Administrative Law

Does v. Ministry of Defense

Case/docket number: 
CrimFH 7048/97
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, April 12, 2000
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioners were citizens of Lebanon, who were brought to Israel between the years 1986-1987 by the security forces, and put on trial for their membership in hostile organizations and for their involvement in attacks against IDF and LDF.  The petitioners had been convicted and sentenced to various sentences of imprisonment, which they served.  Subsequently, the petitioners were held in administrative detention under section 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979.  This administrative detention was extended from time to time, for additional six month periods, in accordance with the same section.  The question before the court was whether a person can be held in administrative detention – when that person himself does not pose a danger to national security –for that person to serve as a “bargaining chip” in the negotiation to release prisoners or missing persons from among the Israeli security forces?

 

Held: As per the judgment of President Barak, whose view was shared by Vice-President Levin, and Justices Or, Mazza,  Zamir and Dorner, and against the opposing opinions of Justices M. Cheshin, Y. Kedmi, and J. Türkel, the Court held that according to the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 there is no authority to detain a person from whom no danger is posed to national security, and therefore it concluded that the respondent does not have the authority to detain the petitioners by authority of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979. Therefore, the court ordered the release of the prisoners. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
dissent
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

CrimFH 7048/97

                                                                    

John Does

v.

Ministry of Defence

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeal

[April 12th, 2000]

Before President A. Barak, Vice-President S. Levin, Justices T. Or, E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, Y. Kedmi, I. Zamir, D. Dorner, J. Türkel

 

A  further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court (President A. Barak, Justices Y. Kedmi and D. Dorner) in ADA 10/94, November 13, 1997.

 

Facts: The petitioners were citizens of Lebanon, who were brought to Israel between the years 1986-1987 by the security forces, and put on trial for their membership in hostile organizations and for their involvement in attacks against IDF and LDF.  The petitioners had been convicted and sentenced to various sentences of imprisonment, which they served.  Subsequently, the petitioners were held in administrative detention under section 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979.  This administrative detention was extended from time to time, for additional six month periods, in accordance with the same section.  The question before the court was whether a person can be held in administrative detention – when that person himself does not pose a danger to national security –for that person to serve as a “bargaining chip” in the negotiation to release prisoners or missing persons from among the Israeli security forces?

 

Held: As per the judgment of President Barak, whose view was shared by Vice-President Levin, and Justices Or, Mazza,  Zamir and Dorner, and against the opposing opinions of Justices M. Cheshin, Y. Kedmi, and J. Türkel, the Court held that according to the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 there is no authority to detain a person from whom no danger is posed to national security, and therefore it concluded that the respondent does not have the authority to detain the petitioners by authority of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979. Therefore, the court ordered the release of the prisoners.

 

Basic law cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ss. 2, 4, 8, 10.

 

Legislation cited:

Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979, ss. 1, 2, 2(A), 2(B), 4, 5.

Penal Law-5737-1977, s. 43U.

 

Regulations cited:

Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, r. 119.

 

International treaties and conventions:

Fourth Geneva Convention (Relative to the Protection of Civilians during Times

of War) 1949, articles 34, 147

Third Geneva Convention article 118.

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

ADA 10/94 [1] John Does v. State of Israel IsrSC 53(1)97.
HCJ 4400/98 Ismail Braham v. Legal-Expert-Judge Colonel Moshe Shefi (not yet reported).
ADA 2/86 John Doe v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 41(2) 508.
HCJ 869/92 Zwilli v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the 13th Knesset IsrSC 46(2) 692.
HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Ministry, Ministry of Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749 at 763.
CA 105/92 Re’em Mehandesim Kablanim Ltd v. the City of Nazareth Elite, IsrSC 47 (5) 189.
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior (1969) IsrSC 23(2) 477.
CA 165/82 Kibbutz Hazor v. Rehovot IsrSC 39(2) 70.
ADA 2/82 Lerner v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 42(3) 529, at 532
EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of Knesset Elections Committee (1965), IsrSC 19(3) 365 at p. 390). 
MApp 15/86 State of Israel v. Avi Tzur IsrSC 40(1) 706 at 713.
CrimMApp 335/89 State of Israel v. Lavan IsrSC 43(2) 410.
HCJ 2320/98 Elmamala v. IDF Commander IsrSC 52(3) 346.
ADA 7/94 Ben Yosef v. State of Israel (not reported). 
ADA 2/96 State of Israel v. Freedman (not reported).
EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83.
HCJ 2006/97 Mison Mahmet Avu Fara Ganimat v. Central Command General Uzi Dayan IsrSC 51(2) 651.
ADA 4/94 Ben Horin v. State of Israel IsrSC 58(5) 329 at 333-335). 
CrimA 6182/98 Sheinbein v. Attorney General (not yet reported). 
HCJ 279/51 Amsterdam v. Minister of the Treasury IsrSC 6 945 at 966.
CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General IsrSC 17 2033, at 2041.
CA 522/70 Alkotov v. Shahin IsrSC 25 (2) 77.
HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority IsrSC 50(2) 793.
CA 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon, IsrSC 39(1)113.
CA 376/46 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, IsrSC 2 235.
HCJ 5100/94 The Public Committee against Torture v. Government of Israel (not yet reported).
HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 52(5) 481.
ADA 1/91 Plonim v. Minister of Defence (unreported).
ADA 1/94 Plonim v. Minister of Defence (unreported).
ADA 1/93 Plonim v. Minister of Defence (unreported).
CrimA 6696/96 Kahane Binyamin v. State of Israel (not yet reported).
CFH 2401/95 Ruth Nahmani v. Daniel Nahmani IsrSC 50(4) 661.
HCJ 606/78 Eyov and others v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 33(2) 113. 
CrimA 437/74 Kwan v. State of Israel IsrSC 29(1) 589.
HCJ 320/80 Kawasame v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 35(3) 113.

 

Israeli books cited:

A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2 (1994).
S.Z. Feller Foundations in Criminal Law, Vol. A, 1984.
A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 1, Rules of General Interpretation (1994).
I. Englard, Introduction to Jurisprudence (1991).
A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3, Constitutional Construction (1984).

 

Israeli articles cited:

L. Klinghofer ‘Preventive Detention for Security Reasons’ Mishpatim 11 (1981).
Y. Sussman, ‘Some of the Rationales of Construction’ the Jubilee Book for Pinhas Rosen, 147 (1962).
S. Shetreet ‘A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An Assessment of the Israeli Law’ 14 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1984) 182.
I. Zamir ‘The Rule of Law and the Control of Terrorism’ 8 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law (1988) 81.
M. Gur Aryeh, ‘Proposed Penal Law (Introductory Part and General Part) 5752-1992’, Mishpatim 24 (1994-2995) 9.

 

Foreign books cited:

G. Robertson Freedom, the Individual and the Law (London, 6th ed., 1989).

[47]A.F. Bayefsky International Human Rights Law (Toronto and Vancouver, 1992).

 

Foreign articles cited:

[48]M.P. O’Boyle “Emergency Situations and the Protection of Human Rights; A Model Derogation Provision for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights” 28 Northern Ireland L.Q. (1977) 160.

O. Ben-Naftali, S. Gleichgevitch “Missing in Legal Action: Lebanese Hostages in Israel” 41 Harv. Int’l. L. J. (2000) 185.

[50]Y. Dinstein “The Application of Customary International Law Concerning Armed Conflicts in the National Legal Order – Introductory Reports” National Implementation of Humanitarian Law – Proceedings  of an International Colloquium held at Bad Homburg, June 17-19, 1988 (Dordrecht, M. Bothe and otherseds., 1990) 29.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

Ecclesiastes 1, 6.
Yoma 21 p. A.

 

Other:

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979.

 

For the petitioner—Tzvi Risch.

For the respondents —Shai Nitzan.

 

JUDGMENT

 

President A. Barak

May a person be held in administrative detention – when that person himself does not pose a danger to national security – when the purpose of the detention is for that person to serve as a “bargaining chip” in the negotiation to release prisoners or missing persons from among the security forces? – This is the question before us in this further hearing.

The Facts

1.  The petitioners are citizens of Lebanon.  They were brought to Israel between the years 1986-1987 by the security forces.  They were put on trial for their membership in hostile organizations and for their involvement in attacks against IDF and LDF forces.  They were convicted and sentenced to various sentences of imprisonment.  All the petitioners completed their prison terms.  Despite this, they were not released from prison.  At first they were held in detention by authority of the deportation orders that were issued against them.  Later – beginning May 16, 1991 – as to petitioners 8-10, and beginning September 1, 1992 as to petitioners 1-7 – they were held in administrative detention by authority of the orders of the Minister of Defence that were issued in accordance with section 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter: “the Detentions Law”).   This administrative detention was extended from time to time, in accordance with the same section, by an additional six months.  On August 22, 1994 an additional extension was requested.  The extension was authorized by the Vice-President of the District Court in Tel-Aviv Jaffa.  An appeal was filed on this decision to this court (ADA 10/94 [1]).  The judgment in the appeal serves as the subject of this further hearing.  It is to be noted that in the interim the Minister of Defence decided to release two of the petitioners (petitioners 1 and 8).

2.  There is no debate among the parties that the petitioners themselves do not pose a threat to national security.  They served their sentence and under normal circumstances they would be deported from Israel.  There is also no debate that the reason for the detention of the petitioners is the hastening of the release of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces, and in particular the release of the navigator Ron Arad, who has been missing since his airplane was downed (on October 16, 1986) in the skies of Lebanon.  Indeed, the petitioners are held in administrative detention as “bargaining chips” in a difficult negotiation that Israel is undertaking for the release of Ron Arad and other prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces.  The debate between the parties – which is at the center of the judgment the subject of this further hearing was twofold: first, is the Minister of Defence authorized to issue an administrative detention order when the only reason for issuing it is the release of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces, without there being a specific risk from the detainees themselves?  Second, was the discretion of the Minister of Defence properly exercised?

3.  In the Supreme Court, the views were split.  The majority justices (President Barak and Justice Kedmi) answered both questions in the affirmative.  It was determined that return of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces, is, on its own, a purpose and interest that is included within the framework of national security, and the authority of the Minister of Defence also encompasses the case in which there is no danger to national security from the detainees themselves, and the whole purpose of their detention is to hold them as “bargaining chips”.  So too it was determined that under the circumstances, exercising the discretion of the Minister of Defence was lawful.  The majority justices were convinced that there exists a concern, at the level of near certainty that the release of the petitioners will bring about a real harm to national security and that the continued detention of the petitioners was essential for continuation of the negotiation for the release of the prisoners and missing persons.  It is to be noted that under the circumstances there is no alternative to detention that can be utilized; whose infringement on the basic rights of the petitioners would be less.

4.  The minority opinion (Justice Dorner) determined that the Minister of Defence does not have the authority to order the detention of a person who does not pose a danger to national security.  The purpose of the detention is the prevention of danger to national security or public safety from the detainee himself, as long as this goal cannot be achieved by a criminal proceeding.  Justice Dorner also determined that as for exercising the discretion of the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Defence was not able to show that there exists a near certainty, and not even a reasonable possibility, that the release of the petitioners would undermine the possibility of releasing prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces.

5.  The petitioners applied for a further hearing to be held in the judgment of the Supreme Court.  Vice-President S. Levin granted the application (on January 25, 1998), and determined:

“It has been decided to hold a further hearing on the question of the validity of an administrative detention by authority of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979, where this detention takes place for the reason that it may advance the release of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces.”

The further hearing took place in the form of written summations and oral arguments.  The respondent directed our attention to the fact that a number of the petitioners in the further hearing were not parties to ADA 10/94[1].  The application of the counsel for the petitioners to join them to the further hearing proceedings was denied (on August 11, 1998) by me.  So too the panel decided (on January 1, 1999), with the consent of the parties, to consider the two appeals that were filed in the Supreme Court (ADA 5700/98 and ADA 5702/98) – which deal with Lebanese detainees who are not among the petitioners – separately.

6.  The opening of the arguments before us concentrated – as said in the decision of my colleague, Vice-President, Justice S. Levin – with the question of the authority of the Minister of Defence.  During the course of the arguments we decided (on February 1, 1999) to examine “in the special circumstances of the case, and with the consent of the parties” ex parte the confidential information in the hands of the respondent, and this “without taking a stand at this stage as to the relevance of the material to determination of the petition.”   We heard, behind closed doors, the head of the research unit in the intelligence section in the army general command (on May 26, 1999).  Pursuant to this we received a supplementary notice (on August 26, 1999) and an application on behalf of the State Attorney General.  This is the language of the supplementary notice:

“(1) The various aspects that arose in the course of the hearings in this hon. court were brought to the attention of the entities at the head of the IDF and the political ranks, and at their head the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence.

(2)In a hearing that was held on this matter in the office of the Minister of Defence, attended by the Attorney General, senior officials from the State Attorney’s Office who are dealing with this case, and the entities from the Ministry of Defence dealing with this, headed by the Chief of Staff, the various issues that arise in this case were discussed, including the moral and security issues it entailed.

(3)  At the conclusion of the discussion after the majority of those present made their opinion heard, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence decided as follows:

A.  In all that relates to issues which deal with the matter of prisoners and missing persons, including Ron Arad, the following primary considerations exist:

1)  An effort to clarify what has come of their fate in order to be able to bring them back to Israel.

 2)  The State of Israel is obligated to make every effort in this area, since the State is the one that sent them to battle.

B.  The State of Israel is before negotiations that have been bounded to a defined time frame of 15 months, in which it will be clarified whether there is a possibility of reaching a political solution in the area in which we live. The issue of the prisoners and the missing persons is an inseparable part of this negotiation and only now is the framework for negotiation in the hands of each party, being held up to the ultimate test.

C.  Return of the prisoners now, before the beginning of the negotiation, will leave the State of Israel without a means of bargaining in this issue in the framework of negotiation.

D.  During the course of the negotiation and along with its advancement we can assess the chances of reaching a solution in the time allotted for this, and so too, it will be assessed whether it is possible to release some of the detainees in this timeframe.

In any event at the conclusion of the 15 months that were allotted or a shorter time frame, in the course of which the negotiation will be concluded and if it turns out, we hope not, that these detainees do not fill any role in the release of the prisoners or missing persons, it would be proper, in the view of the Minister of Defence as well, to reconsider the approach as it was formulated in the Defence Authority, in the spirit of the comments of the court.

E.  The Minister of Defence is of the view therefore that the continued detention of the petitioners during said time period is vital to the continuation of the negotiation and the advancement of the release of prisoners and missing persons.

(4)  In conclusion, the Attorney General wishes to add:

A.  With all due respect it appears that the conclusion of the President in ADA 10/94 [1] that ‘it is possible in principle and in exceptional circumstances to detain a person for acts and danger which are rooted in another’ indeed emphasizes the exceptional nature of the circumstances, meaning the enormous effort to free the prisoners and missing persons.

This exceptional nature must by nature be examined thoroughly and at all times, as one who is detained in administrative detention in these circumstances is an exception even to the administrative detention which itself is an exception in the realm of human dignity and basic rights.

B.  Therefore, the proportionality of the act must be examined at all times and the date that the judgment was handed down, November 13, 1997, is not like the date after almost two years have passed (and over a year after the filing of the appeal by the State on the decision of Justice Ilan) in which no progress has been made in the matter of the release of the prisoners and missing persons.

Under these circumstances it is the opinion of the attorney general that the scales tip slightly in favor of gradual release of the prisoners in a manner that will signal consideration, such as beginning with the mentally ill, or the younger ones, or those who have not started a family, as part of a legal-humane-moral approach.

The attorney general is aware that for now the opinion of the holder of authority, the Minister of Defence is different; but it is possible that starting the release will also have a positive impact on the negotiation, thereby enabling integration of the two approaches.

(5)  In addition to what has been said above we wish to update:

A.  The Arad family has met recently with the Attorney General.  At the meeting the State Prosecutor, the Head Military Prosecutor and additional entities from the IDF and the Justice Ministry were present.

In the meeting it was clarified that the Arad family asks in every way possible to be heard before this hon. court.

(6)  In light of the sensitivity of the topic and its history and its human and public interest, the Attorney General is of the view that this is appropriate and that it is proper to hear the family’s viewpoint.

This hon. court is therefore requested to decide on the matter of the petition of the Arad family.

(7) In light of all that was said above, we request that in accordance with the decision of the Court in the matters mentioned above, an additional date be set for a hearing, in which the Arad family will have the opportunity to be heard before this hon. court, and to the extent necessary an authorized entity from the military-security ranks, will appear and clarify before the court additional clarifications in all that relates to the matters raised above.”

Counsel for the petitioners responded to the supplementary notice (on September 9, 1999).  He expressed his objection to delaying determination of the appeal for an additional fifteen months.  In his opinion, foreign considerations are at the root of the application. Counsel for the petitioners also objected to the application to hear the Arad family.  Despite this we decided (on November 8, 1999) to hear (in writing) the Arad family.  In its letter the Arad family notes that Ron Arad was taken prisoner approximately 13 years ago.  His daughter, who was a year and three months when he was taken prisoner, is fourteen today.  Ron Arad fell in the hands of individuals lacking any moral or other restraint.  He was “sold” from place to place. His captors dragged him from place to place, held him in conditions, which are not even conditions, and refused to let the Red Cross visit him.  His captors treated him according to the “the laws of the jungle”.  It is not appropriate that the State of Israel deny itself any means when trying to bring him back.  The Lebanese detainees willingly took part in the battle against Israel.  Just as Ron Arad was aware of the dangers entailed in flying in the skies of an enemy country, so too were the Lebanese detainees aware of the dangers entailed in their activity against Israel, including their involvement in the imprisonment of Ron Arad.  In this sense the war in Lebanon is not over and as long as Ron Arad has not been brought back to Israel it is not appropriate to return the detainees to Lebanon.  According to the assessment of security entities it is possible that Ron Arad is still alive.  This working premise is not to be dismissed or ignored.  Release of the Lebanese detainees will send a message to Israeli society and persons in the security forces that the court will tie the hands of the State of Israel when it comes to take steps to protect their liberty, life, and security.

7.  Consequently, three applications have been brought before us: an application by the Arad family (that was included in the position paper submitted on their behalf, in accordance with our decision of November 8, 1999) to bring their words before us orally; the application of the petitioners to bring their words before us in the framework of a letter (as to this both an application by their counsel and the letter written by the petitioners were submitted); and the application of the State Attorney General to set another date for consideration of the petition.  After considering these applications we decided (on December 12, 1999) to make do with the written position paper submitted by the Arad family.   We also decided to accept the letter of the petitioners themselves.  In this letter the petitioners note that the human rights of the detainees were denied – in contradiction of international treaties and basic tenets.  They have been in Israeli prison for 13 or 14 years.  Some of them that were put on trial served their sentence some time ago.  Most were under the age of 20 when they were detained.  The goal of detaining them is not clear: at times it is claimed, that it is intended to advance the return of those missing in action from the Sultan Ya’akub battle, and at times it has been tied to the subject of Ron Arad and at times it appears that they are held as a general bargaining chip for the negotiations with Syria and Lebanon.  They have no connection to the Sultan Ya’akub battle as most of them were still children in 1982.  Some of them have been in Israeli imprisonment since before Ron Arad was captured.  The time that passed in prison proves that there is no use in keeping them in prison, as the matter of Ron Arad has not advanced at all.  The detainees are simple people, lacking any status or influence in Lebanon.  They have no information about Ron Arad or connection to his being held in prison.  The Hezbollah organization has repeatedly declared that it has no information or connection to Ron Arad, and the Israeli working premise is that Ron Arad is not in Lebanon at all.  The head of Internal Security Service himself declares (based on newspaper reports) that there is no point in the continued detention of the detainees.

8.  As we have seen, counsel for the respondent requested that we set another date for the hearing.  We requested to hear (within seven days) the position of the counsel for the petitioners.  In his response (of December 27, 1999) counsel for the petitioners objected to the setting of another date for the hearing.  Despite this, we decided to hold a hearing (on July 1, 2000).  In this hearing we heard the arguments of the counsel for the parties.  We also received information (behind closed doors) as to the efforts being made lately to obtain details as to the fate of Ron Arad.  Now the time has come hand down our judgment.

The Petitioners’ Arguments

9.  According to the petitioner’s claim, the Detentions Law is not to be interpreted as including authority for the administrative detention of a person solely as a “bargaining chip”.  According to their claim, the basic principles of the liberty of the individual and their dignity, as they have been expressed in the framework of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, unravels the basis for the detention of the petitioners in administrative detention.  Detaining them as such stands not only in contrast to the purpose of the law and the intention of the legislator, but also in contradiction of international law.  Returning prisoners and missing persons is in fact an important interest, but it is not part of “national security” in its meaning in the Detentions Law.  According to the petitioners, the Detentions Law surrounds and relates only to a situation in which a personal risk is posed by the detainee.  The administrative detention is an individual act based on a person’s personal responsibility for his actions.  Alternatively, the petitioners argued that there is no factual and evidentiary basis for holding them in administrative detention, and that there exist less damaging alternatives for achieving the goal for which they are detained.  For these reasons, the petitioners are of the view, that the opinion of Justice Dorner in ADA 10/94 [1] is to be adopted, and it is to be determined that the Minister of Defence deviated from his authority when he ordered their detention in administrative detention.

The Respondent’s Arguments

10.  According to the respondent’s claims, the Minister of Defence is indeed authorized to detain a person in administrative detention even where the reason for his detention is just to serve as a “bargaining chip”.  Protecting the safety of IDF soldiers and their return from imprisonment is included within the term “national security” in the Detentions Law, meaning, in the language of the law.  The purpose of the law also includes the authority for administrative detention in the circumstances of the case before us.  The law is intended to address serious dangers and unexpected events, in order to protect national security.  Such is the situation before us.  For this reason the law was not worded narrowly but broadly, in order to address those extreme and exceptional situations in which a person’s detention is necessary in order to protect national security and public order.  According to the respondent’s approach, the legislator’s (subjective) intent does not include a clear indication that the authority in the law does not include administrative detention as a “bargaining chip”.  So too, it is argued, the principle of personal responsibility is an important principle, however, the very authority in the law is an exception to this principle and from here stems the authority to deviate from it.  According to the respondent’s claim, examining the case before us in the perspective of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, also supports the position of the majority in ADA 10/94 [1].  This is so, as the administrative detention under the circumstances is “for an appropriate purpose and to a degree that does not surpass that which is necessary.”  Therefore, the basic law does not change the construction of the Detentions Law in the context before us, and does not justify deviation from previous judgments of this court, which recognized the authority of the Minister of Defence to detain a person, just as a “bargaining chip”.  As to international law, the respondent claims that there is not a customary law prohibition on the taking of “hostages” and the prohibition in conventional law in this matter, does not apply in this case.  Whether for its non-application to the petitioners – who are “terrorists” according to its claim; whether due to the lack of applicability of conventional law to the State of Israel or whether due to the existence of a contradictory statutory provision in the domestic law, such as the Detentions Law.  For these reasons, the respondent argued, the judgment in ADA 10/94 [1] is to be left as is, and the application in the further hearing is to be dismissed

The Normative Framework

11.  The detention of the petitioners in administrative detention is done by authority of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979.  This law applies only when there is a valid declaration of a state of emergency (section 1 of the law).  The detention authority is granted to the Minister of Defence (section 2 of the law).  An important and necessary element for granting validity to a person’s administrative detention is the judicial review (section 4 of the law).  A person against whom an administrative detention order has been issued must be brought before the President of the District Court within 48 hours.  The court is obligated to review the considerations of the Minister of Defence and will at times re-examine the evidentiary foundation on the basis of which the administrative detention order was issued (see HCJ 4400/98 Ismail Braham v. Jurist-Judge Colonel Moshe Shefi [2]; ADA 2/86 John Doe v. Minister of Defence [3]; L. Klinghofer ‘Preventive Detention for Security Reasons’ [41] 286).  Even if the order is authorized, there is a duty to bring the matter and the validity of the detention order for re-examination before the court, at least once every three months (section 5 of the law).  The further hearing before us revolves around the scope of the authority of the Minister of Defence to detain a person under administrative detention, meaning, it revolves around the interpretation of section 2 of the Detentions Law, of which this is the language:

“2 (a) Where the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to assume that reasons of national security or public safety necessitate that a certain person be held in detention, he may, with an order bearing his signature, order the detention of a person for a period that will be noted in the order and which shall not exceed six months.

(b) Where the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to assume, on the eve of the expiration of an order based on subsection (a) (hereinafter – the original detention order), that reasons of national security or public safety continue to necessitate holding the detainee in detention, he may, with an order bearing his signature, order, from time to time, the extension of the validity of the original detention order for a period which shall not exceed six months, and the law as to the extension order is as the law of the original detention order in all aspects.”

In the judgment the subject of this further hearing this provision was reviewed in both the realm of authority and the realm of discretion.  Logically, the question of authority is to be considered first.

12.  The authority of the Minister of Defence to order administrative detention is conditioned on the fact that the Minister has reasonable grounds to assume that reasons of national security or public safety necessitate that a certain person be held in detention (section 2(a) of the Detentions Law).  I am now of the view – as I was in the judgment the subject of this further hearing – that in the textual realm, the statement “national security” is sufficiently broad to also encompass within it situations in which the danger to national security does not stem from the detainee himself but from the actions of others, which may be impacted by the detention of that person.  There is nothing in the statement “national security” in and of itself that can point in the textual realm to the detainee himself posing a danger to national security.  But as is known, the textual realm is not the only realm to be taken into consideration.  The interpreter is none other than a linguist.  As interpreters, we need to give the statement in the law the same meaning – among the totality of textual meanings (over which the judge is in charge as linguist/philologist) – which realizes the purpose of the law.  What is the purpose of the Detentions Law?

13.  As is known, the purpose of the law is a normative concept.  It includes its subjective purpose and its objective purpose.  (See HCJ 869/92 Zwilli v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the 13th Knesset [4] at p. 706).  We will open with the subjective purposes.  These are the purposes which were examined by the legislators, and in fact, left by it at the foundation of the law.  That is the “legislator’s intent”.  We can learn about these purposes from the language of the statute and the legislative history.  This examination in the case before us does not reveal a clear-cut picture.  It is true, one can find expressions in the Knesset which relate to the danger posed by the detainee himself to national security (see, for example, the words of the Minister of Justice brought by my colleague, Justice Dorner, in paragraph 2 of her opinion which is the subject of this further hearing).  Certainly that would be the natural and simple case.  But, no basis is to be found in the Knesset minutes for the approach that the Knesset sought, in fact (as a historical fact), to limit the application of the law only to the detention of people who themselves posed a threat to national security.  It appears that the problem before us – applying the law to one from whom no danger is posed – did not come up for discussion, and was not, in fact, examined, by those dealing with the tasks of legislation.  There is therefore no escape but to turn to the objective purpose at the foundation of the Detentions Law.

14.  The objective purpose of the law (in Sussman’s words “the legislative objective” ‘Some of the Rationales of Construction’ the Jubilee Book for Pinhas Rosen, 147 (1962) [42] at 160.) is the purpose that the statute was intended to fulfill in our society.  It is derived from the type of law and its character.  It is meant to realize the foundational values of the system.  It expresses the values of the State of Israel as  Jewish and democratic state (see HCJ 869/92 [4] supra; HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Ministry, Ministry of Interior [5] at 763; CA 105/92 Re’em Mehandesim Kablanim Ltd v. the City of Nazareth Elite [6] at 198),  Indeed the law is a “creature living within its environment” (Justice Sussman in HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior (1969) [7] at 513).  This environment includes the proximate legislative context; this environment also sprawls out onto “broader circles of accepted principles, foundational goals and basic criteria” (CA 165/82 Kibbutz Hazor v. Rehovot [8] at 74).

15.  What is the objective purpose of the Detentions Law as far as it relates to the problem before us?  The answer is that this purpose is twofold: On the one hand, safeguarding national security; on the other hand, safeguarding the dignity and liberty of every person.  These purposes are apparent from different circles which surround the law.  The closer circle, which focuses on the statute itself and its types of arrangements, contains within it an integrated purpose that deals with protection of national security while taking care with human liberty and dignity.  For this reason the law limited (in section 1) the administrative detention authority for a period in which the State is in a state of emergency, and for the same reasoning a process of periodic judicial review was established (in section 4) over exercise of authority.  A similar amalgamation also arises from the more distant circle, which gives expression to the foundational values of the system.  These values also include the Jewish and democratic values of the State of Israel as a liberty and dignity seeking state alongside the social interest in safeguarding national security.  We will briefly discuss each of these (objective) purposes and the balance between them.

16.  Safeguarding national security is the societal interest that each state wishes to realize.  In this framework, democratic freedom seeking states recognize the “institution” of administrative detention (see O’Boyle, ‘Emergency Situation and the Protection of Human Rights: A Model Derogations Provisions for Northern Ireland Bill of Rights’ [48] at 160; Shetreet, ‘A Contemporary Model of Emergency (Detention) Law: An Assessment of the Israeli Law’[43] at 203).  The need for this means stems, inter alia, from the difficulty in finding a response within criminal law to certain threats to national security (see ADA 2/82 Lerner v. Minister of Defence [9] at 532).  Indeed we are a “defensive democracy” (see EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of Knesset Elections Committee [10] at p. 390).  The daily struggle against terrorism requires more often than once the use of unconventional means (see Zamir, ‘The Rule of Law and the Control of Terrorism’[44]).  One of those means is administrative detention.

17.  Safeguarding the liberty and dignity of every person and protecting this liberty and dignity are basic constitutional rights in Israel (see section 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty).  The liberty and the dignity are at the base of our social order.  They are the foundation for all the other basic rights (see MApp 15/86 State of Israel v. Avi Tzur [11] at 713; CrimMApp 335/89 State of Israel v. Lavan [12] at  419-420).  Therefore, the protection and safeguard of the liberty and dignity of the individual is a basic value which stretched out over all statutes (see HCJ 2320/98 Elmamala v. IDF Commander [13]).  Such safeguarding and protection of liberty and dignity are also stretched out over the liberty and dignity of one who the state seeks to detain in an administrative detention.

18.  There is a sharp clash between the two (objective) purposes which are at the foundation of the Detentions Law – national security and individual liberty and dignity.  Detention – every detention – harms liberty.  The liberty ends where the detention begins (see R. Robertson, Freedom, the Individual and the Law 26 (1989)).  The harm of administrative detention to the liberty of the individual and their dignity is particularly harsh.  The individual is detained without a trial, by authority of the order issued by the executive branch (Minister of Defence).  The detention may go on – as the case before us shows – for a long period that is not limited in advance.  Not once, the detainee does not know – for reasons of national security – what the factual basis is for the decision as to his detention.  His ability to defend himself against the administrative detention is limited (see ADA 7/94 Ben Yosef v. State of Israel [14]; ADA 2/96 State of Israel v. Freedman [15]).  With that, there is no escape – in a freedom and security seeking democratic society – from the balancing of liberty and dignity and security.  Human rights must not be turned into an axe for denying public and national security.  A balance is required – a delicate and difficult balance – between the liberty and the dignity of the individual and national security and public safety (see EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [16]).

19.  This balancing presumes – and in the petition before us the matter has not come up at all – that it is possible to enable – in a democratic freedom and security seeking state -- the administrative detention of a person from whom a danger to national security is posed, but this possibility is not to be extended to the detention of a person from whom no danger is posed to national security and who merely constitutes a “bargaining chip”.  The reasoning for this position is twofold: first, the damage of administrative detention to the liberty and dignity of a person who poses a threat to national security is severe.  The damage is severe as it harms the liberty of a person – liberty which is protected in Israel at a constitutional-supra-statutory level – without a trial and without a judgment (see HCJ 2320/98 El-Amla v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria Region [13].  However, it is tolerated.  It is a matter of the lesser of two evils.  On the other hand, the damage to liberty and dignity, in the administrative detention of a person who himself does not pose a threat to national security, is extremely severe, to the point where the interpreter is not entitled to presume that the statute intended to achieve such severe harm.  I discussed the severe harm of such administrative detention in the judgment the subject of this petition when noting:

“Administrative detention harms the liberty of the individual.  When the detention is done under circumstances in which the detainee is a ‘bargaining chip’, there is in this a severe harm to human dignity, as the detainee is perceived as a means to achieving a goal and not as a goal in and of itself.  Under such circumstances the detention harms the autonomy of will, and a person as a master of his actions and responsible for the consequences of his actions.  The detention of the appellants is none other than a situation where the key to the imprisonment of persons is found in the hands of others and not in their own hands.  This is a difficult situation” (para. 12 of my judgment).

Indeed, the transition from the administrative detention of a person from whom a danger is posed to national security to the administrative detention of a person from whom no danger is posed to national security is not a “quantitative” transition but a “qualitative” transition.  The state detains, via the executive branch, a person who committed no crime, and from whom no danger is posed, and whose entire “wrongdoing” is in being a “bargaining chip”.  The harm to liberty and dignity is so substantive and deep, that it is not to be tolerated in a liberty and dignity seeking state, even if the rationales of national security lead to undertaking such a step.  My colleague, Justice Cheshin, has already discussed that as to regulation 19, of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 the basic concept is that “every person bears the weight of his own offense and each person shall only be put to death for his own crime . . .   there is no punishment without warning and no one but the offender is reprimanded” (HCJ 2006/97 Ganimat v.  Central Command General Uzi Dayan [17] at 654).  A similar approach is to be taken as to administrative detention.  Each person will be detained based on their wrongdoing and each will be held in administrative detention based on their offense.  One is not to detain in administrative detention any other than one that himself poses a risk, with his own actions, to national security.  This was the situation prior to the legislation of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.  This is certainly the case after this basic law was passed, and raised human dignity and liberty to a constitutional-supra-statutory level.  It is true, the Detentions Law is not being subjected to constitutional examination relative to the basic law (due to the preservation of laws provision: section 10 of the Basic Law), but the provisions of the Detentions Law must be interpreted against the background of the Basic Law (see ADA 4/94 Ben Horin v. State of Israel [18] at 333-335).  This interpretation leads to the conclusion that it is not to be determined that the (objective) purpose of the Detentions Law is to enable administrative detention of a person who himself does not pose a risk.  Indeed, the harm to basic human rights from administrative detention in which a detainee – who himself poses no risk – serves as a bargaining chip is so severe, that only a provision in the Detentions Law which would explicitly establish the statute’s applicability to one from whom no danger is posed to national security – a provision whose constitutionality would need to be examined of course against the criteria of the Basic Law – could lead the interpreter to the conclusion that the law was intended to enable administrative detention of this type.  Indeed, in a comparative perspective, it appears that there is no state in the Western world, which makes use of administrative detention of one who does not himself pose a risk to national security.

20.  Second, holding people as “hostages” – and this term also includes holding people as “bargaining chips” – is prohibited by international law (see article 1 of the International Treaty against the Taking of Hostages (1979); article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949).  Indeed, I am willing to presume – without ruling on the matter – that there is no such prohibition in customary international law.  I am also willing to presume – without ruling on the matter – that the conventional prohibition on taking hostages does not bind the State of Israel in the domestic law of the State absent its application in state law.  One way or the other, it is presumed that the purpose of the law is, inter alia, to fulfill the provisions of international law and not to contradict it (see CrimA 6182/98 Sheinbein v. Attorney General [19]).  There is a “presumption of accord” between public international law and local law (see HCJ 279/51 Amsterdam v. Minister of the Treasury [20] at 966; CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General [21] at 2041; CA 522/70 Alkotov v. Shahin [22] as well as A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2 (1994) [36] at 576).  Application of this presumption under the circumstances in this case strengthens the trend which arises from turning to the objective purpose of the law.

21.  We have reached the end of our road: “the legislator’s intent” (the subjective purpose) does not take a stand on the question that is bothering us.  Not so the “statutory purpose” (objective purpose).  This leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the law is to apply to situations in which the administrative detention is required due to danger posed by the detainee himself.  In this situation, in which we must search for the overall purpose of the Detentions Law on the basis of both purposes – while giving preference to the subjective purpose if it clashes frontally with the objective purpose – we must reach the conclusion, that the purpose of the Detentions Law was to apply to the detention of a person from whom himself a danger is posed to security, and not beyond this.  This purpose establishes the (legal) meaning that will be given to the Detentions Law.  This (legal) meaning does not extend over the entire (textual) meaning of the statute (see HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [22] at p. 811).  A person from whom himself no danger is posed and who is only a “bargaining chip” is not to be detained.  Having reached this conclusion, I would like to make three comments.

22.  First this conclusion contradicts the conclusion I reached in the judgment the subject of this petition.  Meaning – I changed my mind.  Indeed, since the handing down of the judgment -- and against the background of the further hearing itself – I have not stopped questioning myself as to whether my approach was properly based in the law.  I am not of those who hold that the finality of a decision attests to its correctness.  Any one of us may err.  Our professional integrity requires that we admit our errors if we are convinced that we in fact erred.  (See CA 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon [24] at 136).  “True and stable – True is preferable” (President Smoira in CA 376/46 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum [25] at 253).  These words were said as to the power of the Supreme Court to deviate from its precedents.  This question does not arise before us as we find ourselves in the process of the further hearing which establishes a formal framework for revocation of a decision that was decided and is not in accordance with the law.  However, these words are relevant to each and every judge, who struggles with himself and examines his decisions.  In our difficult moments when we question ourselves the North Star which should guide us is the uncovering of the truth which leads to the realization of justice in the framework of the law.  We must not entrench ourselves in our previous views.  We must be prepared to admit our error.  Self-reflection in the case before us is not easy.  Balancing is not a mechanical act.  I understand the hearts of my colleagues who continue to hold that the Detentions Law also applies to a detainee who serves as a “bargaining chip” without any danger being posed by him to national security.  This time I shall not be able to share their view.

23.  Second, I am aware that this decision does not make it easier for the State in its struggles against those that rise up against it.  Detaining a detainee – from whom himself no danger is posed to national security – in administrative detention as a “bargaining chip” may on occasion be an efficient means of advancing the State’s security.  But not every efficient means is lawful.  I can only repeat what I have said in another context:

“We are aware of the fact that this judgment of ours does not make coping with this reality easier.  That is the fate of democracy that not all means are legitimate in its eyes and not all methods which its enemies undertake are open before it.  More than once democracy fights with one hand tied behind its back.  Despite this, democracy has the upper hand, as protection of the rule of law and recognition of individual liberties, constitute an important component in its conception of security.  At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its power and enable it to overcome its difficulties.” (HCJ 5100/94 the Public Committee against Torture v. Government of Israel [26]).

These words are relevant to our matter as well.

24.  Third, I am aware of the suffering of the families of prisoners and missing persons from the IDF.  It is heavy as a stone.  The passage of years and the uncertainty wound the human spirit.  Even more painful than this is the situation of the prisoner who is held in secret and in hiding, ripped from his home and homeland.  Indeed, I am not oblivious to this pain, together with the prime interest of the State of Israel in returning its sons to its borders.  It did not lift from my heart when I handed down my decision in ADA 10/94 [1].  It has not lessened from then to today.  The human and societal tragedy of prisoners and missing persons is carried daily on our shoulders.  However, as important as the purpose is of the release of prisoners and missing persons, it is not sufficient – in the framework of the petition before us – to legitimize all means.  It is not possible – in the legal situation before us – to right a wrong with a wrong.  I am confident and certain that the State of Israel will not be still and will not rest until it finds a way to solve this painful problem.  As a state and a society, our comfort is in the fact that the way to the solution will suit our foundational values.

25.  Before concluding, I would like to comment that were I of the opinion that the Minister of Defence had the authority to issue a detention order against a detainee from whom no danger is posed to national security, I would rule in the case before us, that the use of the discretion of the Minister of Defence in this case, was not lawful.  Administrative Detention cannot go on endlessly.  The more the period of detention that has passed lengthens, so too are weightier considerations needed to justify an additional extension of the detention.  With the passage of time the means of administrative detention is no longer proportional.  The placement of the “breaking point” changes with the circumstances.  It is all dependent on the importance of the purpose that the administrative detention seeks to achieve; it is all conditioned on the degree of probability of achieving the purpose by the use of detention and the degree of suitability of the administrative detention to achieving the purpose; it is all tied to the existence of alternative means to achieving the purpose whose harm to individual liberty is lesser; it is all derived from the severity of the harm to individual liberty against the background of the appropriate purpose which is sought to be achieved.  Indeed, it is a matter of a totality of considerations which change from matter to matter and time to time.

26.  The totality of factors points to the fact that the continued detention of the petitioners is not proportional.  Today there is not a near certainty or even a reasonable possibility that the continued detention of the petitioners will bring about the release of the prisoners or missing persons.  Due to the long time that has passed since the detention and the absence of any real data in this matter, the probability that the continued detention will indeed bring about the release of prisoners and missing persons is very low.  A possible opening in the negotiation which the respondents described in the supplementary notice – does not change this assessment.  In my view, there has not been presented before us – not even in the discussions behind closed doors – a factual foundation according to which it could be said today that there is a near certainty (or reasonable possibility) that the continuation of the administrative detention will bring about advancement of the release of the Prisoners or missing persons.  All that has been brought before us is theories and wishes, whose degree of probability is increasingly diminishing with the years and today hangs on by a thread.

In conclusion, since the respondent does not claim that there is a lawful means of detaining the petitioners except by way of administrative detention according to the Detentions Law, and since we reached the conclusion that according to the Detentions Law there is no authority to detain a person from whom no danger is posed to national security, it is concluded that the respondent does not have the authority to hold the petitioners in detention.

The result is that we grant the petition, and declare that the respondent is not entitled to detain the petitioners by authority of the Detentions Law.  Absent any other grounds for their detention, the petitioners will be released from detention and arrangements will be made immediately for their release from detention and return to Lebanon.

 

 

Justice T. Or

 

I agree.

 

Justice E. Mazza

 

I agree.

 

Justice I. Zamir

 

I agree.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

In the north of Israel battles are taking place – land battles and battles from the air.  These are not couch-battles.  These are not battles of words.  These are real battles, battles in which fighters are killed and wounded, young men-fighters and adult-fighters.  One who is killed in these battles is as one who was killed in war; in a war in its simple meaning and in a war as defined by international law.  One who dies - dies, whether fighting in a war as defined by international law and whether fighting in these battles that are not a war as defined by international law.  This is so for one who is killed and this is so for one who is wounded.  In war – or in battles that are not war – it also happens that members of one camp fall in the hands of the other camp.  And when the war or the battles are over (without a definitive victory) – or possibly by agreement in the course of the war or the battles – the battling sides exchange those that fell in their hands from the other camp.  And sons return to their homeland.

The fighter Ron Arad fell in enemy territory, was caught by the enemy and was held – is held? –by our enemies as of today, the Hezbollah.  The petitioners, member-fighters of the Hezbollah, are held in our hands.  Against this background the State tells us: when Ron Arad is returned to us -- or when the Hezbollah informs us of his fate, if he is not in their hands – the petitioners will be returned to their homes, to the hands of the Hezbollah.

In principle, I share this position.  This is the beginning - This is also the end.  And if I must discuss that which is between the beginning and the end – and explain and explicate that which is obvious to me, meaning: from where have we acquired the right to hold on to enemy fighters until the redemption of our fighters – I will do my best to explain and explicate.

2.  We are dealing with the provision of article 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter we shall refer to this law as – “the statute”), which establishes and instructs us as follows:

 

Detention Order

2 (a)

Where the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to assume that reasons of national security or public safety require that a certain person be held in detention, he may, with an order bearing his signature, order the detention of such a person for a period that will be specified in the order and which shall not exceed six months.

 

  (b)

Where the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to assume, on the eve of the expiration of an order based on subsection (a) (hereinafter – the original detention order), that reasons of national security or public safety continue to necessitate holding the detainee in detention, he may, with an order bearing his signature, order, from time to time, the extension of the validity of the original detention order for a period which shall not exceed six months, and the law as to the extension order is as the law of the original detention order in all aspects.

The main points are found in the opening of article 2(a) [like in the opening of article 2(b)], according to which the Minister of Defence is authorized to order the detention of a person when he has a reasonable basis to assume that reasons of national security or public safety necessitate detaining that person.  The authority of the Minister of Defence will arise, therefore, when the following two conditions are cumulatively met: the one is that there is a situation which falls within the scope of the concept “national security or public safety” and the second is that the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to presume that detaining that person is necessitated by that situation.  Let us review these conditions, in order, and one at a time.

3.  As to the subject of “national security or public safety”: there is not the slightest doubt in my mind – not even a doubt as slight as the shadow of a bee in flight – that the purpose of the return home of prisoners and missing persons from among our fighters is at the deepest core of the concept of “national security”.  It is for good reason that the imperative of redemption of prisoners was established – and it is a command of the highest degree –for indeed all of Israel (and in our matter: not only Israel) are responsible for one another.  The strength of an army is in the comradery of fighters, and the comradery of fighters is made up of a single unit, in times of battle and when a fighter falls in enemy captivity.  And in the words of the three musketeers, as Alexandre Dumas wrote: “Tous pour un, un pour tous”.  The fighter will fight knowing that he is not alone, and that in times of need his friends will go to his rescue.  We are commanded and insistent not to leave the wounded in the field, and just as with the wounded we will not settle down until our prisoners have been released from their imprisonment.  Fighters are like rock-climbers tied one-to-the-other by ropes and by fate and a climber who lost his grip and his body is thrown into the abyss, will be saved by his friends.  Such is the climber, such is the fighter.  And this is national security.

4.  And as for the second condition for detention: does the Minister of Defence – in principle -- have a reasonable basis to assume that the holding of the petitioners in detention is necessitated by the need to release Ron Arad from his imprisonment? As for myself there is not a slight doubt in my mind that indeed it is so.  This conclusion is, in my opinion, self-evident, when we know that the petitioners have fallen in our hands and they are member-fighters of the Hezbollah, meaning, ones who counted themselves in fact with the enemy army.  Knowing this, we say thus: Ron Arad was held – is held? – in the hands of the Hezbollah; the petitioners are held in our hands; if the enemy will release Ron Arad – or at the minimum, inform us of his fate –those held in our hands will go free.  Any other conclusion is simply not acceptable to me.  Shall we accept that the enemy will hold our fighters but we shall not be permitted to hold their people until they release our fighters?  Shall we agree to this interpretation of the law?  For myself I say: I have difficulty with this, great difficulty; I do not agree and will not agree.  Indeed, my view is that where the enemy holds our fighter in their hands, reasons of national security require us to hold the enemy fighter in our hands until the exchange.  Ron Arad fell in enemy hands in an act of war, and the petitioners – member fighters of the enemy – also fell in our hands in an act of war.  An act of war will be held up against an act of war.  I do not know otherwise.  Even if we said that the law is open to two interpretations – and what law is not open to two interpretations? – our interpretation, in my opinion, is a just, correct and proper interpretation.

5.  There is no substance to the claim that the petitioners do not pose a danger if they are released.  The petitioners as fighters of the Hezbollah tied their fate with Israel’s war with the Hezbollah.  In this way, the matter of the petitioners differs from the subject of the demolition of the homes of terrorists, a subject that in its time came up frequently on the agenda of this court.  Indeed, it is a supreme value for us that every person bears the weight of his own offense and each person shall only be put to death for his own crime. For this reason I have also held – in a minority-minority opinion – that a military commander does not have the authority to demolish a house in which the family members of a terrorist-murderer live, even if said terrorist lives in the same house.  (See HCJ 2006/97 Mison Mahmet Avu Fara Ganimat v. Central Command General Uzi Dayan [17] at 654 and the references there).  But specifically for this reason of “each person bears the weight of his own offense” the matter of the petitioners differs from the matter of the families of the terrorists; the petitioners as fighters for the enemy, and not as families of the terrorists – knowingly and intentionally tied their destiny to the destiny of the fighting.

6.  The state does not claim that there is another legal source – beyond the statute – for holding the petitioners in detention, neither in domestic law nor in international law (as for the view that holds that the statute does not give power nor grant authority to detain the petitioners, but that there is authority – albeit qualified authority –  to detain them in international law, see: Orna Ben-Naftali and Sean S. Gleichgevitch, ‘Missing in Legal Action: Lebanese Hostages in Israel’ [49] esp. 244-248, 250-251 (2000)).

The question before us, which will be before us and will not let up: If the State is obligated to release the petitioners from detention how shall we fight our enemies?  They will hold our people and we shall not be permitted to hold their people?  Where the statute, according to its language – and in my view: also its spirit –also applies to people like the petitioners?  The (historical) determination that the statute was not intended at its core to catch in its net scenarios such as the one in front of us, does not add or detract.  Indeed, a law – any law – is a living creature within its environment; and just as a living creature adapts itself to its environment – otherwise it will not live – so too the law will do its best – and we will help it – to be integrated and interlaced in its environment and to be interpreted against the background of the living.  Therefore, the question that is asked is three-fold: one, whether the language of the statute relates to our matter? Second, whether the purpose of the statute is our purpose? Third, whether the interpretation of the statute as permitting the holding of the petitioners – as a matter of principle -- does not cause deep wounds to human rights, does not undermine the most basic of the principles on which the social and legal community is based in our community?  My answer to the first two questions is an adamant yes: the language of the statute relates to our matter and the purpose of the statute is our purpose.  My answer to third question is an adamant no: our detention of prisoners, as a matter of principle, does not wound human rights.

7.  The petitioners joined the ranks of the enemy in actuality, and describing them – during the time in which we are detaining them – as “hostages” or “bargaining chips” – terms which reek of a foul smell –can corrupt the language and the truth.   I resist this description with all my strength.  First of all, what a “bargaining chip” is I do not know, nor have I heard of a game of “bargaining chips”.  A person is a person; a chip is a chip; and a person is not a chip.  Never, ever will a person be as a chip.  The petitioners too are persons and not chips.  And I have had difficulty understanding how the petitioners are chips.  As for “bargaining”, I also have difficulty with this term, as, we are not dealing with bargaining.  If only Ron Arad will be returned to his home – or we will be informed of his fate –the petitioners will be returned to their homes.  The petitioners are also not “hostages”, not by the definitions accepted in international law, or by any other definition.  We all know what “hostages” are.  “Hostages” taken by Germans in the Second World War, and “hostages” in bank robberies.  We have never heard that those who number among warring parties and fall in the hands of the enemy are “hostages”, even if they are held until the conclusion of the hostilities or until a release agreement.  Indeed, just as the holding of prisoners of war is regarded as holding for a legitimate and proper purpose – and thus prisoners of war are not described as “hostages” or “bargaining chips”—so too by way of parallel are the fighters of the Hezbollah, whom we hold for the legitimate and proper purpose of national security.  The petitioners have none of the indicators of a “hostage” or a “bargaining chip” and thus we know that they are neither a “hostage” nor a “bargaining chip”.

We should remember and remind that the petitioners are not innocent villagers forcibly taken to a land not theirs.  Indeed, the petitioners were none other than simple fighters in the ranks of the Hezbollah.  However, they counted themselves with the enemy fighters and therefore they are neither “hostages” nor “bargaining chips”.

8.  Even if the Minister of Defence has the authority to detain the petitioners – and that is my view – this authority must meet the requirement of proportionality.  Does the detention of the petitioners meet the requirement of proportionality?  Since the petitioners were detained – years ago – no contact has been made with the Hezbollah in the matter of Ron Arad.  For this reason, I was of the opinion – when the sessions before us began in the further hearing – that the time frame of the detention of the petitioners, under the circumstances, exceeded the limit of proportionality, and thus passed the limits of permitted according to the law.  If we had determined the matter at that time, then at that time I would have voted for the release of the petitioners from detention, if only due to the deviation of the detention from the proper proportionality.

However, in the last two sessions held, it turns out that lately – after all those years, and after the decision before us in the further hearing – there is a shift in the position of the Hezbollah.  Contact has been made – albeit indirect contact – between Israel and the Hezbollah and in this matter the leader of the Hezbollah even said things in public.  Following that contact, the head of the Mossad for Intelligence and Special Tasks declared before us – in answer to a question and after describing certain developments that occurred --   that in his opinion and in the opinion of his counterpart in a friendly country that is helping Israel as a mediator, the solution to the release of Ron Arad is found in the hands of the Hezbollah.  Indeed, it is a matter of an assessment, an assessment and not knowledge, but as an assessment by a senior professional dealing with the matter, it is proper that we accept it if only for a brief period of months.  Indeed, my opinion is that the State is entitled that we grant its request; and that we enable the continued detention of the petitioners for now, if not for an extended period.

Having said what I have said, it is clear that I am disagreeing with the words of President Barak in paragraph 26 of his opinion, as to the conclusion necessitated by the quality of the likelihood that the continued detention of the petitioners will bring about a change in the stance of the Hezbollah.  Indeed, such is the case: there is no proximity to certainty that there will be progress with our contacts with the Hezbollah; however the assessment of the head of the Mossad -- if only an assessment – appears to me to be worthy of proper consideration on our part.

9.  Until today we have held, over and over, consistently and without reservations, that the petitioners, them and those like them, are held in administrative detention lawfully.  See paragraph 9 of the opinion of President Barak in the decision that is before us for review, and the references there.  So too it has been held in several decisions by President Shamgar and Justices G. Bach and Z. Tal.  Joining those three – in the judgment under review – were President A. Barak and Justice Y. Kedmi.  We have had, then, at least five of our colleagues that have – explicitly -- been of the opinion to date that the law holds the power to authorize the Minister of Defence to hold the petitioners in administrative detention.  And here now, come the nine of us, and by a majority of 6 to 3 we decide as we have decided.  Will this be our way, that when we wish to we broaden and when we wish to we abbreviate, and all within a short period of years?  We would have agreed to the statement “Truth and stable – Truth is preferable” if we only knew what the truth was.  And as we know that none of us has the stone of wisdom that will show him the truth – the one and only truth – we will further know that each and every one of us will live with their own truth.  I have spoken my truth and have not heard an answer to my words, not from my colleagues and not from those writing the articles that criticized the original decision of my colleague the President.  And let us know: the meaning of this judgment of my colleagues is that the State will no longer be able to lay its hands on fighters of the Hezbollah as it did in the matter of the petitioners.  I do not accept this conclusion at all.

10.  Last word: the differences of opinion that have emerged between us are not differences of opinion between those who have taken upon themselves the task to protect human rights and the dignity of the individual and those who surrender  the right of man and the dignity of the individual for the good of the public, seemingly.  We have seen the petitioners and we have gone beyond this and read words that they have written to us by their own hand.  Anyone who read those words, something would move in their hearts.  We have seen the petitioners – Ron Arad we have not seen.  We have not read words he has written us, as he has not written to us.  But this we knew and know: Human rights and individual dignity Ron Arad has also earned.  Not just the petitioners.  And we owe a heavy debt – all of us – to Ron Arad.  A very heavy debt.

11.  My view is, therefore, that it is proper for us to enable the detention of the petitioners, while not for a long period.  If my view were heard we would reassemble in approximately two months to hear from the State whether there is anything new.

And so it was after this.

12.  I read the opinions of my colleagues, Vice-President S. Levin and Justice Dorner, and I was sorry.  I was sorry not because they disagree with my view – or that I disagree with their view – as I knew this before I wrote what I wrote.  I was sorry because I have not succeeded, it appears, in explaining those things I wished to explain.  I will repeat those things I said and add to them.

13.  My colleague the Vice-President establishes that the respondent does not hold the authority by law to detain the petitioners and the reason is:

“A different answer would authorize the respondent to detain the family members, relatives and friends of a person, where there is a reasonable basis to assume that he may endanger national security, only in order to pressure him to talk or to give himself or others in, even if there is no fault that can be attributed to his family, his relatives, or his friends...  Indeed, the simple construction of the expression “national security” or “public safety” is that it does not refer other than to the detention of one from whom the danger to national security or public safety stems .”

In these words the Vice-President repeats words that Justice Dorner stated in her opinion in the judgment under consideration, while disagreeing with the original position of President Barak.  And these were her words (para. 2 of her judgment):

“The position of my colleague President Barak leads to interpreting the law as enabling detention, for an unlimited time period, of any person, as long as the detention has a benefit, if only indirectly, for national security.  Such sweeping and unlimited authority is not even recognized by the laws of war in the realm of international law.  I cannot recognize it in the realm of Israeli law.”

These words are true in and of themselves; it is true that the Minister of Defence does not have authority according to the law to detain “the family members, relatives and friends of John Doe” (as in the words of the Vice-President) or to detain “any person” (in the words of Justice Dorner).  But the petitioners are neither these nor those, as I have tried to explain in my opinion.  Their status is the status of quasi-prisoners, and to this I have not heard a response from my colleagues.

14.  In her opinion my colleague describes the petitioners – again and again, more and more – as bargaining chips and hostages; she does not even put these terms in quotation marks.  I deny these things with all my might.  I have discussed this in my opinion, and cannot say more than I already have.   I have read the words of my colleague; and I have not heard an answer to my words.

15.  My colleague goes on about international conventions which prohibit holding hostages.  I agree to all of her words, but the petitioners are not hostages and thus those conventions have nothing to do with our matter.

16.  Last words: in her judgment the subject of the further hearing my colleague closes the pathway for detaining the petitioners by authority of the statute.  In her present opinion my colleague also closes the pathways of international law as a source of authority for detention.  Meaning: they will hold our people and we will not be allowed to hold their people, if only to exchange people for people.  I am sorry that my opinion is a minority opinion.

Vice President S. Levin

1.  The only question to be decided before us is, whether the Minister of Defence is authorized by power of section 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter: “the statute”), to order the administrative detention of a person for the single reason that the detention has the potential to advance the release of prisoners or missing persons from among the security forces.

I agree with the President, that the authority is not granted to the respondent.  A different answer would authorize the respondent to detain the family members, relatives and friends of a person, where there is a reasonable basis to assume that he may endanger national security, only in order to pressure him to talk or to give himself or others in, even if there is nothing that can be attributed to his family, his relatives, or his friends.  Moreover, section 2(a) of the statute also covers a situation which relates to “public safety”.  Is it possible to interpret the statute, such that it affords the authority the power to detain the family members of a criminal offender, who endangers “public safety” without attributing anything to them?  Indeed, the simple construction of the expression “national security” or “public safety” is that it does not refer other than to the detention of one from whom the danger to national security or public safety stems himself.

2.  Mr. Nitzan, on behalf of the State, has not brought before us any other legal source in domestic or international law which justifies the continued holding of the appellants in detention, apart from the statute, and we are not permitted to search for such a source on our own initiative.  I am aware of the reality pointed to by my hon. colleague justice Cheshin, that we are all, of course, aware of, according to which the fighter Ron Arad has fallen in the hands of an enemy, who is of the view that the laws of war do not apply to him and who does not see himself as subject to the rules of international law.  It would be naïve and even dangerous to keep from the State an appropriate means of freeing its fighters.  However: the statute has not placed such a tool at its disposal; in order to place it as its disposal, it requires, in my view, a different source or grounds for its authority in primary legislation on a matter that prima facie has significance of a primary nature.  Compare  HCJ 3267/97 [27] and HCJ 5400/94 [26].  The State has not legislated a suitable statute, and as said has not pointed us to another source on which the power to detain the appellants is based.

For this reason alone, I have agreed to the grant of the appeal.

Justice Y. Kedmi

Introduction

1.  I have gone back and examined my position and have not seen fit to change my approach according to which the holding of the petitioners in detention is within the authority established in section 2 of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter: “the statute”).  On this matter, I am going along the path that was forged in its day by President Shamgar in ADA 1/91 Plonim v. Minister of Defence [28] according to which the redemption of captives and return of missing persons are reasons of national security as per their meaning in section 2 of the said law; and I adopt the words that were said in this context later by Justice Tal in ADA 1/94 Plonim v. Minister of Defence [29], as detailed in the judgment of President Barak in ADA 10/94[1].  President Shamgar and Justice Tal were joined by the Justices who sat with them on those cases; and Justice Bach decided in the same vein – in ADA 1/93 Plonim v. Minister of Defence [30].

And this is how this was expressed in the judgments of President Shamgar and Justice Tal:

President Shamgar:

“the routine grounds for detention by authority of said law is indeed a matter of the security risk that arises from the future anticipated activity of a person whose detention is being weighed at that time.  However, reasons of national security do not embrace only the prevention of hostile intelligence or terrorist activities.”

And later on:

“. . .  and taking effective steps to release hostages, who fell in enemy hands, are, in my view, reasons of national security.”

While as per Justice Tal:

“I am also of the view that the rationale for release of our captives is a quintessential rationale of national security.  It is well known that army morale is of utmost importance for its effectiveness.  The confidence of a soldier that the State will not spare any effort to free him if he falls captive, is an important component of his morale, his dedication and his willingness to take risks”

And later on:

“Therefore, I have no doubt that considerations of redemption of prisoners are considerations of national security.”

National Security and the Value of Redemption of Prisoners

2.  “Redemption of prisoners” is one of the basic values of the Jewish people; and it appears that none more than it demonstrates the basic responsibility of everyone in this nation for the liberty of their brothers, in the sense that all of Israel is responsible for one another.  That is a national duty of the first degree that each of us – and all of us together – is bound by.  It was such in the period in which we were exiled from our land; and there is no measure to its significance in an era of gathering of exiles and return to our homeland.  By its nature, this duty constitutes a basic component of the “glue” which unites and protects us as a nation; and there is no other value as necessary and vital to our national security.  The knowledge that the nation and the people are behind each of our fighters, that none of them will be abandoned in the field and that no effort will be spared in order to return home sons who have fallen in the prison of the enemy – whatever it may take – to their homeland, is at the basis of the might of our security forces; and grants those who assure our existence, the valor and courage necessary to fulfill their duties.

Under these circumstances, there is no need to go on in order to clarify: first – the value of redemption of prisoners – which as said, is one of the basic values of the Jewish people – is counted among the components of the nation’s security; and second – blocking the road to meeting the requirements of this value, is equal to harm to national security.  Our enemies are aware of the strength and contribution of said value to security.  Until the case brought before us, our commitment to the value of redemption of prisoners has served as a means for our enemy to extort a “price”; while in this case a real effort was made by them to undermine the faith in this obligation and in this way to cause damage, direct damage, to a vital component of our security.

The Normative Framework: Detention Authority

3.  The petitioners are held in detention by power of the provisions of section 2(a) of the statute, of which this is the language inasmuch as it relates to our matter:

“2 (a) Where the Minister of Defence has a reasonable basis to assume that reasons of national security . . .   necessitate that a certain person be held in detention, he may. . . order the detention of that person. . .”[emphasis mine, Y.K.]

The basis for those who negate the authority to detain the petitioner by authority of said section 2(a), is the approach which says: that the detention authority established in this section relates only to the detention of a person who constitutes – himself – a danger to national security; when his detention serves as a means to prevent the coming of the – as said, personal – danger which would, by nature, be entailed in his release.  I do not accept this constricting approach; and to my approach, it does not arise from the language of the statute or the purpose of its legislation.  Indeed, in most of the cases in which use has been made to date of said detention authority, it was a matter of one who himself constituted a – personal – danger to national security.  Indeed, this fact, on its own, is not sufficient basis for said approach.  Determining the scope of the authority is properly done based on the text of the law and its purpose; when of course one is not to ignore the duty not to infringe on man’s basic right to liberty, by means of the detention, except to the extent that there is no other recourse.

The text of the statute refers to the detention of a “certain person” for “reasons” of national security [which “necessitate” holding a person in detention], without any characterizing addition to “reasons” or the character of the “detainee”; and it is not possible, therefore, to base on the language of the statute the stance that it is a matter only of “reasons” which are based in “personal dangerousness” of the detainee.  To my approach, this is sufficient to undo the foundation of the construction which limits the detention authority only to those who constitute a danger themselves; had it been the will of the legislator, it can be presumed that he would have given it explicit expression in the language of said section 2(a), or in another clarifying provision.

The absence of “restricting” words around the phrase “reasons” and particularly around the phrase “a specific person” -- such as: “reasons of risks to national security” and “a certain person who endangers national security” teaches that the said constricting meaning was not being considered by the legislator.  The general language that was used in said section 2(a) tells us that the legislator was of the opinion that it is to be left to the court to determine the extent of the detention authority, according to the range of “reasons” that the changing security reality presents; and this, in order for it to be able to apply it in every place that reasons of national security necessitate detention of the same person whose imprisonment can fulfill those “reasons”.  The expression “for reasons of national security”, when it stands alone without a characterizing addition, reflects an intention to protect national security from any “harm”, in the broader meaning of the term; and restricting the detention authority based on this expression only to those who “personally” endanger national security, deviates from “construction” of what is written and spills over to add limiting words that are not found in it.

This situation is also necessitated, in my view, by the purpose of the law.   As a rule, the purpose is learned, inter alia, from the words that were said in this context in the framework of the legislative process, whether in the explanatory notes which accompanied the draft law and whether in the Divrei Knesset which reflect the discussion which preceded its passing.  I am not oblivious to the fact, that in the Divrei Knesset we find reference to the dimension of the personal dangerousness; and that they do not have an explicit reference as to its application in other circumstances as well.  However, in the framework of the reference, it was not said that the dimension of personal dangerousness will be the only – and necessary -- criterion to apply the provisions of the law; and under the circumstances, it appears that the reference to the said dimension is anchored in the fact that “personal dangerousness” is a clear concretizing example for the use of the detention authority according to the statute.  That is all, and no more.

Review of the Divrei Knesset in their entirety – and in their light, of the text of the statute – shows that the purpose of the legislation was: creating an emergency tool for protection of national security (or “public safety”, which is not the issue here), in circumstances in which less extreme measures are not useful; and this through the detention of a person in administrative detention, as a last resort for safeguarding security from harm that the detention has the ability to cope with.  Administrative detention is by its nature a “preventative” detention which is characterized by the fact that it is intended to prevent harm and not punish for it.  But, the fact that the detention is “preventative” by its nature, does not necessitate the conclusion that the single criteria for applying it is rooted in the “personal” dangerousness of the detainee to national security; and its “preventative” character does not rule out making use of it as a means of applying pressure on those who wish to harm security, by blocking the road to redemption of prisoners, in order to change their decision.

Punitive imprisonment – as opposed to preventative – by its nature refers to the denial of the liberty of one who bears responsibility for committing an act that carries a punishment.  Therefore, only one who bears personal responsibility for committing that act will be imprisoned; since the rule is that each person will be punished for their crime.  But, when it is a matter of preventative detention it is not the “crime of” the detainee that is at the basis of his detention, but rather the ability of the detention to prevent harm to national security.  As such, there is nothing to prevent the “crime of” another being at the basis of the detention; as long as – as will be explained later –the detainee links himself by his behavior or actions to the crime of the “other”.

According to my approach, therefore, one is not to rule out circumstances, in which reasons of national security necessitate detaining one whose imprisonment is necessary as an emergency means to advance implementation of the value of “redemption of prisoners”.  This, subject to the fact that – as is required by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom –the right of every person to liberty rules out detaining him without the existence of a “link” between his behavior and actions and the purpose of the detention.

Under these circumstances, although it is a matter of preventative detention – as opposed to punitive – I agree that not every person can be detained by authority of the law, but only one who “links” himself with his behavior to the grounds for his detention.  As opposed to those who rule out the detention authority as to one who does not constitute a “personal danger” to security, it is sufficient, according to my approach, for there to exist a “link” – willingly and by free choice – between the detainee and the grounds and purpose of the detention; and there is no need for the detainee – himself -- to pose a “security risk”.  Such a link is self-evident where it is a matter of one who poses a “security risk” due to his own activity; while when it is not a matter of detention against the background of personal activity, such a “link” may be dictated by the existence of an organizational link between the detainee and the activities of others.  This -- as derived from what has been written above – when that activity harms security, and the imprisonment of the detainee, given his link to others, is the last means left to safeguard against it.

In the case before us – as will be detailed below – the petitioners “linked” themselves to the grounds for their detention, in that they joined with the terrorist organizations in whose hands the navigator Ron Arad has fallen; and as such, have a link sufficient to hold them in administrative detention for the purposes of creating pressure on the leadership of their organizations to reveal what has become of him.

In conclusion, national security has many faces, and the law establishes administrative detention as a uniform emergency means to protect it, be the nature of the harm that it is dealing with what it may be.  In such a situation when the law uses general wording which leaves room for broad construction of its application, we will miss the target of the purpose of the legislation – protection of national security – if we specifically choose a limiting construction.

It would not be superfluous to mention in this context that this is not a lone case where the law allows – in a time of emergency – taking emergency measures against persons to whom no personal action against national security is attributed, where the -- personal -- “crime “is rooted only in the existence of a “link” between them and those taking such action.  Thus, for example, the law “reconciles” itself with the taking of deterrent measures – demolition of homes – against family members of terrorists, lest they give them shelter – in their homes – and this despite the fact that they themselves are not partners to the acts of the terrorists and their “link” to the harm to security is rooted only in their willingness to provide the latter with shelter as said.  It appears, that without the existence of said “link”, it would not be possible to apply the demolition authority to family members of terrorists according to the provisions of regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945.  As to this matter see the judgment of the President in HCJ 2006/97[17].  There it was said, inter alia:

“We are aware of the fact that demolishing the structure damages the shelter of the first petitioner. . .  this is not the purpose of the demolition order.  It is not punitive.  Its purpose is to deter.  However, the result is difficult for family members.  The respondent thinks that this is essential in order to prevent further injury to innocent people.  He held that pressure by families may deter the terrorists.  There is no total assurance that indeed this means is efficient, but in the framework of the few means that remain for the State in order to defend itself against “living bombs” this means is not to be derided.” (Emphases mine – Y. K.).

