Right to Education

Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa v. Minister of Finance

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3429/11
Date Decided: 
Sunday, January 15, 2012
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Budget Elements Law was amended in 2011 to include a new section 3b, which provided that if an entity that receives support or budgeting from the government incurs an expense that falls within any of several listed categories, the Minister of Finance can reduce the entity’s budget or support by an amount no greater than three times the size of the said expense. Of the categories listed, the petitioners focused their challenge on two of them: the first, sub-section 3b(b)(1), referring to an expense which was “in essence” a negation of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; and the second,  sub-section 3b(b)(4), referring to an expense which was “in essence” a marking of the day of Israel’s establishment as a day of mourning. A decision to reduce the budget in accordance with this section requires that the Minister of Finance first receive an opinion from a professional team composed of representatives from various ministries, the approval of the minister in charge of the budget item through which the entity received funding, and an opinion from the legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance. In addition, he must also grant the relevant entity a hearing on the matter.    

 

The petitioners are the alumni association of an Arab school in Haifa, which runs various activities that are held at the school, dealing with issues of Arab and Israeli identity; several parents of students in a bilingual Arab-Jewish school, whose goals include education about respect for other cultures and in which activities are held that commemorate both Israeli Independence Day and Nakba events; and an academic who is the proponent of a model/theory that describes Israel as an ethnocracy, rather than as a democracy. All the petitioners argued that they could be harmed by the exercise of the Budget Elements Law’s provisions; the statutory provisions were also challenged on the ground that they effectively constituted a violation of the right to education, collective identity and freedom of expression and of occupation.   

 

Held: Justice Naor held that the petition should be denied on the basis of the ripeness doctrine and because of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy.  Because the statutory provisions had not actually been implemented against any of the petitioners or any other parties at all, and because there was therefore no way of knowing how the law would be implemented, if at all, against the petitioners, the Court could not reach an informed decision regarding the constitutionality of the manner and scope of its hypothetical application.  The uncertainty (and consequently, the absence of sufficient ripeness) was heightened by the fact that the law itself prescribed an extensive process of supervision and review before any decision to reduce funding could be implemented. Justice Naor also found that the petition to the High Court of Justice could be denied because of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy; once the Law had been implemented, a petition challenging a reduction in funding could be brought in the Administrative Matters Court. An indirect attack on the constitutionality of the Law would also be permissible in that context.  President Beinisch and Vice President Rivlin concurred, with President Beinisch adding that there was no need to decide the matter of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 3429/11

 

Petitioners                                             1. Alumni Association of the Arab Orthodox School in Haifa

                                                   2. Radwan Badarneh

                                                                    3. Ayman Miari

                                                                    4. Hazar Hijazi

                                                                    5. Ron Shapira

                                                                    6. Arik Kirshenbaum

                                                                    7. Professor Oren Yiftachel

                                                                    8. Adalah – Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

                                                                    9. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel

 

                                                                    v.

 

Respondents                                         1. Minister of Finance

                                                                    2. Knesset

 

                                                         .

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[5 October 2011]

 

Before President D. Beinisch, Vice President E. Rivlin, Justice M. Naor

 

Petitions for an order ­nisi and for an interim order.

 

Facts: The Budget Elements Law was amended in 2011 to include a new section 3b, which provided that if an entity that receives support or budgeting from the government incurs an expense that falls within any of several listed categories, the Minister of Finance can reduce the entity’s budget or support by an amount no greater than three times the size of the said expense. Of the categories listed, the petitioners focused their challenge on two of them: the first, sub-section 3b(b)(1), referring to an expense which was “in essence” a negation of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; and the second,  sub-section 3b(b)(4), referring to an expense which was “in essence” a marking of the day of Israel’s establishment as a day of mourning. A decision to reduce the budget in accordance with this section requires that the Minister of Finance first receive an opinion from a professional team composed of representatives from various ministries, the approval of the minister in charge of the budget item through which the entity received funding, and an opinion from the legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance. In addition, he must also grant the relevant entity a hearing on the matter.    

The petitioners are the alumni association of an Arab school in Haifa, which runs various activities that are held at the school, dealing with issues of Arab and Israeli identity; several parents of students in a bilingual Arab-Jewish school, whose goals include education about respect for other cultures and in which activities are held that commemorate both Israeli Independence Day and Nakba events; and an academic who is the proponent of a model/theory that describes Israel as an ethnocracy, rather than as a democracy. All the petitioners argued that they could be harmed by the exercise of the Budget Elements Law’s provisions; the statutory provisions were also challenged on the ground that they effectively constituted a violation of the right to education, collective identity and freedom of expression and of occupation.   

Held: Justice Naor held that the petition should be denied on the basis of the ripeness doctrine and because of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy.  Because the statutory provisions had not actually been implemented against any of the petitioners or any other parties at all, and because there was therefore no way of knowing how the law would be implemented, if at all, against the petitioners, the Court could not reach an informed decision regarding the constitutionality of the manner and scope of its hypothetical application.  The uncertainty (and consequently, the absence of sufficient ripeness) was heightened by the fact that the law itself prescribed an extensive process of supervision and review before any decision to reduce funding could be implemented. Justice Naor also found that the petition to the High Court of Justice could be denied because of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy; once the Law had been implemented, a petition challenging a reduction in funding could be brought in the Administrative Matters Court. An indirect attack on the constitutionality of the Law would also be permissible in that context.  President Beinisch and Vice President Rivlin concurred, with President Beinisch adding that there was no need to decide the matter of the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy.

Petition denied.

Legislation cited:

 

Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40) 5771 -2011

Administrative Courts Law, 5760-2000

Disengagement Plan Implementation Law, 5765-2005

Civil Wrongs (State Liability) Ordinance (Amendment No. 7), 5765-2005

Public Education Law, 5713-1953

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

 

HCJ 7190/05 Lobel v. Government of Israel (unreported, 2006) [1]........................... 10

HCJ 731/86 Micro Daf v. Israel Electric Corp. [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 449 [2].............. 13

HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing, [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229 [3]            13

HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd. v. Minister of Construction & Housing, [1991] IsrSC 45(25) 50 [4]          13

HCJ 2009/07 Klein v. American Friends of Israel Scouts (unreported, 2007) [5].... 13

HCJ 453/84 Iturit Communications Services Ltd. v. Minister of Communications [1985] IsrSC 38(4) 617 [6]               13

HCJ 217/80 Segal v. Minister of Finance [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 429 [7]....................... 13

HCJ 1842/04 Michai v. Ministry (unreported, 2003) [8]............................................... 14

HCJ 1431/05 Orian v. Minister of Transportation (unreported, 2005) [9]................ 14

HCJ 128/09 Basiso v. Minister of Defense (unreported, 2009) [10]............................ 15

HCJ 6556/11 Glickman v. Major-General Sami Turjeman, Commander of the IDF Land Forces (2011) (unreported) [11]         15

HCJ 8276/05 Adalah – the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. Minister of Defense (2006) (unreported) [12]  15

HCJ 7052/03 Adalah – the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. Minister of the Interior (2006) (unreported) [13].................................................................................................................................................. 16

HCJ 3248/09 Sari v. Minister of Justice, (2009) (unreported) [14]............................. 17

HCJ 6972/07 Lakser v. Minister of Finance (2009) (unreported) [15]....................... 17

HCJ 1468/11 Ben Sa’don v. Minister of Religious Affairs (2011) (unreported) [16] 20

HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior, [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 950 [17]....... 21

HCJ 212/03 Herut National Movement v. Chairman of the Central Committee for the Election of the 16th Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 750 [18]........................................................................................................................................... 21

HCJ 2426/08 Ben Atar v. State of Israel – Ministry of Transportation (2008) (unreported) [19]       21

HCJ 6715/10 Hina v. State of Israel, Ministry of Defense, Department of Rehabilitation (2010) (unreported) [20]      21

HCJ 2055/02 Sheikh Abed Al Karim Abayet v. Minister of Defense (2002) (unreported) [21]            21

HCJ 1076/07 Maman Eilat Group Ltd. v. Minister of Finance (2009) (unreported) [22]     21

HCJ 6090/08 Berger v. Minister of Justice (2008) (unreported) [23]......................... 21

 

US Supreme Court cases cited

 

Abbot Labs et. al. v. Gardner, 387 U.S 136 (1967) [24]................................................. 15

United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) et. al. v. Mitchell et. al., 330 U.S. 75 (1947) [25]             18

 

 

 

For the petitioners                             — H. Jabarin, S. Zahar, D. Yakir

 

For respondent 1                              — S. Rotsenker

For respondent 2                              — Dr. G. Blay, E. Yanun

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice M. Naor

The Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40), 5771 - 2011 authorizes the Minister of Finance to reduce the budget of a supported or financed entity under certain circumstances and after a specific procedure; the reduction may be ordered when it is found that the entity has incurred an expense which is, in its essence: a rejection of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State, or the marking of Independence Day or the date on which the State of Israel was established as a day of mourning. The procedure to be followed before the reduction can be ordered is that the Minister of Finance must first receive an opinion from specified parties, grant a hearing to the entity and obtain the consent of the minister in charge of the matter. The petition before us is directed against the constitutionality of the provisions of this law.

 

 

 

Background

On 4 January 2009, the Draft Independence Day Law (Amendment – Prohibition of the Marking of Independence Day or the Date of Israel’s Establishment as a Day of Mourning) – 5769-2009 (hereinafter: “the Draft Independence Day Law”) was placed before the Knesset. The amendment sought to anchor the prohibition of any activity or event that refers to Israeli Independence Day as a day of mourning or a day of sorrow. This proposed law was abandoned (passively) and on 6 July 2009 its backers placed before the Knesset the Draft Budget Foundations Law (Amendment – Prohibited Expense) 5769-2009 (hereinafter: “the Draft Budget Foundations Law” or “the Draft Law”). This Draft Law was supported by the Ministers Committee on Legislation, subject to coordination of the legislative processes with the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Finance. Coordination between the various parties led to changes being made in the text of the original Draft Law, after which it passed a first reading in the Knesset. After more changes were introduced in the text in anticipation of the second and third readings, the Knesset, on 23 March 2011, passed the Budget Foundations Law (Amendment No. 40), 5771-2011 (hereinafter: “the Law”). The key issue raised in the petition before us is the constitutionality of the provisions of sections 3b(b)(1) and (4) of the Law. The relevant sections provide as follows, with an emphasis added to those parts whose constitutionality is being challenged:

‘1.  The following will be inserted after s.3a of the Budget Foundations Law, 5745 -1985:

3b.  (a) In this section –

“Entity” – a financed or supported entity, as these are defined in s. 21, and a supported public entity pursuant to s. 3a:

“Expense” – includes a waiver of income.

(b) If the Minister of Finance finds that an entity has incurred an expense which is in its essence one of the items listed below (in this section – “an unsupported expense”), he may, with the consent of the minister in charge of the budget item pursuant to which the entity is financed or supported, and after affording the entity a hearing, reduce the amounts that are to be transferred from the State budget to that entity pursuant to any law:

(1) Rejection of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state;

(2) Incitement to racism, violence or terror;

(3) Support for an armed struggle or terrorist act, of an enemy state or of a terrorist organization, against the State of Israel;

(4)  Marking of Independence Day or the date of the establishment of the State of Israel as a day of mourning;

(5)  An act of destruction or physical contempt which defiles the State flag or the State symbol;

(c)  No reduction pursuant to sub-section (b) may exceed an amount which is three times the size of the unsupported expense.

(d)     (1) The Minister of Finance may make a decision pursuant to sub-section (b) after obtaining an opinion from the legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance regarding the fulfillment of the provisions of that sub-section, and after he has received the recommendation of a professional team regarding the scope of the unsupported expense; the consequences of the reduction for the entity or for other parties related to it; and the proper amount of the reduction, given all the circumstances of the matter.    

              (2) In this sub-section, the term “professional team” shall mean a team appointed by the Minister of Finance whose members include an employee of the Ministry of Justice, at the recommendation of the Minister of Justice; an employee of the Ministry of Finance; and an employee of the ministry whose minister is in charge of the budget item pursuant to which the entity is financed or supported, at the recommendation of that Minister.

 Arguments raised in the petition

2.    Before responding to the petitioners’ arguments, I wish to briefly present the seven petitioners in this case. Petitioner 1 is a non-profit organization which includes approximately 90 alumni of the Arab Orthodox High School in Haifa (hereinafter: “the School”). Petitioner 1 was incorporated for the purpose of supporting the School and increasing cooperation among its alumni. Each year, Petitioner 1 organizes several activities in various areas, which include discussions of the State’s identity, the status of its Arab citizens and the “Future Vision of the Arabs in Israel” documents. In addition, Petitioner 1 conducts educational activities dealing with Palestinian history and its activities are carried out in the School. Petitioner 1 believes that some of its activities are likely to fall within the framework of those items that constitute grounds for reduction of its budget pursuant to the Law, and that the size of the School’s budget’s will consequently be at risk.

3.    Petitioners 2-6 are parents of students who study in the “Galil” school in the town of Misgav, which is a bi-lingual and bi-national school (hereinafter: “the Bilingual School”) and a formal educational institution that is recognized by the Ministry of Education. It seeks to promote a shared lifestyle as well as education about equality and respect for the cultures of other groups within the society in which the students live. In order to achieve its objectives, the Bilingual School conducts various activities in anticipation of Memorial Day and Independence Day, the purpose of which is to mark both Independence Day and the Nakba events. Petitioners 2-6 fear that the Bilingual School will be forced to restrict its activities and that its abilities to achieve its goals will thus be impaired.  

4.    Petitioner 7 is an academic who developed a model according to which he argues that the Israeli regime is a type of “ethnocracy”. As this model indicates, Petitioner 7 believes that the State of Israel cannot be defined as Jewish and democratic. Petitioner 7 is concerned that the Law will impair the possibility of conducting an academic and public discussion of the model that he has developed, since such a discussion is likely to refer to the negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Petitioner 7 is also concerned that the Law will have serious consequences for his writings and publications.   

5.    We now move on to the petitioners’ claims. The petitioners have, as stated, attacked two of the grounds listed in subsection 3b(b). The petitioners argue that the other three grounds set out in the Law for reduction of budgetary support will also create substantial constitutional difficulties in that they restrict freedom of speech. They also see a constitutional difficulty arising from the fact that these sections empower the Minister of Finance to impose measures that are in essence punitive sanctions with respect to actions that are defined as offenses – but without stipulating that a due process proceeding be held in a court to determine that a criminal offense has been committed.  Nevertheless, the petitioners have focused their petition and their constitutional challenge only on the two grounds listed in sections 3b(b)(1) and 3b(b)4.  According to the petitioners, the damage done by these sections is “the most harmful”.

6.    According to the petitioners, the Law harms the historic memory of the Arab minority by allowing the majority to use its power to repress the narrative of the Arab minority with respect to events, facts, feelings and ideologies. According to their argument, there is no difference between the marking of the Nakba, on the one hand, and the non-recognition of the State of Israel or the non-recognition of the self-determination of the Israeli Jews, on the other hand, since the use of the term “Al-Nakba” – which means “the tragedy of all tragedies” – is intended to stress the historic aspect of the tragedy.   They argue that the Law seeks to indirectly deter the occurrence and development of a cultural discussion regarding the concept of “Al-Nakba” and the constitutional definition of the State. According to the petitioners, the scope of the damage is very serious, and the Law “uses vague and unclear terms, which creates considerable uncertainty as to how the Minister of Finance and the courts will interpret its provisions.”

7.    The Petitioners then point to a list of rights that they argue are violated by the Law’s provisions. I will discuss their arguments only briefly, because I see no need to discuss the details more extensively, given my ultimate conclusion regarding the issue raised in the petition. The argument made is that the Law violates the freedom of political, artistic and academic expression. It is argued that the prohibition of political expressions on the basis of their content alone is inconsistent with the “near certainty test” for permitted prohibitions of expression, as established in the case law. They argue further that the Law is likely to violate freedom of artistic expression, which has also been given special broad protection even when real offense is given to the sensitivities of a part of the public, and even when such freedom clashes with official political positions. It is also argued that the violation of freedom of expression is especially sweeping in that a single act which falls within the scope of either of the two challenged grounds for budget reduction, even if only marginal, will be sufficient to justify the imposition of a financial sanction.

8. In addition, the petitioners argue that the Law violates their right to equal treatment because it discriminates on the basis of nationality and on the basis of social or political ideology. According to this argument, there is a serious concern that the Law will prevent Petitioner 1 from carrying out those of its communal and cultural activities that have a cultural-political character – activities that are directed at developing a discussion of the status of Arab citizens and of the historic wrong that has been done to them. In contrast, the Law will have no impact on the alumni organizations of Israeli schools which conduct various activities relating to the identity and Jewish character of the State. The Law will not affect activities directed at commemoration of the Jewish-Zionist narrative, either. It is also argued that the violation of the right of Petitioners 2-6 to equal treatment is reflected in the fact that the bilingual schools such as the school in which these petitioners’ children study will not be able to realize their central and essential objectives – objectives that include the exposure of Jewish and Arab students to the nationalist narratives of groups other than their own. In contrast to this, other special schools will be able to continue their activities that are directed at the achievement of their educational objectives. In addition, it is argued that Petitioner 7 will suffer from discrimination based on his scientific and academic research, and that his position within the academic world is likely to be substantially impaired. In contrast, it is argued, academics who promote undemocratic positions that refer to Israeli Arabs as constituting a demographic threat will continue to maintain their academic status, without any infringement of their work.

9.    The petitioners argue that a budgetary statute that discriminates on the basis of nationality or political ideology through the adoption of a nationalist-ethnic ideology is an unconstitutional discriminatory statute. It is further argued that although the Law is worded in a neutral manner and applies equally to the activities of both Arabs and Jews and to both Arab and Jewish institutions that receive state financing or support, it is clear that the intention is to impact primarily on Arab citizens.

10.  Another argument made is that the Law violates the right to education. The Law will prevent the children of Petitioners 2-6 and others from receiving an education based on the Palestinian nationalist narrative, and is thus in violation of the objective of public education, as such is defined in s. 2(11) of the Public Education Law, 5713-1953. It is also argued that the violation will maintain and even increase the suppression that has developed because of the Ministry of Education’s strict monitoring of the education provided in Arab schools. An additional claim made is that the Law violates the right of the students’ parents to freely choose an educational institution for their children in accordance with their own educational ideology and philosophy.

11.  The petitioners also argue that the Law’s provisions lead to a violation of the right to freedom of occupation for all those who in the framework of their work are involved in a critical examination of the nature of the state as a Jewish state (such as Petitioner 7 and the teachers in the Bilingual School). It is also claimed in this context that Petitioner 7’s right to equal treatment in exercising his freedom of occupation is restricted, as opposed to other academics with political perspectives that conform to the views of the majority.

12.  Finally, the petitioners claim that the Law violates the right of Arab citizens to collective dignity. It is argued that the Palestinian narrative is an integral part of the identity of most Israeli Arabs, and that the attempt embodied in the Law’s provisions to restrict the discussion of this narrative violates a constitutive element of the identity of these Arab citizens. It is also argued that the attempt to prevent opposition and legitimate protest against the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state violates the collective dignity of the Arab citizens because it prevents them from objecting to the fact of the discrimination to which they are exposed. It is argued that the Law seeks to shape and outline the values and perspectives of the Arab minority, as well as its behavior, by using a tool that is tied to the state budget.

13.  The Petitioners argue that the Law does not comply with the provisions of the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Law gives the representative of the executive branch broad discretion, in that its provisions do not provide clear criteria that indicate when a budget reduction will be allowed; the Law’s sections are broad, vague, ambiguous and general. It is argued that these statutory provisions do not comply with the tests for primary legislation arrangements as established in this Court’s case law, and that the violation of constitutional rights therefore contravenes the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which require that any violation either be anchored in a statute or permitted pursuant to a statute. It is also argued that the violation of these constitutional rights does not have an appropriate objective, in that the violation is caused in an arbitrary fashion, it involves political considerations and it penalizes the petitioners in particular and the Arab population in general. It is also argued that the Law has no proper objective because it violates the public interest – an interest which specifically requires protection of the principle of cultural pluralism, freedom of expression, equality, freedom of occupation and dignity. It is further argued that the Law lacks a proper objective because it violates democratic values and indirectly allows the imposition of collective punishment, since the entire group of those benefitting from a particular service may be harmed because of a single act, or because of the act of a single individual. According to the petitioners, in light of the fact that the Law is not a statute as defined in the Basic Law, and because it lacks an appropriate purpose, there is no need to examine the matter of whether it is proportionate, since the Law’s purpose is the starting point for the three-part test for proportionality.

14.  Finally, it is argued that the Law has a “chilling effect” and deters certain activities, because of a concern that such activities will be covered by the Law’s provisions, and will thus lead to the imposition of budgetary sanctions.

The position taken by Respondent 1

15.  Respondent 1 argues that the petition challenges the constitutionality of a law before the manner of its implementation and application has been examined by the authorized parties; Respondent 1 argues further that the petition is based on various extreme scenarios that the petitioners presented, even though the likelihood of their occurrence is completely unknown and it is also unknown whether the Law will in fact apply to them. Respondent 1 therefore argues that it is too early to reach a decision regarding this petition, because as of the current time, the Minister of Finance has not yet been asked to implement the Law in any concrete situation and no interpretative content has yet taken form with respect to his authority pursuant to the Law; and that this petition is thus overly generalized and theoretical. Respondent 1 emphasizes that pursuant to the provisions of the Law, a professional team must be established in order to exercise the granted authority, and the Minister of Finance must receive an opinion from the legal adviser to his Ministry and hold a hearing for the entity regarding which he is considering exercising his authority. In addition, the Law requires that the Minister of Finance obtain the approval of an additional minister (other than himself) – the minister who is in charge of the relevant budgetary item. Regarding this issue, Respondent 1 cites the position that I took in HCJ 7190/05 Lobel v. Government of Israel [1], in which I chose to make use of the “ripeness” doctrine that has been applied in the past in the field of constitutional law. According to this doctrine, a court may refrain from deciding an abstract dispute if there is no clear and complete factual background that has been presented to the court with respect to the issue facing the court.

16.  Respondent 1 offered an additional threshold argument, relating to the legal forum in which the petition should have been brought. The argument is that even if a concrete decision to reduce a budget had been reached pursuant to the Law, the proper forum for the deliberation of the issues raised regarding such a decision would be the Administrative Matters Court, as provided in Item 40 of the First Schedule to the Administrative Courts Law, 5760-2000 (hereinafter: “the Administrative Courts Law”). Respondent 1 argues that this Court cannot take the place of the entity that is authorized pursuant to that law, and issue a forward-looking legal opinion with regard to the manner in which the authority granted in the Law should be exercised.

17.  The argument is also made that the Law, on its face, does not apply to the petitioners, as they do not fall within the Law’s definitions of a “financed entity” or a “supported entity”.

18. In light of the conclusion I have reached, I see no need to respond at length to Respondent 1’s substantive arguments. I will note briefly that Respondent 1 believes that this Court’s intervention would not be justified, as the Law passes the test set out in the limitations clause for a statute’s constitutionality. Respondent 1’s argument is that the Law fits into Israel’s framework of statutes that sustain its existence as a Jewish and democratic state, while preserving the state’s right to protect its basic principles. Respondent 1 also argues that the state has the prerogative to direct the allocation of its budget and not to finance activities the purpose of which is to undermine the basis for its existence. The core principles on which the state is based are a legitimate consideration in terms of the distribution of budgets, and the state may choose not to finance activities that are not consistent with these core principles. In addition, it is argued that the Law establishes a mechanism of restraint, balance and supervision through which decisions about budget reductions are reached. The intention is not to have the Law apply to marginal or minimal activity, but instead only to those activities which in their essence negate the character and existence of the state, including its character as a Jewish and democratic state.

19.  Regarding the petitioners’ claim that there has been a violation of various basic rights, Respondent 1 argues that the Law does not violate freedom of expression. Respondent 1 argues that the supported or budgeted entity retains the right to choose whether or not to carry out those activities that conflict with the grounds for budget reduction that are stipulated in the Law, but the Law allows the Minister of Finance to decide – when dealing with a supported or budgeted entity that engages in such activity – that the state will not finance the entity’s activity that falls within the categories listed in the Law. For this reason, it is also argued that there is no violation of a right to collective dignity. In addition, the Minister of Finance argues that even if there is a violation of freedom of expression, that violation nevertheless complies with the terms of the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Regarding the petitioners’ argument that the Law violates the principle of equality, Respondent 1 argues that the Law applies to any supported or financed entity whose activities are covered by one of the grounds enumerated in the Law. Respondent 1 notes that a claim that the Law may be abused, in that it might be enforced in an arbitrary fashion, is only a theoretical claim. Respondent 1 argues that the claim regarding a violation of the right to education should also be rejected. It is argued in this context that, inter alia, the state may and is entitled to promote those goals that it wishes to emphasize and to budget resources for the purpose of achieving those objectives. In the instant case, the relevant objectives are the goals of public education and the principles underlying the Declaration of Independence. In response to the claim concerning a violation of freedom of occupation, Respondent 1 argues that this is again a remote and theoretical concern – one that is not based on the facts. Respondent 1 argues, at length, that even if there has been a violation of a constitutional right, it is a violation which is permitted pursuant to the conditions set out in the limitations clause.

Response of Respondent 2

20.  Respondent 2 describes at length the reasons that justify a denial of the petition. Some of its claims are similar to those of Respondent 1, and there is therefore no need to repeat them, as they have already been noted above in the discussion of Respondent 1’s claims.

21.  Regarding the right to equality, Respondent 2 argues that this case involves a budget reduction for certain entities, pursuant to the Law, which is carried out on the basis of the relationship between the activities of such entities and the basic principles of the state, and without any connection to the national identities represented by those entities. Respondent 2 also notes that there are Jews who wish to deny the Jewish character of the state, such as Petitioner 7. Respondent 2 argues that the Petitioners’ claim is far-reaching and suggests that any time that the state wishes to promote Zionist or Jewish values, even without discriminating directly against individuals on the basis of their nationalities, it will be seen as discriminating against members of the Arab nationality. Respondent 2 argues further that the state of Israel recognizes its Jewish and Zionist values alongside its democratic values and its constitutional framework. Thus, the granting of a particular position to these values within the framework of the state’s laws is presumptively not an unlawful discriminatory act.

22. Next, Respondent 2 argues that even if the right to education (a right that the petitioners claim is also being violated) is recognized as a constitutional right, this Court has held in the past that the State may determine different levels of financing for educational institutions in accordance with their compliance with the core studies program established by the Ministry of Education; this Court has held that such a determination is neither discriminatory nor a violation of the right to equal education. Accordingly, Respondent 2 argues that even though the petitioners are free to promote a curriculum which is based on the Palestinian national narrative, the State is not required to finance that curriculum.

23. With respect to the claim that there has been a violation of the freedom of employment, Respondent 2 argues that this right is a protective right which is intended to ensure for each individual an area in which he can support himself without interference from others. It is therefore argued that the Law does not violate the right to freedom of employment, as it does not prohibit the employment of teachers or lecturers who wish to promote values that deny the Jewish and democratic nature of the State, and who mark Independence Day as a day of mourning. The Law also does not prevent any individual from teaching content that falls within the definition of such activity. The Law only provides that the State will not participate in the financing of such activities.

Discussion and determination

24.  My position is that at this stage, the petition should be denied without any decision being made regarding the constitutional questions presented to us, and I will suggest to my colleagues that we so hold. I do not deny that the petition before us raises important and fundamental questions and issues. Despite the importance and complexity of these issues, this is not the time to respond to their substance. I will explain myself as follows:  

25. As is known, the power granted to the High Court of Justice pursuant to s. 15(c) and (d) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary is a power that the Court may or may not exercise, in accordance with its own discretion (see: HCJ 731/86 Micro Daf v. Israel Electric Corp. [2], at p. 456; HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing, [3], at p. 243; HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd. v. Minister of Construction & Housing [4], at pp. 58-59; and HCJ 2009/07 Klein v. American Friends of Israel Scouts [5], at para. 11). Over the years, rules have been developed regarding the circumstances in which this discretion may be exercised in the form of the rejection of a petition. These rules do not constitute a numerus clausus, and they can be changed and given new content as needed at a specific time and location (see: HCJ 453/84 Iturit Communications Services Ltd. v. Minister of Communications [6], at p. 620). The rules allow for the rejection of a petition under, inter alia, the following circumstances: when alternative relief is available, when there has been a previous petition or when there may be a theoretical later petition regarding the same matter, when there has been delay or an absence of clean hands on the part of the petitioner, when a petition is overly general, or when the route for legal proceedings has not been fully exhausted, etc. This is not, as stated, a numerus clausus. Justice A. Barak referred to these rules, which qualify as “judicial creations”, in his remarks in HCJ 217/80 Segal v. Minister of Finance [7], at p. 440, in which he noted that they are intended to regulate the pace at which appeals are addressed to the Court.

26.  As noted, the above-mentioned list of grounds for rejecting a petition is not a numerus clausus. In Lobel, the petitioners sought to attack the constitutionality of the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law, 5765-2005 (hereinafter: “the Disengagement Law”) by challenging the section of that law which permitted the imposition of criminal sanctions on parties who were being removed from the Gaza Strip, and who remained in the area after the removal day. An expanded panel of this Court summarily rejected the petition, on the ground that there was an alternate remedy: the constitutional claims could be raised in the framework of a criminal proceeding brought against an individual who had violated the Disengagement Law. Note that in that case, the state, at the end of the day, decided not to prosecute residents who had violated only the provisions of the Disengagement Law. The criminal sanctions were imposed only against those few residents who used violence against the security forces, and who committed additional criminal offenses. The circumstances of that case led me to the conclusion that the petition should be rejected because of the availability of an alternate remedy, and I therefore joined in President Barak’s opinion; however, I also supported a rejection of the petition because the issue it presented was not yet ripe. In my view, there was no reason at that stage to decide an issue of principle in the framework of a direct constitutional attack on the Disengagement Law in the High Court of Justice. And I stress that the ripeness doctrine was not used for the first time in the Lobel opinion cited by the state here. It had already been mentioned in this Court’s earlier case law. Thus, in Segal [7], Justice A. Barak remarked that the grounds established by this Court for a summary dismissal included the ripeness doctrine as well:

‘We may also mention the doctrine relating to an academic or unripe issue, or an issue that is not justiciable. These doctrines attempt to give the court – each from a different perspective – legal mechanisms with which the court can lock its gates when it believes that the particular matter should not be dealt with’ (Segal [7], ibid., at p. 440).

Indeed, from time to time, we encounter petitions that we decide to reject on the grounds that, for various reasons, the questions they present are not ripe for decision. Non-ripeness as a ground for dismissal has been mentioned both in response to petitions relating to administrative cases and, often, in response to petitions relating to constitutional matters. (For examples of petitions that were submitted in connection with administrative cases and were rejected on the grounds that they were not ripe, see the following: in HCJ 1842/04 Michai v. Ministry [8], this Court held that as the competent authority had not yet decided the petitioners’ case, the petition was early and unripe; in HCJ 1431/05 Orian v. Minister of Transportation [9], we rejected a petition that was general and theoretical, and was for that reason held to be unripe for decision; and in HCJ 128/09 Basiso v. Minister of Defense [10], the petitioner asked that she be allowed to return to her home in the Gaza Strip. This Court rejected the petition because we found that the petitioner had just left the country, and that the planned time for her stay abroad had not yet passed; it was therefore held that her petition regarding her ability to return to her home was not ripe for decision. In HCJ 6556/11 Glickman v. Major-General Sami Turjeman, Commander of IDF Land Forces [11], the Court rejected an appeal that was directed, inter alia, at a Chief of Staff Order concerning the service of male and female soldiers together. We held that under the circumstances of that petition, there was no need to study the interpretation of the order or its applications, because a staff team was still working on a study of the subject. In such a situation, it was held, a petition seeking to subject the army’s instructions to judicial review was not yet ripe. For examples in which petitions dealing with constitutional issues have been rejected on the ground that they were not yet ripe, see Lobel [1] and HCJ 8276/05 Adalah – the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. Minister of Defense [12], (“Adalah I”) discussed below.

27.  The source of the ripeness doctrine is American constitutional law (see Lobel [1], per Justice Naor, at para. 5). The United States Supreme Court faced the issue in Abbott Laboratories, et. al. v. Gardner [24] at pp. 148-149, when it held that the rationale at the basis of the doctrine is the Court’s need to avoid deciding issues before the time is ripe for the Court to do so:

‘Without undertaking to survey the intricacies of the ripeness doctrine it is fair to say that its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’

28. I believe that the circumstances here justify the application of the ripeness doctrine. At this stage, the issue raised by the petition is not yet ripe for a judicial determination, due to the absence of a clear, complete and concrete set of facts – the type of fact pattern that is essential if a judicial determination of the principle of the issue is to be properly made. The importance of a crystallized dispute for the purpose of making a determination regarding a constitutional issue has been discussed by my colleague, Vice President E. Rivlin, in his opinion in HCJ 7052/03 Adalah – the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. Minister of the Interior  [13] (“Adalah II”), at para. 6:

‘The deliberation is not fruitful when it takes place too early, before the dispute is known, or when it has not yet crystallized.’

The Minister of Finance has not yet, on any occasion, carried out those sections that the petitioners wish to have stricken, and we cannot know whether, when and in what circumstances the Minister will make use of the powers that these sections confer upon him. The mechanism established in the Law provides that before the Minister of Finance decides to impose the financial sanction, the issue must go through several stages of review and approval. The Minister’s decision will only be carried out in coordination with various other parties, and only after their opinions are obtained. Thus, for example, the Law requires that in order for a financial sanction to be imposed, the minister in charge of the budgetary item through which the entity in question is either budgeted or supported must agree to the imposition of that sanction. Additionally, the budgeted or supported entity that will be affected must be given a hearing before the sanction can be imposed. Furthermore, pursuant to sub-section (d) of the Law, the Minister of Finance can only reach a decision to reduce funding after receiving an opinion from the legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance and only after the specially-appointed professional team has made its recommendation. The Law provides that the professional team will be composed of an employee of the Ministry of Justice, an employee of the Ministry of Finance, and an employee of the ministry whose minister is charged with the budget item through which the entity is either budgeted or supported. I note here that the mechanisms established in the Law were the fruit of various discussions held in the Knesset’s Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice. As may be recalled, the original draft law placed before the Knesset was the Draft Independence Day Law – a draft law which sought to prohibit any activity or event which includes a marking of Independence Day or a reference to the fact of the establishment of the State of Israel as a “day of mourning” or a “day of tragedy”. This prohibition was accompanied by a penal sanction of up to three years imprisonment. This proposal was abandoned, as stated, and the Budget Foundations Law was tabled in its place. However, the Draft Budget Foundations Law also went through many changes before it was enacted in its final form; for example, Respondent 1’s Response indicates that the definition of a “prohibited expense” was narrowed and it was determined that it would apply only to activities which were in their essence the equivalent of one of the grounds listed in the section and not for every expense that “could”  fit within one of those grounds. The Law also provides for a controlled and careful decision-making process, which I have noted above – a process that includes, as stated, professional opinions, a hearing, and the consent of the minister in charge of the relevant budgetary item. The Law also provides that the budget reduction for the supported or budgeted entity may not be of an amount greater than three times the amount of the expense that has led to the imposition of the sanction. (Originally, the amount of the reduction was up to twenty times that amount, which was then reduced to ten times the amount of the expense).

29. Thus, the Law requires that a long road must be travelled before the sanction created by the Law can be imposed. I will not take any position at this stage regarding the mechanism established in the Law or regarding the Law’s constitutionality. However, at this stage, before the Law has been implemented and when the mechanism established therein has also not yet entered into operation, I do not believe that there is any reason to engage in speculations and estimations regarding the manner in which the power granted in the Law will be exercised. As I noted in Lobel [1], a well-informed judicial determination must be tightly connected to concrete facts that are presented in the case before the court, even if a constitutional question has arisen. (See: Lobel [1], at para. 6. See also HCJ 3248/09 Sari v. Minister of Justice [14], at para. 3; HCJ 6972/07 Lakser v. Minister of Finance [15], at para. 26). In this case, there have not yet been any incidents in which a question has arisen regarding the application of the Law, its interpretation or its consequences. The situation was similar in Adalah I [12], in which this Court was asked to decide the issue of the constitutionality of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance (State Liability) (Amendment No. 7), 5765-2005. With regard to the provisions of that law, President (emeritus) A. Barak held, and his colleagues concurred, that s. 5c of the law was invalid. However, it is his discussion of s. 5b of that law that is relevant to our discussion here. Regarding that section, it was held that the issue presented in the petition was not yet ripe. Some of the remarks made in that case are also pertinent here:

‘The question of the constitutionality of s. 5b of Amendment 7 arose before us in a marginal manner only . . . We were not presented with any cases in which the question of its application arose. All this reflects upon the question of the constitutionality of the section. In these circumstances, as long as these questions have not been properly addressed, the time has not come to decide the constitutionality of s. 5b. Much depends on the manner in which it is implemented and the interpretation that is given to the provisions of the section. . . . Naturally, the parties have the right to raise their arguments concerning the constitutionality of s. 5b as it will arise in specific cases. The civil courts are competent, in specific tort cases, to examine arguments concerning the constitutionality of the section. In the circumstances of this case, we see no reason to decide the question of the constitutionality of s. 5b of Amendment 7. (Emphasis in the original – M.N.) (Ibid. [12], at para. 31).  

30. The United States Supreme Court dealt with a similar issue in United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) et. al. v. Mitchell et. al. [25]. In that case, the plaintiffs, who were all federal employees, challenged a statute that prohibited their participation in political activities. Except for one employee, none of the plaintiffs had actually violated the statute, but they had all declared their intention to become involved in political activity of the type that had been prohibited by the statute. The Court held that other than the issue presented by the single plaintiff who had already violated the statute, there was no legal question that could properly be decided. The Court noted the employees’ concern that if they did violate the law they would lose their jobs, but held that because the employees had not yet violated the statute, this was a purely hypothetical-speculative concern which did not justify a judicial determination or the granting of judicial relief:

‘The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court, to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public statements or the circumstances of their publication. It would not accord with judicial responsibility to adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality, between the freedom of the individual and the requirements of public order except when definite rights appear upon the one side and definite prejudicial interferences upon the other’ (ibid. [25], at p.89-90).

Justices Douglas and Black presented the minority view, and wrote that the dispute could be adjudicated. Justice Douglas wrote that the plaintiffs did not need to wait until they actually lost their jobs. To remove doubt: I also believe that there can be cases in which even in the absence of a concrete foundation for a dispute, it would be wrong to postpone the adjudication of a particular petition until a specific factual background – one that can cause substantial harm to the petitioners – has arisen, and in such cases it would be proper to decide a question even if it has not yet become fully ripe. However, even if we agree with the minority view in United Public Workers [25], the outcome in our case would not change. In the instant case, even if the Law’s provisions had been put to use, the impact on the petitioners would not be immediate. As stated, because of the complex decision-making mechanism prescribed by the Law, a multi-staged process separates the initial decision by the Minister of Finance and its actual implementation. In any event, if the Minister does exercise his power pursuant to the Law and such exercise is likely to harm some of the Petitioners, the option of initiating legal proceedings remains open. It should also be noted that one element of the mechanism established in the Law is the holding of a hearing for an entity that is likely to be harmed.

31. As stated, not every petition that lacks a concrete factual foundation should be summarily dismissed on the ground that it is unripe. Each case must be judged on its merits. As noted, the lack of ripeness is a threshold ground for dismissal, and a court may exercise discretion in deciding whether or not to rely on it. It is certainly possible that on some occasions, even in the absence of a concrete factual background, a court should nevertheless address the issue raised in the petition. We can draw an analogy to the fact-pattern of United Public Workers [25], and find that the Court’s intervention at an early stage would be justified if the circumstances are such that if a petitioner is asked to wait for his case to become ripe, he will pay too heavy a price. Thus, for example, if the Draft Independence Day Law had been enacted as law, and if the petitioners had sought to attack its constitutionality, this Court might have responded to the petition even before use had been made of its provisions in a concrete case. This judicial response would have been needed because of the harsh criminal sanction that was contained in Draft Independence Day Law (three years imprisonment).  However, this does not mean that whenever a petition challenges the constitutionality of a law which contains a criminal sanction, this Court must address it despite its lack of ripeness. (Regarding this matter, see Lobel [1], opinion of Justice Naor.) As I have noted, the Court must exercise its judgment in each case, based on the specific circumstances that are presented.

32.  Moreover, the Response submitted by Respondent 1 indicates that we cannot be certain that the Law will apply to the petitioners in this case. In addition, even if the Law does apply to the petitioners, there is still uncertainty regarding the degree to which it will apply to them or to others, and in what circumstances it will apply. The use of the ripeness doctrine does not mean that the courthouse doors are permanently closed before the petitioners or before others, or that the Court will not deliberate the issue in the future. It may be that in the future – if and when the Law’s provisions are put into use and the petitioners or others feel that they have been harmed by that use – the petitioners will be able to address the competent tribunals who will adjudicate their claims. In such a situation, and on the basis of a concrete factual background, the disputed issue will certainly be more coherent, and this will make the deliberation more efficient; the Court will be able to render a wiser decision, based on concrete facts (see HCJ 1468/11 Ben Sa’adon v. Minister of Religious Affairs [16]). Nevertheless, it may also be the case that the passage of time will render a deliberation of a petition irrelevant, as the petitioners’ concerns may never be realized (compare, Lakser [15]) – either because the Minister of Finance may fail to exercise the power conferred upon him by the Law, or because the provisions will be exercised in a manner that does no harm to the petitioners; other factors may allay the petitioners’ original concerns as well. However, in the current situation, the operative significance of the Law is not yet clear and it is not yet the right time for us to respond to the substance of the claims (compare Ben Sa’adon [16]).

33.  I wish to add the following to these remarks: the ripeness doctrine is, as stated, one of the tools that this Court can use to establish the pace at which petitions are brought before it. It allows the Court to regulate, to a certain degree, the flow of matters submitted to it and to refrain from deciding matters when the Court believes that there is no justification at that particular time for determining the issues presented (see Segal [7], supra). The Court has discretion to determine the circumstances in which it will apply the doctrine, in the framework of the power the legislature has conferred upon it in s.15 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary. When it weighs the various considerations for and against the deliberation of a particular petition, the Court must also consider the need to organize its time, given that the time available to us is a finite resource. When this Court is faced with a petition that is particularly urgent, we work night and day to decide the issue that is before us. However, when the submission before us is a petition that is not yet ripe – a petition that does not include a clear, complete and concrete set of facts – the Court must consider whether a theoretical adjudication is justified at that particular stage.

34.  Furthermore, I believe that alongside the above-mentioned threshold ground for dismissal based on a lack of ripeness, the petition here should also be denied because an alternative proceeding and remedy are available. In Lobel, I noted that the ripeness doctrine is sometimes combined with other threshold grounds for dismissal, such as the availability of an alternative proceeding and remedy. This is because the ripeness required for an informed determination concerning the constitutional issues is likely to take shape in the context of the pursuit of an alternative remedy (see ibid., at para. 8). That is the case here. In the framework of the amendment of the Law, the Knesset also amended the Administrative Matters Court Law, such that the list included in First Schedule of that law was expanded to include a new item 40; this item confers on the Administrative Courts the power to adjudicate petitions dealing with the reduction of financial support pursuant to a decision by the Minister of Finance. It is black-letter law that the granting of power to the Administrative Matters Courts does not negate the power of this Court (see HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior [17], at p. 953; HCJ 212/03 Herut National Movement v. Chairman of the Central Committee for the Election of the 16th Knesset [18], at p. 756). However, the choice to petition the Administrative Matters Court is a choice to take the intended main road. Of course, the petitioners may also raise their claims regarding the constitutionality of the Law in the context of a petition to the Administrative Matters Court. The authority of the High Court of Justice to adjudicate claims regarding unconstitutionality does not prevent a deliberation of such claims in an “ordinary” court (see HCJ 2426/08 Ben Atar v. State of Israel – Ministry of Transportation (2008) (unreported) [19],  per Justice Naor, at para. 3; HCJ 6715/10 Hina v. State of Israel, Ministry of Defense, Department of Rehabilitation [20], at para. 5; HCJ 2055/02 Sheikh Abed Al Karim Abayet v. Minister of Defense [21], at para. 5; HCJ 1076/07 Maman Eilat Group Ltd. v. Minister of Finance [22]; Adalah I, supra). A party who believes that he has been harmed by the implementation of a law may thus turn to the Administrative Matters Court by filing a petition. In the context of such a petition, the party may use an indirect attack to present arguments regarding the constitutionality of the particular law. It has already been held that trial courts can adjudicate a particular litigant’s matter through an indirect attack, even if the litigant can, in principle, submit a petition to the High Court of Justice. This has also been allowed in cases in which the “indirect attack” was brought by the litigant who initiated the proceeding, and did not use it as a defensive claim (see: HCJ 6090/08 Berger v. Minister of Justice [23], at para. 5; Hina, supra; Lakser [15], at para. 29). The ability to present their claims in the form of an “indirect attack” also gives the petitioners the ability to pursue an alternative remedy (see: Hina, supra; Berger [15]; Orian, supra; and see:  Sheikh Abed Al Karim Abayet; and see: Lobel [1], per President A. Barak, at para. 12, and per Justice Naor, at para. 1). And furthermore: in the context of an administrative petition, it will be possible to ask for temporary relief in the form of an order for the non-implementation of the sanction.

