appeals on the following grounds –

 

The requirements for ACUM’s operation should balance the authors’ property rights in their works with the public interest in a market free of monopolistic effects, a unique interest when in the context of a market of works, which inherently must be accessible to the public (albeit for payment). The analysis focused on two issues: the requirement to appoint public directors and the scope of the rights exclusion mechanism. Both should be examined from the unique perspective that combines the purpose of copyright law with that of antitrust law, considering the balance that both fields of law must achieve between individual property rights and economic interests, on the one hand, and the general public interest, on the other hand.

 

Regarding the requirement that at least a third of appointed members to the board of directors be external public directors (the practical meaning of which was the appointment of a total of four such directors), ACUM failed in its challenges to both the requirement itself and the number of external directors it was obligated to appoint.

 

The appointment of public directors is one of the mechanisms that facilitates supervising a company’s conduct and that of its directors and controlling shareholders. It helps deal with the various representative problems associated with its activity. Their appointment also adds a professional dimension to the company that would increase its adequate management; the appointment of public directors to ACUM’s board is consistent with the purpose of the cartel’s approval. Although ACUM is not a public company, it effectively manages a resource that has clear public aspects, and in fact those aspects of ACUM’s activity are the basis for the cartel's approval. At the same time ACUM’s monopolistic characteristics and its status as a cartel in the copyright of musical works per se grant it a public dimension. The requirement to appoint public directors to provide another layer of supervision over ACUM’s activity is therefore warranted by and inherent to the rationale of the cartel’s approval from the point of view of protecting both authors and users. The Court added that making the cartel’s approval subject to the appointment of public directors, even when a public corporation in the ordinary sense is not involved, has already been done in the past, for example with respect to the recycling corporation. Moreover, the public directors might represent cross-group interests that carry broader considerations as to the general interest of artists as a whole, rather than representing the interest of certain artists groups, which may conflict. Moreover, without laying down rigid rules, there is prima facie basis for the argument that the importance of a public director is in fact greater in a corporation like ACUM, which is not led by a clear control group and has diverse ownership.

 

In fact, ACUM itself also acknowledged the advantages of appointing public directors, and the updated language in its articles of incorporation now requires the appointment of two public directors. The basic aspect of the dispute, which had to a certain extent become one of extent and degree, had thereby been somewhat resolved. In this respect, the Court believed that the proportion of directors that was fixed – one third of the total members of the board – was not excessive or unreasonable, considering the character of ACUM as a corporation with diverse ownership and especially in light of the concern for abuse that always exists regarding a cartel.

 

Under the circumstances, there is no need to rule on whether ACUM should be regarded as a hybrid entity, and in any event a complete discussion of the criteria for recognizing an entity as such is unnecessary.  However, it is not superfluous to note that ACUM’s activity does fit many of the factors mentioned in case law as indicative of a hybrid entity. Those factors, even if insufficient to categorize ACUM as a hybrid entity in the ordinary sense of the term, do shed further light on the basic justification of the Director-General’s requirement. Although the appointment of public directors is not ordinarily considered one of a hybrid entity’s duties, the fact that ACUM is an entity that owes important duties to the public can serve as a factor in how the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority exercises power when subjecting a cartel to requirements.

 

Two questions were at the root of the dispute regarding the requirements about the rights exclusion mechanism. First, whether the requirement for consent by all joint owners of a work in order to exclude it from ACUM’s catalog is justified or whether that power should be held individually by each of the artists; and secondly, how delicate and precise should the “segmentation” mechanism be in the scope of the exclusion ability, in light of distinctions between a work’s different types of use.

 

As a point of departure it can be assumed that works of the type that ACUM manages are often ones to which several artists share the rights. Conditioning exclusion upon the consent of all rights owners will undoubtedly burden the individual artist who seeks to exclude her own work. However, this is not an undue burden considering the purpose of the permanent permit.

 

The most important tool available to ACUM in the collective management of the rights is the grant of a sweeping license, known as a “blanket license,” which permits the licensee to use ACUM’s entire catalog. From the perspective of transaction costs, the advantages of a blanket license are the primary reason for ACUM’s activity, despite the conflicts with antitrust law. Given the typical ownership structure of a musical work, an exclusion ability that is not conditional upon the consent of other owners effectively means that a single author, regardless of their role in creating the work, may exclude the entire work from ACUM’s blanket license system.  Thus, a user who wishes to make lawful use of the work would have to negotiate with the excluding author in addition to acquiring the blanket license from ACUM.  Such a state of affairs would greatly limit the benefit the cartel provides the user public to the point that it is doubtful whether the cartel is indeed “in the public interest” in terms of section 9 of the Antitrust Law. Furthermore, accepting that consent by all joint owners of the work is not necessary in order to exclude it might also allow for some of the artists’ opportunistic exploitation of the exclusion, creating “extortion” or “free-riding” problems.

 

Ultimately, even in the narrow exclusion regime joint artists can contractually regulate the scope of the work’s exclusion from collective management in advance. Indeed, the narrow exclusion regime merely provides the default for the inclusion of a joint work in ACUM’s catalog. Insofar as the authors wish to regulate decision-making differently in managing joint works, they are at liberty to do so. Presumably such an arrangement, which would be made in a timely manner and before any of the parties is in a position to potentially exploit or become a free rider, would help to limit the coordination challenges in obtaining consent for excluding joint work, as detailed by EMI Israel and Anana. Therefore, the default prescribed – that in the absence of agreement to the contrary between owners of rights in a joint work, all of their consent is necessary in order to exclude it from management by ACUM – is a proper one.

 

Finally, the Court considered the rights exclusion mechanism that enables artists to exclude their rights in some – rather than all – uses but only in one of four specific alternatives – “exclusion packages” that make limited “segmentation” possible according to types of use. The dispute between the parties revolved around the precision of the necessary segmentation. While the current segmentation mechanism essentially distinguishes between audio and audio-visual uses, EMI Israel (supported by Anana) also wished to distinguish between use in “old media” – like television and radio – and use in “new media” – like Internet and cellular phone services.

 

Here, the Court held that the exclusion mechanism approved by the Tribunal should be upheld, subject to the question of excluding “new media” – on conditions and restraints – being comprehensively reviewed during the cartel approval’s renewal proceeding.

 

The distinction between “new” media and “old” media raises fundamental and practical difficulties. The issue is a developing one and more experience and study are necessary to achieve a proper balance. The world of communications is characterized by constant, rapid technological development. In light of this reality the distinction between “old media” and “new media” is not a binary dichotomy, nor is it permanent or stable.

 

Reviewing the implications of excluding “new media” shows that there is not necessarily any justification for completely prohibiting excluding works from “new media” uses. Nevertheless, there are clear indicators that the same applies only to a limited exclusion mechanism, which focuses on certain types of “new media” uses and strives to minimize harm to users. Such exclusion mechanisms cannot be based merely on the technological distinction between “old media” and “new media” and allow a sweeping exclusion of all uses of the latter, as EMI Israel and Anana propose. In any event, examining the possibility of another “new media” exclusion category and fashioning the boundaries of that category should be done with care after studying interested parties’ positions about the issue and all the relevant facts. As mentioned, this is a matter that the Antitrust Tribunal ought to consider when the extension of the cartel’s approval comes before it. This position is also supported by a factor that concerns the temporary nature of the approval – for only five years. At the end of that period (two years of which have already elapsed), the Tribunal will reconsider approving the cartel, at which time it can also reconsider the extent of the exclusion mechanism’s “segmentation,” in light of the five years’ experience gained with a “narrow” exclusion mechanism. International experience could also enrich the set of information available to the Tribunal.

 

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, deciding not to intervene in the requirements attached to the cartel’s approval. Currently, the requirements for the permanent permit, including those challenged in the appeals, are all necessary to dispel the concerns naturally raised by a cartel concerning the collective management of copyright. These conditions are necessary to ensure that the cartel’s benefit to the public does indeed exceed the harm perceived from it. At the same time, the possibility remains that the proper balance between the rights of authors and the general public interest might in the future dictate a result different from that reached by the Tribunal in terms of integrating the distinction between different types of “new media” and “old media” in the rights exclusion mechanism.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting As a Court of Civil Appeals

CA 5365/11

CA 5489/11

 

Before:

His Honor, Justice E. Rubinstein

His Honor, Justice Z. Zylbertal

Her Honor, Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

 

 

 

The Appellant in CA 5365/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5489/11:

 

ACUM – The Association of Composers

 

 

v.

 

 

The Appellant in CA 5489/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5365/11:

 

EMI Music Publishing Ltd

 

 

v.

 

 

The Respondents:

1. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority

 

2. The Association of Restaurants in Israel

 

3. Partner Communications Company

 

4. The Association of Function Hall & Garden Owners

 

5. Golden Channels

 

6. Matav Cable Communication Systems

 

7. Tevel Israel International Communications

 

8. Anana Ltd

 

9. EMI Music Publishing Ltd

       

 

Appeals against the judgment of the Antitrust Tribunal in Jerusalem on June 2, 2011 in AC 513/04 by Her Honor Judge N. Ben-Or

 

Date of Session:

Nisan 3, 5773 (March 14, 2013)

 

 

On behalf of the Appellant in CA 5365/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5489/11:

Adv. Uri Sorek, Adv. Assaf Neuman

 

 

On behalf of the Appellant in CA 5489/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5365/11:

Adv. Michelle Keynes

 

 

 

 

 

On behalf of the First Respondent:

Adv. Uri Schwartz, Adv. Yael Sheinin, Adv. Elad Mekdasi

 

 

On behalf of the Third Respondent:

Adv. Eyal Sagi, Adv. Amir Vang

 

 

On behalf of the Fourth to Seventh Respondents:

Exempt from appearance and representation

 

 

On behalf of the Eighth Respondent:

Adv. Ronit Amir-Yaniv, Adv. Ido Hitman

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

1.         Which principles should guide the activity of ACUM with regard to the management of copyright in musical works in Israel? This question has been presented to us in full force against the background of the finding by the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority that ACUM’s activity creates a cartel, in order to review the conditions prescribed for the approval of the cartel in a way that will balance the rights of authors with the general interest of works being used in public.

 

Background and Previous Proceedings

 

2.         “The Association of Composers, Authors and Publishers,” known as ACUM, is a corporation that operates in order to manage the copyright of its members – lyricists, composers, arrangers, translators, and others – in Israel. ACUM members transfer their rights in their works to it, whilst ACUM acts on their behalf in order to license the use of those works in consideration for royalties that it collects for its members. Ordinarily, the licenses that ACUM grants are sweeping licenses ("blanket licenses") that permit licensees to make use of the whole repertoire of works managed by ACUM (mainly by making them accessible to the public in various ways). In addition, ACUM is bound by agreements with foreign copyright collective management entities (hereinafter "affiliates"), by virtue of which it administers in Israel the rights that are managed by the affiliates abroad.

 

3.         On April 30, 2004 the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (hereinafter "the Director-General") published a ruling pursuant to section 34(a)(1) of the Antitrust Law, 5748-1988 (hereinafter "the Antitrust Law" or "the Law") according to which ACUM’s activity involves the creation of cartels (both between ACUM members and between ACUM and the affiliates) and a declaration under section 26(a) of the Law that ACUM’s activity as a cartel creates a monopoly in the market of managing copyright in musical works (or more precisely, with regard to management of  broadcasting, public performance, copying, recording, and synchronization rights in those works). The decision was made by the then Director-General, Mr. Dror Strom. However, it also reflects the position of the officers who have succeeded him, Ms. Ronit Kan and currently, Prof. David Gilo, as detailed below. Reference to the position of the Antitrust Authority will henceforth be made without specifically referring to those successors, using the general title – the Director-General.

 

4.         At that stage, ACUM instigated legal proceedings before the Antitrust Tribunal (hereinafter "the Tribunal") – an appeal against the determination of the Director-General that its activity involves cartels (AT 512/04) or, alternatively, an application for the approval of a cartel in accordance with sections 7 and 9 of the Antitrust Law, on the grounds that the cartel's approval is necessary in the public interest (AT 513/04). Both proceedings were heard together. Subsequently, to ACUM’s request, the appeal it filed was withdrawn, leaving only its application for approval of the cartel. The Director-General did not oppose the cartel's approval considering the public importance involved in ACUM's activity, as explained below, but the Tribunal was moved to set conditions to the approval so as to protect not only the public interest but also the individual rights of authors.

 

5.         To make its continued activity possible until completion of the litigation, ACUM filed a request for a provisional permit for operation of the cartel. The Tribunal granted the request and on December 28, 2004 it granted a provisional permit for ACUM’s activity subject to certain conditions (hereinafter "the Provisional Permit"). As detailed below, those conditions regulated, inter alia, situations in which authors could exclude rights in certain works from ACUM’s management so that those authors, rather than ACUM, would themselves deal with granting licenses to exercise those rights (hereinafter "the Exclusion Mechanism"). Over the years the Provisional Permit was extended from time to time based on of the Director-General’s recommendation, various amendments and modifications introduced to its terms. The last of those provisional permits (before the Tribunal's judgment), granted on February 24, 2009, introduced several significant changes, including making the Exclusion Mechanism "tougher," as detailed below.

 

6.         In addition to the position of the Director-General, oppositions to the cartel's approval were filed to the Tribunal by several other entities, including the Association of Function Hall & Garden Owners, Partner Communications Company (hereinafter "Partner"), the Association of Restaurants in Israel, and several cable companies – Golden Channels, Matav and Tevel (hereinafter "the cable companies") (whose activity has since been consolidated).

 

7.         At a later stage, an application to join the proceedings was made by two publishers that represent authors, the publishers themselves being members of ACUM – Anana Ltd (hereinafter "Anana") and EMI Music Publishing (Israel) Ltd (hereinafter "EMI Israel"). Those applications, like the time when they were made, were explained by the changes that had been made to the Provisional Permit’s conditions on February 24, 2009 as regards the Exclusion Mechanism. On December 1, 2009, the Tribunal partially allowed the applicants to join the proceedings in the sense that it permitted each of the two applicants to file a brief document with reference to the conditions that were acceptable to them and to make summations without extending the existing factual basis of the discussion.

 

8.         In its decision of January 25, 2009, the Tribunal stated that by consent of the parties it would rule based on the parties’ summations and supplemental oral arguments, without hearing evidence. The decision further stated that all of the parties agreed to ACUM's approval as a cartel, and took issue merely with regard to the terms of that approval. Consequently, the conditions of the Provisional Permit of February 24, 2009 (hereinafter "the Provisional Conditions") would serve as point of reference for the parties' positions. Accordingly, each of the parties filed its reservations regarding the Provisional Conditions in such manner that enabled the Tribunal to decide which of the conditions would be adopted as is within the permanent conditions, and which would be modified.

 

9.         On June 2, 2011 the Tribunal approved ACUM’s activity as a cartel, subject to a series of conditions (hereinafter "the Permanent Conditions"), which would remain in force for five years from the date of their approval. The Tribunal stated that the basic premise for reviewing the parties' arguments with regard to the conditions was that the anticipated benefit from the cartel substantially exceeded the damage likely to be caused by it, as required by section 10 of the Antitrust Law. In this context, it was explained that ACUM’s activity benefited not only its members – copyright owners (hereinafter "the authors") but also the general public who uses the works it manages (hereinafter "the users"): on the one hand, the sweeping licenses permit the users to make use of the whole repertoire of works that ACUM holds, thereby sparing the public from having to locate the owners of various rights and to negotiate individually with each of them; on the other hand, the sweeping licenses also benefit the authors since they streamline (and, to a great extent, enable) collection of royalties and enforcement of their rights.

 

10.       Since all parties agreed on principle to the approval of the cartel, the Tribunal hearing focused on the nature of the conditions to which the approval should be subject in order to dispel concern as to its abuse with regard to authors or users. The point of departure for the hearing was, as aforesaid, the Provisional Conditions, some of which were agreed upon by all parties, whilst others were in dispute. The disputes on which the appeal before us focuses pertain to the conditions prescribing the extent of the duty owed by ACUM to appoint external directors and the extent of ACUM members’ ability to exclude their rights from its management, as detailed below.

 

11.       Other controversies, including those concerning the definition of acts that would be construed as an abuse of ACUM's position and the way in which ACUM should act in taking legal action against users, were ultimately not considered by us since only few of the arguments concerning them were raised within the written appeal, while the arguments before us did not in fact concentrate on them.

 

12.       The appointment of external directors – the position of the Director-General was that a condition should be added to the Permanent Conditions to the effect that ACUM should appoint external directors in a proportion of no less than one third of the total members of its board and those directors would be responsible for the internal plan to enforce antitrust law that ACUM is obliged to implement (in accordance with section 10 of the Provisional Conditions). ACUM objected to this requirement, on the grounds, inter alia, that it is not a public company where the appointment of external directors is necessary in order to protect minority rights, and in any event ACUM's articles of association ensure due representation for each category of its members, and even guarantee numerical balance between the categories.

 

13.       The Tribunal accepted the Director-General's position on this matter, noting that a corporation for the collective management of copyright naturally raises concern as to the abuse of power against the authors themselves. Appointing a substantial number of external directors and entrusting them with the internal enforcement plan, it was held, would help deal with that concern, especially considering the fact that the corporation's members are dispersed and lack management expertise. The Tribunal also attributed importance to the fact that from ACUM's position in the proceedings it appeared that ACUM itself acknowledged the need to appoint external directors and was willing to do so even before the Tribunal’s judgment in order to reinforce the "managerial, professional, economic character of ACUM's board of directors".

 

14.       The extent of ACUM members’ ability to exclude rights from ACUM’s management – the Provisional Permit that ACUM had originally obtained (in 2004) included, in section 2.3 of the Provisional Conditions, a mechanism permitting a member to give notice "at any time, of his desire to assume all or any of the copyright with regard to any of his works, with regard to all users or specific categories of users," such that the works included in the notice would cease to be part of ACUM's repertoire, and copyright ownership would revert to the notifying member (hereinafter "the broad exclusion mechanism"). Underlying this mechanism was the concept that a “liberal” option to exclude any right in a work, even specifically, would intensify competition and increase the authors' power against ACUM. Later on, based on the experience accrued from the implementation of this arrangement, the Antitrust Authority reached the conclusion that the broad exclusion mechanism was not yielding the anticipated results with regard to enhancing market competition, and in contrast was aggravating the concern for abuse of the exclusion ability. For example, it turned out, according to the Director-General, that the broad exclusion mechanism that enabled interested authors, inter alia, to exclude from ACUM's management merely the use of "new media" (such as mobile phones and the Internet) and to leave it with the power to grant sweeping licenses for broadcasting rights only in "traditional media" (like television and radio), might undermine the justification for ACUM's existence as a corporation whose purpose is to reduce the substantial transaction costs involved in individually contracting with each of the authors. Accordingly, in 2009 the exclusion mechanism in section 2.3 of the Provisional Conditions was limited in two ways: first, the Provisional Conditions provided that an exclusion notice could only be given with the consent of all joint authors in a collective work whose exclusion was sought (for example, the lyricist, the composer of the music, and the arranger); second, it was provided that partial exclusion, namely exclusion of some of the uses of the work, could only be done in accordance with four "exclusion baskets" concerning different categories of use (hereinafter "the narrow exclusion mechanism"): presentation of the work in an audio format (for example radio broadcasting); its presentation in an audio-visual format (for example in a television program); copying the work; and recording it. The narrow exclusion mechanism therefore did not permit the author to exclude the work in various formats at his discretion, as specifically chosen by him (for example, excluding the work's use only with regard to mobile phones).

 

15.       The Director-General's position, joined by ACUM, Partner, and the cable companies on this issue, was that the narrow exclusion mechanism should be included in the Permanent Conditions. In contrast, EMI Israel and Anana believed that the broad exclusion mechanism should be adopted with regard to both aspects that distinguish it from the narrow exclusion mechanism and they challenged both the requirement for unanimous consent of all authors of a joint work and the restriction of exclusion according to "exclusion baskets."

 

16.       EMI Israel pleaded that the narrow exclusion mechanism improperly infringed on the constitutional property rights of the authors it represented, both because the predefined "exclusion baskets" limit the prerogative of the right’s owner to permit or prohibit certain uses of his work, and because the vast majority of musical works managed by ACUM are jointly owned by several authors. Under these circumstances, it was argued, making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of the other owners in fact negates the ability of a given author to permit or prohibit the use of his work. EMI Israel further asserted that adopting the narrow exclusion mechanism would compromise the competition among ACUM's members in the sense that only large corporations would be able to afford managing rights outside of ACUM, while individual authors would not be able to bear the financial and logistical burden it involves.

