Communications

Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 6126/94
HCJ 6143/94
HCJ 6126/94
Date Decided: 
Monday, July 26, 1999
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: Chana Szenes, born in Budapest, Hungary in 1921, emigrated to Mandatory Palestine alone at the age of 18. In 1943, during World War II, she enlisted in the British army. In June 1944, Chana Szenes parachuted in Yugoslavia, and crossed the border into Hungary with the aid of partisan groups. The German army captured her almost immediately. Chana Szenes was executed by a German firing squad on November 8, 1944. The current petition concerns the play “The Kastner Trial,” written by respondent no. four. The play, based on the true story of the Kastner affair, was intended to be televised. In one of the scenes of the play, one of the characters claims that Chana Szenes broke under interrogation by the Hungarian police and betrayed her comrades. Petitioners, including relatives of Szenes, petitioned this court to prevent the broadcast of that scene in the play. Petitioners claimed that the scene contained falsehoods, defamed Chana Szenes, and injured the feelings of many, including survivors of the Holocaust.

 

Held: For the purposes of the petition, the Court assumed that the play, with the scene in question, defamed Chana Szenes, and also injured the feelings of the public in general and that of Holocaust survivors in particular. The Court held, however, that, in a democratic society, only a near certainty of grave and severe injury to feelings can justify the prior restraint of expression. The court held that the scene in question did not present a near certainty of such injury. As such, the petition was denied. Justice Cheshin dissented. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 6126/94

HCJ 6143/94

HCJ 6126/94

1. Giora Szenes

2. Eitan Szenes

3. Dr. David Szenes

4. Deputy Chairman of Yad Va‑Shem                                 

HCJ 6143/94

1. Nadia Matar

2. Women’s Association for the Future of Israel

v.

1. The Broadcasting Authority

2. Chairman of the Broadcasting Authority

3. Director-General of National Television

4. Mordechai Lerner

5. Uri Barbash                            

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[July 26, 1999]

Before President A. Barak, Justices E. Mazza, M. Cheshin

Petition for an order nisi and Interim Order

Facts: Chana Szenes, born in Budapest, Hungary in 1921, emigrated to Mandatory Palestine alone at the age of 18. In 1943, during World War II, she enlisted in the British army. In June 1944, Chana Szenes parachuted in Yugoslavia, and crossed the border into Hungary with the aid of partisan groups. The German army captured her almost immediately. Chana Szenes was executed by a German firing squad on November 8, 1944. The current petition concerns the play “The Kastner Trial,” written by respondent no. four. The play, based on the true story of the Kastner affair, was intended to be televised. In one of the scenes of the play, one of the characters claims that Chana Szenes broke under interrogation by the Hungarian police and betrayed her comrades. Petitioners, including relatives of Szenes, petitioned this court to prevent the broadcast of that scene in the play. Petitioners claimed that the scene contained falsehoods, defamed Chana Szenes, and injured the feelings of many, including survivors of the Holocaust.

Held: For the purposes of the petition, the Court assumed that the play, with the scene in question, defamed Chana Szenes, and also injured the feelings of the public in general and that of Holocaust survivors in particular. The Court held, however, that, in a democratic society, only a near certainty of grave and severe injury to feelings can justify the prior restraint of expression. The court held that the scene in question did not present a near certainty of such injury. As such, the petition was denied. Justice Cheshin dissented.

Israeli Cases Cited:

  1. HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 23(2) 477.
  2. CA165/82 Kibbutz Hatzor v. Assessment Clerk Rechovot, IsrSC 39(2) 70.
  3. HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel‑Aviv/ Jaffa, IsrSC 42(2) 309.
  4. FH 9/77 Israel Electric Company v. “Ha’aretz” Newspaper, IsrSC 32(3) 337.
  5. HCJ14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board, IsrSC 41(1) 421.
  6. EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee of the Eleventh Knesset, IsrSC 39(2) 225.
  7. CA 723/74 “Ha’aretz” Newspaper Publications v. Israel Electric Company, IsrSC 31(2) 281.
  8. HCJ 73/53 “Kol Ha’Am” v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 7 871.
  9. HCJ 153/83 Levi v. District Commander of Israeli Police Southern Command, IsrSC 38(2) 393.
  10. CA 105/92 Re’em Engineers and Contractors v. Municipality of Upper Nazareth, IsrSC 47(5) 189.
  11. CrimA 225/68 State of Israel v. Ben Moshe, IsrSC 22(2) 427.
  12. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company v. Film and Play Review Board, IsrSC 50(5) 661; [1997] IsrLR 23.
  13. HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board, IsrSC 43(2) 22.
  14. HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 41(3) 255.
  15. HCJ 5503/94 Segal v. Speaker of the Knesset, IsrSC 51(4) 529.
  16. CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira, IsrSC 43(3) 840.
  17. HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem District Commander, IsrSC 48(2) 456.
  18. CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum, IsrSC 46(2) 464.
  19. HCJ 5688/92 Vichselbaum v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 47(2) 812.
  20. FH 3299/93 Vichselbaum v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49(2) 195.
  21. HCJ 109/70 The Orthodox Coptic Patriarch of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police, IsrSC 25(1) 225.
  22. HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.
  23. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence, IsrSC 49(4) 94; [1995-6] IsrLR 178.
  24. CrimFH 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel, IsrSC 49(4) 589.
  25. HCJ 372/84 Kloppfer-Naveh v. Minister of Education and Culture, IsrSC 38(3) 233.
  26. HCJ 953/89 Indoor v. Mayor of Jerusalem, IsrSC 45(4) 683.
  27. HCJ 257/89 Hoffman v. Appointee for the Western Wall, IsrSC 48(2) 265.
  28. HCJ 606/93 Kiddum Yazamoth (1981) and Publishing v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 48(2) 1.
  29. HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Channel Two Television and Radio, IsrSC 51(5)193.
  30. CrimA 126/62 Dizenchik v. Attorney General, IsrSC 17 169.
  31. CrimA. 696/81 Azulai v. State of Israel, IsrSC 37(2) 565.
  32. CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel, IsrSC 52(1) 535.
  33. HCJ 987/94 Euronet Kavei Zahav (1992) v. Minister of Communications, IsrSC 48(5) 412.
  34. HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Attia v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport, IsrSC 49(5) 1.
  35. HCJ 351/72 Keinan v. Film and Play Review Board, IsrSC 26(2) 811.
  36. HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful Movement v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 51(2) 509.
  37. HCJ 807/78 Ein Gal v. Films and Play Review Board, IsrSC 33(1) 274.
  38. HCJ 273/97 Association for the Preservation of Individual Rights of Homosexuals, Lesbians and Bisexuals in Israel v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport, IsrSC 51(5) 822.
  39. HC 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 35(3) 365.
  40. HCJ156/75 Dakah v. Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 30(2) 94.
  41. HCJ 266/81 Avron v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 35(3) 502.
  42. HCJ 2137/98 Elias v. Chairman of Managerial Committee, Broadcasting Authority (unreported case).
  43. HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Attorney General, IsrSC 44(2) 485.
  44. HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing, IsrSC 47(2) 229; [1992-4] IsrLR 19.
  45. HCJ 259/84 M.I.L.N Israeli Institute for Better Business and Product v. Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 38(2) 673.
  46. HCJ 243/82 Zichroni v. Directorial Committee of the Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 37(1) 757.
  47. CrimA 232/55 Attorney General v. Greenwald, IsrSC 12 2017.
  48. FH 7325/95 Yediot Acharonot v. Krauss, IsrSC 52(3) 1.
  49. CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel, IsrSC 49(3) 355.
  50. CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel, IsrSC 48(1) 87; [1992-4] IsrLR 170.
  51. CA 1482/92 Hagar v. Hagar, IsrSC 47(2) 793.
  52. HCJ 3933/92 Barachat v. C.O.S. Central Command, IsrSC 46(5) 1.
  53. CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon Lezion Jewish Burial Society, IsrSC 53(3) 600; [1998-9] IsrLR insert.
  54. CA 1182/90 Shacham v. Rothman, IsrSC 46(4) 330.

 

District Court Cases Cited

  1. DC (Jer) 124/53 Attorney General. v. Greenwald, IsrDC 44 3.

American Cases Cited

  1. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
  2. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
  3. Davis v. Costa-Gravas, 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
  4. Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
  5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).

German Cases Cited

  1. 30 BVerfGE 173 (1971).

Israeli Books Cited

  1. H. Cohen, Z’chuyot Haadam Bimikra Ubitalmud [Human Rights in Jewish Law] (1984).
  2. 2 A. Rubinstein, Hamishpat Haconstitutzioni shel Midinat Yisrael [Israeli Constitutional Law] (5th ed. 1997).
  3. R. Cohen-Almagor, Gvulot Hasavlanut Vihacherut [Limits of Tolerance and Freedom] (1994).
  4. 3 A. Barak, Parshanut Bimishpat, Parshanut Chukatit [Interpretation in Law, Constitutional] (1993).

Israeli Articles Cited

  1. A. Barak, Chofesh Habitoi Umigbaloteha [Freedom of Expression and its Limitations], 40 Hapraklit 5 (1993).
  2. A. Barak, Hamisoret shel Chofesh Habitoi Biyisrael Ubiayoteha [The Tradition of Freedom of Expression in Israel and its Problems], 27 Mishpatim 223 (1997).
  3. H. Sommer, Hazchuyot Habilti Minuyot Vihekefa shel Hamahapacha Hachukatit [The Unspecified Rights – The Scope of the Constitutional Revolution], 28 Mishpatim 257 (1997).
  4. A. Barak, Zchuyot Adam Muganot: Hahekef Vihahagbala [Protected Human Rights], 1 Mishpat Umimshal 253 (1992-1993).
  5. Y. Karp, Mikztat Shielot Al Kvod Haadam lifi Chok Hayesod: Kvod Haadam Vicheruto [Questions about Human Dignity], 25 Mishpatim 129 (1995).
  6. A. Bendor, Chofesh Lishhon-Hara [Freedom of Defamation], 20 Mishpatim 561 (1990-1991).

Foreign Books Cited:

  1. F.F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982).
  2. D.P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd ed., 1997).
  3. D.P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994).

 

Foreign Articles Cited:

  1. D.A. Anderson, Symposium: Defamation in Fiction: Avoiding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51 Brook. L. Rev. 383 (1984-1985).

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

  1. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Eruvin, 13b.
  2. Bamidbar Rabbah, Pinchas, 21:2
  3. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia, 58b
  4. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Deot, 7:2.
  5. Mishnah, Ethics of our Fathers, 2:14, 3:14.
  6. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Taanit, 23a.
  7. Exodus 1:6, 1:8
  8. Judges 2:8, 2:10.
  9. Genesis 1:27.
  10. Mishnah, Ethics of our Fathers 3:14.
  11. I Samuel 2:30.

 

 

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

1. “The Kastner Trial” is a screenplay, penned by M. Lerner. It was intended for television broadcast. The play, an artistic creation divided into three parts, was inspired by the Kastner affair, especially by the trial in the Jerusalem District Court. See D.C. 124/53 The Attorney-General v. Greenwald [55]. The screenplay takes place primarily in the courtroom. It retells the story of the rescue of the Jews of Hungary during the Second World War and the moral dilemmas that these efforts involved. It is a docudrama – an artistic genre that does not purport to accurately reflect the events that it depicts. Quite naturally, it mixes both reality and fiction. Each episode is prefaced by a notice which states:

The events depicted in this film were inspired by the Kastner-Greenwald trial. Nonetheless, the movie should not be regarded as a recreation of these events, but rather as a drama of historical fiction.

2. One of these episodes features the mother of Chana Szenes, Mrs. Catherine Szenes. She is seen testifying as a witness in the criminal trial of Mr. Greenwald. As Mrs. Szenes is being cross-examined, Mr. Kastner, who is sitting in the courtroom, interrupts. In one of his outbursts, he lashes out at Catherine Szenes, exclaiming:

How dare you criticize me? Who even asked your daughter to come to Budapest? What did she think she would do? Due to her own recklessness, and the arrogance of those who sent her, she crossed the border like a new recruit and was captured five minutes later. And I will tell you who told the Hungarian police that Palgi and Goldstein were on their way to me. It was her! Your daughter, Chana Szenes, the heroine! She broke under interrogation and revealed everything. I can imagine the sort of tortures she underwent. Nobody could have withstood such torture. But it was not because of me that Palgi and Goldstein were arrested, but because of her! (emphasis added).

To this Catherine Szenes replies: “Not true!”

3. Kastner’s lines in the script, which I italicized, offended Chana Szenes’ brother and his sons, the petitioners in HCJ 6126/94. They also offended Ms. Matar and the Women’s Association for the Future of Israel, the petitioners in HCJ 6143/94. The petitioners approached the Broadcasting Authority and the playwright and requested that the italicized lines – according to which Chana Szenes broke under interrogation and revealed that Palgi and Goldstein were on their way to meet Kastner – be deleted from the broadcast. They claimed that the lines were false, that Chana Szenes had bravely borne her interrogation and did not betray her comrades. Furthermore, they maintain, these falsities tarnish the image of Chana Szenes as one of the greatest Jewish heroines in history. They argued that broadcasting the lines will deeply offend thousands of people who cherish Chana Szenes’ memory. These include both Holocaust survivors and native-born Israelis. Both the author and the Broadcasting Authority rejected the petitioners’ requests, emphasizing the principles of the freedom of expression and artistic creativity. They noted that the screenplay was a fictional drama, merely inspired by events that had actually occurred. Mr. Lerner explained that he had attempted to balance between historical facts and the need to express his own worldview, as well as his commitment to artistic quality. It was for the public to judge whether he had fulfilled these tasks. In its response, the Broadcasting Authority stated that the screenplay was prefaced by the “Author’s Explanation,” which stated that the play is:

A fictional drama inspired by events that actually occurred. The drama strives to integrate these historical events with the behavioral patterns of dramatic characters. Casting events in this manner obviously necessitated divergence from how the events actually occurred and, as such, posed a difficult dilemma concerning the degree of historic accuracy required in an artistic creation.

Respondents informed us that it would be stressed, at the beginning of each episode, that the film should not be seen as a documentary presentation, but rather as historical fiction. They also stated that, after the film’s conclusion, an in-studio discussion would be held to which Chana Szenes’ brother would be invited, along with historians and journalists. In this forum, all those dissatisfied with the series would have an opportunity to respond.

4. The response of the Broadcasting Authority did not satisfy petitioners. They petitioned this Court to order the Broadcasting Authority to delete the paragraph in which Kastner states that Chana Szenes had broken under interrogation and revealed the imminent arrival of Palgi and Goldstein. Petitioners asked the Court for an interim order preventing the broadcast, scheduled for November 7, 1994, from being aired until the petitions were decided. That same morning, the Court convened to hear the claims. All agreed that Kastner never actually spoke the words attributed to him by the script. Nor was it disputed that Kastner’s lines were substantively untrue and lacked historical basis. As such, petitioners argued that the Broadcasting Authority, as a national agency, must refrain from airing misleading and unreliable information. See The Broadcasting Authority Law-1965, § 4. Petitioners also argued that airing the false statements would deeply and seriously taint Chana Szenes’ dignity and good name. Thus, petitioners submit, Kastner’s lines constitute intentional defamation, without the protection of the defenses of “good faith” or “truth.” Moreover, petitioners argue that this injury is magnified by the inability of the late Chana Szenes to protect her rights. Petitioners further argue that broadcasting the false paragraph will offend the feelings of the public. The tale of Chana Szenes’ bravery belongs to the history of the Jewish nation. It is part of our national folklore. This being the case, petitioners maintain, in the conflict between freedom of expression on the one hand, and the public’s feelings and the individual’s right to dignity on the other, the latter must prevail.

5. Respondents defend their position. They argue that freedom of expression may only be infringed under extreme circumstances, which involve a clear and present danger to the public peace. Such circumstances do not characterize the case at bar. The Broadcasting Authority, they argue, gave appropriate weight to the conflicting interests. Its decision is reasonable and the necessary measures were adopted in order to mitigate the damage to the dignity of Chana Szenes, and that of her family and the general public.

6. On that same day, we rendered our decision and held as follows:

We have decided to reject the petition, in accordance with the majority opinion of Justices Barak and Mazza, with Justice Cheshin dissenting. Our reasons for this decision will be provided separately. The three of us are convinced that deleting the disputed paragraph would not interfere with the flow of the screenplay. Even so, the majority held that such a decision is subject to the authority of the Broadcasting Authority, it is not the Court’s place to instruct them in this regard. The dissent, for its part, contended that, since the Broadcasting Authority was not the drama’s original author, it may be ordered to comply with the petitioners’ request.

The time has come to give our reasons for that decision.

The Normative Framework

7. Our point of departure is the Broadcasting Authority’s power and discretion, which derive from the Broadcasting Authority Law. According to the provisions of that law, the Broadcasting Authority shall “broadcast educational, entertainment and informational programs in the areas of politics, social life, economics, culture, science, and art.” See the Broadcasting Authority Law-1965, § 3. In these broadcasts, the Authority must present the “different outlooks and opinions of the public, as well as supply reliable information.” Id., § 4. The scope of this power and discretion is determined by the interpretation of the law’s provisions, in view of the fundamental principles of our legal system. Indeed, a statute is “a creature of its surroundings.” HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1] at 513 (Sussman, J.). A statute’s surroundings are not limited to its textual setting but also include the statute’s broader context. This context is predicated on “broad circles of accepted principles, fundamental goals and basic criteria.” CA 165/82 Kibbutz Hatzor v. Assessment Clerk Rehovot [2] at 75. These values and principles form the statute’s general purpose. It may be presumed that the legislature intended to bring these values to fruition. See HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel‑Aviv/Jaffa [3] at 329.

8. There are three principles and values applicable to our case. First, we must consider the freedom of expression and creativity. Second, we must bear in mind a person’s right to his or her good name. Finally, we must consider the public welfare. At times, these values are compatible. Occasionally, however, they conflict, making it necessary to strike an appropriate balance. Quite often, the values and principles come in pairs, each one pulling in its own direction. The thesis confronts the antithesis, and a synthesis between the two is required. This synthesis is achieved by examining the relative weight associated with the different values in the conflict. The balancing must be normative and principled; the basic criteria for deciding this balance must be determined. See FH 9/77 Israel Electric Company v. “Ha’aretz” Newspaper [4] at 361; HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [5] at 434.

9. In interpreting the scope of the Broadcasting Authority’s discretion, the first value to be considered is the freedom of expression. This is a basic value derived from the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Indeed, Jewish heritage is based on a plurality of opinions and views. See Justice Elon’s opinion in EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of the Eleventh Knesset Elections Committee [6] at 294. “Both are the words of the Living God.” See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Eruvin 136b [76]. Jewish Law is characterized by pluralism, without the interference of the sovereign. “Just as people’s faces are not alike, so too their opinions are not the same. Rather, each one has an opinion of their own.” Bamidbar Rabbah, Pinchas 21:2 [77]. Justice Elon, in Neiman [6] at 296, summed up the Jewish approach to freedom of expression in the following manner:

This is the doctrine of leadership and government in the Jewish tradition. Every single person should be tolerated. Every single group, according to its own views and opinions. This is the great secret of tolerance and listening to the other, and the great power of the freedom of expression for every person and community. Not only is this essential for proper and enlightened government, it is also essential for its creativity. In this world, two opposing forces confront each other and reproduce, and how much more so is this true in the spiritual world.

A classic expression of this is the freedom of expression granted the biblical prophet, as H. Cohen noted:

The typical embodiment of freedom of speech in ancient Jewish history is not negative, but positive, namely the institution of prophecy … there arose for us prophets, whose prophecies embodied the freedom of speech.

H. Cohen, Z’chuyot Haadam Bimikra Ubitalmud 69 (1984) [62].

Freedom of speech is one of the State of Israel’s fundamental values as a democratic state, which regards freedom of speech as a “supreme” or “sublime” right. See CA 723/74 “Ha’aretz” Newspaper Publications v. Israel Electric Company [7] at 295; HCJ 73/53 “Kol Ha’Am” v. Minister of the Interior [8] at 878. As such, it occupies a “place of honor in the pantheon of basic human rights.” HCJ 153/83 Levy v. District Commander of the Israeli Police – Southern Command [9] at 398. Indeed, freedom of speech is “an integral part of our legal system’s ethos.” CA 105/92 Re’em Engineers v. Municipality of Upper‑Nazareth [10] at 201, and it is said to constitute democracy’s “soul.” CrimA 255/68 The State of Israel v. Ben Moshe [11] at 435 (Agranat, J.). Artistic expression is a central element of the freedom of expression. HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company v. Films and Play Review Board [12] at 680 {41}.

Freedom of expression “forms a basis of the freedom of artistic creation in the literary sphere and in forms of visual expression.” HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios v. Film and Play Review Board [13] at 27 (Shamgar, P.). “Freedom of expression is the freedom of the creator to burst out of the confines of his or her heart, spread out his or her wings and let his or her thoughts roam free.” Laor [5] at 433. Freedom of expression is not the only source of the individual’s freedom of artistic creation. This latter freedom can also be regarded as an independent human right, existing in its own right. This is a person’s right to freedom of artistic creation, to which I referred in Station Film [12] at 680 {41}, stating:

It may be understood as a constitutional right that “stands on its own two feet,” so to speak. It is based on the notion that man is an autonomous creature, entitled to self-actualization, as both a creator and as one who benefits from creation. Indeed, freedom of artistic expression is the artist’s freedom to create. It is the freedom to choose a subject and the manner in which it is presented. It is also the freedom of others to listen and absorb.

In our case, the freedom of artistic creation in question is that of Mr. Lerner. It is his freedom of expression. From the perspective of the Broadcasting Authority, this case also involves its own freedom of expression, as both speaker and as the forum. HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcasting Authority [16] at 268; HCJ 5503/94 Segal v. Speaker of the Knesset [15] at 545. Freedom of expression and freedom of artistic creation include the freedom of every one of us to read, to look, and to absorb. The public’s “right to know” is to be taken literally. It signifies the right of everyone to listen and to understand, to form an opinion, to debate and to persuade.

10. Do freedom of expression and artistic creation extend to expression that is not true? The answer to this question is affirmative. Speech which is false is contained within the freedom of expression and creation. Speech which is false and defamatory is included within the definition of freedom of expression. See CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira [16] at 857. An obscenity based on a falsehood is included in freedom of expression. See Station Film [12] at 676 {35}. An artistic work based on falsehood is included in freedom of expression. Compare Laor [5] at 433.

11. This having been said, freedom of expression and creation are not the only values that we must consider. A democratic society is founded on a spectrum of values and principles, with the freedom of speech and of artistic creation being only one of these. Realization of these other values dictates that we rein in the protection afforded the freedom of expression and creation, in order to extend appropriate protection to these other values. My freedom of movement ends where your body begins. My freedom of expression does not give me license to defame another, nor does it allow me to disclose confidential state secrets or to endanger the public welfare. Freedom of expression is not the freedom to commit perjury. Constitutional theory distinguishes between the scope of a human liberty and the degree of protection that the legal system confers upon it; between the coverage of the freedom and its protection. See Kahane [14] at 270; Avneri [16] at 857; F.F. Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 89 (1982) [72]. I addressed this distinction in Universal City Studios [13] at 33, where I wrote:

Any discussion of freedom of expression demands consideration of two separate questions. First, we must examine the content of freedom of expression – what it includes and what it does not. This examination delineates the scope of the expression “covered” by freedom of expression. It deals with the issue of what constitutes “expression” for the purposes of this fundamental value. For example, is giving false testimony in court included in the freedom of expression? Does the freedom of expression include demonstrations; does it extend to commercial advertising? Second, what is the scope of protection afforded by law to those expressions covered by the freedom of speech? Do they enjoy absolute or only relative protection? If the protection accorded to them is relative, what are its criteria?

On the basis of this distinction it was held, for example, that the freedom of expression, as a constitutional right, extends to “any opinion, view and belief in a free society.” Neiman [6] at 278 (Shamgar, P.). Freedom of expression is the freedom to voice an opinion in a manner that is “uninhibited, robust and wide-open,” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brennan, J.) [56], regardless of its content. Even so, not everything that is included within the constitutional definition of free speech is necessarily granted constitutional protection. The scope of protection given to this freedom is a function of balancing between freedom of expression and other conflicting principles. It is the product of the horizontal balancing between the rights of two persons. My freedom of speech ends where the protection of your good name begins. It is also the product of the vertical balance between individual freedom and the public interest. My freedom of expression ends where there is a near certainty of imminent actual harm to public safety. HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Jerusalem District Commander [17] at 475. Practically speaking, the main problem that generally arises, which in fact is the issue in the case before us, is the demarcation of the borders of the respective rights – an individual’s right as opposed to the public’s needs. To do this, we must balance, either vertically or horizontally, between the competing values and interests. We must, in the words of Justice Agranat in Kol Ha’Am [8] at 879:

weigh the various competing values in the balance and, after reflection, select those, which, under the circumstances prevail.

We therefore now examine the other values and principles to be taken into account.

12.  The second value we must consider is human dignity. In the context of this petition, our concern is with the aspect of human dignity relating to a person’s good reputation. This aspect of human dignity is vital to all people. A person’s right to his or her good name is a basic value in every democratic system. It is a necessary condition for a freedom-loving society. It is predicated on the need for an internal sense of value, personal pride and personal recognition among people. I mentioned this in Avneri [16] at 856, in which I wrote:

A person’s dignity and good name may be as important to him or her as life itself. They can be cherished by that person above and beyond all other assets.

The above is derived from the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state, as our Jewish heritage attaches central importance to a person’s good name. Indeed, our sources teach that “slander kills” and that “whoever publicly shames his neighbour is deemed to have shed blood” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia 58b [78]. Even if the victim forgave the slanderer, the slander continues to “burn within him.” To this effect, the sources further state that “our forefathers in the desert were not punished for any reason other than slander” Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Deot, 7:2 [79].

The significance of preserving a person’s reputation also derives from the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state. One who steals my property can compensate me monetarily, but he who robs me of my good name has stolen the very reason for my existence. One’s good name determines the manner in which one perceives oneself and how one’s peers and society relate to one. In effect, the only asset of many people, both public servants and those working in the private sector, is their reputation, which they cherish as life itself. This applies to both the living and the dead. We must protect the dignity of the deceased and their good name. See CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [18] at 519; HCJ 5688/92 Vichselbaum v. Minister of Defense [19] at 827; FH 3299/93 Vichselbaum v. Minister of Defense [20] at 195. In the case at bar, the paragraph in dispute in Mr. Lerner’s screenplay, as produced by the Broadcasting Authority, offended the memory of Chana Szenes; it maligned her dignity and the myth surrounding her. The petitioners emphasize this point, stressing that “the name of one of the heroes of Israel, who gave her life to save her brethren and who, in the middle of the Holocaust, was prepared to enter the lion’s jaws of the Nazi regime in an attempt to rescue the remnants of the survivors, is being disgraced.” Sec. 3 of the petition in HCJ 6143/94.

13.  The third value to be considered is the public interest. A person is a social creature; he or she does not live on an island but is part of a society. Society has interests that it seeks to realize, including the state’s existence, its democratic character, public security and welfare, the integrity of the judiciary and other similar values. If these public interests are not realized, human rights cannot be upheld. Human rights cannot be a national suicide pact. In the absence of public order there can be no freedom. Freedom is not anarchy and a democracy should not commit suicide in order to prove its vitality. Without public order, a democratic system cannot be maintained. See HCJ 109/70 The Orthodox Coptic Patriarch of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police [21] at 246. Each state has its own collective identity; each state has its national history and its own social goals, the realization of which forms part of the public interest. See Laor [5] at 433.

14.  The public interest is not a static, defined concept. Rather, it reflects society’s basic credo. It is an expression of the general interest, required by it as an organized collective. See Dayan [17] at 472. It also includes various aspects of the individual’s interests. Consequently, protection of freedom of expression and of artistic creation is in the public interest. Similarly, protection of a person’s dignity and good name are also in the public interest. It is in the public interest that human rights be protected and upheld. It is in the public interest that the freedom of expression and artistic creation be maintained. But, in addition to this, the public interest also includes the interests of the general public. It includes the nurturing of culture, art and language. It includes the protection of language as a tool for national expression and cultural value, Re’em Engineers [10] at 203, the consideration of public sensitivities as an expression of social tolerance, HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [22] at 44 {196}, the maintenance of historical continuity, and honoring national values. In our case I will assume that the paragraph in dispute does disgrace the good name and dignity of Chana Szenes. I will assume that it does harm national values, that it offends public feelings in general and the feelings of Holocaust survivors in particular. I will assume that it injures all those who cherish the memory of Chana Szenes.

The Balance

15.  We began by addressing the freedom of expression and of artistic creation. We distinguished between the scope of these rights and the protection that we accord them. The paragraph in dispute in Mr. Lerner’s screenplay, as it appears in a film prepared by the Broadcasting Authority, is included in both Mr. Lerner’s and the Broadcasting Authority’s freedom of expression. It is part of their freedom of artistic creation and part of the freedom of creation of every member of the public. Freedom of expression and creation also includes the freedom to create and express that which is untrue. The issue before us, however, is whether the paragraph in dispute is constitutionally protected. Freedom of expression and creation, be it the creator’s, the producer’s or the public’s, is not absolute. Rather, it is relative. Its full scope is not protected. Does the paragraph in dispute benefit from the protection of Israeli law? In order to respond to this question we must first consider the other values and interests to be taken into account. Each of these values and interests must be given the weight that reflects its relative importance. Each must be placed on the scales and balanced. This balancing exercise is not conducted according to a single balancing formula. Instead, it is the substance of these conflicting values that determines how the balancing is to be carried out. Thus, the appropriate balance between the freedom of expression and between one’s good reputation is not the same as the appropriate balance between the freedom of expression and between the public peace. “The variety of nuances necessitates many points of balance.” Levy [9] at 401. We will now examine the appropriate modes of balancing.

16.  The first pair of values to be discussed is freedom of expression and a person’s right to his or her good reputation. Where these two values conflict, which takes precedence? The answer is that speech which harms a person’s reputation does not cease to be protected speech, merely by virtue of its offensive content. The constitutional right to freedom of expression also extends to speech that harms an individual’s reputation. Even so, our legal system is sensitive to the need to safeguard a person’s good name in addition to protecting the freedom of expression. In the final analysis, they are both sustained from the same source – human dignity. Every legal system attempts to balance between conflicting values. This balance determines both the scope of the values and the extent of legal protection afforded the freedom of speech and reputation. This balance is reflected in the laws prohibiting defamation. These laws are the product of the balance which the legal system establishes between the freedom of expression on the one hand, and the need to protect a person’s reputation, on the other. They are the “conduit” via which the correct balance between freedom of expression and reputation is infused into the legal system. Whatever falls within the category of defamation loses the protection given to the freedom of expression. This balance is a “horizontal one”, for it determines the borders of the pertinent rights. The remedies for infringing these rights constitute part of the private law. Sometimes, the laws of defamation are not commensurate with the appropriate criteria for balancing between conflicting values. In such cases, the defamation laws may be adjusted in order to reflect the correct balance. See Sullivan [56].

17.  Within the framework of the law of defamation, the genre of the docudrama is liable to raise special problems. The author of a docudrama is a creative interpreter. Reality is initially only the basis of his or her screenplay, but it eventually becomes an inseparable part of the artistic creation. The artistic creation reconstructs reality and supplements it. See D.A. Anderson, Symposium: Defamation in Fiction; Avoiding Defamation Problems in Fiction, 51 Brook. L. Rev. 383 (1984) [75] at 393. In these circumstances, the line between reality and imagination may be blurred, as well as the distinction between facts and assessments. In such a case, unique difficulties may be encountered in enforcing defamation laws. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991) [57]; Davis v. Costa Gravas, 654 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) [58]; Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1997) [59]. We have no need to discuss these issues here, for the petitioners’ suit is not based on the law of defamation. Rather, their claim was filed within the framework of public law. They have requested that the Broadcasting Authority refrain from broadcasting the paragraph in dispute, for reasons of public interest, and for these reasons only.

18.  In this case, in the context of public law, the freedom of expression and of artistic creation conflict with the public interest. The freedom of expression and creation at issue here is that of the playwright, Mr. Lerner. It is also that of the Broadcasting Authority. It is also the freedom of expression of every member of the public wishing to view the program, in the sense of “the public’s right to know.” The public interest in the case before us is complex, for it includes the public interest in protecting the rights of Mr. Lerner, of the Broadcasting Authority and of Chana Szenes, including the dignity and good name of Chana Szenes. The public interest also includes the interest in protecting historical truth and honoring national values. It further extends to the public interest in seeking not to offend public feelings in general and the feelings of Holocaust victims in particular. Indeed, these Holocaust survivors were particularly offended by the harm to the legend of Chana Szenes. How is this conflict then to be resolved?

The issue is not a new one for us; it raises the well-worn question regarding the “vertical” balance between individual rights and the public interest. This balance does not establish the scope of the right, but rather determines the degree of protection afforded it, and the license given to government authorities to violate it. In a long series of judgments, which anchored the tradition of freedom of expression in Israel, this Court examined this balancing exercise. See A. Barak, Chofesh Habitoi Umigbaloteha, 40 Hapraklit 5 (1993) [66]; A. Barak, Hamisoret shel Chofesh Habitoi Biyisrael Ubiayoteha, 27 Mishpatim 233 (1997) [67]. Our point of departure is that, in a freedom-loving, democratic society, it is justified to limit the protection granted to freedom of expression and creation when doing so harms the public interest. Nonetheless, not all harm to the public interest warrants circumscribing the protection granted freedom of speech and expression. Such limitations are considered justified only if they are consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, if the limitation is for a proper purpose and if the limitation is not greater than necessary to prevent the harm. These requirements are entrenched in the limitation clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, and reflect the position of the legislature regarding the public interest’s ability to curtail individual freedom. See HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence [23] at 138 {231}; CrimFH 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [24] at 653; Horev [22] at 41-43 {193-95}. Indeed, if every public interest justified withdrawing the protection granted to the freedom of expression, these freedoms would be dealt a fatal blow, seriously undermining the democratic character of the state.

19.  Do the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state allow for the freedom of expression and artistic creation to be violated in order to uphold a public interest? The answer to this question is in the affirmative. Admittedly, the freedoms of expression and creation are integral parts of a democracy. Democracy and the freedom of speech are inextricably intertwined. An improper infringement of the freedom of expression and creation infringes all other human rights and jeopardizes the democratic nature of the regime. See Israel Electric Company [4] at 293. Democracy is the heart of freedom of expression, and freedom of expression revitalizes democracy. See Kol Ha’Am [8] at 876; HCJ 372/84 Kloppfer-Naveh v. Minister of Education and Culture [25] at 238; Kahane [14] at 274. This having been said, in order to sustain a democratic regime that protects human rights, it is sometimes justified to infringe the freedom of expression and artistic creation.

20.  In the framework of the public interest, harm to which justifies curtailing the freedom of expression and creation, we should also consider offense to public feelings. This conclusion is by no means obvious; it poses a difficult dilemma for any legal system founded on democratic values. See Horev [22] at 47-48 {200-01}. On the one hand, there is a serious danger of violating freedom of expression and artistic creation if offense to public feelings is cause for restricting these freedoms. Expression can offend another person’s feelings; if every such offense was to justify infringement of the freedom of expression and creation, surely these freedoms, and indeed democracy itself, would be emptied of meaning. HCJ 953/89 Indoor v. Mayor of Jerusalem [26] at 690. A democratic society is based on the recognition that the feelings of some will inevitably be offended by their fellows’ exercise of their respective freedoms. This is part of tolerance for the opinions of others, which characterizes the democratic regime. Universal City Studios [13] at 37. On the other hand, a democratic regime is sensitive to these feelings, for this too is an aspect of tolerance:

The sons and daughters of a free society, in which human dignity is a cherished value, are all called upon to respect the personal religious feelings of the individual and his or her human dignity. This must be based on tolerance and the understanding that personal religious feelings and their various modes of expression differ from one individual to another.

HCJ 257/89 Hoffman v. Appointee over the Western Wall [27] at 354 (Shamgar, P.).

The solution to this dilemma is found in the understanding that only severe offenses to feelings warrant curtailing the freedom of expression and creation. Thus, a democratic regime must arrive at a “level of tolerance” for offending feelings. Only where the degree of offensiveness exceeds this “level of tolerance” can restrictions on the freedom of expression and creation be justified in a democratic society. See Horev [22] at 47‑48 {200-01}. I explained this in Indoor [26] at 690, in which I wrote:

A democratic society that endeavors to protect both freedom of expression and public feelings must set a “level of tolerance,” according to which only an offense to public feelings that exceeds this level can justify curtailing the freedom of expression.

In Horev [22] at 48 {201}, I added:

[I]t is possible to infringe human rights for the purpose of protecting feelings – particularly religious feelings and lifestyle – in a society with democratic values, provided that the harm exceeds the threshold of tolerance accepted in that society.

In HCJ 606/93 Kiddum Yazamoth and Publishing (1981) v. Broadcasting Authority [28] at 16, Justice Dorner wrote:

A democratic society, characterized by tolerance extended to differing views, assumes and permits that feelings be offended up to a certain point. For expressions that are pleasant to the ears of all do not require protection… Harm which is sufficiently great to warrant restricting freedom of expression must be both severe and significant.

The same idea was raised by Justice Mazza, in HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Channel Two Television and Radio [29] at 201, who wrote:

In order for the Court to impose prior restraints on speech, based on the argument that publishing the expression will harm public feelings, it must first be convinced that the speech’s content is so severe, and the harm expected to the public so grave, that failing to prohibit the publication will create a clear and imminent danger of undermining public order or will severely and concretely disrupt it.

Thus, in view of the priority that democracy sees in the freedom of expression and artistic creation, only an offense to public feelings that is both severe and grave – one which exceeds the level of tolerance level that a person assumes in a democratic society – will justify restricting or withdrawing the protection normally afforded freedom of expression and artistic creation. Moreover, the likelihood of the harm actually occurring must be one of “near certainty.” A. Rubinstein, Hamishpat Haconstitutzioni shel Midinat Yisrael 1003 (5th ed. 1997) [63]. Even so, special and exceptional circumstances may justify a standard of “reasonable likelihood.” See CrimA 126/62 Disentzik v. Attorney General [30] at 169; CrimA. 696/81 Azulai v. The State of Israel [47]; CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. The State of Israel [32].

A Proper Purpose and the Appropriate Means

21.  An infringement on freedom of expression and creation is only justified when the infringement is for a proper purpose and the least restrictive means are used to achieve that purpose. A purpose is deemed proper if it constitutes a social goal in a society sensitive to human rights. An infringement will be considered not to exceed that which is necessary if it adheres to the standards of proportionality. See HCJ 987/94 Euronet Kavei Zahav (1992) v. Minister of Communications [33]; HCJ 3477/95 Ben Attia v. Minister of Education Culture and Sport [34]. An examination must always be conducted in order to ascertain whether it is possible to adopt less restrictive measures for the purpose of achieving the purpose in question.

From the General to the Specific

22. My presumption is that the paragraph in dispute offended the dignity and good name of Chana Szenes and harmed the legend of Chana Szenes. It is not an accurate description of historical events. It offended the feelings of the public and, specifically, the feelings of Holocaust survivors. All of these harm the public interest. Does this harm justify withdrawing the statutory protection afforded Mr. Lerner, the Broadcasting Authority and the freedom of expression and creation? My answer is in the negative. This answer is based on the fact that infringing the freedom of expression and artistic creation of Mr. Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This being the case, I need not conduct the further examination of determining whether the infringement was for a proper purpose and did not exceed that which was necessary.

23. The values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state include the freedom of expression and artistic creation of every individual, even when his or her expression is offensive to the feelings of others. For it is precisely in those cases, when expression is provocative, that the speech and its author require protection. A democracy’s strength lies in the protection that it extends to unpopular opinions and works. The test of democracy is not the protection granted to expressions that are pleasant to hear. Its test is in those difficult cases, in which the population rejects the expression and shuns the creation. See HCJ 351/72 Keinan v. The Film and Play Review Board [35] at 816. This is the doctrine of tolerance, on which democracy is founded. Each individual in society accepts that certain expressions will, to some extent, hurt his or her feelings, as long as the offensiveness does not exceed the appropriate level of tolerance. In my opinion, the offensiveness of the disputed paragraph, to the feelings of the public in general and of the Holocaust survivors in particular, does not exceed the level of tolerance which binds the members of a Jewish, democratic society. It is true that many have been offended, and the offense is real and sincere. Yet this is not sufficient; much more is required. To be precise, our concern here is not whether the heirs of Chana Szenes have a legal claim to civil damages. We are not dealing with the horizontal balance between the rights of the speaker and creator and between the rights of the maligned and defamed person. Our concern is with the restriction of freedom of speech for reasons of public interest, and as part of the offense caused to public feelings. In this context, my position is that the harm to Chana Szenes’ dignity and good name does not exceed the tolerance level assumed by every member of Israeli society.

24. The “level of tolerance” for offense to feelings differs from freedom to freedom. HCJ 7128/96 Movement for Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel [36] at 521. The tolerance threshold is particularly high in the context of limitations on the freedom of speech and creation. Only in exceptional and extreme cases will we find that feelings are offended beyond that high level of tolerance. In reference to these instances, I noted in Universal City Studios [13] at 38 that:        

Our tradition of freedom of expression and our reluctance to impose content-based prior restraints, limits these cases to those that are exceptional and unusual. These must be cases that shake the very foundations of mutual tolerance.

As such, expression can only be limited if it offends public feelings to the extent that it shakes the foundations of mutual tolerance. This high degree of offensiveness does not exist in the case before us. Despite all the pain that results from the maligned image of Chana Szenes, it certainly cannot be contended that the screenplay shakes the foundations of mutual tolerance. It is no different than instances of offended feelings in other cases, in which this Court ruled that the offensiveness does not exceed the level which warrants imposing restrictions on freedom of speech. See e.g., Keinan [35]; Laor [5]; Universal City Studios [13].