35.  The existence of an available alternative proceeding and remedy in this case reinforces the conclusion that this petition is not ripe for decision by this Court. If a petition does need to be filed, it will be filed in the Administrative Matters Court, and to the extent necessary, it will be based on a concrete factual background, and not on hypothetical scenarios, as is the case in the petition which is before us now. The concrete facts will also allow that court to decide whether or not a concrete interpretation of the Law justifies the particular decision reached by the Minister of Finance, or whether the constitutional question needs to be decided.

36.  In conclusion: the petition before us contains complex questions that are of public importance, but at this stage, there is no need to render a judicial decision concerning the claims that have been presented. The petition is not ripe because of the absence of a concrete factual background – and we must have a concrete factual background in order to reach a decision regarding the various issues raised by the petitioners. In addition, if the petitioners or any of them or others are harmed as a result of the Law’s implementation, they have an alternate proceeding and remedy available to them in the Administrative Matters Court, where they will also be able to file an application for an order nisi preventing the implementation of the Law with respect to them.

37.  I propose to my colleagues that the petition be denied without an order regarding expenses.

President D. Beinisch

I agree with my colleague Justice M. Naor that the petition before us raises complex questions which are of public importance. I stress that these questions can, in certain circumstances, reach the core of the problems that currently divide Israeli society. However, I accept my colleague’s position that the petition before us is not ripe for judicial review. At a declarative level, the Law raises, on its face, difficult and complex questions, but the constitutionality of the Law is largely dependent on the interpretive content that is given to its provisions, and the nature of this content will only become clear when the Law is implemented by the relevant authorities.

Before a judicial determination can be made regarding the circumstances to which the Law will apply and the scope of its implementation, the executive needs to be allowed to set the boundaries and procedures for its implementation. The petitioners have painted various scenarios of hypothetical possibilities, and we cannot yet determine the likelihood that any of these scenarios will be realized. We do not know to whom they will apply, whether they will indeed relate to the petitioners, or what event will justify the implementation of the Law. We must therefore leave for a later time a deliberation of the constitutionality of the Law’s provisions – if indeed there is a need for such at the stage when they are put to concrete use, if such a stage is reached, and if the chosen form of implementation passes through the relevant filters established in the Law itself.

As of now, I also do not see a need to decide the question of the availability of an alternative remedy, and whether, when the time comes, a decision reached pursuant to the Law should be deliberated in the Administrative Matters Court or in this Court. That question will also be decided in the future, on the basis of the particular circumstances that arise.

I therefore join in the result reached by my colleague.

 

Vice President E. Rivlin

I join in the judgment of my colleague Justice M. Naor. I believe that under the circumstances, we are far from the concrete stage of the  implementation of the law. This is because according to the law itself, a long way must be travelled between the occurrence of an event mentioned in the Law and the actual imposition of a sanction – and there are many obstacles to overcome over the course of this distance. Furthermore, it is not at all certain that the Law will actually apply to the petitioners. With respect to constitutional judicial review, this natural selection is the result of the absence of factual circumstances which raise the constitutional question. In foreign systems which implement concrete factual examinations, this natural selection precedes constitutional review. Such examination often renders the actual constitutional review redundant.

For these reasons and for the reasons described by my colleague Justice M. Naor and those listed in the judgment written by my colleague President Beinisch, I join in their decisions.

 

Decided as per Justice M. Naor

10th of Tevet 5772.

15 January 2012.

Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Social Affairs

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7245/10
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

We are concerned with petitions for the revocation of Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009, as it is unconstitutional, which included Amendment no. 113 to the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter: the “Amendment to the Law”) that ordered, inter alia, the reduction of the child allowances paid for children who have not received the vaccines required based on their age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. The vaccination program includes a vaccination by the name of MMRV, which is a “quadrivalent” vaccine against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and chicken pox. The vaccination is given to infants at the age of one year, and the program will apply to infants born starting January 1, 2012, such that the first reduction of allowances will be made no earlier than July 1, 2013.

 

The HCJ (per the opinion of Justice Arbel, Justices Hayut and Barak Erez concurring) denied the petitions and held:

 

Justice Arbel held that there is no room for judicial intervention in the legislative process for the Amendment. Justice Arbel reviewed the nature of the child allowance arrangement and its purpose, the approach of the Ministry of Health and medical science towards vaccinations generally, and the quadrivalent vaccination specifically. Justice Arbel believed that the starting point should be that the legislator, in setting child allowances, had in mind the welfare and best interests of the children. Justice Arbel stated that in the framework of the constitutionality of the Amendment, the question of whether constitutional rights established in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter: the “Basic Law”) are violated will be examined, and if the answer is affirmative, it will be examined whether the conditions of the limitation clause of the Basic Law are satisfied. If one of the conditions is not satisfied, the remedy for the unlawful violation will be discussed.

 

Justice Arbel examined whether the Amendment violated rights enshrined in the Basic Law, i.e. the right to a dignified life or the right to social security, the right to autonomy and the right of equality, and held that the Amendment does not violate the right to a dignified life and does not violate the constitutional right to autonomy or to parental autonomy, but does violate the right of equality. It is noted that in this context, Justice Arbel believed that the group of equals included the parents insured through the National Insurance Law. However, Justice Arbel held that the violation satisfies all four conditions of the limitation clause of the Basic Law: the violation of the human right was made in or by a law or by virtue of explicit authorization therein; the violating law befits the values of the State of Israel; the violating law is intended for a proper purpose; the law violates the right to an extent no greater than  required. Justice Arbel held that this violation satisfies all of the conditions of the limitation clause in a manner that strikes a proper balance with other interests and rights, and hence the Amendment is proportionate and there is no room to intervene therein.

 

Justice Barak-Erez also found that the Amendment to the Law violates the right of equality, holding that the petitions should be denied because the violation satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. Justice Hayut believed that the starting point according to which the question of discrimination should be examined is that the right to the child allowances is a right of the parents, and that this is the relevant group of equals. Unlike Justices Arbel and Barak-Erez, Justice Hayut found that the distinction made by the Amendment to the Law between parents who have vaccinated their children and parents who have refrained from doing so, for the purpose of deducting a fixed amount from the child allowances, does not violate the constitutional right of equality of the parents who chose not to vaccinate their children, and therefore in her opinion too, the petitions should be denied. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

In the Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

                                                                                                                        HCJ 7245/10

                                                                                                                        HCJ 8357/10

                                                                                                                        HCJ 908/11

 

Before:                                                Her Honor Justice E. Arbel

                                                Her Honor Justice E. Hayut

                                                Her Honor Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

The Petitioner in                     

HCJ 7245/10:                          Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

                                   

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The Ministry of Social Affairs

                                                2. The National Insurance Institute

                                                3. The Knesset

 

The Petitioner in                      The Israel National Council for the Child

HCJ 8357/10: 

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The Israeli Government

                                                2. The Minister of Finance

                                                3. The Attorney General

4. The Minister of Health

5. The Israeli Knesset

6. The National Insurance Institute

 

The Petitioners in                    1. The Association for Information on Vaccines

HCJ 908/11:                            2. Binyamin Brotski

                                                3. Matan Koren

                                                4. Netta Dror

                                                5. Itay Hadar

                                                6. Lilach Rochel                                             

 

                                                v.

 

The Respondents:                   1. The National Insurance Institute

                                                2. Director General, Ministry of Health

                                                3. The Speaker of the Knesset

 

Petitions for an order nisi and an interim order

 

Date of session:                       Tammuz 12, 5772 (July 2, 2012)

 

On behalf of the Petitioner    

in HCJ 7245/10:                      Adv. Z. Zausan, Adv. H. Jabarin

 

On behalf of the Petitioners   

in HCJ 8357/10:                      Adv. V. Windman, Adv. C. Pollack-Cohen

 

On behalf of the Petitioners   

in HCJ 908/11:                        Adv. A. Naveh

 

On behalf of Respondents     

1-2 in HCJ 7245/10 and

Respondents 1-4 and 6

in HCJ 8357/10 and the

Respondents in HCJ 908/11:  Adv. A. Keidar, Adv. M. Freeman

 

On behalf of Respondent 3

in HCJ 7245/10 and

Respondent 5 in HCJ

8357/10:                                  Adv. Dr. G. Bligh

 

 

Judgment

 

Justice E. Arbel:

 

The petitions before us concern the reduction of child allowance for a parent whose children have not received the required vaccines announced by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. In the petitions, the petitioners demand the revocation of Section 61(2)(d) of the Arrangements Law (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009 (hereinafter, the “Arrangements Law” or the “Law”), on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.

 

The Arrangements Law

1.The Arrangements Law, which was enacted in 2009, included Amendment no. 113 (hereinafter, the “Amendment”) to the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “National Insurance Law”). The Amendment mainly concerns the gradual increase of the child allowances paid for the second, third and fourth child in a family unit. Concurrently, the Amendment orders the reduction of the child allowances paid for children who have not received the required vaccines based on their age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health. The main part of this arrangement is currently set out in Section 68(d) of the National Insurance Law:

(d)(1) If the child meets the provisions of Paragraph (2), the monthly child allowance paid for him will be reduced by the sum of NIS 100 (in this section – the “Sum of the Reduction”), provided that notice was given as stated in Subsection (e) and the 14-day period has passed as stated in the said subsection from the date of service of the notice according to the provisions of Subsection (h)(2); the reduction will begin on the 1st of the month following delivery of the notice to the Institute as stated in Paragraph (2);

(2) The Ministry of Health shall notify the Institute that six months have passed from the date on which the child was required to receive the vaccines based on his age and health condition and according to the Vaccination Program ordered by the Director General of the Ministry of Health; such notice shall be sent to the Institute no later than seven days after the date on which six months have passed as aforesaid;

(3) A program as stated in Paragraph (2) will be published in the Israel Official Gazette and shall include provisions regarding the type of vaccine, the vaccination schedule, additional dates on which a vaccine that was not administered on the required date may be supplemented, and the maximum age at which each vaccine may be administered (in this section, the “Vaccination Program”).

It should be noted that additional sections in this arrangement include: instructions regarding the notice that must be sent to parents whose children have not received vaccines as aforesaid, options to challenge and appeal decisions on the matter, sums of allowance reductions according to the number of children in the family, recalculation of the allowance after the child has been vaccinated as required or after the passage of the last date on which the vaccine, because of which the allowance was reduced, could be administered, etc.

2.Publication of the Vaccination Program by the Director General of the Ministry of Health was initially postponed because claims were raised regarding lack of access to Family Health Centers (“Tipat Chalav”) by the Bedouin population in the Negev, such that in practice the Amendment could not be implemented. After actions were taken to increase access and awareness among the Bedouin population in the Negev, the Director General of the Ministry of Health published a vaccination program by virtue of the Law, which included one vaccine named MMRV, a “quadrivalent” vaccine against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and varicella. The vaccine is given to infants at the age of one year and the program applies to infants born starting January 1, 2012, such that the first reduction of allowance will be made no earlier than July 1, 2013.

The petitions at bar were filed against this arrangement.

HCJ 7245/10 –Petitioners’ Claims

3.The petitioners are organizations and associations that act to promote Arab and Bedouin minority rights, as well as residents and chairpersons of local committees of three Bedouin villages in the Negev, in which, on the date this petition was filed, no Family Health Center operated.

4.First, the petitioners claim that the Amendment was passed following a coalition agreement, and that prior to its approval no discussion was held in respect thereof. They also argue the respondents did not base the approval of the Amendment on any analysis or research. Second, the petitioners claim that the Amendment violates the children’s constitutional rights. According to them, the child allowance belongs to the children themselves, even though it is remitted to their parents. The court has emphasized on various occasions the importance and objective of the child allowances is for the children’s welfare. The conclusion, therefore, according to the petitioners, is that reduction of the allowances harms the children and violates their rights, mainly children belonging to poor families that will be forced to waive monetary expenses necessary for the upbringing and development of the children. It is argued that the Amendment violates the supreme principle of the best interest of the child, which has been established in the case law of the Supreme Court and in international treaties. The petitioners further claim that the Amendment violates the principle of equality between children, as it creates an irrelevant distinction between children who have received vaccines and those who have not received vaccines, and between children whose parents have access to preventive medical services and children for whom the State has not ensured access to such services. They further claim that the Amendment violates the children’s constitutional right to the property, since the allowances belong to them. They claim that the very payment of the insurance contributions to the National Insurance Institute create a contractual agreement between the parent and the National Insurance Institute, which includes the expectation of payment of child allowances against payment of the insurance contributions by the parent. Violating this expectation, it is claimed, is also contrary to

5.According to the petitioners, the violation of the aforementioned constitutional rights does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause. The violation, it is argued, is not for a proper purpose. The violation was made without examination and without an appropriate foundation; it aggravates poverty and socioeconomic gaps; and it also harms the public interest that mandates protecting and avoiding harm to those children who are not being vaccinated.

6.It is further asserted that the violation does not satisfy the threefold proportionality test. The violation does not satisfy the rational connection test, since the means chosen do not achieve the objective of protecting the child’s health and public health. According to the petitioners, the Amendment in fact harms the child’s wellbeing, health, development, property and right to social security, and causes a deepening of poverty. It is asserted that punitive use of the allowances is prohibited, and that the allowances should not be used to combat various negative or wrongful phenomena. The Amendment punishes the children for non-receipt of vaccination services.

The petitioners further claim that the violation does not meet the second proportionality test, the less harmful means test. According to them, other appropriate means could have been adopted to achieve the goal, such as making preventive health services accessible in the unrecognized villages in the Negev. The petitioners assert that the main population that will be harmed by the Amendment is the children residing in the Bedouin villages, including the children of the unrecognized villages. According to them, the high rate of unvaccinated Bedouin children is the product of the State’s failure to provide preventive health services at Family Health Centers. The Bedouin children’s access to these services is limited. In approximately forty-five unrecognized villages there are, it is argued, only twelve Family Health Centers, and even those were only put in place after a petition to the HCJ, and some are under threat of closure. The petitioners add that the residents of these villages also have limited mobility due to the absence of driving licenses and suitable public transportation in the area, and that they have low socioeconomic status and a very high rate of poverty. The Amendment therefore punishes the Bedouin children through no fault of their own, and due to the Ministry of Health’s failure to fulfill its obligation to realize these children’s rights from the outset. This punishment will further aggravate the socioeconomic status of the Bedouin children, and deepen the social gaps between this population and the general population. The petitioners assert that despite the neutral language of the Amendment, the said data reveal that, de facto, it discriminates against the Bedouin children on the basis of nationality.

Finally, the petitioners claim that the violation also fails to fulfill the narrow proportionality test. According to them, democracy cannot justify punishing children because they have not been vaccinated by their parents. The Amendment leads to a result opposite to that sought by the legislature and, instead of protecting the children’s health, causes them additional harm.

7.In supplementary pleadings filed by the petitioners on August 16, 2012, the petitioners seek to emphasize the claim that the violation of rights should be examined in light of the fact that the matter concerns children, a group with special characteristics which mandate special constitutional protection. According to them, this fact distinguishes between a regular violation of the right of equality, which may be a permitted distinction, and a violation which falls under the definition of prohibited discrimination, i.e. violation of the constitutional right.

HCJ 8357/10 – The Petitioner’s Claims

8.The petitioner in HCJ 8357/10 is the Israel National Council for the Child. It too asserts that the Amendment constitutes a violation of the equality between children whose parents vaccinated them and children who have not been vaccinated for whatever reason. According to the petitioner, this is not a distinction that is relevant to the purpose of the legislation. The purpose of the child allowance arrangement, it is argued, is to allow a redistribution of income among the population, transferring income from citizens who have no children to those who have children and whose income needs to be divided between a greater number of persons. According to the petitioner, the allowance is not a prize for desired behavior, and conditioning the allowance on a condition unrelated to the size of the family is wrongful ab initio. The petitioner claims that the case does not concern denial of a benefit given to parents for vaccinating their children, as the State claims, since the allowance increment granted in the Amendment does not apply to the first child or the fifth and any subsequent children. The Amendment may also harm populations that are already weakened, who do not vaccinate their children due to lack of access to Family Health Centers or due to the absence of time and financial resources. The petitioner emphasizes that the rate of unvaccinated children is particularly high in the unrecognized settlements in the Negev as a result of a lack of physical, cultural and linguistic access to vaccination services. The petitioner further claims an additional violation of the right to social security which will bring more children into the cycle of poverty and deepen penury among families already below the poverty line, contrary to the objective of the child allowances, particularly with respect to the first child and the fifth child onwards in the family.

9.The petitioner argues that the violation of the constitutional rights of the children does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause. The objective of increasing the vaccination rate is foreign to the purpose of the allowances, and therefore is not a proper purpose. Introducing this consideration will create a dangerous precedent whereby allowances may be reduced for any health, educational or social reason. The proportionality test is also not satisfied according to the petitioner. When the reasons for non-vaccination are ideological or depend on access to health services, it is clear that the reduction of the allowances will not affect vaccination. Therefore, the means are inconsistent with the purpose. The lack of consistency, it is claimed, stands out against the background of the data regarding the high rate of vaccination in the State of Israel, mainly with respect to the vaccinations currently required by the Vaccination Program published in accordance with the Amendment. The petitioner makes a distinction between a benefit, the conditioning of which on vaccination may be proportionate, and the imposition of a sanction for failure to vaccinate which is not proportionate. The petitioner rejects the State’s claims regarding the measures taken in order to moderate the harm. It further claims that there are many and varied measures for achieving the goals reflected in the Amendment that do not violate the children’s rights and have a greater benefit potential. Thus, it is possible to act to increase awareness and improve access to child vaccination services.

HCJ 908/11 – The Petitioners’ Claims

10.The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 are the Association for Information on Vaccines and parents whose children they argue suffered various negative reactions following a vaccination. The petitioners claim that there are differences of opinion in the medical community and among the public regarding the effectiveness of vaccines and the severity of their side effects. Hence, they believe that parents should be allowed the right to choose whether or not to vaccinate their children. According to them, the fact that there is a law aimed at compensating those injured by vaccines proves that vaccines are not risk-free. The petitioners further assert that the Amendment violates the right to equality, the individual’s right to autonomy and the right to autonomy of parents in the upbringing of their children. The petitioners challenge the Amendment legislation procedure and its inclusion in the Arrangements Law, which does not allow the issue to be thoroughly discussed and examined. Similar to the other petitions, these petitioners claim that the violation does not satisfy the conditions of the Limitation Clause.

The Respondents’ Claims

11.Respondents 1-5 the legislative proceedings, which began at the initiative of the Director General of the Ministry of Health, and included preparation and examination of the data in Israel and worldwide. A separate legislative memorandum was subsequently circulated, unlike the regular procedure for enactment of the Arrangements Law, in order to allow specific examination of the matter. The memorandum was discussed both at the various government ministries and at the Finance Committee of the Knesset, and conflicting positions were heard. The respondents note that it was decided to stop collecting the Family Health Centers’ fees in order not to create an economic barrier to vaccination. The respondents further specified the actions that were performed by the ministries for the implementation of the Law, including increasing access to Family Health Centers and increasing awareness of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law.

12.The respondents emphasize the importance of the MMRV vaccine and the severity of the diseases against which it immunizes. According to them, the vaccine is intended to combat diseases that can cause severe harm to public health, and particularly to the health of children. In addition, these diseases are highly contagious. The respondents stress that according to professional opinion, in order to reach “herd immunity”, which protects even those who cannot be immunized or who have not developed resistance despite having received the vaccine, the immunization coverage required in the population is approximately 95%. The respondents further state the importance of immunization coverage to each individual child, relative to both the child population and the general population. They also note the expected economic and social repercussions for the State due to the absence of effective prevention of disease outbreak.

13.The respondents maintain that the default is that the Court will not be inclined to intervene in socioeconomic policy established in primary legislation of the Knesset. The respondents further claim that the legislative procedure was duly carried out and does not create cause for the Court’s intervention. The respondents also assert that the Amendment does not violate constitutional rights. With respect to violation of the children’s rights, the respondents contend that the allowance is not a direct right of the child, but rather the right of the parents, intended to help them support the family unit. It is argued that the fact that the amount of the child allowance depends on the birth order of the child in the family supports this conclusion. In addition, on the practical level, it is the parents who decide on the use of the allowance, and they are not obligated to use it for purposes pertaining directly to the children. According to the respondents, even if the allowance did belong to the children, there is no case law establishing a property right for recipients of the allowances. 

14.According to the respondents, the Amendment does not violate the constitutional right to minimal dignified existence. According to the respondents, there is no room for the assumption that any change in the allowance’s entitlement rate constitutes a violation of a constitutional right. They refer to case law that determines that the array of social rights does not necessarily reflect the bounds of the right to social security at the constitutional level. Moreover, the case at bar concerns the reduction of an allowance that for the most part corresponds to the allowance increment that was granted in the Amendment, and therefore there is no ground for the assertion that the Amendment will violate the right to minimal dignified existence. With respect to the violation of equality, the respondents claim that the Amendment establishes an egalitarian norm which seeks to incentivize individuals to take action that is highly desirable from a social and health perspective, and it cannot be said that it constitutes a discriminatory norm. Every parent is able to ensure that his child is vaccinated, and in such a case, the child allowance will not be reduced. In any event, it is argued that there is no violation of equality at the constitutional level—that is, a violation that is closely and pertinently related to aspects of human dignity as a constitutional right. As for the assertion of consequential discrimination on the basis of nationality, the respondents claim that the data indicate a similar rate of vaccination in the Jewish sector and in the Arab sector, while in the Arab sector there is a slightly lower rate of vaccination than in the Bedouin sector. The respondents admit that the percentage of vaccination in the unrecognized villages in the Negev is lower, but believe that the current level of access to Family Health Centers in these settlements, after various actions have and are being taken, is reasonable and appropriate. Finally, the respondents assert that the Amendment does not violate the constitutional rights to autonomy and to parenthood. They state that the professional position of the Ministry of Health, which is based on the prevailing approach in the medical world, is that vaccines are a desirable, efficient and safe method of preventing morbidity. They claim that the fact that there is a professional dispute on the matter does not provide grounds for the Court’s intervention in primary legislation. They further argue that the law does not force parents to vaccinate their children, but merely creates an economic incentive to vaccinate. In any event, it is argued that there is no violation whose severity rises to the level of a violation of a constitutional right. The respondents believe that the Amendment promotes other aspects of human dignity, leaving no basis to determine that the bottom line is injurious.

15.Alternatively, the respondents assert that even if it is determined that a constitutional right is being violated, the violation is lawful and satisfies the conditions of the Limitation Clause. They state that the purpose of the Amendment is protection of children while ensuring their health and welfare and caring for public health in general. This, they claim, is a proper purpose the values of the State of Israel. They further claim that the purpose is not foreign and extraneous to the National Insurance Law. They also assert that the Amendment satisfies the three proportionality tests. Experience in other countries establishes the effective connection between economic incentives and the conduct of parents with respect to their children, including increasing vaccination rates. Regarding the less harmful means test, the respondents admit that other alternatives exist to incentivize the vaccination of children. However, they claim that the means chosen by the legislator do not exceed the bounds of proportionate measures. They add that the State may intervene in arrangements and regulation of conduct where there is a public good that creates a “market failure” in the actions of citizens, each of whom is relying on the immunization of the other. Finally, they claim that the proportionality requirement in its narrow sense is fulfilled, in view of the clear public interest in vaccinating children and maintaining a high vaccination rate on the one hand, and considering that the harm is limited and proportionate, taking into account the conditions and limitations set forth in the legislation regarding reduction of the allowance, on the other hand.

16.The respondents refer in detail to the issue of the repercussions of the Amendment on children in the Bedouin diaspora. They argue that following actions taken on behalf of the respondents, there is currently reasonable and adequate access of the Bedouin population to Family Health Centers. In addition, they state that the MMRV vaccination rate in the Bedouin population registered at Family Health Centers is higher than the MMRV vaccination rate in the Jewish sector.

17.Respondent 6, the Knesset, rejects the petitioners’ claims and joins the position and reasoning of Respondents 1-5.

Deliberation and Decision

Claims Pertaining to the Legislative Process

18.The petitioners raise claims concerning the enactment of the Amendment in the framework of the Arrangements Law in expedited legislative proceedings, and argue that the Amendment was born out of a coalition agreement without comprehensive ground work. These claims should be dismissed. As detailed by the respondents in their response, the Amendment emerged following the request of the Director General of the Ministry of Health in 2008, Prof. Avi Israeli, to the Ministry of Finance, in which he requested to examine the possibility of conditioning child allowances on various acts, including vaccination of children. In 2009, the issue was also introduced into the coalition agreements, but there is nothing wrong with that in itself. Following the request of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance carried out a review of similar arrangements around the world, as well as examined the vaccination data in Israel. The resulting position paper stated that the use of allowance conditioning around the world to increase school attendance and the use of preventive medicine has been proven to be effective. It further indicated that there is a phenomenon in Israel of not vaccinating infants, contrary to the Ministry of Health’s recommendation. An outbreak of tuberculosis in Israel in 2008 was mentioned, and it was emphasized that the Ministry of Health has no effective means to handle the said problem. The position paper proposed a model whereby receipt of child allowance would be conditioned upon regular attendance at an educational institution and receipt of the vaccines required by the child’s age and health condition. As part of the discussions in preparation for the Arrangements Law, several discussions regarding this proposal were held at the relevant ministries as well as before the Attorney General. In the course of these discussions, several changes were made to the model proposed by the Ministry of Finance. Later, a Government Resolution was made generally adopting the proposed model with certain changes, primarily the reduction in child allowances, rather than their denial, and the establishment of caps for the reduction in each family.

19.Following the Government Resolution, and contrary to the regular procedure in the framework of the Arrangements Law, the Ministry of Finance circulated a separate legislative memorandum in order to allow continued examination and detailed discussion on the issue. The memorandum was examined by various entities at the ministries, and the Ministry of Justice also forwarded its comments regarding the memorandum. In addition, the Finance Committee of the Knesset held a discussion on the memorandum and examined the arrangement established therein. Prior to the discussion, the committee members received an analysis on the matter prepared by the Knesset Research and Information Center, which also included positions opposing the proposed arrangement. Many entities from the various ministries and from the National Insurance Institute were present at the Committee’s discussion on June 24, 2009, as well as representatives of the Israel National Council for the Child, one of the petitioners at bar. The vaccination data in the various sectors in the State of Israel were presented to the members. On July 7, 2009, another discussion was held at the Finance Committee, and its members were informed of the removal of the condition of regular attendance at an educational institution. Finally, the Finance Committee approved the bill for a second and third reading. The law in its final version was approved by the Knesset on July 14, 2009 after a discussion that included specific reference to the issue at bar (see the Knesset minutes of July 13, 2009, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/plenum/data/02626209.doc#_Toc258334465).

20.In order to examine the petitioners’ claims regarding the legislative proceedings described above, it is necessary to mention the case law that held that intervention of this Court in parliamentary proceedings will be limited to cases in which “the legislative process causes deep harm to material values of the constitutional regime[.]” (HCJ 6784/06 Shlitner v. The Pensions Commissioner, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia (January 12, 2011)). The test that was set out is “whether the defect in the legislative proceeding goes to the root of the proceeding, and whether it harms basic values of the constitutional regime.” (Id). It was further held that an expedited legislative proceeding, such as the Arrangements Law, does not, in itself, lead to the striking down of the law. Even in such a case, the Court will examine whether there was a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding to an extent that justifies judicial intervention, and the consequence of such a defect in accordance with the severability model. (HCJ 4885/03 The Poultry Breeders in Israel Organization Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd. v. The Israeli Government [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 42 (hereinafter, “The Poultry Breeders Organization Case”); HCJ 3106/04 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 567). It was further held that “even if it were proven that the legislative procedure prevented the holding of an in-depth and exhaustive discussion and impaired the ability of Knesset members to formulate a well-established position with respect to each one of the issues included in the bill, this is not enough to justify judicial intervention.” (The Poultry Breeders Organization Case, on p. 50).

21.In the case at bar, there is no room for judicial intervention in the legislative proceedings of the Amendment. Contrary to the practice with the Arrangements Law, a separate legislative memorandum was circulated on the issue in question to the various ministries for their comments. In addition, as can be seen from the chain of events reviewed above, the issue was discussed and examined by various entities; various positions were heard, a report of the Knesset Research and Information Center was prepared and data were presented regarding the success of similar arrangements around the world. In the course of the discussions, the bill was modified, narrowed, and arrangements were added in order to reduce the harm to the entitled population. The issue was also raised in the discussion at the Knesset, and objections by various Knesset Members were heard regarding conditioning the child allowances on the vaccination of children. Indeed, there may have been room for a more in-depth discussion with a broader foundation. However, this is not a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding, and therefore there is no room for the Court’s intervention based on a defect in the legislative proceeding. (See and compare HCJ 494/03 Physicians for Human Rights – Israel v. The Minister of Finance [2004[ IsrSC 59(3) 322, 330 (hereinafter, “PHR Case”)).

Regarding the Content of the Legislation

22.Before examining the constitutionality of the Amendment, we must first state the essence and purpose of the child allowance arrangement. I will then review the standpoint of the Ministry of Health and medical science on vaccines in general, and specifically on the MMRV vaccine. These reviews will lay the foundation for examining the constitutionality of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. As part of this examination, I will examine the question, as customary, of whether constitutional rights established in Basic Law:

 

Child Allowance – the Arrangement and its Purpose

23.

24.Johnny Gal Taub Center  Social Policy Dan BenDavidEditor, 2010) (hereinafter, “Gal”); HCJFH 4601/95 Serossi v. The National Labor Court [1998) IsrLC 52(4), 817, 831; HCJ 6304/09 Lahav, The Umbrella Organization for Independent Businesspeople v. The Attorney General, Paragraphs 43-44 (September 2, 2010) (hereinafter, “Lahav Case”)). The social insurance system is supposed to ensure minimal dignified existence for all of its residents and to protect their standard of living. The system is based on the principle of social solidarity and mutual assistance. (LCA 7678/98 The Payment Officer v. Doctori [2005] IsrSC 60(1) 489, 525; Lahav Case, Paragraphs 44, 58). The purpose of the child allowances is to help families with children to bear the increasing costs of raising children. In fact, the child allowances to equalize the state of different-sized families whose level of income are equal. In addition, they help families not to fall below the poverty line due to the added expenses of having children, and protect the family against exposure to the social risk of a decline in the standard of living created as a result of expansion of the family. (Abraham Doron “The Erosion of the Israeli Welfare State in 2000-2003: The Case of Children Allowances”, Labor, Society and Law, 11 95, 106 (5766); Gal, on p. 254; Ruth Ben-Israel “Family and Social Security: From A Traditional Division of Labor to a New Division”, Menashe Shava’s book, 207, 215-216 (Aharon Barak & Daniel Friedmann eds., 2006)). Understandably, these allowances affect the welfare of the child in the family, and therefore one of the purposes of the allowance is to further the best interests of the child and caring for the children’s welfare. (NIA /04 Azulay v. The National Insurance Institute, the opinion of Deputy President E. Barak-Ussoskin (November 2, 2006) (hereinafter, “Azulay Case”); HCJ 1384/04 Betzedek – The American-Israeli Center for the Promotion of Justice in Israel v. The Minister of the Interior [2005] IsrSC 59(6) 397, 408 (hereinafter, “Betzedek Center Case”)).

25.The Competent Authority under the Invalids (Nazi Persecution) Law 5717-1957 [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 408 (hereinafter, “Sin Case”), Justice C. Cohen holds that the child allowances are not income of the insured parents, but rather escrow funds the mother is entrusted with to spend for the welfare of her children. Certainly, it was held, it is not income of the father, who does not receive the money, neither into his possession nor for his enjoyment. The Court added that “the legislator’s intention in allocating an allowance to children would be entirely thwarted and frustrated if the children’s allowance was deemed as income of their parents, and all types of authorities would be able to get a hold thereof and take it from the mouths of the children in order to collect payment from their parents.” (Sin Case, on p. 411; see also LCA 3101/00 Betiashvili v. The Competent Authority [2002] IsrLC 57(1) 183). Indeed, a ruling of the National Labor Court held that the person who is entitled to the child allowance is the insured parent and not the child directly, and that the parent does not hold the money in trust for his child in the legal sense. (Azulay Case, Paragraphs 4-5 of the opinion of Justice V. Wirth Livne). However, this Court has not ruled on the issue, and the petition filed on the opinion in the Azulay Case was dismissed in limine because it was theoretical, and did not state a position on the merits of the issue. (HCJ 967/07 Jane Doe v. The National Insurance Institute (April 29, 2007)). In addition, it should be noted that in the Azulay Case, a minority opinion was voiced by Deputy President E. Barak-Ussoskin. This position, which was based, inter alia, on the said judgments of this Court, asserted that the right to child allowance is granted to the child and not to the parent, and that the parent receives the allowance in trust in order to care for the welfare of the child.

In any event, I do not believe that we are required to decide this issue, but we should rather assume that the legislator, when determining the child allowances, had in mind the welfare and best interests of the children.

The Vaccination Program

26.The issue at bar mainly concerns the conditioning of part of the child allowance on vaccinating the child for whom the allowance is paid. Therefore, the purpose of the Vaccination Program in Israel should be briefly stated. As the respondents clarified, the professional position of the Ministry of Health is that vaccines are a means of utmost importance for protection of the health of children and of the general public. The vaccine system currently in place protects the population in general and children in particular from serious morbidity. The importance of the vaccines is not expressed merely in vaccinating children, but also in ensuring the vaccine is timely given, in accordance with the recommendations of the Ministry of Health. This was addressed in the past by Deputy President E. Rivlin:

“There is no doubt that compliance with the vaccination dates is of great importance, and it is the duty of the persons charged with it to ensure and verify that there is no unjustified delay in vaccinating infants. The schedule set for vaccinating infants was set for good reason, and it obviously must be adhered to with the utmost attention and the strictness required in such a matter.” (CA 9628/07 Shalom v. Clalit Health Services, Paragraph 6 (September 2, 2009)).

27.The Ministry of Health deems the vaccination of children to be of great importance on two levels: the first level concerns the protection of the health of the individual child receiving the vaccine. The respondents state that a vaccine is the only way to ensure protection of the individual from the diseases against which the children are vaccinated. They explain that in a world that has become a type of “global village,” there is a risk that any immigrant or tourist will bring with him diseases that are not currently found in Israel, and which may infect those who are not immunized against such diseases. The second level concerns what is termed “herd immunity.” Herd immunity protects individuals in the public who have not been vaccinated for justified reasons, such as newborn babies who have yet to reach the age in which the vaccine is administered, the elderly person whose immune system is not functioning properly, or other persons at risk with respect to their immune systems, such as people suffering from serious illnesses or undergoing chemotherapy. In addition, herd immunity protects the small percentages of individuals who were vaccinated but are not reacting to the vaccine. Herd immunity is only achieved when there is a high coverage rate of vaccinated individuals in society and so long it is maintained.

Herd immunity creates a unique characteristic with respect to the issue of children’s vaccination, since the individual decision of each parent as to whether or not to vaccinate his children has an effect on the entire public. In addition, a “free rider” problem may develop in this regard, whereby a parent will choose not to vaccinate his children on the assumption that herd immunity will protect them from the diseases against which the vaccines protect. A wide-scale phenomenon of free riders could harm the herd immunity and thus harm the general public.

28.It appears that the majority of the petitioners also recognize the importance of vaccines and their significant contribution to public health; the main dispute is about what measures should be taken in order to encourage the vaccination of children. However, the petitioners in HCJ 908/11 challenge this starting point, arguing that the effectiveness of vaccines and the severity of their side effects are in dispute. It appears to me that this position cannot change the said starting point. It seems that the position of the Ministry of Health regarding the importance of vaccines is a prevalent and very common position in Israel and around the world. (See e.g. Avraham Sahar “Opportunity Makes the Thief...” Beliefs, Science and the Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law, 5750-1989” Medicine and Law 36 on p. 105 (2007) (hereinafter, “Sahar”); Bilhah Kahana “The Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law – A Law that is Not Enforced” Medicine and Law 38 on p. 14 (2008)). Insofar as we are aware, to date no causal link has been scientifically proven between vaccines and neurological or other damages. However, medical science recognizes that vaccines, or to be precise, the fever caused in some children as a result of vaccination, can create a risk and cause damage to a very small percentage of children with a certain genetic predisposition who receive a vaccine. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether, even if the vaccine had not been given, damage could have been caused as a result of another fever-inducing disease. (See Tali Sagi “Comments on the Article “Opportunity Makes the Thief - Beliefs, Science and the Vaccine Victims’ Insurance Law”” Medicine and Law 36 on p. 116 (2007)). In addition, there is broad consensus that even if there is a certain risk, it is very small, and that the benefit resulting from the vaccine is much greater:

“The risk entailed in receiving the vaccine, even though it does in principle exist, is very distant and rare, while the benefit and necessity of the vaccine to the health of the child are not doubted” (CA 470/87 Eltori v. The State of Israel – The Ministry of Health [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 146, 153).

Examples from Israel and around the world can illustrate this risk. When the public immunization level declines, usually due to fears raised by vaccine opponents, there are reports of outbreaks of epidemics which were ostensibly extinct, causing severe injuries. This was the case in Britain after the rate of persons immunized against pertussis dropped to approximately 30% in early 1980; a pertussis epidemic broke out leading to the hospitalization of approximately 5,000 children and the death of twenty-eight children (Sahar, on p. 106). In Israel, an outbreak of measles occurred in 2003 among a population that did not habitually vaccinate. Within two weeks, sixty children fell ill, out of whom one child passed away from the disease. Another outbreak occurred in 2007-2008 after a sick tourist arrived from England. The disease spread among a non-immunized population and within several months 1,452 cases of measles were reported.

29.It should further be noted that the case law holds that the administrative authority, and certainly the legislative authority, may rely on expert opinion, even if there is a contradicting opinion, and the court will honor the authority’s decision between the contradicting opinions. “When a law is based on a matter within professional expertise, the fact that there are contradicting opinions on such issue does not justify striking it down.” (HCJ 6976/04 The “Let the Animals Live” Association v. The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Paragraph 11 (September 1, 2005) (hereinafter, “LAL Case”); see also HCJ 1554/95 Gilat Supporters v. The Minister of Education and Culture [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 2, 19; HCJ 4769/95 Menachem v. The Minister of Transport [2002] 57(1) 235, 271 (hereinafter, “Menachem Case”)). Understandably, had there been a well-established and prevalent position among medical experts believing that the risks from the vaccines exceed the benefit, it would have affected the constitutional analysis of the Amendment being examined before us. However, this is not the factual situation. As I stated, the prevalent and recognized position worldwide is that the benefit derived from the vaccines immeasurably exceeds the risk inherent therein. (See e.g. . This position has opponents, but it appears that they are the relatively marginal minority. Therefore, this will be the starting point for the continuation of our discussion.

The MMRV Vaccine

30.As mentioned above, according to the Amendment to the National Insurance Law, the Director General of the Ministry of Health is required to publish a program of the vaccinations required. The child allowance will be reduced only for parents who have not vaccinated their children with the vaccines included in the program published. This program currently includes only one vaccine, the MMRV, also known as the quadrivalent vaccine, which is given to infants at the age of one year in a single dosage. Another dose is given to children in first grade, but this dose is not included in the Vaccination Program published. It is therefore appropriate to provide some details on this vaccine.

31.The quadrivalent vaccine, as its name suggests, protects against four diseases: measles, mumps, rubella and chicken pox. The vaccine is common in many countries worldwide. All European countries recommend a vaccine against measles, mumps and rubella. The vaccine against chicken pox is recommended in the United States, Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Latvia, and Japan.

32.Measles is a serious childhood disease. The disease may cause serious complications in the respiratory airways and in the nervous system. Approximately one third of patients will develop complications such as otitis media, diarrhea and keratitis. Rarer complications are pneumonia and encephalitis (one in 1000 cases). A very rare complication of the disease, which may appear approximately ten years after its manifestation, is a complication that manifests as a degenerative disease of the brain called subacute sclerosing panencephalitis and which causes serious and irreversible damage to the central nervous system, including mental deterioration and seizures. The risk of complications is higher among children under the age of five, among adults over the age of twenty, and among patients with a suppressed immune system. 1-3 children of every 1,000 patients die from the disease. Worldwide, measles is responsible for approximately twenty-one percent of mortality resulting from diseases preventable by vaccines. Measles is highly contagious, and a person who is not immunized and is exposed to a patient has a general risk of 90% of being infected. The vaccine against measles is very effective. 95% of children who receive the vaccine at the age of one develop antibodies against the disease, which give them long-term immunity. A few lose the protection against the disease after several years, and to address that, a repeat vaccine was introduced in Israel to be administered at school age. It should further be noted that in outbreaks of measles in Israel, the highest morbidity rates were of infants below the age of one, as they were not vaccinated against the disease.

33.Measles manifests in swelling in the salivary glands and in the glands beneath the ear lobe, sore throat, high fever, headaches and weakness. In approximately ten percent of patients, meningitis may develop, which manifests in vomiting and headaches. A common complication among adults is orchitis; more rare complications are an infection in the joints, thyroid, kidney, cardiac muscle, pancreas and ovary, deafness and other complications in the nervous system. Manifestation of the disease in a pregnant woman in the first trimester causes an increased rate of spontaneous miscarriage. The disease is more severe among adults and the rare mortality from the disease is mainly among this group. The vaccine against the disease is very effective. 80% of persons vaccinated with a single dosage are protected, and 90% are protected after receiving 2 doses.

34.Rubella may, in certain cases, cause complications such as encephalitis, which is more common in adults, and hemorrhaging due to a decline in the number of platelets, a phenomenon common mainly in children. Among women in the first months of pregnancy, rubella may harm the developing fetus and cause the death of the fetus or severe birth defects, which include eye defects that cause blindness, heart defects, deafness, defects in the nervous system which cause behavior disorders, and mental disability.

35.Chicken pox manifests in a high fever accompanied by a rash with blisters. Complications of the disease are pneumonia and encephalitis, a severe bacterial infection of the skin, a decline in the number of platelets and in rare cases hemorrhaging, kidney dysfunction, and even death. The disease is more severe among adolescents and adults, and is especially serious among persons with suppressed immunity who cannot receive the vaccine. Cases of death from chicken pox have been described among children treated with corticosteroids, which are frequently given as a treatment for other diseases (such as asthma). Contracting chicken pox in the first twenty weeks of pregnancy may cause birth defects in the eyes, limbs, skin and nervous system. Contracting the disease shortly after birth is especially dangerous for a newborn. Patients who have recovered carry the “varicella-zoster” virus in a dormant state in their body. This virus may, years later, or when the immune system is weakened, cause an outbreak of a disease called “herpes zoster.” This disease causes severe local pain which may last for a long time. The vaccine results in the development of protection in 85% of the persons vaccinated at the age of one year. The vaccine protects against a serious disease with complications, and giving two doses leads to a very high protection of 97%, to a point where it is impossible to identify chicken pox.

36.With respect to the MMRV vaccine, the vaccination coverage in Israel among the general population was on average 90% between the years 2006 and 2009. It should be noted that according to what we have been told, the position of professionals is that to achieve “herd immunity” with the MMRV vaccine, the vaccination coverage required in the population is approximately 95%.

Now that the factual foundation has been laid, the legal aspect shall be built upon it.

Examination of the Constitutionality of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law

37.We should first reiterate what is known: that the Court will not be quick to intervene and repeal statutory provisions enacted by parliament. In this regard, the court must exercise judicial restraint, caution and reserve:

“Indeed, striking down a law or part of it is a serious matter, not to be taken lightly by a judge. Striking down secondary legislation for conflicting with a statute is not the same as striking down primary legislation for conflicting with a basic law. By striking down secondary legislation, the judge gives expression to the desire of the legislator. By striking down primary legislation, the judge frustrates the desire of the legislator. The justification is that the legislator is subject to supra-statutory constitutional provisions, which he himself set. (See A. Barak “Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of a Statute”, Law and Governance C 403 (5756)). Nevertheless, considerable judicial caution is required.” (LAL Case, Paragraph 9).

However, I do not accept the respondents’ position that the judicial restraint required in this case is similar to that required for constitutional review in areas of economy and finance. As is known, case law mandates that this Court exercise particular restraint in areas of economy and finance, which involve far-reaching social and economic aspects. It has been held that the authorities entrusted with the economic policy should be allowed broad leeway “as the entities in charge of determining the comprehensive policy, and bearing the public and national responsibility for the State’s economy and finance.” (Menachem Case, on p. 263; see also HCJ 8803/06 Ganei Chuga Ltd. v. The Minister of Finance, comments of Justice Procaccia (April 1, 2007); Lahav Case, Paragraph 63). In the case at bar, although the Amendment to the National Insurance Law is part of the Arrangements Law, it is not a law whose essence is budgetary or economic. Although this is a socio-public matter, this is not what was meant by the special judicial restraint mentioned. As the respondents emphasized, the purpose of the Amendment is not economic and is not monetary savings. On the contrary, the purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that no child loses his allowance, since the purpose is that all children be vaccinated. Hence, I do not believe that the said case law applies to this matter. It is, however, clear the judicial restraint and reserve required by the mere constitutional review of an act of the Knesset also apply to the case before us.