 

17.       Anana pleaded that adopting the narrow exclusion mechanism would lead to infringement on its reliance interest, given the fact that, relying upon the wording of the broad exclusion mechanism, it had already excluded works it managed from ACUM's repertoire with regard to the use of "new media" that it would now have to restore. In addition, it made a series of arguments concerning the restrictions set forth in the narrow exclusion mechanism – a lack of distinction between authors whose contribution to a joint work was significant and authors whose contribution was negligible (who nevertheless obtain a de facto veto right to exclude the work); impairing the ability of authors to maximize their profits; as well as infringing on the moral aspect of the author’s right (in the sense that an author who wishes to preclude the use of his work for religious, image-related, or moral reasons would find it difficult to do so under the narrow exclusion regime). Anana further contended that making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of all joint authors effectively makes it a dead letter since joint authors would frustrate any attempt to reach the necessary agreements.

 

18.       The Tribunal held that the approval should be made conditional upon a narrow exclusion mechanism and in that respect it adopted the position of ACUM and the Director-General (joined by Partner and the cable companies). The Tribunal explained that such exclusion mechanism provided an appropriate answer to the necessary balance between enhancing market competition and protecting the individual author's proprietary right. The Tribunal went on to state that a corporation for the collective management of copyright is in any event not intended to enable its members to realize their rights in full. On the contrary, such arrangement is based upon a waiver of complete and total freedom with regard to the works in consideration for reducing the cost of managing and enforcing copyrights. EMI Israel and Anana, the Tribunal held, were in fact seeking to enjoy the benefits of belonging to a cartel without bearing the costs. The Tribunal further explained that copyright grants an author a monopoly that may harm the general public, a concern which is intensified when authors are incorporated in a cartel. Therefore, there is no reason to avoid subjecting the cartel's approval to conditions that restrict the individual author's proprietary right in his work.

 

19.       As aforesaid, the Tribunal ultimately approved ACUM's activity as a cartel, subject to a series of conditions, including those mentioned above. The two appeals before us – the appeal by ACUM and the appeal by EMI Israel – were filed against its said judgment – as detailed below.

 

The Appeals

                       

20.       ACUM's appeal (CA 5365/11) concerns, as aforesaid, only one aspect of the Tribunal's judgment – the condition regarding the duty to appoint external directors. Its arguments in this respect are directed both against the basic obligation to appoint external directors and against their number.

 

21.       EMI Israel’s appeal (CA 5489/11) originally revolved around several of the other conditions to which the Tribunal made the permanent permit subject, but at the hearing before us EMI Israel concentrated its arguments on the details of the condition regulating the rights exclusion mechanism. It should be noted that Anana, which did not appeal the Tribunal’s judgment, appeared at the hearing as a respondent and in that capacity it presented arguments in support of EMI Israel's basic position.

 

22.       Generally, EMI Israel believes that the narrow exclusion mechanism impairs the protection of the authors' rights and reinforces ACUM's monopoly. More specifically, EMI Israel pleads that implementing the narrow exclusion mechanism would lead to infringement on authors' proprietary rights and would impair the possibility of creating a competitive copyright market. According to EMI Israel, the protection of copyright necessitates both recognition of the power of each author to implement the exclusion mechanism with regard to a work he helped create, even without obtaining the other authors’ consent, as well as authors’ right to exclude their works outside of the "exclusion baskets" that necessitate "crude" and imprecise choices that do not express important distinctions, primarily the distinction between "old" media (like radio and television) and "new" media (such as mobile phones).

 

23.       On the other hand, the Director-General believes that both appeals should be dismissed. He supports the Tribunal’s judgment and emphasizes that the conditions it approved are required in order to protect authors and users against the monopolistic power of ACUM and in order to protect the public interest involved in the use of the works.

 

Our Ruling

 

24.       Having reviewed the parties' arguments we have reached the conclusion that both appeals should be dismissed. We are convinced that, at the moment, the Permanent Conditions, including the conditions against which the appeals have been addressed, are all necessary in order to dispel the concerns raised inherently by a cartel related to the collective management of copyright. These conditions are necessary in order to ensure that the cartel’s benefit to the public will exceed the perceived damage from it. Indeed, as detailed below, reviewing the parties' arguments has made it clear that the distinction between "new" and "old" media within the exclusion mechanism is an evolving issue, the regulation of which should be monitored. However, as noted, the approval and its conditions have been set for a period of five years, of which two have already passed (as the conditions relating to the narrow exclusion mechanism were approved by the Tribunal in June 2011). At the end of that period, it will be possible to revisit the conditions and the way they are being implemented in order to make decisions towards the future. In that sense, our ruling reflects the facts presented in the proceedings, including the experience accumulated in the Israeli market and its existing uses of copyright.

 

The Normative Framework: Between Copyright Law and Antitrust Law

 

25.       Two normative frameworks frame our discussion: copyright law – as a framework that seeks, inter alia, to balance the author's rights in his work and the public interest to enjoy the fruit of the work for the benefit of all, in order to promote culture and knowledge; and antitrust law – which recognizes, inter alia, the possibility of approving a cartel, subject to conditions aimed at protecting the public from the abuse of monopolistic power. Copyright law is currently governed by a relatively new statute – the Copyright Law, 5768-2007 (hereinafter "the Copyright Law"), which replaced the relevant British Mandate statute, while the issues concerning the activity of cartels are regulated by the Antitrust Law.

 

26.       The activity of ACUM should be evaluated and examined according to these two perspectives. As mentioned in the introduction to our judgment, ACUM was established for the collective management of copyright in musical works. From the perspective of copyright, that management should be for the benefit of authors and in the name of protecting their rights, but without neglecting the public's ability to enjoy the works; from the perspective of antitrust law, that management, which constitutes a cartel and monopoly, should be for the benefit of the public and should ensure that public access to the works is not unreasonably denied. More specifically, in order to comply with the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the Antitrust Law with regard to the approval of a cartel, it has to be ensured that the benefit to the public from such collective management substantially exceeds the damages that it might cause to all or some of the public.

 

27.       In many ways, the controversies that have arisen before us pinpoint once again the dilemmas that underlie copyright law. Recognition of copyright is aimed at encouraging the creation and dissemination of expression but also at balancing this benefit against the costs of limiting access to protected works (cf: Guy Pesach, The Theoretical Basis for the Recognition of Copyright, 31 Mishpatim 359, 410 (2001)). In the words of Vice President (retired) S. Levin:

 

            "In Anglo-American law the basic justification for these laws is perceived as the desire to provide an incentive to the author in order to achieve maximum access to the work by the public at large. This is the heritage of Israeli copyright law" (CA 326/00 Holon Municipality v. NMC Music Ltd, PD 47(3) 658, 671 (2003)).

 

Copyright Management Corporations: ACUM as a Test Case

 

28.       The case before us should be examined not only in light of the general principles of copyright law, on the one hand, and antitrust law, on the other hand, but also in light of the experience accumulated from copyright management through corporations established for such purpose. ACUM is a local corporation that was established back in pre-state Israel (see: Michael Birnhack, Colonial Copyright: Intellectual Property in Mandate Palestine 185-186 (2012)). Nevertheless, more broadly speaking it is merely one of many examples of corporations known as "copyright collection societies" or collective management organizations" (hereinafter "collective management corporations"). Such corporations operate in many countries and thereby provide an answer to a genuine need of authors who cannot routinely manage the grant of licenses to use their works, collect royalties, and enforce copyright law on those who infringe their rights. These corporations manage the rights of many authors collectively and thereby contribute to reducing the costs of negotiating with users and reducing enforcement costs. At the same time, the mechanism of collective management also benefits the public who uses the works because it allows bringing these works to the public on a regular basis. The collective management corporation typically offers users "a blanket license" in relation to the corporation's whole repertoire, thereby saving them the need to negotiate individually with each of the authors of works included in the repertoire. Such users are for the most part broadcasting stations owners, producers, hall owners, and others, through whom the works are made accessible to the public at large (see: Ariel Katz, Monopoly and Competition in the Collective Management of Public Performing Rights, 2 Din Ve'Devarim 551 (2006); Guy Pesach, Associations for the Collective Management of Rights – Another Look at Effectiveness and Fairness, 2 Din Ve'Devarim 621 (2006) (hereinafter "Pesach"); Walter Arthur Copinger, Copinger on Copyright, pp 1790-1794 (16th ed., 2011) (hereinafter "Copinger")).

 

29.       Alongside recognizing the fact that collective management corporations are a well-known and widespread phenomenon, the concern that accompanies their activity is also acknowledged. Collective management of copyright involves a significant challenge from the perspective of antitrust law, considering the fact that it has centralized characteristics and therefore raises the concerns involved in the creation of a cartel, including the concern of acquiring and abusing monopolistic market power, either by demanding high royalties or in other ways. Against those disadvantages, we usually weigh the necessity of such activity for effectively managing copyright and it is therefore common to regard collective management corporations as "natural monopolies" (and, to a certain extent, something of a necessary evil) and to allow them to operate subject to supervisory mechanisms and regulation (see: Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 541, 544-548, 551-553 (2005) (hereinafter "Katz"); Copinger, pp 1798-1800). It is along these lines that the activity of the two major collective management corporations in the U.S. – the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI) – is regulated by special judicial orders ("consent decrees") as part of antitrust law. These orders, whose conditions are revised from time to time, place collective management corporations under a host of constraints in order to ensure their compliance with the competition criteria set forth in antitrust law (for a discussion of the supervisory mechanisms of collective management corporations in the U.S., see: Stanley M. Besen, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va. L. Rev. 383 (1992).) Similarly, collective management corporations that operate in Europe are under supervision, subject to the antitrust law of the European Union (see: Lucie Gaibault & Stef Van Gompe, Collective Management in the European Union, in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 135 (2nd edition, Daniel Gervias ed. 2010); Copinger, pp 1801-1808).

 

The Conditions in Dispute: Public Directors and the Exclusion Mechanism

 

30.       As already mentioned, the controversy before us does not concern the basic authority for ACUM’s operation as a cartel but rather the conditions that have been prescribed for its activity, or, more precisely, two of these conditions. In that sense, the discussion is based on the accepted notion, explained above, which views collective management corporations as something of a "natural monopoly," the existence of which is essential but their activity necessitates supervision and restraint in order to protect the public from the potential negative effects of substantial market power being accumulated by a single entity. The conditions for ACUM’s operation should therefore express the balance between the proprietary right of authors and the public interest in a market free of monopolistic influences, which acquires a unique aspect with regard to the market of creative works that naturally need to be accessible to the public (albeit for a fee).

 

31.       Ultimately, the hearing in this case revolved around two matters: the requirement to appoint directors, and the scope of the rights exclusion mechanism. Both of these need to be examined from the unique point of view that combines the purposes of copyright law with those of antitrust law, paying attention to the balance that both those sets of laws seek to achieve between individual proprietary rights and economic interests, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other hand.

 

The Appointment of Public Directors: Between the Public Interest and the Interest of the Rights Owners

 

32.       The first condition that was prescribed for the approval of the cartel was to appoint public directors who will constitute a third of the total number of board members (which in practice means appointing four such directors). As aforesaid, ACUM has objected to this condition both in principle and in practice.

 

33.       In principle, ACUM asserted that it is not a public company and therefore there is no justification to enforce on it a supervisory mechanism appropriate to public companies. In this context, it was further asserted that its board of directors includes a delicate balance between all the sectors ACUM represents, which in itself ensures protection of the public interest (article 30.2 of ACUM's current articles of association provides that the company's board of directors shall consist of nine members that include two lyricists, a writer, two easy listening composers, one composer of concert music, one publisher, and two external directors). ACUM also noted that its corporate governance is dispersed and therefore does not raise an "agency problem" of the type with which the mechanism of external directors is designed to deal. ACUM also asserted that in any event it has in place adequate mechanisms to resolve potential disputes and conflicts of interest, including an internal arbitration mechanism as well as the Permanent Conditions that prohibit ACUM from discriminating between its members. According to ACUM, the appointment of public directors would "dilute" the authors' control over their property rights. In practice, ACUM further noted the costs involved in the appointment of the requisite number of public directors, which lead ACUM to be willing to appoint no more than two public directors.

 

34.       According to the Director-General, the need to appoint public directors stems from two factors: first, it will help ensure that ACUM serves the interests of all its member authors, taking into account the interests of individual authors rather than only the group interests of certain categories of authors. Second, the appointments will ensure that at least some of the directors have professional skills in the area of corporate management.

 

35.       With regard to the proportion of public directors on the board, the Director-General's position is that the requirement that no less than a third of the board would be comprised of external directors is justified, since the need for external directors is specifically greater under ACUM’s circumstances, where the corporate structure is dispersed and lacks a distinct controlling shareholder. In this respect the Director-General went on to explain that, in his opinion, ACUM's members need even more protection than "ordinary" shareholders, considering the fact that their livelihood depends on the corporation and they cannot sell their shares to "realize their profits."

 

36.       Having reviewed all this, we have reached the overall conclusion that ACUM's case in this respect should be dismissed.

 

37.       The appointment of public directors – that is, directors who are not employees or shareholders of the company – is one mechanism which allows supervising the behavior of the company, its managers, and its controlling shareholders and helps dispel the various agency problems involved in its activity (see: Irit Haviv-Segal, Company Law, 429, 438 (2007) (hereinafter "Haviv-Segal")). It can be said that the essential contribution of the public director lies in the "external dimension" that he brings to the board's work – as someone who reviews matters referred to the board from a broad, objective, and balanced perspective that also takes into account the public implications of its activity. The provisions of section 240(a1)(1) of the Companies Law, 5759-1999 (hereinafter "the Companies Law"), according to which a public director shall have professional skills or accounting and financial expertise, ensure that his appointment will add a professional dimension to the company that will contribute to its satisfactory management (see: Joseph Gross, The New Companies Law, 386-387 (Fourth Edition, 2007) (hereinafter "Gross")).

 

38.       The mechanism of appointing public directors is typically operated in the context of the activity of public companies – section 239 of the Companies Law requires a public company to appoint at least two public directors, whilst sections 114 and 115(a) of that Law require a public company's board of directors to appoint an audit committee from amongst its members, on which all the public directors shall serve. In addition, there are laws that impose a duty to appoint public directors to serve on the board of certain corporations whose shares are not held by the public, but whose activity has other public importance. Thus, for example, a mutual fund must appoint at least five directors to serve on its board and the proportion of public directors is the same as required of a public company (see: section 16(a) of the Joint Investments Trust Law, 5754-1994); while an insurance company, as defined in the Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1981, must appoint public directors who will constitute a third of the total members of its board (see: section 2(1) of the Control of Financial Services (Insurance) (Board of Directors and Its Committees) Regulations, 5767-2007). In addition, the board of directors of a company that manages provident funds is required to appoint an investment committee for each fund it manages, the majority of committee members being qualified to serve as public directors (see: section 11(a) of the Control of Financial Services (Provident Funds) Law, 5765-2005).

 

39.       Having reviewed the case, we are satisfied that the condition concerning the appointment of public directors to serve on ACUM's board is consistent with the purpose underlying the approval of the cartel. Although ACUM is not a public company, it does essentially manage a resource that has clear public aspects. From the point of view of the authors, ACUM provides an essential service, without which it would be difficult for them to produce financial benefit from their works. In many ways, that is also the case from the point of view of the public at large: the protected works belong to the authors (and to whoever has acquired rights in them) but it is important that they are used in such a way that will also benefit the general public. Indeed, these public aspects of ACUM's activity underlie its approval as a cartel. At the same time, ACUM's monopolistic characteristics and its status as a cartel in the domain of musical copyright grant it a public dimension in and of themselves. The requirement to appoint external directors to provide a further layer of supervision over ACUM's activity is therefore called for and inherent to the rationale of the cartel's approval in order to protect both authors and users. It should be noted that making the approval of a cartel conditional upon the appointment of external directors, even when the corporation in question is not a public corporation in the ordinary sense, is not unprecedented. Thus, for example, the approval as a cartel of the recycling corporation that was established as a joint venture of manufacturers and importers of soft drinks in Israel was made subject to a similar condition (see section 4 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Recycling Corporation, as approved in AT (J'lem) 4445/01 Shufersal Ltd v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (November 5, 2001)). The same applies to the approval as cartels of two other collective management corporations: the Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd. (hereinafter "PIL") (see section 11.3 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd., as approved in AT (J'lem) 3574/00 The Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd. v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (April 29, 2004)), and the Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes (hereinafter "IFPI") (see: section 13.3 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes Ltd, as approved in AC (J'lem) 705/07 The Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes Ltd. v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (February 3, 2011).

 

40.       With regard to authors' protection, there appears to be grounds to the argument concerning the importance of protecting the common interests of ACUM's members, regardless of the “category” to which they belong. Public directors can express "cross-category" interests that concern the benefit of authors generally in their relationship with ACUM, as opposed to the benefit of particular categories of authors. Moreover, without laying out hard and fast rules, it can be said that there is prima facie grounds to the assertion that the importance of the public director institution is in fact greater in a corporation characterized by dispersed ownership, in the absence of controlling shareholders, as is the case with ACUM. The agency problem in companies of this type is characterized by interest gaps between management and shareholders (as opposed to interest gaps between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, which are typical of companies that have controlling shareholders). Some view the appointment of public directors as a central mechanism for dealing with such gaps (see Haviv-Segal, pp 438-439). Clear expression of this distinction can be found in the First Schedule to the Companies Law, which contains suggested provisions for the corporate governance of public companies. Paragraph 1 of the Schedule prescribes the recommended percentage of independent directors, distinguishing between companies that do and do not have controlling shareholders. With regard to the latter, the Schedule provides that a majority of the directors should be independent, whilst in the former it provides that it is sufficient for a third of the directors to be independent.

 

41.       Furthermore, even assuming that the present structure of ACUM's board of directors faithfully represents its member authors, that structure does not prima facie guarantee that the protection of authors will also take into account the public interest more broadly. Indeed, a public director's fiduciary duty to the company is no different than that of an ordinary director, in the sense that he too must act for the benefit of the company (see: Gross, p. 406; cf: CA 610/94 Buchbinder v. The Official Receiver, para. 43 (May 11, 2003)). However, the public director will presumably represent a broader, more objective point of view, cognizant of the public implications of the corporation's activity.

 

42.       Moreover, as already explained, the appointment of public directors also has great importance as regards guaranteeing a minimum number of directors with professional managerial skills. In fact, ACUM itself acknowledged the professional advantages of appointing public directors even before the Tribunal's judgment was handed off and the revised version of ACUM's articles of association now require the appointment of two such directors. The fundamental aspect of this controversy has thus somewhat eroded and it has become a matter of extent and degree. We believe that the proportion of directors set forth in the Permanent Conditions – a third of the board members – is not excessive or unreasonable, considering ACUM’s character as a corporation whose ownership is dispersed and especially given the lingering concern of abusing monopolistic power.

 

43.       This discussion, which is "internal" and concentrates on corporate and antitrust law, can be supplemented by an "external" discussion, based on the significance that entities with public aspects have from the perspective of public law. According to this Court's case law, a private corporation whose activity has clear public aspects might be regarded as a "hybrid" entity, which places it under additional duties over and above those it is subject to in accordance with private law. Care must be taken not to overextend the category of hybrid entities in order to avoid eroding the significance of acknowledging a public status and blurring the lines between the public and private spheres. Moreover, under the current circumstances, there is no need to rule on whether ACUM should be regarded as a hybrid entity and a complete discussion of the criteria for the recognition of an entity as hybrid is unnecessary. However, it should be noted that ACUM's activity does entail many of the criteria mentioned in previous case law as characterizing a hybrid entity. Thus, for example, in HCJ 731/86 Micro Daf v. Israel Electric Corporation Ltd PD 41(2) 449 (1987) (hereinafter "Micro Daf"), where the question of hybrid entities was discussed for the first time – in the context of the Electric Corporation's activity – the factors taken into account were the monopolistic aspect of the corporation's activity, the nature of the resource it manages, and the fact that statutory powers have been entrusted to it. These factors were not considered an "exhaustive list" and since then entities which lacked those characteristics, at least to the same extent, have also been recognized as hybrid (see: CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Hevra Kadisha Burial Society v. Kastenbaum PD 46(2) 464 (1992)). For further discussion, see: Daphne Barak-Erez, Administrative Law vol. 3 - Economic Administrative Law 463-492 (2013)). With regard to ACUM, the monopolistic aspect of its activity is beyond dispute. In Israel, although there are other collective management corporations, including the abovementioned PIL and IFPI, the product they supply – licenses for the broadcasting and public playing of sound recordings – does not substitute the product ACUM supplies. As the Director-General stated in his declaration, ACUM has no direct competitors in its relevant market and although formally nothing stops authors from managing their works themselves, few of them find such course of action practical or worthwhile, so that in fact the vast majority of works for which royalties are paid in Israel are under the management of ACUM. The same applies to the implications that the resource managed by ACUM has on the general public. Although the licenses that ACUM offers are acquired by a relatively small category of users, those licenses feature the right to play the works in public (or make them otherwise available to the public). Hence, they have a very significant effect on public access to the works. In other words, the public aspect of ACUM's activity also derives from the fact that the product it supplies is not in fact the musical works themselves but rather the collective management mechanism, which facilitates (and to a great extent enables) playing those works in public and therefore constitutes a product of clear public importance. Finally, although ACUM does not exercise statutory powers, its approval as a cartel entrusts it with power that derives from a statutory decision established in the Antitrust Law. These characteristics, even if they are insufficient to define ACUM as a hybrid entity in the ordinary sense of the term (and, as aforesaid, we have no need to rule on this issue), do support the basic justification for the Director-General's requirement under the current circumstances. Indeed, the appointment of public directors is ordinarily not imposed on a hybrid entity. However, the fact that ACUM constitutes an entity that owes important duties to the public can serve as a factor in the Director-General's decision to subject a cartel to conditions.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism

 

44.       The other condition at the center of the litigation before us concerns, as aforesaid, the rights exclusion mechanism. Underlying the controversy were two questions: first, is the requirement for the consent of all joint authors of a work in order to exclude it from ACUM's repertoire justified or should that power be held by each of the authors individually? Second, how delicate and precise should the "segmentation" mechanism be with regard to the exclusion ability, as regards the distinction between different types of uses? We shall clarify those questions below.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism: the Consent of All Authors or a Personal Right?