Finally, I am not oblivious to the fact, of course, that there are rules for war – and one exists between us and the organizations which hold our navigator –and the law of nations determines the permitted and the prohibited and arranges relations between warring parties; and I am aware of the fact that as members of the community of cultured nations we are obligated by said rules, even where the opponent is not a nation but a terrorist organization that ignores those rules.  However, in my view, in the context discussed here, our commitment to the rules of war does not deny the authority that the law grants as to detaining the petitioners where other means have exhausted themselves; and this, taking into consideration its purpose – preventing harm to national security – against the background of our basic commitment to the core value of redemption of prisoners.

From the General to the Specific

4.  The petitioners number amongst the members of hostile terrorist organizations, which declared an all out war against Israel and do not recoil at any means to advance their issue.  The navigator Ron Arad, the uncovering of whose fate is the purpose for which the petitioners are detained, fell in the hands of said organizations in the course of an operational activity.  About a year after Ron Arad fell in the hands of those organizations all traces of him disappeared and a dark curtain was brought down on his fate, no information was given about him to his family or his nation and all efforts made in this connection did not bear fruit.

Distancing the petitioners from their families and holding them in detention was intended to create pressure on the leadership of said organizations – of which the petitioners are members – to change their decision and clarify where Ron Arad is held, what his fate has been since he fell in their hands.  At the foundation of the detention of the petitioners are the following two things: first – the presumption that the desire to preserve their image as ones who are concerned for the welfare of their friends will motivate the leadership of the organizations to take action for the release of their friends; and second – and this appears to be primary – the presumption that the family members of the petitioners – as all family members – will apply heavy and weighty pressure to the leadership of their organizations, to remove the cover of secrecy that has been draped over the fate of Ron Arad and thereby bring about the release of their sons.  If they cannot do this on their own, they will recruit the voice of the public in their country and outside of it to help them.  From the private perspective the families of the detainees have gained – in fact –a “joint” interest in exposing what has happened to Ron Arad; under the circumstances, it was thought, that the families of the detainees would “cooperate” – for their own reasons – and contribute at least to opening a crack in the wall of silence behind which said organizations have entrenched themselves.

Under these circumstances, using the term “hostage” – which has been much used in the context being discussed here – is not suited to the holding of the petitioners in detention.  At the core of the classic meaning of the term “hostage” lies -- the real and tangible – “threat” of harm to the bodily welfare and even the lives of those held as such, in order to prevent their “friends” from undertaking this action or the other in the framework of their ongoing activity.  In such circumstances, the holding in detention constitutes a “fighting means” in the struggle between two opposing sides; when its illegitimacy is rooted, primarily in the inhumane threat it entails.  While here: the petitioners are not subject to any threat; and their detention is not equated with the use of a “weapon” which requires the opponent to refrain from any activity or to change his ongoing activity.

The use of the term “bargaining chip” without a further clarification that the “bargaining” is none other than creating pressure to provide information, is significantly off the mark of the precise description of the manner of the detention of the petitioners.  In its pure meaning “bargaining chip” constitutes an “asset” that one party holds in the course of “bargaining and sale” with the goal of forcing the opponent to moderate his demands.  Absent negotiation with those organizations, it is not to be said that we are “trading” in the petitioners.  Meaning, according to my view, the petitioners are being held for one single purpose, and that is: moving the leaderships of the organizations with a connection to the matter – including states involved in the case – to open a portal in the wall of silence; and to hand over to the family, to the people of Israel and the entire world information as to the fate of our navigator.  This is not a matter of “haggling” as to the conditions of the return of Ron Arad, but of “pressure” to expose details that have been hidden until now with a glaring degree of inhumanity.

Indeed, even when detention is directed only at creating pressure to expose details – when no risk to life or bodily wellness hovers over the petitioners – it contain, in itself, a severe injury to the liberty of the petitioners; and such injury, indeed, is not consistent with the humanistic principles of cultured nations and with the basic rules on which our state is founded.  However, in my view, where a terrorist organization takes steps of heartlessness, cruelty and inhumanity, which are expressed in placing a complete black-out on the fate of a fighter of ours that fell in their hands in the course of an operational activity, a “balance” is necessitated on our part between, the basic humanistic principles in the struggle with enemies who are after our lives, and the interest of redemption of prisoners which is of utmost importance to us.  Such a balance justifies and legitimizes holding in detention by law the fighters of a terrorist organization connected to the matter; when the purpose is applying pressure on the organization – via the families of detainees – to expose what has become of the fate of our fighter.  This is the least – and in fact the entirety – that we can do, without causing an injury which exceeds the proper proportionality in our commitment to the humanistic principles of freedom and liberty.  If we do not do this, we find that we are acting amiss toward our fighters and the security of our state; and at the same time, we encourage terrorist organizations to violate and shatter every basic human rule, even when this does not have the potential to contribute anything or half of anything to advancing its purposes.

One who joins a terrorist organization cannot claim to have clean hands and not to bear personal responsibility for the behavior of his leaders, in all that concerns the black-out that has been placed regarding what has happened to our navigator; and the claim cannot be heard from him, that he is to be related to as any innocent peace-seeking citizen who has been uprooted from his family and is held behind lock and key through no fault of his own.

In the clash between the injury to the basic right of every person to liberty and the injury that terrorist organizations cause to the basic human value of providing information as to a detainee in their custody the latter has the upper hand.  We have not demanded of the terrorist organizations to refrain from activity by “threat” of injury to “hostages” from among their friends; although they are ostensibly being held as “bargaining chips” we have not presented the petitioners as “assets” to be traded with another “asset”.  All that we ask is this: basic information as to what has happened to a fighter from among our fighters who has fallen in their hands.

Under these circumstances, the severe criticism directed against us by the petitioners and their families, needs to be directed at the leaderships of the terrorist organization which the petitioners joined and whose words and goals they adopted; when before their eyes must be the fact, that all that is being sought of their leaders, is limited, at the first phase at least, to providing information as to the fate of a fighter that has fallen in their hands.

As these words are being written, I am not oblivious to the fact that the definitions of the terms “hostages” and “bargaining chips” in the conventional international law arena have been broadened such that it is possible to include within them the holding of the petitioners in administrative detention for the narrow purpose stated above.  This does not change my position which is rooted in construction of our domestic law; as for my view, in the special circumstances of the case, we are not obligated to apply the provisions of conventional international law, in the face of the shameful and inhumane behavior of the terrorist organizations who hold the key to solving the mystery of the “disappearance” of Ron Arad.  These organizations and their friends trample with an outstretched foot – by their behavior in this context –the rules of basic human behavior; and this is sufficient to prevent their friends – the petitioners – from raising their voices and crying out against the legality of their detention.

Conclusion

5.  I accept that even for the above limited purpose there is a limit and a proportion to detention; and at a certain point in time, when it appears that holding the petitioners in detention is not effective, the foundation for its justification is undermined.  When more than ten years of detention have passed, without any sign pointing to a change in the position of the organization to which the petitioners belong, in all that relates to removing the black-out from what has happened to our navigator, a heavy question mark is placed on the effectiveness – and therefore on the justification – of the detention.  In these circumstances, an additional extension of the detention is conditioned upon bringing proof which points to the existence of a genuine, real, and tangible chance that continued detention is necessary for changing the stubborn position of the terrorist organizations in this episode.  Absent such evidence, there will be no escape from the conclusion that the detainees are to be released, as their detention will have been proven to be useless.

And here, from the material brought before us in the two discussions that took place recently I have been impressed that there appear to be first signs of change as stated in the position of organizations related to the matter; and there is a real chance that the change will bring, finally, provision of information for which the petitioners are being held in detention.  This fact has been supported – soon after the first of the two hearings -- in the words of the secretary of the Hezbollah organization, Sheik Nasrallalla, who said in the media: that “I am sure and certain that the movement will discover what has become of Ron Arad’s fate.  We have been following this matter with great seriousness and we are full of confidence and optimism”; and that “we are not giving up on achieving a result in the case of the navigator Ron Arad.  We are following the matter and hope that all the prisoners of the Hezbollah in Israel will be released.” (See for example the Globus: from January 21, 2000; emphases mine, J.K.).

Unfortunately, we have not heard in the last discussion held on this episode, of the hoped for breakthrough; and ostensibly this heralds retreat to the old position.  However, I have been convinced that we must not rush to learn from the lack of advancement that real hope of achieving that breakthrough is lost; and this, taking into consideration that negotiation of this type is characterized by “ups and downs” which are directed at wearing down the opponent.  As for myself, it appears to me, that the door to the negotiation is not closed; and it is proper to examine the effectiveness of the continued detention against this background.  The significance of releasing the petitioners now is that we have reached the conclusion that there is no more use in holding them.  The latest developments do not necessitate this conclusion: and if it turns out that we failed, where will we find ourselves.

If my opinion is heard, I would propose to my colleagues to delay the hearing one further time; and go back and hear from the security forces details as to the developments that will take place in said negotiation, in two months from today.

Justice J. Türkel

1.  The path to the decision in the question before us was difficult and agonizing, simply put.  From the start, when I read the judgment of the Supreme Court in ADA 10/94[1] which was placed before us in this further hearing, I was of the opinion – as was the minority opinion there, which is the majority opinion here – that the Minister of Defence is not authorized by power of section 2(a) of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter: “the statute”), to order the administrative detention of a person in order to advance the release of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces.  However, “the wind turns and turns; round it the wind returns”(Ecclesiastes 1,6 [51]), and at the end of the road I found myself standing in the place where those holding the majority opinion there – which is the minority opinion here – stood, and similarly held by President M. Shamgar and Justices G. Bach and T. Tal, in different decisions,  that the Minister of Defence is indeed authorized to do so.

2.  The primary reason for the change in my approach is that according to the objective purpose of the law, we have before us two reasonable constructions of the term “reasons of national security” from which a determination must be made.

One interpretation which emerges from the previous judgment of President A. Barak in ADA 10/94 [1]in which he said, inter alia, that: “it is true that the term national security can withstand many interpretations and many meanings” and that “I accept, in this matter, the position of the respondent, according to which just as the welfare of IDF soldiers frequently constitutes a consideration of national security, so too the welfare of missing persons and prisoners, including return to their homeland, constitutes a reason of national security.”  His conclusion there was that the severe damage to human dignity by the detention of the petitioners “is necessitated by the policy and security reality, and reflects the proper balance under the circumstances between the liberty of the individual and the need to preserve national security.” 

The second interpretation emerges from his opinion in the case before us, which was supported by five judges in this panel, and in it – valiantly and in open heartedness worthy of praise – he changed his mind and reached an opposite conclusion; meaning, that the purpose of the statute (the objective purpose) “leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the statute is only to apply to situations in which the administrative detention is necessary due to the danger posed by the detainee himself.”

3.  In determinations such as these, sometimes the legislator himself leads the way, as he did for example, in section 34u of the Penal Law according to which “where a law is subject to several reasonable interpretations according to its purpose, the matter will be determined by the interpretation that is most lenient with the one who is to bear liability according to that law.”  (On this matter see, inter alia, the words of President A. Barak on interpretation in criminal law in 6696/96 Kahane Binyamin v. State of Israel [31]; S.Z. Feller Foundations in Criminal Law, Vol. A, 1984 [37] p. 176 and further; M. Gur Aryeh, ‘Proposed Penal Law (Introductory Part and General Part) 5752-1992’ [45] at p. 9 and on).  However, at times, the choice between interpretations is done according to the relative weight of the values which are placed on the scales, as in the case before us.  As to this I stated elsewhere:

“After all this, I wonder what is the point in trying to weigh the competing values in the scales of the law, or in trying to follow ‘one of the paths of the law’, when the weight of the values changes according to the person applying the law, when it is possible to choose between several paths and when one path may even lead to different results. Even in the opinions of those of my colleagues who are of my opinion, more than one ‘legal path’ is presented whereby one may reach the result that they reached, which is no less ‘legalistic’ than the paths followed by those who disagree with them. If this is the case, what did those who followed this path achieve thereby?

Moreover, if there is indeed more than one ‘legal path’, how does one choose between the different paths and the different destinations to which each path leads? Is this choice also dictated by ‘the law’? In complex issues, like the one before us, there is no legal geometry that necessitates unequivocal results. Unlike my colleagues who think this, I cannot point to one solution, or to a ‘more correct’ solution, that can be applied in the case before us. The opinions before us illustrate well how different values can be put in the place of each variable in the chosen formula. Instead of the findings on which judges espousing one viewpoint rely, one can reach the opposite findings.”[CFH 2401/95 Ruth Nahmani v. Daniel Nahmani [32] at 739, see also pp. 734-741].  (See A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 1, Rules of General Interpretation (1994) [38] at pp. 36-38; and , Ibid, Vol. 2, Statutory Construction (1993) [36] at pp. 555-558; I. Englard, Introduction to Jurisprudence, [39]at pp. 95-97).

My colleague Justice Cheshin sees in the command of redemption of prisoners “a command of the highest degree” which is tied to the fact that “all of Israel (and in our matter: not only Israel) are responsible for one another.”  Justice Kedmi holds similarly to him that “‘Redemption of prisoners’ is one of the basic values of the Jewish people; and it appears that none more than it demonstrates the basic responsibility of everyone in this nation for the liberty of their brothers, in the sense that all of Israel is responsible for one another.”  In their approach, the interpretation of the term is also derived from this.  I also hold as they do.

4.  I wish to add to the uplifting words of Justices Cheshin and Y. Kedmi.  The protection of the dignity and liberty of every person and protection of these basic constitutional rights (see section 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty) is dearer than dear, however, in the episode before us it does not stand up against the protection of national security in the limited meaning of the term, as it is interpreted by the majority opinion holders.  In my eyes, the dignity and liberty of the detainees from among the fighters of the enemy are placed on the scales, one facing the other, against the dignity and liberty of our prisoners and missing persons; those who are in trouble and in imprisonment today and those who will, we hope not, be in trouble and imprisonment in the future.  Weighing these – which is at the core of the interpretive process – is not done within a legal laboratory but in a melting pot of values, including national ones, and feelings of human compassion.  When I come to weigh among these, I cannot but determine – albeit with sorrow and pain – that the dignity and liberty of our fighters is dearer to me than those of the enemy fighters.  This consideration tilts the scales toward a broadening interpretation of the term “reasons of national security”.

5.  Therefore, the question is asked whether the use made by the Minister of Defence of the authority to detain the petitioners – some of them from May 16, 1991 and most of them from September 1, 1992 – is “proportional” or perhaps “not proportional” (compare Yoma 21 p. A [52])?  In other words, after eight or nine years have passed has the measure been filled to the rim and the detention no longer to be continued?

My answer to this is that when it has been declared before us by the senior commanders in charge of handling the subject of prisoners and missing persons that there is an end and there is hope – and not in the distant future – we are not entitled to reject their professional opinion which is weighted more than our assessment.  When it is a matter of life and death – and the matter before us is one of genuine life and death – the small candle smoldering before us in the dark is not to be extinguished before it has gone out, which we hope it will not, on its own.  Therefore I would delay the decision until they have come and told us that all hope is gone.

6.  I have reached the end of the road that began with my view that the Minister of Defence is not authorized by authority of section 2(a) of the statute to order the administrative detention of a person in order to advance the release of prisoners and missing persons from among the security forces, and its end is in my conclusions of today that the law authorizes him to do this and that the use he is making of this authority does not go beyond that which is proportional.  I wish I could reach the conclusion that two interpretations of the term “reasons of national security” could live side by side – as though they are “opposites united at their root” (H.N. Bialik, “He Peered and was Injured”) – and I wish I could avoid any decision on the matter, however, as judges we are not entitled to spare ourselves from the law and we are not free to be released from reaching a decision.

7.  If my opinion were heard, we would leave the judgment of ADA 10/94 [1] as is for now and postpone the continuation of the hearing to two months from today, in order to hear from those in charge of dealing with the matter of the prisoners and missing persons whether holding the petitioners in detention still has benefit for advancing their release.

Justice D. Dorner

1.  I agree with the judgment of my colleague, President Barak, in the further hearing.  My opinion has remained as is since it was expressed by me – it was then a minority opinion – in ADA 10/94 [1].  I disagree with my colleagues, Justices Cheshin, Kedmi, and Türkel.

My judgment in ADA 10/94 [1], that the state is not entitled to hold the petitioners in detention by authority of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law 5739-1979 (hereinafter: “the Detentions Law”), was based on the factual foundation that the State presented.  According to this foundation, the purpose of the detention of the petitioners is to make use of them as bargaining chips in the course of the negotiation for the return of the imprisoned navigator Ron Arad and other prisoners and missing persons.  However, in light of the fact that the petitioners were members in organizations which fight against us in Lebanon, I added, that “this does not present a position on the question. . .  as to the authority to detain the appellant by authority of other laws, such as international law” (in section 3 of my judgment).

However, the State, which prosecuted the petitioners for membership in a hostile organization, did not argue in this further hearing that they are to be viewed as prisoners of war.  It continued to tie its authority to detain the petitioners to the Detentions Law and repeated the same factual foundation, according to which the petitioners do  not endanger national security and are held in detention only as bargaining chips to advance the release of our prisoners.

Against the background of this factual foundation, I wrote in the judgment on appeal:

“We must ignore . . . the membership of the appellants before us in hostile organizations and their past activity against Israel.  They have been punished for this membership and this activity, and these are not the grounds for their detention.  Is it that because the law does not explicitly prohibit the detention of family members of the enemy’s individuals, or other individuals whom for one reason or another the enemy might have an interest in their release, that we can interpret it as enabling their detention?  The position of my colleague President Barak leads to interpreting the law as enabling detention, for an unlimited time period, of any person, as long as the detention  benefits, if only indirectly, national security.  Such sweeping and unlimited authority is not even recognized by the rules of war in the realm of international law.  I cannot recognize it in the realm of Israeli law” [section 2 of my judgment].

2.  Citizens who are held in detention as bargaining chips are hostages as  defined in section 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979.  The detention of hostages is absolutely prohibited  by this treaty. It has been established as follows in section 1 of the treaty:

“Any person who seizes or detains and threatens... to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage, commits the offence of taking of hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of this Convention.”

Israel signed this treaty on November 19, 1980 and even added its comment in this language:

“It is the understanding of Israel that the Convention implements the principle that hostage taking is prohibited in all circumstances and that any person committing such an act shall be either prosecuted or extradited pursuant to article B of this Convention or the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or their additional Protocols, without any exception whatsoever.”

Detention of citizens of an enemy state as hostages for any purpose was already absolutely prohibited thirty years earlier, in article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (Relative to the Protection of Civilians During Times of War) 1949 (hereinafter: “the Geneva Convention”).  This includes their detention for the purpose of improving the conditions of prisoners of war, or in order to exchange them for prisoners of war, acts that were acceptable in prior times.  See, for example, English Manual of Military Law (1929) at 464.

There are those who believe that the severe prohibitions in the Geneva Convention, which were declared in section 147 of the Convention, including the prohibition on holding hostages, have, over the years, attained the status of customary international law.  See Yoram Dinstein, ‘Report on the Application of Customary International Law Concerning Armed Conflicts in the National Legal Order’, National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law - Proceedings of an International Colloquium at Bad Homburg June 17-19, (M. Bothe - ed., Dordrecht, 1990) [50].

A basis for their approach is found in the words written by the Appellate Committee in the matter of the extradition of Pinochet to Spain, which were quoted in agreement in the judgment of the House of Lords in that matter.  And it was written as follows:

“[T]he taking of hostages, as much as torture, has been outlawed by the international community as an offence... [I]nternational law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone ... [T]he contrary conclusion would make a mockery of international law.”  (See also A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3, Constitutional Construction (1984) [40]at p. 323; Anne F. Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law (1992) [47] at p. 14).

In this way civilians are distinguished from prisoners of war whom it is permitted to hold until the end of the war and the return of the prisoners of war of the holding state.  See article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention.  But, as said, the position of the State in our matter is, that the petitioners are not prisoners, and they are held by authority of the Detentions Law.

3.  As we know, according to our legal system, the absorption of rules of customary international law is direct, and they are part of local Israeli law.  See, for example, HCJ 606/78 Eyov and others v. Minister of Defence [33].  Ratification of the International Convention which only anchors customary law does not turn what is stated in it to part of domestic law.  For this, adoption of the convention by law is necessary.  However,  case law has established an interpretive presumption according to which the laws of the state and the norms of international law to which the State of Israel is committed are in agreement, and that the laws of the state will be interpreted – as much as possible – as consistent with international law.  See, for example, CA 562/70 Alkotov v. Shahin [22] at p. 80; CrimA 437/74 Kwan v. State of Israel [34] at p. 596.  This is the case, in general, and all the more so in matters that relate to basic rights.

4.  In any event, whether the international prohibition on holding hostages is customary or conventional, it appears to me that there is no need for any interpretive effort in order to reach the conclusion that Israeli law does not permit the holding of hostages.

Even in the international laws of war it is absolutely prohibited for warring forces to balance the security needs of the state, including the need to guarantee the welfare of the prisoners of the warring force and their return from imprisonment, against the injury to the liberty of the citizens of the enemy state by holding them as bargaining chips.  All the more so, that a broad interpretation of municipal law, such that it will include the authority to hold people in detention for  the purpose of their serving as bargaining chips in the negotiations to release prisoners, is not appropriate.

5.  And in fact, in my opinion, there is no reasonable way to interpret the Detentions Law such that it will include such authority.

This was not the intent of the legislator, as emerges from the text of the Detentions Law literally and the legislative history, which teach us that the purpose of the law was just to enable the detention of people who endanger national security or public safety, and this when it is not possible to achieve this purpose within a criminal procedure.  Interpreting the law as though it authorizes detaining people in order to use them as bargaining chips also contradicts the principles of the legal system in the State of Israel,  a democracy which protects basic human rights.

In our matter, the purpose of the detention of the petitioners – advancing the release of Ron Arad and the other prisoners and missing persons – is as worthy as can be.  However, it cannot on its own grant detention authority.  The words of the stand-in President Chaim Cohn are appropriate here:

“Let no one think that these are no more than formal semantics, which come to undermine a security operation of great value: the regulations were intended to serve the state and its agents as a means of fighting against enemies from within, who come to do their evil damage to public safety; and how different the fighting of the state from the fighting of its enemies, as the one fights while keeping the law, and the other fights while breaching the law.  The moral strength and the substantive justness of the fighting of authorities are entirely dependent on protecting the laws of the state: in giving up this strength and the justness of its fighting, the authorities serve the purposes of the enemy.  The moral weapon is no less important than any other weapon, and may even be more important – and there is no more efficient moral weapon than the rule of law.  It is better that all who need to know, will know, that the rule of law in Israel will never succumb to its enemies.”

[HCJ 320/80 Kawasame v. Minister of Defence [35] at p. 132.]

6.  In my judgment in the appeal the subject of this further hearing I noted that even if the Detentions Law enabled detention for the purpose of using detainees as bargaining chips, it is not appropriate to extend the detention in this case.  As, I have not found that a reasonable possibility existed – and all the more so near certainty – that the discontinuation of the detention will undermine the possibility of releasing Ron Arad or other prisoners or missing persons.  Since the judgment on appeal approximately two and a half years have passed.  During this period neither Ron Arad nor any other prisoner or missing person has been released.  Unfortunately, the time that has passed has not increased the degree of reasonableness of the possibility that the detention of the petitioners would bring about the release of our prisoners and missing persons.

Therefore, I share the views of President Barak, Vice-President Levin, and Justices Or, Mazza, and Zamir, that the petitioners are to be released from their detention.

 

It has been decided as per the judgment of President Barak, against the opposing opinions of Justices M. Cheshin, Y. Kedmi and J. Türkel.

 

4 Nisan 5760

April 12, 2000

 

 

Doe v. District Psychiatric Board for Adults

Case/docket number: 
CrimA 3854/02
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, January 22, 2003
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law-1991 provides that, when a court is of the opinion that one accused of a criminal offence is unfit to stand trial, the accused may be hospitalized. The District Psychiatric Board is responsible to review the case of such a mentally ill accused person, and it can order the accused’s release from the hospital. This petition concerns the amount of time a mentally ill accused person may be hospitalized on the authority of the initial judicially issued criminal hospitalization order.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the treatment of the psychiatric patient must balance between the patients’ rights, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other.  Forced hospitalization of an incompetent criminal defendant infringes his constitutional rights, including his liberty, his dignity, his autonomy and his self image, by imposing a stigma upon the accused long after his release from commitment. Nevertheless, the court stated, these constitutional rights are not absolute.  Opposite them stand the interests of protecting public peace and safety from the accused, as well as the public interest in treating the accused and protecting him from himself. Pursuant to these general principles, the Court held that a mentally ill accused person could not be held indefinitely pursuant to an initial criminal hospitalization order. As such, the Court ordered the court that had issued the original criminal hospitalization order to review the case in order o determine whether forced criminal hospitalization pursuant to the original order had become unreasonable. The Court noted that no explicit statutory provisions governed the reexamination of such criminal hospitalization orders. As such, until the Knesset examined the matter, the Court set out guidelines for the examination of such cases in the future. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

CrimA 3854/02

1.  John Doe

v.

1.  District Psychiatric Board for Adults

2.  The Attorney-General

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 22, 2003]

Before President A. Barak, Justices E. Mazza and D. Beinisch

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

 

Facts: The Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law-1991 provides that, when a court is of the opinion that one accused of a criminal offence is unfit to stand trial, the accused may be hospitalized. The District Psychiatric Board is responsible to review the case of such a mentally ill accused person, and it can order the accused’s release from the hospital. This petition concerns the amount of time a mentally ill accused person may be hospitalized on the authority of the initial judicially issued criminal hospitalization order.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the treatment of the psychiatric patient must balance between the patients’ rights, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other.  Forced hospitalization of an incompetent criminal defendant infringes his constitutional rights, including his liberty, his dignity, his autonomy and his self image, by imposing a stigma upon the accused long after his release from commitment. Nevertheless, the court stated, these constitutional rights are not absolute.  Opposite them stand the interests of protecting public peace and safety from the accused, as well as the public interest in treating the accused and protecting him from himself. Pursuant to these general principles, the Court held that a mentally ill accused person could not be held indefinitely pursuant to an initial criminal hospitalization order. As such, the Court ordered the court that had issued the original criminal hospitalization order to review the case in order o determine whether forced criminal hospitalization pursuant to the original order had become unreasonable. The Court noted that no explicit statutory provisions governed the reexamination of such criminal hospitalization orders. As such, until the Knesset examined the matter, the Court set out guidelines for the examination of such cases in the future.

 

Legislation cited:

Treatment of Mentally Sick Persons Law-1955, §6(a)

The Criminal Procedure Law [New Version]-1982, § 170

Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law-1991 §§ 10m 15(a), 16(a), 17, 21, 24(c), 28, 28(a), 28(b) 29(a), 30(a), 35(b)

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        CApp 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist, IsrSC 52(1) 697

[2]        VCA 2305/00 John Doe v. State of Israel, IsrSC 54(4) 289

[3]        VCA 92/00 John Doe V. State of Israel, IsrSC 54(4) 240

[4]        VA 196/80 Toledano v. State of Israel, IsrSC 35(3) 332

[5]        HCJ 547/84 Of Haemek, Agricultural Society v. Ramat Yeshai Local Council, IsrSC 40(1) 113

 

United States cases cited:

[6]        Jackson v. Indiana, 406 US 715 (1972).

 

Foreign books cited:

[7]        R.D. Makay. Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law 219 (1995);

[8]        E. Tollefson & B. Starkman, Mental Disorder in Criminal Proceedings 115 (1993)

 

Foreign articles cited:

[9]        P. Fennel & F. Koenraadt, Diversion, Europeanization and the Mentally Disordered Offender, in Criminal Justice in Europe- A Comparative Study 171 (P. Fennel et al. eds., 1995)

[10]      A. Feinberg, Out of Mind, Out of Sight: The Disposition of Mentally Disordered Persons Involved in Criminal Proceedings, 3 Monash U.L. Rev. 134 (1975)

[11]      Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C.D.L. Rev. 1 (1993)

[12]      S.N. Verdon-Jones, The Dawn of a ‘New Legalism’ in Australia? The New South Wales Mental Health Act, 1983 and Related Legislation, 8 Int. J.L. & Psychiatry 95 (1986)

 

Miscellaneous:

[13]      9.3 The Laws of Australia, Criminal Law Principles (1993). 

 

Petition denied.

 

For the petitioners— Yehonatan Ginat

For the respondent— Hovav Arzi

 

 

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

      Petitioner was brought to criminal trial. The court found that the petitioner was mentally ill and was unfit to stand trial. The court ordered that the petitioner be hospitalized in a psychiatric institution.  He currently resides in the psychiatric institution, and, despite his medical treatment, remains unfit for trial.  How long may this hospitalization be carried out under the authority of the original judicial hospitalization order?  Is the judicial hospitalization order limited by time, and if so, what is that limitation? This is the question before us in the petition at hand.

 

Facts and Proceedings

 

1.  The petitioner was prosecuted.  He was charged with assault and theft.  The court ruled, based on the opinion of the District Psychiatrist, that the petitioner suffered from a mental disorder, schizophrenia, and that he was not fit to stand trial.  On August 30, 1988, the court instructed that the petitioner be hospitalized pursuant to section 6(a) of the Treatment of Mentally Sick Persons Law-1955.  During his hospitalization, petitioner was once again charged with assaulting and threatening his mother. Pursuant to this indictment, an additional hospitalization order was issued against the petitioner.

 

2.  The petitioner recently approached the Psychiatric Board [hereinafter the Board].  The petitioner requested that the Board grant him a discharge, and cancel the hospitalization order issued against him.  The petitioner based his application on the findings of the doctors of the ward in which the he was hospitalized.  Those doctors had determined that the petitioner showed neither suicidal nor aggressive tendencies, and that he could be granted occasional leave. The Board rejected the discharge request.  It determined that the petitioner presented a danger both to himself as well as to others.  However, the Board decided to allow the petitioner short periods of leave, not to exceed 72 hours.  An appeal against this decision was submitted to the District Court.  The petitioner argued that there was no justification for the fact that the original hospitalization was issued for an indefinite period of time.  He also argued that there was no room to deviate from the doctors’ conclusions—certainly not without giving reasons for doing so.

 
District Court

 

3.   The District Court (Judge Berliner) ruled that the original hospitalization order was not issued for an indefinite period of time.  It also ruled that the Board was permitted to determine, based on its experience and expertise, that the petitioner continued to present a danger, both to himself and to others. The court ordered the Board to reexamine the petitioner’s condition within a month’s time and, if the Board determined that he no longer presented any danger, consider whether to discharge him or take other steps to alleviate the conditions of his hospitalization.  The court also drew the Board’s attention to the need to give reasons when determining whether a patient presents a degree of danger which differs from that suggested by his doctors.  An application for permission to appeal this judgment was submitted.  The application was accepted and permission granted.

 

Continuation of the Proceedings

 

4.  The Board reexamined the petitioner’s case.  He was not discharged from the forced hospitalization.  The Board did not change its assessment of the danger presented by the petitioner.  However, it extended the duration of the occasional periods of leave that could be granted.

 
Petitioner’s Arguments

 

5.  Petitioner argued that, in criminal proceedings, issuing a hospitalization order for an indefinite period of time is unreasonable and disproportional.  Petitioner argued that, in consideration of the long amount of time that has passed since the issue of the original hospitalization order, and taking into account the maximum sentence the petitioner would have been expected to serve had he been convicted, the Board should have cancelled the hospitalization order issued on the “criminal track.”  The petitioner noted that annulling the hospitalization order does not necessarily lead to the discharge of the petitioner from forced hospitalization, as he may still be hospitalized via the “civil track.”  The infringement of the petitioner’s liberty is less severe in civil hospitalization. The petitioner also claimed that the Board has the responsibility to give reasons for its decision, if that decision conflicts with the position of the doctors treating the petitioner. 

 

Respondents’ Arguments

 

6.  The Attorney-General (respondent 2) relies upon the District Court’s judgment.  He claims that, due to their nature, the duration of mental illness cannot be predicted, and thus the validity of judicial, criminal hospitalization orders should not be bound by time. Such limitations would disturb the delicate balance provided by the current law and would also harm the public interest.  The “civil track” is also insufficient, as it does not offer the necessary supervision and control over a person who has proven himself to be dangerous—so it is argued—by committing a criminal offense. The Attorney-General agrees that the Board must give reasons for its decision.  However, in this case, he asserts that the fact that it neglected to do so is not reason enough to invalidate the Board’s decision. 

 

The Normative Framework

 

7.  When there is an indictment, the court, whether by its own initiative or by the appeal of one of the parties, is faced with the question of whether, due to mental illness, the accused is fit for trial.  If the court decides that the accused is unfit for trial, the court must suspend the proceedings. See The Criminal Procedure Law [New Version]-1982, § 170. The court may order that the accused be hospitalized in a psychiatric institution. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law-1991, § 15, which states:

 

15(a) Hospitalization or Clinical Treatment of an Accused by Virtue of a Court Order

 

Where an accused person is brought to trial, and the court is of the opinion, based on the evidence before it, that the accused is not fit to stand trial by reason of his being ill, it may order that he be admitted to a hospital or receive clinical treatment;  Where the court has decided to investigate the guilt of the accused pursuant to section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Law [New Version]-1982 [hereinafter the Criminal Procedure Law], the hospitalization order issued will be valid until the investigation is complete.  When it has been completed, or the investigation has been discontinued and the accused has not been acquitted, the court shall decide on the question of his hospitalization or clinical treatment.

 

While he is in the hospital, the accused is treated by a staff of doctors.  Nevertheless, neither the staff of doctors nor the hospital’s director may order that the accused be discharged.  His liberty is in the hands of the District Psychiatric Board.  This Board reviews the case of an incompetent criminal defendant at least once every six months. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 28(a). It is authorized to approve periods of leave.  It has the authority to unconditionally discharge the patient from the hospital. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 28(b). One of those notified of the date of discharge is the Attorney-General, who may order that the accused be prosecuted for the crime he was charged with. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 21.

 

 8.  What is the objective of hospitalizing an accused person who suffers from mental illness?  The primary objective is “to provide medical treatment.” See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 35(b). If this treatment is successful, the Psychiatric Board will order that the patient be discharged. The Attorney-General will then consider whether to continue the criminal proceedings against the accused. What is the law, however, in a case where the medical treatment is unsuccessful, such that the patient cannot be discharged from the hospital due to the danger he presents to himself and to others, and such that he cannot to be brought to criminal trial?  In such a case, the mentally ill accused will remain in the psychiatric institution on the authority of the hospitalization order. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 35(b). This forced hospitalization infringes upon the liberty and dignity of the patient.  Nevertheless, this infringement is justified in that it is intended both for the protection of the accused as well as for the protection of society. See  CApp 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist, [1] at 707. 

 

9.  This petition is raised against this legal background.  For what length of time may the mentally ill accused be held on the authority of a hospitalization order?  The petitioner before us has been hospitalized for over fourteen years.  Had his trial continued regularly, and had he been convicted, he would have finished serving his sentence long ago.  Can the accused be forcibly hospitalized for such a long period of time?  Does a judicial hospitalization order, which authorizes the hospitalization of the accused, have the power to compel hospitalization for a period of time which exceeds the maximum punishment the accused may have been sentenced to?  See  R.D. Makay. Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law 219 (1995) [7]; P. Fennel & F. Koenraadt, Diversion, Europeanization and the Mentally Disordered Offender, in Criminal Justice in Europe- A Comparative Study 171, 175 (P. Fennel et al. eds., 1995) [9].  And if the Psychiatric Board does not order that the accused be discharged, will he be held in the hospital for the remainder of his life, only because of a hospitalization order issued after charges of assault and theft?  Does this not amount to life imprisonment without the possibility of a pardon? See A. Feinberg, Out of Mind, Out of Sight: The Disposition of Mentally Disordered Persons Involved in Criminal Proceedings, 3 Monash U.L. Rev. 134, 144 (1975) [10].

 

10.  It must be noted that the alternative to the indefinite validity of the judicial hospitalization order is not the discharge of the mental patient. We assume that the accused continues to pose a danger, both to himself and to others.  Thus, continuing the forced hospitalization is justified.  Yet, is it justified that his hospitalization be carried out under the authority of a judicial hospitalization order which originates from a criminal charge that cannot be prosecuted?  In order to understand this dilemma, it is appropriate to clarify that forced hospitalization on the authority of a judicial hospitalization order issued during a criminal proceeding is not the only form of forced hospitalization recognized by the law. See, e.g., Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 17 (examination of a suspect); Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 16(a) (hospitalization of a suspect); Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 15(a) (hospitalization of the accused). In addition to criminal hospitalization under the authority of a judicial order ("the criminal track"), the law also recognizes hospitalization on the authority of a “civil” hospitalization order (“the civil track”). See VCA 2305/00 John Doe v. State of Israel [2].  A comparative study of the criminal and civil tracks shows that the infringement upon the mental patient’s liberty is more severe in the criminal track.  Justice M. Cheshin correctly noted:

 

Comparing the status of those moving along the civil tack to the status of those moving along the criminal track will reveal to us—unsurprisingly—that the status of the former is more comfortable than that of the latter; the civil track is more comfortable for the patient; the criminal track more difficult.

 

John Doe, [2] at 311. Thus, for example, in the criminal track, only the Psychiatric Board is authorized to discharge a mentally ill accused, and only it has the authority to grant periods of leave. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 28. In the civil track, on the other hand, the director of the hospital may discharge the patient from the hospital and approve periods of leave. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 30(a). Furthermore, in the criminal track, the forced hospitalization, on the authority of the judicial order, continues until the Psychiatric Board orders that the accused be discharged. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 28. In the civil track, on the other hand, the period of hospitalization cannot exceed six months, unless the Psychiatric Board extends the period, and each additional extension cannot exceed six months. Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 10.

 

11.  As such, the real question before us is for what length of time may a mentally ill accused person be held on the criminal track?  Is there not a point in time at which the accused may no longer be held through the criminal track, and where the hospitalization must be carried out through the civil track, which is more comfortable for the mental patient?  Of course, on both tracks, the mental patient will be discharged from hospitalization if such discharge is medically justified.  However, where the mental patient presents a danger to himself and to others in such a way as to justify his forced hospitalization, when should the mental patient be transferred from the criminal track to the civil track?

 

12.  These questions are not unique to us.  They have arisen in several modern democracies.  In the United States, for example, in the State of Indiana, a law was in effect which allowed the indefinite pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously ruled that this law was unconstitutional.  It ruled that a period of judicially forced hospitalization can last only for the period of time reasonably necessary to decide whether the accused will, in the future, be fit for trial.  Justice Blackmun wrote:

 

We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period necessary to determine whether there is substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.  If it is determined that this is not the case, then the state must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.  

 

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 US 715, 738 (1972) [6]. Following this judgment, a number of states changed their laws.  The new statutes generally established a period of time, after which the mentally ill criminal defendant would be transferred to a civil track. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C.D.L. Rev. 1, 9 (1993) [11] [hereinafter Morris & Meloy].  In Canada, the Penal Law specifies the maximum period that an incompetent criminal defendant may be forcibly hospitalized.  After that period has passed, if the accused continues to present a danger, he may be hospitalized under civil legislation. See E. Tollefson & B. Starkman, Mental Disorder in Criminal Proceedings 115 (1993) [8] [hereinafter Tollefson & Starkman].  In New South Wales, Australia, the law establishes a special mechanism through which an incompetent criminal defendant is transferred from the criminal track to the civil track. See S.N. Verdon-Jones, The Dawn of a ‘New Legalism’ in Australia? The New South Wales Mental Health Act, 1983 and Related Legislation, 8 Int. J.L. & Psychiatry 95, 110 (1986) [12] [hereinafter Verdon-Jones].

 

13.  What, then, is the law in Israel?  The law contains no explicit provision regarding a maximum time period for a judicially ordered hospitalization issued during a criminal proceeding.  Furthermore, there is no explicit provisions concerning the transfer of an accused from the criminal track over to the civil track.  Does this mean that the judicial criminal order is indefinite, and that so long as the Psychiatric Board does not order that the mentally ill accused be discharged, in accordance with its authority under section 28(b) of the law, he will remain hospitalized via the criminal track?

 

14.  Our response to these questions is that the Treatment of Mentally Sick Persons Law-1991 is deficient in that it does not explicitly regulate the issue at hand.  We hope that, following this judgment, the law will be amended and will provide a comprehensive statutory arrangement which appropriately balances the psychiatric patient’s liberty against concerns of public safety.  Yet, until the law is amended, can we not offer any assistance?  Our response is that although we cannot, through judicial means, set up the mechanisms and institutions which can only be established through legislation, we can make progress towards the proper arrangement with the few legal tools at our disposal. 

 

15. The Treatment of Mentally Sick Persons Law-1991 does not stand alone.  It is one link in a long chain of Israeli legislation.  It exists within the framework of the Israeli legal system, which constitutes the “normative material” in which the law is embedded.  This normative framework includes values and fundamental principles which constitute the objective goals of the law.  Relevant to the issue at hand is the principle of reasonableness.  We must keep in mind that the psychiatric patient’s treatment demands that we reasonably balance between the patients’ rights, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other.  Forced hospitalization of an incompetent criminal defendant infringes his constitutional rights, including his liberty, his dignity, his autonomy and his self image, by imposing a stigma upon the accused long after his release from commitment. See Valinchik [1]; VCA 92/00 John Doe V. State of Israel, [3] at 249-51; VA 196/80 Toledano v. State of Israel, [4] at 336.  Nevertheless, these constitutional rights are not absolute.  Opposite them stand the interests of protecting public peace and safety from the accused, as well as the public interest in treating the accused and protecting him from himself.

 

16.  The principle of reasonableness also applies to hospitalization orders issued by judges during criminal proceedings. Compare HCJ 547/84 Of Haemek, Agricultural Society v. Ramat Yeshai Local Council, [5] at 141.  It also applies to the conditions for issuing those orders, as well as to the conditions for their continuing validity.  Hospitalization orders lie outside the “zone of reasonableness” when it becomes apparent that there is no longer an actual probability that the mentally ill accused will become fit for trial. Hospitalization orders also go fall outside the zone of reasonableness when—regardless of the probability of the defendant eventually becoming fit for trial—the ratio between the period of time the accused has been hospitalized and the maximum sentence that the accused would have received had he been convicted is unreasonable.  In these and other situations, continuing to implement the hospitalization order may become unreasonable over time. 

 

Comparative law may also be of aid here.  In a number of states of the United States, the period of hospitalization via the criminal track may last only as long as the maximum period of imprisonment which one would have served for committing the crimes he has been charged with. See Morris & Meloy, [11] at 16-17.  In contrast, in some of the states, there is one uniform hospitalization period set for all offences. Morris & Meloy, [11] 14-15. Canada has implemented the “caps” method, which divides criminal offences into three categories and sets a maximum period of “criminal track” hospitalization for each.  In the first category, which includes offences such as treason and murder, the maximum period is hospitalization for life.  In the second category, which includes offences for causing bodily harm or compromising national security, the maximum period is hospitalization for ten years.  The third, residual category consists of the remainder of unspecified offences, and the maximum period of hospitalization for these offences is two years. See Tollefson & Starkman, [8] at 116.  New South Wales, in Australia, employs a different method.  There, when a person is held to be unfit for trial, his case is transferred to a Psychiatric Tribunal which assesses whether he will become fit for trial within the next 12 months.  If the tribunal determines that he will become fit for trial, the court then orders that he be hospitalized for that period of time.  If, on the other hand, the tribunal decides that the defendant will not recover within one year, the Public Prosecutor must decide whether a special hearing should be held or whether the charges should be dropped.  This hearing is held in a manner which is as similar as possible to criminal proceedings, and it may result either in acquittal, acquittal by reason of mental illness, or a ruling that the crime was committed.  If the hearing concludes that the crime was indeed committed, the court must rule on whether the accused would have been sentenced to imprisonment had he been fit for trial and been convicted. This period is called the “limiting term,” and it constitutes the maximum period for “criminal track” hospitalization. See 9.3 The Laws of Australia, Criminal Law Principles 133-34 (1993).  This law also grants the court the authority to determine that a patient who is unfit for trial be considered a “continued treatment patient,” thus entitling him to the rights to which a patient hospitalized via the civil track is entitled. See Verdon-Jones, [12] at 113. 

 

17.  What is the result when the duration of the hospitalization order lies outside the zone of reasonableness?  The result, of course, is not the immediate cancellation of the order, nor is the mentally ill accused allowed to leave the hospital as he wishes.  Such a result would be unreasonable and should be avoided.  Hospital gates should not open of themselves.  A conscious determination is necessary, which may not lead to the release of the patient, but rather to transferring him from the criminal track to the civil track.  What conscious determination must be made and who is to make it?   It is of course appropriate that these questions be explicitly answered in legislation.  Yet, what is the law where such an explicit provision is absent?  It is insufficient to simply determine that in principle, the hospitalization order is unreasonable.  Detailed arrangements are needed to actualize this determination.  What are these arrangements and what is their legal basis?

 

18.  It seems to me that the answer to these questions is that the court must decide whether the hospitalization order should be cancelled.  The court issued the original hospitalization order, and it is responsible to decide whether time has brought the need for its cancellation.   A hospitalizing order is not automatically cancelled as a result of its having becoming unreasonable.  However, unreasonableness is a cause for the cancellation of the hospitalization order by whoever issued it, namely, the court itself.  So long as the court has not cancelled the hospitalization order, it remains valid.  No other official may cancel the hospitalization order.  As such, we are of the opinion that the Psychiatric Board does not have the power to cancel the hospitalization order.

 

19.  How will the court become aware of the need to reconsider the reasonableness of the hospitalization order?  Usually, the court does not act of its own initiative.  It must be prompted by an interested party.  Who is this party?  Of course, the psychiatric patient himself is allowed to approach the court and request the annulment of the hospitalization order.  However, due to his condition, this task must not only be left to him.  An institutional arrangement that has the ability to follow the development of the situation must be ensured.  For this reason, we should also not be satisfied with granting permission to the relatives of the accused.  Which institutions may here be considered?  One of the institutions which may be considered is the Psychiatric Board.  It reviews the psychiatric patient’s case every six months. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 28(a).  It is familiar with the psychiatric patient's condition.  It is aware of whether there is an actual probability that the accused may be fit for trial, and what the chances of his recovery are.  A jurist who is able to assess the necessity of approaching the court stands at the head of the Board. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 24(c).  One of the obstacles before such a resolution is that the Psychiatric Board is a statutory body of limited authority.  I doubt that the authority to approach the court in the matter at hand falls within its authority.

 

20.  Another institutional agent is the Attorney-General.  He charged the accused, and is aware of the hospitalization order.  He has the ability to appeal the decisions of the Psychiatric Board before the court. See Treatment of the Mentally Ill Law, § 29(a).  As such, he has information regarding the condition of the accused.  As one who is appointed over the public interest, he has the responsibly, and the means, to follow the development of the situation and examine whether the continuing validity of the hospitalization order lies outside the zone of reasonableness. He has the ability to turn to the court and request that the hospitalization order be cancelled or that the charges be dropped.  As one who is responsible for the public interest, he also has the ability to approach the District Psychiatrist and encourage him to transfer the patient from the criminal track to the civil track. 

 

21.  Thus, absent specific legislation, and so long as such legislation has not been passed by the Knesset, the practical resolution which may be achieved within the bounds of the law is that the Attorney-General shall be responsible for ensuring the continuing reasonableness of the hospitalization order. It is appropriate that, for this purpose, detailed guidelines be set out which arrange a system for supervising the hospitalization of the accused.  Within the framework of this system, the Psychiatric Board may be asked to report to the Attorney-General regarding its decision for continuing to hospitalize the accused.  Furthermore, the guidelines may also specify that, after a certain period of time, the Attorney-General will examine the need to continue hospitalizing the accused via the criminal track.  If the Attorney-General is of the opinion that there is room to cancel the hospitalization order, he may approach the court.  He can simultaneously approach the District Psychiatrist, in order to bring to his attention the need to transfer the accused to the civil track.  Additionally, the guidelines may specify a maximum period of hospitalization that a mentally ill accused may remain on the criminal track.   When designating this period, The Attorney-General can draw upon the comparative law here discussed.  The Attorney-General will have to take into account the nature of the offence that the mental patient is charged with, its severity, the conditions under which it was committed, the sentence specified by the law, the amount of time which has passed since the beginning of his hospitalization, as well as the patient’s chances of recovery.  In our opinion, this solution, whereby the authorities will be directed by detailed, clear guidelines, is the proper resolution to be implemented until the Knesset considers this matter.  We are aware that our resolution is not free of difficulty.  However, these difficulties pale in comparison to the current situation, where an accused may be forcibly hospitalized under the authority of an unreasonable hospitalization order.

 
From the General to the Specific

 

22.  The case at hand cries for help.  For over fourteen years the petitioner has been in a psychiatric institution under the authority of a hospitalization order.  He has been forgotten, and had it not been for his commendable attorney, he would probably have continued in that situation for some time.  The attorney acted admirably in approaching the District Court.  The court must examine the accused’s case.  It must hear the Attorney-General’s opinion regarding the continuing validity of the charge and the validity of the hospitalization order.  It must decide whether there is room to cancel the hospitalization order, while also taking into account the arrangements for hospitalization via the civil track.

 

The result is that we grant this appeal, and return the case to the District Court so that it may rule in accordance with par. 22.

 

Justice E. Mazza

I agree.

 

Justice D. Beinisch

I agree.

 

 

Petition Granted.

January 22, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

Translated by:   Leora Dahan

Edited by:             Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dayan v. Wilk

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 2481/93
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, February 9, 1994
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner applied for a permit to hold an assembly directly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas political party. The District Commissioner of Police refused the permit, because it would violate the rights of privacy of the rabbi, his family and his neighbours.

 

Held: It is necessary to balance the petitioner’s right to freedom of assembly against the right of privacy of the public figure, his family and his neighbours. According to Vice-President Barak, these rights are of equal importance: in principle there is a right to hold an assembly outside the private home of a public figure, but this right must not materially intrude on the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours. When the home is used to some extent also for public activity, then slightly less protection will be given to the right of privacy of the public figure in his home than in a case where the home is not used for public activity. According to Justice S. Levin, the right of privacy of the public figure in his home is of greater importance than the right to hold an assembly outside that home. According to Justice Goldberg, an assembly outside the private home of a public figure should only be allowed when he conducts all or most of his public activity from home.

 

In the present case, Vice-President Barak and Justice Goldberg would have granted the petition and allowed the petitioner to hold an assembly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, if the petitioner had agreed to restrictions of time, place and manner. The petitioner, however, refused to agree to any restrictions.

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 2481/93

Yosef Dayan

v.

1. Yehuda Wilk – Jerusalem District Commissioner

2.       Rabbi Ovadya Yosef

3.       Dr Meira Sarel and Professor Shalom

4.       Shoshana Eitan

5.       Ricka Barsela

6.       Oren Sheindel

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[9 February 1994]

Before Vice-President A. Barak and Justices S. Levin, E. Goldberg

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner applied for a permit to hold an assembly directly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas political party. The District Commissioner of Police refused the permit, because it would violate the rights of privacy of the rabbi, his family and his neighbours.

 

Held: It is necessary to balance the petitioner’s right to freedom of assembly against the right of privacy of the public figure, his family and his neighbours. According to Vice-President Barak, these rights are of equal importance: in principle there is a right to hold an assembly outside the private home of a public figure, but this right must not materially intrude on the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours. When the home is used to some extent also for public activity, then slightly less protection will be given to the right of privacy of the public figure in his home than in a case where the home is not used for public activity. According to Justice S. Levin, the right of privacy of the public figure in his home is of greater importance than the right to hold an assembly outside that home. According to Justice Goldberg, an assembly outside the private home of a public figure should only be allowed when he conducts all or most of his public activity from home.

In the present case, Vice-President Barak and Justice Goldberg would have granted the petition and allowed the petitioner to hold an assembly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, if the petitioner had agreed to restrictions of time, place and manner. The petitioner, however, refused to agree to any restrictions.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, ss. 3, 7, 7(a), 8.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, s. 226.

Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 83, 84, 84(a), 85.

Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, ss. 2(1), 4, 5, 18, 19.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 3080/92 – unreported.

[2]      HCJ 148/79 Saar v. Minister of Interior [1980] IsrSC 34(2) 169.

[3]      FH 16/61 Companies Registrar v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 7.

[4]      HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv–Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[5]      FH 9/77 Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337.

[6]      CA 524/88 Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [1991] IsrSC 45(4) 529.

[7]      HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registrar [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.

[8]      HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commander [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 393; IsrSJ 7 109.

[9]      HCJ 243/62 Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [1962] IsrSC 16 2407; IsrSJ 4 208.

[10]    HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229.

[11]    MApp 82/83 State of Israel v. Alia [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 738.

[12]    HCJ 3815/90 Gilat v. Minister of Police [1991] IsrSC 45(3) 414.

[13]    FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16 430; IsrSJ 4 112.

[14]    EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83.

[15]    HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1.

[16]    FH 9/83 Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 837.

[17]    HCJ 109/70 Coptic Orthodox Mutran of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police [1971] IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[18]      HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421.

[19]    HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90.

[20]    CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 840.

[23]    HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255.

[22]    HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 701.

[23]    CrimA 126/62 Disenchik v. Attorney-General [1963] IsrSC 17 169; IsrSJ 5 152.

[24]    HCJ 869/92 Zvilli v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Thirteenth Knesset [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 692.

[25]    HCJ 456/73 – unreported.

[26]    HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd v. Minister of Building and Housing [1991] IsrSC 45(5) 50.

[27]    HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229, [1992-4] IsrLR 19.

[28]    CA 461/62 Zim Israeli Shipping Co. Ltd v. Maziar [1963] IsrSC 17 1319; IsrSJ 5 120.

[29]    CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464.

[30]    CA 670/79 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Mizrahi [1987] IsrSC 40(2) 169.

 

Israel Magistrates Court cases cited:

[31]    CrimC (Jer.) 4300/81 – (unreported).

 

Australian cases cited:

[32]    Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29.

 

American cases cited:

[33]    Rowan v. Post Office Dept. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

[34]    City of Wauwatosa v. King 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).

[35]    Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollack 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

[36]    Martin v. Struthers 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

[37]    Gregory v. Chicago 394 U.S. 111 (1969).

[38]    Carey v. Brown 447 U.S. 455 (1980).

[39]    Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

[40]    Pruneyard Shopping Centre v. Robins 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

[41]    United Electrical, R. & M. Workers v. Baldwin 67 F. Supp. 235 (1946).

[42]    Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

[43]    Frisby v. Schultz 487 U.S. 77 (1988).

[44]    Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

 

English cases cited:

[45]    Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21 (PC).

[46]    Francis v. Chief of Police [1973] 2 All ER 251 (PC).

 

German cases cited:

[47]    Ovg. Koblenz, Beschl v. 24.5.86 7B 36/86.

 

Indian cases cited:

[48]    Indulal v. State (1963) 50 A.I.R. Gujarat 259.

 

Canadian cases cited:

[49]    R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

[50]    Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.

[51]    Cheema v. Ross (1991) 82 D.L.R. (4th) 213.

 

For the first respondent — N. Arad, Director of High Court of Justice Department at State Attorney’s Office.

For respondents 2-6 — Y. Bar Sela.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Vice-President A. Barak

A asks the competent authority in the police force for a permit to hold an assembly. He wants to hold it, together with others, on the pavement outside the apartment of B (in a cooperative house). B is a public figure. His apartment is also used for public purposes. B opposes the granting of the permit. The neighbours also oppose it. What is the scope of discretion of the competent authority in the police force in such circumstances? This is the question before us.

The facts

1.    Rabbi Ovadya Yosef is a spiritual leader. He is the president of the Council of Torah Scholars. This council is the supreme body of the Shas movement. This movement is a political party represented in the Knesset. It is a member of the coalition. Rabbi Yosef lives, together with his wife, in a cooperative house in a residential neighbourhood in Jerusalem (36 Jabotinsky Street). Rabbi Yosef has an office elsewhere (Hizkiyahu HaMelech Street). Persons interested in meeting Rabbi Yosef must arrange such meetings in advance with the rabbi’s office. Rabbi Yosef’s family lives in his private apartment. The rabbi does not regularly hold meetings in his home about matters relating to his public activities. Nonetheless, he receives visits from persons in government at his apartment, such as the Prime Minister, cabinet-ministers, deputy-ministers and members of the Knesset. The frequency of the visits of deputy-ministers and members of the Knesset from the Shas party is four to five visits a month. The Minister of the Interior (a Shas representative) usually visits Rabbi Yosef once a week. The Council of Torah Scholars does not meet in the rabbi’s house.

2.    The petitioner applied to hold an assembly (on 6 May 1993) outside Rabbi Ovadya Yosef’s apartment. He wants to ‘protest the continued participation of Shas in the Government’. He expects two hundred and fifty participants. He wants to use a stage and two loudspeakers. The assembly is to last two hours (19.00-21.00). The demonstrators are to meet at Wingate Square (near the rabbi’s house) and disperse there. On 2 May 1993, the petitioner applied to the Jerusalem District Commissioner of the Israel Police Force to receive a licence for the assembly. Clarifications requested from the petitioner indicated that the demonstrators intend ‘to approach Rabbi Ovadya Yosef’s house with signs and loudspeakers, to erect a stage and protest against the rabbi and the Shas party’. In communications with the petitioner, it was suggested that he hold the assembly in the plaza of the Van Leer Institute (an aerial distance of two hundred meters). This is situated nearby. The petitioner rejected the suggestion.

3.    The Jerusalem District Commissioner (on 4 May 1993) denied the petitioner’s request. The reason was the ‘ruling held by the Supreme Court with regard to a demonstration involving an intrusion into the private domain of a public figure and a harassment in his private life’. The petition before us was filed against this decision. We issued on that day a show cause order as requested. We ordered that Rabbi Ovadya Yosef should be joined as an additional respondent in the petition. We fixed the hearing for 12 May 1993, in view of the statement of the petitioner that he wanted to hold the meeting on a new date. At the beginning of the hearing (on 12 May 1993), we discovered that the service of the court papers on Rabbi Ovadya Yosef was not done properly. We postponed the continued hearing of the petition to a new date, after proper performance of service. We granted an application of residents (the applicants in HCJApp 2593/93) to be joined as additional respondents in the petition. Several days later (on 18 May 1993), we held a hearing on the petition itself. We heard the arguments of the parties. The attorney of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef was asked to submit, within a week, a list of the frequency of the visits of persons in Government to the rabbi’s house during the last month. The parties were given leave to submit further arguments in writing.

The petitioner’s position

4.    According to the petitioner, the police’s position deprives him of his basic right to freedom of speech. The purpose of the assembly is to draw public attention —

‘to the protest of Sefardim (Jews of oriental origin) against the direction in which the rabbi was going. We approach the head of the pyramid in order to influence him, for his opinions influence others.’

The petitioner further claims that the police are discriminating against him. In the past, a permit was given to hold an assembly opposite the private residence of the Prime Minister (in Ramat-Aviv), and opposite the apartments of Supreme Court justices. According to the petitioner, Rabbi Ovadya Yosef carries out his political activity mainly from his apartment. The rabbi is ‘a figure standing at the head of a political movement, and his movement is involved in an acute political controversy among the Israeli public, and it is therefore inconceivable that he is immune to public criticism.’

The position of the police

5.    The position of the Jerusalem District Commissioner is mainly based on the consideration about the intrusion into the private life of a public figure and harassing him in his private life. The first respondent (hereafter — ‘the respondent’) relies on a guideline of the Attorney-General that ‘a permit to hold a demonstration directed against a public figure may be refused if it is to be near his private residence, as distinct from his place of work…’ (Attorney-General’s guideline no. 21.566, (‘freedom of assembly’), s. 12(e)). In the respondent’s opinion, the significance of holding the assembly and its immediate effect is a disturbance, harassment and intrusion into the private life of the rabbi, his family members and his neighbours. In these circumstances, the right of the petitioner and his friends to demonstrate must yield to the right of the rabbi, the members of his family and his neighbours not to be harassed in their private lives. In her arguments before us, Mrs Arad, arguing for the respondent, pointed out that the freedom of speech does not include the freedom to force another person to listen to that speech. A demonstration whose purpose is to put pressure on a specific person should not be permitted in the name of freedom of speech. Within the framework of the considerations for granting a permit, the District Commissioner must take into account the right of privacy of the rabbi and his family. He must also take into account the fact that the demonstration will cause a nuisance. Mrs Arad further argued that the petitioner wants to hold an assembly on public land, but at the entrance to a person’s house, literally adjacent to his private premises. This is likely to constitute a real nuisance to him and intrude upon his privacy. The consideration of preventing an intrusion on privacy is a relevant factor that must be considered. The rabbi and members of his household may become involuntary ‘prisoners’, in that they will be a captive audience; among the District Commissioner’s considerations, he must take into account the reasonable balance required in realizing the right of free speech against the right to privacy. In this respect, the fact that the rabbi has public standing is insufficient to justify an intrusion on his privacy. This right is currently protected both in the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and with regard to the petitioner’s freedom of speech, this can be exercised at some distance from the door of the rabbi’s house, without undermining the purpose of the assembly and the message that it carries to the public.

6.    In his reply, the District Commissioner pointed out that when he refused to grant the permit, he assumed that it referred to the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. He did not imagine that a claim might be made that the rabbi’s apartment is also used as an office. A claim to this effect was never made by the petitioner during the contacts with him. Nonetheless, when the claim was raised, it was also investigated. The attorney of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef explained the actual situation, and in view of this explanation there is no justification for intruding on the privacy of the rabbi and the members of his household. Neither is there any discrimination, for in similar circumstances applications to hold demonstrations outside the private homes of public officials were refused.

7.    In his affidavit of reply, the District Commissioner mentioned another consideration. It is impossible to hold an assembly on the plaza at the intersection of Jabotinsky Street and Marcus Street. The crossroad is a ‘traffic island’, approximately twenty metres in diameter, at an intersection of four main roads. The plaza is covered with decorative plants and grass and there is no access to pedestrians. It was not designed for holding assemblies, erecting platforms, for meetings or for gatherings. An assembly as requested should not be held at the intersection of Jabotinsky Street and Marcus Street since there is no suitable physical location for this. The assembly can be held nearby. Nonetheless, the District Commissioner points out that ‘the most important reason given for refusing the request was in essence the applicants’ demand that the assembly had to take place outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef.’

8.    The respondent rejects the claims of discrimination. He points out that in the past a petition was filed against his decision not to allow a demonstration or a disturbance to be held outside the homes of judges. The petition was dismissed in limine (HCJ 3080/92 [1]). Similarly approval was not given in the past to hold demonstrations outside the private home of the Prime Minister, where he lives in Ramat-Aviv.

The position of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef

9.    Rabbi Ovadya Yosef supported the District Commissioner’s position. His attorney pointed out that ‘the rabbi’s apartment is not used as his office, even though, in the course of his daily affairs, important visitors and guests whom the rabbi cannot receive in his office come to the rabbi’s apartment, and the apartment essentially serves as his home where the rabbi spends most of the day and night in study.’ In a statement on behalf of the rabbi, it was also pointed out that —

‘More than the rabbi suffers from the ongoing harm to his ability to enjoy his private apartment, the rabbi’s wife, who is unwell, suffers greatly from the disturbances which include, inter alia, people shouting at her when she goes out and comes in, and banging on the door of the apartment late at night. In addition to this there is the suffering of the neighbours.’

It should also be noted that ‘the congregating of many dozens of people and speeches made with loudspeakers, would constitute a serious and real disturbance to the rabbi’s household and to all the neighbours.’ ‘Both the rabbi and his neighbours who live in the building are entitled to lead their private lives without disturbance and without any disruption of their lifestyle. The rabbi and the members of his household are entitled to leave and enter their home freely, to pass along the pavements adjoining their home, and not to be exposed to fears and injuries.’

The neighbours’ position

10. Respondents 3-6 are neighbours of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. They are residents in the building where his apartment is situated. They wish to support the decision of the District Commissioner. They point out that ‘for some time a kind of mini-demonstration has been held next to the building in the form of a protest vigil. This phenomenon has recurred from time to time over a period of years.’ They add:

‘The most recent protest vigil began several weeks ago. At first it was right in front of the building next to the entrance to the house. The participants in the vigil brought chairs and tables and signs, and they sat around the tables, eating, drinking and talking. In addition, one car or more always accompanied the group, and this contained equipment and supplies. The police surrounded the demonstrators with protective barriers, and on the police barriers the participants hung up protest signs against the Prime Minister, Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, Minister Deri and other similar signs. After a while, and apparently as a result of complaints made by neighbours, the police moved the protest vigil from the front of the building to the side of the building, on the pavement next to the plaza adjacent to the building.’

The neighbours emphasize that the protest vigil has caused an intolerable disturbance to the residents of the building and it has disrupted the lives of the residents of the building. This was the background for the fundamental position of the neighbours. They recognize the importance of freedom of speech. It has the same status as a person’s right to enjoy his privacy and his freedom to enjoy his own home and property without interference. The petitioner can realize his freedom of speech at some distance from the respondents’ house. Among its considerations, the police must take into account the neighbours’ right to privacy, enjoyment of their apartments and quiet living. Just as a property right warrants protection, the right to privacy and enjoyment of property also warrants protection. The neighbours have no other remedy. Applying to the civil court will not help them. An injunction against the organizers is ineffective, for others will come to demonstrate. A civil court can examine the question of nuisance, but not the legality of the permit. The neighbours have the standing to turn to the police and oppose the granting of a permit to the petitioner. From this standing derives their right also to apply to the court against a decision to grant a permit. ‘Just as a person can apply to this honourable court for the right to demonstrate, the door of the honourable court must also be open to anyone in Israel whose privacy is being invaded.’

The normative framework

11. The normative premise is enshrined in s. 84 of the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 (hereafter — ‘the Police Ordinance’). This provision provides that the district commissioner of police may determine — whether in general or in a specific instance — that holding an assembly or a procession requires a licence. This decision depends upon whether the district commissioner of police thinks this is necessary in order ‘to maintain public security or public order’. On the basis of this provision, district commissioners of police have issued general notices whereby anyone who wishes to organize or conduct a procession or an assembly out of doors must obtain a permit (see HCJ 148/79 Saar v. Minister of Interior [2], at p. 173). Under this provision, anyone wishing to organize or hold an assembly (which under s. 83 of the Police Ordinance means a gathering of fifty or more persons for the purpose of hearing a speech or lecture) or a procession  (which means, under the definition in s. 83 of the Police Ordinance is a march or assembly in which 50 or more persons are to walk together) must apply to the district commissioner of police for a licence. The Police Ordinance provides that the officer in charge may grant the licence, refuse it, or grant it subject to conditions (s. 85 of the Police Ordinance). The Police Ordinance does not establish the scope of the discretion given to the officer in charge (see D. Libai, ‘The Right to Assemble and Demonstrate in Israel’, 2 Iyunei Mishpat, 1973, 54, at p. 58). This means that the officer in charge must exercise his discretion within the framework of the purpose for which he was given the authority (see FH 16/61 Companies Registrar v. Kardosh [3]). This purpose includes a specific purpose and a general purpose (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa [4] at p. 326). The specific purpose is enshrined in the Police Ordinance, and it concerns maintaining security and public order. The general purpose concerns protecting and promoting fundamental values, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of movement, property rights and the right of privacy. Justice Shamgar discussed this, saying:

‘… the recognition of basic freedoms as a substantial part of the Israeli legal system leads also to the conclusion that the basic freedoms are, both in name and in purpose, a part of the law, i.e., as basic rules that guide and formulate ways of thinking and legal interpretation, and influence these by their character and their purpose’ (FH 9/77 Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 359).

I too discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘… the constitutional premise is the existence and protection of basic rights in a democratic regime. The assumption is that the legislature (parliament or a delegated authority), when passing legislation, wishes to maintain and protect basic rights. It follows that the purpose of all legislation is to maintain and protect basic rights and not to harm them’ (CA 524/88, Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [6], at p. 56).

And in another case I said:

‘The basic principles of the system and basic human rights determine the purpose of legislation. The presumption is that the purpose of legislation is to realize the principles of the system, and to promote human rights in it. These principles constitute a kind of “normative umbrella” that extends over all legislation… they permeate into all legislation and constitute its purpose’ (HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of the Population Registrar at the Ministry of Interior [7], at p. 763.

We will consider these purposes and the relationship between them.

The right to hold an assembly or a procession

12. Holding an assembly, procession or picket is one of the basic human rights in Israel (Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]; HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8]). This right ‘is recognized, alongside the freedom of speech or as deriving therefrom, as belonging to those freedoms which shape the character of the Government in Israel as a democratic government’ (ibid., at p. 398). ‘Through this freedom, means of expression are granted to those who do not have access to political or commercial avenues of expression. For this reason our legal system, like the legal systems of other enlightened democracies, accepts that the right of demonstration and assembly has a recognized place in the hall of basic human rights’ (D. Kretzmer, ‘Allocating Resources to Protect Demonstrations: The Israeli Approach’, Freedom of Expression and the Charter, ed. D. Scheiderman, 1991, 424). In the past, this right was recognized in case-law, and it was one of those ‘basic rights that are “unwritten”, but which derive directly from the character of the State as a freedom-loving democracy.’ (Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [9], at p. 2415 {216}). It appears that now this right can be derived from the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides a statutory constitutional basis for the human right to dignity and liberty. The freedom to express oneself — in words alone or by expressive actions — is a major expression of human dignity and liberty. Indeed, ‘the freedom of demonstration and assembly has a broad ideological basis, at the centre of which is the recognition of the worth of the human being, his dignity, the freedom given to him to develop his personality, and the desire to maintain a democratic form of Government’ (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at p. 398 {114}).