38.As is known, constitutional review is divided into three stages. At the first stage, it is necessary to examine whether the law in question violates constitutional rights enshrined in the basic laws, and in the case before us, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter, “Basic Law”). If the answer is negative, the constitutional review ends and it should be held that the law in question is constitutional. If the answer is affirmative, it is necessary to proceed to the second stage at which we examine whether the violation satisfied the conditions set in the Limitation Clause in Section 8 of the Basic Law. In order for the law to be declared constitutional, the violation must satisfy all of the conditions set forth in the Limitation Clause. If one of the conditions is not met, it is necessary to proceed to the third stage, which is the stage of the remedy for the unlawful violation. (HCJ 2605/05 Human Rights Unit v. The Minister of Finance, Paragraph 16 of the opinion of President Beinisch (November 19, 2009); HCJ 10662/04 Hassan v. The National Insurance Institute, Paragraph 24 of the opinion of President Beinisch (February 28, 2012) (hereinafter, “Hassan Case”); Lahav Case, Paragraph 75). As held in the Hassan Case, this method of constitutional analysis will be identical both when we are concerned with civil and political rights and when we are concerned with social and economic rights. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 31 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

We shall begin, therefore, at the first stage of constitutional review and examine whether, as the petitioners claim, the Amendment to the National Insurance Law indeed violates rights enshrined in Basic Law. In this framework, we will specify three principal rights that the petitioners mentioned in their pleadings: the right to a dignified life or the right to social security, the right to autonomy, and the right to equality.

The Violated Rights: The Right to a Dignified Life

39.Nowadays, no one disputes that the human dignity enshrined in Basic Law also includes the right to a minimal dignified existence, including both the positive and negative aspects of the right. This right means that “a person will be guaranteed the minimum of material resources that will allow him to sustain himself in the society in which he lives[.]” (HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. The Minister of Finance [2005] IsrSC 60(3) 464, 482 (hereinafter, “CPSJ Case”)). It was held that this right is at the core and nucleus of human dignity:

“Living in starvation and without shelter, while constantly searching for handouts, is not a dignified life. A minimal dignified existence is a condition not only to preserving and protecting human dignity, but also to exercising other human rights. There is no poetry in a life of poverty and deprivation. Without minimum material conditions, a person lacks the ability to create, aspire, make his choices and realize his freedoms.” (Hassan Case, Paragraph 35 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

It was further held that the right to a dignified life is not a right derived from the right to human dignity, but a right that constitutes a tangible manifestation of human dignity. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of President Beinisch; CPSJ Case, on p. 479).

40.The right to a dignified life is protected by the State using a variety of measures, systems and arrangements, and there is no doubt that the welfare legislation and allowances of the National Insurance Institute constitute a considerable and significant part of the realization of this right. The child allowances also constitute an additional tool to realize the right, since families living in poverty due to, inter alia, the expenses of raising children, can gain much assistance from these allowances and rise above the threshold that enables a dignified life. It should indeed be kept in mind that child allowances are universal allowances given according to the make-up of the family, and are not dependent on the family income. Therefore, the object of realizing a dignified life will not always be relevant to these allowances, compared to income assurance, for example, which is an allowance whose main purpose is to create a lasting safety net for families that need it. (Hassan Case, Paragraph 44 of the opinion of President Beinisch). However, there might be cases in which families on the edge of the last safety net will fall below it if they are denied the child allowance. The assumption is that “the gamut of the welfare arrangements granted in Israel provide the ‘basket’ required for a minimal dignified life.” (Hassan Case, Paragraph 46 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

41.Despite the aforesaid, I believe that in the case at bar, the petitioners have not presented a sufficient factual foundation to prove the existence of a violation of the right to a dignified life resulting from the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. As is known, a person who claims a violation of a constitutional right bears the burden of proving such violation. (Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation 374 (Vol. 3, 1994)). The petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that after examination of the range of services provided to the family, reduction of the child allowances will cause harm to the dignity of families whose material living conditions will fall short. At the very least, and under the lenient approach, they should have presented individual cases that indicated the alleged harm; then, the burden of proof would have shifted to the State. (See the comments of President Beinisch in the CPSJ Case, on p. 492-493; HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, Paragraph 48 of the opinion of President Beinisch (June 14, 2010) (hereinafter, “Yekutieli Case”)). In the CPSJ Case, it was held that the mere reduction, even if it is a significant reduction, in income assurance allowances, does not in itself  prove a violation of the right to a dignified life, and it is necessary to examine the gamut of services and arrangements granted as a safety net in the State of Israel. “The examination is always concrete and consequential.” (CPSJ Case, Paragraph 19 of the opinion of President Barak; see also PHR Case, on p. 334; HCJ 10541/09 Yuvalim S.D.I. Ltd. v. The Israeli Government (January 5, 2012)).

42.The above is all the more relevant to the case before us. First, the petitioners did not point to any data proving their claim regarding the violation of the right to a dignified life of families to whom the Amendment will apply. The reduction in the child allowance cannot, in and of itself, establish a foundation for proving the violation. “The right to dignity, as well as the right to a dignified life, is not the right to a monthly allowance in a certain amount.” (CPSJ Case, on p. 485).

Second, this case concerns child allowances, distinguishable from income assurance allowances. As I stated, while the central purpose of the latter is to create a safety net for the realization of the right to a dignified life, this is merely one of the purposes of the child allowance. Therefore, while there are grounds to assume that denying income assurance allowance for reasons other than the existence of different sources of income violates, under the appropriate circumstances, the right to a dignified human existence of the person whose allowance was denied (see Hassan Case, Paragraph 46 of the opinion of President Beinisch), it is difficult to make a similar assumption with respect to the denial of the child allowances, and certainly with respect to their reduction. The case of child allowances therefore requires even more data-based proof of the violation of the right to a dignified life.

Third, and perhaps most important, most of the reduction in the child allowances for families who do not vaccinate their children is made after an increase of a similar amount of the child allowance, as it was prior to the Amendment. The Amendment increased the child allowance for the second, third and fourth child by NIS 100 per month for each child. At the same time, the reduction due to non-vaccination is NIS 100 per month for each child. It should be emphasized that for a family with more than three children the reduction is capped by the Amendment at NIS 300 per month, such that the reduction will be paralleled by a NIS 300 per month increase of the child allowances for that family (for the second, third and fourth children). The increase was also taken into account for families with two or three children, because for these families the maximum reduction will be NIS 100 and NIS 200 per month, respectively, equal to the increase in the child allowances that these families will receive. The only difficulty pertains to a family with a single child. In such a family, a reduction may be made in the sum of NIS 100 per month if the child is not vaccinated with the MMRV vaccine without such family receiving an increase in the child allowance to which the family is entitled. However, even with respect to such a family, it cannot be said that a violation of the right to a dignified life has been proven. As said above, data showing such a violation for a family of this type was not presented. In the absence of data, it may also be assumed that families with one child are less at risk of deprivation compared to large families. (See data thereon in the article of Yoram Margalioth “Child Allowances”, the Berenson Book on 733, 747-748 (5760)). Finally, weight should be given to the fact that even for such a family, the child allowance to which the family is entitled is merely reduced and not fully denied. In any event, “a deduction from a person’s income . . . is not the same as not granting a benefit.” (Betzedek Case, on p. 409). Where the main reduction is made following an increase of a similar amount in the allowance, it should be deemed as not granting a benefit, not as a deduction from a person’s income.

The conclusion is therefore that the Amendment does not violate the right to a dignified life.

43.I should note that insofar as the petitioners claim a violation of the right to social security, as distinguished from the right to a minimal dignified existence, they did not provide any support for its existence as a constitutional right, and made no argument as to the content of such right as distinguished from the right to a minimal dignified existence. This Court has not yet discussed the status and scope of the right to social security in Israeli law. (See HCJ 5578/02 Manor v. The Minister of Finance [2004] IsrSC 59(1) 729, 737 (hereinafter, the “Manor Case”); PHR Case, on p. 333). The petitioners did not expand on this issue, and it appears that some of them did not specify the differences between the two rights at all. Hence, I saw no room to discuss the issue of violation of this right separately. This is also the case with respect to the claim of violation of the property right. The question of whether the constitutional right to property applies to child allowances has not yet been decided in the judgments of this Court. (See the comments of Justices (formerly) Grunis and Rivlin in the Manor Case). The petitioners in HCJ 7245/10 raise this claim in a laconic and unsubstantiated manner, and I therefore also did not expand on this claim. In addition, I should note that the contractual assertion raised by the petitioners should be dismissed. No link is required between the insurance contributions collected by the National Insurance Institute and the allowances paid to entitled persons in respect of the various grounds for entitlement. (Lahav Case, Paragraph 57). Therefore, no harm is caused to the expectation of parents who pay national insurance contributions and whose child allowance will be reduced as a result of not vaccinating their children and a fortiori when the reduction in the child allowances almost fully corresponds to the increase in the amount of the allowance by the Amendment.

The Violated Rights – The Right to Autonomy and Parental Autonomy

44.The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 raised, at the center of their arguments, the violation of the right to autonomy, the right to parental autonomy and the right to parenthood. “One of the most important basic values is the value of the individual’s freedom of will” (Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – General Theory of Interpretation, 301 (vol. 1, Ed. 3, 1998)). This value of autonomy constitutes part of human dignity and is constitutionally protected by the Basic Law (HCJ 4330/93 Ganam v. The Israel Bar Association [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 221, 231 (hereinafter, the “Ganam Case”)). The meaning of the right to autonomy is the right of every individual to decide on his actions and wishes, according to his choices, and to act according to such choices:

 A person’s right to shape his or her life and fate encompasses all the central aspects of his or her life: place of residence, occupation, the people with whom he or she lives, and the content of his or her beliefs. It is a central existential component of the life of every individual in society. It expresses recognition of the value of every individual as a world unto him or herself. It is essential for the self-determination of every individual, in the sense that the entirety of an individual’s choices constitutes his or her personality and life.

(CA 2781/93 Ali Daka v. Haifa “Carmel” Hospital [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 526, 570 (hereinafter, the “Ali Daka Case”). The right to autonomy is a framework right from which many other rights are derived. (See Ganam Case; HCJ 7357/95 Barki Feta Humphries (Israel) Ltd. v. State of Israel [1996] 50(2) 769; see also Ali Daka Case, on p. 572). The importance of the right to autonomy was recognized especially in the context of giving or avoiding medical treatment, and it gives rise to a separate cause of action which entitles the claimant to damages. (Ali Daka Case).

45.One of the aspects of the right to autonomy is the right to parental autonomy. Parents are the natural guardians of their children. (Section 14 of the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962 (hereinafter, the “Legal Capacity Law”)). As such, they have the “obligation and the right to care for the needs of the minor, including his education, studies, training for work, occupation, and employment, as well as preserving, managing and developing his assets; also attached to this right is the permission to have custody of the minor and authority to represent him and to determine his place of residence.” (Section 15 of the Legal Capacity Law). The parents are obligated to ensure the “best interests of the minor [in the way that] devoted parents would act under the circumstances.” (Section 17 of the Legal Capacity Law). This Court’s rulings have recognized a very broad autonomy of parents in raising their children. Several reasons are presented as underlying this recognition. First, this recognition derives from the natural connection between a child and his parents. Second, it is commonly assumed that the parents, who are in charge of the family unit and know it from every aspect, will make the best decisions for the children. The supplementary assumption is that outsiders will not always be able to make the best decisions for the minor because the decisions often entail emotional aspects. Third, often these are issues on which there is no social consensus. Finally, the fact that the parents are those who will need to cope with the practical repercussions of the decision is taken into account. (LCA 5587/97 The Attorney General v. John Doe – Minor, PDI [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 830, 860 (1997)). However, it should be emphasized that the autonomy of parents vis-à-vis their children is not absolute and is limited by the principles of the child’s best interests and his rights.

46.Nevertheless, I do not believe that any harm to autonomy or parental autonomy will be recognized as constitutional harm which requires compliance with the terms and conditions of the limitation clause. Obviously, the closer the harm is to the core of the right, the greater the inclination to recognize it as constitutional violation. (See the comments of Deputy President Rivlin in CA 8126/07 The Estate of the Late Bruria Tzvi v. Bikur Holim Hospital (January 3, 2010)). “Overexpansion of the extent of the constitutional right should be avoided. Sweeping expansion of the limits of the constitutional right at the first stage, and “automatically” proceeding to the tests of the limitation clause in any case in which it is argued that legislation violates that right, may lead, in the overall balance, to an erosion of the protection granted by the basic laws.” (Hassan Case, comments of Justice U. Vogelman). It appears to me that two parameters may be examined to determine whether or not the violation will be recognized as a constitutional violation of the right to autonomy. First, the essence of the choice denied the individual should be examined. The more the harm to autonomy pertains to aspects concerning personal expression and self-realization of the person, the greater the inclination to deem it as a violation of a constitutional right. Denying a citizen of the State the possibility to marry the love of his life is not the same as denying another the option to choose the type of facilities that will be installed in the public park next to his home. A second parameter that should be examined in my opinion is the extent of coercion and denial of will. A prohibition that entails a criminal sanction is different from the denial of a minor financial benefit.

47.In the case at bar, I am not convinced that a violation of the constitutional right to autonomy or to parental autonomy has occurred. Even if I assume that the first parameter regarding the essence of the choice denied is met, the second parameter regarding the extent of the coercion is not fulfilled. The Amendment does not create an obligation to vaccinate children, nor does it impose a criminal sanction on non-vaccination. The monetary reduction that accompanies non-vaccination of children is not high and can range between NIS 100 and NIS 300 per month at most. Even if I do not disregard the fact that for some families this amount is significant, as mentioned above, it is, for the most part, a reduction of the same amount that was added to the child allowances in the Amendment to the National Insurance Law. Hence, I do not believe that the reduction in the Amendment may be deemed to violate the right to autonomy in its constitutional sense.

The Violated Rights: The Right of Equality

48.Much has already been said in the rulings of this Court on the right of equality, its status and importance, and it has been widely extolled:

The principle of equality is one of the building blocks of the law and constitutes the backbone and ‘life-blood’ of our entire constitutional regime. (Justice Landau in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. The Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693, 698; HCJ 4805/07 Israel Religious Action Center of the Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. The Ministry of Education, Section 70 of the opinion of Justice A. Procaccia (July 27, 2008) (hereinafter, “IRAC Case”); HCJ 11956/05 Bashara v. The Minister of Construction and Housing (December 13, 2006)). The right of equality was recognized in our legal system in the early days of the State, when it received a place of honor in the Proclamation of Independence, and it was further established in various laws that were enacted by the Knesset over the years, and in the case law of this Court, which deemed it a ‘regal right’ and a principle which is ‘high above the other principles’.” (HCJ 2671/98 The Israel Women’s Network v. The Minister of Labor and Social Welfare [1998] 52(3) 630, 650; HCJ 2911/05 Elchanati v. The Minister of Finance, Section 17 of the opinion of Justice E. Hayut (June 15, 2008)); APA 4515/08 State of Israel v. Neeman, Paragraph 17 of my opinion (October 6, 2009) (hereinafter, “Neeman Case”)).

And elsewhere I stated:

            “It appears that no one disputes that equality is the keystone of a democratic regime and a central aspect of the relations between the individual and the State. No society can be maintained in a democratic state without equality, which is one of the derivatives of justice and fairness. Equality is a synonym for justice and fairness, as it appears to members of society in a certain period. Equality leads to justice, equality whose path is fairness. (See HCJ 7111/95 Federation of Local Authorities in Israel v. The Knesset [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 485, 502)” (HCJ 6298/07 Rasler v. The Israeli Knesset, Paragraph 18 of my opinion (February 21, 2012)).

The importance of the right of equality has been recognized and emphasized numerous times with respect to the distribution of budgets or resources of the State. “The resources of the State, whether land or money, as well as other resources, belong to all citizens, and all citizens are entitled to benefit from them according to the principle of equality, without discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex or any other prohibited consideration.” (HCJ 1113/99 Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164, 170).

49.The right of equality, which creates the duty not to discriminate, does not mean equal treatment for everyone. It is a complex right which results from the fact that the common concept of equality seeks to give equal treatment for equals and unequal treatment for unequals. Equality does not require things to be identical. (HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61 (1) 619, 677 (hereinafter, the “MQG Case”). Not every difference between people justifies distinguishing between them, but only a difference that is relevant to the matter in question. (HCJ 200/83 Veted v. The Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 113, 119 (hereinafter, the “Veted Case”)). “The difference between wrongful discrimination and a permitted distinction depends, as is known, on whether a relevant difference exists between the groups that received different treatment from the authority.” (HCJ 6758/01 Lifshitz v. The Minister of Defense [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 258, 269; Yekutiel Case, Paragraph 35, 37 of the opinion of President Beinisch). In order to determine that the right of equality has been violated, it is necessary to examine who is the group of equals for the purpose of the matter at hand. The group of equals will be decided according to the purpose of the examined norm and the nature of the matter and the circumstances, as well as in accordance with common social conceptions. (HCJ 8300/02 Nasser v. The Israeli Government, Paragraph 37 (May 22, 2012) (hereinafter, the “Nasser Case”; Neeman Case, Paragraph 18 of my judgment; MQG Case, on p. 677; HCJ 1213/10 Nir v. The Speaker of the Knesset, Paragraph 14 of the opinion of President Beinisch (February 23, 2012) (hereinafter, the “Nir Case”; HCJ 4906/98 “Free Nation” for Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education & Culture v. The Ministry of Construction and Housing [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 503, 513); Veted Case, on p. 119, 122; Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 36 of the opinion of President Beinisch).

In the case before us, it appears to me that it is possible to say that the right of equality   has been violated. As described above, child allowances are universal allowances that are granted to every family according to its composition. Their purpose is to assist in financing the expenses of raising children, and to prevent the family in general and the children in particular from becoming impoverished. Therefore, adding a condition to the receipt of the allowance that is dependent on the vaccination of the family’s children is foreign both to the structure of the allowance and to its purposes. Indeed, the child allowance serves the best interests and welfare of the children, and the assumption is that vaccinating the children is also in their best interests and protects their health. It is still a stretch to say that the condition is naturally integrated with this allowance. The main and natural condition to receiving the allowance is the number of children. Additions and conditions beyond that (apart from conditions such as residency, and without going into the issue of conditioning the allowances on income) would be foreign to the allowance, and therefore violate the right of equality. The fact that the allowances are intended for the best interests of the children also has repercussions for the determination that the right to equality has been violated. In fact, children whose parents decide not to vaccinate them are harmed twice, both by their non-vaccination and by the decision to reduce the allowances intended for their benefit. The equality group, therefore, is all parents who are insured pursuant to the National Insurance Law.

50.The petitioners argue that in principle, the national insurance allowances, the main purpose of which is social-welfare, should not be made contingent upon conditions intended to regulate behavior and achieve other social objectives that do not have a direct and close connection to the allowance granted. They emphasized that the allowances are not a prize for proper behavior. They also raise an understandable concern about the expansion of the conditions to the point of absurdity. Will it be possible to condition the granting of child allowances on the parents not smoking? On maintaining proper nutrition? On installing bars on home windows? Where will the line be drawn between behavior that ought to be encouraged through the conditioning of child allowance and that for which conditioning will not be the correct and constitutional tool? (See the comments of Members of the Knesset at the Finance Committee’s discussion on June 24, 2009).

51.“The main purpose of social insurance is to realize the State’s obligation to ensure a minimum standard of living for all of its residents, so that no person falls below the threshold of a dignified life. Social insurance, and the statutory frameworks intended to realize it, are an important component in realizing the idea of a society based on foundations of justice, equality and social care for the needy.” (Lahav Case, Paragraph 44; Johnny Gal

52.However, our work does not end here. Since we are concerned with primary legislation of the Knesset, it is necessary to examine the issue and ask whether the violation of equality in this case is a violation in the constitutional sense, i.e. whether it amounts to a violation of the right to human dignity enshrined in the Basic Law. “The Knesset has broad discretion in the task of legislation, and there are situations in which broader protection may be afforded against a violation of equality caused by an administrative authority than to one inflicted by the legislator.” (Nasser Case, Paragraph 43). In the MQG Case, an interim model was adopted for interpretation of the term human dignity in the Basic Law:

The interim model does not limit human dignity merely to humiliation and contempt, but it also does not expand it to all human rights. According to this model, human dignity includes those aspects of human dignity which find, in various constitutions, manifestation in special human rights, and are characterized by having, according to our perception, a pertinent and close connection to human dignity (whether at its core or in its margins). According to this approach, human dignity may also include discrimination that is not humiliating, provided that it is closely related to human dignity as expressing the individual’s autonomy of will, freedom of choice and freedom of action, and other such aspects of human dignity as a constitutional right.

(MQG Case, on p. 687). Not every violation of equality, therefore, amounts to a constitutional violation. In order to prove a violation of the constitutional equality, it is necessary to demonstrate that the violation of equality has a pertinent and close connection to human dignity (whether at its core or in its margins). (See also Nir Case, Paragraph 11 of the opinion of President Beinisch; HCJ 9722/04 Polgat Jeans Ltd. v. The Israeli Government (December 7, 2006); HCJ 8487/03 IDF Disabled Veterans Organization v. The Minister of Defense [2006] IsrSC 62(1) 296, Paragraph 23; Nasser Case, Paragraph 44; Lahav Case, Paragraph 76).

53.It appears that the discrimination in this case violates the constitutional right of equality as part of human dignity. The fact that a small group of residents is excluded from the group of all residents with children because of its choice not to vaccinate its children violates the human dignity of this group. The gap created between the two groups creates a sense of discrimination of the latter group, and has a close connection to human dignity. (See, similarly, Lahav Case, Paragraph 92). The violation is comprised of both the lack of respect for the belief or choice of this group not to vaccinate its children for various reasons, and the sense that other parents, whose actions may harm the best interests of their children or the best interests of the public in other ways, continue to receive full child allowances. The sense is that the legislator focused specifically on this group and on this social objective, which is the only one for which a condition is imposed on the child allowances, harming the dignity of the chosen group. (See Nasser Case). The consequence that this reduction has on the distinction between groups of children also contributes to the conclusion that the right of equality has been constitutionally violated.

However, it appears that there is no need to rule on this issue, in light of my conclusion that the above violation satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause. I will proceed, therefore, to examine the violation through the lens of the limitation clause in Basic Law.: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

The Limitation Clause

54.It is well known that the right of equality, like other rights, is not an absolute right, and as such it requires a balancing with other rights and interests relevant to the issue in question. This balance is formed in the limitation clause set forth in Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

President Barak stated the importance of the limitation clause in the MQG Case:

This provision plays a central role in our constitutional structure. It is the foothold on which the constitutional balance between the individual and the general public, between the individual and society, rests. It reflects the concept d. (See D. Hodgson, Individual Duty Within a Human Rights Discourse (2003)). It reflects the concept that the human rights set forth in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are not absolute but rather relative. They are not protected to their full scope. The limitation clause emphasizes the concept that the individual lives within the confines of society, and that the existence of society, its needs and tradition, may justify a violation of human rights. (See re. United Mizrahi Bank Case, p. 433; re. Investment Managers Bureau Case, p. 384; APA 4436/02 Ninety Balls – Restaurant, Members Club v. The City of Haifa, PDI IsrSC 58(3) 782, 803 (hereinafter, “re. Ninety Balls Case”) (re. MQG Case, on p. 691-692).

55.The limitation clause contains four conditions, only upon the cumulative fulfillment of which will the non-constitutionality of the prejudicial law be prevented. The first condition is that the violation of the human right was made in or by a law or by virtue of explicit authorization therein. The second condition is that the prejudicial law befits the values of the State of Israel. The third condition is that the prejudicial law is intended for a proper purpose. The fourth condition is that the law violates the right to an extent no greater than is required.

56.There is no dispute that the first condition is satisfied. In addition, the petitioners did not raise claims with respect to the satisfaction of the second condition. Therefore, all that remains is to examine the existence of a proper purpose and the proportionality test.

57.“The purpose of a law that violates human rights is proper if it is intended to achieve social objectives that are consistent with the values of the State in general, and exhibit sensitivity to the place of human rights in the overall social fabric.” (MQG Case, on p. 697). It was further held that the more important the right violated, and the greater the harm, the stronger the public interest needed to justify the violation. (MQG Case, on p. 698-700; Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 44 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Nir Case, Paragraph 19 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Hassan Case, Paragraph 55 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Part of the petitioners’ claims regarding the satisfaction of the proper purpose condition focuses on the violation alone and not on its purpose. In addition, the petitioners argue that the purpose of increasing the vaccination rate is extraneous to the purpose of the allowances and may create a dangerous precedent of reducing allowances on various grounds. As I stated above, I do not believe that every conditioning of allowances is prohibited, and the fear of a slippery slope is a matter for the proportionality test. It appears to me that the purpose of increasing the rate of vaccination among children is a proper purpose which promotes an important social objective of caring for public health in general and children’s health in particular. The purpose underlying the Amendment does not focus only on children that have not yet been vaccinated, but also on additional populations that may be harmed as a result of non-vaccination of such children, including newborn infants whose time to be vaccinated has yet to arrive, populations who are unable to be vaccinated for various medical reasons, a certain percentage of the population whom the vaccination does not protect, despite being vaccinated, etc. As stated above, the diseases against which the vaccines protect might cause serious complications that compromise a person’s health and in rare cases might even cause his death. In this sense, the purpose of the Amendment has a close connection to the right to health and life. Therefore, even if we say that the Amendment seriously violates an important right, the purpose of the Amendment is sufficiently strong and important to justify the violation.

58.I further add that the purpose of the Amendment also expresses the principle of mutual guarantee. A separate question is whether encouraging vaccination could be deemed as a proper purpose if we were concerned only with the best interests of the children who have not yet been vaccinated. However, the purpose does not concern only the best interests of the children who have not been vaccinated or whose parents do not intend to vaccinate them, but the best interests of a broader population, as described above. The non-vaccination of such children may have an effect not only on their health and life, but on the health and life of a broader population. The principle of mutual guarantee, alongside the said purposes, justifies deeming the purpose of the Amendment as a proper purpose. It should be noted that this principle is not extraneous to the National Insurance Law, but rather, as I already mentioned, underlies it, albeit in a different context.

The conclusion is therefore that the proper purpose condition is satisfied. All that remains is to examine is whether the violation meets the proportionality test of the limitation clause.

59.The determination that the purpose of the violating law is proper does not mean that all of the measures taken to achieve it are legitimate. The end does not always justify the means. (Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 47 of the opinion of President Beinisch). The proportionality test was created for this situation. The test is divided into three subtests, all three of which must be satisfied in order to hold that the violation is proportionate. The first subtest is the “compatibility test” or the “rational connection test”. In accordance with this test, a connection of compatibility is required between the end and the means. The second subtest is the less harmful means test. According to this test, the legislator is required to choose a measure which achieves the legislative purpose and which least violates the human right. The third subtest is the proportionality test in the narrow sense. It examines the proper relation between the benefit derived from achievement of the proper purpose and the scope of the violation of the constitutional right.

60.It appears to me that the Amendment satisfies the rational connection test. It should be noted that several means might achieve the end. In addition, there is no need to prove that the means will definitely achieve the end, and a reasonable degree of probability of achieving the end is sufficient. (MQG Case, on p. 706; Hassan Case, Paragraph 59 of the opinion of President Beinisch). It should further be emphasized that there is no requirement that the means chosen achieve the end in full, and partial achievement, not minor or negligible, of the purpose following the use of the means chosen is sufficient. (Nir Case, Paragraph 23 of the opinion of President Beinisch; Hassan Case, Paragraph 59 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Indeed, it is impossible to know for certain whether the Amendment will achieve its objective and whether the percentage of vaccinated persons will rise significantly and create “herd immunity”, or at the very least create a broader protection for the public. However, it is possible to say that there is a sufficiently high probability that such objective will be achieved. The respondents presented data regarding the success of similar programs in countries worldwide and about the support of the World Bank for such programs. (See also Gal, on p. 256-257; report of the Knesset Research and Information Center of June 23, 2009 regarding increasing and conditioning the child allowances). In addition, data was presented regarding a similar program implemented in Israel that made the receipt of maternity allowance contingent upon delivery in a hospital in order to reduce the phenomenon of home births. The respondents report that following this legislation, the number of home births in Israel decreased significantly. Past experience therefore indicates a substantial probability of achieving the objective with this measure. It should also be added that the assumption is that some parents who do not vaccinate their children are not acting based on ideological reasons, and that there is a “free rider problem” whereby parents are in no hurry to vaccinate their children and rely on the vaccination of the entire public to protect their children against outbreaks of diseases. The respondents also indicated the difficulty of late vaccination of children, which the Amendment might solve by incentivizing parents to vaccinate their infants on time. Finally, I note that after the Amendment is implemented and real data collected regarding its repercussions, it will be possible to reexamine the reality created, and it might transpire that this reality does not meet the rational connection test or another proportionality test. (See HCJ 9333/03 Kaniel v. The Israeli Government [2005] IsrSC 60(1) 277, 293).

61.The Amendment, in my mind, the second subtest, the less harmful means test. It should be kept in mind for the implementation of this test that the court does not put itself in the shoes of the legislator, and that it will intervene only when it is convinced that the expected purpose may be achieved through the use of less harmful means –

When examining the severity of the violation and whether there is a less harmful means through which it is possible to achieve the purpose of the legislation, the court does not put itself in the shoes of the legislator. The assumption underlying the test of need is that there is maneuvering space in which there may be several methods for achieving the objective of the legislation, from which the legislator can choose one method. So long as the chosen method is within this maneuvering space, the court will not intervene in the legislator’s decision. The court will be prepared to intervene in the method chosen by the legislator only where it is possible to demonstrate that the harm is not minimal, and that the purpose of the legislation may be achieved through the use of less harmful means.”

(Yekutieli Case, Paragraph 45 of the opinion of President Beinisch). Indeed, there is a range of means for achieving the purpose of encouraging vaccination. Some of these means are more harmful than the means adopted by the legislature, and therefore are irrelevant for the purpose of the test in question. This is the case with respect to criminal sanctions on anyone who fails to vaccinate his children, as proposed by some of the petitioners, and for denying school attendance for those who cannot provide confirmation of vaccination, as is done in the United States. (James G. Hodge & Lawrence O. Gostin, “School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social and Legal Perspectives” 90 Ky. L.J. 831 (2001-2002)). It should further be emphasized that the economic sanction used in the Amendment is very similar to the denial of a benefit, since in the majority of cases, the reduction that will be made in the child allowance of parents who have not vaccinated their children is equal to the increase in the child allowances in the same Amendment. The petitioners refer to additional means that concern informational activities and increasing accessibility to Family Health Centers. With respect to informational activities, this is certainly an appropriate means, but it is included and precedes implementation of the Amendment itself. The respondents stated that a campaign is planned for informing the population about the law, in which the importance of vaccination will also be emphasized. Obviously, the sanction of reduction of child allowances will not be used against those who are convinced by the informational activity and vaccinate their children. Therefore, the informational means is also incorporated into the means chosen. The concern, of course, is that the informational means are insufficient in view of the vaccination “market failure,” whereby, as aforesaid, a child who is not vaccinated may be protected against the outbreak of diseases due to the vaccination of the population around him, but this failure may cause the non-vaccination of a certain population, which will cause the outbreak of an epidemic therein.

62.Regarding the accessibility of the Family Health Centers, this difficulty pertains to the Bedouin population in the Negev, and mainly to the population of the unrecognized villages in the Negev. Due to this difficulty, which the respondents recognize, the implementation of the Amendment was postponed in order to make arrangements and increase the accessibility of Family Health Centers to this population. However, the steps specified in the respondents’ response are satisfactory with respect to the level of accessibility achieved and the efforts being made to further increase it. The respondents report that there are currently forty-five Family Health Centers spread throughout the southern district, twenty-five of which service the Bedouin community: thirteen centers in permanent settlements, eight portable centers for the Bedouin villages, and centers in the Jewish settlements which also service the Bedouin population. There is also a special mobile family health unit to provide vaccinations for the Bedouin population. This mobile unit travels every day through a different location in the unrecognized villages and is intended to vaccinate children of families who have not visited Family Health Centers. The unit is operated five times a week between 8:00 and 16:00. Three centers in Bedouin settlements which were closed have been reopened and a petition filed on the matter was dismissed with consent. (HCJ 10054/09). The respondents are also working to encourage hiring of male and female nurses for Family Health Centers in the south and in the Bedouin settlements. To this end, it was decided to increase the financial incentive for such personnel, to add administrative personnel and security positions for the centers, and to add positions to make the services accessible to the population that finds it difficult to come to the centers. In June 2011, an incentive plan was formed for the personnel of the Family Health Centers in the Bedouin sector in the south of Israel, including payment of an encouragement bonus, payment of a persistence bonus, reimbursement for rent in certain cases, consideration for travel time to and from work, increased overtime pay, and provision of a mobile telephone to nurses. The respondents further state that mediators are brought in to make the services culturally accessible, and their role includes providing information about the importance of early registration with a Family Health Center. A special program financed by the Ministry of Health was established at Ben-Gurion University to train nurses from the Bedouin sector. The program’s students undertake to work in the Bedouin sector upon completion of their studies.

The current data regarding vaccination of the Bedouin population in the Negev with the MMRV vaccine should also be taken into account. According to the data, the vaccination rate for this vaccine in the Bedouin population is higher than in the Jewish sector, the rate in the unrecognized villages is 90%, and in the permanent settlements 93.5%.

It therefore appears that the less harmful means for achieving the purpose of encouraging vaccination have been exhausted, and the next step on the ladder for achieving the purpose may be at the economic level, as was done in the Amendment. The second subtest is therefore also satisfied.

63.The last question that we must ask is whether we ought to go one step further on the ladder, after previous steps have not yet achieved the desired objective. This is an ideological question, which is based on principles of balance and examines the relationship between the benefit in achieving the proper purpose and the damage that will be caused by the violation of human rights. (See MQG Case, on p. 707; Hassan Case, Paragraph 69 of the opinion of President Beinisch). In my opinion, the Amendment also satisfies this test. We should not disregard the harm that will be caused to parents who do not wish to vaccinate their children, who will be discriminated against compared to the group of child allowance recipients and will either need to be satisfied with a reduced allowance or act against their will and vaccinate their children. There is also difficulty in the distinction that may be created between strong groups in the population which can allow themselves to waive part of the child allowance in order to realize their desire not to vaccinate their children and weak groups which will be forced to choose between aggravated poverty and waiving their desire not to vaccinate their children. Conversely, consideration should be given to the fact that the violation of equality in this case is not arbitrary and is not based on any suspect distinction between different sectors. In addition, the harm was limited to reduction of the child allowance, and was also limited to a maximum amount that can be reduced. Further arrangements in the Amendment, including a right of appeal, prior notice, and increasing the allowances after vaccination also support the proportionality of the violation. On the other side is the benefit, as I have already stated, that may be significant and important to the health of those children who have not yet been vaccinated, and more importantly, to the public at large. The effect of each and every individual on the public justifies a balance which harms the individual to a limited and restricted extent for the benefit of the public. It is impossible to ignore that the individual lives within society and sometimes his acts or omissions impact the society around him:

A person is not solitary individual. The person is a part of society. (HCJ 6126/94 Sanesh v. The Broadcasting Authority, on p. 833). A person’s rights are therefore his rights in an organized society; they concern the individual and his relations with others. (HCJ 5016/96 Chorev v. The Minister of Transport, on p. 41). Hence, a person’s dignity is his dignity as a part of society and not as an individual living on a desert island. (Cr.M 537/95 (hereinafter, “Cr.M Ganimat”), on p. 413; LCA 7504/95 Yassin v. The Registrar of Political Parties, on p. 64; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, on p. 365)” (hereinafter, the “CPSJ Case, on p. 496-497).

A balance is therefore required between the rights of the individual and the best interests of society, a balance, which in my opinion, is proportionate in the case at bar, and within the bounds of proportionality afforded to the legislator.

Conclusion

  1. The constitutional examination of the Amendment to the National Insurance Law revealed that the Amendment indeed violates the right of equality enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. However, this violation satisfies all of the terms of the limitation clause, such that a proper balance is struck with other rights and interests. Hence, the Amendment is proportionate and this Court will not intervene. I will mention that this Court does not examine what it would have done in the legislator’s shoes and what its preferences would have been in such a matter, but merely examines whether the legislator’s choice is within the boundaries of the range of proportionality available to the legislator. (See HCJ 1715/97 The Bureau of Investment Managers in Israel v. The Minister of Finance, [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367, 386). I mentioned that most of the reduction in the child allowances will be executed simultaneously with the increase in the allowances set in the Amendment. I further noted the importance attributed to the vaccination of the children, not only for the health of the children themselves, but also for the health of the environment, society and the public. Thus, the conclusion I have reached is that the violation resulting from the Amendment satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause and therefore, the petition should be denied. I did not see fit to an order for costs.

If my opinion is heard, the petition will be denied and as aforesaid, there will be no order for costs.

 

  •  

Justice D. Barak Erez

  1. The petitions before us raised fundamental issues pertaining to the manner in which the State fulfills its responsibility for the health of the public in general and the welfare of children in particular. They also raised the basic issue of conditioning rights and eligibilities. In general, I concur with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Arbel, and I too believe that the petition should be denied. Nevertheless, I wish to clarify my position with respect to some of the reasons that support this conclusion.

The Legal Issues

  1. In fact, the discussion of the issue that has been placed before us—conditioning a part of the child allowances on the children’s vaccination within an amendment to a law—raised several secondary issues. The first question concerns the examination of the essence and legal status of the child allowances, the conditioning of which is at the center of our discussion. Specifically, the question in this context is whether the eligibility for child allowances is an “ordinary” legal right, conferred merely by a law, or whether it constitutes a manifestation of constitutional rights. Insofar as the argument is that the child allowances embody constitutional rights, it is necessary to examine what is the constitutional right they represent. This question is important because the violation of a constitutional right is not tantamount to the violation of a legal right that does not enjoy a super-statutory status. The second question revolves around the essence and purpose of the condition for granting the allowance: the requirement to vaccinate the children as infants. As part of this question, it is necessary to examine what is the purpose of the vaccination requirement is and whether there is a link between this purpose and the objective of the child allowances. The third question focuses on the legal regime that applies to the conditioning of rights. This question is related to the first question, since the conditioning of legal rights and the conditioning of constitutional rights should not be addressed in the same manner. The fourth question is whether the distinction that was made in legislation between parents who vaccinate their children and parents who do not amounts to a violation of the constitutional right of equality. The fifth question, derived from the former questions, is how the above normative scheme affects the constitutional judicial review of the amendment to the law, in accordance with the constitutional tests of the limitation clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Child Allowances: History and Purpose

  1. As we mentioned, the first question with which the discussion should begin revolves around the essence and objective of the child allowances, as were set in the National Insurance Law. (5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “National Insurance Law”). Because the basis for a discussion on constitutional review of the validity of a law is the status of the right violated, we should begin and by examining if, and to what extent, the eligibility to receive a child allowance is a right that enjoys constitutional protection.
  2. My colleague, Justice Arbel, articulated the purpose of the child allowances as part of the fabric of Israel’s social legislation. To this I would like to add a review of the historic development of the arrangements in the field, a development that sheds light on the ongoing use of the child allowances as a tool for promoting of social policies.
  3. In general, the child allowances were subject to many changes from the time they were first introduced in the format of legislation until the regulation thereof in our time. Generally speaking, a clear process of strengthening the universal element in granting the allowances can be pointed out. The intention is to grant child allowances to each and every family for each of its children, without taking into consideration economic data or other distinguishing criteria (distinct from past practice when they were only granted to some families or some children based on distinguishing criteria).
  4. Before the establishment of the State, payment to parents for their children was made in the form of an increase to the employees’ salary. (See Johnnie Gal, Social Security in Israel, 97 and 102 (2004) (hereinafter, “Gal”)); Abraham Doron “Policy on Child Allowances in Israel” Spotlight on Social Policy Series 1, 2 (2004) (hereinafter, “Doron, the “Allowances Policy” ”)).
  5. After the establishment of the State in 1950, the Kanev Committee submitted the Inter-Ministerial Report on Social Security Planning (1950), which included reference to a “children’s grants” plan (See Abraham Doron, In Defense of Universalism –The Challenges Facing Social Policy in Israel, 128-129 (1995) (on the report and its importance)). The report determined that this plan would only be implemented in the last stage of the introduction of social insurance in Israel because its performance was not economically feasible in the immediate future. Nevertheless, striving to increase the birth rate in Israel, the then prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, introduced a monetary prize to families with ten children and more. (Gal, on p. 103). Starting from the early 1950’s, proposals were made to grant allowances, and in the second half of that decade, the government began to demonstrate preparedness to consider the idea. (Meir Avizohar, Money to All – The Development of Social Security in Israel 67 (1978) (hereinafter, “Avizohar”)).
  1. The first piece of legislation that dealt with child allowances was adopted in 1959 as an amendment to the National Insurance Law. (National Insurance Law (Amendment) (No. 4), 5719-1959 (hereinafter, “Amendment 4”)). The initiator of the legislation was the Minister of Labor, Mordechai Namir (hereinafter, “Namir”). In the background was a mass immigration from Middle Eastern countries that included large families whose breadwinners did not, at the time, adequately integrate into the labor market. The legislative initiative was thus derived from the social-economic gap created between the immigrant families and long established families in Israel, which were characterized by a smaller number of children on average. (Knesset Minutes 27, 2693-2642 (1959); Giora Lotan, Ten Years of National Insurance – An Idea and its Fulfillment 38 (1964)). Some argue that the Wadi Salib events in 1959 were a material catalyst to the enactment of the law (Gal, on p. 103, Avizohar, on p. 68-70) and this appears to have partial support in a discussion that was held in the Knesset (Knesset Minutes 27, 2642 (1959)). More generally, it can be said that the payment of the allowances was the first stage of a process that increased the involvement of the National Insurance Institute in reducing poverty and economic and social gaps in the population. (Ester Sharon, The Child Allowances System in Israel: 1959-1987 Where did it come from and where is it going? 3 (1987) (hereinafter, “Sharon”)).
  2. The allowance payments were consistent, in principle, with the basic principles of national insurance in Israel, in the sense that they were granted on a universal basis, independent of income level. However, the allowance was initially granted only to families with at least four children, and only for children under the age of fourteen. (Michal Ophir and Tami Eliav, Child Allowances in Israel: A Historical View and International Perspective (2005) (hereinafter, “Ophir and Eliav”)). Minister Namir explained that these conditions were imposed for budgetary reasons, and that the aspiration was to lay down an infrastructure that would be expanded gradually. The deliberations on the scope of Amendment 4 were not particularly heated despite reservations on its small scope. Knesset Members supported Amendment 4 and expressed their hope that the terms of eligibility would be expanded in the future, and that it would presently succeed in encouraging births, eradicating poverty and enforcing equality among the various groups in Israeli society. (Knesset Minutes 27, 2667-2680 (1959)).
  3. In 1965 the child allowances were expanded in several respects. First, the allowances were paid for all minor children, with no age distinction (that is, until the age of 18). Second, the allowance paid by the National Insurance Institute was accompanied by an employees’ children allowance that was only paid to salaried employees by their employers for their first three children, and was financed by the National Insurance Institute. Therefore, this allowance, unlike the regular child allowance, was deemed as taxable income. (See: The National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 12), 5725-1965, Statutes 461, 208; The National Insurance Regulations (Employees’ Children Allowance) (Part-Time Employees and Employment Seekers), 5725-1965 which were promulgated by virtue of Sections 31K and 115 of the National Insurance Law, 5714-1953; Gal on p. 103). In addition, in the early 1970s, an additional allowance was introduced for families with four or more children, if a family member served in the security forces (hereinafter, the “Military Veterans Allowance”). This payment was made directly from the National Insurance Institute and was exempt from tax. (Regulations on Grants to Soldiers and their Families, 5730-1970, Regulations 2605, 2180, promulgated by virtue of Section 40(B1)(2) of the Discharged Soldiers Law (Reinstatement in Employment), 5709-1949). In 1975, this payment was expanded to also apply to families with three children. (Regulations on Grants to Soldiers and their Families (Amendment), 5735-1975, Regulations 3298, 1001). Over the years, payments were also made to additional families, who did not fulfill the statutory condition of a military service; ultra-orthodox families received additional payments from the Ministry of Religion and families of new immigrants received such payments from the Jewish Agency. (Gal, on p. 104; Eliav and Ophir, on p. 5-6; Yoram Margaliot “Child Allowances” Berenson Book, Second Volume – Beni Sabra 733, 745 footnote 40 (Editors, Aharon Barak and Haim Berenson, 2000) (hereinafter, “Margaliot”)).
  4. We can therefore summarize that in general, in the first half of the 1970’s, financial support was provided to relatively large families in several formats: first, universal child allowances were given by the National Insurance Institute; second, additional allowances were given in the Jewish sector to families for their children (whether Military Veterans Allowances or other allowances); third, employees’ children allowances were paid to salaried employees by their employers, and were taxed. These mechanisms were added, of course, to other welfare payments to which the families were eligible based on their individual economic condition. Additionally, families with a relatively high income enjoyed tax benefits which took the family size into consideration. However, this benefit was only enjoyed by families with a relatively high income, whose income was taxed. The incompatibility at the time between the various benefits and the understanding that families with many children constitute a more impoverished group together were a catalyst to a reform in the system. (The National Insurance Bill (Amendment Number 12), 5733-1972, Government Bill 1022, 30; The Amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance Bill (Number 18), 5733-1972; The Government Bill 1022, 31; The National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 12), 5733-1973, Statutes 695, 142; Raphael Rotter, The Reform in Child Allowances in Israel (1972); Arieh Nitzan, Twenty Years of National Insurance in Israel (1975) (hereinafter, “Nitzan”)).
  5. The policy with respect to allowances underwent further turmoil following the recommendations of the Ben-Shahar Committee on the subject of the income tax reform in 1975. (Report of the Committee for Tax Reform – Recommendations for Changes to the Direct Tax, 25A-26A (1975)). Pursuant to the committee’s recommendations, the double treatment of the child allowances—within tax law and national insurance law—was discontinued, and it was decided to grant tax-free allowances on a universal basis to all families of salaried and non-salaried employees for all children in the family, starting with the first child, until they reach the age of 18. (National Insurance Law (Amendment Number 17), 5735-1975, Statutes 773, 152; Sharon, on p. 9-11).
  6. The trend of expanding eligibility changed in the 1980’s to the desire to reduce public expenditure. The scope of allowances was reduced. In addition, the child allowances for the first two children, in families of up to three children with a marginal tax rate on the main breadwinner’s salary of at least 50%, were taxed. (Amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance (Number 59) Law, 5744-1984, Statutes 1107, 64; Sharon, on p. 11-12). In 1985 a tax was also imposed on the child allowance for the third child in families with up to three children and the marginal tax rate was reduced. In addition, the universal payment of the child allowance for the first child was revoked, except for low-income families. (The Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985, Statutes 1159, 20; Sharon, on p. 12-13). The 1985 arrangement was supposed to remain in effect for only one year, but it “survived” (with various changes pertaining to the income test’s threshold amount) until 1993. (Ophir and Eliav, on p. 8; Sharon, on p. 12-13).
  7. The pendulum swing child allowances policy continued in full force in the 1990’s. At first, the trend of reducing the universality which characterized the granting of the allowances at the end of the last decade continued, and the eligibility of small families not defined as “in need” was significantly reduced. Later, the trend was one of expansion, while strengthening universality in granting the allowances. In this decade, the following changes occurred: the conditioning of eligibility for the allowance on the family size was revoked; the Military Veterans Allowances were gradually cancelled; the allowances for large families were gradually increased. (The Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy (Amendment Number 15), 5750-1990, Statutes 1328, 188; The Arrangements in the State Economy Law (Legislative Amendments), 5751-1991, Statutes 1351, 125 (Indirect Amendment to the Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985); The Income Tax Law (Temporary Order), 5753-192, Statutes 1407, 22 (Indirect Amendment to the Arrangements Law for an Emergency in the State Economy, 5746-1985); The Arrangements in the State Economy Law (Legislative Amendments for Attaining the Budget Goals), 5754-1994, Statutes 1445, 45 (Indirect Amendment to the Discharged Soldiers Law (Reinstatement in Employment), 5709-1949); Dalia Gordon and Tami Eliav “Universality v. Selectivity in the Granting of Child Allowances and Results of Performance Limitations” 50 75, 78 Social Security (1997) (hereinafter, “Gordon and Eliav”)).
  8. The turmoil continued, even more forcefully, in the following decade. In 2001, the child allowance rate for large families was significantly increased—starting with the fifth child. However, shortly thereafter, a gradual cutback began in all allowances, including the child allowances, in order to reduce public expenditure. Another fundamental change that occurred in this period was equalizing the allowance given for each child in the family, irrespective of his birth order. At the same time, the attempt to reinstate the Military Veterans Allowances failed. (See Doron “The Allowances Policy”, on p. 4; Abraham Doron “Multiculturalism and the Erosion of Support for the ‘Welfare State’: The Israeli Experience” Studies on the Revival of Israel 14 55, 63-64 (2004)); Knesset Research and Information Center, Child Allowances in Israel: A Historic Review – an Update 8 (2008)).
  9. The issue before us is related to an additional stage in the development of the policy on child allowances within Amendment No. 113 of the National Insurance Law, which was enacted as part of the Economic Streamlining Law. (Legislative Amendments for Implementation of the Economic Plan for 2009 and 2010), 5769-2009 (hereinafter, the “Amendment”)). As part of the Amendment, the allowances for the second, third and fourth child in the family were gradually increased by 100 shekel per month for each child, and eligibility to receive the full amount of the allowance was made contingent on the vaccination of the children.
  10. This short historical review of the eligibility for child allowances reveals several important things. First and foremost, it demonstrates how eligibility for child allowances has always served as a platform for the promotion of national public objectives (for example, the encouragement of births and reduction of social gaps), which go beyond the narrower purpose of supporting the family’s finances. For example, in a discussion held in the Knesset on Amendment 4, which gave rise to the child allowances for the first time, Minister Namir stated the following:

The law was intended to achieve three goals that are social demographic and economic in nature: a) to ease the difficulties in the social condition of weak parts of society; b) to stop signs of negative trends in our demographic development c) to remove several errors and anomalies in the field of employment and distribution of wages in the factories, in relation to the employees’ family status.” (Knesset Minutes 27, 2639 (1959)).