25. The disputed paragraph is not historically accurate. Indeed, it lacks any historical basis and is false. Is it appropriate to protect false expression? Is the expression’s falsehood sufficient to transfer it beyond the “level of tolerance”? The answer to these questions is that a democratic, freedom loving society does not predicate the protection of speech and creation on that speech being an accurate reflection of the truth. This point was made by Acting President Landau:

If it was only an issue of fabricating historical facts, this in itself would be insufficient to ban the film. For the authors could argue that there is no one historical truth and that each historian has his own truth. In any event, generally speaking, since when does falsehood in a film or play provide grounds for banning it in a state which guarantees freedom of expression to its citizens?

HCJ 807/78 Ein Gal v. Film and Play Review Board [37] at 277.

The rationale underlying this approach is not that we cannot know what the truth is, as yesterday’s lie may yet become tomorrow’s truth. This approach does not derive from our indifference to the lie and or our placing it on equal footing with the truth. This approach does not attach the same degree of importance to truths and lies. Rather, it is premised on a preference for the truth. Underlying this understanding is an approach beckoning us to seek to reveal the truth and frustrate the lie. At foundation, this stance is based on the philosophy of freedom, according to which the test of truth is its persuasive power. The way to deal with falsehood is not by suppressing it but by explaining the truth. Falsehood fails when it is exposed, not when it is suppressed. Compare R. Cohen Almagor, Gvulot Hasavlanut Vihacherut 130 (1994) [64]. Lies are not fought by suppressing the freedom of the one who lies, but by strengthening the freedom of the one who speaks the truth. See Kahane [14] at 272. The truth shall prevail by virtue of its own inner power and ability to defeat falsehood in the clash of ideas. The truth shall emerge from the struggle between it and falsehood. President Agranat made this point in Kol Ha’Am [8] noting:

At foundation, the process is no more than the process of clarifying the truth, so that the state may learn and know how to choose a course of action and achieve that action in the most efficient manner. Freedom of expression serves as a means and as an instrument to clarify what that truth is, since it is only by considering “all” points of view, and through the free exchange of all ideas that “truth” can be uncovered.

Id .at 877.

The following statements made by Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California (1927) [60] at 377, are also well-known:

To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.

These words reflect the tradition of freedom of speech in Israel. Falsehoods shall fail as a result of education. Lies will be put to the test in confronting the truth. Encouraging public discussion, rather than its suppression, is the remedy that democracy supplies against the malady of falsehood. With respect to Chana Szenes, the truth will emerge in the public discussion likely to follow in the wake of the screenplay’s broadcast. Public discussion, together with the publication of articles on the matter by researchers and writers, will lead to the triumph of truth over falsehood. These will enhance Chana Szenes’ grandeur and illuminate the flame that she kindled. Internal conviction, not government prohibition, shall lead to the victory of truth over falsehood. See HCJ 273/97 Association for the Preservation of Individual Rights of Homosexuals, Lesbians and Bisexuals in Israel v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [38].

26. This high threshold required to justify restricting the freedom of speech is especially applicable to the literary genre of the docudrama. This genre combines historical truth and literary imagination. Classic creations throughout the generations were premised on this combination. Indeed, human culture would be stunted were creators unable to draw upon historical characters. Authors and playwrights are not historians and one should not expect them to reconstruct the truth. Their freedom of imagination should be protected and they should be subject to an artistic, rather than scientific, examination. An artistic creation should be assessed artistically and comprehensively, not historically.

27.  Is this case unique since the work in question damages the legend of Chana Szenes, a national heroine and revered figure? Should this myth be shattered in the name of freedom of expression? The paragraph in dispute is quite unfortunate. Had I written the screenplay myself, I would have done without it. But the play was written by Mr. Lerner – he is its creator. In his opinion, his artistic criteria necessitated the paragraph. It is not for us to censor plays and movies. One can only be sorry for the possible damage to the legend of Chana Szenes. However, a democratic society does not preserve the image of its heroes by repressing freedom of expression and artistic creation. The legend must flow from the free exchange of ideas and opinions. It cannot be the fruit of governmental restrictions imposed on freedom of expression and creation. The legend of Chana Szenes will survive and flourish by virtue of the truth that lies in freedom, not by way of stifling falsehood. The legend is founded on Chana Szenes’ poetry and bravery. Falsehood can harm neither her nor her memory. In the struggle between them, in the “free market” of ideas, truth shall reject falsehood.

28.  Mr. Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority offended both the dignity of Chana Szenes and her good name. Is this offense protected by the freedom of expression? We must be precise: we are not concerned with conflicting basic rights in the framework of private law. Our concern is not deciding whether private law – for example, the law of torts or contracts – recognizes a right of action and offers a remedy. We are not dealing with an action by Chana Szenes or her heirs against Mr. Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority. This is not an issue of defamation or damages. Nor is it an issue of an injunction within a civil claim. As we observed above, a civil claim is both difficult and complex.

Our concern is different, for we are dealing with Chana Szenes’ human dignity and good name as part of the public interest. In this context, human dignity, as a right, is subsumed within the public interest. We are therefore dealing with the vertical balance between a person’s right to freedom of expression and the public interest in preserving Chana Szenes’ good name and dignity. The issue is whether the injury to her dignity and good name warrants the violation of the freedom of speech and artistic creativity. The answer to this question is provided by the vertical balance, according to which freedom of expression and creativity can be violated only if such violation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, is for a proper purpose, and does not exceed the necessary means. The infringement is deemed to be consistent with the State of Israel’s values only if the probability of its materialization is nearly certain, and only if the harm to the public interest is harsh, serious and severe. Such harm will be considered to have occurred when it exceeds the “level of tolerance.” As such, the fact that Chana Szenes’ dignity and good name were violated is insufficient to justify a parallel violation of freedom of expression and creativity. Nor is it sufficient that the violation of dignity and reputation are extreme and severe. Within the framework of the vertical balance between freedom of expression and creativity and the right to preserving one’s reputation, the question we must ask ourselves is whether the harm to dignity and reputation, as part of the public interest, is so grave as to exceed Israeli society’s level of tolerance. The question is whether the harm to Chana Szenes can be said to shake the very foundation of mutual tolerance. We do not ask ourselves whether the rights of Chana Szenes or her heirs were transgressed; instead, we ask whether the public interest was gravely harmed so as to justify restricting freedom of expression and artistic creation, irrespective of the rights of Chana Szenes and her heirs. These questions must be answered in the negative. Within the framework of public law, even serious damage to Chana Szenes’ reputation and dignity cannot be considered sufficient to justify violating freedom of expression and creativity. Such a violation becomes possible only when it appears that the harm to the dignity and reputation of Chana Szenes, including the damage to her ethos, to historical truth and to the other components of the public interest, is serious and grave, so that it may be said, with near certainty, that it is above and beyond that which can be tolerated in a freedom-loving democratic society. As we have seen, the harm in question did not reach this dimension. The remedy for the damage to Chana Szenes’ dignity can only be sought in the realm of private law.

I am aware that, under similar circumstances, the German Constitutional Court recognized the possibility of restricting freedom of expression. See 30 BverfGE 173 (1971) [61] [hereinafter Mephisto]; D.P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany [73] at 301. Even so, this ruling – itself the subject of controversy, D. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany [74] at 195 – related to private law relationships and had no application to public law. The case dealt with the right of an actor’s relatives to request an injunction against the publication of a book that, in their opinion, defamed their relative, the deceased. It does not address the duty of a public authority to prevent the work’s publication for reasons of public interest. Mephisto [61] involved a conflict between two rights – the freedom of expression and artistic creativity as opposed to human dignity. The remedy requested was within the realm of private law. In the petition at bar, the right of freedom of expression and artistic creation conflicts with the public interest (human dignity). Accordingly, the balance in the two cases may be different.

29.  Prior to completing my remarks on this subject, I will stress that there is no sharp distinction between balancing in public law and in private law. Just as considerations of individual rights form part of the public law, so too do public policy considerations flow into the private law realm and help shape the rights protected there. See CA 294/91 [18]; see also 3 A. Barak, Parshanut Bimishpat, Parshanut Chukatit 649 (1994) [65]. This having been said, we are not dealing here with total identity of interests. Rather, the weight that attaches to the different considerations and interests is likely to vary with the context – private or public law – and with the specific case. Accordingly, the final balance may also change. In our case, both the horizontal balance, which determines the scope of the right to freedom of expression and artistic creation when these conflict with human dignity (as part of the public interest), and the vertical balance, which determines whether freedom of expression and artistic creation may be violated in order to protect human dignity, are conducted within the framework of public law. The question before us is whether the public interest, in its broad sense, justifies violating the freedom of expression and artistic creation. My answer to this question is in the negative.

The Discretion of the Broadcasting Authority

30. Until now, we have discussed the freedom of expression of Mr. Lerner, the Broadcasting Authority and of the public. We have concluded that Mr. Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority are free to publish and broadcast the screenplay, without that freedom being restricted for reasons of public interest. In our analysis, we did not distinguish between Mr. Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority. We related to them as to any other person in the State of Israel. But is the Broadcasting Authority like any other person? Is the Broadcasting Authority, by virtue of its special status, not subject to restrictions which are not applicable to Mr. Lerner? The Broadcasting Authority Law provides that the Broadcasting Authority shall conduct its programming as “a government service.” The Broadcasting Authority Law, § 2. Can a government authority televise a program, fully aware of its historically inaccurate basis, which disgraces a revered public figure like Chana Szenes? One of the Broadcasting Authority’s functions is to reflect the life of the State of Israel. The Broadcasting Authority Law, § 3(1)(a). Does it discharge this duty when it publishes falsities regarding Chana Szenes? How does this broadcast comply with the Broadcasting Authority’s duty to ensure that “reliable information,” see The Broadcasting Authority Law, § 4, is available to the public? Can it not be said that the Broadcasting Authority exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner?

31. These questions are not new for us. The scope of the Broadcasting Authority’s discretion has been examined by our case law. In this respect, this Court emphasized two basic propositions, one general and the other specifically relating to the Broadcasting Authority. The general proposition is that a decision is only deemed unreasonable if no reasonable agency could have adopted such a decision. The degree of unreasonableness, it follows, must therefore be extreme. Indeed, “only a blatant affront to our sense of justice can justify striking down an agency’s act.” HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [39] at 378 (Shamgar, J.). The unreasonableness must be extreme, going to the root of the matter. HCJ 156/75 Dakah v. Minister of Transportation [40] at 103.

The specific proposition, for its part, relates to judicial intervention concerning the freedom of expression. To this effect, Justice Shamgar wrote, in Shiran [62] at 378:

[t]he fact that we are dealing with the broadcasts or publication of written material prompts us to act with further restraint. This is due to the additional guiding principle of freedom of expression, which is a component to which special weight attaches. Thus, in order for this Court to prohibit a public authority from broadcasting or publishing a particular broadcast or publication, extreme circumstances indicating the presence of a tangible and nearly certain danger to public peace … or other clear and obvious illegality, must exist.

Justice Shamgar continued, Id. at 379, holding:

[E]verything must be done in order to prevent issues which are no more than disputes over culture, education, good taste or the like, from being dragged into Court. For, as stated, this Court cannot take upon itself a supervisory role over the contents of broadcasts, nor should it do so ... except in extreme circumstances, as mentioned above.

Justice Shamgar pointed out that the supervision over the Broadcasting Authority’s exercise of its discretion in such matters is administrative and internal, rather than judicial and external. He noted that the Authority’s organs are charged with this role. Hence, the Court should not intervene except where a blatantly unreasonable decision, which creates an almost certain danger to the public interest, is adopted. See also HCJ 266/81 Avron v. Broadcasting Authority [41]. Indeed:

Be the historical truth what it may, the Court will not censor the Broadcasting Authority by prohibiting programs which any particular petitioner, the Court, feels that it does not reflect the real truth. This is the dictate of freedom of expression, upon which the State of Israel as a democratic state is founded.

HCJ 2137/98 Elias v. Chairman of the Broadcasting Authority’s Managerial Committee [42].

32. I accept that the Broadcasting Authority has discretion in determining its programming. Mr. Lerner’s freedom of expression, however, does not necessarily obligate the Broadcasting Authority to broadcast his screenplay on the radio or television. The Broadcasting Authority functions both as a forum and a spokesman and its freedom of expression allows it to decide what to broadcast and what not to broadcast. Indeed, the Authority is entitled to decide that, for any particular reason, that it will not broadcast Mr. Lerner’s screenplay. I am even prepared to grant that the paragraph in dispute would have constituted an appropriate reason for such purposes. However, the Broadcasting Authority did in fact decide to broadcast Mr. Lerner’s screenplay and we are now being asked to interfere with that decision. This we cannot do, for two reasons. First, the Authority’s decision is not so unreasonable as to justify the intervention of the High Court of Justice. Second, it certainly cannot be said that no reasonable Broadcasting Authority could have decided to broadcast Mr. Lerner’s screenplay, including the paragraph in dispute. The reasonableness of a decision is a function of the appropriate balance between conflicting values. HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Attorney General [43] at 513; HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing [44]. The conflicting values in this case are freedom of expression and artistic creation, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other. Additional factors to be considered are the Broadcasting Authority’s status as a government service provider, its role and its integrity. As we observed, with respect to the conflict in the case before us between freedom of expression and artistic creation, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other, the freedom of expression and artistic creation prevail. Considerations relating to the Broadcasting Authority’s status cannot cause the decision to broadcast the program to be regarded as exceeding the parameters of reasonability. Certainly, it cannot be said that this decision’s unreasonableness is so extreme that no reasonable Broadcasting Authority could have adopted it.

33. Second, the scope of the High Court of Justice’s intervention in the Broadcasting Authority’s freedom of choice is narrow. As Justice Shamgar noted in Shiran [39] exceptional circumstances are required to justify a judicial decision enjoining the Broadcasting Authority from exercising its freedom of expression and artistic creation. Deputy President Justice Ben-Porat dwelled on this point, in HCJ 259/84 M.I.L.N, Israeli Institute for Better Business and Product v. Broadcasting Authority [45] at 680, stating:

It is established that when freedom of publication or broadcast is involved, this Court will act with great restraint and will limit its intervention to extreme cases, such as a tangible and nearly certain danger to the welfare of the public at large… or clear and obvious illegality. The public has a right to freedom of expression being preserved in the media. The broadcast spectrum belongs to the public and the Broadcasting Authority’s various organs are entitled, and even obligated, to assume the responsibility for complying with the law when gathering and broadcasting information. Thus, this Court’s powers of supervision and review are to be exercised cautiously and rarely when considering intervention in the freedom of publication.

Such exceptional circumstances are said to exist only if the broadcast will cause severe, grave damage to the public interest. When the alleged damage is injury to feelings, such injury must be extreme to the point of shaking the foundations of mutual tolerance in a democratic society. Harm of this nature is not present in this case. Consequently, there are no grounds for the intervention of this Court.

34. These two are interrelated and are bound up with the balance between freedom of expression and artistic creation, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other. Indeed, the discretion of the Broadcasting Authority must not be isolated from the total complex of constitutional values and the appropriate balance between them. See HCJ 243/82 Zichroni v. Directorial Committee of the Broadcasting Authority [46] at 785; Kahane [14] at 307. Our determination that harm to the public interest does not justify suspending the protection offered by freedom of expression and artistic creation necessarily affects the reasonableness of the decision of the Broadcasting Authority. This is certainly the case when the Broadcasting Authority’s decides to permit, rather than censor, a publication. This is certainly the case when we are requested to impose a prior restraint on a program, despite the Broadcasting Authority’s decision to televise it. We will only adopt the role of censor as a last resort. In this context, I concur with the comments of my colleague, Justice M. Cheshin: “the director of the Broadcasting Authority is responsible for its broadcasts; this Court is not responsible for the content of the broadcasts. I refuse to assume the management of the Authority.” Kiddum [28] at 37.

 

As such, when the Broadcasting Authority decides to broadcast a particular program that offends the feelings of the public, only very extreme and exceptionally severe cases will warrant this Court’s intervention. Such intervention, in the form of the prior restraint of the expression, infringes on the freedom of expression and artistic creation of the program’s author. It violates the Broadcasting Authority’s freedom of expression, both as a speaker and forum. Moreover, it violates the right of every member of the public. This three-tiered violation can only be allowed when the harm to the public interest is so severe and serious that it shakes the very foundations of mutual tolerance. The case must be extreme to the extent of shattering all that unites us. The harm to the public interest must be, in the words of Justice Mazza, “so fatal that refraining from prohibiting the publication will create a concrete and imminent danger of uprooting the public order, or of severely and gravely disrupting it.” Novik [29] at 202. These are not the circumstances in the case before us.

35. What then will become of the Broadcasting Authority’s public role? My response to this is that airing the play will not interfere with the function of the Broadcasting Authority. The play is a docudrama, interpolating imagination with reality. It is based on a combination of historical figures and historical events. The falsehoods in the play are peripheral, intended for artistic effect. All of these factors bring the decision to broadcast the screenplay within the boundaries of reasonableness. Admittedly, the Broadcasting Authority is under a duty to broadcast “reliable information.” A docudrama, however, is not a program that broadcasts information. It is an artistic creation and must be viewed as such. It must be assessed according to its artistic character, not according to its historical message. It must be understood as an artistic whole, comprising elements both true and false. With respect to the Broadcasting Authority’s role and the reasonableness of the decision, the work’s artistic character is decisive. The case is not so extreme as to justify our intervention.

It is for these reasons that I have decided to reject the petition.

Justice E. Mazza

I concur with the judgment of my colleague, the President.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

He was born on March 25, 1992. When he was two years old, we improved his appearance and gave him understanding. Today he is about seven and a half. Long may he live. I am, of course, referring to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the law enacted in honor of human dignity and liberty. Human dignity is this central pillar of this law. The law is infused with human dignity. Human dignity gives it life. I had hoped that the petition before us would drive a stake deep into the bedrock of our law and that, above ground, this stake would be a mast, flying the flag of human dignity. All would know – all over the land – that the beginning, the middle and the end are human dignity. That in the absence of human dignity there is neither man nor society. This was my hope; this was my expectation. I am sorry that we missed this opportunity. We will not despair; we wait for tomorrow.

The Facts

2.    Our case concerns a screenplay written by the playwright Motty Lerner. It is called “The Kastner Trial.” Israel Television was scheduled to broadcast, and did broadcast, the screenplay in three parts, beginning on November 7, 1994 – the 50th anniversary of Chana Szenes’ murder by the Gestapo. The screenplay is rooted in the actual events that occurred in Hungary during the Second World War, in 1944, and during the Kastner trial, which took place in Israel from 1953 through 1958.

3.    First, there was the terrible tragedy that befell the Jews of Hungary during the Second World War – the murder of these Jews by the Nazis and the attempts made to rescue some of them from this inferno. This tragedy was the background to the indictment filed by the Attorney-General of Israel against Malchiel Greenwald, charging him with defaming Dr. Yisrael Kastner. In 1944, Dr. Kastner was one of the leaders of Hungarian Jewry. Greenwald distributed a pamphlet in which he publicly accused Dr. Kastner of being guilty of the following four charges, in the words of the court:

(a) Collaboration with the Nazis;

(b) The “indirect murder” or “preparing the ground for the murder” of Hungarian Jewry;

(c) Profiteering with a Nazi war criminal [S.S. Commander Kurt Bacher];

(d) Helping that criminal evade punishment after the war.

Greenwald’s trial was conducted in the Jerusalem District Court, with President B. Halevi presiding. Ultimately, President Halevi decided to acquit Greenwald of three of the four counts of defamation. Greenwald was only convicted on the third count. In recognition of his acquittal on all the other counts, he was fined the token sum of one Israeli Lira. DC (Jer) 124/53 Attorney General v. Greenwald [55].

The Attorney-General appealed the district court’s judgment. In a panel of five judges, the Supreme Court accepted the main part of the appeal. Greenwald was convicted of charges (a) and (b). With respect to charge (a), he was convicted by a majority opinion of four against one. His acquittal on charge (d), however, remained intact. See CrimA 232/55 Attorney-General v. Greenwald [47].

4. Motty Lerner’s screenplay is the third floor of the story, built on the two floors underneath. The first floor is the tragedy that struck Hungarian Jewry in 1944. The second floor is the drama played out in the Jerusalem District Court during the Greenwald trial, the trial known as the “Kastner Trial.” The third floor is the drama on stage – Motty Lerner’s screenplay “The Kastner Trial.” Whoever saw the play on television – and I saw it – knows that the playwright is particularly gifted. And we know that the play’s impact on viewers is directly proportional to the talent of the playwright and the power of the play.

5. One paragraph in the play particularly troubles the petitioners here. We refer to the part where Mrs. Catherine Szenes, the mother of Chana Szenes, is cross-examined. Mrs. Szenes appeared as a witness in the trial and was cross-examined by Greenwald’s attorney. During her testimony, Dr. Kastner repeatedly interrupts her, until the climax in which he accuses Chana Szenes of betraying her comrades to the Gestapo. The script reads as follows:

“Kastner

(angrily, at Catherine Szenes):

How dare you criticize me? Who even asked your daughter to come to Budapest? What did she think she would do? Due to her own recklessness, and the arrogance of those who sent her, she crossed the border like a new recruit and was captured five minutes later. And I will tell you who told the Hungarian police that Palgi and Goldstein were on their way to me. It was her! Your daughter, Chana Szenes, the heroine! She broke under interrogation and revealed everything. I can imagine the sort of tortures she underwent. Nobody could have withstood such torture. But it was not because of me that Palgi and Goldstein were arrested, but because of her!

Catherine Szenes:

Not true!!! “

These lines formed the basis of the petitioners’ claim. The petitioners request that the paragraph be deleted from the play. They claim that the statement that Chana Szenes betrayed her two comrades, Peretz Goldstein and Yoel Palgi, to the Gestapo, is a lie, and that this will irreparably defame Chana Szenes. In fact, they claim, Chana Szenes bravely endured severe torture at the hands of the Gestapo and did not divulge secrets to her torturers. This was the case with Goldstein and Palgi, and it was also the case regarding the secret code that she had for British intelligence transmissions, which the Nazis wanted in order to transmit disinformation.

6.    Petitioners submitted evidence to prove their claim. In fact, it is undisputed that Kastner’s statement in the play was false. There is not even a shred of evidence that Chana Szenes betrayed her comrades to the Gestapo. Thus, we may dispense with the first floor, the events that occurred in Hungary in 1944. Proceeding to the second floor – the trial itself – all agree that, at Greenwald’s trial, Kastner never made the allegation attributed to him by Lerner. In other words: Kastner’s words in the play, as cited above, have no basis in reality and are no more than a figment of the playwright’s imagination.

7.    Motty Lerner and the Broadcasting Authority were obviously aware of the sensitivity of televising the play. Thus, each segment was prefaced by the following paragraph:

The events depicted in this film were inspired by the Kastner-Greenwald trial. Nonetheless, the movie should not be regarded as a recreation of these events, but rather as a drama of historical fiction.

Furthermore, the play was shown at the Tel‑Aviv Cinematheque. At the time of the screening, an explanatory sheet was distributed to the audience, entitled “The Author’s Apology.” The following is Motty Lerner’s explanation of the screenplay:

The film ‘The Kastner Trial’ is a fictional drama inspired by events that actually occurred. The drama strives to integrate these historical events with the behavioral patterns of dramatic characters. Casting events in this manner obviously necessitated divergence from how the events actually occurred and, as such, posed a difficult dilemma concerning the degree of historic accuracy required in an artistic creation.

This dilemma may be avoided by responding that the film is merely an artistic creation, not a historical document. As such, it must be assessed according to artistic standards, as opposed to historical ones. Even so, there is no escaping the fact that the script offers an interpretation of events which are the subject of sharp controversy; clearly many viewers will choose to see it as interference with the historical record, rather than simply as an artistic creation. Given that, while writing the script, I wavered between these two approaches. As such, I think that I should clarify some of the rules that I set for myself.

As a rule, I strove to be as accurate as possible. Even so, and specifically with respect to scenes that took place behind closed doors, where I was unable to discover what had actually happened, I assumed poetic license to recreate events with my own imagination, with the reservation that the events must be consistent with the historic reality. I did my best to utilize this freedom in order to give the characters depth, and to put the events that actually occurred into a sharper focus. My working principle was that I would not facilitate my task by deleting events that contradicted my own political, historical world-view. This was not just because I wanted to act with artistic and intellectual integrity, but also because it was precisely those events that challenged my political views that created a more authentic, penetrating and moving drama.

I hope that I have succeeded in finding the optimal balance between the historical imperatives, the need to express my own personal worldview, and my commitment to the quality of the artistic creation.

Motty Lerner (emphasis added).

About ten days before the first showing, on October 28, 1994, an article appeared in the weekend section of the newspaper Yediot Aharonot, entitled “Did She Break?”

A huge controversy is liable to erupt following the new television series, which will accuse the paratrooper Chana Szenes, who was sent to the aid of Hungarian Jewry during the Holocaust, of breaking under interrogation and betraying her comrade paratroopers to the Fascist police. The accusation comes from the mouth of Yisrael Kastner, the organizer of the rescue train from Budapest and the man “who sold his soul to Satan.” Author Aharon Meged: “this is a travesty and lies.”

Ms. Aspa Peled, the author of the article, interviewed Mr. Lerner:

[Peled:] “... Motty Lerner, is the legend a lie?

[Lerner:] I see myself as someone disclosing the subjective truth of Kastner and the members of the Rescue Commission, who were trapped in a web of mythology and myth, one which they could not escape. Perhaps they were even afraid to do so. It seems to me that today we have the maturity to understand that Chana Szenes was indeed a great heroine, even though she may have broken under interrogation. In the final analysis, how many of the Israeli soldiers who fell prisoner to the Egyptians or the Syrians did not break under interrogation? In my view, this in no way detracts from her bravery.

[Peled:] So was she a traitor or not?

[Lerner] I was not present at the interrogation and I do not know. What is clear is that Chana crossed the border and she had one contact address that she had to reach – Kastner. Three days later, Goldstein and Palgi reached Kastner without him even knowing that they were on their way to him. I have no tools with which to examine the matter and so in the film, I present it as Kastner’s opinion.

[Peled:] But Kastner never said that.

[Lerner:] Kastner was convinced that Chana had turned the paratroopers in. This I know from hints in his writings.

In reaction to Mr. Lerner’s last comments regarding the “hints” in Dr. Kastner’s letters, we note that this argument, nor anything similar to it, was ever raised at the trial before us, neither directly or even by implication. All agree that the words attributed to Dr. Kastner in the play are false, both in that cursed year 1944 in Hungary, and in Greenwald’s trial. There is not a shred of evidence that Chana betrayed her comrades to the Gestapo. Quite the opposite. Furthermore, Dr. Kastner never made the statements attributed to him by the screenplay’s author. In plain language, it may be said that the accusation leveled at Chana Szenes by Dr. Kastner in the play is defamatory.

This completes our review of the facts, some of which we shall revisit during the course of our comments.

The Broadcasting Authority’s Duty and Our Authority to Disallow the Broadcast

8.    Prior to entering the chamber of values and truth, we will say a few words regarding our authority to order the Broadcasting Authority to comply with the petitioners’ request. No one questions our authority to prevent the Broadcasting Authority from televising the disputed paragraph. The Broadcasting Authority was entitled to refuse to broadcast “The Kastner Trial,” either in its entirety or in part, and its decision to reject the petitioners’ request to delete the paragraph in question is subject to our judicial review. The question is not whether this is the sort of matter that the High Court of Justice can review and reverse. Up to this point, my colleagues and I agree. But from here on, our ways part. My colleagues argue that the petitioners did not succeed in crossing the threshold; in my opinion they indeed crossed it, and with room to spare.

The Issue in Dispute

9.    These are the two forces, each pulling in different directions. On one end, Motty Lerner’s freedom of expression and artistic creation and, on the other, human dignity. The dignity of Chana Szenes, a young woman murdered by the Gestapo, who is unable to come and defend her dignity. Shall we accede to the petitioners’ request and enjoin the Broadcasting Authority from broadcasting that paragraph, about one minute long, since it violates Chana Szenes’ dignity? Or, in recognition of the creative author’s freedom of expression and creation, shall we refuse to grant their request?

For the purpose of examining the matter, let us position all the leading actors on stage, present them individually, and listen to their monologues. All being assembled on the stage, we will allow them to converse among themselves and we will then know whose rights prevail. We shall divide our comments in this respect into three sections. First, we shall discuss freedom of expression and the right to reputation, as concepts and legal principles. We shall then examine the hierarchical status of freedom of expression and the right to reputation. Finally, we will have them confront one another, so that we can measure the power of one against the other.

We will begin our discussion by examining the freedom of expression and creation, and thereafter we shall proceed to human dignity.

Freedom of Expression and Artistic Creation

10. Freedom of expression and artistic creation have deep roots in Israeli law. We need not recap their origin; this has been explained on many occasions. I have expressed my own opinion regarding certain aspects of the freedom of expression and the conflict between freedom of expression and other values, occasionally at length, in at least three places. They are, in chronological order, HCJ 606/93 Kiddum [28] at 17; HCJ 4804/94 Station Film [12] at 688 {55}; FH 7325/95 Yediot Acharonot v. Krauss [48]. In these three decisions, as in this case, I was in the minority. My opinion has not changed. While I obviously do not contest the basic right of freedom of expression and artistic creation, I nonetheless feel that my colleagues have gone too far in the protection they grant freedom of expression, in the process curtailing other, extremely important rights.

11. I will not repeat what I wrote and will limit my comments to the issue at hand. Freedom of expression is not a single unit. It is a federation, a federation of rights and interests. There is the chronicle and the speech, the polemic article, fiction and poetry, criticism of the government and commercial advertising. There is the procession and the demonstration, the play and the film. Each of these modes of expression reflects a particular value, and one interest is not identical to the other. Commercial advertising does not benefit, nor should it, from the same protection granted to a chronicle. Instead of referring to freedom of expression in the abstract, we must pick out the particular component relevant for our purposes. Obviously, our concern is not merely with labels – fiction, non‑fiction, poetry or demonstration. It is incumbent upon us to conduct a deep investigation in an attempt to understand the interest requiring protection, its substance and the substantive content of the right presented before the Court. It was in this context that I wrote in Station Film [12] at 689 {56-57}:

In the house of freedom of expression there are various modes of expression and speech, which have a place in the sanctuary, and there are other modes of expression and speech that do not. When freedom of expression clashes with opposing interests, the various modes of expression and speech will wage the battle, each with its own intensity. Freedom of expression is not an idol, before which we should prostrate ourselves wherever we encounter it. Upon concluding that the matter at hand involves one of the derivatives of freedom of expression – an expression that finds shelter under the wings of the broader principle – we test its mettle before sending it out to battle with conflicting interests. Our way is the way of atomization, or, if one prefers: the way of molecularization - dividing the field of freedom of expression into individual categories, according to the type of interest which we protect. There is an article in a newspaper and then there are belles-lettres, there is a description of events and then there is a speech, there is a commercial advertisement and then there is criticism of the regime, there is societal criticism and then there are parades. Each one of these, and others besides them, reflect a certain interest, and the strength of the right will be equal to the strength of the interest. The same applies to modes of expression and speech: there are newspapers and then there are films, there is theatre and then there is television, there is radio and then there is the stage. 

In the same vein I also wrote:

[P]eople often try to explain the nature of one type of freedom of expression using interests that support freedom of expression of another type, and thus we find ourselves mixing apples and oranges. Hence, for example, when considering freedom of the press or a documentary report on certain events, it is simple for the Court to establish the boundaries and strength of freedom of expression in a way which is commensurate with the issue in a manner compatible with the issue being discussed before it ‑ an issue forming one of the pillars of the democratic regime.

Id. At 689 {57-58}.

See also Id. at 688-91; Kiddum [28] at 25‑28; Krauss [46] at 78-80.

12.  Let us return to our case. Which kind of freedom of expression are we referring to? If you will, what is the interest that freedom of expression, in this case, places against other conflicting interests? We are dealing with a screenplay, but not one that is the fruit of the playwright’s imagination from beginning to end. Our concern is with a special kind of play known as a docudrama. In other words – a creation including both drama and documentation. Facts based on reality interpolated with dramatic foundations. The veneer is dramatic, but actual events, which all or at least some of the spectators have heard of and are familiar with, are inseparably woven into the drama. Needless to say, in this kaleidoscope of life and imagination, each docudrama is different. There is no fixed degree of imagination or historical facts; it is entirely up to the creator, who may broaden or narrow either.

13.  “The Kastner Trial” is deeply rooted in historical facts. The plot is basically true, taken from “real life,” and the heroes of the play appear with their own names. Thus, the judge is Judge Binyamin Halevi, the prosecutor is the Attorney-General, Haim Cohen. The attorney for the defense is Shmuel Tamir. The accused is Malchiel Greenwald. Ms. Catherine Szenes, Ms. Hanz Brand, Yoel Palgi and, most importantly, Chana Szenes, also appear in the play. Motty Lerner, the playwright, took specific real life events and cast them into dramatic format. The innocent viewer, as well as the informed viewer, do not know which parts of the play are true and which are false. Did Kastner really say the words attributed to him? Is there any factual basis for Kastner’s allegations against Chana Szenes, or perhaps Kastner is not telling the truth? The viewer does not know.

This is the artistic creation before us; it contains elements of both life and drama. Given what we know about the play, I reject Lerner’s statement that the play is “a fictional drama inspired by events that actually occurred.” The drama is by no means fictitious and the “events that actually occurred” were not just a source of “inspiration” for the author. They are an integral, indistinguishable part of the creation. Nor can I concur that “the script offers an interpretation of events which are the subject of sharp controversy”. The issue before us is not disputed – all agree that Chana Szenes did not betray her comrades to the Gestapo. I also find it difficult to accept Lerner’s statement that “I strove to be as accurate as possible.” His intentions may have been commendable, but his actions were not. In the disputed paragraph Motty Lerner was not just inaccurate – he spoke untruthfully. This is not a question of “poetic license,” as Motty Lerner claims. Motty Lerner did not even comply with his own commitment that “the result of the events must be consistent with the historic reality.” Kastner did not say the words that Lerner attributed to him. Nor are the words substantively correct. Motty Lerner thought that Kastner’s outrageous words in the play would raise the dramatic tension; this indeed is their effect. I am, indeed, at a loss to find any other reason for the scene in which the actor portraying Dr. Kastner lashes out at Chana Szenes. The actor playing Dr. Kastner was Sasson Gabbai; his performance was superb and moving and anyone who saw Dr. Kastner in the play making his accusation against Chana Szenes could not fail to be convinced that his words were true. I find it difficult to accept the claim that “The Kastner Trial” is a “fictional drama.” The drama is far from being “fictional.”

14. This cocktail of imagination and reality situates the play somewhere between a documentary‑chronicle and a dramatic creation. As its name indicates, it is a docudrama, with the primary emphasis being on the documentary‑chronicle component. Chana Szenes was imprisoned and tortured by the Nazis. Yoel Palgi and Peretz Goldstein were captured by the Nazis. Chana Szenes was executed by the Nazis. All of these are historical facts, and they are all woven around Dr. Kastner’s outrageous accusation thrown at Chana Szenes’ mother. If all of the surrounding facts are true, then wouldn’t the innocent viewer believe that statement to be equally accurate? Why wouldn’t one believe that Dr. Kastner had actually said those words and why wouldn’t he believe that Kastner knew, or believed, that Chana Szenes had betrayed her friends to the Nazis? It would have been different had Kastner stood up in the middle of Catherine Szenes’ testimony, attempted to open his mouth and then begun to float around the room, like a character out of one of Marquez’s books. But this was not the case.

Personally, it seems to me that the playwright cannot hide behind the label of a “fictional drama,” nor would it be appropriate for us to allow him or her to do so. The words attributed to Dr. Kastner regarding Chana Szenes are clearly perceived as part of the docudrama’s documentary aspect. In any event, we certainly cannot see this as belonging to the dramatic part of the play, distinct from the reality being displayed on stage. If we imagine the documentary and dramatic parts of the play as celestial objects with their own individual gravitational pull, then Dr. Kastner’s fabricated statement revolves in a “figure 8” around these two bodies. In other words, Dr. Kastner’s fabricated statement purports to have a little of this and a little of that: a description of the reality, as it supposedly was – in Hungary of 1944 and in the Jerusalem Court – and dramatic elements. The viewer does not know whether he or she is viewing reality or a figment of the playwright’s imagination.

15. Freedom of speech and of creative expression have therefore produced a sort of hybrid creation, a documentary presenting the truth as it (supposedly) was, as well as drama which is the product of the playwright’s imagination.

16. Until now we have discussed freedom of speech and artistic creation. We shall now proceed to examine a person’s right to his or her good name.

Human Dignity –One’s Right to One’s Good Name

17. A person’s deep, psychological need for a good reputation, a natural yearning, has long been legally recognized. Our nation has been escorted by rabbinic dictums such as “whoever publicly shames his neighbour is deemed to have shed blood” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia 58b [78]. Similarly, “all who descend into Gehenna reascend, except for three persons who descend and do not reascend... he who publicly shames his neighbour…”Id. [78]. Indeed, “a person’s good name and dignity may be dearer to him or her than any other asset” CA 214/89 Avneri [16] at 856 (Barak, J.) A person’s dignity and reputation are at least as dear to that person as his or her body. Just as a person has a right to bodily integrity, so too is a person entitled to protect his or her dignity and good name. Maligning a person’s dignity and reputation can be likened to rape or an indecent act performed on a person’s body. The difference between both forms of damage is only that, in the case of rape, one first damages the body and only after the soul. In the case of a person’s dignity and reputation, it is the soul that is initially damaged, which may lead to the body being harmed as well.

18.  A person can look to two legal sources for recognition of his or her right to reputation: namely, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Defamation Law, 1965. We shall discuss the Basic Law at a later juncture. Infra. paras. 28 and 29. For now, we shall turn to the Defamation Law.

19.  The Defamation Law expressly and specifically sets out the rights a person has to his or her good name. The law itself balances between a person’s reputation and his fellow’s freedom of expression. If Chana Szenes were with us today, I do not have the slightest doubt that she would have a claim, under the Defamation Law, against the playwright and against the Broadcasting Authority. As defined in section 1(1) of the Defamation Law, defamation is anything the publication of which may “lower a person in the estimation of others, or make him or her the object of hatred, contempt, or ridicule on their part.” Defamation Law, 1; or a publication which may “bring a person into disrepute because of acts, conduct or qualities attributed to him or her.” Sec. 1(2) of the Law. As such, the statement of Dr. Kastner in the screenplay constitutes defamation. There are those who will claim that it is not for us to pass judgment on one who suffered and, in his pain, revealed such secrets. As our rabbis said: “Do not judge thy neighbour until you are in his place” Mishnah, Ethics of our Fathers, 2:4 [80]. One could even claim that, as such, neither the playwright nor the Broadcasting Authority defamed Chana Szenes. Even having cited the words of our rabbis, however, it would seem that there are few who would dispute that the words uttered by Dr. Kastner constitute defamation.

Were Chana Szenes with us today – seventy-eight years old – she would be able to petition this Court to enjoin the statement attributed to Dr. Kastner. Chana Szenes, however, returned her soul to God in suffering, after being tortured and murdered, on November 7, 1944, at the age of twenty-three. Chana Szenes is no longer with us, and the question is only whether there is another who can file suit to reclaim her dignity. The following people have claimed to represent Chana Szenes’ dignity: In HCJ 6126/94 the petitioners are her brother, Giora Szenes, his two sons Eitan Szenes and Dr. David Szenes, as well as Reuven Dafni, the chairman of Yad Vashem, who, in 1944, parachuted into Yugoslavia with Chana Szenes. In HCJ 6143/94 the petitioners are Ms. Nadia Matar and the Women’s Association for the future of Israel (“Women in Green”).

What is the law regarding the defamation of the dead?

20. It turns out that the law has changed in this matter. Initially, at the time of its enactment, the Defamation Law provided:

Defamation of a

         Deceased          Person

5.  Where defamatory matter is published after a person’s death, it shall be treated as the defamation of a living person. The spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased shall be regarded as persons injured by the defamation.

This is to say, defamation of the deceased was the same as defamation of the living, except that the right to file for judicial redress was exclusively reserved to the deceased’s spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters. Under this law, Chana Szenes’ brother, Giora Szenes, was fully entitled to demand that the disputed paragraph be expunged from the play. This was in contrast to the previous law. See section 6 of the draft proposal for the Defamation Law-1962.

The law, however, was amended in 1967, see Defamation Law (Amended Version), 1967, and the right to file suit for the defamation of a deceased was curtailed. The following is the current language of section 5 of the Defamation Law:

Defamation of a

Deceased 
Person

5.  Defamatory statements regarding a person that are published after his or her death shall be treated as the defamation of a living person, but do not constitute cause for a civil claim or a private criminal complaint, and no indictment shall be submitted for an offense under this section unless it is requested by the deceased’s spouse or one of his children, grandchildren, parents, brothers or sisters.

This amended Defamation Law contains three principles. The first is that defamatory matter regarding a dead person “does not constitute cause for a civil claim or a private criminal complaint.” The second is that charges may be laid for defamatory statements regarding the deceased, after a request by the deceased’s spouse or one of his children, grandchildren, parents, brothers or sisters. The third principle is that, subject to the first two principles, defamation of the dead shall be treated as defamation of the living. We regard this third principle as constituting the heart of the law: essentially, defamation of the dead is the same as defamation of the living, even though, procedurally speaking, the law imposes restrictions on the ability to seek legal redress, either in a civil claim or in a criminal indictment.

To complete the picture, we will also mention section 25 of the law, which deals with the institution of legal proceedings by one of the deceased’s relatives, within a limited period after the death of the deceased. It also deals with the continuation of defamation proceedings begun by the deceased, if he or she passed away prior to the termination of such proceeding.

21. What does all of the above tell us? We see that defamation of the deceased is subject to the same law as defamation of the living. This is the credo of the law and its message. This is the version of human dignity presented by the Defamation Law. Defamation of the deceased does not constitute grounds for a civil claim or a private criminal complaint, but sealing off the road to the Court does not detract from the substantive prohibition against publishing material defamatory of the dead and does not lessen the statutory moral‑legal condemnation of such defamation.