 

45.       The requirement that the exclusion of the work should be conditional upon the agreement of all its authors prima facie imposes a constraint on the right of each of the authors to control the rewards of his work. For that reason it has been criticized by EMI Israel and Anana. In contrast, the position of the Director-General and ACUM is that making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of the other authors is essential to protect both users and authors. The main argument regarding the protection of users relates to the concern that a "liberal" exclusion mechanism that would give an independent exclusion right to each author would impair ACUM's ability to offer sweeping licenses and thereby undermine the basic justification for its existence from the perspective of public interest. With regard to the protection of authors, it is asserted that the ability to exclude rights without the agreement of the other authors would encourage abuse of that power by "powerful" authors at the expense of the other authors of the work. ACUM explained that if each author of a joint work could exclude his rights from ACUM’s repertoire without the agreement of the other authors, it would grant veto power to that author to prevent works from being used by those to whom other authors wish to grant permission. ACUM also emphasized that where the rights in a work are vested in several authors veto power will forever be involved and the remaining question is only which veto power is least damaging: that of an author wishing to prevent the work's exclusion and leave it with ACUM's repertoire, or that of the excluding author to prevent any use of a work contrary to the position of the other authors. According to ACUM, the former is infinitely preferable. Having reviewed the case, we have reached the overall conclusion that we accept the position of the Director-General and ACUM in this respect.

 

46.       We accept as a starting point for our discussion the (reasonable) assumption that the rights in the type of works that ACUM manages are often shared by several authors. This can be illustrated by the typical case of a song. According to copyright law, every song is made up of several independent works, the rights in each of which are vested in different authors – the words of the song are a literary work owned by the lyricist; the music is a musical work owned by the composer. Moreover, there are also cases in which several composers or lyricists collaborate in the process of creating a work and in such cases the circle of rights owners expands even further. Considering this situation, it is easy to understand EMI Israel and Anana's grievances: making the exclusion power conditional upon the agreement of all authors undoubtedly burdens the individual author who seeks to exclude his work. However, this does not suffice. The question before us is whether this burden is justified, considering the purpose of the permanent permit – and our answer to that question is in the affirmative.

 

47.       In order to discuss this question it is necessary to return to the original reasons that led to managing rights through a corporation like ACUM. The most important tool available to ACUM for the collective management of rights is the grant of a sweeping license known as a "blanket license," the advantages of which in terms of transaction costs constitute the basic reason that legitimates ACUM's activity, despite difficulties in terms of antitrust law. Extending the ability to exclude rights from ACUM's management will naturally impair its ability to offer blanket licenses and thereby reduce the public benefit from its operation as a cartel. Over-extending that possibility will impair the public benefit from ACUM’s activity to such extent that it will no longer be the case necessarily that the benefit substantially exceeds the potential damages to the public interest from the cartel's operation. Having considered matters, we are satisfied that the grant of a personal "exclusion right" to each author would amount to such over-extension. Considering the typical ownership structure of musical works, an exclusion mechanism that is not conditional upon the agreement of the other authors effectively means granting authority to a single author, regardless of his part in the work, to exclude the work as a whole from ACUM's blanket license regime. Thus, a user who wishes to make lawful use of the work would have to negotiate with the excluding author in addition to acquiring the sweeping license from ACUM. Such a state of affairs would greatly limit the benefit of the cartel for users to the point of raising doubts as to whether the cartel is indeed "in the public interest," as required by section 9 of the Antitrust Law whenever a cartel is approved.

 

48.       Furthermore – accepting the position whereby the consent of all the authors of a joint work is unnecessary to exclude it would also raise difficulties for the relationship between the authors themselves as it may enable some of the authors – usually the more "powerful" ones – to exploit their exclusion power at the expense of the other authors. This may occur in situations where the user has already acquired most of the rights to use the work by means of a blanket license and merely needs to "supplement" the excluded right. This may give rise to phenomena of "extortion" and "free-riding," so that the remaining owner of the right will demand exceptionally high license fees for his share. We have already discussed the problem of such a state of affairs from the user's point of view. However, in truth, the problem also exists from the perspective of the excluding author making excess profit at the expense of the other authors. This difficulty is intensified in light of the fact that the ability to exclude rights from ACUM's management – given the complexity involved in negotiating with users individually – would essentially be of benefit to powerful rights owners, like large publishers, as opposed to individual, independent authors.

 

49.       It should be noted that we have so far used the expression "joint authorship" in order to describe all the cases in which the rights in a particular song are shared by several authors, although in fact it is prima facie possible to distinguish between two models of joint authorship. One model, of "joint authorship in indefinite shares," relates to two or more authors who collaborated in such way that it is impossible to distinguish the share of each of them in the finished work. In such a case, the work is considered a "joint work" according to section 1 of the Copyright Law. The other model, of "joint authorship in definite shares," involves a finished product, like a song, which is made up of several units, each of which was created by a different author and is a protected work in itself (for example the words of the song, which were written by one author, constitute a literary work; while the music, which was composed by another author, constitutes a musical work). The authors in such a case are not regarded as joint authors according to the Copyright Law, despite the fact that their relationship is substantively founded upon sharing. It is interesting to note that the American copyright law does distinguish between works where the shares of the various authors are inseparable and works where the shares of the various authors are interdependent. Nevertheless, both situations are considered "joint work" (see: Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.4 (2002) (hereinafter "Nimmer"). In any event, for the purpose of the present discussion concerning the ability of authors to exclude rights from ACUM’s management we need not consider this distinction. In both cases, splitting the licensing authority would place practical obstacles for using the joint work.

 

50.       In fact, the controversy before us derives not only from the different interests that the various parties represent but also from the fact that the Copyright Law does not expressly regulate the issues to which joint authorship gives rise (see: Michael Birnhack, A Cultural Reading: the Law and the Creative Field, Authoring Rights: Readings in Copyright Law 83, 105-106 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pesach, Editors, 2009) (hereinafter "Birnhack"); Gilad Wexelman, Corporate Creation and Cooperative Creation, Authoring Rights: Readings in Copyright Law, 167, 177-178 (2009) (hereinafter "Wexelman"). Cf  Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles, Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works and Entrepreneurship, 75 Or. L. Rev. 257 (1996)). In fact, the only arrangement the Law establishes with regard to joint works (as defined in section 1) relates to the period of protection of the work, which is measured according to the age of the surviving joint author, plus 70 years (section 39 of the Copyright Law).

 

51.       Additionally, reference to comparative law does not yield an unequivocal answer, considering the numerous potential approaches to this issue. Thus, for example, subject to certain restrictions, the law in the U.S. vests each of the joint authors with an independent right to permit use of their work even without the consent of the other authors, provided that they are paid their proportional share of the profit produced from the work (see: Nimmer § 6.10; Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 123, 149-150 (2002)). In contrast, according to the approach prevailing in English law, the agreement of all authors is necessary in order to permit use (see: Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, section 173(2). See also: Copinger, p 334.) For the purpose of the ruling before us, we must be cognizant of the fact that the variety of existing approaches regarding copyright management of joint works attests not only to the great complexity of the matter but also to the fact that recognizing authors' proprietary rights does not inherently dictate a particular result.

 

52.       Since there is no specific regulation of the issue of jointly owned copyright within the Copyright Law, we may turn to legislation in other contexts concerning the joint ownership of property rights. Detailed regulation of this sort exists regarding the joint ownership of land in sections 27 to 36 of the Land Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter "the Land Law"). According to section 9(e) of the Movable Property Law, 5731-1971 (hereinafter "the Movable Property Law"), arrangements concerning joint ownership of land essentially apply to movable property too, "save as may be otherwise provided in a co-ownership agreement." By virtue of section 13(a) of the Movable Property Law, such arrangements also apply to joint ownership of "rights." Nevertheless, reference to the Land Law with regard to the legal regime governing joint authorship should be made with care. As Prof. Michael Birnhack has noted:

 

            "Even if a model of joint authorship is prescribed, the socio-legal institution can be designed in various ways, ranging from management based on the decisions of all owners, through consent-based management, to each author having freedom of use. Selecting the appropriate point on this range should be influenced by an understanding of the law concerning the creative process and the reciprocal relationship between joint authors, between each of them and the work, or anywhere else where the work and its significance are formed" (Birnhack, p 106).

 

Similarly, Dr. Gilad Wexelman has also written:

 

            "A joint work raises problems of a different type, when compared with the joint ownership of tangible resources and applying the doctrines that exist regarding joint ownership of tangible resources to joint authorship is therefore improper and inappropriate. These doctrines do not provide the necessary solutions for joint authorship. The inference deriving from this is that it is appropriate to adopt a broader, different conception of the joint authorship process, rather than a conception influenced by the private property model" (Wexelman, p 178).

 

53.       One way or the other, before we seek to draw an analogy based on the arrangements relating to joint ownership of land, it is important to emphasize that we need not consider the legal regime that governs the relationship between joint authors as an independent issue. The question of joint authorship should be analyzed in the case before us merely in the particular context of a joint work's management by a collective management corporation like ACUM – which naturally goes beyond the default rules that apply to joint authorship. In any case, under the circumstances,  reference to the existing legal arrangements regarding the management of joint rights should serve merely as a framework and a starting point for the discussion.

 

54.       The arrangement prescribed in the Land Law concerning joint ownership is based on a concept of management by majority decisions, except for matters that go beyond ordinary management and use, in which unanimous agreement is required. In this respect, section 30 of the Land Law provides:

 

            (a)       The owner of a majority of the shares in any joint property may determine all matters relating to the ordinary management and use of the property.

 

            (b)       A joint owner who considers himself aggrieved by a determination under subsection (a) may apply to the Court for directions and the Court shall decide as seems just and expedient under the circumstances of the case.

 

            (c)       Any matter outside the scope of ordinary management and use requires the consent of all the joint owners.

 

55.       The joint owners of a land can agree upon a different method for the management of their rights but, as provided in section 29 of the Land Law, this is the arrangement that applies "unless otherwise provided in a joint ownership agreement" (subsection (c)) (see also: CA 810/82 Zol Bo Ltd. v. Zeida PD 37(4) 737 (1983); CA 663/87 Nathan v. Greener PD 45(1) 104 (1990)).

 

56.       At the same time, section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law provides that each joint owner may, without the consent of the other joint owners, make reasonable use of the joint property, provided that he does not prevent another joint owner from conducting such use. In other words, none of the joint owners of land may stop his fellow owners from using the property, so long as it applies to reasonable use.

 

57.       What can be learned from these arrangements for the case in question? Applying the arrangement prescribed in section 30, mutatis mutandis, leads to the conclusion that the requirement of a "unanimous" decision is appropriate insofar as management or use out of the ordinary is involved. It can therefore be argued that the management of copyright through an entity like ACUM is the ordinary, accepted method worldwide for the management of individual authors' rights, and departing from that arrangement therefore constitutes an "extraordinary" decision outside the ordinary realm of rights management. It should therefore be made unanimously, exactly as provided by the conditions that have been approved.

 

58.       Indeed, as stated above, the considerations relevant to joint ownership of land are not necessarily apt with respect to joint authorship. Thus, for example, the arrangement contained in the Land Law can be seen as "hostile" to a state of joint ownership, recognizing that joint ownership of land may burden its efficient management. Section 37 of the Land Law therefore provides that "each joint owner of immovable property is entitled at any time to demand the dissolution of the joint ownership." Yet, joint authorship is not a "pathological" condition. On the contrary, the process of authorship frequently involves collaboration – either direct or indirect – between several authors and dissolving the joint authorship should not be regarded as socially desirable. It is also likely to be more difficult to appraise the value of the work for the purchase of one of the joint authors' shares than severing the joint ownership of land. Consequently, as already mentioned, the analogy from the Land Law should be drawn with all due care. However, even taking into account the difference between joint ownership of land and joint authorship, it does appear that the requirement of unanimous consent for the exclusion mechanism is proper. Particularly because joint authorship is a "natural" condition and typical of many works, it is appropriate to be apprehensive about an exclusion mechanism that is based on each of the authors having an individual right of action, reinforcing the status of strong authors and burdening public access to the works, as explained below.

 

59.       Examining the rule with regard to the reasonable use of jointly owned land also leads, prima facie, to a similar conclusion. By drawing an analogy based on section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law it can be inferred that leaving the work under the management of ACUM constitutes reasonable use, considering the fact that it is the typical, widespread method for the collection of royalties. According to this logic, there appears no justification for adopting an exclusion mechanism that enables a joint author, who so desires, to prevent his fellow author from making reasonable use of the work, by excluding it from the collectively managed repertoire.

 

60.       It should be noted that this Court has previously considered the question of collaboration between joint authors, in CA 1567/99 Sivan v. Sheffer PD 57(2) 913 (2003) (hereinafter "Sivan"). Under the circumstances of that case, we recognized the right of each of the joint authors to terminate a contract that had been made in connection with the use of the rights when the contract was breached. Can it therefore be inferred that it would be proper in the current case to permit each of the joint authors to individually decide on exclusion? Despite the apparent similarity between the situations, in fact they are quite different and the conclusion should therefore be different too. In Sivan the issue was the rescission of a contract due to its breach and ipso facto it was possible to rely on the principle that whosever right has been infringed on is not required to forgive the infringement. This result is supported by considerations deriving from the law of obligations and in particular from the issue of multiple creditors. In contrast, in the case at hand, the question is posed for the purpose of delineating the ordinary rules of management, in the absence of any alleged breach. The relevant considerations are thus different, and so is the result that they dictate. Indeed, in Sivan the Court has made a clear distinction between these two questions. In fact, it noted that it was not ruling on the question of unilateral exercise of copyright in a joint work, which is more similar to the present case, and it went on to state that section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law prima facie makes it possible to adopt a flexible approach in such cases (Sivan p 942).

 

61.       Taking a broader view, it appears that the position presented to us by EMI Israel and Anana does not give proper weight to the effect of high transaction costs and free-riding in the management of multiple ownership resources, a phenomenon referred to as "the tragedy of the anti-commons" alongside the better-known term "the tragedy of the common property" or "the tragedy of the commons" (see generally: Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L. Rev 621 (1998); James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. L. & Econ. 1 (2000)). Indeed, the narrow exclusion mechanism that the Tribunal approved appears more suitable for dealing with these phenomena. In connection with joint authorship, “the tragedy of the anti-commons” is manifested in sub-optimal use of the work as a result of uncoordinated behavior by its owners. In a legal regime where a license to use a particular work necessitates the agreement of all its owners, each of the owners might act to maximize his own profits by claiming a high fee for agreeing to its use, without considering the negative externality that such behavior for the other owners. Ultimately many users will find it difficult to meet the overall price required of them and the work will be used to a lesser extent, thus harming both the joint authors and the public, whose access to the work has been limited. It is common to believe that the solution to this problem is one of the major advantages embodied in the activity of collective management corporations (see: Katz, p 561; Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market for Intellectual Property: the Case of Complementary Oligopoly in The Economics of Copyright 162, 168-169, Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds. 2003 (hereinafter "Parisi & Depoorter")). Since dealing with the market failings associated with joint authorship is one advantage that justifies the monopolistic activity of corporations like ACUM, great importance is attributed to the design of an exclusion mechanism that will not frustrate that advantage by vesting veto power in each joint author who wishes to preclude use of a joint work.

 

62.       Ultimately, even under the narrow exclusion regime joint authors can agree in advance, contractually, on the scope of their understandings with regard to the work's exclusion from collective management. In fact, the narrow exclusion regime merely provides the default with regard to the inclusion of a joint work in the repertoire managed by ACUM. Insofar as the authors wish to agree on a different decision-making mechanism with respect to the management of joint works, they are at liberty to do so. Presumably such an arrangement, made before any of the parties is in a position for extortion or "free-riding," will help limit the coordination difficulties asserted by EMI Israel and Anana with regard to obtaining the consents necessary for the exclusion of a joint work. In view of the aforesaid, the default mechanism prescribed – according to which in the absence of an agreement between the joint authors to the contrary, the consent of all authors is necessary to exclude the work from management by ACUM – is appropriate.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism: the Degree of Segmentation and the Distinction between New and Old Media

 

63.       As mentioned above, the arguments by EMI Israel and Anana also revolved around the fact that the "exclusion packages" defined in the Permanent Conditions do not distinguish between uses for the purpose of "old media" and uses for the purpose of "new media." In this respect Anana reiterated the case that it made before the Tribunal concerning the impairment of authors' ability to exhaust the full financial potential embodied in their works by excluding the works from management by ACUM solely with regard to "new media," and concerning the damage caused to Anana itself, having prima facie relied upon the previous exclusion mechanism in excluding rights that it will now have to restore to ACUM’s management.

 

64.       In contrast, the Director-General and ACUM argued before us that categorizing the necessary permissions according to types of media will allow ACUM members to abuse their power against users by forcing them to purchase specific uses (for example using the work on a cellular platform) in addition to the general fee for the license awarded through ACUM. In addition, ACUM mentioned that the adoption of a "liberal" exclusion regime enabling a precise "segmentation" of the excluded uses of any work would involve a significant logistic and financial burden on its ability to manage copyright of its repertoire.

 

65.       Deciding between the conflicting positions in this respect has proven to be more complex than the parties' arguments revealed. In truth, as we explain below, both positions are extreme and fail to fully address the difficulties they entail. Consequently, at present, we believe that the exclusion mechanism approved by the Tribunal should be upheld, provided that the question of excluding "new media" – subject to conditions and constraints – will be comprehensively reviewed towards the renewal of the cartel’s approval. We shall explain our said position.

 

66.       The present exclusion mechanism, as expressed in section 2.3 of the Permanent Conditions, enables an author to exclude his rights completely, in respect of all their potential uses. Moreover, the mechanism allows excluding the rights in respect of some of the uses, yet solely in accordance with one of four alternatives – "the exclusion packages" that stand at the center of the discussion. Because of their importance, we shall lay them out in full below:           

 

            "2.3.1  Excluding the rights for audiovisual broadcasting, including synchronization and recording for the purposes of such broadcasting, and including the provision of interactive and/or on demand services and any similar service, including by television, Internet, telephony or mobile phone.

 

            2.3.2   Excluding the broadcasting rights by means of audio, including recording for the purposes of such broadcasting, and including the provision of interactive and/or on demand services and any similar service, including by television, Internet, telephony or mobile phone.

 

2.3.3   Excluding the right of copying. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that excluding the right of copying does not include the right of copying for broadcasting purposes.

 

2.3.4   Excluding the right of imprinting and/or recording. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that excluding the right of imprinting and/or recording does not include the right of imprinting and/or recording for broadcasting purposes".

 

67.       The alternatives at the center of the present controversy are the first and the second (and to a limited extent also the fourth, insofar as the exercise of the right of copying is aimed at integrating a musical work in the soundtrack of an audiovisual work). These alternatives deal with uses that make the work available to the general public – its broadcasting on television or radio, making it accessible by means of "streaming" technology, which enables viewing or listening to content through the Internet without copying it to the user's computer, and the like. The main distinction that the exclusion mechanism makes in this context is between presenting the work by audiovisual means and presenting it by audio only. Thus, for example, given the present situation, an author can be represented by ACUM for the purpose of playing songs on the radio but not for using them in the format of television content.

 

68.       Presumably, maximum protection of the author's rights and his financial interests should have enabled every author to make specific exclusion decisions as much as possible – even with reference to a specific work in a particular use. Along these lines, ACUM's present exclusion mechanism permits, as aforesaid, limited "segmentation" by types of use. However, it has been argued before us that this does not suffice. The dispute revolved around the degree of precision required by segmentation. While the present segmentation mechanism essentially distinguishes between audio and audiovisual uses, EMI Israel (supported by Anana) also wishes to distinguish between "old media" – like television and radio – and "new media" – such as the Internet and cellular phone services. This position was presented to us as warranted by technological progress and the launching of new channels to use works, as well as the protection of the author's prerogative to manage the works he owns. However, as we explain below, this position raises fundamental and practical difficulties and thus cannot be adopted in the format in which it was presented.