  1. The legislative history also demonstrates the fact that over the years, the child allowances expressed a different and changing welfare policy. In other words, the tool remained one, but into it were cast various objectives, or at least secondary objectives. The goal of reducing poverty among children hovered, throughout the year, over legislation concerning the child allowances indirectly and directly. However, in each of the periods reviewed, alongside the purpose of eradicating poverty stood additional purposes. In fact, even Amendment 4, which gave birth to the child allowances, was intended to provide a response, according to its legislators, to demographic data regarding births in Israel. An additional purpose at the time was bridging the social gaps created between various groups of immigrants in order to promote their integration in Israel.
  2. The recurring oscillation between the expansion of eligibility for allowances for small families, and its reduction for large families, marks the tension between the perception that, in general, the State’s role is to contribute towards the cost of raising children ,together with their parents (Doron “The Allowances Policy”, on p. 2), and the perception that child allowances provide a way to fulfill other roles the State has taken upon itself, such as reducing unemployment and gaps in society and encouraging births. (Margaliot, on p. 734-754). In practice, we have learned that child allowances constituted, throughout the years, a means of realizing various social and economic goals that were placed at the top of the political agenda in each period. For our purposes, it is important to note the following information: child allowances are supposed to promote the welfare of families raising minor children. However, the child allowances are not paid in correlation with the family’s economic situation (and in this they differ from income assurance payments). (Compare: HCJ 5578/02 Manor v. The Minister of Finance [2004] IsrSC 59(1) 729 (hereinafter, “Manor Case”), in which former President A. Barak referred to the old-age pension and held that unlike the income assurance allowance, this one is not intended to guarantee a dignified minimal existence). At most, it might be said that they are provided according to the estimated needs of families raising children. (Compare: Abraham Doron, The Welfare State in an Age of Change 72 (1987)). Additionally, the purpose of promoting the economic welfare of families who are raising children is not the sole purpose of the allowances.
  3. Thus, it can be determined that in view of the many aspects of eligibility for child allowances, as well as the changes it has undergone through the years, the objective of the allowances is a broad objective of striving to promote the welfare of the children in the Israeli society, as well as to promote the social policy of the government at a given time. This insight is important in continuing the discussion on the legal status of the allowance.

Child Allowances: Legal Rights or Constitutional Rights

  1. Child allowances are currently given by virtue of a law—the National Insurance Law. Does the right to receive child allowances as it they are granted today constitute an exercise of a constitutional right? Like my colleague, Justice Arbel, I too believe that it was not proven before us that this is correct at this time.
  2. The ruling on this issue is relevant to the continuation of the constitutional examination process, since the conditioning of the legal means for exercising the constitutional right is not tantamount to the conditioning of the constitutional right itself. Indeed, without legal means for exercising the constitutional right, the right may remain as an empty normative shell, void of content. There may certainly be situations where either the conditioning or denial of the means to fulfill the constitutional right will amount to a violation of the right itself. However, this should be examined in each and every case. This can be compared to a two-story building: on the upper floor is the constitutional right itself; on the lower floor are the means for its fulfillment. Too severe of an injury to the foundations of the lower floor, by conditioning or otherwise, will result in harm to the upper floor, the floor of the constitutional right, and undermine protection. Thus, the question is whether the petitioners have successfully shown that conditioning eligibility for child allowances amounts to a violation of a constitutional right. Additional examples that illustrate the importance and relevance of this distinction can be found in case law regarding the violation of the right of access to the courts. For example, it has been held that a person does not have a vested right to exercise the right of access to the courts through a specific procedural proceeding. Therefore, limiting the ability to file a class action does not necessarily amount to a violation of the right of access to the court. (See and compare: HCJ 2171/06 Cohen v. The Chairman of the Knesset, paragraphs 21 and 24 (August 29, 2011)).
  3. Child Allowances and the Right of Dignity – Indeed, this Court’s rulings have repeatedly emphasized that the protection of the right to a dignified human existence falls within the scope of the protection of the right of human dignity enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and that its protection is identical to the protection given to the other basic rights. (HCJ 366/03 The Association for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. The Minister of Finance, [2005] IsrSC 60(3) 464, 482-484; HCJ 10662/04 Hassan v. The National Insurance Institute (February 28, 2012), paragraphs 34-36 (hereinafter, “Hassan Case”)). However, a distinction should be drawn between the constitutional right and the legislative and administrative means that are used for its fulfillment. The right to dignified human existence does not have to be fulfilled through the payment of child allowances, and in the present legal situation it is not even clear that this is the purpose for which they are paid. As a matter of policy, and in order to promote various national public objectives, the Israeli legislature has chosen to provide for the welfare of families with children, irrespective of their economic situation.
  4. In legislative conditions in which the State does not provide a means of existence for weakened populations, payment of child allowances may, de facto, guarantee their dignified existence. Nevertheless, at this time, it has not been proven to us that eligibility to receive child allowances was intended to maintain a dignified human existence or that it is essential to its protection, and therefore, under these circumstances, conditioning the eligibility is not in itself conditioning of a constitutional right. Nothing in the aforesaid negates the possibility to prove that, in a specific case, or following other changes in the welfare system in Israel, cutbacks in child allowances will violate the rights of individuals to basic conditions of a dignified existence. As mentioned, this has not been argued before us and was consequently not proven. It should be added that Section 68(c) of the National Insurance Law orders an increase in the regular child allowance payment for the third and fourth child when the parent is eligible for an income assurance allowance or support payments through National Insurance, but the amendment to the law before us has no ramifications on this special increment and does not derogate therefrom.
  5. Child Allowances and the Right to Property – The petitioners also argued that the eligibility for child allowances is a property right protected by the constitutional protection of property under the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, through application of such protection to “new property.” Indeed, through the years, the term “property” has been attributed a broader and more realistic understanding. Currently, rights vis-à-vis the State (the right to a license, the right to an allowance) are no less important to a person’s financial situation than classic rights of property, and their importance may even exceed that of classic property rights, as demonstrated by the scholar Reich in his classic article on the issue. (Charles Reich, New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964)). The legal protection of new property was also recognized in the judgments of this Court. (See HCJ 4806/94 D.S.A. v. The Minister of Finance, [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 193, 200-202; HCJ 4769/95 Menachem v. The Minister of Transport [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 235, 275), which also recognized certain welfare allowances as new property (Manor Case, on p. 739). However, recognizing rights vis-à-vis the State as property cannot be identical in all characteristics to the protection of traditional rights of property. When the State wishes to expropriate a plot of land owned by a person it is a violation of property that requires constitutional justification and is required to satisfy the tests of the limitation clause. It would be improper to apply precisely the same legal regime to a situation in which the State is seeking to reduce eligibility given to a person by the State treasury. The eligibility for child allowance payments for example, expresses, inter alia, the economic and social policy in place at the time the eligibility was granted. Adopting the approach that the scope of eligibility for an allowance as it was set in the past has become a property right in its classical sense, would lead to the conclusion that the State is very limited, more than it should be, in the possibilities available to it to change its social and economic policy. (Compare: Daphne Barak Erez, Administrative Law, Volume A, 50-52 (2010) (Barak Erez, Administrative Law); Daphne Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer – Law and Government in a Changing State 32-33 (2012) (hereinafter, “Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer”). This perception is contrary to the democratic perception to practical needs, and to the justified recoiling from “sanctifying” the status quo (which occasionally may also reflect unjustified bias toward strong groups that acted in the past to enact laws that benefitted them). Obviously, if the eligibility for child allowances was required for the protection of dignified human existence, this would have been a good reason to impose restrictions on its reduction. In addition, rights to receive allowances from the State must be protected in that they must be granted equally and changes to them must take into consideration legitimate reliance upon them. Furthermore, there may be room for additional distinctions such as a distinction between an allowance based on an insurance mechanism or a feature of savings via mandatory payments that were made over the years (such as an old-age pension; see Manor Case, on p. 739), and an allowance that was granted in the form of a one-time grant (compare Daphne Barak Erez “The Defense of Reliance in the Administrative Law” Mishpatim 27, 17 (1996); HCJ 3734/11 Haim Dudian v. The Knesset of Israel, paragraphs 24-25, (August 15, 2012)). In any event, the argument that “what was will be”, in itself, cannot be sufficient.
  6. To emphasize further, holding that there is no constitutional right to receive support from the State in the form of child allowances, does not mean that this eligibility is not significant. Moreover, once the State has chosen to pay child allowances under law, it is required to do so in a manner that complies with constitutional standards and in this context to ensure, among other things, that payment of the allowances will be made equally and indiscriminately (as distinct of course, from the setting of legitimate conditions to the receipt of the allowances), as will be explained below.
  7. As Justice Arbel mentioned, the argument regarding violation of rights was also raised before us with a special emphasis on an alleged violation of the rights of the children for which the allowances are to be paid, separately from their parents’ rights. This argument is supported by the current perception that recognizes children’s rights and does not merely support a paternalistic protection of their interests. (Compare: CA 2266/93 John Doe, Minor v. John Doe [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 221, 251-255; Yehiel S. Kaplan “The Child’s Rights in Israeli Case Law – The Beginning of the Transition from Paternalism to Autonomy” Hamishpat 7 303 (2002)). This development is indeed very significant. Nonetheless, under the circumstances of this case, it cannot change the framework of the discussion. First, it is important to note that the distinction between the rights of children and protecting their best interests without asking their opinion is important in situations where it is possible to consider the child’s autonomy of will. However, our case focuses on young infants who, undisputedly, cannot take an autonomous and rational stance on the question of whether to be vaccinated. It should be emphasized in this context that the statutory scheme explicitly orders the continued payment of the allowance even if the children were not vaccinated, once the early infancy period proper for vaccination passes. Second, the petitioners’ argument regarding the amendment’s violation of the child’s rights was made generally without stating which of the rights has been violated. The discussion we conducted clarifies that the contingent reduction of the child allowances does not violate, in itself, a constitutional right, including constitutional rights of children (unless it will be invalid for another reason, such as discrimination, an issue that will be examined separately below). To a certain extent, the argument of a violation of the children’s rights in this case wishes to repeat the argument regarding the violation of the parents’ autonomy to make decisions with respect to their children’s best interests. This tension frequently underlies decisions on the best interests of children and repeatedly arises, for example, in relation to decisions regarding the children’s education. (Compare: Yoram Rabin, The Right of Education 121-124 (2002)).

The Objective of the Vaccination Requirement: Between Rights and the Public Interest

  1. Based on all that has been said thus far with relation to the legal status of the child allowances and the objective underlying them, it is necessary to address the second question regarding the objective of the Amendment that conditions part of the eligibility for the allowance on vaccinating the children.
  2. The policy on the vaccination of young children is currently considered a very important tool in the protection of children’s health – both from the aspect of each child’s right to good health and the aspect of the public interest in eradicating epidemics which claimed many victims in the past. (See for example: David E. Bloom, David Canning & Mark Weston, The Value of Vaccination, 6 World Economics 15 (2005); Saad B. Omer and others, Vaccine Refusal, Mandatory Immunization, and the Risks of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 360(19) New England J. Medicine 1981 (2009)). The State of Israel has excelled since its establishment in operating Family Health Centers, which were an important element in ensuring the population’s health. This public health operation ensured the vaccination of children, for their benefit and for the benefit of the population as a whole.
  3. Through the years, criticism was voiced against the sweeping policy of child vaccination. Some parents refrain from vaccinating their children for various reasons—both because of a belief that vaccinations are dangerous to children’s health and because of a position that prefers “natural” immunization, acquired over the years via “natural” contraction of diseases. So long as those refraining from vaccinations are a minority, choosing this alternative is ostensibly a rational alternative for the relevant persons because of the effect known as “herd immunization;” that is, the phenomenon wherein those who are not vaccinated are in fact protected from contracting diseases when most of the people around them are properly vaccinated. Thus, there is a risk of free riders here, and if it increases it may eventually compromise “herd immunity,” which weakens as the rate of non-vaccinated persons rises. In fact, the decision to vaccinate has characteristics of the “prisoner’s dilemma:” it is a decision that must be made in conditions of uncertainty with regard to the acts of others, and whose benefit from the perspective of the individual also depends on the behavior of such others. Individuals facing the decision whether to be vaccinated will always tend not be vaccinated (provided that others are being vaccinated), purely out of promotion of self-interest. This is a classic case of a “market failure” that justifies intervention. (See also Christine Parkins, Protecting the Herd: A Public Health, Economics, and Legal Argument for Taxing Parents Who Opt-Out of Mandatory Childhood Vaccinations, 21 S. Cal. Interdisc. L. J. 437 (2011)). De facto, there is a decline in child vaccination. The professional opinion of the Ministry of Health, supported by clear professional opinions on the matter, is that the decline in child vaccination constitutes a health risk, both to the children themselves and to the population as a whole (due to the risk of contracting diseases from children who were not vaccinated and later contract serious diseases).
  4. The new Amendment to the law was intended to provide a response to the problem presented above. This problem is also present in other countries, and a spectrum of responses to situations of non-vaccination of children can be pointed to. (See in general: Daniel Salmon and others, Compulsory Vaccination and Conscientious or Philosophical Exemptions: Past, Present and Future, 367 Lancet 436 (2006)). Among the well-known examples, the United States and France represent a rigid approach to the enforcement of the vaccination obligation. In France, the Code of Public Health (Code de la Sante Publique) states that parents and guardians of children are personally responsible for their vaccination, and proof of proper vaccination must be presented upon the child’s acceptance to an educational institution. (Section L3111-2 of the code). Alongside the aforesaid obligation, criminal sanctions of up to six months imprisonment and a fine were set forth. (Section L3116-4 of the code). A mandatory vaccination policy is also common in the United States. The means employed, as well as the scope of the limited exemptions granted on religious freedom or freedom of conscience grounds, vary between the different states, as these issues are regulated on a state, and not a federal, basis. However, it appears that a central means used is the imposition of a limitation on the enrolment of children in schools when they are not vaccinated in accordance with the basic vaccination plan, because of the concern that others will be infected. Constitutional petitions that challenged laws that imposed vaccination obligations were rejected, based on the recognition of the importance of vaccinations to public health. (See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (a general discussion of the vaccination obligation); Zucht v. King, 260 US 174, 176-77 (1922) (a specific discussion on the conditioning of school enrollment on vaccination). Alongside the aforesaid, additional sanctions were used over the years, including setting a statutory vaccination obligation whose violation entails a fine and cutbacks in municipal education budgets. In the city of New York, for example, it was decided to impose fines on schools that accept unvaccinated children, even when they fall within one of the exceptions that allow parents not to vaccinate their children. The fine is imposed for each day in which an unvaccinated child was present on school grounds. In this manner, the city of New York wished to create an incentive for parents to vaccinate their children, since failing to do so compromises the school’s budget and the level of education it is able to provide. (See further: Alan R Hinman, Walter A Orenstein, Don E Williamson & Denton Darrington, Childhood Immunization: Laws That Work, 30 J. L. Med. & Ethics 122, 123 (2002); Gary L Freed, Victoria A Freeman & Alice Mauskopf, Enforcement of Age-Appropriate Immunization Laws, 14(2) Am. J. Prev. Med. 118 (1998); D. Isaacs, H. A. Kilham & H. Marshall, Should Routine Childhood Vaccinations be Compulsory?, J Pediatr. Child Health 40(7) 392, 395 (2004); Anthony Ciolli, Religious & Philosophical Exemptions to Mandatory School Vaccinations: Who Should Bear the Costs to Society?, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 287 (2009); Ross Silverman, Litigation, Regulation, and Education – Protecting the Public's Health through Childhood Immunization, 360(24) New England J. Medicine 2500 (2009)).
  5. Unlike in the United States, there is no norm of mandatory vaccination as a condition to the acceptance of children to school in Canada. In fact, only two provinces of Canada, Ontario and New Brunswick, have a statutory vaccination requirement. Nevertheless, an inspection of the education legislation of Ontario shows that alongside the requirement to vaccinate children as a precondition to their enrollment in the education system, a fine of up to $1,000 is also imposed on parents who fail to vaccinate their children. (Education Act, SNB 1997, c E-1.12, s 10; Immunization of School Pupils Act, RSO 1990, c I.1, s 3-4).
  6. A different approach prevails in Australia, where monetary incentives are given to parents who respond to the vaccination plan. This is, to a certain extent, in the spirit of the solution chosen by the Israeli legislator. This approach is recognized in academic literature as more respectful of the parents’ autonomy, and ethically appropriate, insofar as it does not endanger the lion’s share of welfare payments for children. (See David Isaacs, An Ethical Framework for Public Health Immunisation Programs, 23(5-6) NSW Public Health Bulletin 111,114 (2012).
  7. The comparative law was reviewed merely to illustrate the variety of means employed by other legal systems in a similar context. Obviously, these examples themselves cannot dictate the outcome. However, they emphasize several points that ought to be discussed. First, they show that the issue of child vaccination and imposing sanctions in this context (even when they may indirectly harm the children themselves) are also present in other systems to promote the welfare of the children themselves and the welfare of the public. Second, other systems went as far as imposing sanctions, which may be deemed harsher than those methods adopted by the Israeli legislature. These sanctions may indeed serve more closely the purpose of achieving the result of vaccinating children (due to their weight), but they simultaneously entail more severe harms to the children and their parents (including the imposition of fines or prevention of the children’s studies in educational institutions). I will mention these alternatives again when addressing the limitation clause.
  8. And now: the Amendment discussed before us was intended to achieve a double purpose of protecting the health of infants, for whom contracting the diseases against which the vaccine protects may be dangerous and at times even lethal, and protecting public health as a matter of national medical policy through the creation of  “herd immunity”. This double purpose will also be important for our later discussion regarding the limitation clause. At this point it can also be said that the double purpose of the law does not mandate a direct confrontation with the discussion on the limits of paternalism. As is known, the classification of a legal rule as paternalistic is made through the prism of the grounds underlying it. Therefore, the more the legal rule intervenes in the individual’s autonomy of will for the sole purpose of protecting him and his welfare from his own actions, the more likely we are faced with a paternalistic rule. More specifically, in our case we have a paternalistic rule which intervenes in the parents’ autonomy of will in order to stop them from making a mistake, as the issue is perceived by the Ministry of Health. The question of the appropriate limits of paternalism has been extensively discussed and this framework is too narrow to discuss it. (See, for example: John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Arieh Simon, Translator, 1946); Peter De Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, 34(1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 68 (2006); Gerald Dworkin, Moral Paternalism, 24(3) Law and Philosophy 305 (2005)). For purposes of the current discussion it is important to state on this issue the following two points. First, it is evident that those engaged in the legislative work were aware of the difficulties caused by over-intervention in the decisions of individuals. Thus, for example, the drafters of the law refrained from setting a statutory vaccination requirement, the breach of which entails a punitive sanction; instead, they were satisfied with the creation of an economic incentives scheme, which leaves parents a wider array of choices. The fact that it is only the increase in the allowances that is made contingent on the vaccination of the children, while leaving the base allowance intact suggests the same. Second, it is certainly doubtful whether we have before us a paternalistic rule in the full sense of the word, considering that the Amendment was intended not only to protect the children and their parents from themselves, but also to protect the general public against the outbreak of diseases. It seems that the duty of the Ministry of Health to institute preventive measures to eradicate diseases that threaten public health cannot be disputed.
  9. Moreover, since the Amendment was intended to promote the protection of the health of children in the State of Israel, it should not only be deemed as a means that violates rights (in the name of an important public interest), as the petitioners argued, but also as a means intended to promote rights in a positive manner—in this case, the children’s right to health. The above fits in with the general perception of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, pursuant to which the protection of basic rights is not merely reduced to a negative protection against the damaging power of government, but also extends to a positive protection which reflects the government’s duty to operate in an active manner for the protection of basic rights. While according to Section 2 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person as such” (and here the negative protection of these rights is expressed), according to Section 4 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty “[a]ll persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and dignity (in other words, the government is also required to positively promote these rights).” Although the question regarding the scope of the constitutional right to health has yet to be decided, there is no doubt that striving to guarantee basic conditions of good health falls within the boundaries of the right to human dignity. In addition, it can be deemed as a derivative of the right to life and of the protection of the person’s body. (Compare: Eyal Gross “Health in Israel: Right or Product”, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Israel (Yoram Rabin and Yuval Shani, Editors, 2004); LCA 4905/98 Gamzo v. Yesha’ayahu [2001] IsrSC 55(3) 360, 375-376; HCJ 3071/05 Luzon v. The State of Israel (July 28, 2008), in paragraphs 9-17; HCJ 11044/04 Solometkin v. The Minister of Health (June 27, 2011), in paragraphs 11-16). Legislation seeking to create incentives for child vaccination is legislation that falls not only into the category of laws that limit rights, but also that of promoting rights in general and children’s rights in particular. Section 4 of the Basic Law expresses a clear position that rejects the perception that the State is at its best when it does not intervene. Article 25 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 also states the obligation of the member states to act for the promotion of children’s health, including “to develop preventive health care.” (Article 25(6)).

Conditioning of Rights: The Normative Framework

  1. The third question of those I mentioned in the beginning is the legal question at the heart of the petition: to what extent can conditions be imposed on rights vis-à-vis the State and more specifically, is it possible to condition rights on requirements which the recipient of the right is required to fulfill?  What is the supposed novelty of setting conditions? The law frequently defines rights and eligibilities as such that include restrictions and conditions to their fulfillment, either paternalistic conditions seeking to protect the holder of the right from himself or conditions seeking to protect the public interest. However, the other side of the coin is that imposing conditions on rights raises a concern of weakening those specific rights and eroding the concept of a right until it is turned into a benefit given by the grace of government.
  2. An important distinction that should be drawn at the outset is the distinction between constitutional rights and legal rights. The main concern regarding the conditioning of rights pertains to the conditioning of constitutional basic rights. The liberal doctrine of rights is based on the perception that constitutional basic rights are the individual’s shield against government’s power, and thus they are supposed to be, in the usual case, autonomous of any and all limitations. The history of the democratic fight for rights is tied to the perception that rights are also conferred on those who are not perceived as “normative persons,” violators of law, and those who are not deemed, ever or at the time, to be “model citizens”. On the contrary, many battles for rights were shouldered by those whose opinions outraged others and were a thorn in the side of people in authority.
  3. Does this mean that conditions may never be imposed on constitutional rights? In fact, since I have reached the conclusion that payment of child allowances does not reflect, at least for the time being, a protection of a constitutional right, I am no longer required to answer this question directly, and therefore I will address it relatively briefly. In general, the position regarding the setting of conditions on the exercise of constitutional rights should be suspicious and minimizing. However, attachment of conditions to the exercise of a constitutional right cannot be rejected at the outset and in advance (as distinct from conditions aimed at denying the constitutional right itself), if only because of the perception that rights are relative for the most part, and not absolute, as indicated by the limitation clauses included in the basic laws. For example, exercising the right of access to courts can be made contingent upon payment of a fee (subject to exceptions guaranteeing that the payment of the fee does not bar persons without means from conducting legal proceedings). (See for example, LCA 3899/04 The State of Israel v. Even Zohar [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 301, 319-321; LCA 2146/04 The State of Israel v. The Estate of The Late Basel Naim Ibrahim [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 865, 868; M.C.M. 457/01 Karlitz v. The Officer of the Elections for the City of Beer Sheva 1998 [2001] IsrSC 55(3) 869, 872)). Similarly, the income assurance allowance, which is generally the legal manifestation of the constitutional right to a dignified human existence, can be contingent upon the requirement to “exhaust earning capacity.” In both cases, the conditions are not “foreign” to the purpose of the relevant rights considering that the payment of a fee assists in making sure that the use of the right of access to the courts will not lead to inefficient use of the important public resource of the judicial system, and that the requirement to exhaust earning capacity contributes to the proper use of the limited resource of support for those who cannot ensure their basic sustenance.
  4. In any event, the case before us falls within a different category: the conditioning of legal rights vis-à-vis the State (by virtue of legislation, as distinct from super-statutory constitutional basic rights). Because the conferral of rights pursuant to the law is supposed to also serve public interests and public policy, the conferral of this type of right is often accompanied by conditions. Below I will refer to standards which should guide the legislature, and later the court, in outlining the proper framework for the conditioning of legal rights.
  5. Presumably, the conditioning of rights available to individuals vis-à-vis the State does not necessarily raise a constitutional difficulty. We should remember that the law often defines rights and eligibilities as such that include restrictions on and conditions to their fulfillment. The aforesaid notwithstanding, in practice the imposition of conditions on legal rights may also be problematic on the constitutional level, when the essence of the condition is a waiver of a constitutional right. For example, conditioning of a legal right, such as eligibility for an allowance, on the recipient’s waiver of his right to freedom of speech or his right to freedom of religion and conscience is problematic even though, theoretically, the government may choose not to grant such an allowance at all. The reason for this is concern about an indirect limitation of constitutional rights. In American constitutional law, the accepted term for discussing the problem of eligibilities given by the government based on a (supposedly voluntary) waiver of constitutional rights is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. (See for example: Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 144 (1968); Allen Redlich, Unconstitutional Conditions on Welfare Eligibility, Wis. L. Rev. 450 (1970); Richard A Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989); Cass Sunstein, Is There An Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine?, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 337 (1989); Brooks R. Fundenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 371 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quamire: Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 Fla. ST U. L. Rev. 913 (2006); Renee Lettow Lerner, Unconstitutional Conditions, Germaneness, and Institutional Review Board, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 775 (2007); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va. L. Rev. 479 (2012)). We are not bound, of course, by the details of this doctrine, and some aspects of its scope and application are still in dispute in American law itself. Nevertheless, it does indicate the caution necessary in conditioning legal eligibilities, which may indirectly violate constitutional rights. In this spirit, and without exhausting discussion in the matter, I wish to present primary relevant considerations in examining such conditioning. As I will clarify below, these considerations will ultimately be included in the formal constitutional examination performed within the context of the limitation clause.
  6. Relevance of the Condition and its Affinity to Eligibility – Essentially, conditions to eligibility are supposed to have a relevant connection to the policy the eligibility is intended to promote. In order to clarify the nature of the discussion, let us consider two hypothetical examples that may be discussed in relation to framing the eligibility for income assurance allowances: first, conditioning eligibility for receipt of the allowance on the applicant not having a bad traffic record; second, conditioning eligibility on the applicant’s active desire to re-join the employment circle by visiting the employment bureau each week. Our intuition suggests that the second condition is legitimate, as it is consistent with the purpose of the income assurance allowance and it comports with the public interest underlying it—the re-integration of a person who has been excluded from the employment circle, while providing a last residual protective net on the way there. (Hassan Case, in paragraphs 6-7 and 57). The translation of this intuition into a legal principle tells us that the condition should derive from the same legal circle within which the conditioned right is operated. In other words, the purpose of the condition and the public interest promoted through it must be derived from the same normative field in which the conditioned right is rooted. The weaker the connection between the two becomes, the more the conditioning becomes constitutionally illegitimate. For example, although there is no dispute that eradicating driving violations and creating a system of incentives to promote this are desirable from perspective, these have absolutely nothing to do with eligibility for income assurance allowance. The purposes underlying each of these arrangements are foreign to one another. This foreignness indicates the arbitrariness of the conditioning and the flaw in combining them with each other. Sometimes, the question of the relevance of the conditioning may also be examined with respect to the question of whether the condition is paternalistic and seeking to promote the best interests of the holder of the right himself, or a condition seeking only to protect a wide public interest. Sometimes, of course, the conditioning of the right may encapsulate more than one reason within it.
  7. An auxiliary test that may assist in examining the nature of the affinity and the connection between the purpose of the condition and the conditioned right focuses on the date the condition was imposed and the legislative history behind it. Generally, insofar as the condition was imposed on or about the time the right was granted, the conditioning will be classified as part of the definition of the right and delineation of its scope. Insofar as the condition is added, or should we say “pasted,” at a later date, adding it should be deemed as external conditioning of the normative content of the right. This is of course merely an auxiliary test and no more. Situations can also be conceived where a new statutory eligibility is “born” with an attached foreign and inappropriate condition.
  8. Without making a final determination, an example seemingly close to our case is the birth grant given by the State, which is contingent on the mother having chosen to give birth in a hospital and not in her home. (Sections 42-43 of the National Insurance Law). In this context too, the State wishes to help the mother but at the same time promotes a public policy that the delivery will take place in the hospital, which is, as the State and professionals perceive it, in the best interests of the mother and the newborn as well as in the best interests of the public as a whole. In addition, the condition attached to the eligibility is in affinity the general purpose of the eligibility, promoting the welfare of the mother and her family.
  9. Voluntary Choice – A distinction must be made between voluntary conditions, which give the individual freedom of choice, and conditions that refer to inherent identity characteristics that a person is unable to change or that it would be inappropriate to require him to change (such as religious or national origin). The importance of this consideration cannot be exaggerated. Conditioning rights on a requirement that contradicts identity characteristics will, by its nature, cause difficulties, and raise a heavy suspicion of discrimination. Obviously, between the extreme situations of full choice on the one hand, and coercion and lack of choice on the other hand, there may be interim situations in which the incentives that accompany the choice affect whether the condition violates a right. 
  10. Scope of Conditioning – Another consideration that should be taken into account concerns the scope of conditioning: that is, the extent of exposure of the right to the restricting power of the condition. In this context, both the scope of coverage of the condition and whether it applies to the entire right or perhaps only to part of it are significant. Similarly, it may be examined whether the condition pertains to an addition to an existing eligibility, or perhaps results in the derogation therefrom.

Imposition of Conditions on Rights: From the General to the Particular

  1. The application of these standards to the case before us makes clear that the Amendment in our case does not create an arbitrary connection between a legal right and the promotion of a public interest.
  2. Pertinence of the Condition and its Affinity to Eligibility – The State grants child allowances to everyone (in other words, over and above what is required for the purpose of guaranteeing the right to a dignified human existence of children who grow up in conditions of poverty) in order to promote the welfare of the families who raise children and the children who are raised by them in particular, including the promotion of their health, alongside other public purposes. Thus, in this case, the conferral of the right to receive a child allowance was made contingent upon a condition that has a direct and unequivocal affinity to the purpose for which the right was conferred in the first place; the condition is based on an opinion of independent professionals who indicate that the best interests of children and of society require that they be vaccinated. In these circumstances, in which the right to the allowance is contingent upon a condition that is directly and clearly entwined with the best interests of its beneficiary, it is not difficult to hold that the condition is pertinent. The child allowances are not only granted in order to provide for the children, but for their welfare, including other basic rights they have such as education and health.
  3. Indeed, an inspection of the comparative law may serve as a basis for the argument that a condition that links the acceptance of children to schools and their vaccination expresses a stronger affinity between the condition and the right than as distinguished in our case where eligibility for child allowances was made contingent upon their vaccination. However, in practice, and following further inspection, this argument is unconvincing. De facto, the only difference between the American conditioning model and the Israeli conditioning model is the time the children’s vaccination condition was imposed, not the intensity of the link between the condition and the eligibility. Both models see the need to protect the children themselves and the need to protect those who come into daily contact with them. However, the Israeli legislator wished to move up the date of the condition that incentivized children’s vaccination as a preventive measure, and thereby make redundant the future dilemma with which health policy makers in the United States and Canada are dealing, namely, when parents are required to enroll their children in the education system. In addition, earlier vaccination of infants appears to be more effective from a preventive medicine standpoint, and if so, it is more logical to create an incentive to vaccinate the children at an earlier stage, prior to sending them to the education system. In fact, insofar as the main purpose is to prevent the infection of other children, it makes sense to make the connection to the time of entrance into the educational institution. However, insofar as the purpose is the promotion of the best interests of the children themselves, an earlier date is preferable.
  4. Some of the arguments advanced by petitioners attempted to undermine the assumption that conditioning the allowances indeed promotes the children’s health and their general welfare. One argument made before us on this issue is that there are views that vaccination of children does not serve their best interests and that the route of natural immunity is preferable. A second argument raised in this context is that conditioning the right to child allowance constitutes “double punishment” of the relevant children. First, they are not being vaccinated and thus their health is compromised. Second, the State does not pay their parents the full child allowance amount, and thus their welfare is also harmed. These arguments should be dismissed. The first argument, pertaining to the uselessness of vaccination for the children’s health cannot be accepted because of the factual basis underlying it. The medical opinion underlying the vaccination policy is a solid one supported by many studies. The petitioners’ arguments regarding the existence of other approaches have their due respect, but the formulation of national policy is supposed to be based on the position of the professional bodies of the government, founded on studies and examinations. Nothing in the petitioners’ arguments undermines the firm basis underlying the policy, at least for the time being. The second argument should also be dismissed. This argument is based on the assumption that conditioning part of the eligibility for child allowances on vaccinating the children is merely a sanction and cannot direct behavior. This assumption remains unsubstantiated. Moreover, the Amendment was enacted in a format that inherently attests that it was intended to direct behavior. The reduction of child allowances is not imposed as a sanction in an irreversible manner. This reduction applies only during the period in which the parents are supposed to vaccinate the child with the vaccine they avoided. During the vaccination period the parents receive several notices and warnings on the consequence of failure to vaccinate the children. Furthermore, once the suitable period for giving the vaccine passes, the allowance returns to its regular amount. Thus, it may be said that the Amendment is phrased in a manner intended to create a means for directing behavior, and at least at this stage, there is no reason to believe that it will not succeed to do so. In any event, this cannot be pre-assumed.
  5. Voluntary Choice – The Amendment to the law assumes, in practice, that the impediment to vaccinating children derives from the parents’ choice not to vaccinate, and not from the fact that the State does not guarantee reasonable access for the entire population to this essential service, in terms of both location and cost. The aforesaid is particularly important in view of the fact that one of the petitions before us was filed by Adala Center, which alleged insufficient dispersion of Family Health Center services among the Bedouins in the Negev region. If indeed there was no reasonable access to the vaccination services for the entire population, then the Amendment is problematic because this would mean the denial of eligibility for child allowances is in fact arbitrary and does not in practice promote the purpose of the Amendment. In order to avoid this inappropriate result, the Amendment should be interpreted pursuant to its objective and denial of the eligibility for child allowances should only apply in situations where parents choose not to vaccinate their children, and not in situations in which the parents refrain from doing so due to lack of reasonable access to health services. De facto, the State’s arguments painted a positive picture of improvement in the level of accessibility to Family Health Center services in the Negev region, and the State is presumed to continue to act in this direction. In addition, the State has undertaken, both in writing and orally, that the vaccination fee will be cancelled, so that the cost of vaccination will not be a barrier for those who lack financial means.
  6. Scope of Conditioning – conditioning eligibility for child allowances on the children’s vaccination does not apply to the entire allowance but only to part of it. Failure to fulfill the condition does not deny the entire child allowance (like it does not deny all other means that the social laws in Israel provide for the fulfillment of the child’s right to a dignified existence).
  7. Thus, it may be concluded, at this time, that the imposition of conditions on eligibilities relies on solid foundations, at least when (like in the case before us) the eligibilities discussed are eligibilities pursuant to a law that promote public policy (as distinguished from constitutional rights), the condition set is related to the purpose of granting the eligibility, the fulfillment of the condition depends on the free choice of the relevant party, and especially because the conditioning does not apply to the entire eligibility.

Equality in Granting Eligibilities

  1. The fourth question that should be examined, according to the order of things, also relates to the content of the conditioning, and in this context focuses on the level of equality. The petitioners argue that the Amendment to the law discriminates in issue granting full payment of child allowances between those who vaccinate their children and those who do not vaccinate their children. Is this really the case?
  2. My colleague, Justice Arbel, accepts the petitioners’ argument on this matter, based on the assumption that the condition placed upon the allowance is foreign both to the structure of the allowance and to its purposes (paragraph 49 of the opinion of Justice Arbel). In my opinion, the starting point for the discussion on this issue should be different. In fact, as the discussion on the history of the child allowances makes clear, these allowances embodied several purposes throughout the years, and they are seeking, inter alia, to promote the welfare of children in Israel in general. Examining things from this perspective, it cannot be said that a condition that promotes the vaccination of children in Israel, and thus protects their health (according to the prevailing perceptions in the scientific community), is a condition foreign to the purpose of the allowances (as I explained above in paragraph 48).
  3. Furthermore, it is also possible to observe the matter through a comparison of the children who receive vaccinations and those who are denied vaccinations by their parents. The conditioning of the child allowances expresses the State’s commitment to also care for the latter.
  4. On a wider perspective, an important question hovering in the background is whether whenever the law distinguishes between people or groups, it is right to deem the distinction as a violation of the right to equality, and then to examine through the limitation clause; or whether there are “relevant” distinctions that would not be considered, a priori, a violation of the right to equality. For example, does the payment of child allowances only to parents of children constitute justifiable “discrimination” because it is done for a proper cause and satisfies all other conditions of the limitation clause, or is it a distinction that does not amount to a violation of the right to equality from the outset?
  5. Ultimately, I am of the opinion that a ruling on these issues is not necessary in the case before us because a link exists between the distinction made and the relevant individuals’ autonomy of will. According to the judgments of this Court, the right of equality is constitutionally protected as part of the right to human dignity in those situations where the distinction projects on the individual’s autonomy of will. (See HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 619, 680-691; HCJ 7052/03 Adala Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Interior [2006] IsrSC 61(2) 202, 303-304). Since the Amendment has ramifications for decisions that express the parent’s autonomy of will with regard to the upbringing of their children, even if the Amendment does not violate the autonomy of will, the fact that underlying the distinction is the autonomous choice of the relevant individuals justifies holding that the Amendment violates equality in a manner that requires to examine whether it satisfies the limitation clause.
  6. It is important to add that it cannot be said, based on the data placed before us, that the Amendment imposes a discriminating reality that wrongfully distinguishes between infants from the Jewish sector and infants from the Bedouin sector. Against this argument made by Adala Center the State presented figures (updated as of 2009) in which the rate of unvaccinated Bedouin children (nine percent) is similar to the rate of  unvaccinated Jewish children (seven percent), insofar as we are referring to children between the ages of two and five ( three percent in the Arab sector). In any event, the Amendment should be interpreted in a way that excludes from the condition anyone who wishes to vaccinate his children, but to whom vaccination services are not made reasonably accessible by the State. In this sense, the petitioners’ path will be open to argue against the implementation of the law (as distinct from against its constitutionality) insofar as the access to the vaccination services is not adequately available.