13. In analyzing the constitutional right we did not distinguish between an assembly, a procession or a picket. All three are characterized by the fact that the speaker has a physical presence at the place of the expression. Nonetheless, Israeli law distinguishes between these forms of expression. Thus, for example, a permit is required for holding an  ‘assembly’ or a ‘procession’, but a permit is not required for a picket (see CrimC (Jer.) 4300/81 [31] and Kretzmer, ‘Demonstrations and the Law’, 19 Isr. L. Rev. 1984, 47). This derives from the special arrangements in the Police Ordinance. As we have seen, the Ordinance requires a licence for holding an assembly or a procession. Assembly is defined in s. 83 as follows:

‘ “assembly” – fifty or more persons who have congregated in order to hear a speech or lecture on a political issue or in order to discuss that issue.’

It follows that fifty or more persons holding a picket, without having ‘congregated in order to hear a speech’ does not constitute an assembly. The same is true of forty-nine or less persons who have congregated to hear a speech or lecture. ‘Procession’ is defined in s. 83 as follows:

‘ “procession” – fifty or more persons walking together, or who have congregated in order to walk together, from one place to another, whether they are actually moving or not, and whether they are organized in any specific form or not.’

It follows that fifty or more persons who have not congregated in order to walk together do not constitute a procession. The same applies to forty-nine or less persons who have congregated together to walk together. Other arrangements can be found in the Penal Law, 5737-1977, and in the Protection of Privacy Law. I will first analyse the constitutional rights in accordance with their inherent nature, without reference to these special definitions. Thereafter I will examine the influence of the said provisions, in so far as they are relevant to this case, on the realization of the constitutional rights.

14. An assembly, procession or picket are characterized inter alia by the fact that the participant in an assembly, procession or picket has a physical presence at the place of the expression (see Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at p. 51). This presence may naturally impair the interests and values of others. A procession through city roads is liable to impair the right of movement of those using the roads. An assembly or picket next to a house may impair the use and enjoyment derived by the residents of the building from the land in their possession. An assembly, procession or picket may harm public order. This ‘friction’ between the right of assembly, procession or picketing and other values and interests necessitates a balance between the conflicting rights, involving reciprocal concessions. We will address the nature of this balance below. It expresses the ‘relativity’ of the constitutional right. In this case, it should be emphasized that the restriction of the right of assembly, procession or holding a picket does not derive from the ‘inherent’ nature of the right, or its own innate insufficiency. The restriction of the right of assembly or procession or holding a picket is derived from considerations that are ‘external’ to the right itself, which derive from the existence of competing rights and conflicting interests. Indeed, we must distinguish between matters that are included within the inherent nature of a basic right (‘the extent of the right’) and the degree of recognition given to its inherent nature in a given context (‘the extent of the protection’): see HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [10], at p. 33 {244}, and also F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Cambridge, 1982.).

Property rights and the right of privacy

15. An assembly, procession or picket are all liable to interfere with a person’s ability to use and enjoy his property. When the assembly or picket take place on a person’s property without his consent, they interfere with his property rights. The same applies to an assembly or picket that are supposed to take place in the streets of the city that are intended for assemblies, when they are held outside a person’s house or apartment. In such a case, the assembly or picket may interfere with the person’s ability to enjoy his property, namely the ability to escape into one’s own private property from the pressures of society and the inquisitive public eye. Property rights have been recognized by Israeli case-law as a constitutional right (see Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [6]; J. Weissman, Property Rights: General Part, The Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1993, 37). In particular, the assembly, procession and picket interfere with a person’s right of privacy. This right is also a constitutional basic right (see MApp 82/83 State of Israel v. Alia [11], at p. 741, and cf. HCJ 3815/90 Gilat v. Minister of Police [12], at p. 424). These two basic rights — property rights and the right of privacy — were recognized as basic rights by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Basic Law states: ‘One may not harm a person’s property’ (s. 3) and ‘Every person is entitled to privacy and confidentiality’ (s. 7(a)). For the purposes of petition before us, we do not need to set down the boundary between property rights and the right of privacy, or between them and other rights. Since the focus of the petition lies in the violation of the right of privacy, we will consider this issue, and reserve judgment on the question whether, in addition to the violation of the right of privacy, there is also a violation of the resident’s property rights.

16. Every person in Israel is ‘entitled to privacy’ (s. 7(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). The scope of this right is not entirely free of doubt. Much has been written about it (see, inter alia, R. Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’, 89 Yale L.J., 1979-1980, 421). Now that it has a statutory constitutional basis, it must be interpreted from a ‘broad perspective’ (Justice Agranat in FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [13], at p. 442 {124}) ‘with the understanding that we are dealing with a provision that shapes our way of life… the issue is one of human experience, which must adapt itself to changing realities’ (EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [14], at p. 306 {157}). For this reason a constitutional provision must be construed ‘with a broad outlook, and not in a technical manner’ (HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [15], at p. 618 {100}). This is the source of the approach — accepted in enlightened democratic countries — that a constitutional provision should be interpreted ‘liberally’ (Justice Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [45], at p. 25), with a substantive approach and not a ‘legalistic’ one (in the language of Judge Dickerson in R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd [49]), with an objective approach and not a ‘technical’ or ‘pedantic’ one (in the language of Judge Dixon in Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) [32], at p. 81). Against a background of such an approach, it can be held that the constitutional right of privacy includes, inter alia — but without any attempt to encompass all aspects of the right —a person’s right to lead the lifestyle he wishes inside the privacy of his home, without outside disturbance. A man’s home is his castle, and inside it he is entitled to be left to himself, to develop the autonomy of his own private will (see Rowan v. Post Office Dept. (1970) [33], at p. 736). In this respect, the right to privacy is, inter alia — in the language of Prof. Gavison — a restriction on the accessibility of others to the individual (see Gavison, in her article, supra, at p. 428). Indeed, in the tumult of life in modern society, a person’s right of privacy allows him to be on his own and with the cherished members of his family, and enables him to gather strength at home for the following day (see City of Wauwatosa v. King (1971) [34], at p. 537). The right of privacy is therefore intended to ensure that a person does not become a prisoner in his home, and is not compelled to expose himself at home to disturbances that he does not want. In this way, the right of privacy constitutes — in the language of Justice Douglas — the beginning of freedom (see Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollack (1952) [35], at p. 467). Indeed, Warren and Brandeis referred — in their preliminary list on this matter — to a person’s right to be let alone as a right that is the ‘most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man’ (S.D. Warren and L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 1890-1891, 193). Justice Frankfurter rightly said in the case of Martin v. Struthers (1943) [36], at p. 153, that:

‘….homes are sanctuaries from intrusions upon privacy and of opportunities for leading lives in health and safety.’

In a similar vein, Justice Black said that allowing every person to do as he wishes would ultimately lead to a situation where:

‘…homes, the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of life. Men and women who hold public office would be compelled, simply because they did hold public office, to lose the comforts and privacy of an unpicketed home. I believe that our Constitution, written for the ages, to endure except as changed in the manner it provides, did not create a Government with such monumental weaknesses’ (Gregory v. Chicago (1969) [37], at p. 125).

Justice Brennan made similar remarks in Carey v. Brown (1980) [38], at p. 471, where he stated:

‘Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and woman can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick”.’

Justice Shamgar gave an excellent description of this, when emphasizing that a picket outside or at the door of a person’s home, intrudes on his privacy, for it is liable to —

‘…deprive a person of his tranquillity, his feeling of personal security and the feeling that he can run his own life, without having his private affairs becoming a display for all, and hence the harassment and the resulting infringement of privacy’ (FH 9/83 Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [16], at p. 851).

So we see that the right of privacy draws the line between the individual and society. It defines the boundaries within which the individual is left to himself, for the development of his own individuality, without the interference of others (see T.I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, New York, 1970, 544). Indeed, just as the recognition of human dignity and liberty leads to the recognition of freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration, so the recognition of human dignity and liberty leads to the recognition of a person’s right to be free from unwanted speech. This was discussed by Prof. Black, who said:

‘The claim to freedom from unwanted speech rests on grounds of high policy and on convictions of human dignity closely similar if not identical with those classically brought forward in support of freedom of speech in the usual sense. Forced listening destroys and denies, practically and symbolically, that unfettered interplay and competition among ideas which is the assumed ambient of the communication freedoms’ (C.L. Black, ‘He cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor,’ 53 Colum L. Rev. 1953, 961, 967).

Indeed, just as everything in human rights necessitates freedom of speech, there is nothing in human rights that necessitates the hearing of unwanted speech.

Freedom of movement

17. The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket may conflict with the right of the individual to move freely in the roads and streets. ‘Roads and streets were intended for walking and travelling’ (Saar v. Minister of Interior [2], at p. 177). Just as one person has a constitutional right to hold a procession through a city street, so another has a constitutional right to walk along a city street. This constitutional right exists independently, and it can also be derived from human dignity and liberty.

The public interest

18. Hitherto I have discussed human rights with regard to an assembly, procession or picket. Alongside these rights of the individual, there also exists the public interest (R. Pound, ‘A Survey of Social Interests,’ 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1943-44, 1). These are the interests of the public as such, which it demands as an organized entity. One cannot maintain an organized democratic society without maintaining the public interest in security, order and public peace. Admittedly, one cannot have democratic government merely on the basis of public order alone, but one cannot have democratic Government without public order. Public order is one of the basic values of the legal system (see HCJ 109/70 Coptic Orthodox Mutran of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police [17], at p. 246). The public interest includes public peace, the quiet and tranquillity of daily life, the personal security of a person in his home and in public places, and the proper relationships between individuals and between the individual and government. Indeed, the public interest also includes protection of the human rights of the individual. Without public order it is impossible to ensure human rights. Without order there is no freedom (see HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [18], at p. 433). When a group of people want to hold an assembly, picket or procession in a city street, there is a public interest in maintaining order and security in the city streets, in ensuring the flow of traffic in the streets and in protecting property and privacy. Justice Brennan discussed this in Carey [38] at 471, saying:

‘The state’s interest in protecting the welfare, tranquility and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.’

It follows that there is a public interest in protecting the interest of the individual and it is the interest of the individual to protect the public interest. In a democratic society there is an inseverable link between order and freedom. How can we ensure the proper operation of this link? The answer that our legal system gives to this question lies in the need to balance interests and values when they conflict. The key lies in an attitude of ‘give and take’ and a balance of conflicting values. Human rights are not ‘absolute’. They are ‘relative’. The public interest wishes to ensure proper ‘subsistence areas’ for the relative nature of the right. We will now turn to this matter.

Balancing between conflicting interests

19. As we have seen, the District Commissioner of Police has discretion in granting a licence for an assembly or a procession. This discretion is exercised within the framework of the purpose of the Police Ordinance. This purpose includes the realization of the specific and general aims underlying the Ordinance. As we have seen, these purposes include safeguarding the constitutional right to hold an assembly and a procession, safeguarding the constitutional right to property, privacy and freedom of movement and safeguarding the public interest. No difficulty arises when all the values and interests that must be taken into account point in the same direction. This is certainly the case when there is a request to hold an assembly in the desert, far from any town. The individual exercises his right without harming anyone. The public interest is realized in its entirety. But in the vast majority of cases the individual does not want to hold an assembly in the desert. The individual wants to hold an assembly in the busy streets of the city, or on the quiet promenades of a residential neighbourhood. He wants to convey a message to others by means of a physical presence, and thereby he is likely to injure the rights of others and the public interest. Indeed, giving the protection of the law to the right of assembly and procession to the fullest extent will harm the right of property, the right of privacy and the freedom of movement, which also demand protection to the fullest extent. It necessarily harms the public interest. Therefore a constitutional process is required to restrict the protection given to constitutional rights, so that they are only protected to a partial extent. This restriction is based on the recognition that it is impossible to protect all of the rights to the fullest extent. The fullest protection of the right of A to hold an assembly cannot be reconciled with the fullest protection of the right of B who does not consent to the presence of A on his property (the property right), or who wishes not to be exposed to A’s speech (the right of privacy), or who desires to walk in precisely the same area where A wishes to hold the assembly (the freedom of movement). Indeed, complete protection of human rights contains an inherent contradiction, for human rights are not only directed against the Government, but they are also directed one against another. There exists between them a structure of connected vessels. Therefore an act of constitutional balancing is required (see HCJ 3080/92 [1]). By means of the constitutional balance, proper protection will be given to the various constitutional rights and the public interest in a manner that achieves constitutional harmony. Justice Agranat discussed this, when addressing the relationship between the freedom of speech and public peace:

‘… the right to freedom of speech is not an absolute and unlimited right, but a relative right, which can be restricted and supervised in view of the aim of upholding important socio-political interests that in certain conditions may be preferable to those protected by the realization of the principle of free speech. Delineating the limits of the use of the right of freedom of speech and of the press depends therefore on a process of placing the different values on the scales and, after weighing them, choosing those which, in the circumstances, must prevail (HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Ltd v. Minister of Interior [19], at p. 879 {99}).

Israeli law adopts a similar position with regard to the conflict between other constitutional human rights (such as the conflict between the freedom of speech and the right to reputation; see Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5]; CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira [20]; the conflict between freedom of speech and freedom of movement; Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]). Similarly, Israeli law adopts this approach with regard to the conflict between human rights and the public interest (such as the conflict between the freedom of speech and public order; see HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [21]; freedom of movement and state security; see HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22]; freedom of speech and judicial integrity; see CrimA 126/62 Disenchik v. Attorney-General [23]; freedom of speech and the public interest in election propaganda; see HCJ 869/92 Zvilli v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Thirteenth Knesset [24]; freedom of assembly and the public interest in the privacy of a public figure; HCJ 456/73 [25] and HCJ 3080/92 [1]).

Principled balance

20. The ideal balance between conflicting human rights — among themselves and between them and the public interest — should be a principled balance; cf. HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd v. Minister of Building and Housing [26], at p. 60. What characterizes a principled balance — as opposed to an ad hoc balance — is that a ‘rational principle’ (in the language of Justice Agranat in Kol HaAm v. Minister of Interior [19], at p. 881 {--}) is established that reflects ‘a criterion that expresses a principled guideline’, as distinct from a ‘chance, paternalistic criterion, the nature and direction of which cannot be anticipated’ (Justice Shamgar in Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 361). Indeed, the principled balance reflects a general legal norm, which establishes a constitutional principle that applies to all similar cases (see T.A. Aleinkoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, 96 Yale L.J. 1986-87, 943, 948).

Different kinds of principled balancing

21. The principled balance cannot be expressed by one formula. I discussed this in one case, when I said:

‘The diversity of possible situations requires a diversity of balancing points. One cannot adopt a single criterion, which can solve all of the problems. The reason for this is that the conflicting interests are not always of the same normative level, and the difficulties raised by the conflict are of diverse kinds’ (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at pp. 401-402 {117}).

In a similar vein, Vice-President Justice Ben-Porat said:

‘… the proper criterion is not fixed and standard for all types of cases… but a proper test must be adopted by considering the nature and importance of the competing principles in our way of thinking as to their relative priority and the degree of protection that we wish to give to every principle or interest’ (Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22], at p. 708).

Take the conflict between the freedom of assembly and procession and property rights. The balance between these two constitutional rights when one wants to hold the assembly or the procession on land belonging to the State or to public authorities is not the same as the balance when the assembly or procession are to be held on private property (see Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at p. 402 {117}). Moreover, even with respect to land owned by the State or public authorities, one must distinguish between different kinds of land according to their typical functions. There is therefore a basis for distinguishing between land that has been designated, by social tradition, for holding assemblies or processions (such as streets, roads or airports — see Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada (1991) [50]) and land not designated for that purpose (such as Government offices). Between these two there are intermediate situations, such as State land which is used for courts and prisons (see Cox v. Louisiana (1965) [39], and also H. Kalven, ‘The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana’ [1965] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1). Moreover, with regard to roads and streets, which belong to the State or to public authorities, roads and streets in busy city centres are not the same as roads and streets in residential areas. The same is true of private property. Private property which according to social tradition is the ‘castle’ of the individual (such as his apartment or house) is not the same as private property that according to social tradition is used by the public (such as a shopping centre: see Pruneyard Shopping Centre v. Robins (1980) [40]). Indeed, the balancing formulae vary in accordance with the conflicting values, and within the framework of a given set of values, in accordance with social aims and basic constitutional outlooks. We therefore distinguish between a ‘vertical balance’ and a ‘horizontal balance’. In the ‘vertical balance’, one value that conflicts with another value is superior to it. Nonetheless, this superiority is realized only if the requirements of the balancing formula are fulfilled with regard to the likelihood and extent of the harm to the superior value. Thus, for example, the public interest in public peace and public order prevail over the freedom of speech, provided that there is ‘near certainty’ that real damage will be caused to the public interest if the freedom of speech is not curtailed (see Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [10]). Similarly, the public interest in security will prevail over the freedom of movement outside the borders of the state, provided that there is a ‘genuine and serious fear’ of harm to security if the right to leave the country is realized (see Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22]). In the  ‘horizontal balance’ the two conflicting values have equal status. The balancing formula examines the degree of reciprocal concession of each of the rights. Thus, for example, the right of movement and the right to hold a procession are of equal status. The balancing formula will establish conditions relating to place, time and extent in order to allow the two rights to co-exist. Needless to say, these conditions of place, time and extent are liable to change in accordance with the nature of the ‘equal’ rights, the social purposes underlying them and basic constitutional perceptions.

Legislative balancing and judicial balancing

22. As we have seen, the balancing formulae determine the extent of the protection that the legal system gives to constitutional human rights, from which the ‘relativity’ of constitutional human rights is derived. For this reason they are so important. Occasionally it is the constitutive authority, or the legislature (in Israel — the Knesset) that establishes the balancing formula. Thus, for example, the Canadian Charter provides a list of human rights. Alongside these rights, there is a general provision (section 1) according to which these rights are subject:

‘… to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’

In a similar vein, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides a list of human rights. Alongside these, there is a general balancing formula (‘a restriction clause’), whereby:

‘The rights under this Basic Law may only be violated by a law that befits the values of the State of Israel, is intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent that is not excessive.’ (s. 8).

In these situations, there is a statutory balancing formula and the court is required to interpret it and to give it specific content. Sometimes there is no statutory balancing formula. The law (whether legislation or case-law) recognizes human rights and the public interest, even in the absence of a statutory balancing formula. In such a situation, there is no alternative but to develop balancing formulae in case-law. This, for example, is the position in the United States. The First Amendment to the Constitution regarding freedom of speech, establishes this freedom in ‘absolute’ terms (‘Congress shall make no Law… abridging the freedom of speech’). Notwithstanding this, judicial balancing formulae have been established that have moderated the absolute freedom and have restricted the protection given to the freedom of speech, out of consideration for other values. The same is true in Germany. A number of constitutional human rights established in the Basic Law (the Grundgesetz) do not provide balancing formulae, and these have been determined by the courts (see D.P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Durham, 1989). A similar approach has been adopted in Israel. Alongside the statutory balancing formulae, case-law balancing formulae were established in the past (such as the test of ‘near certainty’: see Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [9]). This is the method that the courts must adopt in the future, when constitutional human rights established in the Basic Laws are in conflict with one another.

Balancing, ‘weight’ and the ‘enlightened public’

23. Before we proceed to the balance required in the case before us, it should be pointed out that the word ‘balancing’ is merely a metaphor. Behind this word lies a constitutional outlook that the various rights, values and interests do not have the same social importance. ‘Balancing’ between values and interests is merely an examination of the relative social importance of the different values and interests. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘These terms — balance, weight — are merely metaphors. They are based on the outlook that society does not regard all principles of equal importance, and that in the absence of statutory guidance, the court must assess the relative social importance of the different principles. Just as there is no man without a shadow, so there is no principle without weight. Determining the balance on the basis of weight means making a social assessment as to the relative importance of the different principles’ (Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [18], at p. 434).

Indeed, the determination of the ‘balance’ is a normative activity. It is intended to reflect the value society attributes to the values and interests within the values of society as a whole. This action is not done in accordance with the subjective attitudes of the judge. It is an expression of the objective attitudes of society. I discussed this in HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [27], at p. 265 {68}, where I said:

‘In determining “the relative social importance”, the court is a “faithful interpreter of the accepted attitudes of the enlightened public, in whose midst it dwells”… These are the attitudes enshrined in basic values and basic conceptions, and not in temporary, passing trends. They reflect the “social awareness of the people in whose midst the judges dwell”… They are an expression of “the national way of life”… They reflect “the nation’s vision and its basic credo”... They are not the product of judicial subjectivity. In attaching weight to the various considerations, the judge aims, to the best of his ability, for judicial objectivity. He does not reflect either his subjective values or his personal considerations. The judge reflects “the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State.”…’

The criterion guiding normative judicial activity is the one established by Justice Landau, according to which the judge is obliged:

‘to be a faithful interpreter of the accepted attitudes of the enlightened public, in whose midst he dwells’ (CA 461/62 Zim Israeli Shipping Co. Ltd v. Maziar [28], at p. 1335 {135}).

The judge must be familiar with the society in which he lives:

‘He must learn about the social consensus, the foundations and values that are common to members of society. He must absorb the legal ethos and the basic principles that make society a democratic society’ (Efrat v. Director of Population Register at Interior Ministry [7], at p. 780).

He must express ‘the conscience of the general public and the value beliefs of society with regard to appropriate and inappropriate behaviour…’ (CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [29], at p. 532). He must give expression to the basic beliefs of society. Against this background, we will now turn to the balancing required in the type of cases to which the case before us belongs.

An assembly, procession or picket outside the apartment of a public figure

24. The petitioner wants to hold an assembly outside the apartment of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. This apartment is used by him and his family for their home. Nonetheless, persons in government visit him there. The apartment is located in an apartment building, in which there are several residents. The building is situated in a residential area. The District Commissioner of Police refused to give the petitioner a licence to hold the assembly. His main reason was the intrusion on the privacy of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. He also gave a ‘traffic related’ reason, but it was emphasized that the ‘most important reason’ relates to the violation of the right of privacy. On the basis of this factual background, the focus must be on the relationship between the right of someone to hold an assembly with others outside the private residence of a public figure in a residential area and the right of the public figure and his neighbours to protect their privacy. There is no reason, within the framework of the petition before us, to discuss the ‘traffic related’ consideration and the relationship between the petitioner’s right to hold an assembly and the right of any person in the community to move freely on the road or the pavement upon where the assembly is supposed to take place, since this consideration was not the basis for the District Commissioner’s decision. Furthermore, the petitioner wishes to hold the assembly on the pavement or on the road. He does not want to enter the premises belonging to the individual. In these circumstances, we do not need to examine the relationship between the right of assembly and property rights (in the narrow sense). Finally, the permit requested a location outside an apartment which is used by the public figure mainly as his home. It is not a Government office, nor is it even an ‘official’ residence like the President’s House. A change in the designated use of the house changes the proper balance between the conflicting rights. The petition before us focuses on the relationship between the individual’s right to hold an assembly in a residential area and the right of a public figure and his neighbours not to have their privacy in their private apartments violated by the holding of the assembly, and the relationship between these two rights and the public interest in maintaining public order.

The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket next to the private house of a public figure

25. The constitutional premise is that every man has the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket. This right is not restricted only to Government or commercial centres of the city. In terms of its internal scope, the right extends even to holding an assembly, procession or picket in residential areas (see Comment, ‘Picketing the Homes of Public Officials’, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev., 1996-1997, 106). In discussing a picket in a residential area, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in the opinion of Justice Brennan:

‘There can be no doubt that in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the public streets and sidewalks in residential neighbourhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive conduct that falls within the first Amendment’s preserve’ (Carey [38], at p. 460).

In explaining this approach, another American court noted that the recognition of the right to hold a protest vigil next to the (private) home of an employer:

‘… brings home the fact that a man may leave his tools at his work but not his conscience or his relations with his fellow man’ (United Electrical, R & M Workers v. Baldwin (1946) [41], at p. 242).

Indeed, in view of the public reasons which underlie the right to hold an assembly, demonstration or picket, there is no substantive difference between an assembly, demonstration, or picket in a residential neighbourhood and an assembly, demonstration or picket in another area. The individual may also wish to express himself in a residential area. Sometimes it is precisely the residential neighbourhood that serves as an effective focal point for expressing that view. It creates the direct link between the petitioner and a public figure, which an assembly or procession in Government areas (such as the Government complex) or commercial areas do not create (see D.M. Taubman, ‘Picketers at the Doorstep’ 9 Harv. Civil Rights L. Rev., 1974, 95, 106). Prof. Kretzmer discussed this, noting that:

‘There are times when demonstrations outside the home of a public figure are the most effective way of communicating a view on a matter of public importance. In other cases such demonstrations may be the only really effective way of communicating that view to the public figure involved. The privacy interests of public figures should not override the expression interest involved in such demonstrations’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

There is also no difference — from the viewpoint of the (inherent) scope of the right to hold an assembly, demonstration or picket — between an ‘official’ residence of a public figure (such as the President’s House or the Prime Minister’s House) and his ‘private’ home. Both of these are a focus for an assembly, demonstration or picket and the reasons that underlie the constitutional right to demonstrate, assemble or picket, exist for both of them.

The right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours

26. ‘Every person has a right to privacy’ (s. 7(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). The public figure is also entitled to privacy. The fact that he is a public figure should not deprive him of the right to live within the privacy of his own home, on his own or with his family. It is precisely because of the public exposure involved in his position or office that he needs the quiet and tranquillity of his home, and the privacy is intended to give him these at the end of the day. Indeed, it is the right of public figures ‘to protect at least part of their lives from the media’ (Gavison, ‘Prohibition of Publication that Violates Privacy,’ Civil Rights in Israel, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ed. R. Gavison, 1982, 177, 200). In one case, the petitioner applied to hold an assembly outside the home of the Foreign Minister. The District Commissioner of Police refused the application. The petition to the Supreme Court was denied. The court said:

‘The freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression upon which the petitioner relied in his petition do not mean that permission is given to intrude on the privacy of a person holding public office and to harass him and the members of his family in their private lives in order to influence him, in this way, with regard to his public activity’ (HCJ 456/73 [25]).

In a similar vein, Prof. Kretzmer stated:

‘All persons, including public figures, are entitled to respect for the privacy of their homes’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

The neighbours of the public figure are entitled to realize their right to privacy. The fact that nearby there lives a person holding public office should not deprive them of that right.

The public interest

27. The public interest in this case is mainly restricted to the realization of the right of assembly, procession and picket on the one hand and the right to privacy on the other hand. As we have seen, the public interest in the freedom of movement was not the basis for the decision in this case. Nor is there any fear of a disturbance of the peace. Indeed, we are concerned with the public interest in protecting the human rights to hold an assembly, procession and picket on the one hand and the privacy of the home on the other. The question is how we can protect, in a democratic society, both the freedom of assembly, procession and picketing and the right of privacy. The answer to this question lies in the necessity of balancing these two values. We will now turn to this balance.

The balance

28. The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket in the city streets and the right to the privacy of a person’s home are constitutional rights in Israel. They are cherished by Israeli democracy. They are rights of equal stature. Neither of them is preferable to the other. Justice Burger rightly pointed out in Rowan [33], at p. 736, ‘… the right of every person “to be let alone” must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate’. It follows from this equality that it is insufficient for there to be a near certainty of a substantial violation of one right in order to deny the other right. Even if it is proved that it is definitely certain that the freedom of assembly, demonstration or picketing will intrude on privacy, this is insufficient to justify denying that freedom. Similarly, even were it proven that it was definitely certain that the full exercise of the right to privacy would violate the right of assembly, procession or picket, denying the right to privacy would still not be justified. Indeed, we are not dealing with a  ‘vertical balance’ which looks for formulae of reasonable likelihood. We are concerned with two human rights of equal standing, and the balance between them must therefore find expression in a reciprocal waiver whereby each right must make a concession to the other in order to allow the coexistence of both. The protection of the law does not extend to either of the rights in its entirety. Each right suffers restrictions of time, place and manner in order to allow the substantive realization of the other right. Indeed, the proper balance between the freedom of speech and privacy is one of the foundations of a sound democratic regime. The balance required between the rights is a horizontal balance. We are dealing here — in the language of Justice Landau in Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 343 — ‘not with a “vertical” scale of a “supreme right” as opposed to a normal right’ but with a horizontal delineation of ‘rights of equal standing, without an aim of preferring one right as defined in legislation at the expense of another.’ At the heart of the horizontal balance is the recognition that both freedom of assembly, procession and picketing in the streets and privacy in homes are rights that are cherished by the democratic regime, but in a democratic society it is impossible to give protection to each of these rights to the fullest extent without harming the other right. Democracy therefore requires a reciprocal restriction of the extent of the protection given to each of the rights. This restriction must, in so far as possible, preserve the essence of each of the competing values (see L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Mineola, 2nd ed., 1988, 977). It must try, in so far as possible, to prevent a major violation of one right in upholding the other right. With regard to legislation that violates the freedom of speech in order to uphold the right to privacy, Justice Harlan said:

‘The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is… dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner’ (Cohen v. California (1971) [42], at p. 21).

The horizontal balance results in limitations of time, place and manner for realizing one of the rights in order to maintain the essence of the other right (see, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, New York, 1966, 75). With regard to legislation restricting the freedom of assembly, procession and protest in order to uphold the right of privacy, Justice Brennan said:

‘The ordinance is subject to the well-settled time, place and manner test; the restriction must be content and viewpoint neutral, leave open ample alternative channels of communication, and be narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest’ (Frisby v. Schultz [43] at 491).

For this reason, Justice Brennan — who was in the minority in that case — thought that legislation which absolutely prohibited picketing in a residential area violated the constitution and was void. On the other hand, legislation passes the constitutional test if it establishes arrangements governing place, time and manner. Justice Brennan wrote, at p. 494:

‘Thus, for example, the government could constitutionally regulate the number of residential pickers, the hours during which a residential picket may take place, or the noise level of such a picket. In short, substantial regulation is permitted to neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects of picketing around the home. But to say that picketing may be substantially regulated is not to say that it may be prohibited in its entirety. Once size, time, volume, and the like have been controlled to ensure that the picket is no longer intrusive or coercive, only the speech itself remains, conveyed perhaps by a lone, silent individual, walking back and forth with a sign.’

In fact, an assembly or a picket that is held on one occasion is not the same as repeated assemblies or pickets; an assembly or picket held in the morning or afternoon is not the same as an assembly or picket held during hours of rest; an assembly or picket with a large attendance is not the same as an assembly or picket with few participants; an assembly or picket that is supposed to be held over several hours is not the same as a short assembly or picket; an assembly where use is made of loudspeakers or other means of amplifying sound is not the same as one that is held quietly; an assembly held next to a private building is not the same as an assembly held at some distance from it; and an assembly held alongside pickets is not the same as an assembly held without picketing (see A. Kamin, ‘Residential Picketing and the First Amendment’, 61 Nw U. L. Rev, 1966-67, 177; R. E. Rigby, ‘Balancing Free Speech in a Public Forum v. Residential Privacy: Frisby v. Schultz’, 24 New Eng. L. Rev., 1989-90, 888).

Restrictions regarding time, place and manner

29. It follows that in Israel a person in entitled to hold an assembly or picket in a residential area. He is entitled to hold an assembly or picket next to the house of a public figure. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of holding the assembly or picket a proper balance must be guaranteed between a person’s right to hold an assembly or picket and the right of the public figure and his neighbours to their privacy in their apartments. This proper balance reflects the public interest, which the police must protect. Within the framework of the police’s statutory powers, it must ensure that the right of assembly of the one does not substantially intrude on the privacy rights of the other. For this purpose, the police may determine reasonable restrictions of time, place and manner. With regard to time, the police may determine that the assembly may not be held during hours of rest. It may also determine that the assembly will be held for a relatively short time. It may determine — on the basis of equality and without any reference to the substance of the message being conveyed at the demonstration — the frequency for holding demonstrations, so that the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours is not seriously violated. It may also take into account the frequency of holding assemblies or pickets in the past. With regard to place, the police can determine that the assembly will take place at a certain distance from the home of the public figure. It may determine that the assembly will not prevent free entry and exit to and from the building. With respect to manner, the police may restrict the number of participants. It may regulate the use of loudspeakers, including their volume and number (see Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) [44]; Francis v. Chief of Police (1973) [46]; Indulal v. State (1963) [48]; Cheema v. Ross (1991) [51]).

A private apartment used for public activity

30. The balances that I have discussed assume that the public figure does not use his private apartment for his public activity. In this situation, the public figure is entitled to the same measure of privacy as his neighbours. The balance may change if the private home of the public figure is also used for his public activity. The extreme case is that of an official residence (e.g., the President’s House or the Prime Minister’s House) which are situated at a distance from residential areas. This residence acts as a symbol of the office and here the public figure carries out both his public and private activity, without it being possible to distinguish them. Because of the unique nature of the official residence, it should generally be regarded as a public building (such as a Government office). The appropriate balance between the freedom of assembly, demonstration or picketing and the right to privacy will therefore in these circumstances tend in favour of the freedom of assembly, demonstration and picketing. An intermediate case is one where there is a basic distinction between the place of the public activity of the public figure and his home, even though the public figure carries out some public activity at his home. In this situation, the proper balance between the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket and the right of privacy must take account of this special situation. The extent of protection for the privacy of a public figure who keeps his public activity and his residential apartment separate is not the same as the extent of protection for privacy when the public figure carries out part of his public activity in his apartment (see: Carey [38], at p. 471; Frisby [43] at p. 479). The proper balance between the constitutional rights must reflect the special function of the home. It follows that the more the private home is used for public activity, the more the balance will tend in ‘favour’ of the freedom of assembly, procession or picketing.

31. It is a special case when the private home of a public figure is also used for a part of his public activity. Nonetheless, this apartment is situated in a residential building, where there live additional residents who are not involved in the public activity. How will the proper balance be made in such a case? It seems to me that, in making the proper balance, one must take account of the special aspects of this complex situation. On the one hand, there is no justification, in a democratic society, for substantially limiting the extent of protection for the privacy to which a ‘private’ resident is entitled, merely because his neighbour is a public figure. On the other hand, there is a justification in a democratic society for demanding some concession with regard to the privacy of a private resident because of the fact that his neighbour is a public figure. This is the ‘price’ that the private neighbour must pay for the public activity of his neighbour. It seems to me that the proper balance between the constitutional rights must take account of this complicated situation. One must therefore guarantee, within the framework of the proper balance, that the ‘private’ neighbour is given substantial protection for his privacy, even if this protection may be slightly less than the protection given to a resident whose neighbour is not a public figure.

From the general to the specific

32. Against the background of this normative framework we must examine the case before us. It seems to me that had the petitioner asked to hold a procession on one occasion — with the number of participants proposed by him — which would pass by the apartment of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef and his neighbours, there would be a basis for approving it, subject to restrictions of time and manner, taking account of the question whether such processions took place in the recent past and taking account of the transport factor. A procession passing by the house intrudes minimally on privacy and it upholds the proper balance between the relevant constitutional rights. Similarly, it appears to me that the petitioner would have been within his constitutional rights — in accordance with the proper balance between these and the rights of the residents of the building — if he had asked to hold a picket on one occasion with a small number of participants, standing silently with signs, without there having been such picketing in the past. Even here there would be justification for fixing restrictions of time and place. The petitioner may hold this picket without a police permit. He is entitled to police protection if he wants to hold this kind of picket (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8]). It also seems to me that a picket held within the framework of the proper constitutional balance is a legal activity for the purpose of the Protection of Privacy Law (see ss. 18 and 19). It should be emphasized that with respect to the picket, there was a basis for taking account of the fact that in the recent past pickets have been held next to the house and the extent of the intrusion on privacy that these caused.

33. The petitioner does not want to hold a procession or a picket. His request is to hold a  ‘picketing assembly’. He wants approximately two hundred and fifty people to participate. He wants to use a stage and two loudspeakers. He wants to hold it for two hours (19.00-21.00). Had this assembly been an isolated event, without there having been pickets in the past, it might have been possible to approve it, subject to certain restrictions in terms of time (shortening the length of the assembly) and manner (foregoing the loudspeakers, reducing the number of participants). The problem is that the assembly requested comes against a background where pickets have been held next to the house for a long time. In these circumstances it was proper to consider the overall balance between the freedom of assembly of the petitioner and his friends and the intrusion on the privacy and the property of the residents of the building. Such an examination was not made by the police. It did not take account of the number of pickets that took place in the past, but it was satisfied with the intrusion on privacy as the sole reason for the refusal. In doing so, it acted albeit without discrimination and in accordance with its usual practice. Nonetheless, it did not accord sufficient weight to the freedom of assembly. We asked the petitioner whether he would be prepared to hold the assembly subject to the restrictions that would be placed on him with regard to the size of the assembly (less than two hundred and fifty persons) and with regard to additional factors of manner and time (such as use of loudspeakers, length of the assembly). The petitioner told us that from his viewpoint he was not prepared for any change at all, in the sense of ‘all or nothing’. In these circumstances, there is no point in returning the petition for reconsideration by the respondent, and it should be denied.

Supplementary remarks

34. Our premise in examining the petition before us was the discretion of the District Commissioner of Police. In order to examine this discretion, we needed to examine the relationship between the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket, on the one hand, and property rights and the right of privacy on the other. We established a formula for principled balancing in the relationship between one human right and another. This balancing formula was also sufficient for establishing the extent of the administrative discretion, for in the circumstances before us, there was no reason, in view of the positions of the parties, for taking account of additional considerations. Such considerations, had they existed (such as the fear of a disturbance, the traffic consideration), would have necessitated the establishment of additional balances. Indeed, the case before us is based on normative harmony. There is a complete internal balance between public law and private law. An individual’s right with respect to the Government (to hold an assembly) within the framework of public law is derived from the balance between that individual’s right (to hold an assembly) and another individual’s right (to protect his privacy) within the frameworks of both public and private law. Indeed, if the persons holding the assembly were sued by the persons entitled to privacy for committing a tort (such as private nuisance), the action would be dismissed, since the proper constitutional balance between the human rights determined the proper degree for reasonable use of land to which a person is entitled under the law of torts. Indeed, the various torts of private law — and its other remedies — are merely an expression of the proper balance between constitutional human rights. The source of constitutional human rights is in public law and balancing between them is constitutional. Nonetheless, they are afforded protection, inter alia, within the framework of private law, and in accordance with the doctrines accepted by private law. Reasonableness, fairness, proper behaviour, public policy and similar working concepts of private law are merely instruments of private law that express the constitutional balance between human rights. Note, moreover, that public law does not merely deal with the structure and powers of Government authorities. Public law (and the Basic Laws that reflect them) also deals with the various human rights, their interrelationship and their relationship to Government authority. It follows that one can consider the case before us from the perspective of public law towards private law (by means of the discretion given to a public authority), and one can consider the case before us from the perspective of private law towards public law (by means of torts). The difference in perspective does not change the balance. The law is consistent. But again, this is not always the case. Sometimes the public authority considers general factors of security, law and order and keeping the peace. In such cases, the balance between the various human rights may require one balancing formula, whereas the balance between the human right and the requirements of security, law and order and keeping the peace may require a different balancing formula. Thus, for example, sometimes the balancing formula between human rights that conflict with one another is horizontal, whereas the balance between human rights and considerations of security, law and order and keeping the peace is vertical.

The result is therefore that the petition is denied.

 

 

Justice S. Levin

1.    In HCJ 456/73 [25], this court held, in a short unreported decision, which was given in a petition to allow the petitioner to organize an assembly in the form of a demonstration next to the house of the Foreign Minister, that:

‘Under the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 84 and 85, the police have discretion to grant the licence requested, to grant it with sureties or with conditions or restrictions, or to refuse it. It appears that the police believe that the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech, on which the petitioner relies in his petition, do not amount to granting a permit to intrude upon the privacy of a person holding public office, and to harass him and the members of his family in their private lives, in order to influence him, in this way, with regard to his public activity. We found nothing wrong with this attitude.’

For that reason the petition was denied.

I rely on that decision, and had my esteemed colleague, the Vice-President, not written his monumental opinion, with his extensive erudition, in accordance with current practice, I would merely have denied the petition, as our predecessors did twenty years ago, without adding to, or subtracting from, the aforesaid; but since I cannot merely remain silent, I have found at least four reasons for supporting the aforesaid view: first, in my opinion a public figure has — no less than the average man, and perhaps even more so — the right to privacy in his home, and for me the saying ‘a man’s home is his castle’ is not merely theoretical and it applies also to public figures. An intrusion on privacy, under ss. 4 and 5 of the Protection of Privacy Law, is a tort and also a criminal offence. Within the framework of an ‘intrusion on privacy’, s. 2(1) of the said law also includes ‘sleuthing or shadowing a person, which may disturb him, or another harassment’; President Shamgar also discussed this in his judgment in Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [16], where he wrote, at p. 851, the following:

‘What is “another harassment”? It seems that this may include, for example, the usually acceptable act of walking behind another person wherever he goes, openly and closely and even in protest, which does not constitute trailing him secretly but following him openly. Picketing, by standing next to someone’s home or by his door, is similar to this. Such an act may deprive a person of his tranquillity, his feeling of personal safety and his feeling that he can conduct his life on his own, without his private affairs being on display for others, and therein lies the harassment in the act and the intrusion on privacy that derives from it.’

Second, there is a fear that permitting demonstrations next to the private home of public figures may dissuade potential public figures, who are qualified, from engaging in public activity, and there is even a fear that under the pressure of the demonstration, or under the pressure of the members of his family as a result of the demonstration, the public figure may change his opinion, not for objective reasons but merely to stop the harassments against him. Third, if we allow demonstrations outside the home of a public figure, we will make him, his family and his neighbours the ‘captive audience’ of the demonstrators, since they will be left with no choice but to listen to what they are saying, even if they do not wish to do so. Fourth, a public figure, no less than any other person, has the right — within the proper limits — to prevent the harm caused to him as a result of the demonstration within the framework of civil law (such as the commission of a tort of nuisance or trespass) and to prevent a criminal offence that is about to be committed against him and which derives from the breach of law and order.

2. Notwithstanding the right of privacy of the public figure in his home that is his castle, this court has recognized the freedom of demonstration: Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]; and even though this freedom is not expressly mentioned in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (whereas property rights and the right of privacy and confidentiality are mentioned in ss. 3 and 7), I am prepared to assume, without deciding the matter, that the law does not compel us to prefer one basic right to the other merely because one is not mentioned expressly in the Basic Law whereas the other is mentioned.

Like my esteemed colleague, the Vice-President, I too will not refrain from making a balance between the competing rights, but in my opinion, in the circumstances that have been proved before us, the right of privacy prevails over the right of demonstration. Before explaining my approach in this matter, I would like to make several fundamental assumptions:

First, what is stated in our judgment does not relate to the freedom of demonstration next to the place of work of the public figure and the place of his public activity, with regard to which there are considerations that do not exist in the circumstances of the present case. Second, the decision whether to allow or not to allow an assembly or procession to be held is the duty of the District Commissioner of Police, who is obliged to consider, mainly (but not only) factors of ‘maintaining public safety or law and order’ (s. 84(a) of the Police Ordinance [New Version]). The decisions that the District Commissioner must make must naturally be made within a short time, and too complicated a burden of balancing should not be required of him, since he is not in the legal profession, and he will be unable to discharge it. Third, it is precisely for this reason that I believe that it is sufficient in our case to distinguish between the private home of the public figure and his place of work or the place of his public activity, and we should not incorporate in the balance equation the complicated case where we are dealing with a private home that is used, to some extent, also as a place for public activity. Fourth, in view of the aforesaid, I will assume that because of the minimal public activity of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef in his private apartment, we are merely dealing with the private apartment of the revered Rabbi.

3.    In my opinion, the right of privacy is of great value especially in an open society that tends more and more to interfere in the affairs of its citizens, whether through Government institutions or through the media, supported by the principle of the public’s right to know. In CA 670/79 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Mizrahi [30], I considered the proper balance between the power of the media to publish incorrect facts about the individual and the right of the individual to his good name, and I held that there is no basis for the attitude that ‘in the prevailing circumstances it is necessary to disturb the delicate balance established in case-law by a greater restriction on the individual’s right to his reputation in favour of extending the power given to the press to publish incorrect facts about him’ (ibid., at p.200). In the case before us we must evaluate the balancing equation between the right of demonstration and the right of privacy, and what was stated above is even more applicable when speaking of a public figure; the acts of the public figure in his public activity, as well as in most areas of his overt private activity, are exposed to the public, and this is also proper in an open and democratic society; there is no doubt that a person who accepts public office exposes himself to a large extent to the watchful public eye. There is only one place whither he can escape from his day’s work at the end of his onerous public activity — to the bosom of his family, protected for a short time from the major external pressures to which he is subject, so that he may renew his strength for tomorrow. This is his private home. This home must be protected to the maximum extent that the law allows.

The extra protection granted to the right of privacy of the public figure in his private home as compared with other basic rights is nothing new and is accepted in other countries; see in Canada: the Cheema [51] case, where the court did not see any reason to distinguish between the rights of a public figure not to be excessively disturbed at his home and the rights of his neighbours not to have their rest disturbed; in the United States, see the Carey [38] judgment, at p. 2295, and especially the minority view of Justice Rehnquist, at p. 2296 et seq.; and the comment of Justice Black in the Gregory [37] case, at pp. 953-954, and also Frisby [43]. Kamin’s article, supra, at p. 182, says something with which I entirely agree:

‘In the Constitutional value scale, the quiet enjoyment and privacy of residential premises — even of the privately-owned homes of public officials — merits higher priority than freedom of speech.’

Kamin gives reasons for this opinion, at p. 228, that if such demonstrations are to be permitted:

‘All demonstrations at the homes of public officials will, of necessity, affect neighbors who are strangers to the political controversy. Does assumption of public office by a householder terminate the right of privacy for him, his family and his neighbors? The question has a pervasive significance in a democratic society. If losing the last redoubt of privacy and repose, if subjecting one’s family and neighbors to the constant harassment of sidewalk demonstrations is the price of holding public office, then the republic shall have lost the services of its ablest citizens.’

He sums up, at pp. 230-231:

‘Residential picketing is neither a primary nor a conventional way of communicating the existence of a grievance to a public officer. Rather, it is an instrument of achieving political results by oppressing and harassing the official and his family.’

In American law also, especially recently, there are signs of a trend that sees a need to balance the right of privacy and tranquillity against the right to demonstrate vertically; in other words, we are not talking of rights on an equal footing but of one right (privacy) that prevails over the other (freedom of demonstration), even when we are speaking of a quiet demonstration held outside the home of a public figure. It therefore appears that in the circumstances of the case before us, when the issue is one of holding a demonstration outside the home of a public figure who lives in the middle of a residential neighbourhood, American law would also have the result of prohibiting the holding of the demonstration.

In Germany: the judgment in the case of Ovg. Koblenz, Beschl v. 24.5.86 7B 36/86 [47] considered the question whether to permit or prohibit a demonstration intended to protest Government policy with regard to nuclear reactors, near the home of Chancellor Kohl’s home (a building used as the Chancellor’s home but where meetings and official events were occasionally held). The Supreme Court for administrative matters held that such a demonstration was prohibited since it violated the rights of the individual. It held that in the balance between the public interest (to hold a demonstration) and the individual interest (the right of the individual, his family and neighbours to enjoy their private property without disturbance), the interest of the individual prevails. The court even added that especially when a public figure is concerned, the importance of the right of privacy and property rights increases, for the public figure is constantly exposed to criticism and his private home is truly his castle, the only place where he can rest and recover from his public work.

If we add to the aforesaid also the interests of the family and the neighbours to prevent nuisance, and the possibility, which has been proved in this case, of holding the demonstration at some distance from the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, I am satisfied that there is no sufficient reason for intervening in the discretion of the first respondent.

For these reasons I too, like my esteemed colleagues, thought on the day we gave our judgment that the petition should be denied.

 

Justice E. Goldberg

1.    An assembly, which is one of the basic freedoms in Israel, is embodied, even according to its definition in the Police Ordinance [New Version], in the simultaneous existence of two elements: the first element, which is the main one, is the actual physical presence of the demonstrators at the place of the assembly, and the second element is verbal expression on the part of those present on the subject of the assembly. The physical presence is not merely a means of making it possible to hear what is said at the assembly, but in itself it serves as a ‘medium’ for conveying the message which the assemblers wish to convey, and in this the assembly is different from other methods of expression. The presence attracts the attention of the public, arouses awareness of the subject of the assembly and emphasizes the extent of the support for it. This is in addition to the direct application inherent in the presence to whoever is the target of the assembly.

It can therefore be said that the demonstration is one of the effective ways in which those present at an assembly may express themselves, when direct access to the electronic media is not available to everyone, and an application to the written media is likely to be buried in the vast amount of information conveyed in them.

In this respect Prof. Kretzmer said in his article, supra, in Is. L. Rev., at p. 53:

‘The demonstration is a form of expression which exploits the “physical presence factor” in order to communicate a view likely to be lost if communicated in other ways. It is indeed true that the modern demonstration is very often geared towards the news media, and dependent on coverage therein for its success, but it is the unique “physical presence” factor that makes the view expressed “newsworthy”, and which therefore gains the demonstrators access to the media.’

It transpires from what we have said that real implementation of the freedom of speech by way of an assembly occurs when there is a link between the physical presence of the assemblers and the site of the assembly. Without an effective site, the assembly is ineffective.

2.    But the right of assembly, despite its great importance, is not absolute. Other interests and rights conflict with it and they may be harmed by it, albeit temporarily. This is the source of the need to balance between the right to hold an assembly next to the homes of public figures and the property rights and right of privacy of the public figures, members of their families and their neighbours.

Since we said that effectiveness of the site is the very essence of the assembly, the appropriate balance when considering the question whether to permit an assembly next to the home of a public figure lies, in my opinion, in whether there is or is not an alternative site for the assembly, an alternative where the effectiveness will be maintained and not materially impaired. If there is such an alternative, then the right of privacy and property rights will prevail, for the harm to these rights with then be excessive. This is in the spirit of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, which protects property rights (s. 3) and the right of privacy (s. 7(a)), but alongside the protection lies the provision in section 8 that:

‘The rights under this Basic Law may only be violated by a law… and to an extent that is not excessive.

This ‘compromise’ position was adopted by the author of the article, supra, in U. Chi. L. Rev., at p. 140, who said:

‘The practice of residential picketing exerts “injuries” upon the home-owner public official, making of him and his family a captive audience and intruding into the enjoyment and privacy of their home. In weighing the benefits of the residential sites against the detriments, the argument for prohibition of residential picketing is strongest, since only by such prohibition can the homeowner’s interests be protected.

Undeniably, prohibition of residential picketing would work to the detriment of the picketer; he would lose a forum which affords him economy, publicity and effectiveness. These benefits are not completely lost; they can be largely approximated elsewhere. Thus prohibition, its detriments mitigated by the availability of other demonstration sites, offers the most tenable compromise.’

3.    This is the basis for the distinction between a case where an assembly next to the home of the public figure is the only effective site, and a case where there is an effective alternative site. In this context Prof. Kretzmer states:

‘There are times when demonstrations outside the home of a public figure are the most effective way of communicating a view on a matter of public importance. In other cases such demonstrations may be the only really effective way of communicating that view to the public figure involved. The privacy interests of public figures should not override the expression interest involved in such demonstrations’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

4.    In my opinion, the home of a public figure should be regarded as the only effective site for holding an assembly only when he conducts all or most of his public activity there. In any other case, there is no reason that the site next to the office of the public figure should not be considered an effective alternative. In the first case, the assembly will be allowed outside the home of the public figure, albeit subject to proper restrictions of time, number of participants, holding the assembly and the frequency of assemblies at that site. In the other case, it will be prohibited.

5.    The circumstances in our case fall into the first category, and therefore I would have seen fit to grant the petition, had not the petitioner refused to hold the assembly with the restrictions required to limit the extent of the intrusion on privacy resulting from it.

The result is that the petition should be denied.

 

 

Petition denied.

9 February 1994.

 

 

Full opinion: 

Council for Higher Education v. HaAretz

Case/docket number: 
AAA 9135/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 19, 2006
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: In the first case, HaAretz Newspaper Publishing submitted a request to the Council for Higher Education for information. The Council gave HaAretz copies of decisions it had made, but refused to allow it access to the minutes of meetings. HaAretz therefore applied to the District Court to order the Council to grant it access to the minutes of the meetings.

 

In the second case, the Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel applied to the Council for a licence to open an institute of higher education in Ashkelon. When the Council refused the licence, Shachar applied to the District Court to set aside the decision, alleging that certain members of the Council had a conflict of interests. In the course of that proceeding, Shachar asked the court to grant it interim relief by ordering the Council to disclose the minutes of the meeting of the Council at which it decided to refuse the licence.

 

In both cases, the Council argued that it should not be required to disclose the minutes of its meetings, since under s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law, ‘internal discussions’ are exempt from the general duty of disclosure under that law.

 

In both cases, the District Court ordered the Council to provide minutes of its discussions, subject to various conditions. The Council appealed on the question of the scope of the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the law that concerns ‘internal discussions’ of a public authority.

 

Held: Section 9(b) of the Freedom of Information Law does not speak of a prohibition against providing the information, but of information that the authority is not obliged to provide. Therefore, the margin of discretion that the authority should exercise before refusing to provide information of the kinds set out in s. 9(b) of the law is broader than in s. 9(a), which does speak of a prohibition.

 

The main reason for the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) is the concern regarding the ‘chilling effect’ that is reflected in the reluctance of members and employees of a public authority to hold frank discussions where they are not guaranteed a certain degree of protection for the opinions expressed in the course of making the decisions.

 

The authority may refuse to provide information concerning internal discussions, but before doing so it should take into account all the considerations that are relevant to the case, and it needs to find in the specific circumstances of each case the balancing point between the public interest in exempting the information and the public and private interest, in so far as there is one, in disclosing the information.

 

The decisions of the Council in which it refused the requests for information in both cases did not satisfy the test of administrative reasonableness, and therefore the District Court rightly decided to set them aside.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

AAA 9135/03

1.       Council for Higher Education

2. Yael Atiya, Director of Freedom of Information at the Council for Higher Education

v.

1.       HaAretz Newspaper Publishing

2.       Shmuel Rosner, editor

3.       Ran Reznick, journalist

AAA 9738/04

Council for Higher Education

v.

Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Administrative Appeals

[19 January 2006]

Before President A. Barak, Vice-President M. Cheshin
and Justices D. Beinisch, E. Rivlin, M. Naor, S. Joubran, E. Hayut

 

Appeals of the judgments of the Jerusalem District Court on 11 September 2003 in AP 924/02 (Justice B. Okon) and on 19 September 2004 in AP 489/04 (Vice-President D. Cheshin).

 

Facts: In the first case, HaAretz Newspaper Publishing submitted a request to the Council for Higher Education for information. The Council gave HaAretz copies of decisions it had made, but refused to allow it access to the minutes of meetings. HaAretz therefore applied to the District Court to order the Council to grant it access to the minutes of the meetings.

In the second case, the Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel applied to the Council for a licence to open an institute of higher education in Ashkelon. When the Council refused the licence, Shachar applied to the District Court to set aside the decision, alleging that certain members of the Council had a conflict of interests. In the course of that proceeding, Shachar asked the court to grant it interim relief by ordering the Council to disclose the minutes of the meeting of the Council at which it decided to refuse the licence.

In both cases, the Council argued that it should not be required to disclose the minutes of its meetings, since under s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law, ‘internal discussions’ are exempt from the general duty of disclosure under that law.

In both cases, the District Court ordered the Council to provide minutes of its discussions, subject to various conditions. The Council appealed on the question of the scope of the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the law that concerns ‘internal discussions’ of a public authority.

 

Held: Section 9(b) of the Freedom of Information Law does not speak of a prohibition against providing the information, but of information that the authority is not obliged to provide. Therefore, the margin of discretion that the authority should exercise before refusing to provide information of the kinds set out in s. 9(b) of the law is broader than in s. 9(a), which does speak of a prohibition.

The main reason for the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) is the concern regarding the ‘chilling effect’ that is reflected in the reluctance of members and employees of a public authority to hold frank discussions where they are not guaranteed a certain degree of protection for the opinions expressed in the course of making the decisions.

The authority may refuse to provide information concerning internal discussions, but before doing so it should take into account all the considerations that are relevant to the case, and it needs to find in the specific circumstances of each case the balancing point between the public interest in exempting the information and the public and private interest, in so far as there is one, in disclosing the information.

The decisions of the Council in which it refused the requests for information in both cases did not satisfy the test of administrative reasonableness, and therefore the District Court rightly decided to set them aside.

 

Appeal denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Council of Higher Education Law, 5718-1958, ss. 2, 4A, 25C, 25D(b)(13).

Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, s. 44(a).

Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, ss. 1, 2, 3, 7(a), 8, 8(1), 9, 9(a), 9(b), 9(b)(1), 9(b)(2), 9(b)(4), 9(b)(5), 9(b)(6), 9(b)(8), 10, 11, 13, 17(d).

Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 5771/93 Citrin v. Minister of Justice [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 661.

[2]      HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [1991] IsrSC 44(3) 353; IsrSJ 10 204.

[3]      HCJ 3751/03 Ilan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality (not yet reported).

[4]      HCJ 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessing Committee of Holon Municipality [1967] IsrSC 21(1) 69.

[5]      AAA 8282/02 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. State of Israel, State Comptroller’s Office [2004] IsrSC 58(1) 465.

[6]      AAA 6103/04 State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd (not yet reported).

[7]      HCJ 2534/97 Yahav v. State Attorney [1997] IsrSC 51(3) 39 (decision).

[8]      CA 4999/95 Alberici International v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 39.

[9]      HCJ 243/81 Yaki Yosha Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 421.

[10]    CA 7759/01 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Ministry of Justice, State of Israel (unreported).

[11]    AAA 1825/02 State of Israel, Ministry of Health v. Retirement Homes Association (unreported).

[12]    HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421.

[13]    HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[14]    CA 165/82 Hatzor Kibbutz v. Rehovot Assessment Officer [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 70.

[15]    HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 812.

[16]    HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Attorney-General [1990] IsrSC 44(2) 485.

[17]    HCJ 2324/91 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. National Planning and Building Council [1991] IsrSC 45(3) 678.

[18]    CA 6926/93 Israel Dockyards Ltd v. Israel Electric Co. Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 749.

[19]    HCJ 954/97 Cohen v. President of Israel Bar Association [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 486.

[20]    HCJ 131/65 Savitzky v. Minister of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 369.

[21]    HCJ 557/75 East Lod Buildings (1953) Ltd v. Lod Local Planning and Building Committee [1976] IsrSC 30(2) 17.

[22]    HCJ 162/78 Federation Health Fund v. Appeals Board [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 449.

[23]    HCJ 62/75 9 Hibbat Zion Street Ramat Gan Co. Ltd v. Ramat Gan Local Planning and Building Committee [1975] IsrSC 29(2) 595.

 

American cases cited:

[24]    Schell v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 843 F.2d 933 (6th Cir., 1988).

[25]    National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).

[26]    National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service, 861 F. 2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1988).

 

Australian cases cited:

[27]    Harris v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 50 A.L.R 551.

[28]    Re James and Others and Australian National University (1984) 6 A.L.D. 687.

[29]    Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 A.L.D. 138.

[30]    Re Sunderland and Department of Defence (1986) 11 A.L.D 258.

[31]    Re Burns and Australian National University (No. 2) (1985) 7 A.L.D. 425.

 

Canadian cases cited:

[32]    Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry) (C.A.) (2001), [2002] 1 F.C. 421; 2001 FCA 254.

 

For the appellants — D. Briskman.

For the respondents in AAA 9135/03 — T. Glick, M. Fridman.

For the respondents in AAA 9738/04 — R. Har-Zahav, Y. Shamir.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice E. Hayut

The two appeals before us, AAA 9135/03 Council for Higher Education v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing (hereafter — ‘the HaAretz appeal’) and AAA 9738/04 Council for Higher Education v. Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel (hereafter — ‘the Shachar appeal’), raise the same question with regard to the scope of the duty to provide information that is imposed on a public authority under the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998 (hereafter — ‘the Freedom of Information Law’ or ‘the law’), and with regard to the interpretation of the exemption stipulated in this regard in s. 9(b)(4) of the law, according to which the authority is not obliged to provide information:

‘Information that should not be provided or that there is no duty to provide

9. …

     (b) A public authority is not obliged to provide information that is one of the following:

            …

 

(4) Information concerning internal discussions, memoranda of internal consultations between employees of public authorities, their colleagues or advisers, or of statements made within the framework of an internal inquiry, as well as an opinion, draft, advice or recommendation, which were given for the purpose of making a decision, with the exception of consultations stipulated by law.

Both the appeals concern the refusal of the Council for Higher Education (hereafter — ‘the Council’) to disclose internal documents and minutes of its meetings and the meeting of its subcommittees. Because of the common questions that arise as aforesaid in both of these appeals, it was decided to hear them jointly and with an extended panel (see the decisions of 13 January 2005 and 16 January 2005).

The facts and the judgment of the trial court in the HaAretz case

1.    The respondents in the HaAretz appeal, within the framework of their work as journalists, published articles concerning the Council and they wished to continue to report on its activity. Inter alia, the respondents wanted to monitor the measures that the Council was adopting as a result of the publication of the findings in the State Comptroller’s report concerning it in April 1999. For this purpose, the third respondent requested the Council to allow it to inspect the minutes of its meetings in the five years that preceded the request and its decisions in those years, as well as the minutes of the discussions and the decisions of the Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council in the four years preceding the request. Following discussions between the parties, the respondents restricted their request to the minutes of the meetings in the three years that preceded the request. The second appellant, who is the person at the Council responsible for making information available to the public, agreed to send to the respondents the decisions that was made at the meetings of the Council and the meetings of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, but she refused to provide them with the minutes that were requested, in reliance on the provisions of s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law. In response to the refusal, the respondents filed a petition to obtain the material that was requested. The petition was filed in the Jerusalem District Court, sitting as the court for administrative affairs.

2.    In its judgment on 11 September 2003, the trial court (his honour Justice B. Okon) discussed the great public interest in the activity of the Council. With regard to the exception provided in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law, the court held that although it did exclude information originating in internal discussions from the scope of information that required disclosure, nonetheless in order to justify the privilege of information in a concrete case the authority was required to indicate the reason justifying the privilege and the harm that it might suffer as a result of the disclosure. The court said:

‘It is not sufficient for the authority to say that the information is classified as an internal consultation. The internal consultation is a condition that allows the authority to refrain from providing the information, but it is not a sufficient condition. The authority must point to something else that allows the refusal. In other words, the law provided a list of cases in which the authority is not liable to provide information. The fact that a certain case falls within the scope of this list does not allow the authority to refrain from making the disclosure. It allows the authority to refrain from making the disclosure only if there is a reason that justifies this… It is necessary to point to the fact that harm may be suffered in practice as a result of revealing the information. It is not sufficient in this case to mention possibilities or speculations’ (para. 9 of the judgment).

The court held that the concern that the disclosure of internal consultation might harm proper administration is not a sufficient reason for preventing the disclosure. Even the argument that the members of the Council are representatives of various institutions and therefore it will be difficult for them to speak freely about a matter concerning their colleagues and the fear that the information will be taken out of context do not justify a refusal to provide the information. The court went on to hold that the decisions of the Council in this context were laconic and did not reflect the various opinions that were expressed with regard to adopting them, and therefore it was insufficient merely to provide the decisions, and the Council should also provide the respondents with the minutes that preceded them. The court rejected the Council’s argument that the scope of the material requested justified the refusal to provide the information and it also rejected the Council’s argument that the petition sought to impose the duty of disclosure retroactively; the court held that retroactive disclosure could not be compared to retroactive application of the law and that the disclosure was limited to the current composition of the Council, which should have anticipated the duty of disclosure. For these reasons, the trial court granted the petition but allowed the Council to refrain from disclosing information that violates the privacy of third parties or information that is protected by established rules of privilege, in accordance with the following rules: first, it held that if the Council was of the opinion that certain minutes or certain decisions harmed the interests of a third party, it could remove those passages from the minutes, provided that it indicated that the passage had been removed, the date on which the minutes were recorded and the reason why the privilege was sought. The court also held that the Council was entitled to remove passages that were privileged under the law, including consultations with lawyers, provided that it expressly mentioned that the passage was removed, the exact reasons for this and the dates of the discussions. Finally, the court held that the Council could apply to the court in order to omit the names of certain speakers or the names of speakers in certain minutes, while giving the reason for this based on the content of the discussion or the statement, and that the disclosure process should be completed in its entirety within 30 days. With the respondents’ consent, the disclosure was restricted to minutes of the current composition of the Council only, but the respondents retained the right to petition the court once again with regard to the restrictions and privileges that the Council would seek to impose pursuant to the rules that the court determined as aforesaid.

This led to the filing of the HaAretz appeal before us. At the same time as it filed the appeal, the Council applied for a stay of execution of the judgment, and on 13 October 2003 this court (per Justice S. Joubran) granted the application.

The facts and the judgment of the trial court in the Shachar case

3.    The respondent in the Shachar appeal, the Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel, submitted to the Council, at the end of 2001, an application to receive a licence under s. 25C of the Council of Higher Education Law, 5718-1958 (hereafter — the Council of Higher Education Law), to open an institution in Ashkelon that would teach courses for a degree of MD that would be given by the University of Gdansk in Poland. The respondent withdrew this application after it found out that the Ministry of Health, as well as senior members of the Council, expressed their objection in principle to holding medical courses within the framework of a branch of a foreign university. In January 2003 the respondent filed another application, and this time it asked for a licence to establish in Ashkelon an institution for paramedic courses only, which would give an entitlement to a credit point for a degree of MD from the University of Gdansk. The Council’s subcommittee for the extensions of foreign institutions (hereafter — the extensions committee) examined the new application and recommended giving a temporary licence to the respondent subject to various conditions that it stipulated. This recommendation was considered at the meeting of the Council on 25 November 2003, during which the position of the deans of the medical schools in Israel was heard as well as the position of the respondent’s representatives. On 16 December 2003, the council decided, by a majority, to refuse the application notwithstanding the recommendation of the extensions committee. In its decision, the Council said that it saw no reason to increase the scope of the activity of extensions to include the sensitive field of medical studies and it explained this by saying that:

‘The experience that has been accumulated with regard to the activity of extensions of foreign institutions in Israel since the enactment of amendment 11 of the Council of Higher Education Law in 1998 is in general not positive, and therefore it is inconsistent with an increase in the scope of the activity of extensions of foreign institutions to such a sensitive field as medical studies.’

The Council also said in its decision that there is no research activity taking place within the framework of the institution in Israel that is the subject of the petition, and therefore it held that the respondent does not satisfy the condition provided in s. 25D(b)(13) of the Council of Higher Education Law, according to which the institution in Israel should provide the education ‘at an appropriate place with suitable conditions, including conditions that are required for ensuring a proper standard of education.’ At the end of its decision, the Council further said that the scope of the teaching at the institution by lecturers whose main position was at recognized and subsidized Israeli institutions prima facie exceeds what is permitted by the Planning and Budgeting Committee, but in view of the other reasons that decided the application the Council did not address this issue in detail.

4.    The respondent in the Shachar appeal applied to the Jerusalem District Court sitting as the court for administrative affairs and it petitioned the court to set aside the decision. In its petition it argued, inter alia, that some of the members of the Council who took part in making the decision had a conflict of interests since they were the representatives of universities where there were medical faculties that wished to prevent competition in this field. As interim relief the respondent applied to the court to order the Council of Higher Education to disclose to it all the minutes of the discussions that took place with regard to it in the plenum of the Council and the extensions committee, as well as the report of the licensing unit concerning it which was submitted to the extensions committee. At the suggestion of the trial court, the part of the petition attacking the actual decision of the Council was struck out because of lack of jurisdiction, and the hearing before the court continued only with regard to the rest of the original petition, which concerned the disclosure of the minutes and the report of the licensing unit. To complete the picture it should be stated that with regard to the actual decision of the Council, which rejected the application to receive the licence, the respondent filed a petition to this court sitting as the High Court of Justice. This petition is still pending and no decision has yet been made (HCJ 6671/04 Shachar Organization for the Advancement of Education in Israel v. Council for Higher Education).

5.    In its judgment on 19 September 2004, the trial court (his honour the vice-president, Justice D. Cheshin) granted the administrative petition with regard to providing the documents, in which it said the following:

‘Even if the authority is not obliged to provide the information, this does not mean that it can refuse to provide it contrary to the rules of administrative law with regard to the manner of making an administrative decision. Therefore, when we are speaking of the minutes of internal discussions, there is admittedly no obligation to provide them, as there would be under the general provision of s. 1 of the law, but a decision not to provide them cannot be made solely because they are the minutes of internal discussions… but the public authority should consider each case on its merits and decide it according to the best administrative tradition’ (para. 13 of the judgment).