Defamation of the dead does not provide grounds for a civil claim – a claim for damages, an injunction or a declaratory judgment within the framework of the civil law. However, I am unable to see any good reason why a person should not be able to file suit within the framework of public law, provided that the issue concerns a body or person subject to public law. The Broadcasting Authority is indeed exempt from the yoke of private law with respect to defamation of the dead, as is any other person or body operating within the realm of private law. However, as a body which is also subject to public law, it must be held legally accountable within the parameters of that law.

22. Thus, the Defamation Law does not prevent the petitioners from petitioning the High Court of Justice for a public law remedy against the Broadcasting Authority. Granted, the petition of the brother, Giora Szenes, is not equivalent to the petition filed by the Women in Green. By its very nature, the latter is a public petition, relating to the collective interest. As such, it raises the issue of the public interest regarding the publication of a statement defaming Chana Szenes. In other words, in this petition, the defamation of Chana Szenes does not appear as an independent and exclusive basis for the legal claim, but rather as a component of the public interest in the wider sense of that concept. The public interest includes many other elements besides the protection of a person’s good name, including the freedom of expression and the playwright’s freedom of artistic creation. In this petition, the right to one’s good name must battle all the other components of the public interest. It is only then, if it finds itself victorious in this battle, that the right to a good name can wage its war against the freedom of expression and of artistic creation.

Giora Szenes’ petition, for its part, is different. It is, by its very essence, a private petition, one that raises the interest of the individual. I would go a step further and say that it is an intimate petition. Should we be surprised when a son or daughter comes to protect the honor of his or her mother or father? Does it astonish us when a brother battles for his sister’s dignity, or when a sister fights for her brother’s dignity? Surely, a father and mother would protect their children in the same way. While Giora Szenes refers to his sister as “the soldier-poet who sacrificed her life on the altar of human dignity and liberty,” he makes it equally clear that his petition is focused on the “maligning of the dignity of Chana, of blessed memory, and that of her family,” and that the injury “is further intensified by the series being scheduled on the fiftieth anniversary of her execution.” It is no wonder that, in his affidavit, Giora Szenes speaks of “my sister” and states that, “since becoming aware of the scheduled broadcast, I feel as though my world has fallen apart and that I am powerless.” This is the statement of a brother afflicted.

As such, the petition of Giora Szenes raises the issue of defamation in its purest sense, as a right to reputation standing on its own, as though Chana Szenes herself had petitioned the Court. This is not the nature of the petition of the Women in Green, which seeks to protect the right to a good name as a component of the public interest. Giora Szenes carries the sword of reputation, not the sword of the public interest. It is with this sword that he sets out to battle.

Giora Szenes brings a private claim in the realm of the public law. Chana Szenes is unable to file suit to reclaim her dignity, and her brother does so in her stead. Here, Giora Szenes and Chana Szenes are one and the same. The same applies to the other relatives in section 5 of the Defamation law.

23. A question: are the relatives named in section 5 of the Defamation Law the only ones who possess a “private right” in the public law realm? I would not restrict the right to these relatives exclusively. There are situations in which a friend is like a brother to the deceased and if “spouse” means a husband and wife who are legally married, then it would seem that even those who are not legally married, but who are also a couple, have a private right within the public law realm. However, we need not decide this question, since it is Giora Szenes, Chana Szenes’ brother, who has come to protect the dignity of his sister.

24. A final word: “Defamatory statements regarding a person that are published after his or her death shall be treated as the defamation of a living person.” Does this apply to everyone that has lived since the dawn of mankind? Can one defame Abraham? Moses? Miriam? Yael, the wife of the Keni? Samson? King David? Jeremiah? Judah the Maccabee? Hillel the Elder? Bar-Kochba? Maimonides? Spinoza? Does the defamation of any of these figures confer rights under public law?

It could be argued that the question is whether all of these, our nation’s historical figures, are included in the definition of “person” as provide by the law. It could further be claimed that a distinction must be made between a “person” and a “historical figure.” The law intended to protect a “person” and not a “figure.” All of the above are “figures,” not “persons,” as defined by the law. When then does a person become a “historical figure”? Is Ben Gurion a “figure” or a “person”? The question is far from simple and at this stage we shall be satisfied with the tentative determination that a “person,” within the meaning of the Defamation Law, is someone whose family members, as specified in section 5, bring a claim of defamation. The determination of those entitled to file suit establishes the confines of the right and delineates the border between a “person” and a “figure.”

Another criterion for defining a dead “person,” for the purposes of defamation, is whether there are people alive who knew him or her personally. For as long as there are people living who knew the deceased, he or she continues to live as a “person.” As the poet Chanoch Levin wrote in “When My Eyes Shall Grow Dark,” in his book The Lives of the Dead (1999):

When my eyes shall grow dark

Draw my dead eyes

Towards your open eyes

And welcome my lifeless image into your embrace,

…draw my eyes

my dead eyes towards your eyes

there I will live a little longer

I will see through your living, seeing eyes

I will see the world that I cannot see

The world I so loved, and now

It is lost to me, and I am no more,

Only my dead eyes peering through your seeing eyes

In your living eyes, my dead eyes

live a little more, so long

as you will live

I too live, so long

as you will remember,

so long.

In this context we cannot but refer to the wonderful legend of Choni the Circle Maker who was overtaken by slumber and slept for seventy years. When he woke up there was no one that knew him, and he knew no one, as his generation had already passed away. “His resolve was weakened, begged for mercy ‑ and died.” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Taanit, 23a [81]. And so it is in every generation. “And Joseph died, and all his brethren and all that generation” (Exodus, 1:6 [82]); and immediately following: “Now there arose a new king over Egypt who knew not Joseph.” Id. Thus it was in the days of the prophets: “And Joshua the son of Nun, servant of the Lord died, being an hundred and ten years old ... And also all that generation was gathered to its fathers; and there arose another generation after it which knew not the Lord nor yet the work which He had done for Israel.” Judges 2:8, 2:10 [83].

Needless to say, this question does not arise in the case at bar. Chana Szenes’ brother, her own flesh and blood, stands before us, and demands that his sister’s dignity be restored. These being the circumstances, is it possible or appropriate that we refer to her as a “figure”? There can be no doubt – Chana Szenes is a national heroine, a historical figure. We were educated through her heritage and sang her songs. This is the Chana Szenes of the petition of the Women in Green. However, this is not the case in the private, personal petition of Giora Szenes.

Intermediate Summary

25.  Up to this point we have addressed the freedom of expression and a person’s right to reputation as substantive legal concepts. They are independent principles in their own right, which grant rights to some and obligate others. They also serve as foundations for the interpretation of statutes and case law. They are interpretative principles both in the narrow sense and in the creative sense. However, the examination of the essence of the rights is not sufficient. Given our awareness that these two rights will come into direct conflict, we must further examine their hierarchical status in the legal system and whether one of the two has prevalence over the other in the legal hierarchy, or whether they share the same status in the legal pyramid. Deciding this question is a prior condition for preparing the rights for the struggle in which they are to engage. We will therefore examine the legal hierarchy of the rights, and we will begin with freedom of expression.

Human Dignity – Freedom of Expression’s Hierarchical Status

26.  Until the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the right to reputation and the right to freedom of expression possessed equal legal status. The right to reputation was already enshrined in statute – in the Defamation Law, as well as in preceding case law. Freedom of expression, in contrast, was exclusively a product of case law. Of course, that case law had the status of law. In other words, with the exception of the internal balancing tests within the parameters of the law itself, all of which defined the scope of freedom of expression, it was an accepted presumption that freedom of expression could only be curtailed or circumscribed by force of Knesset legislation. See e.g., CrimFH 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [24] at 400, and citations there. As with other basic rights, freedom of expression had the status of law. This was so until the enactment of the Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty. Since the promulgation of the Basic Law, there has been some confusion as to the exact state of the law.

27. The right to freedom of expression was not specifically recognized in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, or in any other Basic Law. Even so, there are those who maintain that the concept of human dignity in the Basic Law also includes the freedom of speech, which they see as one of the derivatives of human dignity. According to this view, “Human Dignity” is an overflowing fountain, nourishing all those human rights that may possibly derive from it, or that are implicit therein. One of these basic rights is the right to freedom of expression. On the other hand, there are those who maintain that human dignity is human dignity and in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, human dignity does not include freedom of expression. This, they claimed, is particularly true in the case of this specific Basic Law and its legislative history. Between these two extremes there are a number of variations on this theme. See e.g., H. Sommer, Hazchuyot Habilti Minuyot Vihekefa shel Hamahapacha Hachukatit, 28 Mishpatim, 259-61 (1997) [68]; A. Barak, Zchuyot Adam Muganot: Hahekef Vihahagbala, [69], 253; Y. Karp, Mikztat Shielot Al Kvod Haadam lifi Chok Hayesod: Kvod Haadam Vicheruto, [70]; A. Barak, Interpretation in Law [65] at 413. Judges too are occasionally tempted to speculate, in obiter dictum, regarding the nature and scope of the concept of human dignity.

We will not take that path and will not reveal our inner-most thoughts. For our purposes, without ruling upon the matter, we shall agree that freedom of expression is a derivative of human dignity in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. We shall therefore presume, without ruling upon the matter, that since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, freedom of speech has ascended the legal hierarchy and today reigns supreme on the throne of rights set out in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

An Aside

In his opinion, my colleague, the President, distinguishes between the scope of freedom of expression and the protection that the law should grant that expression. That is to say, there are times when a person has freedom of expression even though the law may not extend its protection to him or her. Thus, for instance, a lie will find shelter under the wings of free speech, even if it will not be protected. This statement requires further examination, but, given that there is no need to decide the matter, I have not discussed it.

Human Dignity – The Hierarchical Status of the Right to Reputation

28. Since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty we all know, including those who were previously ignorant, that human dignity is the crown jewel. The concept of “human dignity” is expressly referred to four times in the Basic Law, and once by implication. First, in the law’s title – The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Second, section 1(a) of the law provides that “[t]he purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty.” Third, section 2 of the law provides that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such.” Fourth, section 4 of the law establishes that “[a]ll persons are entitled to the protection of their life, body and dignity.” In addition to these, section 1 of the law specifies the “basic principles” according to which “[b]asic human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being.” The “value of the human being,” as is self-evident, includes human dignity.

And so, one must conclude that human dignity is the fundamental pillar of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Further on in our remarks, we will address the force of a person’s right to dignity. Here we have merely noted its centrality in the system of basic rights.

29. Be the territory covered by “Human Dignity,” as distinct from the freedom of expression, what it may, it is unanimously agreed that human dignity includes a person’s reputation. Human dignity has a number of progeny, but it is clear that one’s good name – or perhaps we should say one’s very name, it being one’s own name – is one’s first-born child. For if human dignity does not include a person’s good name, what then is human dignity? Seeing as how our concern is with human dignity, we need not pursue our search for other basic rights implicit in the concept of human dignity. Furthermore, a person retains his or her dignity both in life and after death. This is the specific stipulation of section 5 of the Defamation Law. Case law further added expressly and definitively that the human dignity in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty also extends to the dignity of the deceased. See e.g., CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel [50] at 102 {184}; CA 105/92 [10] at 201; CA 1482/92 Hagar v. Hagar [51] at 801; HCJ 294/91 [18] at 523; HCJ 5688/92 [19] at 820, 827-28; FH 3299/93 [20] at 201, 205, 208, 211; HCJ 3933/92 Barachat v. C.O.S. Central Command [52] at 6; A. Barak Interpretation in Law [65] at 437-38; CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon Lezion Jewish Burial Society [53].

A person’s good name has therefore been directly recognized and protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The Hierarchical Status of the Right to Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation – A Summary

30. It appears to us, therefore, that both the right to freedom of expression and the right to one’s reputation are protected on two levels. One level is that of the law. With respect to freedom of expression, we are dealing with case law that has the status of statutory law. The higher level is that of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Chana Szenes, too, has the right to her good name – some will say the right of the living to maintain the good name of Chana Szenes. This right, as well as the freedom of expression of the playwright and the Broadcasting Authority, enjoys the status of basic rights, or supreme rights. It is these two supreme rights that are locked in a duel. Which of them will prevail?

We cannot decide between the two rights on the basis of their fundamental essence. They are both deeply rooted rights – rights without which our democratic society could not survive. Nor can we decide between them according to their hierarchical status in the legal system, for both are of royal stature. We must therefore search for an appropriate criterion for deciding between the rival rights. Such a criterion can be found by a deeper examination of the essence of the rights. We will not refer to each of the rights purely as principles, or by reference to their respective proximity to the apex of the pyramid of rights. Instead, by way of metaphor, we will use a geiger-meter, to measure the internal power of each of the rights claiming supremacy. We will measure the internal power of the right to freedom of expression of the playwright and the Broadcasting Authority and we will then measure the internal power of Chana Szenes’ right to her good name, as it is carried on the petitioners’ shoulders. Finally we will compare their respective powers. The right which has more power, its internal light shining brighter, is the right which will prevail in the case before us.

We will now examine the internal power of each of the rights before us.

The Right to Freedom of Expression and the Right to a Good Name

31. We will begin with freedom of expression and artistic creation. As we saw, we cannot be satisfied with the examination of the right of freedom of expression in the general sense. It is incumbent upon us to further examine that particular thread of freedom of expression presenting itself before us. Its internal power must be evaluated in order to assess its strength in the confrontation with other basic rights that it attempts to curtail.

32. In fact, we already examined the aspects of freedom of expression relevant for our purposes. We found that we are dealing with part fiction and part drama. As indicated by its name, it is a “docudrama.” To the extent that the dramatic element is involved, we have no quarrel with either the playwright or the Broadcasting Authority. Furthermore, even if, for dramatic effect, the playwright occasionally diverges from the truth, we would not take issue with the matter. The dramatic element of the play is the life-breath of the docudrama’s author. It forms that creation’s soul and we would dare not damage it.

This is not the case with the other element, that of the chronicle. Indeed, here too we will not be overly meticulous, nor can we be, for the author is a playwright, not a historian. Thus, for example, regarding the crossing of the border from Yugoslavia to Hungary: Chana Szenes crossed the border on the night between the 9th and 10th of June in 1944 and was caught after two hours. Yoel Palgi and Peretz Goldstein crossed the border two weeks later, on June 23rd. Chana did not know when they were to cross the border, and the two of them crossed the border about 100 kilometers away from where Chana herself crossed the border (see the affidavit of Reuven Dafni, who, as their leader, was responsible for the group of paratroopers in Yugoslavia). Diverging from this fact, Yoel Palgi in the play says – as does the playwright in his interview with Yediot Aharonot, supra para. 7 – that he crossed the border three days after Chana Szenes. By distorting their respective dates of crossing the border, reducing the period between crossings from two weeks to three days, the playwright sows the seeds that give rise to Kastner’s accusation that Chana betrayed both Palgi and Goldstein to the Nazis. The proximity of the dates could indicate that Chana knew the date when Palgi and Goldstein would arrive. Had this been the total extent of the divergence from the truth, no one would have criticized the playwright. The same applies to other similar divergences. However the divergence in the case before us is different. For it is not only a divergence from the truth; while diverging from the truth it viciously damages a person’s good name.

33. Freedom of expression regarding actions or events that occurred is of the highest importance. The freedom and right to report events and actions, especially events and actions about which the public must know, is not just a right. When speaking of the media, the right goes hand in hand with the obligation. There is a public duty on those reporting, to report that which should be reported. It is for this reason that the reporter has the defense of “truth of publication” under section 14 of the Defamation Law. I dwelt at length upon the defense of truth in my opinion in the Krauss [48] and will not deal with it here (In that decision, my opinion was the minority view, but not with respect to the defense of truth).

The freedom of expression with regard to the publication of a chronicle, as well as the defense of truth, also subject the reporter to a special duty to restrict himself or herself to the truth and not to report untruths – even if unintentionally and unwittingly. Certainly this is the case when the reporter knowingly or recklessly reports untruths. In any event, even if we say that the freedom of expression includes falsehood – and we express no opinion on this point – I am at a loss to understand why the law should protect falsehood with the same protection granted to freedom of expression. I cannot see what the protected interest is. Just as my right to lift my hands on either side terminates when I reach another person’s nose, so too, the freedom of expression terminates upon encountering a person’s good name. One way or another, regarding a false report, I find no interest capable of supporting the right to freedom of expression in its battle with another person’s right to his good name.

All of this relates to the power of the rights of the playwright and the Broadcasting Authority to freedom of expression and artistic creation.

34. With respect to Chana Szenes’ right to dignity and her good name, as they are borne on the petitioners’ shoulders, I find it difficult to find a more noble right. Regarding human dignity, I said the following in Krauss [48] at 74:

With respect to human dignity, truth be told, we will find it exceedingly difficult to distinguish between a person and his or her dignity. A person and his or her dignity enter this world intertwined. One is one’s dignity, and one’s dignity is oneself. “A person and his or her dignity emerged together from the mother’s womb, and the two become one. A person is his or her dignity, and that dignity is the person.” CA 3077/90 A. v. B. at 592. One who lost one’s dignity is merely the shell of a person, if you will: the shadow of a person.

Thus, a person and his or her dignity are identical, and a person without dignity is but nothing more than the shell of a person. To quote the sublime words of Shakespeare in Richard the Second:

The Purest Treasure mortal times afford

Is spotless reputation; that away,

Men are but gilded loam or painted clay.

Mine honour is my life, both grow in one,

Take honour from me and my life is done”

See William Shakespeare, Richard II, act I, sc. I.

In our own sources, human dignity is reserved a place of honor in the Temple of basic rights. The reason, we are taught, is that man was created in God’s image: “So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him.” Genesis 1:27 [84]. And Rabbi Akiva taught us “Beloved is man, who was created in the image of God.” Mishnah, Ethics of our Fathers 3:14 [85] To this the Court added, in Krauss [48] at 75:

Those who are believers and observe the commandments derive the dignity of man from the honor of The Holy One, Blessed be He. In so doing, they elevate human dignity to supreme heights. And what will those say who do not believe and who do not observe? They will say: why should we anchor our recognition of the noble value of human dignity in God? Isn’t a person qua person sufficient reason for protecting one’s dignity? For a person is his or her dignity, and that dignity is the person. Nor can we forget the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the basic law that engraved human dignity both in its name and content, establishing it in the Israeli legal system.

From all of the above, we know that the power emanating from Chana Szenes’ right to dignity is unparalleled. Regarding Chana Szenes, we can further say that her dignity and good name are larger than life itself, for as much as she was tortured, until she was murdered, she did not divulge her secret. To be precise, our concern is with Chana Szenes’ refined and pure right to her dignity and reputation, both of these having been carried by Giora Szenes from the battlefield and presented to us.

35. Chana Szenes’ right to dignity and reputation are laid before us in all their grandeur. We no longer need to examine the claims of the “Women in Green,” who present Chana Szenes’ interest as part of the public interest. The private, immediate interest of the brother Giora is sufficient, and we need not discuss the collective interest of the Women in Green. Nonetheless, it bears mentioning that all of the judgments cited by my colleague, the President, in support of his opinion, deal with freedom of expression conflicting with the collective interest and not with freedom of expression conflicting with an individual interest. In referring to an individual interest our intention is to a particular person cited by name and description. The only exception is the ruling in Avneri [16] with regard to which we have two comments. First, the issue there concerned a temporary injunction, in circumstances that were not entirely clear. Second, in any event, the rule established in that case warrants renewed examination for since then the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has been enacted. My colleague, the President, also agrees with this. In his own words in Ganimat supra [49] at 418:

The new status for the right to a good name, part of the right to human dignity, may justify a renewed examination of the exercise of judicial discretion in granting temporary injunctions against publications which are allegedly defamatory.

Compare CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira. See also A. Bendor, Chofesh Lishhon-Hara, 20 Mishpatim 561 (1990-1991) [71].

36. Here we must add and understand the need to peel off the label of “freedom of expression” from the group of interests to which it attaches, and to further examine the nature and texture of the particular component of the specific interest. Having peeled off the label, we now know that even if we state that human dignity encompasses freedom of expression – and we take no position either way on the matter – the dignity of Motty Lerner confronts the dignity of Chana Szenes. This being the case, we can further ask: could anyone dare to claim that Motty Lerner’s dignity prevails over that of Chana Szenes? Motty Lerner’s dignity is indeed dignity and he is worthy of it, but we will not agree to his dignity being constructed over that of Chana Szenes, or to his dignity dismissing the dignity of Chana Szenes. As the verse says: “for them that honor me, I will honor.” I Samuel, 2:30 [86].

37. The results of the confrontation between the rights are clear. Our concern is not with rights of equal standing. We are dealing with a right of dimensions struggling against a smaller right. The dignity and reputation of Chana easily prevail over the rights of the playwright and the Broadcasting Authority.

In HCJ 1/81 supra [39] at 378, Justice Shamgar wrote:

In order for this Court to prohibit an individual, responsible for public broadcasting and advertising, from publishing a particular broadcast, there must exist extreme circumstances, posing a tangible and near certain danger to the public welfare at large… or a clear and obvious illegality (emphasis added).

In the paragraph that the petitioners requested be deleted, there is a “clear and obvious illegality.”

Epilogue

38. Soon after turning twenty-three, Chana Szenes returned her soul, in all its purity, to God. Chana Szenes cannot come to claim her dignity. It is incumbent upon us to restore her dignity to her. In CA 1182/90 Shacham v. Rothman [54] at 347, the Court decided to honor a person’s wishes expressed in his will, and I concluded my opinion there with the following words:

I am happy with the result that I have reached, which in my opinion is the fulfillment of the deceased’s wishes. A person’s will is his or her dignity; it is human dignity. But the dead are unable to realize their wishes and preserve their dignity. We have therefore acted for the fulfillment of the deceased’s wish and the preservation of the deceased’s dignity.

Chana Szenes was a soldier-poet, or perhaps we could say poet‑soldier. She was a poet, a soldier, and a dreamer. Chana loved life. And when Chana wandered barefoot on the golden sands of Caesarea, a young girl, twenty years old, she prayed to God:

O Lord, my God

I pray that these never end

the sand and the sea,

the rush of the water,

the flash of the heaven,

the prayer of man.

In those days that were blacker than black, redder than blood, before she entered the inferno, Chana sang of the rebellion, of death and dignity. This was Chana’s song in Serditza, Yugoslavia:

Happy…

Happy is the match that burnt and ignited the flames

Happy is the flame that burnt in the recesses of hearts

Happy are the hearts that knew to extinguish in dignity…

Happy is the match that burnt and ignited flames.

Chana Szenes’ heart knew how to extinguish in dignity. Whether by words or by action, the dignity and good name of Chana Szenes cannot be taken away.

Chana Szenes

11 Tammuz 5781 – 28 Cheshvan 5805

July 17, 1921 – November 7, 1944

******

The case was decided in accordance with the majority opinion, as per the opinion of President A. Barak, with Justice Mazza concurring and against the dissenting opinion of Justice M. Cheshin.

July 26th, 1999.

 

 

Full opinion: 

SHIN, Israeli Movement for Equal Representation of Women v. Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5432/03
HCJ 5477/03
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, March 3, 2004
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The third respondent held a concession for broadcasting the ‘Playboy’ channel in Israel. This channel shows material of an erotic or pornographic nature. The first respondent gave a licence to respondents 4-7 to broadcast the ‘Playboy’ channel, subject to a number of restrictions relating, inter alia, to the times when the broadcasts were permitted, the manner of subscribing to the channel, and measures that needed to be taken to ensure that the channel was not accessible to persons under the age of 18. The petitioners challenged the decision of the first respondent, on the grounds that the first respondent erred in its interpretation of the law, and that the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel fell within the scope of a provision in the law that prohibits ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’ The petitioners further argued that the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel offended the feelings and dignity of women.

 

Held: The majority of the Supreme Court justices who heard the petition held that even pornography enjoyed the protection of the constitutional right of freedom of expression. As such, even though there were conflicting rights or interests, the first respondent’s decision struck a proper balance by permitting the broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel, subject to the restrictions that it imposed. Even those minority justices who questioned whether pornographic expression fell within the scope of the right of freedom of expression accepted that there were no grounds for intervention in the decision permitting the broadcasting of the ‘Playboy’ channel, in view of the restrictions imposed on the broadcasts.

 

Petitions denied.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 5432/03

HCJ 5477/03

SHIN, Israeli Movement for Equal Representation of Women, and 11 others (HCJ 5432/03)

Chairperson of the Knesset Committee on the Status of Women, MK Gila Gamliel and 52 others (HCJ 5477/03)

v.

1.     Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting

2. Adv. Dorit Inbar, chairperson of the Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting

3.     Play TV Ltd

4.     D.B.S. Satellite Services (1998) Ltd (‘Yes’)

5.     Tevel Israel International Communication Ltd

6.     MATAV Cable Communication Systems Ltd

7.     Golden Channels & Co.

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[3 March 2004]

Before President A. Barak, Vice-President T. Or and Justices E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, D. Dorner, J. Türkel, D. Beinisch, E. Rivlin, A. Procaccia, E.E. Levy, A. Grunis

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: The third respondent held a concession for broadcasting the ‘Playboy’ channel in Israel. This channel shows material of an erotic or pornographic nature. The first respondent gave a licence to respondents 4-7 to broadcast the ‘Playboy’ channel, subject to a number of restrictions relating, inter alia, to the times when the broadcasts were permitted, the manner of subscribing to the channel, and measures that needed to be taken to ensure that the channel was not accessible to persons under the age of 18. The petitioners challenged the decision of the first respondent, on the grounds that the first respondent erred in its interpretation of the law, and that the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel fell within the scope of a provision in the law that prohibits ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’ The petitioners further argued that the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel offended the feelings and dignity of women.

 

Held: The majority of the Supreme Court justices who heard the petition held that even pornography enjoyed the protection of the constitutional right of freedom of expression. As such, even though there were conflicting rights or interests, the first respondent’s decision struck a proper balance by permitting the broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel, subject to the restrictions that it imposed. Even those minority justices who questioned whether pornographic expression fell within the scope of the right of freedom of expression accepted that there were no grounds for intervention in the decision permitting the broadcasting of the ‘Playboy’ channel, in view of the restrictions imposed on the broadcasts.

 

Petitions denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, s. 3.

Classification, Marking and Prohibition of Damaging Broadcasts, 5761-2001, s. 3(a)(4).

Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law, 5742-1982, ss. 6Y, 6Y(2), 6Y(2)(3), 6Y(2A), 6AK, 6BE.

Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law (Amendment no. 27), 5762-2002.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, ss. 34U, 214, 214A.

Telecommunications Law (Amendment no. 25), 5761-2001.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 4267/93 Amitai, Citizens for Good Government and Integrity v. Prime Minister [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 441.

[2]        CrimA 4693/01 State of Israel v. Babizaib [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 580.

[3]        HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 661; [1997] IsrLR 23.

[4]        HCJ 606/93 Advancement Promotions and Publishing (1981) Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 1.

[5]        HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90.

[6]        HCJ 4644/00 Jaffora Tavori Ltd v. Second Television and Radio Authority [2000] IsrSC 54(4) 178.

[7]        CrimA 2831/95 Alba v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 221.

[8]        HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94; [1995-6] IsrLR 178.

[9]        HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.

[10]     HCJ 1/49 Bajerno v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80.

[11]     HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel [1997] IsrSC 51(2) 509.

[12]     HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229.

[13]     HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 817; [1998-9] IsrLR 339.

[14]     HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Second Television and Radio Authority [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 193.

[15]     HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[16]     HCJ 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 267.

[17]     HCJ 701/81 Malach v. Chairman of District Planning and Building Committee [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 1.

[18]     CrimFH 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 193.

[19]     HCJ 2753/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff, IDF [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 359.

[20]     HCJ 92/56 Weiss v. Chairman and Members of the Legal Council [1956] IsrSC 10 1592.

[21]     CA 311/57 Attorney-General v. M. Diezengoff & Co. (Navigation) Ltd [1959] IsrSC 13 1026; IsrSJ 3 53.

[22]     FH 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 7.

[23]     HCJ 636/86 Nahalat Jabotinsky Workers’ Moshav v. Minister of Agriculture [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 701.

[24]     HCJFH 4128/00 Director-General of Prime Minister’s Office v. Hoffman [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 289.

 

American cases cited:

[25]     American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (1985).

[26]     Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

[27]     United States v. Playboy Ent. Gp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).

 

Canadian cases cited:

[28]     R. v. Butler [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.

[29]     R. v. Hawkins (1993) 15 O.R. (3d) 549.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[30]     Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot 48a.

[31]     Isaiah 11, 9.

 

For the petitioners in HCJ 5432/03 — Y. Abadi.

For the petitioners in HCJ 5477/03 — S. Ben-Natan.

For respondents 1-2 — A. Licht.

For respondent 3 — Z. Bar-Natan, R. Peled, A. Halfon, R. Gazit, B. Rottenberg, A. Wang.

For respondent 4 — M. Matalon, L. Porat.

For respondents 5-7 — U. Rahat.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

The Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting permitted the broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel on cable TV and satellite. The law prohibits the depiction of ‘a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’ The question before us is whether permitting the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel was lawful, i.e., whether the broadcasts of the channel breach the prohibition prescribed by law.

The petitioners and the respondents

1.    The petitioners in HCJ 5432/03 are feminist and social organizations who have joined in order to prevent pornographic broadcasts on the cable and satellite channels. The petitioners in HCJ 5477/03 currently serve, or served in the past, as Knesset members. The first respondent is a public council (hereafter — the Council), which operates pursuant to the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law, 5742-1982. The second respondent, Adv. Dorit Inbar, was at the relevant times for our purposes the chairperson of the Council. The third respondent (hereafter — the Playboy company) is a private company that holds a concession for broadcasting in Israel the broadcasts of Playboy TV International LLC, including broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel. This channel is an erotic channel, which has enjoyed great success around the world. It is broadcast in 175 countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, England, Belgium, France, the Scandinavian countries, the countries of Latin America, Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand, Poland, Turkey, Spain and Portugal. The fourth respondent (hereafter — ‘Yes’) is a licensee for television broadcasts by satellite, which is operates under the name ‘Yes.’ Respondents 5-7 (hereafter — the cable companies) broadcast television programs on cable in accordance with a licence given to them for this purpose.

The background to the petitions

2.    The possibility of broadcasting erotic and pornographic channels (hereafter — adult channels) on television began when ‘Yes’ came into the market and began operating digital technology that allows the separation of adult channels from other channels. In decisions of the Council dated 6 July 2000 and 9 July 2000, the ‘Blue’ channel was approved for broadcasting, and in its decision dated 17 July 2000, the ‘Playboy’ channel was also approved. In July 2000 ‘Yes’ began marketing and broadcasting the approved channels.

MK Zevulun Orlev and MK Shulamit Aloni filed a petition to this court against the approvals that the Council gave to the ‘Blue’ channel only, in HCJ 5885/00, but on 3 September 2000, following the recommendation of the court, the petitioners withdrew the petition, and it was struck out.

In April and May 2001, the cable companies also began to broadcast with digital technology, and so they too obtained the possibility of marketing adult channels. In June 2001, after receiving the approval of the Council, the cable companies began broadcasting three adult channels — ‘Vivid,’ ‘Spice’ and ‘Playboy’ — while complying with various restrictions that the Council had stipulated. These restrictions were fully formulated on 7 June 2001, after the Council took into account the public positions that it surveyed and after it formulated a general policy with regard to the content of the broadcasting and the manner of broadcasting sexual content.

The broadcasting of the adult channels in general, and the ‘Playboy’ channel in particular, met with great commercial success. According to the reports of the companies, more than 50% of the satellite subscribers and 65% of the cable subscribers bought the ‘Playboy’ channel broadcasts.

3.    On 25 July 2001, the Knesset passed the Telecommunications Law (Amendment no. 25), 5761-2001 (hereafter — amendment 25), which changed the name of the law to the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law (hereafter — the Communications Law). Amendment 25 added to the law s. 6Y(2A), which prohibits the broadcast of a channel whose main broadcasts are sex broadcasts. A criminal sanction was also prescribed for a breach of this provision, in s. 6AK, and this stipulates a penalty of five years imprisonment or a fine in an amount of seven million new sheqels.

This change in legislation led the Council to hold meetings and even to announce a public hearing. On 9 August 2001, following various positions that were presented to the Council, it published a new policy, whereby the law applies to sex broadcast channels, but not to broadcasts using the ‘pay-per-view’ system, which allows subscribers to purchase individual broadcasts and to pay for them separately. Accordingly, the Council determined that the approvals that were given for the broadcasts of the adult channels would be cancelled, and instead it permitted the broadcast of the adult channels according to the pay-per-view system and with additional restrictions that it determined. On 26 September 2001, the adult broadcasts were stopped in the format of channels, and they were broadcast according to the new format only. Subsequently the permits were again amended in order to permit watching of the ‘Playboy’ channel on a ‘pay-per-night’ basis, namely the purchase of a whole night of broadcasts.

On 16 October 2001, the Playboy company and its main shareholder filed a petition in this court against amendment 25 of the Communications Law on the grounds that the amendment was unconstitutional in that it violated freedom of expression, freedom of occupation and property rights. In the petition, the court was asked to cancel the amendment, suspend it or order the State to pay compensation for the harm that it caused the petitioner. This petition, HCJ 8003/01, is also pending before the High Court of Justice with a panel of eleven judges, after it was amended several times as a result of the changes in the legal position, as will be set out below.

At the beginning of March 2002, the ‘Playboy’ channel stopped its broadcasts completely as a result of difficulties in selling its broadcasts in accordance with the conditions of the Council.

4.    The legislative developments continued. On 9 July 2002, the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law (Amendment no. 27), 5762-2002, was passed (hereafter — amendment 27), in which s. 6Y(2) of the law was amended. The section in this version, which is also the most recent version that is in force today (hereafter — the section), prohibits broadcasts which contain obscenities, as defined in the Penal Law, 5737-1977, especially when their subject-matter is the ‘depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’

As a result of the enactment of the section, all the broadcasts of the adult channels were stopped immediately. At the same time, the Playboy company applied to this court with an application to amend its petition so that it would be directed at amendment 27. In addition to the amendment of the petition, the Playboy company and the cable and satellite companies applied to the Council with a request to approve the channel. A hearing was held before the Council, and the two parties submitted to it a legal opinion. The Council also received an opinion of its legal advisors, which supported the approval of the channel. The Council went further and made a request to the Attorney-General, Mr Elyakim Rubinstein. At the end of several meetings, the Attorney-General submitted to the Council, on 24 October 2002 and 21 November 2004, his response and his clarification of the response. The position of the Attorney-General was that the law could be interpreted in different ways, and therefore the Council had the right to decide in accordance with its discretion.

In a decision dated 28 November 2002 (hereafter — the first decision) the Council prohibited the broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel within the framework of the cable and satellite broadcasts on account of the offence to women and on account of the public interest in protecting children and adolescents, stating that ‘in the balance of the interests, it is possible to prohibit the broadcast of the channel.’

Following this decision, the third respondent amended its petition once again, so that it was directed against this decision of the Council. On 3 March 2003, a hearing of the petition was held, and at this counsel for the Playboy company asked that the panel should be expanded, in view of the drastic nature of the relief sought, namely the disqualification of a law of the Knesset. The application was granted, and on 25 March 2003, the President of this court decided to form a panel of eleven judges.

5.    Then the Playboy company and the cable and satellite companies applied once again to the Council with a request to reconsider their application to approve the channel. In response to this, the petitioners in HCJ 5432/02 applied to the Council with a request to prevent such a further consideration. On 12 June 2003, after its legal adviser held that it was entitled to reconsider the first decision, the Council decided to approve the ‘Playboy’ channel. In the decision after the reconsideration (hereafter — the second decision) the Council decided that the first decision was defective and was based on an erroneous legal test. The following, inter alia, was written in the second decision:

‘The Council, after it examined the scope of the possible interpretations of this term [of a “sex object”], is of the opinion that it should be interpreted as applying to situations in which a human being is treated as an object or as a tool without a personality or will of his own, and not in every case in which a person is depicted in a way intended to arouse sexual gratification or a person is depicted in a sexual context. The Council was persuaded that the purpose of the legislation that amended the law was not the desire of the legislator to prohibit every depiction of nudity or eroticism in television broadcasts, but to prevent a situation of “objectification” of the participants in those broadcasts, including a depiction of involuntary acts or physical humiliation of the participants.’

In this interpretation, the Council also took into account the restrictions that could be imposed on the pornographic channel, whose main purpose was to protect children. Therefore it decided that:

‘In the view of the Council, the correct balance… does not prohibit broadcast of the channel… but approval of the broadcast of the channel subject to the conditions and restrictions set out below:

a.            The channel will be broadcast digitally only.

b.            The channel will broadcast only from 10:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. each day.

c.            The channel will be offered and sold within the framework of a separate channel and it will not be included in existing or future packages…

d.            For the purpose of purchasing the channel, a positive notice or consent of the subscriber will be required, and this will relate to the channel independently of any other channel or service or package.

e.            The licensee will adopt reasonable measures in order to ensure that the age of the subscriber purchasing the channel is over 18.

f.            The channel will be sold as a channel requiring payment… a separate payment will be charged for the channel…

g.            The channel will be encoded and encrypted in such a way that only someone with a personal decryption code will be able to watch it. Each entry into the channel will be done by means of entering a secret code with at least four digits.

h.            The licensee will include, in the course of the broadcasts of the channel, broadcasts that are at least 30 seconds long, explaining the prohibition against exposing children and adolescents to the channel, recommending the encryption of the channel in order to prevent it being watched by children and adolescents, and including a detailed and clear explanation of the way of blocking the channel and changing the secret code…

i. No previews will be broadcast for the channel on other channels and also no content will be presented in the electronic program guide (EPG)… including visual, verbal, textual or oral expressions of sex, including expressions as aforesaid that contain full or partial nudity, with regard to the channel.

j. The Council reserves the authority to order any reference to the names of programs to be deleted from the channel’s information strips that are broadcast to subscribers who have not bought the channel.’

The petitions in HCJ 5432/03 dated 18 June 2003 and HCJ 5477/03 dated 19 June 2003 (hereafter — the petitions) were filed against the second decision. The hearing of the petitions was joined on 26 June 2003.

The arguments of the parties

6.    The petitioners argue that the interpretation that the Council gave to the law in its second decision is mistaken as to the intention of the proponents of the law and the intention of the legislature, which was to prohibit the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel. This, in their opinion, is reflected by the number of Knesset members who are petitioners. In the view of the petitioners, the interpretation in the first decision constituted a proper balance between the rights of the women who appear in the programs on the channel and women among the public, in general, to dignity, integrity of body, protection of their feelings, positive freedom and ‘active’ freedom of expression, and the rights and interests that conflict with these rights — freedom of property and occupation of the ‘pimps.’ The petitioners believe that it was actually the first decision that gave proper weight to the public interest and expressed social justice. Their position is that the pornographic and erotic industries, both softcore and hardcore — and they see no difference between them — are not entitled to the protection of freedom of expression, since in their opinion these are industries that treat women like a commercial object and fall within the scope of prostitution and obscenity. In addition they inculcate sexual discrimination in society, encourage physical and emotional attacks on women and even endanger public order. Consequently, ‘true freedom’ will come only from restraining the strong and from regulatory intervention in the market, as was done with regard to racism and slavery. In the view of the petitioners, the principle of proportionality allows, and even requires, the prevention of pornographic and erotic broadcasts, including broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel, on cable TV and satellite. This is because of the accessibility of these media and because the television is a public resource supervised by the State.

According to the petitioners, the legislature chose to adopt the term ‘object’ which is derived in the context under discussion from radical feminism, and which is true to the teachings of Kant that regard every person as a purpose in himself, to the ‘Communist Manifesto’ of Karl Marx that opposes the ‘objectification’ of the workers (who can be compared to the slave element that remains among women), to the war against fascism and to the criticism of the school of Critical Legal  Studies (CLS), and thereby to stand firm against the male capitalist outlook.

The argument of the petitioners is that the prohibition in the law, whose main purpose is to protect women, includes a depiction of women as available for sexual intercourse. It does not apply only to the explicit and complete depiction of sexual intercourse, and it is sufficient if the broadcast contains enough to allow male viewers to achieve sexual satisfaction in their homes. The fact that this channel does not also show male nudity makes it perhaps the ‘most discriminatory channel of all.’ According to the petitioners’ approach, it is even possible that the softer the pornography is, the stronger the objectification is.

The petitioners also have claims that are procedural in nature. First, they argue against the willingness of the Council to reconsider the first decision and the procedures of the reconsideration. According to them, holding a reconsideration, without justification, harmed stability and the public interest. Second, their argument is that the second decision of the Council was made in an underhand manner, without a proper factual and legal basis, without giving the petitioners a right to make additional arguments as required, and that the considerations of the Council were political, irrelevant and improper. They also claim that the chairperson of the Council, Adv. Inbar, was tainted by prejudice when she expressed in public her preconceived opinion that was formed before the decision was adopted by the Council.

7.    The respondents, on the other hand, support the interpretation given to the law by the Council in the second decision. According to them, there is no clear subjective purpose of the legislature, and in any event the legislative history and the language and purpose of the law, from an overall perspective, support their interpretation. On the merits, the ‘Playboy’ channel does not, in their opinion, contain any degradation, violence or sexual intercourse with minors, and women are not presented as empty objects devoid of will. In any event, its broadcasts do not fall within the scope of the prohibition in the law and the scope of its main purpose, namely the protection of minors. Disqualifying the channel harms the freedom of expression, the freedom of occupation, the right to privacy and personal autonomy, and it will constitute discrimination in relation to other channels that have been approved and in relation to other media, such as video and the Internet, which broadcast similar and even more hardcore content. Disqualification of the channel will lead also to heavy losses and many redundancies, after the Playboy company and the satellite and cable TV companies relied on the concessions and the permits that they received and made huge investments. In the respondents’ opinion, the position of the public at large, many of whom watch the channel, should not be ignored. The ‘Yes’ company also said that, when interpreting the prohibition, weight should also be given to the fact that amendment 27 cancelled the transition provisions enacted in amendment 25 in order to protect its interests.