The Amendment to the Law through the Limitation Clause

  1. Based on the above, I wish to discuss the fifth and concluding question: does the Amendment include a violation of a constitutional right, and does this violation, if any, satisfy the constitutional tests of the limitation clause.
  2. Like my colleague Justice Arbel, I showed that the majority of the petitioners’ arguments regarding the violation of constitutional rights are unconvincing. In the absence of a violation of a constitutional right, the discussion ends before it begins, and all that remains is criticism (right or wrong) of a public policy that was embodied in an act of legislation and whose place is in the public sphere. The eligibility for child allowances is part of a welfare policy currently serving the best interests of many children across the country in the immediate future, as well as the best interests of the public as a whole in the long term. However, there is no constitutional right to receive it in one specific form. The State can also care for the welfare of people in general and people living in poverty by paying other allowances and introducing changes to the current allowance policy, which is not “sacred” or “set in stone.” No factual foundation has been laid out before us for the argument that child allowances are essential for the dignified human existence of their recipients, and even more so, no factual foundation has been laid out before us to establish that those who avoid vaccinating their children are people who particularly need these allowances. It should be further noted that in most cases (except when the unvaccinated child is an only child), even parents who refrain from vaccinating their children, whatever their motivations might be, are left with the eligibility for the basic child allowance. They are not denied the latter, but only the increase provided by the Amendment. The strongest argument for a violation of a constitutional right in this case was the argument on the alleged violation of the right to equality. Even if a violation of the right of equality was found, it would satisfy the tests of the limitation clause (pursuant to Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), as I will demonstrate briefly.
  3. Under the circumstances of this case, it can easily be seen that the first three conditions of the limitation clause are satisfied almost prima facie. The classification of the eligibility for child allowances was set in an explicit amendment to the law. The purpose of the law is proper, both in the with respect to the right to health of each one of the children to be vaccinated and with respect to the sense of the national interest of public health. In any case, legislation that promotes such important purposes befits the values of the State of Israel as a state that wishes to promote the welfare of its citizens. Thus, it remains to discuss the question of proportionality, which focuses on the means chosen to achieve the purpose. A proper purpose is not enough; the means chosen to achieve the purpose must also be appropriate, suitable and proportionate.
  4. The first sub-test of proportionality is the rational means test that asks, whether the means chosen are indeed expected to achieve the purpose of the legislation. The answer to this question is positive, as we stated earlier, at least for the time being. A legislative practice of granting monetary incentives (positive and negative) to promote various behaviors, by conditioning various eligibilities (in the areas of taxes and welfare) is a common matter. Underlying each and every one of these acts of legislation is the assumption that incentives direct behavior. There is no reason to believe that things will be different in our case. If different information accumulates later on, the legislature will be required to assess it.
  5. At most, it may be said that the application of the first sub-test of proportionality in the case before us presents the following paradox: the means used (conditioning the eligibility on an act of vaccination) is expected to achieve the purpose, but may achieve it less effectively than harsher means (such as prohibiting acceptance of unvaccinated students to educational institutions). This is why the petitioners characterize the means used as some kind of a “sanction” and not as means of enforcement: because it cannot be guaranteed in advance that the parents will respond to the incentive the conditioning seeks to create. Using a harsher means could have guaranteed the achievement of the purpose with more certainty, but it would have come at the price of a more severe violation of rights, and in this sense would have created more difficulty within the framework of the second sub-test and the third sub-test of proportionality, discussed below.
  6. The second sub-test of proportionality examines whether the chosen means are the less harmful means. It seems to me that the case before us is a clear instance where the act of legislation is based on a careful and meticulous thinking process with regard to the means chosen as compared with other possible alternatives. In the course of deliberation, arguments pointed out alternative methods that were used elsewhere or that might have been used, such as preventing unvaccinated children from studying in educational institutions (as in France and the United States) and imposing punitive sanctions, .It can easily be seen that the majority of these means are actually harsher and more harmful than the route chosen by the Israeli legislature. Preventing unvaccinated children from studying in educational institutions is a very harsh step with regards to the scope of the damage to the children. It also comes at a relatively late point in time considering the optimal age for vaccination according to the policy of the Ministry of Health. Imposing a punitive sanction on people who choose not to vaccinate their children is certainly an offensive step, which does not respect those who are deeply convinced that the vaccination will harm their children. Thus, only the tool of advocacy remains, whose value cannot be exaggerated in this sensitive context in which the parents’ level of conviction is essential to obtaining the goal of wide-scope vaccination. (Compare Michal Alberstein and Nadav Davidowitz “Doctrine of Therapeutic Law and Public Health: An Israeli Study” Mehkarei Mishpat (26) 549, 571-578 (2010)). However, the Amendment to the law was enacted after the advocacy approach failed to produce sufficiently effective results according to the Ministry of Health. It may be added that having said that refraining from vaccinating is a seemingly rational act for the promotion of self-benefit in an environment in which most people are vaccinated, the creation of a monetary incentive (if only limited) to be vaccinated is thinking in the right direction because it creates a counterbalance to the benefit entailed in the decision not to vaccinate. (Compare to the discussion in Parkins’ paper above). Perhaps an incentive that is not directly related to child allowances could have been used, and perhaps this type of an incentive should have been preferred. A “vaccination bonus” or a similar benefit could have been established for parents who vaccinate their children. Practically speaking, there is no significant difference between these two methods because in both cases the result is the denial of a benefit from a family because the parents choose not to vaccinate their children. In conclusion, the petitioners failed to indicate a measure of lesser harm that would have achieved the legislative purpose to a similar extent. (See in this context: Aharon Barak, Proportionality in the Law 399 (2010)).
  7. Another consideration in assessing the existence of alternative means pertains to the fact that the basic Vaccination Program to which the Amendment applies includes vaccinations for diseases whose consequences are very severe on one hand, and the contraction of which cannot usually be prevented through other means on the other hand. This consideration is important seeing as part of the vaccination plans enforced in other countries are aimed at diseases, contracted through sexual relations or blood donations that can also be prevented in other ways. (See Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1820 (2008); Marry Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B Mandate for Infants and Young Children, 12 Yale J. Health Pol'y L. & Ethics 39 (2012)).
  8. The third sub-test of proportionality, the narrow proportionality test, examines the appropriate relationship between the means chosen and the purpose, as “the end does not justify all means.” I believe that the Amendment to the law before us also passes this final sub-test relatively easily. The purpose which the Amendment to the law seeks to promote is highly important—promoting the health of young children in Israel, as well as promoting the public’s health in the face of serious diseases that break out during times when vaccination enforcement is lax. The means chosen to promote this purpose—a partial reduction of child allowances for a limited period as a means to encourage parents to vaccinate their children—is relatively mild. In addition, it should be kept in mind that currently the Vaccination Program is limited to only four vaccines (given in one concentrated shot), such that the condition to receiving the allowances is essentially limited. It was further determined that the process is reversible in the sense that once the child is vaccinated or the maximum age for vaccination passes the reduction will be cancelled and the allowance recalculated. Furthermore, the reduction of the allowance was capped and proceedings to contest and appeal the institution’s decision to limit the allowances have also been established. The importance of the purpose alongside the relatively minor harm caused by the sanction, speaks for itself. The relatively minor violation of rights in this case constitutes a counterbalance to the recognition that employing a harsher means could have created a tighter link between the means and the purpose within the first sub-test of proportionality as specified above.

Conclusion: About Rights and the State’s Responsibility

  1. An overview of the petition reveals a fundamental tension between the expectations the various individuals have of the State. On the one hand, there is an expectation that the State minimize its intervention in decisions of its citizens. On the other hand, there is an expectation that the State operate in an active manner to promote the citizens’ welfare. (On the discrepancies between the various expectations from the State, compare Barak Erez, Administrative Law, on p. 54-55; Barak Erez, Citizen-Subject-Consumer, on p. 34-35). The tension that exists between these expectations might lead to a conflict, like in the case before us. When the State takes an active stance with respect to child vaccination, it is intervening in personal decisions. Thus, it is ostensibly intervening in the private sphere. However, the means used by the State in this case pertain to the granting of child allowances, the mere granting of which expresses the State’s involvement in the family sphere. Moreover, intervention in the private sphere is not necessarily bad, particularly when it is done to promote the rights of the weak individuals in the family unit, those whose voice is not always heard—in this case the children whose parents did not act to vaccinate them.
  2. There may be a dispute on the scope of the requirement to vaccinate children and perhaps, over the years, changes will even occur in the perceptions that direct the policy in this area. However, on principal, the starting point with regard to the State’s intervention in promoting children’s welfare does not always have to be suspicious. Essentially, taking an active stance on the issue of child vaccination is not the State riding roughshod over rights, but rather evidence of the State’s commitment to the welfare of the children in Israel, a commitment whose importance cannot be exaggerated.
  3.  

Justice E. Hayut:

  1. I agree with the result reached by my colleagues, Justice E. Arbel and Justice D. Barak Erez, that the three petitions should be denied. Like them, I too believe that the petitioners in each of the petitions did not show a violation of the constitutional right to property or to a dignified human existence, and in this context I saw no need to add to the explanations in my colleagues’ opinions. As for the constitutional right to equality, Justices Arbel and Barak Erez determined that Amendment No. 113 to the National Insurance Law ([Consolidated Version], 5755-1995 (hereinafter, the “Amendment to the Law”) violates the right of equality, but further held that despite this violation, the petitions should be denied because the violation satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. My route to the same result is different. For the reasons I will specify below, I believe that the petitioners in the three petitions failed to show a violation of the right to equality. However, before we examine the question whether the right to equality has been violated, we should inquire what is the group of equals that should be referred to in this context.
  2. One of the arguments raised by the petitioners in HCJ 7245/10 is the argument that the right to child allowances a right conferred upon the child and not his parents. (compare CA 281/78 Sin v. The Competent Authority under Nazi Persecution Disabled Persons Law, 5717-1957 [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 408) and thus the relevant group of equals is the group of children who were given the right to the allowances specified in the National Insurance Law when they came into the world. According to this approach, the essence of the violation of the constitutional right to equality is that, with regard to the child allowances, it is improper to distinguish between children who were vaccinated and those who were not vaccinated. On the contrary, this type of distinction, it is argued, constitutes a double harm to the children: not only did their parents fail to vaccinate them, but the allowance for which they are eligible is reduced because of it. This argument is captivating but it appears to have no real basis in the provisions of the law. Section 66 of the National Insurance Law states that “an insured parent is eligible for a monthly child allowance under this chapter for each child.” This indicates that the right set forth in the law is the parent’s right, provided that the child for whom the allowance is paid is in the custody of that parent. (See Section 69 of the National Insurance Law). Another provision that supports this conclusion that the right to the allowance set in the National Insurance Law is the right of the parent and not the child, is Section 68(b) of the National Insurance Law, which determines a differential payment of the allowance for each of the children in the family according to the birth order. It is obvious that such differential payment is improper if the right to the allowance is the child’s right, since there is no justification to discriminate between the children with regard to the extent of social support they will receive from the State, based only upon the time they were born relative to the other children in the family. In contrast, if the allowance is the parent’s right, it makes sense and is justified to consider, with regard to the social support the cumulative amount available to the family, and therefore setting different allowance amounts for children, based on their birth order does not constitute discrimination. It should further be mentioned that in the past, a tax, in various amounts and under various conditions, was imposed on the child allowances, treating them as parents’ income. (See for example: Taxation of Allowance Points Law (Temporary Provision), 5744-1984; for support of the continuation of child allowances taxation policy see Yoram Margaliot “Child Allowances” Berenson Book Second Volume – Beni Sabra 733 (Editors, Aharon Barak and Haim Berenson, 2000); and for a historical review of child allowance taxation see paragraphs 8-15 of the opinion of Justice D. Barak Erez). The National Labor Court has also adopted the opinion that the person eligible for the child allowance is the parent and not the child. (See NIA 1117/04 Azulai v. The National Insurance Institute (November 2, 2006)). The starting point in examining the question of discrimination raised in the petitions before us is that the right to child allowance is the parents’ right, and that the parents therefore constitute the relevant group of equals.
  3. Does the Amendment to the law, which is the subject matter of the petition, discriminate between the different groups of parents?

“The obligation to act with equality means giving equal treatment to equals and different treatment to those who are different.” (See, for example, HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, paragraph 35 (June 14, 2010) (hereinafter, “Yekutieli Case”)). Since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the right to equality has been recognized as part of the person’s right to dignity in the sense that discrimination, even if it is unaccompanied by humiliation, will be deemed as a violation of the constitutional right to equality which enjoys the constitutional protection conferred under the Basic Law. (HCJ 6427/02 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Knesset [2006] IsrSC 61(1) 619, paragraphs 40-43 of the opinion of President Barak (hereinafter, “re: MQG Case”)). The obligation not to discriminate, which is imposed first and foremost on government authorities, is nothing but a mirror image of the person’s right to equality; therefore, a law that discriminates between equals in the aforementioned aspects may be invalidated as unconstitutional, unless the violation of equality can be justified as a violation that satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause in Section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The uniqueness of the petitions before us is in that the petitioners are not arguing that it is unjustified to prefer the group of vaccinating parents over the group of non-vaccinating parents; they focus their arguments instead solely on the manner in which the legislature has chosen to express this preference. For example, the arguments of two out of the three groups of petitioners (in HCJ 7245/10 and HCJ 8357/10) make clear that they consider it very important that the population of children will indeed receive the MMRV vaccine according to the Ministry of Health’s vaccination program (hereinafter, the “Vaccination Program”), and they also deem it justified to set a policy that incentivizes parents to give their children this vaccine, in order to protect the general population from spreading of dangerous epidemics. The petitioners in HCJ 908/11 argue that the effectiveness of the vaccines is uncertain, but they do not argue that simply creating an incentive to vaccinate the children creates an irrelevant and unequal distinction, and focus their arguments on the discrepancy they believe exists between this distinction and the objective of the child allowance. It appears that there is no dispute that the State is entitled, and perhaps even obligated, to use the means available to it to maintain public health, and that according to the medical data in the State’s possession (the accuracy of which the petitioners in HCJ 908/11 dispute), the Vaccination Program is effective and essential in the prevention of dangerous diseases. From this derives the conclusion that the legislature is allowed to treat the group of parents who vaccinate their children differently than the group of parents who do not vaccinate their children, and from the arguments in all three petitions it is clear that had the legislature chosen, for example, to give a monetary bonus to the parents who vaccinate their children rather than reduce the allowance for those who do not vaccinate their children, the petitioners would have had no argument regarding a constitutional violation of the right to equality. In other words, the petitioners do not dispute the fact that the legislator may give different treatment to each of the aforesaid groups, and that it is permitted to do so, inter alia, through an economic incentive.                

  1. Does the fact that the economic incentive enacted by the Knesset was incorporated into the child allowance mechanism by way of reducing the allowance (a negative incentive) cause, in itself, a violation of the constitutional right to equality?

Justice Arbel believes that the purpose of the child allowances is to help fund the families’ expenses in raising children, and thus the denial of a part of the allowance for reasons unrelated to the number of children in the family “would be foreign to the allowance, and therefore violate the right to equality.” (Paragraph 49 of her opinion). Justice Barak Erez believes that the “strongest argument, relatively, of a violation of a constitutional right in this case was the argument on the alleged violation of the right to equality,” and although she doesn’t explicitly determine that such a violation indeed exists and or indicate what makes it strong, she holds that “in any event, even if a violation of the right to equality was found, it would satisfy the tests of the limitation clause.” (Paragraph 61 of her opinion, and see also paragraphs 57-58 of her opinion).

I disagree.

The fact that the legislature amends an existing law, and at the same time creates a new distinction between the groups of those entitled to receive all rights pursuant to the amended law, does not, in itself, constitute a violation to equality, unless we believe that the groups designated as entitled persons in the original law must never be changed. It appears to me that such a rigid approach is uncalled for, and it seems that the question that ought to be examined in this context, like in other cases in which we try to identify wrongful discrimination, is whether the new distinction between the groups of entitled persons created by the law in its amended form treats equals differently. The common method in case law to identify the “group of equals” whose members are entitled to equal treatment is to examine the “objective of the law and essence of the matter, the fundamental values of the legal system, and the special circumstances of the case.” (See for example HCJ 6051/95 Rekant v. The National Labor Court [1997] IsrLC 51(3) 289, 346; HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. The Minister of Science and Arts [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 259, 281; AA 343/09 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. The City of Jerusalem, paragraph 41 of the opinion of Justice Amit (September 14, 2010)). In other cases it was stated that the question of whether this is a prohibited discrimination or a permitted distinction will be examined according to the “accepted social perceptions,” (HCJ 721/94 El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. V. Danilowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749, 779; HCJ 200/83 Watad v. The Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3), 113, 118-119; MQG Case, in paragraph 27 of President Barak’s judgment). The fundamental values of our legal system recognize legislative models in which the legislator incorporates into a law intended for a specific main objective, secondary objectives intended to promote important social purposes, even if there is not necessarily a tight link between them and the main objective of the law. For example, the main purpose of the Income Tax Ordinance is “[to] ensur[e] income for the public authority’s treasury,” but the legislature has also used the ordinance and taxation provisions to promote additional social purposes through which “[S]ociety fights phenomena that are perceived as negative. It encourages acts that it wants to encourage and deters acts it wants to prevent.” (Aharon Barak “Interpretation of Tax Law” Mishpatim 28, 425, 434 (1997); For example, see HCJ 2651/09 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Minister of Interior, paragraph 31 of Justice Danziger’s opinion (June 15, 2011)). The above also applies to customs laws intended mainly, to increase the State’s income, but at the same time serving additional purposes including the “regulation of the demand and the protection of local production and products.” (CA 2102/93 The State of Israel v. Miron Galilee Industrial Plants (MMT) Ltd. [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 160, 167). The objective of the National Insurance Law is to “guarantee proper means of existence for the insured, their dependents and survivors, whenever their income is reduced or disappears for one of the reasons set by the law.” (CA 255/74 The National Insurance Institute v. Almohar [1974] IsrSC 29(1), 11, 14). However, this law, like the other acts of legislation mentioned, promotes additional social purposes as well, such as incentivizing the social and public interest of delivering children in hospitals rather than at home (Section 42 of the National Insurance Law), performing amniocentesis for pregnant women aged thirty-five to thirty-seven (Section 63 of the National Insurance Law), and encouraging the integration of disabled persons into the workforce. (Section 222C of the National Insurance Law; and see in general, Abraham Doron “The Erosion of the Insurance Principle in the Israeli National Insurance: The Effect on the Functioning of the Israeli Social Security Scheme” Social Security 71, 31 (2006)).                   

  1. Does each additional social purpose promoted by a law necessarily violate the constitutional right to equality by discriminating with respect to its general purpose? Of course not. The main question that ought to be examined in this context is not what is the relationship between the general purpose of the existing law and the additional purpose the legislator is seeking to promote, but whether, according to the general tests set in the Rekant Case and other cases which we mentioned above, the legislator has wrongfully discriminated between equals for the promotion of such purpose. For example, it was held in the past that granting tax benefits that are not based on pertinent distinctions or criteria is constitutionally discriminatory and wrongful. (Former) President Beinisch articulated this as follows:

            Granting of tax benefits is tantamount, in economic terms, to granting public funds to selected individuals. Although it is true that the State does not directly transfer funds to taxpayers (and therefore it is commonly deemed as indirect support), essentially, the indirect support is tantamount to charging all taxpayers with tax payment, and in the second stage repaying it to selected individuals only. Such a distribution of public resources, without criteria, constructs a reality in which selected individuals are preferred over others, despite the fact that there is no relevant difference between them. This amounts to a blunt disrespect for a person’s equal status before the law.

            (HCJ 8300/02 Nassar v. The Government of Israel, paragraph 46 (May 22, 2012) (hereinafter, “Nassar Case”) From the positive one can deduce the negative: the tax benefits intended to direct social behavior, although they do not directly derive from the objective of income tax, are not wrongful in themselves, unless they give preference to a group which is not relevantly different from another group.

  1. The petitioners focused on the main purpose of the child allowances, i.e. the provision of social-financial support to those who are parents of children (this purpose also underwent many changes over the years, as arises from the comprehensive review of the legislative history in this regard, specified in the opinion of Justice Barak Erez). Based on this purpose, the petitioners argued that the relevant group of equals is all of the insured, as defined in Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law, who are parents of children.

Indeed, this probably was the purpose of the child allowances on the eve of the Amendment to the law. However, the legislature has now revealed its view that it wishes to add a secondary purpose, which will affect a certain derivative of the increased allowance set in the Amendment (up to NIS 300 per family)—increasing  the rate of vaccinated children in the population in order to promote the health of children and the public. As far as the normative ranking, this additional purpose does not differ from the objective of the child allowances before the Amendment, and in this sense the former purpose has neither priority nor exclusivity for the purpose of defining the relevant groups of equals. Because the normative ranking is identical, the examination of the argument of discrimination with regard to the Amendment to the law is different from an argument of discrimination in regulations or procedures of the executive authority, in that we are often required to examine the latter in reference to the purpose of laws ranking higher on the normative ladder. (See for example HCJ 9863/06 Organization of Fighter Leg Amputees v. The State of Israel – The Minister of Health, paragraphs 11-14 (July 28, 2008); HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221, 240-242; HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. The Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94, 108-110). On the constitutional level, it has been held in the past that legal provisions are discriminatory with respect to the purpose of the same law when a distinction irrelevant to the purpose for which the law was intended was made. (Nassar Case, paragraphs 39-42, 50-52 of the opinion of (former) President Beinisch; Yekutieli Case, paragraph 39 of President Beinisch’s opinion. In these cases, it was a law whose clear purpose pertains to a wide group, but whose clauses were “hiding” conditions that reduce its applicability to a specific group. (On hidden discrimination, see for example HCJ 1113/99 Adala Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164, 175; HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. The Prime Minister of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 241, 259-262). This is not the case here. The Amendment to the law which is the subject matter of this petition has altered the purpose of the child allowance in the sense that, similar to the tax legislation which promotes various public purposes, it includes the purpose of incentivizing child vaccination, incidental to promoting its general purpose as articulated above.       

  1. This does not complete the examination of the violation of the constitutional right of equality. As aforesaid, the group of equals is defined not only with respect to the purpose of the law, but also with respect to the essence of the issue, the fundamental values of the legal system, the special circumstances of the case and the prevailing social perceptions. Had the legislature sought to add to the child allowance scheme another purpose that created a distinction between groups that are not relevantly different from one another pursuant to these tests, such an addition would have violated the constitutional right to equality. For example, had the distinction been between groups, the belonging to which does not depend on choice but rather derives from various characteristics of the parents, it would have been justified to wonder whether these characteristics are relevant, according to the fundamental values of the legal system and the prevailing social perceptions. In such a theoretical case, it could not have been argued that the purpose of the Amendment to the law is to promote proper behavior of the parents, and it would have therefore been necessary to deeply examine whether there is indeed a relevant distinction that would justify preferring one group over the other. In addition, regarding the aspect of providing an incentive—positive or negative—for certain behaviors, it should be examined whether the distinction between the various behaviors justifies a distinction between the legal consequences that accompany them in accordance with the tests established in case law. However, in the case before us, not only did the petitioners not support the argument that these are equal groups according to the acceptable tests accepted in case law in this context, but, de facto, they agreed that this is a distinction between groups that may justifiably be treated differently because it is necessary to protect public health, at least according to the studies held by the Ministry of Health. Hence my conclusion that in this case, the distinction set forth by the Amendment to the National Insurance Law between parents who vaccinated their children and parents who refrained from doing so, with regard to the reduction of a set amount of child allowance, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right of equality of the parents who chose not to vaccinate their children.
  2. In HCJ 7245/10, an argument was raised on the discrimination of the Bedouins in the Negev based on the fact that this sector’s access to Family Health Center services is very limited and this sector consequently finds itself in an impossible situation where it has no access to vaccines and yet is being told to vaccinate. In my opinion, this argument does not establish constitutional grounds for a violation of equality; and insofar as it indeed transpires that pursuant to the Amendment any child allowance belonging to a parent who wished to vaccinate his child but was unable to do so due to lack of suitable access to a Family Health Center was reduced, this would, in my opinion, be a good argument to raise in the contestation and appeal proceedings set forth in Sections 68(i) and 68(j) of the National Insurance Law. Without addressing the argument on the merits, it should be noted that while these petitions were being deliberated, the respondents acted to increase access to Family Health Centers in the Bedouin sector in the Southern District (see details in paragraph 62 of the opinion of Justice Arbel), and the respondents have also presented figures that show that the vaccination rates in this sector are similar to the rates in the other sectors. Therefore, the discrimination argument insofar as it was raised with regard to the Bedouin sector should be rejected in this case.
  3. Before concluding and, I would like to make two notes. One pertains to the nature of the reduction contemplated in the petition. Unlike my colleague, Justice Barak Erez (paragraphs 37-53 of her opinion), I believe that a reduction of child allowances by a set amount as a result of failing to vaccinate according to the Vaccination Program is a sanction and not conditioning. As I understand it, there is an obvious difference between the reduction set by the Amendment to the law and the conditions set forth with regard to eligibility for child allowances, including: the child’s presence in the State of Israel, the child’s age is below eighteen (Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law [Consolidated Version], 5755-1995), the child is, generally, in the custody of an eligible parent (Section 69 of the National Insurance Law), and the parent is an “Insured” within the definition of Section 65(a) of the National Insurance Law. These and others are conditions to the receipt of child allowances, which guarantee that the allowance will be given to families whose characteristics fulfill the purpose of the child allowance. However, the nature of the reduction set by the Amendment to the law is different from these conditions in several respects. First, the amended law grants an increment to the allowance and alongside such increment also determines that certain amounts of this increment will be deducted from the allowance paid to the parent if the required vaccine is not given by the date set forth in the Vaccination Program. In the words of the provision, if the child is not vaccinated “the monthly child allowance paid for him will be reduced by the sum of NIS 100.” (Section 68(d)(1) of the National Insurance Law; the emphasis has been added). A “reduction” is, as its name suggests, the denial of a right that has been granted, and therefore, it seems that the words of the law and the mechanism chosen support the viewpoint that this is a sanction. Second, this is a reduction that is intended to motivate parents to vaccinate their children using a negative economic incentive that denies part of the allowance amount due to conduct that is inconsistent with the goal the legislature seeks to promote. Such a negative economic incentive bears, by its essence and purpose, the characteristic of a sanction and has a punitive hue that is directed against someone who chooses to jeopardize the health of his children and the health of the general public. In view of my position that we are faced with a sanction and not conditioning, I did not deem it necessary to address the doctrine and the auxiliary tests, which my colleague chose to develop at length in her opinion, with respect to the issue of conditioning. I will further note in this context that the position that we are faced with conditioning was not raised by any of the litigants, and in any event was not discussed and deliberated in the petitions at bar. For these two reasons, I believe this issue may be left for the opportune moment.
  1. Another remark I would like to make as a side note follows. In my opinion, while the reduction at the center of the petitions neither violates the constitutional right to equality nor other constitutional rights and, thus there is no need to grant the remedy sought in the petitions—invalidating the Amendment to the law which sets the reduction—it is difficult to avoid the impression that in the case at bar, the legislature chose a “shortcut” in order to promote the Vaccination Program of the Ministry of Health. The fact that the legislator chose to enforce an administrative Vaccination Program, set by the Director General of the Ministry of Health (Section 68(d)(3) of the National Insurance Law) through a reduction in child allowances derives mainly, it seems, from considerations of efficiency. These considerations were expressed in the Statements of Raviv Sobel, (Former) Deputy Director of Budgets at the Ministry of Finance, in a deliberation held before the Finance Committee of the Knesset:

            The data presented by Dr. Kedman regarding the ineffectiveness of the criminal supervision . . . PM Oron says that we will send an army of policemen, an army of controllers, and they will get the job done, but we see that this is not working . . . there are worse things for which the State of Israel does not indict people; and if someone thinks that the criminal tools are those through which all problems can be solved, just like they discovered around the world that this is not the way, it also became clear in Israel that this is not the way. Criminal tools are not enough. Therefore, certainly, financial incentives are also a tool.

            (Minutes of the Finance Committee’s meeting of June 24, 209, on p. 44; Annex 2 to the preliminary response to the petitions on behalf of the Knesset).  

Indeed, it is difficult to dispute the assumption that the imposition of a sanction based on the data relied upon by the authority, without having to confront the difficulties of its execution, makes the sanction highly efficient. However, without derogating from the importance of considerations of efficiency, it may have been proper to also take additional considerations into account. Perhaps, based on such considerations, it would have been appropriate to first enact a law that creates a vaccination requirement before imposing a sanction on its breach, which would also be set out in the same law. In other words, perhaps it would have been appropriate to take the statutory “highroad” and to regulate the entire issue of vaccination in a single act of legislation. In this context, it is noteworthy that if, for example, a criminal prohibition had been imposed on refraining from vaccinating children it would not have been possible to collect fines imposed on child allowances since national insurance allowances are non-attachable. (Section 303(a) of the National Insurance Law; Section 11 of the Tax Ordinance (Collection); and see also, Pablo Lerner “On the Attachment of Salaries in the Israeli Law”, Hapraklit [48] 30, 46 2005); David Bar Ophir, The Procedure and Case Law of Execution 893-894 (Seventh Edition, 2012)). Furthermore, the right to child allowances is a central and basic social right. This was expressed in both the petitioners’ arguments and in deliberations of the Knesset’s Finance Committee. For these reasons, and for other reasons that can be raised in this context, I believe that it would be appropriate to consider the use of other means to promote the proper purpose of encouraging child vaccination, such as through granting a positive economic incentive to those who vaccinate, or alternatively, through the use of different sanctions. In any event, because I have not found that the manner in which the legislature has acted violates a constitutional right, I concur with the result reached by my colleagues, Justices Arbel and Barak Erez, that the three petitions should be denied.

 

The conclusion of the judgment as per the opinion of Justice E. Arbel.

 

Issued on this date, 26 Sivan 5773 (June 4, 2013).

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Yated v. Ministry of Education

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 2599/00
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, August 14, 2002
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Special Education Law, 1998, provides that the State must provide special education, as per the definition of that term in the statute. Petitioners are the parents of children with special needs who are integrated into the regular educational system. They claim that that State does not provide financial aid to aid them with the expense of educating their children. Petitioners assert that this infringes their children’s fundamental rights, discriminates against them, and violates the provisions of the Special Education law.

 

Held: The Court held that the right to education is a fundamental right. This right is recognized by sources of Jewish law, the law of the State of Israel, international law, and the laws of foreign countries. The Court interpreted the provisions of the Special Education Law, 1998, in light of this fundamental right. It held that the State had an obligation to provide special education, free of charge, to those children with special needs who have been integrated into the regular educational system.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

                

                                      HCJ 2599/00

1.                            Yated – Non-Profit Organization for Parents of Children with Down Syndrome

2.            54 Parents (Anonymous)

v.

1.            The Ministry of Education           

2. The Minister of Education      

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[August 14, 2002]

Before Justices T. Or, D. Dorner, E. Levi

 

Petition for an order nisi. Petition accepted.

Facts: The Special Education Law, 1998, provides that the State must provide special education, as per the definition of that term in the statute. Petitioners are the parents of children with special needs who are integrated into the regular educational system. They claim that that State does not provide financial aid to aid them with the expense of educating their children. Petitioners assert that this infringes their children’s fundamental rights, discriminates against them, and violates the provisions of the Special Education law.

 

Held:. The Court held that the right to education is a fundamental right. This right is recognized by sources of Jewish law, the law of the State of Israel, international law, and the laws of foreign countries. The Court interpreted the  provisions of the Special Education Law, 1998, in light of this fundamental right. It held that the State had an obligation to provide special education, free of charge, to those children with special needs who have been integrated into the regular educational system.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

Statutes Cited:

Special Education Law, 1998

Compulsory Education Law, 1949

Rights of the Student Law, 2000

Equal Rights for People With Disabilities Law

Special Education Law (Amendment No.6), 2002

 

Treaties Cited:

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966

Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]          HCJ 7715, 1554/95 Shoharie Gilat v. The Minister of Education and Culture, IsrSC 50(3) 2

[2]          HCJ 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49(4) 94

[3]          HCJ 7081/93, Botzer v. Municipal Council of Maccabim-Reut, IsrSC 50(1) 19

[4]          FH 10/69, Boronovsky v. The Chief Rabbis of Israel, IsrSC 25(1) 7

[5]          HCJ 153/87, Shakdiel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, IsrSC 42(2) 221

[6]          HCJ 953/87, 1/88, Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, IsrSC 42(2) 309

[7]          CrimA 131/67 Kamier v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 22(2) 85

[8]          CA 522/70, Alkotov v. Shaheen, IsrSC 25(2) 77

[9]          CrimA 3112/94, Abu Chassan v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 53(1) 422

 

[10]        HCJ 1113/99 Adallah – The Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, IsrSC 54(2) 164

[11]        HCJ 507/81 Abu Hatzeira v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 35(4) 561

 

Foreign Constitutions Cited:

[12]        Constitution of Belgium

[13]        Constitution of South Africa

[14]        Constitution of Spain

[15]        Constitution of Ireland

 

United States Cases Cited:

[16]        Oberti v. Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1993)

[17]        Daniel RR v. State Bd. Of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989)

 

Israeli Articles Cited:

[18]        Gershon Gontovnik, The Constitutional Law: Direction of Development after the Constitutional Revolution, 22 Iyunie Mishpat 129 (1999)

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[19]        Maimonides, Laws of Torah Study, Ch. 1,2

[20]        Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Nedarim 81b

 

For petitioners—Omri Kabiri, Ori Kaidar

For respondents— Dana Briskman, Office of the State Attorney

 

JUDGMENT

Justice D. Dorner

This petition raises the following questions: Are children with special needs only entitled to free special education in a special education institution? Or is the State also under an obligation to provide free special education to children with special needs who have been integrated into the regular education system?

The Statutory Provisions

1. Section 4 of the Special Education Law, 1988 provides that “[t]he State is responsible to provide special education under this law.” Sections 3 and 7 of the statute regulate the placement of children with special needs in educational institutions. Pursuant to section 3 of the law:

A child with special needs is entitled to free special education in a special education institution in his area of residence. Where an institution is not located in the child’s area of residence, the local education authority must provide such special education, in a suitable institution, as close as possible to the child’s area of residence, even if this institution is located within the jurisdiction of another municipal authority.

Section 7 of the law further provides:

(a) The Placement Committee shall determine the eligibility of a child with special needs for special education and his placement in a special education institution.

(b) In determining the placement of a child with special needs, the Placement Committee shall prefer placement in a recognized educational institution which is not a special education institution.

(c) Where the Placement Committee has decided on the placement of a child with special needs in an institution as stated in subsection (b), the Committee shall recommend the treatment or special lessons that shall be given in that institution.

Section 1(a) of the law defines the terms “special education,” “special education institution,” and “recognized educational institution” in the following manner:

“special education” – systematic instruction, teaching and treatment given under this law to a child with special needs, including physiotherapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy, and treatments as per other professional disciplines that shall be determined, all in accordance with the needs of the child with special needs;

“special education institution” – a recognized educational institution in which special education is provided, including a class in a recognized educational institution in which special education is provided;    

“recognized educational institution” – as defined in the Compulsory Education Law, 1949.

Facts, Procedure, and Claims

2. Yated, a registered non-profit organization, together with 54 parents of children with Downs syndrome, asks that we order the State to provide free special education to children who, though having special educational needs, have been found suitable for integration in regular educational institutions. Petitioners claim that the authorities are required by the Special Education Law to finance special education in any educational institution where a child is placed. They claim that the approach expressed in section 7(b) of the law requires the Placement Committee to prefer the placement of children with special needs in a regular educational institution. Furthermore, pursuant to the policy of the Ministry of Education, children with special needs should, wherever possible, be placed in the regular educational system and also be given additional educational assistance. Petitioners explained that the Ministry of Education, though it encourages such integration, does not provide financial aid. As such, the financial burden falls on the parents. As such, parents who are unable to bear these expenses are forced to transfer their children to special education institutions, despite the fact that these children have been found suitable for integration into the regular educational system.

Petitioners referred us to the State Comptroller’s Report. This report examined the special education framework for 2001 and concluded that the budgetary framework, as set forth above, was inadequate. Report No. 52B of the State Comptroller (2001) noted that the Ministry of Education’s interpretation of the law was that there was no entitlement to receive free special education within the regular education framework. The Report noted that this interpretation found expression in the Ministry’s guidelines and in the allocation of resources. Special education institutions received monies as per the services to which their pupils were entitled. In contrast, the budgetary allocation for the integration programs did not suffice to meet the needs of the integrated pupils. The Report also stated that, in recent years, the number of hours allocated by the Ministry of Education has been inadequate to meet the needs of the integrated students. Moreover, a large majority of the monies of the Special Education Department is directed to special education frameworks; only a small part thereof is directed to integration. The Report concluded by stating that the limited resources allocated to the integration program do not meet the needs of the children in the program. Under these circumstances, the economic and psychological burden of integration falls on the children’s parents, who are forced to finance the services independently. Since most families lack such resources, the integration options for many children are limited.

This was the background for petitioners’ claim that the policy of the Ministry of Education violates the right to education – a fundamental right. They further alleged that this policy infringes the fundamental right to equality. This is because it discriminates between parents whose children’s special education needs are paid by the Ministry of Education and between parents who are forced to bear these costs independently. Furthermore, they claim, the policy also discriminates between those children integrated into regular classes – as their parents can bear the expenses involved – and those children placed in special education institution solely due to their parents’ inability to bear those expenses.

3. In its response, the State did not dispute the pedagogical advantages of integrating children with special needs into regular educational institutions, and that the policy of the Ministry of Education was to encourage such integration. As part of this policy, since 1996 the Ministry of Education has even implemented programs for children with special needs who have been integrated into the regular education system.  The Minister of Education appointed a public committee in 2000, which noted the importance of giving preference to integration within the regular education system, as provided by the Special Education Law. The Committee also noted the inadequacy of the resources allocated towards such integration. Internal ministerial committees were appointed to implement the recommendations of the public committee. These determined that the regular education system should be granted monies for additional integration hours and personnel trained in special education. They further determined that those special education students studying within the regular education system should receive the services provided by the law, as available resources allow.

The State claims that, subject to budgetary pressures, significant resources are allocated towards integration. Even so, the State contended that the clear import of section 3 of the law is that the right to free special education, which is conferred by section 4 of the law, can only be realized in an institution for special education or in a special education class within a regular institution. The actual extent of assistance granted to children with special needs in the regular education system is subject to the discretion of the Placement committee. The State claimed, however, that the Placement Committee is not authorized to provide assistance for all “special education,” as per the broad definition of that term in the law. They further argued that, pursuant to section 7(b) of the law, the State is under no statutory obligation to provide such assistance. This is because the decisions of the Placement Committee are only recommendations; their realization is contingent upon the resources actually available to the State.

The Right to Education

   4. The right to education has long been recognized as a basic human right. The right is anchored in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Article 26 of this Declaration provides that every person has the right to education and that education must be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 was also ratified by Israel in 1991. This declared in article 13 that education should be directed to the full development of the human personality, and that it should strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also determined that elementary education should be compulsory and freely available. See XXXI Treaties of Israel 1037, at 205. The right to education is also anchored in articles 28 and 29 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. See XXXI Treaties of Israel 1038, at 221.

   The right to education is also anchored in numerous constitutions, such as the Belgian Constitution (article 24) [12], the South African Constitution (article 29) [13], the Constitution of Spain (article 27) [14], and the Irish Constitution (article 42) [15]. The German Constitution and the constitutions of most of the states of the United States establish the government’s responsibility to provide education for its citizens.

  5. In Judaism the right to education and the obligation to educate are fundamental, and are deeply rooted in Judaic sources. The traditions of scholarship and diligence which have characterized Judaism for thousands of years are firmly grounded in a variety of obligations under Jewish law. Education and study were seen as being of equal value to all other religious commandments combined. The best students were directed into education and teaching, and the teachers were mandated to facilitate equal education for all, so as to avoid discrimination against the poor. See Maimonides, Laws of Torah Study, Ch.1 [19]. In this context the Babylonian Talmud states: “[b]e heedful of [do not neglect] the children of the poor, for from them the Torah goes forth.” See Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Nedarim 81b [20].

The obligation of education was not only imposed on individuals. It was the responsibility of the entire community. The community was responsible for ensuring the education of all children whose parents could not take care of them. The community had to provide this critical service and make it equally available to all persons. It was the community that bore the burden of the consequences of the failure to provide education. This was Maimonides’ ruling on the matter:

In every country, district and town we should arrange for study classes for the children. A city which does not have schools for its children is excommunicated until arrangements for classes are made.

See Maimonides, Laws of Torah Study, Ch. 2 [19].

6. Shortly after its establishment, with the enactment of the Compulsory Education Law, 1949, the State of Israel delineated the scope of its obligation to ensure the rights of its citizenry to education. This law sets out an arrangement for compulsory education for every boy and girl until the age of 15, as well as the State’s responsibility to ensure the provision of such education. More recently, the right of children to education in Israel was anchored in the Rights of the Student Law, 2000. The purpose of this law is to determine the principles for the rights of the student in the spirit of human dignity and the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Case law, too, recognized the right to education as a fundamental right. Justice Theodor Or made the following comments regarding the importance of this right:

One cannot exaggerate the importance of education as a social tool. This is one of the most important functions fulfilled by the government and the State. Education is critical for the survival of a dynamic and free democratic society. It constitutes a necessary foundation for every individual’s self-fulfillment. It is essential for the success and flourishing of every individual. It is crucial to the survival of society, in which people improve their individual well-being and thus contribute to the well-being of the entire community.

HCJ 7715, 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat v. Minister of Education and Culture, at 24 [1].

The right to free education is also an expression of the principle of equality. It enables every child to realize their innate talent and potential, to integrate into society and to progress therein, irrespective of their parents’ socio-economic status.

Even so, to date, the question whether the right to education is included in the right to human dignity, as defined in sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, has yet to be definitively resolved. Indeed, Justice Or contended that the right to education was not included in the right to human dignity. See HCJ Shoharei Gilat, [1] at 26. But this was a solitary view, and the other two justices preferred to leave the question open. Id. at 34.

Discrimination in the exercise of the right to education, if occasioned on the basis of group affiliation, may indeed be regarded as degradation that violates the right to human dignity. Compare HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, [2] at 131-32. By contrast, unequal treatment occasioned by political, administrative, or budgetary reasons is not degrading, and does not, therefore, violate human dignity. For our purposes, discrimination against children with special needs, though rooted in their group affiliation, is motivated by budgetary considerations. As such, the question of whether such discrimination violates human dignity is not unequivocal and I see no need to answer it. Petitioners did not claim that the law should be annulled because it violates the right to human dignity. Their claim was rather that the law should be interpreted and applied in light of the right to education. Indeed, the basic right to education, as established by statute, our case law, and international law, is of independent validity, and has no necessary connection to the right to human dignity prescribed by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. See Gershon Gontovnik, The Constitutional Law: Direction of Development after the Constitutional Revolution, 22 Iyunei Mishpat 129, 132-47 (1999) [18].

 

The Right to Special Education

7. The right to special education is a derivative of the right to education. Children with special needs are not able to exercise their right to education unless they receive special education that addresses their needs. Accordingly, the signatory States to the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognized the right of children who are physically or mentally disabled to enjoy full and decent lives in conditions that ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate their active participation in communal life. See section 23 of the Convention. In order to ensure the protection of these rights, the Convention provides:

Party States recognize the right of the disabled child to special care. Party States shall encourage and ensure the extension, subject to available resources, to the suitable child and those responsible for his or her care, of assistance for which application is made and which is appropriate to the child’s condition and to the circumstances of the parents or others caring for the child.

Children with special needs are entitled to an education suitable for their needs; this right is recognized in most of the countries around the world. For example, in the United States, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 USCS § 1400 et seq. provides:

The purposes of this title are:

(1) (A) to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living;

Many States have also recognized the importance of integrating people with special needs generally and children in particular into regular frameworks, and have created statutory arrangements for such integration. Thus, the Disabilities Education Act provides, in section 1412(a), that preference shall be given to placing children with special needs in the regular education system:

5. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT-

(A) [States must establish procedures to ensure] to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.

See also Oberti v. Board of Education, 1204 F. Supp. 995 (2d Cir. 1993) [16]; Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir.1989) [17].

In a similar vein, section 6(a)(2) of the Equal Rights For People With Disabilities Law of 1998 provides that “the exercise of right and the grant of services to a person with disabilities shall be carried out … within the framework of the services granted and intended for the general public, after making such adjustments as may be required under the circumstances….” We ourselves ruled that the integration of the handicapped in the regular fabric of community life is intended to protect the dignity and the liberty of such persons, by ensuring equality and participation in society. HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v. Municipal Council of Maccabim-Reut, [3] at 19. This is the background for the interpretation of the Special Education Law.

Interpretation of the Law

8. As stated above, the questions raised by this petition are: Is the right to special education conferred by the Special Education Law limited to special education provided in separate institutions for special education (as argued by the State)? Alternatively, does this right extend also to special education provided to children studying in the regular education system (as argued by petitioners)?

Our presumption is that statutes are interpreted in a manner commensurate with the basic values of the legal system. As such, our interpretations must accord with the principle of equality. See, for example, FH 10/69 Boronovsky v. The Chief Rabbis of Israel, [4] at 35; HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, [5] at 275; HCJ 953/87, 1/88 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv/Jaffa, [6] at 320-29. Similarly, statutory interpretation must harmonize with the right to education, including the right to special education.

Another rule of interpretation is the presumption that the norms adopted by the State should be in accord with the norms of international law by which the State is bound. According to this presumption, all rules will, wherever possible, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the norms of international law. See CrimA 131/67 Kamier v. The State of Israel, [7] at 80; CA 522/70 Alkotov v. Shaheen, [8] at 80; CrimA 3112/94 Abu Chassan v. The State of Israel, [9] at 430 (Landau, J.).

These interpretive presumptions may be rebutted only when the language of the statute, or its particular purpose as specified in the law, cannot be reconciled with the general values of the legal system or with the international norm. See Poraz, at 329-30 [6]; Kamier,[7] at 112.

9. For our purposes, the Special Education Law is intended to provide special education free of charge to any child with special needs, in order to ensure that he fulfills his potential and that he integrates into society. See also the Explanatory Notes to the Special Education Law Bill, 1988. The notes point out that special education is intended to aid integration into society and ensure the full development of the innate potential – physical, intellectual, and emotional – of each student. This purpose conforms with and gives expression to the right to education, the principle of equality, and the international conventions ratified by the State of Israel.

Section 7 of the law, which discusses special education in a regular educational institution, does not specifically provide that such education must be funded by the State, as it provides in section 3 regarding special education in separate institutions and classes. However, in view of the rights to education and to equality, the principles of international law, as well as the purpose of the law as described above, the necessary conclusion is that the funding duty of the State also applies to the assistance required for a child with special needs integrated into a regular educational institution.

Until now, the State has been guided by a discriminatory interpretation, which leads to an unreasonable result. The Special Education Law prescribes two paths for the provision of special education. The first path is within the separate framework of special education. The second path is within the regular educational framework. In the latter path, children receive assistance as determined by the Placement Committee in accordance with their needs. It is implausible that the Knesset would have arbitrarily decided to limit the State’s duty to provide free special education to only one of these statutory frameworks. This is especially true in light of the undisputed fact that the regular framework has substantial advantages.

Furthermore, it is unacceptable that parents of children with special needs should waive their children’s right to integration within the framework of regular education solely due to financial difficulties. This would undermine the very heart of substantive equality. The aspiration for such equality is manifest in the goal to provide equal opportunities for every child in Israel. When children with special needs are sent to frameworks for special education rather than the regular education framework – solely due to financial reasons – these children are deprived of this equal opportunity. Such discrimination is unacceptable.

10. The State’s claim – that the duty of assistance under section 7 of the law is narrower than the duty set out by the definition of special education – is unacceptable. The provision regarding the recommendation for separate assistance is the natural result of placing a child with special needs in a regular educational framework. In such a case, it is the Placement Committee’s duty to determine the type of assistance the child requires. This determination is classified as a “recommendation,” not because the State is released from its duty to provide the assistance, but rather because flexibility is required in implementing the recommendation. This implementation must consider the evolving needs of the particular child.

The Remedy

11. A purposive interpretation of the law requires that the state implement it in accord with the principle of equality. Discharge of this duty requires an equal budgetary allocation for all the frameworks providing special education. In this context, a distinction must be made between the current budget and future budgets, beginning with the next fiscal year.

As for the future: it is clear that it is incumbent upon the Ministry of Education, with the assistance of the Ministry of Finance, to allocate its budget in a manner that implements the law as interpreted by this judgment. The Supreme Court has elucidated the nature of this obligation in the context of cemeteries, which are the responsibility of the Ministry for Religious Affairs:

In all of its actions, the Ministry for Religious Affairs, like any public body, must be guided by the principle of equality; as such it must adhere to this principle already in the preparatory stages of the draft budget for the coming year. At this stage the workers of the Ministry, together with the workers of the Ministry of Finance, may adopt one of two main routes: The first is for the Ministry for Religious Affairs to stipulate the total amount designated for cemeteries of all religions in the draft budget itself. The Ministry for Religious Affairs will then divide that amount between the cemeteries of the different religions, naturally on the basis of equal allocation. The second route is for the Ministry for Religious Affairs to designate, in the draft budget, different amounts to the cemeteries of different religions.