The trial court went on to hold that for the purpose of the decision whether or not to disclose the minutes, the Council should take into account all the considerations relevant to the issue, including general public considerations and principles concerning the sensitivity of internal discussions and concrete considerations concerning the facts of the specific case and the harm that would actually be caused as a result of the disclosure, on the one hand, and the non-disclosure, on the other. In our case, the trial court held that the Council had not proved any actual harm that it might suffer as a result of a disclosure of the requested documents; the decision leads to the problematic outcome of shutting the respondent out; in addition, public confidence is likely to be harmed if the Council’s deliberations are not transparent. The court went on to hold that it was not persuaded that the material that was given to the respondent was sufficient in order to allow it to argue in an ‘informed and effective’ manner against the decision made in its case. The court denied the alternative application of the Council to exclude the names of the speakers from the documents, since it held that this might undermine the purpose for which the information was requested in the first place. Finally, the trial court held that it could not accept the general argument that the Council raised to the effect that disclosing the minutes of the internal deliberations of public authorities would result in a reduction in the scope of recording the minutes so that essential information would be missing from the authority’s files. The trial court emphasized in this context that the Council could not do what it wished when recording the minutes and it had a duty to record complete and full minutes of the deliberations that it held in order to allow scrutiny of its decision-making process. For these reasons, as we have said, the trial court accepted the respondent’s arguments and ordered the Council to provide the documents that were the subject of the petition for the respondent’s inspection, after removing the parts that concerned legal advice.

This led to the filing of the Shachar appeal before us. Together with the appeal, the Council filed an application for a stay of execution of the judgment and its application was granted (see the decision of his honour Justice Y. Adiel of 7 November 2004).

The arguments in the appeals

6.    In both of the appeals, the Council complains of the interpretation given in the judgments against which it is appealing to the exemption contained in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law. It also complains of the finding in those judgments, which in its opinion is erroneous, that a public authority must point to the harm that it will suffer as a result of disclosing the information that was requested, and that it is not sufficient for it to show that the documents that were requested are minutes of internal deliberations, in order that the information included in them should be privileged. This finding, so it is alleged, is contrary to the language and the purpose of the section, which is to protect the free and honest speech of the members of the authority within the framework of the closed discussions that it holds. According to the Council, an internal discussion is a discussion that is held prior to making a decision or formulating a policy, and it is not open to the public. Therefore, it is sufficient for the authority to show that we are dealing with an internal discussion for it to be able to refuse to provide the minutes of that meeting. The Council also argues that, contrary to the rulings of the trial court in both judgments that are the subject of the appeals, the burden of persuading the court that there is a special interest justifying the requested information being provided should rest with the party asking for the information, and not with the authority. In this context, the Council refers to the provisions of s. 17(d) of the Freedom of Information Law, according to which the court has the power, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 9 of the law, ‘to order the requested information to be provided… if in its opinion the public interest in the disclosure of the information takes precedence over the reason for rejecting the request…’ and in its opinion this section supports its approach with regard to the burden imposed on the person requesting information in such a case. The Council further emphasizes that the approach adopted by the District Court, according to which minutes of internal discussions should be disclosed unless the authority can show that this harms or is likely to harm the public interest in the specific case overlooks the fact that disclosing such minutes harms the public interest and that this reason is what prima facie lies at the heart of the exemption contained in s. 9(b)(4) of the law. According to the Council, the disclosure of information from internal discussions as aforesaid is not only likely to cause harm to the process of making the decisions, since the members of the authority and its representatives will be deterred from expressing their opinions in an honest and open manner, but there is an additional concern that the desire to protect the participants in the discussions from a disclosure of their positions will lead to the result that the authorities will refrain from keeping exact minutes that reflect the discussions as they really took place, with all of the different opinions and doubts that are characteristic thereof. Alternatively, the Council argues that even if we assume that it is obliged to provide the requested information, the trial court should have held that it is entitled to exclude the names of the speakers from the minutes.

In the HaAretz appeal, the Council further emphasizes that there is no justification for holding it liable to make clarifications with third parties who may be harmed by the disclosure and that in view of the large number of these third parties, this will involve an unreasonable burden in its work, a burden that is in itself a reason for nor providing the information under s. 8(1) of the Freedom of Information Law. The Council reiterated its argument that the disclosure involves a retroactive dimension, since its members could have assumed that their names would not be disclosed unless the person requesting the information showed a specific reason for this. Finally, the Council argues that it does not object to providing the respondents in the HaAretz case with those parts of the minutes that discuss general issues which do not directly concern the interests of a third party and which do not involve other reasons as to why they should be privileged, although this should be without the names of the speakers. The Council says that it has already provided the respondents with hundreds of pages of minutes, as well as the letter of the chairman of the Planning and Budgeting Committee, which reviews the actions that were carried out in response to the publication of the State Comptroller’s report.

In the Shachar appeal, the Council further argues that the fact that the information relates to the respondent itself does not justify its disclosure. It also argues that the trial court erred when it held that that material that it supplied to the respondent was insufficient to allow it to make effective and informed argument with regard to the decision that was made, and the proof of this is the petition that the respondent filed in this regard in the aforesaid HCJ 6671/04, within which framework the respondent may avail itself of procedural methods for receiving additional information that is required for the petition. The Council also argues that there is nothing to prevent the respondent being given the minutes of the meeting in which it participated and that, as a rule, it would agree to provide information from internal discussions in various cases, when these concerned discussion of matters of principle with wide-ranging ramifications, which do not harm any third party, after removing the names of the speakers.

7.    The respondents in the two appeals rely on the judgments of the trial court and argue that a restrictive interpretation of the exemption contained in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law realizes the right of the public to receive information from public authorities, which is a supreme principle that underlies the Freedom of Information Law. Therefore they are of the opinion that the rulings of the trial court should be upheld in both cases; according to these, the fact that we are concerned with information that relates to internal discussions is an insufficient justification for the authority to refuse to provide the information, and it needs to show that in the circumstances of the case there is a real reason that justifies the information being privileged. The respondents further argue that it is not right that meetings of the Council, which is a public body with extensive powers, should remain privileged; the Council, as a statutory body, should conduct its discussions transparently. They also argue that public authorities have a duty to keep full and complete minutes of their meetings, and it is questionable whether meetings of the plenum of the Council fall within the scope of the term ‘internal discussions’ in s. 9(b)(4) of the law, in view of the fact that these are not merely preparatory discussions but the official discussions of this body, in which its decisions are made.

The respondents in the HaAretz appeal further argue that inspecting the decisions of the Council and the Planning and Budgeting Committee, without inspecting the minutes, cannot help them since the decisions are laconic and do not give the reasons underlying them. In response to the Council’s argument concerning the protection of third parties, the respondents argue that the mechanism determined by the trial court in this regard is effective and it properly balances the rights of third parties against the public’s right to know. The respondents also argue that the Council’s argument that the substantial amount of minutes justifies their refusing to provide them should be rejected. Finally the respondents argue that the names of the speakers should not be removed from the minutes, and since the duty of disclosure has only been directed at the current composition of the Council, there are no grounds for the argument of retroactivity.

 The respondent in the Shachar appeal further argues that its right to inspect the minutes derives not merely from the right enshrined in the Freedom of Information Law that is given to every citizen and resident, but also from the right of inspection that it has because of its personal interest in the information. The respondent further argues that in order to substantiate its argument that the Council’s decision was not based on any valid reasons, the identity of the speakers needs to be disclosed, and in any case even if it had sufficient information in its possession to attack the decision, this would not be a reason for denying the application.

Deliberations

The right to receive information from public authorities

8.    The right to receive information concerning the activity of public authorities is one of the cornerstones of a free society. It concerns the very existence of democracy, it nourishes and is nourished by the freedom of expression and it reflects the legal outlook that the authority is a public trustee that is obliged to look after the interests of the public, rather than itself, when carrying out its duties (see A. Barak, ‘Freedom of Information and the Court,’ 3 Kiryat HaMishpat 95 (2003), at pp. 96-99. On the relationship between the right of the public to information and the freedom of expression, see HCJ 5771/93 Citrin v. Minister of Justice [1], at p. 673, and see also A. Mason, ‘The Relationship between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information,’ Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Information (J. Beatson and Y. Cripps eds., 2000), at p. 225). This was already discussed by John Adams in the eighteenth century, when he said:

‘… liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge, as their great Creator, who does nothing in vain, has given them understandings and a desire to know. But, besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible, divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean of the characters and conduct of their rulers. Rulers are no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees for the people; and if the cause, the interest and trust, is insidiously betrayed, or wantonly trifled away, the people have a right to revoke the authority that they themselves have deputed, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys, and trustees’ (J. Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765)).

In HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [2], at p. 361 {216}, this court emphasized the importance of the principle of freedom of information from an additional perspective, namely scrutiny of the propriety of the actions of the public authority, when it said: ‘The public eye is not merely an expression of the right to know, but also a reflection of the right to scrutinize.’ Indeed, the transparency of the actions of government authorities allows citizens to monitor their actions and the considerations underlying them, and so to criticize them, where justified, and it makes a decisive contribution to ‘public hygiene’ and to improving the quality of the authority’s conduct when it knows that its actions and its decision-making process are exposed and transparent to the public eye (see N.S. Marsh, ‘Introduction,’ Public Access to Government-Held Information (N.S. Marsh ed., 1987) 1, at p. 4). The positive correlation between the right of the public to information and public confidence in government authorities was discussed by Justice M. Cheshin in HCJ 3751/03 Ilan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [3], at para. 15:

‘When we realize that the civil servant acts as a trustee and as an agent of the public, he is therefore bound by the duties of an agent, including the duty to account for his actions, i.e., to disclose to his principals — the entire public — what he has done and what he has not done, why he has done one thing and not another, and when he takes no action, why he took no action. He is obliged to disclose all his acts and omissions, together with the reasons for them. Only in this way can the public know whether the civil servant has acted faithfully; only in this way will the public have confidence in the administration and its employees. The administration therefore has a duty of transparency in its actions and decisions.’

The access of the individual to information, as opposed to making the information privileged and keeping it secret, brings the individual closer to the authority and increases his confidence in government decisions. The remarks of Gerald Wetlaufer in this regard (G. Wetlaufer, ‘Justifying Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege,’ 65 Ind. L. J. 845, at p. 886) are also pertinent:

‘There is a strong association between secrecy and bad acts. Not that secrecy always entails a bad act, but that bad acts always seek out secrecy… secrecy operates to alienate — to create subjective distance between — the secret keeper and the one from whom the secret is kept. In the public sphere, such alienation between the governed and the governors tends toward hierarchy and away from democracy and citizen sovereignty.’

9.    These important reasons that underlie the principle of the freedom of information are a daily occurrence in every democracy that is based on a culture of rights. For this reason, the Israeli legal system recognized the right of the citizen to receive information from public authorities for many years before the legislator expressly enshrined this right in the Freedom of Information Law (see HCJ 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessing Committee of Holon Municipality [4], at pp. 71-72; AAA 8282/02 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. State of Israel, State Comptroller’s Office [5], at pp. 469-472; AAA 6103/04 State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd [6], at para. 9. See also, Z. Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law (2000), at pp. 15-64). The explanatory notes to the draft Freedom of Information Law also address the reasons and rationales underlying the principle of the freedom of information, where they say:

‘The right to receive information from public authorities is one of the basic rights in a democracy. It is a basic condition for realizing freedom of expression and for realizing a person’s political and other rights in all spheres of life. Greater access to information will promote the advancement of social values, such as equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, and it will also allow better public scrutiny of government actions. The right to information has indeed been recognized in case law; but in practice it appears that the public has not been given an adequate amount of access to the information held by the authorities, and it is difficult to eradicate the tendency of the authorities to regard the information as their property rather than property that is held by them in trust for, and on behalf of, the public’ (see Draft Laws 5757, at p. 397).

The Freedom of Information Law and the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the law

10. In furtherance of the purposes that the Freedom of Information Law is intended to realize, the law begins, in s. 1, with a general and broad declaration of the existence of the right to receive information from public authorities. It states:

‘Freedom of information

1.  Every Israeli citizen or resident has the right to receive information from a public authority pursuant to the provisions of this law.

In his book The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, Prof. Segal says that this section is ‘the key section on which the whole law is based. It is the “cornerstone” on which the legal right to receive information from a public authority is based’ (at p. 97). Because of the great importance that the legislature attributed to the realization of this right, it even saw fit to require every head of an authority to appoint one its employees as a ‘person responsible for making information available to the public,’ who is in charge of dealing with requests to receive information and of implementing the provisions of the law (s. 3 of the law). But like other constitutional rights, no matter how important they are, this is not an absolute right but a relative right, which in appropriate cases needs to yield to other rights that are also deserving of protection, such as the right to privacy, dignity, property and reputation, and also to important public interests such as state security, foreign relations or the proper functioning of the public authority (see Barak, ‘Freedom of Information and the Court,’ supra, at pp. 99-102). The expression given in the Freedom of Information Law to the need to strike a balance between the freedom of information and other rights and interests was recently discussed by Justice Rivlin in State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd [6], and I can do no better than to cite his illuminating remarks in that case:

‘… The Freedom of Information Law lists various cases in which the freedom of information yields to other rights and interests. Thus the law provides, in s. 8, a list of cases in which the public authority may reject an application to receive information. It speaks, in principle, of circumstances in which dealing with the application or finding the information involves real difficulties or requires the allocation of unreasonable resources, and also of circumstances in which the information has been published and is available to the public or is in the possession of another public authority. Section 9(a) of the law lists types of information that the authority is prohibited from providing. This concerns information whose disclosure gives rise to a fear of harm to Israel’s foreign relations or the security of the state, security of the public or the safety of an individual, and also information whose disclosure constitutes a violation of privacy or whose disclosure is prohibited under any law. Section 9(b)… provides an additional list of items of information that the authority is not obliged to provide… Sections 8 and 9 do not stand alone… Section 10 provides that when considering a refusal to provide information under ss. 8 and 9, the public authority should consider, inter alia, the interest of the applicant in the information, if he states it in his application, and also the public interest in the disclosure of the information for reasons of maintaining public health or safety, or preserving the environment. Section 11 adds to this that information falling within the scope of s. 9, which can be disclosed without allocating unreasonable resources or placing a significant burden on the activity of the authority, by excluding details, making changes or stipulating conditions with regard to the manner of receiving and using the information, should be provided accordingly. And as if all of this were not enough, s. 17(d) comes and provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 9, the court may order that requested information should be provided, in whole or in part and under such conditions as it shall determine, if in its opinion the public interest in the disclosure of the information takes precedence over and overrides the reason for rejecting the application, provided that disclosure of the information is not prohibited by law’ (ibid. [6], at para. 21; see also HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. State of Israel, State Comptroller’s Office [5], at pp. 472-474).

11. In the two appeals before us, the Council bases its arguments on the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law, and it argues that the information requested should not be given to the respondents because it is ‘information concerning internal discussions.’ The main issue in this case therefore revolves around the interpretation of this exemption and the scope of its application. Let us therefore take a closer look at s. 9(b)(4) of the law, which we already cited at the beginning of our remarks:

‘Information that should not be provided or that there is no duty to provide

9. …

     (b) A public authority is not obliged to provide information that is one of the following:

            (1) …

         (2) …

 

         (3) …

 

(4) Information concerning internal discussions, memoranda of internal consultations between employees of public authorities, their colleagues or advisers, or of statements made within the framework of an internal inquiry, as well as an opinion, draft, advice or recommendation, which were given for the purpose of making a decision, with the exception of consultations stipulated by law.

As distinct from the absolute exemptions in s. 9(a) of the law, which prohibit the authority from providing information, inter alia, when there is a concern that its disclosure will harm state security, Israel’s foreign relations, public security or the security or safety of an individual, or information whose disclosure constitutes a violation of privacy within the meaning thereof in the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, the exemptions that are addressed in s. 9(b) of the Freedom of Information Law are more moderate. The subsection does not speak of a prohibition against providing the information, but of information that the authority is not obliged to provide. Therefore, the margin of discretion that the authority should exercise before refusing to provide information of the kinds set out in s. 9(b) of the law is broader. These types of information include, inter alia, information whose disclosure is likely to undermine the proper functioning of the public authority or its ability to discharge its functions (s. 9(b)(1)), information that concerns a policy that is in the planning stages (s. 9(b)(2)) and ‘information concerning internal discussions, memoranda of internal consultations between employees of public authorities, their colleagues or advisers, or of statements made within the framework of an internal inquiry…’ as stated in s. 9(b)(4) of the law, which is the subject of this case.

12. The main reason for justifying the exemption for providing information of the kind mentioned in s. 9(b)(4) lies in the concern regarding the ‘chilling effect’ that is reflected in the reluctance of members and employees of the public authority to hold frank discussions where they are not guaranteed a certain degree of protection for the opinions expressed in the course of making the decisions. Making it possible for the employees of the authority to hold an open and frank dialogue, without any concern that the remarks that are spoken by them in internal discussions or in internal advice will be exposed to the public is therefore intended to protect the quality of the decisions of the public authorities and the effectiveness of the process of making them; this is the main purpose underlying the exemption (see State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd [6], at para. 28; Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at p. 201; and cf. HCJ 2534/97 Yahav v. State Attorney [7] (decision); CA 4999/95 Alberici International v. State of Israel [8], at pp. 45-46; HCJ 243/81 Yaki Yosha Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [9], at p. 424). This purpose is expressed in the explanatory notes to s. 9(b)(4) of the draft law, which say:

‘In order to discharge its duties, the public authority holds internal discussions or internal investigations and its employees prepare various opinions, which are essential for formulating policy and making decisions. Some of the opinions mature into binding policy and some are shelved. It is an accepted assumption that it is not possible to hold frank discussions in the course of the authority’s activity, unless a certain degree of protection can be guaranteed for the process of formulating the authority’s discretion and the authority’s internal scrutiny process’ (Draft Laws 5757, at p. 404).

For the same reason, many countries around the world have recognized, within the framework of the legislation that guarantees the freedom of information, the need to protect information that relates to consultations, opinions and internal discussions that constitute a part of the decision-making process of public authorities (see D. Banisar, Global Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws Around the World (Freedominfo.org, 2004)). It seems to me that it is not superfluous to examine the normative arrangements provided in this regard in different legal systems, before we turn to examine the interpretation of the provisions of s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law and the scope of its application.

Comparative law

13. American law distinguishes between the disclosure of information concerning internal discussions and the disclosure of information concerning documents such as internal memoranda and letters that are sent within the authority itself or between one authority and another in the course of the decision-making process. The disclosure of information of the second type is addressed by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, which in subsection (a) addresses the general duty imposed on authorities to give information to the public with regard to their activity, and it gives details in subsection (b) of the matters that are not subject to this duty. Section 5(b), which is referred to as Exemption 5, speaks of:

‘(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;’

American case law has discussed the main reason for providing Exemption 5, which is similar in essence to the reasons that we have discussed with regard to the exemption set out in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law:

‘The ultimate goal that Exemption 5 seeks to achieve is to prevent the quality of agency decisionmaking from deteriorating as a result of public exposure’ (Schell v. United States Department of Health & Human Services [24], at p. 939; National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. [25], at p. 151).

The chapter in the Justice Department Guide to the Freedom of Information Act (2004) that deals with Exemption 5[1] gives three secondary reasons for the exemption, which are a part of this main reason:

‘Specifically, three policy purposes consistently have been held to constitute the bases for this privilege: (1) to encourage open, frank discussions on matters of policy between subordinates and superiors; (2) to protect against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they are finally adopted; and (3) to protect against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency's action’ (ibid., in the text referred to by footnote 65).

14. In so far as the interpretation of Exemption 5 is concerned, American case law has adopted a restrictive approach, by making its application dependent upon two conditions. First, the document protected by this exemption is required to relate to the stages that precede the making of the decision (i.e., to be ‘predecisional,’ as opposed to ‘postdecisional’). The reason for this condition is that the public interest in information that concerns binding decisions is more significant and also there is no concern that disclosures of discussions that took place after the decision was formulated will affect the quality of the decision that has already been made (see National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. [25], at pp. 151-153). Second, the document needs to include an opinion or recommendation that constitutes an integral part of the deliberative process, and the exemption does not apply to information that is merely factual (see National Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service [26], at p. 1117; Justice Department Guide to the Freedom of Information Act (2004), in the text referred to by footnotes 73-76).

15. As I have already said, internal discussions of public authorities do not fall within the scope of Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act and the premise with regard to these discussions is that they are available for public inspection, pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, which is referred to as the Government in the Sunshine Act, apparently in reference to the immortal words of Justice Brandeis that ‘sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants’ (L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money, and How the Bankers Use It (1914)) (with regard to the relationship between the laws, see M.P. Cox, ‘A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information Act; the Privacy Act; and the Government in the Sunshine Act,’ 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. (1977) 969).

Subsection (b) of the Open Meetings Act provides in this regard that:

‘… Except as provided in subsection (c), every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation.’

The principle concerning the publicity of the meetings of the authorities is based on the recognition that the public should be given as much information as possible with regard to the decision-making process and it should be allowed to examine this process without any intermediaries (see B.S. Baird, ‘The Government in the Sunshine Act — An Overview,’ 1977 Duke L. J. (1977) 565, at p. 566). In a case where the discussions took place in camera, the authority has a general duty to give the public the minutes that document them (see subsection (f)(2) of the Open Meetings Act), with certain exemptions that are set out in subsection (c), to which subsection (k) of the Open Meetings Act refers. These exemptions address exceptional cases in which the authority is entitled to hold meetings in camera and to refuse to provide minutes of the discussions, and they are similar to those provided in s. 9(a) and ss. 9(b)(1), (5), (6) and (8) of Israel’s Freedom of Information Law. In addition, subsection (c) of the Open Meetings Act includes specific exemptions that concern financial institutions (see paragraph (8) and subparagraph (9)(A) of subsection (c)) and an exemption that concerns legal proceedings in which the authority is involved (see paragraph (10) of subsection (c)). Subsection (d) of the Open Meetings Act provides a detailed and strict mechanism for the manner in which the authority should act with regard to voting and providing a public explanation for a decision to close a meeting and not to disclose the content of the discussions that it is holding.

16. In England, the Freedom of Information Act 2000 came into effect in January 2005. Section 1 of the law, like the Freedom of Information Law in Israel, gives rise to a general right of access to information held by public authorities, and the other sections of the Act give details of specific exemptions, including the exemption concerning information regarding government policy, which is provided in s. 35 of the Act, and the general exemptions provided in s. 36 of the Act concerning access to information held by a public authority that is not exempt by virtue of s. 35. The following is the main provision of the aforesaid s. 36:

‘36. (1) …

     (2) Information to which this section applies is exempt information if, in the reasonable opinion of a qualified person, disclosure of the information under this Act —

          (a) …

          (b) would, or would be likely to, inhibit —

(i) the free and frank provision of advice, or

(ii) the free and frank exchange of views for the purposes of deliberation, or

          (c) would otherwise prejudice, or would be likely otherwise to prejudice, the effective conduct of public affairs.

     …’

In their book, The Law of Freedom of Information, Macdonald and Jones say that the power to refuse a request for information under s. 36 of the Act is given to the qualified person in each authority, who is usually the most senior person in that authority, as defined in s. 36(5), on the assumption that giving the power solely to this person will serve as a restraint on the use made of the exemption and will prevent it from being used excessively (see J. Macdonald and C.H. Jones, The Law of Freedom of Information (2003), at p. 199).

17. In Australia, s. 36 of the Freedom of Information Act of 1982 provides that the authority does not have a duty to disclose information concerning an opinion, advice, recommendation or consultation before making a decision, if giving the information is contrary to the public interest. In the words of s. 36(1):

‘Internal working documents

36. (1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document the disclosure of which under this Act:

(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the Government of the Commonwealth; and

     (b) would be contrary to the public interest.

…’

Australian case law addresses the cumulative condition in s. 36(1)(b), according to which it must be shown that providing the information is contrary to the public interest. It holds:

‘That a document is an internal working document does not of itself make the document an exempt document under cl. 36. To justify refusal of access to a document under this clause, the agency concerned must also form a view that it would be contrary to the public interest to give access to the document and specify the ground of public interest involved… In evaluating where the public interest ultimately lies in the present case, it is necessary to weigh the public interest in citizens being informed of the processes of their government and its agencies on the one hand against the public interest in the proper working of government and its agencies on the other’ (Harris v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation [27]; Re James and Others and Australian National University [28], at paras. 87-89; R. Tomasic and D. Fleming, Australian Administrative Law (1991), at pp. 436-437).

It has also been held that for information to be exempt, the authority needs to show that in the circumstances of the specific case all of the considerations taken into account justify the information being exempt, and it is insufficient merely to raise a general argument to this effect (see Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury [29], at paras. 27 and 30; Re Sunderland and Department of Defence [30]; Tomasic and Fleming, Australian Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 439-440). In its arguments, the Council referred us to the Australian case of Re Burns and Australian National University (No 2) [31], and it sought to derive from it that notwithstanding the general position in Australian case law that tends not to give decisive weight to the concern that the frankness of discussions will be affected, the court held in that case that this interest prevailed. This is of no significance. As we have seen, the public interest is examined on its merits on a case by case basis, and in Re Burns and Australian National University (No 2) [31] the Australian court based its conclusion on the circumstances of the case before it and on the special characteristics of the University and its discussions, which were the subject of the dispute in that case (see ibid. [31], at para. 41).

18. In Canada, s. 21 of the Access to Information Act of 1982 concerns the exemption given to information that constitutes a stage in the decision-making process of government institutions. It states:

‘21. (1) The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested under this Act that contains

(a) advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a minister of the Crown,

(b) an account of consultations or deliberations involving officers or employees of a government institution, a minister of the Crown or the staff of a minister of the Crown,

if the record came into existence less than twenty years prior to the request.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a record that contains

(a) an account of, or a statement of reasons for, a decision that is made in the exercise of a discretionary power or an adjudicative function and that affects the rights of a person; or

(b) a report prepared by a consultant or an adviser who was not, at the time the report was prepared, an officer or employee of a government institution or a member of the staff of a minister of the Crown.’

According to Canadian case law, the burden of proving that the head of a government institution has not exercised his discretion lawfully rests with the party applying for the information, but the head of the institution has the initial duty of giving explanations for his refusal to provide the information by virtue of the duty of fairness imposed on him under the rules of administrative law and in order that the court can examine the reasonableness of the decision under those rules (see Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Industry) [32], at paras. 99-102).

19. Article 255 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community establishes the general right to receive information from the institutions of the European Union as follows:

‘1. Any citizen of the Union… shall have a right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.

2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific provisions regarding access to its documents.’

Under this article, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted in 2001 regulation no. 1049/2001 (Regulation (EC) no. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents). The regulation is intended to realize the public’s right of access to documents and to establish rules that will ensure that it is realized without difficulty and that there is a proper administrative practice in this regard (see para. 1 of the regulation). The exceptions to the general right provided in art. 2 of the regulation are set out in art. 4 thereof, and the exception that concerns our case is the exemption set out in art. 4(3), which states:

‘Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.

Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.’

The test adopted in the European Union, as can be seen from art. 4(3) that is cited above, is the ‘seriously undermine’ test; only when this is satisfied will it be possible to exempt the information, unless there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.

Interim Summary

20. We have seen from comparative law that the rationale underlying the exemptions such as the one in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law is based on a recognition, both in Israel and in other countries around the world, that the disclosure of information concerning internal discussions and memoranda of internal consultations and opinions that are given for the purpose of making decisions may harm the decision-making process of the authority and reduce its quality. But the need to protect the decision-making process and its quality is not the whole picture. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Australia discussed the danger of placing too much weight on the pressures that always accompany the implementation of the duties arising from the principle of the freedom of information in Re James and Others and Australian National University [28], at para. 96, where the tribunal said:

‘The pressures flowing from greater accountability are, in my view, an inescapable concomitant of more open government. To react too timorously to every anticipated situation of pressure could well negate the principles underlying the Freedom of Information Act.’

It follows that, because of the general public interest that we discussed above, the authority may admittedly refuse to provide information concerning internal discussions, but before it does so it should take into account all the considerations that are relevant to the case, and it needs to find in the specific circumstances of each case the correct balance between the public interest in exempting the information and the public and private interest, in so far as there is one, in disclosing the information. As we said above, the need to strike a balance that takes into account the specific facts of each case and the fact that the general interest alone should not serve as a ground for refusing to disclose information was discussed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia in Re Sunderland and Department of Defence [30]. It said:

‘A claim for immunity made for the document before us will not succeed if all that can be said on the public interest issue is that either its release will inhibit the candour and frankness of members of the Committee in future or that it is one of a class of documents of such a generic nature that none of the elements of that class, for that reason, should be made public. We therefore come to look at the particular document in question and ask ourselves whether its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest’ (see also Fleming, Australian Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 439-440).

In other words, the authority cannot refuse to provide the information that is requested by relying solely on the general public interest in maintaining the frankness and effectiveness of the discussions. Such a refusal de facto makes the exemptions such as the one in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law into absolute exemptions that do not allow the exercising of discretion in any specific case, and this is inconsistent with the language of the statutory arrangements that we have reviewed. More important still, this is not consistent with the general purpose underlying these arrangements, which seek to realize the principle of the freedom of information in so far as public authorities are concerned.

The exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law and the discretion of the authority

21. The conclusion that arises from the interim summary is pertinent and correct with regard to the manner in which the exemption set out in s. 9(b)(4) of the Israeli Freedom of Information Law. This is because of the language of the section, which invites the exercising of discretion, in view of the legislative environment surrounding this section and in view of the general purpose of the Freedom of Information Law, as defined in s. 1 of the law (see A. Barak, Legal Interpretation (vol. 2, Statutory Interpretation, 1993), at pp. 306-308). The immediate legislative environment that is relevant to this issue is the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the Freedom of Information Law. Section 10 of the law provides the fundamental assumption that the authority exercises discretion in such a case and it sets out guidelines with regard to the criteria that the authority should take into account. The section provides:

‘Consider-ations of the public authority

10. When it is considering a refusal to provide information under this law, under the provisions of sections 8 and 9, the public authority should take account, inter alia, of the applicant’s interest in the information, if he stated this in his application, and also of the public interest in the disclosure of the information for reasons of maintaining public health or security, or protecting the environment.’

The considerations mentioned in this section are not the only considerations that should guide the authority in exercising its power, but the fact that they are expressly mentioned in this section amounts to a statutory indication that is intended to direct the public authority that it should give proper weight to these considerations before it decides to refuse to provide information (see Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at p. 221). Thus, for example, if the person applying for the information indicates his private interest in the requested information, this is a significant ground for tipping the scales towards providing the information, even though the right to receive information under the law is not contingent ab initio upon giving reasons for the application and the applicant is not obliged to give the reason for his application (s. 7(a) of the law). An important criterion with regard to the discretion that the authority should exercise in this regard is provided in s. 11 of the law. This section allows the authority to integrate principles of proportionality in exercising the discretion and in the balance that it strikes, by stating that it may provide partial information and also make the providing of the information dependent upon conditions (with regard to providing partial information as a proper balancing point in the circumstances of the case, see and cf. CA 7759/01 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Ministry of Justice, State of Israel [10], at para. 10). With regard to the principle of proportionality, which is reflected in s. 11 of the Freedom of Information Law, see Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at p. 225, and with regard to the manner of exercising the discretion in so far as concerns providing information that is subject to the exemptions stated in ss. 8 and 9 of the law, see State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd [6], at para. 31). In the language of the section:

‘Providing partial information and providing information conditionally

11. If the requested information is information that the public authority is entitled or obliged not to provide as stated in section 9, and it is possible to disclose the information, without an unreasonable allocation of resources or a significant burden to the activities of the authority, by omitting details, by making changes or by imposing conditions on the manner of receiving and using the information, the authority shall provide the information with omissions, changes or with the required conditions, as applicable; if omissions or changes are made as aforesaid, the authority shall state this, unless this fact should not be disclosed for the reasons set out in section 9(a)(1).’

It should be emphasized that when I say that the authority should take into account, when making a decision to refuse information, the circumstances and the facts of the specific case, I do not means that the authority has a burden to show that ‘special harm’ will or is likely to be caused as a result of disclosing the information. This approach was rejected by this court in AAA 1825/02 State of Israel, Ministry of Health v. Retirement Homes Association [11], in which Justice Naor said:

‘The trial court went a step further and held, as cited, that if there is no “special harm” to the authority, the information should be provided, even in a case that falls within the scope of s. 9(b) of the law. My opinion is that the “special harm” formula should not be introduced into the required balance. Indeed, “formulae” are relatively simple to apply, but their weakness lies in their rigidity, and the case before us, in my opinion, proves this… Ultimately, the result of this formula is that if the person applying for the information shows that he has a personal interest in the information, and the authority does not show “special harm,” the information should, in the opinion of the trial court, be disclosed. The “special harm” formula is not, in my opinion, a balancing formula. The “special harm” formula does not appear in the law, it is not required by the law, and in my opinion it has too restrictive an effect on the considerations of anyone who needs to strike a balance between all the interests — the authority within the framework of s. 10 and the court within the framework of s. 17(d)’ (ibid. [11]), at para. 20. Cf. Macdonald and Jones, The Law of Freedom of Information, supra, at p. 182; art. 4(3) of Regulation no. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and Council, supra).

Thus we see that we are dealing with a flexible balancing formula that should be constructed and implemented while taking into account the facts and circumstances of the individual case.

22. The District Court, as well as the parties in their arguments before us, addressed in this context the question of the burden of proof. The respondents asked us to adopt the ruling of the District Court that the authority has the burden of showing a special reason for a refusal, whereas the Council argued that when the exemption provided in the law is satisfied, the applicant should show a special reason why, despite the exemption, the authority should provide the information. In my opinion, the use of the terminology of burdens of proof, which is borrowed from the laws of evidence, is out of place in this context. A public authority that is requested to provide information concerning one of the matters that falls within the scope of any of the exemptions in ss. 8 or 9 of the Freedom of Information Law, should deal with this application in accordance with the rules of administrative law that govern it in all of its actions. One of the important rules in this regard provides that a public authority should exercise the discretion given to it in a reasonable manner. Reasonableness, as a normative concept, means —

‘… identifying the considerations that should be taken into account, giving weight to the various considerations and striking a proper balance between them at the point where they conflict (see HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [12]). The relevant considerations are derived from the purpose of the legislation. They include the particular purposes that the legislation is intended to realize and the basic principles of the legal system, which serve as a “normative umbrella” and a general purpose for all legislation (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [13]; CA 165/82 Hatzor Kibbutz v. Rehovot Assessment Officer [14]). This purpose also determines the internal weight that should be given to the various considerations. A reasonable decision is a decision that strikes a balance between the various considerations in accordance with the weight that is derived from the purpose of the legislation. Indeed, for a decision to be reasonable it is insufficient that relevant considerations are taken into account. The decision is reasonable only if the internal weight given to the relevant considerations is proper’ (HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [15], at p. 824. See also HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. Attorney-General [16], at pp. 513-514; Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at p. 202).

In our case, in order that a decision to refuse to provide information under ss. 8 and 9 of the law will satisfy the test of reasonableness, the authority should identify and examine all of the considerations that are relevant to the case and strike a balance between them, inter alia, by availing itself of the tools put at its disposal for this purpose in ss. 10 and 11 of the Freedom of Information Law.

23. An additional duty that is imposed on the authority under administrative law, in so far as dealing with an application to provide information under the Freedom of Information Law is concerned, is the duty to give reasons for the refusal to provide all or some of the requested information in accordance with the authority’s decision. The duty to give reasons allays the concern that decisions may be made arbitrarily or erroneously and it contributes towards building confidence in the relationship between the authority and the citizen in a democracy (regarding the importance of the duty to give reasons and its being one of the basic duties imposed on an administrative authority, see I. Zamir, Administrative Authority (vol. 2, 1996), at pp. 897-898). Indeed, a public authority may not simply give a laconic refusal to an application to provide information. It is obliged to give details of its reasons for the refusal, in order to allow the person applying for the information to be aware of the reasons for the refusal and to consider his position. Details of the reasons for the refusal also allow the court to know the considerations that the authority took into account and the internal balance that it made between them, when it scrutinizes the decision.

In so far as judicial scrutiny of decisions of the authority under the Freedom of Information Law is concerned, the duty to give reasons has special importance because the judicial involvement in these decisions is carried out on two levels: first, the court examines whether a decision of the authority to refuse to provide information under ss. 8 or 9 of the law satisfies the criteria required by administrative law, i.e., whether the process in which it was made was proper and fair, and whether the decision is reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances of the case. But even if the refusal decision satisfies this first test, the court still has a special jurisdiction under s. 17(d) of the Freedom of Information Law, which goes beyond the usual scope of judicial scrutiny of administrative acts (for the limited scope of this scrutiny in general, see HCJ 2324/91 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. National Planning and Building Council [17], at p. 688). Section 17(d) of the Freedom of Information Law provides the following:

‘Petition to the court

17. …

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9, the court may order requested information to be provided, in whole or in part and on conditions that it shall determine, if in its opinion the public interest in the disclosure of the information takes precedence over and overrides the reason for rejecting the application, provided that the disclosure of the information is not prohibited under any law.’

In practice, s. 17(d) allows the court to substitute its own discretion for the discretion of the authority ‘notwithstanding the provisions of section 9,’ and to order the disclosure of the information even is it finds no defect whatsoever in the discretion of the authority according to the tests of administrative law (cf. s. 44(a) of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, with regard to the disclosure of privileged evidence). This provision in s. 17(d) of the Freedom of Information Law highlights and emphasizes the importance of the principle of freedom of information that the law is intended to realize. In State of Israel, Ministry of Health v. Retirement Homes Association [11] the court left undecided the question of the character and nature of a hearing under s. 17(d) of the Freedom of Information Law. It did not decide the question whether the hearing is held de novo, so that the court does not attribute special importance to the decision of the public authority with regard to providing the information (see Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at p. 252). As we shall see below, in our case there is also no need to make a firm decision in this regard, since where the authority did not exercise reasonable discretion under s. 9 of the Freedom of Information Law, the court does not need to resort to exercising the special jurisdiction given to it in s. 17(d) of the law, and it can find a basis for setting aside the refusal decision and the obligation to provide the information, in whole or in part and on such conditions as it sees fit, on the general principles of administrative law.

From general principles to the specific case

24. The relevant authority in both of the appeals before us is the Council for Higher Education. This authority satisfies the definition of the term ‘public authority’ in s. 2 of the Freedom of Information Law, since it is a ‘statutory corporation’ (see subsection 8 of the aforesaid definition), and it is the national institution for matters of higher education in Israel that is the authority on all matters concerning institutes of higher education and the degrees given by them. The Council numbers twenty-five members, who are appointed by the president of the state. Fair representation is given on the Council to all the types of institutions that are recognized as institutes of higher education in Israel, and two thirds of its members are ‘persons with standing in the field of higher education, who were recommended by the Minister of Education and Culture, after consultation with the recognized institutes of higher education’ (see ss. 2 and 4A of the Council of Higher Education Law). The Council has control of the regular budgets of the institutes of higher education in Israel and of their development budgets, through the Planning and Budgeting Committee, which was given, by virtue of a government decision, the sole power to distribute budgets to institutes of higher education. We can therefore summarize by saying that the Council, as the public authority that is responsible for dealing with all issues concerning the institutes of higher education in Israel, is without doubt one of the most important and influential authorities in Israel in this field, and therefore it arouses great public interest.

The nature and characteristics of the public authority that receives an application for disclosure of information concerning its internal discussions — which in this case is the Council for Higher Education — are in my opinion of significant weight among the considerations that should be taken into account when dealing with the application to provide the information. It may be assumed that there is a direct correlation between the importance and degree of influence of the public authority on public affairs and the strength of the public interest in the disclosure of the information concerning its actions and decisions. Moreover, as we have already said, the authority should consider the public importance of the specific matter that was addressed in the internal discussions that are the subject of the request for information, and here too it may be assumed that there is a direct correlation between the degree of public importance of the issue that was discussed and the strength of the public interest in the disclosure of the information in this regard. Against this set of considerations that all operate in favour of providing the information, to which should also be added the personal interest that the party requesting the information has in receiving it, the authority should consider the strength of the general interest of exempting the information in order to protect the effectiveness of the decision-making process at the authority, and it should also consider additional interests that may also justify, in the specific case, a refusal to provide the information that was requested, in whole or in part. At all times the authority should be mindful of the general purpose for which the Freedom of Information Law was intended — realizing the right of every citizen and resident to receive information from public authorities, as stated in s. 1 of the law.

25. In the cases before us, the Council refused to give the Shachar organization minutes from the discussions that were held with regard to it in the plenum of the Council and in the extensions committee, as well as the licensing unit’s report that was submitted to the extensions committee with regard to it. Likewise, the Council refused to give the HaAretz newspaper the minutes of its meetings and the meetings of the Planning and Budgeting Committee in the three years that preceded the request for the information. In both cases, the District Court was of the opinion that the refusal was unlawful and it ordered the information to be provided on the conditions that it outlined.

From the position that the Council presented in the District Court and in the appeals before us, it appears that in its opinion the fact that we are concerned with information regarding its internal discussions is sufficient for it to be able to refuse to provide it, by virtue of the exemption provided in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law. In view of this fundamental position, the Council did not consider in either of the two cases all of the considerations that it ought to have considered before it refused to provide the information that was requested and it therefore did not determine the proper balancing point in each of them. Indeed, the Council for Higher Education sought to rely absolutely on the exemption in s. 9(b)(4) of the law, and therefore it did not take into account its pivotal national status with regard to all matters of higher education in Israel, the budgetary power that it controls, the public importance of its discussions and decisions on a general level and the specific degree of importance of the discussions concerning which the information was requested. In addition, the Council did not consider the harm that would be caused to the personal interest of the Shachar organization if the information requested by it was not disclosed, and the harm that would be caused to the public interest as a result of the non-disclosure of the information that was requested by the respondents in the HaAretz appeal, in view of the fact that they are representatives of the media who serve as an important and effective conduit through which the public exercises its right to know (on journalists as the antenna of the individual and the public… who march in the vanguard of the people,’ see HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. State of Israel, State Comptroller’s Office [5], at p. 479; see also Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at pp. 222-223). Moreover, all of these considerations that the Council ought to have taken into account should have been reflected in reasoned refusal decisions, as required by law.

The decisions of the Council do not satisfy these requirements and the approach that it adopted with regard to the refusal decisions in both cases before us undermines the reasonableness of its decisions and justifies their being set aside. Admittedly the general concern underlying the exemption provided in s. 9(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law that the frankness and effectiveness of the internal discussions taking place in public authorities will be impaired also applies to the Council. At the same time, this general concern on its own cannot be decisive for every application to disclose information concerning internal discussions. As we have already said, the fact that holders of public office, including the members of the Council, are required to contend with the tension inherent in the duty to act transparently and to disclose to the public the information concerning their activity is unavoidable and required by the public character of the Council’s activity. Thus we see that someone who accepts public office, because he serves the public and owes a duty of trust to the public, should take into account ab initio that his actions within the framework of this office will be to a large extent ‘in the public eye’ (see and cf. CA 6926/93 Israel Dockyards Ltd v. Israel Electric Co. Ltd [18], at p. 799). He should take into account that disclosure of the information is the rule, which derives from the principle of transparency and the right of the public to know, whereas non-disclosure of the information is the exception, which will be possible only when one of the exemptions provided in the law in this regard is satisfied and only after the authority has exercised discretion and adopted a reasonable decision not to disclose the information.

26. In the HaAretz appeal the Council also raised an alternative argument concerning the conditions stipulated by the court with regard to the information that it ordered the Council to provide. In this context, the Council argued, inter alia, that these conditions, in so far as they concerned a third party that was likely to be harmed by the disclosure of the information, imposed upon it a heavy and unreasonable burden of making enquiries with dozens of third parties under the mechanism provided in this regard in s. 13 of the Freedom of Information Law. This argument was raised by the Council without a proper basis and it is unfounded, and this is sufficient reason to reject it (on the duty of giving details that is required of an authority that argues that providing the information involves an unreasonable investment of resources, see H. Sommer, ‘The Freedom of Information Law: Law and Reality,’ 8 HaMishpat 435 (2003), at pp. 450-452; see also Segal, The Right to Know in Light of the Freedom of Information Law, supra, at pp. 165-166). Moreover, the respondents undertook to pay all the expenses incurred by the Council (see para. 52 of their petition).

27. In closing, we should draw attention to an additional argument that was raised by the Council, according to which requiring the authorities to provide minutes of their discussions is likely to lead to them refraining from keeping full minutes; instead, they will prefer to record the main points and decisions only. It is to be hoped that this fear will not be realized, and to the extent that it is realized it will be necessary to examine each case on its merits, in view of the duty imposed on a public authority in general to keep minutes that faithfully reflect its discussions (see Ilan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [3], at para. 18, and cf. HCJ 954/97 Cohen v. President of Israel Bar Association [19], at pp. 519-528). A similar argument was made by the authority in State of Israel, Ministry of Transport v. Israeli News Co. Ltd [6], and the remarks uttered by Justice Rivlin in that case, with regard to the cooperation of civil servants with the internal auditor, are also pertinent and apt, mutatis mutandis, in our case:

‘It is the duty of civil servants to cooperate with the internal auditor so that he can carry out his duties. These duties are not subject to the good will and sympathetic disposition of the persons involved… all of the parties concerned are presumed to carry out their duties, and it should not be assumed ab initio that they will be derelict in discharging their duties merely because of the likelihood that reports of public importance will be brought to the attention of the public’ (ibid. [6], at para. 24).

28. In summary, the decisions of the Council in which it refused the requests for information in the two cases before us do not satisfy the test of administrative reasonableness and therefore they cannot stand. Does it follow from this conclusion that the consideration of the requests should be returned to the Council so that it can reconsider them in accordance with the rules relevant to the issue? The Council did not raise this possibility in its arguments and it seems to me that in the circumstances that have been created there is no need for this, since in the course of the comprehensive hearings that took place in the trial court in each of these proceedings the whole question was laid before the court and the court examined the arguments of the parties and reached operative results that strike a proper balance between all the relevant considerations. In the HaAretz case the court even provided a proportionate and detailed mechanism that gives the authority a certain margin of discretion even at this stage with regard to the conditions for disclosing the requested information. I am therefore of the opinion that we may content ourselves with adopting the operative conclusions reached by the trial court in the two judgments that are the subject of the appeals before us. This conclusion is made even more necessary in view of the time that has passed since the requests were originally made.

Conclusion

29. I shall therefore propose to my colleagues that we deny the appeals and find the Council liable to pay legal fees in a sum of NIS 20,000 to the respondent in the Shachar appeal, and an additional amount of NIS 20,000 to the respondents in the HaAretz appeal.

 

 

President A. Barak

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Hayut.

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch

I agree.

 

 

Justice E. Rivlin

I agree with the comprehensive and wide-ranging opinion of my colleague Justice E. Hayut.

 

 

Justice M. Naor

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Hayut.

 

 

Justice S. Joubran

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Hayut.

 

 

Vice-President M. Cheshin

I agree with the comprehensive and profound opinion of my colleague, Justice Hayut. I would, however, like to add two comments to her remarks.

2.    Section 1 of the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, tells us the following:

‘Freedom of information

1.  Every Israeli citizen or resident has the right to receive information from a public authority pursuant to the provisions of this law.

A text cannot be interpreted contrary to its simple meaning, and what the law says is, in my opinion, simple and clear: every Israeli citizen or resident has a right to receive information from a public authority ‘pursuant to the provisions of this law.’ A citizen and a resident do not have a right to receive information from the public authority in every case; the right is ‘pursuant to the provisions of this law.’ Before we can know the essence and the scope of the right of the citizen and the resident to receive information from the public authority, we should first direct our steps along the paths of the law — both the visible paths and the hidden paths — since only in this way shall we know if in a specific case the citizen and the resident do indeed have a right to receive information from the public authority. I would therefore not classify s. 1 as a key provision, and certainly not as the ‘cornerstone’ on which the law is built. The law does not depend on s. 1; on the contrary, s. 1 is dependent on the law. These remarks are not intended to detract from the value of s. 1 as a provision of statute that contains a normative declaration — for the first time in Israeli legislation — of the existence of a right to receive information from a public authority. But we cannot ignore the phrase at the end of s. 1, ‘pursuant to the provisions of this law.’ Section 1 says what it says, and no more; let us read into s. 1 what it says, and not read into it what it does not say.

3.    The second comment is that this is the first time that the Supreme Court is interpreting the provisions of s. 9(b)(4) of the law in an authoritative and detailed manner, and the appellant has learned for the first time — from our judgment that is before us — that it erred in interpreting the law. In such circumstances, I at first thought that we ought to return the case to the trial court, and thereby make it possible for the appellant to raise arguments, and perhaps even to bring evidence, to justify its position in the spirit of our remarks in this judgment. This has always been the case law rule, and I thought we should follow it. See, for example, HCJ 131/65 Savitzky v. Minister of Finance [20], at p. 378; HCJ 557/75 East Lod Buildings (1953) Ltd v. Lod Local Planning and Building Committee [21], at p. 20; HCJ 162/78 Federation Health Fund v. Appeals Board [22], at p. 452. But I have been persuaded that all the arguments that could have been raised were brought before the trial court, and in these circumstances — including the period of time that the matter has been before the courts — I have changed my mind and agreed that we should decide the appeals instead of returning them to the trial court. See and cf. HCJ 62/75 9 Hibbat Zion Street Ramat Gan Co. Ltd v. Ramat Gan Local Planning and Building Committee [23], at p. 600.

 

 

Appeal denied.

19 Tevet 5766.

19 January 2006.

 

[1]    Published at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption5.htm.

Conterm Ltd. v. Finance Ministry

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 164/97
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, February 4, 1998
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner acquired a license from the Customs Authority to operate a licensing warehouse on land in dispute between it and the Port and Train Authority. The Customs Authority asked for proof that the petitioner had a right in the land, as required by the regulations, and in return it received an agreement that did not appear to address such a right. The Customs Authority granted the license anyway. When it became aware of the dispute over the land, it refused to renew the license. The central question is whether the petitioner had a duty to disclose the existence of the dispute to the Customs Authority, and more broadly, whether individuals owe a duty of fairness in their dealings with administrative agencies.

 

Held: All three justices held that the Customs Authority had a right to refuse to renew the license, each on different grounds. Justice Zamir held that not only does the government owe a duty of fairness to citizens, but citizens owe a reciprocal duty of fairness to the government, including a duty to disclose information material to a request for a license. Such duty stems from the social contract, in which citizen and government are partners in the democratic enterprise. The petitioner’s breach of such duty in failing to disclose material information of primary importance justified refusing to renew the license. President Barak held that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government. Any duty owed by the individual to the government must be specific to the issue in question and dependent on the proper balance between the interests of society as represented by the government and the rights and freedoms of the individual. The petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to Respondents 1-2 stems from the fact that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. Justice Cheshin held that in his or her dealings with the government, the individual bears no duty to disclose information at its own initiative. The government is better situated to know what information is material and to ask for it. The Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the license, however, does not warrant judicial intervention because the petitioner did not meet a material condition set by the Regulations regarding a right in the land.

 

Objection to order-nisi of February 25, 1997. Petition denied. Order-Nisi rescinded.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

HCJ 164/97

Conterm Ltd.

v.

1.  Finance Ministry, Customs and VAT Division

2.  Customs Officer, Ashdod

3.  Port and Train Authority

 

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[February 4, 1998]

Before President A. Barak and Justices M. Cheshin, I. Zamir

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner acquired a license from the Customs Authority to operate a licensing warehouse on land in dispute between it and the Port and Train Authority. The Customs Authority asked for proof that the petitioner had a right in the land, as required by the regulations, and in return it received an agreement that did not appear to address such a right. The Customs Authority granted the license anyway. When it became aware of the dispute over the land, it refused to renew the license. The central question is whether the petitioner had a duty to disclose the existence of the dispute to the Customs Authority, and more broadly, whether individuals owe a duty of fairness in their dealings with administrative agencies.

 

Held: All three justices held that the Customs Authority had a right to refuse to renew the license, each on different grounds. Justice Zamir held that not only does the government owe a duty of fairness to citizens, but citizens owe a reciprocal duty of fairness to the government, including a duty to disclose information material to a request for a license. Such duty stems from the social contract, in which citizen and government are partners in the democratic enterprise. The petitioner’s breach of such duty in failing to disclose material information of primary importance justified refusing to renew the license. President Barak held that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government. Any duty owed by the individual to the government must be specific to the issue in question and dependent on the proper balance between the interests of society as represented by the government and the rights and freedoms of the individual. The petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to Respondents 1-2 stems from the fact that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. Justice Cheshin held that in his or her dealings with the government, the individual bears no duty to disclose information at its own initiative. The government is better situated to know what information is material and to ask for it. The Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the license, however, does not warrant judicial intervention because the petitioner did not meet a material condition set by the Regulations regarding a right in the land.

 

Objection to order-nisi of February 25, 1997. Petition denied. Order-Nisi rescinded.

 

For the petitioner—Yehoshua Wolf and Yaakov Yaniv

For Respondents 1-2 —Dana Briskman, Executive Deputy State Attorney

For Respondent 3 —Yaakov Liraz.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

Basic Law: The Judiciary – s.1(a).

Basic Law: The Government – s.1.

 

Israeli Legislation Cited:

Port and Train Authority Law, 1961.

Contract Law (General Part), 1973 – ss.12, 13, 15, 39, 61(b).

Interpretation Law, 1981 – ss.11, 17(b).

Land Law, 1969 – s. 14.

Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962.

Mandatory Education Law, 1949.

Penal Law, 1977 – ss.262, 491.

Traffic Ordinance [new version] – s.64a.

Shipping Law (Sailors), 1973 – s.39.

Law of Return, 1950.

Business Licensing Law, 1968 – s.1(a)(1).

Customs Ordinance [new version] – s.70(b).

 

Regulations Cited:

Customs Regulations, 1965 – numbers 12, 14, 14(b), 12-23, ch.7, sixth addendum, part 3.

Traffic Regulations, 1961 – numbers 144, 146.

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1] HC 233/53 Alspector v. Mayor of Beit Shean, IsrSC 8 659.

[2] HC 9/49 Bloi v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 2 137.

[3] HC 56/53 Kakanda v. City of Ramla, IsrSC 7 949.

[4] HC 56/76 Berman v. Police Minister, IsrSC 31(2) 687.

[5] HC 799/80 Shallam v. Gun Law, 1949 Licensing Clerk, Oil Administration of Petach Tikvah, Interior Ministry, IsrSC 36(1) 317.

[6] HC 475/81 Deak & Co. Inc. v. Governor of the Bank of Israel, IsrSC 36(1) 803.

[7] CA 433/80 I.B.M. Israel Assets, v. Property Tax Director and Compensation Fund of Tel-Aviv, IsrSC 37(1) 337.

[8] CA 736/87 Yaakobovitch v. Land Appreciation Tax Director of Nazareth, IsrSC 45(3) 365.

[9] CA 1928/93 Securities Authority v. Gabor Savarina Textile Factories., IsrSC 49(3) 177.

[10] CA 338/85 Speigelman v. Chapnik, IsrSC 41(4) 421.

[11] HC 707/80 Ilanot Housing, Building and Development Co. v. Arad Local Council, IsrSC 35(2) 309.

[12] CA 391/80 Mira Lesserson v. Workers Housing Ltd., IsrSC 38(2) 237.

[13] CA 402/76 Azaranikov v. State of Israel, IsrSC 31(1) 270.

[14] HC 640/77 Baranovsky v. Department of Customs and Excise Director, IsrSC 32(2) 75.

[15] HC 566/81 Amrani v. Chief Rabbinical Court, IsrSC 37(2) 1.

[16] HC 221/86 Kanafi v. National Labor Court, IsrSC 41(1) 469.

[17] FH 22/82 Beit Yules Ltd .v. Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd., IsrSC 43(1) 441.

[18] HC 376/81 Lugassi v. Communications Minister, IsrSC 36(1) 449.

[19] HC 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Land Administration, IsrSC 47(3) 853.

[20] HC 840/79, Center for Contractors and Builders in Israel v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 34(3) 729.

[21] HC 549/75 Noach Film Company, Ltd. v. Film Review Council, IsrSC 30(1) 757.

[22] HC 135/75 Cy-Tex Corporation Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister, IsrSC 30(1) 673.

[23] HC 3/58, Berman v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 12 1493.

[24] HC 335/68 Israeli Consumer Council v. Chair of the Gas Services Investigatory Committee, IsrSC 23(1) 324.

[25] HC 135/71 Fresman v. Traffic Supervisor, IsrSC 25(2) 533.

[26] HC 1930/94 Nathan v. Defense Minister, IsrSC 48(4) 643.

[27] HC 656/80 Abu Romi v. Health Minister, IsrSC 35(3) 185.

[28] HC 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessment Committee, Town of Holon, IsrSC 21(1) 69.

[29] HC 421/86 Ashkenazi v. Transportation Minister, IsrSC41(1) 409.

[30] HC 727/88 Awad v. Religious Affairs Minister, IsrSC 42(4) 487.

[31] HC 2911/94 Baki v. Interior Ministry Director-General, IsrSC 48(5) 291.

[32] HC 2918/03 City of Kiryat Gat v. State of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 832.

[33] HC 442/71 Lansky v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 26(2) 337.

[34] HC 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Communications Minister, IsrSC 48(5) 412.

[35] HC 1635/90 Zharzhavski v. Prime Minister, IsrSC 45(1) 749.

[36] HC 669/86 Robin v. Berger, IsrSC 41(1) 73.

[37] HC 142/70 Shapira v. Bar Association Jerusalem Regional Council, IsrSC 25(1) 325.

[38] HC 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Housing and Construction Minister, IsrSC 47(2) 229.

[39] CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank. v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative Village, IsrSC 49(4) 221.

[40] HC 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres, IsrSC 44(3) 353.

[41] CA 148/77 S. Roth v. Yeshufa Construction Ltd., IsrSC 33(1) 617.

[42] CA 207/79 Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. v. Beit Yules Ltd. IsrSC 37(1) 533.

[43] HC 59/80 Be’er Sheva Public Transportation Services Ltd. v. National Labor Court in Jerusalem, IsrSC35(1) 828.

[44] HC 8507/96 Orin v. State of Israel, IsrSC 51(1) 269.

[45] HC 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and Religious Affairs Minister, IsrSC47(5) 485.

[46] CrimA 119/93 Lawrence v. State of Israel, IsrSC 48(4) 1.

[47] HC 1/49 Bazherno v. Police Minister, IsrSC 2 80.

[48] HC 192/61 Kalo v. City of Bat Yam, IsrSC 16 1856.

[49] HC 328/60 Musa v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 17 69.

[50] HC 43/76 Amitar Company, Ltd. v. Tourism Minister, IsrSC 30(3) 554.

[51] HC 208/79 Ineis v. Health Ministry General Director, IsrSC 34(1) 301.

[52] HC 758/88 Kendel v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 46(4) 505.

[53] HC 740/87 Bentali v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 44(1) 443.

[54] CA 186/52 Jerusalem “Eden” Hotel v. Dr. Gerzon, IsrSC 8 1121.

[55] HC 1921/94 Sukar v. Jerusalem District Committee on Construction, Residence, and Industry, IsrSC 48(4) 237.

[56] HC 35/48 M. Breslov & Partners Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister, IsrSC 2 330.

[57] HC 132/57 First v. City of Lod, IsrSC 11 1324.

[58] HC 280/60 “Avik” Ltd. v. Voluntary Authority on Importation of Pharmaceutical Preparations , IsrSC 16 1323.

[59] HC 115/61 Yakiri v. City of Ramat Gan, IsrSC 16 1877.

[60] HC 27/62 Alt v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Local Town Building and Planning Committee, IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[61] HC 278/62 Sarolovitch v. City of Jerusalem, IsrSC 17 508.

[62] HC 329/64 Guri v. Bnei Brak Local Town Building and Planning Committee, IsrSC 19(1) 365.

[63] HC 109/70 Orthodox Coptic Metropolitan in Jerusalem v. Police Minister, IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[64] HC 37/49 Goldstein v. Jaffa Guardian of Abandoned Property, IsrSC 2 716.

[65] HC 143/62 Schlesinger v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 17 225.

[66] HC 58/68 Shalit On His Own Behalf and On Behalf of His Children v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 23(2) 477.

[67] HC 5364/94 Welner v. Chair of Israeli Labor Party, IsrSC49(1) 758.

[68] HC 305/82 Y. Mor v. Central District Regional Planning and Construction Committee, IsrSC 38(1) 141.

[69] HC 107/59 Mei-Dan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Local Planning and Construction Committee, IsrSC 14 800.

 

United States Cases Cited:

[70] Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).

[71] Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).

 

English Cases Cited:

[72] Scruttons v. Midland Silicones [1962] 1 All E.R. 1 (H.L.).

[73] Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 52.

[74] Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Zamir [1980] A.C. 930.

[75] Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Khawaja [1984] A.C. 74.

 

Israeli Books Cited:

[76] H. Klinghofer, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] (1957).

[77] G. Shalev, Dinei Chozim [Contract Law] (1995).

[78] A. Barak, Shikul Da’at Shiputi [Judicial Discretion] (1987).

[79] 2 I. Zamir, Hasamchut Haminhalit [Administrative Authority] (1996).

[80] M. Mautner, Yiridat Haformalism Vialiyat Haarachim Bamishpat Hayisraeli [Decline of Formalism in Israeli Law] (1993).

[81] 1 B. Aktzin, Torat Hamishpat [Jurisprudence] (2nd ed. 1968).

[82] G. Shalev, Chozei Rishut Biyisrael [Contracts]  (1985).

[83] 1 B. Bracha, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] (1987).

[84] M. Cheshin, Mitaltilin Bidin Hanizikin [Chattel in Torts] (1971).

 

Foreign Books Cited:

[85] L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985).

[86] L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1988).

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[a] Babylonian Talmud, Order Tractate Shabbat 31:1; 104:2.

[b] Leviticus 19;18; 25;17.

[c] Isaiah 58:7.

[d] Micah 6: 8.

[e] Exodus 21:15, 16.

[f] Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia 59:1.

[g] Mishnah, Tractate Avot, 2:3; 1:10.

[h] Genesis 4:22.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice I. Zamir

 

            1. The petitioner, Conterm Company Ltd., received a customs license to operate a licensing warehouse.  By law, the license had to be renewed yearly. The Customs Authority refused to renew the license. The petitioner is challenging that refusal; it claims that it has a right to a renewal of the license.

 

            A central question raised in this petitions is the duty of fairness between the administrative agency and the citizen. Usually, that question is directed at the administrative agency: What kind of duty does it owe the citizen? This time, the question is directed at the citizen: Does the citizen owe a duty of fairness (or, in other words, a duty to behave properly) to the administrative agency?

 

The Facts

 

            2. For over 20 years, the petitioner has operated a freight terminal in Ashdod. The terminal operates as a licensing warehouse through a license granted by the customs director, under the seventh chapter (beginning at Regulation 12) of the Customs Regulations, 1965 (hereinafter – the Regulations). The license authorizes the storage of goods for which customs duties apply. The warehouse operates on land which the petitioner owns, in the northern industrial zone of Ashdod, about 50 meters from the railway leading to the Ashdod Port (hereinafter: the main railway).

 

            The petitioner wanted to take advantage of the warehouse’s convenient location by using the railway to make the process of shipping the freight to and from the facility more efficient, minimizing the use of trucks and saving on transportation costs. The petitioner submitted a proposal to the Port and Train Authority, under which it would build, at its expense, an extension of the tracks from the main railway to the warehouse. The extension would allow the petitioner to load freight from the port onto the train, then unload it close to the warehouse and store it there, as well as to load freight from the warehouse onto the train, to send to the port.

 

            The Port and Train Authority, a statutory corporation created by the Port and Train Law, 1961 (hereinafter – the Port Authority), owns and operates the railway. It also owns 44 dunams [4.4 hectares – trans.] of land bordering the main railway on one end, and the warehouse on the other (hereinafter – the land). The petitioner wanted to build the railway extension on the land, which was vacant and unused, so that the railway would reach the warehouse. Toward the end of 1992, it approached the Port Authority with its request.

 

            On June 6, 1994, following extensive negotiations, the petitioner and the Port Authority signed a contract (hereinafter – the contract). Section 2B of the contract declared the following:

 

All lines and systems of the extension will be built on land belonging to the Authority [The Port Authority – I.Z.] and will become its property upon their construction. The company [the petitioner – I.Z.] has no right whatsoever to the Authority’s land in general, and to the land on which the extension is built, in particular.

 

As an appendix to the contract, the parties attached a scheme marking the route of the main railway and the planned extension: The Chief Engineer of Israel Railways signed it on January 3, 1994, and later the petitioner, the Train’s Deputy Director-General for Commerce, Economics, and Finance, and the Train’s Deputy Director-General for Operations signed as well (app. R/7 of the Port Authority’s Statement).

 

            3. Not long after the parties signed the scheme designating the route of the extension (hereinafter – the first scheme), the petitioner approached the Port Authority with a request to change the route of the extension. According to the petitioner, the change was necessary to allow it to set up and operate machinery for loading and unloading bulk seeds. The change would mean that the route of the extension, which, under the first scheme, was to reach the border of the warehouse, would be moved further from the warehouse, close to the main railway. The change would enlarge the open area between the extension and the warehouse.

 

            The Port Authority agreed to the proposed change. The new route of the extension was drawn on a new scheme prepared by the petitioner’s planner, and on May 15, 1995, the Director of the Engineering Department in Israel Railways signed it (hereinafter – the second scheme). The new route was not the only change between the first and second scheme; on the second scheme, the parties labeled the area between the extension and the warehouse as a “storage area.”

 

            4. The appendix to the contract, signed at the same time as the contract itself, gave the petitioner a limited right to use the land (referred to in the appendix as “the plot”). The petitioner was to be allowed to use the land to load and unload freight and to transport it from the train to the warehouse and from the warehouse to the train. According to the appendix:

 

3. The company [the petitioner – I.Z.] may make use of the plot running along the tracks of the train stationed in the extension exclusively for purposes of loading and/or unloading trains which are stationed at the extension for that purpose, so long as they are stationed there.

 

Unloading and/or loading trains include transporting or shipping the freight from the extension to the company’s storage facilities adjacent to the plot and the reverse.

 

4. Any change of any kind to the plot and/or anything attached and/or connected to it requires the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.

 

            5. The petitioner, however, had a larger plan: It intended to use the area of the land not just to load and unload freight from the train and onto the train, as the contract provided, but also to store freight. It planned to enlarge the area of the warehouse to include the area of the land, as well. In order to accomplish this, it needed to do two things. First, it needed to do work on the land, in order to prepare it for use as a licensing warehouse, including fencing in the land to prevent freight from being added or removed without undergoing inspection. This task posed a problem with the Port Authority, which owned the land. The second thing the petitioner needed was a license to use the land as a licensing warehouse. That task posed a problem with The Customs Authority, which is authorized to grant such licenses.

 

            6. The petitioner began working on the first task: preparing the land for storing freight. Under the terms of the contract, the petitioner could not make “any change, of any kind” to the land, without “the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.” Para. 4, supra. However, the petitioner began work on the land without obtaining such approval. Nor did it obtain permission once the work was completed. Without such approval, the petitioner paved the land with asphalt, erected a fence around the perimeter, installed lighting, and built gates. It finished its preparatory work on March 18, 1996.

 

            7. The petitioner and the Port Authority disagree over when the Port Authority became aware of the work that the petitioner was doing on the land. According to the petitioner, the work was done in the presence of representatives of the Port Authority. The Port Authority, on the other hand, claims that it became aware of the work only by coincidence, in early January, 1996, during a tour that its employees took of the land.

 

            In any event, immediately after the tour, on January 8, 1996, the Deputy Director-General for Commerce, Economics, and Finance at Israel Railways (hereinafter: the Railways Deputy) sent the following letter to the Director-General of the petitioner:

 

Pursuant to my tour of the site and the measurements we conducted, I wish to call your attention to the following points:

 

1.     Our measurements show that Conterm has annexed an area of 38.5 dunams [3.85 hectares – trans.].

2.     That area is being used to store containers, in violation of the contract.

3.     The areas have been fenced in, paved, and marked, and Conterm’s equipment and installations have been placed there.

4.     According to the appendix of the contract, you are permitted to use a strip of land along the length of a train only, for loading and unloading trains exclusively.

5.     Seizure and use of the land constitute a violation of the contract.

6.     Be advised that, according to the appendix, we may give anyone approval to use the land.

7.     You must immediately vacate the areas noted above.

8.     Be advised that you will be charged taxes and rent on the areas seized, for the period of time from the seizure until you vacate, as determined by an assessor.

I would appreciate your taking immediate action to vacate the area and to avoid violating the contract between us.

 

            The petitioner gave no response whatsoever to this letter. On March 10, 1996, the Railways Deputy sent another letter to the petitioner’s Director-General. This letter warned of the petitioner’s violations of the contract in a few ways, including violation related to “use of the areas.” It noted that Israel Railways considers the violations to be severe and added that if they are not corrected, Israel Railways will feel free to take action to preserve its rights. The petitioner’s Director-General responded to this letter on March 19, 1996. Regarding the use of the land, he wrote the following:

 

During our last three meetings, we discussed the above-stated issue, and to the best of my recollection, we agreed to find a way to resolve the issue.

 

At this stage, as you agreed, I am waiting to set a date for another meeting with you.