The respondents further argue with regard to the procedural claims of the petitioners that there was no impropriety in the Council’s reconsideration of its decision as a result of its concern that it was not consistent with the purpose of the law. This concern arose as a result of a proceeding before this court, the attitudes of the general public and the policy formulated by the Council with regard to other channels. In changing its decision, the Council took into account the fact that the reasonable reliance of any party should not be harmed. The respondents insist that there was also no impropriety in the proceedings in which the decision was made or in the conduct of Adv. Inbar.

Interpretation of the law

8.    Amendment 27 provides as follows:

‘Prohibited broadcasts

6Y. A licensee for cable TV [and satellite (see s. 6BE of the law)] broadcasts shall not transmit any broadcasts —

 

 

(2) that contain any obscene material within the meaning thereof in the Penal Law, 5737-1977, including broadcasts involving one of the following:

 

(1) A depiction of sexual intercourse that involves violence, abuse, humiliation, degradation or exploitation;

 

(2) A depiction of sexual intercourse with a minor or with a person that appears to be a minor;

 

(3) A depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object;

 

all of which when the broadcasts listed in sub-paragraphs (1) to (3) do not have significant artistic, scientific, newsworthy, educational or explanatory value that justifies, in the circumstances of the case, their broadcast.

       [Emphasis not in the original].

As stated above, of the various subsections the one that, in the opinion of the petitioners, prohibits the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel is the one prohibiting ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’

9.    Indeed, the interpretation of this subsection, as well as the decision whether the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel fall within its scope, are likely to involve a degree of discretion. Nonetheless, the question of interpretation and the basic ‘factual’ question are legal questions. Although the legal authorities — the legal advisers of the Council and of course the Attorney-General — may indeed take into consideration the professional media evaluation of the members of the Council, such as with regard to the anticipated effect of the channel’s broadcasts, from the viewpoint of the State, the authority to interpret the law and to determine whether the prohibition in the law applies to a specific case falls to its legal advisers. See and cf. HCJ 4267/93 Amitai, Citizens for Good Government and Integrity v. Prime Minister [1], at p. 473. It is therefore difficult to accept the position of the Attorney-General that since the law, in his opinion, can be interpreted in various ways, the Council may decide in accordance with its discretion. The existence of various possible interpretations is the beginning of the professional interpretive procedure, not its end. The more difficult or complex a legal question of interpretation may be, and the greater the degree of discretion, expertise and professional experience involved in solving it, the more important it is that the decision of the State should be made by its competent authorities in the relevant field, namely the law. And in cases where there is a dispute on a legal question between the State (whose position on this matter, as aforesaid, is determined by its competent legal advisers) and another party, the dispute should be referred to the court for its determination.

In such cases, as well as in the case before us, even the judicial decision is not merely judicial review of the objectivity and reasonableness of the discretion that the authority exercised with regard to the legal question. The court must, within the framework of its primary function of interpreting the law, itself consider the question and decide it.

10. Turning to the issue, the interpretation of the law on which the second decision was based, according to which the depiction of sexual intercourse or content intended for sexual stimulation does not make a broadcast prohibited, is correct. This is the case both in view of the interpretive considerations concerning the specific law and also in view of more general constitutional considerations that reflect the basic principles of our legal system and that govern the interpretation of all laws.

Specific interpretive considerations

11. With regard to the considerations of the first kind, first, the interpretation of the Council is consistent with the internal logic of the section. The law itself refers to ‘obscenity’ according to the meaning thereof in the Penal Law, and the Communications Law itself, in s. 6AK, provides that the breaches of the prohibitions therein are criminal offences. In any case the interpretation of the provisions in the law should be made cautiously, with an awareness of the ramifications of the interpretation on the criminal liability. This is required also by the provisions of s. 34U of the Penal Law, which requires the matter to be decided ‘… in accordance with the interpretation that is most lenient to the person who is going to be held criminally liable under that law.’ Cf. the remarks of Justice Türkel in CrimA 4693/01 State of Israel v. Babizaib [2], at p. 586.

Second, the other subsections in the section require an express depiction of hardcore sexual intercourse or paedophilia. A broad interpretation of the subsection of ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object’ to include any depiction of sexual intercourse or content intended for sexual gratification is inconsistent with the serious content in the other subsections, for whose broadcast a similar sanction is prescribed, and it even renders them de facto redundant.

Third, we must take into account the change that the Knesset made to the current version as compared with the previous version, in amendment 25, in which s. 6Y said:

‘A licensee for cable TV broadcasts shall not transmit broadcasts —

(2A) [of]… a channel whose main broadcasts are sex broadcasts; for the purpose of this paragraph, ‘sex broadcasts’ — broadcasts of which a substantial part includes content concerning sex by way of depicting sexual intercourse or by way of depicting acts intended to arouse sexual gratification or which involve sexual humiliation or degradation or which depict a person as a sex object or as subject to physical or sexual abuse.

…’

(Emphases supplied).

 The current version, which amended the version of amendment 25, omitted the phrases ‘… by way of depicting sexual intercourse or by way of depicting acts intended to arouse sexual gratification…’, which previously were associated with the prohibition of depicting ‘a person as a sex object.’ It follows from this that in the view of the Knesset, there is content that depicts sexual intercourse or acts intended to arouse sexual gratification that does not fall within the scope of the prohibition of ‘objectification.’

And fourth, the Classification, Marking and Prohibition of Damaging Broadcasts Law, 5761-2001, expressly states in s. 3(a)(4) that it applies to pornographic broadcasts, and thereby it recognizes the existence of a lawful possibility of broadcasting them.

Constitutional considerationsdo pornographic broadcasts fall within the scope of a constitutional right?

12. The aforesaid outcome, according to which the law does not prohibit every depiction of sexual intercourse or content that is intended to arouse sexual gratification is also necessitated by the basic constitutional principles according to which the law should be interpreted. In this respect, it appears that pornographic broadcasts fall within the scope of at least two basic rights: freedom of expression and freedom of occupation.

In examining the right of freedom of expression the point of origin in our legal system is that every expression, whatever its content may be, is ‘covered’ by the constitutional protection. Indeed, ‘freedom of expression, as a constitutional right, applies to every expression. “Expression” in this context is any activity that seeks to transmit a message or meaning. It extends to political, literary or commercial expression… with regard to the scope of freedom of expression, we do not examine whether the expression is true or false; we do not examine its content; we do not examine its consequences’ (per President Barak in HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at p. 676 {34-35}). Indeed, we should adopt a broad approach in interpreting the scope of application of the constitutional right to freedom of expression, which does not require an examination of the content or a value judgment with regard to the specific expression. ‘The totality of freedom of expression is necessitated by its character and its nature’ (HCJ 606/93 Advancement Promotions and Publishing (1981) Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [4], at p. 11).

Pornographic and erotic expression (which are hereafter, for the sake of convenience, referred to jointly as ‘pornography’) — including also any description of a sexual act, whether softcore or hardcore, is not different in this context. See Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at p. 677 {37-38}. It is part of human creativity in modern times, furthers public debate and influences the positions of those who participate therein. Indeed, the petitioners themselves, who without doubt reflect important parts of society, are fighting against the damaging consequences of those positions that the pornographic content represents, and thereby they recognize de facto the expression inherent therein. As Judge Easterbrook said:

‘... this simply demonstrates the power of pornography as speech. All of these unhappy effects depend on mental intermediation. Pornography affects how people see the world, their fellows, and social relations’ (American Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut (1985) [25], at p. 329).

13. This broad approach to the scope of the freedom of expression is especially appropriate in Israeli law, where the protection of freedom of expression, like all other basic rights, is not absolute. The broad interpretation of freedom of expression does not determine the balance between it and other rights and interests, but merely allows such a balance so that the deliberation focuses on the degree of protection afforded to the right. This question is considered on the basis of the purposes underlying the freedom of expression, which mostly concern the self-realization of human beings, furthering democracy and enriching the marketplace of ideas that contributes to discovery of the truth. See HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [5], at p. 876 {95}. In so far as the expression realizes these purposes more completely, the degree to which it is protected will increase. Thus, for example, the protection of political expression is broader than the protection of commercial expression, which is reflected in the balancing formula between it and the competing values and interests, since ‘everyone agrees that the boundaries of freedom of commercial expression, to which not all the reasons for freedom of expression are applicable, are narrower than the boundaries of freedom of political or artistic expression’ (HCJ 4644/00 Jaffora Tavori Ltd v. Second Television and Radio Authority [6], at p. 182).

Indeed, the social value of the expression in a pornographic creation is low, and in general it is an inferior medium for transmitting its messages and positions. Pornography is also likely to cause harm and damage, and therefore it sometimes needs the restraint of the criminal law. In this it is similar to racial expression, which is also included, at least in the opinion of the majority in this court, in the freedom of expression. See CrimA 2831/95 Alba v. State of Israel [7], at pp. 296-297. But the harm inherent in the expression does not as a rule exclude it from the scope of freedom of expression. Thus even the criminal prohibition on the publication and depiction of pornography which amounts to prohibited ‘obscenity’ (ss. 214, 214A of the Penal Law) must be interpreted narrowly and comply with the terms of the limitation clause (cf. HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence [8], at p. 138 {231}; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [9], at p. 41 {193}; Alba v. State of Israel [7], at p. 294). My conclusion, therefore, is that even pornographic expression falls within the scope of the basic right of freedom of expression.

It need not be said that the question whether freedom of expression is included in the rights set out in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, with regard to which various opinions have been expressed by the justices of the court, does not require a decision or consideration in this proceeding.

14. Similarly, even the constitutional protection of freedom of occupation, which is enshrined in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, gives its protection to the pornography industry. Section 3 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, states that ‘every citizen or resident of the State is entitled to engage in any occupation, profession or work.’ Indeed, in the renowned words of Justice S.Z. Cheshin, ‘… every man has the natural right to engage in the work or profession that he chooses for himself… [this is a right that] derives from the natural right of every person to seek sources of livelihood and to find for himself work that supports him’ (HCJ 1/49 Bajerno v. Minister of Police [10], at pp. 82-83). Including an activity within the right of freedom of occupation does not involve, as a rule, any judgment as to its content or morality, and any occupation — including an occupation in pornography — is covered by the freedom of occupation.

Constitutional consideration — protection of feelings

15. Opposing the aforesaid basic rights are several considerations that may conflict with them. One prominent consideration is the public interest requiring protection against an injury to feelings. For this purpose, the question is whether the injury is ‘grave, severe and serious’ (Horev v. Minister of Transport [9], at p. 51 {204}; HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel [11], at p. 523; HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [12], at p. 40 {253}. In the words of my colleague, the President:

‘… Only serious injuries to feelings justify a restriction of the freedom of speech and the freedom of creative expression. Indeed, in a democracy it should be recognized that there is a “level of tolerance” of injury to feelings, which the citizens of a democratic society must suffer, and which is implied by the principles of tolerance themselves. Only when the injury to feelings exceeds this “level of tolerance” is it possible to justify, in a democracy, a restriction of freedom of speech and freedom of creative expression…

… This level of tolerance is positioned very high, when the injury to feelings seeks to deny protection to the freedom of speech and the freedom of creative expression’ (HCJ 6126/94 Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority [13], at pp. 836-839 {360-364}).

This level of tolerance is normative. In considering the extent of the injury, one must take into account the nature and source of the injury. The examination does not focus on the extent of the personal suffering of the injured persons, but it is derived from the normative outlooks of society.

Thus, for example, religious feelings are given the relatively broadest protection in view of the special status of the freedom of religion. See, for example, Horev v. Minister of Transport [9], at p. 58 {211-212}. By contrast, an injury to feelings, even if it is acute and painful, which derives from a distorted or even untruthful depiction of events that occurred, is not given strong protection, since the basic values of our legal system require the development of tolerance and being able to stand firm against opposing and even untruthful views. Cf. HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. Second Television and Radio Authority [14].

In our case, I am prepared to assume that the mere broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel causes an injury to feelings. However, as a rule those persons who are exposed to the content of the channel are not a ‘captive audience.’ There is no obligation or necessity to watch the broadcasts; rather the opposite is the case — a positive and deliberate action is required in order to do so. In this situation, the level of protection against the injury decreases. As President Barak said:

‘The injuries to feelings that justify injury to rights… these are injuries whose occurrence cannot be prevented; usually these are injuries to feelings of a “captive audience” ’ (Horev v. Minister of Transport [9], at pp. 49-50 {203}).

And as Justice Or said, ibid., at p. 97:

‘The injury to the orthodox Jewish public also reflects the fact that members of the orthodox Jewish public who live there are a kind of “captive audience,” which is exposed against its will to activity which desecrates the Sabbath. Therefore, in principle, the right of the members of the orthodox Jewish public not to be injured in the aforesaid manner deserves consideration.’

The conclusion is therefore that the injury to feelings with regard to the existence of the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel in itself cannot justify an injury to the freedom of expression and the freedom of occupation that is not required by the clear language of the law.

Constitutional considerations — dignity of women

16. The essence of the right to dignity is protection against degradation. See Miller v. Minister of Defence [8], at p. 132 {224}. Notwithstanding, the question whether the dignity of women is harmed as a result of the broadcasts of an erotic or pornographic channel on cable TV or satellite is not a simple one, since there is fierce debate also on the question of the harm caused by the pornography industry as a whole. Those who support the imposition of wide-ranging prohibitions on all branches of the pornography industry constitute a broad and unique coalition of conservative and radical feminist groups, which also finds expression in the combination of the Knesset members among the petitioners before us. Opposed to these are liberal groups and also feminist groups who oppose intervention. These debates concern the nature of the rights in dispute and the harm to them, and also the effect of the pornography industry and its marketing policies on society and the public interest. See, for example: C.A. MacKinnon, ‘Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,’ 20 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. (1985) 1; R. Dworkin, ‘Liberty and Pornography,’ The Problem of Pornography (Belmont, ed. by S. Dwyer, 1995) 112; I. Nemes, ‘The Relationship Between Pornography and Sex Crimes,’ 20 J. Psych. & Law (1992) 459; C. Gilligan, In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982; N. Strossen, ‘A Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography,’ 79 Virginia L. Rev. (1993) 1099; R. Rivlin (under the supervision of M. Kremnitzer), Pornography: Morality, Liberty, Equality — A proposal to Amend the Prohibition against the Publication and Display of Obscenity and Associated Offences (2003), at p. 56.

Notwithstanding this debate concerning the pornography industry, I am also prepared to assume that pornographic broadcasts, including the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel, do indeed harm the dignity of women. Nonetheless, like the previous two rights, the right to dignity is also not an absolute right, and in any event this assumption leads to an examination of the constitutional balance between the right of women to dignity and the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of occupation.

The background to the constitutional balance — the existing reality

17. The constitutional balance must be made against the background of the prevailing social reality, which embodies the outlook of society as to what is permitted and what is forbidden. It cannot be overlooked that pornography is legal and available in a variety of media apart from cable TV and satellite, such as books and magazines, as well as video cassettes, CDs and DVDs, which are available not only in lending libraries but also at vending machines situated ‘under every leafy tree.’ Compare the remarks of Justice M. Cheshin in Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at p. 694 {64-65}. The Internet, to which there is very wide access, is especially prominent, and it allows easy access to pornographic content that is much more hardcore than that on the ‘Playboy’ channel. It appears that it is only a question of time until the convenience and availability of Internet content exceeds every other medium.  In such circumstances, the harm to the dignity of women from the addition on cable TV and satellite of a single erotic or pornographic channel with relatively softcore content (or even the addition of more than one such channel) cannot be particularly serious.

In addition, a broad interpretation of the prohibition provided in the law, which deviates substantially from accepted social norms, will open the floodgates for the disqualification of much sexual content that is broadcast on the various television, cable and satellite channels. We must be cautious not to return to past eras of intensive censorship, which it is hard to reconcile with a democratic and open society that respects human rights.

The background to the constitutional balance — comparative law

18. As stated, there are 175 countries that permit the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel. There is therefore almost an ‘international consensus’ against imposing a prohibition on the ‘erotic’ pornographic content that this channel presents.

Thus, in the United States, the current test for distinguishing between the protected pornographic expression and the unprotected obscenity is the three-stage test set out in Miller v. California [26], at p. 24:

‘The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest… (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct… (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive “hard core” sexual conduct.’

In Canada, the Supreme Court held that:

‘Pornography can be usefully divided into three categories: (1) explicit sex with violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and (3) explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor dehumanizing...

Some segments of society would consider that all three categories of pornography cause harm to society... Others would contend that none of the categories cause harm. Furthermore there is a range of opinion as to what is degrading or dehumanizing... That arbiter is the community as a whole’ (R. v. Butler [28], at p. 484).

This was explained by the Court of Appeal in the State of Ontario:

‘The depiction of persons engaged in purely sexual activity through the medium of videotape films has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a form of expression whose freedom is guaranteed...

Under the Butler test, not all material depicting adults engaged in sexually explicit acts which are degrading or dehumanizing will be found to be obscene. The material must also create a substantial risk of harm to society’ (R. v. Hawkins [29], at p. 566).

Thus it can be seen that in democratic legal systems from which we derive inspiration there is a recognition that different pornographic expressions must be distinguished according to their gravity, and only a limited portion of these expressions should be restricted as prohibited ‘obscenities.’

The constitutional balance — the vertical balance (proportionality) and the horizontal balance

19. Where a constitutional right conflicts with an interest that is not in itself a constitutional right, a need arises for proportionality, i.e., for vertical balancing. Proportionality involves ensuring that the harmful action is consistent with the purpose of the harm, choosing the action that causes the right a minimum of harm and ascertaining that the benefit in achieving the proper purpose is proportional to the harm caused to the right. See, for example: HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [15], at p. 423, and Horev v. Minister of Transport [9], at p. 64 {218-219}.

Unlike the limitation clause, which aims to minimize the harm caused by the interest to the right, in a conflict between rights we should aim to reduce the harm to the conflicting rights by means of a reciprocal concession. This is the horizontal balance. I discussed the distinction between a vertical balance and a horizontal balance in HCJ 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority [16], at p. 284:

‘… The fundamental distinction between the two types of balance does not lie in the outcome of the balance in the sense of a mutual concession as opposed to a preference of one value over the other, but in its purpose, from which the criteria for the balance are derived. The vertical balance — which is applied when there is a conflict between a human right and a public interest — is intended to minimize, as much as possible, the harm to the right even when the public interest overrides it, whereas the horizontal balance — which is applied when one human right conflicts with another — is intended to reduce, as much as possible, the harm to each of the two rights.’

20. The interpretation of the Council is, in my opinion, a correct interpretation, since it realizes the required constitutional balances. It realizes the vertical balance in that the protection against the harm to feelings, which is not a basic right in itself and which reflects a public interest of limited weight, is achieved by a proportional restriction of the rights of freedom of expression and freedom of occupation. Thus there is no absolute prohibition of the broadcasts; only extreme content is prohibited, and within the framework of its discretion the Council imposed restrictions on the times when the channel may be broadcasted, the manner in which it may be marketed and sold, and the way in which people may be exposed to it.

This interpretation also realizes the horizontal balance, according to which the opposing rights yield, since Playboy, as well as the cable TV and satellite companies, cannot realize their right of freedom of expression and occupation fully, and at the same time the right to dignity withdraws, because the channel is not banned and it is allowed to broadcast relatively ‘mild’ content subject to the restrictions that we have mentioned.

From the general to the specific — the ‘Playboy’ channel

21. As the Council stated in its decision, which was based on the opinion of its experts, the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel should be classified into four categories: feature films or series; instructional programs that depict techniques for improving relationships or improving sex; documentaries, chat shows and entertainment programs on sexual subjects; programs that depict naked women outside the framework of a film or a series. In all of these, women are depicted ‘fully naked (but without close-ups of the sexual organs and without any pictures at all of male sexual organs),’ and the sex depicted is simulated only. Even the content of the tapes filed by the parties, including the petitioners, does not fall within the scope of the prohibition in the law, according to the narrow interpretation set out above.

In the classification of pornographic content, this content is relatively mild, and it does not amount to the prohibition of obscenity in the Penal Law. Cf. United States v. Playboy Ent. Gp. [27]. It is only natural that this is the conclusion of the 175 countries that permit the channel’s broadcasts, including, as aforesaid, many democratic countries whose legal system is similar to our own.

The procedural arguments

22. In view of the fact that the decision in this petition has a legal basis, and is not a judicial review of the ‘subjective’ discretion of the Council and its members, there is not much importance to the procedural arguments of the petitioners against the holding of the reconsideration and against the procedures and involvement of Adv. Inbar, since an administrative authority may in certain circumstances change decisions that it has made, and examine unlawful decisions, and the principles of ‘finality’ do not apply to such decisions (except in cases of estoppel or similar circumstances, which are irrelevant to this case). See, for example, I. Zamir, Administrative Power, vol. 2, Nevo, 1996, at p. 1004; HCJ 701/81 Malach v. Chairman of District Planning and Building Committee [17], at p. 6. In any case, the decision on the question of lawfulness, now that the matter has reached the courts, is made by the court — in a proceeding in which all the parties have been heard in full — and not by the Council.

Although not really required, it may also be said that from the evidence it appears that the contentions of the petitioners were heard to the extent required for making the decision, and that there was no defect in the proceedings held by the Council.

I propose therefore that the two petitions should be denied, without making an order for costs.

 

 

Vice-President T. Or

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice Dorner, that the decision of the Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting, which is the subject of this petition and which permitted the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel, was lawful and did not breach any prohibition prescribed by law.

 

 

Justice E. Mazza

I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Dorner.

 

 

Justice A. Procaccia

I too agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Dorner.

 

 

Justice E.E. Levy

I am disgusted by the content of the broadcasting channel in dispute, but in view of the importance of basic rights that are enshrined in statute and case law, and since a way has been found to prevent the channel from being accessible to everyone but rather only to persons who choose to watch it for payment, I am of the opinion that the outcome reached by my colleague Justice Dorner is inevitable.

 

 

Justice A. Grunis

I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Dorner.

 

 

Justice M. Cheshin

The Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting decided to permit the broadcast of the ‘Playboy’ channel on cable TV and satellite, and we have not found any proper reason to intervene in that decision and to prohibit what it has permitted. I agree with the conclusion reached by my colleague Justice Dorner that it is right and proper to deny the two petitions before us.

2. We are concerned with the interpretation of s. 6Y(2) of the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law (hereafter — the Communications Law), which states (after its amendment in 2002) as follows:

‘Prohibited broadcasts

6Y. A licensee for cable TV broadcasts shall not transmit any broadcasts —

 

(1) …

 

(2) that contain any obscene material within the meaning thereof in the Penal Law, 5737-1977, including broadcasts involving one of the following:

 

(1) A depiction of sexual intercourse that involves violence, abuse, humiliation, degradation or exploitation;

 

(2) A depiction of sexual intercourse with a minor or with a person that appears to be a minor;

 

(3) A depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object;

 

all of which when the broadcasts listed in sub-paragraphs (1) to (3) do not have significant artistic, scientific, newsworthy, educational or explanatory value that justifies, in the circumstances of the case, their broadcast;

 

We see that all of the aforesaid broadcasts are prohibited broadcasts, including broadcasts involving:

‘A depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’

This formula that the law prescribes extends a net of prohibition, and the question under discussion is whether the ‘Playboy’ broadcasts are caught in the net or whether they slip through the holes in the net. Prima facie, nothing is simpler than the solution to the problem. We watch the ‘Playboy’ broadcasts; we place the prohibition formula next to them; we bring the two together, and the solution will present itself to us automatically, plain and simple. Is this really so?

3.    We are currently considering a special kind of pornography, and we have long known that pornography is a matter of geography. Moreover it is not only a matter of geography but also of time and period. Pornography is dependent on time and place. The outlooks of society from time to time will decide the matter. Vox populi vox dei. The voice of the people is like the voice of God. I think that we can guess what a court in England would have decided in England in the Victorian era, or what a court would decide in a country where the spirit of Queen Victoria reigns. Were I a judge in the time of our father Abraham, I can but guess what I would decide; the same in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah; the same in the time of Rabbi Judah, President of the Sanhedrin; the same in the period of the second Aliya; the same in the Jewish settlement in Hebron at the beginning of the twentieth century. I am not sure whether at the end of the nineteen-forties — before the State was founded and in the early years of the State — the court would have decided as we are deciding today. And I am not referring to the constitutional winds that blow through the camp nowadays. I am referring to the voice of the people, in the simple sense of the phrase. Indeed, we are not concerned mainly with the interpretation of a law in the narrow sense; with the explanation, meaning and interpretation of language. We are also not concerned mainly with doctrines or basic principles that run through the law. Not at all. The net of the prohibition that the law spreads puts before us an ‘open tapestry,’ and the text of the prohibition will be filled with content that is found mainly in materials that come from beyond the precincts of the judiciary. It is incumbent upon us, the judges, to go out into the street, to literature, to poetry, to the press, to the radio and television, to day-to-day conversation.

Let us recall that in our time, not so very long ago, D.H. Lawrence’s book Lady Chatterley’s Lover was literally regarded as obscene literature, whereas today — today we think this absurd. In this regard it was said in Advancement Promotions and Publishing (1981) Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [4], at p. 30:

‘Times come and go, social arrangements are transformed, the ways of people change, fashions come and go, and our time is not like times past… we are not like our fathers, our children are not like us, and our grandchildren are not like our children. Each generation has its own teachers, each generation has its own customs.’

And as our Rabbis told us: ‘Go, see how the people conduct themselves’ (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot 48a [30]). It need not be said that understanding the voice and conduct of the people is not always an easy task, for conflicting winds blow among us. But there is a prevailing wind, and there are breezes that are not so strong.

4.    Contrary to the remarks of my colleague, the statement that pornographic expression is protected by freedom of expression — namely that freedom of expression also includes pornographic expression — is not a statement that is self-evident. Moreover, not only is this statement not self-evident, but I do not know how this applies to our present case. In paragraph 12 of her opinion, my colleague cites the remarks of President Barak in Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at p. 676 {34-35}; her own remarks in Advancement Promotions and Publishing (1981) Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [4], at p. 11; in paragraph 13 she goes on to cite additional remarks written by President Barak in Alba v. State of Israel [7], at pp. 296-297. Her conclusion is (at the end of paragraph 13) that ‘even pornographic expression falls within the scope of the basic right of freedom of expression.’

I know of the rulings made in foreign countries, but I have difficulty in transposing them, as they are, from one legal system to another. In Advancement Promotions and Publishing (1981) Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [4] I wrote the following (ibid., at p. 28): ‘I think that everyone agrees that not every vibration of the vocal chords, nor every grumbling of the stomach is entitled to the protection of the freedom of speech. The protection is not given to a vibration that a person makes in the air, even if that vibration has acquired a meaning in the dictionary as having a certain content. This is the case with sounds emerging from the human mouth — in the literal sense — and with every other method of expression, like a written publication;’ see also Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at pp. 690-691 {59-60}; Szenes v. Broadcasting Authority [13], at p. 865 {398}. I have difficulty, for example, in classifying racism,  incitement, mutiny or pornography of the XXX variety as being inherently protected — even prima facie — by the freedom of expression. I also have difficulty in understanding the real and substantive significance — beyond the legal technique — of classifying these publications one way or the other.

I should emphasize that I agree that every person has a right of expression, in the fullest sense, as long as we are referring to a right that is a freedom or liberty; a freedom like the freedom of occupation was in Bajerno v. Minister of Police [10], which prevailed before the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was enacted. I also agree that every person has an interest in expressing himself in any way that he sees fit, provided that we add and realize that this interest is a part of the marketplace of interests, and it may conflict with a more elevated interest. The legal system is a marketplace of interests that are continually struggling with one another; sometimes the interests combine with one another, sometimes they cut into each other, and sometimes they conflict directly with each other. The interest of freedom of expression is like any other interest in this struggle of interests. Knowing all this, I have difficulty in accepting, for example, that pornography — especially hardcore pornography — racism, incitement, mutiny and other similar evils enter the struggle with other social interests with the crown of freedom of speech on their heads. I have not denied — nor will I deny — the interpretation that freedom of expression has an exalted status, which gives freedom of expression a special, additional strength when it conflicts with other social interests. Indeed, the interest of freedom of expression has acquired special additional strength — an internal substantive strength — and in many cases it will easily overcome those who wish to subdue it or detract from it. But in the final analysis, the light and warmth that emanate from it are what will determine the status of freedom of expression in the Israeli legal system.

 

 

Justice J. Türkel

1.    I agree with the outcome that my honourable colleague Justice Dorner reached in her opinion, namely that the petitions should be denied. I disagree with her reasoning, and the following are some of my doubts and my reasons for explaining my position.

2.    No-one disputes that the right of freedom of expression is one of the most exalted of human rights. I spoke of this in one case:

‘In my opinion, according to the criterion that has absolute freedom of expression at one end and its prohibition at the other, the point of balance should be established very close to the first end. In other words, we should adopt an approach that holds freedom of expression to be almost absolute’ (Alba v. State of Israel [7], at p. 331. See also CrimFH 8613/96 Jabarin v. State of Israel [18], at p. 211).

And in another case I added that:

‘Freedom of expression… is an integral part of our legal ethos, it stands in the vanguard of the freedoms on which our democracy is based, and it has a “place of honour in the sanctuary of basic human rights” (per President Barak in HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police, at p. 398 {114})’ (HCJ 2753/03 Kirsch v. Chief of Staff, IDF [19], at p. 376).

I am not certain whether the scope of the right’s application is ‘universal,’ in the sense that it is ‘like water covering the sea’ (Isaiah 11, 9 [31]), or whether there are ‘islands’ that it does not cover (but cf. my remarks in Alba v. State of Israel [7], at pp. 334-335). There is also a basis for saying that pornographic expression — in words, hints or pictures — is such an ‘island’ that is not covered by that right, but even if pornographic expression is covered by the right of freedom of expression, it can be restricted (see the remarks of President Barak in Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at pp. 677-678 {37-38}). The question whether the conditions for such a restriction are fulfilled, and how they should be applied, should be considered separately.

3.    One way or the other, deciding the question before us does not require this deliberation and the other clarifications and considerations that my colleague took into account. The Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting (hereafter — ‘the Council’) interpreted the wording of s. 6Y(2)(3) of the Communications (Telecommunications and Broadcasting) Law — ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object’ (hereafter — ‘the provision’) — as ‘applying to situations where a person is treated as an object or as a tool without a personality or will of its own, and not in every case in which a person is depicted in a way intended to arouse sexual gratification or a person is depicted in a sexual context.’ I have grave doubts as to whether this is the proper interpretation, but even if we interpret the provision as applicable to every case where a person is depicted in a sexual context, the Council has discretion as to how the provision is to be implemented, and according to its decision, ‘nothing in the broadcasts of the “Playboy” channel… amounts to broadcasts that are included within the framework of the prohibited broadcasts in section 6Y(2) of the Communications Law.’ There is no basis for intervening in this discretion for the reason that, according to the accepted rules of this court, the court will not replace the discretion of the administrative authority that has the duty of deciding the matter with its own discretion (see, inter alia: HCJ 92/56 Weiss v. Chairman and Members of the Legal Council [20]; CA 311/57 Attorney-General v. M. Diezengoff & Co. (Navigation) Ltd [21]; FH 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [22]; HCJ 636/86 Nahalat Jabotinsky Workers’ Moshav v. Minister of Agriculture [23]; HCJFH 4128/00 Director-General of Prime Minister’s Office v. Hoffman [24]; Kirsch v. Chief of Staff, IDF [19]; R. Har-Zahav, Israeli Administrative Law (1997), at p. 436).

Indeed, I also have doubts with regard to the Council’s decision in so far as the implementation of the provision is concerned. There is a basis for saying that ‘programs that depict naked women outside the framework of a film or a series’ as well as photographs that depict women ‘fully naked (but without close-ups of the sexual organs and without any pictures at all of male sexual organs)’ — as the Council described the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel — fall within the scope of ‘a depiction of a person or any part of a person as a sex object.’ Such programs and photographs involve an injury to the feelings of many women and men among the public and also to the dignity of women and even to the dignity of men, and this can be seen from the petitions and the personalities of those men and women who backed them. As stated above, this is insufficient for intervention in the decision of the Council, and there is even less basis for intervention when in its decision the Council imposed restrictions on the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel that make the channel’s broadcasts a private matter (‘The channel will broadcast only from 10:00 p.m. until 5:00 a.m. each day; the channel will be offered and sold within the framework of a separate channel…; for the purpose of purchasing the channel, a positive notice or consent of the subscriber will be required…; the licensee will adopt reasonable measures in order to ensure that the age of the subscriber purchasing the channel is over 18; the channel will be sold as a channel requiring payment…; the channel will be encoded and encrypted…’).

4.    Therefore I too have decided that the petitions should be denied.

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch

Like my colleague Justice Dorner, I too agree with the determination that pornographic expression is protected by the freedom of expression. In her opinion, Justice Dorner assumed that the right of women to dignity is harmed by the pornography industry and various expressions of pornography, but she came to the conclusion, in which I join, that in so far as the matter before us is concerned — the broadcasts of the ‘Playboy’ channel — the proper balance between the rights is maintained. I join also in the determination that the interpretation given by the Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting to the provisions of the law and the restrictions that the Council determined for the purpose of implementing it are correct and comply with the interpretive tests in the constitutional spirit required by the nature of the rights placed on the two pans of the balance.

I will point out only that the question of the scope of the protection that should be given to pornographic expression is a complex question that does not require a decision in the case before us. The degree of legitimacy or protection that should be given to pornographic expression and the question what is pornographic expression have engaged the courts in various countries whose legal systems are similar to ours, and they have provided material for many academic articles, and this too was discussed by my colleague in her comprehensive opinion. It may be assumed that this question will return to engage us in the future, and it will be decided in each case according to the specific circumstances.

 

 

Justice E. Rivlin

I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Dorner and all its reasoning. I disagree with the remarks of my colleague Justice M. Cheshin, who has difficulty in classifying certain publications within the scope of freedom of expression. In this sense I disagree also with the reservation expressed by my colleague Justice Türkel. In this matter it has been held by this court, more than once, that freedom of expression, as a constitutional right, extends to every expression, whatever its content, whatever its effect, and however it is expressed (per Justice Barak in Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [12]. and in Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [3], at p. 676 {35-36}). The freedom of expression extends also to expression whose content is pornography (ibid., at p. 677 {36-38}). Indeed, recognizing the fact that every expression is protected by the freedom of expression does not guarantee absolute protection for every expression. The scope of the protection of freedom of expression in each case is the result of an ethical balance. In the case before us, the interpretation given by Justice Dorner to the law reflects the proper ethical balances.

 

 

President A. Barak

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice Dorner, and the remarks of my colleagues Justices Rivlin and Beinisch.

 

 

Petitions denied.

10 Adar 5764.

3 March 2004.

 

Herut--The National Jewish Movement v. Cheshin

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 212/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 16, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: Petitioner attacked the decision of the respondent to disqualify an election commercial it had prepared for broadcast over both radio and television. The jingle included praise for Yasir Arafat and a call for the expulsion of Jews from Jaffa and Ramle. In addition, the television version of the commercial depicted an Israeli flag, flying over the Knesset, as it changed into a Palestinian flag. The Chairman of the Elections Committee disqualified this commercial, reasoning that the jingle caused severe injury to the dignity of the flag and the national anthem. In the context of the petition, respondent also asserted that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to intervene in his decision.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider the petition. It held that the authority of the High Court of Justice originates in the provisions of the Basic Law: The Judiciary, a constitutional law. As such, section 137 of the Elections Law cannot negate this authority. The Court further held that the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve broadcasts should apply to both television and radio broadcasts. The fact that the statute did not expressly grant him that authority regarding radio broadcasts was a lacuna that should be filled by judicial interpretation. Finally, the Court held that, in his decision, the Chairman of the Elections Committee was to balance the competing values of freedom of speech and of public order. The Court held that the decision of the Chairman did properly balance between these competing considerations. In a dissenting opinion, the President of the Court stated that the Chairman did not achieve a proper balance between the two competing values.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

 

HCJ 212/03

Herut – The National Jewish Movement

v.

Justice Mishael Cheshin, Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 8, 2003]

Before President A. Barak, Justices E. Mazza and T. Strasberg-Cohen

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: Petitioner attacked the decision of the respondent to disqualify an election commercial it had prepared for broadcast over both radio and television. The jingle included praise for Yasir Arafat and a call for the expulsion of Jews from Jaffa and Ramle. In addition, the television version of the commercial depicted an Israeli flag, flying over the Knesset, as it changed into a Palestinian flag. The Chairman of the Elections Committee disqualified this commercial, reasoning that the jingle caused severe injury to the dignity of the flag and the national anthem. In the context of the petition, respondent also asserted that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to intervene in his decision.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider the petition. It held that the authority of the High Court of Justice originates in the provisions of the Basic Law: The Judiciary, a constitutional law. As such, section 137 of the Elections Law cannot negate this authority. The Court further held that the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve broadcasts should apply to both television and radio broadcasts. The fact that the statute did not expressly grant him that authority regarding radio broadcasts was a lacuna that should be filled by judicial interpretation. Finally, the Court held that, in his decision, the Chairman of the Elections Committee was to balance the competing values of freedom of speech and of public order. The Court held that the decision of the Chairman did properly balance between these competing considerations. In a dissenting opinion, the President of the Court stated that the Chairman did not achieve a proper balance between the two competing values.

 

Legislation Cited:

Flag and Emblem Law-1949, § 5

Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version)-1969 § 137

Elections Law (Propaganda Methods)-1959, § 20b

Basic Law: The Judiciary § 15

Administrative Courts Law-2000

Foundations of Law Act-1980, § 1

Broadcasting Authority Law-1965, §§ 15(a), 15A(b), 15B, 16b & 16c

Penal Law-1977, § 1

Basic Law: The Knesset, § 7

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 344/81 Negbi v. Central Elections Committee for the Tenth Knesset IsrSC 35(4) 837

[2]HCJ 637/88 Laor Movement v. Chairman of the Knesset Elections Committee IsrSC 42(3) 495

[3]CA 6821/93 Bank Hamizrahi v.  Migdal Association Village IsrSC 49(4) 22

[4]HCJ 1384/98 Avni v. The Prime Minister IsrSc 52(5) 206

[5]HCJ 3434/96 Hofnung v. Chairman of the Knesset IsrSc 50(3) 57

[6]HCJ 2208/02 Slama v. Minister of Interior (unreported decision)

[7]HCJ 8071/00 Jacobowitz v. The Attorney-General (unreported decision). 

[8]HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority IsrSc 50(2) 793

[9]CA 733/95 Arpel Aluminum v. Kalil Industries IsrSC 51(3) 577

[10]HCJ 89/92 Zweely v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Thirteenth Knesset IsrSC 5(2) 692

[11]CA 108/59 Pritzker v. Niv. IsrSC 14 1545

[12]CA 164/47 Minkowitz v. Phishtzener IsrSC 2 39

[13]BAA 663/90 Doe v. Regional Committee of the Bar Association of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa IsrSC 47(3) 397 

[14]CA 4628/93 State of Israel v. Apropim IsrSC 49(2) 265

[15]CA 3622/96 Haham v. Macabee Health Management Organization IsrSC 52(2) 638

[16]CA 205/7 Ross v. State of Israel IsrSC 27(2) 365

[17]CA 10596/02 Leah Ness v. Likud Party (unreported decision)

[18]HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board IsrSC 47(2) 22

[19]HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation IsrSC 51(4) 1

[20]HCJ 1514/01 Gur Arieh v. The Second Television and Radio Authority IsrSC 55(4) 267

[21]CA 697/98 Sostzkin v. State of Israel IsrSC 52(3) 289

[22]HCJ 4804/94 Station Film v. Film Review Board IsrSC 50(5) 661

[23]HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of Interior IsrSC 7 871). 

[24]HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. The Broadcasting Authority IsrSC 35(3) 365

[25]HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. The Second Television and Radio Authority IsrSC 51(5) 193, 200 

[26]HCJ 6126/94 Senesh v. The Broadcasting Authority IsrSC 53(3) 817

[27]CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon Letzion Burial Society IsrSC 53(3) 600

[28]HCJ 8507/96 Oreen v. State of Israel IsrSC 51(2) 269

[29]HCJ 399/85 Knesset Member Rabbi Meir Kahane v. The Administrative Council of the Broadcasting Authority IsrSC 41(3) 255

 

Petition denied.

 

For the petitioners— Shai Zuckerman

For the respondent— Shai Nitzan; Dani Hurin

 

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

 

1.  The National Jewish Movement Herut [hereinafter Herut] is a list of nominees participating in the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset.  Herut approached the Chairman of the General Elections Committee for the sixteenth Knesset, Justice M. Cheshin [hereinafter the Chairman of the Elections Committee] on January 6, 2003, requesting that he approve the following jingle for broadcast on radio, during the time set aside for election propaganda broadcasting, in Arabic, and accompanied by the tune of “Hatikva:”

 

Original

                 

Biladi Biladi
Phalastin

Arafat Salah-A-Din

Mabruk Yah Shahid

Al-Hamdu Li’llah

Fatah Ashaf Hizballah

Yaffo Aco Ramleh V’Lod

Ya Habibi Imshi al-Yehud

Allah Hu Akbar Allah Al-Karim

Phalastin Al-Quds Yerushalayim

 

Translation

 

My State My State

Palestine

Arafat, Salah-A-Din

Congratulations, O Martyr

Praise to God

Fatah, PLO, Hizballah

Jaffa, Aco, Ramleh, and Lod

My Friend, Jews Out

Allah is Great, Allah is Generous

Palestine Al-Quds Jerusalem

 

Herut also requested that a broadcast, during which this jingle is heard, be approved for the time set aside for election propaganda broadcasting on television.  During the first five seconds of the broadcast an Israeli flag is seen waving above the Knesset building, gradually changing into the Palestinian flag.