 

69.       It should be stated that the question of excluding "new media" should first be considered in light of the two perspectives that fashion the discussion as a whole – that of copyright law and that of antitrust law. However, in this context, it is important to bear in mind another point of view which relates to the interface between law and technology and focuses on the adaptation of the legal framework to technological developments as well as its implications to future technological development, for better or worse (see and compare: Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Trade-Off: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 951 (2012)).

 

70.       At the outset, we should consider the fact that the ability to exclude "new media" that EMI Israel seeks to adopt relies primarily on a technological distinction between "old" and "new" communication platforms. This distinction is replete with difficulties. The world of communications is characterized by constant, rapid technological development. More importantly, the technological aspect of this area is characterized by a phenomenon sometimes called "technology collapse": with the development of technology the walls that separate various media platforms gradually collapse and different types of technology "collapse" into each other, creating new interfaces. Thus, for example, a movie that is distributed through the Internet is also available for viewing on a smartphone, while traditional radio stations also broadcast songs and programs by streaming technology over the Internet. Given this technological reality, the distinction between "old media" and "new media" is not dichotomous, nor is it permanent or stable. In fact, EMI Israel and Anana did not even explain how these categories should be defined in their view, and settled for giving clear-cut examples (such as using a song as a ringtone), which were insufficient to delineate the boundaries of the distinction. Their case therefore left many practical questions unanswered. For example, no explanation was given as to whether the transmission of television broadcasts through the Internet to be viewed on smartphones would, according to the proposed approach, require a license for "new media" or "old media" or in any event how would this example be classified to one category or the other. The rapid, constant development of new communication technology guarantees that questions of this type will not remain theoretical. In this context, we should note the interesting case of the American company MobiTV, which at the beginning of the 21st century developed technology that enabled receiving satellite or cable broadcasts and viewing them on mobile phones. A dispute (which gave rise to several legal proceedings) arose between MobiTV and ASCAP, one of the two largest collective management corporations in the U.S. The dispute concerned the purchase of a blanket license necessary to legitimate the transmissions, as a result, among other things, of MobiTV's objection to being charged a "new media" rate even though the content it offered its customers was the same as broadcast by traditional means (although ultimately the judgment did not rule on this question directly. See: United States v. ASCAP, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 (SDNY 2010)). With regard to the controversy relating to the classification of MobiTV's services as "new media," see also its preliminary response in the legal proceeding it initiated (Applicant Mobitv, Inc's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 25, United States v. ASCAP, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 (SDNY 2010)).

 

71.       Insofar as the distinction between "new media" and "old media" is intended to extend to situations in which the content of radio and television programs is transmitted through the Internet to computer screens or by cellular phone services to mobile phone screens, adopting this distinction is likely to have a "chilling effect" on the use of the works in "old media" too. This is because users would presumably refrain in advance from integrating excluded works in productions intended for "old media," if only given their concern of future marketing constraints in "new media." Thus, for example, when a television program is produced, certain songs might not be included in it – as a cautionary measure – so as not to impair the possibility of broadcasting the program over the Internet too. Such indirect implications are not always clear "in real time" to an author who wishes to exclude his work, but recognizing them might also be weighed against the distinction proposed by EMI Israel and Anana.

 

72.       Another aspect to be considered is the likely implications of the exclusion mechanism on cyberspace users. In their arguments before us EMI Israel and Anana concentrated on institutional and corporate users, such as large communications companies, thereby presenting only a partial perspective on the matter in dispute. However, the exclusion mechanism they sought to adopt is not intended to apply only to such users. In fact, a sweeping exclusion of "new media" uses is likely to lead, without distinction, to difficulties for small website operators, including, for example, Internet radio operators, for which the ability to contract with collective management corporations constitutes a lawful, practical way for making regular use of a wide variety of works (and indeed some believe that the activity of collective management corporations is of especial importance for authorized use of musical works over the Internet. See, for example: Daniel Gervais, The Landscape of Collective Management Schemes 34 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 591, 601 (2011) (hereinafter "Gervais, Landscape"). For a discussion of the importance of collectively managing works in a digital environment, see also: Recommendation 2005/737/EC on collective cross-border management of copyright and related right for legitimate online music services [2005] OJ L276/54 (hereinafter "the 2005 EC recommendation"); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market (July 11, 2012) (hereinafter "the 2012 proposed directive"). See also Copinger, pp 1816-1826).

 

73.       The effects of the requirement to distinguish the use of new technologies on making works accessible to the public should also be considered in view of past experience in similar contexts. Thus, for example, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini 533 US 483 (2001) (hereinafter "Tasini"), the US Supreme Court considered whether a newspaper (the New York Times) could upload articles by freelance writes to a computer database. After lengthy litigation, the US Supreme Court accepted the position of the writers who argued that the license previously given to the newspaper was merely for the purpose of printed publication, as opposed to electronic media. Following the judgment the newspaper had to acquire permission from the writers to publish their articles in the database. Yet, since the newspaper believed that taking such action would not be financially viable, the result in practice was the removal of the articles from the database, thereby denying public access to them. We do not need to go into the merits of the judicial ruling in Tasini insofar as it relates to the understandings between the newspaper and its writers at the relevant times. In fact, the ruling in Tasini is not directly relevant to the technological aspects of the publication format and is instead focused on whether uploading the articles to a general computerized database (of numerous articles from various newspapers and journals) could be construed as a newspaper publication (indeed, in another case of similar circumstances the Supreme Court of Canada held that a newspaper could copy articles published in its printed edition to digital CDs containing articles of that newspaper alone. See: Robertson v. Thomson Corp. 2006 SCC 43 (2006)). Nevertheless, the results of this case embody an important lesson. Taking the broader view it teaches us that an arrangement that does not take into account the dynamic nature of uses might prove to burden and damage the public interest. Taking a forward-looking view, it appears that experience teaches us that it is difficult to base licenses for use on a distinction between technologies as this might subsequently frustrate broad access to cultural assets (see also: Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The Economics of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 90 Ky. L. J. 295 (2001-2002)).

 

74.       What is the experience of other legal systems regarding the exclusion of "new media"? On the face of it, this is an important question, considering the fact that the challenges of technology in the area of copyright are by no means unique to Israel. However, for the reasons detailed below, the benefit of a comparative study has proven limited at the present stage of developments in the area.

 

75.       Truth be told, reference to legal developments in Europe and the U.S. shows that the exclusion of "new media" is often recognized as possible. Presumably, this reinforces the position of EMI Israel and Anana. However, studying matters in depth indicates that this experience has limited application to the case before us, because, among other reasons, the issue under consideration here is still in the early stages of formulation, trial, and controversy in other systems too.

 

76.       The two major collective management corporations in the U.S. – BMI and ASCAP – recently permitted two of their members (including global EMI) to exclude the rights owned by them from collective management for the purpose of certain aspects of the works' use in "new media" (as detailed on their websites – http://www.bmi.com and http://www.ascap.com). Yet, it is important to note that the ability to do so is embodied in the decisions of the corporations themselves rather than the result of external regulation. Moreover, the American rights management corporations operate in a different way than ACUM in the sense that they manage only one type of rights – public performance rights, which concern the permission to perform the work in public, to broadcast it, or to make it available to the public (but not the permission to copy the works or integrate them in audiovisual productions). That is, the starting point for the exclusion is a market of rights that is more "split" than the market in which users and authors operate in Israel. This background is likely to influence the factors relating to the desirable exclusion mechanism. Subsequently, it should be noted that reference to the exclusion of "new media" from administration by collective management corporations in the U.S. is not made in "all or nothing" terms, and in fact includes certain restrictions. For example, BMI's most up to date announcement on the matter (as published on its website) has clarified that the ability to exclude "new media" is aimed at cases where the work's use necessitates more than one type of license, while ASCAP has emphasized in addition that exclusion is possible with regard to making works accessible to the public exclusively through "new media," and does not apply to users that are broadcasters. Finally, and this is a major point, it cannot be ignored that some of the decisions on these matters are very recent (for example, BMI's announcement, of February 11, 2013, was published long after the litigation between the parties before the Tribunal had ended). It is therefore difficult to draw inferences from other legal systems' sustainable experience in this area. In fact, it can be said that at this stage the secondary effects of the "shock waves" that the new reforms have created for users have not yet been fully clarified, although the existence of such "shock waves" is already apparent. For example, we may point to a new development – lawsuits brought by users against management corporations to reduce the fee charged for a "blanket license," since "the blanket" no longer covers "new media" too (for instance, the claim brought against ASCAP by a large Internet radio company called Pandora at the end of 2012, which is still pending. For reports in the media about the case, see, for example: Don Jeffrey, Pandora Media Sues ASCAP Seeking Lower Songwriter Fees (November 6, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/pandora-media-sues-ascap-seekin... Ed Christman, Pandora Files Motion to Keep Low Publishing Rates (June 20, 2013) available at http://www.billboard.com/ biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1567890/pandora-files-motion-to-keep-low-publi-shing-rates).

 

77.       In principle, European law permits a rights owner to join a collective management corporation even when he seeks to reserve the use of the rights on the Internet or through CDs (see: Commission Decision of August 6, 2002 in case COMP/C2/37.219 Banghalter/Homem Christo (Daft Punk) v. SACEM. See also: section 5(3) of the 2005 Commission recommendation and the 2012 proposed directive, mentioned above). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this arrangement is also the result of factors irrelevant to Israeli reality, primarily the desire to reach a standard, coordinated pan-European regulation where there are multiple collective management corporations.

 

78.       Another factor that should be mentioned parenthetically involves the broader context in which the exclusion mechanism is embodied, with regard to the acceptance of the Conditions towards authors' freedom of action and freedom of choice. In this context, for example, it is significant that the Permanent Conditions ensure the right of each of ACUM’s members to contract with users individually and to offer them individual licenses to use certain works alongside the management of those works by ACUM, without excluding them from its repertoire (section 2.4 of the Permanent Conditions). This is similar to the U.S. practice and different from the norm in Europe, where most collective management corporations require exclusivity from their members in respect of all rights in their work (see: Gervais, Landscape, p 598). Indeed, it is possible that this course of action will not be frequently used and it is likely to be significant mainly from the perspective of users who do not require blanket licenses but rather individual licenses for certain works. However, from a more general perspective, this mechanism creates something of a balancing effect on ACUM's coercive power (see also and compare: Parisi & Deporter, pp 170-172).

 

79.       More generally, it can be said that EMI Israel and Anana’s requirement to allow a sweeping exclusion of "new media" uses was based on the assumption that they are entitled to enjoy the fruits of the cartel while realizing the financial potential embodied in the works they manage to its fullest. That is a mistake. Indeed, once ACUM's activity was recognized as a cartel, which raises concern of abuse of monopolistic power against the public, it can no longer be said that ACUM members are entitled to fully exercise their proprietary rights while enjoying the benefits of the cartel. Although the cartel has been approved, its approval was made subject to conditions. Those conditions bear a price that ACUM and its member authors must pay in order to balance the excess benefits such membership confers and to ensure that the public is protected against the concerns involved in the cartel's activity. In fact, what we have previously stated regarding the exclusion of a work without the consent of all joint authors is also appropriate with regard to the issue of segmentation – the adoption of a segmentation mechanism that enables the exclusion of works based on a technological distinction between new and old media, without reservation, might reduce the benefit that ACUM’s activity yields for the public to such extent that may undermine the justification of its approval as a cartel.

 

80.       We can therefore sum up and say that even if the ability to exclude "new media" uses should not be outright dismissed, EMI Israel and Anana have at present failed to lay a substantial foundation for the considerations and details of the exclusion mechanism they wish to adopt, regarding, inter alia, the ability of such a mechanism to provide an answer to the concerns indicated above. For that reason, we cannot accept their position. We should parenthetically emphasize that we have not ignored the possibility that the ability of an author to manage his works independently in the realm of "new media" might prove to be significant for some authors, including "small" or independent ones. The Internet is a flexible technological platform that is far more accessible to private agents than traditional media. It allows direct, convenient, and relatively easy communication between the rights owner and the individual user and thereby yields more direct patterns of consumption, sometimes dramatically reducing transaction costs and thus enabling "small" authors to profit from their works without the assistance of collective management mechanisms (see: Casey Rae-Hunter, Better Mousetraps: Licensing, Access and Innovation in the New Music Marketplace, Journal of Business & Technology Law 7(1) 35, 39 (2012)). However, this is merely one of many considerations and it has not been argued before us. Thus, for example, in contrast, the ability to exclude "new media" might actually be damaging to small authors in particular given the "dilution" it would generate in the value of blanket licenses. Consequently, as a general rule and as already mentioned, the question of "new media" should be revisited comprehensively as part of the cartel's re-approval at the end of the five-year period allotted to it. This is based on the understanding that one cannot rule out in advance the possibility that a delineated and limited format of "new media" exclusion (insofar as such a format is proposed in the future) might enable interested authors greater independence in the management of their works, without impairing the interests of the public at large, to an extent that will undermine the reasons underlying the cartel's approval.

 

81.       In other words, the precise definition of the "exclusion category" sought in respect of "new media" is likely to have a decisive impact on whether the overall exclusion mechanism yields a balanced result. An important, albeit not the only, aspect of this definition relates to the phenomena of "technology collapse" and "content leakage" that we have already considered. As previously mentioned, a sweeping, generalized definition of "new media" regarding the exclusion ability would yield uncertainty in respect of the scope of the excluded uses, might lead to many users being charged double fees (not only by ACUM but also by authors themselves), and would create a "chilling effect" from the users’ perspective, as they might refrain from including an excluded work in productions intended for "old media" based on their concern that new media marketing will be limited in future. In contrast, a narrower definition of excludable uses, particularly a definition that focuses on uses designated for new media (for example the production of a ringtone based on an existing tune) would help reduce the awkwardness that numerous exclusion possibilities yield, moderate the negative effects of "content leakage" between different technological platforms from the users’ perspective, and reduce the damage caused to their financial interests. In this context, we may add that part of the negative experience accumulated from the operation of the broad exclusion mechanism (in the scope of the Provisional Conditions for ACUM’s activity before their 2009 amendment) resulted from the fact that it granted complete flexibility with regard to the exclusion format and did not consider the significance of the term "new media" nor did it regulate the boundaries of the exclusion options related to it.

 

82.       To complete the picture it should be noted that the issue of excluding rights in "new media" from collective management as part of a cartel's approval in Israel has not arisen for the first time in ACUM’s case. As already mentioned, the Tribunal had authorized in the past the activity of two other collective management corporations that were also considered a cartel – PIL and IFPI. In both cases the conditions for the approval regulate the corporation members’ ability to exclude rights from collective management in accordance with a predetermined "exclusion basket," and include several categories concerning various Internet and mobile phone uses (see: section 3.3 of the conditions for the operation of IFPI and section 2.2 of the conditions for the operation of PIL). Recognition of this is prima facie relevant to the discussion. However, we should consider the fact that both those entities deal with the management of producers rights (the owners of sound recordings), an area which is not identical to the area in which ACUM operates (management of composers, songwriters, and arrangers rights). We expected the parties before us to refer to this comparison – one way or the other – but they failed to do so. Each of them clung to the position of "all or nothing" and sided, respectively, either with a complete exclusion of "new media" or an absolute negation of the ability to exclude new media uses. Thus, the option of excluding "new media" and the conditions for it were not fully addressed.

 

83.       What emerges from all the aforementioned is this: reviewing the implications of excluding "new media" shows that it is not necessarily justified to completely negate the option to exclude works for the purposes of "new media." Nevertheless, there are clear indications that this applies only to a limited exclusion mechanism, which concentrates on certain types of "new media" uses and strives to minimize the harm caused to users. Such an exclusion mechanism cannot be based merely on a technological distinction between "old media" and "new media" which allows a sweeping exclusion of all uses of the latter type – as proposed by EMI Israel and Anana. In any event, examining the possibility of another exclusion category concerning "new media" and fashioning the boundaries of that category should be done with care after studying the positions of all interested parties and all the relevant facts. As aforesaid, this matter is for the Tribunal to consider when the extension of the cartel's approval arises. Our position is also supported by the temporary nature of the approval – for only five years. At the end of that period (two years of which have already passed), the Tribunal will revisit the approval of the cartel, at which time it can also reconsider the scope of the exclusion mechanism's "segmentation," on the basis of five years’ experience with the operation of a "narrow" exclusion mechanism. That experience will join with lessons already learned from the operation of an unlimited exclusion mechanism (as part of the Provisional Conditions) and will help the Tribunal evaluate the possibility of adopting a balanced, intermediate alternative that will permit the exclusion of limited uses for the purposes of "new media," without undermining ACUM’s purpose as a collective management corporation. Presumably, by the time the Tribunal considers the extension of the cartel's approval, international experience on this issue will also be established which will enrich the set of facts before the Tribunal.

 

84.       To sum up, our opinion is that the conditions for the permanent approval should be left as they are for the time being, including the issue of excluding works for the purposes of "new media," based on the assumption that the Tribunal will be able to revisit this issue when the current conditions expire. It should be emphasized that this does not express any substantive holding regarding the result to which the Tribunal should reach on this or any other issue, beyond the general statement that the possibility of permitting a limited, well-defined exclusion of "new media" uses should not be ruled out. On the basis of the up-to-date facts laid out before it, the Tribunal will presumably reach a correct decision regarding the proper and most effective way to do so, insofar as it deems fit to follow such path.

 

Conclusion

 

85.       The appeals before us revolved around ACUM’s activity, yet they necessitated a broad discussion with regard to the collective management of copyright, considering not only the complexity of jointly owned works that derive from the talents of several authors but also the complexity of the variety of uses in a constantly changing technological world. At the present time we have reached the overall view that according to the facts before us we should not intervene in the conditions attached to the cartel's approval – from the perspective of balancing the proprietary rights of all authors against the public interest of accessibility to works that are part of the general cultural repertoire and it is therefore important to avoid placing substantial barriers to their use. We have not ruled out the possibility that in future the proper balance between authors’ rights and the public interest might dictate a different result with respect to integrating the distinction between different types of "new media" and "old media" in the rights exclusion mechanism. To a great extent, this issue represents the challenge of collectively managing rights in the modern era with its changing technological and business environment, where the practice of collective management is more essential than ever but also raises more serious difficulties and complexities than ever. The answer to these challenges (both with regard to "the segmentation mechanism" and with regard to other matters discussed before us) lies in a delicate, changing balance between the relevant interests. As we have mentioned, this balance might be affected by changes in technological platforms and business practices, by studying new information, and by lessons derived from ACUM’s activity in Israel and the operation of collective management corporations worldwide.

 

86.       In conclusion, I would suggest to my fellow justices to dismiss both appeals. ACUM would bear the Director-General's costs in the amount of NIS 20,000. EMI Israel would bear the Director-General's costs in the amount of NIS 40,000 and Partner's costs in the amount of NIS 10,000.

Justice Z. Zylbertal

 

I concur.

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

A.        I concur with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice Barak-Erez.

 

B.        Without wishing to gild the lily, I would like to add brief remarks. We are dealing with ACUM, a special entity established in 1936, during the British Mandate, to protect the rights of authors and artists in their intellectual property and it is as though it has always been a fundamental Israeli institution. Indeed, perhaps if we could start over today it would have been possible to think of other ways of organization for this purpose, not necessarily a private company, but such is the situation we are facing, in which we are called upon to have our say. However, even given the current situation, the challenges of dealing with the rights of those in need of ACUM’s services are ever-changing, especially with the dynamic technology, and it is not without reason that my colleague qualified the second part of her opinion with regard to the exclusion mechanism, by looking to the future.

 

C.        With regard to public directors, the Tribunal was indeed right in its decision. In my opinion, the more the better, provided that these directors do their work faithfully as agents of the public and it is to be hoped that this is the norm, in which case the financial expense involved is justified. Regarding their duties, see Prof. J. Gross, Directors and Officers in the Era of Corporate Governance (Second Edition, 2011) Chapter I, p 1 et seq and the references there; and see also Amendment No. 8 to the Companies Law (2008) with regard to the possibility of appointing independent directors; I. Bahat, Companies, 12th edition, 5771-2011, 386. My colleague described in detail the circumstances of this case but also added notes drawn from general public law, namely when a particular entity appears to be hybrid, and as derived from this analysis – the fact that ACUM is similar to that model in view of its duties to the public, without deeming it necessary to rule that it is indeed a hybrid entity. I myself would tend to say that we are indeed dealing with a hybrid entity, whether we take a relatively narrow view of it, through the eyes of its direct beneficiaries, or a broader view of the general population of users; see also my comments in ALAA 1106/04 Haifa Local Planning and Building Committee v. The Electric Corporation (2006), paras. C and D.