HCJ 1113/99 Adallah – Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, [10] at 182 (Zamir, J.)

Similarly, in our case, the State must allocate its budget for the coming year in a manner that implements the right to education on the basis of equality. This can be done by the allocation of one global sum for educational expenses, to be subsequently divided up on an equal basis. Alternatively, this right can be realized by making a separate allocation, within the framework of the draft budget itself, of sums designated for the education of these children in institutions of special education as well as in regular schools.

 And as for the present year: the appropriate remedy when human rights are violated is to compel the authorities to undo this breach immediately, even if this involves amending the budget structure. Such was the ruling of this Court in HCJ Adallah, [10] at 185-86:

Now it may well be that the Ministry for Religious Affairs has already decided on its budgetary allocation for cemeteries for the present year; it may even have notified the particular bodies who are to receive the funds, and they would have certainly planned their activities for the year on the basis of that notification. Indeed, some of the money may already have been transferred, pursuant to such notification. Nonetheless, and despite the possible difficulty, the Ministry can still, and indeed, must uphold the principle of equality between the different cemeteries. This applies even at this stage of the year, regardless of any additional administrative burdens and any additional funding that may be required for the cemeteries. If indeed there is a need for additional funding, the Ministry for Religious Affairs must take measures (with the assistance of the Ministry of Finance, if required) to obtain it. Such measures may be achieved by economizing in other sections of the Ministry, by digging into the reserves of the Ministry, or by any other manner.

This is the rule, but in the present case it would be inappropriate for us to issue a rigid order, one that applies to the current fiscal year. For we fear that, as a result of the current dire economic straits in which the State finds itself, a renewed budgetary allocation would adversely affect those children with special needs currently being educated in special education institutions. In many cases the situation of these children is more acute than that of those in regular educational institutions, and it is not appropriate that the realization of the rights of the latter be at the expense of the former. Even now, however, the State should, wherever possible and at least partially, attempt to provide funding for the education of children with special needs in the regular educational institutions.

 

I therefore propose that the petition be accepted in the sense that it will be declared that the State has not discharged its statutory duty to provide free special education for children placed in regular educational institutions; that it must quickly adopt the measures necessary for it to come into compliance with the statutory requirements; and that it must comply with these requirements no later than the preparatory stages of the budget for the coming fiscal year, all subject to the restrictions of section 7(e) of the law. I also suggest that the State should bear petitioners’ costs, in the sum of NIS 15,000.

Justice E. Levi

I agree.

Justice T. Or

1. Petitioners suffer from Down Syndrome and, as such, they require special treatment and guidance in school. As with all other children of compulsory education age, each of them is entitled to free special education, pursuant to section 6 of the Compulsory Education Law, 1949. Our concern is whether they are also entitled to receive “special education” free of charge in a regular school. Petitioners assert that this right is conferred by statute. The State claims that the statute confers that right only to children with special needs who are studying in a special education institution, and not to those studying in a regular framework.

Like my colleague Justice Dorner, I also believe that the State is obligated to provide free special education (within the statutory limitation, see infra para. 10) to children with special needs who have been integrated into the regular framework of a recognized educational institution, and not only to children with special needs who have been integrated into a special education institution. In my view this is the 

necessary conclusion to be drawn from the provisions of the Special Education Law, 1988.

2. The Special Education Law is concerned with providing special education to children with special needs. Section 1(a) of the law sets out the following definition of a “child with special needs:”

“child with special needs” – a person between the ages of three and twenty one who has limited ability for adaptive behavior and is in need of special education.

The special education required by the child with special needs is also defined in section 1(a) of the law:

“special education” – systematic instruction, teaching and treatment given under this law to a child with special needs, including physiotherapy, speech therapy, occupational therapy and treatments as per additional professional disciplines that shall be determined, all in accordance with the needs of the child with special needs;

The import of these two definitions is that a child with special needs is not only a child who receives special education in the framework of a special education institution, but also a child who has been integrated into a regular recognized educational institution.

3.            According to the statute, a child with special needs may be directed by the educational authorities to one of two kinds of institutions. The first is a special education institution, defined by section 1(a) of the law as “a recognized educational institution in which special education is provided, including a class in a recognized educational institution in which special education is provided.” The second is a recognized educational institution, though not a special education institution, in which the child is integrated into a regular class. Placement Committees are authorized to place the child in either one of these frameworks. These committees were established pursuant to the statute, which prescribed the manner of their appointment, their composition, and their powers. See sections 5-13 of the law. The law also established an Appeal Committee, to which appeals can be made against the decisions of Placement Committees.

Recently, section 7(A1) was added to the law, and it provides for the possibility of placing a child with special needs in a special education institution even without a referral from the Placement Committee. See Special Education Law (Amendment No.6), 2002. Similarly, a child with special needs may be placed in a regular class even without a referral from the Placement Committee. Referrals by the Placement Committee, however, remain the principle manner of placement.

4. Section 7(b) of the law sets forth guidelines for the Placement Committee. It provides:

In determining the placement of a child with special needs, the Placement Committee shall prefer placement in a recognized educational institution which is not a special education institution.

These guidelines are directed towards the best interests of the special needs child. From the perspective of such a child, a regular study framework is preferable, if integration is possible. This is the position of the education authorities, of the Ministry of Education, and of the special committee established by the Minister of Education, the Margalit Committee. This recommendation is also consistent with the purpose of the law, which is to accommodate, as far as possible, the integration of children with special needs into society. This purpose is set out by section 2 of the law, which provides that:

2. The aim of special education is to advance and develop the skills and ability of the child with special needs, to improve his physical, intellectual, and emotional behavior, and to impart knowledge, skills and habits, and to facilitate his integration in both society and the workforce.

For our purposes, however, the important factor is that section 7(b) regards all children referred by the Placement Committee to the framework of regular education as “children with special needs.” Such children are those who require “special education” as defined by the law, namely those children who require systematic instruction and teaching as provided by the statute, in accordance with their needs, within the definition of “special education” in the law.

5. The conclusion from all of the above is that placement of a child with special needs – whether in a special education institution or as an integrated child in a regular educational institution – is regulated by the law; and that “special education” is provided to both categories: both to the integrated child with special needs as well as to the child with special needs who learns in a special education institution.

6.            It is against this background that section 4(a) of the law must be read. This section provides that “[t]he State is responsible for the provision of special education pursuant to this law.” This section must be interpreted to provide that it is the State’s responsibility to provide special education free of charge. As stated above, “special education” within the meaning of the law means special education provided for children with special needs. This applies regardless of whether such education takes place within a special education institution or within an institution for regular education. The term “pursuant to this law” in the concluding part of section 4(a) directs the interpreter of the law, first and foremost, to the definitions in section 1(a) of the law. As we observed above, these definitions designate special education for every child with special needs. Second, it directs him to the special arrangements of the statute concerning the manner of providing special education, which I will discuss below. I should also note that section 4(a) comes in addition to the provisions of section 3 of the law, which provides that a child with special needs studying in a special education institution is entitled to receive free education in that institution. Such education must, to the extent possible, be located near his place of residence.

This interpretation of section 4(a) is preferable to the alternative interpretation that the section only identifies the body that has responsibility for providing the special education which, pursuant to section 3(a), must be provided free of charge to those learning in a special education institution. The interpretation is preferable because it conforms with the interpretative principles elucidated by my colleague, Justice Dorner, especially the principle that a statutory provision must, whenever possible, be interpreted in a manner that does not discriminate. Justice Barak dwelled on this point in HCJ 507/81 Abu Hatzeira v. The Attorney-General, [11] at 561, 585:

A fundamental principle, which serves as a legislative purpose of all acts of the legislative body, is the principle of equality before the law …. One must therefore presume and interpret legislative acts as being intended to realize this purpose and not to contravene it

This is also true in our case. The interpretation that section 4(a) provides for free special education for all children with special needs accords with the principle of equality, and also accords with the general purpose of special education, as defined by the law itself. As such, this is the appropriate and correct interpretation of the section.

7.            The current statutory arrangements regarding the two educational frameworks are not set out in the same amount of detail. The statutory arrangement concerning special education institutions is comprehensive. See chapter 4 of the statute. By contrast, the arrangement for the studies of integrated children is not detailed to the same extent. Nonetheless, the definition of “special education” in section 1(a) of the law makes it clear that special education must be adjusted to the needs of every child, including children integrated in the regular educational system. The definition even articulates the assistance that must be provided to all children in special education. Furthermore, section 7(c) instructs the Placement Committee as follows:

Where a Placement Committee has decided on the placement of a child with special needs in an institution as defined in subsection (b), the Committee shall recommend the treatment or special lessons that he shall be given in that institution.

In other words, the law even regulates the procedure to be adopted by the Placement Committee when it recommends extra support for an integrated student. This arrangement is only partial, and does not touch on the details of the study program. In practice, as things currently stand, institutions for regular education in which children with special needs are studying must adjust their syllabus to the needs of those children.

The current absence of a statutory arrangement regulating the development of a syllabus for integrated children is undesirable. The legislature is aware of the problem and, at this time, steps are being taken to amend the law and add a chapter that regulates the development of a syllabus for integrated children. In December 2001 a bill was tabled in the Knesset, entitled “Special Education (Integration of Children with Special Needs into Regular Frameworks) Law, 2001.” This bill adds Chapter D1 to the statute, entitled “The Integration of a Child with Special Needs into the Regular Education System.” Section 20B of the bill provides:

An integrated child shall be entitled, within the framework of his studies in a regular institution, to additional systematic instruction and teaching, and to special services set out in this statute;

The amendment, however, does not affect the issue of free special education, to which integrated children are entitled under section 4(a) of the law.

8.            In its arguments against this interpretation of section 4(a) the State relies primarily on the provisions of section 7(c) of the law. The State claims that the fact the Placement Committee can only recommend the treatments or lessons that are to be given to the integrated child indicates that the integrated child does not have a right to receive such treatments and lessons in the framework of the regular institution in which he is to study.

I concur with my colleague Justice Dorner; a different interpretation must be given to this provision. The latter does not purport to resolve the question of whether treatments and lessons required for integrated children are to be provided free of charge. For, as stated above, section 4(a) of the law answers that question. Section 7(a) is only intended to charge the Placement Committee with the duty of specifying what it considers to be the needs of the child. The Placement Committee examines and assesses the child’s condition and may deem it appropriate to refer him to the regular education framework. Accordingly, and having regard for the Committee’s knowledge of the particular circumstances of the child concerned, it is only natural that it be charged with informing the institution to which the child is referred regarding that child’s special needs. The fact these provisions are limited to the Committee’s recommendation regarding lessons and treatments does not derogate from the integrated child’s right to receive free “special education,” as defined by the statute. This right to special education is granted by other sections of the statute. It is not limited by the particular fact of the child’s placement in an institution for regular education. Nor is it limited by the fact that the Placement Committee’s opinion regarding the special education required by the child is only a recommendation.

9. It should be added that, in their response to the petition, respondents noted that they recognize the importance of the integration of children with special needs in regular education frameworks. They further mentioned that the Ministry of Education makes every effort to use the resources at its disposal in order to advance the interests of children in integrated frameworks. In respondent’s words:

There are guidelines for the teacher to develop individualized educational programs which take into consideration the specific learning difficulties of every student.

The principle of equality mandates the provision of tools for the integration of children with special needs into the framework of regular education. The principle requires equality between children with special needs in regular educational frameworks, and between children with special needs in special education frameworks. It also requires the provision of equal opportunities to children, regardless of any special needs they may have.

This is also the import of the Equal Rights for People with Disabilities Act, 1998, whose goal it is to integrate persons with disabilities into society.

I mention this fact in order to clarify that, even before this judgment, the Ministry of Education did not ignore the needs of integrated children, and made efforts to locate resources in order to provide financial aid. It is now clear, however, that the Ministry is obligated to provide free special education for all children with special needs. 

10. The legislature was aware of the budgetary ramifications of the implementation of the law. Section 7(e) deals with this problem and establishes a mechanism for a “budget increase” in favor of special education. The section provides:

The Minister of Education, with the approval of the Minister of Finance, shall, with respect to each academic year, fix a budget for an increase in the number of persons entitled to special education. The Minister of Education shall determine the number of entitled persons that the Placement Committee may approve for each academic year.

The existence of a “budget increase” mechanism attests to the real problem confronting those dealing with special education: the resources at their disposal do not enable the provision of free education for all children with special needs. This being the case, the Ministers are required to determine, on an annual basis, the quota for those entitled to special education. From now on, the Ministers will also have to include integrated children in the “budget increase” section. And, as clarified in the judgment of my colleague, Justice Dorner, this applies to the next budgetary year.

 

 

 

Based on all of the above, I concur with the opinion of my colleague, Justice Dorner.

 

Decided as per the opinion of Justice Dorner.

August 14, 2002

Noar KeHalacha v. Ministry of Education

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 1067/08
Date Decided: 
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel is a recognized unofficial school that operates under a licence from the Ministry of Education and is subsidized by the state. In 2007 changes were made to the school, and a new ‘Hassidic track’ was introduced alongside the ‘general track.’ These tracks were completely separate from one another, and the new ‘Hassidic track’ was housed in a separate wing of the school, with a separate playground, a separate teachers’ room, a wall separating the two tracks and a different uniform from the one worn by girls in the ‘general track.’ Thus the school was effectively split into two schools.

 

An investigation carried out on behalf of the third respondent found that 73% of the girls in the new school (the ‘Hassidic track’) were of Ashkenazi origin (i.e., their families came from northern European countries), whereas only 27% were of Oriental or Sephardic origin (i.e., their families came from Middle-Eastern or North African countries). In the old school (the ‘general track’) only 23% of the girls were of Ashkenazi origin. Nonetheless, the investigation found no evidence that there were any girls who were refused admission into the Hassidic track.

 

The third respondent ordered the school to remove the physical separations between the two tracks and to eliminate the separate uniforms. However the school did not comply.

 

Held: The physical separation and differentiation of the two tracks was discriminatory and the school was ordered to remove the physical barriers and eliminate any indication of discrimination in the school. The Ministry of Education was ordered to ensure that the order was complied with, failing which, it should consider cancelling the school’s licence and subsidy.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

CJ 1067/08

Noar KeHalacha Association

and another

v.

1.     Ministry of Education

2.     Immanuel Local Council

3.     Independent Education Centre

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[6 August 2009]

Before Justices E.E. Levy, E. Arbel, H. Melcer

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel is a recognized unofficial school that operates under a licence from the Ministry of Education and is subsidized by the state. In 2007 changes were made to the school, and a new ‘Hassidic track’ was introduced alongside the ‘general track.’ These tracks were completely separate from one another, and the new ‘Hassidic track’ was housed in a separate wing of the school, with a separate playground, a separate teachers’ room, a wall separating the two tracks and a different uniform from the one worn by girls in the ‘general track.’ Thus the school was effectively split into two schools.

An investigation carried out on behalf of the third respondent found that 73% of the girls in the new school (the ‘Hassidic track’) were of Ashkenazi origin (i.e., their families came from northern European countries), whereas only 27% were of Oriental or Sephardic origin (i.e., their families came from Middle-Eastern or North African countries). In the old school (the ‘general track’) only 23% of the girls were of Ashkenazi origin. Nonetheless, the investigation found no evidence that there were any girls who were refused admission into the Hassidic track.

The third respondent ordered the school to remove the physical separations between the two tracks and to eliminate the separate uniforms. However the school did not comply.

 

Held: The physical separation and differentiation of the two tracks was discriminatory and the school was ordered to remove the physical barriers and eliminate any indication of discrimination in the school. The Ministry of Education was ordered to ensure that the order was complied with, failing which, it should consider cancelling the school’s licence and subsidy.

 

Petition granted.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Budget Principles Law, 5745-1985, ss. 3A(i), 3A(j).

Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949, ss. 1, 7.

Special Cultural Schools Law, 5768-2008.

State Education (Recognized Schools) Regulations, 5714-1953, r. 9.

State Education Law, 5713-1953, ss. 1(b), 2, 3, 11.

Student Rights Law, 5761-2000, ss. 1, 3, 5, 16(a), 16(b).

Supervision of Schools Law, 5729-1969, ss. 3, 12(a), 15, 28, 30, 31, 32(a1).

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 421/77 Nir v. Beer-Yaakov Local Council [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 253.

[2]        HCJ 4363/00 Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(4) 203.

[3]        HCJ 4805/07 Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education (unreported decision of 27 July 2008).

[4]        FH 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 32.

[5]        HCJ 10296/02 Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [2005] IsrSC 59(3) 224.

[6]        HCJ 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat Society v. Minister of Education [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 2.

[7]        HCJ 2599/00 Yated v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834; [2002-3] IsrLR 57.

[8]        HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [2006] (1) IsrLR 105.

[9]        HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance [2005] (2) IsrLR 335.

[10]     HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel-Aviv Municipality [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 393.

[11]     HCJ 8437/99 Habad Kindergarten Network in the Holy Land v. Minister of Education [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 69.

[12]     HCJ 5026/04 Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd v. Director of Sabbath Work Permits Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs [2005] (1) IsrLR 340.

[13]     HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13.

[14]     HCJ 114/78 Burkan v. Minister of Finance [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 800.

[15]     HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[16]     HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset (unreported).

[17]     HCJ 6698/95 Kadan v. Israel Land Administration [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 258.

[18]     HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 193.

[19]     HCJ 727/00 Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils in Israel v. Minister of Building and Housing [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 79.

[20]     HCJ 59/88 Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 705.

[21]     HCJ 11020/05 Panim For Jewish Renaissance v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport (unreported decision of 16 July 2006).

[22]     HCJ 6051/95 Recanat v. National Labour Court [1997] IsrSC 51(3) 289.

[23]     HCJ 6778/97 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Public Security [2004] IsrSC 58(2) 358; [2004] IsrLR 1.

[24]     FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [1971] IsrSC 25(1) 7.

[25]     HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk, Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324.

[26]     HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 193.

[27]     HCJ 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 267.

[28]     HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin v. Minister of Education [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 199.

[29]     HCJ 3094/93 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 404; IsrSJ 10 258.

[30]     HCJ 240/98 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 167.

[31]     HCJ 7111/95 Local Government Centre v. Knesset [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 485.

[32]     HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94; [1995-6] IsrLR 178.

[33]     HCJ 10203/03 National Assembly Ltd v. Attorney-General (unreported decision of 20 August 2008).

[34]     HCJ 200/83 Wathad v. Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 113.

[35]     HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 241.

[36]     HCJ 3261/93 Manning v. Minister of Justice [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 282.

[37]     HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 443; [2004] IsrLR 53.

[38]     HCJ 10808/04 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Education and Culture (unreported decision of 11 July 2006).

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

[39]     AP (Jer) 1320/03 Alkaslasi v. Upper Beitar Municipality [2003] IsrDC 641.

 

American cases cited:

[40]     Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[41]     Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

[42]     Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[43]     Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yehaveh Daat 4, 4 and 5, 6; Yabia Omer 2, 6.

[44]     Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch ben Yaakov Ashkenazi, Responsa Hacham Tzvi, 33.

[45]     Exodus, 19, 3.

[46]     Midrash Sechel Tov (Buber edition), Exodus, Introduction.

 

For the petitioners — A. HaCohen, Y. Avraham.

For the first respondent — S. Shmueli.

For the second respondent — O. Barchash-Rubowitz, R. Arbiv.

For the third respondent — M. Janovsky.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice E.E. Levy

Background

1.    The Beit Yaakov Girls Primary School in the town of Immanuel is a ‘recognized unofficial’ institution for Jewish religious education. The Independent Education Centre, which is the third respondent in the petition, is the organization that operates and manages the school. The first respondent, the Ministry of Education, is the body that supervises, on behalf of the state, the functioning and activity of the third respondent and its educational institutions.

2.    At the end of the 5767 academic year in 2007, it was decided to make several changes to the school’s building and educational programme, and in practice an additional school was erected alongside the existing school. In the course of these changes, the school building was split into two by erecting partitions, and separate entrances were made. The playground was also divided into two, by means of a cloth curtain and a separation fence. The teachers’ room was also made separate. A new wing was built on the third floor of the school building, solely for the use of the pupils of the new school. There are claims that the school hours were changed so that the students’ breaks in the two schools would not overlap. Moreover, the school uniform, which has been worn at the school since it was founded, was changed in order to distinguish the students of the new school from their counterparts in the old one.

While the parties dispute the purpose of the aforesaid changes, no one can deny their outcome – a separation between most of the girls whose families are of Ashkenazi origin and their counterparts whose families are of Sephardic origin. With regard to the factors that led to the aforesaid change, some of the inhabitants of the town believe that the aforesaid separation was made because of a continuing tension between the Ashkenazi population and the Sephardic population in the town, and some feel that the school, by taking this action, has created an ethnic split, in order to discriminate against and victimize the Sephardic students and their parents.

3.    As a result, after several telephone calls, counsel for the parents of some of the Sephardic students wrote on 12 Elul 5767 (26 August 2007) to the Ministry of Education, asking it to exercise its powers to prevent the continued discrimination against the students. When the Ministry of Education did not answer her letter, counsel for the parents wrote a second time with a request to remedy the situation and to deal with the persons responsible. The petitioners, through their counsel, also wrote to the Ministry of Education with a request for clarifications regarding the separation process that was introduced in the school, as well as with regard to the scope of supervision of this process.

4.    Following this, the director-general of the Ministry of Education, Mrs Shlomit Amichai, wrote to the Independent Education Centre with a request to cancel the separation in the school and to act to return matters to the original position. Moreover, Mrs Amichai stipulated a date by which her instructions should be carried out, and added that if the Independent Education Centre did not comply with the aforesaid date, she would consider cancelling the school’s licence. When the date passed, Mrs Amichai Advocate Mordechai Bas, who had held office in the past as legal adviser to the State Comptroller’s Office, to examine the complaints made against the management of the school. Advocate Bas especially examined whether on the basis of a licence to run one institution, the school was running two separate schools, and whether the separation between the students as described above was the result of ethic discrimination.

 In the report describing the examination that he made, Advocate Bas described the demographic changes that had occurred in Immanuel — including the influx into the town of new inhabitants, most of whom are of Sephardic origin — and he surveyed the effects of these developments on the town’s population in general, and on the Beit Yaakov Girls School in particular. He found that the initiative to separate the school’s students came from parents belonging to a specific group within the town, most of whom were parents of students of Ashkenazi origin. Advocate Bas added that many Ashkenazi families that follow the Hassidic way of life did not want to expose their daughters to the modern way of life, which, in their opinion, includes unbecoming speech and conduct that is inconsistent with the strict laws of modesty that they follow. Therefore, Hassidic parents requested that their daughters should be separated from their counterparts, because of the concern that they would be exposed to content that in their opinion is unbecoming. When the parents approached the Independent Education Centre, it insisted that the segregationist group should remain within the existing school, in a new ‘Hassidic track’ that it would open alongside the ‘general track,’ rather than setting up a separate school. The Independent Education Centre also insisted, according to Advocate Bas’s report, that the two tracks should be under joint management, and that the pedagogic environment — including the teachers’ room, the study programme, the hours of study and the times of the breaks — should also be the same for all the students of the school. However, despite the instructions of the Independent Education Centre, Advocate Bas’s examination of what was being done in the school during the 5768 (2007-2008) academic year found, as I have already described, a different reality: the school was split into two, and this split found expression, inter alia, in the uniform that was adopted, the management of the school and the segregation that was introduced in the playground and even the teachers’ room. It should be emphasized that despite Advocate Bas’s finding that the split was made without the approval of the Independent Education Centre and in defiance of its instructions, the Independent Education Centre confirmed in a letter to the Ministry of Education on 11 Tishrei 5768 (23 September 2007) that it knew of the process of segregation and had not taken any practical steps in order to stop it (respondents’ exhibit 2, at page 8).

With regard to the question of the motive for the segregation between the students, Advocate Bas said that, to the best of his understanding, this was a result of the level of strictness of the members of the Hassidic community in conducting a religious lifestyle as compared with that of the members of the Sephardic community in the town. Advocate Bas summarized his findings as follows:

‘Indeed, the Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel has de facto been split, improperly and contrary to the provisions of the law and proper administrative practice, into two schools, but this split, with all of its negative aspects, was not done with an intention of discriminating against students because of their ethnic background and in practice there is no such discrimination. I arrived at this conclusion even though I am aware of the quantitative aspect of the ethnic separation between the two schools, i.e., that in the old school the percentage of girls who are from Ashkenazi families is approximately 23%, whereas in the new school they make up approximately 73%.

My conclusion that the school has indeed been divided into two separate schools, and has not merely introduced a new ‘Hassidic’ track, as the Independent Education Centre claims, is based on the situation, as I saw it when I visited the school, and on what I heard from the headmistress of the old school.

My additional conclusion that this split is not based on ethnic discrimination is based on documents that I saw, and on the impression that I formed after speaking to parents in both schools and the complainants when I met with them. I gave particular weight to the claim of the Independent Education Centre, the headmistress of the old school and the parents who initiated the split, that no parent who wanted or wants to register their daughters in the new school, and who was or is prepared to accept the conditions for doing so, has been refused. Not only was there no evidence to refute this claim, but even the complainants did not deny that it was factually true. If there is no refusal, where is the discrimination?’ (respondents’ exhibit 2, at page 1).

In view of all of the aforesaid, the sole recommendation of Advocate Bass was that the Ministry of Education should take enforcement action against the initiators and perpetrators of the split, but solely for a breach of the duties of reporting a split of a school.

5.    While this was happening, the petitioners filed their petition in this court. An order nisi was issued on 11 Tammuz 5768 (14 July 2008), and this was amended on 12 Tammuz 5768 (15 July 2008). This ordered the respondents to show cause why the Ministry of Education should not exercise real and effective supervision over the schools for which the Independent Education Centre was responsible, and why it should not make the support given to the institutions established by it or associated with it conditional upon compliance with the provisions of the law concerning the prohibition of discrimination. In addition, we ordered the respondents to show cause why it should not be held that ‘all of the students currently attending the Beit Yaakov School in Immanuel are entitled to continue to attend the school as one institution, and not subject to a screening policy that was mainly based on an improper ethnic segregation,’ as stated in the order.

The position of the third respondent — the Independent Education Centre

6.    In a memorandum that was attached to its preliminary reply, the Independent Education Centre outlined the events that preceded the split of the school. It was explained that in view of the successful attempt in the past, when two educational institutions were set up for boys in the town, it was the inhabitants of Immanuel, from every sector, that asked for an additional school to be set up for girls, despite the contrary opinion of the Independent Education Centre and the headmistress of the original school. According to the Independent Education Centre, it was the parents of the Sephardic students who promoted the idea of the new school, and even formed a team ‘whose purpose was to assist in setting up the Sephardic school. The team met several times, but after a while the representatives of the parents of the Oriental communities announced that for various reasons they were not capable of setting up the additional school’ (p. 4 of the memorandum). The attempt to set up the new school was ultimately successful because of the efforts of the Hassidic community. The Independent Education Centre goes on to say in its reply:

‘The founding of the school was well-known in the town, and following this, parents from the boys’ school and other parents who knew of the success of the boys’ school did indeed approach the school and ask that their daughters should be given the strictly Orthodox education and lifestyle and spiritual guidance that would be provided in it.

The result was that girls from all ethnic backgrounds and groups, who wish to be educated with the lifestyle and spiritual guidance of the school, were registered. In practice more than 35% of the students currently studying in the school are of Oriental origin’ (ibid., at p. 5).

 Notwithstanding, already on the date of filing the preliminary reply, the headmistress of the school, Mrs Stern, was ‘in practice the headmistress of both wings of the school, and there was complete cooperation in the operation of the two wings, including joint meetings of the staff, and there is no separation between the wings’ (ibid.).

Following Advocate Bas’s examination of the matter, the Independent Education Centre changed its position, and in its written reply of 19 August 2008, it claimed that a new school had not been established within the framework of the existing school, but only a new track — a ‘Hassidic track.’ It was also alleged that the fact that the Ministry of Education appointed a special examiner to examine the allegations of discrimination showed that the school was still being supervised properly. Finally the Independent Education Centre said that in view of the uproar in the town, it was essential that the Ministry of Education should recognize the two wings in the school, but it undertook that apart from the physical division between the two wings, all additional indications of separation would be removed and steps would be taken to return matters to their original position, including the use of a joint teaching staff, identical study programs and books, identical uniform and joint breaks. Thus all that would distinguish the two wings would be the strictly Orthodox spirit that determined the customs and lifestyle according to which each wing was supposed to conduct itself (ibid., at p. 6).

The position of the first respondent — the Ministry of Education

In a supplementary statement, the Ministry of Education clarified that it accepted the position of the external examiner, Advocate Bas, with regard to the failure of the school to comply with the reporting duties that bound it, including the split of the institution, and it added that ‘it [the breach of the reporting duty] is capable of justifying the cancellation of the existing licence of the Beit Yaakov school’ (p. 4 of the supplementary statement of 7 Tammuz 5768 (10 July 2008)). The Ministry of Education added that ‘the establishment and operation of the new separate school were done in a flagrant violation of the law, complete disregard for the provisions of the Supervision of Schools Law, a violation of the guidelines of the Ministry of Education and a serious infraction of the terms of the existing school’s licence’ (ibid.).

With regard to the issue of ethnic discrimination, the Ministry of Education thought that in the absence of clear criteria with regard to the principles underlying the division of the school, the burden of allaying the prima facie concern that the basis for separating the students was ethnic discrimination rested with the Independent Education Centre, especially in view of the unequal numerical division in the number of the students of the different ethnic backgrounds in the two wings, as discussed in the report of Advocate Bas.

The Ministry of Education went on to clarify that Mrs Amichai wrote once again to the Independent Education Centre with a demand that it remove any indication of a segregation between the parts of the school and that it unite the management both from an organizational viewpoint and with regard to staff. The Independent Education Centre was also asked to send the Ministry of Education, as required by law, notices regarding the registration dates for the academic year for the whole target population, and in so far as it was interested in setting up a separate educational track, it should send a plan setting out the characteristics of the new track, with the criteria for participation and admission requirements. It was clarified that if the Independent Education Centre did not comply with these conditions, it would consider the possibility of cancelling the school’s licence and reducing the amount of economic support given to it.

The agreement reached between the respondents

7.    When the Independent Education Centre refused to comply with the instructions of the Ministry of Education, after lengthy discussions between the persons in charge of the two organizations and their counsel, the representatives of the Independent Education Centre were summoned to a hearing before Mrs Amichai and the representatives of the ministry. During the hearing it was agreed between the respondents that the school would have two tracks, a Hassidic one and a general one, which would be approved by the Ministry of Education, and the students would have a right to choose between them when admitted to the school, on condition that they committed themselves to the religious way of life practised in the track that they chose. The Independent Education Centre even sent a proposed draft set of regulations for the Hassidic track for the approval of the Ministry of Education. This, together with an appendix that was intended to be read only by the parents of the students, contained the following clauses:

‘(a) The prayers and the studies in the school are conducted in the holy language (Ashkenazi pronunciation). In order to make it easier for girls who are not accustomed to pray at home with this pronunciation, the parents will ensure that even at home the students will become accustomed to pray as they do at school.

(b) The spiritual authority for the Hassidic track will be Rabbi Barlev, who will guide the students of the school in matters of conduct and Jewish law. The parents undertake not to allow a situation in which there will be a conflict between the spiritual authority practised in their homes and the one adopted by the school.

(c) For reasons of modesty, the girls will not be allowed to ride bicycles outside the home.

(d) The parents shall ensure that the friends that their daughters meet in the afternoon will only be from homes that accord with the spirit of “Beit Yaakov” education in every respect.

(e) The parents shall act with regard to clothing in accordance with the determination of the Rabbinical Committee on Matters of Clothing at the Rabbinical Court of Rabbi Vozner.

(f) No radio shall be played in the home at all. No computer that can play films of any kind shall be allowed in the home. Obviously no connection to the Internet shall be allowed.

(g) The girls should not be taken to hotels or any kind of holiday resorts. They should not visit the homes of relatives or friends who do not observe the Torah and the commandments.’

This proposed set of regulations was presented to us in the Ministry of Education’s reply of 20 Av 5768 (21 August 2008). In view of the comments of the court, and in view of Mrs Amichai’s letter in which she made it clear that she did not accept the proposed set of regulations, the Independent Education Centre submitted a revised version. The revised version omitted the provision that the students should pray with Ashkenazi pronunciation, and the duty to dress ‘in accordance with the decision of Rabbi Vozner’ — a rabbi who adopts a particularly strict approach to the prohibitions of immodesty — was replaced with the decision of the ‘committee of rabbis whose authority is binding in independent education institutions for Beit Yaakov schools.’ In its supplementary statement, the Ministry of Education clarified that it was satisfied with the wording of the amended regulations, and it thereby gave its approval to their being two tracks in the school.

 However, a later inspection conducted by the Ministry of Education showed that the reality of the segregation continued, and therefore Mrs Amichai once again demanded, for the third time, that the Independent Education Centre should remove any physical separation in the school, take action to combine the teachers’ room, and stop any act that involved any discrimination against any sector of the population. In addition, the Ministry of Education emphasized that if there was any claim of discrimination in the procedure of registration for a particular track, a student who was refused or encountered a difficulty in being admitted was entitled to write to the appeals committee, which would examine the claims of discrimination on their merits. Following Mrs Amichai’s demands, the Independent Education Centre once again demanded that the school should remove any physical barrier — including the plaster wall — that separated the different wings of the school. The Independent Education Centre also demanded that the teachers’ room should be combined, the use of a standard uniform by all of the students should be reintroduced and any other action that distinguished between students in the different tracks should be stopped.

The petitioners’ arguments

8.    The petitioners stand by their claim of entrenched discrimination that continues to characterize the school. This discrimination is not affected by the adoption of one set of regulations or another. It was argued that the amended regulations are merely a series of linguistic changes that disguise the flagrant ethnic preference with hollow statements, when in practice there is no change in the situation of the girls in the school. Their physical and ideological segregation continues, and thus, inter alia, the standard uniform worn in the two tracks is significantly different; the policy whereby the school gates and playgrounds are separate still exists, and the plaster wall that was built following the segregation, which separates the two parts of the school, has not been removed. The petitioners further argued that they are required to pay an additional monthly payment in order that their daughters may study in the Hassidic track, and bureaucratic difficulties are placed in the way of Sephardic parents who wish to register their daughters in that track. It was emphasized that despite the repeated demands of the respondents to stop the segregation, the school has refused to return the school to its original position in a manner acceptable to everyone. Finally, the petitioners emphasize that the segregation and its characteristics have left the Sephardic students and their parents feeling ostracized and humiliated.

Deliberations

The normative framework

9.    It is a matter of first principles that children and teenagers in the State of Israel are entitled to free education, by virtue of section 7 of the Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949:

‘Duty to provide free compulsory education

7.  (a) The state has a duty to provide compulsory education under this law.

     (b) The availability of official education institutions for providing compulsory education under this law for children and teenagers who live within the borders of a certain local education authority, is the joint responsibility of the state and that local education authority.’

At the same time, every parent has a duty to ensure his children are educated in accordance with the Compulsory Education Law, and the state, together with the local authorities, has a duty to allocate resources for the existence, management and supervision of the education system (HCJ 421/77 Nir v. Beer-Yaakov Local Council [1], at p. 263; HCJ 4363/00 Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 214; HCJ 4805/07 Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 53 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia).

Education services in Israel are provided today through official schools — i.e., state education — and in addition, ‘alongside the official schools, there are recognized schools that are not run by the state. These schools seek to give their students an education that is consistent with the ethical outlooks that the schools is seeking to foster’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 1). These are the ‘recognized unofficial schools’ (s. 1(b) of the State Education Law, 5713-1953), which, together with the ‘exempt schools’ that are not relevant to this case, constitute the majority of the schools in Israel that are not state schools.

The state may recognize an unofficial school, provided that it operates under a licence (s. 3 of the Supervision of Schools Law, 5729-1969). Granting a licence depends upon compliance with certain conditions, including physical, pedagogic, financial and sanitary conditions. An institution that is given a licence receives a budget from the state in an amount determined by the Minister of Education, and it is subject to the supervision of the ministry (s. 11 of the State Education Law, and ss. 30 and 31 of the Supervision of Schools Law).

With regard to the scope of the Ministry of Education’s authority with regard to independent schools, this court has held in the past that ‘Recognized unofficial schools, even though they do not operate within the framework of state education, are subject to the supervision of the public authority in several respects’ (Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 216). For this purpose, the State Education (Recognized Schools) Regulations, 5714-1953, define the conditions in which a school will be declared a recognized unofficial school, and the Supervision of Schools Law regulates the ways in which they will be established, how they operate and how they are supervised. Thus, s. 28 of the Supervision of Schools Law provides:

‘Supervision of schools

28. (a) The Minister of Education and Culture may give a licence holder the instructions that are required, in the Minister’s opinion, in order to ensure that the education provided in the school will be based on the principles set out in section 2 of the State Education Law, 5713-1953.

 

     (b) The study programme, textbooks, other books, study aids and scholastic achievements of the school shall be subject to the supervision of the Minister of Education and Culture and shall conform to the general rules in force at that type of school.

 

     (c) The director-general shall approve, from time to time, in view of the type and character of the school, the tuition fees of the school and the arrangements for collecting them.

10. The court has recognized the authority of the Ministry of Education to determine policy in the different types of school. It has held that ‘the basic areas of supervision relate first and foremost to ensuring an education in the spirit of the ethical principles that characterize state education. The supervision also encompasses administrative matters, such as financial administration, including the amounts of tuition fees and how they are collected’ (Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 218). It follows that the supervisory powers of the Ministry of Education with regard to the activities of recognized unofficial schools are broad, and they are also accompanied by a sanction in the form of cancelling the licence for operating the school (s. 15 of the Supervision of Schools Law) and a reduction in, or even a end to, the contribution to the school’s budget, if the school refuses to comply with the instructions of the Ministry of Education (ibid. [2], at p. 216). Despite the aforesaid, ‘the manner of exercising the supervision and its scope are matters that are subject to the discretion of the public authority, which is responsible for determining priorities for all of its duties, in view of its resources’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 81 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia). Indeed —

‘The administrative authority is given discretion so that it will have freedom to act in carrying out its wide variety of duties, the circumstances of which change from day to day and cannot be determined with precision in advance. This freedom allows the authority to consider the circumstances of each case that comes before it and to find the appropriate solution for it’ (FH 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [4], at p. 1215 {para. 5}).

12. In view of the independent character of the recognized unofficial schools and the scope of discretion given to them, this court has on several occasions been called upon to consider questions concerning recognized unofficial schools. Inter alia, it has considered the legality of a policy of charging payments for funding the schools as well as the relevance of the core curriculum to these schools (Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 215; HCJ 10296/02 Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [5], at p. 235; Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 62). Within this context, no one disputes that schools of every kind are bound by the basic rights of the individual. Basic rights constitute the cornerstone of our legal system and democracy, just as giving an education to the younger generation is a cornerstone for nurturing participation in Israeli society and passing on the values of the State of Israel (HCJ 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat Society v. Minister of Education [6], at p. 24). These two foundations — basic rights and providing an education — lie at the heart of the right to education, which was enshrined in s. 3 of the Students’ Rights Law, 5761-2000, which provides that:

‘Right to education

3.  Every child and teenager in the State of Israel is entitled to education in accordance with the provisions of every law.

The court said of this in HCJ 2599/00 Yated v. Ministry of Education [7], at p. 841 {65-66}:

‘The right to education has recently been recognized as one of the basic human rights… The right to education has also been recognized as a basic right by case law… Notwithstanding, the question whether the right to education is included in the right to human dignity, within the meaning thereof in ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, has not yet been decided.’

Justice Procaccia also stressed that:

‘The decisive importance of the right to education derives from the fact that education is essential for realizing human rights as an individual and for exhausting one’s personal autonomy; it develops his personality and abilities, and gives him the ability to compete and a possibility of realizing equal opportunities in the society in which he lives in childhood and adulthood’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 51 of her opinion; see also Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 213; HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [8]).

This court has discussed in the past the many aspects of the right to education that are enshrined in case law, international law and Israeli legislation (see Yated v. Ministry of Education [7], at p. 841 {65-66}; Y. Rabin, The Right to Education (2002), at p. 301). It has been written that ‘The basic right to education, as created by statute, international law and case law, stands on its own, and is not necessarily related to the right to human dignity provided in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty’ (Yated v. Ministry of Education [7], at p. 843 {66-67}). The right to education has been recognized as having a negative element, which is expressed, inter alia, in the prohibition of violating a person’s right to education except in accordance with the provisions stipulated in this regard in the law (ss. 1 and 3 of the Student Rights Law), and it has also been recognized as having a positive element, which is reflected in the duty that the right imposes on the state to provide free education (see Y. Rabin, ‘The Many Faces of the Right to Education,’ in D. Barak-Erez & A.M. Gross, Exploring Social Rights (2007) 265, at p. 267; Compulsory Education Law; Yated v. Ministry of Education [7], at p. 848 {71-72}; cf. HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Society v. Minister of Finance [9], at para. 12 of the opinion of President Barak. It has also been said that:

‘The right to education affects other basic human rights, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of occupation; realization of the right to education is intended to achieve social purposes. Education constitutes a link between the different and varied sectors of society and an essential means of bridging between them to build a harmonious social fabric. Education is an important means of furthering free democratic values. It is an essential condition for the individual’s self-realization and for the existence of a proper social life’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 51).

13. In view of the inseparable connection between a person’s education and his identity, the right to education is not limited to instilling knowledge or the acquisition of pragmatic tools to solve various problems. This can be seen in s. 2 of the State Education Law, which I have chosen to cite in full despite its length:

‘Purposes of state education

2.  The purposes of state education are:

(1) To educate a person to love his fellow man, to love his people and to love his country, to be a loyal citizen of the State of Israel, who respects his parents and family, his heritage, his cultural identity and his language;

 

(2) To teach the principles in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel and the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and to develop an attitude of respect for human rights, basic freedoms, democratic values, observance of the law, the culture and beliefs of others, and also to teach an aspiration for peace and tolerance in relations between individuals and between peoples;

 

(3) To teach the history of the land of Israel and the State of Israel;

 

(4) To teach Jewish law, the history of the Jewish people, Jewish heritage and Jewish tradition, to instil awareness of the memory of the Holocaust and Jewish Martyrdom, and respect for them;

 

(5) To develop children’s personalities, their creativity and their different talents, to extend their cultural horizons and expose them to artistic experiences, all of which in order to realize all of their potential as human beings who have a high-quality and meaningful life;

 

(6) To give children knowledge in the various spheres of knowledge and science, the various forms of human art throughout history, and the basic skills that they will require in their lives as adult human beings in a free society, and to encourage physical activity and a leisure culture;

 

(7) To strengthen the ability to make critical judgments, to foster intellectual curiosity, independent thinking and initiative, and to develop an appreciation for and awareness of changes and innovations;

 

(8) To give equal opportunities to every boy and girl, to allow them to develop in their own way and to create an atmosphere that encourages and supports differences;

 

(9) To nurture involvement in Israeli social life, willingness to accept office and discharge it with diligence and responsibility, a desire to help others, a contribution to society, volunteering and a striving towards social justice in the State of Israel;

 

(10) To develop an attitude of respect and responsibility for the natural environment and an attachment to the land, its scenery, and animal and plant life;

 

(11) To be familiar with the language, culture, history, heritage and special tradition of the Arab population and of other population groups in the State of Israel, and to recognize the equal rights of all citizens of Israel;

 

(12) To teach recognition of the sanctity of life and to instil a consciousness of safety and caution, including road safety.

Thus we see that the purposes of education concern the world of content from which the student originates and his culture, they concern his heritage and lifestyle, and the schools should balance the need to impart tools and skills, with which a student can go out into the world and realize his potential, against the cultural, ethical and national need to develop the character of the child and educate him in the light of his national identity and the heritage of his ancestors. As Justice Or wrote in one case: ‘We are speaking of one of the most important functions of the government and the state’ (HCJ 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat Society v. Minister of Education [6], at p. 24). The right to education, therefore, is not limited to the mere establishment of a school, but extends to the character of the school and the content that is learned in it.

14. The right to denominational education has found expression in legislature since the earliest days of education in Israel. Thus, along with the founding of the state education system, the state recognized the need of various sectors of the population to teach their children in the spirit of their special culture, religious belief and community affiliation. The right of the community to denominational education — education that is consistent with its special outlook on life — reflects the right of every citizen to study in a school that suits his outlook on life (cf. HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel-Aviv Municipality [10], at p. 412). Within this framework, unofficial schools were recognized by the Compulsory Education Law, and the importance of a variety of schools was incorporated in s. 3 of the State Education Law:

State education from 1953

3.  From the academic year 5714 (1953-4) onwards, state education will be introduced in every official school; religious state education will be introduced in an official school that in the 5713 (1952-3) academic year was a part of the Mizrahi stream or the Agudat Yisrael stream or the religious part of the workers’ stream.