 

By the way, at this stage, the area is being used exclusively for loading and unloading containers.

 

The dispute, however, remained unresolved. On April 18, 1996, counsel for the Port Authority wrote to the petitioner, alerting it to the encroachment onto the Port Authority’s land and the illegal use of the land, including fencing it in and using it for storage. Counsel demanded that the petitioner vacate the land immediately. The Railways Deputy also wrote the petitioner, again, on April 21, 1996, demanding that it vacate the land immediately. The letters went unanswered.

 

            On May 19, 1996, the petitioner wrote to the Deputy Director-General for Operations at Israel Railways in a letter that made no mention whatsoever of the letters sent by the Port Authority demanding evacuation of the land. The petitioner wrote, in part, that,

 

We intend to begin storing empty containers, before they are transported to the ports, and we ask that you price our requests, addressing the factor of the substantial quantities to be transported.

 

On May 23, 1996, The Railways Deputy Director-General for Operations responded by saying that Israel Railways did not intend to transport containers from the Ashdod Port to the petitioner’s warehouse. He also wrote that:

 

I remind you that the contract is about transporting containers between Ashdod and Haifa, not storing empty containers or vehicles in the terminal station.

 

            The Port Authority and the petitioner continued their correspondence and discussions. The former repeatedly demanded that the latter vacate the land. On June 20, 1996, the Director of the Commerce and Transportation Department of Israel Railways wrote the following to the petitioner:

 

1. Pursuant to the discussion that took place in the office of Israel Railways’ Deputy Director-General for Economics, Finance, and Commerce, it became clear that the Conterm Company seized about 40 dunams [four hectares – trans.] of territory belonging to Israel Railways, in the area of the Conterm Ashdod extension. Conterm fenced it in without permission and even placed hundreds of vehicles belonging to the Universal Motors Company and the Mazda Company in the area.

 

2. In that same discussion mentioned above, we demanded that you vacate the area. Thus far, you have failed to do so and continue to seize the area.

 

3. I wish to advise you that in the coming days, Israel Railways intends to sell the area through a public auction. You are therefore asked to vacate the area immediately, removing every object, person, and thing.

 

The Port Authority sent additional letters containing similar contents on July 21, 1996, October 14, 1996, and November 28, 1996.

 

            Throughout the correspondence between the Port Authority and the petitioner, when the Port Authority claimed that the petitioner was trespassing on its property in violation of the contract, the petitioner did not claim that it had a right to the land as renter or lessee, or that it had permission to fence in the land and use it for storage. Only on June 30, 1996, did the petitioner address its right regarding the land. It wrote:

 

 …

3. There is no doubt that Conterm has rights to the above-mentioned area for purposes of loading and unloading trains that are stationed in the extension.

 

4. As you must know, we invested a substantial amount of money in the extension and in preparing the above-mentioned area for operating the extension.

 

5. In addition, there is no doubt that Conterm has certain rights in the area by virtue of the [written – trans.] agreement and the agreements between the parties.

 

 

8. On the other hand, given the current circumstances, we suggest that the parties negotiate in order to find a mutually-agreed upon solution for how the above-mentioned area will be operated.

 

            The Railways Deputy responded to that letter on July 21, 1996:

 

2. Conterm has no rights to the above-mentioned area, even if it made investments. Such investments were done without our approval, and there were no agreements over use of the area.

 

3. Areas cannot be allocated except through a bidding process, except in rare circumstances, which do not exist in this case.

 

8. When the parties did not resolve the dispute through negotiation, as the petitioner suggested, the Port Authority brought an action of ejectment against the petitioner in Ashdod Magistrate’s Court. That action is still pending in the Magistrate’s Court.

 

            The Magistrate’s Court will decide the dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner, and its resolution, whatever it may be, is not the concern of this court. If that is the case, then how is their dispute relevant to the issue before us? That dispute is also the root of the argument between the petitioner and The Customs Authority at the heart of this petition. How?

 

9. The petitioner took the first route – preparing the land for storage of freight – at the same time that it took the second route: On June 8, 1995, a year after the contract was signed and shortly after the second scheme was signed, the petitioner asked the Customs Authority branch in Ashdod for a license to enlarge the area of the warehouse to include the area of the land, as well, meaning the area between the extension and the warehouse. The petitioner and Customs engaged in a process of verification to make sure that the petitioner met the criteria necessary to receive a license to operate a licensing warehouse.

 

            According to Regulation 14 of the Regulations, an application for a license must be submitted to the Customs branch “in the form provided in the Sixth Addendum.” The Sixth Addendum details what must be included in an application, including the following:

 

Below are the details of the warehouse:

 

We declare that we own the warehouse registered in the Land Registry as Block Number … Parcel … we are in possession of it under the terms of a rental contract or lease with … for a period of … years, beginning on …. and ending on … attached is a schematic description of the warehouse and the marked areas of the requested warehouse …

 

According to the addendum, these details must be submitted whether the application is for a new license or “if changes are made in the area or in the size of the warehouse.” The implication is that the Regulations require applicants to declare that they own, rent, or lease the warehouse, as a condition of receiving a license for a new licensing warehouse or of expanding an existing one.

 

            This condition seems appropriate, or at least reasonable. In any event, the petitioner does not challenge the legality of the condition or of any other provision of the Regulations.

 

            10. Pursuant to this regulation, and after the petitioner applied for a license for the land, on December 5, 1995, the Ashdod Customs branch wrote to the petitioner asking for various details and documents, including “a rental or lease contract for the additional area.”

 

            In response, on December 11, 1995, the petitioner sent the Customs branch the June 6, 1994 contract and attached a map prepared by its surveyor on December 7, 1995 (Appendix 7 to the Petition).

 

            The Customs Authority presumed that the petitioner met all the conditions set forth in the Regulations for receiving a license. Among other things, the Customs Authority presumed that the petitioner held rights to the land, as required by the Regulations. It was unaware of the fierce dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner over the rights to the land, a dispute expressed in a number of ways, including in letters that the Port Authority sent the petitioner on January 8, 1996. Therefore, once the Customs Authority concluded that the land had been properly prepared for use as a licensing warehouse, it decided to grant the petitioner the license it had requested, on July 1, 1996.

 

            11. So long as the petitioner communicated in these two parallel tracks, with the Port Authority on one hand, and the Customs Authority on the other, each agency separate from the other, it seemed as though the petitioner had achieved what it set out to obtain. When the two agencies communicated with each other, however, their relationships with the petitioner hit a snag.

 

            In September 1996, the Customs Authority learned of the dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner over rights to the land. On September 25, 1996, the Customs Authority wrote to the Port Authority asking for the precise status of the petitioner with respect to the land and “whether, under the contract signed with you, the Conterm Company has a right to store containers in the area.” The Port Authority responded by saying that the petitioner has a right to load and unload the trains stationed at the extension but not to store containers on the land. After receiving this response, the Customs Authority asked the petitioner for an explanation. On November 18, 1996, the petitioner responded by telling the Customs Authority that it had an “understanding” with representatives of the Railway allowing the petitioner to store freight on the land and that, “the arrangement has not been put on paper because of Israel Railways’ limitations.” It attached the second scheme, on which the area of the land was labeled “storage area.” The petitioner added that “this document is irrefutable, decisive evidence of the Authority’s intentions, beyond what is said in the agreement.” The Customs Authority, however, was unconvinced. It decided not to renew the petitioner’s license for the land. On December 26, 1996, the Customs Authority informed the petitioner that it was canceling the authorization it had granted the petitioner to use the land as a licensing warehouse, and that the license granted the petitioner for 1997 would be renewed exclusive of the area of the land. In the same notice, the Customs Authority also demanded that the petitioner remove the freight from the land and put it into a licensing warehouse within 30 days.

 

            12. The petitioner claims that the Customs Authority did not have the right to revoke the license it had granted to use the land as a licensing warehouse. It therefore filed this petition against the Customs Authority, later joining the Port Authority as respondent. The petitioner is asking for an order obligating the Customs Authority to include the area of the land in the license for 1997.

 

            At an early stage of the proceedings, we issued an order-nisi and decided that the license to use the area of the land as a licensing warehouse would remain valid in the interim.

 

            On September 10, 1997, we decided to deny the petition without giving an explanation at the time, and we imposed court costs on the petitioner in the sum of 25,000 NIS to be paid to Respondents 1 and 2 and 25,000 NIS to Respondent 3.

 

            We now explain our decision.

 

The Reasons for Revoking the License

 

13. The Customs Authority gives two reasons for its refusal to include the area of the land in the license granted the petitioner for 1997: the first – substantive; the second – procedural.

 

The first reason: Under the Regulations, the petitioner is not eligible to receive a license for the area of the land. The Regulations stipulate that without rights to the land (through ownership, rental, or lease), there is no right to a license. If it becomes clear that a license was granted to someone who has no right in the land, because of misrepresentation or mistake, that license can be revoked. Therefore, the Customs Authority’s realization that the petitioner had no right in the land is reason enough not to renew the license for the area of the land.

 

This reason, of course, touches on the private law dispute between the petitioner and the Port Authority over rights to the land.

 

The Custom Authority’s second reason is the petitioner’s procedural obligation to disclose all material information regarding its application for a license, including information about rights to the land. By failing to disclose material information on this issue to the Customs Authority, the petitioner violated this obligation. This violation alone is reason enough not to renew the license for the area of the land.

 

This second reason is entirely the province of public law: the claim is that a citizen applying for a license has an obligation to disclose information material to the license to the administrative agency.

 

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that neither the substantive nor the procedural reason justify the Custom Authority’s decision. First, the petitioner claims that its dispute with the Port Authority over rights to the land is not the concern of the Customs Authority. In any event, the petitioner claims, the dispute does not constitute a reason to revoke a license already granted. Second, the petitioner claims, it fulfilled any disclosure obligation to the Customs Authority that may have existed by submitting the June 6, 1994 contract it signed with the Port Authority regarding the rights to the land.

 

We will examine each of these reasons in order.

 

Rights to the Land

 

14.  The petitioner claims that, “With all due respect, the relations between the petitioner and the PTA [Port and Train Authority – I.Z.] are not the concern of the Customs Authority.” It also argues that, “It is inconceivable that, at a point at which a dispute has yet to be decided, and it could go either way, the Director of Customs should take a stance and adopt the PTA’s version.”

 

Indeed, it is an old precedent that an agency authorized to grant a license must make that decision based on considerations from the field of public law, not private law. HC 233/53 Alspector v. Mayor of Beit Shean (hereinafter – the Alspector case[1]), held that a local council may not condition receipt of a license to operate a business in an apartment on the consent of the apartment owner. As Justice Berinson held (at 665):

 

By opening a store in his apartment without the consent of the apartment owner, the applicant may indeed be violating the terms of his lease. If that is the case, the apartment owner may fight his fight with the applicant. That is not the concern of the municipality, however, and it cannot serve as the basis for refusing to grant the license.

 

See also HC 9/49 Bloi v. Interior Minister [2]; HC 56/53 Kakanda v. City of Ramla [3].

 

            This precedent would seem to construct a high wall between private and public law.  See H. Klinghofer, Mishpat Minhali [76] at 128-30. That is not the case. Today, it is well-known that there is no clear and rigid separation between these two fields. They are separated by a widely-spaced net, easily passed through or jumped over. The two fields are becoming more and more intermingled, and there is nothing wrong with that. In principle, therefore, considerations from the field of private law may influence an administrative agency’s decision. In any event, it depends on the context: the nature of the power, the nature of the agency, and the circumstances in question. For example, is it illegitimate for a municipality to refuse to grant a license to operate a business, or for a planning and building committee to refuse to grant a license to erect a building, when it is clear that the license applicant has no rights to the land of which he or she has taken possession?

 

            The Alspecter case, supra, provided for this possibility. Justice Berinson qualified the rule he stated:

 

If the case involved a construction permit to make changes to the building, which could not be issued without the request or consent of the building owner, then the reason would be valid.

 

The same is true in the case before us. The Regulations require that an applicant for a license declare that he or she has a right in the land. See para.9, supra. It is therefore clear that the question of rights in the land is relevant. The Customs Authority may and even must take it into consideration. It may and even must clarify the answer. Under the Regulations, it should require a license applicant to declare what kind of right he or she has in the land. If a license applicant declares that he or she has no right in the land, the Customs Authority may and even must deny the application for a license. The same is true of a situation in which the applicant declared that it has a right in the land, but an investigation by the Customs Authority reveals the declaration to be false or misleading. In either case, under the Regulations, the Customs Authority need not, and may not even be permitted, to give a license to a trespasser.

 

            If the petitioner does not have a right in the land, the Customs Authority was under no obligation to grant the license. Indeed, the Customs Authority claims that if it had known that the petitioner had no such right, it would not have granted the license.

 

            15. The petitioner, however, argues that even if the Customs Authority could have refused to grant the license from the outset, it may not revoke a license already granted. There is a difference between prospectivity and retrospectivity: the holder of a license purchased a right, and revoking a vested right is different, and more difficult, than refusing to grant the right in the first place. Therefore, not every consideration sufficient to refuse to grant a new license justifies refusing to renew an existing license.

 

            The case law distinguishes between refusing to grant a new license and refusing to renew an existing license. The considerations relevant for renewing a license are not identical to the considerations for granting a license; the weight of the considerations may vary. More so than is the case for granting a new license, in renewing an existing license, the balance tips toward the citizen, in order to protect the right that the license gave him or her.

 

            However, if the agency’s grant of the license stemmed from a substantive error, it generally may revoke the license or refuse to renew it, particularly if the applicant is responsible for the mistake. See e.g. HC 56/76 Berman v. Police Minister [4]. As Justice Barak said in HC 799/80 Shallam v. Gun Law, 1949 Licensing Clerk, Oil Administration of Petach Tikvah, Interior Ministry [5] at 331:

 

 

As is known, the administrative law rule is that an administrative agency may generally review its decision and correct it “for the following reasons: deceit, fraud, mistake, surprise, inadvertence, new evidence that has come to light, changed conditions” …

 

There seems to be no doubt that deceit by the license applicant is generally grounds in itself to justify revoking a license … what happens, however, if the problem is pure mistake, not caused by the applicant, but rather solely the fault of the agency? In a case like that, the license may still be revoked, but the power to do so must be exercised only in special circumstances.

 

Justice Barak continued in HC 475/81 Deak & Co. Inc. v. Governor of the Bank of Israel [6] at 807:

 

 Once a license is granted, its holder may assume that the application was investigated with the required care and that he or she may now invest money and effort into running the business for which a license was granted, without having to worry that the administrative agency will change its mind. At the same time, where the agency has the formal authority to revoke a license, under extraordinary circumstances, it may be justified in exercising it. Such circumstances may involve facts in existence prior to the granting of the license but which became apparent to the administrative agency only afterward … they may also involve new facts which came about after the license was already granted.

 

Deciding whether a set of facts justifies revoking a license or refusing to renew it depends on the balance of interests in each set of circumstances, primarily the balance between the license-holder’s interests and those of the general public, which the administrative agency represents.

 

            In balancing these interests, the ramifications of the mistake in the administrative process are of particular importance. Did the mistake cause the administrative agency to make an ultra vires decision or a decision that violates the law in some other way? Or is the decision, though undesirable from the point of view of the agency, nevertheless legal? In CA 433/80 I.B.M. Israel Assets v. Property Tax Director and Compensation Fund of Tel-Aviv [7] at 351, Justice Bach classified the different kinds of administrative mistakes into three categories:

 

1. A decision that violates the law or is ultra vires in some other way;

2. A decision resulting from a technical bureaucratic mistake, made inadvertently;

3. A decision involving an oversight, meaning that a clerk improperly implemented the agency policy or exercised discretion unreasonably.

 

What is the difference between each kind?

 

Public agencies generally can go back on the first two types of decisions which are mistaken or in other ways contrary to the law and make new decisions in their place;

 

The third kind of decision, involving only some kind of ‘oversight’ in an exercise of discretion, is different. The agency will generally be bound by its decision, especially when the citizen has already begun to take action in accordance with the original decision.

Id. at 351-52 (Bach, J.).

 

See also CA 736/87 Yaakobovitch v. Land Appreciation Tax Director of Nazareth [8] at 372;  CA 1928/93 Securities Authority v. Gabor Savarina Textile Factories [9] at 191-92.

 

            16. Under the case law, then, whether the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license was justified depends on the circumstances. If the Customs Authority mistakenly believed that the petitioner had rights in the land, as required by the Regulations, and only after granting the license did it realize the mistake, particularly if the petitioner is to blame for the mistake, then the petitioner holds a license to which it is not entitled under the Regulations, and the balance will tip toward refusing to renew it. Are those the circumstances in this case?

 

            Before discussing whether the circumstances justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license, I will examine the second reason cited for the refusal to renew. The Customs Authority also claims that the petitioner violated its duty to disclose information material to the license, meaning information material to its rights in the land. Does the petitioner owe such a duty to the Customs Authority?

 

The Citizen’s Duty to the Agency

 

            17. Contract law imposes a duty on contractual parties, regardless of their identities, to disclose information material to the circumstances at hand.  That duty derives from the duty to negotiate a contract formation in good faith and using acceptable forms of behavior, under section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part), 1973. It also derives from the obligation to act in good faith and use acceptable forms of behavior in fulfilling a duty and exercising a right stemming from the contract, under section 39 of the Law. Section 15 governs the consequences of failing to disclose information which must be disclosed under the circumstances. According to Section 15, a party who enters a contract because of a misrepresentation made by the other party has the right to void the contract. What is considered misrepresentation? Under the section, it includes, “nondisclosure of facts which the other party should have disclosed by law, by custom, or under the circumstances.” The rule incorporates the duty of good faith under sections 12 and 39 of the Law, including the duty to disclose facts. See e.g. CA 338/85 Speigelman v. Chapnik at 426 [10]. See also G. Shalev, Dinei Chozim [77] at 55, 223. Contract law imposes a duty to disclose material facts, and non-disclosure of such facts is grounds for voiding the contract.

 

            This duty applies to contracts between the citizen and the administrative agency, obligating the citizen as well as the agency. See, e.g., HC 707/80 Ilanot Housing, Building and Development Co. v. Arad Local Council [11] at 312. See also Shalev, supra [77] at 652.

 

            In public law, however, there is no similar statute imposing a duty to disclose material facts on parties in a power relationship involving a lawful exercise of authority, such as in a citizen’s application for a license. Must we conclude that, in the context of this relationship, both the administrative agency as well as the citizen may conceal material facts from each other?

 

            No properly-functioning society could accept that possibility. If the law forbids people from misleading each other, including concealing material facts, a fortiari it forbids people from misleading an administrative agency, which is the embodiment of the public. A person who misleads an administrative agency misleads the public, even if only indirectly. The result may be that the agency, in the name of the public and sometimes at its expense, grants a benefit to a person who misled the agency and who is not entitled to the benefit. Misleading an administrative agency harms the public as a whole. If contract law forbids a person from misleading another, including by concealing material facts, could public law permit a person to mislead the public? Justice Alon’s comments on good faith are instructive here:

 

Just as the legal system forbids a contractual party from “using the contract to play the scoundrel,” so it also forbids and prohibits the party from using the law or public activity, in any area of law, to play the “scoundrel.”

CA 391/80 Mira Lesserson v. Workers Housing Ltd. [12] at 262.

 

            The legal system cannot allow that possibility to take place. It delineates two ways of preventing misrepresentation, including the concealment of material facts, in public law as well. The first way is to copy the duty to act in good faith, as established by the Contract Law (General Part), from private law into public law. The second way is to establish a special public law rule.

 

            First, we will evaluate whether the duty to act in good faith applies in public law, and whether it applies to a citizen in his or her dealings with an administrative agency.

 

The Duty of Good Faith

 

            18. Although they are designed primarily to apply to contracts, the provisions of the Contract Law (General Part) have other applications as well:

 

Where appropriate and with the necessary changes, the provisions of this law apply to legal actions not involving contracts and to obligations that do not stem from a contract.

Id. at sec. 61(b).

 

Under the simple language of the statute, the provisions of sections 12 and 39, which impose a duty of good faith, can also apply to the actions of an administrative agency, so long as they are “legal actions.” Undoubtedly, an administrative agency, acting by law to grant rights to a citizen or to impose obligations on him or her, engages in legal actions. Such actions may, for example, include granting a license or pension, confiscating land, and assessing taxes. It would therefore seem right to say that the Contract Law (General Part) imposes a duty of good faith on the agency to the citizen and on the citizen to the agency, when they engage in these actions.

 

            Indeed, the case law supports this position. President Sussman addressed the principle established by section 39 of the Contract Law (General Part), imposing a duty of good faith:

 

As an expression of a universal rule of behavior between persons and between a person and an agency, this principle imposes obligations beyond this context, and it also applies in public law.

CA 402/76 Azaranikov v. State of Israel [13] at 274.

 

See also HC 640/77 Baranovsky v. Department of Customs and Excise Director [14] at 78; HC 566/81 Amrani v. Chief Rabbinical Court [15] at 10; HC 221/86 Kanafi v. National Labor Court [16] at 476-77.

 

            True, thus far, the Court’s application of this principle in public law has been limited to imposing a duty on the administrative agency, vis à vis the citizen. The principle, however, as established by the Contract Law (General Part), applies to both parties. It would seem, therefore, that we can use the principle to impose a duty of good faith on the citizen vis à vis the administrative agency.

 

            The duty of good faith requires one party to disclose material information to another. See para. 17, supra. It would therefore seem that a citizen who applies to an administrative agency for a license or other benefit has an obligation to disclose the information material to the application. If the citizen violates this duty, and the agency, as a result, grants the license or other benefit, the agency may void its decision.

 

            19. The public law duty of good faith that we might impose on both parties to the legal actions of an administrative agency is not necessarily the same duty as that imposed on parties to a contract. The duty of good faith varies with the circumstances. Good faith in the relationship between parties to a sales contract is not necessarily the same as the good faith between trustee and beneficiary or principle and agent. See FH 22/82 Beit Yules Ltd .v. Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. [17] at 484. If good faith changes according to the type of contract, it certainly changes according to the field of law. Section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part) applies the statutory provisions, including those addressing good faith, to legal actions not involving contracts, only “where appropriate and with the necessary changes.” In translating the duty of good faith into public law, we can therefore adapt it to the special nature of that field. See HC 376/81 Lugassi v. Communications Minister [18] (hereinafter – the Lugassi case) at 465.

 

            It is possible, then, to apply the duty of good faith, with adaptations, into the field of public law and to require the citizen to disclose material information to the agency. Is that what the rule is?

 

            20. The question is not whether it is possible, but rather whether it is desirable, to copy the duty of good faith, with the necessary changes, from private law into public law. Section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part) says that the statutory provisions apply to legal actions not involving contracts only “where appropriate.” Is it appropriate to impose a duty of good faith in public law? As noted, some justices have said yes. Para. 18, supra. However, some justices believe that the duty of good faith, as established in private law, is inappropriate for public law.

 

            Justice Shamgar discussed this issue in the Lugassi case [18]. He said that while an administrative agency must act in good faith, that duty does not arise from the Contract Law (General Part). In his words (at 455-56):

 

The intention [of Section 61(b) of this law – I.Z.] was not that a norm from contract law would be adopted as is into administrative law, which, for a long time, has already had a robust, existing rule about good faith, derived from another source. In any event, the condition that the provisions of the statute will be applied ‘where appropriate and with the necessary changes’ means there should not be a simplistic standardization of private law and public law rules. It is preferable not to take things out of the context of their subject matter and primary legal source. In any case, we do not need to look at what is said in section 61(b) in order to evaluate the good faith of an administrative agency, the way it acts, and its fulfillment of its duties …

 

Justice Ben-Porat concurred in that opinion (Id. at 465).

 

            I, too, agree with Justice Shamgar. From the outset, administrative agencies had a duty of proper behavior vis à vis the citizen, irrespective of the duty of good faith established in the Contract Law (General Part). There is no need, and it would not be a good idea, to uproot the agency’s duty of proper behavior, which sprouted long ago in public law soil, and to replace it with a good faith duty that sprouted later, in a different kind of soil, namely that of private law. This is especially true because there is a difference between the two duties. The soil of private law bore one species of the duty of good faith, while the soil of public law bore a different species. The fact that those species bear the same name might blur the distinction. Differentiating the names can help make the difference more pronounced and preserve the distinction in substance, and indeed, today we do use different names: in private law, there is a duty of good faith; in public law, there is a duty of fairness.

 

            To be sure, there is a duty of good faith in public law, as well, but it generally has a different meaning: we say that an administrative agency is not acting in good faith when it knows it is not acting according to the law, such as when it makes a decision based on an irrelevant consideration, knowing the consideration is illegitimate. See e.g. the Lugassi case [18] at 459-60. We should preserve the distinction between the meanings of each phrase: in public law, good faith refers to the mental state of the administrative agency (which can also be called arbitrariness or malice), while fairness refers to the behavior (including omissions) of the administrative agency.

 

            21. What, then, is the difference between the duty of good faith in private law and the duty of fairness in public law? The difference in the nature of the duties reflects a difference in the nature of the relationships. First of all, the relationship between an administrative agency and a citizen is generally a relationship of authority, under the law, while the relationship between citizens is generally one of equality, under an agreement. Moreover, the relationship between an agency and a citizen, as is common in relationships of authority, is one of trusteeship. Professor A. Barak explained that well in his book, Judicial Discretion [78]:

 

In determining the content of an administrative duty of fairness, the judge must compare it to the contractual duty of good faith. The two are not one and the same. The contractual duty of good faith sets a minimum level of fairness based on contractual “rivalry.” Each contractual party seeks to achieve his or her self-interest, and the rules of good faith are designed to guarantee “a fair game,” set by the ethical perspective of enlightened Israeli society. The administrative duty of fairness is different. It is not based on rivalry between the self-interest of the public agency and the interest of the citizen. The public agency takes care of the general interest, including the interest of the citizen. The public agency has no “self” interest of its own. The duty of fairness in administrative law therefore imposes a higher-level duty than the “contractual” duty of good faith. This is not minimal fairness, but rather the fairness imposed on a body charged with achieving the collective interest.

Id. at 487-88. See also Id. at 473-75.

 

Justice Dorner addressed this point as well:

 

The duty of administrative fairness – rooted in the status of the agency as a trustee of the public – is more exacting than the duty of good faith required of an individual.

HC 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Land Administration [19] at 860.

 

            I think these principles lead to an additional conclusion. For administrative agencies, we should distinguish between two areas: actions in the field of private law and actions in the field of public law. When an administrative agency acts in the field of private law, such as by forming a contract, it bears a double duty: the private law duty of good faith and the public law duty of fairness. In practice, however, because the duty of fairness is more exacting, it will generally encompass the duty of good faith. As a practical matter, within the field of private law, the duty of fairness suffices. On the other hand, when the agency acts in the field of public law, such as by considering an application for a license, the duty of good faith does not apply at all. Because the agency bears a similar duty – the duty of fairness – we might say, in the language of section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part), that the duty of good faith is not appropriate. See also Shalev, supra [77] at 45. Practically, we can say that the administrative agency is subject to the duty of fairness in all its actions, whether in public or private law, and there is no need to subject it to the duty of good faith.

 

            What, then, is the duty of fairness?

 

Duty of Fairness

 

            22. A cornerstone of public administrative law is that the administrative agency, as the trustee of the public, must behave fairly. See e.g. HC 840/79, Center for Contractors and Builders in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] at 745-46. The administrative agency owes a duty of fairness, first and foremost, to the public. This is the duty of a trustee to a beneficiary. In practice, because the public is composed of people, the duty does not just apply to the public as an abstract body but also to every person.

 

            It is often said that the administrative agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. One can say that, but we should bear in mind that, in this context, citizen means person, including a resident who is not a citizen and a collective body such as a corporation.

 

            The duty of fairness that an administrative authority owes the citizen is the conceptual source for various rules governing the relationship between the agency and the citizen. An example of this is the rule requiring the agency to grant the right to be heard to those affected by its decisions. As President Agranat said:

 

The reason for the above-stated rule [the citizen’s right to be heard before the administrative agency – I.Z.] is to guarantee that the administrative agency will address the citizen’s concern with fairness …

HC 549/75 Noach Film Company, Ltd. v. Film Review Council [21] at 767.

 

            The same is true of the rule about fulfilling administrative promises. In Justice Berinson’s words:

 

[If – trans.] a promise is given by an official, within the bounds of his or her authority, with the intention of giving it legal validity, where the other party accepted it as such, then public fairness demands that the promise in fact be fulfilled, even if the citizen did not change his or her position for the worse in reliance on the promise.

HC 135/75 Cy-Tex Corporation Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister [22] at 676.

 

23. Such is the duty of fairness imposed on the administrative agency to the citizen. Does just the administrative agency bear the duty of fairness, while the citizen is exempt from the obligation to treat the agency fairly?

 

The answer is that the relationship between the agency and the citizen is, in fact, two-sided. In my opinion, the citizen should therefore owe a duty of fairness to the agency, as the agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. This requirement is deeply rooted: it springs from the social contract at the foundation of the state. Under this contract, as it is understood in a democratic state, the agency and the citizen stand not on opposite sides of the barricade but rather side-by-side, as partners in the state. In a democracy, as Justice Silberg said, “the government is part of the very body of the citizen …” HC 3/58, Berman v. Interior Minister [23] at 1511. The government [… – ed.] has a duty to serve the public – to guarantee safety and order; to provide essential services; to protect the dignity and liberty of every citizen; to do social justice. The public administration, however, which has nothing of its own, can only give the public what it receives from the public. It is desirable, indeed, necessary, that the relationship between the administration and the public be a reciprocal relationship of give-and-take. The same is true of the relationship between the public administration and the citizen. As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything. A citizen’s right vis à vis the agency is coupled with an obligation vis à vis the agency. This is the essence of the social contract among citizens and between citizens and the public administration. It is also the root of the existence of the state.

 

24. The citizen’s obligations to the state, in essence, to the public, are generally delineated in the statute books: the duty to pay taxes, to go to school until a certain age, to serve in the army, and others. Duties may also, however, arise from judicial case law. That is how the administrative agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen arose. That is also how the citizen’s duty of fairness to the administrative agency arises.

 

If the citizen did not bear a duty of fairness to the administrative agency, we might say that the citizen bears a duty of good faith in his or her relationship with the agency, under section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part). See para. 18, supra. The duty of fairness, in this context, however, is preferable to the duty of good faith. First, the duties involved in the relationship between the administrative agency and the citizen should not come from different sources, meaning that the agency bears the duty of fairness, whose source is public law, and the citizen bears the duty of good faith, whose source is private law. The harmony between the citizen and the agency will be enriched if reciprocal duties arise from a single source, namely public law.

 

Second, the relationship between the citizen and the administrative agency, which represents the public, is substantially different from the relationship between citizens. When the agency acts within the field of public law, therefore, we should not copy the duty of good faith from private law and apply it, even with changes, to the relationship between the citizen and the agency. It is better to allow the case law to develop the duty that arises from this relationship in its own way, appropriate to the environment in which the duty lives, namely the environment of public law. I call this duty, arising from public law, the duty of fairness.

 

25. What does the duty of fairness include? There is no comprehensive answer, even within the context of the agency’s duty to the citizen, except to say that this court has long recognized such a duty. Indeed, we would do well not to give a comprehensive answer. The concept of the duty of fairness, by nature, is opaque. It can and should be filled with content from time to time, according to changing needs, rather than delineated into a rigid definition. It should be open-ended, so that new rules can be added and subtracted as necessary.

 

The same is certainly true of the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency. This duty is a new concept. It must develop gradually, as the common law does, from case to case, until the time is ripe to formulate rules.

 

Having said that, and without pretending to make any final ruling, I would like to suggest guidelines to characterize a citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency:

 

(a) In a well-ordered society, the duty of fairness must express the appropriate relationship between the public administration, which acts as the trustee of the public, and citizens, who are the public. This relationship is a reciprocal relationship between partners in a goal-oriented activity, based on respect, trust, and reliability. The duty of fairness should develop from this foundation, gradually becoming a system of flexible rules by which both citizen and agency must and can abide. Compare this with the nature of the duty of good faith, FH 22/82 [17] at 484-85.

 

(b) As noted, an agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen is different from the citizen’s duty of fairness to another citizen, because of the different nature of the two kinds of relationships. See para. 21, supra. Similarly, the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency may differ from his or her duty of good faith to a fellow citizen.

 

(c) It would seem that a citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency differs from the agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen, because of the difference between the status of a citizen and the status of an agency. The agency is a trustee of the public, including of the citizen, and the duties stemming from that status differ from the duties owed by a citizen.

 

(d) The citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency, like the agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen, varies with the circumstances of each case. One example is the agency’s duty to hear the citizen, which derives from the duty of fairness. Ordinarily, the agency fulfills that duty by providing an opportunity for the citizen to submit something in writing; in certain circumstances, the duty of fairness may obligate the agency to conduct an oral hearing or even to allow the citizen to examine witnesses. As Justice Sussman said in HC 335/68 Israeli Consumer Council v. Chair of the Gas Services Investigatory Committee [24] at 334:

 

There is no standard rule we can set for the way the agency must proceed on every issue, except to say that it must treat the citizen with fairness. The appropriate level of fairness depends on the circumstances.

 

We can say the same thing about the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency: the decision about whether, in a particular case, the citizen must behave in a certain way toward the agency depends on the circumstances.

 

            26. While I will not attempt to define the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency, I will suggest, again, without setting a rigid rule, examples of duties that derive from the duty of fairness.

 

            In my opinion, the duty to act with the speed appropriate to the circumstances derives from the duty of fairness. The agency owes such duty to the citizen. See sec. 11 of the Interpretation Law, 1981. See also HC 135/71 Fresman v. Traffic Supervisor [25] at 540. In my opinion, the citizen owes a similar duty to the administrative agency.

 

            Similarly, the requirement that a citizen not shirk obligations that he or she has undertaken to the agency derives from the duty of fairness. See e.g. HC 1930/94 Nathan v. Defense Minister [26], p. 655 and thereafter.

 

            Elsewhere I noted an additional example:

 

It is a question whether a person who alleges that an agency is acting outside the scope of its authority may suppress that allegation, only to raise it later, if and when it becomes convenient to do so. For example, may a person choose to wait and see how the agency decides: to keep quiet if it decides in his or her favor, not saying a word about authority, but if the agency decides against him or her, to argue that the action was ultra vires from the outset? That question remains open. In my opinion, the right rule is that a person who has allegations against an administrative agency must compile them and present all of them to the agency at the earliest opportunity to do so, rather than suppress part of them until he or she feels like raising them. That rule applies to an allegation of ultra vires actions. Such an allegation means that the agency must remove itself from the case and that perhaps another agency can and must deal with it. It is inappropriate to let the administrative agency continue to take the trouble, and possibly to trouble others, for a pointless discussion.  We might say that alongside the agency’s duty to treat the citizen with fairness, a parallel duty is imposed on the citizen to treat the agency with fairness. The duty of fairness obligates a citizen who claims that an agency acted without authority to raise that claim at the earliest opportunity.

2 I. Zamir, Hasamchut Haminhalit [79] at 696-97.

 

The Duty to Disclose

 

            27. The duty of fairness is the source of the duty to disclose information material to the matter at hand. This duty is owed, first and foremost, by the administrative agency to the citizen. It is expressed in the agency’s obligation to hear the citizen before making a decision that could harm his or her interests. As Justice Barak said in HC 656/80 Abu Romi v. Health Minister [27] at 189:

 

The right to a hearing is not properly observed unless [the agency – trans.] brings information that has been received in the citizen’s case to his or her attention and provides an opportunity to respond to it appropriately.

 

            It is also expressed in the agency’s duty, in certain circumstances, to grant a citizen access to the agency file connected to his or her case. As Justice Witkon said in HC 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessment Committee, Town of Holon [28] at 71-72:

 

A legitimate administration in a free society does not approve of all of this ‘secrecy,’ which erects a barrier between the government and the citizen ....

 

The petitioner’s demand [to see the agency file – I.Z.] is justified, not just because his right to access the documents stems from the provisions of the statute, but – and primarily – because the common sense and elementary fairness in the public relations between government and citizen inexorably lead to this conclusion.

 

The agency’s obligation to disclose information to the citizen has been expressed in additional contexts, in legislation and in case law, and it continues to develop.

 

            28. The citizen also owes a duty to disclose material information. As noted, in private law, a citizen owes a duty of disclosure to other citizens, as part of the duty to act in good faith. Para. 17, supra. A citizen who petitions the court for a remedy against an administrative agency also owes that duty. For example, President Shamgar discussed that duty (which is part of the duty to act with clean hands) in HC 421/86 Ashkenazi v. Transportation Minister [29] at 410:

 

A primary rule that has always guided this court is that someone who petitions the High Court of Justice must disclose all relevant facts to the Court. Someone who conceals facts that bear on the petition does not deserve a remedy from the Court.

 

            The citizen bears a similar duty to the administrative agency, not just in the field of private law, but also in public law. That duty may be imposed by legislation, as a condition of receiving a certain license or benefit. However, even if there is no statutorily-imposed duty, it exists under the common law as an expression of the duty of fairness. Fairness does not tolerate a situation in which a citizen seeks a license or benefit from an administrative agency to which he or she is not entitled or in some other way tries to influence the agency’s decision through misrepresentation, including by concealing information. Disclosure of material, reliable information by a citizen applying to the agency is not just a moral imperative, it is also a practical need. After all, an agency must make its decision based on the relevant considerations. If the citizen conceals material information, it is likely to eliminate relevant factors from the agency’s awareness, obstruct the work of balancing considerations, and distort the agency’s decision. As a result, the agency is likely to make a wrong or perhaps even illegal decision, to the detriment of the public. For example, it may grant a license to someone who is not qualified, or give a money grant from the public treasury to someone who is not eligible. Hence the rule, derived from the duty of fairness, that a citizen must disclose to the agency material and reliable information related to the issue at hand.

 

            29. The Court articulated this rule in HC 727/88 Awad v. Religious Affairs Minister (hereinafter – the Awad case) [30]. There, the Minister of Religious Affairs authorized the appointment of the petitioner as chair of the religious council in Rosh Haayin. The minister later discovered that the petitioner had been convicted of stealing in the course of his job as treasurer of the religious council. The minister rescinded his approval of the appointment, and the petitioner challenged that decision. The Court held that a candidate’s qualifications for a job, including whether he has a criminal past, are relevant considerations that the minister properly took into account in deciding about the appointment. Justice Barak added:

 

In formulating his position on these qualifications, the minister accessed a set of facts that did not comport with reality. The minister knew nothing about the petitioner’s conviction in the past. Moreover, under the circumstances, the petitioner had a duty to inform the local council about his conviction, and both the local council and the petitioner had a duty to inform the minister about the conviction. The duty of good faith and fairness require nothing less …

Id. at 492.

 

            30. What does the citizen’s duty to disclose material information to the agency require? At this stage, the answer is unclear. At this stage, the circumstances of each case will determine what the duty to disclose requires in that particular case. As time goes by, a clearer answer will surely arise from the case law. Even at this stage, however, the following thoughts emerge:

 

            (a) Regarding the scope: The duty does not necessarily apply to every relationship between the citizen and the administrative agency. It primarily applies to cases in which a citizen requests something from the administrative agency, such as a license, appointment, or other benefit, in contrast to cases in which the agency exercises power without being asked to do so by the citizen, particularly if such power harms the citizen. There may definitely, however, be exceptional cases in which the scope of the duty expands or contracts, depending on the special circumstances of each case.

 

            (b) Regarding the substance: The citizen is only obligated to give the agency information that he or she has or can access and that is relevant to the issue at hand. Such a consideration should be taken into account by the agency, and it may affect the content of the decision. In other words, the citizen need not give the agency information about an irrelevant consideration, which the agency, in any event, is barred from taking into account.

 

            (c) The relevant considerations are often numerous and diverse, some of which are primary and some of which are secondary. Generally, as a practical matter, the agency cannot and is not required to take all relevant considerations into account, but rather only the primary ones. There is therefore no need, and it would be impractical, to require the citizen to disclose all relevant considerations to the agency, with no exceptions. It suffices if the citizen discloses the primary considerations that could substantially influence the agency’s decision. The citizen, like the agency, must behave reasonably. In other words, the right test for the level of disclosure is the test of the reasonable citizen, and perhaps more accurately, the test of the reasonable and fair citizen.

 

            (d) The citizen’s duty to disclose does not exempt the administrative agency from its duty to do its own check of the facts that form the basis for its exercise of authority.

 

            31. An additional question of great practical importance is the question of the consequences of the citizen’s breach of this duty. Does a breach of the citizen’s duty to disclose necessarily lead to revoking the agency’s decision? The answer is no. The consequences of breaching the duty depend on every case and its circumstances. In some cases, the breach may justify revoking the decision, whether it’s a decision to give a license, award a pension, make an appointment, or do something else; in other cases, the breach may justify changing an aspect of the decision, declining to renew the license, or another choice that does not rise to the level of revoking the original decision; and sometimes, the circumstances will not justify making a change to the citizen’s detriment.

 

As a matter of principle, on this issue and for others, we should distinguish between breach of a duty and the implications of the breach. That is the case when an administrative agency breaches a duty; not every breach voids the decision. On this issue, I noted:

We should distinguish carefully between a rule obligating an administrative agency and the remedy that the court grants for violating the rule. The rule exists on one plane, and the remedy on another. Ex poste, the considerations that the court weighs may differ from the considerations binding the agency ex ante. Therefore, the agency should fulfill its duty under the case law to grant a hearing, without regard to the anticipated or potential result of breaching the duty.

HC 2911/94 Baki v. Interior Ministry Director-General [31] at 304.

 

            See also HC 2918/03 City of Kiryat Gat v. State of Israel [32] at 848.

            32. The same is true of a citizen’s duty of disclosure owed to the administrative agency – we should distinguish between the duty to disclose and the implications of breaching that duty. The duty of disclosure exists in its own right, and the citizen is not exempt from it, even in circumstances in which breaching the duty would not justify voiding the agency’s decision or taking other steps against the citizen. The set of considerations requiring the citizen to fulfill the duty differs from the set of considerations guiding the agency (or, at the stage of review, the court) in its response to the breach.

            Any response to a citizen’s breach of duty must take into account the need to respect and carry out administrative decisions. The administrative decision may grant a right to a citizen or create an expectation upon which he or she relies, and denying that right, frustrating that expectation, or undermining either of them by voiding or changing the decision should be done only after seriously considering the matter. Which considerations come to bear on the duty of disclosure?

            First, it matters what information the citizen failed to disclose to the agency. Was it of primary or secondary importance for the matter at hand? Was it information that the citizen had, should have had, or should have taken the trouble to obtain? Was it information of which the agency was aware or should have been aware from its own sources, or information that, by its nature, is available to the citizen but not the agency? The important question here is whether the citizen’s disclosure of the information was reasonably likely to have changed the agency’s decision. If the information is a relevant consideration of substantive importance, and the agency did not take it into account before making the decision, then the decision is flawed, irrespective of the citizen’s breach of the duty, and that flaw is sometimes enough to justify voiding the decision.

            An additional consideration of substantial importance concerns the citizen’s intention.  Do the circumstances indicate that the citizen intended to mislead the agency in order to influence its decision, or did the citizen willfully remain blind or act negligently? If so, breach of the duty is very serious, and in some cases may even rise to the level of criminal behavior. In any event, in a case like that, the citizen’s reliance interest becomes so weak as perhaps to disappear entirely. A citizen who knowingly misleads the agency, knowing that the agency’s decision will be based on the misinformation, cannot use his or her reliance interest to prevent the agency from changing or voiding its decision.

            Similarly, it is always relevant to consider the harm to the public interest that is likely to result from the citizen’s breach of the duty, weighed against the damage that the citizen will likely suffer if the agency changes or cancels its decision.

            There may be additional considerations. Consider, for example, HC 135/71, supra [25]. In that case, the Traffic Supervisor decided to revoke a taxi license after finding out that in applying for the license, the license-holder gave misleading information about the period of time in which he had worked as a taxi-driver. Acting President Sussman said:

The petitioner misled the agency about the time in which he had worked as a taxi-driver. That mistake is what led the agency, against the rules, to award him more points than he was entitled to receive. Had the agency known the truth, it would not have awarded him the license. Just as a contracting party who is misled may void the contract, so too, in administrative law, can an agency revoke a license it granted, if it did so because of fraud or misrepresentation …

Id. At 539.

            Nevertheless, the Court held that, under the circumstances of that case, the Traffic Supervisor erred in revoking the license. Why? Primarily “because the respondents failed to act with the required promptness. They delayed the matter too long, for no reasonable purpose.” Id. at 541.

            Whether the administrative agency may revoke the decision, change its terms, refuse to renew a license or take other action against a citizen who violated the duty to disclose depends on the balance of the relevant considerations. It is incumbent upon the administrative agency to exercise caution before taking action against a citizen who violated the duty of disclosure, to make sure it does not shirk the proper execution of its job, does not treat the citizen’s minor violations strictly, as if they were major, and does not cause more harm to the citizen than is warranted by the circumstances.

            What, then do the circumstances warrant in the case before us?

 

The Case at Bar

 

33. The case at bar requires us to examine two claims which, according to the Customs Authority, justify its refusal to renew the petitioner’s license. Supra para. 13. The first claim concerns the petitioner’s rights in the land for which the license was granted: the Customs Authority was justified in refusing to renew the license once it learned that the petitioner had no rights in the land, as required by the Regulations. The second claim concerns the petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to the Customs Authority: the petitioner breached its duty when, prior to receiving the license, it failed to disclose material information about its rights in the land to the Customs Authority. According to the Customs Authority, the very breach of that duty justifies refusing to renew the license.

 

34. First, regarding the petitioner’s rights in the land: As mentioned, under the Regulations, a license applicant must declare to the Customs Authority that it is the owner, renter, or lessee of the land for which the license is requested. Supra para. 9. That right in the land is, according to the Regulations, a condition of or at least a relevant consideration in applying for the license. Did the petitioner have such a right?

 

When asked by the Customs Authority to produce a rental agreement or lease for the land, the petitioner sent the contract. Supra para. 10. The contract, however, is neither a rental agreement nor a lease, and it does not appear to be one either on its face or upon close scrutiny. Indeed, the petitioner itself does not claim that the contract, by itself, grants a right to rent or lease the land. Paragraph 12 of the petition says that, “the contract itself contains no explicit prohibition against the petitioner storing freight in the area.” Of course, the absence of an explicit prohibition on storage is not the same as the petitioner’s receiving permission to store freight on land that doesn’t belong to it. Does the contract grant that permission? The petitioner fails to point to a single clause of the contract that says that the petitioner was granted a right to lease or rent or even permission to store freight on the land. Moreover, paragraph 13 of the petition says that, “After signing the agreement, the representatives of the P.A. [Port Authority – I.Z.] and the petitioner’s representatives reached an agreement that … among other purposes, the area would be used for storing freight.” In other words, the agreement on storage was reached only after the contract was signed. Paragraph 29 of the petition says that, “The understanding regarding the size of the area, its boundaries, and its designations was reached after the signing.” The petitioner, however, in response to the Customs Authority’s request to produce a rental or lease agreement, produced only the contract, as though it granted it a right to rent or lease the land. It added nothing about an agreement or understanding reached after the contract was signed. In other words, to the Customs Authority, the petitioner produced only the contract, as though it granted it a right of rental or lease, even though the petitioner itself acknowledged that the contract granted no such right, and that is the right that the Regulations require.

 

It is therefore necessary to clarify whether the petitioner was granted such right, as it claims, after the contract was signed. Recall that according to the appendix to the contract, signed along with the contract, the petitioner may use the land “exclusively for the purposes of loading and/or unloading trains” and that, “Any change of any kind to the plot and/or anything attached and/or connected to it requires the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.” Supra para. 4. The petitioner, however, does not claim to have any such permission from the Director-General of Israel Railways or from anyone else authorized or pretending to be authorized to write on behalf of the director-general.

 

Moreover, on January 1, 1996, a year and a half after the contract was signed, the Railways Deputy told the petitioner in writing that it was not permitted to use the land for purposes other than loading and unloading, that “[s]eizure and use of the land constitute a violation of the contract,” and that “[y]ou must immediately vacate the areas noted above.” Supra para. 7. One would think that the petitioner, consistent with its version of the story, would rush to tell the Railways Deputy that the agreement reached after the signing of the contract gave it a right to store freight on the land. However, the petitioner failed to respond to the letter entirely. Only two months later, in response to an additional letter sent by the Railways Deputy, did the petitioner address the question of use of the land. In that response, however, it did not claim that there was no basis for the charge of contractual violation or that there was no basis for demanding that it vacate the land, because it was using the area pursuant to an agreement. The Director-General of the petitioner wrote to the Railways Deputy, saying only that, during the course of the last meetings on the subject, “to the best of my recollection, we agreed to find a way to resolve the issue.” Even afterward, in the months during which the Port Authority repeated its demands that the petitioner immediately vacate the land, the petitioner never said that it had a right of rental or lease in the land or that it had a right to fence in the land and use it to store freight. Supra para. 7.

 

During the course of this petition, the petitioner had another chance to produce proof about its right to rent or lease the land. Bear in mind that the petitioner is challenging the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew its license for the land, after the Customs Authority concluded that the petitioner did not and does not have a right in the land. How does the petitioner respond to this stance of the Customs Authority? Its answer is based on two claims, outlined in paragraph 30 of the petition:

 

The scheme clearly contains a notation that the area in question is intended for storage. That document was signed by the Director of the Engineering Department in the P.A./Israel Railways, and the petitioner claims that it is binding in every way. This scheme comes in addition to the oral understandings and agreements reached between the P.A. representatives and the petitioner, and together they constitute the basis for the extensive project and investment undertaken in reliance on the [written – trans.] agreement and the additional agreements and understandings.

 

The petitioner, however, provides no details whatsoever about those agreements and understandings (who agreed or understood, what was agreed or understood, etc.), and it provides no documents to support that claim. It merely makes the claim, which is unsupported by the correspondence between the petitioner and the Port Authority and has no weight as a evidence. We should further recall that, according to the contract, the oral agreements and understandings that the petitioner claims took place are insufficient to authorize transferring a large piece of land to the possession and use of the petitioner, contradicting the contract’s explicit provisions, including the provision requiring “the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.”

 

            The sole piece of evidence left for the petitioner is the scheme, that is, the second scheme from May 15, 1995, in which the area of land is marked as “storage area.” Supra para. 3. The petitioner presents the second scheme (signed a year after the contract was signed) as if it were the only scheme. That is not the case. The first scheme was prepared as early as January 3, 1994 (a year and a half before the contract was signed) and signed by the petitioner and two deputies director-general of the Railways, who also signed the contract itself. The first scheme outlines the route of the extension, and it includes no marks designating land use, whether for storage or any other purpose. The second scheme was prepared, as noted above, a year and a half later, by the petitioner’s planner, in order to mark the new extension route proposed by the petitioner. It was signed not by the two deputies director-general who signed the first scheme, but rather only by the Director of the Railways Engineering Department.

 

            The petitioner claims that the second scheme is proof that the Port Authority agreed to let it use the land for storage. The Port Authority counters that in signing the second scheme, the Director of the Israel Railways Engineering Department intended only to approve the new route of the extension from an engineering point of view and not to approve the use of the land, something he was neither involved in nor even authorized to decide. In paragraph 7 of its response affidavit, the Port Authority claims that:

 

According to what he told me, all that Mr. Doron Rubin, Director of the Israel Railways Engineering Department, was asked to do was to sign the back of the scheme from 1995, to indicate approval of the extension route from an engineering point of view. Under these circumstances, claiming that his signature granted rights in the land to the petitioner, just because the petitioner’s planner added the words “storage area” in the margins of the plan, without bothering to call it to Mr. Rubin’s attention, is pure temerity, and it stems from a failure to behave in good faith.

 

            35. Are these claims and evidence enough to rule that the petitioner has no right in the land? Definitely not. Whether the petitioner has a right in the land is an open question, currently pending before the Magistrate’s Court in Ashdod, as part of the action of ejectment brought by the Port Authority against the petitioner. The Magistrate’s Court will rule on that question in light of the arguments and evidence brought before it. Supra para. 8. That, however, is not the question that the Customs Authority faced, and it is not the question before this court. The question before us is whether, in considering whether to renew the license, the Customs Authority had sufficient evidence to decide the issue. As is known, the evidence required to base a decision by an administrative agency differs in substance and in weight from the evidence required to base a judgment by a court. Administrative agencies act according to the test of administrative evidence, not the rules of evidence used in court. Under this test, the administrative agency must have before it sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable person would rely, under the circumstances, in order to make the decision in question. See HC 442/71 Lansky v. Interior Minister [33] at 357; HC 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Communications Minister [34] at 423-24. Such evidence may be sufficient to form the basis for a refusal to renew a license or a revocation of the license. See e.g. HC 475/81, supra [6] at 808.

 

            In my opinion, under the test of administrative evidence, the Customs Authority could have decided at the outset that the petitioner had no right in the land, as required by the Regulations for receipt of a license. The contract itself, which on its face is neither a rental or lease agreement, would have been sufficient evidence for that decision. A fortiari, it would have been sufficient afterward, in view of the Port Authority’s opposition to the petitioner’s seizure and possession of the land. Under the test of administrative evidence, the evidence, which would have been sufficient for a refusal to grant the license at the outset, is also sufficient to determine, for purposes of renewing the license, that the petitioner has no right in the land, as required by the Regulations.

 

            The conclusion is therefore that the Customs Authority granted the license to the petitioner based on a mistake caused by the petitioner’s representation regarding its right in the land. Once the mistake was discovered, and it became clear that, under the Regulations, the petitioner was not entitled to the license, the Customs Authority had the grounds needed under the case law to refuse to renew the license or even to revoke it.

 

            36. Nevertheless, under the facts of this case, I have doubts as to whether these grounds by themselves are sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the license for the land. My doubt stems from two sources: First, the Customs Authority is not absolved of responsibility for the mistake that, once discovered, motivated it to decline to renew the petitioner’s license. As noted, when the petitioner applied for the license, the Customs Authority asked it to send a rental or lease agreement for the land, and it sent the contract. The contract, on its face, is neither a rental nor a lease agreement, and that is obvious to a lawyer after a surface reading of it. However, the Customs representative who handled the petitioner’s application did not bother to read the contract at all. The Customs Authority explained that in paragraph 8 of its response affidavit:

 

The Customs Authority representatives who approved the petitioner’s request assumed, based on the relationship of trust that had developed between the two and in light of the assumption that the petitioner was acting in good faith, that the contract submitted by the petitioner indeed granted it storage rights in the area in question and that there was no reason not to approve the request.

 

            This explanation does not absolve the Customs Authority of responsibility. In every case, the Customs Authority, like any administrative agency, must take reasonable steps to clarify whether the conditions set by the statute or regulations for its exercise of authority have been met. This is the administrative agency’s duty owed to the public, which has endowed it with authority, subject to certain conditions. The agency may not exempt itself of the responsibility to investigate those conditions just because it assumes, hopes, or trusts that the citizen will act in good faith.

 

            Furthermore, the citizen can assume that the agency conducts a reasonable investigation of the conditions necessary to exercise its authority, and that if the agency grants the request, the citizen may generally rely on the that decision. As Justice Barak said:

 

A license grantee may assume that the necessary checks were done and that the he or she may begin investments and activities without fear that everything will be re-opened just because of a mistake. There is another reason, and it is connected to proper public administration. Administrative agencies should establish a system of checks and investigations that will allow it to arrive at its stance in advance, before the license is granted. Only under an illegitimate and dangerous system of administration would the agency first grant a license and only afterward investigate.

HC 799/80, supra [5] at 331.

 

The question therefore becomes whether, under the circumstances of this case, the mistake regarding the petitioner’s rights in the land was sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the license.

 

The second source of doubt is the fact that the balance of damages seems to tip toward the petitioner. On the one hand, the petitioner invested a lot of money in preparing the land to serve as a licensing warehouse, negotiated with clients, has operated the warehouse for months, and will certainly suffer substantial damage when forced to stop using the land as a licensing warehouse, particularly if it is forced to do so immediately. On the other hand, what damage would result if the petitioner continues to use the land as a licensing warehouse until the civil court rules on the Port Authority’s action to eject the petitioner from the land? From the point of view of the Customs Authority, there is no practical damage, because the land has been properly prepared for use as a licensing warehouse, and only the question of the petitioner’s rights in it remains open. There is therefore no concern that the petitioner will store goods on which customs duties are owed unsafely or unsupervised. What of the damage caused to the Port Authority? Such damage does not appear to be a relevant consideration for the Customs Authority’s decision whether to renew the petitioner’s license. In any event, should the civil court rule that the petitioner has no right in the land and that it is occupying the land as a trespasser, the Port Authority may, should it so desire, sue the petitioner for money damages in the form of the appropriate amount of rent, purging the petitioner of unjust enrichment, or request any other remedy.

 

If that is the case, should the Customs Authority renew the petitioner’s license temporarily, pending the civil court’s ruling on its right in the land? In the final balance, were I required to rule on this case based exclusively on the question of the right in the land, I think that I would rule against the petitioner, despite my doubt. The primary reason is that, based on the administrative evidence, the Customs Authority’s granting of the license was not just an error in judgment but was actually illegal, because it contradicted the Regulations requiring that a license-holder have a right in the land. In principle, an administrative agency is not supposed to accept an illegal situation. Indeed, if it were a question of freezing the current situation for just a brief period, pending a final ruling on the question of the right in the land, it would have been possible to maintain the status quo, out of consideration for the damage that the petitioner would otherwise suffer. In practice, however, years may pass before the courts will give a final ruling, including on any appeals. It would not serve the public interest to allow the petitioner, which apparently received the license in violation of the Regulations, to maintain the license and benefit from it for a long period of time, while the authorized agency is helpless to correct the problem. Therefore, as noted, if I had to rule on this case based on this reason alone, I think that, despite the doubt, I would deny the petition.

 

However, if any doubt remained about whether this reason is sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license for the land, the second reason, namely breach of the duty to disclose, removes any doubt I might have harbored.

 

37. As noted, as part of the petitioner’s duty to disclose owed to the Customs Authority, the petitioner had an obligation to disclose information material to the license requested. Supra text beginning on para. 27. I have no doubt that the petitioner violated that duty.

 

This was the case from the petitioner’s first step in this case. When asked by the Customs Authority to produce a “rental contract or lease” for the land, the petitioner sent the Customs Authority the contract (in December 1995), noting in its cover letter that, “Enclosed is the rental/lease agreement with the Port Authority and the Railways.” However, as noted, that contract is neither a rental agreement nor a lease. Even the petitioner acknowledges in its petition that its claim to a right in the land is based on understandings and agreements made later. Supra para. 34. The petitioner, however, did not tell the Customs Authority that its right in the land derives not from the contract but rather from later understandings and agreements. Had it said that in the letter sent to the Customs Authority, the Customs Authority would likely have sought to clarify what those understandings and agreements are and why they are not included in the appendix to the contract or in another document.

 

Moreover, the petitioner sent the contract to the Customs Authority without attaching the first scheme, which presents the extension route as it was first established. Supra paras. 2-3. Therefore, the picture presented to the Customs Authority was incomplete and inaccurate. Had the petitioner attached the first scheme as well, which left a smaller area between the extension and the warehouse, along with an explanation about the change in the route, the Customs Authority might have investigated and discovered the situation as the Port Authority viewed it.

 

In any event, the petitioner knew very well that the Customs Authority required it to have a right of rental or lease in the land, and that after it submitted the contract, the Customs Authority believed that the petitioner did indeed have such a right.

 

Even if the petitioner believed it had such a right, not long after it submitted the contract to the Customs Authority, it learned that the Port Authority thought otherwise. The letter sent to the petitioner on January 8, 1996 said, in the name of the Port Authority, that the petitioner had seized the land in violation of the contract and that it must immediately vacate the land. The Port Authority repeated that stance over and over for a period of months. Supra para. 7. During that time, the petitioner’s application for a license was pending before the Customs Authority until it decided, on July 1, 1996, to grant the license requested. The petitioner should have known, if it did not in fact know, that this information about the stance of the Port Authority was material to the Customs Authority’s decision on its application for a license. The petitioner itself submitted the contract to the Customs Authority as proof of its rental or lease right in the land. That being the case, during the months in which it engaged in regular communications with the Customs Authority about the license, how could the petitioner have neglected to inform it that the other party to the contract vehemently denied that the contract imparted any such right whatsoever to the petitioner?

 

If the case involved private individuals, we might have said that the petitioner was obligated to disclose that information to the other party as part of its duty to act in good faith during negotiations leading to the formation of a contract, under section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part), and that the other party could consider the failure to disclose as a misrepresentation under section 15 of that law and therefore void the contract. In this case, because we are dealing with an administrative agency and not a private individual, we can say that the petitioner breached its duty owed the Customs Authority to disclose material information.

 

Violation of the duty to disclose may result from a random mistake or from deliberate misrepresentation. It is often difficult to distinguish between the two, and in any event it is difficult to prove that the violation resulted from that latter. Generally, however, there is no need to prove that. It is sufficient that, under the facts of the case, the citizen, as a reasonable and fair person, had a duty to disclose the material information to the agency, and that the citizen’s violation of such duty caused the agency to be misled.

 

38. Misleading an administrative agency by a citizen’s failure to disclose information material to its application for a license or other benefit causes substantial harm, not just to the agency but also to the public. It is clearly in the public interest to avoid such misrepresentation. The public also has an interest in revoking a license or other benefit given by the agency as a result of such misrepresentation. Such misrepresentation, if it is not de minimus, is therefore likely to justify a decision by the administrative agency to revoke the license or other benefit granted, especially if there are grounds to believe that the agency would not have granted the license or benefit, but for the misrepresentation.

 

This is the case before us. The Customs Authority says that, had the petitioner disclosed the full picture of its rights in the land, either at the start of the license application process or at any time before the decision was made, it would not have given the petitioner the license it requested. This claim is persuasive.

 

The consequence is thus that the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license for the land was justified.

 

I therefore conclude that the petition should be denied, and the petitioner should pay court costs.

 

Addendum: Person and State

 

39. Finished but not complete. President Barak responds to me: He agrees with the outcome I reach but not with the route I take to reach it. As for the result, he agrees that the petitioner owes the Customs Authority a duty of disclosure, that it violated such duty, and that the petition should therefore be denied. As for the route, he does not agree that the duty of disclosure imposed upon the petitioner derives from a general duty of proper behavior owed by the citizen to the public administration. In his opinion, the duty of disclosure is circumscribed, and it is wrong and perhaps even dangerous to impose a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen, toward the public administration.

 

Because there is no dispute over the outcome, the dispute over the way to get there may seem abstract and marginal. In actuality, however, it is a dispute of principle and importance. It reflects a difference in world views about the nature of the state or, at least, the proper relationship between a person and the state.

 

What is the proper relationship between a person and the state? The point of departure is rooted in the general rule, which is essentially the basic rule of jurisprudence, that every person, including every legal entity, must behave properly in every case, according to the circumstances. That, in my opinion, is the entire body of jurisprudence in a nutshell. As for the rest: go and learn. Indeed, jurisprudence has developed an extensive system of different rules for the proper way to behave in various situations. Beyond those rules, however, and in addition to them, there is a general duty of proper behavior.

 

In private law, which governs relationships between individuals, the general duty is a duty of good faith. That duty applies to contractual relations as well as to other legal acts. It can serve as a conceptual explanation for the existing rules, a legal source from which new rules are derived, and even a duty in itself.

 

In public law, which governs relationships between an individual and the public, the duty is customarily called the duty of fairness. Like the duty of good faith, the duty of fairness requires proper behavior under the circumstances of the case.

 

There is no dispute that the public administration owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. Does the citizen, however, owe a parallel, if not identical, duty to the public administration? The Court has yet to address that question. Now that it has come before us and created a dispute, I see fit to add a few words to explain my position.

 

            40. President Barak does not see a justification for imposing on the citizen a duty of fairness parallel to that owed by the public administration, because the relationship between the citizen and the public administration is asymmetrical. I agree that there is no symmetry. However there is, or at least ought to be, reciprocity.

 

            There is no symmetry because the public administration is the trustee of the public, meaning that of every citizen, while the citizen is not the trustee of the public administration. To clarify: the loyalty owed by the public administration to the citizen is not a legal duty. It is not even a legal relationship. In that way, it differs from the duty of loyalty in private law. In public law, as opposed to private law, loyalty is just a conceptual duty. It expresses the idea that the public administration draws its authority from the public and must exercise that authority for the sake of the public, in the way that public decides. Inter alia, it must exercise its authority with fairness. Various duties owed by the public administration to the citizen arise from fairness, including the duties that the legislature imposes and those that the courts impose.

 

            The citizen, on the other hand, is not the trustee of the public administration but rather the beneficiary. Obviously, then, the citizen’s legal duties owed the public administration cannot be identical to the legal duties owed by the public administration to the citizen. However, it is just as clear that the citizen is not exempt from owing legal duties to the public administration. The citizen is subject to various legal duties imposed by the legislature and by the courts. For example, it is agreed that the citizen must produce a driver’s license to a police officer; may not insult a public servant; and must disclose material information to an agency from which he or she applies for a license to operate a business. These and other duties are not imposed upon the citizen arbitrarily. They are supposed to express the proper way for the citizen to treat the public administration. In that way, they share common ground – a general duty of proper behavior. That duty constitutes a central ingredient in the culture of our lives. It is also necessary for society to function efficiently and legitimately. What, then, is that duty, and how is it distinct from the duty which the public administration owes the citizen?

 

            41. As a conceptual matter, the duty of loyalty owed by the public administration to the citizen is expressed in legal duties which can be roughly divided into three groups: first, authority; second, reasonableness; and third, fairness.

 

            On the issue of authority, every administrative agency has a duty to refrain from exceeding the bounds of its statutorily delineated-power. That is the duty of authority in the broad sense. The duty of authority, in this sense, requires the agency to do only what the statute authorizes it to do, using only the means that the statute authorizes it to use. It includes, for example, the duty to consult with a certain body or to receive authorization from another body, depending on what the statute stipulates. That duty, of course, does not apply to the citizen, who has not been granted authority by the statute.

 

            In addition, the administrative agency has a duty to act, not just within the bounds of authority defined by the statute, but also with reasonableness. That is the duty of reasonableness in the broad sense. The duty of reasonableness, in this sense, tells the agency to exercise its discretion properly. It is composed of two secondary duties: the agency must exercise its authority for a proper purpose; it must consider the relevant considerations and ignore the irrelevant ones; it must give each relevant consideration the proper weight and balance the various considerations (that is the duty of reasonableness in the narrow sense); and it must not harm the citizen to an extent greater than necessary. The citizen also does not owe the duty of reasonableness, because such duty relates to the discretion entailed in authority [which has been delegated – trans.], and the citizen has no such authority.

 

            The duty of fairness relates to the administrative process, meaning the way in which the administrative agency exercises its authority vis à vis the citizen. It is expressed in various duties, like the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into the circumstances of the case, to lend an ear to the claims of the citizen, to allow the citizen to access documents concerning the matter at hand, and to explain its decision. The common denominator in these duties is the duty to behave properly toward the citizen. It is commonly said that such duty derives from the duty of loyalty that the public administration owes the citizen. That is true, but it is not the only source. The status of the agency as the trustee of the public adds another dimension to this duty, but the duty, at its core, derives from a different source. It derives, first of all, from the basic duty of proper behavior in societal relationships, which includes fairness. Because it derives from this duty, which is not unique to the relationship between the public administration and the citizen, it can apply to the public administration’s duty to the citizen as well as to the citizen’s duty to the public administration.

 

            There may therefore be uncertainty over whether the duty of fairness, as opposed to the duty of authority and the duty of reasonableness, creates a parallel duty which the citizen owes the public administration. President Barak answers that question in the negative. However, his answer gives the duty of fairness a broad meaning. It includes the duty of procedural fairness but also substantive fairness, like, for example, the duty not to discriminate and not to work for an illegitimate goal. In my opinion, the duty of substantive fairness, which concerns administrative discretion, is not part of the duty of fairness but rather part of the duty of reasonableness. That duty is obviously not imposed on the citizen, because the citizen has no authority and therefore cannot be obligated to consider the relevant considerations or fulfill other conditions of exercising authority.

 

            The dispute between President Barak and me is limited to the question of whether the citizen bears a general duty of proper behavior toward the public administration within the field that President Barak refers to as procedural, as opposed to substantive.

 

            42. President Barak objects to imposing a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen vis à vis  the public administration, irrespective of its nature and scope, on two primary grounds: one concerns the reason, and the other concerns the result.

 

            President Barak believes that, first of all, the reason which leads to imposing a duty of proper behavior on the public administration, owed to the citizen, does not lead to imposing a parallel duty on the citizen, owed to the public administration. “A general duty like this,” he says (in paragraph 8), “is inappropriate.” Why? The major reason is this:

 

… The view that the government is the trustee of the public is the basis for imposing a general duty of fairness that government owes to the individual. This view is based on a democratic perspective which puts individual liberty at the basis of the social structure. These reasons for imposing a duty do not exist in a relationship between the individual and the government. The individual is not the trustee of the government … the proper perspective on democracy means that there is no room to impose a duty of fairness that the citizen owes the government. Imposing a general duty of fairness would radically alter the perspective on democracy and the place that the individual occupies within it.