 

D.        The author A. Harel in his work Hybrid Entities – Private Entities in Administrative Law (5768) enumerates (pp 118-125) criteria for analyzing the hybrid nature of an entity, including a vital public function, providing a service to the public, not-for-profit activity, a monopoly, the concentration of great power that might be abused, and functional public funding. When dealing with a monopoly, as in the case before us, although ACUM is incorporated as a private company, it is painted in bold colors of hybridity, in particular considering the narrow choice given to individuals (ibid, 115). Indeed, in a rapidly changing world of varied technological possibilities for using works, the interest of authors and artists, as well as the general public, is one of fairness towards everyone; see also D. Barak-Erez, Citizen, Subject, Consumer and Government in a Changing Country (2012), 119, 121, who characterizes an entity as hybrid, when, inter alia, it serves as an actual substitute for government involvement. In the case before us, as implied above, the matter could have presumably been dealt with through a regulatory framework and this component justifies, in my view, a thorough discussion of the issue of public representatives. Indeed, before us is a private company, yet this is merely its framework and shell while its content is significantly broader; even the name attests to its belonging to the public realm – the Association of Composers, Authors and Publishers. ACUM's articles of association (as last approved on July 21, 2013 according to its website) include external directors and the controversy consists merely of their number. According to its website, ACUM presently has approximately 7,500 author members; don’t they deserve extensive protection against a potential clash of interests between various groups within the company?

 

E.         Now a few words on the role of external directors, which is the current legal term, or public directors; as we know, the Companies Law, 5759-1999 refers to an external director (article five, sections 239 et seq) but the literature uses this expression interchangeably with public director, as it was termed in the Companies Ordinance (section 96(b)(c)). Indeed, according to the learned author J. Gross (Directors and Officers in the Era of Corporate Governance (2011) 92), the external director "does not represent the regulator or the general public. He owes a fiduciary duty to the company and to it alone and he only has to bear the interest of the company in mind"; and see also Dr. O. Haviv-Segal, Company Law (2007) 438. However, even if this narrow definition is correct in principle, without going into a comprehensive discussion, the current case involves a special instance of a "private-non-private" company, which does not strive to maximize its profits. In this context, see by analogy the statement by Haviv-Segal, ibid, about the external director’s function in restraining "opportunistic behavior" by a controlling shareholder or management: "in this respect the external director can be regarded as the representative of the public shareholders on the company's board of directors." We should also mention (Gross, p 93) that the external director "brings with him knowledge, experience, and objective judgment and might balance the various views within the company, especially when the board of directors is made up of several cohesive groups"; he is "removed from the shareholders' personal interests… can express objective opinions in cases where differences have arisen between various groups in the company and balance the different interests in the company…". By analogy, this statement is presumably consistent with the present case, despite ACUM's "private" corporate framework. Therefore, the external directors have a particularly important role from the broad, overall perspective of the interests of ACUM's members generally as well as the public at large; see also Hadara Bar-Mor, Corporate Law III (5769-2009) 307-309. Thus, we should not intervene in the ruling of the Tribunal on this matter.

 

Regarding my colleague's remarks concerning the rights exclusion mechanism and old and new media, what can be inferred from them is a lesson in complexity and arbiter humility. We are dealing with money and maximizing authors’ benefit but the question is whether the baby won’t be thrown out with the bathwater. My colleague pointed out the difficulties and her conclusion is that more experience and study is necessary in order to reach a proper balance (see para. 82). My sense is that this appears difficult and challenging; the technological means are constantly changing before our very eyes, along with their implications to the issue before us, and hence solutions are likely to be short-lived. The regulator, the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority, has an extremely important role in this respect since the Tribunal has only what its eyes can see, while the Director-General is equipped with available monitoring tools. Finally, this summer I have had the opportunity to serve as a "secondary partner" in three intellectual property decisions. Their common denominator is the complexity caused by time, complexity of different types, technological and economic. Studying the fascinating collection CopyrightReadings in Copyright Law (M. Birnhack & G. Pesach, 5769-2009) reveals a variety of insights that will concern us a great deal in the future. Apart from the need to plough through the specific material, the constant changes, perhaps more than in any other area of civil law, also place the courts, and equally so – the regulatory entities, under weighty responsibility. The tension between property and competition, and between the long, short and medium term, poses real challenges. The professionalism of the regulators – be it the Patent Office or, as aforesaid, the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority – helps courts in making their rulings but does not relieve them of their responsibility. In these matters comparative law may also be useful. The bottom line is that this judgment ought to be a starting point for lessons to be learned; over, but not done.

 

Held as per the opinion of Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

September 3, 2013 (Elul 28, 5773)

Full opinion: 

El-Al Israel Airlines v. Danielowitz

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 721/94
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, November 30, 1994
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The first respondent, who is employed by El-Al as a flight attendant, has a stable relationship with another man. Under a collective agreement, El-Al gives every permanent employee a free aeroplane ticket, every year, for that employee and his/her spouse (husband or wife). Under a collective arrangement, a free ticket is also given to a companion recognized publicly as the employee’s husband/wife. The first respondent asked El-Al to give him a free ticket for his companion, but his request was denied.

 

Held: (Majority opinion — Vice-President A. Barak, Justice D. Dorner) Not giving the respondent a free ticket for his same-sex companion amounted to discrimination, since a distinction on the basis of the difference between a heterosexual and a homosexual relationship is unjustified in the context of employee benefits.

 

(Minority opinion — Justice Y. Kedmi) Linguistically, only a heterosexual couple can be called a ‘couple’; the concept of the ‘couple’ linguistically only applies to an union of male and female that can, conceptually, have children. Therefore a distinction between a same-sex companion and an opposite-sex companion is a distinction between persons who are fundamentally unequal, and this does not amount to discrimination.

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 721/94

El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd

v.

1. Jonathan Danielowitz

2. National Labour Court

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[30 November 1994]

Before Vice-President A. Barak and Justices Y. Kedmi, D. Dorner

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The first respondent, who is employed by El-Al as a flight attendant, has a stable relationship with another man. Under a collective agreement, El-Al gives every permanent employee a free aeroplane ticket, every year, for that employee and his/her spouse (husband or wife). Under a collective arrangement, a free ticket is also given to a companion recognized publicly as the employee’s husband/wife. The first respondent asked El-Al to give him a free ticket for his companion, but his request was denied.

 

Held: (Majority opinion — Vice-President A. Barak, Justice D. Dorner) Not giving the respondent a free ticket for his same-sex companion amounted to discrimination, since a distinction on the basis of the difference between a heterosexual and a homosexual relationship is unjustified in the context of employee benefits.

(Minority opinion — Justice Y. Kedmi) Linguistically, only a heterosexual couple can be called a ‘couple’; the concept of the ‘couple’ linguistically only applies to an union of male and female that can, conceptually, have children. Therefore a distinction between a same-sex companion and an opposite-sex companion is a distinction between persons who are fundamentally unequal, and this does not amount to discrimination.

 

Petition denied, by majority opinion (Vice-President M. Shamgar and Justice D. Dorner), Justice Y. Kedmi dissenting.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, ss. 7, 8.

Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, ss. 14, 31.

Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936, s. 152(2).

Employment Service Law, 5719-1959, s. 42.

Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 5748-1988, ss. 2, 2(a) 2(c).

Equal Employment Opportunities Law (Amendment), 5752-1992.

Equal Remuneration for Female and Male Employees Law, 5724-1964.

Equal Retirement Age for Female and Male Employees Law, 5747-1987.

Government Corporations Law, 5735-1975, s. 18A.

National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5728-1968, s. 8.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, s. 351(3).

Penal Law (Amendment no. 22), 5748-1988.

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, s. 1.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      FH 13/84 Levy v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee [1987] IsrSC 41(4) 291.

[2]      HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13.

[3]      EA 2/88 Ben-Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 221.

[4]      HCJ 114/78 Burkan v. Minister of Finance [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 800.

[5]      HCJ 453/94 Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 501; [1992-4] IsrLR 150.

[6]      HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[7]      HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. National Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4) 749; IsrSJ 10 136.

[8]      HCJ 507/81 Abu Hatzira MK v. Attorney-General [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 561.

[9]      HCJ 301/63 Streit v. Chief Rabbi [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 598.

[10]    HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry at Ministry of Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.

[11]    HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 221.

[12]    HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.

[13]    HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 1; IsrSJ 8 21.

[14]    HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.

[15]    HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 812.

[16]    FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [1971] IsrSC 25(1) 7.

[17]    HCJ 30/55 Committee for Protection of Expropriated Nazareth Land v. Minister of Finance [1955] IsrSC 9 1261.

[18]    CrimA 112/50 Yosipof v. Attorney-General [1951] IsrSC 5 481; IsrSJ 1 174.

[19]    HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186.

[20]    CrimA 224/63 Ben-Ami v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 225.

[21]    HCJ 720/82 Elitzur Religious Sports Association, Nahariyah Branch v. Nahariyah Municipality [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 17.

[22]    HCJ 4169/93 — unreported.

[23]    HCJ 410/76 Herut v. National Labour Court [1977] IsrSC 31(3) 124.

 

Israel National Labour Court cases cited:

[24]    NLC 33/25-3 Flight Attendants Association v. Hazin [1973] 4 IsrNLC 365.

[25]    NLC 44/85-0 – unreported.

 

American cases cited:

[26]    Welsh v. United States 398 U.S. 333 (1970).

[27]    Califano v. Westcott 443 U.S. 76 (1979).

[28]    Boutilier v. Immigration Service 387 U.S. 118 (1967).

[29]    Nemetz v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 647 F. 2d 432 (1981).

[30]    Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. 544 N.Y. Supp. 2d 784 (1989).

[31]    Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Harpster 510 N.Y. Supp. 2d 976 (1986).

[32]    Two Associates v. Brown 502 N.Y. S. 2d 604 (1986).

[33]    E. 10th St. Assoc. v. Estate of Goldstein 552 N.Y. Supp. 2d 257 (1990).

 

English cases cited:

[34]    Dyson Holdings Ltd v. Fox [1975] 3 All E.R. 1030 (CA).

 

European Court of Human Rights cases cited:

[35]    Norris Case 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) (1988).

[36]    Modinos v. Cyprus Case 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (Ser. A) (1993).

 

Canadian cases cited:

[37]    Schachter v. Canada (1992) 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1.

[38]    R. v. Turpin [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.

[39]    Vriend v. Alberta (1994) 6 W.W.R. 414.

[40]    Egan v. Canada (1993) 103 D.L.R. (4th) 336.

[41]    Haig v. Canada (1992) 94 D.L.R. (4th) 1.

[42]    Layland v. Ontario (Consumer Protection & Commercial Relations) (1993) 104 D.L.R. (4th) 214.

[43]    Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554.

 

Jewish Law sources cited:

[44]       Genesis 1, 27; 1, 28; 2 24; 5 2; 6 19.

 

For the petitioner — Y. Winder, A. Ben-Israel

For the first respondent — S. Donevitz, O. Kalmaro

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Vice-President A. Barak

A collective agreement and a collective arrangement confer a benefit on a ‘spouse’ (husband or wife) or a ‘companion recognized as a husband/wife’ of an employee. Is this benefit conferred also on an employee’s same-sex companion? That is the question before the court in this petition.

The facts and the litigation before the Labour Court

1.    The first respondent (the respondent) works as a flight attendant for the petitioner (the El-Al company). Under the collective agreement, every (permanent) employee is entitled to receive free (or discounted) aeroplane tickets for himself and his ‘spouse (husband/wife)’ once a year. Under a collective arrangement (entitled ‘professional guidelines’), aeroplane tickets (as of 1 January 1986) are given to ‘a companion recognized as the husband/wife of an employee of the company if the couple live together in a joint household as husband and wife in every respect, but they are unable to marry lawfully.’

2.    The respondent applied (on 21 January 1988) to the petitioner with a request to recognize his male companion as his ‘companion’ for the purpose of receiving an annual free or discounted aeroplane ticket. In his request, the respondent explains that he has a stable and long-term relationship (since 1979) with another man. The relationship involves, inter alia, running a joint household and cohabiting in a private apartment purchased jointly. The respondent’s request was refused.

3.    The respondent applied to the Regional Labour Court. He asked the court to declare him entitled to receive free or discounted aeroplane tickets for his male companion, just as El-Al gives these to its employees’ spouses. According to a procedural agreement, it was agreed that the court would first consider the underlying question whether an El-Al employee is entitled to a free or discounted ticket for a same-sex ‘companion’. On this question, the Regional Labour Court (Justice Lubotsky and public representatives Ozeri and Pinchas) held that the provision of the collective agreement (which confers the right to the benefit on a ‘spouse’) does not confer a right on a companion of an employee, and this does not involve improper discrimination. However, the provision of the collective arrangement conferring a benefit on persons recognized as a couple (despite their being unable to marry lawfully) but not conferring the same benefit on a same-sex couple (who are also unable to marry lawfully) is a discriminatory provision. This discrimination is prohibited by the provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 1988. Under the provisions of this law (in s. 2) — as amended in the Equal Employment Opportunities (Amendment) Law, 1992 — an employer may not discriminate against any of his employees in their conditions of employment ‘on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, personal status or their being parents.’ Because of this prohibited discrimination, the discriminatory provision in the collective arrangement was disqualified. By virtue of the procedural agreement, the Regional Labour Court went on to consider whether the respondent in fact cohabits with his companion.

4.    El-Al appealed to the National Labour Court. The National Labour Court (President M. Goldberg, Vice-President S. Adler, Justice Y. Eliasof and public representatives R. Ben-Yisrael, Abrahamovitz, Friedman and Galin) dismissed the appeal.[*] It was held that the respondent does not fall into the category of those entitled to a discount under the collective agreement, since the expression ‘spouse (husband/wife)’ does not include a same-sex companion. It also held that the respondent does not fall into the category of ‘persons recognized as the husband/wife of an employee’ in the collective arrangement, since a recognized companion, in the context of the collective arrangement, does not include same-sex companions. Notwithstanding, the court held that this position constitutes improper discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, contrary to the principle of equality set out in the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, as amended in 1992. This improper discrimination, contrary to provisions of the law, gives the respondent (as of 2 January 1992) a right to demand for himself the benefit that was not conferred on him for discriminatory reasons.

5.    The petition before us is directed against the decision of the National Labour Court. El-Al (the petitioner) asks for a ruling that its refusal to give the respondent an aeroplane ticket for his companion does not constitute improper discrimination under the Equal Employment Opportunities Law as amended in 1992. El-Al’s contention is that this law — in the 1992 amendment — added an additional type of prohibited discrimination (‘sexual orientation’) but it did not confer rights to receive benefits that an employee was not previously entitled to receive. The respondent argued before us that there is no reason why we should intervene in the National Labour Court’s judgment, which ruled that a cause of action based on discrimination was created by the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, justifying giving aeroplane tickets for the respondent’s companion as of the date when the law was amended (on 2 January 1992).

The interpretive construction

6.    The respondent (the flight attendant, the employee) may base his argument to receive the benefit (a free or discounted ticket) for his companion on two legal constructions. According to the first construction, his right is founded on the collective agreement that gives benefits to ‘a spouse (husband/wife)’ and on the collective arrangement that gives a benefit to ‘a person recognized as the husband/wife of an employee.’ According to this construction, the term ‘spouse’ (in the collective agreement) and the term ‘recognized companion’ (in the collective arrangement) should be interpreted according to their purpose to include also a spouse of the same sex and a recognized companion of the same sex. The respondent’s right to receive the benefit is contractual, and it is founded on the text of the collective agreement and the collective arrangement, just like the respondent’s right to receive the benefit for himself. This legal model is interpretive in nature. It is intrinsic to the actual text. In this the respondent’s right to receive benefits — for his companion and for himself — derives from the legal meaning of the contractual text that is chosen from among its various linguistic meanings. Naturally this right accrues to the employee when the conditions entitling him to it are fulfilled.

7.    The interpretive construction was rejected by the Labour Courts. They held that the (legal) meaning of the term ‘spouse (husband/wife)’ in the collective agreement does not include same-sex companions. The National Labour Court pointed out that —

‘In the case before us, the parties to the collective agreement expressly showed that they did not mean a same-sex companion. The collective agreement says “spouse (husband and wife)”. The words “husband and wife” attached to the term spouse show that the parties used the term spouse in its narrow sense. It follows that this expression in the collective agreement does not include recognized companions and same-sex companions who are indisputably not “husband and wife”.’*

With regard to the term ‘person recognized as a husband/wife’ in the collective arrangement, the National Labour Court held that this does not include persons of the same sex who cohabit. The National Labour Court pointed out that the ‘term “recognized companion” does not appear by itself, but it is accompanied by the words “as husband/wife”.’* This use of language shows ‘that the intention of the drafter was not to include persons of the same sex.’*

The statutory construction

8.    A second legal construction is also available to the respondent. This construction starts with the premise that the contractual right to receive a benefit is conferred only on a companion who is not the same sex as the employee. According to this construction, the contractual arrangement (the product of the interpretive construction) is a discriminatory arrangement that is contrary to the Equal Employment Opportunities Law (as amended in 1992). The remedy given to the respondent as a result of this discrimination is not to nullify the contractual arrangement — a remedy that he did not request at all — but to make a (judicial) order based on the provisions of the law to correct the discrimination. The respondent will therefore be entitled to the benefit for his companion by combining the discriminatory contractual provision with the corrective statutory provision. This construction is not interpretative. It is extrinsic to the actual text. Its existence derives from the combination of (A’s) contractual right and the statutory mandate to prevent discrimination (against B). The resulting right of the employee arises on the day that the statutory prohibition against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation came into force (i.e., on 2 January 1992). It may be called a statutory (or extrinsic) construction. The National Labour Court accepted this construction, and this is what El-Al is attacking before us. Analyzing this legal model must be done in two stages: first, whether the contractual arrangement (the product of the interpretive construction) is (improperly) discriminatory because of sexual orientation; second, what remedy should be given to an employee who has been the victim of (improper) discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?

9.    The respondent did not reargue the interpretive construction before us. Indeed, this construction — which, as stated, was rejected by the National Labour Court — is complex (cf., with regard to the term ‘spouse’, FH 13/84 Levy v. Chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee [1]; see also C. A. Bowman, B. Cornish, ‘A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances,’ 92 Colum. L. Rev. (1992) 1164; R. Elbin, ‘Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others),’ 51 Ohio St. L. J. (1990) 1067). We would have been compelled to decide this, had the respondent insisted on his (contractual) right to receive a benefit from the date when these (contractual) rights were created. As we have seen, the respondent accepts the decision of the National Labour Court that his right is based on the argument of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, relying on the amendment (of 2 January 1992) to the Equal Employment Opportunities Law. As a result, we do not need to consider the interpretive construction. I therefore presume — without deciding the issue — that the respondent does not have a (contractual) right under the collective agreement and the collective arrangement to receive the benefit for his companion. On this basis, I will now examine the statutory construction, with its two questions (is discrimination present; what is the proper remedy). I shall begin with the first question.

The right to equality and its violation

10. Equality is a fundamental value in Israeli law. ‘It is the heart and soul of our whole constitutional regime’ (Justice Landau in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Finance Minister [2], at p. 698 {18}) and ‘it is part of the essence and character of the State of Israel’ (Vice-President Justice Elon in EA 2/88 Ben-Shalom v. Central Election Committee for the Twelfth Knesset [3], at p. 272). ‘…The rule that one may not discriminate against persons on the basis of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, beliefs or social status is a fundamental constitutional principle which is counted among our fundamental jurisprudential perspectives and constitutes an integral part of these’ (Justice Shamgar in HCJ 114/78, Motion 451, 510/78 Burkan v. Minister of Finance [4], at p. 806). Considerations of justice and fairness underlie the principle of equality. ‘The principle of equality… has long been recognized in our law as one of the principles of justice and fairness…’ (Justice Mazza in HCJ 453/94 Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [5], at p. 521 {150}). Equality is a central element of the social contract upon which society is based (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa; Labour Party in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipal Council [6], at p. 332). Indeed —

‘Discrimination is a plague that fosters a feeling of unfairness and frustration. It harms the sense of belonging and constructive motivation to participate in, and contribute to, social life. A society that practices discrimination is not a healthy society, nor can a state in which discrimination is practised be called a civilized state’ (Justice Bach in HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. National Labour Court [7], at p. 760 {150}).