The right of various sectors to education that is consistent with their beliefs was recognized as a central component of the general right to education, within the framework of the right to choose the character and content of the education (Rabin, ‘The Many Faces of the Right to Education,’ supra, at p. 273). Concerning the importance of variety in schools, it was said in Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2] that:

‘The right of a person to choose a private school for his child instead of the state school has been recognized in Israel and around the world, in both international law and domestic law. The private education system seeks to create special educational frameworks that satisfy the needs of certain sectors of the population that wish to give their children education of a special character as an addition to the basic academic programme studied in all educational institutions. Preserving academic autonomy in private education is an important value that should be respected within the context of the protection of the human right to self-realization, subject to ensuring the preservation of the basic educational values as defined in the State Education Law’ (ibid. [2], at p. 221; see also HCJ 8437/99 Habad Kindergarten Network in the Holy Land v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 81).

Within the framework of the recognition of the right to education, the right of students to equality in education has also been recognized (Rabin, ‘The Many Faces of the Right to Education,’ supra, at p. 277). It has been held that the right of a community to denominational education is not sufficient to reduce the state’s obligations to outline an equal policy, to supervise its implementation and to determine the core curriculum as stated in the law:

‘In view of the special weight of education in determining the appearance of the individual and society, the state has a duty not only to enforce and supervise the implementation of compulsory education in all sectors, but also to regulate directly the essential content of the education and the basic values that are imparted through it in all the schools’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 53 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia).

This court has discussed in the past the need to preserve the core curriculum, which constitutes the cornerstone of education in Israel, and it is based on foundations of equality:

‘The core curriculum is intended to expose every student in Israel, whoever he is, and irrespective of the social group to which he belongs, to basic academic content of a general, national and universal nature. This content is the nucleus that is common to and unites all of the different streams in Israeli society, and which constitutes a “common denominator for all students on a conceptual-content-ethical level and for intellectual and educational skills”’ (ibid. [3], at para. 31; see also Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [5], at p. 236).

The recognized unofficial schools have therefore received legislative recognition, as well as being subject to supervision. The operation and budgeting of these schools is subject to the discretion of the Ministry of Education (see s. 11 of the State Education Law; Habad Kindergarten Network in the Holy Land v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 81). Notwithstanding, the right to denominational education in itself has not yet been recognized as a positive right and the Ministry of Education has not been required to take active steps to realize it. When a community establishes an independent school, it bears the main burden of managing and funding it:

‘The recognized (unofficial) schools are not like the official schools, since in the case of the former the state does not have these direct obligations: it does not have the direct obligation to provide education to children being educated in them nor does it have a direct obligation to fund the running of those schools. Recognized (unofficial) schools are run by private bodies; they also have the main responsibility for what is done in them and they are liable for the expenses of running them’ (Habad Kindergarten Network in the Holy Land v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 82).

15. From all of the aforesaid it can be seen that within the framework of the right to denominational education, members of a certain community may establish and operate a school that is consistent with their beliefs. The state may recognize the school, even though it is not obliged to do so, and contribute to its funding, all of which in accordance with the provisions of the law.

However, the right to denominational education, like any right, is not absolute. Indeed, ‘human rights are the rights of a person as a part of society. It is possible to restrict human rights in order to realize social goals. Only when these goals are realized is it possible to have human rights’ (HCJ 5026/04 Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd v. Director of Sabbath Work Permits Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs [12], at para. 11 of the opinion of President Barak). Thus, when two basic rights conflict, the court is required to examine the nature and scope of the aforesaid rights, and to strike a balance between them in a manner that expresses the freedom of the individual and protects the public interest. In our case, the right to denominational education conflicts with the right to equality.

The right to equality

16. This court, from its earliest days, has discussed the importance of the principle of equality in our legal system. Thus Justice Landau emphasized the ‘basic principle of everyone being equal before the law’ (HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [13], at p. 697 {17}), and this was reiterated by Justice Shamgar when he said that ‘the rule that one may not discriminate against someone because of his ethnic origin, sex, nationality, community, country of origin, religion, belief or social status is a basic constitutional principle, which is part of the fabric of our basic legal ethos and constitutes an integral part thereof’ (HCJ 114/78 Burkan v. Minister of Finance [14], at p. 806; see also HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [15], at p. 331). The principle of equality has also found a place in the debate on rights (HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset [16], at para. 26 of the opinion of President A. Barak and the references cited there). It has been written that ‘it constitutes a basic constitutional value, which is part of the fabric of our basic legal outlooks and constitutes an integral part thereof’ (HCJ 6698/95 Kadan v. Israel Land Administration [17], at p. 273); see also Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset [16], at para. 40 of the opinion of President A. Barak). More than once this court has emphasized the destructive results of an unequal treatment of equals, for both the individual and society:

‘Indeed, there is no force more destructive to society than the feeling of its members that they are being treated unequally. The feeling of inequality is one of the most painful feelings. It undermines the forces that unite society. It destroys a person’s individual identity’ (Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [15], at p. 332).

Justice M. Cheshin emphasized:

‘… We shall always hear a claim of discrimination, which is the most fundamental of issues. The principle of discrimination is based on the deep need that is innate to us, to every one of us — perhaps we should say, in the inclination and necessity in man: in man, but not only in man — that we are not discriminated against, that we are treated equally, by God above and at least by man… (Real or seeming) discrimination leads to a feeling of unfairness and frustration, the feeling of unfairness and frustration lead to envy, and when envy comes, reason is lost’ (HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [18], at p. 203).

17. In the past, this court has considered the status of the principle of equality in the education system, and it has been said on this subject that —

‘The purposes of state education originally included the value of equality. Implementing the value of equality in education is reflected, inter alia, in strengthening the aspiration of giving equal opportunities to students in education without economic, social and cultural gaps perpetuating significant differences in the education and professional qualifications that are acquired’ (Upper Poria Board v. Minister of Education [2], at p. 218).

The principle of equality is therefore a cornerstone of our legal system, without which it is not possible to have a proper education system. This outlook has found expression in legislation, and s. 5 of the Student Rights Law provides a criminal sanction where a school, or a person acting on its behalf, acts in a discriminatory manner:

Prohibition of discrimination

5.  (a) A local education authority, school or person acting on their behalf shall not discriminate against a student on ethnic grounds, for reasons of socio-economic background, or for reasons of political opinion, whether of the child or of his parents, in any one of the following:

 

(1) Registration, acceptance or expulsion from a school;

 

(2) Determining separate study programmes and advancement tracks in the same school;

 

(3) Having separate classes in the same school;

 

(4) Students’ rights and duties, including disciplinary rules and their implementation.

 

(b) Whoever transgresses the provisions of this section is liable to a year’s imprisonment or a fine, as stated in section 61(a)(3) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977.

18. With regard to the allocation of state resources, case law has emphasized, on more than one occasion, that ‘allocating state money for various public purposes is always subject to the principle of equality… treating individuals or institutions differently, when there is no relevant difference between them, constitutes improper discrimination and gives rise to a ground for judicial intervention’ (HCJ 727/00 Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils in Israel v. Minister of Building and Housing [19], at p. 88; see also HCJ 59/88 Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [20], at p. 706; Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at paras. 71-72). Notwithstanding, Justice E. Arbel added:

‘The principle of equality governs all fields of law and also applies to the distribution of budgets and subsidies by the authority. Many rules have been determined with regard to the application of the principle of equality in distributing budgets and subsidies. The essence of these rules is that the distribution of budgets and subsidies by the state should be done while upholding the principles of equality and reasonableness and while determining clear and transparent criteria for the distribution of the money. The authority that distributes the budget should consider only relevant considerations, and it may not discriminate between groups that do not differ from one another in any relevant way. Notwithstanding, it has been emphasized that equality does not mean identity. Sometimes, for the purpose of achieving real and genuine equality, the authority should distinguish between groups on the basis of the relevant difference between them’ (HCJ 11020/05 Panim For Jewish Renaissance v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [21], at para. 8).

However, it has been held on several occasions in the past that equal treatment does not mean identical treatment. Indeed, ‘it is clear that when an authority is ordered to act with equality, we are dealing with substantive equality, and not merely with formal equality. Sometimes, in order to achieve substantive equality we should act differently towards different individuals’ (Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils in Israel v. Minister of Building and Housing [19], at page 89, and see the references cited there). The principle of substantive equality ‘is based on a criterion of relevance in the sense that there is no basis for distinguishing between persons or between issues on grounds that are not relevant, when it is possible to distinguish between them on grounds that are relevant’ (HCJ 6051/95 Recanat v. National Labour Court [22], at p. 312; HCJ 6778/97 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Public Security [23], at p. 365 {9-10}). The meaning of substantive equality was discussed by President Agranat in one case:

‘In this context, the concept of “equality” therefore means “relevant equality”, and it requires, with regard to the purpose under discussion, “equality of treatment” for those persons in the aforesaid position. By contrast, it will be a permitted distinction if the different treatment of different persons derives from their being, for the purpose of the treatment, in a state of relevant inequality, just as it will be discrimination if it derives from their being in a state of inequality that is not relevant to the purpose of the treatment’ (FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [24], at p. 35).

Balancing rights — the right to equality in education

19. It is true that when the right to denominational education meets the principle of equality, there is an inherent difficulty in reconciling the two in a manner that upholds them to the fullest extent. Consequently —

‘… a constitutional process is required to restrict the protection given to constitutional rights, so that they are only protected to a partial extent. This restriction is based on the recognition that it is impossible to protect all of the rights to the fullest extent… Therefore an act of constitutional balancing is required’ (HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk, Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [25]).

As we have said:

‘… the principle of equality does not rule out different laws for different people. The principle of equality demands that the existence of a law that makes distinctions is justified by the type and nature of the matter. The principle of equality assumes the existence of objective reasons that justify a difference’ (HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [26], at p. 236).

It follows that when a certain school has determined characteristics by means of which a sector of the population will be distinguished, this policy should be examined in accordance with its concrete characteristics, as well as its actual results. Within this framework, the actions of the school making the distinction should be examined in the light of the purposes of the education and the basic values of the legal system. If the distinction serves the purpose — namely the right to denominational education — in a relevant manner, it will be a permitted distinction. If the distinction serves the purposes in a manner that is not relevant — namely in a manner whose characteristics, purpose or results create a distinction that is, in the circumstances of the case, irrelevant — this will constitute prohibited discrimination.

Indeed, not every special characteristic — whether it is a difference in culture, religion, custom or ideology — can justify discrimination. The characteristic needs to be an inherent part of the outlook of the educational institution that seeks to impart the values of a particular denomination, it should be relevant to the purpose of the distinction, and it should be a characteristic without which it will be difficult to maintain the denominational education system according to its own criteria. It is the court that will determine whether a certain denomination has been distinguished justly — in order to allow a certain denomination to live freely in its community — or whether the case is one of prohibited discrimination whose whole purpose is to exclude people who are different and isolate them from proper society.

20. As we have said, recognized unofficial schools are entitled to determine cultural characteristics according to which the students in the school will conduct themselves. These characteristics should represent the belief and culture of the denomination in whose spirit the school was founded and is operated, and they should reflect the lifestyle and outlook of the denomination. But where the school rules — or the rules of the track within the school — are designed solely in order to prevent the admission of one group or another into a certain educational framework — we are dealing with improper discrimination.

21. Indeed, there are those who believe — and this is what the external examiner, Advocate Bas, said — that there are behavioural, cultural and community characteristics that discriminate against a certain denomination, but constitute an inherent part of the religious outlook of various denominations. In other words, in a conflict between the two rights — the right to denominational education and the right to equality — there are characteristics that are required for the purpose of preserving the world of values of the one right, while conflicting with the other right. For this purpose we need to seek a balance between the conflicting rights.

When we seek to find the constitutional balance, ‘we are dealing with a balance that is required between a violation of one liberty and a violation of the other. The balance is a horizontal one. It determines restrictions that will allow each liberty to be upheld in its essentials’ (HCJ 1514/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority [27], at page 277). In our endeavour to strike the aforesaid balance, we seek for the outcome that gives expression to the conflicting rights in a state of coexistence:

‘We are concerned with two human rights of equal standing, and the balance between them must therefore find expression in a reciprocal waiver whereby each right must make a concession to the other in order to allow the coexistence of both. The protection of the law does not extend to either of the rights in its entirety. Each right suffers restrictions of time, place and manner in order to allow the substantive realization of the other right’ (Dayan v. Wilk, Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [25], at page 480 {353}).

In our case, the legislature recognized the existence of denominational schools and even established conditions for them, by requiring that they obtain a licence for regulating and subsidizing them. Along with the recognition of this right, the legislature enshrined the rights of students to be treated equally and not to be discriminated against (s. 5 of the Student Rights Law). It has been said in the past with regard to this balance that:

‘The accepted premise in Israel, like that in other democratic countries, is that the aforesaid tension should be resolved by respecting the autonomy of the family to choose the type of education that it desires for its children, while at the same time recognizing the authority — and sometimes the duty — of the state to intervene in this autonomy in order to protect the best interests and rights of the child, and to achieve a general social purpose by creating a common denominator of basic educational values that unites all the members of society’ (Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 55).

22. Indeed, the right of communities to operate educational frameworks that are consistent with their outlook has been recognized by law, but these schools are conditional upon ‘minimum requirements that the state determines, subject to a respect for human rights and basic liberties, in order to realize the possibility of every individual taking a de facto part in society’ (ibid. [3], at para. 56). Thus, in another case, the funding of recognized unofficial schools was made conditional upon adopting the state core curriculum, which establishes an equal standard for academic requirements in Israeli schools (Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [5], at p. 239; Israel Religious Action Centre v. Ministry of Education [3], at para. 55 of the opinion of Justice Procaccia). It was held that ‘the subsidizing of schools that do not satisfy the conditions enshrined in the law and that do not realize the goals of state education is ultra vires and a violation of the duty of trust that the public authority owes to the public from which it derives its authority’ (Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [5], at p. 236).

23. How does the aforesaid balance apply to the manner in which a school is run and to the rules of conduct that it demands? A preliminary answer to this question can be found in the remarks of Vice-President Barak in a case where the court was called upon to consider the question of the head covering of a student who was a girl of Arab ethnicity. This cultural symbol deviated from the uniform dress code that was the practice in the St. Joseph’s Greek Catholic Secondary School, and it was therefore prohibited. Following a petition that the student filed in this court, it was held that:

‘We should consider the reasons underlying the requirement of a uniform dress and conduct code. Indeed, were these reasons based on uniformity as an independent value, I would be prepared to hold that the petitioner’s freedom of religion overrides them. [In our case], we are satisfied that the requirement of a uniform dress and conduct code is based on educational considerations relating to the character and nature of the school as a school of a religious community. The uniformity of dress and conduct provides the common denominator that allows all the students… to have a joint lifestyle in the school, which is based on religious and ethnic pluralism. Undermining the uniform dress and conduct code will undermine the character of the school and it special quality, and ultimately it will undermine its special framework and the (moderate) religious outlook that prevails in the school’ (HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin v. Minister of Education [28], at p. 202).

In another case, the Administrative Court (the honourable Justice B. Okon) considered the application of the principle of equality in admissions to private schools that are included among the exempt schools (AP (Jer) 1320/03 Alkaslasi v. Upper Beitar Municipality [39], at p. 655). It was held that ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination Law sets a clear standard that requires the application of equal criteria, and it imposes them on private organizations, including schools… [The Ministry of Education] cannot grant an exemption to schools that do not satisfy the requirements of this law’ (ibid. [39], at p. 657). And if this is the case with regard to exempt schools, it is clear that the Ministry of Education is not permitted to allow discrimination in schools that benefit from the state budget.

The Ministry of Education, in its supplementary statement, also characterized the line that separates the relevant from the discriminatory in a case where there are separate academic tracks:

‘A separate track does not mean an absolute separation in all spheres of education and during all study times between the students who study in it and the other students in the school; it should only relate to those study times during the week during which the special material or the specific content of that separate track is taught, and not to all the other hours of study in the school, nor to breaks, the uniform, the staff, the management and the other separate characteristics adopted in this regard’ (p. 5 of the supplementary notice of 7 Tammuz 5768 (10 July 2008)).

24. From all of the aforesaid it can be seen that a school may have a special track in which the religious practices and outlook of a certain denomination are taught. The school may also determine relevant rules of conduct for students in the track, for the purpose of integrating the academic content studied in it. However, the school should allow each student who satisfies the relevant basic conditions and who seeks to adopt the lifestyle that accompanies them to study in the track that he wants. Above all, it is clear that the denominational affiliation of a student should not be a relevant condition for admitting him to a certain track, and creating segregation within one school — by separating the students at all times of the day, introducing a different uniform, separating the teachers’ room and charging extra tuition — is not a relevant measure for the purpose of student education. The school may distinguish between students in different tracks solely for the purpose of studying content that is unique to those tracks only, but the regular studies and the rules of the school should be the same for everyone studying in the school throughout the study hours.

I should also emphasize that a policy of ‘equal separation’ cannot atone for improper discrimination where there is any, as this court said in another case:

‘A policy of “separate but equal” is inherently unequal. This approach is based on the outlook that separation implies an insult to a minority group that is excluded, emphasizes the difference between it and the others and perpetuates feelings of social inferiority’ (Kadan v. Israel Land Administration [17], at p. 279).

25. The Ministry of Education has the authority to supervise the balance discussed above. It should protect the rights that require balancing and deal strictly with those who violate that balance. Admittedly, the Ministry of Education’s power to cancel the licence of a school is a discretionary power (section 15 of the Supervision of Schools Law), but it is a well-known rule that the authority should exercise its power reasonably, and this court has held in the past that ‘a discretionary power becomes a non-discretionary power when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our constitutional and legal system make a failure to exercise the power unreasonable in a way that goes to the heart of the matter’ (HCJ 3094/93 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [29], at p. 421 {282} and the references cited there). A gradual process of remedying the defect is unacceptable, and the Ministry of Education should take effective and unequivocal steps to eradicate discrimination and return the school to the path of the constitutional balance.

From general principles to the specific case

26. It is easy to determine that in the case before us the purpose of the rules — some of which found their place in the wording of the separate regulations for the Hassidic track, and some of which were applied de facto without official regulations — as the examination report of Advocate Bas showed, was simply this: the separation of girls of the Hassidic denomination from their Sephardic counterparts. This determination is based mainly on the outcome test, which shows that de facto two wings were operated within the school. These wings — which were initially intended to be two separate schools and were subsequently run as two wings — were characterized by a division of the population that was not coincidental, and it clearly shows the discriminatory intentions of the initiators of the separation, to such an extent that ‘it can be said to speak for itself’ (Vice-President M. Cheshin in HCJ 240/98 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [30], at p. 178).

This discrimination is also clearly reflected in the regulations that were submitted for the approval of the director-general of the Ministry of Education, some of which were cited above. A study of the various regulations shows that we are not dealing with a ‘track whose purpose is the study of the Hassidic way of life,’ but with an attempt to separate different sectors of the population on an ethnic basis, under the cloak of a cultural difference. The preference of students from a certain ethnic group in admissions to the Hassidic track, while placing bureaucratic difficulties in the path of parents of students from another ethnic group who want to register their daughters for the track, seriously undermines the right to equality. The same is true with regard to the school’s requirement that parents of the students should act in accordance with the lifestyle practised in the school, and the request — which was rightly excluded from the regulations — that the prayers should be recited solely in accordance with the Ashkenazi pronunciation. All of these merely serve an improper purpose, which is to exclude from the Hassidic track students from the Sephardic community, solely because of their origin.

The characteristics of the discrimination in this case can also be seen in the atmosphere that has enveloped this case from the outset and that is discernible in the respondents’ conduct. In other words, the main discrimination in this case was discussed above, but it is also reflected in the fact that the Independent Education Centre and the school did everything that they could in order to satisfy the requirements of the Ministry of Education on an institutional level, but they did not really implement their solutions. In practice, their undertakings had little effect on the lifestyle in the school, and in this regard it has been said that: ‘It should be remembered that discrimination always — and maybe today more than in the past —  conceals itself and goes underground, but achieves its goals by using valid arguments. Improper discrimination is not always discussed openly’ (Alkaslasi v. Upper Beitar Municipality [39], at p. 652).

27. With regard to the Ministry of Education, in view of its authority and responsibility to supervise the school, and in view of the continuing violation of the right to equality on the part of the school, it is clear that the ministry should have taken all the steps available to it in order to eradicate the discrimination and return the policy of the school to the framework of the constitutional balance. When the Independent Education Centre and the school failed to comply with the instructions of the Ministry of Education, it should have exercised its powers to cancel the school’s licence and stop its subsidy, and I have said in the past that ‘one should not turn a blind eye to a continuing situation of ultra vires, and an administrative authority should not be allowed to adopt a policy of procrastination in remedying what is wrong’ (Secondary School Teachers Organization v. Minister of Education [5], at p. 238).

28. Indeed, this case reflects a harsh reality of the extent to which the recognized unofficial education stream respects the rights to equality of the individuals studying in its institutions. I can only express regret at the fact that various denominations avail themselves of the right to denominational education in order to deepen discrimination in Israeli society. In view of the many aspects of this case and the uncomfortable feelings of everyone involved in it, I can only hope that ultimately the inhabitants of the town will once again live together and send their daughters to a proper school that will teach them, inter alia, the value of tolerance for other human beings.

The relief

29. The Beit Yaakov School and the Independent Education Centre have therefore violated the right of the Sephardic students to equality, and thus they have departed from the constitutional balance between the rights relevant to this case. The Ministry of Education acted ultra vires when it failed to exercise the means available to it for the purpose of preventing the aforesaid discrimination.

I shall therefore propose to my colleagues that we make the order nisi absolute, and we order the Independent Education Centre to remove any indication, both formal and substantive, of the phenomenon of discrimination that exists in the school. We also order the Ministry of Education, in so far as it finds that the Independent Education Centre does not comply with this order, to take all the legal steps to remedy the situation, including the cancellation of the school’s licence and stopping its subsidy.

Finally, I propose that the respondents should pay the costs of the legal fees of counsel for the petitioners — the first respondent in a sum of NIS 15,000 and the third respondent in a sum of NIS 60,000.

 

 

Justice E. Arbel

I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice E.E. Levy, and with his reasoning.

We are dealing with a petition concerning an act of discrimination in a school that was carried out by creating two separate wings that split the student body into an Ashkenazi group and a Sephardic one. In order to formalize the segregation, regulations were prepared for the approval of the director-general of the Ministry of Education, together with additional rules that would be implemented informally. The petitioners spoke of the feelings of rejection and humiliation experienced by the Sephardic girls and their parents as a result of their being segregated from the girls of Ashkenazi origin.

The prohibition of discrimination, which is the opposite of equality, lies at the heart of the case before us. As has been said on several occasions in our case law, and also by my colleagues here, the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination are basic principles in our law in general and in the field of education in particular. A different treatment of equals, discrimination and segregation mean the adoption of an arbitrary double standard that has no justification. The segregation completely undermines interpersonal relations. The feeling of discrimination leads to the destruction of the fabric of human relationships (see HCJ 7111/95 Local Government Centre v. Knesset [31], at p. 503).

It is important to emphasize that the right of a community to denominational education on the basis of religious differences does not release it from the obligation of equality (see s. 5 of the Student Rights Law, 5761-2000). Although as a rule a certain sector of the population may impose demands on religious issues in order to realize purposes relating to religious education of the kind that it espouses, these requirements should not be confused with requirements that are based on ethnic backgrounds, nor should we be misled by the religious-ideological cloak with which it is disguised.

In the case before us, the original requirement of using the Ashkenazi pronunciation during prayers — a requirement that was ultimately removed — creates a difficulty of forcing a girl to pray with a pronunciation that is different from the one used at home and in the synagogue to which her family belongs. The character of this requirement blatantly reveals the true intention underlying the basis for the separation between the tracks and the basis for the regulations that were drafted. But in addition to this clause, it is difficult to accept the demand for an Ashkenazi religious authority that will apply to the whole lifestyle of the students and their parents, without any exception and without any consideration for the ethnic group from which the student originates. One may ask: it is conceivable to expect the parents of a student from the Sephardic community to act in accordance with Ashkenazi religious practices when there may be cases where even the strictest of Sephardic rabbis have ruled differently? Admittedly the school is a denominational one, but one might expect a minimal level of tolerance for others, which in this case means a girl from another ethnic background, when this does not materially affect the religious standard required by the school. Therefore, this broad and unqualified requirement in the regulations also shows, in my opinion, the true intention that underlies it, namely a separation between ethnic groups and not between different standards of religiosity. I should point out in closing that the question of the legitimacy of the various requirements made by schools of the parents of students (as distinct from the students themselves) is complex and deserves a thorough examination, but this is not the proper place for that.

The Ministry of Education is responsible for the school and the way in which it is run, and it should first and foremost ensure a policy of equality and supervise its implementation. The Ministry of Education should therefore employ all the means at its disposal, and act without fear to eradicate the phenomenon of discrimination.

Therefore, as aforesaid, I agree with my colleague’s opinion and the result that he reached. 

 

 

Justice H. Melcer

1.    I concur with the opinion of the presiding justice in this case, my colleague Justice E.E. Levy, and with the remarks of my colleague Justice E. Arbel. Notwithstanding, in view of the importance of the matter, I would like to add a few remarks and emphasize several points.

2.    My colleagues discussed how the discrimination directed in this case at the students of Sephardic origin (who were mostly placed in the ‘general’ track) in relation to the students of Ashkenazi origin (who were placed in the ‘Hassidic’ track) and the segregation that was de facto introduced in the school violate the right to education and the right to equality of the victims of the discrimination.

The right to education has a constitutional basis, which can be deduced from the basic outlooks of our legal system, but whether it is enshrined as a super-legislative constitutional right is unclear (see HCJ 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat Society v. Minister of Education [6], per Justice T. Or; Justices Tz. Tal and D. Dorner reserved judgment). Notwithstanding, there is a view that the right to education can be derived from the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, but even those who hold this view maintain that its recognition as a super-legislative constitutional right is indirect (see Y. Rabin, The Right to Education (2002), at pp. 376-387; Y.M. Edrey, ‘Human Rights and Social Rights,’ Berinson Book (vol. 2, 2000) 45, at p. 87).

The right to equality has, of course, been recognized since HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Knesset [16] as a part of the right to human dignity in so far as this right is integrally bound up with human dignity (ibid. [16], at para. 33).

It seems to me that the case before us falls within this framework, but it can also be said that alongside the violation of the right to education and the right to equality as such, there is also a direct violation of an express constitutional right, which is enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, namely the right to dignity. I will discuss this immediately below.

3.    The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is based, inter alia, on the recognition of the importance of man and the fact that he is a free agent, protects, inter alia, the dignity of man as a human being. Within this context, humiliation is a blatant violation of dignity. Indeed, Justice D. Dorner held in HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defence [32], at pp. 132-133 {223-225} that:

‘Notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that the purpose of the Basic Law was to protect people from degradation. The degradation of a human being violates his dignity. There is no reasonable way of construing the right to dignity, as stated in the Basic Law, such that the degradation of a human being will not be considered a violation of that right’ (ibid. [32], at p. 132 {223}).

In our case, the humiliation arises from the fact that the classification into study tracks was done de facto against a background of ethnic origin (based on the pseudo-religious ground that we will refute later). Justice Dorner went on to explain in Miller v. Minister of Defence [32] that:

‘Such discrimination is based on attributing an inferior status to the victim of discrimination, a status that is a consequence of his supposedly inferior nature. This, of course, involves a profound humiliation of the victim of the discrimination’ (ibid. [32], at p. 132 {224}).

This is because it —

‘… sends a message that the group to which he belongs is inferior, and this creates a perception of the inferiority of the men and women in the group. This creates a vicious cycle that perpetuates the discrimination. The perception of inferiority, which is based on the biological or racial difference, causes discrimination, and the discrimination strengthens the deprecating stereotypes of the inferiority of the victim of discrimination. Therefore the main element in discrimination because of sex, race or the like is the degradation of the victim’ (ibid. [32], at p. 133 {224-225}).

In passing we should add that a similar (and more far-reaching) outlook is expressed by Dr Orit Kamir, in her analysis of the relationship between the value of equality and the value of dignity (see, O. Kamir, Human Dignity — Feminism in Israel: A Social and Legal Analysis (2007), at p. 54). According to Dr Kamir’s approach, whereas the Aristotelian concept of equality (‘equality means equal treatment of equals and different treatment of those who are different according to the extent of their difference’ — see Miller v. Minister of Defence [32], at p. 133 {225}) assumes the existing social structure, accepts it and compares the rights of individuals within it, without recognizing the basic discrimination that characterizes it, the outlook of equal human dignity determines that all human beings are equal partners, by definition, in the absolute value from which their basic rights are derived (see Kamir, Human Dignity — Feminism in Israel: A Social and Legal Analysis, supra, at p. 55). Dr Kamir also distinguishes between human dignity and the dignity of human existence. Human dignity is the essence of the human nature of a person and it includes his ‘physical, conscious and emotional existence in basic security and welfare as well as the autonomy to self-definition and development’ (ibid., at p. 52). By contrast, the —

‘... dignity of human existence’ ‘attributes a value to the special human potential of each individual according to his free definition. It does not relate to the basic human element that is common to all human beings, but actually to the complex aggregate that characterizes every such human individual. The dignity of human existence is the basic ethical dimension of the human sphere, which includes the characteristics of every individual, his qualities, skills, abilities, tendencies and ambitions’ (ibid., at p. 53; emphasis added).

According to this distinction, Dr Kamir is of the opinion that discrimination against groups should be defined in terms of equal human dignity — human dignity and the dignity of human existence — and we ought to fight for the rights of individuals who belong to groups that are discriminated against for the sake of this equality (ibid., at p. 57). It may be possible to deduce from this approach that in the circumstances of the case before us, even if we do not say that the students here suffered a violation of their human dignity, as can be seen from the arguments of the third respondent (and this seems doubtful to me), in any case at least a violation of their ‘dignity of human existence’ occurred in this case.

4.    Justice Dorner’s opinion, which was cited above, relied in Miller v. Minister of Defence [32], inter alia, on what was said in the famous judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka [40], which gave rise to questions that are to some extent similar to those that arise in our case. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka [40] rejected the doctrine that was previously accepted in American law with regard to ‘separate but equal’ education.

With regard to the effect of separate education, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Earl Warren, said on behalf of the whole court:

‘We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does…

Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone’ (ibid. [40], at p. 691).

In view of the aforesaid, the Supreme Court of the United States held unanimously as follows:

‘We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal’ (ibid. [40], at p. 691).

The facts and the aforementioned American case (which was based on the right to equality that is enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, on the ground of inferiority and humiliation, which is more similar to the value of protecting dignity in Israel in the sense presented above) have as noted a certain similarity to the facts before us on the question of segregation, since in the reply to the petition it was also implied that it is supposedly possible to have equality despite the separation between the tracks, and that this does not constitute ethnic discrimination.

Despite the huge importance of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka [40] in the United States and the revolution that it brought about there, which led to the end of racial discrimination in education in the United States (see A. Gotfeld, ‘Brown v. Board of Education in Topeka and its Place in American History,’ in D. Gotwein and M. Mautner (eds.) Law and History (1999)), it was not the final word on the subject. It gave rise to a variety of new and additional questions both with regard to the ways in which it should be implemented, and with regard to the right of minority communities to preserve their special character in a multi-cultural environment (see the fascinating book: J.M. Balkin (ed.), What Brown v. Board of Education Should have Said: The Nation’s Top Legal Experts Rewrite America’s Landmark Civil Rights Decision (2001); ‘Symposium: Brown at Fifty: Reasonable Umbrage: Race and Constitutional Antidiscrimination Law in the United States and South Africa,’ 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1378 (2004); D. Gibton, ‘Awaiting Mizrahi v. Board of Education of Topi-Gan (unconsidered): A Critical and Comparative Analysis of the Position of Israel’s Supreme Court on Integration in the Israeli School System,’ 28(2) Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) 473 (2004)). A vague echo of some of these questions can also be found in the case before us, and we shall discuss them in paragraph 6 below. But before we discuss that, we should explain the significance of the fact that this case involves, in our opinion, a direct violation of a basic constitution right (the right to dignity), which is expressly enshrined as aforesaid in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

5.    The significance is that incorporation in the Basic Law . the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.s aforesaid cinating book: J.M. Balkin (ed.),ty communities to preserve their speciahas ramifications on both the definition and the scope of the right (which as a constitutional right is interpreted broadly, and according to some opinions should be ‘balanced’ horizontally against other constitutional rights of equal importance and status), and on the conditions in which it is permitted, if at all, to violate it by virtue of the ‘limitations clause’ (see Miller v. Minister of Defence [32], at p. 133 {224-225}; HCJ 10203/03 National Assembly Ltd v. Attorney-General [33]). Here, not only is there no such law (or express authorization therein) that allows a violation of the right, which is the first condition that needs to be satisfied in order to implement the ‘limitations clause’ in s. 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, but there are several laws that establish the right and expressly prohibit ethnic discrimination of the kind under consideration in the petition. We will set out these laws and their relevant provisions below:

(a) The Student Rights Law, 5761-2000 (hereafter — the Student Rights Law):

Section 5 of the Student Rights Law states:

Prohibition of discrimination

5.  (a) A local education authority, school or person acting on their behalf shall not discriminate against a student on ethnic grounds, for reasons of socio-economic background, or for reasons of political opinion, whether of the child or of his parents, in any one of the following:

 

(1) Registration, acceptance or expulsion from a school;

 

(2) Determining separate study programmes and advancement tracks in the same school;

 

(3) Having separate classes in the same school;

 

(4) Students’ rights and duties, including disciplinary rules and their implementation.’

(emphases added).

The meaning of the terms ‘school’ and ‘recognized school’ in the Student Rights Law follows the definition of these terms in the Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949. If we refer to the Compulsory Education Law, we see that according to the definitions in s. 1 of that law, a ‘recognized school’ also means ‘any other school that the minister has declared, in a declaration published in Reshumot, to be a recognized school for the purpose of this law’ (hereafter: a ‘recognized unofficial school’). In the petition before us, there is no dispute that the Beit Yaakov Girls Primary School in Immanuel is a recognized unofficial school.

Section 16(a) of the Student Rights Law further provides that ‘The provisions of this law shall apply to every recognized school.’ Section 16(b) of that law states: ‘A recognized unofficial school shall be subject to the provisions of this law, except for sections 6, 7 and 13, but the minister may order, with the approval of the committee and after considering the character of the school, that all or some of the provisions of the aforesaid sections shall apply to it.’ It follows from the aforesaid that section 5 of the aforementioned Student Rights Law applies to the Beit Yaakov Girls Primary School, which is the subject of the petition before us.

The minutes of the meetings held by the Education, Culture and Sport Committee of the Knesset in the course of preparing the draft law (which was tabled by MK Silvan Shalom) — prior to its second and third readings — give an insight into the background underlying s. 5 of the Student Rights Law.

Thus, for example, MK Zevulun Orlev, the chairman of the committee, said with regard to the question of the special nature of the various schools:

‘We are not seeking to cancel the tracks and the special characteristics. All that we want is that within each framework there will be no discrimination. MK Silvan Shalom did not intend in this law to cancel the status of any track in education. I want there to be no discrimination in any track.’

(See the minutes of the second meeting of the subcommittee of the Education, Culture and Sport Committee of the Fifteenth Knesset of 23 May 2000, at page 24; emphases added).

In another meeting MK Silvan Shalom explained the provision as follows:

‘… I am referring to the ethnicism (sic) that is introduced here for ethnic reasons. Usually religious discrimination is ethnic; it is within the religious track, but for ethnic reasons…’

(See the minutes of meeting no. 113 of the Education and Culture Committee of the Fifteenth Knesset, at p. 6 (19 June 2000); emphasis added).

In summarizing the issue in the Knesset after the law passed its third reading, MK Silvan Shalom said the following:

‘The prohibition of discrimination: From today it is not permitted to discriminate between one student and another for the purpose of admissions, on ethnic grounds or because of social or economic background. It will also be prohibited to refuse admission to a student because of the political beliefs of the parents of the child himself. Admittedly there is a possibility of discrimination in other situations, but they are appropriate situations, such as when a boy or girl wishes to learn in a single-sex school. If that is the character of the school, that is how it should be. If there is a situation in which a child who does not observe the Torah and the commandments wishes to be admitted tomorrow to an Orthodox religious school, he will not be permitted to do so. If a Jewish or an Arab child wishes to be admitted to an Orthodox Jewish school or a religious Arab school, or in a certain kind of Jewish school or a certain kind of Muslim school, the student will not be able to say that the refusal is discrimination.’

(See: Knesset Proceedings 5761, at pp. 1271, 1274; emphasis added).

Thus we see that s. 5 of the Student Rights Law was intended, inter alia, to prevent situations in which discrimination is based on ethnicity, such as the one that occurred in the Beit Yaakov School in Immanuel. Therefore all we can do is to give effect to the proper purpose underlying the aforesaid s. 5.

(b) The Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entrance to Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 5761-2000 (hereafter: ‘the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products and Services Law’):

The Prohibition of Discrimination in Products and Services Law defines ‘public service’ as follows:

‘Transport, communications, energy, education, culture, entertainment, tourism and financial services, which are intended for the use of the public’

(emphasis added).

Section 3(a) of the Discrimination in Products and Services Law states as follows:

‘Prohibition of discrimination

3.  (a) Anyone whose occupation is the supply of a product or a public service or the running of a public place shall not discriminate in supplying the product or the public service, in allowing entry into the public place or providing a service in the public place on account of race, religion or religious group, nationality, country of origin, sex, sexual orientation, beliefs, political affiliation, personal status or parenthood.’

(emphases added).

For the implementation of the aforesaid provisions, see: AP (Jer) 1320/03 Alkaslasi v. Upper Beitar Municipality [39].

It follows from the aforesaid that the constitutional right to the protection of dignity, which was directly violated here as a result of the humiliation involved in the ethnic discrimination directed in this case at the students of Oriental origin can only be remedied by eliminating the discrimination. In this context it should be emphasized that, as we have said, the relevant laws do not allow any violation of this kind (on the contrary, they expressly prohibit it). Moreover, the other conditions of the limitations clause (which we saw no need to address in this case) are also not satisfied in the circumstances.

6.    How therefore does the third respondent try to justify its conduct? It argues that the separation was on a religious basis and not an ethnic one (see para. 15 of its statement of reply). Thereby it is trying to avail itself of the ‘freedom of religion’ exception, which in its opinion extends to conduct of this kind, or the exception that allows a cultural minority community to have its own educational autonomy. In the United States, an argument of this kind was accepted in the past, with regard to the Amish sect, on the basis of the right to freedom of religion, but in the United States that right is enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (see Wisconsin v. Yoder [41]). Here I should point out that the aforesaid judgment has been criticised in legal literature. See: W. Kymlica, Citizenship, Community and Culture (1989); W. Kymlica and R. Cohen-Almagor, ‘Ethnic-Cultural Minorities in Liberal Democracies,’ Basic Issues in Israeli Democracy (1999) 187; Rabin, The Right to Education, at pp. 159, 231-235, which also refers to a previous judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts [42] (which was considered in Wisconsin v. Yoder [41]).

Moreover, it would appear that the reliance on ‘religious grounds’ for the de facto separation is merely a disguise for discrimination, and even disguised discrimination is unacceptable (see the remarks of Justice J. Türkel in HCJ 200/83 Wathad v. Minister of Finance [34], at pp. 121-122; the majority opinion per Justice M. Cheshin in HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [35], at pp. 259-260).

Furthermore, in Israeli law the right to freedom of religion has not yet achieved the status of a super-legislative constitutional right, even though Prof. A. Barak in his book Legal Interpretation (vol. 3, Constitutional Interpretation) (hereafter: ‘Barak, Constitutional Interpretation’) originally expressed the opinion that this right is also derived from ‘human dignity’ and the purpose clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (ibid., at p. 430; see also his remarks in HCJ 3261/93 Manning v. Minister of Justice [36], at p. 286 and in HCJ 4298/93 Jabarin v. Minister of Education [28], at p. 203, where he expresses himself more moderately. See also the opinion of Justice A. Procaccia in HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [37]. For a different opinion, see H. Sommer, ‘The Unlisted Rights — On the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution,’ 28 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 257 (1997), at pp. 325-326).

According to some authorities, a horizontal balance should not be made with such a right, in so far as it is not super-legislative (if that is indeed its status), against the constitutional right of the protection of dignity, since the latter is higher than the former in the constitutional hierarchy (for other opinions on this issue, on which I too would reserve judgment at this stage, see HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk, Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [25], at pp. 473-478, per Vice-President A. Barak, and the separate opinion of Justice S. Levin, ibid. [25], at p. 486; Barak, Constitutional Interpretation, at pp. 215-249; A. Barak, ‘Freedom of Information and the Court,’ 3 Ono Academic College Yearbook in Memory of Haim H. Cohn 95 (2003), at pp. 100-101; Sommer, ‘The Unlisted Rights — On the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution,’ supra, at pp. 334-337; R. Segev, Weighing Values and Balancing Interests (2008), at pp. 129-213).

Whatever the outlook is with regard to the aforesaid question that I presented, modern literature in this field holds that cultural practices should be subjected to the criterion of dignity. See M. Dan-Cohen, ‘Defending Dignity’ in Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self and Morality, 150 (2002). For different and additional outlooks on this issue, see G. Gontovnik, ‘The Right to Culture in a Liberal Society and in the State of Israel,’ 27(1) Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) 23 (2003); R. Gordon, ‘ “Saturday Morning, a Beautiful Day” — The Struggle of Women in the Orthodox Community for Participation in the Synagogue and Religious Rituals,’ Studies in Law, Gender and Feminism (D. Erez-Barak, ed., 2007) 143); R. Cohen-Almagor and M. Zambotti, ‘Liberalism, Tolerance and Multiculturalism: The Bounds of Liberal Intervention in Affairs of Minority Cultures,’ in K. Wojciechowski and J.C. Joerden (eds.), Ethical Liberalism in Contemporary Societies (2009), at pp. 79-98.

The most up-to-date and comprehensive Israeli research in the aforesaid field has been carried out by Prof. Menachem Mautner in his new book Law and Culture in Israel at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century (2008). There (at pp. 385-423) he proposes two innovative models for resolving the question of the extent of consideration that should be given to minority cultural practices: one model that is based on human rights law and another model that is based on the concept of ‘man.’ In both models, the element of dignity, as Prof. Mautner interprets it, has a central role. This is how he explains the proper criterion for considering minority cultural practices:

‘Since we have adopted the duty to treat human beings with dignity as a justification for non-intervention in their cultures, then we should say that if we find a group whose culture is not based on treating human beings with dignity, the validity of the group’s claim that non-intervention in its culture is justified is undermined, and an opening is created for intervention in its cultural practices, in order to restore dignity to the human beings living in that culture. This is because it would be an internal contradiction if we were to allow a group to block intervention in its practices on the ground of the need to treat human beings with dignity, while the practices themselves are based on a lack of dignity for human beings’ (ibid., at pp. 411-412).

This outcome of eradicating ethnic discrimination (even if disguised), because of the violation of the dignity of the students studying in the special cultural framework to which the Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel belongs, is required in the case before us by the aforesaid models and also by the provisions of s. 5 of the Student Rights Law. As stated above, this section makes the proper distinction and provides that a student should not be the subject of ethnic discrimination in each of the cases involving education that are listed there. On the other hand, it is clear that it is possible to hold separate prayers and religious rituals in schools of the kind discussed in the petition in accordance with the customs and rites of the different communities (see, in this regard, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Responsa Yehaveh Daat 4, 4 and 5, 6; Yabia Omer 2, 6 [43]); see Rabbi Binyamin Lau, MiMaran ad Maran (2005), at pp. 202-219). On this point it should be noted that already in the eighteenth century a similar issue was considered (cf. Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch ben Yaakov Ashkenazi, Responsa Hacham Tzvi, 33 (1712). With regard to the students’ uniform, I agree with the minority opinion of Vice-President Justice A. Barak in Jabarin v. Minister of Education [28], but in view of the extensive discussion that has recently taken place in international case law and comparative law on this question, I think that there is no need at this stage to make any firm determination on this matter.

Now that we have considered the relevant constitutional issues, let us turn to the perspective of administrative law.

7.    In the field of administrative law, there are two questions that arise in this context, on the assumption that the prohibition of discrimination has been violated:

(a) What is the fate of the licence given to the school?

(b) Should the state continue funding the school?

Let us consider these issues briefly in their proper order.

The fate of the licence given to the school

8.    The Supervision of Schools Law, 5729-1969, prohibits the opening or running of a school without a licence. The Supervision of Schools Law also regulates the conditions for granting a licence. In our case, it is possible to find provisions in the Supervision of Schools Law that allow the director-general of the Ministry of Education to exercise discretion with regard to the fate of the licence of the Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel, which is a school that is subject to the Supervision of Schools Law, since it is a school in which more than ten students study or are educated on a regular basis and it provides primary education (see s. 12(a) of the law).

Section 32(a1) of the Supervision of Schools Law provides that if the director-general of the Ministry of Education is of the opinion that the prohibition of discrimination provided in s. 5 of the Student Rights Law has been violated, he may order the school in writing to close, after he has asked the licence holder in writing to remedy the situation within a reasonable time and after he has warned him that a failure to comply with the demand will result in an order being made to close the school. Here the word ‘may’ has become a duty, as has been explained (in another context) by the presiding justice, my colleague Justice E.E. Levy, unless the school expressly undertakes to comply with the provisions of the aforesaid s. 5 and de facto carries out its undertaking.

Section 30 of the Supervision of Schools Law allows the director-general of the Ministry of Education, or whomsoever it appointed for this purpose, as well as the health authority, to enter a school and its premises at any reasonable time in order to ascertain whether the provisions of the Supervision of Schools Law, the regulations enacted thereunder and the terms of the licence have been observed, and they may demand that the licence holder, or the headmaster of the school, shall provide any information that they need in order to carry out their duties under the aforesaid law.