Para. 6.

 

 

            What, however, is the proper perspective on democracy? Obviously, there are many perspectives on democracy – from popular democracy to Western democracy; from formal democracy to substantive democracy; and within substantive democracy, there are different perspectives on what the substance is. There is no dispute that the State of Israel is not just a formal democracy that makes do with choosing representative institutions every few years, primarily the legislative and executive branches. The State of Israel is a substantive democracy, all of whose representative institutions are guided by basic values, at the center of which is human dignity and liberty, in order to serve the human being as a human being. The Court has used that perspective on democracy to establish basic human rights, develop them, and defend them against violation by other institutions. However, even within the context of substantive democracy, with human rights as the consensus, there may still be different perspectives on the proper relationship between the state and the individual.

 

            President Barak believes that, “A democratic regime is based on the recognition of each individual’s human rights … the role of the government is to maintain a society that respects human rights.” Para. 3, infra. Indeed currently, that is the prevalent perspective on the democratic regime here. In my opinion, however, it only captures part of it. A democratic regime is more than recognition and protection of human rights. Human rights are indeed a value of the utmost importance, but they are not the only value. A person is more than a bundle of rights. A person is also a bundle of needs, proclivities, and aspirations. We cannot, therefore, say that the role of the government is to respect human rights – period. That is indeed a role of the utmost importance, but it is only one role among others. In the same breath, we must also say that an additional role is to advance the well-being of people – all people. Another role is to achieve social justice – justice for all. Human rights are not supposed to overshadow personal well-being and social justice. Human rights must not be just for those who have enough. Every person must have enough, so that he or she can enjoy human rights, in actuality and not just by law. This role is integrated, and the government is not the only one who must fill it. It is, first and foremost, the role of society. In other words, each of us must fill that role. Need we fill the role by helping the public administration? Yes. May we shirk the role and impose it on the public administration? No. In fulfilling that role, each of us must take a system of duties upon himself or herself, not just toward other people but also toward society. That, in my opinion, is the proper perspective on a democratic society – rights existing side-by-side with duties. While there is no symmetry in the relationship between the individual and society, there is reciprocity.

 

            That is my view on the social contract. It is not a historical fact whose content is determinable, and it is not even a legal document whose meaning is debatable. The social contract is nothing but an idea that expresses the character that society should have. In my opinion, the desirable character of a society should guarantee not just human rights but also personal well-being and social justice. Toward that end, society does not make do with imparting people with rights; it also imposes duties upon them. That is the soul of democracy.

 

            The State of Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. The Court, as a branch of the state, must be guided by the very democratic values it simultaneously advances. It unquestionably does that and always has. The Court primarily develops and cultivates human rights. However, to be hand-on-heart honest, does it not do so at the expense of other values? The Court devotes it primary efforts and dedicates its first rung on the ladder of priorities to human rights. That is the case in practice, even more so in the rhetoric, and appropriately so: human rights should stand at the top of the ladder of priorities. However, the perspective on democracy as a government which protects human rights is a one-dimensional perspective. Democracy is more complicated and, frankly, better than that. The right perspective on democracy must put personal well-being and social justice together with human rights at the top of the ladder of priorities. The practice and rhetoric of the Court ought to reflect that perspective more clearly.

 

            43. In my opinion, President Barak’s perspective on democracy derives from a feeling of tension or even conflict between the state and the citizen. The state, through this perspective, is a regime that stands against the citizen. Indeed, the government of today is no longer what it was: it is not a totalitarian regime, either monarchical or colonial. Today, in a democracy, the government is the trustee of the people, and it therefore bears a general duty to take care of the public, which includes a duty to protect human rights. That perspective, however, still views the government as a body external to the citizen. It may be a new government, but it has grown from the roots of a totalitarian regime, meaning the roots of paternalism. Even today, the government is like a big brother or beneficent mother whose duty it is to take care of the child, while the child owes obedience and gratitude in return.

 

            This perspective is reflected in the very way we talk about the government. Indeed, the government as trustee. A government, at best, which is legitimate and enlightened. But still a government. It operates externally. And I, as a citizen, am subject to it. Fear its heavy hand. Ask that it leave me alone. Look for ways of restraining it.

 

            It is not the term which is determinative. The perspective is determinative. The term only reveals the perspective. Therefore, even if we find another expression, and replace “government” with “public administration,” nothing will change unless we change the perspective.

 

            44. I reject this perspective. I would like to see the state as a partnership. Of course, not a partnership in the private law sense, and not even a partnership as a legal relationship, but rather a partnership as a conceptual perspective which replaces the perspective of the state as a regime.

 

            According to this perspective, the state is the joint project of all citizens. It includes a division of roles. Those roles dictate the legal relationships. Civil servants play an important role, which entails authority and duties. It gives them control and obligates them as trustees. They are not, however, a regime above me. They are still our partners.

 

            The partnership perspective has implications for the system of rights and duties that apply to both the citizen and the public administration. The partnership is not limited to periodic elections in which the citizen empowers the Knesset and the government to manage national affairs as it sees fit for a few years, until the next elections. Partnership means giving the citizen a real opportunity to participate in the daily running of the country’s national life, and an opportunity, in practice, to act and influence on a daily basis, not just through elections. It requires more publicity and openness of the public administration; additional avenues for early consultation with the relevant bodies outside the public administration; willingness to incorporate those bodies in its regular activities. Administrative regulations stand out as an example. On a regular basis, ministers and other agencies issue a tremendous number of regulations, many of which have the same practical importance as statutes. Unlike the case of statutes, however, the agency authorized to issue regulations does not tend to publish a draft of the regulations and does not hold a public discussion before those regulations enter into force. That process reflects aspects of the government perspective. It is inconsistent with the partnership perspective. The partnership perspective advances democracy to a higher level. It correctly expresses the idea of rule of the people.

 

            The government perspective encourages the citizen to demand personal benefits from the government. It does not encourage the citizen to contribute to society. It tempts the citizen to think: I gave the government power and responsibility, and it should repay me with rights and services. It owes me. This is not a perspective of partnership.

 

            45. The partnership perspective also has implications for the duty that the citizen owes the public administration. The public administration is essentially a public servant. The public servant is flesh of my flesh. He or she works for me and for my benefit. We are partners who have different jobs within the state. According to that perspective, I owe a general duty of proper behavior to the public servant. It is inconceivable that I would owe such a duty such a duty to my employer, my neighbor, as a bus driver or shop salesperson (and it doesn’t matter if we call it good faith or anything else) but not to a public servant, who works for me and for my benefit. Such a duty arises obviously from the partnership relationship between the citizen and the public servant.

 

            I call this duty the duty of fairness. It is a term of convenience. It does not matter very much. We could also call it a duty of good faith. It means a general duty of proper behavior. Proper behavior is an elementary duty. All persons owe it to all other persons. In my opinion, perhaps even a fortiori, the citizen owes it to the public servant.

            The general duty of proper behavior, like the general duty of good faith, does not pretend to be a positive description. In reality, good faith is often lacking in interpersonal relationships. That does not, however, invalidate the duty. The duty is a legal norm, and it exists as such even when breached in practice. The same is true of the duty of fairness that the administrative agency owes the citizen. In reality, the administrative agency may not behave fairly toward the citizen. Nevertheless, and perhaps for that very reason, the duty of fairness is necessary as a legal norm. The norm sends a message, educates, and serves as a tool for adjudicating disputes. For this reason, we also need the norm of a duty of proper behavior owed by the citizen to the administrative agency.

            46. President Barak objects to imposing a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen, to the public administration, not just because he sees no conceptual reason to do so, but also because he is concerned about the practical consequence that will result. In paragraph 13, he says:

The theoretical basis determines how the arrangement develops. The theory determines the practice. In my view, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, because such a duty would be inconsistent with the way we view the individual in society ... “Fairness” is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state.

            Indeed, theoretical perspectives have practical importance. However, the court is responsible for translating the theoretical perspectives into rules of behavior. That principle applies to the theoretical perspective on the duty of fairness owed by the public administration to the citizen. The Court used that perspective to say that various duties that have long been imposed on the public administration, such as the duty to hold a hearing and the duty to disclose, derive from the duty of fairness. The Court, however, has not imposed any additional duties just because they arise from the theoretical perspective on the duty of fairness. The Court will determine that a duty derives from the duty of fairness only after it concludes that the relevant considerations justify imposing such duty on the public administration.

            The same holds true in the opposite direction. In this judgment, the Court holds that, under certain circumstances, the citizen owes a duty of disclosure to the public administration. The Court established that duty by balancing the good of the public against human rights. Having established that duty, I suggest holding that it derives from the duty of fairness. This is the expected course of things. It is also the appropriate course. It may be presumed that if the Court determines that a citizen owes a general duty of fairness to the public administration, the theoretical perspective will not motivate the Court to impose a particular sub-duty on the citizen, unless it concludes that the relevant considerations justify it. It may also be presumed that the Court will only impose additional duties on the citizen through a careful and controlled process, exercising restraint, in order to maintain an appropriate balance in the relationship between the citizen and the public administration.

            47. Clearly, the system of rules derived from the citizen's duty of fairness will differ from the system of rules derived from the public administration's duty of fairness. The name may be the same, but the content is different. In this sense, there is no difference between the duty of fairness and the duty of good faith. For example, the duty of good faith owed by an agent to the principal differs from the duty of good faith owed by the principal to the agent. See para. 25, supra.

            However, in this case, President Barak and I do not dispute the content of the duty of fairness. On that question, I don't think we would disagree. In this case, we agree that, under certain circumstances, the citizen owes a duty of disclosure to the public administration. I expect that there are additional cases in which we would agree that the citizen does or does not owe additional duties. Our disagreement is not over one duty or another, but rather over a prior question which expresses a theoretical perspective: whether the citizen owes the public administration a general duty of fairness, regardless of what the content of that duty may be.

            48. In my opinion, the theoretical perspective that a citizen owes a general duty of fairness to the public administration causes no damage and poses no risk. To the contrary: this perspective adds a helpful theoretical and practical benefit to law and to society. It sends an appropriate message. Fairness is an appropriate message in every human relationship. That is true (in the garb of good faith) of the way people treat each other, and it is true (in the garb of fairness) of the way the public servant treats the citizen. Could it be possible that the way the citizen treats the public servant is the sole exception to this rule? As a person and as a citizen, I willingly assume a duty of fairness to public servants.

 

President A. Barak

            I agree with the result at which my colleague, Justice Zamir arrived: that the petition should be denied. That conclusion is based on the view that the petitioner violated the duty of disclosure owed to Respondent 1. My colleague also recognizes the petitioner's duty of disclosure. The difference in our positions concerns the source of that duty. My colleague sees the duty of disclosure as part of a general duty of fairness which the individual owes the government. I disagree. I will briefly explain my position.

            1. Today, it is universally agreed that the government owes the individual a duty of fairness. This duty is owed by anyone who wields governmental authority. It is owed to any individual, as part of his or her personhood. It applies to every governmental function (legislative, executive, judicial). At first, the legal system recognizes particular duties which the government owed the individual, such as the duty to hear opposing sides, the duty to give reasons, and the duty to behavior reasonably and not arbitrarily. After a while, the system sought and found a general principle at the core of each particular duty. This is the duty of fairness. See HC 840/79, supra [20] at 745. At first, it was just a principle that summarized the particular duties that had already been recognized. Later, it came to be recognized as a super-principal which gives rise to the various duties. The view is that the principle has a life of its own. It is not just a summary of the specific duties recognized in the past. Over the years, new duties that had not been recognized in the past arose from this principle. Indeed, that is – in the Viscount Simonds' words – the "genius" of case law. Scruttons v. Midland Silicones(1962) [72] at 7. It recognizes particular duties that, over time, come to be viewed as an expression of a general principle from which new particular duties arise, which come to be viewed as an expression of a general principle (new or old) from which new particular duties arise, and so on. In the case before us, first the specific duties were recognized, such as the duty to conduct a hearing and avoid a conflict of interests. Later, the legal system derived from them the general principle that, in relationships between the government and the individual, the government must behave fairly toward the individual. Such fairness is both procedural and substantive. Procedural fairness requires the government to establish a procedure that is fair to the individual. For example, the government must hear the individual before making a decision in his or her case, and it may not subject itself to a conflict of interests. Substantive fairness requires the government to consider appropriate considerations (for example, the duty to act reasonably, without discrimination or arbitrariness and not for an inappropriate purpose).  The categories of fairness (procedural and substantive) are never closed or rigid, and they never rest on their lees. HC 1635/90 Zharzhavski v. Prime Minister [35] at 841.

            Why does the government owe a general duty of fairness to the individual? Such duty stems from the view that the governmental authority does not act for itself but rather on behalf of the public. In our legal system, the governmental authority is seen as the trustee of the public who owes the public a duty of fairness. I said as much in one case:

The state, through those who act in its name, is the trustee of the public, put in charge of the collective interest and public assets in order to use them for the collective good …

This special status subjects the state to a duty to behave with reason, integrity, purity of heart, and good faith. The state may not discriminate, act arbitrarily, or in bad faith, or allow itself to be subject to a conflict of interests. It must maintain the rules of natural justice. In short, it must act fairly.

HC 840/79, supra [20] at 745-46.

            Indeed, my view is that the government is the trustee of the collective. My position is that the government is nothing in itself, and anything that it has, it has for the sake of the public. See HC 669/86 Rubin v. Berger [36] at 78. Justice H. Cohen articulated this position:

The individual is different from the public body. The former does as he or she pleases, granting or refusing as he or she wishes, while the latter exists only to serve the collective. It has nothing of its own. All that it has, it holds in trust. On its own, it has no rights or duties beyond, different, or separate from those arising from the trusteeship or granted it or imposed upon it by statutory provisions.

HC 142/70 Shapira v. Bar Association Jerusalem Regional Committee [37] at 331.

My theoretical point of departure is therefore that the government is a trustee, trusteeship requires fairness, and fairness (procedural and substantive) requires behavior based not on self-interest but rather on the need to advance the collective good. See HC 1635/90, supra [36] at 841. See also HC 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Housing and Construction Minister [38] at 258.

            3. Why do I see the government as the public trustee? The reason is that a democratic society is based on the recognition of individual human rights. These rights are natural to people by virtue of their personhood. The government does not grant these rights to people; the rights pre-exist the government. The role of the government is to maintain a society that establishes human rights. Of course, as a matter of daily life in society, human rights sometimes must be infringed. We cannot protect human rights without infringing on human rights. A democratic government is not characterized by the fact that it never violates human rights. Human rights are not a recipe for national destruction. A democratic society is characterized by the fact that an infringement of human rights must be done for a purpose which advances human rights, and the infringement must be to an extent no greater than necessary. A democratic society allows human rights to be infringed upon in order to maintain a social framework that preserves human rights. The right of the individual and its violation derive from a common source. CA 68211/93 United Mizrachi Bank. v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative Village (hereinafter – the Mizrachi Bank case [39]) at 433. Within the context of this view, the role of the government is to take care of the public. The government in itself has no “private” interest of its own. The government exists for the sake of individuals. The government does not exist for its “own” sake. Those who represent the government have no “self” interest that must be protected. They must act to achieve the collective interest. Indeed, there is a serious concern – a concern which history has repeatedly validated – that representatives of the government will develop their own interests and use the tremendous power granted them for purposes that do not reflect the collective good. The duty of loyalty seeks to prevent that. The duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government takes care of the public and not itself; the general duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government takes care of the public and not itself; the general duty of fairness seeks to guarantee that governmental authority is exercised in a way that serves the collective, and not the government itself.

            4. These reasons, which lie at the core of the general duty of loyalty, determine its content. The general duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government does not achieve “its own self-interest” but rather the collective interest. The duty of loyalty does not set the “rules of the game” between “rivals.” It sets rules of behavior for “friends.” Indeed, like the trustee of a private trust, the government must suppress any “private” or “self” interest. It must exercise its powers for the sake of the public and the collective. Therefore, the government must act with integrity and purity of heart; it must abide by the rules of natural justice; its actions must recognize the equality of persons; it must keep its promises (see HC 135/75, supra [22] at 676); it must provide the public with information (HC 142/70, supra [37]); it must take only relevant considerations into account; it must abide by public ethics in its actions (see HC 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [40] at 365); it must act in a way that allows it to achieve the public task imposed on it.

            5. Do individuals, in their relationships, bear a general duty of fairness to each other? The answer is no. The law takes as its point of departure that people have rights (in the broad sense) vis à vis each other. The law recognizes the individual's self-interest and the power of the individual to protect that interest and achieve it. The law does not require an individual to suppress his or her self-interest and give priority to the interest of another person (who would also have to suppress his or her own self-interest). The law does not ask for that level of altruism. The law recognizes the self-interest of the individual and his or her will to achieve it. Of course, the individual may not cheat or defraud, but he or she is not asked to ignore his or her personal interest in dealings with others. Our legal system does not recognize that “quality of righteousness” (as Justice Alon called it in CA 148/77 Roth v. Yeshufa Construction Ltd. [41] at 635). However, over the years, our perspective on the proper relationship between individuals has changed. The perspective that has developed is that the “buyer beware” maxim is inappropriate in interpersonal relationships; it would be wrong to allow each individual to achieve his or her desire without considering those with whom he or she comes into contact.  There was a need to raise the threshold for what is considered proper behavior between individuals in their relationships. In private law, emerging principles of social solidarity and social justice set a standard of achieving the reasonable expectations of parties in private law. See M. Mautner, Yiridat Haformalism Vialiyat Haarachim Bamishpat Hayisraeli [80] at 57. Altruistic [in Jewish tradition: “angelic” – trans.] behavior is not required, but it is no longer acceptable for the individual to ignore the interests of others (in Jewish tradition: “wolfish” behavior – trans.]. The accepted view is that individuals must act in good faith in their interpersonal relationships [in Jewish tradition: behave like a person]. See CA 207/79 Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. v. Beit Yules Ltd. (hereinafter – the Raviv case [42]) at 543. The legal system recognizes a general duty of good faith in contractual negotiations and in executing legal actions in private law. Sec. 12, 39, and 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part). It has also recognized the prohibition on abusing a right. Sec. 14 of the Land Law, 1969. These duties, as important as they are, do not impose a duty of altruism. They do not require the individual to ignore his or her own self-interest. In contracts, the duty of good faith does not require a contractual party to relinquish the self-interest he or she has in the contract and its execution. The duty of good faith imposes a duty on a contractual party to consider the interest that is common to himself or herself and the other party to the contract. The duty of good faith requires the holders of a contract to act to realize their common intent, through dedication to the joint goal that they had in making the contract and consistency in achieving their joint expectations. HC 59/80 Be’er Sheva Public Transportation Services Ltd. v. National Labor Court in Jerusalem [43] at 834. As a rule, for relationships between individuals, the law does not impose the duty of fairness it imposes on the government in its relationships with the individual. The duty of good faith imposed on individuals in their interpersonal relationships is “easier” than the duty of fairness imposed on the government in its dealings with individuals. HC 4422/92 [19] at 860. Good faith starts with the assumption that the individual takes care of his or her own interests. Good faith seeks to guarantee that he or she does so appropriately, taking into consideration the justified expectations of the other party. Good faith does not assume that each party will take care of the interests of the other, at the expense of his or her own interests. Good faith is based on the assumption that each contractual party takes care of his or her own interests, but it seeks to guarantee that he or she exercises integrity in doing so, safeguarding the joint mission of the parties, as befits a civilized society. See FH 22/82, supra [17] at 485. Good faith sets rules for a fair game between “rivals.” In contrast, the duty of fairness sets rules for a fair game between “friends.” The duty of fairness does not view the government and the individual as “rivals.” The government must take care of the collective to which the individual belongs. The government's duty of fairness – like, in some ways, an agent's duty of fairness to the principal, a director's to a company, a guardian's to those with whose care he or she is charged – is a “heavier” duty than the duty of good faith.

            6. Does an individual owe a general duty of fairness to the government? In order to answer that question, we must return to the discussion of the reasons for imposing on the government a general duty of fairness to the individual. As we have seen, the view that the government is the trustee of the public is the basis for imposing a general duty of fairness that government owes to the individual. This view is based on a democratic perspective which puts individual liberty at the basis of the social structure. These reasons for imposing a duty do not exist in a relationship between the individual and the government. The individual is not the trustee of the government. The individual does not seek to advance the liberty of the government. Democracy recognizes the liberty of the individual from the government, but not the liberty of the government from the individual. An individual may do anything that the law does not prohibit. The government may do nothing that the law does not permit. 1 B. Aktzin, Torat Hamishpat [81] at 128. A democratic perspective recognizes the individual's independent will and independent interest. A democratic perspective does not recognize the government's independent will and independent interest, because the government acts for the sake of the public and the collective. In a democratic society, we cannot say that the individual has nothing for himself or herself, and that all that he or she has is for the sake of the collective. These words are true of the government. The proper perspective on democracy means that there is no room to impose a duty of fairness that the citizen owes the government. Imposing a general duty of fairness would radically alter the perspective on democracy and the place that the individual occupies within it. My colleague, Justice Zamir, says that the social contract is the source of the general duty of fairness. I would not draw that conclusion from the social contract. Our accepted view of the social contract is that it establishes a limited government authorized to serve the people and allow them to realize their natural rights. This view gives rise to the government's general duty of fairness to the individual. It does not give rise to a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government.

            7. This analysis does not mean that the individual has no duties to the government. Democracy is not just human rights. Democracy is also human duties – duties to other individuals and duties to the government. Indeed, democracy is based on social life and national interests. The government acts for the sake of the public. To facilitate that activity, we must give it rights (in the broad sense), because otherwise it would not be able to achieve the collective interest. Giving rights to the government means imposing duties on the individual, to the government. The purpose of these duties is to make it possible for the government to achieve the objectives imposed upon it in a democratic society. They derive from social life and the need to advance the liberty of every individual. They are based on a view of a social welfare state and social solidarity. They derive from a proper view of the individual as someone who is shaped by society and therefore whose personality necessarily includes a “social aspect” that gives rise to an internal need to take the collective into consideration. These duties also derive from society's demand of the individual, as a member of society, to act for the sake of the collective. They are the product of the balance between the needs of the collective and the needs of the individual. We should recall, however, that the individual's duties to the government and the government's duty to the individual are different. They stem from different sources; they have different scopes. The existence of the government's general duty of fairness to the individual does not entail – as a matter of neither logic nor policy – the existence of a general duty of fairness owed by the citizen to the government.

            8. What duties does the individual owe the government, and how do they differ from the government's duty of fairness to the individual? The individual's duties are based on a view of the individual in a democratic society and the role of the government in a democracy. Their point of departure is individual liberty, on one hand, and the role of the government on the other. There is tension between those two poles, because the government must act for the collective good, and the collective good is likely to conflict with the rights of the individual. That tension is released in various and sundry duties imposed on the individual, to the government. These duties are not based on a general duty imposed on every individual. Creating such a general duty would be inappropriate. By their nature, the duties that the individual owes the government are the product of balancing conflicting values. They are a compromise between the individual's human rights and the collective interest of the public. In this balance, as the infringement on individual rights intensifies and the public interest weakens, the duty owed by the individual will become more moderate. In contrast, as the infringement on individual rights becomes more moderate and the public interest becomes stronger, the duty owed by the individual becomes stronger. Between those extremes lie the hard cases in which the violation of human rights is severe and the public interest is strong. In these situations, each society finds a balance point –which gives rise to the individual's duty – depending on its views about the appropriate relationship between the individual and the collective, between the person and the public.

            9. The complex relationship between the individual and the government is not based on a one general duty owed by the individual to the government. The individual's duties are sporadic, and their content changes according to the circumstances. The individual owes no general duty to the government beyond the duty to obey the law, and he or she certainly owes no general duty of fairness. The individual's duties are “specific.” For some issues, the individual's duties to the government are weaker than the duties of good faith that individuals owe each other in private law, and they may be limited to a duty not to mislead. For other issues, the individual's duties may be identical in scope to the duties of good faith that individuals owe each other. Indeed, in order to facilitate the government's activities in the field of private law, in his or her private law dealings with the government, the individual should bear the same duties of good faith that he or she owes to other individuals. The individual should not be given a break in his or her dealings with the government as it forms contracts or engages in other legal actions in order to fulfill its role. The provisions of sections 12 and 39 of the Contract Law (General Part) therefore apply to every legal action (see section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part)) in which the individual engages vis à vis the government. See G. Shalev, Chozei Rishut Biyisrael [82] at 59. For other issues, the individual's duties may be similar in scope to the duties of fairness imposed on the government. Sometimes, the individual may owe even more serious duties.  Indeed, the individual must sometimes sacrifice his or her life in defense of the state. We must, however, keep in mind, that the duties of the individual – unlike the general duty of fairness – are specific in nature and different in character. They result from the balance, at various points, between individual liberty and the collective good. They depend on the special circumstances of each case, entailing an investigation into whether the individual fulfilled his or her duty to the government, the source of the duty, and its scope. I therefore cannot concur with the position of my colleague, Justice Zamir, that the relationship between the agency and the individual is two-sided, such that “the citizen should therefore owe a duty of fairness to the agency, as the agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen.” No such symmetry exists. The agency's duties to the individual are separate from the individual's duties to the government. The philosophy at the root of each duty differs, as does the scope of each. The relationship between the individual and the government may be two-sided, but they are neither reciprocal nor equal. As my colleague, Justice Zamir, rightfully points out, the proper relationship between the administrative agency and the citizen is “a reciprocal relationship of give-and-take.” Supra para. 23. However, the “give” and the “take” are not identical. The individual gives part of his or her liberty in exchange for a social life that defends his or her liberty. My colleague correctly notes that, “As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything.” Id. However, that does not mean that the duty of the individual and the duty of the agency are identical in content. A principal is not entitled to the loyalty of an agent unless he or she fulfills his or her duties to the agent. However, the principal's duty to the agent differs from the agent's duty to the principal. The agent owes a duty of loyalty and fairness. The principal does not. My colleague points out that, parallel to the right that citizen enjoys from the agency, the citizen bears a duty to the agency. That does not mean that the individual's duty to the agency is the same as the agency's duty to the individual. Parallel to the right that the individual enjoys from the agency, the agency bears a duty to the individual. That duty includes the duty of fairness. Parallel to the right that agency enjoys from the individual, the individual owes a duty. The right of the agency is not general, and therefore neither is the duty of the individual (beyond the duty to obey the law). The right of the agency is specific, and it changes according to the issue in question. The individual's duty, derived from that right, is also specific, and it changes according to the issue in question.

            10. Under the circumstances of this case, does the petitioner owe a duty to Respondents 1 and 2? If so, what is the scope of that duty, and what are its sources? My answer is that the petitioner indeed owes a duty of disclosure to Respondents 1 and 2. It must disclose the fact that it has a civil-law relationship with Respondent 3 (The Port Authority). In my opinion, this duty – grounded in the Regulations – includes the duty to disclose its relationship and communications with the Port Authority. Such information is relevant to the execution of a governmental task. It is only natural for the Customs Authority to seek to ensure that it does not give the authority to store goods on which customs duties have yet to be paid to someone whose possession of the land – and therefore, of the goods – is in question. In order for there to be security in protecting goods on which customs duties have yet to be paid, the protector must have stable rights in the land. For that reason, information about the civil-law relationship between the petitioner and Respondent 3 (the Port Authority) – including the information that there is a dispute between them – is material to the decision of Respondents 1 and 2 (Customs). The source of the duty of disclosure is the power of the government to grant a license to the individual (the petitioner). Granting the license must be done for the relevant reasons, based on the proper factual infrastructure. We want the government's decision to be proper and to advance the social interests that justified giving the government the power to make it. That is why the decision must be based on the proper factual infrastructure. Hence, the agency has a duty to collect the factual data, assess them as necessary, and use them to determine – within the rules of administrative evidence – the factual infrastructure relevant to making the governmental decision. While the governmental agency bears the burden of collecting the data and assessing them, the individual must assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license. The harm to the individual in imposing this duty is minimal, while the advancement of the collective interest is substantial. In the final balance, it is therefore appropriate to require the individual – who is applying for the license or permit from the government – to disclose the factual data material to the factual infrastructure which will serve as the basis of the government's exercise of discretion. This is particularly true of information which the applicant knows, but the agency does not. If the individual requests a license or permit from the government, and in order to exercise its discretion, the government needs facts known to the individual, the individual bears the burden of disclosing those facts to the government, unless there is another social interest that weighs against disclosure (such as privacy). The basis for the duty of disclosure is two-fold: First, it is a particular aspect of the principle of good faith, which, through parallel reasoning from private law, applies. If two rivals negotiating a contract bear a duty of disclosure, then it is only natural that such duty applies to negotiations over a governmental license, which is intended for the good of the collective, including the individual. However, the good faith that individuals owe each other is different from the good faith that individuals owe the government. Good faith between individuals is rooted in a conflict of interests. It is good faith between “rivals.” In contrast, the good faith owed the individual to the government is based on the agency's governmental role to act for the collective good, including that of the individual requesting the license. The difference in these basic positions means that good faith differs in these two situations, despite their commonalities concerning the duty to disclose. Second, we can view the basis for the duty as part of a special administrative law that applies to the relationship between the individual and the government, having nothing to do with the principle of good faith. Either way, the duty of disclosure does not derive from a general duty of fairness. Furthermore, there is no recognized general duty of disclosure owed by the individual to the government. The duty of disclosure is always the product of the balance between the right of the individual and the needs of the collective. It exists only where the balance between these values justifies it. It does not always exist. For example, a suspect has the right to remain silent during a criminal proceeding. He or she need not disclose information to the government, if such information may be incriminating. The duty of disclosure I discuss is a duty which is limited to the kinds of issues addressed in this petition.  It applies to licensing governments through which an individual applies for a license. Under those circumstances, I accept that the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion. Of course, the duty of disclosure may exist in additional areas. We will address that question when the time comes, by balancing the conflicting values. The duty of disclosure may exist for Issue X, but not for Issue Y.

            11. Of course, we might see a general trend of raising the threshold of what is considered proper behavior of the individual toward the government. We might say that, just as Israeli society raised the threshold of morality in behavior between individuals by requiring them to act in good faith, so should it raise the threshold of morality in behavior of individuals vis à vis the government. We might try to avoid introducing competition into the relationship between the individual and the government, such that the individual could exploit any mistake by the government for his or her personal benefit. However, that trend should be approached with caution. Taken to an extreme, it could turn things topsy-turvy, making the individual the trustee of the government, thereby destroying the democratic nature of the government. We would do well to use the standards of Israeli democracy to evaluate carefully any trend toward stepping up the individual's duty of proper behavior to the government. Such trend must withstand the balance between individual liberty and the collective interest.

            12. One might ask how my approach differs from that of my colleague, Justice Zamir. After all, he also recognizes the individual's duty of disclosure to the government under the circumstances of the present case. Indeed, we do not disagree that, under the circumstances of this case, the individual bears a duty of disclosure. Our dispute concerns the source of that duty. My colleague's position is that the duty derives from a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. In my opinion, there is no such general duty of fairness, because the individual is not the trustee of the government. The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. In this case, our paths meet. My colleague's general duty of fairness imposes a duty of identical scope as the one I would require, for the special circumstances raised by this petition. Our agreement in this particular zone does not mean we agree on the entire front. Our paths may part ways in other circumstances.

            13. One might argue that the difference in our positions is purely semantic. Isn't the duty of disclosure that I espouse the same as my colleague's duty of fairness? After all, my colleague, Justice Zamir, thinks that the individual's duty of fairness to the government may change with the circumstances of each case. Why not adopt his view, while making sure that a general duty of fairness, of a flexible nature, always leads to the same solutions as I would reach using my approach? There are three reasons not to do so: First, the theoretical basis of a legal arrangement is significant for determining its content and boundaries. The theoretical basis determines how the arrangement develops. The theory determines the practice. In my view, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, because such a duty would be inconsistent with the way we view the individual in society. The individual's duty to the government must be specifically defined according to the special circumstances of every case, by balancing the conflicting values. The scope of the duty and its content change according to the circumstance, and the principle of fairness – which derives from the principle of loyalty – is not the common denominator of all these duties. Second, words have a force of their own. They have a life of their own. “Fairness” is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state. There is some concern that, in the future, if we face the problem of whether the individual owes a particular duty to the government, the question we will ask is whether such a duty flows from the principle of fairness. The law will then try to answer that question, and the duty of fairness will determine how we address the issue. In my opinion, we need to ask a different question. The question is whether the right balance between individual liberty and the collective good allows us to recognize that duty. These two questions are different, and they should not be interchanged. Third, “fairness” – and the duties derived from it – should not be given a double-meaning, sometimes referring to duties arising from a relationship of trusteeship and sometimes referring to duties that have nothing to do with trusteeship. Justice Zamir correctly notes that:

The fact that those species bear the same name might blur the distinction. Differentiating the names can help make the difference more pronounced and preserve the distinction in substance.

Para. 20.

            This approach itself warns against using the term fairness to describe both the duty that the individual owes the government as well as the duty that the government owes the individual. The sources of these duties differ, the scope of each differs, and they develop differently. They may sometimes intersect – as is the case of the duty of disclosure in this petition – but that does not mean we should blur the differences between them.

            14. One might wonder: Can we “really” say that the individual does not owe a duty of fairness to the government? Should we recognize an individual's freedom not to be fair to the government? Of course, if fairness means not to defraud or cheat, then of course the individual owes a duty of fairness to the government (and to other individuals). However, the term fairness is not just the opposite of deception. Fairness is a normative concept. It is an objective concept. It determines standards of behavior. It is a “code” which activates various duties of proper behavior. For the government's dealings with the individual – which derive from the role of the government as a trustee – fairness means the highest standard of proper behavior. It is a standard of behavior that originates in the view that the government has no self-interest, and that it can only aspire to ensure the collective good. Private law imposes a similar (but not identical) duty only on those who owe a duty of loyalty, such as a trustee, agent, director, or guardian. That is the reason we do not say that individuals owe (objective) duties of fairness to each other. The duty of good faith (as stated in the Contract Law (General Part)) applies to relationships between individuals, not the duty of fairness. That is why I believe that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government.

            For these reasons, I concur with my colleague's conclusion but disagree with his reasons.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

            1. Not long after the close of the proceedings, we decided that the petition should be denied, and that is how we ultimately ruled. However, from the outset, we knew that we arrived at that conclusion from different places and in different ways. Now is the time for each of us to name those places of origin and to map our routes to our common destination.

            2. My colleagues’ opinions laid out in front of me are comprehensive. They stretch out into a broad, panoramic view of fairness and good faith, of the individual and the government, of the relationships among individuals and between individuals and the government, of friends and not-friends, of the social contract, and of brotherhood. I wish to address two of these: the duty of fairness that the individual owes the government and the status and authority of a public agency to decide disputes between individuals. I will start with the first and end with the second.

Disagreements over the Issue of Fairness

 

            3. My two colleagues, each in his own way, present two different theses that, in some senses even oppose and rip each other. My colleague, Justice Zamir, soars to heights of noble and lofty principles like fairness and good faith – the principles and what lies between and around them – seeking to create a pillar of fire and a pillar of smoke [biblical: guiding light for desert travel – trans.] by which the camp can navigate, mapping the duties of the individual to the government. Truth be told, my colleague presents fairness as a central pillar upon which the entire tent hangs. In our language – the language of jurists – he says that within the context of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the government, in principle, the individual owes a duty of fairness to the government. My colleague carves out secondary duties from the general duty of fairness: daily duties which are outlined in the case law and in books on administrative law.

            My colleague, the President, opposes this view and, holding buckets of water, throws cold water on the flames of fairness. Unlike my colleague, Justice Zamir, who steers a course between basic principles – primarily fairness –from which he derives the individual’s duties to the government, my colleague, the President, believes that the individual’s duties to the government are “specific” and “sporadic,” and that their content changes, depending on the issue. In the opinion of my colleague, the President, the individual’s duties to the government derive from the balance that is conducted, for every issue, between opposing forces; fairness, as such, is not a primary foundation – if you like, not a necessary foundation – for the creation of these duties.

            4. As for our issue, my two colleagues are of the same mind. Our issue is the case in which the individual applies for a license from the government, and the question is this: what duty does the individual owe the government to disclose – at his or her initiative – factual information relevant to the government’s exercise of discretion? My colleague, Justice Zamir, believes that a secondary duty to disclose that information can be carved out of the duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. The idea is that the individual’s duty to disclose information to the government is just subsidiary to the parent duty of fairness that the individual owes the government. My colleague, the President, agrees that such a duty of disclosure should be imposed. In his words, “the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows that are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.” He also says that, “the individual must assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license.” As for the source of that duty to disclose relevant information, President Barak says, “The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision.”

            5. My colleague, Justice Zamir, concerns himself with basic principles which are supposed to govern the relationship between the individual and the government – meaning, the fairness that the individual, in his opinion, owes the government. On the other hand, President Barak believes that the process of discovering and creating the individual’s duties to the government is the same as the process of discovering and creating any right or duty in law – for our purposes, in administrative law. These processes do not use the duty of fairness, as such, as a generative foundation. For our purposes, President Barak grounds himself in the daily plane of administrative law: the duties that the individual owes the government in the gray area of administrative law and the individual’s duty to supply the government with the information that allows it to exercise discretion properly and decide as we would expect it to decide. In any event, President Barak’s opinion is that the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government.

            6. To sum up: My colleague, Justice Zamir, inserts the foundation of fairness as a primary, generative foundation in founding the duties of the individual to the government. In contrast, my colleague, President Barak, rejects this thesis of fairness. In his opinion, we should predicate the individual’s duties to the government within each system by considering the interests appropriate to each issue and studying their force (“the balancing process”).

            7. The careful reader will understand that my colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to inject a foundation of content – a foundation of fairness – into the process of creating the individual’s duties to the government. He believes that this foundation of content should influence the development and determination of the extent of these duties. My colleague, President Barak, denies that such foundation of content exists within this context. He applies the balancing formula used throughout our legal system (for our purposes, within the field of public law) to the creation of duties that the individual owes the government.

            My colleagues would appear to take very different positions, such that their paths crossed through happenstance, to bring them to the same place. Just as someone crossing from east to west might meet someone crossing from north to south, after which the two part ways, so did my colleagues meet for a fleeting moment, shake hands in greeting, and then continue on their way, one going west and the other, south. That is how it would appear. I personally am not convinced that that is how it really is. Upon close inspection, it seems to me, that the difference between my colleagues is primarily a difference in rhetoric. That it was not blind fate that brought them to the same destination.

            8. First, I will say that each of my colleagues creates models made of different materials and belonging to different orders. My colleague, Justice Zamir, is concerned with a model of content to determine the individual’s relationship to the government.  He sees fairness as a cornerstone of the relationship between the individual and the government and builds a model for creating the individual’s duties to the government around that principle. My colleague, President Barak, disagrees with the use of fairness as a primary generative foundation for determining the individual’s duties to the government. At the same time, as an alternative model to the model of content, he presents us with a structural model. In his words, “The individual's duty to the government must be specifically defined according to the special circumstances of every case, by balancing the conflicting values. The scope of the duty and its content change according to the circumstance, and the principle of fairness – which derives from the principle of loyalty – is not the common denominator of all these duties.” Para. 13 of his opinion. My colleague, the President, does not determine the content of the individual’s duties to the government, but rather the technique for determining those [duties – trans.]. He therefore does not see himself as rejecting the possibility that a consideration of fairness, even in its broad sense, could sometimes enter the mix of considerations which determine the creation of the individual’s duties to the government. Indeed, in the Awad case, President Barak imposed, in certain cases, a “duty of good faith and fairness” on the individual to the government. Supra [30] at 492. See also para. 28 and subsequent text, infra. My colleagues, then, are not as far apart as they seem upon first glance.

            9. There is more. My colleague, President Barak, objects to the all-encompassing doctrine of fairness of my colleague, Justice Zamir. He even objects to the use of the term “fairness” as such. He therefore says, inter alia, that “words have a force of their own. They have a life of their own. ‘Fairness’ is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state.” Para. 13 of his opinion. Upon reading these words, I hurry to shake my colleague’s hand firmly and warmly. I have also believed – and still believe – that words can have a magical kind of power, and we should stay as far away from magic as possible.. That is one of the reasons I so strongly objected to using the phrase, “constitutional revolution” to describe the accumulated weight of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the Mizrachi Bank  case [39], I expressed this opinion about adding the words, “constitutional revolution” (on p. 567, para. 135):

I see the label, “revolution” as problematic. Isn’t it sufficient to say that there has been a ‘change’ in the path of the legal system? I say this because labels can sometimes blind us, leading us to allow our wishes to fulfill themselves. Moreover, even if we said that the Basic Laws have the potential to work very important changes in the Israeli legal system – and we have said that – the term, “constitutional revolution” means a lot more than the term, change. It not only creates over-excitement, but also, by adding force and energy to one side of the equation, it sucks away force and energy from the other side. Is that the right way for us to build a constitution?

            I fear that careless words will create an entity with a force of its own. If that is our concern, however, let us proclaim loudly and clearly that in discussing the duty of fairness that the individual owes the government, we do not intend to create a dynamic, creative, generative doctrine. We seek only to note what is appropriate and desirable in interpersonal relationships. If we take this course, we, along with everyone else, will know that we have only stated the obvious about the proper way for the individual to behave. That is not, however, what my colleague, Justice Zamir, means. He intends to create a real, live, generative principle. We must address that principle, and not something similar.

            10. Generally: My colleague, Justice Zamir, created a general principle of fairness as a principle that binds the individual in his or her dealings with the government. My colleague, President Barak, objects to creating this general principle, but he does not rule it out as a factor in determining the individual’s duties to the government in these and other legal contexts.

On the Duty of Fairness

 

            11. My colleague, Justice Zamir, demands that we impose a general duty of fairness on the individual, to the government. In his opinion, that duty derives from the social contract at the core of the existence of the state, a contract that makes the citizen and the government partners in the same act of creation: “As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything. A citizen’s right vis à vis the agency is coupled with an obligation vis à vis the agency. This is the essence of the social contract among citizens and between citizens and the public administration. It is also the root of the existence of the state.” Para. 23 of his opinion.

            Who could disagree with these noble words of my colleague? How could we help but agree? The individual owes a duty of fairness to the government, says my colleague. Can we say that this is not the law? Can we say that the individual may not behave with fairness – or may behave without fairness – to the government? Can a court say such things? Are these the proper norms of behavior to establish for the relationship between the individual and the government? Indeed, the requirement of fairness captures the heart and lifts the spirit. Only someone apathetic to things beautiful would rise up against the duty of fairness suggested to us. We would appear to be in a sort of trap. We have no choice but to agree to my colleague’s words, or risk being thought of as troublemakers upsetting the proper order of things. And still, I find it difficult to agree.

            12. We measure the relationship between the individual and the government and administrative state using the relationship that members of society have with each other as the model. We can build a few models of human relationships to understand the reciprocal relationships among individuals within society. Hillel’s saying is the foundation, the basis: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor.” Babylonian Talmud, Order Tractate Shabbat 31, 1 [a]. Hillel goes on to say: “That is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary; go and learn.” Of course, that is not the minimum level of conduct we need present to a well-ordered society and for the proper education of the individual. For now, however, we will allow it to suffice. That is one model. We might resort to a higher level, primarily through the use of “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18 [b]), which is the second model. This level is higher than the first because, among other reasons, it does not just impose prohibitions on the individual – negative commandments – it imposes positive duties on the individual. An even higher level of conduct – the third model – stems from the principle that, “Is it not to share your bread with the hungry, and bring the homeless poor into your house; when you see the naked, to cover him, and not to hide yourself from your own flesh?” Isaiah 58:7 [c]. That is the highest degree of love of humanity and of kindness. As Micah the Prophet coined in his wonderful saying – wonderful throughout the generations – about human relationships:

He has showed you, O man, what is good;
and what does the Lord require of you
but to do justice, and to love kindness,
and to walk humbly with your God?

Micah 7:8 [d].

            “Do justice” is primarily about “what is hateful to you” and a little about “love”: mostly negative commandments, and a few positive ones. “Love kindness” is the purest form of love of humanity. If you like: love of love. This is not the place to discuss “humbly.”

13. Law’s primary objective is to order the relationships between individuals in society and to make sure that society is organized properly.  A person is a wonderfully complex creature. The relationships between individuals in society are also complex, and in some ways, they are more complex than the complexity of the individual. From among the wealth of relationships between individuals, the law cuts out a part that seems appropriate for organization and definition by the legal system, and it imposes a network of legal norms on that part.

            Among the three models presented, the law is primarily interested in the first model (the minimal model of “don’t do”): Don’t murder, don’t steal, don’t lie, whoever strikes his father or mother shall be put to death (Exodus 21:15, [e]), and whoever curses his father or mother shall be put to death (Id., verse 17). Lord Atkin discussed this point in the well-known case of Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) [73], saying what has become a classic:

The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.

Id.at 580.

The law borrows from the second model, as well, but very lightly. Honor your father and mother (a positive commandment whose reach is broader than the negative commandment not to hit or curse). Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy (a positive commandment alongside a negative one: don’t do any work, etc.)  The third model is supposed to serve the law primarily as a source of inspiration. It is just an illustration of the statement that the law seeks to impose itself on a certain segment of human relationships while leaving other parts of those relationships alone.

14. Against the backdrop of three alternative – or partially cumulative – models, let us evaluate the duty of fairness that individuals in society may owe each other. A superficial glance shows that the duty of fairness is a duty that knows no boundaries. It exists in each of the three models, differently in each, derived from the fundamental principles at the core of each. Examine, consider, and you will know.  We will thus find, perhaps surprisingly so, that the term “fairness” – as well as the term, duty of fairness – is a kind of “framework-term,” whose content varies with the model constructing it, the world surrounding it, and the world in which it lives. “Fairness” in the first model differs from fairness in the second, and “fairness” in the second model differs from fairness in the third. “Fairness” in the second model, for example, includes the “fairness” of the first model, but the reverse is not the case.

15. To the issue of concern to us: When my colleague, Justice Zamir, said that the individual owes the government a duty of fairness, what kind of fairness did he mean?  My colleague told us only that the duty of fairness can vary from issue to issue, depending on the circumstances. But what is the content of that fairness, and which circumstances will fill the fairness with its content? What functioning order did the duty of fairness join, and which model shall we use? Perhaps it is a different model from the three we mentioned? We can’t do anything until we answer that question, which is the central issue. I said, and I will repeat: The duty of fairness is a duty that knows no boundaries – it lives and exists in law and outside law. For example, it exists in the realm of morality – and we therefore must define things precisely: Which part of that all-inclusive duty of fairness – fairness in the broad sense – is the law supposed to take under its protective wing and establish legal sanctions for violating the duty? Which part of “fairness” will the law adopt, and which part will it leave to other systems of norms?

I will give an example from another context: It is strictly forbidden for a person to shame another in public. If Rueben embarrasses Simon in public, the law will come to Simon’s aid by granting him a right in the form of the law against defamation. The law has taken this part under its protective wing. However, if Gad shames Zevulun in public, the law may not grant Zevulun a legal right, even though Gad’s deed was worse than Rueben’s. Of Gad’s deeds, we might say: “He who publicly puts his neighbor to shame has no portion in the world-to-come.” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia, 59:1 [f]. We might say that, and no more. Both Rueben and Gad owed a duty of fairness to Simon and Zevulun (respectively); Both Rueben and Gad breached the duty owed; and nevertheless, Rueben is subject to the legal sanction, while Gad is given no sanction (in this world). The question for our purposes is: Which part of the all-inclusive duty of fairness should the law cloak with a legal sanction – by creating a legal duty of fairness – and which part of the all-inclusive legal duty of fairness should the law leave to other systems of norms, like the educational system, the ruling culture, discussions among members of society, and the like.

And perhaps tomorrow I will be asked: Must the individual be fair to other individuals and to the government? Does the individual owe a duty of fairness to other individuals in society and to the government? My answer to that question will be unequivocally: Yes, the individual owes a duty of fairness. That, however, is not the question which currently troubles us. The question currently before us does not just concern the duty of fairness. It concerns the legal duty of fairness that the individual owes the government. We have yet to understand the nature of that duty, its content, and its way.

16. Our discussion so far: To say that the individual owes a (legal) duty of fairness to the government – by itself – is just a label on a jug, a formal legal-conceptual framework. Until we find out the criteria for creating this “duty of loyalty,” which beverage to pour into the jug, what is the formula for creating the beverage, we have as good as said nothing. To be precise: Because we have created the label – the label and not the content – it would not seem appropriate to discuss the existence of a general “duty of fairness.” After all, it is possible that, after determining the formula for creating the duty, we will learn that we have only the tail-end of a duty or the tip of fairness, such that it would be inappropriate and incorrect to talk about a “general duty of fairness.” As such, it would be misleading if, prior to determining the scope of the duty – prior to determining the criteria for outlining its borders – we were to talk about its existence. I therefore deny – with full force – the existence of a general duty of fairness owed by an individual to the government, until we learn what that duty is, what bounds have been set for it, and of what materials it is made.

 

On the Individual, the State, and the Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the State

17. I have been asked to hold that the individual owes a general duty of fairness to the government, and that the content of that duty will be determined periodically by the case law and by analyzing this or that set of facts. According to my colleague, Justice Zamir, the duty of fairness arises from the social contract at the foundation of the state, a contract which holds that the individual and the agency are not rivals but rather partners in a joint enterprise. And just as partners in a project owe each other a general duty of fairness, so do the government and its individuals owe a reciprocal duty of fairness. The general duty of fairness that the state owes its individuals is well-established, and now my colleague suggests that we impose a duty of fairness on the individual toward the government.

18. Section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part) tells us that, “In negotiations to form a contract, a person must behave in an acceptable way and in good faith.” In the Raviv case [42], the Court had to interpret this statutory provision and its applications on private bidding (in other words, bidding not held by a public agency). The question asked was what duty of good faith is imposed on individuals in negotiations between themselves to form a contract, how should the law be interpreted, how will the bounds of that duty be outlined. In short: On which track should we put the relationship between individuals in commercial negotiations they conduct. Using the metaphor that Thomas Hobbes created, my colleague, Justice Barak, held that this relationship would not be one in which “person to person – behaves like a wolf” (Homo Homini Lupus). At the same time, we will not put this relationship on the path of “person to person – behaves like an angel” (Homo Homini Deus (vel Angelus)). My colleague suggested that the relationship between people should move along the lines of “person to person – behaves like a person” (Homo Homini – Homo). We will, of course, agree; how could we not? We will not agree to establish a norm of behavior of person to person – behaves like a wolf (really, person to person, like a wolf to a lamb; we should recall that a wolf has no better friend than his or her fellow wolf who lives together in the same pack). At the same time, it would be inappropriate to establish that person to person – behaves like an angel. Establishing this standard of behavior would not be realistic, and there is no point in setting a norm by which people will not abide. The recommended and appropriate standard of behavior is therefore that person to person – behaves like a person.

I have established, and not just by the process of elimination, the formula for the duty of fairness between people: person to person – behaves like a person. This formula, however, like the formula for fairness, merely presents us with a label on an empty jug. We are now supposed to pour a beverage into the jug, because only then will we know the content of fairness. The question is: what norm will we establish for relationships between people? How should a person behave toward another person? What standard of behavior will we require that people use toward each other? What will be the content of the good faith established by law? We have returned to our starting point, and again, we must continue to grope around in the dark.

19. Before we touch on fairness itself, let us talk a bit about those who share in the duty of fairness, about the individual and about the government. My colleague, Justice Zamir, feels a certain discomfort in holding that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the “government.” The government is always the government, and the term “government” sounds to us like a body that rules us and instructs us what to do and what not to do. The determination that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the “government” grates on my colleague’s ears. Don’t call it the government, he tells us, but rather an agency, an administrative agency, the state. As if changing the name and switching the label will change the content. Of course, I will not object to calling the government an agency or an administrative agency, but I will add that, even after changing the name, we are talking about the government, about the relationship between the individual and the government, and about the duty of fairness that we are asked to impose on the individual toward the government. By the way: the term “agency” [also “authority” – trans.] is, in some ways, harsher than the term government. As the sages teach us: “Be wary of the government [authorities – trans.], for they get friendly with a person only for their own convenience; They look like friends when it is to their benefit, but they do not stand by a person when he is in need.” Mishnah, Avot 2:3 [g]. Pinhas Kehati interprets it to mean, “When dealing with the ruling powers, do not reveal to its agents too much of your affairs, and do not rely on their promises …” See also Mishnah, Avot 1:10 [g]: “Shemaiah says, ‘Love work. Hate authority. Don’t get friendly with the government.’” Is the relevance of this advice of our sages limited to the time at which they wrote it?

            20. We could or could not agree with the statement that people owe each other a duty of fairness. In either event, we understand what is being said to us. However, when we hear that a person owes a duty of fairness to an administrative agency, we struggle to understand the words. For all that concerns a prohibition on doing certain things, we can understand imposing this duty on the individual – whether the prohibition concerns other individuals or an administrative agency. A prohibition imposed on someone, from whatever source, sort of concentrates itself on the person bound by the prohibition, and therefore it can be understood to exist in its own right. The term “fairness” is different, because it is more than just a prohibition against doing certain things. “Fairness” implies – and it should imply – not just a prohibition against doing something but rather an obligation to do something, a positive obligation to do something for another person. The term “fairness” itself implicates the relationships people have with each other. A person may or may not be fair to another person, and he or she will still be a person. In this context, what content shall we pour into the statement that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the agency, if the agency is not a person at all? How can we impose a duty of fairness on a person to someone who is not a person at all?

            21. An administrative agency – every administrative agency, and we can add all the governmental powers, meaning the state itself – is just a term, a concept, the product of our thoughts. Furthermore, an administrative agency – like the state – is not a tool, a device, an instrument, for achieving certain purposes, like the wheel in the hand of a sailor and the axe in the hand of the woodworker. The state, as such, has no life of its own. We can agree that we could not exist without the framework of the state, but that statement of reality cannot make the state into something it is not. That is true of the state, and that is true of the administrative agency.

            An administrative agency charged with giving licenses in a certain field, for example, licenses to operate a business, seems like a machine, like the machines that dispense café au lait or bottles of cold drinks. Like the machine, the administrative agency has licenses to operate a business in its stomach. Press a series of buttons – one after the other in a certain order – pay what you are required to pay (a fee), and you get what you asked for. If you do not press the right buttons, or you press them in the wrong order, you will not get what you asked for: café au lait, a bottle of a cold drink, a license to operate a business. Indeed, in this way, an authorized agency may differ from a machine, because an agency is imparted with discretion, while it is difficult to grant discretion to a machine (is it?). Perhaps we should recall that a machine – unlike an authorized agency – does not operate arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or condescendingly. In any event, just as we would find it difficult to outline a duty of fairness owed a machine, so will we find it difficult to establish a duty of fairness toward an “agency” that is anything more than a legal concept.

            Perhaps you might say: Aren’t the “agency,” the “government,” indeed bodies to which we should owe a duty of fairness? After all, they are no more than virtual creations (although they can hurt an individual). And what about those who work for the agency, who are flesh-and-blood? Why shouldn’t we say that the individual owes a duty of fairness to them? The answer to that question is that those employees of the agency are just the agents of the (conceptual) agency, who do its bidding. They have nothing but what the agency has, because they do not operate for themselves but rather for the agency. And if we found it difficult to hold that the individual should owe a duty of fairness to an “agency,” we may not create something out of nothing by identifying the employees of the agency with the agency.

            22. To remove any doubt, I will quickly clarify that we should not identify state with “homeland” (with “society,” with “people,” or with “nation”). A homeland is the birthplace of a person: it is the land in which he or she grew up and was educated, it is the landscape of his or her childhood, it is the society in which he or she lives. A homeland is our home, a homeland is our family: “Love of the home is the mother of love for the homeland.” Someone who loves the homeland is a patriot. “Homeland” is not “state.” The term homeland is intangible, and therefore we must resort to symbols: the flag, the symbol. In the not-so-distant past, a person of authority called the state flag a stick with a rag stuck to it, and I had this to say about it:

The flag of Israel is not “just an expression of a stick with a blue-and-white rag stuck to it.” The flag of Israel is me and you, he and she, they, we, and our children. Even for those who have left and will not return to us, we, all of us, we are not a rag.

HC 8507/96 Orin v. State of Israel [44] at 277.

The state is a tool and an instrument to achieve certain purposes. It is not like my extended family, the homeland. Licenses to operate a business are given by the state – not the homeland – and we should therefore be careful not to confuse unlike things.

23. I will return to our subject and note – as an opening comment – that conceptually, I find it difficult to recognize the individual’s duty of fairness toward the administrative agency. That is just the beginning of the journey, however. After trampling for a long time through the hallway, the time has come for us to put ourselves into the drawing room and examine our surroundings.

24. Unlike my colleague, Justice Zamir, I do not think that the relationship between the individual and the government is a “friendly” relationship, as though the two were friends, between whom the duty of fairness would naturally arise. On my station of embarkation for the journey – the journey to discover the duties that the individual owes the government – hangs a sign, and on the sign, written in big letters, is the word, “freedom.” My view about the status of the individual in his or her relationship with government agencies and the administration is that the individual may and is entitled to do anything (or to omit doing anything) that he or she is not prohibited from doing (or required to do), unless he or she bears a duty to do it (or not to do it).Most of the duties that the law imposes on the individual are negative duties – don’t murder, don’t steal – and that is the minimal level required for a properly-functioning society. The individual may owe some positive legal duties, but the law explicitly sets out these duties, and they are few. Examples include: the duty to serve in the military; the duty to pay taxes; parents’ duties to their children under the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962 and the Mandatory Education Law, 1949; the duty certain people owe protected persons; the duty to prevent a crime (sec. 262 of the Penal Law, 1977), and others.

Beyond those explicit negative and positive duties, the individual owes no legal duty to the government, and in my opinion, it would not be proper to obligate him or her with additional duties. The individual has a right to do as he or she pleases, and he or she acts on his or her own account. The individual has a right, a right of the highest virtue: a right to freedom and permission which has the virtue of law (or the virtue of a basic law). Cf. HC 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and Religious Affairs Minister [45] at 29 and subsequent text. The individual is born free in the law and remains free in the law all the days of his or her life, until it is established that he or she owes some kind of duty. Someone who abstains from prohibited acts and performs the positive duties explicitly imposed on him fulfils his or her duty in law. He or she owes nothing to no one and nothing to the government. He or she is not a saint. He or she is not a righteous person. He or she does what is required of him or her. He or she is an ordinary citizen.

In my opinion, this is the liberal-democratic station of embarkation, and I personally think that we should adopt it and cultivate it. A healthy, appropriate society does not exist without volunteer works, altruism, and assistance to “the poor and the elderly,” but these exist – for the most part – outside the framework of law. Indeed, the law does sometimes adopt a duty that can be characterized as an altruistic duty, such as: the duty to offer assistance to the victim of a traffic accident and duties incident to it (sec. 64A of the Traffic Ordinance [New Version] and Regulations 144 and 146 of the Traffic Regulations, 1961); the duty to save lives at sea (sec. 39 of the Shipping Law (Sailors), 1973); the duty to offer assistance to a public servant under certain circumstances (sec. 491 of the Penal Law). See also, CrimA 119/93 Lawrence v. State of Israel [46] at 29 and subsequent text; A. Barak, Shikul Da’at Shiputi [78] at 463-64. These, however, are exceptions to the rule.

25. That is generally the case in law, and that is the case, in my opinion, of the relationship between the individual and the government. In principle, I am not prepared to recognize the duty of an individual toward the government, whether we call such duty a duty of fairness or something else, unless that duty is explicitly or implicitly required by law. Because of the Basic Laws, once a duty is established by law, that duty is supposed to adjust to the restrictions imposed by the Basic Laws. That is all. My colleague, Justice Zamir, will forgive me, but I am hard-pressed to shake off the impression that, in his opinion, he sketches a Utopian state of fairness, a state in which the majority breathes fairness, a state in which people hurry to inquire into the welfare of each other, a state in which the majority seeks the collective good, all the time. What can we do if we don’t live in a Utopian state of this kind? And since that is the case, in my opinion, it is inappropriate to impose a duty of fairness on the individual to the government, a duty that a Utopian state could impose on its individuals.

Moreover, the individual and the government do not have equal rights. They do not have equal powers, and they are not of equal status. Nor are they friends. The government has most of the power, most of the force, most of the wealth, such that the individual – however much power, force, and wealth he or she may have – is not in the same league. The government has nothing of its own; anything it has, it holds in trust – for the good and benefit of the individual. However, the normative-legal statement that this is the status of the government vis à vis the citizen cannot take away from the phenomenon we witness on a daily, hourly basis: the individual standing in line at the government counter, and the line winds and plods forward, longer and longer. Some call this phenomenon, “bureaucracy,” and others call it something else. Whatever its name, it is all-too-familiar to us all. This is why, in the past, the courts were called to the aid of the individual facing this huge machine – they were called in the past, are called today, and will continue to be called in the future. This is the reason that the courts established the principle of the trust that the government owes the individual. For the same reason, the case law has established a duty of fairness that the government owes the individual. This principle and this duty stem from the agency’s abundant authority, its excess power, and its ability to deprive the individual of a benefit which he or she could have enjoyed, had it not been prohibited.

The duty of fairness owed by the government to the individuals in society derives from the excess power that the government wields, from the tremendous force that the government holds. The duty of fairness is designed to serve, among other means, as a check on the power and a restraint of the force. Can we say the same thing about the individual vis à vis the government? The individual, after all, is Gulliver in the land of the giants: The giants surround the feast, and Gulliver stands on the dining table, the entire tiny length of him, every bone in his body, quivering in terror. He is like a salt shaker to them, like the stub of a carrot. One simple exhalation of breath, and Gulliver is no more. I could understand imposing a “duty of fairness” on the giants, owed to Gulliver. I find it difficult to understand imposing a duty of fairness – a matching duty – on Gulliver. Duties – including the duty of fairness – are intended to restrain power, force, wealth. What power does the individual have, relative to the government?

26. Consider a license required to establish and operate a business. Originally, the individual was permitted and allowed to engage in any business or profession in order to support himself or herself and his or her family. Abel shepherded his sheep without a shepherding license; Cain worked the land without a license to plough and plant; and Tubal-Cain forged instruments of bronze and iron (Genesis, 4:22 [h]), without having obtained a business license. It was their natural right, and “every person has a natural, imparted right to engage in the job or profession he or she chooses, so long as engaging in that job or profession is not prohibited by law.” HC 1/49 Bazherno v. Police Minister [47] at 82 (S.Z. Cheshin, J.). When the legislature forbad some professions unless certain preliminary conditions were met – it made its prohibition, and we must abide by it in letter and in spirit. However, that very prohibition and the exemption from the prohibition are what create the government’s duty to the individual, the duty of fairness and the other duties similar to it in form and character. The individual’s duty to equip himself or herself with a license to engage in a certain business, as well as the government’s ability to provide the individual with that license, are what create the duty of fairness owed by the government to the individual. Despite my searching and poking around, I found no source from which we could hew a duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. The principle is the principle of individual liberty, and this principle – by itself – does not generate a duty of fairness.

27. A final word on the duty of fairness, a duty which I am not prepared to recognize. Because the proposed duty of fairness is a duty, violating the said duty is supposed to create a legal counter-action, a sanction that will be applied against the violator for violating a duty imposed on him or her. Because the individual’s duty is owed to the government, that would mean that the government could impose a sanction against the individual, if the latter violated his or her duty. It is as though we are being asked to equip the government with a kind of penal authority against an individual who violated a duty of fairness owed the government. For example: by suspending or revoking the license.

Indeed, in addition to other obstacles that this legal structure would create for us – problems entrenched in the principle of legality and the principle of separation of powers – this path would collide with a doctrine well-established in the case law. The doctrine is that an authorized agency may not take into account, as part of its considerations, the consideration that the individual acted with unclean hands. For example, in HC 192/61 Kalo v. City of Bat Yam, the petitioner opened a butcher shop without receiving a license. When he applied for a license, the municipality responded by saying that it would not consider his application because “he opened the butcher shop without a license, taking the law into his own hands.” The Court responded by saying that the doctrine of unclean hands is a consideration that the Court may consider – the Court and not the administrative agency. The Court held that:

The municipality is different from this court.  Section 7 of the Courts Law, 1957 authorizes this court to grant a remedy, at its discretion, while the municipality must consider an application submitted to it and make a decision on the merits, irrespective of the applicant’s behavior. I do not approve of the decision of the municipality’s licensing committee not to consider the applicant’s request because he opened the store without a license. Moreover, the applicant has already been subject to criminal proceedings for that deed, and he has been convicted of violating that ordinance. A local authority must serve as an example for its citizens by stringently abiding by the law, because if it fails to do so, the citizen will follow its example. The licensing committee’s June 25, 1961 decision disregards this duty …

HC 192/61, supra [48] at 1858 (Sussman, J.). See also HC 328/60 Musa v. Interior Minister [49] at 79 (Sussman, J.).

The difference between an act (or omission) that constitutes unclean hands and a breach of the duty of fairness – if you prefer, the difference between the clean-hands requirement and the duty of fairness – is minimal. It would not be difficult for us to locate a violation of the duty of fairness within the bounds of the doctrine of unclean hands. In other words, recognizing the proposed duty of fairness would seriously erode the doctrine well-established in the case law, namely that an agency cannot consider an applicant’s lack of clean hands. This would be done without giving the Kalo [48] doctrine an opportunity to defend itself and justify its continued applicability. And if we were to examine the matter a bit more closely, we would see that the Kalo [48] doctrine clearly and appropriately expresses the principle of separation of powers and the principle of legality. Would it be right for us to give up on this expression of principles lying at the base of the legal system?

            The Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the Government As Derived from the Agency’s Authority

28. My colleague, President Barak, disagrees with my colleague, Justice Zamir, about imposing a general duty of fairness on the individual, owed to the government. In his opinion, there is no appropriate legal source for this duty of fairness, and in any event, the duty has no place in Israeli law. So far, my colleague, the President, and I are traveling in the same carriage, side by side. However, at this point, we will part company, he to travel in his carriage, and I to continue in mine.

29. According to my colleague, the President, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, but he or she may, in the balance of rights and duties between him or her and the government, owe certain duties to the government. For our purposes, as my colleague, the President says – meaning, in a system in which an individual requests any sort of license from the government – the individual owes a duty to the government. And what is that duty? The duty is to bring to the agency’s attention the facts that the agency needs in order to appropriately and properly exercise its lawful authority. The governmental decision, my colleague says, “must be based on the proper factual infrastructure. Hence, the agency has a duty to collect the factual data, assess them as necessary, and use them to determine … the factual infrastructure relevant to making the governmental decision.” This is the source from which we learn about the individual’s duty, which is the duty to “assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license.” Therefore, an individual applying for a license or permit from the government bears a duty “to disclose the factual data material to the factual infrastructure which will serve as the basis of the government's exercise of discretion.” In a slightly different formulation, “If the individual requests a license or permit from the government, and in order to exercise its discretion, the government needs facts known to the individual, the individual bears the burden of disclosing those facts to the government …” Again, “The duty of disclosure I discuss … applies to licensing regimes through which an individual applies for a license. Under those circumstances, I accept that the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.”

We therefore find that, instead of the all-encompassing duty that my colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to impose on the individual vis à vis the government – the general duty of fairness – within a system in which an individual seeks a license from the government, my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose a duty to disclose “the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.” Instead of the duty that my colleague, Justice Zamir establishes – a duty that emanates a whiff of social morality – my colleague, the President, makes do with an ordinary duty belonging to the ranks of day-to-day administrative law. An ordinary duty – but a duty nonetheless.

30. To these ideas, I will add my own contribution: just as I found it difficult to accept the yoke of a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government, so do I find it difficult to add my support to a duty to make the appropriate disclosures of facts relevant to exercising discretion. If my opinion were to hold sway, the individual would owe the government neither a general duty of fairness nor a duty to disclose relevant facts. I am not saying that an individual is released from the yoke of any duty owed the government. I do, however, say that the individual’s duties to the government are far more limited than those that my colleagues – each in his own way – seek to impose. I will discuss those duties later. For now, I will try to explain why I find it difficult to concur with President Barak on the issue of a duty to disclose the facts relevant to the exercise of discretion.

31. We read the sign hung on the embarkation point of our journey, and I will remind you that engraved upon it is the word “freedom.” “Freedom” means that the individual owes no duty to the government other than the duties that a provision of law – including of case law – imposes upon him or her, whether it is a positive or negative duty. The penal code, for example, which is filled to the brim with negative duties, constitutes negative duties which are explicitly imposed by law (however they may be formulated), and they are the minimum duties that make a society human. These duties restrict the individual’s freedom, the freedom with which we began our journey. Alongside these negative duties reside positive duties which the law imposes on the individual. Examples of these duties include the duty to serve in the military and the duty to pay taxes. Other examples are the duties that parents owe their children and those that certain individuals owe to protected persons and to helpless persons. It is superfluous to note something which everyone knows – that there are far fewer positive duties than negative duties. That is not for naught. We have decided that, in principle, negative duties burden the individual less than positive duties, meaning that negative duties invade an individual’s area of freedom less than positive duties. In other words, consistent with liberal democracy and individual rights – among other things – it is easier to impose negative duties on the individual than positive duties. We learn from this that before imposing a positive duty on an individual, we must consider and reconsider whether our decision goes too far, whether we have exceeded what is appropriate and permissible under the basic perspective accepted in our society.