11. The principle of equality is entrenched in Israel in a number of normative structures. First, it is a principle of case-law — the product of  ‘Israeli common law’ — that has been recognized and developed by the courts in Israel. This principle reflects on the (objective) intention of every piece of legislation and acts as a criterion for its interpretation. ‘The fundamental principle, which constitutes a legislative goal for all the acts of the legislature, is the principle that everyone is equal before the law… legislation should therefore be presumed and interpreted as intending to achieve this purpose, not to undermine it.’ (HCJ 507/81 Abu Hatzira MK v. Attorney-General [8], at p. 585. See also HCJ 301/63 Streit v. Chief Rabbi [9], at p. 612). The case-law principle of equality reflects on the law’s ‘fundamental concepts’ (such as reasonableness, justice, equality and public policy) and constitutes a normative element in establishing the scope of their application (see HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Register at Interior Ministry [10]). A discriminatory collective agreement may therefore be contrary to public policy and be disqualified as a result (see Nevo v. National Labour Court [7] and L.C.J. 3-25/33 Flight Attendants’ Committee v. Hazin [24]). The case-law principle of equality is a normative basis for recognizing the right of equality as a human right in Israel. It leads to the formulation of case-law rules based on it — such as the rule of spouses’ joint property ownership (see HCJ 1000/92 Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court [11]).

12. Second, the principle of equality is incorporated in Israeli legislation. This began with Israel’s Declaration of Independence, which provides that the State of Israel shall treat its citizens equally ‘irrespective of religion, race or sex’. It continued in legislation that creates equality in specific relationships. Thus, for instance, the Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951, provides that ‘women and men shall be subject to the same law for every legal act...’ (s. 1). The Employment Service Law, 1959, prohibits discrimination by the Employment Service when referring a person for employment (s. 42). The Equal Remuneration for Female and Male Employees Law, 5724-1964, aims to ensure equality in employees’ salaries. Special legislation is intended to allow corrective preferential treatment for women (see section 18A of the Government Corporations Law, 1975). Another law — which is the relevant one in this case and which we will discuss separately — is the Equal Employment Opportunities Law. This development culminated in the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which entrenched equality as a super-legislative constitutional right, within the framework of human dignity:

‘Today the principle of equality can be entrenched in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Such entrenchment implies the elevation of the principle of equality to a constitutional, super-legislative normative status’ (per Justice Or in HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [12], at p. 362).

13. Needless to say, equality does not confer an absolute right. The human right of equality — like every other human right — is a relative right. The principle of ‘equality is not an absolute but a relative principle’ (per Justice Or in Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [12], at p. 361); the limits of extending the principle of equality are determined by an (internal) balance between the whole spectrum of human rights and by the public interest (see A. Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, Shoken, 4th edition, 1991, at pp. 199, 299). The right to equality may be restricted by virtue of other appropriate values (see HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [13], at p. 13 {32}, and cf. s. 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). Indeed, sometimes equality is not completely protected. Equality may be lawfully restricted if this is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, is for a proper purpose and if equality is not restricted more than necessary.

14. The factual premise is that people are different from one another. ‘...No person is completely identical to another’ (Justice S. Levin in HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [14], at p. 148 {67}). Every person is a world in himself. Society is based on people who are different from one another. Only the worst dictatorships try to eradicate these differences. Moreover, the presumption behind the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is that every person is free to develop physically and spiritually as he sees fit (see HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [15]). This underlying freedom is the basis for the principle of equality. It means equality before the law and the law being impartial to the differences between people. It means equality in applying freedom. It means equality in opportunities. This equality presumes a normative arrangement that is applied uniformly to all individuals, irrespective of the factual difference between them. However, the principle of equality does not presume only one rule for everyone. Indeed, the principle of equality does not rule out different rules for different people. The principle of equality demands that the existence of a rule that treats people differently is justified by the nature and substance of the issue. The principle of equality therefore presumes the existence of objective reasons that justify a difference (a distinction, dissimilarity). Discrimination — which is the opposite of equality — exists therefore in those situations where a different law for people who are (de facto) different from one another is based on reasons that are insufficient to justify a distinction between them in a free and democratic society. In Justice Or’s words, discrimination is ‘different treatment without an objective justification’ (Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [12], at p. 360). President Agranat discussed this and pointed out:

‘The principle of equality, which is merely the opposite of discrimination and which, for reasons of justice and fairness, the law of every democratic country aspires to achieve, means that people must be treated equally for a particular purpose, when no real differences that are relevant to this purpose exist between them. If they are not treated equally, we have a case of discrimination. However, if the difference or differences between different people are relevant for the purpose under discussion, it is a permitted distinction to treat them differently for that purpose, provided that those differences justify this. In this context, the concept of “equality” therefore means  “relevant equality”, and it requires, with regard to the purpose under discussion, “equality of treatment” for those persons in this state. By contrast, it will be a permitted distinction if the different treatment of different persons derives from their being, for the purpose of the treatment, in a state of relevant inequality, just as it will be discrimination if it derives from their being in a state of inequality that is not relevant to the purpose of the treatment’ (FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [16], at p. 35).

Therefore a particular law will create discrimination when two individuals, who are different from one another (factual inequality), are treated differently by the law, even though the factual difference between them does not justify different treatment in the circumstances. Discrimination is therefore based on the factors of arbitrariness, injustice and unreasonableness. Justice Witkon discussed this and pointed out:

‘What is discrimination? Not every distinction between different groups of people is called “discrimination”; the concept of discrimination includes the idea of unfairness in treating equals unequally’ (HCJ 30/55 Committee for Protection of Expropriated Nazareth Lands v. Minister of Finance [17], at p. 1265).

Discrimination — which, as stated, is the opposite of equality — means unfair, unjust and arbitrary treatment (see CrimA 112/50 Yosipof v. Attorney-General [18], at p. 490 {183}).

15. As we have seen, the contractual regime at El-Al gives a male or female employee a right to receive a benefit (a free or discounted aeroplane ticket) for a wife or husband or recognized companion (male or female), provided that they are of the other sex. Does this constitute discrimination against a companion of the same sex? As we have seen, the test for equal and discriminatory treatment is the question whether the difference in sex is relevant to the issue. This relevance is examined on the criteria of arbitrariness, fairness and justice. The basis for giving a benefit to an employee for a spouse or a recognized companion lies in the attitude that there are reasons for giving a benefit — such as an aeroplane ticket — to an employee for the person with whom he lives and shares a common household, from whom he is separated when he leaves on his flights and to whom he returns when he finishes his work. This is the criterion that both a spouse and a recognized companion have in common. The purpose of the benefit is not to strengthen the institution of marriage. Indeed, El-Al gives the benefit to an employee living with a recognized companion, even when that recognized companion is lawfully married to someone else. The idea underlying the giving of the benefits is therefore cohabitation for a certain period (specified in the collective arrangement), which is evidence of a firm social unit based on a life of sharing. In this context, it seems clear to me that denying a same-sex companion this benefit amounts to discrimination and a violation of equality. Indeed, the only reason for denying the benefit to a same-sex companion is sexual orientation. There is no other reason. This difference is not at all relevant to the issue before us (supporting a firm social unit, based on a life of sharing). In the case before us, we are dealing with a distinction that is arbitrary and unfair: is parting from a same-sex companion easier than parting from a companion of the opposite sex? Is living together for persons of the same sex different, with regard to the relationship of sharing and harmony and running the social unit, from this life of sharing for heterosexual couples?

16. One might argue that a life of sharing and harmony between persons of opposite sexes (whether as husband and wife or as recognized companions) is so different in its character from a life of sharing and harmony between persons of the same sex that any legal regime giving a benefit to the former relationship does not discriminate against the latter relationship. Although this argument seems to me problematic, I am prepared to reserve judgment, since the question that we must ask is not whether one relationship (a life of sharing and harmony between persons of opposite sexes) is different on any criteria from the other relationship (a life of sharing and harmony between persons of the same sex). As stated, I am prepared to assume that in various social contexts this difference does indeed exist. The question that we must ask is whether the difference in the relationship is relevant to the issue before us. The ‘issue before us’ is the social unit, the life of sharing and harmony that justify, in El-Al’s opinion, giving a benefit to a (permanent) employee in the form of an aeroplane ticket which will enable him to take with him the person with whom he cohabits. In this respect, the difference between a life of sharing between persons of different sexes and a life of sharing between persons of the same sex is clear and blatant discrimination.

Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation

17. We have seen, therefore, that giving a benefit to a (permanent) employee for a spouse or recognized companion of the opposite sex and not giving the same benefit for a same-sex companion amounts to a violation of equality. What is the nature of this discrimination? Indeed, all discrimination is prohibited, but among the different kinds of discrimination there are varying degrees. The severity of the discrimination is determined by the severity of the violation of the principle of equality. Thus, for example, we consider discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality, language, ethnic group and age to be particularly serious. In this framework, the Israeli legal system attaches great importance to the need to guarantee equality between the sexes and to prevent discrimination on the basis of sex (see HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [19]; Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [6]). It may be said that the discrimination in the appeal before us is based on improper considerations of sex. Conversely, it may be argued that discrimination on the basis of sex does not exist, since the same benefit is conferred on (permanent) male and female employees. This argument, in itself, does not strike me as convincing. However I do not need to decide the issue, since there can, I think, be no doubt that the discrimination in this case is based on the ‘sexual orientation’ of the (permanent) employee. This discrimination — against homosexuals and lesbians — is improper. It is contrary to equality. This emerges clearly from the provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law. This law, as amended in the Equal Employment Opportunities Law (Amendment), states (in s. 2):

‘(a) An employer shall not discriminate between his employees, or between candidates for employment on the basis of their sex, sexual orientation, personal status or their being parents with respect to any of the following:

(1)  giving employment;

(2)  conditions of employment;

(3)  promotion in employment;

(4)  training or professional studies;

(5)  dismissal or severance pay.

(b) For the purposes of subsection (a), making irrelevant conditions shall also be regarded as discrimination.

(c) Discrimination shall not exist under this section when it is required by the character or nature of the job or position.’

In explaining the provision about the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the chairwoman of the Labour and Welfare Committee, Mrs O. Namir, pointed out:

‘I hope that adopting the proposed law will contribute towards treating men and women equally, regardless of their sexual orientation, allowing them to live according to their sexual orientation as equal citizens in every respect, and affording them the legal protection enjoyed by every other group.’

This provision does not deny the differences between human beings. These differences are natural. This provision states that the different sexual orientation of persons shall not be relevant in employment, unless this is required by the nature of the job. Indeed, with regard to conditions of employment, the employer must be impartial to his employees’ sexual orientations. He must determine the conditions of employment only in view of the criteria required by the nature of the job. Therefore if a benefit is conferred on an employee having a long-term and permanent relationship with a woman, that benefit should be conferred on an employee who has a long-term and permanent relationship with another man. Thereby the employer implements the principle of equality. Thereby he is prevented from invading the privacy of the employee (cf. s. 7 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). Conferring a benefit on a permanent employee for his recognized companion and not conferring it on a permanent employee for a same-sex companion (who complies with all the requirements of a recognized companion apart from the requirement of sex) amounts to discrimination in conditions of employment because of sexual orientation. This discrimination is prohibited. Consider A, a permanent employee of El-Al, who shares his life for several years with a woman B. They cohabit and run a common household (as required by El-Al for complying with the conditions of a recognized companion). A is entitled to an aeroplane ticket for B. Now consider A who lives in the same way with a man C. They too cohabit and run a common household. A is not entitled to an aeroplane ticket for C. How can this difference be explained? Does the one carry out his job as an employee differently from the other? The only explanation lies in A’s sexual orientation. This amounts to discrimination in conditions of employment because of sexual orientation. No explanation has been given that might justify this discriminatory treatment. There is nothing characterizing the nature of the job or the position that justifies this unequal treatment (see s. 2(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law). To be sure, it is possible that El-Al thinks that a (permanent) employee who lives with a (same-sex) companion behaves ‘improperly’. It is possible that someone at El-Al thinks that this joint lifestyle should not be encouraged. We need not examine this argument on an ethical level. Whether or not we agree with it, it does not amount to a justification that negates the existence of the discrimination. Indeed, the discrimination is not determined merely by the will and intention of the person creating the discriminatory norm. It is determined by the effect that it has in practice (see Nevo v. National Labour Court [7], at p. 759; Bavli v. Great Rabbinical Court [11]). Occasionally we can justify a violation of equality — which, as we have seen, is not an absolute but a relative right — on the basis of a proper purpose. Such grounds must be very substantial and relevant. A very great weight rests on someone who tries to discharge this burden. In the case before us, the burden has not been discharged. No attempt has even been made to discharge it. All that we have heard is that same-sex companions who cohabit are not like companions of different sexes who cohabit. Thereby they indicated to us the difference that exists between the different situations. In doing so they did not negate the discrimination, and they certainly did not point to a proper purpose that might justify it (see M. N. Cameli, ‘Extending Family Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women,’ 68 Chi-Kent L. Rev. (1992-93) 447.

The remedy for a violation of the right to equality

18. I have therefore reached the conclusion that the legal regime created by the collective agreement and the collective arrangement, with regard to the benefit conferred on an employee to receive a (free or discounted) aeroplane ticker for a spouse or recognized companion (of the opposite sex), discriminates against an employee living with a same-sex companion. Now we must turn to the second question requiring a decision, namely the remedy to which an employee who has suffered discrimination is entitled. Case-law has established that a discriminatory contractual regime may support a claim that the provision in the contract is contrary to public policy and is therefore invalid (see Flight Attendants Association v. Hazin [24]). This invalidity may cause the whole contract to be invalid. In most cases, there is no reason to invalidate the whole contract, and it is sufficient to invalidate the illegal part by severing it from the lawful part (see ss. 14 and 31 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973). Thus, for instance, in Nevo v. National Labour Court [7] the contractual regime provided that the ‘retirement age for a pension is 65 for men and 60 for women’ (ibid. at p. 753). The Supreme Court held that this amounts to discrimination against women. It was held that the proper remedy — which the petitioner sought in that case — is striking out the invalid part. The result is that the part of the employment agreement providing that ‘the retirement age for a pension is 65’ remained valid. The Court thereby used a technique of severance. This technique is not possible in the case before us. Indeed, had the collective agreement and collective arrangement provided that a permanent employee is entitled to a benefit for whoever is his companion, except a companion of the same sex, it would have been possible to strike down the limiting provision, and so re-establish equality. But the contractual text in our case is different. It does not allow operating on the body of the text and severing the healthy part from the unhealthy part. What, then, is the remedy to which the petitioner is entitled?

19. As we have seen, a possible remedy is voidance of the contractual arrangement regarding the benefit. The result, from the respondent’s perspective, will be a case of ‘Let me die with the Philistines’ (Judges 16, 30): the respondent will not receive a benefit, but neither will recognized companions of the opposite sex. This outcome is not reasonable in the circumstances. Why should recognized companions of opposite sexes suffer a material loss? What wrong have they done? The National Labour Court rightly pointed out that the petitioner himself did not seek this remedy.

20. The appropriate remedy in this situation is to confer the benefit also on same-sex cohabitees. This remedy is recognized in the comparative literature. It was developed mainly in the case of laws that are contrary to the principle of equality laid down in a constitution. In American constitutional literature it is called the  ‘extension’ of the existing text. In Canadian constitutional literature it is called ‘reading into an arrangement’ or ‘reconstruction’ of the text. These terms are not accurate ones. The judge does not change the existing text, nor does he reconstruct it nor add to it. The judge does not do anything to the existing text. What the court does is different. It determines that as long as the existing text remains as it is — and as stated the judge does not do anything to it — similar benefits must be given to an additional group that is not mentioned in the text. Conferring this benefit derives directly from the principle of equality, which is a normative principle to which the text is subservient and to which it must conform. It can be seen then that the court does not implant an additional organ into the body of the text infected by improper discrimination. The court determines, however, that by virtue of the principle of equality — as long as the discriminatory contractual arrangement remains unchanged — a relief of conferring a benefit also on the victims of discrimination is required in order to remove the discrimination.

21. As we have seen, this relief is recognized by American constitutional law. In the case of Welsh v. United States (1970) [26] a statute exempted a person from military service because he was opposed to war for reasons of religion or faith. The petitioner asked for an exemption for reasons of conscience. A number of judges held that the exemption for reasons of religion or faith extends also to an exemption for reasons of conscience. Justice Harlan, however, disagreed. In his view, an exemption for reasons of conscience was not included in the statute. In this the statute violated the provisions of the Constitution. The proper remedy, in the judge’s opinion, was not nullifying the exemption for reasons of religion or faith but granting an exemption, based on the Constitution itself, for reasons of conscience. Justice Harlan writes, on page 361:

‘Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion there exist two remedial alternatives; a court may either declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion…’

He continues at p. 364:

‘While the necessary remedial operation, extension, is more analogous to a graft than amputation, I think the boundaries of permissible choice may properly be considered by the legislative pronouncement on severability.’

Since that case, American courts tend to grant this remedy (see R. Bader-Ginsburg, ‘Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation’ 28 Clev. St. L. Rev. (1979) 301; B. K. Miller, ‘Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Appraisal of Heckler v. Mathens,’ 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. (1985) 79. This remedy appears to the court natural and appropriate and preferable to nullification. One of the cases involved a statute that gave assistance to needy families. The statute provided, inter alia, that the support would be given to a family where the mother did not work and the father had worked previously but was now unemployed. A family where the father did not work and the mother had worked previously but was now unemployed was not included among the recipients of the support. The court held that the statute unlawfully discriminated against families where the father did not work whereas the mother had worked but was now unemployed. Against this background arose the problem of the remedy: whether to nullify the support for the family that was entitled (because of the discrimination inherent in the arrangement) or to extend the application of the statute to a family that was not included in it. It was held that the family which was the victim of discrimination should be added (Califano v. Westcott (1979) [27]).

22. The Supreme Court of Canada has a similar approach. It often tends to ‘read in’ to the statute provisions that will negate the unconstitutional nature of the statute. Justice Lamer wrote in Schachter v. Canada (1992) [37], at p. 12:

‘…extension by way of reading in is closely akin to the practice of severance. The difference is the manner in which the extent of the inconsistency is defined. In the usual case of severance, the inconsistency is defined as something improperly included in the statute which can be severed and struck down. In the case of reading in, the inconsistency is defined as what the statute wrongly excludes rather than what it wrongly includes. Where the inconsistency is defined as what the statute excludes, the logical result of declaring inoperative that inconsistency may be to include the excluded group within the statutory scheme. This has the effect of extending the reach of the statute by way of reading in rather than reading down.’

23. These remedies are appropriate in the constitutional sphere. They promote the purpose underlying the constitutional arrangement. They make it unnecessary to nullify legislation. The use of this remedy is not mechanical. We must consider in each case whether extension is possible. We must examine whether it is simple to implement, and whether it does not involve excessive intervention in the legislative fabric. We must consider the budgetary ramifications. Indeed, a benefit conferred by law to a marginal group does not justify granting a constitutional remedy by extending the remedy to a large and significant group. Neither should we adopt this technique to impose obligations on sectors of the population in whose favour the law has discriminated by not imposing these obligations on them.

24. These remedies — which were developed in the constitutional sphere — can be applied in the field of collective agreements and collective arrangements. They create a contractual regime that is subject to a supreme normative principle of equality. This principle derives its supremacy (with respect to collective agreements and arrangements) from the Equal Employment Opportunities Law. This principle of equality applies — by virtue of the express provisions of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law — also in private law. It is not merely a principle of public law. It obliges every employer not to discriminate against any of his employees in the fields of private law. Indeed, with regard to the prohibition of discrimination because of sexual orientation — just as with regard to other kinds of discrimination — the law establishes a mandate that obliges the employer. By virtue of this normative mandate — which is of supreme status with regard to collective agreements and arrangements — the employer is forbidden to discriminate against any of his employees with regard to conditions of employment. When a contractual arrangement drawn up by him involves prohibited discrimination, the contract is tainted with illegality. It may be voided by virtue of the provisions relating to invalid contracts. To prevent it being voided, we may demand — as an alternative remedy — that the employer refrains from the prohibited discrimination. This is achieved by compelling the employer to confer the benefit on the employee who is the victim of the discrimination. This does not change the agreement between the parties. We do not thereby read into the contract what is not there. We thereby merely remove the discrimination and comply with the normative mandate not to discriminate. Indeed, the basic fact is the discriminatory contractual arrangement. The contents of this are determined by the parties to the contract, and they control it and can change it. As long as the discriminatory contractual arrangement remains unchanged, the supreme normative mandate — which derives from cogent law — exists alongside it and compels the employer to act with equality. Indeed, just as by virtue of the normative supremacy of the constitution (or the entrenched Basic Law) the scope of applicability of a provision of a law may be extended, so too can the normative power of the law extend the scope of applicability of provisions in a collective agreement or a collective arrangement. By virtue of this normative supremacy, the contractual regime must modify itself to comply with the principle of equality (in our case, the prohibition against discrimination in conditions of employment because of sexual orientation). This modification does not require cancelling the existing contractual arrangement. This modification is achieved by conferring a benefit — which originates not in the contractual arrangement but in the principle of equality that extends the contractual arrangement to equivalent situations — on the class that is the victim of discrimination. This extension is suitable for the contractual model. It adds a small group of beneficiaries and does not therefore impose a significant budgetary burden. Justice is done, and justice is seen to be done.