 

2.  The Chairman of the Elections Committee disqualified the jingle and the radio broadcast.  He considered them both “a show of contempt towards the national anthem and a desecration of it—contempt and desecration which lead to provocation and even incitement.”  The Chairman of the Elections Committee also drew attention to the provisions of section 5 of the Flag and Emblem Law-1949.  The petition before us is directed against this decision.  On January 8, 2003, we decided, by majority decision, to deny the petition.  These are our reasons.

 
The Authority of the High Court of Justice

 

3.  At the beginning of this proceeding, the State Attorney raised the argument that the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee is final, and that the High Court of Justice lacks the authority to review it.  He based his argument on section 137 of the Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version)-1969 [hereinafter the Elections Law], which states:

 

Any complaint as to an act or omission under this Law shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Committee, and, save as otherwise provided by this Law, no court shall entertain an application for relief relating to any such act or omission or to any decision or direction of the Central Committee, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee, the Chairman of the Committee, a District Committee or Voting Committee.

 

This provision also applies to the decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee regarding the broadcasting of election propaganda over radio and television. See Elections Law (Propaganda Methods)-1959, § 20b. It has been interpreted in various judgments as granting “procedural immunity” against judicial review, including the review by the High Court of Justice." See HCJ 344/81 Negbi v. Central Elections Committee for the Tenth Knesset [1]; HCJ 637/88 Laor Movement v. Chairman of the Knesset Elections Committee [2]. Respondent claimed that, pursuant to this case law, the petition should be denied.

 

4.  We cannot accept this argument.  The authority of the High Court of Justice originates in the provisions of the Basic Law: The Judiciary, § 15.  As such, it is enshrined in a constitutional, superior law.  An ordinary legal provision does not have the power to change a provision of a Basic Law.  I clarified this in Bank Hamizrahi:

 

Basic Laws are chapters of the state’s constitution.  They are products of the Knesset’s constitutional authority.  A Basic Law exists at the highest normative level.  Consequently, Basic Laws and their provisions should not be changed by anything but Basic Laws.

 

CA 6821/93 Bank Hamizrahi Ltd. v.  Migdal Association Village [3]. See also HCJ 1384/98 Avni v. The Prime Minister [4]. Similarly, a regular law does not have the power to infringe upon the provisions of a Basic Law, unless such is allowed by the limitations clauses which are part of the Basic Laws themselves. See Hofnung v. Chairman of the Knesset [5].   Consequently, we ruled that the Administrative Courts Law-2000 does not have the authority to deny the authority of the High Court of Justice in administrative matters. We noted that “regular legislation, whether it was legislated before or after the institution of a Basic Law, cannot change the provisions of a Basic Law…. As such, legislation which grants authority to a different court in matters already granted to the High Court of Justice by the Basic Law, cannot alter the authority of the High Court of Justice. HCJ 2208/02 Slama v. Minister of Interior (unreported case) [6]; see also HCJ 8071/00 Jacobowitz v. The Attorney-General  [7] (unreported case). 

 

5.  Therefore, section 137 of the Elections Law does not have the power to negate the authority of the High Court.  The decisions cited by the State Attorney in support of its arguments were handed down before our Bank Hamizrahi [3] judgment, and they are inconsistent with it.  Thus, inasmuch as section 137 of the Elections Law—which states that “no court” shall grant the remedies there stated—can be interpreted as negating the authority of the High Court of Justice, it is unconstitutional, and thus void regarding its application to the High Court of Justice. Of course, the law continues to apply to all other courts. This same conclusion may be reached—and I think more properly—by reinterpreting the phrase “no court” as referring to all other courts besides the High Court of Justice.  This interpretation reflects the view that “it is preferable to limit the scope of a law through interpretation, rather than achieve the same result by declaring a part of that law as being unconstitutional and void.” HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority, [8] at 814.  This interpretation is consistent with the approach that “the right to the access to court is not a basic right in the ordinary sense of a basic right.  Its existence is a necessary and essential condition for the existence of all other basic rights.” CA 733/95 Arpel Aluminum v. Kalil Industries [9].  As such, find that we have the authority to consider the petition at hand.  We now move on to consider the remaining arguments before us.

 

The Authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee

 

6. Petitioner claims that the Chairman of the Elections Committee does not have the authority to prevent the broadcasting of election propaganda over the radio. Petitioner points to section 15A(d) of the Elections Law (Propaganda Methods)-1959 [hereinafter the Propaganda Methods Law],  which establishes the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee regarding televised propaganda. The provision states:

 

Only election propaganda, whether produced by a political party or by list of nominees at their own expense, which has been approved by the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, shall be televised pursuant to this section.

 

No such provision exists regarding propaganda broadcasting over radio.  Mr. Zuckerman argues that this arrangement—an explicit grant of authority over television propaganda broadcasting, and the absence of such an explicit grant for radio broadcasting—implies that the Chairman has no authority over the radio broadcasting. Petitioner argues that we should not interfere with this statutory scheme—we should not fill in the blanks, nor we should not exercise our inherent authority, nor should we interfere by any other means. As such, even if the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee lawfully instructed that the propaganda broadcast not be televised, he lacks all authority to give similar instructions regarding a radio propaganda broadcast.   

 

7.  Indeed, an inspection of the Propaganda Methods Law reveals that it contains no explicit provision similar to section 15A—a provision which only relates to television—that would provide that no election propaganda shall be broadcast over radio unless it has been approved by the Chairman of the Elections Committee. The legislative history regarding this matter is short. The regulation of propaganda methods was first set out in the Elections Law (Propaganda Methods)-1959.  This law was legislated during the era of radio, before television was introduced into Israel. It forbade certain propaganda methods, and included a prohibition against election propaganda in film.  Its central purpose was to empower the Chairman of the Elections Committee to set aside time slots that would be allotted to each party for radio broadcasting.  He was not given the authority to intervene in the actual content of the broadcasts. When television was introduced into Israel, the legislature regulated televised election propaganda in the Elections Law (Propaganda Methods) (Amendment 3)-1969.  This law provided that the absolute prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda in film would be extended to television as well, aside from the time explicitly allotted to televised election propaganda broadcasting. All election propaganda broadcasting over television was prohibited, except that which was approved by the Chairman of the Elections Committee. 

 

Two questions arise concerning the broadcast of election propaganda over radio. First, is there a prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda over radio? As we have seen, the law which originally regulated propaganda methods during elections did not include a provision regarding this issue.  The amendment of the original law, after the introduction of television into Israel, applied only to the prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda over television.  What is the law regarding broadcasting election propaganda over radio?  This question arose in HCJ 89/92 Zweely v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Thirteenth Knesset, [10] at 713. There, the court ruled that the prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda over television did not apply to broadcasting election propaganda over radio.  It noted: “not including radio in the original language of the provision reflects a conscious policy against extending the prohibition towards election propaganda over radio.” Id. at 713.  At the same time, Zweely [10] stated that the lack of authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee is balanced by the authority of the Broadcasting Authority. The Broadcasting Authority, when broadcasting election propaganda over the radio, must take into consideration the prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda over television. Zweely [10] emphasized that “it is not proper that the legislature’s policy of limiting televised broadcasting be completely defeated by allowing the breach of those limitations through radio.” Id. at 713.  While Zweely [10] was pending before this Court, the law was amended and extended the prohibition against broadcasting election propaganda on television or in film to include election propaganda on radio as well.  We are left with the second question, which refers to the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve election propaganda broadcasts.  This authority originally concerned, as we have seen, the approval of election propaganda broadcasts for television. What is the law regarding the Chairman’s authority to approve election propaganda broadcasts for radio?  This is the question before us.

 

8.  Petitioner argued that the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve election propaganda broadcasts for television indicates that he lacks any such authority regarding election propaganda on radio. The State Attorney argued, in contrast, that the silence of the Election Law in this matter constitutes a lacuna.  The Court may complete this lacuna through inference, in comparison with the provisions regarding television broadcasts, by virtue of the authority granted to it in the Foundations of Law Act-1980.

 

9.  We agree with the State Attorney.  The authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve election propaganda over television should not be interpreted as negating his authority to approve the broadcast of election propaganda over radio. Such a negative inference may be drawn where the silence is “conscious.” See CA 108/59 Pritzker v. Niv, [11] at 1549 (Sussman, J.). A negative inference may also exist where the silence “speaks.” See CA 164/47 Minkowitz v. Phishtzener, [12] at 43 (Silberg, J.).  Silence is “conscious,” and silence “speaks” when making a negative inference is necessary for realizing the objective of the law. See BAA 663/90 Doe v. Regional Committee of the Bar Association of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, [13] at 404. There is no reason to assume that realizing the goals of the Propaganda Methods Law demands that the Chairman of the Elections Committee be denied the authority to approve election propaganda over radio.

 

10.  Even so, should we view the silence of the Election Propaganda Methods Law as a lacuna in the law?  Should we not say, as we did in Zweely, that “the legislature was aware of radio and he even mentioned it in other provisions of the law.” Zweely [10] at 713. This is not a simple question.  In Zweely we did not see the silence of the Propaganda Methods Law concerning the radio broadcast of election propaganda as a lacuna, primarily because were of the opinion that the resolution of the problem could be found in a normative arrangement external to the Propaganda Methods Law. This arrangement was the Broadcasting Authority Law-1965. We were of the opinion that, regarding the radio broadcast of election propaganda, the discretion of the Broadcasting Authority—under the Broadcasting Authority Law-1965—was a substitute for the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee. We added that the Broadcasting Authority, in exercising its discretion with reference to broadcasting election propaganda, should presume “that the legislature prohibited the broadcasting of election propaganda on television, and it is not proper that the legislature’s policy of limiting televised broadcasting be completely defeated by allowing the breach of those limitations through radio.” Id. at 713. 

 

No such external arrangement is present here. The Broadcasting Authority and the Second Television and Radio Authority do not have the authority to interfere with the content of radio election propaganda broadcasts. See the Broadcasting Authority Law-1965, §§ 15(a), 15A(b), 15B, 16b & 16c.  Thus, the silence of the Propaganda Methods Law should not be seen as “neglecting to take a stand on a legal issue, while leaving its regulation to other normative arrangements, external to the law being interpreted.” BAA 663/90 [13], at 404.  It is our opinion that the only possible way to interpret the silence of the Propaganda Methods Law regarding the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve radio election propaganda broadcasting is that it is a legislative oversight. Indeed, a lacuna will exist whenever a legislative arrangement is incomplete, and this incompleteness acts to counteract the objective of the arrangement. See CA 4628/93 State of Israel v. Apropim, [14] at 323; CA 3622/96 Haham v. Macabee Health Management Organization, [15] 648.  Such is the case before us.  There is no reasonable justification to distinguish between granting the Chairman of the Elections Committee the authority to approve election propaganda broadcasting for television and denying him this authority regarding radio. There is no reasonable justification for a state of affairs where there is no supervision of election propaganda broadcasting over radio.  In building a wall around election propaganda broadcasting the legislature forgot to lay a brick, thus creating a void which constitutes a lacuna, regarding the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve election propaganda for radio.

 

11.  When a statute contains a lacuna, the court must fill in the lacuna. Section 1 of the Foundations of Law Act-1980 considers this issue:

 

Where the court, faced with a legal question, finds no answer in statute, case law, or by analogy, it shall decide the question in the light of principles of Israel's heritage—freedom, justice, equity, and peace.

 

This provision states that, as a first step towards filling in a lacuna, analogies should be drawn. If no suitable analogy may be drawn, we must turn to the principles of Israel’s heritage: freedom, justice, equity, and peace.  In this case, an analogy may be drawn from the provisions of section 15a of the Propaganda Methods Law.  Thus, the provision that states that election propaganda shall not be broadcast unless it has been approved by the Chairman of the Elections Committee, also applies to election propaganda over radio. As such, the Chairman also has the authority to prohibit the broadcast of election propaganda over radio, as he has similar authority over televised election broadcasting. 

 

We shall now turn to consider the scope of respondent’s authority and discretion in this matter. Before leaving the issue of interpretation, however, we would like to make three comments. First, a criminal offence should not be created by filling in a lacuna in the law. See Penal Law-1977, § 1; CA 205/7 Ross v. State of Israel, [16] at 372.  Therefore, though a failure to adhere to the decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee constitutes a criminal offence with regard to television broadcasting, it does not constitute a criminal offence in the case of radio broadcasting.  Here, the lacuna and its interpretation produce constitutional and administrative law, and do not create criminal offences. Second, in filling in the lacuna, a new text is added to the law.  This text has the same status as the law in which the lacuna was found.  Therefore, the remainder of the law’s provisions also apply to that text, as if it itself was an integral part of the law. Thus, for example, section 137 of the Elections Law, which we have discussed, see supra paras. 3-4, which also applies to decisions made according to sections 15 and 15A of the Propaganda Methods Law, see the Propaganda Methods Law § 20, will also apply to the decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee regarding election propaganda broadcast over radio. Third, the current legal situation, where a lacuna exists in the Propaganda Methods Law, is unsatisfactory. Our filling in the lacuna is not a substitute for a legislative act which will regulate the matter comprehensively.

 

The Authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee

 

12.  What is the scope of the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee pursuant to section 15A(d) of the Propaganda Methods Law?  This question arises regarding television broadcasts, which are explicitly regulated by section 15A, as well as radio broadcasts, which are regulated by the interpretation of the lacuna discussed above. The principles stated in section 15A of the Propaganda Methods Law apply to both these cases:

 

Only election propaganda, whether produced by a political party or by list of nominees at their own expense, which has been approved by the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, shall be televised pursuant to this section.

 

Petitioner asserts that the authority of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee extends only to those two grounds explicitly mentioned in the Propaganda Methods Law for the disqualification of election propaganda broadcasting. These two grounds restrict election propaganda broadcasts involving the security forces or victims of terrorism, see Propaganda Methods Law, § 2B, and broadcasts that involve the participation of children, see Propaganda Methods Law, § 2C.  The State Attorney, on the other hand, argues that the authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee is more expansive—it includes the disqualification of election broadcasts that contain incitement, racism, and violations of privacy.  The State Attorney claims that if this authority is not granted, the electoral system will descend into anarchy—a situation well described by the passage: “each man will swallow up his fellow man alive.”

 

13.  We agree with the State Attorney. The authority of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to approve election broadcasts is not limited to the two matters above. The proper interpretation of this authority demands that it extend to additional matters associated with election propaganda. Not only have the Chairmen of the Election Committees acted in this manner over the years, this interpretation is also essential to ensure the public interest.

 

The Discretion of the Chairman of the Elections Committee

 

14.  The Chairman of the Elections Committee was authorized to approve election propaganda broadcasts for both radio and television.  This discretion is exercised in order to achieve the goals of the Propaganda Methods Law.  These goals are both specific and general, and both subjective and objective.  The application of these goals differs with regard to each specific matter.  They naturally include those goals associated with the organization of elections, and which constitute the foundation of the Elections Law and the Propaganda Law. These include the preservation of equality in elections, the fairness of elections, the integrity of elections, preventing the deception of voters and preventing distortion in the electoral process and its results. See, e.g., CA 10596/02 Leah Ness v. Likud Party [17] (unreported case).  In this petition we must consider two opposing goals. We consider the realization of the freedom of speech as well as the attainment of public order. We must balance these two goals. The discretion of the Chairman of the Elections Committee is exercised within the context of this balance. 

 

15.  On one side of the scales lies the freedom of speech. We discussed the essence of this freedom, as embodied in the Propaganda Methods Law, in Zweely:

 

Freedom of speech is a central and fundamental principal, which is important for forming the goals of a law.  This freedom reaches every expression.  It has special significance regarding political expressions in general, and specifically regarding political expressions articulated during election struggles. … One of the principle justifications of freedom of speech relates to the democratic regime.  The spirit of democracy is lost without freedom of speech.  Freedom of speech cannot exist without democracy.  “True democracy and liberty of speech are one.  This is true throughout the life of a democracy and especially true during elections.” …  Freedom of speech ensures the exchange of ideas between members of the public, and thus allows them to form opinions regarding issues which are on the national agenda. … “Only in this way will a person be able to form his own opinions with regard to critical issues—both social and national—whose resolution is ultimately in his hands by virtue of his right to choose the institutions of the state.” … The result, which was expressed by President Shamgar in HCJ 372/84 Klopfer-Neve v. Minister of Education and Culture, at 239, is that “[i]t is not feasible to think that elections may be held in a democratic regime without allowing the exchange of ideas and mutual persuasion, and without allowing those debates in the context of which public opinion is formed, and which play an essential part in any free regime, whether during elections or during any other time of the year…” Id. at 706-07.

 

16.  On the other hand, we have the public’s interest in security, peace, and civil order. In the case at hand, these interests include protecting the feelings of members of the public regarding the anthem and the flag.  Indeed, protecting the feelings of members of the public, whether they be religious, national or other feelings, is an integral part of the public interest. See HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board, [18] at 34; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, [19] at 34; HCJ 1514/01 Gur Arieh v. The Second Television and Radio Authority, [20] at 275; CA 697/98 Sostzkin v. State of Israel, [21] at 307-08; HCJ 4804/94 Station Film v. The Film Review Board, [22] at 678.

 

17. In the petition before us these values and principles—freedom of speech on the one hand and the public interest on the other—are in conflict. Balancing is necessary to resolve this clash. This balance has been with us since Kol Ha’am. See HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am Company v. Minister of Interior [23]. In Kol Ha'am we held that freedom of speech should not be subject to prior restraint unless there is near certainty that, if the expression were to be articulated, the public interest would suffer serious and substantial injury. See HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. The Broadcasting Authority, [24] at 378.  My colleague, Justice Mazza has noted:

 

Preventing the expected publication of expression constitutes a direct and serious injury to the freedom of speech.   It is a well established law…that granting such relief may only be considered, where neglecting to do so creates a danger, whose probability reaches near certainty, of substantial injury to public peace or civil order, or of causing severe harm to any other protected value.

 

HCJ 2888/97 Novik v. The Second Television and Radio Authority, [25] at 200. When the protected value concerns the feelings of the public, one of the things which must be shown is that the injury to such feelings is so serious and severe that it exceeds tolerable levels. See HCJ 5016/96, [19] at 55; HCJ 6126/94 Senesh v. The Broadcasting Authority, [26] at 836; CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon Letzion Burial Society, [27] at 657.

 

18.  Does the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee properly balance between freedom of speech and the public interest?  My answer to this question is negative.  There is no certainty— neither near, nor reasonable, nor substantial—that publicizing the propaganda broadcast of the petitioner—a national movement that holds the sanctity of the anthem and flag especially dear—will cause painful and serious injury to feelings concerning the flag and the anthem, and which will exceed levels that are tolerable in a democratic society.  I am willing to assume that there will be a number of people who will raise their brows and question the tastefulness of the broadcast.  However, that is not our concern here.  We are concerned with the censorship of freedom of speech; we are concerned with prior restraints on the freedom of political speech during the critical time of elections.  Imposing such restrictions requires the utmost caution.  Only when there is near certainty that the realization of freedom of speech will lead to painful and serious injury to the feelings of a considerable part of the public, will restrictions on political expressions be justified.  Such circumstances do not exist in this case.  For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 

19.  The desecration of the sanctity of the flag, which the Chairman of the Elections Committee referred to, is severe. See HCJ 8507/96 Oreen v. State of Israel [28].  Nevertheless, I do not believe that in the case at hand there is a sufficient factual basis, regarding either the actus reus or the mens rea, to satisfy the elements of the offence established in section 5 of the Flag and Emblem Law-1949. Under these circumstances, this consideration—the desecration of the flag—cannot justify curbs on the freedom of speech. See HCJ 399/85 Knesset Member Rabbi Meir Kahane v. The Administrative Council of the Broadcasting Authority [29]. 

 

The Scope of Judicial Review

 

20.  It is well established that authority and discretion are not the same.  The High Court of Justice has the authority to review the decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee.  Yet, does this case require us to exercise our authority?  The decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee are subject to judicial review just as the decisions of any other public officer.  Of course, our discretion is not a substitute for the discretion of the Chairman of the Elections Committee.  We explained this in Zweely:

 

We do not act as a superior Chairman of the Elections Committee.  We will not interfere with his decisions unless a decision is made which is radically unreasonable.

 

Zweely, [10] at 703. We do not place ourselves in the position of the Chairman.  However, if the Chairman’s interpretation of a law differs from our own, and if the Chairman does not act within the boundaries of the proper balance, we have no choice but to intervene. See Zweely [10].

 

21.  In exercising our discretion, we must be aware of the special circumstances under which the Chairman of the Elections Committee acts.  He must make a large number of decisions in a short period of time.  We do not wish to act—nor can we act—as a court of review over each and every decision. Section 137 of the Elections Law is another example of this approach. Although that section itself does not apply here, its presence influences us. Of course, the Chairman has broad discretion in setting out the scope of freedom of speech on the one hand and the scope of the public interest on the other. The balance which we have discussed creates a “zone of reasonableness.” Any given balance allows for a variety of results which may occasionally contradict each other. Balancing is not an exact science.  It allows for discretion.  We will usually not intervene in this discretion, and this is especially true when it is the Chairman of the Elections Committee who exercises this discretion.  Thus, had I been of the opinion that the respondent’s decision falls within the “zone of reasonableness,” I would not have intervened, even in a case where, had I myself been the Chairman of the Elections Committee, I would not have made the same decision. This, however, is not the case in the petition before us.

 

Had my opinion been accepted, we would issue a final order and instruct the respondent to approve the petitioner’s broadcast.

 

Justice E. Mazza

 

I agree with President Barak’s reasoning with regard to our authority to deal with the petition, as well as with regard to the subjecting of radio election propaganda to the approval of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, and also with regard to the extent of the Chairman of the Elections Committee’s authority to intervene in the content of radio and television propaganda broadcasts. I also agree that, in exercising his extensive authority, the Chairman of the Elections Committee must appropriately balance between the freedom of speech— to which every nominee list is entitled—and between other protected values. I cannot agree, however, with the President’s conclusion that, in the case at hand, there is just cause for our intervening in the Chairman of the Elections Committee’s decision to disqualify the petitioner’s broadcasts. 

 

In the broadcasts which were disqualified, petitioner made use of the flag and the anthem.  In the propaganda jingle, which was intended to be broadcast over both radio and the television, words which attempt to imitate the Palestinian anthem “Biladi Biladi” were adapted to the tune of Hatikva.  Examining the words of the song, cited in their original and accompanied by a Hebrew translation in the President’s opinion, reveal that the song includes praise of Arafat, the “Shahid,” the Fatah Movement, the Hizballa Organization, and the PLO. The song also calls for the expulsion of Jews from Jaffa, Aco, Ramla and Lod, and connects the greatness of Allah to that of Jerusalem and “Holy Palestine.”  At the beginning of the propaganda film, which was intended to be broadcast on television, the Israeli flag is shown waving above the Knesset building.  Within a few seconds, during which the jingle plays in the background, the flag gradually turns into a Palestinian flag.  In his explanation as to why he disqualified the broadcast, the Chairman of the Elections Committee stated that the two broadcasts contain “a show of contempt towards the national anthem and a desecration of it—contempt and desecration which lead to provocation and even incitement.” Regarding the manner in which the state flag is shown in the propaganda television broadcast, the Chairman referred to section 5 of the Flag and Emblem Law-1949, which categorizes acts that desecrate the Israeli flag as criminal offences.

 

In his opinion, the President refers to the accepted tests regarding the prior restriction of expression: in general, freedom of speech should not be restricted unless there is near certainty that, if the expression were to be articulated, the public interest would seriously and substantially be injured. Furthermore, restricting freedom of speech, due to the suspicion that the public’s feelings may be harmed, may only be justified if the expected injury from the expression exceeds the level of tolerance that can expected of the public. After laying down these tests, the President states that the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to disqualify the broadcasts does not accord with this balancing equation.  He is of the opinion that “There is no certainty—neither near, nor reasonable nor substantial—that publicizing the propaganda broadcast of the petitioner—a national movement that holds the sanctity of the anthem and flag especially dear—will cause painful and serious injury to feelings concerning the flag and the anthem, and which exceed levels that are tolerable in a democratic society.” The President, however, is willing to assume that, as a result of permitting the broadcasts, “there will be a number of people who will raise their brows and question the tastefulness of the broadcast.” 

 

I am not willing to concur with this position, and have thus supported the denial of this petition.  As my honorable colleague has suggested, the petitioner’s broadcasts do indeed suffer from a lack of “tastefulness.”  If this were their only shortcoming, my colleague and I would be of the same opinion, as the point of departure in this matter is that each nominee-list is entitled to express its propaganda messages in whatever manner it chooses.  However, this case is not that simple.  I have not found any basis for our intervening in the Chairman’s determination that these broadcasts contain contempt and injury towards the anthem and the desecration of the sanctity of the flag, and that permitting the broadcasts may lead to provocation and incitement. 

 

Furthermore, I accept that the intervention of the Chairman of the Elections Committee in the content of propaganda broadcasts, produced by the list of nominees and submitted for his approval, is only justified when there is a an actual suspicion that another protected value may be injured. Even so, the Chairman of the Elections Committee has broad discretion in deciding whether, under the specific circumstances, the suspicion of such injury exists.  The normative framework for his decision of whether to approve a broadcast is similar to the way this Court itself balances between the freedom of speech and other values.  However, his implementation of the balance must take additional considerations into account. These additional considerations are necessary since all propaganda broadcasts are subject to his approval.   Thus, for example, the Chairman of the Elections Committee may disqualify a propaganda broadcast which includes expressions that incite racism, or expression opposition to the existence if the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, even if there is no probability that the broadcast will harm the values which section 7 of the Basic Law: The Knesset is intended to protect.  This also applies to the Chairman’s power to prevent the improper use of values, which the public is generally sensitive about, for propaganda purposes, even if the goal of the broadcast is not to harm these values, but rather to associate them with a specific nominee list. By virtue of this principle, Chairmen of Elections Committees have, in the past, disqualified broadcasts which made use of IDF soldiers, children, and members of bereaved families for the purposes of election propaganda. Such actions were taken even before the legislation of sections 2B(b) and 2C of the Propaganda Methods Law in 2001, which enshrined these prohibitions in legislation

 

An additional consideration, intrinsic to subjecting all election propaganda broadcasts to the approval of the Chairman of the Elections Committee, is in his duty to form identical, equivalent standards—which may occasionally be technical—for the examination of the broadcasts.  The significance of this is that, in examining the broadcast, the Chairman should refrain from assuming that the broadcast is not intended to cause the injury which the broadcast, at face value, is likely to cause.  In the appropriate circumstances, this consideration may lead him to disqualify propaganda broadcasts, which, according to an ordinary balancing approach, may have deserved approval.  Take our case as an example:  the President is of the opinion that as the petitioner is “a national movement that holds the sanctity of the anthem and flag especially dear.” Thus, there is no reason to be concerned that its use of the anthem and flag in the propaganda broadcasts, in the specific manner in which they were used by the movement, will harm public feelings.  I suspect that had the Chairman of the Elections Committee decided to approve the broadcasts, based on the consideration that the petitioner is not suspect of intending to desecrate the sanctity of the flag and anthem, he would have difficulties disqualifying other propaganda broadcasts which make similar use of the anthem and the flag, by a nominee list not known for holding the sanctity of the anthem and flag dear. 

 

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the disqualification of the propaganda jingle and television broadcast, which were produced by the petitioner, does not establish a cause for our intervention.  The Chairman of the Elections Committee was within his discretion in deciding as he did. With all due respect, I am of the opinion that his decision was correct.  As such, I cannot agree that his decision deviates from the zone of reasonableness.

 

 

Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen

 

I too am of the opinion, as is my colleague Justice Mazza, that the petition should be denied.

 

I do not disagree with my colleague, the President, with reference to the rules, principles and norms which should guide us in our decision in the matter at hand.  I too am of the opinion that “[o]n one side of the scales lies the freedom of speech … On the other hand lies the public’s interest in security, peace, and civil order.  In the case at hand, these interests include protecting the feelings of members of the public regarding the anthem and the flag.  Indeed, protecting the feelings of members of the public, whether they be religious, national or other feelings, is an integral part of the public interest.”  We differ, however, with regard to the question of the application of those principles to this case, and the question of our intervening to invalidate the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee.

 

Regarding the application of the above-mentioned principles, I am of the opinion that that using the anthem and flag, as the petitioner has done, crosses the bounds of legitimacy, in such a way that subjects its right to express its opinions to the public’s interest in security, peace and civil order.

 

In reviewing the decisions of the Chairman of the Elections Committee, “our discretion is not a substitute for the discretion of the Chairman of the Elections Committee.” See para. 20 of the President’s opinion. Similarly, “we do not act as a superior Chairman of the elections committee.  We will not interfere with his decisions, unless the decision made is radically unreasonable.” Zweely, at 703.

 

I am of the opinion that the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee properly balances between the freedom of speech and the public interest, and in any case, his decision falls within the zone of reasonableness and does not suffer from radical unreasonableness.  Therefore, there is no room for intervention in the decision. 

 

Petition Denied.

January 16, 2003

 

 

 

Translated by:   Leora Dahan

Edited by:             Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

 

Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 1514/01
Date Decided: 
Monday, June 18, 2001
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: Petitioners are the subject of a film made by or for the respondents.  The film was designated for broadcast on television on Shabbat.  When the petitioners discovered the film was going to be broadcast on Shabbat they approached the Second Television and Radio Authority, and asked that the film not be broadcast on Shabbat stating that broadcast of the film on Shabbat would harm their religious feelings and violate their religious freedom.  The request was denied by the Second Television and Radio Authority, which was willing to add captions on the screen which would state that the film was filmed on a weekday, but was not willing to broadcast the film on a weekday.  The petition was filed against this decision.

 

Held: In the majority opinion, written by President Barak, it was determined that broadcast of the film on Shabbat constituted a violation of the petitioners’ religious feelings but not their freedom of religion.  In the balance between the violation of the petitioners’ religious feelings and the freedom of expression of the respondents the freedom of expression prevails.  The petition was therefore denied.

 

In a dissenting opinion Justice Dorner was of the view that the petitioners’ freedom of religion was violated, and that in balancing the competing human rights – the freedom of religion of the petitioners, on the one hand, and the freedom of expression and right to property of the respondents on the other – in this specific instance, the freedom of religion of the petitioners should prevail.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

Translator’s note: The Hebrew word Shabbat has been translated as Shabbat which can refer to either Saturday or the Jewish Sabbath.

 

HCJ 1514/01

1.  Yaakov Gur Aryeh

2.  Bat Shir Gur Aryeh

v.

1.  Second Television and Radio Authority

2.  TTV, Ltd.

3.  Eyal Zayid

4.  Avital Levi

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[June 18th, 2001]

Before President A. Barak, Vice President S. Levin, Justice D. Dorner

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice for an order nisi and an interlocutory order.

 

Facts: Petitioners are the subject of a film made by or for the respondents.  The film was designated for broadcast on television on Shabbat.  When the petitioners discovered the film was going to be broadcast on Shabbat they approached the Second Television and Radio Authority, and asked that the film not be broadcast on Shabbat stating that broadcast of the film on Shabbat would harm their religious feelings and violate their religious freedom.  The request was denied by the Second Television and Radio Authority, which was willing to add captions on the screen which would state that the film was filmed on a weekday, but was not willing to broadcast the film on a weekday.  The petition was filed against this decision.

 

Held: In the majority opinion, written by President Barak, it was determined that broadcast of the film on Shabbat constituted a violation of the petitioners’ religious feelings but not their freedom of religion.  In the balance between the violation of the petitioners’ religious feelings and the freedom of expression of the respondents the freedom of expression prevails.  The petition was therefore denied.

In a dissenting opinion Justice Dorner was of the view that the petitioners’ freedom of religion was violated, and that in balancing the competing human rights – the freedom of religion of the petitioners, on the one hand, and the freedom of expression and right to property of the respondents on the other – in this specific instance, the freedom of religion of the petitioners should prevail.

.

Basic laws cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, s. 4.

 

Legislation cited:

Second Television and Radio Authority Law 5750-1990, ss. 48, 48(a).

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 164/97 Kontrem Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance IsrSC 52(1) 289

[2]      HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcast Authority Management Board (1987) IsrSC 41(3) 255

[3]      HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company Ltd. v. Film and Play Review Board, IsrSC 50(5) 661.

[4]      HCJ 6218/93 Cohen v. Bar Association IsrSC 49(2) 529.

[5]      HCJ 953/89 Indor v. Head of Jerusalem Municipality IsrSC 45(4) 693.

[6]      HCJ 3888/97 Novik v. Second Authority IsrSC 51(5) 199.

[7]      HCJ 287/69 Meiron v. Minister of Labor IsrSC 24(1) 337.

[8]      HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation IsrSC 51(4) 1. 

[9]      HCJ 351/72 Keinan v. Film and Play Review Board IsrSC 26(2) 811.

[10]    HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studio Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board IsrSC 43(2) 22.

[11]    CrimAp 697/88 Sutzkin v. State of Israel IsrSC 52(3) 289.

[12]    HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel IsrSC 51(2) 509.

[13]    HCJ 243/81 Yaki Yoshe Company Ltd. v. Film and Play Review Board IsrSC 35(3) 421.

[14]    HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior IsrSC 40(2) 701.

[15]    CrimA 126/62 Disenchek v. Attorney General IsrSC 17 169.

[16]    CA 294/91 Chevra Kadisha GHSHA ‘Kehillat Yerushalayim’ v. Kestenbaum. IsrSC 46(2)464.

[17]    HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Commander of Jerusalem District IsrSC 48(2) 456.

[18]    HCJ 148/79 Sa’ar v. Minister of Interior and Police IsrSC 34(2) 169.

[19]    HCJ 291/74 Bilet v. Goren IsrSC 29(1) 98.

[20]    HCJ 115/50 Yosefof v. Attorney General, IsrSC 5 481.

[21]    HCJ 866/78 Morad v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 34(2) 657.

[22]    HCJ 650/88 Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 42(3) 377.

[23]    HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense IsrSC 5295) 481.

[24]    HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin v. Minister of Education, IsrSC 48(5) 199.

[25]    HCJ 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. vs. Prime Minister IsrSC 47(5) 485.

[26]    CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Chevra Kadisha GHSHA Rishon LeZion [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600.

[27]    HCJ 262/62 Peretz v. Local Council Kfar Shmaryahu, IsrSC 16 2101.

[28]    HCJ 292/83 Ne’emanei Har Habayit, Association v. Commander of Jerusalem District, IsrSC 38(2) 449.

[29]    HCJ 6656/93 Am K’Lavi v. Commander of Jerusalem Police IsrSC 48(4) 793.

[30]    CrimA 7528/95 Hillel v. State of Israel IsrSC 50(3) 89.

[31]    HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense IsrSC 49(4)94.

[32]    HCJFH 4466/94 Nuseiba v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 49(4) 68.

[33]    CrFH 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel IsrSC 49(4) 589.

[34]    HCJ 1715/97 Office of Investment Managers in Israel v. Minister of Finance IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[35]    HCJ 450/97 Tnufah Manpower Services and Maintenances Ltd. v. Minister of Labor and Welfare IsrSC 52(2) 433.

 

American cases cited:

[36]    United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).

[37]    Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).

[38]    Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).

 

German cases cited:

[39]    BVerfGE 35, 36 [1973].

[40]    BVerfGE 93, 1 [1995].

 

Israeli books cited:

[41]    A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2, (1993).

[42]    A. Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in Israel (5th ed., volume A, 1996.

[43]    H.H. Cohen, The Law (1992).

 

Israeli articles cited:

[44]    D. Statman, ‘Violation of’ Multi-Cultural ‘Religious Feelings’ in a Democratic and Jewish State’ Memorial Book for Ariel Rosen Zvi, may his memory be a blessing’ (eds. M. Mautner, A. Sagi, R. Shamir) (1998). 

[45]    Berinson ‘Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Israel’ Iyunei Mishpat 3, 405 at 406;

[46]    Gavison, ‘Religion and State – Separation and Privatization’ Misphat U’Memshal 2 55 at 78 (1984).

[47]    H. H. Cohn, ‘On Freedom of Religion and Religious Wellbeing – Reviews in Legal History’ Landau Book 813 (volume B, 1985). 

[48]    A. Kasher, ‘Violation of Feelings for the Overall Good’ Mishpat U’Memshal B 289 (1984).

[49]    I. Zamir and M. Sobel, ‘Equality before the Law’, Mishpat U’Memshal 5 (2000) 165.

[50]    Aharon Barak, ‘Protected Human Rights: The Scope and the Limitations’ Mishpat U’Mimshal A (1993) 253.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[51]    Mishnah, Avot 1, P.

[52]    Avot of Rabbi Natan 22, A

[53]    Rabbi David Stav, ‘Filmed on a Weekday, Broadcast on Shabbat’ Nekudah 211 (1988) 52.

[54]    Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Oyerbach ‘Repeat Radio Broadcast on Shabbat’, Tehumin, Religious Law Compilation on the Topics of Torah, Society, and State 17 (1997) 13.

[55]    Rabbi Dr. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich, Electricity in Jewish Religious Law (Part B – Shabbat and Holiday, 1981) 270.

[56]    Rabbi Dr. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich, ‘Asking in the Matter’ Hadarom Torah Collection 15 (1962) 120.

[57]    Shavuot 39, A.

[58]    Mishnah, Psahim A, B.

 

For petitioners – Naftali Wersberger

For respondent no. 1 – Doron Avni; Tamar Hacker.

For respondents no. 2-4 – Efrat Avnet; Amir Ivztan

 

JUDGMENT

 

President A. Barak

The television network seeks to broadcast a film documenting the life and worldview of the petitioners, who are observant Jews.  They fill an active role in the film, which includes interviews with them.  The film was filmed on the weekdays.  The television network would like to show the film on Shabbat.  The petitioners object to this.  They claim violation of religious feelings and religious freedom.  Whose side is the law on – that is the question before us.

The Facts

1.    The Second Television and Radio Authority (hereinafter: ‘the respondent’) is a statutory corporation.  It was set up by power of the Second Television and Radio Authority Law 5750-1990.  Most of the broadcasts are by franchisees.  The Second Authority Council is authorized to ‘take time slots from a broadcast unit of the franchisee, for the purpose of showing broadcasts on behalf of the authority, on topics that in its opinion ‘are of special interest to the public’’ (section 48(a) of the law).  Against this background for four years now the program ‘Documentary Word’ has been broadcast on Shabbat.  This is the only half hour broadcast time slot that the respondent has.  The respondent decided (in 1999) to invite proposals for the production of documentary films on the topic of ‘places, phenomenon, and people in Israel on the issue of the tension between Judaism and Israeliness.’  Consequent to this it was decided between the respondent and respondent no. 2, a private company, that the latter would make a film about the residents of the settlement ‘Mitzpeh Kramim’.  The film was directed by the respondent no. 3.  The investigative research and interviews were conducted, inter alia, by respondent no. 4, who was the acting producer.

2.    The petitioners are residents of the settlement ‘Mitzpeh Kramim’.  As stated above, they are observant Jews.  They were identified by respondents 2-4 as suited to take part in the film.  They agreed to this.  The film was made and sent to the respondent.  Since it was considered suitable, it was supposed to be broadcast in the framework of the show ‘Documentary Hour’, which is broadcast, as stated, on Shabbat.  The petitioners approached the respondent, and asked that the film not be broadcast on Shabbat.  According to their claim, broadcast of the film on Shabbat violates their religious feelings and their religious freedom.  The respondent denied the request.  It is willing to add captions on the screen which would state that the film was filmed on a weekday.  It is not willing to broadcast the film on a weekday as it does not have a time slot for this.  The petition before us was filed to counter this decision.

3.    At first the petitioners argued before us that an agreement was made with them that the film would not be broadcast on Shabbat.  During the course of the arguments the petitioners repeated this claim, while arguing that there was a misunderstanding.  The source for this was, according to their claim, in the fact that some of the respondents were religious and from this the petitioners concluded that the film would not be broadcast on Shabbat.  After reviewing the material before us, we are making the determination that there was no agreement between the petitioners (or some of them) and the respondents according to which the film would not be broadcast on Shabbat.  The opposite: it was said to the petitioners that the film would be broadcast on the show ‘Documentary Word’.  From this the petitioners could conclude that the film would be broadcast on Shabbat.  Moreover, it is routine that observant Jews are filmed on weekdays and the film is aired on Shabbat.  Indeed, the petitioners should have known that the film would be aired on Shabbat, and the respondents assumed and were entitled to assume, that the petitioners agreed to this.  It was the duty of the petitioners to look into this matter before they participated in the film (compare HCJ 164/97 Kontrem Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance [1]).  Against this background the question was raised whether the petitioners have the right – which is not anchored in an agreement – that the film not be broadcast on Shabbat as, according to their claim, it violates their religious feelings and freedom of religion.  In truth, the petitioners themselves are not being made to desecrate Shabbat.  However, broadcast on Shabbat turns the petitioners, according to their claim, into accomplices of the desecration of Shabbat.  When the petition was filed we sought to resolve the matter by amicable means.  A conference was held before the President.  The petitioners’ Rabbi was invited to the meeting.  We sought to examine various ways to settle the dispute by agreement between the parties.  The respondents offered to broadcast the film with a caption that the filming took place on a weekday; it was also proposed that the caption would further state that the petitioners objected to broadcast of the film on Shabbat.  It was proposed to them that they make do with the filing of the petition without insisting on a judicial determination.  All proposals were rejected.  There is no recourse therefore but to hand down a judicial determination.

The normative framework

4.    The respondent is a statutory corporation.  Its discretion is subject to principles of public law in Israel.  It must weigh the relevant values and principles, and it must properly balance them.  On the one hand, there is the right of the respondent to freedom of expression.  That is the freedom of expression of the respondent – which serves as a spokesperson and a stage simultaneously (see HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcast Authority Management Board [2] at 268); it is the freedom of (artistic) expression of the other respondents (see HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company Ltd. v. Film and Play Review Board  [3] at 680); it is the right of the public to know (see HCJ 6218/93 Cohen v. Bar Association [4] at 541).