Why do I say all this? Because my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose on a license or permit applicant a positive duty to disclose details relevant to the exercise of the authority imparted to the government. And I say that before imposing this positive duty on the individual, we carefully examine if we have exhausted other ways of achieving the goal we seek to achieve, without imposing a positive duty on the individual.

32. I personally found it difficult to understand where the duty of disclosure that my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose on a license applicant came from. We all agree, of course, that an authorized agency which has the power to give – or to refuse to give – a license to an individual bears a primary duty to assemble all the relevant information necessary to lay a factual basis for exercising its discretion. However, this duty to assemble information is imposed on the agency, not on the individual seeking to receive a license. The agency is the trustee of the public, and as a faithful trustee, it must rest on its lees until is assembles all the information relevant to the issue, because only on a solid foundation can one build a house that will not collapse. What is the basis for saying, as does my colleague, President Barak, that, “The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision?” What does the duty imposed on the agency tell us about the duty imposed on the individual? Aren’t these two duties, in some ways, contradictory? What is the basis for saying that the duty imposed on the government in itself breeds a duty imposed on the individual?

Another Opinion

            33. I think that just one bridge can bridge the gap between the duty imposed on the agency and the duty that has been said to be imposed on the individual. The bridge is this: in the course of fulfilling its duty to assemble information, the governmental agency may – may, and even must – ask the license applicant to hand over the facts which he or she has (and of which the agency may not know from other sources). This is the case, for example, where the written law itself – the statute or regulations – sets pre-conditions for receiving a license. In our case, the law requires an applicant for a license to operate a licensing warehouse to possess a warehouse it owns, rents, or leases. Regulation 14 and the Sixth Addendum to the Customs Regulations. Once the law sets preconditions for applying for a license, it is elementary that the government agency can require the applicant to provide reliable information regarding the existence of those preconditions (unrelated to any duty of fairness). We should recall the holding that, if the law explicitly sets certain preconditions for granting a license, and the law does not impart the agency with additional discretion, the agency may not add conditions to the ones established. HC 43/76 Amitar Company, Ltd. v. Tourism Minister [50] at 559-60; HC 208/79 Ineis v. Health Ministry General Director [51] at 304; 1 B. Bracha, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] [83], n.52 on p.164. If the agency lacks the authority to add conditions to the conditions, as a matter of course, it lacks the authority to demand information about those conditions which it has no authority to set for a license applicant.

            34. Therefore: where the law explicitly sets preconditions for granting a license, the agency has the authority and may – may and even must – require a license applicant to convince it that those conditions have been met, that it disclose the information necessary to prove that those conditions have been met. Another typical case is where the written law does not explicitly set preconditions for granting a license, but we know the scope of the agency’s discretion – meaning, the authority of the agency to set the conditions that must be met for it to grant the license – through the purpose of the statute. Once we know learn and discover that the agency’s discretion depends on certain considerations, we know for ourselves that the agency is authorized to collect information about those issues in order to fulfill its role. This authority to set conditions includes the secondary authority to require a license applicant to provide the requested information (unless the applicant has a right under the law not to disclose the information, and if that is the claim, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that right), because only if the license applicant fulfills that requirement, can the agency properly perform what the law requires of it. Section 17(b) of the Interpretation Law, under which “authority to do something or to require it to be done – means the secondary authorities necessary thereto, to an acceptable extent.” Authorizing a governmental agency to grant a license – or to refuse to grant a license – includes the secondary authority to demand information from the license applicant. This secondary authority is necessary for the agency “to an acceptable extent,” to allow it to exercise its discretion properly.

            35. This is the bridge that bridges the gap between the duty imposed on a governmental agency to exercise its discretion in the best way possible and the duty imposed on a license applicant to provide information to the agency; if receiving the information from the license applicant is necessary for the government agency to exercise its discretion properly, it has the authority, and it may require the individual – via a law, regulations, or internal regulations, or on a case-by-case basis – to provide information in the area of its exercise of discretion. When asked to provide information, the individual must provide the required information, to the extent it is required and in the way it is required. However, the government bears the burden of initiating the requirement – by setting preconditions normatively or on a case-by-case basis – and the individual bears no duty other than the duty to respond to the demands placed on him or her. I personally would not agree to impose a case-law duty on the individual – as my colleagues propose – whether it is a general duty of fairness, as my colleague, Justice Zamir proposes, or a duty of the individual to provide, at his or her own initiative, information relevant to the agency’s exercise of discretion, as my colleague, President Barak, suggests.

            36. The agency is the one with the experience, as its job is to grant license of the kind discussed: in our case, licenses to operate a licensing facility. In other case: a business license. In yet another situation: a driver’s license. The daily business of a governmental agency allows it to accumulate experience and knowledge about the requirements that it should impose on license applicants including the questions it should ask them. That is how the governmental agency acquires experience – precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line [Isaiah 28:10 – trans.] – and when a license applicant approaches it, it can ask him or her questions and demand answers and information. Who are we to impose a duty on the individual – be it a general duty of fairness or a duty to provide relevant information – when the agency, in the course of the proper fulfillment of its role, knows how to ask for the information it desires?

            Moreover, because it is experienced in its field, the governmental agency knows what relevant information it needs to exercise its discretion properly. On the other hand, how will the individual know what information the agency needs – meaning, what information is relevant – if the agency does not explicitly ask him or her to provide it? Doesn’t the individual have a right to assume that information which the agency does not explicitly request is not relevant information? Is it relevant that he was convicted of beating his wife ten years prior to submitting the application? Is it relevant that she has refused to make maintenance payments to dependents? And if the individual has not been explicitly asked to give the agency information about prior convictions, why should we require him or her to volunteer information that is embarrassing to him or her? May he or she not assume that such information is not relevant, because he or she was not asked to provide it to the agency? Furthermore, the duty to disclose information would be imposed on the individual only if the agency omitted something – did not fulfill its duty properly – and did not ask the individual to provide this or that important piece of information. If the agency omitted something by not demanding a certain piece of information from the individual, why should we require the individual to “know” that such information is relevant and to provide it to the agency at his or her initiative?

            37. In our case, a precondition for granting a license to operate a licensing warehouse is that the applicant possess a warehouse that he or she owns, rents, or leases for a particular time, from day X to day Y. Sixth Addendum to the Customs Regulations. The license applicant has a duty to give the agency information about the “warehouse” he or she possesses. The regulations explicitly provide, in detail and in a way that leaves no room for doubt, that the applicant must give the agency information about his or her rights in the warehouse. We have no need for a duty of fairness or any other case-law duty imposed on the individual to provide relevant information to the agency. The license applicant’s duty is explicitly written and established in the law, and we have no need to resort to a duty from any other source.

            To draw a comparison, assume, arguendo, that the Customs Regulations did not explicitly require – as they currently do – that an applicant for a license to operate a licensing warehouse possess a licensing warehouse which he or she owns, rents, or leases. Let us further assume that the agency does not explicitly require the applicant to prove ownership or a rental right in the licensing warehouse. Can we say that the applicant must – at his or her initiative – provide the agency with information about the warehouse or be viewed as someone who violated a duty owed, because the information is relevant information? I wonder.

            38. Here, we should differentiate between the duty of disclosure that the individual owes an agency and the duty of disclosure that the individual owes another individual with whom he or she is supposed to form a contract. Under section 15 of the Contract Law (General Part), someone who forms a contract because of a mistake stemming from the other party’s misrepresentation may void the contract. For this purpose, “misrepresentation” means: “nondisclosure of facts which the other party should have disclosed by law, by custom, or under the circumstances.” We learn about the scope of this duty that the law imposes on those about to enter into a contract from the positions that parties occupy in relation to each other. The two are not just “rivals,” but they are also supposed to have equal power. A priori, one may not require and has no authority to require the other to provide material or relevant information about the contract. This is the source of the duty which the law imposes on the parties – mutually – and the sanction it imposes for failing to fulfill such duty. On the other hand, the relationship between the individual and the government is different from North to South, if only because of the position of power which the government occupies in relation to the individual. When the individual applies for a license or permit from the government, the government has the right and authority to require the individual to provide information material and relevant to the license. Once the government has been granted this power, there is no need to impose a duty on the individual vis à vis the government.

More on the Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the Government

            39. In the Awad case [30], the petitioner was a member of the Rosh Haayin Religious Council and was even chosen to be its chairman. It became clear that the Minister of Religious Affairs agreed to the petitioner’s appointment without knowing that he had previously – in the context of his tenure as the treasurer of the Religious Council – been convinced of crimes of theft. Because of a prior petition submitted to the High Court of Justice, the Minister of Religious Affairs informed the petitioner that this appointment [as chairman – trans.] was terminated, as was his appointment as a member of the Religious Council, because it became clear that approval of the appointment to the Religious Council (the petitioner was the candidate of the local council) “was granted through a mistake and/or misrepresentation, namely concealment of the fact that the petitioner had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and therefore is not suited to serve as a member of the Religious Council.” Id at 490. In considering the Awad [30] petition challenging the decision of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Court held that the prior conviction of a candidate for the Religious Council is an appropriate consideration in the question of whether or not to select him as a member. The Court then considered the next question, whether the minister could “revoke his approval of the petitioner’s candidacy as submitted by the local council, based on the claim that at the time he gave his approval, the minister did not know that the petitioner had committed a crime of moral turpitude?” Id.at 492. The Court held that the minister could revoke his approval. On this issue, Justice Barak wrote:

Personal integrity, the lack of a criminal past, etc. are considerations material to this issue. The minister arrived at his stance regarding these considerations by examining a set of facts that does not comport with reality. The minister knew nothing about the petitioner’s prior conviction. Moreover, under the circumstances, the petitioner had a duty to disclose the fact of his conviction to the local council, and both the local council and the petitioner had a duty to inform the minister of it. The duty of good faith and fairness require this step to be taken. Reg. v. Home Secretary, ex p. Zamir (1980) at 950. Therefore, we are dealing with a material mistake in the minister’s approval, because of a lack of information about facts which were required to be brought to the attention of the minister. The result is that an appointment was made which seriously undermines the integrity and image of the civil service, as well as public faith in it. I think the combined weight of these facts is another reason to allow the minister to revoke his approval. In the proper balance between the public interest in the integrity of the civil service and public faith in the public administration, on the one hand, and the public interest in the uninterrupted activities of the administrative agency and the petitioner’s personal interest in the continued validity of his appointment, on the other hand, the first interest trumps.

Id.

            My colleague, Justice Zamir, uses these words to establish, inter alia, the general duty of fairness which he tries to impose on someone who applies for a license from an agency. Para. 29 of his opinion. I wish to tarry and ponder this a bit.

            40. No one would disagree that a candidate for a Religious Council must be an honest person; the question of a candidate’s integrity – if you like, his criminal past – is a primary consideration in the authorities’ discretion whether or not to choose him as a member of the Religious Council. There is further agreement that – from the public’s perspective – a candidate for the position should disclose – at the beginning of the process – his unsavory past. The question is whether the candidate bears a legal duty to disclose his criminal past to the authorities selecting him; and if such a legal duty does exist, what sanction might the candidate bear if he omits fulfilling the duty imposed on him? It seems to me that the question of the duty – “the duty of good faith and fairness” – was not relevant in the Awad case [30], and to the extent it was relevant, it remained hidden in the margins.

            Justice Barak held that the question of Awad’s criminal conviction constituted an important factor in his appointment, and that the minister’s ignorance of that criminal past constituted a serious deficiency of discretion. As he held, “we are dealing with a material mistake in the minister’s approval … (emphasis added – M.Ch.).” I will, of course, agree. However, if that is the case, of what relevance is the duty of good faith and fairness? Let us assume, for example, that because of an omission or negligence, Awad was not asked about his criminal past, and the subject came up only by coincidence. In that case, wouldn’t the minister’s approval still be tainted by a “material mistake?” And in that case, wouldn’t Awad’s appointment as a member of the Religious Council still be an appointment which, in the words of Justice Barak, “seriously undermines the integrity and image of the civil service, as well as public faith in it?” If so, how is the “duty of good faith and fairness” relevant? Another case: assume, for example, that Awad was asked about his criminal past; that he responded honestly to the questions asked; but that his answers got lost somewhere on the way to the minister. In a case like that, wouldn’t his appointment still seriously undermine the integrity of the civil service and so forth? Wouldn’t the minister’s approval under these circumstances still be tainted by a material mistake? Indeed, in this last case, we might feel personal empathy for Awad, but I doubt it would change the conclusions and results of the court decision.

            41. From this we learn, in my opinion, that the primary question does not concern the duty of fairness that Awad owed the authorities but rather the material mistake they made in exercising their discretion. Once the agency learned that it had made a material mistake in its discretion, it was allowed – in principle – to revoke its decision, even if it doesn’t always have such power. See e.g. the Awad case [30] at 492; see also the citations in para. 15 of Justice Zamir’s opinion. The primary question concerns the substantive aspects of the discretion, as Justice Barak held:

We face the following question: May the Minister of Religious Affairs revoke his approval of the petitioner’s candidacy, as proposed by the local council, with the claim that at the time he gave his approval, the minister did not know that the petitioner had committed a crime of moral turpitude? In my opinion, the answer to that question is in the affirmative.

Id. at 492.

            Indeed, a candidate’s knowing concealment and denial of negative information about his character is likely to work to his disadvantage. It seems to me, however, that the main issue is not the duty of fairness or its violation, but rather the very fact that the authorized agency made a material mistake in exercising its discretion.

            42. The main point: in any case in which an authorized agency’s decision is tainted by a material mistake, the agency may and has the authority – as a matter of principle – to revoke the decision. The question of the duty of fairness that an individual owes (or does not owe) to the government is not relevant, because the agency’s mistake was and remains material, whether or not we say the individual owed a duty of fairness.

            43. In order to ground the duty of fairness owed by an individual to the government, Justice Zamir relies on Justice Barak’s comments in the Awad case [30] (see the citation in para. 39, supra). Justice Barak, for his part – in the Awad case [30] – extrapolated from the comments of Lord Wilberforce in Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Zamir (1980) (hereinafter – the Zamir case [74]). In that case, Zamir, a citizen and resident of Pakistan, applied for an entrance visa to the United Kingdom, in order to join his father, who had been living in the United Kingdom for ten years. This took place in 1972. Zamir completed an application form for a visa and described himself as a bachelor, as he indeed was (at the time, he was 15 years old). His application was granted in 1975. In 1976, while still in Pakistan, Zamir married, and one month later, he traveled to the United Kingdom on the visa he had received. At the time he entered the United Kingdom, he did not disclose to the authorities that he had married, and he was not asked about his marital status. An immigration clerk approved Zamir’s entrance into the United Kingdom for an unlimited period of time. After a while – when Zamir’s wife and son applied to join him – the truth was discovered, and the agencies sought to deport Zamir from the United Kingdom. Zamir petitioned the court, challenging the decision to deport him, and his petition was rejected by two levels of the court system. His case now reached the House of Lords. The House of Lords also rejected Zamir’s petition. In the course of his opinion, Lord Wilberforce said:

It is clear on general principles of law that deception may arise from conduct, or from conduct accompanied by silence as to a material fact. It can be no answer to a claim that such deception has occurred to say that no question was asked... I would, indeed, go further than this – a point so far left open in the Court of Appeal. In my opinion an alien seeking entry to the United Kingdom owes a positive duty of candour on all material facts which denote a change of circumstances since the issue of the entry clearance (emphasis added – M. Ch.).

Id.at 950. 

 

            In other words: Lord Wilberforce recognizes a duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. “A positive duty of candour” means that the individual owes a duty to disclose information to the agency, even if he or she is not asked about it. My colleague, Justice Zamir, calls it the duty of fairness.

            44. However, this rule – in that formulation – did not last long. It was overruled (with the concurrence of Lord Wilberforce) four years after the Zamir case [74], in the decision made in Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Khawaja (1984) (hereinafter – the Khawaja case [75]). The facts in the the Khawaja case [75] were similar to the facts of the Zamir case [74], except that this time, the House of Lords rescinded the duty of fairness that Lord Wilberforce established in the Zamir case [74]. In the later case, the House of Lords held that a person applying for an entrance visa to the United Kingdom does not bear a duty to disclose material information (“duty of fairness”). The individual’s only duty is not to engage in fraud or deception. Regarding the Zamir case [74] (which was the law in the the Khawaja case [75]), the House of Lords held that Zamir’s behavior, in fact, rose to the level of deception (because in entering the United Kingdom, he implicitly presented himself as a bachelor, when he was in fact married). Lord Fraser says in his opinion (with which the other judges concurred) that Lord Wilberforce’s comments (cited above) in the Zamir case were dicta. He went on to hold that:

At the time when his [Lord Wilberforce’s – M. Ch.] speech was delivered I agreed with all of it ... but on further reflection, in the light of the arguments in the present appeal, has convinced me that it would be wrong to construe the Immigration Act 1971 as if it imposed on persons applying for leave to enter a duty of candour approximating to uberrima fides. But, of course, deception may arise from silence as to a material fact in some circumstances; for example, the silence of the appellant Khawaja about the fact of his marriage to Mrs. Butt and the fact that she had accompanied him on the flight to Manchester were, in my view, capable of constituting deception, even if he had not told any direct lies to the immigration officer.

Id. at 97.

            Lord Wilberforce himself agreed (Id.at 99) that his comments in the Zamir case [74] were dicta, and that the case in question had been a typical case of deceit (by Zamir). The other judges agreed with Lord Fraser. See Lord Bridge’s opinion at 118-19, 126; Lord Scarman’s opinion at 107, 108. Lord Scarman also expresses reservations about Lord Wilberforce’s comments in the Zamir case [74], and goes on to say the following: All agree that an applicant to enter the United Kingdom bears a duty to answer the questions he or she is asked honestly and to provide the information requested. He or she bears no additional duties. The applicant does not know which facts are material. The immigration clerk is the one who knows which facts are material to his or her decision, and therefore the individual should not bear a duty to provide material facts. Lord Scarman writes:

It is certainly an entrant’s duty to answer truthfully the questions put to him and to provide such information as is required of him... But the Act goes no further. He may, or may not, know what facts are material. The immigration officer does, or ought to, know the matters relevant to the decision he has to make. Immigration control is, no doubt, an important safeguard for our society... To allow officers to rely on an entrant honouring a duty of positive candour, by which is meant a duty to volunteer relevant information, would seem perhaps a disingenuous approach to the administration of control... The Immigration Act does impose a duty not to deceive the immigration officer. It makes no express provision for any higher or more comprehensive duty: nor is it possible, in my view, to imply any such duty. Accordingly I reject the view that there is a duty of positive candour imposed by the immigration laws and that mere non-disclosure by an entrant of material facts in the absence of fraud is a breach of the immigration laws.

Id. at 107-08.

            The English law perspective is clearly that the individual does not owe a “duty of fairness” to the government, and therefore, he or she does not owe a duty to disclose information. This is the case where the individual does not engage in an act of fraud and deceit.

            45. A note: Even though I express reservations about Lord Wilberforce’s comments in the Zamir case [74] regarding the duty the individual owes the government, I liked the comment he made in the Khawaja case [75] regarding his comments in the Zamir case [74]. In his opinion in the Khawaja case [75], Lord Wilberforce said that his comments in the Zamir case [74] about “a positive duty of candour” owed by the individual to the government were not necessary to reach the decision, because that case was “a case of clear deception.” He went on to say that:

I ventured the opinion that a system of consideration of individual cases for the privilege of admission to this country can only work humanely and efficiently on a basis of candour and good faith on the part of those seeking entry. If here I trespassed on to the ground of moral judgment, I am unrepentant.

Id. at 99.

            That is what we said in another place: there is a legal “duty of fairness” and there is a “duty of fairness” belonging to social morality, and the two are not the same. Lord Wilberforce sought to take a “duty of fairness” from the institution of social morality and bring it to the order of law. His intention was good – we all agree – but establishing the norm as he suggested would have the legal system adopt a mode of proper behavior that is best left to other normative orders.

            Lord Wilberforce concludes his comments with a statement the likes of which we are not accustomed to hearing in judgments of the House of Lords (or in judgments of other courts). If, in founding a duty of fairness in the Zamir case [74], he says – the same duty of fairness that the individual owes the government – I trespassed into the area of moral adjudication, I do not regret my words. Lord Wilberforce’s speech is among the noblest of any made in the United Kingdom at that time.

            By the way: There is reason to think that the duty of fairness that Lord Wilberforce discusses in the Zamir case [74] was not presented as an all-encompassing doctrine of law but rather as a duty limited to the subject of immigration. He alludes to that in his comments in the Zamir case [74], in which he presents immigrants as those requesting a privilege, meaning those who have a lower-ranked right. Id. at 950 (In Israel, the law is that someone who is not a citizen or an immigrant under the Law of Return, 1950, does not have a right to enter or remain in Israel except by permission. See e.g. HC 758/88 Kendel v. Interior Minister [52] at 520; HC 740/87 Bentali v. Interior Minister [53]; and citations therein). As a fundamental rule, the state does not owe a duty to foreigners seeking to settle in its territory. And if, in an immigrant’s first step on the territory of the homeland that adopted him or her, he or she tries to trick the authorities, we can understand – if not necessarily justify – the view that in doing so, the applicant forfeits his or her right to immigrate.

            46. My opinion, as noted, is that the individual does not owe a duty of fairness to the government. In other words, for our case, the individual need not disclose, at his or her initiative, material information that the agency needs to exercise its authority. Of course, that does not mean that the individual owes no duty whatsoever to the agency. It means only that such duty is limited to the duty not to deceive, to lie, to cheat, to mislead, to spin a web of lies about the agency. As it is written, “You shall not wrong one another, but you shall fear your God …” Leviticus 25:17 [b]. It goes without saying that I am referring not only to active deceit – such as when the individual gives the agency false information – but also to implied deceit, through silence or behavior. This was the case of the Pakistani citizen, Zamir, who in entering the United Kingdom, implicitly presented himself as single, knowing full well that his entrance was permitted under an entrance visa in which he presented himself as a single.

            The same is true of our case: the petitioner knew full well about the precondition it had to meet, namely that it possess the warehouse for which it sought a license as an owner or through a rental contract. From the outset, it was required to produce certain documents, including “a contract of rental or lease for the additional area.” Despite that requirement, the petitioner sent the Customs Authority documents that did not give it – as it knew – a right to rent or lease. The petitioner knew those documents did not meet the precondition required of it. The fact that the customs agents did not properly check what they were supposed to check and did not demand what they were supposed to demand, cannot absolve the petitioner of responsibility for the serious deed it did. As a matter of fact, the petitioner spun a web of lies about the Customs Authority, breaching the duty it owed the agency. When the agency therefore sought to revoke the license, the petitioner could not deny the act of misrepresentation it committed, and in any event, it could not raise a claim worth hearing. A license issued through an act of deception by the grantee is a license flawed from inception, and the necessary conclusion is that the agency had a right to revoke the license. There are exceptions to the rule, but these would be mandated by the special circumstances of a particular case. See e.g. HC 135/71 [25]. The main point of our case is that the petitioner complicated things for itself not just by failing to disclose information, meaning by breaching the duty of fairness that it allegedly owed the Customs Authority, but also by intentionally misleading it. The Regulations imposed a serious of preconditions which needed to be met before the petitioner could receive a license for a licensing facility; not only did the petitioner fail to meet those conditions, but it intentionally misled the agency about their fulfillment, exacerbating its sin.

            47. Thus far, we have discussed the duty of fairness. I now want to move on to the second issue that I wish to address, and it is the issue of a public agency’s authority to adjudicate a dispute between individuals.

On the Status of an Administrative Agency in a Dispute Between Individuals

            48. What is the status, and what is the authority, of an administrative agency to adjudicate – directly or indirectly – a dispute between individuals? An administrative authority is born and conceived in public law, its formation is a formation of public law, it breathes the air of public law, its gait is the gait of public law. Knowing all this, I will ask: When an administrative authority is called to address an issue within its authority, must it limit its considerations to public law considerations, or can we say, perhaps, that it may consider considerations from the field of private law? And if we take this latter path and say that the administrative agency may consider considerations from the field of private law, does this statement conceal a subsidiary statement that the administrative agency may and has the authority – as a derivative of its exercise of power– to adjudicate disputes between individuals?

            49. My colleague, Justice Zamir, tells us that, “it is an old precedent” that an agency authorized to grant a license is supposed to limit itself to considerations from the field of public law, and to take care not to cross into considerations from the field of private law. At first, I thought that the descriptive “old” refers to a dignified rule, like a fine wine which improves as it ages. However, upon further reading, I realized that my colleague was actually referring to the opposite. “Old” meant obsolete. That realization kept me up at night.

            50. We will never, never change a precedent nor apply a precedent without knowing where it comes from – who were its mother and father, in what environment it was born and grew up – and where it is headed. Know from where you come and to where you go. Let us recall that, if we only knew the force motivating precedent and law, we would know their boundaries and their limitations. Regarding precedent (but not law), we will add: cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa. When the reason of the precedent ceases, the precedent itself ceases. What is the precedent in our case, and what is the force urging it along its way? According to my colleague, what was the precedent in our case, and what was the force urging it forward, at the time?

            51. Personally, I have never encountered an all-encompassing rule that an administrative agency many not take into account, as part of its quorum of considerations, considerations from the field of private law. Reuben, a café owner, asks for permission to hire a band that will play and make his guests’ stay more pleasant. Can anyone say that the municipality may not clarify how much the playing will intrude upon the neighbors’ peace and quiet? Would we bar the municipality from considering this factor of the neighbors’ quality of life? Would we tell the municipality – and the neighbors – that the subject of the nuisance is a subject “from the field of private law” which the agency therefore must ignore, referring the irate neighbors to a civil court?  We have never encountered a case-law rule like this, if only because it has never been established. Indeed, a license that a municipality gives to hire a band in a café does not include a license to permit playing that rises to the level of nuisance. CA 186/52 Jerusalem “Eden” Hotel v. Dr. Gerzon [54] at 1132-33. This rule is self-evident, because a municipality does not have the legal authority to permit a nuisance. We would not hold that a municipality, at the outset, may not include, in its quorum of considerations, the possibility that the band’s playing will rise to the level of a nuisance. The case law has not held as such, and in my humble opinion, it should not hold as such. I would not know for what purpose a rule like this – were it established – would be designed, or what social or other objective it would serve. On the contrary: a rule like this, if established, would place the burden on the neighbors, and in the overall social balance, this burden is inappropriate and unjustified. This is true of a license to hire a band in a café, and it is true of any other administrative act. The rule is not – nor was it – that an administrative agency may not include, in its quorum of considerations, considerations from the field of private law simply because they are from the field of private law.

            By the way, “suitable environmental quality and the prevention of nuisances and hazards” is, today, one of the declared purposes of the Business Licensing Law, 1968 (sec. 1(a)(1)). The authorized agency therefore may – indeed, must – consider the issue of nuisance. Even if that were not part of the law – in the absence of an explicit prohibition – the agency may, and even must, consider the issue of a nuisance to the neighbors.  

            52. Similar things have been said about the traditional distinction between private and public law. We are told that times have changed, and that today – unlike in the past – the distinction between private and public law is not so clear and rigid. In the end, we are told, private and public law are one – they frequent the same places, and a natural process of osmosis takes place between them: principles and doctrines from one area penetrate and seep into the other, and on chance occasions, we discover that a rule from one area has made its way into the other. This integration of fields, we hear, breeds “hybrid creatures” – a kind of amphibian – and these creatures, at least some of them, take their orders from private and public law.

            I confess: These statements, and others like them – although I, too, have written them – have troubled me in the past, and they continue to trouble me today. Indeed, regarding the division of jurisdiction between the High Court of Justice and the civil courts, the legislature has forced us to divide the law into two. See e.g. HC 1921/94 Sukar v. Jerusalem District Committee on Construction, Residence, and Industry [55]. Regarding the substantive law, however, I see no difference between our era and bygone days. As a matter of fact, when was there a “clear and rigid” distinction between public and private law? The opposite is true: English common law jurists always took pride in the fact that in Britain, the common law ruled, and that administrative law is just an extension of the common law.

            53. Having said all that we have said, we cannot, of course, ignore the historic legal development, the development which presented us with the legal system as we have it today. The legal system is divided into families, and this division is designed to affect the content of the norms themselves. This is true of the family of contract law, the family of tort law, the family of property law, the family of administrative law, and other legal families. It is superfluous to note that, throughout the years, there have been intermarriages – an inevitable phenomenon within the areas of a single legal system – and “hybrid creatures” have been born. We cannot avoid determining, however, that this historic development has had a prominent effect on the formation of the legal system as we know it today.

            54. The division of the legal system into private and public law is similar – similar but not identical – to the internal division of private law into different branches of law. This is the case, for example, of the division between contract law and tort law. These two kinds of legal classifications, while not identical, bear a resemblance to each other. This is certainly true of the technique of division. I said as much in another context:

Classification imposes order on the primordial rules of law. The legal system's basic principles determine the categories of classification [… ed.] The doctrines applicable to the rules associated into one category (capacity, consideration, mitigating damages, etc.) derive from the classification, and the classification derives from them. At particular points in time, the classification is made based on equality of the doctrines that apply to particular rules of law. Once the classification is made, and once the doctrine has been created and applied to a particular section of law, the doctrine rules over those associated rules of law, because they are located in a single section of law. That is true, making the necessary adjustments, when a specific rule of law is born, which is included in a particular section of law (whether explicitly or via its “interpretation”), because it will then be ruled by that section’s doctrines. This, of course, is merely a presumption (sometimes, it is not the case). The different points of departure of a classification may bring about a change in the legal rule. The point of departure may be chosen, a priori or a postiari, and in the latter case, great importance attaches to the historical events that had a hand in shaping the legal system.

M. Cheshin, Mitaltilin Bidin Hanizikin [Chattel in Torts] [84], n. 2 on p. 161.

In Israeli law, because of the jurisdictional divide between the courts, the distinction between public and private law became particularly sharp. The general view was that the High Court of Justice specializes in public law, while the civil court specializes in private law. If you add a few doctrines that have always governed in the High Court of Justice (clean-hands, delay, taking the law into one’s own hands, a done deed, intervention “for reasons of justice,” etc.), you will understand why the classification between public and private law has been so deeply rooted. However, it is nearly certain that, if public law petitions were brought before the ordinary civil court, the division of law between private and public law would be similar – though not identical – to the division of the law between contract law and torts.

55. Let us return to the matter in question. As I noted above, I know of no doctrine prohibiting an administrative agency from benefiting from private law considerations, simply because they belong to private law. Does that mean that every administrative agency may consider every private law consideration for every issue it addresses? Of course that is not the law. In the Alspector case [1], the local council refused to give the petitioner – a tenant – a license to open a convenience store in his apartment. The reason for the refusal: the landlord did not agree to turn a room in the apartment into a store. The court held that this consideration by the local council was illegitimate, as Justice Berinson’s opinion stated:

We fail to see the validity of that explanation … while in opening a store in his apartment without the landlord’s approval, the applicant may violate his lease, if that is the case, the landlord may come and fight his fight with the applicant. None of that however, is the municipality’s concern, and it cannot serve as the basis for refusing to grant the license.

Id. at 664-65.

How are we to understand Justice Berinson’s comments? In my opinion, Justice Berinson did not intend to establish a doctrine that private law considerations, as such, are illegitimate considerations for an administrative agency to use. For if he intended to make that ruling, we would protest: what is the source of that doctrine, and what is the justification for it? The Court, however, did not make that ruling. The Court’s holding did not concern private law considerations as such, but rather an attempt by the administrative agency to decide a dispute that arose between landlord and tenant by refusing to give the tenant a license. The Court thought in the following way: it would seem as though the petitioner is entitled to a license to open a store, because he fulfilled all the preconditions established by law for opening a store. So? The landlord claims that operating the store would violate the lease he signed with the tenant? The landlord is welcome to come and sue in the court with the proper jurisdiction to hear the complaint. The agency is not authorized to decide the dispute between the parties, and once the petitioner has fulfilled all the preconditions necessary to open a store, it must approve his application.

56. We therefore find the following: at the very least, in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, it seems that an administrative agency may not adjudicate civil disputes between individuals. It would seem as though an administrative agency may not take a dispute between individuals into account as a consideration in its decision over whether or not to approve an application. The consideration of a dispute between the applicant and a third party is external to the agency’s decision-making process. We are not talking about invalidating a consideration because it belongs to private law. The rule is the following: an administrative agency may not take into account considerations which the statute does not permit it to consider, whether they originate in private or public law. And one of the forbidden considerations is that the agency may not adjudicate a dispute that has arisen between the petitioner and another individual.

To be precise: there is no doubt that, once the preconditions necessary to receive a license have been filled, the administrative agency must approve the application submitted. There is nothing remarkable about that, and what we just said falls under the category of idem per idem. The novelty is in the statement that adjudicating disputes between individuals would seem to be outside the administrative agency’s scope of activity, and that the consideration of a dispute of the kind discussed above is a consideration that will be summarily rejected.

            57. This rule – forbidding the administrative agency from deciding – even indirectly – disputes between individuals, has been accepted in the case law as a doctrine, and I have never found a reservation to it. See e.g. HC 9/49 [2]; HC 35/48 M. Breslov & Partners Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister [56]; HC 56/53, supra [3]; HC 132/57 First v. City of Lod [57]; HC 280/60 “Avik” Ltd. v. Voluntary Authority on Importation of Pharmaceutical Preparations (the Avik case [58]); HC 115/61 Yakiri v. City of Ramat Gan [59]; HC 27/62 Alt v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Local Town Building and Planning Committee (the Alt case [60]); HC 278/62 Sarolovitch v. City of Jerusalem (the Sarolovitch case [61]); HC 329/64 Guri v. Bnei Brak Local Town Building and Planning Committee at 370.

 

            58. One extension of this rule is that the police may not eject someone from land on grounds of incursion unless the incursion is "recent." If the incursion is not "recent," the police must refer the complainant to the court authorized to grant a remedy. See e.g. HC 109/70 Orthodox Coptic Metropolitan in Jerusalem v. Police Minister (the Coptic Metropolitan case [63]) at 240-44 (Agranat, J.); HC 37/49 Goldstein v. Jaffa Guardian of Abandoned Property [64] at 726 (Agranat, J.). By the way, the same doctrine governs other areas of law, like a registrar clerk's duty to record the documented information given him or her into the Population Registry (like the fact of marriage), without the authority to investigate the legal validity of that information (for example: whether or not the marriage is valid). See HC 143/62 Schlesinger v. Interior Minister [65]; HC 58/68 Shalit On His Own Behalf and On Behalf of His Children v. Interior Minister [66].

 

            59. What is the logic of the rule? What motivates and maintains it all these years? In my opinion, the answer lies in our legal system's structural need to designate and to allocate the primary functions and areas of activity to each of the three branches of government. To express it in the negative: the structural need of our legal system and system of government – as a matter of principle – to remove the primary powers designated for one branch from the domain of the other two. When we place the three branches side-by-side, we know for certain that the judicial branch is designed to judge. As section 1(a) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary says, "These are the courts given the authority to judge …" The authority of the judiciary is to judge, meaning to decide disputes. See HC 5364/94 Welner v. Chair of Israeli Labor Party [67] at 786 (Barak, Dep. Pres.). Unlike the judiciary, the primary function of the government and the public administration is to execute. As section 1 of the Basic Law: The Government says, "The government is the executive branch of the state." For our purposes, we can say that the structural principle in our system is the need to designate the power to judge – the power to decide disputes – to the judiciary, and to deprive the executive branch of that power. Thus, for example, in the Alspector case [1] and in subsequent related cases, had we recognized the power of the administrative branch to refuse to grant a license to an applicant because a third party claimed – claimed, and may even have proven by documentation – that receipt of the license and operation of the business would lead to his right being violated, we would have augmented the powers of the administrative branch, equipping it with the authority to judge. Because we are bound by the presumption that, in the absence of explicit and unambiguous authorization, the courts – and only the courts – will judge, as a matter of course, we prohibit the administrative branch from making itself judge in a dispute outside its domain.

           

            For those who insist on precision, I will add that I am aware of the phenomenon that the borders separating the powers are not hermetic, and that a system of separation of powers is based on "checks and balances." I will recall, however, that the foundation is the principle of separation, and that those very "checks and balances" are built on that same foundation.

 

            60. I will further note that in the U.S. legal system, a similar question arises concerning Congress's authority to pass legislation imparting the executive branch with judicial powers. The question is whether such grant of authority undermines constitutional principles, according to which the power to judge rests with the court system. The development of the case law on this issue is a fascinating story in itself, but I will not expand on it here. See e.g. L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices [85]; L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law [86];  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor (1986) [70]; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.[71].

 

            We negate the authority of administrative and governmental agencies to adjudicate and issue rulings – even temporarily – in a dispute between individuals for the principled reason of separation of powers (using “checks and balances”), and the main point of doing so is to prevent one branch from encroaching on the domain of another. That is the way to preserve the distinct function of the judiciary to judge, guaranteeing the right of litigants to a just trial conducted by an independent body. There is a supplemental reason – a daily reason – and it is that the executive branch lacks the appropriate work tools to issue rulings and adjudicate disputes. Each of the three branches has adapted to its environment and role – it has specialized in its area of activity and created work tools to execute its function to the best of its ability.  Just as the court lacks the appropriate tools to engage in execution, so does the executive branch lack the appropriate tools to judge. The (surviving) plants and animals have adapted to their environments, as have the three branches of government. The best way to adjudicate disputes is the court’s way, and we therefore prevent administrative and governmental agencies from adjudicating disputes. They were not trained for it, and they are not the ones who bear the burden of doing justice for individuals who have quarreled. As Justice Berinson wrote in the Alt case [60], regarding a local planning and construction committee:

 

The local committee – like the regional committee – is not a legal body for determining the rights of conflicting parties. Neither is capable of deciding factual and legal questions concerning the mutual rights and duties of the asset’s owners and the actual or potential harm they would suffer. Their considerations are considerations of town planning and construction, and no more. The possibility that the rights of another will be infringed by construction done pursuant to a license issued by the local committee is not for the respondents to address, unless the opposing party alleging the infringement of rights has direct legal standing in the subject of the hearing …”

Id. at 1334.

 

See also HC 305/82 Y. Mor v. Central District Regional Planning and Construction Committee [68] at 148-49 (Or, J.).

 

            62. My colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to prove that private law considerations can affect the decision of an administrative agency, and that there is “nothing wrong with that.” Along those lines, he writes:

 

For example, is it illegitimate for a municipality to refuse to grant a license to operate a business, or for a planning and building committee to refuse to grant a license to erect a building, when it is clear that the license applicant has no rights to the land of which he or she has taken possession (emphasis added – M.Ch.)?

 

Later, my colleague addresses the subject of the petitioner, saying that “under the Regulations, the Customs Authority need not, and may not even be permitted, to give a license to a trespasser.”

 

63. Now I will say my opinion. I do not disagree with my colleague that private law considerations may enter into a governmental or administrative agency’s quorum of considerations. That is my position, too. I personally think that statement, to some extent, amounts to bringing apples to an orchard. Not only is there nothing wrong in it, but it may bring about a lot of good. I agree with my colleague concerning the example he cites, namely that where it is unambiguously clear that an applicant’s request is based on an obstruction of justice, the authorized agency may – may, and perhaps even must – reject the application. However, as a matter of methodology, we cannot, from this example, deduce the rule that my colleague seeks to deduce. The reason is simple: the example is an extreme one, and it wouldn’t be right to learn the median from the extreme.

 

Our sages teach us: “Fools cannot serve as an example.” Tractate Shabbat 104:2 [a]. The reason is self-evident: fools act differently than those who are not fools. Their thought processes are not like those of an ordinary person; they do things that ordinary people would not do. We therefore do not deduce examples from either their thought processes or from their acts and omissions, and we do not analogize from their behavior to the general behavior of people. Just as we do not draw generalizations from fools, so do we not draw generalizations from extreme events. An extreme, by nature, has no choice but to carry the mental or emotional baggage characteristic of an extreme. In trying to draw analogies from extreme to median, therefore, we are likely to be led astray by that same baggage which is relevant – perhaps even essential – to the extreme, but nonexistent in the median, because it is the median. The extreme is graced with the qualities of an extreme, its unique value is the value of an extreme, and the qualities of the median are not necessarily the qualities of the extreme. For the matter of our concern, it is interesting to note that the rule about a “recent” incursion (supra para. 58) is explicitly founded the extremity of the case, and the rule is therefore limited to that same extreme case. As Justice Agranat held in the Coptic Metropolitan case [63]:

 

The duty of the police to come to the aid of a person in the above situation and to help him or her extract the asset from the one who has seized it depends on two conditions, both of which must be met: (a) the request for police assistance is made at the time the incursion is still “recent”; (b) it is clear to the police that there is no doubt and no question about the fact of incursion without permission.

Id. at 240.

 

            Only in cases of a disturbance of the peace – as demonstrated by Justice Agranat’s comments – may (and even must) the police intervene in a dispute between individuals. And if the disturbance of the peace is not immediate or the fact of incursion is in doubt, the police may not intervene in a dispute between individuals. Justice Agranat made the same point, with the necessary adjustments, in the Avik case [54], supra, as did Justice Landau in the Sarolovitch case [61], p. 514, and it is applicable here, too.

 

            64. Finally: So far, we have discussed the principle of negating the authority of the governmental and administrative agencies to intervene in a civil dispute between individuals. The substantive authority of the agencies, on the other hand, depends on the law for the issue in question. The law sets the framework for the agency’s authority, which in turn determines the range in which it may operate and exercise discretion. The Alt case [60], for example, made that holding, distinguishing a prior ruling on the same issue (HC 107/59 Mei-Dan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Local Planning and Construction Committee (the Mei-Dan case [69]) at 805). In the Mei-Dan case [69], because the law explicitly granted standing to the owner of the asset, the agency was permitted to include, within its quorum of considerations, “disputes” between the owner of the asset and its possessor. In the Alt case [60], on the other hand, the law, as interpreted by the Court, did not grant standing to the owner of the asset, and the Court therefore held that such disputes were outside the agency’s field.

 

            65. Returning the case at bar: We began our journey with section 70(b) of the Customs Ordinance [new version], according to which, “In the Regulations, the government may establish the conditions under which warehouse licenses will be granted …” I will discuss the broad consensus which the government enjoys to issue regulations concerning licensing warehouses, thus paving the road for understanding how to treat the Regulations. In addressing the Customs Regulations, we find (in Regulation 14(b)) that a license application “will be according to the formulation in the Sixth Addendum,” and the Sixth Addendum in effect establishes the preconditions which a person must fulfill in order to be awarded a license for the warehouse. We are primarily interested in Part 3 of the Sixth Addendum, according to which the license applicant must make, inter alia, the following declarations:

 

We declare that we own the warehouse, and that it is recorded in the Land Registry under the documentation Block number … Parcel … in our possession via a rental or lease contract with … for a period of … years, commencing on … and ending on … Attached is a scheme of the warehouse and markings of the areas of the requested warehouse, approved by Engineer … the address of the warehouse: …

 

            This tells us that the applicant must be the owner, renter, or lessee of the warehouse, and the applicant must prove as much to the Customs Authority. These conditions are reasonable and appropriate. A licensing warehouse is an extension of the Customs Authority itself, in all its dignity, because it stores goods on which customs have not been paid. This is the reason for the requirement of ownership, rental, or lease – a requirement declaring that the applicant possesses the warehouse by right.

 

            Should we understand from this that the Customs Authority can investigate an applicant’s right, as a court would? Indeed, the question of the applicant’s right in the warehouse is a relevant question. It would be wrong to grant a license – more precisely, to interpret the law as though it ordered the granting of a license – to a blatant trespasser or someone whose right in the warehouse is eroded on all sides. However, how deep may the Customs Authority go to clarify the applicant’s right? Do the Regulations mean that the applicant must prove his or her right in the asset beyond a reasonable doubt? By a preponderance of the evidence? Assume, for example, that Gad possesses a warehouse by virtue of a rental contract, but Naftali, the warehouse owner, claims that Gad violated the rental contract; that the contract is therefore terminated; and that Gad must vacate the warehouse immediately. May the agency refuse the application, based on the fact that Gad has not proven his right in the warehouse? Let us further assume that Naftali filed an eviction action against Gad, and that the action is pending at the time the application is submitted to the Authority. May the Authority refuse to grant the application for this reason alone?

 

            66. In our case, there is no dispute that the petitioner possesses and exercises control over the area, as the holder of a right should possess and exercise control over a licensing warehouse. As for the petitioner’s right to possess and exercise control over the area, we cannot say for certain that it is a blatant trespasser. Moreover, for now (even if that was not the case at the outset), the petitioner has, at the very least, preliminary evidence regarding its right to possess the area, in the form of the map that was exchanged between the petitioner[ ] [trans.] and the Port and Train Authority (PTA) marked with the words, “storage area.” Against this background, I will insist and ask: Did the Customs Authority have a right not to renew the petitioner’s license, a license that it itself issued to the petitioner? In other words, I agree that, at the outset, the Customs Authority could have refused to grant the petitioner’s request, because the petitioner did not prove its rights in the licensing warehouse. However, considering what transpired since the petitioner received the license, and considering our holding today, that the question is the renewal of the license, and not the issuance of a new license – couldn’t one claim that, as of today, for purposes of renewing the license, things have changed to the benefit of the petitioner? Furthermore, since we know that the PTA has sued the petitioner to vacate the area, and the suit is pending in the authorized court, doesn’t the Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the petitioner’s license constitute intervention in a dispute between the petitioner and the PTA? Can’t we add that we are witnessing not mere intervention in a civil dispute but rather an adjudication of that dispute (even temporarily)? I will go further: I personally found it difficult to avoid the impression that the Customs Authority was called to the aid of its good friend – the PTA – and that its failure to renew the license was intended to adjudicate, even temporarily, the civil dispute that arose between the petitioner and the PTA.  Indeed, the Customs Authority did not explain to us – it did not even try to explain – which state interests would likely suffer harm if the petitioner’s license were renewed, even just until the court ruled on the eviction action.

 

            6[7 – trans.]. I have explained my serious trepidations – from this angle – in joining the camp of my colleague, Justice Zamir. And if I decided, for now, to drag myself into my colleague’s camp, it is only because I couldn’t say that the Custom Authority’s considerations were flawed – or flawed enough – such that a court should intervene in its decision. Had the issue been a basic right of citizens and residents, I would hold otherwise. I imagine that my colleague, too, would reach a different holding.  However, the issue is not a basic right of citizens and residents but rather a statutory right that a person is requesting. The petitioner is asking to be the trustee of the Customs Authority, to be permitted to hold goods in the warehouse in trust for the Customs Authority. Where a person asks to be recognized as a trustee, asks to be permitted to stop by anytime as an insider in the Customs Authority’s house, I can’t say that it is inappropriate to undertake a meticulous investigation as to whether the preconditions have been met. A similar – but not identical – thing may be said about those immigrants who sought to adopt the United Kingdom as their homeland. Supra para. 45. “Draw me after you – let us make haste” [Song of Solomon 1:4 – trans.]. I was drawn, and I made haste after my colleague.

 

            6[8 – trans.]. The end: At the relevant time, I concurred that the petition should be denied. My concurrence remains as is.

 

 

 

The petition is therefore denied. The petitioner will pay court expenses in the sum of 25,000 NIS to Respondents 1-2 and 25,000 NIS to Respondent 3.

 

 

February 4, 1998.

Negev Coexistence Forum v. Ministry of Infrastructure

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3511/02
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 16, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: This petition concerns an urgent petition for an interim order. Petitioners request that the State build a bridge over Wadi Hebron in order to enable children to reach the regional public school. The State recognizes the urgent need for erecting a bridge, but claims that it is not possible within the framework of current regional planning laws.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Basic Law: the Judiciary has a constitutional status superior to ordinary legislation. This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction but also applies to its conferral of power to grant remedies. The Court, however, will generally abstain from granting a remedy under the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. The Court held that, under the circumstances, use of its authority pursuant to the Basic Law was justified. As such, the Court ordered the State to build, as quickly as possible, a bridge over Wadi Hebron.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

                                                                                                                HCJ 3511/02

 

  1. Negev Coexistence Forum
  2. The Association of Forty
  3. Communal Council of the Settlement of Um Batin

v.                     

  1. The Ministry of Infrastructure
  2. Drainage and Infrastructure Development Administration
  3. Water Commissioner
  4. Ministry of the Environment
  5. Ministry of Health
  6. Ministry of the Interior
  7. Ministry of the Treasury
  8. Drainage Authority of Shikmah Bsor
  9. Omer Regional Council
  10. Meitar Regional Council
  11. Tel Sheva Regional Council
  12. Bnei Shimon Regional Council
  13. The Government of Israel
  14. The Israel Lands Administration

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 16, 2003]

Before Justice E. Mazza, Justices D. Dorner and E. Levi

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: This petition concerns an urgent petition for an interim order. Petitioners request that the State build a bridge over Wadi Hebron in order to enable children to reach the regional public school. The State recognizes the urgent need for erecting a bridge, but claims that it is not possible within the framework of current regional planning laws.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Basic Law: the Judiciary has a constitutional status superior to ordinary legislation. This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction but also applies to its conferral of power to grant remedies. The Court, however, will generally abstain from granting a remedy under the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. The Court held that, under the circumstances, use of its authority pursuant to the Basic Law was justified. As such, the Court ordered the State to build, as quickly as possible, a bridge over Wadi Hebron.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: The Judiciary, §15

 

Legislation Cited:

Planning and Building Law-1965, § 151

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 2208/02 Salama v. Minister of Interior Affairs, IsrSC 56(5) 950

[2]HCJ 101/74 Building and Development in the Negev Inc. v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 28(2) 449

 

Israeli District Court Cases Cited:

[3]CA (Tel-Aviv) 71208/00 Bar Ilan v. State of Israel (unreported decision)

 

Israeli Magistrate Court Cases Cited:

[4]CA (Tel-Aviv) 15237/97 State of Israel v. Bar Ilan (unreported decision)

 

Petition granted.

 

On behalf of the petitioners— D. Fish; L. Golan

On behalf of respondents 1-7, 13, 14—A. Koren  

JUDGMENT

Justice E. Mazza

This petition, submitted on April 25, 2002, concerns the problem of the sewage flowing in Wadi Hebron, which has been afflicting residents of the scattered Bedouin settlement of “Um Batin.” One petition requested that we issue an interim order requiring the state to immediately erect small bridges for passage by foot and by car over the wadi “in order to immediately alleviate this constraint on the residents’ freedom of movement into the settlement and outside of it, as well as to preserve their health and prevent incidents of drowning.”  In response, the State asserted, that, although the government had decided to establish a permanent settlement for the scattered settlement of Um Batin, “until the permanent settlement is planned, there are practical and normative difficulties in arranging access roads to the illegal settlement.”  The State described the planning difficulty:

 

The district planning scheme states that building permits will not be issued, nor will lands be allowed to be used, unless such is done pursuant to the regional scheme.  No such regional planning scheme exists for the area where the scattered settlement of Um Batin and the adjacent riverbed are located.  Until a detailed planning scheme, which will allow for the issuance of building permits, is approved, or until a regional planning scheme that modifies the above-mentioned rule is approved, no building will be permitted in that area, not even small bridges. 

 

On May 20, 2002, Justice Levi ordered that the application for an interim order be decided by the panel hearing the petition.  On September 11, 2002 we held oral arguments and decided:

 

[t]he petition raises a difficult problem which demands a practical resolution within a short period of time.  The solution offered by the government is not satisfactory.  We understand that a meeting is to be held on September 30, 2002 for the purpose of developing a solution—unfortunately only temporarily—for the issue dealt with in the petition.  Before deciding how to deal with the petition, we ask that, before the end of October, the State Advocate submit supplementary briefs setting out the suggested plan and a tentative schedule for its execution.  We expect that the arrangement will be one that can be practically implemented within a short period of time. 

 

On January 1, 2003, after the State had submitted several updating statements, petitioners submitted an urgent application for an interim order.  The application stated that “due to flooding in Wadi Hebron last week, one of the two unstable, make-shift bridges, which were constructed by the residents of Um Batin of their own accord, collapsed.  All agree that these bridges do not provide a solution to the problem and are not a substitute for safe, well-designed bridges. When the bridges collapsed, only a miracle prevented human casualties. The one remaining bridge is narrow and unstable and only allows for individual passage.” Additionally, petitioners explained that “since the bridge that collapsed had been located near a school, and since crossing the strong water currents is dangerous for the children, the settlement’s elementary schools were closed” on rainy days. 

 

In its response, the State reiterated its claim that, from a planning perspective, building even only temporary small bridges is impossible.   However, the State noted that significant changes in the planning situation are expected over the next few months, which will allow for the issuing of permits for building stable small bridges.

 

Following an urgent hearing on January 9, 2003, the State accepted the responsibility “of examining possible legal means of either situating a new small bridge on the location that is predisposed to flooding, or rehabilitating or strengthening the currently standing bridge.” However, in a statement submitted on January 14, 2003, the State asserted that it had not succeeded in finding such a legal means. At the same time, the State claimed that the Ministry of the Interior had committed itself to building such bridges within the coming months, as soon as the planning arrangements were confirmed.

 

We begin by noting that we have reservations regarding the State’s claim that the Planning and Building Law does not allow the construction of a temporary bridge without a building permit.  For example, in the case of the Maccabia Bridge tragedy, the defendants were acquitted of a charge of illegally building a bridge without a permit.  The court there stated, based on a number of Supreme Court precedents, that planning laws do not apply to temporary structures. See Crim. A. (Tel-Aviv) 71208/00 Bar Ilan v. State of Israel, [3]; CA (Tel-Aviv) 15237/97 State of Israel v. Bar Ilan, [4]. However, we need not resolve this issue at this time.  This is because we are of the opinion that we have the authority to issue the requested urgent interim order, even under the assumption that planning laws do not allow this.

 

Section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary states:

 

The Supreme Court shall sit also as a High Court of Justice. When so sitting, it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court.

 

The normative status of this law is constitutional and superior to ordinary law. See HCJ 2208/02 Salama v. Minister of Interior Affairs, [1] at par. 2.  This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction—an interpretation which may possibly be gleaned from some of the judgments regarding this section—but also applies to its conferral of the power to grant remedies. Justice Berinson noted as much in his precedent-setting judgment in HCJ 101/74 Building and Development in the Negev Inc. v. The  Minister of Defense, [2] at 455:

 

We should note that, just as there is no limit to our subject matter jurisdiction, (aside from refraining from interfering with matters under the authority of another court), similarly, and perhaps even more so, there is no limit to the remedies that this court may offer the citizens who have been harmed by an act or omission of the government or a public authority. This Court may grant any remedy or relief it sees fit as necessary for the sake of justice.

 

Nevertheless, the High Court of Justice will generally abstain from granting a remedy under section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” and there is no alternative way to legally provide “relief for the sake of justice,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. 

 

This is a “Kafkaesque” situation that cries out for help. Young children are required to endanger their lives in order to reach the public school that the State of Israel erected near their homes, or, alternatively, to refrain from attending school on rainy days.  The State does not deny its duty to build a small bridge for passage over the wadi in order to prevent these dangers.  It claims, however, that the law prevents it from doing so for the next few months.  It is unthinkable that planning laws are intended to prevent the building of emergency temporary structures for the sake of saving lives.  Even if we were to assume that this was their intention, planning laws cannot overcome the constitutional and superior rule found in section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary.  This is especially true when the rules which here allegedly prevent the granting of building permits for the bridges are located in inferior secondary legislation—regulation 17(2) of the Planning Regulations (Substantial Deviation from a Plan)-2002, and section 8.1 of the regional planning scheme RCP 14/4—and not in the relevant primary legislation, the Planning and Building Law-1965, § 151.

 

As such, due to the outstanding circumstances of this case, we have decided to issue an interim order instructing the State to build, in the shortest possible period of time, a stable small bridge over Wadi Hebron, which will allow the children of the scattered settlement of Um Batin to safely cross over the wadi on their way to school.  In their final statement, petitioners requested that additional bridges be built on the path to the regional medical clinic and at the entrance to the village.  This request was not mentioned in their urgent application on January 1, 2003, or in the hearing which was held on January 9, 2002.  As such, we have disregarded this request.

 

January 16, 2003

 

 

 

Translated by:    Leora Dahan

Edited by:             Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

The Movement for Quality in Government v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3094/93
HCJ 4319/93
HCJ 4478/93
AHC 4409/93
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, September 8, 1993
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (1) In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2) An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (1) Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2) Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3) Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4) Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5) In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (1) The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2) Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3) Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (1) When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2) Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3) The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (1) Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2) The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3) This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (1) The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2) Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3) In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G. (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (1) The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2) The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3) Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.  (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (1) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2) When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3) If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4) If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5) When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I. (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1) One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2) In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

            (3) A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

H.C.J 3094/93

H.C.J 4319/93

H.C.J 4478/93

A.H.C. 4409/93

 

1. The Movement for Quality in Government in Israel

 (H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93).

2. Moshe Kirstein

 (H.C. 4478/93)

3.Adv. Zeev Trainin

 (A.H.C. 4409/93)

v.

1. State of Israel

2. Prime Minister

3. Attorney General

4. Rabbi Arye Deri

5. Shas, International Organization of Tora Observant Sepharadic Jews

 

In the Supreme Court Sitting as High Court of Justice

[September 8, 93]

Shamgar P., Barak J., D. Levin, J. Goldeberg J., Mazza J.

           

Editor's Summary*

 

                These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

                The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

                According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

                The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (l)       In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2)     An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (l)       Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2)     Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3)     Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4)     Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5)     In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (I)      The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2)     Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3)     Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (l)       When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2)     Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3)     The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (I)      Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2)     The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3)     This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (l)       The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2)     Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3)     In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G.      (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (l)       The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2)     The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3)     Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.      (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (I)      A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2)     When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3)     If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4)     If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5)     When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I.       (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1)     One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2)     In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

          (3)     A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

 

Israel Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]   Election Appeals 2,3/84 Neimann v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for the llth Knesset; Avni v. The Same 39 (2) P.D. 225.

[2]        H.C. 1523, 1540/90 Levi v. The Prime Minister 44 (2) P.D. 213.

[3]        H.C. 1635/90 Jarjevsky v. The Prime Minister 45 (1) P.D. 749.

[4]        H.C. 142/70 Shapira v. The Israel Bar, Jerusalem 25 (1) P.D. 325.

[5]        H.C. 4566/90 Dekel v. The Minister of Finance 45 (1) P.D. 28.

[6]        F.H. 16/61 Register of Companies v. Kardosh 16 P.D. 1209.

[7]        H.C. 297/82 Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37 (3) P.D. 29.

[8]        H.C. 156/75 Daka v. Minister of Transport 30(2) P.D. 94.

[9]        H.C. 190/57 Asaig v. Minister of Defence 12 P.D. 52.

[10]      H.C. 2/80 Bat v. Minister of Religious Affairs 34(3) P.D. 144.

[11]      H.C. 596/75 Maccabi Tel-Aviv v. Broadcasting Authority 30 (1) P.D. 772.

 

[12] H.C. 542/76, 103/77 Int. Consortium v. Director General, Ministry of Communications 31 (3) P.D. 477.

[13]      H.C. 653/79 Azriel v. Director of Licensing Department 35 (2) P.D. 85

[14]      H.C. 376/81 Lugassi v. Minister of Communications 36 (2) P.D. 499.

[15]      H.C. 4267, 4287, 4634/93 "Amitay" v. The Prime Minister 47 (5) P.D. 441.

[16] H.C. 6177, 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing 47 (2) P.D. 229.

 

English Cases Cited:

[17]      Rex v. Robert. Ex parte Scurr [1924] 2 K.B. 695 (C.A.)

 

E. Shraga, E. Shapira - for the petitioners in H.C. 3094/93 and H.C. 4319/93;

The Petitoner in H.C. 4478/93 - appeared on his own behalf;

D. Beinish, N. Arad- For the First three respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93.

Z. Agmon, Y. Hirch - for the 4th, 5th respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93;

The Applicant in A.H.C. 4409/93 - appeared on his own behalf.

 

JUDGMENT

The President:

 

The petitions

 

            1. These petitions are aimed against Rabbi Arye Deri's continuing to serve as a member of the Government in his capacity as the Minister of the Interior.

 

            The petition in H.C. 4319/93 evolves directly from the fact that an indictment was filed against Minister Arye Deri; that in H.C. 3094/ 93, which preceded the former petition, deals with the chain of events before the indictment. In the course of proceedings the petition in H.C. 3094/93 was waived, as the petition in H.C. 4319/93 took its place. The petition in H.C. 3094/93 is therefore cancelled.

           

            The petitions in A.H.C. 4409/93 and H.C. 4478/93 are applications to be joined as respondent and petitioner, respectively, in the main petition.

 

            2. (a) The indictment against Minister Arye Deri was submitted to the Knesset on August 2, 1993. It was accompanied by a request that the question of lifting Minister Deri's immunity in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the Immunity, Rights and Duties of Knesset Members Law, 1951, be considered. The Knesset Committee discussed the said request already on 3.8.93 and decided to continue their deliberations on 26.9.93.

           

            (b) The Indictment

           

            The indictment contains the following offences against the law:

           

            (1) Accepting a bribe contrary to section 290 of the Penal Code, 1977 (hereinafter "the Code").

           

            (2) Breach of trust on the part of a public servant, contrary to section 284 of the Code.

           

            (3) Obtaining by deceit under aggravating circumstances, contrary to the last part of section 415 of the Code.

           

            (4) False entry in corporate documents, contrary to section 423 of the Code.

           

            (5) Stealing by a director, contrary to section 392 of the Code.

           

            Each of the above provisions of the Code embrace a substantial number of acts and not only an isolated one.

           

            (c) The facts, whose legal headlines appear above, and which reflect the prima facie evidence in the hands of the prosecution, are described in detail in an indictment which consists of 50 pages. The events dealt with in the indictment concern Minister Deri's exploitation of his office and standing, at first when he served as an assistant to the Minister of the Interior and in charge of his office, in his capacity as the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, and afterwards as Minister of the Interior. He fraudulently caused money to flow from state funds to various societies in which he was either active himself or was otherwise involved; these societies transferred to him, either directly, or by making payments to others on his behalf, over a long period of time and on many occasions, bribe money, in exchange for his assistance in getting funds for them. The sum total of these bribes was NIS 135,000 (at the time of payment their value was about $ 71,000). In addition there were sums of money, whose value then was about $95,000, which were transferred in other ways, as well as other gratuities.

 

            Another section deals with the use of the respondent's position and connections, as an official of the Interior Ministry, in order to further the granting of a sum of NIS 500,000 to a society in which he was active, by moving the Ministry of Religious Affairs through false representations. This money was used in a deceitful manner and not for the declared purpose, with the aid of fraudulent records and various misrepresentations.

           

            A third section deals with conspiring to move government bodies to grant land to persons, who had bought plots in Nebi Samuel from one of the above societies, when it transpired that the society in question could not fulfil its obligations towards them. The respondent acted in a manner involving an absolute clash of interests, concealed facts and made false representations in order to receive privileges and money - for his societies - and through them for himself.

           

            Within the framework of his activities for the purpose of forwarding the affairs of the societies which paid him bribe money in exchange for his services, the respondent initiated a grant of NIS 200,000 from the Jerusalem Municipality to one of these societies. For this purpose an extraordinary sum was budgeted, contrary to Interior Ministry practices.

           

            An additional matter concerns the appointment of Moshe Weinberg, his accomplice in most of the above offences, to the post of chairman of the appointed Local Council of Lehavim, in order to enable him to draw a salary and have an official car. This Weinberg had previously been a real estate and haulage agent and for some time had been the respondent's driver. Weinberg was heavily debt-ridden and his appointment to public office was intended to rescue him from his troubles.

 

3. The Parties' Arguments

 

            From the parties 'written and oral arguments before us it would appear that the petitioners maintain that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to Minister Arye Deri's tenure of office. This approach is consistent with that of the Attorney General who told the Prime Minister, both in writing and verbally, that once the above indictment had been submitted to the Knesset, on August 2, 1993, it was only proper that Minister Deri's tenure of office be terminated. Mr. Harish, the Attorney General, said the following in a letter dated August 6, 1993:

           

"From now and until the end of his trial it would be contrary to the basic principles of law and government, and also unethical, for Mr. Deri to continue to serve as a Minister in the Government."

 

            In written arguments the Attorney General added further details and summed up his stand as follows:

           

            "(a) The letter containing the undertaking which Minister Deri deposited with the Prime Minister (a document to which we shall refer later - M.S.) made his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government and a member thereof basically conditional; and, therefore, nothing is being taken away from him today, only the question of granting a conditional right to his very tenure as Minister of the Interior in the Government, being at issue.

           

            (b) From the moment that Minister Deri signed his letter the circumstances changed, mainly because the suspicions and evidence that had not been thoroughly examined before then became embodied, in a clear and concrete indictment, into offences involving ignominy for the person accused of them.

           

            (c) As long as there is a weighty suspicion that Minister Deri committed these offences, his trustworthiness as a person in charge of public money on behalf of the government is questionable; and in this I find even the fear of a conflict of interests insofar as his function as Minister of the Interior is concerned, mainly with respect to the manner in which he exercises his discretion in matters connected to subjects bound up with the suspicions against him.

           

            (d) Insofar as the allegations in the indictment and the offences of which he is suspected are concerned, the indictment which is before the Knesset today must be seen as having progressed beyond the corridors of the court, and Minister Deri must therefore immediately honour his undertaking to suspend himself from the Government. In this matter the process of lifting his immunity will not serve as a stumbling-block in the way of the duty to terminate his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government."

           

            4. Minister Arye Deri informed the court , through the learned counsel for the International Organization of Torah Observant Sepharadic Jews (Shas) (the 5th respondent), that he saw no room for appearing and putting his case before us personally as expression would be given to his stand in the arguments brought on behalf of the 5th respondent, whom he represents in the Government. He added that he would of course honour any decision of the court.

           

            5. The stand of the Prime Minister, as conveyed to us by the Attorney General and which can also be gathered from the written material submitted by the Attorney General, is that he is not obliged by force of law to exercise the power vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to remove Minister Deri from office .

           

            In this context the Prime Minister referred, in his letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, to the course of events in the matter before us which accompanied the formation of the Government in July, 1992: about a year ago, in a letter dated July 2, 1992, the Attorney General brought the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that an investigation was being conducted by the police against Minister Deri. In his letter the Attorney General spoke of "heavy suspicion of criminal acts which have not yet been thoroughly examined and clarified" and mentioned the use to which Minister Deri had put his right to remain silent. On July 6, 1992, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, and on the strength of what was agreed there, with the consensus of the Attorney General, Minister Deri deposited a letter with the Prime Minister in the following language:

 

"If Shas joins the Government which you will head, and if Shas decides that I should be a member of the Government, and in the light of the Attorney General's letter to me concerning my affairs, and on the strength of your request to me, I hereby inform you that if and when an indictment is brought against me in court I will suspend myself from the Government of my own accord."

 

            The Prime Minister saw, and sees, in the arrangement to which expression is given in the above letter, not only a unilateral undertaking by Minister Deri but a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 2IA of the Basic Law: The Government, unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the above letter ("...when and if an indictment is brought...in court") are fulfilled.

           

            In July, 1992, a Government was formed which included Minister Deri. His letter was brought at the time to the notice of the Knesset, as required by section 13B of the Basic Law: The Government, and exposed openly to the public.

           

            In the Prime Minister's letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, which is in the nature of a reply to the detailed and reasoned opinion of the Attorney General, of August 6, 1993, a substantive part of which was quoted above, he notes that he does not accept the Attorney General's approach, in accordance with which, since July, 1992, there had occurred a change of circumstances expressed centrally in the submission of the indictment to the Knesset, for the following reasons: in the meantime Minister Deri had abandoned his right of silence and answered his interrogators' questions; the suspicions of July, 1992, were no less serious than those embodied now in the indictment, and perhaps even the opposite was the case; the fear of a conflict of interests raised by the Attorney General in his above letter was exposed and known at the time the Government was formed.

           

            It was argued further that cognisance should be taken of the fact that in the matter of removal from office the legislature had laid down express provisions for electees and for functionaries other than ministers or deputy ministers, as can be seen in the State Service (Discipline) Law, 1963, in section 42B of the Basic Law: the Knesset, in section 20 of the Local Authorities (Election and Tenure of Head and Deputy Heads) Law, 1975, etc. On the other hand, the Basic Law: The Government makes no provision for the suspension of ministers and deputy ministers or their removal from office because of suspicions, investigations or criminal charges. Which means that when the legislature saw fit to enact obligatory provisions for the removal from office on account of criminal acts, it did so by law. The arrangement in the Basic Law: The Government, in respect of ministers and deputy ministers, is a negative one, which means that there is no similar obligatory provision of law there.

           

            As stated in the Prime Minister's letter of 22.8.93:

           

"In this serious matter there exists, according to the law, a fundamental and substantive difference between electees and functionaries. And it was not only incidentally that the legislature enacted different provisions for these two categories. The electee serves by virtue of the confidence of the public which elected him in a democratic process, and which has the power to remove him from office in the same manner if he is found to be tainted. There must, therefore, be very serious reasons for removing an electee from office or suspending him, such as a criminal conviction of an ignominious nature, a prison sentence, etc. - which does not apply to ordinary functionaries."