The petition is denied. The case is remanded to the District Labour Court, as stated in the judgment of the National Labour Court. The petitioner shall pay the costs of the first respondent in a total amount of 10,000 NIS.

 

 

Justice Y. Kedmi

The question we must decide in this case is: does the concept ‘spouse’ used in the employment agreements include same-sex companions or not? My esteemed colleague, the Vice-President, answered this in the affirmative. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with that conclusion. The following are my main reasons:

1.    ‘Spouse’: the conceptual significance in the social sphere

(a) The linguistic concept of spouses, who together form a ‘family’, expresses, in the social sphere, an union of two individuals of opposite sexes to form a ‘couple’; a ‘couple’, in this context, has since the origin of man until the present represented a joining of two individuals of opposite sexes. This is the case here and throughout the world, and the Book of Books gives decisive proof of this: ‘And God created man in His image, in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them’ (Genesis 1, 27 [44]).

This is the case with man and it is the case with the animals, and the story of Noah’s ark leaves no doubt about this: ‘You shall bring two of each into the ark to preserve with you; they shall be male and female’ (Genesis 6, 19 [44]).

There is of course nothing to prevent the term ‘couple’ expressing a ‘quantity’ of two individuals; but we are not dealing here with the quantitative meaning of the concept but with its substantive meaning in the social sphere.

To give the concept ‘couple’, in the context discussed here, a different meaning from the linguistic meaning that it has always had is impossible. ‘A different meaning’ of this concept would deprive it of its essence; once again we are not speaking of a ‘couple’ that builds a family, incorporating a ‘husband’ and a ‘wife’, but a ‘couple’ that expresses a ‘quantity’ of two individuals who have come together, whatever their sex is.

In Hebrew the concepts of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ are inseparably associated with the concept of ‘family’; you cannot have a ‘family’ unless two companions of different sexes are its basis (‘a heterosexual couple’).

(b) The relationship that turns two individuals — of opposite sexes — into a ‘couple’, in its linguistic-social meaning, is characterized by the decision of the two to have a joint lifestyle; ‘joint’, in this context, inter alia and especially, expresses family life whose primary purpose — and from a conceptual viewpoint it is impossible otherwise — is to bring children into the world: ‘And God blessed them, and God said to them: be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth…’ (Genesis 1, 28 [44]).

Thus it is no coincidence that the concept ‘couple’ is, in Hebrew, derived from the root meaning ‘intercourse’; the ‘couple’ and ‘intercourse’ are one, and only where these exist can we speak of a ‘family’.

Admittedly not every couple is ‘capable’ — or wishes — to bring children into the world, and not every ‘couple’ becomes such in order to bring children into the world. But these ‘exceptions’ in this context cannot undermine the fundamental conceptual meaning of the concept ‘couple’; therefore a precondition for two people being a ‘couple’ is that they are of different sexes.

(c) The heterosexual ‘couple’ is what creates the basic family unit; and, as stated, there is no ‘family’ in the social meaning of the word, unless a heterosexual couple forms the basis of it.

It is indeed possible to change the meaning of basic concepts such as ‘couple’ and ‘family’. However the change must primarily be a conceptual change of basic epistemological meanings; the language that has existed from ancient times does not recognize a ‘couple’ and a ‘family’ that are not heterosexual, except as an exceptional phenomenon that requires a descriptive supplement alongside the use of these concepts, which lose their original meaning where we do not refer to a joining of the two sexes.

(d) It is indeed possible for ‘two persons’ of the same sex to adopt for themselves external characteristics that describe a ‘couple’ and a ‘family’ as stated, and to imitate — in so far as they can — the behaviour pattern of ‘spouses’ and even to establish in practice a ‘family’. But they do not become a ‘couple’ and a ‘family’ in the fundamental meaning of these terms in our language; and language is, in the end, the mirror that reflects our society.

In order for two people to become a ‘couple’ that establishes a ‘family’, in the conceptual-epistemological meaning of our language — and it is a common language that forms the basis of our existence as a society — it is an essential and necessary condition that the two individuals who comprise a ‘couple’ come from opposite sexes.

In this regard, it is irrelevant that two individuals of the same sex, who join into a ‘couple’, do so because their natural sexual orientation does not allow them to be ‘spouses’ in the conceptual sense accepted in our language, namely that of persons of the opposite sex. It is not the ‘capacity’ to be a spouse, in the said basic epistemological meaning, that matters, but the sex of the partner. The criterion for two persons to be a ‘couple’ — according to the epistemological meaning of the concept — does not lie in the lifestyle led by the two persons but, primarily, in their being of different sexes.

(e) The aforesaid should not be regarded as a position deriving from a conservative religious outlook: religion did not dictate the meaning of the concept ‘couple’ in the epistemological sphere, but life itself dictated it; and the reality that reflects life is what lies at the basis of the expression ‘couple’ and this is what gave it the aforesaid meaning in the social sphere.

(f) It should be emphasized:

(1) The concept ‘couple’ — whose components are a ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ — is not necessarily connected with the institution of marriage. Use can be made of the concept ‘couple’ both with regard to a ‘married couple’ and an ‘unmarried couple’, so long as the joining of the spouses makes them a ‘couple’ within the meaning set out above.

(2) There is nothing to prevent adjectives being added to the concept ‘couple’ in its basic social meaning, such as married and unmarried; the adjective ‘married’ does not affect the basic meaning of the concept ‘spouse’ which expresses, in the context under discussion, two individuals of opposite sexes forming a social unit, based on sexual collaboration, whose nature is determined by its original purpose.

(3) In consequence — and more will be said about this below — there is no reason why ‘recognized companions’ should not be regarded as ‘spouses’, since they comply with the basic condition of an union of two persons of different sexes into a family unit, within the basic meaning of this expression as aforesaid. Recognized companions are not a ‘married’ couple but they do constitute a ‘couple’ and a ‘family’; as such, there is no fundamental conceptual difficulty in applying to them legal arrangements prescribed for a ‘married’ couple, and treating them, socially and linguistically, as a ‘couple’ in every respect.

(4) In these circumstances, in the language of human beings — all human beings — the word ‘couple’, in a social context, expresses an union of two individuals of opposite sexes, for a ‘joint life’ in the primary meaning of the word as aforesaid; and if we wish to change the meaning of the concept, we must do so, first and foremost, in the sphere of the basic linguistic concepts of our language and determining this change, expressly, in legislation relating to this issue. Without an express determination, the law gives expression to the linguistic meaning of the concepts to which it refers, unless it states the contrary.

The law speaks in human language, since it is intended for human beings; wherever we wish to deviate from human language and speak in the ‘language of the law’ — this should be done in accordance with an express, clear and unambiguous provision of the legislator. In the present context, this must be a provision that deliberately changes the linguistic significance of the term ‘couple’ in the social context and gives this concept, for the purpose under discussion, another meaning, materially different from its meaning in current usage.

2.    Marriage and the institution of recognized spouses

(a) As a rule, wherever we speak of a ‘couple’ — in the social sphere — the initial impression created in the conscience of the listener or the reader is one of a ‘married’ couple; for ‘marriage’ is what grants legal — and social — recognition to the joint life of the ‘spouses’ as a family unit, in the aforesaid primary meaning.

(b) However, as stated, it is not the external, formal framework of marriage that gives a ‘couple’ its traditional, literal meaning as aforesaid: a ‘couple’ in the sense discussed here, may be ‘married’ or ‘unmarried’, but it must always be a ‘couple’; and you do not have a ‘couple’ in the meaning discussed here unless the two individuals who form it are of opposite sexes. Linguistically, there is no ‘other’ couple in the social sphere; and language is what underlies human communication, and it is the means whereby people express their thoughts.

So marriage, as a legal institution, does not give the linguistic term ‘couple’ its content and conceptual meaning; it merely adds to it social recognition as a family unit in the community, and grants the two individuals forming it — the man and the woman — rights and duties in the legal sphere.

(c) For this reason — and this too has already been said — wherever a ‘couple’ complies with the basic definition of the concept — namely, wherever we are speaking about an union of two individuals of different sexes for a joint lifestyle as a family unit within the meaning set out above — there is no logical difficulty in regarding them as a ‘married couple’ for the purpose of duties and rights that the law prescribes for a ‘married’ couple; regarding the two as a ‘couple’ forms the basis whereby the law confers rights and imposes duties on a married couple.

By contrast, wherever we are speaking of two persons who have joined together for a joint lifestyle as a ‘pair’ that is not a ‘couple’ within the aforesaid basic linguistic sense, logic does not allow us to regard them from a legal viewpoint as if they were a ‘couple’, because they constitute something ‘else’. The ‘married’ couple and ‘recognized companions’ are a ‘couple’, whereas two persons who have joined for a joint lifestyle and are of the same sex are not a ‘couple’ but a ‘pair of friends’.

3.    The collective agreement and the collective arrangement

(a) Now let us turn from the general to the particular. The collective agreement, whose provision we are interpreting, speaks of a ‘spouse (husband/wife)’ (emphasis added); the term ‘spouse’ should be given the traditional linguistic meaning, whereby it refers to individuals of different sexes forming a ‘couple’ as set out above.

The addition ‘husband/wife’ is not intended to tell us that we are referring to spouses of different sexes, since for this we do not need any addition, and use of the term ‘spouse’ is sufficient. The addition is intended to clarify that this agreement refers to spouses who are married to one another, for they alone are called ‘husband’ and ‘wife’; the supplementary addition in the collective arrangement referring to a ‘companion recognized as a husband/wife’ proves that this is indeed the case. Had it not been for this supplement, the words ‘husband/wife’ in the collective agreement could have been interpreted as restricting ‘spouse’ to a ‘married’ couple only, and it would have been necessary to clarify that they are referring also to a ‘couple’ that is not married but which is merely recognized publicly as such.

(b) The addition of ‘recognized companion’ in the collective arrangement does not break away from the framework provided in the collective agreement: both refer to a ‘couple’ and ‘spouses’ in the basic social meaning of the concept ‘couple’, as aforesaid; distinguishing between ‘couples’ on the basis of marriage has more than a hint of discrimination. A married couple and an unmarried couple are fundamentally ‘equal’, in so far as the meaning of the concept ‘couple’ is concerned; distinguishing between them on the basis of ‘marriage’, which merely constitutes a formal, external mark of the framework of their joint lifestyle as a ‘couple’, amounts to improper ‘discrimination’ and not a permitted ‘distinction’. This is sufficient to justify the supplement in the collective arrangement, which intends to prevent improper and forbidden discrimination between ‘couples’.

(c) By contrast, introducing a pair made up of two individuals of the same sex (‘a same-sex couple’) into the said provisions of the agreement and the arrangement amounts to planting a foreign type of plant — something that is not a ‘couple’ — in a field that contains only couples, whether married or unmarried.

A same-sex ‘couple’ is not a ‘couple’ within its basic linguistic meaning, and it should, in my opinion, be referred to, linguistically, as a ‘pair’; the argument that it is a victim of discrimination in comparison with other ‘couples’ is unfounded: the married and unmarried couples are couples, and distinguishing between them constitutes discrimination, whereas the ‘pair’ is not a ‘couple’, and distinguishing between it and a ‘couple’ (married or merely publicly recognized) is not discrimination. So long as the linguistic and social meaning of the concept ‘couple’ is unchanged, a ‘pair’ will not become a ‘couple’: the latter ‘combine into one’ (‘Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall become one flesh,’ Genesis 2, 24 [44]), whereas the former will always remain two.

4.    The interpretive aspect

(a) The means of communication between human beings is language, and a precondition for understanding between persons having a discussion is that the words, expressions and concepts that form the language have a stable linguistic meaning.

(b) As stated, the law speaks to human beings in human language: and the word is, first and foremost, the basis for interpretation of its provisions. The concepts ‘couple’ and ‘spouses’ and the linguistic relationship between them and ‘family’ are primarily linguistic concepts, whose meaning — in so far as the social sphere is concerned — is, as stated above, an union of two individuals of opposite sexes to share their lives in a family unit, when this sharing is characterized, inter alia, by intimacy designed, conceptually, to ensure the continuation of life.

(c) The same is true of interpretation of the law, and likewise with regard to interpretation of a legal document: a ‘couple’ requires the union of two individuals of opposite sexes; this is true even when the two are incapable in practice or unwilling — for whatever reason — to be intimate for the purpose of ensuring the continuation of life.

(d) Indeed, one of the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation is that the law is interpreted in order to achieve the purpose for which it was legislated; mutatis mutandis, a legal document is interpreted so as to achieve the intention of the parties to it.

Where the language is clear, we would fail in our duty if we were to deviate from the agreed linguistic meaning by which people plan their lives, and give the concepts used by the law or the agreement a different meaning from the one that they have in the world of language.

5.    The Equal Employment Opportunities Law – discrimination

(a) I wholeheartedly agree with the illuminating remarks of my esteemed colleague — the Vice-President — with regard to the significance of the principle of equality and the duty to realize and apply it.

However, as my esteemed colleague noted — when citing Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [16] and Committee for Protection of Expropriated Nazareth Lands v. Minister of Finance [17] — you cannot violate the principle of equality unless you have ‘equals’; where you have persons who are not equal, treating them differently compared with others who are different from them should not be regarded as improper discrimination, but merely as a permissible distinction.

(b) My esteemed colleague found that same-sex couples are ‘equal’ to heterosexual couples; from here, it was naturally easy to reach a conclusion of ‘discrimination’ between the two types of ‘couples’, where one is entitled to a benefit and the other is not.

I do not accept this position. In my opinion — following what I have said until now — we are dealing with two ‘couples’ that are completely different in nature; the one — the heterosexual (whether married or unmarried) — is a ‘couple’, whereas the other — the homosexual — is merely a ‘pair’; therefore conferring a benefit on the one does not constitute discrimination when not conferring the benefit on the other.

(c) The common denominator that makes the two ‘couples’ — the homosexual and the heterosexual — ‘equals’ for the purpose of the principle of equality, lies, according to my esteemed colleague, in the fact that the characteristic marks of the joint lifestyle of the two are equal; both run a common household, both form a family unit, and both live within a social framework based on a life of sharing and harmony; prima facie, they only differ from one another in one external-formal factor, which is merely that the homosexual couple cannot marry.

My esteemed colleague adds: ‘the inability to marry’ is a factor that also distinguishes married spouses from ‘publicly recognized’ companions; and this distinguishing factor did not prevent a total comparison between the latter and the married spouses.

(d) According to my thinking, a sharing and harmonious relationship — as pointed out by my esteemed colleague — is insufficient to make a homosexual couple a ‘couple’ within the meaning that this concept has in our language in the context discussed here, because it lacks an element essential to ‘being a couple’, namely that the spouses must be of opposite sexes. The formal ‘inability’ to marry — by a formal marriage — does not put the homosexual couple in the same category as the heterosexual ‘publicly recognized’ unmarried couple; the latter is a ‘couple’ within the linguistic meaning of this concept, whereas the former is not.

The distinction between the heterosexual couple — including ‘publicly recognized companions’ — and the homosexual couple is based on the fundamental nature of the concept ‘couple’; the first is a ‘couple’ because it is comprised, as stated, of two individuals of opposite sexes, whereas the second is otherwise; the fact that the homosexual spouses maintain a social framework ‘similar’ in its external characteristics to that of the heterosexual couple — the natural family unit — does not make them a heterosexual couple.

As stated, an essential factor — which is an indispensable condition in this context — for converting two individuals enjoying a life of sharing and harmony into a ‘couple’, within the meaning of the term in the Hebrew language, lies in them being ‘of one flesh’ and their being able — conceptually — to fulfil the precept of ‘being fruitful and multiplying’. The ‘married’ couple and the ‘publicly recognized’ couple meet this basic requirement, and they are therefore ‘equal’ for the purpose of examining an allegation of discrimination; whereas the homosexual couple, which does not meet the said basic requirement, is different from them in the said respect.

(e) My esteemed colleague is aware of a substantive difference that distinguishes, conceptually, between the two ‘couples’ as stated, but according to his approach this difference has no implication for the case before us; this is because in his opinion El-Al decided to confer a benefit on its employees ‘in the form of an aeroplane ticket enabling the employee to take with him the person with whom he shares his life’ (emphasis added), and for this purpose there is no difference between the two couples.

Even this narrow and restrictive approach to the problem before us does not, unfortunately, enable me to agree with my colleague. Admittedly we are concerned with the interpretation of El-Al’s decision. However, this decision does not speak of granting an aeroplane ticket to a person who ‘lives together with the employee’ (emphasis added) but to ‘the employee’s spouse’ (emphasis added); the linguistic difference between the two speaks for itself. As I have already stated, in my opinion the concept ‘couple’ in our language — in the social sphere considered here — expresses the union of two individuals who share their lives, which makes them physically into ‘one flesh’ in the primary sense of the expression; ‘He created them male and female… and He called their name man…’ (Genesis 5, 2 [44]); whereas the union of two individuals that ab initio cannot, physically, become ‘one flesh’ as stated, and who conceptually cannot achieve the said purpose, creates a couple quantitatively (since there are two), but not qualitatively (since the two cannot become one, within the framework of the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying).

(f) In my opinion, all we have before us is the language of the collective agreement — and in the supplement found in the collective arrangement — namely: ‘spouse (husband/wife)’ in the agreement, and ‘the person publicly recognized as husband/wife of the company’s employee’ in the arrangement; I do not think that we may read instead of these: ‘whoever lives together with the employee’ and even not ‘whoever forms a family unit with the employee’.

We are not dealing with a ‘life of sharing’ or a ‘family unit’, but with spouses within the basic conceptual meaning that this concept has in our language; these are always heterosexual, as long as language does not change its meaning.

5.    With regard to the allegation of discrimination between a ‘homosexual couple’ and a ‘heterosexual’ couple, there is no place in my opinion for considerations of social justice; the distinction between these two does not lie in the employees’ sexual orientation, but in the distinction between a ‘couple’ and a ‘family’ and those who do not constitute either a ‘couple’ or a ‘family’, within the meaning given to these terms in our language. Even single employees — whether ‘heterosexual’ or ‘homosexual’ — have close friends with whom they would like to spend their vacation abroad; yet no-one claims that they are discriminated against in that they are refused the benefit merely because they do not commit themselves to a formal framework of ‘a joint lifestyle’ with those friends.

El-Al saw fit to confer a benefit on ‘spouses’ that constitute a ‘family’ within the meaning thereof in the language which we use to communicate with one another; this does not constitute discrimination on the basis of ‘sexual orientation’, since we do not regard the homosexual spouses as included in the linguistic concepts ‘couple’ and ‘family’. We have here a distinction between a ‘spouse’ and someone ‘who is not a spouse’, and it may be argued that from a sociological and social viewpoint there is discrimination between ‘couples’ and those who are not ‘couples’; however, discrimination on a basis of ‘sexual orientation’ is not present here.

6.    More regarding the distinction between ‘couples’

(a) Heterosexual couples share a complete mutual commitment to sharing and stability, each to the other and both to the framework of the couple, in all spheres of life. The law gives validity to this commitment, since society, as such, has a profound interest in preserving the framework of the couple — which forms the basis of the organizational structure of human society — and ensuring its stability.

Society has adopted in this respect the approach that regards spouses becoming ‘one flesh’ — that is capable, conceptually, of achieving the mission of ‘being fruitful and multiplying’ — as a condition for making two people who unite for a life of sharing into a ‘couple’; language expresses this with the meaning it attaches to ‘couple’ and ‘family’. At the same time, society created rules to give a seal of social recognition to the framework of the ‘couple’, and it protects it and intervenes when a couple wishes to dissolve the framework, and it even seeks to prevent the dissolution whenever possible.

The said protection and intervention are achieved with legal tools; and the law — following language, which reflects social consensus — attaches the said meaning to ‘couple’ and ‘family’, but not to the homosexual couple.

(b) The recognition of the heterosexual couple that is ‘publicly recognized’ as a ‘couple’, even though it does not have all the legal guarantees of mutual commitment and stability, derives from the existence of the basic social requirements for the existence of a ‘couple’ — namely, an union of two individuals of opposite sexes as ‘one flesh’, who are able, conceptually, to ensure reproduction — and when these exist, there is no social justification for ignoring the de facto existence of the family unit and the spouses comprising it; on the contrary, it must ensure that the mutual commitment and stability of the unit are protected, even without the formal status of marriage.

The rules granting ‘mutual benefits’ to publicly-recognized heterosexual couples just like to married couples — in the circumstances provided by law — are based on a desire to give expression to the mutual commitment and ensure the stability of the family unit created by the publicly recognized ‘couple’, not necessarily by formally entering into the institution of marriage.

(c) This case of the homosexual couple is different: on the one hand, the substantive condition of different sexes is not met, and without this, one cannot speak physically of ‘one flesh’ and conceptually of reproduction and continuation of life, and therefore it does not constitute the same fundamental unit that lies at the basis of the organizational structure of human society; on the other, the partners do not have the same mutual commitment to the stability and continuity of the partnership that might induce society to recognize them as a ‘special’ couple and fit them in alongside the ‘typical’ couple at the basis of the social structure.