It seems therefore that the current statute law allows the Ministry of Education to exercise all of its powers with regard to the licence of the Beit Yaakov Girls’ School in Immanuel. No more need be said on this subject.

Making the continued funding of the school conditional on the immediate cessation of the discriminatory policy

9.    Section 11 of the State Education Law, 5713-1953, provides:

‘The Minister may determine, in regulations, arrangements and conditions for declaring unofficial schools to be recognized schools, for introducing the core curriculum therein, for their management, supervision and state subsidy of their budgets, if the minister decides upon a subsidy and to the extent that he so decides.’

It would appear that this section, together with the regulations that were enacted under the State Education Law (the State Education (Recognized Schools) Regulations, 5714-1953) and the general powers that exist with regard to subsidies and funding, allow the director-general of the Ministry of Education to consider the question of the continued subsidizing of a school that adopts a discriminatory practice (see also r. 9 of the aforesaid regulations).

This is the place to point out that even the provisions of ss. 3A(i) and 3A(j) of the Budget Principles Law, 5745-1985, which paved the way for subsidizing and determining the character and status of strictly Orthodox Jewish education through the corporations of the Independent Education Centre and the Maayan Israel Torah Education Centre, cannot save the third respondent from the continued funding of the school being made conditional upon the immediate cessation of the discriminatory policy. Admittedly it has been held that the arrangement incorporated in the aforesaid provisions of the statute sought to equate the budgetary status of the schools of the aforesaid corporations with the status of the official schools that the state has the duty of maintaining (see HCJ 10808/04 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Minister of Education and Culture [38]), but the reasoning there was based, inter alia, on the fact that the subsidy should be given in accordance with objective, uniform and equal criteria like those for all children in Israel. Just as for all children in Israel it is inconceivable that the state will provide funding for ethnic discrimination, so too there is an inherent condition in the funding of the third respondent’s schools that it ensures that the prohibition of discrimination is not violated. This is the place to point out that the Special Cultural Schools Law, 5768-2008, is also not relevant to this case, since without discussing its substance and details, it applies to a ‘special cultural school,’ which is a school in which students study in the ninth to twelfth grades (whereas in our case we are dealing with students in a primary school), that has been recognized as such for the ‘special cultural group’ in it, as defined in the aforesaid law.

10. In conclusion, for these reasons, as well as the reasons cited by my colleagues, I agree that the order nisi issued in the petition should be made absolute.

In closing, I think it is superfluous to mention that the school that is the focus of the petition is called ‘Beit Yaakov.’ This name is derived from the well-known verse in the Book of Exodus, 19, 3 [45], which speaks of the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai. The verse says: ‘... thus you shall say to the house of Jacob (Heb. Beit Yaakov), and speak to the children of Israel.’ Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki (Rashi) explains: ‘Thus you shall say — in this language and in this order: to the house of Jacob (Beit Yaakov) — these are the women... and tell the children of Israel — the men.’ From this we can see two things:

(a) The Torah was given to women first (see: A. Weinroth, Feminism and Judaism (2001), at p. 58).

(b) In this verse, a distinction was only made between Beit Yaakov and the children of Israel, and it follows that any other or additional distinction, including in a school that bears the name Beit Yaakov, involves prohibited and improper discrimination.

We should remember and remind ourselves that the approach is that all the children of Jacob are equal. The Midrash states:

‘Rabbi Yehoshua of Sachnin said in the name of Rabbi Levy: the names of the tribes are not given everywhere in the same order, but sometimes one order is used, and at other times another order is used, so that people will not say that because they are superior the names of the sons of the mistresses (i.e., Leah and Rachel) were given first, and the names of the sons of the maid-servants (i.e., Zilpah and Bilhah) were given afterwards, thereby teaching you that they are all equal.’

(Midrash Sechel Tov (Buber edition), Exodus, Introduction [46]).

 

 

Petition granted.

16 Av 5769.

6 August 2009.

 

Lam v. Dal

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5936/97
Date Decided: 
Thursday, September 2, 1999
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: Diagnosticians of children’s learning disabilities and a nonprofit organization representing them challenged a decision by the Ministry of Education to cease recognizing diagnoses of learning disabilities, generally conducted for students seeking eligibility for special governmental conditions and services, unless the diagnoses are conducted by educational psychologists. Petitioners alleged that the decision violated the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

Held: The decision to cease recognizing diagnoses conducted by the petitioners violates the freedom of occupation and does so neither by force of a statute nor or in accordance with any statute, by virtue of express authorization therein, as required by the Basic Law. The Education Ministry is the primary consumer of educational diagnoses and as such, its decision to stop recognizing the diagnoses effectively prevents the petitioners from working in that field, constituting an infringement on the freedom of occupation. This infringement is not authorized by statute, as the relevant statutes make no mention of the diagnosis of learning disabilities or of the standards by which they are to be recognized. The decision is also invalid because it did not include transitional provisions required in light of the reliance and legitimate expectation interests of the petitioners and others. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

   HCJ 5936/97

1.Dr. Oren Lam

2.Amutat Amal – Organization of Learning Disabilities Diagnosticians

3.Nira Noi

v.

  1. Mr. Ben Tzion Dal, Director-General Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport
  2. Minister of Education Culture and Sport

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[2 September 1999]

Before President A. Barak and Justices D. Dorner, D. Beinisch

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: Diagnosticians of children’s learning disabilities and a nonprofit organization representing them challenged a decision by the Ministry of Education to cease recognizing diagnoses of learning disabilities, generally conducted for students seeking eligibility for special governmental conditions and services, unless the diagnoses are conducted by educational psychologists. Petitioners alleged that the decision violated the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

Held: The decision to cease recognizing diagnoses conducted by the petitioners violates the freedom of occupation and does so neither by force of a statute nor or in accordance with any statute, by virtue of express authorization therein, as required by the Basic Law. The Education Ministry is the primary consumer of educational diagnoses and as such, its decision to stop recognizing the diagnoses effectively prevents the petitioners from working in that field, constituting an infringement on the freedom of occupation. This infringement is not authorized by statute, as the relevant statutes make no mention of the diagnosis of learning disabilities or of the standards by which they are to be recognized. The decision is also invalid because it did not include transitional provisions required in light of the reliance and legitimate expectation interests of the petitioners and others.

 

Legislation Cited

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, ss.2, 4.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s.4.

National Education Law, 1953, s.34.

Interpretation Law, 1981, s.17 (b).

Land Brokers Law, 1996, ss.20 (a), 20 (b), 21.

Bar Association Law, 1961, 2.112.

Dentists Ordinance (Amendment), 1951, s, 1.

Dentists Ordinance (Amendment) (No.2), 1992, s.7.

Dentists Ordinance (New Version), 1979.

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

 

[1] HCJ 6300/93 Institute for Qualification of Rabbinical Advocates v. Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 48 (4) 441.

[2] HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Company Ltd v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 48(5) 441.

[3] CA 294/91 Chevra Kadisha v. Kestenbaum,  IsrSC  46 (2) 464.

[4] HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49(4) 94.

[5] HCJ 5016/96 Chorev v. Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 51(4) 1.

[6] HCJ 1/49 Bzarno v.Minister of Police, IsrSC 2 80.

[7] HCJ 337/81 Mitrani v.Minister of Transport, IsrSC 37(3) 337.

[8] HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 51 (5) 481.

[9] HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, IsrSC 42 (2) 309.

[10] HCJ 1715/97 Bureau of Investments Directors in Israel v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[11] HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labor and Welfare, IsrSC 52(2) 433.

[12] HCJ 2832/96 Banai v. National Council of Advocates, IsrSC 50(2) 582.

[13] HCJ  3930/94 Gizmavi v.Minister of Health,  IsrSC 48(4) 778.

[14] FHCJ 3299/93 Vixenblaum v.Minister of Defense, IsrSC 49(2) 195.

[15] FHCJ 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and the Minister of Religion, IsrSC 47(5) 485.

[16] HCJ 1452/93 Igloo Contracting Company for Building Installation and Development v. Minister of Industry and Trade, IsrSC 47(5) 610.

[17] HCJ1 703/92 K.A.L. Consignment Airways v. Prime Minister, IsrSC 52(4) 193.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice D. Dorner

The facts, the procedure and the claims

1.   Petitioners 1 and 3 (hereinafter – the petitioners) work as diagnosticians of children’s learning disabilities. Petitioner 1 is a doctor in neuro-psychology. He lectures in Haifa University on learning disabilities, their diagnosis and their treatment. For the last eight years he has been the owner of a diagnostic clinic, dealing, inter alia, with the diagnosis of learning disabilities. Petitioner 3 has worked in special education for about twenty years.  She completed a special course dealing with learning disabilities, under the aegis of the Education Ministry, and also specialized in field-work for two years.  After passing the examinations, she received her license from the Education Ministry authorizing her to diagnose learning disabilities. Petitioner 2 is a nonprofit organization currently in formation, which will amalgamate the diagnosticians of learning difficulties, among them petitioners 1 and 3.

Learning disabilities, including a broad range of learning difficulties, generally result from defects in cognitive processes, presumably of neurological origin. They are distinct from learning difficulties, which occur in the natural cross section of the population, consummate with each person’s talents, motivation, and environment.

Even those with above average intellectual capacities experience difficulty in achieving basic learning skills, e.g. reading (dyslexia) writing (dysgraphia) and arithmetic as a result of a learning disability. People with learning disabilities also suffer from disturbances in cognitive functions: language conceptualization, memory, concentration and the like. Treatment of learning disabilities includes, among other things, adapting syllabi and tests to the specific disability from which each particular pupil suffers, to enable students to exploit their capacities and intellectual talents to the fullest extent.

Since the beginning of the 1990’s, there has been an increased demand for trained, professional diagnosticians of learning disabilities. This is the result of the educational system becoming increasingly aware that students at all levels, including universities, suffer from learning difficulties.  Between 1992 and 1994, the Ministry of Education encouraged the training of diagnosticians in courses conducted in the colleges it supports. Graduates of these courses (hereinafter – the diagnosticians) received a license from the Ministry of Education as “didactic diagnosticians”, after completing a period of supervised practical work and passing examinations.  Until September 1996, the Ministry of Education officially recognized the diagnoses given by diagnosticians.

2.   In September 1996, the Ministry of Education issued a circular, signed by its Director-General Ben-Tzion Dal, and distributed it in educational institutions at all levels.  The circular provided that the Ministry of Education would only recognize a diagnosis of a learning disability (differential diagnosis) if given by an expert educational psychologist (as defined in the Psychologists Regulations (Approval of Degree as Expert), 1979).

Once the Ministry of Education stopped recognizing the diagnoses of the diagnosticians, there was no longer any reason for students in need of a diagnosis to request their services, and the demand for their services declined significantly. 

In November 1996, a number of diagnosticians whose livelihoods had suffered, including Petitioner 1, applied to Mr. Dal by way of their attorney.   Protesting the circular, they argued that it was the Education Ministry that had encouraged them to undergo training for work in diagnosis; that diagnosis of learning disabilities demands special training, which educational psychologists do not have; and that in any event there was no ground for limiting such diagnosis to educational psychologists.

In January 1997 the Minister of Education and the Minister of Science appointed a committee of experts, headed by Prof. Malka Margalit, to examine how to help students suffering from learning difficulties to realize their potential fully.  The letter of appointment directed the committee to submit its recommendations within six months, in other words, by June 1997.

Prior to the due date, on 26 February 1997, the Education Ministry issued a second director-general circular, in which it once again provided:

“As of the publication date (of the director-general’s circular of September 1996), the definition of learning disabilities shall only include those which have been diagnosed as such by an expert educational psychologist”.

On the other hand, in the committee’s report submitted in June 1997 (hereinafter –the Margaliot Committee Report), it expressed its opinion that diagnosis of a learning difficulties requires special academic training, not offered within the framework of the regular training of educational psychologists. Its conclusion was that recognition of diagnoses should not be reserved for educational psychologists who had not been specially trained for that purpose.

The committee therefore recommended that diagnosis of learning difficulties be performed by an interdisciplinary committee of psychologists, teachers and educational consultants who had received training for that purpose in a Master’s level program specializing in learning difficulties. The members of the committee would divide the tasks involved in diagnosis among themselves.  In other words, in order to approve a student’s educational framework, the psychologist, who was an expert in learning disabilities, would conduct a differential diagnosis, examining the disparity between function and intellectual capacity as measured by intelligence tests, the gap which defines a learning disability.  At the same time, the teacher would assess the components of the learning disability in order to construct an appropriate didactic program.

The diagnosticians again applied to the director-general of the Ministry of Education, relying on the Margalit Committee’s report.  The Ministry of Education responded that educational psychologists undergo courses under the auspices of the Psychological Service in the Pedagogical Center of the Ministry of Education (P.A) in which they also learn about learning difficulties.  In the Ministry’s view, these courses provide the expertise required under the recommendations of the Margalit commission. Consequently, the Ministry of Education saw no reason to amend its guidelines.

3.   The petition before us challenged this decision.  The petitioners asked that the Ministry of Education be directed to annul the guidelines prescribed by the director-general of the Ministry of Education.  Alternatively, they asked that we determine reasonable and egalitarian criteria for recognizing diagnoses of a learning disability when performed by persons specifically trained for that purpose. As an alternative to the alternative, they requested that transitional provisions be enacted until the new guidelines came into force.

In their petition, the petitioners claimed that preferring educational psychologists untrained in the diagnosis of learning disabilities, over diagnosticians who were experts in the field, violates the diagnosticians’ freedom of occupation and therefore violates the provisions of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  In this context, they claimed that the director-general’s circulars have no basis in Knesset legislation.  They further claimed that the director general’s circulars were not issued for an appropriate purpose, as they are based on irrelevant considerations.  Furthermore, they submitted that the director general’s circulars violated their freedom of occupation to an extent greater than necessary.  In that context, the petitioners appended to their petition the expert opinion of a psychologist who had specialized in the area of learning difficulties. The gist of the opinion is that a psychologist’s training does not include specialization in diagnosis of learning disabilities and of those suffering from such disabilities; that the tools used by psychologists for assessing intellectual ability (I.Q tests) are inappropriate for assessing examinees suffering from learning disabilities; and that the entire area of diagnosis constitutes a distinct discipline necessitating specific and basic professional training.

At the petitioner’s request, an interim order (order nisi) was issued.

In their response to the petition, the respondents claimed that the director-general’s decision reflected the professional stance of the competent authorities in the Ministry of Education and that there was no cause to annul it.   In that context, they too submitted the expert opinion of an educational psychologist, the thrust of which is that educational psychologists are best equipped to diagnose learning difficulties and that their required courses train them for that purpose.  The respondents further contended that the director-general’s circulars do not, in any way, abridge the petitioners’ freedom of occupation, because they do not prevent them from working as diagnosticians of learning disabilities.  Nor do the circulars restrict their work in any manner, for example, by requiring a license.  The only thing decided by the circulars was that the Ministry of Education would no longer accept their diagnoses.  This, they submitted, does not infringe upon their freedom of occupation. Moreover, the circulars themselves still provided the petitioners with plenty of work, given that the entire realm of the specific diagnosis of particular disabilities (as opposed to the diagnosis in principle of a learning disability) remained open to them.  And so, absent a violation of the freedom of occupation, there is no need to enact transitional provisions that enable diagnosticians previously engaged in diagnosis of learning disabilities to continue working in their professions. In any event, regarding the transitional provisions, the respondents further claimed that they were unnecessary with regard to the petitioners.  A transitional provision is intended for persons occupied in a field who must, in order to continue working in the field, make adjustments in light of new conditions.  The transitional provision allows them to continue their work in that field while simultaneously adjusting to the new conditions.  In the case before us, there was no intention to require the petitioners to satisfy certain conditions in order to qualify for diagnosis of learning disabilities.  Rather, the intention was that their diagnoses would not be accepted by the Ministry of Education.  Finally, the respondents claimed that continued diagnoses by diagnosticians who are not psychologists would harm the pupils and therefore should not be allowed, even during a short transition period.

4.   My view is that the petition should be granted. I say that for two reasons: first; the decision challenged violates the freedom of occupation and does so neither by force of a statute nor or in accordance with any statute, by virtue of express authorization therein. Second; the decision does not establish the necessary transitional provisions required, in light of the reliance and legitimate expectation interests of the petitioners and others.

In view of these conclusions, we need not rule on the question of whether the decision violated the freedom of occupation to a greater extent than necessary.

The decision violates the freedom of occupation

5.   As stated, the respondents claimed that the director-general’s circulars do not involve any infringement on the freedom of occupation, because they do not prohibit the petitioners or others from continuing to work in their occupations.

This claim cannot be accepted.

Whether or not an administrative agency’s decision violates the freedom of occupation is a question that must be examined substantively and not formally.  The freedom of occupation is violated not just where an agency directly restricts the right to engage in any work or vocation, for example, by imposing a prohibition on the occupation or the requirement of a license. Effectively preventing the possibility of engaging in particular work or a particular profession also constitutes a violation of the freedom of occupation.

For example, we have held that imposing limitations on studies necessary to qualify for work in a particular profession constitutes a violation of the freedom of occupation. See HC 6300/93 Institute for Qualification of Rabbinical Advocates v. Minister of Religious Affairs (hereinafter – Rabbinical Advocates Institute), [1]).  Even when an agency grants a subsidy to only a portion of those engaged in a particular area, while denying the same subsidy to others, it violates the freedom of occupation (see HC 726/94 Clal Insurance Company Ltd v. Minister of Finance [2] at 471).

Similarly, an agency violates the freedom of occupation by agreeing to receive exclusively the occupational product of those with particular training, even without prohibiting the actual engagement in the occupation for those with different training.   An agency practicing this kind of policy will be regarded as having violated the freedom of occupation if in practice it prevents, or seriously restricts, the possibility of working in the occupation.  An agency violates the freedom of occupation if it imposes restrictions on the employment of those engaged in a particular profession or occupation, or upon the use of their products, when it has a monopoly over the employment of persons engaged in that profession or occupation, or it is the sole consumer of their products.   The agency’s monopoly status enables it to prevent engagement in an occupation without imposing a formal prohibition.  Cf. C.A. 294/91 Chevra Kadisha v. Kestenbaum [3] per Shamgar, P. at 484.  Under those circumstances, the exclusive utilization of the service of particular sources grants them monopoly status as a matter of fact, if not formally.  This too violates the freedom of occupation of the other sources, whose services the agencies decline to utilize. Cf A. Barak Interpretation in Law, vol.3 “Constitutional Interpretation” [18] at 613 – 614.  On the other hand, if engagement in a particular occupation is open to a person despite the agency’s refusal to accept the products of his occupation, that refusal will not be regarded as a violation of freedom of occupation.

This conclusion is dictated by the underlying goals of the freedom of occupation. Freedom of occupation is a particular instance of the general principle of human dignity and liberty. “It is by way of his occupation that a person shapes his personality and his social status. When you take away a person’s freedom of occupation you take away his human image. Take away a person’s freedom to choose a profession and you have taken away his reason for living” (see Barak, supra [18] at 583).  Freedom of occupation also has an economic aspect.  It is intended to protect peoples’ ability to pursue their livelihoods. These goals are frustrated not only when the State prohibits engagement in a particular profession or occupation or makes the engagement therein conditional upon receiving a license; they are also frustrated when the State, enjoying monopoly status over employment in a particular profession, refrains from employing particular people, or imposes restrictions on their employment.

Indeed, as a rule, the freedom of occupation does not compel the State or its authorities to employ.  Freedom of occupation means the freedom to employ or not to employ.  See A. Barak “The Economic Constitution of Israel” [20] at 369.  In all instances, the State must exercise its power as an employer and as a purchaser of services on the basis of equality, and on the basis of reasonable, relevant considerations. The State may refuse to employ certain persons or refuse to purchase their services, and may even refuse to use their products. Generally speaking, however, none of these actions denies people the ability to engage in their profession, and therefore they do not constitute a violation of their freedom of occupation.  The situation changes, however, when the State enjoys a monopoly over employment in an occupation, or over the use of the products of an occupation, and its refusal to employ precludes the possibility of engagement in the occupation.  This kind of violation is substantively an infringement on the freedom of occupation.

6.   In the case before us, the State has not only refrained from employing the petitioners and their colleagues as diagnosticians of learning disabilities, but it has also refused to recognize their diagnoses, even when their services are procured by others. 

The Ministry of Education’s failure to recognize the petitioners’ diagnoses bars the entire profession to them.  The Ministry of Education is the only institution in the country that requires these diagnoses and controls the large part of the education network of the entire country. The Ministry requires the diagnoses in order to create special educational frameworks for pupils suffering from learning disabilities, mostly in order to determine special conditions for taking various examinations, especially the university matriculation examinations.  The directives of the Ministry of Education guide universities, too, which also use these diagnoses to determine special conditions and concessions for paths of study and examinations.  The refusal of the Ministry of Education to recognize the petitioners’ diagnoses means they are excluded from that realm of occupation and that their freedom of occupation has been violated. Essentially, there is no real difference between non-recognition and the establishment of a condition under which only those trained as educational psychologists can be occupied in the diagnosis of learning disabilities. 

7.   As stated, the respondents claimed that even after the petitioners are excluded from the field of diagnostics, plenty of work is available for them in other related fields (such as the diagnoses of specific disabilities and formulating programs of study for those suffering from learning disabilities).  This, however, does not vitiate the infringement on the petitioners’ freedom of occupation, which is expressed by their exclusion from the occupation as diagnosticians.  The diagnoses themselves are of critical importance and of great economic value, for they determine the entire course of treatment, and most importantly - the pupil’s entitlement to concessions and special conditions in his studies. We therefore cannot belittle the importance of the diagnostic process in the overall treatment of learning disabilities.   

 

The decision is subject to the limitation provision

8.  Having determined that director-general’s circulars infringe upon the petitioners’ freedom of occupation, we must examine whether this violation comports with the conditions prescribed by the limitation provision of section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, namely, that it be by statute, or in accordance with a statute, by virtue of express authorization in that statute; that it befit the values of the State; that it is enacted for a proper purpose; and that the freedom is violated to an extent no greater than necessary.  These criteria, prescribed in the limitation provision of the Basic Law, also apply to cases in which an administrative agency violates a person’s basic rights (see HC 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense [4] at 138; HC 5016/96 Chorev v. Minister of Transport).

 

The violation was neither by statute nor in accordance with a statute

9.   Under section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, a violation of the freedom of occupation is legal only if effected by a statute or in accordance with a statute, by virtue of express authorization therein.  This principle was already incorporated into our legal system in the early days of the State, in HC 1/49 Bzarno v. Minister of Police [6]. Years passed, and the Supreme Court reiterated its holding, per President Shamgar:

“…the starting point accepted in a free society is that a person is permitted to engage in any work or occupation, as long as no restrictions or prohibitions have been determined in respect thereof, and the latter cannot be enacted and maintained except pursuant to a specific legislative provision.”  (HC 337/81 Mitrani v. Minister of Transport (hereinafter – Mitrani [7]) at 353, emphasis added – D.D).

This principle was entrenched in 1994, even receiving constitutional force in section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  Its basic rationale is that a norm violating the freedom of occupation, like any norm that violates a basic right, constitutes a primary arrangement.  In accordance with the principles of separation of powers, the rule of law and democracy, primary arrangements must be statutorily prescribed by the legislative branch. See HC 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [8].

“:…violation of human rights, even when it promotes the values of the State, even when for a worthy purpose, and even when not exceeding the required degree, must be established in a law that prescribes primary arrangements and the formal delegation of legislative agency to the executive branch is insufficient.  Hence, the requirement that primary legislation establish primary arrangements and that administrative regulations, or administrative provisions, should deal exclusively with arrangements for its implementation, derives from the imperative of protecting individual liberty.  Indeed, in a democracy it may happen that the violation of individual rights is necessary for the realization of the general interest.  Even so, the requirement is that such a violation even where justified, must be established in primary legislation and not be delegated to the executive branch itself…”

Conceivably, violating the freedom of occupation via administrative regulations, and a fortiori in the director general’s circulars or other forms of administrative directives, would be more efficient.  The reason is that, generally speaking, the legislative process in the Knesset is more complex, protracted and expensive than the administrative process.  Nonetheless, efficiency is not necessarily an advantage where there is a question involving infringement of the freedom of occupation.  It is precisely the “cumbersome” nature of primary legislation and the requirement of a majority of the people’s representatives in order to pass a statute which provide a kind of institutional guarantee that basic rights will not be violated except where necessary.

10. In our case, the relevant statutes – the National Education Law, 1953, and the Special Education Law, 1988 – make no mention of the diagnosis of learning disabilities or of the standards by which the Education Ministry is to recognize these and other diagnoses.

It might be argued that these matters fall within the framework of the general authorization provisions in these statutes, which establish the Minister of Education as supervisor over their implementation. See section 34 of the National Education Law and section 23 of the Special Education Law.  That is to say: these provisions empower the Minister to adopt all measures necessary for the efficient implementation of the laws and the realization of their goals, and this is sufficient to satisfy the principle of administrative legality.  See A. Gazal, “Violation of Basic Rights ‘by statute’ or ‘in accordance with a statute’” [21] at 384 – 385.

We reject this claim.  As a rule, a law will not be construed as violating or as granting power to violate the freedom of occupation unless it is explicitly determined therein. This was stressed by President Shamgar in HC Mitrani, supra [7]  at 358 – 359:

“authorization for this purpose, means express authorization, and for my part, I refer  exclusively to a case in which the primary legislator states clearly and expressly that he authorizes the secondary legislator [the administrative agency – ed.] to enact regulations that establish prohibitions or restrictions on occupation in a particular profession.

When dealing with subjects touching upon the restriction of basic freedoms, the secondary legislator cannot, in my opinion, act in the particular realm, unless the primary legislator has clearly conferred it clear, visible and express authority to deal with the matter by way of restriction or prohibition, whichever is relevant…”

This is the rule for administrative regulations adopted by virtue of express authority to enact regulations, and the same applies, perhaps even a fortiori, with regard to administrative directives of the kind being challenged in this petition, which purport to have been enacted by force of the general executive authority under the law.

This is also the law governing the scope of the auxiliary powers under section 17 (b) of the Interpretation Law, 1981.  The provision that “any empowerment [authorization – trans.] to do or enforce the doing of something, implies the conferment of auxiliary powers reasonably required therefore” - does not authorize an administrative agency to violate human rights”. See Y. Zamir, Administrative Authority (vol. 1) [19] at 253.

Admittedly, there is a less stringent approach, also with some basis in our case law, under which the administrative agency is empowered to violate basic rights even without specific legislative empowerment, provided that such empowerment is required for the realization of the particular purpose of the law. See HC 953/87 Poraz v. Tel-Aviv Jaffa Mayor, [9]. Yet it is doubtful whether this approach is applicable to a violation of freedom of occupation, in view of the requirement of section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides that any violation of the freedom of occupation must be either by statute, or in accordance with a statute, by virtue of express authorization in that law. Either way, even under the second approach, the director-general’s circulars challenged here are illegal, inasmuch as nothing in the purposes of the relevant laws compels the Ministry of Education to withhold recognition from diagnoses of learning difficulties performed by diagnosticians.

The diagnosticians’ freedom of occupation to engage in the diagnosis of learning disabilities cannot therefore not be negated exclusively on the basis of the director general’s circulars, which were issued within the framework of his general executive powers as prescribed in the Education Laws.  This kind of violation of the freedom of occupation, regardless of its substantive justification, must be determined by statute, and at the least requires express authorization therein.

Consistency with the values of the state, an appropriate purpose, and no greater a violation than necessary.

11. As stated, the values of democracy provide a central justification for the requirement that the violation of the freedom of occupation be by or in accordance with a statute, by virtue of express authorization therein.  In a democratic state, violations of human rights must receive the approval of the nation’s representatives. Hence, a violation of human rights exclusively by force of an administrative guideline is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel, which, as stated in section 2 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, are the values of a Jewish and democratic state.

12. On the other hand, the purpose of the decision upon which the petition is based is proper.  It purports to ensure that the diagnosis of learning disabilities is performed correctly, by appropriately qualified professionals.  A mistaken diagnosis can harm those being diagnosed and even cause disruptions in the educational system.  Measures should be taken to prevent cases of mistaken diagnoses or prevent them from being given consideration.   Should the Knesset decide to enact a law on the matter, it would certainly be entitled to regard this as one of its goals.  Accordingly, for example, one could not challenge the legitimacy of a statute prohibiting unqualified persons from engaging in the diagnosis of learning disabilities.

13. Does the decision being challenged infringe upon the freedom of occupation to an extent greater than necessary?  The question has a number of dimensions.

On the one hand, when gauged by the parameter of proportionality, which, for violations of freedom of occupation, is a relatively broad parameter, the tendency is not to interfere in the assessment of the competent authorities regarding the professional training required for a profession or trade, even if there are divergent views.  See my comments in HC 1715/97 Bureau of Investments Directors in Israel v. Minister of Finance (hereinafter - Bureau of Investments Directors [10], at 419 – 423 and HC 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labor and Welfare [11], especially where the administrative authority determines that the employment of those who have not received specific training is liable to cause damage.

On the other hand, the inadequacy of a particular kind of training is generally insufficient grounds to justify violating the freedom of occupation.  The Margalit committee determined that the ideal training for this occupation is the study of educational psychology together with specialization in the area of learning disabilities as part of an academic masters program.  Nonetheless, because of practical constraints, the respondents did not adopt its recommendation. The respondents were content with diagnoses been performed by educational psychologists, even those who lacked the appropriate specialization.  Nor have the respondents themselves even attempted to prohibit diagnosticians who are not educational psychologists from working in the diagnosis of learning abilities.  Their failure to do so raises doubts as to whether they really believe - as they contend  - that diagnoses performed by diagnosticians who are not educational psychologists are potentially harmful.   As stated, the diagnosticians were trained and specialized under the supervision, and even with the encouragement, of the Ministry of Education.  This too raises doubts as to whether there is any justification for violating the freedom of occupation, even within the relatively broad parameter of proportionality.

In any event, and whatever the result, because we invalidate the decision on the grounds that it lacks a legislative basis, we need not decide the question within this particular case. Should the issue be presented for its consideration, the Knesset will assess the different options and ensure that any legislative arrangement does not violate the freedom of occupation to an extent greater than necessary.

The decision is invalid because no transitional provisions were enacted.

   14. The decision challenged in the petition is also invalid because it took effect immediately, with no transitional provisions.

Transitional provisions are necessary to protect the interest of reliance, which is a legitimate interest of the individual, the protection of which forms the basis of a number of rules in constitutional and administrative law.  See D. Barak-Erez “Protection of Reliance in Administrative Law,” [22].  Administrative authorities have an obligation to protect reliance, and to a certain extent, anticipation as well, and to establish transitional provisions where reasonably required for their protection; this obligation is grounded, inter alia, in the rules of fairness, estoppel, reasonability and proportionality.  See HC 2832/96 Banai v. National Council of Advocates (hereinafter – Banai [12]) at 594.  Where a governmental norm violates the freedom of occupation (or one of the rights established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), the obligation to enact transitional provisions is particularly important, in order to meet the requirement of proportionality.  Justice Zamir stressed this point in the Banai case, in which we granted a petition challenging a decision that violated the freedom of occupation without enacting transitional provisions. Justice Zamir wrote:

“The immediate commencement (of the decision), considering the need and its expected result, constitutes a violation in excess of what is necessary.  This is especially true when the violation is upon the freedom of occupation, because the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (in section 4) bars it from being violated, unless, inter alia, the harm is to no greater extent than necessary.

The obligation to refrain from violating the freedom of occupation without enacting appropriate transitional provisions is therefore a constitutional obligation which is binding upon the Knesset itself in its adoption of laws.  Indeed, to date there has been just one case in which this Court invalidated a legislative arrangement for violating the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, on the basis of the inadequacy of its transitional provisions, which violated the freedom of occupation to a greater extent than necessary. See HC Bureau of Investments Directors[10].

15.  In the case before us, the respondents argued that, with respect to the petitioners, there was no need for transitional provisions, because there was no intention to make their engagement as diagnosticians dependent upon conditions to which they would need to adjust; the intention was rather to deprive them altogether of the opportunity to work in the field, vis a vis the Ministry of Education.

The Court rejects this claim.

There are a number of reasons for enacting transitional provisions, when a new normative arrangement takes effect. They may also find expression in a variety of forms, depending on the specific circumstances of each particular arrangement. See Banai  [12] at 594.  This is true of transitional provisions regulating an arrangement restricting work in a particular occupation.

Indeed, transitional provisions may be enacting for those currently working in a particular occupation, granting them time to adapt and prepare to meet the requirements established by the new normative arrangement.  In those cases, the new arrangement generally takes effect only at the end of a specific period, or it is applied to those already working in a particular occupation only at the end of a specified period, during which they can adjust to the new arrangement. See e.g. Land Brokers Law, 1996, section 20 (a):

“…a citizen or resident of Israel who immediately prior to the acceptance of this Law dealt in land brokerage, may continue to deal in land brokerage – even without a license – for two additional years following the enactment of this Law”.

See also section 21 of the law which states:

“This Law shall come into force six months after the date of  its publication”.

However, transitional provisions may exempt certain people altogether from the the provisions of the new normative arrangement, rather than just grant them an adjustment period.

Provisions of this kind are usually prescribed for people who have worked in a particular occupation for many years and gained extensive experience; as a result, either there is no need to subject them to the new qualifying conditions or doing so would be unjust.  For example, when a statute barred drafters of certain kinds of requests who did not hold a lawyer’s license from engaging in certain occupations, it included a transitional provision. The provision held that a person who had been continuously engaged in drafting requests beginning prior to 1949 and until the adoption of the Bar Association Law 1961 could continue doing so with the approval of the Minister of Justice, even without a license to practice law.  See section 112 of the Bar Association Law.  Similarly, when persons without an academic degree in dentistry were excluded from the occupation of dentistry, a transitional provision was enacted which, inter alia, permitted persons above the age of 35 to continue working in dentistry without academic qualification, provided that dentistry had been their main occupation for at least fifteen years, See section 1 of Dentists Ordinance (Amendment), 1951.

A similar provision appears in section 20 (b) of the Land Brokers Law, 1996, which states:

“Where a person is over the age of 60, or has a complete academic education and has proven to the Registrar’s satisfaction that he was engaged in land brokering for a period of three years prior to the commencement date of this Law, the Registrar may exempt him from the examination.”

Transition provisions completely exempting certain persons from a normative arrangement regulating a particular occupation sometimes also apply to persons who relied upon the previous qualifying conditions for the occupation and qualified themselves accordingly, sometimes devoting extensive resources to that purpose.  For example, section 7 of the Dentists Ordinance (Amendment) (No.2), 1992 states that the previous provisions of the Dentists Ordinance (New Version), 1979 concerning professional examinations and granting of license “will continue to apply to a person who on the commencement date of this Law was studying in a dentistry course.”  This Court ruled in a High Court case, Institution for Training of Rabbinical Advocates [1], that the new conditions for recognizing an institution for training rabbinical advocates, which were applied without transitional provisions for those currently studying, were unreasonable.  Similarly, the Court ruled that amendments in the rules governing the recognition of comprehensive grades awarded in preparatory courses for medical specialization would not apply to those who had already participated in the courses.  See comments of Justice Tova Strasbourg-Cohen in HC 3930/94 Gizmavi v.Minister of Health [13] at 789:

“The desire to maintain an appropriate academic level motivates all experts responsible for the subject to establish criteria for success in examinations, and such desire is understandable and appropriate.   But this goal does not relieve the authorities from their obligation to adopt suitable and appropriate measures to avoid violating individual rights or limiting the options of medical interns without appropriate advance notice”.

In another case in which this Court adjudicated the issue of the immediate effect of amendments to the conditions regulating qualifying examinations for lawyers, it ruled:

“Under the circumstances, the goal of maintaining the standards of the profession did not justify applying the new rules immediately … the immediate effective date of the rules, considering the justification and the anticipated result, constitutes a violation greater than is necessary” (Banai, supra [12] at 603).

Furthermore, sometimes, even when it is not possible to allow those not complying with new conditions to continue permanently in their occupations, there must still be a period of adjustment to enable them to adjust to the changes or to find another livelihood.

16.  And yet, according to the response they filed to the petition, the respondents did not so much as consider the question of transitional provisions.  This omission per se justifies invalidating the decision on grounds of failure to consider relevant considerations (see FHC 3299/93 Vixenblaum v.Minister of Defense [14]).

In any case, the total absence of any transitional provisions in the director-general’s circulars demonstrates a violation of the freedom of occupation beyond the extent necessary.   I am not convinced that the balance between the violation of the petitioners’ rights and the need to regulate the area of diagnoses justifies applying the new normative arrangement immediately.  As stated, the petitioners have worked in diagnosis for years, and no persuasive argument was given for the necessity of immediately discontinuing their performance of diagnoses.  The respondents’ claim that the petitioners must immediately stop performing diagnoses, in view of the potential damage to pupils diagnosed in a manner that they consider unprofessional, is unfounded.  As stated, the persons concerned were trained in diagnosis by the Ministry of Education itself, and they engaged in the practice for many years.  No evidence has been submitted showing that diagnoses performed by them have thus far caused any damage.  As stated above, apparently the respondents themselves do not ascribe tremendous weight to the claim of damage, because they did not attempt to prevent the diagnosticians continuing in their occupations.  Furthermore, even if there was any fear of damage, the transitional provisions by definition strike a balance between the danger of potential damage and the other pertinent considerations, and they do so even for occupations where the potential damage is far more serious.  See, for example, the above-noted transitional provisions regarding medicine, dentistry and law.

17. I therefore propose that the petition be granted and that the director-general’s circulars at the heart of the petition be annulled.

The respondents will pay the petitioners' expenses in the sum of NIS 30,000.

 

President A. Barak

I concur with the judgment of my colleague Justice Dorner. I wish to add a few comments regarding the scope of the freedom of occupation.

1.   The key question in the petition before us is: does the provision in the circular issued by the director-general of the Ministry of Education, under which the Ministry will only recognize the diagnoses of learning disabilities performed by an expert educational psychologist, infringe upon the freedom of occupation of those engaged in diagnosing learning disabilities?  Should the answer be yes, then that provision is valid only if it satisfies the requirements of the limitation provision (section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) and of administrative law.   If the answer is no, then the director-general’s directive does not raise any constitutional question but must still comply with the requirements of administrative law. These two tests (constitutional law and administrative law) mostly overlap.  This is certainly true of an administrative provision which is not part of primary legislation.  The case before us is such a case. Both the constitutional analysis (under the limitation provision) and the administrative law test require that a norm which is not part of primary legislation but which violates the freedom of occupation be enacted by virtue of express authorization in primary legislation.  Indeed, this is the stipulation of the limitation provision itself (“by virtue of express authorization therein” in section 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation).  This is also dictated by general principles of administrative law (see HC 337/81, supra [7] at 358, holding that the freedom of occupation may be violated only if “the primary legislator clearly and expressly proclaims that he has authorized the administrative authority to enact regulations that establish prohibitions or restrictions on engaging in any particular profession” (Deputy President, Shamgar J)).

2.   Does the provision in the director general’s circular violate the freedom of expression of those engaged in the diagnosis of learning disabilities? The answer would seem to be no, for two reasons. First, freedom of occupation is not freedom of employment.  A diagnostician of learning disabilities is not entitled to ask the education system to employ diagnosticians of learning disabilities.  Conceivably, general principles of administrative law, such as the requirement of reasonableness, may compel the employment of diagnosticians of learning disabilities.  Even so, this kind of obligation to employ cannot be derived from the diagnostician’s right to freedom of occupation.  Freedom of occupation is the individual’s freedom to be engaged (or not be engaged) in an occupation which he regards as appropriate.  In essence it is a “defensive” right, a right against governmental infringement.   Freedom of occupation does not, as a rule, confer an “active” right which compels the government to act (for this distinction, see Barak, supra [18] at 597).  Nevertheless, that kind of “active” right may stem from other freedoms granted to the individual, for example, human dignity (“every person is entitled to protection of his life, body and dignity”, section 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). In fact, freedom of occupation is a Hofeldian freedom, which only materializes when violated and which then creates a “duty” (HC 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and the Minister of Religion [15] at 514; HC 1452/93 Igloo Contracting Company for Building Installation and Development v. Minister of Industry and Trade [16] at 614).   Even so, situations arise in which the freedom of occupation becomes the right to an occupation.  For example, this would be the case when the state is the sole venue for a particular occupation, and refusal by the state to employ would effectively mean barring the occupation itself.   Under those circumstances, when the state functions as a monopoly, the freedom of occupation should be translated into the right to occupation.  Further examination of this point is beyond the scope of the case before us, since it is not the state (Ministry of Education) which employs those engaged in the diagnosis of learning disabilities but rather the parents themselves. 

3.   Second, freedom of occupation is violated if conditions (subjective or objective) are established for entering an occupation, profession or craft; or if conditions are established which regulate the freedom to engage in the occupation, profession or occupation. Accordingly, a determination by the director-general that only an expert educational psychologist may diagnose learning disabilities would certainly violate the freedom of occupation of the diagnosticians of learning disabilities (who are not educational psychologists).  This is not the case before us. The director-general’s circular does not prescribe requirements for engaging in the diagnosis of learning disabilities.  Diagnosticians of learning disabilities are permitted to pursue their occupations even if they are not educational psychologists.  The Ministry of Education limited itself to saying that it would not recognize the results of their diagnoses. 

4.   But what is the rule where a governmental decision, as a practical matter, affects a person’s ability to engage in his occupation with respect to others?  As we noted, the extreme example of this is when the State enjoys monopoly status in the particular occupation.  But what if the State is not the employer, yet its decisions, as a matter of fact, affect the possibility of actualizing the freedom of occupation?  It seems to me that, in principle, the freedom of occupation can be violated not just directly (for example, prohibiting a person from working as a lawyer or doctor unless he or she meets certain conditions).  It can also be violated indirectly, where a governmental decision indirectly impairs the freedom of occupation in practice.  A person’s freedom of occupation is indirectly violated where a government’s decision affects the willingness of individuals to enter into a contractual engagement with a certain person.  A person’s freedom of occupation is violated where the government grants a subsidy to his competitor (see HC 1703/92 K.A.L. Consignment Airways v. Prime Minister [12]).  A decision that violates the freedom of competition violates the freedom of occupation (see HC 726/94 at 471).  Furthermore, in that case, the decision was not intended to infringe upon the freedom of occupation. Its aim was different (e.g., to restrict competition in a certain realm or grant subsidies to another realm).  Even so, the decision may have a consequence that violates the freedom of occupation.   Indeed, freedom of occupation is the freedom of an individual to express his or her personality and make his or her contribution to society by investing efforts in that occupation, work or vocation. This freedom is violated if arrangements (normative or physical) directly or indirectly prevent him or her from acting according to his or her desire and ability.

5.   The director-general’s circular does not directly restrict the freedom of occupation of the diagnosticians of learning disabilities.  Nevertheless, it does restrict their freedom of occupation in an indirect manner.  The restriction is expressed by the fact that they are, as a matter of fact, excluded from a significant portion of their occupation – contracting with parents to diagnose the learning disabilities of their children.  In a law-abiding state which honors human rights, a violation of that nature cannot be permitted by way of a director-general’s circular, absent a basis in primary legislation or by force of an express authorization therein.  As my colleague Justice Dorner showed, such authorization does not exist.   Accordingly, there is no choice but to rule that the directive of the director-general was illegal and thus invalid.   To be precise: had there been a legislative act which authorized violating the freedom of occupation, it would be necessary to examine whether the violation was for a proper purpose and whether it was justified.  We did not conduct these examinations because the director-general’s circular did not pass the test of acting by force of legislation or authorization therein.

For these reasons I concur with the opinion of my colleague, Justice Dorner.

Justice D. Beinisch

I concur with the judgment of my colleague, Justice Dorner, and with the President’s comments regarding the scope of the freedom of occupation.

I will only add that, in my view, it is doubtful that the director general’s circular absolutely excludes the petitioners from the occupation of diagnosis of learning disabilities.

I am prepared to assume that the diagnosticians of learning disabilities still enjoy significant occupational range of freedom, even in light of the director-general’s circular. This assumption, however, does not resolve the question of whether their freedom of occupation was illegally abridged. 

I accept the President’s observation that even an indirect violation of the freedom of occupation, expressed by the abridgment of their ability to actualize the freedom of occupation, is nonetheless invalid unless it is based in a statute or expressly authorized therein.

Even so, and without taking a stand regarding the nature and the scope of the protected right to freedom of occupation, it could be argued that not every administrative act which may affect a person’s occupation in fact violates the freedom of occupation in the constitutional sense.

Given the circumstances of the petition before us, I am convinced that the harm caused to the diagnosticians, albeit indirect, causes substantial damage to their ability to engage in their profession.  The damage is the restriction of the need for professional services in an area that was open to them prior to director-general’s decision.  As such, the restriction cannot remain intact absent express statutory authorization. 

In any event, I will add that even if the violation does not relate to exclusion from the profession as such or to the possibility of being employed in the profession, the circular should be invalidated for the additional reason which my colleague cites in her opinion.

An act by an administrative agency may affect the occupations of those who have attained professional standing.  If they had a substantial expectation that their standing would be maintained, based on a representation made by the administrative agency, any act by the administrative agency which affects such standing must take into account the reliance interest and legitimate expectations of those it harms.

Prior to the issuance of the circular, the diagnosticians worked in diagnosing learning disabilities for the purposes of recognition by the Ministry of Education.  No transitional provision was enacted regarding the continuation of their work. The absence of such provision is inconsistent with the standards of reasonability and fairness binding upon any administrative agency.

I therefore concur that the petition should be granted.

Decided in accordance with the judgment of Justice Dorner

September 2, 1999

Full opinion: 
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