5.    On the other hand, there are the feelings of the petitioners.  I accept that the very knowledge that the film in which the petitioners are participants will be broadcast on Shabbat – thereby turning the petitioners, in their own eyes, to parties to the desecration of Shabbat – can violate the religious feelings of the petitioners.  Preventing this violation is in the public interest.  Indeed a society whose values are Jewish and democratic protects the feelings of the public in general and religious feelings in particular (see HCJ 953/89 Indor v. Head of Jerusalem Municipality [5] at 690; HCJ 3888/97 Novik v. Second Authority [6] at 202; HCJ 287/69 Meiron v. Minister of Labor [7] at 364; hereinafter – ‘the Meiron Case’; HCJ 5016/96 Horev  v. Minister of Transportation [8] at 58; hereinafter – ‘the Horev  Case’; Statman, Violation of Religious Feelings, Multi-Culturalism in a Democratic and Jewish State (eds. M. Mautner, A. Sagi, R. Shamir) at 133 (1998)).  Indeed the coarse violation of religious feelings gnaws at the value of tolerance, which is one of the values which binds and unifies society in Israel.  The duty not to violate the religious feelings of the other ‘stems directly from the duty of mutual tolerance between free citizens of different beliefs, without which a diverse democratic society such as ours is not possible.’  (Justice Landau in HCJ 351/72 Keinan v. Film and Play Review Board [9] at 814; see also HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studio Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [10] at 30; hereinafter – ‘the Universal City Case’; CrimAp 697/88 Sutzkin  v. State of Israel [11] at 307; hereinafter:  ‘the Sutzkin  Case’.

6.    What is the proper balance between the need to protect the freedom of expression of the respondents on the one hand and the need to protect the religious feelings of the petitioners on the other?  This question was discussed at length in the case law of the Supreme Court.  It was determined that the (vertical) ‘balancing formula’ is this: freedom of expression prevails, unless the violation of religious feelings is nearly certain and their violation is real and severe (see HCJ 7128/96 Temple Mount Faithful v. Government of Israel [12]; Universal City Case, p. 31; the Sutzkin  Case, p. 308).  Indeed in order to restrict freedom of expression a ‘plain’ violation of religious feelings is not sufficient.  A real and severe violation is necessary.  It is necessary that the violation go beyond the tolerable threshold of Israeli society (see HCJ 243/81 Yaki Yoshe Company Ltd. v. Film and Play Review Board [13] at 425).  This is a violation that shakes up the ‘doorposts of mutual tolerance’ (the Horev Case, p. 47)).

7.    What is the result of the proper balancing in the petition before us?  In opposition to the violation of the freedom of expression of the respondents is there a near certainty of a real and severe violation of the religious feelings of the petitioners?  There is no debate that the violation of the religious feelings of the petitioners is nearly certain.  It has been proven to us that such violation is certain (compare the Universal City Case, at p. 40).  But is the condition as to the intensity of the violation met?  The answer to this question is negative.  ‘The level of tolerability’ of Israeli society, in a Jewish and democratic state, includes situations in which the image of a believing Jew is broadcast on Shabbat (whether they are a political person and whether they are not a political person; whether it is an active interview or whether it is a chance filming).  This has been the situation in Israel for many years.  No one disputes this.  The violation of the religious feelings of the petitioners does not shake the doorposts of mutual tolerance in the State.  ‘In a democratic society a certain degree of violation of religious feelings is to be recognized.  Only in this way will it be possible for cooperative living of those with different religious views to take place.’ (Universal City Case, p. 39).  Certainly this is so if the broadcast of the film is accompanied by a caption that the film was filmed on a weekday.  A different conclusion would lead to the beginning of the end of broadcasts on Shabbat.  These broadcasts began as a result of a petition to this court (see the Meiron Case).  Consequent to this it is accepted in Israeli society that television broadcasts take place on Shabbat, in which, among others, observant Jews are seen, and in which interviews and conversations with them take place.  Thus on Shabbat, the operation of the Knesset and the government are broadcast, and in the framework of these, observant members of Knesset and ministers who are interviewed on weekdays are viewed; so too, on Shabbat entertainment, political, and cultural programs, in which observant Jews take an active part, are viewed.  If all of these are prohibited from being viewed, chances are great that all television will be shut down on Shabbat followed by the radio.  All this is not consistent with the ‘level of tolerability’ of the violation of religious feelings in Israel, as it has been accepted here for many years.  Indeed, the possibility of a certain violation of religious feelings is the price that every person, be his religion what it may be, is required to pay for life in democratic society, in which secular and religious and members of different religions live side by side one next to the other.  This is in many instances the price one must pay and there is no escape from it.  But, there are cases where a person who has a particular difficulty making peace with the violation of religious feelings can avoid that violation.  The case before us is such a case.  A religious person who is willing to be interviewed for television, but is not willing for the interview to be shown on Shabbat, can condition the interview on the term that the interview is to be broadcast only on a weekday.  But the petitioners did not do so, not explicitly nor by implication.  In this sense, as they themselves note in their notice to the court, they have only themselves to blame.  The result is therefore that the claim as to unlawful violation of religious feelings is to be dismissed.

8.    The petitioners did not base their arguments before us only on violation of religious feelings.  They went on to argue that broadcast of the film on Shabbat violates their freedom of religion.  They argue that in the (horizontal) balance between the violation of freedom of expression and the violation of religious freedom, the violation that is caused to the petitioners in broadcasting the film on Shabbat is more severe than the violation that will be caused to the respondents if the film is broadcast on a weekday.  What is the legal fate of such an argument?  Indeed, a distinction is to be made between the violation of religious feelings and the violation of freedom of religion.  Violation of the former (religious feelings) is a violation of the public interest.  The balancing required between the violation of this interest and the violation of freedom of expression is a vertical balancing (see A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2 [41] at p.688.).  The freedom has the upper hand, unless there is a probability (a likely possibility, near certainty, and the like) of severe violation  (in various degrees of severity) to the public interest (see, for example, HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior [14] at 708 (public safety versus freedom of movement); CrimA 126/62 Disenchek v. Attorney General [15] (judicial purity versus freedom of expression); CA 294/91 Chevra Kadisha GHSHA ‘Kehillat Yerushalayim’ v. Kestenbaum [16] at 519 (public interest in language versus human dignity).  The second violation is to personal liberty.  It is a matter here of the necessary balance between violation of the two liberties (or more) (see HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Commander of Jerusalem District [17] (freedom of expression versus privacy and property); HCJ 148/79 Sa’ar v. Minister of Interior and Police [18] (freedom of expression versus freedom of movement).  The balance is horizontal.  Within it limitations of time, place and shape are established which will enable every liberty to fully fulfill its principles.  Is a vertical balancing necessitated in the petition before us?  In order to answer this question the scope of the competing rights needs to be examined.  Only if in light of this examination there is a clash between them, will there be a need for a horizontal balancing.  What is the situation in the matter before us?

9.    All accept that freedom of religion is a basic right in Israeli law (see A. Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in Israel 175 [42].  More than once it has been ruled that freedom of religion is a ‘core rule in our legal system’ (Justice Kister in HCJ 291/74 Bilet v. Goren [19] at 102), that it is ‘one of the personal liberties guaranteed to him in every enlightened democratic regime’ (Justice Landau in HCJ 115/50 Yosefof v. Attorney General, [20] at 488) and that it is to be seen as a ‘basic principle of our legal regime’ (Acting President Justice Landau in HCJ 866/78 Morad v. Government of Israel, [21] at 663).10.  What is the scope of freedom of religion?  This freedom encompasses the liberty of the individual to believe and his liberty to act according to his faith, while realizing its rules and customs (‘freedom of worship’) (See HCJ 650/88 Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC [22] at 381; HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [23] 528; Berinson ‘Freedom of Religion and Conscience in Israel’ [45] at 406; Gavison, ‘Religion and State – Separation and Privatization’ [46] at 78 (1984); H. Cohn, ‘On Freedom of Religion and Religious Wellbeing – Reviews in Legal History’ [47].  Therefore freedom of religion includes the right of a person not to be compelled to act against their religion (see the Horev Case, at p. 140).  Freedom of religion also includes the right of a person to express himself with attire suited to the directives of his faith (see HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin v. Minister of Education, [24] at 203).  It is superfluous to mention that this is not a closed list.  Freedom of religion is tied to the individual and the realization of his identity.  It is part of his ‘I’.  Just as the ‘I’ constitutes a complex phenomenon whose boundaries are not to be clearly demarcated, so too the boundaries of freedom of religion are not to be demarcated.

11.  Does broadcast of the film on Shabbat violate the freedom of religion – as opposed to the religious feelings, of the petitioners?  The answer is negative.  Broadcast on Shabbat does not violate their liberty to believe and their liberty to act according to their belief.  It does not prevent them from realizing the rules and customs of their faith.  Examination of the arguments of the petitioners shows that their argument in fact is that the actions of others (the respondents) in opposition to the directives of the religion constitute a violation of the freedom of religion of the petitioners.  An argument such as this has been dismissed in the past more than once by this Court.  Thus, for example, the claim was dismissed that the existence of broadcasts on Shabbat constitutes a violation of the freedom of religion of the individual who does not watch television on Shabbat (the Meiron Case, at p. 363).  Justice Berinson noted in that case that despite the broadcasts on Shabbat, nobody was forcing the individual to watch television on Shabbat.  Only a violation that does not enable the individual to fulfill the directives of his religion and faith, or to conduct his lifestyle as a religious person, will be considered a violation of freedom of religion.  In another case, the claim was dismissed that the import of non-kosher meat and the consumption of non-kosher meat by Jews, constitutes a violation of the freedom of religion of believing Jews (see HCJ 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. vs. Prime Minister [25] at 500).  It was determined that the distinction is to be made between direct violation of the individual’s lifestyle (which constitutes a violation of his freedom of religion) and a violation of the feelings of an individual, consequent to the actions of another, which is not a violation of freedom of religion.  In that spirit I noted in another case that ‘I am not of the opinion that driving on Shabbat on Bar-Ilan street violates the constitutional right of every one of the residents of the neighborhood to freedom of religion.  The residents of the neighborhood are free to fulfill the directives of the religion.  The movement of the cars on Shabbat does not deny them this right, and does not violate it.’  (The Horev Case, p. 58).  Indeed, where a person is harmed by the actions of another which are in opposition to religion the claim is not of violation of freedom of religion but rather to its feelings and consciousness.  (See Kasher, ‘Violation of Feelings for the Overall Good’ [48]).

12.  I am aware that in the petition before us the harm to the petitioners is not merely because of the actions of others, but also because of the use on Shabbat of interviews that were conducted with the petitioners on a weekday.  This difference does not change the determination that at the basis of the claim of the petitioners there is the violation of their religious feelings and not their religious freedom.  Just as it cannot be imagined that the freedom of religion of an observant Jew is violated if a book that he wrote on a weekday is read on Shabbat while violating Shabbat, so too it cannot be imagined that the freedom of religion of an observant Jew is violated if an interview he gave on a weekday is broadcast on Shabbat.  Indeed, unchecked expansion of freedom of religion will result in a cheapening of the freedom of religion and depleting it of content.

13.  My conclusion, therefore, is that the broadcast of the film on Shabbat does not constitute a violation of the freedom of religion of the petitioners.  In light of this conclusion, there is no need to examine what the proper (horizontal) balance is between the violation of freedom of religion (were it to have occurred) and the violation of freedom of expression.  This examination raises a number of questions which are not simple, and which I have no need to discuss.  I also do not have the need to discuss an additional claim against the petitioners.  According to the claim, the respondents spent a prolonged period of time producing the film on the basis of a contract between the respondent and the production company, investing significant manpower and monetary resources.  They acted in good faith, and had no basis to think that the petitioners, who cooperated with them throughout the time period, would wake up when the work was done and raise an objection to the broadcast of the film on the date that was determined in advance.  In this situation there is room for the claim that the petition is lacking due to its delay, or that the petitioners are prevented from submitting the petition at this stage, or that it would not be just to grant the petitioners the requested remedy against the respondents.  However, as stated above, these claims can be left without a determination.

The result is that the petition is denied.  We have noted before us the declaration of the respondents that a caption will be added to the broadcast stating that the filming took place on a weekday.

 

 

Vice President Levin

I agree.

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

Unfortunately I cannot agree with the judgment of my colleague, President Aharon Barak.  Indeed, I agree with the opinion of my colleague that the violation of the petitioners’ feelings on its own does not justify, under the circumstances, granting the petition.  However, were my opinion to be heard, we would grant the petition and rule that broadcast on Shabbat of a television film which documents the course of the lives of the petitioners, observant Jews – including interviews conducted with them (hereinafter: ‘the film’) – does not merely harm their feelings, but rather also unlawfully infringes on their right to freedom of religion.

The following are my reasons.

The facts

1.    Production of the film which is approximately 24 minutes long, was ordered from respondents 2-4 (hereinafter collectively: ‘the producers’) by respondent no. 1 (hereinafter: ‘the Second Authority’).  This, with the intention of broadcasting it on Shabbat, in the broadcast time slot of half an hour, which is the only broadcast time slot that was available to the Second Authority for the purpose of broadcasting topics of special interest to the public.  The producers knew this.  However, the intention to broadcast the film on Shabbat, in the framework of the television show ‘Documentary Word’ dealing with the tension between Judaism and being Israeli, was not brought to the petitioners’ attention.  This, on the basis of a presumption based on the experience of the Second Authority with broadcasting interviews with observant Jews on Shabbat, including on the show ‘Documentary Word’ itself, according to which it fulfilled its obligation by accompanying the broadcast with the caption ‘filmed on a weekday’.

At the same time, it never occurred to the petitioners, who are young, and lack experience and contact with the media, that the film was designated for broadcast on Shabbat.  The subject was raised by the petitioners by chance on the day the filming was completed, and the producers promised to handle the matter.  However, it was later made clear to the petitioners by the producers, that the film would be broadcast on Shabbat.  Written requests by the petitioners to the Second Authority were to no avail.  The Second Authority apologized to the petitioners for the harm to their feelings, but explained that it could not broadcast the film on a weekday.  In their difficulty the petitioners turned to their Rabbi, Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, in order to find a solution in Jewish religious law that would not turn them into desecrators of Shabbat.  Rabbi Aviner made a categorical and resolved determination based on Jewish religious law that broadcast of the film on Shabbat would entail a mass desecration of Shabbat with the participation of the petitioners, that showing the film with the caption ‘filmed on a weekday’ may be perceived as propaganda and may even amount to moral corruption, and that in his view there is no solution in Jewish religious law that would allow the broadcast of the film on Shabbat.  Rabbi Aviner repeated this position of his during the course of the discussion which took place in the framework of the petition before us for the purpose of reaching a consensual arrangement.

The questions

Against this background three questions arise.  First, does the broadcast of the film, whose ‘actors’ are observant Jews, on Shabbat, violate their right to freedom of religion, meaning their right to fulfill the directives of their religion, as opposed to merely constituting harm to their feelings, as a result of the breach of the directive of their religion by other Jews.  Second, what is the proper balance between the rights of the petitioners to freedom of religion and the rights of the respondents to freedom of expression and property?  Third, how does the agreement between the petitioners and the producers as to the participation of the former group in the film, which was obtained without relating to the question of broadcast of the film on Shabbat, impact the parties’ rights.

I will discuss these questions in order.

The right of the petitioners

2.    The element which distinguishes freedom of religion from harm to religious feelings is that the violating action is prohibited to the believers or incumbent upon them according to the directive of their religion.  The content of the religion’s directive is determined by the religious guides of the Jewish religious law.  H. Cohn explained this:

‘’Freedom of religion’ means the freedom to do not what the religion permits, but only what the religion obligates. . .  In other words: the right to freedom of religion is the right to fulfill all the directives that a person’s religion imposes upon him, as long as he does not break the law. . .  the question what is the ‘directive’ that the law obligates one to do is a religious question, not a legal one: every single religion and its own directives, and every religion determines what is the degree of obligation in the fulfilment of one directive or another’ [Haim H. Cohn, The Law, [43] 525, emphases in the original].

We find a similar approach in comparative law.  The following was written in a decision of the United States Supreme Court, handed down by Chief Justice Warren Berger:

‘It is not within ‘the judicial function and judicial competence,’ ... to determine whether [the Amish] or the Government has the proper interpretation of the Amish faith; ‘[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.’

[United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) [36] citing Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)[37]]

 In another decision of that court Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote:

‘It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.’  [Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)[38]].

In Judaism which is not monolithic but decentralized, a believing person or believing public chooses their rabbi, and this rabbi is one who determines for him the obligations of his religion.  As it says in our sources ‘find yourself a rabbi and remove the doubt’ (Mishnah, Avot 1, P, [51]; Avot of Rabbi Natan 22, A [52]).  On this matter Justice Izhak Englard has written:

‘There is no place for this court to make an assumption as to the content of a religious law which is different than the one which was determined by the Rishon Le’Tzion and by the Local Rabbi of Rishon Le’Tzion…  It is a great principle in Jewish religious law that the public is obliged to follow the religious determination made by the local rabbi. . .’

[CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Chevra Kadisha GHSHA Rishon LeZion [26]].

In the case before us Rabbi Aviner made the religious law determination that in their appearance in the film being broadcast on Shabbat the petitioners themselves will break the directive of the religion, even if the broadcast is done by others.

Indeed, there are also other approaches more lenient than the approach of Rabbi Aviner.  See for example, a Jewish religious law ruling that permitted an observant film producer to sell his films to the Broadcast Authority knowing that they would be broadcast on Shabbat (Rabbi David Stav, ‘Filmed on a Weekday, Broadcast on Shabbat’ Nekudah 211 (1988) 52, [53] at 52-53).  But the position of Rabbi Aviner is not esoteric, and has much support.  See for example, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Oyerbach ‘Repeat Radio Broadcast on Shabbat’, Tehumin, Religious Law Compilation on the Topics of Torah, Society, and State 17 (1997) 13 [54]; Rabbi Dr. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich, Electricity in Jewish Religious Law (Part B – Shabbat and Holiday, 1981) 270 [55]; Rabbi Dr. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich, ‘Asking in the Matter’ Hadarom Torah Collection 15 (1962) 120[56].

3.    However, we need to draw a boundary between violation of freedom of religion and harm to religious feelings.  Thus, constitutional protection will not be given to an extreme approach which regards every harm to religious feelings due to the breach of religious directives by Jews as a violation of the freedom of religion of the believer, in the sense of ‘all of Israel are responsible for one another’ (Shavuot 39, A [57]).Conversely, the criteria is not necessarily the identity of the one performing the prohibited act, but rather whether the prohibited act is obligatory for the observant person or whether they are being kept from fulfilling a religious obligation.  The obligation need not necessarily be physical.  Thus, for example, running a factory on Shabbat due to an emergency order, when the religion of the owner prohibits them from having their property involved in the desecration of Shabbat, may violate their right to freedom of religion.  Similarly, it was determined in Germany in 1973 that placing a cross on the judge’s podium in court violates the freedom of religion of the Jewish attorney who appears before the court, and therefore is prohibited.  See BVerfGE 35, 36 [39].  In a later case, from 1995, it was determined that hanging a cross in classrooms in a school violates the freedom of religion of the students who are not Christian and is therefore prohibited, and the law that instructed to do so was void.  See BVerfGE 93,1 [40].

In our matter, broadcasting the film on Shabbat harms the petitioners not because of the action of others, nor in the name of a metaphorical mutual guaranty which binds all the people of Israel together.  The petitioners are directly harmed, as they themselves are appearing on television on the day of Shabbat.  They thereby become themselves partners to the desecration of Shabbat, and transgress, at the time of the broadcast, against their will, the directive of their religion. 

My colleague writes, that ‘their [the petitioners’] argument in fact is that the actions of others (the respondents) in opposition to the directives of the religion constitute a violation of the freedom of religion of the petitioners.’ (In paragraph 11 of his judgment).  In my opinion, this is not so.  The petitioners have no claims against the broadcast of television on Shabbat.  They have no complaint against the broadcast of the program ‘Documentary Word’ on Shabbat.  Their petition and request is only in opposition to the broadcast on Shabbat of the specific film that was made about them and with their participation.

Such a broadcast contains a violation of the freedom of religion, which is the provision of the possibility of the individual to fulfill the directive of their religion without government intervention.  Freedom of religion is ‘of the basic liberties which are recognized according to our legal system and constitute a part of it’ (President Meir Shamgar in HCJ 650/88 Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC [22] at 381) and it was guaranteed to all citizens of the state in the Declaration of Independence, whose ‘principles every authority in the State must place before itself’ (Justice J. Sussman in HCJ 262/62 Peretz v. Local Council Kfar Shmaryahu, [27] at p. 2116).  Freedom of religion is counted among the liberties on which our democratic regime is based.  See the words of Justice Barak in HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Head of Jerusalem Municipality [12] at p. 454.

However, as with every right, freedom of religion too is not absolute, and it must be balanced against other rights and protected interests.

Balance between the parties’ rights

4.    In the case before us, against the right of the petitioners to freedom of religion stand the rights of the respondents to freedom of expression and property, which are also basic rights.  On this matter case law has distinguished between values which override one another, in which case the balancing between them is ‘vertical’, and values of equal weight, which concede to one another, in order to enable their collective existence, in which case the balancing is ‘horizontal’.  Vice President Barak explained this:

‘In the ‘vertical’ balancing, one value – in colliding with another value – has the upper hand.  However, this superiority is realized only if the requirements of the balancing formula are met as to the likelihood of the violation of the preferred value and its degree.  Thus, for example, the public interest in public peace and public order overrides freedom of expression, as long as there is a ‘near certainty’ that actual damage will be caused to the public interest if the freedom of expression is not limited. . .  In the ‘horizontal’ balancing the two conflicting values are of equal weight.  The balancing formula examines the degree of mutual concession of each of the rights.  Thus, for example, the right to movement and the right of assembly are of equal weight.  The balancing formula will establish conditions of place, time, and scope in order to enable the collective existence of the two rights.’ [HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Commander of Jerusalem District [28] at p. 474-475].

See also HCJ 6656/93 Am K’Lavi v. Commander of Jerusalem Police [29] at pp. 796-797; CrimA 7528/95 Hillel v. State of Israel [30] at p. 96; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [8] (hereinafter: ‘HCJ Horev’) at pp. 37-38.In the legal literature complications in the distinction between the two types of balancing have been pointed out.  It has been noted that it is proper to strive for collective existence of values, even if these are not equal in weight.  But, if it is not possible for the two values to co-exist, preferring one value over another is unavoidable, even if the two are of equal weight.  See Izhak Zamir and Moshe Sobel, ‘Equality before the Law’ [49] at pp. 214-215.

5.    In my opinion the basis of the distinction between the types of balancing is not in the result of the balancing in the sense of mutual concessions as opposed to preference of one value over another, but in its purpose, from which the criteria for balancing are derived.  The vertical balancing – which is implemented in the collision between a human right and a public interest – is intended to minimize, as much as possible, the violation of the right even where the public interest overrides it.  While the horizontal balancing – which is implemented in the collision amongst human rights, is intended to minimize, as much as possible, the violation of both of the rights.  See and compare Aharon Barak, ‘Protected Human Rights: The Scope and the Limitations’ [50] at pp. 263-264.

A human right, by its nature, carries a social price.  This price is expressed in the criteria for respect of human rights that were established in section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and liberty and in section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (hereinafter: ‘the limitations clause’).  The limitations clause was also applied to violations by administrative authorities (and not only by the Knesset) of basic human rights (including rights that are not established in a basic law).  See, for example, HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense [31] at p. 138; HCJFH 4466/94 Nuseiba v. Minister of Finance, [32] at pp. 86-87; HCJ Horev , Ibid  at p.41-42.

However, the purpose of the limitation clause, the principle of proportionality being among its foundations, is to protect human rights by minimizing the infringement on them when they collide with a public interest.  Thus, within the principle of proportionality, the authority is required to undertake from among the alternative means which may advance the realization of the public interest (the purpose) the means which causes the smallest harm to the right. Today, balancing formulas such as the ‘near certainty’ test and the ‘reasonable possibility’ test, which were formulated in  case law even before the principle of proportionality was absorbed in our legal system, are also integrated into the principle of proportionality, and this for the purpose of establishing the legality of the decisions of the administrative authorities which violate human rights.  These formulas take into account the idiosyncratic weight of the right and the public interest for the sake of which the violation of the right is sought.

The test of the lesser violation and the balancing formulas, therefore, reflect the public price that a democratic society is willing to pay in order to protect human rights.  I explained this in another case which relates to the balance between a person’s right to freedom from detention and protection of public safety:

‘Where the realization of an interest has no price, there is no significance to anchoring it in a right, and all the more so in a constitutional basic right.  The value in the rights of the public and victims’ is generally collective and in opposition to it are the rights of the single accused.  Without recognizing the rights of the accused, there is no existence to the rights of the potential victims, who may find themselves, in other circumstances, as the accused.  Protection of basic human rights is not just a matter of the individual but of society as a whole, and it determines society’s image.

Indeed, it is possible that preventative detention of a person who has not yet committed a crime, cancellation of the presumption of innocence and replacement of the more stringent burden of proof which is customary in criminal law with the degree customary in civil trials would reduce the amount of crime and contribute significantly to the protection of public safety.  But in our democratic regime, in which the liberty of the individual is recognized as a basic right, society concedes some of the possible protection of public safety.’

[CrFH 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [33] at p. 645.]

6.    The criteria in the limitations clause, and in particular the principle of proportionality, are not appropriate for the balancing of two human rights.  The purpose of the horizontal balancing is to reduce the violation of both of the rights, and this, as said, through mutual concessions which enable the realization of both simultaneously, even if not to their full extent.  But if the possibility of the co-existence of the two competing rights does not exist, the prevailing right will be the one which if infringed upon will result in more severe damage to the individual.  The severity will be determined, first, by the substance of said right.  In this matter heavy-weight rights, which grow directly from the core of human dignity and the protection of human image, are to be distinguished from lighter-weight rights, which are more distanced from this core.  However, one is not to merely relate to the title of the basic right, but also to the interests which stand at its foundation in the concrete instance and the specific values which are protected in the relevant context.  See and compare HCJ 1715/97 Office of Investment Managers in Israel v. Minister of Finance [34] at pp. 422-423; HCJ 450/97 Tnufah Manpower Services and Maintenances Ltd. v. Minister of Labor and Welfare [35] at p. 452.  Second, the degree of violation of the right and its scope are to be considered, and we should examine whether the realization of the competing right violates the center of the said right or its margin.

In our matter, I am of the opinion that the competing human rights – the freedom of religion of the petitioners, on the one hand, and the freedom of expression and the right to property (which is of a lesser weight) of the respondents, on the other hand – are of equal weight.  However, mutual concession between them is not possible.  In the existing circumstances, the right to freedom of religion has no room to retreat and its violation is substantive.  And, as stated above, the petitioners have been forced – according to them and according to their rabbi – into the desecration of the Shabbat.

On the other hand, the circumstances of the case enable the respondents to concede a small portion of their rights, by broadcasting the film on a weekday instead of on Shabbat.  Such a concession violates only the margin of the rights.

7.    The respondents claim that ‘the Authority has no other date to broadcast a program of this type’, and that banning the film from being broadcast on Shabbat means banning it from being broadcast at all, which is equivalent to censorship and severe violation of the freedom of expression and the right to property.

This argument is not reasonable.  Indeed, the Second Authority has a broadcast time slot on Shabbat.  However, transferring the program from Shabbat to another day is not impossible.  The legislator entrusted the Second Authority with the discretion to take time slots from a broadcast unit of a franchisee for the purpose of presenting programs on its behalf, as long as notice of this is given in a reasonable amount of time in advance.  See section 48 of the Second Television and Radio Authority Law 5750-1990.

8.    One would think that it would be possible to resolve the difficulty not only by a compulsory ‘taking’.  Even the Second Authority itself wrote the following in its response:

‘Given that the only time slot of the Second Authority is on Shabbat, the realization of the suggested solution required approaching one or the other of the franchisees with a request that they agree to allot, at short notice, a date for broadcast of the program in the framework of their broadcasts.  Taking into consideration the fact that broadcast schedules of franchisees are finalized several months before the date of broadcast, and the fact that documentaries such as this type of program do not draw a large viewership and therefore it is difficult to schedule commercials in them, the broadcast time that could be requested from the franchisees for this purpose is during the late night hours (around 1:00 at night).’

In the framework of the relationship between the franchisees which broadcast in the middle of the week, amongst themselves and between them and the Second Authority there have in the past been deviations from the broadcast schedule and the time slots, as a result of various circumstances.  The broadcast schedule is not ‘holy’ and unchangeable, but rather, when necessary, it can be flexible according to needs and circumstances.  Moreover, the broadcast of the film was postponed with the consent of both parties for a number of months, such that the argument as to the short notice is no longer valid.

Broadcast of the program on a weekday is not impossible, even if it entails a fair amount of effort, and possibly even the provision of financial indemnification to one of the franchisees due to considerations of viewership percentages (taking into account the addition of religious viewers who do not watch television on Shabbat).  This being the case, transferring the program from Shabbat means only minimal violation of freedom of expression and the property right of the respondents.

It turns out therefore, that the requested balance which will enable ‘joint living’ and ‘co-existence’ of the rights necessitates granting the petitioners request.  The petitioners have nowhere ‘to retreat back’ to.  Their Rabbi appeared before the court and could not find a solution in Jewish religious law.  Broadcast of the film on Shabbat means a forced infringement by the petitioners on the directive of their religion and the violation of their freedom of religion.  The respondents on the other hand have room to maneuver.   Refraining from broadcasting the film on Shabbat, while enabling its broadcast on another day, means, as said, a minimal degree of violation of freedom of expression and property of the respondents alongside protection of the freedom of religion of the petitioners.

 The claim of delay

9.    The respondents claim, that the petition was delayed, as for them it is routine to broadcast programs with the participation of religious people on Shabbat, with the accompanying caption ‘filmed on a weekday’, and that they had no basis for assuming that the petitioners would only raise objections to broadcasting the film on Shabbat after its making was completed.

The good faith of the respondents does not detract from the good faith of the petitioners, who are not accustomed to viewing television on Shabbat, and did not know about the said practice.  In fact the petitioners claim that the possibility never crossed their mind that a program about them would be broadcast on Shabbat, and they were even misled into believing that this is the case.  In this situation, there is no room for the claim of delay, as when the petitioners found out about the broadcast planned for Shabbat they approached the Second Authority and tried to prevent it.

However, the primary issue to me is that the Second Authority, which ordered a film about and with the participation of observant people, with the intention of broadcasting it on Shabbat – and according to its claim, even with the knowledge that there was no possibility of broadcasting it on a weekday – is not entitled to rely on the customary practice of placing the caption ‘filmed on a weekday’.   As, under the circumstances, it was obligated to present the petitioners with its intention to broadcast the film on Shabbat.  Even if in practical life, in the face of such a practice, which is based, apparently, on more lenient approaches in Jewish religious law, the Second Authority is accustomed to refraining from obtaining prior consent in similar cases, in doing so, it thereby runs the risk that it will be forced to give up the broadcast on Shabbat if an objection arises.

As a rule, it is appropriate to impose on the Second Authority, or those who represent it who initiate the broadcast and are experienced in contracting with film subjects for the purpose of preparing programming about them, the duty of proper disclosure, when it is possible that the party who is the film’s subject will be harmed.

Ramifications for the future

10.  My colleague, the President, is concerned that consequent to a decision which prevents the broadcast on Shabbat ‘chances are great that all television will be shut down on Shabbat followed by the radio.’  I do not share these concerns.

There are certainly many people who will agree to participate in programs broadcast on Shabbat, including secular people, non-Jews, and even, as the respondents claim, religious Jews who agree to broadcasting with the accompanying caption ‘filmed on a weekday’.

Moreover: the right to freedom of religion does not prevail in every case, but rather only when the injured parties are at the center of the program under discussion.  When this is the situation, the technical action of the broadcasters is the also the substantive action of the subjects of the broadcast.  This being so, the intensity of the belonging of the subjects of the broadcast to the program, as well as the harm to them, prevails over the right of the broadcasters to freedom of expression and their property.  It cannot be inferred that this ruling extends neither to a case of subjects who were filmed by chance in a crowd, nor to public figures or authors who appear frequently on television on Shabbat.  It is possible and necessary to draw analogies only to similar cases.  The words that were said in our sources in the context of the fear of an unlikely event in the case of checking for Chametz, are appropriate here:’ One is not to be concerned that perhaps a rat has dragged it from home to home or from place to place, as if so, then from courtyard to courtyard and town to town and it is endless.’ [Mishnah, Psahim, 1, B [58]]

Therefore, if my opinion were to be heard, we would make the order nisi absolute.

It was decided as per the opinion of President Barak against the dissenting opinion of Justice Dorner.

 

18 June 2001

27 Sivan 5761

 

Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 651/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 23, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: During elections for the sixteenth Knesset, Respondent no. 1 disqualified portions of the election propaganda broadcasts of respondents nos. 2 and 3. These portions were disqualified by the Chairman because they included pictures of the Palestinian flag. Petitioner asserted that this disqualification of the portions constituted an infringement of the freedom of speech of respondents nos. 2 and 3, and an infringement of the voters' right to view political messages uncensored. The Attorney-General, as an amicus curae, asserted that petitioner did not have standing to bring his petition, as the injured respondents could have brought the petitions themselves.

 

Held: The Court held that petitioner did have standing as a public petitioner. The Court noted that the standing of public petitioners has been recognized in matters of a public nature that concern the rule of law, the enforcement of constitutional principles, or where intervention is necessary to repair a substantial error in government operations. In general, however, the standing of a public petitioner has not been recognized where there exists a specific individual who has been injured and also has standing. Even so, in the context of election law, the Court held that the standing of a public petitioner should be recognized even where there exists a specific individual who has standing. This extended right of standing should be recognized due to the importance of regular and proper elections to the democratic process, and due to the fact that all voters have an interest in receiving the political messages of the candidates. As to the merits of the petition, the Court held that, under the circumstances, the appearance of the Palestinian flag in the broadcasts would not cause injury to viewers. As such, the Court struck down the decision of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

 

 

                                                                                    HCJ 651/03

 

Association for Civil Rights in Israel

v.                        

Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset
Raam- United Arab List
Balad- National Democratic Assembly

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 21, 2003]

Before Justices T. Strasberg-Cohen, I. Englard, and A. Procaccia

 

Facts: During elections for the sixteenth Knesset, Respondent no. 1 disqualified portions of the election propaganda broadcasts of respondents nos. 2 and 3. These portions were disqualified by the Chairman because they included pictures of the Palestinian flag. Petitioner asserted that this disqualification of the portions constituted an infringement of the freedom of speech of respondents nos. 2 and 3, and an infringement of the voters' right to view political messages uncensored. The Attorney-General, as an amicus curae, asserted that petitioner did not have standing to bring his petition, as the injured respondents could have brought the petitions themselves.

Held: The Court held that petitioner did have standing as a public petitioner. The Court noted that the standing of public petitioners has been recognized in matters of a public nature that concern the rule of law, the enforcement of constitutional principles, or where intervention is necessary to repair a substantial error in government operations. In general, however, the standing of a public petitioner has not been recognized where there exists a specific individual who has been injured and also has standing. Even so, in the context of election law, the Court held that the standing of a public petitioner should be recognized even where there exists a specific individual who has standing. This extended right of standing should be recognized due to the importance of regular and proper elections to the democratic process, and due to the fact that all voters have an interest in receiving the political messages of the candidates. As to the merits of the petition, the Court held that, under the circumstances, the appearance of the Palestinian flag in the broadcasts would not cause injury to viewers. As such, the Court struck down the decision of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee.

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defence, IsrSC 48(2) 811

[2]HCJ 852/86 Alony v. Minster of Justice, IsrSC 41(2) 1

[3]HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. The Broadcasting Authority, IsrSC 35(3) 365

[4]HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Ministter of Defence, IsrSC 42(2) 441

[5]HCJ 1759/94 Srozberg v. Minister of Defence, IsrSC 51(1) 625

[6]HCJ 16355/90 Jarjevski v. The Prime Minister, IsrSC 45(1) 749

[7]HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 40(3) 505

[8]HCJ 4112/99 Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Municipality of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, IsrSC 56 (5) 393

[9]HCJ 2148/94 Gilbert v. Chairman of the Investigating Committee for the Examination of the Massacre in Hebron, IsrSC  48(3) 573

[10]HCJ 26/76 Bar Shalom v. Israel Lands Administration, IsrSC 31(1) 796

[11]CA 10596/02 Ness v. Likud Party, IsrSC 57(1) 769

[12]HCJ 40/70 Becker v. Minister of Defence, IsrSC 24(1) 238

[13]HCJ 231/73 Bergman v. Minister of Treasury, IsrSC 27(2) 785

[14]HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice, IsrSC 27(1) 794

[15]HCJ 549/75 Noah Films. v. The Film Review Board, IsrSC 30(1) 757

[16]HCJ 14/86 Laor v. The Film & Play Review Board, IsrSC 41(1) 421

[17]HCJ 869/92 Zweely v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Thirteenth Knesset, IsrSC 46(2) 692

[18]HCJ 212/03 Herut—The National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset, IsrSC 57(1) 750

 

Israeli Books Cited:

[19]1 I. Zamir, The Administrative Authority, 81-83 (1996). 

[20]Z. Segel, The Right of Standing in the High Court of Justice 253 (1993

 

Petition granted.

 

On behalf of the petitioner—Dan Yakir

On behalf of respondent no. 1—Anar Helman

On behalf of respondent no. 2—Not Present

On behalf of respondent no. 3—Osama Halabi

 
JUDGMENT
Justice A. Procaccia

1.  Respondents nos. 2 and 3 are, respectively, Raam—The United Arab List [hereinafter Raam], and Balad—The National Democratic Assembly [hereinafter Balad]. Both of these respondents are parties running for election in the Sixteenth Knesset.  Respondent no. 1 is the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee. The Chairman disqualified segments of two of Raam’s and Balad’s election propaganda broadcasts which displayed the Palestinian flag. Petitioner, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, approached this Court with a petition for the invalidation of the Chairman's decision to disqualify the broadcast segments. Petitioner requests that we allow the televising of the propaganda broadcasts in full. 

After oral arguments and viewing tapes of the broadcast, we handed down a judgment on January 21, 2003 in which we made the order nisi final, and allowed the uncensored televising of Raam’s and Balad’s propaganda broadcasts.  Due to the exigency of the issue, we decided that the reasons for our judgment would be given at a later date.  The following are the facts and the reasons for our decision,

Background

2.  The petition before us was submitted by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel against the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee. Raam and Balad were added as respondents.  Raam did not attend oral arguments.  Balad attended the arguments, supported the petition, and joined in the request for relief. 

3.  The petition concerns two election propaganda broadcasts, one produced by Raam and the other produced by Balad.  We have viewed both election broadcasts. Raam’s broadcast is devoted to the troubles of the Bedouin in the Negev.  It contrasts, through pictures, the living conditions of the Bedouin with the living conditions of the Jewish population in Israel. The final seconds of the broadcast consist of a scene of a demonstration, whose participants include Knesset Member Sanah.  In this scene, a Palestinian flag is seen waving while a number of youths make the letter “V” with their fingers.  As per the decision of respondent no. 1, the Palestinian flag was concealed by a white spot.  Aside from this, the entire broadcast was approved for broadcast. 

The Balad broadcast consists mainly of speeches made by the head of the party, Member of Knesset A. Bishara, to the voting public, and of photographs of his meetings with various officials.  At the end of the broadcast, for a split-second, a picture of the Palestinian flag appears.  Here too, the Palestinian flag was concealed by a white spot, as per respondent 1’s decision.

4.  On January 15, 2003, in response to a letter sent by the legal advisor of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Dan Yakir, respondent no. 1 gave the following reasons for his decision:

 

I disqualified a number of segments from election broadcasting, including those segments of which you speak in your letter. I was of the opinion, and am of that opinion still, that it was appropriate not to permit the broadcast of the flag.  We should keep in mind that the present elections are elections for the Israeli parliament and that Israel is currently in a cruel and bitter state of war, even if this does not constitute war as defined under international law.

 

The Parties’ Arguments

 

5.  Following the response of respondent no. 1, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel submitted this petition.  Its main argument is that the disqualification of the segments that display the Palestinian flag constitutes a severe infringement of Raam’s and Balad’s political freedom of speech, and upon the voting public’s right to view propaganda broadcasting.  According to petitioner, election propaganda, including propaganda broadcasting, is an integral part of any constitutional, democratic electoral process. The right to broadcast election propaganda is founded upon the freedom of speech.  This court, in its case law, has formulated an equation for balancing between the freedom of speech in election propaganda and between other public interests.  According to petitioner, in the appropriate balancing of the relevant values, there is no room to disqualify these broadcast segments. The significance of the Palestinian flag should be considered within its context.  In the case at hand, the Palestinian flag does not reflect a show of support for a terrorist organization in an armed struggle against the State of Israel. As such, there is no public interest that justifies the disqualification of the segments, and they should be seen as a part of legitimate political discourse, a discourse that should not be restricted in this case. The decision to disqualify the broadcast of the segments should be seen as unreasonable, and it should be invalidated.

 

6.  The Attorney-General, as an amicus curae, claims that the petition should be denied, both on its merits and also because the petitioner lacks standing. It was argued, in regard to the latter claim, that the petitioner is fighting a battle that is not its own, and that this provides sufficient cause to close the gates of the Court.  No one, aside from the parties running for election, has the right to broadcast election propaganda. If the decision of the Chairman of the Central Election Committee harms any of the candidates' interests in propaganda broadcasting, that candidate or party is entitled to petition for relief.  Under these circumstances, the standing of a public petitioner should not be recognized, if the injured party itself has not petitioned for relief. In this case, Raam and Balad are the political parties whose broadcast segments were disqualified.  If they believed that this decision injured their rights, they could have submitted a petition for relief.  They chose not to petition for their own reasons. The petitioner in this case suffered no injury which would entitle it to submit a petition in its own name.  It was further argued that, in general, the standing of a public petitioner is not recognized in a case where an administrative act injures the rights of a specific individual and that person refrains from petitioning the court. Such is the case before us, where only the party actually affected by the decision has standing. 