When society reaches the conclusion that a homosexual unit should also serve as a basic ‘unit’ of the social structure alongside the heterosexual couple, and when it determines rules for its creation, formal recognition of its existence and the guarantee of the mutual commitment between its constituents to partnership and stability, then the linguistic-conceptual meaning of the term ‘couple’ and ‘family’ in this context will change, and the homosexual couple will be included in the new linguistic framework alongside the heterosexual couple.

But as long as there is no such social consensus, the homosexual couple is not included within the framework of a ‘couple’ in our language, and it is not recognized as one of our society’s nuclear units; consequently its formation, the mutual commitment of its constituents to the partnership and its stability, and the rights and duties of those involved in it are naturally not regulated by our law.

(d) The change required here is therefore a basic conceptual change in our social outlook regarding the substance of the basic social unit, counted among the elements of our society’s organizational basis. The expression of what appears to be ‘tolerance’ towards exceptional cases and an attempt to prevent apparent social discrimination against those exceptional cases on the basis of what is exceptional about them cannot replace the fundamental conceptual change necessary for equating the homosexual couple with the heterosexual couple.

7.    Different conceptual attitudes in different cases

(a) According to my approach, there is no reason to attach an ‘independent’ and different meaning to the concepts ‘couple’ and ‘spouse’ in different contexts of sharing lives in society. I do not accept the approach that says that these concepts should be examined separately in the field of labour relations, in the field of social legislation, in the field of residency and citizenship, in the field of property law and obligations, in the field of taxation, etc..

In my opinion, as stated, in current circumstances, from the linguistic-social viewpoint, the words ‘couple’ and ‘spouse’ have only one conceptual meaning, namely two individuals of opposite sexes who have united into a framework of a joint life, which is based on the physical ability to become ‘one flesh’ and the conceptual ability to fulfil the commandment of being fruitful and multiplying; the removal of this two-fold characteristic from the framework of the definition of the concept ‘couple’ amounts to a nullification of the meaning that this concept has in the language of consensus that we use as an organized society.

(b) Destroying the linguistic-conceptual meaning in one sphere naturally leads to departing from it in other spheres, and the social framework built on an existing agreed meaning is undermined. The term ‘couple’, in this context, will lose its conceptual meaning in our language, and the focus of this meaning, which today derives from the heterosexuality of the spouses, will become a personal decision to have a life of quasi-family sharing at a particular time, where the sex of the spouses will be left to one side. There is nothing to prevent this result being reached, if it is deemed correct to go in this direction. However, this must be done by giving a ‘different’ meaning to the linguistic concept ‘couple’; this is not for us to do, but for whoever is authorized to change the Hebrew language, even if only in the legal sphere.

(c) Let me not be misunderstood: my approach does not seek to challenge the increasingly prevalent social recognition of the sexual orientation of individuals who wish to build their lives with persons of the same sex, nor do I wish to place obstacles in the path of those individuals to prevent their self-fulfilment in accordance with their orientations. All that I want is to refrain from the destruction of a conceptual ‘barrier’, linguistic chaos and communication that suffers from ‘misunderstandings’, by deviating so sharply from the meaning of basic concepts, which are the foundation of society and facilitate its operation in the way that we currently live.

For generations the concept ‘couple’ has been used in the social context to express a heterosexual couple. It was used in this way both orally and in writing, and it was used in this way in determining social arrangements and legal norms. If we try to introduce a change in this matter, this ought to be done in a straightforward way and not in a roundabout fashion; for we are dealing with human language, and we are obliged to respect it and protect the stability of its contents.

8.    Summary

(a) A ‘heterosexual’ couple — whether married or unmarried — is a ‘couple’ within the conceptual meaning of the word, whereas a ‘homosexual’ couple is not.

(b) For this reason, we are not dealing conceptually with ‘equal’ couples, and therefore the distinction made between the heterosexual couple and the homosexual couple is merely a ‘distinction’, and not ‘discrimination’.

(c) There is no basis for partial and limited recognition of the institution of the ‘homosexual’ couple; yes — with regard to labour agreements; no — in other areas, such as taxation, personal status, citizenship, giving testimony, etc..

A change in the meaning of the concept of ‘spouse’ must be general and all-encompassing, and it ought to be done in a way that everyone is aware of the new meaning given to it and its ramifications.

(d) An employer may offer a ‘benefit’ only to heterosexual couples without being guilty of discrimination, because the homosexual couple is not a ‘couple’, and the distinction between employees who are ‘spouses’, in the said basic linguistic sense, and employees who are not, is a ‘distinction’ and not ‘discrimination’.

(e) The discrimination that the respondent alleges in this case, is merely an ‘appearance of discrimination’, and it derives from what clearly appears to be ‘social injustice’. However, every distinction in distributing benefits to employees involves ‘social injustice’; the principle of equality as a defence against discrimination was not intended to address this.

Were my opinion accepted, the petition would be granted and the judgment of the National Labour Court’s decision would be reversed.

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

1.    The French philosopher, Michel Foucault, discussed the influence of social norms — reflecting what is accepted, ‘normal’, and what changes from time to time and from society to society — on the application of transcendental and formal laws (legal norms).

‘…le pouvoir de la Norme… est venu s’ajouter à d’autres pouvoirs en les obligeant à de nouvelles délimitations; celui de la Loi… et du Texte…

…le pouvoir de la norme fonctionne facilement a l’intérieur d’un système de l’égalité formelle, puisque a l’intérieur… la règle, il introduit… des différences individuelles’ (M. Foucault, Surveiller et Punir (1975) 186).

In translation:

‘… the power of social norms joins with other forces — the law and the text — and imposes on them new limitations…

… the power of social norms acts well within a system of formal equality, since it introduces… individual differences into… the rules.’

It seems to me that we cannot decide the petition before us without referring to the changes that have taken place with regard to social norms in Israel respecting homosexuality.

2. The respondent demanded that the petitioner recognize the man with whom he shares his life as a ‘spouse’ for whom he is entitled to receive an aeroplane ticket as of 1989, by virtue of the collective agreement. The Labour Court accepted the claim on the basis of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law (Amendment). The law, which came into effect on 2 January 1992, added to s. 2(a) of the Equal Employment Opportunities Law (hereafter — ‘the Equal Opportunities Law’) a prohibition against discrimination against employees because of their sexual orientation. The Labour Court held that the law changed the existing law and gave the respondent a right that he did not have before it was enacted, and that therefore he is entitled to receive the aeroplane tickets from the date that the amendment came into effect.

My colleague, Vice-President Barak, presumed — in the absence of any contrary argument by the respondent — that the respondent’s right does not derive from the collective arrangement itself. In Justice Barak’s opinion, the respondent’s right derives from the amendment, which reflects the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination against employees on the grounds of their sexual orientation.

My colleague, Justice Kedmi, is of the opinion that the expression ‘spouse’ cannot be given a different meaning in different laws. In his view, this expression has only one meaning: a man and a woman who unite for a joint life. This definition is accepted both from a linguistic viewpoint and a social viewpoint. It follows that without an express provision in the law that a same-sex life-partner is a ‘spouse’, a life-partner of the same-sex should not be given the benefits to which a ‘spouses’ is entitled on the basis of a provision prohibiting discrimination against the employee himself because of his sexual orientation.

3.    I agree with the result reached by the Vice-President. However, in my opinion, the respondent’s right does not derive only from the Equal Opportunities Law, but also derives from the general principle of equality that has, for some time, been a part of our labour law.

In my view, the original version of the Equal Opportunities Law reflected the principle of equality but did not establish it. Thus, for instance, in Nevo v. National Labour Court [7], a provision that provided a different retirement age for men and women was disqualified on the basis of the principle of equality. This disqualification was based on the legal position prior to the Equal Retirement Age for Female and Male Employees Law, 5747-1987, which made the retirement age the same for women and men, while preserving the right of women employees to early retirement. Cf. also the remarks of Justice Mazza in Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [5], at pp. 521-522 {150}.

Similarly, the amendment also did not change the existing law about equal rights for homosexuals, but merely gave expression to them. Consequently, had the respondent insisted on his original claim to receive the benefits for his spouse since May 1989, which was before the enactment of the amendment, I would have granted his request. Conversely, if not for the development of social norms in Israel which no longer totally oppose homosexual relations, it is possible that the Equal Opportunities Law would have been interpreted narrowly, similarly to the interpretation of my colleague, Justice Kedmi, which would not give the respondent the benefits that he claimed.

4.    The principle of equality does not operate in a social vacuum. The question whether a certain case involves discrimination between equals, or whether it merely involves different treatment of different people, is decided on the basis of the accepted social outlooks. Justice Wilson discussed this in the Canadian case of R. v. Turpin (1989) [38], at p. 1331:

‘In determining whether there is discrimination on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, it is important to look… to the larger social, political, and legal context…

Accordingly, it is only by examining the larger context that a court can determine whether differential treatment results in inequality.’

See also the remarks of Lord Denning in Dyson Holdings Ltd v. Fox (1975) [34], at p. 1033.

5.    In the past, intimate relations between members of the same sex — relations that are considered a sin by all the monotheistic religions — constituted a criminal offence. Legitimacy was also given outside the criminal law to a distinction based on sexual orientation. Homosexuals (including lesbians) were fired from their jobs, were not accepted for positions requiring a security clearance, and were forbidden to raise their children. In the United States they were classified as psychopaths and were not allowed to immigrate into that country (The Editors of the Harvard Law Review, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 1990, at pp. 44, 65, 119, 132, 139, 150, 153).

This treatment has changed gradually. Legal literature criticized the definition of homosexual relations as a criminal offence, as well as discrimination against homosexuals in all areas of life, including areas of employment (R.A. Posner, Sex and Reason, Cambridge, 1992, at p. 308). Movements advocating the equality of rights for homosexuals were established. The trend today — which began in the seventies — is a liberal treatment of the sexual orientation of an individual, which is considered to be his private matter.

These changes in social outlook were given expression in law in the Western world, and homosexual couples have achieved equality, in accordance with the social norms in each country.

6.    In European countries, there is no longer a criminal prohibition of homosexual relations. Legislation in the field of public law and labour relations in France, Denmark, Sweden and Norway prohibits discrimination because of sexual orientation. Laws in Sweden, Holland and Norway equate the rights and duties of homosexual couples with the rights and duties of heterosexual couples, including tax benefits and property division arrangements upon separation. The law in Sweden also recognizes the right of inheritance of a homosexual spouse (see L.R. Helfer, ‘Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United Europe’ 32 Va. J. of Int’l L., 1991-92, 157, 168). Homosexuals have achieved the most recognition in Denmark. The law in that country allows ‘marriage’ between two persons of the same sex by registering their life-partnership relationship. This registration entitles homosexual spouses to social rights granted to married couples (M.H. Pedersen, ‘Denmark: Homosexual Marriages and New Rules Regarding Separation and Divorce’ 30 Jour. of Family L., 1991-92, 289).

Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights also provides protection for homosexual relationships as part of the protection given to the right to privacy (see decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the Norris Case (1988) [35]; and Modinos v. Cyprus (1993) [36]). Recently, a proposal was made to amend the Convention to expressly prohibits discrimination of any kind because of sexual orientation (Draft Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).

7.    Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is a part of the Constitution Act, provides protection for the right of every person to equality. In case-law this section has been interpreted as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Vriend v. Alberta (1994) [39]; Egan v. Canada (1993) [40]; Haig v. Canada (1992) [41]). By contrast, claims of homosexual couples for rights conferred on married couples were rejected. It was held that, since the purpose of marriage is raising children, the different treatment of the homosexual couple is not a breach of the charter (Haig [41], at p. 340; Layland v. Ontario (Consumer & Commercial Relations) (1993) [42], at p. 231).

8.    In the United States the change has been more moderate. In some States there is still a criminal prohibition — which is not enforced — against having homosexual relations. As recently as 1967, the United States Supreme Court held that, since the homosexual has a psychopathic personality, as defined in the Immigration and Naturalization Act, his immigration into the United States was prohibited, and he was liable to immediate deportation (Boutilier v. Immigration Service (1967) [28]). Six years later, however, in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association rejected the definition of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder, and, in 1981, the rule in Boutilier [28] was reversed. It was held that because homosexuality is not a psychiatric disorder, it does not indicate bad character, and therefore it does not constitute grounds for rejecting a naturalization request (Nemetz v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (1981) [29]).

During the 1980s, 139 judicial districts (States and local authorities) enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing and education (Note: ‘Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives’ 106 Harv. L. Rev. (1992-93) 1905, 1923-25). The municipal laws of 12 municipalities allowed homosexual couples to register at the municipality as domestic partners, for the purpose of receiving social rights given to families (Bowman and Cornish, supra, at p. 1168).

At the same time, the courts in several States have recognized the rights of a same-sex spouse on the basis of the ‘functional test’. According to this standard, recognition of the homosexual couple depends on the purpose of the law conferring rights on a ‘family’ or ‘spouse’. The homosexual spouse will enjoy the rights conferred by law, if this is consistent with the law’s purpose.

Thus, for instance, the New York State Court of Appeals recognized the life-companion of a deceased tenant as a protected tenant by virtue of his being the spouse of the deceased. It was held that, in view of the purpose of the tenant protection law, the difference between a heterosexual couple and a homosexual couple is irrelevant. If the life-companion were not recognized as the spouse, the purpose of the law would be frustrated, in that a remote relation would be entitled to the accommodation, whereas the person who shared his life with the deceased would be expelled from the apartment where he had lived for years (Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. (1989) [30], at pp. 788-789; see also Yorkshire Towers Co. v. Harpster (1986) [31]; Two Associates v. Brown (1986) [32]; E. 10th St. Assoc. v. Estate of Goldstein (1990) [33]).

The accepted outlook in the United States was summarized in the article of Bowman and Cornish, supra, at pp. 1175-77, as follows:

‘… there is a general tendency to look at the characteristics of the particular relationship to determine whether it qualifies as a family for the purposes of the particular statutory scheme, especially when a statute uses a term such as “family”, “spouse”, or “parent” without defining it.

… Courts have identified certain elements as indicia of a “family-like” relationship, including financial commitment, exclusivity of the relationship, the reliance members place on each other, the length of the relationship, and the presentation of the relationship to the outside.’

9.    The law in Israel regarding homosexuals reflects the social changes that have occurred over the years.

Male homosexual relations were, in the past, included in the offence of deviations from nature, an offence punishable by 10 years’ imprisonment (section 351(3) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977, which was a new version of section 152(2) of the Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936, enacted by the Mandate). This prohibition was never enforced. As early as the year 1963, in CrimA 224/63 Ben-Ami v. Attorney-General [20], at p. 238, the court held that this offence has no basis in our present reality. Speaking for the court, Justice H. Cohn said:

‘Unnatural sexual relations, and homosexual relations, when done in private between consenting adults, are not acts involving moral turpitude, nor do they indicate that the persons who do them are criminals deserving of punishment. These are offences that we inherited from ancient systems and past generations and they have no place in the criminal law of a modern state… ‘Nature’, as such, no longer needs the protection of the criminal law. What needs, and is therefore entitled to, their protection are the human body and human dignity and liberty… one of the basic rights of the citizen is that the State will not interfere in the private life and his behaviour behind closed doors…’

Nonetheless, for many years the offence remained the law and was not repealed. Even in 1980, when the draft Penal Law (Amendment no. 14), 5740-1980 — which, according to its explanatory notes, was intended to replace the provisions of the Mandatory law with legislation suitable to the reality of our times — was tabled in the Knesset, it was suggested that the prohibition against homosexuality remain. Notwithstanding, it was proposed that the punishment for this offence be reduced to one year’s imprisonment. The explanatory notes said: ‘The question whether in our time there is a justification for the interference of the criminal law in sexual acts done between consenting adults in private is a controversial one’ (ibid., at p. 392).

This proposal did not reach the Knesset, and the criminal prohibition was repealed eight years later in the Penal Law (Amendment no. 22), 5748-1988.

This formal repeal reflects the current position of Israeli society that the law (as opposed to religion) should be indifferent to the sexual orientation of a person, so long as he does not harm anyone. There is widespread consensus that homosexuals should not be restricted or subject to discrimination (Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, supra, at p. 334). The amendment to the Equal Opportunities Law reflects this approach. M. Virshowski MK referred to this during the debate proposing the law at first reading:

‘… with this we are in fact establishing the rules accepted today in the enlightened world and allowing people to live in accordance with their sexual orientations, and not to suffer for them or be oppressed because of them’ (Knesset Proceedings 119, 1991, at p. 1034).

10. In our case, it is clear that there is a difference between a homosexual couple and a heterosexual couple. However, a ‘difference’ justifying different treatment must be relevant (Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [16], at p. 35; HCJ 720/82 Elitzur Religious Sports Association, Nahariyah Branch v. Nahariyah Municipality [21], at p. 21; HCJ 4169/93 [22]).

The proper test is therefore to consider the relevance of the sexual orientation to the benefit conferred on the spouse. The functional test meets this requirement. According to this test, no distinction should be made between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples, if the spousal relationship between the spouses of the same sex meets the criteria that realize the purpose for which the right or benefit is conferred. By contrast, when the sexual orientation is relevant to realizing the purpose of the benefit, for instance if the purpose is to encourage having children, withholding the benefit from a same-sex spouse will not constitute discrimination. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé discussed this distinction in the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop (1993) [43], at p. 560:

‘… “family status” may have varied meanings depending on the context or purpose for which the definition is desired… the Tribunal concluded that the potential scope of the term “family status” is broad enough that it does not prima facie exclude same-sex couples. In making this finding, the Tribunal used the proper interpretational approach, considered the purpose of the Act and the values at the base of the protection of families.’

Cf. also NLC 54/85-0 [25]. In that case it was held that a recognized partner is exempt from paying insurance premiums under s. 8 of the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5728-1968, exempting ‘a married woman whose husband is insured’ from making insurance premiums. Justice Goldberg, who wrote the judgment, explained that in view of the purpose of the law to place a recognized partner on an equal footing with the ‘lawful wife’, and in view of the definition in the law of the expression ‘his wife’ including a ‘recognized partner’, the recognized partner must also be regarded as a ‘married woman’.

11. Public authorities are first and foremost subject to the principle of equality, but this principle also applies in the field of labour relations in general (see, for instance, S. Almog, ‘A Guide to Labour Law’ The Employee’s Guide, 1994, 35-36). The employer’s contractual freedom retreats when faced with the employee’s right to equality (Flight Attendants Association v. Hazin [24]; HCJ 410/76 Herut v. National Labour Court in Jerusalem [23]; Nevo v. National Labour Court [7], ibid.). The legislation prohibiting discrimination in labour relations reflects this principle, but did not create it. See also F. Raday, ‘The “Privatization of Human Rights” and the Misuse of Power’ 23 Mishpatim, 1994, at pp. 21, 41.

12. In our case, the aeroplane ticket was not meant for a spouse who is married to the employee, and in any event the purpose of the benefit was not to encourage a lifestyle within a traditional family framework. The benefit is given to the employee for the spouse with whom he shares his life de facto. Indeed, although the petitioner did not intend the arrangement to apply to same-sex spouses, the sex of the spouse is not relevant to the purpose of giving the benefit.

Benefits for a spouse are a significant part of employees’ salaries. Professor Elbin’s calculations found that in the United States 27% of employees’ salary is made up of benefits (in his article, supra, at pp. 1068-1069).

In Israel, benefits (including ‘related conditions’) may lead even to the doubling of the salary (see the monthly periodical Calculation, M. Katzin, ed., October 1994, 50). A significant part of these benefits — such as pension plans and life insurance — are given for the spouse, including the recognized partner, and to deny benefits to a spouse with whom a homosexual lives is tantamount to reducing his salary. Consequently, denying these benefits is discrimination against the employee himself. Professor Elbin said of this:

‘Unable to marry, gay couples are generally excluded from the benefits afforded married couples in our society, including benefits commonly accorded spouses in employee and public benefit programs. For gay employees, the result is total compensation lower than that of other married co-workers performing the same job.

Domestic partner provisions lessen the economic discrimination that results from the ban on same-sex marriage.

… An employer who does not offer domestic partner benefits is, in fact, paying less in total compensation than he should be because employees with domestic partners are not being compensated equitably’ (supra, at 1068-69, 1082).

In the case before us, denying the benefit to the respondent would lead to a reduction of his salary in the amount of the price of the ticket, and there is no justification for this.

For these reasons, I agree that the petition should be denied.

 

 

Petition denied, by majority opinion (Vice-President A. Barak and Justice D. Dorner), Justice Y. Kedmi dissenting.

30 November 1994.

 

 

 

[*]                 NLC 3-160/53 El-Al Airlines v. Danielowitz IsrLC 26 339.

*                 Ibid., p. 349.

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