The Attorney-General also draws attention to the difficulties intrinsic to a proceeding initiated by a public petitioner and not by the true interested party. First, a petition initiated by a public petitioner may lack all the factual data necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the dispute. Second, recognizing public petitioners may generate an excess of public petitions concerning the elections.  This would draw elections issues to the Court, even though they should be dealt with in the public arena.

Regarding the merits of the petition, it was argued that the respondent’s decision is reasonable.  The Attorney-General argues that, in balancing Raam’s and Balad’s political freedom of speech against the public interest, the balance leans towards disqualifying the broadcast segments that display the Palestinian flag.  This flag is the flag of the Palestinian Authority and of the Palestine Liberation Organization [hereinafter PLO].  The Attorney-General argues that it is a symbol of the cruel terrorist war being waged by terrorist organizations against the citizens of Israel, a war which has claimed many victims. As a result of this war, the lives of thousands of families have been shattered.  The disqualification of the segments was intended to prevent certain and substantial injury to the feelings of thousands of families hurt by the terrorist war being waged by the Palestinians.  The Attorney-General adds that the respondent has broad discretion in making decisions regarding elections issues which are under his authority.  In this case, his decisions should be approved. At minimum, it should be held that they do not constitute a radical departure from the zone of reasonableness.

 

Standing

 

7.  In our case law, we have greatly extended the standing of a public petitioner in matters of a public nature that concern the rule of law, the enforcement of constitutional principles, or where intervention is necessary to repair a substantial error in government operations.  The status of the public petitioner has been recognized even where the public petitioner cannot claim to have been personally affected or harmed. See HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defence [1]; HCJ 852/86 Alony v. Minster of Justice [2]; HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. The Broadcasting Authority [3]. Our approach to standing was greatly influenced by our understanding of the role of judicial review in the democratic state.  Our broad understanding of the right of standing is a part of a broader view of this Court, as not only responsible for resolving conflicts between parties, but also as responsible for the rule of law, even outside the context of resolving individual conflicts: 

 

In a democratic society, the court is responsible for preserving the rule of law.  The significance of this is that it must enforce the law with regard to the governmental authorities, and it must ensure that the government is acting lawfully.

 

See HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence [4]; HCJ 1759/94 Srozberg v. Minister of Defence [5]; 1 I. Zamir, The Administrative Authority, 81-83 (1996) [19].  As such, the standing of a public petitioner was recognized in matters of general public importance concerning the rule of law and concerning matters of a constitutional nature, even where the public petitioner has no direct personal interest in the matter.  HCJ 16355/90 Jarjevski v. The Prime Minister [6]; HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel [7]. 

 

8.  Even in light of this extension of the right of standing, this Court will generally not entertain a public petition where there exists an injured party who has not approached the Court.  Where a petition attacks an administrative act which has injured the right or interest of a specific individual, and that person refrains from petitioning this Court, the Court may not recognize the public petitioner’s standing, even if the matter relates to a matter of general public importance.  This exception to standing is intended to limit the public petition to government acts where there is no relevant injured party. If such an injured party exists, the public petitioner will be considered to be intervening in a conflict not its own, and its application will be denied.  Srozberg, [5] at 631; HCJ 4112/99 Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Municipality of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa [8]; HCJ 2148/94 Gilbert v. Chairman of the Investigating Committee for the Examination of the Massacre in Hebron [9].

It is appropriate to note that there has been criticism of limiting the standing of a public petitioner in cases where there is an injured individual with a direct and actual interest in the matter:

This limiting approach should not be maintained if the Court finds that the “public petitioner” is drawing attention to a matter of general and exceptional importance, which goes beyond the specific matter at hand.

Z. Segel, The Right of Standing in the High Court of Justice 253 (1993) [20]. This approach accords with the view that “the greater the public significance of the matter, the greater the Court’s tendency to recognize the petitioner’s right to bring the matter before the Court, even if he is an ordinary citizen.” HCJ 26/76 Bar Shalom v. Israel Lands Administration [10] (Berenson, J.).

9.  Here, Raam and Balad have a direct interest in the respondent’s decision to invalidate the segments for election broadcasting.  They did, however, not petition for relief.  The petitioner is the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. The association did not initiate this proceeding in the name of those two political parties.  Nevertheless, petitioner's standing should be recognized. 

The main reason for recognizing the petitioner's standing lies in the special nature of the matter at hand, which concerns the electoral process.  Matters concerning the electoral process are of the utmost constitutional importance. Additionally, the petitioner has standing as a representative of the interests of the voter, who has a direct interest in the electoral process, and not only as a representative of the parties whose broadcast segments were disqualified. 

10.  The standing of a public petitioner, in matters regarding the elections, should not be compared to any other matter.  The significance of the protected interest in the electoral process, and the petitioner's connection to this interest, are different from that of regular public petitions.  The electoral process is, first and foremost, concerned with guaranteeing the rights of voters and parties that wish to be elected through the democratic process.  Election laws are intended to ensure that the individual be able to realize his right to vote and be voted for, while allowing him to exercise his freedom of speech. They are also intended to preserve rules of equality, as well as the regularity and fairness of the electoral process:

The goal of election laws is, at the end of the day, none other than the translation of the wishes of the voters into the distribution of political power and seats in the Knesset.

CA 10596/02 Ness v. Likud Party, [11] at par. 11 (Barak, J.).  The object of the electoral process is to realize the fundamental right to vote and be voted for in a proper and regular process. The regularity of the electoral process is the concern of the entire public, and goes beyond the direct concern of the specific individual injured by government action.  Even in the past, when our approach to standing still restricted the right of access to the courts, a voter’s right to petition against irregularities in the electoral process was recognized. In HCJ 40/70 Becker v. Minister of Defence [12], Justice Vitkon stated:

The right to public standing developed with regard to two issues. One issue relates to the elections. The reason for this recognition is that ensuring election rights is a precondition for any democratic regime. Every voter is personally and directly harmed by disruption and lack of order in the management of the elections, and he has standing in Court, unless his right has been limited by law.

With regard to examining the merits of a public petition concerning the elections, see also HCJ 231/73 Bergman v. Minister of Treasury [13];  HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [14]. These two cases discussed the merits of the public petitions at issue there. They did not discuss the question of a public petitioner’s standing when a specific party is injured by the government act.

11.  A voter has standing to bring a petition regarding the electoral process where his rights as a voter have been directly violated.  However, his right to standing goes further than this.  In free and democratic elections, the rights of voters are intertwined with the rights of candidates such that the violation of a candidate’s rights may affect the rights of a voter. The candidates’ freedom of speech, for example, expressed through their election propaganda, is an aspect of a voter’s right to receive information from the candidates, consider this information, and formulate their choices.  Injury to a party’s freedom of speech may not only harm the party, but also the voters who wish to hear the full spectrum of political discourse.  Unlawful restrictions on the freedom of speech are not only the concern of the candidate running for election.  They are also the concern of the voter, who requires freedom of speech to formulate his electoral preferences.  In this way, the voter’s rights are connected to the rights of the candidates running for election. A direct injury to the party may constitute an injury to the voter, and grant the latter standing to bring his concern before the courts.

 

12.  We emphasize that, even after recognizing a public petitioner’s standing in election matters, we must still examine whether his petition is founded on a solid factual basis or whether, due to the public petitioner’s distance from the conflict, it relies on vague assertions, and does not bring verified facts and data before the Court. See Gilbert [9]; Adalah [8].

13.  In the matter at hand, both Raam and Balad have a direct interest in the respondent’s decision to disqualify the broadcast segments.  Needless to say, they have the right to approach this Court requesting relief, if they believe that the decision has violated their rights. In petitioning for relief, the petitioner does not act as a substitute for these parties.  The petitioner wishes to protect not only the parties’ political freedom of speech, but also the public interest in guaranteeing the rights of the voter.  The voter has the right—a right related to freedom of speech—to both see and hear the full spectrum of political discourse.  Freedom of speech includes not only the candidate’s freedom to express his opinions, but also the voter’s freedom to know—“to see and to hear.” HCJ 549/75 Noah Films. v. The Film Review Board [15]; HCJ 14/86 Laor v. The Film & Play Review Board [16].  Here, the petitioner’s claim concerns the voter’s freedom to receive the messages of the election broadcasts without interference in their contents.  This aspect of freedom of speech grants the petitioner standing to bring the claim that this freedom has been unlawfully restricted.  This is a result of the alleged injury to the voter, and in light of the constitutional status of the right to vote and be voted for in the democratic process, and of the various aspects of the freedom of speech, which is the backbone of the electoral process:

Freedom of speech is a central and fundamental principal, important for realizing the goals of law.  This freedom touches all expression.  It has special significance regarding political expression in general, and especially regarding political expression during elections….One of the principal justifications of the freedom of speech relates to democracy.  The spirit of democracy is lost without freedom of speech… Freedom of speech ensures the exchange of ideas between members of the public, and allows them to form opinions regarding issues on the national agenda…. Only in this way will a person be able to form his own independent opinions with regard to critical issues—both social and national—whose resolution are ultimately in his hands by virtue of his right to choose the state’s institutions.

 

HCJ 869/92 Zweely v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Thirteenth Knesset, [17] at 706-07 (Barak, J.).

 

In a democratic regime, the freedom of speech during elections requires both the freedom to express ideas and the freedom to receive messages that shape public opinion.  This freedom, at the heart of the constitutional right to vote and be voted for, demands the uninterrupted flow of opinions and ideas. The claim that one's freedom of speech was violated—be it the freedom of the voter or the freedom of the candidate, be it the right to express or the right to hear, see and know—entitles the petitioner to standing, and the doors of this Court will open for him.  For a discussion of foreign countries who broadly interpret a voter’s standing regarding elections, even where the matter does not especially concern him, see Z. Segel, Standing in the High Court of Justice 44 (1993) [20].

 

Petitioner raises a significant constitutional claim concerning the freedom of expression of the parties in the election, a claim that bears on the public interest. Petitioner also represents interests beyond the interests of the two parties here.  It also represents the interests of the voting public, of which its members form a part. As such, the standing of the petitioner should be recognized, and the merits of the petition should be addressed.

 

14.  Though unnecessary to the specific issue at hand, it should be mentioned that Balad was present at oral arguments and expressed its full support of the petition.  It explained that it did not actually submit its own petition for pragmatic and administrative reasons. Such a position demonstrates a mutuality of interest between the positions of the petitioner and one of the parties who has a direct interest in the matter. This greatly diminishes the force of the state’s motion for summary dismissal.

 

Needless to say, the petitioner cannot force Balad and Raam to televise the broadcasts in full, even if the petition is granted.  It may only bring about the judicial invalidation of the limitations imposed upon those parties.

 

For the above reasons, it is appropriate that the petitioner’s standing should be recognized.

 

Respondent’s Decisions—Weighing the Conflicting Interests

 

15.  In HCJ 212/03 Herut—The National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset  [18], this Court set out the limits of the discretion of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee regarding permitting or disqualifying election propaganda broadcasts.  First, according to Herut, the authority of the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee extends farther than the literal language of section 2B of the Elections Law (Propaganda Methods)-1959. Second, two conflicting goals should also be taken into account by the Chairman—the realization of freedom of speech in political discourse as well as the realization of public peace, in its broad sense.  Freedom of speech is the fundamental principle of the democratic electoral process. On the other hand, there is the public interest in security, peace and public order, including protecting the feelings of members of the public.  A proper balance must be struck between these interests.  In balancing these interests, freedom of speech has the status of a constitutional value. Restrictions on the freedom of speech will only be justified if the expression at issue has the potential to injure another protected value.

 

The Scope of Intervention in the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee’s Discretion

 

16. It is well known that, in deciding whether to ratify or disqualify an election broadcast under section 15A(d) of the Propaganda Methods Law, the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee has broad discretion in balancing conflicting values. A spectrum of possible decisions may fall within the within the zone of reasonableness. This is acceptable provided that a decision of the Chairman does not fall outside the zone of reasonableness, and that the Chairman attributes the proper weight to each of the relevant considerations.  Zweely [17] at 703; Herut [18] at para. 21. 

 

From the General to the Specific

 

17.  We viewed the broadcasts of Raam and Balad, and meticulously examined their contents and the details of the segments that were disqualified.  This examination led us to the conclusion that the petition should be granted.  We have no choice but to intervene in the respondent’s decision to disqualify the broadcast segments and allow the broadcasting of the election broadcasts in full. 

 

In examining the respondent’s decision, we focus on the reasons he gave for his decisions in his response to the petition.  His principal reason was that the disqualification of the segments was intended to prevent injury to the feelings of thousands of families harmed by terrorism, victims of the activities of Palestinian terrorist organizations.

 

The Palestinian flag is indeed a symbol of the national identity of the Palestinians.  As it is the flag of the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, it may possibly be identified with hostile groups involved in terrorist activities against Israeli civilians.  Nevertheless, in order to disqualify the display of the Palestinian flag from election propaganda broadcasts, the contents of the display must have the potential to cause substantial, deep and severe injury to the feelings of members of the Israeli public who may view the broadcasts, especially to those who have been harmed by terrorist activities.  Under the proper balance, only such an injury can justify the restriction of freedom of speech in election propaganda. 

 

After viewing the broadcasts, we hold that no such injury arises from their contents.  Balad’s broadcast lasts a few minutes, during which Knesset Member Bishara speaks before an audience and is seen appearing at various events and meeting with various people.  At the end of the broadcast, the Palestinian flag appears in the background for a split-second, and vanishes immediately.   The display of the flag at the end of the broadcast, the short interval during which it is displayed, and the lack of accompanying words which are aggressive or hostile, greatly reduces the potential injury to the public. 

 

We analyze Raam’s broadcast similarly.  The broadcast is dedicated to the issues of the Bedouin in the Negev.  It presents their troubles while comparing their situation to that of the Jewish population in the area.  At the end of the broadcast, the Palestinian flag is displayed for a few short seconds during a demonstration in which the demonstrators make a "V" sign with their fingers. Here too, this display of the flag for a short time constitutes a marginal part of the broadcast—marginal with respect to the main contents of the broadcast—and is not accompanied by hostile words. As such, the impact of the flag is diluted over the duration of the broadcast.

 

In both of the broadcasts, the display of the Palestinian flag is not central.  It is only peripheral.  It is displayed at the end of the broadcasts and is seen for a split-second. The flag does seize the viewer’s attention.  Under these circumstances, the display of the flag does not have the potential to cause injury that would justify disqualification of the pictures of the flag, the limitation of candidates’ freedom of election propaganda and the limitation of voters’ freedom to absorb the full spectrum of political messages.

 

18.  It should be emphasized that the decision to disqualify should not only be measured by the extent of the injury to the party that wishes to televise the propaganda broadcast. The decision should also be measured by the public interest in televising the decision without any part of it being disqualified. Freedom of speech is the standard here. Any injury to it must stand up to the proper balancing tests. 

 

19.  Though unnecessary to resolution of the issue here, it should be mentioned that there is no factual similarity between this case and the case of Herut [18], where, against the dissenting opinion of the President, we approved the disqualification of Herut’s broadcast.  In that case, the party wished to broadcast a jingle with Arabic words to the tune of  “Hatikva.”  The jingle bordered on contempt towards the national anthem, included praise of Arafat and terrorist organizations, called for the banishment of Jews from Jaffa, Acre, Ramleh and Lod, and associated the greatness of Allah with Jerusalem and “Holy Palestine.” In the first five seconds of the broadcast, the Israeli flag was seen waving above the Knesset as it gradually changed into the Palestinian flag.  A majority of this Court found that such use of the anthem and the flag exceeded appropriate levels of tolerance and held that the decision of the Chairman of the Elections Committee to disqualify the jingle fell within the zone of reasonableness.  The extent of the expected injury to the feelings of the public from the broadcast in Herut [18] cannot be compared to the case here.  In Herut [18], the desecration of the flag and national anthem and all they represent led the majority to conclude that the broadcast could cause severe injury and could even lead to the provocation and incitement.  The presentation of the PLO flag in the broadcasts of Raam and Balad—considering the spatial and temporal placement of the flag, the length of time it is displayed and its relationship to the broadcasts in general—is not at all similar to Herut’s broadcast.  No analogy should be drawn between the two.

 

As such, we are of the opinion that Raam’s and Balad’s broadcasts should be allowed to be televised in full, without the disqualification of any segments.

 

Conclusion

 

20.  In light of the above, we are of the opinion that the order nisi should be made absolute. The election propaganda broadcasts of respondents nos. 2 and 3 should be allowed to be broadcast in full, without the disqualification of any of their segments. 

 

Justice I. Englard

I agree.

 

Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen

I concur with the opinion of my colleague, Justice A. Procaccia, both with regard to the question of the petitioner’s standing in this petition and with regard to the question of the principles and norms which we adopt to guide us in the issue at hand.  The question in any given case is the application of those norms to the facts of each case.

 

The major difference between the facts in HCJ 212/03 Herut—The National Jewish Movement v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset [18] and the facts in the matter at hand has been clarified and explained by my colleague, and I see no reason to add to her opinion.  The same principles that guided me in both of the cases have brought me to a different conclusion in each of them.

 

Petition granted.

January 23, 2003

 

 

 

 

Translated by:   Leora Dahan

Edited by:             Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards  elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcasting Authority

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 246/81
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, July 28, 1981
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 1959, provides free radio and television broadcasting time for each of the party lists participating in the Knesset elections. Until 1981, that Law provided that each such party shall receive 25 minutes on the radio and 10 minutes on television, and that each party represented in the outgoing Knesset shall receive an additional four minutes radio time and four minutes television time in respect of each of its members in the outgoing Knesset. An amendment of that Law in 1981 reduced the time allotted to each party participating in the election to 23 minutes on radio and eight minutes on television, while it increased the allocation of radio and television time per member of the outgoing Knesset to six minutes. The effect of this amendment was to decrease the radio and television time allocated to new party lists while it increased considerably the time allocated to the large parties represented in the outgoing Knesset. The amendment was not passed by an absolute majority of the members of the Knesset, as is required in the case of legislation that concerns elections and that deviates from the principle of equality.

               

The Respondents appear in response to orders nisi, issued at the request of the Petitioners who argue that the amendment violates the principle of equality in elections and is therefore void, not having been enacted by the required absolute majority. The court, composed of five Justices, ruled unanimously that the order be made absolute. The five Justices delivered five separate opinions, each setting forth his reasons for the decision.

               

The President of the court, Justice Landau, repeated his assertions in the Bergman case, supra, p. 13, to the effect that equality of opportunity in elections cannot be measured mechanically. Therefore, the substantial discrepancy in the broadcasting times allocated to the various lists under the amendment is not in and of itself determinative of the issue. Although there is a presumption in favor of the validity of legislation enacted by the Knesset, examination of the legislative history in this case reveals that at no point did the Knesset give any consideration to the impact of the amendment on the rights of new party lists, but rather, it completely disregarded this issue. In these circumstances, the presumption of validity fails and the amendment is invalid.

               

 Justice Barak thought that the amendment fails to meet the requirement of equality since it does not allow small parties and new parties the time minimally necessary to enable them to present their views before the public while it gives the large veteran parties more than such minimal time. Although he agreed that the issue could not be determined mechanically, he was of the opinion that the judge's common sense, experience and sense of expertise enable him to distinguish between the permitted and the forbidden. In this respect, the decision is no different from judicial decisions frequently made concerning the fairness and reasonableness of acts done by government officials.

               

Justice Shamgar reaffirmed his preference for as simple and basic a standard of formal equality as is possible. Agreeing that there are circumstances and considerations which would justify deviations from such formal equality, he expressed the opinion that Basic Law: The Knesset provides for such contingencies but requires that the deviation be voted by an absolute majority of the Knesset. This approach is preferable, in his opinion, to the alternative, which waters down the concept of equality by taking into account other ideals and which results in the loss of any clear constitutional standard to serve as a guideline to the legislature.

               

Justice Bejski thought that all that could be demanded was relative equality, not absolute equality. surveying the solutions adopted in many countries, he concluded that even relative equality entails no small amount of problems. In his opinion, the principal fault of the new Law lies in the large and unreasonable gap that it creates between the broadcasting time allocated to large existing parties and that allowed new parties. This gap violates even the relative equality required by the Basic Law and, therefore, must be approved by an absolute majority of the Knesset.

               

Justice Ben-Porat pointed out that the allocation of equal time to each party is not a sine qua non of formal equality, since such formal equality might be achieved by means of some other criterion, such as one based on the relative sizes of the parties. The equality of opportunity to which the new parties are entitled requires allocation of time that is sufficient for their need to present their platform and special message before the viewing public in order to justify their presence in the Knesset. This standard was not met in the Amending Law.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

            HCJ 246/81

HCJ 260/81

         

"AGUDAT DEREKH ERETZ" ET AL.

v.

BROADCASTING AUTHORITY ET AL.

 

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[July 28, 1981]

Before Landau P., Shamgar J., Ben-Porat J., Barak J. and Bejski J.

 

 

Editor's synopsis -

          The Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 1959, provides free radio and television broadcasting time for each of the party lists participating in the Knesset elections. Until 1981, that Law provided that each such party shall receive 25 minutes on the radio and 10 minutes on television, and that each party represented in the outgoing Knesset shall receive an additional four minutes radio time and four minutes television time in respect of each of its members in the outgoing Knesset. An amendment of that Law in 1981 reduced the time allotted to each party participating in the election to 23 minutes on radio and eight minutes on television, while it increased the allocation of radio and television time per member of the outgoing Knesset to six minutes. The effect of this amendment was to decrease the radio and television time allocated to new party lists while it increased considerably the time allocated to the large parties represented in the outgoing Knesset. The amendment was not passed by an absolute majority of the members of the Knesset, as is required in the case of legislation that concerns elections and that deviates from the principle of equality.

         

          The Respondents appear in response to orders nisi, issued at the request of the Petitioners who argue that the amendment violates the principle of equality in elections and is therefore void, not having been enacted by the required absolute majority. The court, composed of five Justices, ruled unanimously that the order be made absolute. The five Justices delivered five separate opinions, each setting forth his reasons for the decision.

         

          The President of the court, Justice Landau, repeated his assertions in the Bergman case, supra, p. 13, to the effect that equality of opportunity in elections cannot be measured mechanically. Therefore, the substantial discrepancy in the broadcasting times allocated to the various lists under the amendment is not in and of itself determinative of the issue. Although there is a presumption in favor of the validity of legislation enacted by the Knesset, examination of the legislative history in this case reveals that at no point did the Knesset give any consideration to the impact of the amendment on the rights of new party lists, but rather, it completely disregarded this issue. In these circumstances, the presumption of validity fails and the amendment is invalid.

         

            Justice Barak thought that the amendment fails to meet the requirement of equality since it does not allow small parties and new parties the time minimally necessary to enable them to present their views before the public while it gives the large veteran parties more than such minimal time. Although he agreed that the issue could not be determined mechanically, he was of the opinion that the judge's common sense, experience and sense of expertise enable him to distinguish between the permitted and the forbidden. In this respect, the decision is no different from judicial decisions frequently made concerning the fairness and reasonableness of acts done by government officials.

           

            Justice Shamgar reaffirmed his preference for as simple and basic a standard of formal equality as is possible. Agreeing that there are circumstances and considerations which would justify deviations from such formal equality, he expressed the opinion that Basic Law: The Knesset provides for such contingencies but requires that the deviation be voted by an absolute majority of the Knesset. This approach is preferable, in his opinion, to the alternative, which waters down the concept of equality by taking into account other ideals and which results in the loss of any clear constitutional standard to serve as a guideline to the legislature.

           

            Justice Bejski thought that all that could be demanded was relative equality, not absolute equality. surveying the solutions adopted in many countries, he concluded that even relative equality entails no small amount of problems. In his opinion, the principal fault of the new Law lies in the large and unreasonable gap that it creates between the broadcasting time allocated to large existing parties and that allowed new parties. This gap violates even the relative equality required by the Basic Law and, therefore, must be approved by an absolute majority of the Knesset.

           

            Justice Ben-Porat pointed out that the allocation of equal time to each party is not a sine qua non of formal equality, since such formal equality might be achieved by means of some other criterion, such as one based on the relative sizes of the parties. The equality of opportunity to which the new parties are entitled requires allocation of time that is sufficient for their need to present their platform and special message before the viewing public in order to justify their presence in the Knesset. This standard was not met in the Amending Law.

           

Note -As indicated in the opinions, the supreme Court handed down its decision shortly after the argument but did not give its reasons at that time. The Knesset responded to this decision by re-instating the wide gaps in the allocation of broadcasting time with some slight changes. The new legislation was enacted by the required absolute majority in all three readings, all in a single day, just seventeen days after the court's decision to invalidate the Law, and was made effective retroactively in order to legalize the broadcasts that had been made under the Law that was invalidated. Only six weeks later, after the elections had taken place, did the court give the reasons for its decision. It has been suggested that had the Justices revealed their reasons earlier, perhaps the Knesset might have been more impressed by the court's high regard for the value of equality. see Klinghoffer, "Legislative Reaction to Judicial Decisions in Public Law", 18 Israel Law Review 30, 31-34 (1983). Compare, however. the legislative developments after the Rubinstein case (infra, pp. 60-62).

 

Israel cases referred to:

[1]   H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23P.D.(1)693; S.J. vol. VIII, supra p. 13.

[2]   H.C. 60/77, Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee 31P.D.(2)556.

 

American case referred to:

[3] Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 438U.S.265(1978).

 

Y. Leshem, A. Ramot for the Petitioners in H.C.246/81.

M. Corinaldi for the Petitioner in H.C.260/81.

R. Yarak, Senior Deputy State Attorney, for the Respondents.

 

JUDGMENT

 

          LANDAU P.: On May 29, 1981 the orders in these two petitions were made absolute, in these terms:

         

          We are of the opinion that for the passage of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law, 1981, a majority of Knesset members was required in accord with the concluding portion of section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and for that reason it cannot be acted upon unless its provisions are adopted by the required majority. In this sense we make absolute the order nisi in the two petitions against the Broadcasting Authority, the first Respondent. There is no order as to costs in the two petitions.

 

And these are my reasons for making the orders absolute:

 

          Sections 15 and 15A of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 1959 (pursuant to the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 3) Law, 1969) provide that each of the parties participating in the Knesset elections shall receive for the broadcasting of election propaganda, 25 minutes on the radio and 10 minutes on television and, in addition, each of the parties represented in the outgoing Knesset shall receive 4 minutes on the radio and 4 minutes on television in respect of each of its members holding office in the outgoing Knesset.

         

          On March 16, 1981 a private bill proposed by Knesset members Ben-Meir, Virshuvsky, Hashai and Corfu was published in Reshumot (Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Bill, 1981). The bill proposed that section 15 of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law allow with respect to the radio, a broadcasting time of 23 minutes instead of 25 minutes for each party and each candidates list and, in addition, 6 minutes for each Knesset member of each party represented in the outgoing Knesset; with respect to television it was proposed to amend section 15A so that each party and candidates list be given 8 minutes of broadcasting time instead of 10 minutes and, in addition, each party represented in the outgoing Knesset would be given 6 minutes instead of 4 minutes for each of its Knesset members. In the explanatory notes to this private bill it was said:

         

            The present version of the Law creates an unreasonable situation concerning the time allotted to a party group with one Knesset member as distinguished from the time allotted to a party group with a larger number of Knesset members.

 

The present bill is intended to temper slightly the ratio of the two time quotas but it continues to give a party group with a single Knesset member an amount of time which is larger than that given to a single Knesset member in a large party group.

 

            This private bill passed the preliminary reading on March 4, 1981 and it was decided to refer it to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee for preparation for the first reading. It passed the first reading on March 23, 1981 and the second reading on April 1, 1981, after a reservation of Knesset member Shulamit Aloni to section 2 of the bill, concerning television broadcasts, was rejected by a majority of 5 votes against 4, and thereafter the entire bill passed the third reading. The proceedings of the session do not note by what majority the bill passed each of the three readings, but it is not disputed that no more than a dozen Knesset members were present at the session of the second and third readings - a number that is far from a majority of the Knesset members.

           

            The Petitioners in the two petitions before us, "Agudat [Association] Derekh Eretz" (H.C. 246/81) and "Shorashim [Roots]..." (H.C. 260/81) -both Ottoman societies that intended to submit new candidates lists for the elections to the tenth Knesset but were not represented in the outgoing ninth Knesset - argued that the above mentioned Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law, 1981 (hereinafter "the Amendment No. 6 Law") is invalid because it contradicts the requirement of equality in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and that the Amendment No. 6 Law did not pass by the required majority, that is, a majority of the Knesset members, as provided in the conclusion to section 4 of the Basic Law. Orders nisi were issued against the Broadcasting Authority and the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Tenth Knesset and the Central Elections Committee itself.

           

            As in the case of Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1], which dealt with the Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law, 1969, this time, too, complex constitutional issues could have arisen concerning justiciability and the power of a later Knesset to deviate in ordinary legislation from an "entrenched" provision in a basic law adopted by an earlier Knesset. There the court refrained from dealing with these issues, and we shall act likewise this time - and in the present case we have before us an explicit written statement on behalf of the Attorney General, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his arguments in response to the order nisi, that he does not intend to raise those issues since he wishes the court to decide on the merits of his arguments concerning the Amendment No. 6 Law, to the effect that this Law does not contravene the equality principle in section 4 of the Basic Law and, therefore, an ordinary majority was sufficient for its adoption. This was the issue upon which we deliberated in these two petitions.

 

            Before examining this question we must dispose of a procedural argument made by Mr. Yarak, who represented the Respondents in an intelligent and dignified manner as befits the weighty matter before us. He argued, in passing, that the large party groups in the outgoing Knesset should have been summoned to the hearing of these petitions since they will lose the additional broadcasting time that the Amendment No. 6 Law gives them if that Law is declared void. I do not intend to delve into the general issue of the parties to whom a petition of prime constitutional character, such as the two present petitions, should be addressed, and whether any person who might argue that the subject of a petition affects his interests should indeed be summoned to the proceedings. In any event the argument must be dismissed in the present instance because, as already mentioned, the Central Elections Committee was made party to the hearing and, therefore, the fact that these petitions are being heard before the court was brought to the attention of the party groups represented in the Committee. Anyone interested in participating in the proceedings could have applied to the court by motion to be joined as a Respondent and to make himself heard. Apparently the large party groups believed that they could depend on the representative of the Attorney-General to present an argument to the court that would adequately protect also their interests - and indeed that has been the case.

           

            Another contention made by Mr. Yarak, which must be dismissed immediately, is that the provision in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, that the Knesset shall be elected by "equal ... elections ... in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law", should be read to include the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law. Such a construction is incongruous with the statutory language, since "the Knesset Elections Law" (in the singular) clearly refers to the Knesset Elections Law and no other Law, even if its subject is related to the Knesset elections.

           

            Mr. Leshem, on behalf of the "Derekh Eretz" Association, and Dr. Corinaldi, on behalf of the Shorashim movement, who endorsed Mr. Leshem's arguments and supplemented them, made the Bergman case [1] the point of departure for their arguments. Indeed, the two matters - the funds that the parties receive from the state treasury to finance the Knesset elections, a significant (if not the greater) part of which are spent on election propaganda, and the matter of election propaganda by way of radio and television - are closely related. In Bergman the equality principle in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, was construed to extend to equality of opportunity for the lists competing in the Knesset elections, including the new candidates lists unrepresented in the outgoing Knesset. That principle should also be applied to the use of state-controlled media, which have forceful impact on the public - a captive audience to the television (this being the primary concern) which broadcasts on a single channel leaving the viewer no refuge (unless he is resolute enough to turn the set off). Two points should nevertheless be emphasized: first, the Financing Law, which Bergman held to be invalid, purported to give nothing to the new lists, whereas the Amendment No. 6 Law leaves something for the new lists (8 minutes on television and 23 minutes on the radio); second, and no less important, no one argues that equality in this matter means mechanical equality. The Bergman judgment itself intimated as much, with reference to the subject of financing ([1], p. 699):

 

... [W]e are in an area that is far removed from the idea of equality before the law in its simple classic meaning, that is, equality of rights for the citizen as an individual. ... This equality must be guarded without compromise. However, as we draw away from this fundamental meaning of the principle of equality before the law, so it clashes with other important principles to which it must defer. ... [A]ll agree that the political parties should not be equated absolutely with each other by being allocated equal funds, regardless of the party's size, although the campaign needs of a small party might require as much of these means as a larger party. And all agree furthermore that the principle of equality in financing should not be applied in such a way as to encourage the submission of candidates lists that would not have formed at all were it not for the temptation that they would receive an advance against the funding. We also know of phenomena of inequality in the general election laws, primarily the minimum percentage of votes required in order to gain representation in the Knesset, and similarly the requirement that a new list must deposit a bond, and the fact that its representatives do not participate in the election committees except as observers after publication of the list. All these restrictions inevitably derogate from absolute equality.

 

            The same applies to the election propaganda broadcasts, and perhaps even more so. The large "historical" parties that are vying with each other for primacy in the next Knesset, naturally require far more time than a newly created list so as to give an account to the voter of their actions in the near and far past and to criticize the shortcomings of their opponents. Mechanical equality of the thirty-one lists submitted in the elections for the tenth Knesset, in the allocation of equal time slots to each of them, would cause serious distortion in the sense of summa aequalitas summa iniuria. Mr. Yarak also rightly pointed out that the large parties alone are subject to a special statutory limitation, since their leaders may not appear in the frame of the general television broadcasts even if they take part in events that are suitable material for coverage as daily news. If the large parties insisted on their full quota and every other list also received an equal time allocation, one can easily imagine the flood of verbiage that would descend on the public to a degree that renders all of this propaganda valueless to the stupefied viewers drowning in the spate of colorful propaganda sent forth by thirty-one lists. That, clearly, would fail to realize the lofty idea of equality before the law, but rather would create a caricature of the democratic process of elections.

 

            It follows, necessarily, that the equality mentioned in section 4 of the Basic Law, as applied to election propaganda, need only be substantive equality with due consideration given to the factors that distinguish a new list from a large party, and even a new list from an existing small party. But where should the permitted line be drawn upon these considerations? It is pointless to seek an exact formula for guidance in this matter. All that can be said is that the equality principle in this sense is violated when a new list is wholly denied a fair opportunity to present itself and its platform to the public. All agree that they may not be silenced nor denied a right of appearance, free of charge, on the electronic media. But what is the minimal time required for that purpose, below which their appearance before the viewer becomes substantially ineffective?

           

            At first I was of the opinion that we would find guidance in this matter from the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law, 1969. This Law, which was enacted, as will be recalled, as a result of the Bergman decision [1], provided "for the removal of doubt" that the provisions in the election Laws are valid for the purpose of any Law and any matter from the date of their coming into force, and "election Laws" also include the Modes of Propaganda Law in its version at the time the above Confirmation Law came into effect. I thought that this Confirmation Law set the line of equality as regards broadcasting time in accord with the provisions of sections 15 and 15A in their original version, the validity of which was confirmed in that Law. It should be noted here that in the Knesset debate on the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 3), Law, which introduced the original arrangement, the then chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Knesset member Moshe Una, voiced the opinion that the time allotted to the small parties and to the lists appearing for the first time was insufficient for them to present their concerns in a complete manner (see D.H. 55 (5729-30) 3661, right column). I am persuaded, however, that this Law should not be referred to for guidance in resolving the issue before us. This court discussed it in the Ressler case [2]. The conclusion from the discussion there is that the Confirmation Law indeed ratified "the election Laws" mentioned therein by virtue of the absolute majority with which it was passed consonantly with the concluding portion of section 4 and section 46 of Basic Law: The Knesset. But it says nothing with respect to the question whether the validity of the election Laws or any of their provisions, that were confirmed for the removal of doubt", was in any event consistent with the equality principle in section 4, or whether they were confirmed despite their inconsistency with the equality principle.

           

            The question, therefore, remains: is the allocation of 23 minutes on the radio and, especially, of 8 minutes on television beneath the limit of tolerance? In this respect learned counsel for the Petitioners emphasized the huge gap between the time slots allotted to the large parties and those allotted to the new lists. Not only was "the poor man's lamb stolen"* from the small ones, in reducing their already meager time slots (8 minutes instead of 10), but the large ones received additional broadcasting time, beyond that which they were entitled to previously. Mr. Leshem calculated that in this way a party numbering 30 Knesset members gained 58 more minutes on television, and that the difference in percentage between such party and a new list rose from 1200% to 2350%.

 

            I admit that I was not much impressed by these calculations, for having found that mechanical equality between an existing large party and a new list is immaterial as regards broadcasting times, there is no reason to hang the decision on this or that algebraic ratio, but rather, as aforesaid, the new list must be assured of the minimal time required for effective propaganda on television and radio. Whoever wishes to invalidate a law of the Knesset bears a heavy "burden of proof', for the Knesset is presumed to have acted within the framework of section 4 of the Basic Law. As stated in the Bergman case (at p. 699):

 

              [A] Law of the Knesset is presumed to be valid as adopted. Therefore this court's primary inclination must be to uphold the law and not to strike it down, even when the argument against it is that it contradicts an "entrenched" statutory provision ...

           

            As for myself, I would be prepared to go far in accepting the decision of the Knesset, as expressed in the Amendment No. 6 Law, since we do not have any substantiated data that ten minutes (according to the original Law) is a sufficient and reasonable time for a new list's television propaganda, whereas eight minutes is less than sufficient and reasonable. Eight minutes might suffice for one person to succeed in his efforts at persuasion, whereas another would not succeed in twice that period of time - all according to the speaker and the audience.

            When does this apply? When we have some indication that the Knesset indeed considered the rights of new lists. I found no such indication in the short "legislative history" of the Amendment No. 6 Law. I have already cited above the explanatory notes to the private bill that was initiated by the four Knesset members. There the issue is presented as a matter of doing justice to the large party groups as opposed to a one-member party group. The small ones are entitled to the basic time slot of 10 minutes for the party group and 4 more minutes in respect of the personal time slot of the single Knesset member, while the large party group is entitled only to the same basic time slot and the personal time slot in respect of each of its members. Thus in the final account the Knesset member from the one-man list is entitled to a larger time slot than the individual Knesset member from the large party group. That wrong is rectified by reducing the basic time slot and enlarging the personal time slot. One could challenge this explanation on the ground that the contestants in our system of Knesset elections are the lists, and not the individual candidates on the list. But the. main shortcoming is that there is also a third side to the problem, that is, the new lists whose equality of opportunity in the elections must be preserved, as explained in the Bergman case. They are principally prejudiced by the new arrangement because their basic time slot is reduced without any increment with respect to their personal time quota. The explanatory notes totally ignore their position, advertently or otherwise. The concrete result of the new proposal, in the overall account, was to add four hours of television broadcasts with respect to the personal quota, mostly to the benefit of the large lists, against a saving of two minutes in respect of each of the lists on account of the basic quota of the party groups as such, including the new lists whose interests, it seems, were totally overlooked.

 

            This was the case throughout the debates on the bill. At the preliminary reading M.K. Yehuda Hashai repeated the explanatory notes on behalf of the proposers without any mention of the new lists. Similarly, at the first reading M.K. Hashai again explained the bill as an issue between an existing large party group and an existing one-person party group, without further ado. During the debate on this reading M.K. Shulamit Aloni, in passing, mentioned new lists together with existing small lists, but her statement evoked no response. This situation recurred at the second and third readings, when M.K. David Glass, chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, again presented the issue without mentioning the amendment's effect on new lists. M.K. Aloni commented again on the situation of a new party group "which, in any event, is in a Procrustean bed; and here its time is reduced even more", but her words fell on deaf ears, and the proposers of the bill did not attempt in any way to discuss the matter.

           

            In view of all this I am constrained to conclude that the Amendment No. 6 Bill was presented to the Knesset, in all its readings, in complete disregard of the important issue of preserving the new lists' equality of opportunity - the issue that was raised before us in these two petitions. This issue was not given any parliamentary consideration. Therefore, it should not be considered in these petitions on the presumption that the Knesset did not deviate from the provisions of an entrenched statutory enactment - the presumption that ordinarily applies to every Law adopted by the Knesset, even by a simple majority of a small number of Knesset members who voted for it. I am of the opinion that in these circumstances the Amendment concerned constitutes a violation of the equality principle that cannot be tolerated. For this reason I voiced the opinion, together with my esteemed colleagues, that the Amendment No. 6 Law should not be acted upon unless its provisions be adopted by a majority of the Knesset members as required under section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

 

            BARAK J.: The equality principle determined in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset does not mean merely "one man one vote" but also "equality of opportunity for the various candidates lists that compete in the Knesset elections" (in the words of Landau P. in the Bergman case ([1], at 698). This equality does not mean merely equality as between the large lists or as between the small lists or as between the lists that are represented in the outgoing Knesset. Equality of opportunity means equality of prospects and opportunity as between all the lists participating in the elections. Therefore, equality of opportunity must be attained between a large list and a small list; between a list represented in the outgoing Knesset and one unrepresented in the outgoing Knesset. The need to attain this equality raises two inherent questions: first, what are the legal standards that determine equality of opportunity among all the competing lists? second, did the Knesset adhere to these standards when it enacted the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law (hereinafter - the Amendment No. 6 Law)? I shall deal with each of these questions separately.

           

The standard with regard to equality of opportunity

 

            2. The starting premise, in my view, in determining equality of opportunity between the various lists, large and small, old and new, is that one should not adhere to a standard that equates equality with identity. Granting the same time to each list certainly results in identity ("formal equality") but does not create equality ("material equality"). The reason is that the starting positions of the various party lists are not uniform. The large, veteran list, which takes a stand on a broad range of topics, must naturally spend more time on explaining its positions, platform, personalities, acts and omissions, failures and successes, than a newly formed list which takes a stand on defined, specific topics. Therefore, to secure equality of opportunity for these two lists at the finishing point they must be given different amounts of time at the starting point. Indeed equality of opportunity is often secured by non-identical allocation of resources. In the words of Professor J. Stone ("Justice in the Slough of Equality", 29 Hastings L.J. (1978) 995, at 1012):

           

              Equal treatment can and often does mean, especially in the welfare state, treatment by a differentiating rule which yields a greater residual equality between the subjects.

           

            By varying the measure of the time allocation one can lead lists that start from unequal points to equality of opportunity at the finishing line. There is no paradox in acting differentially so as to achieve equality. Blackmun J. expressed this well in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke ([3] at 407):

           

            ... in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.

           

            Indeed, granting the rich and the poor an equal opportunity to sleep under a bridge does not create equality between the two as regards the chance of a good sleep.

           

            3. We have said that identity in allocating broadcasting times does not ensure equality of opportunity to the competing lists. How can we ensure equality of opportunity? For that one must ponder the meaning of equality of opportunity. What is the purpose of the equality that we want to achieve? In the present context it appears that equality of opportunity means equality of opportunity to compete for the voter's ballot. To maintain this equality of opportunity, two requirements must be satisfied:

           

            First, one should not allow a situation to develop in which some of the lists have adequate time to explain to the voting public their platforms, personalities and distinguishing features, while other lists do not have such adequate time. Equality of opportunity does not exist where the time at the disposal of one list allows it to present itself properly while the time at the disposal of another list does not so allow.

           

            Second, one should not allow a situation to develop in which some of the lists have time that is sufficient only to show their "identification card" to the public, while other lists have time that is not only sufficient to explain their positions but is also left over for additional use, not given to the first lists, in competing for the voter's ballot. The existence of this additional time for some of the lists creates an inequality of opportunity, since some of the lists can only explain their platforms, whereas other lists can undertake additional functions. These additional activities find external expression mostly in the fact that in the voter's consciousness, the list which does not have additional time becomes blurred and absorbed in the additional "residual" time that allows the other lists to dominate the media.

           

            It follows that in order to secure equality of opportunity in the elections each list should have at its disposal the amount of time - no more and no less - that allows it to present its platform and positions to the voting public in proper fashion. If some lists receive time that is not sufficient to present their platforms properly then, in order to secure equality of opportunity, one of two measures must be taken: either to bring about a similar "deficiency" with the other lists or to fill in the deficiency of the lists that are short. Similarly, if some lists get "additional" time beyond what is necessary for proper presentation of their platform then, in order to secure equality of opportunity, one of two measures must be taken: to give additional time to the remaining lists as well, or to abolish the additional time itself.

 

            4. One could say - and it has been argued before us - that the effect of allocating election broadcasting time according to the above-mentioned standards would be the devotion of considerable broadcasting time to the various lists. Naturally this time would come at the expense of alternative use, such as news coverage, culture and art shows, and the like. Moreover, the provision of a minimum broadcast time for each new list, might be an incentive for ephemeral lists to take part in the election process, which could in turn cause fragmentation of the political map and prevent a stable regime. These arguments are all very well, and perhaps right, but they have nothing to do with the equality principle. Whoever argues that too much time is spent on election propaganda and that it should be reduced to prevent political fragmentation etc., is not making an argument about equality, but rather about other principles that are more important in that person's eyes than the equality principle. It is true that equality is not the only principle that ought to be considered. Often an unequal effect can be justified on other grounds, such as national security, political stability, and similar considerations that appear to the person weighing them more important than the equality principle. Professor I. Berlin said in this respect ("Equality", 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1955-56), 301, at 317):

           

            ...in considering what kind of society is desirable, or what are "sufficient reasons" for either demanding equality or, on the contrary, modifying it in specific cases, ideals other than equality conspicuously play a vital role.

           

            Therefore, if the Knesset wishes to prevent the allocation of time as required under the principle of equality, because it wants to achieve other goals that it regards as more important, it has the power to do so by modifying the principle of equality as determined in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, in a legislative act that is passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset. The legitimacy of that Law would not derive from the equality principle but from the special majority that adopted the Law, despite its incompatibility with the equality principle.

           

            5. In the Bergman case, Landau P. said the following with respect to equality of opportunity:

           

            [W]e are in an area that is far removed from the idea of equality before the law in its simple classic meaning, that is, equality of rights for the citizen as an individual. ... This equality must be guarded without compromise. However, as we draw away from this fundamental meaning of the principle of equality before the law, so it clashes with other important principles to which it must defer.

           

            I respectfully agree with these words, so long as it is made clear that this "retreat" from the equality principle can be maintained only if the other important principles find expression in a statute that is adopted by a majority of the Knesset members, and that otherwise the equality principle must prevail. One cannot - in logic or law -justify a deviation from the equality principle in its substantive sense on grounds of the same equality principle. Any deviation from the equality principle, whether in its "primary" sense (one man, one vote) or in its "secondary" sense (equal opportunity), must be effected in the manner determined in the Basic Law, that is, through legislation adopted by a majority of the Knesset members. Of course this relates to a significant and substantial deviation from the equality principle and not a trivial deviation.

           

Equal opportunity in the Amendment No. 6 Law

 

            6. Does the Amendment No. 6 Law secure equality of opportunity, as defined by us? It would appear that in order to answer this question one must define the standards that determine the differences and the differentiation between the various lists. According to these standards one can consider whether the allocation of time in the Amendment No. 6 Law realizes the principle of equal opportunity. Determining these standards is very difficult. Aristotle defined justice as equal treatment of equals and unequal treatment of unequals, all this being relative to the relevant difference between them. But how are we to determine such relevant difference? Is the size of the list determinative? Is the range of the issues dealt with by the list the decisive factor? These and other questions are difficult because one must take into consideration the new lists, whose size is an unknown, and who wish to compete for the voter's ballot. It seems that all agree that the standards should not merely perpetuate the existing situation, since the opportunity for change lies at the core of elections. But what are the proper standards? (See E. Katz, "Platforms and Windows: Reflections on the Role of Broadcasting in Election Campaigns", 48 Journalism Quarterly (1971) 304 at 311.)

           

            7. I have reached the conclusion that we do not need to answer these hard questions in the present case and that we can leave them open for further consideration, since whatever the proper standard may be, the time allotted to the various lists in the Amendment No. 6 Law is unable to bring about equality of opportunity. This for two reasons:

           

            First, the time slot of eight minutes allotted to the new lists for television broadcasts does not allow (all or some of) the new lists to present their position to the public in a proper way. In this respect one should bear in mind that neither new nor veteran lists can buy additional broadcasting time, and all they have - in view of the Broadcasting Authority's monopolistic status - are those same eight minutes spread over a period of one month. In my view this short time is not sufficient for (all or some of) the new lists properly to present their platform and candidates, while attempting to clarify their distinguishing features and to give a satisfactory reply to the criticism leveled against them by other lists during the course of the election broadcasts.

 

            Second - and, in my view, more important - the veteran large lists were given broadcasting time that is far longer than the minimal time required to present their positions properly. This additional time is generally used by them for ongoing response to election events, for broadcasting news items that cannot be covered in the regular news programs because of restrictions in the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, and for other activities. This additional time is not given to the new lists or the small veteran lists. Indeed, it appears that the result- which is a side effect of the difference in broadcasting times - is that the public finds the new as well as the small veteran lists submerged in the large amount of time at the disposal of the large veteran lists. It appears that the impression made by the new and the small veteran lists is blurred, and that only the large veteran lists remain in the voter's consciousness. Indeed, in my research I did not find any state in the world where the gap between the time designated for new or small veteran lists and that designated for large veteran lists is as great as in Israel (see Hand, European Electoral Systems Handbook (1972) 39, 70, 107, 205).

 

            8. In light of this approach, I do not need to resolve the troublesome question whether the very fact that each new list receives the same time does not violate the equality principle, since the new lists differ in the number of their members, the range of issues that concern them and their modes of propaganda. A similar problem arose also in the Bergman case, with respect to party financing, but the available solution in that situation is that after the elections the new lists that pass the minimal percentage of votes are entitled to funding which reflects their success in the elections. Retrospectively, therefore, the funding for each new list is not identical. A similar arrangement is not possible with respect to propaganda time, because it is not an asset that can be borrowed and compensated for after the elections. It is indeed possible that the very fact that new lists take part in the elections prevents equal application of time allocation because of the special nature of the matter. If that is so, there may be no solution in this matter other than the enactment of a special Law that is passed by a majority of the Knesset members, and which allows for a suitable arrangement that is not compatible with the equality principle.

           

            9. I have expressed my opinion that the Amendment No. 6 Law contradicts the principle of equality in that it fails to grant new as well as small veteran lists the minimal time required for proper election propaganda, while it grants the large veteran lists additional time beyond the minimal requirement. One might ask what grounds there are for this conclusion? The answer is that the tools at the disposal of the judiciary in this matter are limited, and the task difficult. Ultimately one can only resort to common sense, life experience and the lawyer's expert sense. In principle this decision is no different from judicial decisions frequently made as to the reasonableness and fairness of acts done by state officials. Indeed, if we do not have the tools to decide whether a reduction in the new lists' television broadcasting time from ten to eight minutes violates the equality principle, then neither do we have the tools to decide whether a reduction to six or four or two minutes violates the equality principle. Is such a result conceivable? And if common sense, life experience and the sense of expertise can set a boundary between the forbidden and the permitted, between equal and unequal, then why should it be possible to distinguish between four and two minutes (for example) and not between ten and eight minutes (for example)? I am indeed aware that in exercising judicial discretion we are not acting in an exact scientific manner, but I fear there is no better alternative.

           

            10. I have reached the conclusion that the Amendment No. 6 Law violates the equality principle without referring at all - with respect to resolving the equality issue - to the legal situation that prevailed before the amendment under the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, the validity of which was confirmed "for the removal of doubt" in the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law, adopted by a majority of the Knesset members. Is this the right path? Should it not be said that the legal situation in effect before the Amendment No. 6 Law, in light of its confirmation by a majority of the Knesset members in the Election (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law, constitutes an arrangement that is consistent with the equality principle, and therefore all that needs to be examined is whether the change effected by the Amendment No. 6 Law is substantive - and forbidden, or minor - and permitted?

           

            In my view the only issue before us concerns the relationship between the Amendment No. 6 Law and the principle of equality as determined in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. We need not deal at all with the relationship between the Amendment No. 6 Law and the arrangement concerning radio and television propaganda in the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, as confirmed in the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law. The reason is that there is no assurance that the earlier Law was not itself tainted with a violation of the equality principle. Even if that were so - and this question is not before us in any way - it is clear that one deviation from the equality principle cannot be justified by an earlier deviation from that principle. The time allocated prior to the Amendment No. 6 Law, determines a standard for the legality of the broadcasts. It does not determine a standard for equality in them. The broadcasts might be legal, even though they violate the principle of equality.

 

            11. As noted by the esteemed President, the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law determines that the provisions contained in the Knesset Elections Laws - including the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law - are valid for any purpose or matter. It follows, in my view, only that the broadcasting times determined in the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law (before its amendment by the Amendment No. 6 Law) are legal and valid. I am not prepared to say - without further examination - that those broadcasting times are adequate and reasonable. Moreover, I am prepared to assume that the majority of the Knesset members assumed that they were not exploiting the new lists. But I am not prepared to assume, without further examination, that the new lists were not in fact exploited. Ultimately the question before us is not whether the time allotted in the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law is adequate or reasonable, and whether it exploits the new lists or not. The only question before us is whether the allotted time is consistent with the equality principle. It is possible that the time is reasonable according to various criteria of reasonableness, but does not create equality according to the rules of equality. Equality and reasonableness are not one and the same thing. To give each of ten guests an identical portion of cake might be an act of equality, but it would be unreasonable if one of the guests dislikes cake. It all depends on the standard according to which equality is determined, and upon the standard according to which reasonableness is determined. These standards are not necessarily identical.

           

            12. My esteemed colleague, the President, points out that the legislative history of the Amendment No. 6 Law shows it was enacted in total disregard of the question of equal opportunity for the new lists. This legislative history is indeed instructive, and it supports my conclusion that the Amendment No. 6 Law violates the equality principle. However, I am not willing to rest the entire decision on this legislative history. I myself would have reached the same conclusion even if it transpired that Knesset members had expressed the view that the change does not affect the new lists and maintains their equality of opportunity. Ultimately the decision must be made upon analysis of the law and not upon psychoanalysis of the legislature.

           

            SHAMGAR J.: 1. Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset provides:

           

            The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

           

            This provision in the Basic Law delineates the constitutional principles that determine our electoral system. Some of these principles are an inalienable part of every democratic system of elections, since no system worthy of that title can take shape and exist without them - e. g., the principles that determine general, equal and secret elections. Other such principles are the statutory expression of a choice between alternatives that are optional in democratic regimes, e.g., the principle that determines national and proportional, as opposed to regional, elections.

           

            2. The introductory part of section 4, as cited above, also refers to the Knesset elections "in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law". These words do not serve to modify or interpret the constitutional principles with which section 4 opens, nor do they determine that anything provided in the Knesset Elections Law, as amended from time to time, automatically validates the constitutional aspects of such statutory provision as regards its compatibility with the foundations of the elections system laid down in section 4. The meaning of section 4 is that the Knesset shall be elected by general, national (etc.) elections, in accordance with the processes and specified procedures determined in the Knesset Elections Law. In addition, therefore, to the determination of principles, there is also a complementary reference to the procedural element. These two main components in the opening portion of section 4, i.e., the constitutional elements on the one hand and the referral to the particularization in the Elections Law on the other hand, are separate but cumulative substantive provisions that relate to different areas: the one, as aforesaid, to the guiding principles, and the second to their translation into concrete processes; but that translation cannot, by its very nature, override the duty to maintain the principles.

           

            The reference to the Knesset Elections Law is governed by the rule of interpretation found in section 41 of the Interpretation Ordinance [New Version], since there is no provision that limits its application with respect to basic laws, and also since there is nothing in the context or substance of the matter from which one could infer otherwise; that is, the above mentioned phraseology of section 4 does not, as it were, refer at any given time to the Knesset Elections Law in its current form, as opposed to the said Elections Law in its version at the time that Basic Law: The Knesset was enacted. There is nothing, therefore, in the wording of the section that limits the phrase "in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law" to any initial version. Likewise, there is nothing in the wording of the opening portion of section 4 in general, or in the phrase "in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law" in particular, that limits the effect of the closing portion of section 4, according to which any variation with respect to the constitutional elements enumerated in the opening portion of the section requires a special and specific procedure, as provided there.

           

            To summarize this point: the principles embodied in the above-mentioned section 4 are self-sustaining and independent, and constitute a binding guideline that cannot be varied by way of an amendment to the Knesset Elections Law unless the legislation is passed in the manner determined in the concluding portion of section 4. The reference to generality, nationality, equality and the other elements determines guiding principles that reflect upon the system and fashion its character. The words "in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law" refer to specific procedures, as opposed to the said principles, but one may not infer from the text of section 4 that a statutory provision in the Knesset election Laws can in itself modify those principles without having been passed by the required majority, or that such was the legislature's intention in formulating the principles and the words "in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law" in one textual sequence.

           

            3. And now we come to the principle of equality, the meaning of which has been examined by us in these petitions.

           

            According to the mode of interpretation that commends itself to me, the words "equal.. .elections" relate to formal equality, that is, to as simple and basic a standard as is possible, any deviation from which requires passage by a majority of the Knesset members. I have used the words "as is possible" because even the determination of formal equality entails no small degree of theoretical and practical problems.

           

            Equality of rights has the aura of an absolute standard, as if it concerns the result of a mathematical calculation (J. Stone, "Equal Protection and Search of Justice" [1980] Ariz.L.Rev. 1), but its actual application frequently illustrates that formal equality does not necessarily and in all circumstances coincide with the just and fair, as where equal portions are given to both needy persons and those not in need. Furthermore, the Aristotelian point of departure mentioned by my esteemed colleague, Barak J., according to which equality means equal treatment of equals and unequal treatment of unequals, still leaves open the determination of attributes and components that measure equality, and their evaluation and measurement in the concrete case. The difficulty in determining the complex of relevant attributes and components that create the "badge of entitlement" (see Stone, ibid., at 6) is not the only factor that makes it difficult to actually apply the standard of equality, and the theoretical offshoots of the problems that are formed in this area are innumerable. One ensuing question is, for instance, whether immediate equality achieves a just result, or whether there are circumstances in which equality can be achieved only by adopting measures of unequal treatment, as in the application of reverse discrimination (see, inter alia, the deliberation of this issue in the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the Bakke case [3], at 272).

           

            I have raised these matters to illustrate that equality, too, as a formal concept resting on a uniform and quasi-mathematical index or yardstick, is not necessarily easy to apply, but an attempt to adopt standards of substantive equality would impede tenfold a clear definition of the boundaries. Moreover, any attempt to make substantive distinctions resting on the characteristics and features of those receiving the allocation, that seek to add a dimension of justice or fairness to the mathematical distribution, will be influenced inevitably by subjective evaluations or variable normative assessments and will create a full range of possibilities with blurred and undefined lines and boundaries.

           

            4. As explained by the learned President in the Bergman case [1],

           

[T]he principle of equality has two facets: the first expression of equality concerns the right to vote, and this element is the concise translation of the rule "one man, one vote"; secondly, the element of equality also relates to the right to be elected, finding concrete expression in the right to equal opportunity of the various candidates lists competing among themselves in the elections to the Knesset.

 

            My esteemed colleague, the President, related in the Bergman case to the theoretical origins of the equality principle that finds expression in our electoral system, and referred in this respect to the elementary principle of equality for all before the law, which is, according to him, at the very essence of our entire constitutional regime.

           

            The learned President, proceeding to analyze the concrete forms that the equality principle ought to take in relation to elections, distinguished between equality before the law in its simple classic meaning and equality as expressed in the right to be elected (ibid., at 699):

           

[A]s we draw away from this fundamental meaning of the principle of equality before the law, so it clashes with other important principles to which it must defer. ... [A]ll agree that the political parties should not be equated absolutely with each other by being allocated equal funds, regardless of the party's size, although the campaign needs of a small party might require as much of these means as a larger party. ... We also know of phenomena of inequality in the general election laws, primarily the minimum percentage of votes required in order to gain representation in the Knesset, and similarly the requirement that a new list must deposit a bond... All these restrictions inevitably derogate from absolute equality.

 

            It follows from these statements that sometimes there are reasons, grounded in the welfare of the democratic regime, for deviation from the absolute formal equality under which each contestant is entitled, prima facie, to the very same portion, and according to which it would be forbidden to prescribe any restriction that is not imposed at the same time on all those competing for the voter's ballot.

           

            The recognition that absolute equality must at times defer to other interests, which, too, have evolved and were fashioned in order to protect liberty and the democratic regime, is not unique to the election system practised in Israel, and the question how to divide broadcasting time among the parties while preserving the principle of equality has arisen in the case law of other democratic countries too. Thus, for example, the Constitutional Court of West Germany noted in a decision on the petition of the Free Democratic Party of Nordrein-Westphalen (BVR. 158/62 of May 30, 1962, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassunggerichts, vol. 14, p. 121) that in light of the principle of equality in competitive opportunity, the broadcasting networks must, indeed, conduct themselves in a neutral manner with respect to the political parties, but the securement of equal opportunity need not express itself in the allocation of absolutely identical time to each party and it is possible to maintain distinctions between the broadcasting times given to the various parties for "especially important reasons". Thus the following should be considered (ibid., at 134):

           

The elections in the parliamentary democracy are not designed merely to bring about the election of a parliament that reflects as faithfully as possible the various popular opinions, but also to form at the same time a parliament that can establish a government capable of acting. In a system of proportional elections, a meticulous application of equality in rights might allow small groups with meager constituencies or organizations with specific interests to gain parliamentary representation, and thereby increase the risk of excessive party fragmentation, and also - as the experience of the Weimar constitution has taught - to make it difficult or even impossible to form a government. In the face of this state political danger the decisions of the Constitutional Court always found important reasons to empower the legislature, as an extraordinary measure in narrowly defined and specific areas, to digress from the principle of formal equal rights while consolidating the details of the right to vote. This explains, for example, why there are no constitutional grounds for complaint against a provision in the elections law which fixes a reasonable minimum percentage of votes for representation.

 

            For these reasons, the constitutional court there was of the opinion that different parties could be granted broadcasting times of varying durations for election propaganda, taking into account to a certain degree their present strengths (cf. the same court's decision in 2 BVR 7/57, at vol. 9, p. 100).

 

            The above remarks indicate that the search for absolute formal equality is subordinate to other decisive factors that outweigh it. My esteemed colleague, the President, said as much in the Bergman case ([1] at 699):

           

            [W]e are in an area that is far removed from the idea of equality before the law in its simple classic meaning, that is, equality of rights for the citizen as an individual. There is no better example of this classic meaning than the rule of "one man one vote". This equality must be guarded without compromise. However, as we draw away from this fundamental meaning of the principle of equality before the law, so it "clashes with other important principles" to which it must defer.

           

            The other important principles are, for example, principles of fairness and justice (see Stone's above-mentioned article) or the aspiration to safeguard the existence of a democratic regime that has the power to survive.

           

            5. The theoretical question that arises in this context is whether, contrary to the opinion expressed in paragraph 3 above, the concept of equality should be regarded as a broad concept that extends beyond its plain formal sense to include an entire range of circumstances in which full equality is not maintained for various, seemingly justified, reasons; or, whether the concept of equality should not be given a flexible meaning, amenable to the influences of other constitutional or state needs. In other words, are we to say that equality is preserved even when we do not meticulously maintain the principle of full formal equality, but the deviation from perfect equality is done on justifiable grounds rooted in the existential interest of the democratic regime? The alternative, as we said before, is not to distort the plain sense of the principle of equality, but to acknowledge that deviations from that principle are allowed if effected in the way provided in the conclusion to section 4 of the Basic Law - when it appears just and fair to do so, or if there are grounds to do so for the maintenance of a stable democratic regime, such as those mentioned by the esteemed President in the Bergman case [1] or by the German Constitutional Court, as described above.

           

            I am aware that those who prefer the method of broad and flexible construction to its alternative, do so because in constitutional parlance it appears to preserve the equality principle. A contrary view is that the concept of equality is distorted if the mantle of equality is thrown over circumstances which are not such. Furthermore, the effect would be to negate the existence of any clear standard for determining the border posts of equality. Mathematical or simple formal equality could be quite clear, for instance, if it found expression in the allocation to each party of equal and identical broadcast time. Needless to say, such equality is neither reasonable nor just, especially in a country in which 31 lists are competing in the Knesset elections.

 

            If one decides to determine an unequal standard, one that is anchored only in general evaluations as to what is just and fair, it is better to admit clearly that it is just or even necessary, as explained above, to deviate from the equality principle. When the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law has provided up to now that each party receives 10 minutes for television broadcasts and 4 extra minutes for each Knesset member, it means that a party with one Knesset member has a total of 14 broadcasting minutes whereas a new party has 10 broadcasting minutes. The result is inequality which might indeed be justified on the merits but still remains an instance of formal inequality between those competing for the voter's ballot, although there is good reason for its creation and actual perpetuation.

           

            Awareness of the fact that circumstances create inequality would require legislative action in accordance with the concluding part of section 4 and would also alert the legislature to the nature of the action required from it.

           

            In light of the text of section 4, caution in making constitutional changes will be promoted if the point of departure is absolute equality and any variation requires a legislative process as befits an entrenched statutory provision; that is to say, it is effected with awareness of the substance of the act and, consequently, with due consideration to the justification for such measure. If, on the other hand, one adopts a flexible method, under which deviations from equality are still named as equality so long as the court considers the deviation to be reasonable, then one loses any useful constitutional standard to serve as an a priori guideline for the legislature.

           

            As mentioned above, until now each party had 10 broadcasting minutes and 4 additional minutes for each Knesset member, and thus the difference was between 14 minutes for a single Knesset member and 10 minutes for a new list that did not yet have a Knesset member. The statute amending the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, discussed here, varied the times, allotting to a new list only 8 minutes and a list with one Knesset member 6 additional minutes for that member. The question is, therefore, where to draw the line between the reasonable, that can still be regarded as within the range of substantive equality, and the unreasonable, which goes beyond substantive equality. Will 9 minutes suffice to maintain equality, or perhaps, only the existing quota of 10 minutes sanctify the circumstances and stamp them with equality? The difficulty is compounded when we consider the radio broadcasts. Each list was entitled to 25 minutes, and now that time has been reduced to 23 minutes. Where is the line beyond which substantive equality is absent, and what standard can be applied in a way that is clear, open and understandable to every citizen now, and also when the statute is amended next time?

 

          6.(a) As explained above, I accept the idea that there are times when fairness, justice and even the democratic regime's existence necessitate deviation from absolute equality, be it by determining a blocking percentage, by requiring a bond, or by distinguishing in terms of broadcasting time between a body that has already taken part in elections and has passed the test, and a newly established list. The determination of a non-identical standard, or the deference of equality to more important values, as mentioned in the Bergman case, must be done consciously and expressly as a variation on the principle of full equality, that is, in the manner prescribed in the concluding part of section 4 of the Basic Law. We will thus preserve constitutional clarity, which is important inter alia because of the educational element it embodies and addresses to the general public. It is good that the citizen know when a deviation from the equality principle has been effected, and its purpose. In my view it is preferable not to blur the concept of equality with numerical manipulations that rest, ultimately, only on the intuition of the person making the calculations and that lead to a dead end in which there is no clear standard, open and known in advance.

         

          (b) The previous deviations from the principle of equality, as in effect at the time the Knesset adopted the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law, and which also failed to give identical and equal times to all the lists, were confirmed, albeit retrospectively, in the manner prescribed in section 4 of the Basic Law, by the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law.

         

          The adoption of the 1969 statute established that the deviation from absolute equality was effected lawfully and in accord with the course designated in our Basic Law. On the other hand, it did not give a stamp of full and perfect equality to the existing time distribution, as prescribed in sections 15 and 15A of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, until the enactment of Amendment No. 6.

         

          Any further variation of the provisions regarding broadcasting times, that would derogate in any way from the rights granted to the various lists under the prevailing law and widen the deviation from the principle of full formal equality, required a vote in accord with the concluding part of section 4 of the Basic Law, which must be read, naturally, together with section 46 of the Basic Law.

         

          Since it transpired that the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law was not passed by the majority required under section 4 of the Basic Law, I decided to concur in the decision of May 29, 1981, as cited in full in the opinion of my esteemed colleague, the President.

         

            BEJSKI J.: 1. The attempt to formulate principles for the notion of "equality" in our instant context, raises difficult problems of the kind of squaring a circle. Apparently all agree that for this purpose no schematic-arithmetic equality is envisaged, such as according equal broadcasting time to each of the lists appealing to the voter. Even though this simplistic construction would follow strictly from a prima facie reading, yet, having regard to the subject-matter, no greater inequality could be created than would result from such a construction. For that reason it was rejected in the Bergman case [1], and the Petitioners in the present case do not urge it either. But that in no way facilitates the search for other principles that would lead to an appropriate construction, with due consideration given to the range of diverse aspects that the democratic regime weighs in order to grant every list or candidate an equal opportunity to take part in parliamentary life. This objective itself exists and is expressly sanctioned, but the aspiration to attain it requires the erection of barriers to prevent over-fragmentation of power concentrations as a result of ephemeral lists - whether or not they pass the blocking percentage, which would make it difficult to form a government and to maintain orderly parliamentary life. At the same time one must consider budgetary problems entailed in realizing the objective, the sum of broadcasting hours that can be allotted, and also the citizen who must forgo viewing and listening to other programs that interest him in favour of propaganda broadcasts on the same, single, television channel.

 

            2.But the truth is that already at the basic point of departure there is a lack of equality between the lists represented in the legislature and the new ones seeking to gain representation. The former are more or less known and familiar to most of the voting public, for better or for worse, from their activity in the legislature before the elections; all the media provide ongoing coverage of such activities over the years of the Knesset term. Not so with respect to the new list, which for the first time addresses the voter, who usually knows nothing about it. As regards equality of opportunity, one might claim with a degree of logic that a list of this kind needs not only the minimum time it requires to present its platform and creed, but also time in order to challenge the parties represented in the Knesset in a debate on its advantages over the veteran parties, which would obviously also include criticizing their past activities, emphasizing their faults, and so on. As regards equality of opportunity, therefore, the new lists are in an inferior position from the very start of the contest, and the disadvantage grows with the difference in the allotted time. I doubt whether the inequality in the allocation of broadcasting time as between the veteran or large lists and the new ones, can be justified on the ground that the former need more time to explain their acts and omissions during their term in office. It appears to me that as much time is required to challenge the acts and omissions of the large and veteran parties and to call them to account, which is, after all, the only chance to persuade the voter to prefer a new, as-yet-unknown list to the others. One cannot, therefore, deny that the differentiation in allotted broadcasting times is also a differentiation in equality of opportunity. While the new list consumes its small time quota merely to introduce itself, the large list has abundant, ten-fold time, both to defend and justify itself and to attack and discredit other lists, and the small list might become lost in the extra verbiage and photography of the large lists to the extent that its presence is not felt at all. From this point of view, the explanatory notes to the bill of the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law are not at all persuasive and, in fact, underline the inequality of opportunity. It is said there:

 

            The present Bill is intended to temper slightly the ratio of the two time quotas, but it continues to give a party group with a single Knesset member an amount of time which is larger than that given to a single Knesset member in a large party group.

           

            This commentary is possibly pertinent and meaningful with respect to regional elections or in a presidential regime, where a single candidate opposes a single candidate. But in proportional elections, such as ours, the contestants are the lists and not the persons who comprise them, and the equality that is aspired to relate to the lists inter se. A 30-member list in the outgoing Knesset still has only one common platform, and its presentation does not require 30 times longer than the platform of a one-person party group. Likewise with respect to the acts and omissions that the individual member of the party group wishes to explain and attribute to the group. It is not the individual in the large party group who is running for election but a political party, a list, a party group; that is why any attempt to equate the single candidate with the individual in a large party group does not promote equality, but has the opposite effect.

           

            3. Counsel for the litigants brought to our attention the situation in various countries in which the principle of equality in elections is a cornerstone of the parliamentary democracy. In some of these, the arrangements regarding broadcasting times are determined by legislation, and in others the arrangement is reached through a parliamentary committee, or even by means of an agreement between the political parties on the one hand and the broadcasting authority on the other. Obviously, one should not adopt any specific system from a given country, and it is even hard to draw analogies, because in each country the relevant arrangement, whether legislated or otherwise established, evolved from its particular political history and parliamentary tradition and is adapted to them. One cannot compare a state which has constituency elections - and usually a small number of candidates lists - to a state with a different elections system and a larger number of political parties. As for us, the circumstances, background and tradition are essentially different: we are blessed with more than 30 lists at the starting line; the television, which is apparently the focus of the main battle, broadcasts on only one channel. And there is no possibility to purchase radio and television broadcasting times beyond those allocated under the law.

           

            Although one cannot draw analogies or copy a system from another state, it is interesting to note that most countries practise a system of relative equality which gives a clear advantage to parties represented in the outgoing parliament. The mode of time distribution - even between the represented parties, whose strength is known - is not necessarily arithmetic and proportional. In other words, the quest for this relative equality is the lesser of evils, and the relativity is determined (whether through legislation or other means) in accord with local considerations that appear to ensure reasonable opportunity for all participants in the elections.

           

            In England, where there is no legislation on the subject, the arrangement is made before the elections between the broadcasting networks and the principal parties, and the main allotment of time goes to the parties represented in Parliament, some time being allotted to other groups as well. For instance, in the 1966 elections the Liberal party had an 11.2% representation in the outgoing Parliament and was allotted 35 minutes of television and 30 minutes of radio time, whereas the Labour party, with a 44.4% parliamentary representation and the Conservative party with 43.4%, received one hour on television and 55 minutes on the radio. All the remaining groups were allotted 5 minutes on radio and television. In this case the relativity was effected clearly in favor of the small Liberal party.

           

            In the U.S.A. where the broadcasting and television networks are private and cannot be compelled to offer their services to the political parties, section 315 of the Federal Communications Act provides that if any network allows a candidate for public office to use its station, it must allow the same to other candidates for the same office under the same conditions. This provision appears to reflect absolute equality. but it is doubtful whether that is the effect in practice - because only candidates who are backed by parties capable of bearing the heavy expense of buying broadcasting time would benefit from this equality right.

 

            In Italy the broadcasting time is distributed by a parliamentary committee with each party and the government receiving a uniform basic time, while the large parties are allotted additional time in proportion to their size. In the Federal Republic of Germany the broadcasting time is divided among the parties represented in the parliament, and as can be gleaned from the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 30 May 1962, which has been mentioned by my esteemed colleague, Shamgar J. (2 BVR 158/62), the internal distribution was not proportionate to the parliamentary representation. The Constitutional Court did not regard this as a shortcoming affecting equality of opportunity. Only since the 1965 elections has the television broadcasting time been divided under an agreement between the parties represented in the parliament on the basis of their representative strength.

           

            In Holland the broadcasting time is divided equally among all the parties and groups represented in the parliament.

           

            In France the matter was statutorily arranged in 1966, and the broadcasting time is divided among the parties and groups represented in the Conseil d'Etat, without taking into account the Senate's composition. Without dwelling on the details of the arrangement, which has its origin in a presidential regime, the practical result was that in the elections at the time the majority ruling party gained 36.26% of the votes and received the same broadcasting time as all the remaining opposition groups which gained 63.7% of the votes (taken from Ch. Debbash, Traite du Droit de la Radiodifusion Radio et Television (Paris, 1967); Ch. Debbash, "Le droit a l'entenne a propos de l'organisation de la campagne electorale" (Chronique III, BBC Handbook 1963; 1967).

           

            4. These particulars are not mentioned for analogy, but to illustrate that although the principle of equal opportunity is avowed in each of the states mentioned - and there is no doubt that it is their genuine objective to maintain democracy and orderly parliamentary life in their countries - there are no common principles for a solution that satisfies the wishes of all the groups taking part in the election campaign. Absolute equality is clearly not the solution, as Debbash points out, supra:

           

            To give the same broadcasting right to a party that embraces several million voters and a group of a few visionaries creates a wrong exercise of equality. As already said elsewhere, on the authority of the Conseil d'Etat, one cannot treat equally persons or groups that are situated differently. Absolute equality would contradict the democratic principle, whereas relative equality satisfies it.

           

            Relative equality also entails no small amount of problems, and suffice it to point to the many differences between the various solutions reached in the various states. The only common denominator that can be pointed to is the sincere will to grant a reasonable opportunity to all the groups seeking to participate in the elections, while granting advantages to those that have already proven themselves in parliamentary life, yet safeguarding at the same time its orderly functioning. However, the means to achieving these purposes are different and removed from one another.

           

            5. I do not believe that we can formulate guidelines as to where the limits should be drawn. Is the allocation of 10 broadcasting minutes for a small party within the range of reasonable equal opportunity, and would a reduction of 2 minutes constitute an intolerable infraction? What about a further cut in the few remaining minutes? In the present case, however, we are not called upon to answer these difficult questions.

 

            Even if the times determined in the original statute transgressed the limits of relative equality, they were nevertheless determined in a statute adopted by a special majority of the Knesset, as required under section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. The Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law introduces change on two points: in reducing the basic broadcasting times for the parties and candidates lists from 25 to 23 minutes on the radio, and from 10 to 8 minutes on television, and in allotting an additional 2 minutes on both media to every party represented in the outgoing Knesset, in respect of each of its Knesset members. As for myself, I regard the main violation of equality in the second part of the provision, which creates a large and unreasonable differentiation, beyond what is acceptable. As regards the broadcasting time at their disposal, even previously the small and new lists were in a Procrustean bed in competing with the large parties. I, for one, was indeed impressed by Dr. Leshem's calculations with respect to the gap created in favor of a 30-member party as against a new list, and I view this as a conspicuous violation of the relative equality established under the original statute, to the extent that even the relative equality of opportunity is eroded and violated. And since I too am convinced that this violates equality, a special majority was required under section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

           

            For these reasons I agreed to the absolute orders made on May 29, 1981.

           

            BEN-PORAT J.: Although at the time I had no hesitation in concurring in the result we reached unanimously, I must admit that I deliberated much before deciding upon the meaning of the equality principle in section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. There is much reason, with all due respect, in the approach of my esteemed colleague, Shamgar J. , that it concerns formal equality grounded in an a quasiarithmetic, basic, uniform, and absolute standard, and that whenever important principles justify deviation from such equality only a special majority, as required under section 4, can determine the solution that is acceptable to it. Formal equality that allocates identical time to each list can probably be justified, materially speaking, in only one case: when a state is electing for the first time its Knesset members according to an election system of competing lists. I said "probably" because there is always a theoretical possibility that the parties in the outgoing Knesset are all equal in strength and there are no new lists. But, identical time for each party group and list is not a conditio sine qua non for the existence of formal equality, since one can determine a yardstick or uniform indicator of another kind, such as a progressive time measure in accord with the relative size of the parties. This too is a quasi-arithmetic calculation that can be regarded as formal equality and perhaps even material (on condition that it is based on a reasonable coefficient and initial allotment). By extending the equality principle in this way, it is also possible to reconcile my view with the ruling given in the Bergman case [1], by Landau J.- as he then was, today the honorable President of this court. It was stressed there, rightly and justly so (at p. 698) that "[this equality] must ... find expression in equality of opportunity" among both the existing parties and the various candidates lists competing in the Knesset elections. Likewise, it was stressed there - and it is also acceptable to me - that "the parties should not be put in an absolutely equal position by allocating funds equally without considering each party's size...". In short, equality that finds expression in equal time allocation to each party and list regardless of its size, is inherently incompatible with the decisive principle that is equality of prospects or (I would prefer to say) opportunity. In applying a progressive standard as suggested above, one comes across an initial difficulty, which is the existence of new lists that should not be deterred from testing their strength, despite the legitimate wish to prevent their excessive proliferation. As said in the Bergman case (at 699), the prospect of a new list to become a party group in the Knesset is one of the clear identifying marks of a democratic regime, and the new list should not be put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the old party groups. However, not knowing in advance whether a new list will pass the blocking percentage, and if it does, how many Knesset members it will elect, we lack an indicator for applying the uniform progressive measure, and this calls for a suitable independent solution by way of a special majority of the Knesset members.

 

            The Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law (hereinafter - "the Main Law"), that was confirmed inter alia by the Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) law (hereinafter - "the Confirming Law), provided an arrangement that is not based on a uniform standard, but is composed of two cumulative elements, the one fixed and the other progressive: (1) 25 minutes of propaganda broadcasting on radio and 10 on television for every party of the outgoing Knesset and every new list; (2) 4 additional minutes on radio and television for each member of a party in the outgoing Knesset. I do not believe that this complies with formal equality. It is possible that this arrangement is ultimately just and fair, but it is enough, in my opinion, to conclude that it constitutes a deviation from the equality principle (according to my construction) so as to require the sanction of a special majority. It was therefore clearly necessary, in my opinion, that the Confirming Law give effect to such arrangement. The same applies, obviously, to the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law (hereinafter - "the Amending Law") under discussion here. This latter Law reduced the broadcasting time of the parties and lists by two minutes (that is, substituted 23 for 25 minutes on radio and 8 for 10 minutes on television), and at the same time increased by two minutes the additional time for each member of the outgoing Knesset (that is, substituted 6 for 4 minutes on radio and television). The technical nature of the arrangement remains as it was, applying a twofold measure, the one static and the other progressive, but the gap in time allocation between a new list (or small party) and the large parties, has grown incomparably. If we regard the overall outcome of this situation (and not merely the difference in minutes as an isolated factor) there is no escaping the conclusion, in my opinion, that the equality principle has been violated, even if we assume (contrary to my own view) that it was preserved in the Confirming Law.

 

            Incidentally, a look at the explanatory notes to the bill of the Amending Law (which related only to the increment for each Knesset member) reveals an admission that the bill deviates from equality, although on grounds that I, with all due respect, find unacceptable. To clarify my position I shall cite the text:

           

            The present version of the Law creates an unreasonable situation concerning the time allotted to a party group with one Knesset member as distinguished from the time allotted to a party group with a larger number of Knesset members.

           

            The present bill is intended to temper slightly the ratio of the two time quotas but it continues to give a party group with a single Knesset member an amount of time which is larger than that given to a single Knesset member in a large party group.

(Emphasis added -M.B.P.)

 

            This is, therefore, support for the view that the main Law deviated at the time from the principle of equality, to the disadvantage of the large parties, because an arithmetic calculation for each member shows that the time (per member) at the disposal of the small parties is longer than that for the large ones; and this "wrong" (which, in my humble opinion, is an illusory wrong) grows incrementally with the number of members belonging to the party. In our present matter it is important that the Amending Law was regarded as a partial removal of the distortion. It appears that they used a uniform measure (the time quota for each party member), that is, progressive equality which I accept as formal equality, so as to examine whether the result was just, and that they reached the conclusion that it was not so. I have said that this reasoning is unacceptable to me, because under the existing conditions the application of the said formal equality would necessarily lead to an unjust result with respect to the new lists, which were wholly overlooked, as clarified in the opinion of Landau P. The opportunity to which they are entitled, requires an allocation of time that suits their need to present to viewers and listeners the platform and special message that might justify their presence as a party group in the Knesset. I do not have the tools nor the expertise to express an opinion as to how much time is required, considering all the aspects of the problem, but the fact that the distortion as between the existing parties was also rectified at the expense of the new lists, points to a deviation from the principle of equal opportunity. It might be noted, in passing, that the total abolition of the "distortion" referred to in the explanatory notes, is possible only if the fixed time allotted to every party is entirely abolished (which is further proof that the combination of these two factors is incompatible with equality).

 

            I have not surveyed the situation in other countries, because that was done in a comprehensive and painstaking manner by my esteemed colleagues, to which I could not add much.

           

            Judgment given on July 28, 1981

 

* Samuel 12:4-Ed.

 

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