 

            The Prime Minister also referred to the precedent which was created, in his opinion, in the case of Aharon Abuhazeira, who continued to serve in the Government while two criminal actions were being conducted against him, and the then Attorney General, Professor I. Zamir, took no action whatsoever.

 

            As noted, it is argued that there is no legal norm for the matter before us, and that the opinion of the Attorney General is based on public norms pertaining to the confidence of the public in the system of government. But according to the Prime Minister this should be countered by a norm of no less public importance - that is, confidence in the Prime Minister, who formed a Government on the strength of an undertaking which received the approval of the Attorney General, and who is now asked to breach his undertaking on a public and personal plane without any real change in the circumstances. The Prime Minister sums this up in the following manner:

 

"The matter before us is unique and special, as it has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of interpreting a law but concerns a confrontation between two public norms. And this is particularly so after I made an undertaking in this matter, and even acted upon it, on the strength of your opinion given me only about a year ago, and for dishonouring which undertaking I can find no possibility, reason or justification."

 

            6. The 5th respondent, in a written declaration and in the arguments before us by its learned counsel, Advocate Zvi Agmon, also supported the idea that there is no binding law concerning the removal of a minister from office because he has been indicted. Insofar as a member of the Knesset who is also a member of the Government is concerned, he was of the opinion that what was operative here was the Knesset's confidence in the Government. Section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government was enacted only in 1991 and until then the Prime Minister had no power to dismiss a minister, the termination of whose tenure of office could be effected only by his resignation or by the resignation of the whole Government. This section, he argued further, was intended mainly for the purpose of preventing "irregularities" in the Government's actions. At any rate its application in any particular instance came entirely within the discretion of the Prime Minister.

           

            Advocate Agmon, whose arguments paralleled to a great extent the stand of the Prime Minister, as apparent from his letters and from the speeches of the State Attorney who appeared on his behalf before us, referred also, for the purpose of comparison, to express laws concerning removal from office of other functionaries and sought thereby to bolster his conclusion that the absence of legislation concerning ministers is not coincidental. He found this interpretational conclusion to be logical for the following reason: according to the constitutional construction of the regime in Israel, the Government rules by virtue of the confidence of the Knesset, and is collectively responsible to the Knesset. The Knesset is the elected representative of the people as a whole and it can decide when a minister's tenure of office should be terminated, and when not, by using its sovereign power to express a lack of confidence in the Government and, indirectly, in a minister serving in the Government.

 

            In the course of proceedings before us the learned counsel for the 5th respondent agreed that the above section 21A could possibly be applied in the case before us, but added that just as its application should be reasonable so could a decision concerning its non-application be reasonable.

           

            7. Advocate Zeev Trainin, the petitioner in A.H.C. 4409/93, argued before us that the court should take into account the party-political repercussions of any decision concerning Minister Deri's removal from office. Mr. Moshe Kirstein, the petitioner in H.C. 4478/93, who asked to be joined as an additional petitioner, and in whose case no order nisi was given, argued that this court must not intervene in the dismissal of a minister as long as there is no express provision of law on the subject.

           

            8. The Legal Subjects On Which The Proceedings Were Based

           

            We shall now proceed to analyse the arguments before us. Two central legal problems were raised before us. The first is the legal validity of the undertaking which the Prime Minister claimed he had imposed upon himself when Minister Arye Deri signed the letter of July 6, 1992, (the contents of which were given in full above) before him.

 

            The second question bears on the nature of the Prime Minister's powers under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government, which deals with removal of a minister from office.

           

            We shall commence with the question of the undertaking of July 6, 1992.

           

            9. Undertaking not to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            According to the simple wording of the letter of July 6, 1992, it contains a declaration by Minister Arye Deri, dressed as an undertaking on his part, that in the given circumstances, as set out there, he would suspend himself of his own accord from the Government. This declaration was bound up with negotiations for forming a Government , and came following upon a letter from the Attorney General in which he sought to inform the Prime Minister of the existence of an investigation against Minister Deri and of the general substance of the investigation. The Attorney General's letter did not only convey information, but it also contained expressions of doubt concerning the advisability of including in the Government someone concerning whom, at the time, investigations, as described in the said letter, were being conducted. In this context the letter said that it was advisable that the Prime Minister take account of the facts described when weighing up - if at all - the question of the candidacy of Minister Deri for office in the Government which he (the first respondent) was about to form.

           

            After the first respondent had given due consideration to the contents of the Attorney General's letter and had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, on the basis of the written undertaking of July 6, 1992, and following upon it, it is reasonable to conclude that what was contained in the above undertaking was acceptable to both parties: that is, that the yardstick provided for in the undertaking would guide both Minister Deri and the Prime Minister. In other words, just as the one undertook to leave the Government in given circumstances, as described in the under­taking, so did the other, who had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, take it upon himself to honour the condition concerning the timing of the resignation from office contained in the undertaking. From a legal point of view the conclusion is, therefore, that the Prime Minister agreed not to remove Minister Deri from office as long as the conditions laid down in the above undertaking of Minister Deri had not been met.

           

            10. An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, state service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government, and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law. Fettering the power clashes with the legislative purpose of vesting the power, in accordance with which the Prime Minister may remove (a person) from office when the circumstances brought to his attention justify or demand this, and there is no reservation or condition attached to this save for the substantive necessity to exercise this power for its legislative purpose.

           

            11. (a) The relevant provision of enacted law is contained in section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, which states that:

           

            "Where, by law, power is given to remove a person from office in the Knesset, in the Government, in state service, in an association established by law, in a government company or in any other public body - no agreement and no undertaking concerning the non-removal of that person from office may be made."

           

            The "power to remove a person from office" is, in the case under consideration, the power of the Prime Minister by virtue of section 21A of the Basic Law. The prohibition against giving an undertaking in connection therewith, as contained in section 13A, is unequivocal.

           

            In other words, while section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government vests the Prime Minister with the power to remove a minister from office, without being tied to any extraneous undertaking and while exercising his power within the confines of the aim of the law (see E.A. 2,3/84 [1], at p. 252, opposite A) an undertaking not to exercise this power to remove from office, unless the conditions contained in the above letter have been met, is equivalent to an undertaking on the part of the Prime Minister to limit in advance his statutory power, whatever the factual circumstances which might occur.

           

            The said section 13A was added to the Basic Law: The Government on the strength of the Basic Law: The Knesset (12th amendment) which came into force on 22.2.91; that is, only one-and-a-half years before the above undertaking, signed by Minister Deri, was given. The amendment to the law came at the initiative of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset and it is patently clear from its content, including what is contained in sections 13A (a) and (c), that this addendum to the law is a sequel to what was held by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90 [2], and an echo of the problems raised in the proceedings in H.C. 1635/90 [3].

           

            (b) From the point of view of legislative purpose, section 13A , with all three of its sub-sections, is intended to prevent agreements and undertakings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

           

            (c) Subsection 13A(a) deals with an agreement containing an undertaking concerning the office of a minister or deputy minister, and is intended to prevent the acquisition of support from a member of the Knesset who belongs to another party, in exchange for a promise to appoint a minister or deputy minister.

           

            (d) Subsection 13A(b), with which we are concerned here, is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power, in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations, and all the more so when the law requires it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance, in the framework of a political deal, of the power of the authority.

           

            The legal power to appoint and the legal power to remove from office were granted by law to any particular functionary in order to enable him to carry out the administrative duties within his charge, in accordance with the law which granted him the power and subject to the conditions, if any, attached to it by the legislature. Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power is weighed up. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot use it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

            What is said above flows from the standing and duties of a public functionary, either elected or appointed, and is encompassed in them. The powers of a functionary in public service are intended to be used for the general good. Every electee and every holder of office is a servant of the general public (H.C. 4566/ 90,[5]). As we have explained on more than one occasion , this means that the power to appoint or to remove from office should be exercised fairly, without extraneous considerations and for the good of the public.

           

            In every instance when the exercise of such power is required it is only right that the said exercise be reviewed in the light of the circumstances and of all the factors, and while striking a proper and reasonable balance between the various considerations. But, according to the provisions of section 13A(b), the holder of the power is forbidden, inter alia, to fetter his considerations in advance in order to give preference thereby to the political-party consideration whatever the weight of the other factors may be. That is to say, where considerations arise which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove (a person) from office (a subject to which we will return and discuss later) it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

           

            (e) The last subsection of section 13A - subsection(c) - deals directly with the circumstances which were examined and disqualified by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90, [2], above, (financial guarantees) and there is no need to discuss it in detail here.

           

            (f) To sum up, section 13A as a whole comes to prohibit limitation of freedom of action on the part of an authority. It demarcates the boundaries of what is permissible and what is forbidden in the matters described here, in order to cultivate public integrity and to limit the things which can be used, lawfully, as rewards in political deals. Section I3A seeks to ensure that a statutory power conferred on a functionary for the purpose of carrying out his duties will be used by him for the general good. Furthermore, section 13A clothes in legal-statutory dress desirable and obligatory public norms and the prohibitions laid down by law which complement them.

 

            As mentioned above, it was already held by this court, before the enactment of section 13A, that the acts described in it are contrary to the general principles of law.

           

            12. In the light of the thesis propounded by the first and fifth respondents, in accordance with which it is not a unilateral obligation on the part of Minister Deri which we are dealing with, but a bilateral agreement - which is a reasonable conclusion, per se, in the light of all the circumstances - the bilateral obligation which emerges from Minister Deri's letter of July 6, 1992, quoted above, should be seen as an obligation which drastically defies the prohibition in the above section 13A(b). It must, therefore, be deemed to be absolutely invalid: it does not contain any valid limitation of the Prime Minister's power to exercise the right vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law.

           

            13. It must be understood that the question of whether the parties to the agreement had been aware of the existence of section 13A(b), or not, is irrelevant insofar as the validity of the obligation is concerned. The question of this validity depends entirely on the clear wording of section 13A(b) and nothing further need be added.

           

            In the course of proceedings we were asked to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the provisions of the above section 13A(b), and following upon this the State Attorney informed us that the Prime Minister had in fact not been aware at the time of the existence of the above provision in the Basic Law: The Government, but that this did not affect his stand on the substance of the matter. In his opinion he was not in duty bound to exercise the power vested in him by sections 20 and 21A(a) of the Basic Law, for the reasons already quoted above , without there being any connection with the legality of the above undertaking.

           

            We must, therefore, proceed to examine the second question, which is that of a Prime Minister's exercise of his power to remove a Minister from office, within the meaning of section 21A(a) of the Basic Law.

           

            14. The Power to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            (a) Section 21A(a) provides that:

           

            "The Prime Minister may, after informing the Government of his intention to do so, remove a Minister from office; the Minister's tenure of office is terminated 48 hours after the notice of removal from office has been handed to him , save if the Prime Minister changes his mind before then."

           

            The power conferred by section 21A(a) is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary and change from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution. (F.H. 16/61 [6], at p. 1215).

           

            But, even when the power is a discretionary one it still has a normative framework. The usual rules regarding reasonability, fairness, good faith, integrity, absence of arbitrariness and discrimination, etc., apply to every exercise of administrative discretion (see my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in H.C. 297/82 [7], at p. 34).

           

            (b) Furthermore, as already noted in the past, there is no difference for purposes of the matter before us - that is for purposes of the exercise of discretion - between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: where the preliminary conditions required for exercising the power exist it is incumbent upon the statutory authority to act. It follows that even when the authority refrains from exercising its discretionary power its decision to do so is subject to the usual criteria applicable to statutory powers, that is, it can be reviewed to discover whether it was based on reasonable considerations or whether the combination of circumstances did not in fact demand the exercise of the power.

The decision can also be reviewed to see whether it was not unreasonable or was not based on arbitrariness or discrimination, which could disqualify the acts or omissions of the authority. That is to say, not only the unreasonable exercise of a power can be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

            (c) In this context I said, in the above H.C. 297/82 [7], that laying down initial arrangements in a law which vest a particular functionary with the ability to exercise a power in certain defined circumstances, does not only mean giving power and authority, but also means ascribing fundamental meanings to the power which include a duty with respect to the manner in which it is used.

           

            So that attached to the grant of power there is, inter alia, the duty to weigh up whether it is necessary to exercise it and the proper measures to be taken in this context. Secondly, it is understandable and well-known that from the grant of power to a particular functionary there evolves the duty to deal with petitions and requests aimed at moving the holder of the power to exercise it in one way or another. Finally, insofar as examining and dealing with requests in the context of exercising a power is concerned, the nature and content of the manner in which this is done must be consistent with the basic standards laid down in judgments of this court, and any departure therefrom could have repercussions on the validity of any decision. In other words, even when the "may" is not necessarily "must", that is, even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weigh up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

           

            (d) I will add that the holder of a power has the discretion to decide on a matter despite the existence of a decision in principle on the subject-matter of the power. For this latter decision may require re-evaluation in general or with respect to the concrete case. H.W.R. Wade, in discussing this subject, had the following to say, under the heading "Over Rigid Policies" (Administrative Law, p. 330):

 

"An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance".

           

            That does not mean that a fundamental decision, which provides for a desirable policy or method of operation, should not be adopted, but that decision must also be the fruit of an orderly process, and even then every concrete case deserves substantive consideration in order to examine whether to apply to it, either positively or negatively, the guiding rule according to which the authority acts.

           

            Till now we have discussed what was said in H.C. 297/82 [7] in connection with the duty to weigh up , in every ordinary case, all the data and circumstances, before deciding whether to exercise a power or refrain from doing so.

           

            15. When there is a possibility of exercising a power, the statutory authority must give its mind to all the relevant elements, that is to all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it. But it is obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances. However, in order to remove all doubt I will add that where parliamentary-political life is concerned one cannot deny taking account considerations which arise due to political considerations. But, as my esteemed colleague, Justice Goldberg, pointed out in H.C. 1635/90 [3], quoted above, (at p. 866) it should be remembered that we are not dealing, in the context of the case before us, with the binding validity of a political agreement, but with the question of whether an act carried out, or due to be carried out, following upon an agreement, is unlawful or invalid according to the norms of administrative law recognised by us: that is, whether the content of the act is consistent with the basic principles of an enlightened State.

           

            Therefore, the question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations. When certain considerations are given preference over others to an unreasonable extent, a decision would be invalid. In other words, as long as every element is given due and reasonable weight, in the circumstances of the case, there can be no complaints. But, when one consideration is preferred over another, despite the fact that the weight, substance or content of the rejected consideration clearly and obviously indicated that it should have been the preferred one, or that the scales were weighted in its favour, then the decision would be stamped with unreasonableness.

 

            I said, in H.C. 156/75 [8], at p. 105, that there could be circumstances in which the statutory authority did not give weight to any extraneous consideration and only took relevant considera­tions into account, but nevertheless gave the latter so little weight as to make the final conclusion invalid.

           

            That is the rule with respect to "good faith" on the part of a statutory authority. Unreasonableness can be discovered even when there was good faith at the basis of a decision. As Judge Scrutton remarked: "Some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable" (R. v. Roberts, Ex Parte Scurr (l924) [17], at p. 719).

           

            16. In the framework of the arguments before us some of the respondents referred repeatedly to other laws dealing with functionaries other than ministers and deputy ministers, containing detailed provisions concerning their removal from office. They sought to learn from the positive arrangements in other laws that there is a negative arrangement in the case of ministers and deputy ministers: that is, that for them there is no provision of law laying down in advance the circumstances in which the power to remove them must be exercised. There is no legal basis for this argument. There are laws which detail the circumstances in which removal from office is allowed or required. But there is nothing in that to indicate a negative arrangement for removal from office of a minister or deputy minister. The matter of removal from office of a minister is anchored today in the above section 21A of the Basic Law and the absence of any detailed circumstances in which this is permitted or required only goes to show that the law, for this purpose, is the general law concerning statutory powers. The main rules for exercising such powers have already been explained above, and will still be enlarged upon. Furthermore, the absence of detailed provisions permits of the removal from office in a wider diversity of cases than those detailed in the laws dealing with other electees or appointed functionaries. At a later stage we shall deal with those circumstances in which there is a legal duty to exercise the power of removal.

 

            17. Against the background of a general description of the relevant provisions of the law we shall now deal directly with the case before us. There are occasions when discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise. (H.C. 190/57 [9]; H.C. 2/80 [10], at p. 146, and see also Professor B. Bracha, "Administrative Law" (Schocken Publications, 1986), 149). That is, there are circumstances in which the conclusion may be drawn - with respect also to a discretionary power - that refraining from exercising a power is so unreasonable as to descend to the roots of the matter (H.C.596/75 [11]; H.C. 542/76, 103/77 [12], at p. 483). In order to adapt this to the case before us: an authority is in duty bound to exercise a power when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our constitutional and legal system make the failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            Unreasonableness which goes to the root of the matter invalidates a decision of an administrative authority (see H.C. 297/82 [7] above; H.C. 653/79 [13]; H.C. 376/81, [14]).

           

            It is true that the power under section 21A above can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in with the web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. Those are, of course, only examples of what is commonly known as "irregularities". But this does not amount to a comprehensive description of the borderlines of the power under section 21A, the general nature of which points to its breadth and depth. This also does not constitute a description of the complete legislative purpose of the provision in this section of the law. The said provision of law is intended also to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide and serve as an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct and, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in our system of government, on the values upon which our system of government and law is built and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

            In order to remove all doubt I will add that what is said here has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. We are talking here about the law which exists here and according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain given circumstances, to something extremely unreasonable. This is a conclusion based on law and not one which is anchored only on abstract values without any legal basis, as could have been imagined from some of the arguments propounded before us.

           

            It was argued at length before us that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence in the Government. I am prepared to accept this. I am also prepared to accept the distinction between a public servant and a public electee (see H.C. 4287/93 [15], in the case of Deputy Minister Pinchasi). But the confidence of the Knesset does not make the exercise of the power under section 21A, when the circumstances demand it, redundant. Furthermore, the constitutional reciprocal bond between the Government and the Knesset, and from there to the public, is a two-way one. The Government must also serve as a drafter of norms of governmental behaviour and must act in a manner which creates confidence. Suspending a decision following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset - if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to interpreting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor key provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the Prime Minister under section 21A and constitutes unreasonable refrainment from exercising a power granted by the legislator.

 

            18. At this stage a short pause in the presentation of the legal background is called for, in order to return to the facts of the case. We described above the main points of the indictment presented to the Knesset. The indictment includes extremely serious allegations concerning corruption. The indictment is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution. But, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned, even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of significance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for judging the acts attributed to an individual, as clothed in the official dress of an accusation ready for presentation to the judicial instances.

           

            In the case under consideration the lifting of immunity is also required as it affects a member of the Knesset. But the proceedings for lifting immunity do not change the content and significance of the indictment and what is alleged in it. If a minister who is charged with receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels in bribes and of abuse, in other ways, of government office, continues to serve in the Government this would reflect in a far-reaching manner on the image of government in Israel, and on its good faith and integrity. This has a direct effect on the question of reasonability according to the provisions of law (for changes flowing from the differentiation between a public servant and a minister - see also H.C. 6177, 6163/92 [6]).

           

            19. It was pointed out in the arguments before us that there is a precedent for the continued service of a minister in the Government despite the fact that indictments containing serious charges against him were brought.

           

            In my opinion no precedent was established. There was in the past an invalid omission which does not consecrate the system. A past invalid act or omission only demonstrates to what extent each individual act of political convenience becomes harmful, from the aspect of obligatory standards of conduct, as people will seek to learn from it, to imitate it and to regard it, for some reason or other, as a precedent.

           

            In our constitutional history there are more esteemable instances of reactions following upon criminal allegations which it would be preferable to copy.

           

            20. I can now sum up my opinion in the case before us:

            (a) The power under section 21A is a discretionary power.

           

            (b) A government promise not to remove a functionary from office has no validity.

           

            (c) The authority must weigh up whether to exercise its power, when this is demanded or is obligatory, in an orderly and systematic manner, and must use it for the purpose for which it is granted while refraining from applying extraneous considerations.

           

            (d) Parliamentary-political considerations can be legitimate in certain circumstances, but they must be examined with an eye to finding a fine balance with other considerations. When the fact that there is prima facie evidence that a criminal offence has been committed by a member of the Government is one of the other considerations, then the seriousness of the (alleged) offence is a relevant factor. The more serious the offence the less weighty would the other considerations be. I will add that in the context of the matter before us I saw no cause for dealing with the more general subjects discussed in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice D. Levin.

           

            (e) Whoever exercises discretion must keep in mind all the relevant and influential components and factors and must find a reasonable balance amongst them. Giving undue weight to one component or another, can invalidate a decision.

           

            (f) There are circumstances which make the exercise of a discretionary power obligatory. Failure to exercise the power in such circumstances can be found to be so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            (g) An invalid act in the past demands prevention of perpetuation, and not imitation. A blunder in the past does not give a license for the future.

           

            (h) The offences attributed to Minister Deri are outstandingly serious and failure to exercise the power to remove him from office is unreasonable to an extreme extent. Reliance in this case on an undertaking which is inconsistent with the provisions of section 13 A of the Basic Law, has no place.

           

            The damage to confidence in the government as a result of the failure to remove from office a person accused of the crime of corruption is far more serious than the damage to confidence as a result of failure to honour an undertaking which is prohibited by law. As already explained, we are not dealing here with the question of confidence as a moral norm, but with the provisions of law which deal with the reasonableness of failure to exercise a power.

           

            21. I am of the opinion, therefore, that we should declare that the Prime Minister is required by law to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to terminate the tenure of office of Minister Deri. In this sense the order nisi should be made absolute.

           

Justice A. Barak: I concur.

Justice A. Mazza:

 

            I concur with the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President.

           

            The stand adopted by the Prime Minister in the matter before us was based, for the main part, on the existence of a political agreement with Minister Deri, made at the advice of the Attorney General, on the eve of the formation of the Government. And having failed to be convinced of the justice of the Attorney General's argument that there had been a substantive change in the circumstances since the agreement was reached, the Prime Minister decided that he had to choose between two norms of at least equal weight: one, on the basis of which the Attorney General had argued that as long as Minister Deri was not cleared of the suspicions levelled against him with the tabling of the indictment against him in the Knesset he could not continue in office in the Government; and the other, which is connected with the fear of a blow to his trustworthiness, as Prime Minister, in the eyes of the public, of he did not honour his part of the agreement with the Minister. There was, therefore, a basis for assuming that unless the Prime Minister was mistaken in thinking that his obligation to Minister Deri was a valid one and that his credibility in the eyes of the public depended upon his honouring it, he would have refrained from taking the stand which led to the petititoners' application to this court for a remedy on behalf of the public. But this was not the case.

 

 

            From the Prime Minister's letter of 22. 8. 93 to the Attorney General, a copy of which was submitted to us during the course of proceedings, it appears that even after his attention was called to the provisions of section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, his stand remained substantively the same, on the basis of other reasons enumerated in the letter, in which he takes issue with the Attorney General's approach (as detailed in the letter of 6.8.93 to the Prime Minister). In his letter the Prime Minister indicated that there was, in his opinion, a difference between elected functionaries and appointed public servants and he referred also to the case of Minister Abu-Hazeira, as though this were a precedent. But the main reason given by the Prime Minister for not acting on the opinion of the Attorney General was his reliance on his obligation towards Minister Deri, upon the honouring of which his credibility in the eyes of the public ostensibly depended.

           

            The distinction between the principal and the secondary in the Prime Minister's reasons can be seen from a reading of his letter. But there is also a fundamental difference in the content of the reasons: a fear of harm to his credibility in the eyes of the public is a reason with public significance. In presenting this reason the Prime Minister relied on the assumption (albeit a mistaken one) that there existed a political agreement by which he was bound. This reason, even though not legally admissible, is at least understandable. This is not the case insofar as the Prime Minister's other reasons are concerned. The Prime Minister did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of these reasons, but sought to take issue with the opinion of the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office.

 

            This approach is contrary to the constitutional principle, long since accepted in our system of law, according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive (see paragraph 42 of the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in the Pinhasi case, H.C. 4287/93 [15]). And the Prime Minister, with all due respect, could not be heard at all on the grounds of these reasons. I was, therefore, sorry to learn that even after it had been explained to the Prime Minister that the agreement which he had made with Minister Deri had been invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the Attorney General.

 

            As to the question of what is the legal norm applicable to the case before us, the decision lies clearly with the Attorney General. There is, therefore, no cause for enlarging on it. Only recently did Justice Barak explain what the proper legal norm is, in H.C. 6163/92 [16] and again in the Pinhasi case [15]. And also from the reasons contained in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President, the conclusion must be drawn that the law applicable to the continued tenure in office of Minister Deri is no different, if not even more apt.

 

Justice D. Levin:

 

            I agree with the conclusions of the President and I am party to the main points in his legal analysis and to the approach taken towards the central matters at the focus of the proceedings before us, on the basis of which the required result is obvious and obligatory in the circumstances of the case.

           

            However, I would like to add some comments on the subjects which were under discussion and which, in my opinion, call for further enlargement and emphasis.

           

            (a) I agree that a member of the Knesset earns his status by virtue of the confidence placed in him by the voting public, which saw in him someone who faithfully represents its sentiments and viewpoints - either politically or because of his attitude to social and economic matters and his approach to matters of faith and culture. Once he has been elected by this particular public, then it is only natural that he should regard himself as being in duty bound to remain faithful to his electors. If, heaven forbid, he should disappoint them, if the confidence which they placed in him should be shattered, for any reason, then when the time comes he would have to face, politically, the judgment of the electors.

 

            (b) The situation is different when an elected member of the Knesset takes upon himself, on behalf of the faction to which he belongs and which he represents, an official duty within the framework of the executive, as a member of the Government and a minister in charge of a government office, or as a deputy minister.

           

            He then owes a duty of loyalty and a greater degree of responsibility to his electors, to the Knesset which gave him its confidence and to an even greater extent to the general public which he is called upon to serve faithfully.

           

            For, whoever is given executive power by force of law will be found to influence by his acts, or, heaven forbid, by his omissions, for good or for bad, the rights of the general body of citizens and residents of the country. He is their trustee and he must behave towards all of them with fidelity, honesty and fairness and without discrimination. That is the challenge and he will be judged in accordance with how he meets it.

           

            (c) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions and points of view, and to the political and social paths of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the governmental set-up. But, in my opinion, when fulfilling his administrative function, as a minister or even as a deputy minister, as one in charge of a government office and directing its operation, then his political function must give precedence to his administrative function, which has its own rules of conduct.

           

            When fulfilling this function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice, when moved to do so. Within tile framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents, and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice.

 

            If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. He would have to face the said review and, if the circumstances warrant it, be indicted and stand trial.

           

            If that is the position in general, how much more so is it the case when, heaven forbid, a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law. The nature of the offence and of the circumstances in which it was committed could make the possibility of his continuing in office questionable.

           

            I do not suggest that we lay down any hard and fast rules on this subject and decide in a sweeping manner when and how conclusions should be drawn. For, first and foremost, it is the political system which must react, within the framework of the proper political-democratic process. But there may be exceptional situations, such as the one before us, when our intervention is required in order to lay down specific, obligatory norms of behaviour.

           

            (d) It seems to me, for example, that if, heaven forbid, an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy - such as, for example, if a minister is charged with accepting bribes, with fraud, with cheating state authorities, with lying or making false entries in documents - then it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office.

           

            I would think, if this should unfortunately occur, that it would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he is convinced of his own innocence and clean hands. He should allow the process of establishing the truth to be exhausted and await comprehensive clarification of the matter.

 

            (e) If he does not do this then the Prime Minister must weigh up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power, under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government, to remove a minister from office. As this power is a discretionary one, the Prime Minister may exercise it but is not, on the face of it, in duty bound to do so.

           

            When a demand that he exercise his discretion be brought, he can take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, since, as already noted, a minister has a twofold function, both political and administrative. It is only natural and understandable, in my opinion, that the Prime Minister will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. For the sake of ensuring so important and vital a need he can, on an appropriate occasion, forgive "irregularities" in the conduct or pronouncements of a minister, and even opposition to binding decisions of the Government, as all this would come within the confines of the minister's political function, which would be examined and criticised on the credibility plane before the Knesset and the voters.

           

            This is not the case, in my opinion, when the question is one of a minister who sinned against integrity, and who committed offences involving ignominy, such as the examples given above, especially when the offences attributed to him were allegedly committed in the process of fulfilling his office. In such cases the credibility of the Government and its ministers in the eyes of the public must take precedence over any other consideration.

           

            I dismiss out of hand the argument that for the sake of the survival of the Government and the coalition at its base, and because of the desire to further government policy, however important it may be, the implications of the presentation of the above indictment can be ignored, everyday proceedings can be continued, and the minister can be left in office as though nothing occurred.

           

            (f) I think that in our case, too, the Prime Minister actually realised that if Minister Deri should be indicted on the charges being investigated when he was appointed, he would have to suspend himself, and that if he did not do so, he, the Prime Minister, would have to exercise his authority to suspend him.

 

            I would like to assume that the Prime Minister saw this as an inevitable consequence, not only because he faced coalition pressure, but also because, as someone responsible for the existence of an enlightened regime, he thought, to the best of his conscience, that that was what he had to do.

           

            I do not think that there is any difference, or that there should be any difference, from the normative aspect, between an indictment which has already been brought before a court and one which, at some stage, has only been presented to the Knesset Committee for purposes of lifting immunity.

           

            (g) In the course of proceedings before us we heard from counsel for the fifth respondent (Shas), albeit in muted terms, that Minister Arye Deri had earned the confidence of his electors despite the lengthy police investigation conducted against him, and despite the suspicions which hovered above him. It can be assumed that this occurred because they honestly believed that the candidate whom they favoured was innocent, clean and pure of the suspicions against him.

           

            One cannot know if they would have behaved similarly if, heaven forbid, the charge against him had been proved in a court of law or even if the indictment against him, containing allegations of serious offences, was pending in court.

           

            But I do not see any importance in this and there is nothing in it to indicate anything, as this is not the main issue, the main issue being the need for our democratic and enlightened "camp" to remain pure and that persons tainted with corruption and crimes of the nature indicated above do not harm government morality.

           

            It should be emphasised, in order to avoid any mis­understanding, that what I have said on this last subject is purely theoretical. There is nothing in what I have said which can, heaven forbid, establish facts and hand down judgment in the case of Minister Arye Deri, which must still be decided within the framework authorised to do so and be thoroughly cleared up, so that the factual truth may come to light.

 

            As already stated, I concur with the conclusion suggested by the President in his judgment.

           

Justice E. Goldberg:

 

            In contradistinction to public servants, to whom the State Service (Appointments) Law, 1959, applies, a minister and a deputy minister are not appointed to office only because of their skills, qualities and personal standards. Party and coalition interests are at the centre of their appointments, and the texture of public life is not affected by the appointment of a minister or deputy minister who is not exactly blessed with characteristics of the highest quality. The question is whether the confidence of the public in the government is harmed when a minister or deputy minister, against whom an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy has been framed, remains in office.

           

            The answer to this question is not simple or unambiguous. For if we should say that in every such case the confidence of the public in government institutions would inevitably be harmed, we should also have to say that such harm would be caused when a member of the Knesset is found guilty of an offence involving ignominy and is sentenced to imprisonment. For such member of the Knesset would not only participate in legislation, and serve in a quasi-judicial capacity when considering the lifting of another Knesset member's immunity, but it is possible that he would also be a member of one of the Knesset committees, be it the Finance Committee, which deals with the public's money, or the Knesset Control Committee, whose task it is to fix norms of proper management, or any other committee, which deals with public matters of first importance. And, nevertheless, the legislature was not afraid that the public's confidence in the Knesset would be harmed because of this, and provided, in section 6 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, that every citizen is entitled to be elected to the Knesset save "if a court denies him this right by law, or if he is given a prison sentence of five years or more for an offence against the security of the State, as laid down in the Elections to the Knesset Law, and five years have not elapsed since the day he completed this sentence."

 

            Is it not a fact that when a person elected by the public is the issue then the democratic principle takes precedence over any other public interest, even though a Knesset member also fulfills a public service and the Knesset is one of the authorities of the State.

           

            As a minister and deputy minister fulfil political functions, as already stated, could it not be said, in a case where an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy is brought against one of them, that it is the "price of democracy" and that criticism of his appointment belongs to the Knesset, which can pass a vote of no-confidence in the Government for making an appointment which in its, the Knesset's, opinion is not proper.

           

            Furthermore, would not our (the High Court's) intervention in such a matter be interference in "the composition" of the Government and upset the balance between the authorities? One cannot, therefore, deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter before us. But, on the other hand, this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration. I am of the opinion that in any clash between the two aspects we cannot say that the public administration norm, which we have already held is applicable to a public servant (see H.C. 6163/92 [16]), will not apply at all, only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister. Such a consequence would not only constitute a 'double standard", but would also mean the application of double and conflicting legal norms - one for the ordinary public servant and another for the politician who holds office - which is a violation of the principle of equality before the law.

           

            The clash between the two aspects does not mean that the one must supersede the other. All that is required is that a balance should be found between them. This balance makes it obligatory that the court's intervention in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be in small measure, and that it be restricted to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office. In other words, our intervention would occur, save in such cases, only when the administrative authority, which has been given the discretionary power, departs, in the circumstances of the case, radically from reasonability by leaving the minister, or deputy minister, in office.

 

            I am of the opinion that the seriousness of the circumstances, in the case before us, as is evident from the indictment, tips the scales and makes the removal from office of the minister obligatory. I therefore concur with the judgment of the President, on all counts.

           

            Decided as held in the President's judgment.

           

Judgment handed down on 8.9.93.

 


*               Edited by Prof. A. Enker

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 1993/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, October 9, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Prime Minister appointed respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner asks that the High Court of Justice order the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment.

 

Held: The Court, by majority vote, held that it would not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 1993/03

 

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel

v.

  1. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon
  2. The Attorney-General, Mr. Elyakim Rubenstein
  3. The Minister for Public Security, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[October 9, 2003]

Before Vice-President T. Or, Justices E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, D. Dorner, J. Türkel, D. Beinish, and E. Rivlin

 

Objection to an order nisi.

 

Facts: The Prime Minister appointed respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner asks that the High Court of Justice order the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment.

 

Held: The Court, by majority vote, held that it would not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: The Government, 2001

Basic Law: The Government, 1992

Basic Law: The Government, 1968

 

Statutes Cited:

Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971, § 7

Criminal Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law, 1981, §§ 14, 16

Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 3846/91 Maoz v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 46(5) 423

[2]HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney, IsrSC 51(3) 1

[3]HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 51(3) 46

[4]HCJ 2624/97, 2827/97, 2830/97Yedid Ronal, Adv. v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 51(3) 71

[5]HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93 and 4634/93Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 441

[6]HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing, IsrSC 47(2) 229

[7]HCJ 727/88 Awad v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 42(4) 487

[8]HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. The Prime Minister of Israel, IsrSC 55(2) 455

[9]HCJ 325/85 MK Muhammad Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel, IsrSC 39(3) 122

[10]HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel, IsrSC 49(1) 661

[11]428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 40(3) 505

[12]HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v.The Knesset Speaker, IsrSC 39(3) 141

[13]HCJ 306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee, IsrSC 35(4) 118

[14]HCJ 403/71 Alcourdi v. The National Labor Court, IsrSC 26(2) 66

[15]HCJ 222/68 Chugim Le’umiyim Agudah Reshuma v. Police Minister, IsrSC 24(2) 141

[16]HCJ 758/88 Kendel v. The Minister of Internal Affairs, IsrSC 46(4) 505

[17]HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, IsrSC 55(4) 800

[18]HCJ 971/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset Committee, IsrSC 56(6) 117

[19]HCJ 652/81 MK Yossi Sarid v. Knesset Speaker Menachem Svidor, IsrSC 36(2) 197

[20]HCJ 2136/95 Gutman v. Knesset Speaker Prof. Shevach Weiss, IsrSC 49(4) 845

[21]HCJ 3872/93 Mitrael Ltd. v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 47(5) 485

[22]HCJ 935/89 Uri Ganor, Adv. v. Attorney-General, IsrSC 44(2) 485

[23]HCJ 4140/95 Superpharm (Israel) Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Administration, IsrSC 54(1) 49

[24]HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel, IsrSC 41(4) 169

[25]CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative, IsrSC 49(4) 221

[26]HCJ 3434/96 Dr. Menachem Hoffnung v. The Knesset Speaker, IsrSC 50(3) 57

[27]HCJ 7111/95 The Center for Local Government v. The Knesset, IsrSC 50(3) 485

[28]CA 492/73 Schpeizer v. Israeli Sports Betting Council, IsrSC 29(1) 22

[29]HCJ 162/72 Dr. Kinross v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 27(1) 238

[30]APP 7440/97, LCA 6172 State of Israel v. Golan, IsrSC 52(1) 1

[31]RAP 1088/86 Mahmud v. Local Council for the Planning and Construction of the Eastern Galilee, IsrSC 44(2) 417

[32]HCJ 98/54 Lazerovitz v. Food Inspector, Jerusalem, IsrSC 10 40

[33]HCJ 4769/90 Zidan v. The Minister of Labor and Social –Welfare, IsrSC 47(2) 147

[34]CA 184/80 Eigler v. Magen Insurance Company, IsrSC 35(3) 518

[35]HCJ 3687/00 Ashkenazi v. Prime Minister Ehud Barak, IsrSC (unreported decision)

[36]HCJ 6029/99 Jonathan Pollard v. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, IsrSC 54(1) 241

[37]HCJ 4769/95 Ron Menachem v. The Minister of Transportation, IsrSC

[38]HCJ 561/75 Ashkenazi v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 30(3) 309

[39]HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. The Prime Minister, IsrSC 47(1) 37

[40]HCJ 8666/99 Temple Mount Faithful Movement v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 54(1) 199

[41]HCJ 46/00 Ayalon Jordan, Adv. v. The Prime Minister, (unreported decision)

[42]HCJ 6057/99 Victims of Terror Staff v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[43]HCJ 7307/98 Pollack v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[44]HCJ 2455/94 “B’tzedek Organization v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[45]HCJ 4877/93 Victims of Arab Terror v. State of Israel (unreported decision)

[46]HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. The President of Israel 5 801

[47]3094/93 Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. State of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 404

[48]HCJ 194/93 MK Gonen Segev v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, IsrSC 49(5) 57

[49]HCJ 251/88 Wajia Udeh v. The Head of the Jaljulia Local Council, IsrSC 42(4) 837

[50]Dis.App. 4123/95 Or v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner, IsrSC 49(5) 184

[51]HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney-General, IsrSC 52(4) 547

[52]CA 6763/98 Ram Carmi v. State of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 418

[53]HCJ 531/79 Likud Faction of Petah Tikva v. City Council of Petah Tikva, IsrSC 34(2) 566

[54]HCJ 244/86 Revivo v. The Head of the Ofakim Local Council, IsrSC 42(3) 183

[55]CA 6983/94 Shimon Pachima v. Michael Peretz, IsrSC 51(5) 829

[56]HCJ 7805/00 Roni Aloni v. Comptroller of the Jerusalem Municipality, IsrSC 57(4) 577

[57]HCJ 3975/95 Prof. Shmuel Caniel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 53(5) 459

[58]HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 45(1) 28

[59]HCJ 6673/01 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 56(1) 799

[60]HCJ 142/70 Shapira v. Local Committee of Chamber of Advocates, IsrSC 25(1) 325

[61]HCJ 2671/98 Women’s Lobby v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare, IsrSC 52(3) 630

[62]HCJ 103/96 Pinchas Cohen, Adv.  v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 50(4) 309

[63]HCJ 7256/95 Fishler v. The Inspector General of the Israel Police, IsrSC 50(5) 1

[64]HCJ 2682/98 Appel v. The State Attorney, IsrSC 55(3) 134

[65]HCJ 4539/92 Kablero v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 50(3) 50

[66]HCJ 442/71 Lanski v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 26(2) 337

[67]CA 5709/95 Ben-Shlomo v. Director of The Value Added Tax Authority, IsrSC 52(4) 241

[68]HCJ 164/97 Kontram Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance, IsrSC 52(1) 289

[69]HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, IsrSC 48(5) 412

[70]HCJ 1227/98 Malevsky v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 52(4) 690

[71]HCJ 932/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Chairman of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments, IsrSC 53(3) 769

[72]HCJ 4668/01 MK Yossi Sarid v. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, IsrSC 56(2) 265

[73]HCJ 5795/97 MK Yossi Sarid v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 51(4) 799

[74]HCJ 1635/90 Zersevsky v The Prime Minister, IsrSC 45(1) 749

[75]HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, IsrSC 49(1) 758

[76]CA 4012/96 Benny Shachaf Freights and Investments (1976) Ltd v. First International Bank of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 492

[77]CA 3602/97 Income Tax and Property Tax Commissioner, Minister of Finance, State of Israel v. Daniel Shachar, IsrSC 56(2) 297

[78]HCJ 7279/98 MK Sarid v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 740

[79]HCJ 595/89 Shimon v. Appointee of Ministry of the Interior, Southern District, IsrSC 44(1) 409

[80]HCJ 1715/97 The Israel Association of Investment Managers v. The Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51(4) 367

[81]HCJ 288/00 Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 55(5) 673

[82]CrimA State of Israel v. Zeguri, IsrSC 56(4) 401

[83]CrimA 6251/94 Ben-Ari v. State of Israel, IsrSC 49(3) 45

[84]HCJ 3679/94 National Association of Directors and Authorized Signatories of the First International Bank of Israel v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Labor Court, IsrSC 49(1) 573

[85]HCJ 279/60 Gil Theaters v. Ya’ari, IsrSC 15 673

[86]HCJ 6499/99 The National Religious Party v. Rabbi Shlomo Ben-Ezra, IsrSC 53(5) 606

[87]CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 50(5) 221

[88]HCJ 320/96 Yael German v. The Municipal Council of Herzliya, IsrSC 52(2) 222

[89]CrimApp 8087/95 Za’ada v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 50(2) 133

[90]HCJ 3132/92 Mushlav v. The District Committee for Planning and Building, Northern District, IsrSC 47(3) 741

 

United States Cases:

[91]Marbury v. Madison

[92]Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)

[93]INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)

 

Israeli Books Cited

[94]Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Statutory Interpretation (1995)

[95]I Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority (1996)

[96]Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation (1995)

[97]II Amnon Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 687 (5th ed. 1997)

 

Israeli Articles Cited:

[98]Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Law, 3 Mishpat Umimshal 408 (1996)

[99]Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of Regulations  , 21 HaPraklit 463 (1965)

[100]Itzchak Zamir, Law and Politics, in Klinghoffer, Public Law 209 (1993)

[101]Itzchak Zamir, Political Appointments, 20 Mishpatim 23 (1990)

[102]Avigdor Klagsbald, Public Duty, ‘Criminal Past’ and Administrative Evidence, 2 HaMishpat 93 (1995)

[103]Daphne Barak-Erez, The High Court of Justice as Attorney-General, 5(2) Plilim 219 (1997)

[104]Aharon Barak, On Power and Values in Israel, in I A Collection of Writings 382 (H. H. Cohen & Y. Zamir ed. 2000)

[105]Aharon Barak, Conflict of Interest in the Performance of Office, 10 Mishpatim 11 (1980)

[106]Itzchak Zamir, Ethics in Politics, 17 Mishpatim 255-58 (1988)

 

Foreign Books Cited:

[107]Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 22 (2d ed. 1961)

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[108]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 114A

[109]Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 10:1

[110]Exodus 31:2, 35:30

[111]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 55a

[112]Shulkhan Arukh, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:4

[113]Arukh Hashulkhan, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:8

[114]Ribash, Responsa 271

[115]Rabbi A.Y. Kook, Be’er Eliyahu

[116]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 7b

[117]Maimonides, Laws of Temple Vessels, 4:21

[118]Maimonides Reponsa, Chapter 111

[119]Shulkhan Arukh, Chosen Hamishpat, 53:25

[120]Zaken Abraham Responsa, Yoreh Deah, 30

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice E. Rivlin

1. This petition was submitted by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel. Petitioner seeks to prevent the appointment of respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the office of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner’s central assertion is that, because of his connection to four specific affairs, Hanegbi is unfit to serve in this capacity. The details of these affairs are described below.

The Facts and the Petition

2. The elections to the Sixteenth Knesset took place at the beginning of 2003. After the elections, respondent 1, in his capacity as Prime Minister, was charged by the President with the task of forming a new government. Respondent 1 decided to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security. Once the intentions of respondent 1 were made public, but before the new government had been sworn in, this petition was submitted. The petition asked that we order the Prime Minister not to appoint respondent 3. Petitioner further sought an interim order against this appointment.

The petition details several affairs in which respondent 3 was involved and which, it is asserted, make him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

The first affair occurred in 1982. The affair culminated in the filing of an indictment against Hanegbi, who was subsequently convicted. At the time, Hanegbi was a student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was involved in an altercation on campus. The Magistrate Court convicted Hanegbi of brawling in a public place, and imposed a suspended prison sentence and a fine.

The details of the second affair were described at length in HCJ 3846/91 Pinchas Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 423. In 1982, Hanegbi, together with three others, filed a complaint with the police. The complaint alleged that several members of the Student Union and the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had carried out “the greatest fraud in the history of Israeli aviation.” After the police investigation, a number of people were criminally charged, including Pinchas Maoz, who had been serving as external legal advisor to ISTA. Maoz was subsequently acquitted by the Magistrate Court. Hanegbi had been a witness in the case and, according to the court’s opinion, “factual truth was not always a guiding light” in his testimony. The court noted that “the witness did not provide precise answers and avoided topics that did not square with his version of the events.” After this court case, Maoz and others attempted to have Hanegbi indicted for perjury, relaying misleading information, or presenting conflicting testimonies. The Attorney-General decided that the chance of conviction was too small to warrant an indictment. Similarly, this Court decided, “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth,” that it would not intervene in the decision of the Attorney-General.

The third affair concerns Hanegbi’s appointment of Roni Bar-On to the office of Attorney-General. At the time, Hanegbi was serving as Minister of Justice. It was alleged that Hanegbi had misled the Government and the Prime Minister about the opinion of the President of the Supreme Court regarding the appointment. The police recommended that Hanegbi be prosecuted for fraud and breach of trust. However, the Attorney-General decided to close the case for lack of evidence. A memorandum of the State Attorney’s Office criticized Hanegbi’s conduct and characterized it as “a deviation from acceptable standards of behavior.” The State Attorney’s Office, however, did not believe that Hanegbi’s actions amounted to a criminal offense. For a more extensive treatment of this affair and its ramifications, see HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. The State Attorney’s Office [2], at 1; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [hereinafter – Bar-On [3]], at 46; HCJ 2624/97, 2827/97, and 2830/97 Yedid Ronal, Adv. v. The Government of Israel [4], at 71.

At this point it is important to mention that, in Bar-On  [3], petitioner requested that Hanegbi be removed from his position as Minister of Justice. That petition made claims that are very similar to those asserted here. That petition was rejected, and we shall expand on the significance of that case and its ramifications for the current petition.

Finally, we come to the fourth affair, and the most important. It constitutes the chief addition to the facts already laid out in Bar-On [3]. The affair involved the actions of Hanegbi who, at the time, was serving as the head of the “Derech Tzleha” association. As in the previous affairs, here, too, a decision was made not to indict Hanegbi. The Attorney-General, however, saw fit to publish a “public report” on the issue detailing the findings of the police investigation. It described how, in 1994, Hanegbi and MK Avraham Burg prepared a private bill in the Knesset, entitled “The National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Bill.” The purpose of the draft legislation was to improve road safety and, to further this goal, government body would be established to spearhead the campaign against traffic accidents. The bill was placed before the Knesset and passed a preliminary reading. It was then transferred to the Knesset Finance Committee for consideration. The Committee established a subcommittee, with Hanegbi at its head, with the task of preparing the bill for the next stages of legislation.

While he worked for the enactment of the National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Bill, Hanegbi founded a non-profit organization called Derech Tzleha. At first he served as chairman of the organization, and later he became its director-general. He received a salary and benefits for his work. According to the police findings detailed in the report, “MK Hanegbi received from the organization, directly or indirectly, the vast majority of the sum [raised by the organization – amounting to approximately NIS 375,000] in the form of his salary, a company car, reimbursement of expenses, a cellular phone, as well as in the form of a notice of support which was published three days before the Likud primaries.” After his appointment to the office of Health Minister in 1996, Hanegbi resigned as director-general of the organization.

Hanegbi was examined by the Knesset Ethics Committee regarding his involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair. The Committee concluded that Hanegbi had placed himself in a situation involving a conflict of interests, and had benefited from work performed outside of his work at the Knesset. Hanegbi was censured by the Committee and his pay docked for two months.

3. Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair were fully investigated by the police. The police recommended prosecuting Hanegbi for accepting a bribe, fraud, breach of trust, and other offenses. Even the State Attorney’s Office held initially that, while Hanegbi could not be indicted for accepting a bribe, he could be indicted for fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, obtaining by fraud, and falsifying corporate documents. A hearing was held and, following a chain of events not relevant to this case, the Attorney-General decided that, lack of evidence, and in line with the opinion of the State Attorney, no indictment could be filed against Hanegbi. In the report, the Attorney-General summarized his opinion:

In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered filing an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied.

 

The Attorney-General became aware of Hanegbi’s possible appointment to the post of Minister of Public Security. At this point, he presented his opinion to the Prime Minister:

Although according to statute and judicial precedent there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment itself is prima facie problematic from a civic perspective.

 

      Despite the Attorney-General’s counsel, the Prime Minister decided to follow through with Hanegbi’s appointment to the office of Minister of Public Security. It should be noted that, during his previous term as Prime Minister, after the elections to the Fifteenth Knesset, Sharon had resolved not to appoint Hanegbi to serve as a minister in any office responsible for law enforcement. This was in accordance with “advice mainly from a civic perspective,” which he had received from the Attorney-General.

4.   Petitioner asserts that, in all of the above affairs, as well as in other situations of lesser significance, Hanegbi fell afoul of the law and of ethical principles. It is true that, aside from the brawling affair in 1982, Hanegbi was never actually served with an indictment. However, petitioner believes that Hanegbi’s involvement in each of the above affairs, certainly when these are viewed in aggregate, makes the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him to the office of Minister of Public Security unreasonable in the extreme. In this context, it is necessary to give added weight to the decision of the Ethics Committee regarding Hanegbi and the reports published by the State Attorney’s Office and the Attorney-General regarding the role Hanegbi played in the Bar-On and Derech Tzleha affairs. Petitioner argues that the facts that emerge from all the above affairs establish grounds for intervening in the decision of the Prime Minister in keeping with the “rule of administrative evidence.” In relation to Hanegbi’s appointment to the position of Minister of Public Security, the provisions of criminal law are not the only parameter. Petitioner further argues that Hanegbi’s appointment would damage the effectiveness of the police and its public image.

Petitioner further argued that Hanegbi was investigated on more than one occasion by the police, who recommended that he be served with an indictment. This being the case, petitioner alleges, it is reasonable to expect that “innumerable situations involving a conflict of interest will arise should Hanegbi serve in that capacity.” In particular, a conflict of interest would undoubtedly arise in considerations of promotion for any police officers responsible for investigating him in the past, or when setting budgets for various divisions of the police.

5.   Respondents, by contrast, are of the opinion that there are no grounds for interfering with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security. The Prime Minister acted within the parameters of his authority, and the affairs raised by petitioner do not establish that his decision was unreasonable in the extreme. The Prime Minister, they point out, diligently weighed all of the pertinent issues. He considered Hanegbi’s professional abilities, his vast experience, his suitability for the job, as well as the view of the Attorney-General concerning the appointment. The Prime Minister also took into account parliamentary and political factors relating to the formation of the government. Respondents argued that the balance struck by the Prime Minister among these various considerations does not deviate from the decisions of this Court.

Respondents emphasize the wide “range of reasonableness” afforded by the courts to a decision of the Prime Minister in a case of this sort. They point out that, as opposed to earlier cases where this Court did order the Prime Minister to remove a minister or deputy-minister from office, in our case no indictment has been filed against Hanegbi since 1982. With regards to the Derech Tzleha affair, as with the other affairs in Bar-On [3], the case was closed for lack of evidence. Therefore, Respondent 3 is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In any event, there is no justification for arriving at a conclusion different than the one reached by the Court in Bar-On [3]. This is especially pertinent in light of the fact that the current version of Basic Law: The Government, as opposed to the previous version of that law, contains an explicit provision for terminating the office of a minister convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. The respondents further point out that the decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security was approved by a vote of confidence in the Knesset.

Regarding the petitioner’s concerns that the appointment will raise a conflict of interest concerning the police officers who investigated him, Hanegbi stresses that he bears no grudge against those officers. Respondents maintain that there are no conflicting interests whatsoever. It cannot be claimed that the hypothetical fear of negative sentiments between Hanegbi and his investigators warrants intervention in a decision of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, Israel Police is an autonomous body, and the decisions of the minister regarding the appointment of senior officers are subject to the rules of administrative law.

The petition asks us to order the Prime Minister not to appoint respondent 3 to the office of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner requested an injunction to prevent Hanegbi from serving in this capacity. This was rejected. The petition concentrates on his eligibility for such appointment. However, since Hanegbi has been serving in this function for some time now, the petition actually focuses on whether he should continue to hold the office. There is a difference between appointment and termination of office. However, this difference is in fact irrelevant when examining the Prime Minister’s discretion, as we shall explain. See also HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93 and 4634/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel [hereinafter – Pinhasi], [5] at 469.

On March 10, 2003, a panel of three judges heard the parties’ arguments and an order nisi was issued against the Prime Minister. On August 11, 2003 we decided to expand the panel hearing the case, and final arguments were heard by the expanded bench on August 26, 2003.

In my opinion, the petition should be denied.

The Normative Framework

6.   The Government is composed of a Prime Minister and other ministers – section 5(a) of Basic Law: The Government. Section 7(a) of the Basic Law sets down that:

When a new Government has to be constituted, the President of the State shall, after consultation with representatives of party groups in the Knesset, assign the task of forming a Government to a Knesset Member who has notified him that he is prepared to accept the task.

 

Once the Government has been formed, it presents itself to the Knesset, announces the basic lines of its policy, its composition and the distribution of functions among the ministers, and asks for a vote of confidence from the Knesset. After the vote of confidence, the Government has been formed, and the ministers assume office. Section 13(d) of the Basic Law. The Knesset Member who formed the Government becomes its head. Section 13(c) of the Basic Law.

 

We see from here that the task of forming the Government is assigned by the President to the Knesset Member who is the designated Prime Minister. We further see that the Government is formed once the Knesset approves it.

 

The Basic Law adds that the Government may appoint an additional minister. The Government must notify the Knesset of this and, upon receiving the approval of the Knesset, the additional minister assumes office. Section 15 of the Basic Law. The Prime Minister is further authorized to remove a minister from his post, as stated in section 22(b) of the Basic Law:

 

The Prime Minister may, after notifying the Government of his intention to do so, remove a minister from his post.

 

7.   Section 6 of the Basic Law lists a number of criteria for ministers to be considered fit to hold office. These include:

(c)(1) A person who was convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment, and seven years have not yet passed since the day on which he finished serving his term of imprisonment or since the handing down of his sentence – whichever was later, shall not be appointed minister, unless the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee rules that the circumstances of the offense do not involve moral turpitude.

(2) The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee shall not so rule if a court has determined that the offense involved moral turpitude.

 

Likewise, we find in section 23(b):

 

Should a minister be convicted by a court, it shall state in its verdict whether the offense involves moral turpitude; should the court so state, the minister’s tenure shall cease on the date of such verdict.

 

We find a similar provision for the service of a deputy-minister in section 27 of the Basic Law. It should be noted that section 16(b) of the 1992 version of the Basic Law: The Government, provided that:

A person convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and ten years not having passed since the date on which he finished serving his period of imprisonment, may not be appointed as a minister.

However, the 1992 Basic Law contained no provision requiring the removal of a minister convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.

A careful examination of the provisions of the Basic Law reveals, therefore, that the Prime Minister is given the principal authority in the formation of the Government. He has the responsibility of choosing the Government’s ministers, of adding ministers and removing them. Nonetheless, the ministers assume their offices only after an expression of confidence in the Government. A conviction may prevent the appointment of a minister, or his continuation in office, as per sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law, as detailed above.

Returning to the case at hand, no one disputes that none of the criteria that would render Hanegbi unfit for office, set out in sections 6(c) and 23(b), have been met. These criteria, as we have seen, deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime. Hanegbi, however, was never convicted – or even indicted – except for the brawling affair in 1982. This affair does not constitute an impediment to assuming office according to the Basic Law. As such no issue of authority or “statutory eligibility” is at stake here. The only issue is Prime Ministerial discretion: Was there a flaw in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security which warrants the intervention of this Court? On this question this Court has previously ruled:

 

We must distinguish between questions of competence, (or authority), and questions of discretion. The absence of an express statutory provision regarding the fitness of someone with a criminal past establishes the candidate’s competence. However, it does not preclude the possibility of considering his past within the framework of exercising the administrative discretion given to the authority making the appointment. Indeed, the criminal past of a candidate for public office is a relevant consideration, which the authority making the appointment is entitled and even obligated to take into account before making the appointment.

 

See HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing [6], at 256-57.

 

8. As such, even though there is no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, this alone does not render superfluous the need to examine the Prime Minister’s discretion to choose Hanegbi. “Fitness is one issue; discretion quite another.” See Pinhasi [5], at 457; see also HCJ 727/88 Awad v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at 491, and HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. The Prime Minister of Israel [8], at 477. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to note that the criteria for eligibility laid down by the legislature are not irrelevant to the discretion granted to the Prime Minister. The more we depart from the statutory criteria, the more difficult it will be to find justification for interfering with the Prime Minister’s discretion. Indeed, the legislature has established that it is specifically the conviction of a minister of an offense involving moral turpitude which renders him unfit to continue in office. It would not be a simple matter, therefore, for the Court to rule that the minister should also be rendered unfit in situations where he was acquitted of wrongdoing, or when it was even decided not to indict him. We shall return to this point later.

 

The petition calls for an examination of the Prime Minister’s judgment in appointing Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security. However, before undertaking this examination, we must first delineate the criteria for judicial review of such decisions.

 

Judicial Review

 

9. All organs of government are subject to judicial review. See HCJ 325/85 MK Muhammad Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel [9], at 127-28. The power of judicial review over decisions of the Knesset, the Government, and the other governing institutions is the cornerstone of a democracy which upholds the rule of law. It reflects the formal rule of law, meaning that all of the organs of government are subordinate to the law. It also means that everything is subject to judicial review, which is intended to guarantee that the law is kept. See HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel [10], at 698. The law governs all matters. “The reach of Government is high, but the law reaches higher than all.” 428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel [11], at 585. The rule of law prevails, not the rule of man. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) [91]. The rule of law requires us to balance the diverse values, principles, and interests of a democratic society. The government is empowered to exercise its discretion in a manner that ensures a just balance of the appropriate considerations. See Eisenberg [6].

 

This perception of the purpose of judicial review is reflected in the ideal relationship between the three branches of government. Each branch is separate and enjoys freedom to fulfill its role. However, each branch is also framed by – and subordinate to – the constitution and the law.

 

The function of the judicial branch is to ensure that none of the other branches overstep their bounds, and that they act in accordance with the normative provisions by which they are bound.

 

See HCJ 1843/93, [10] at 699; HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v.The Knesset Speaker [12], at 141.

 

The doctrine of the separation of powers does not imply that each branch may act as it wishes. Separation of powers means that each branch is independent in dealing with its own affairs, so long as it operates within the bounds of its authority.

 

Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Law, 3 Mishpat Umimshal 408 (1996) [98]. See also II Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law: Constitutional Interpretation 256-57 (1993) [96]; HCJ 306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee [13], at 141. The Court’s power to review other government bodies is a corollary of the fact that it is the branch responsible for the interpretation of the law, see Kach [12], at 152.

 

All of these principles – the rule of law, the separation of powers, the checks and balances that accompany this separation, the power of judicial review, and the other mechanisms of democracy – form the central pillars of a democratic society. They constitute the essential conditions for the preservation of human rights. They form the nucleus of any democratic society that strives to promote human welfare.

 

In light of the above, it has been stated on more than one occasion that this Court is charged with overseeing the legality and reasonableness of the activities of the State. See HCJ 403/71 Alcourdi v. The National Labor Court [14], at 72. The Court’s powers of judgment and judicial review of government authorities constitute “an integral part of a truly democratic society, and anyone undermining this is liable to topple one of the pillars of the state.” HCJ 222/68 Chugim Le’umiyim Agudah Reshuma v. Police Minister [15], at 172. This is because:

 

Absolutism, however benevolent, is the enemy of freedom. We are free people, and one who is born free or knows freedom will subjugate himself neither to another person nor to an absolute opinion.

 

See HCJ 758/88 Kendel v. The Minister of Internal Affairs [16], at 528 (Cheshin, J).

 

10. At the same time, care must be taken to distinguish between the power of the Court to exercise judicial review over other branches of the government – a power which, as stated above, is extremely broad in nature – and the Court’s readiness to interfere with the decisions of the other branches within the spheres of their authority. The question of the actual existence of judicial review is separate from the issue of when judicial review should be exercised. See Miari [9], at 128; HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee [17], at 809. This Court has adopted different principles in a variety of cases pertaining to the judicial review of actions and decisions of government authorities. The common denominator among these principles is an attempt to exhibit judicial self-restraint. Among these principles we may specify the “range of reasonableness,” the “presumption of suitability,” the “presumption of lawfulness,” the principle that the Court will not overrule the discretion of one branch of government, and the limits set by administrative law. These principles are not mere lip service to the limitations on judicial review. Rather, they are an indivisible and necessary part of it. Their application depends on the type of body under review and the power that has been exercised.

 

11. To be sure, the decision whether to exercise judicial review will depend on an examination of the authority being reviewed. See Livnat [17], at 809. To this end one must take into account the status of the body in question, its position in the system of government, the extent and nature of the powers granted to it, whether the body was elected or appointed, and other similar factors. Thus, for example, when the Court proceeds to review decisions of the Knesset, it takes into account the special status of this body, and acts with the required caution and self-restraint necessitated by this status. After all, the Knesset is the elected body of the State. It is elected by the citizens of the State, and it has the power to legislate laws and enact a constitution for the State. See HCJ 971/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset Committee [18], at 548; and HCJ 652/81 MK Yossi Sarid v. Knesset Speaker Menachem Svidor [19], at 197.

 

The special status of the Knesset, as set forth in the Basic Laws and in the structure of our democracy, requires that the Court exercise its discretion in performing judicial review of its actions with caution and self-restraint.

 

See Livnat [17], at 809. See also 2136/95 Gutman v. Knesset Speaker Prof. Shevach Weiss [20], at 851. Similar sentiments have been voiced regarding decisions of the Government:

 

The status of the Government as the executive branch of the State is special, for it executes the will of the State, as provided in section 1 of Basic Law: The Government.

 

See HCJ 3872/93 Mitrael Ltd. v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Religious Affairs [21], at 497.

 

12. The criteria for the exercise of judicial review are derived not only from the identity of the body subject to review. They are also derived from the character of the decision under scrutiny. See Livnat [17], at 809. The nature of the power which was or was not exercised is especially significant for setting the limits of judicial review. See Sarid [19], at 201. In one case, Justice Zamir expanded on this:

 

The question of whether an administrative decision is unreasonable in the extreme depends on the limits of the range of reasonableness. This delineates the extent to which the administrative authority may employ its discretion for the purpose of making decisions. The range of reasonableness of every administrative authority depends on the nature of its power, the language and purpose of its authorizing law, the identity of the authorized body, the issue addressed by the power, and whether the power is exercised mainly on the basis of factual considerations, policy considerations, or professional criteria, such as medical or engineering evaluations. The range of reasonableness varies according to these factors: it may widen or narrow depending on the circumstances.

Bar-On [3], at 57. Similar sentiments were expressed by Vice-President (then Justice) Or:

The range of reasonableness delineates the area within which the decisions of an authority are reasonable, meaning that there are no grounds for the intervention of the Court. Yet this area is not uniform in all cases. It may change in accordance with the circumstances of the specific case. It is derived from the nature of the subject being judged. It is derived from the nature of the relevant values in any given matter.

See Yahav [2], at 28.

In other words, the “range of reasonableness” is influenced by the “bounds of deference.” Reasonableness is a normative concept. It may be defined as the identification of the relevant considerations and the balance which is struck between these considerations according to their weight. See HCJ 935/89 Uri Ganor, Adv. v. Attorney-General [22], at 513. When reviewing an act of the executive branch, the Court determines whether a reasonable authority would have been permitted to act in a similar manner. Often enough there is more than one decision which a reasonable authority could make. In these circumstances, the authority may act within the “range of reasonableness.” Any decision that comes within the range of reasonableness will not be subject to the Court’s intervention. The Court may only intervene in those decisions which deviate in an extreme manner from the range of reasonableness. Ganor [22], at 514.

Deference, by contrast, is an institutional concept. Deference means that, in examining decisions of other authorities acting within the boundaries of their authority, the Court will not evaluate the wisdom of these decisions or overrule their discretion. The Court does not regard itself as a supra-governing body. See 1843/93 [10], at 499; see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) [92]; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) [93]. This Court recognizes the fact that:

The Knesset and the Government were elected by the public. They were allocated certain areas within which they are empowered to act in the name of the public. The Court recognizes that these areas were allocated to the Knesset and the Government, and not to the Court. It is also cognizant of the fact that in these areas preference was given to the Knesset and the Government over the Court. The body entrusted with the promulgation of laws is the Knesset. Likewise, the authority to determine social and economic policies, as well as the authority to execute laws, was given to the Government. The underlying principles of democracy, among them the separation of powers, require that the Court not trespass the boundaries of the Knesset and the Government.

See I Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority 89-90 (1996) [95].

13. Judicial review thus requires striking a balance between respecting decisions of government authorities within their area of power and the need to preserve the rule of law and protect human rights. This is one of the axioms of democracy. This balance is not static, but changes according to the character of the power under discussion.

While the Court has determined that it holds the power to scrutinize the legality of the decisions of the Knesset, it has itself curtailed this power: It does not intervene in the decisions of the Knesset, even when these run contrary to law, unless they are capable of harming the fabric of parliamentary life or the foundations of the constitution. Likewise, the Court is generally reluctant to substitute its own discretion for the discretion of the Government or any other administrative authority. For the most part, the Court refrains from intervening in matters of policy. This includes not only foreign policy, but also social and economic policy. Only in extreme circumstances is the Court willing to invalidate administrative decisions due to a lack of reasonableness.

See [95], at 90. See also HCJ 4140/95 Superpharm (Israel) Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Administration [23], at 69.

Based on the above, this Court held, in HCJ 971/99 [18] that, in determining the character of judicial review, a thorough analysis of the act of government under review should be undertaken. In that judgment we dealt with the judicial review of Knesset decisions. We defined three broad categories of decisions: completed acts of legislation; intra-parliamentary processes; and quasi-judicial decisions. The Court held that, when dealing with quasi-judicial activity of the Knesset, its judicial review will be “ordinary.” In such situations, the Knesset does not differ from  any other quasi-judicial body. See HCJ 1843/93, [10] at 701; HCJ 652/81, [19] at 202; HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel [24], at 195. In quasi-judicial decisions, the Knesset is involved neither in “political” activity nor in its own internal legislative processes, and the need to preserve the basic fairness of the parliamentary process prevails.

The situation is different when we review intra-parliamentary processes of the Knesset – decisions affecting the Knesset’s own internal guidelines and working procedures. Judicial review may be exercised here only with caution. A balance must be struck between the rule of law, which requires every political entity to respect the law, and the principle that the internal workings of the Knesset are its own affairs, that “belong to the legislative authority under the separation of powers doctrine.” See Sarid [19], at 202-03. Therefore, the Court will intervene in such decisions only where significant harm is caused to the fabric of parliamentary life and the foundations of the constitution. HCJ 652/81 [19] at 204; HCJ 1843/93, [10], at 700.

In reviewing the constitutionality of a law passed by the Knesset, however, additional principles also come into play. Ordinary legislation must respect those human rights enshrined in the Basic Laws, and may not violate these except according to the guidelines of those Basic Laws. Legislation will be presumed to be constitutional; this is a consequence of the requirement not to blur the boundaries between the authorities. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative, [25] at 574. This presumption of constitutionality, however, does not apply to the issue of whether a law that does infringe a constitutional right fulfills the requirements of the Limitations Clause. See Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation (1995) [96]. This Court must  respect the law, as an expression of the will of the people. Therefore, before this Court strikes down a law, it must thoroughly scrutinize its language as well as its purpose. It must be stringent and must be completely convinced that the law is irreparably flawed. See HCJ 3434/96 Dr. Menachem Hoffnung v. The Knesset Speaker [26], at 57. This Court will only strike down a law in a clear case of significant damage to fundamental rights or values. See HCJ 7111/95 The Center for Local Government v. The Knesset [27], at 485.

Therefore, when reviewing the decisions of other government authorities, this Court takes into account the status and function of the body under review, along with the character of its decision. These, in turn, influence how we exercise judicial review and the criteria that guide it. Our statements in HCJ 971/99 [18] regarding the Knesset and its committees can also be applied to decisions of the executive branch and the Prime Minister.

14. Judicial Review of Decisions of the Government and the Prime Minister

Any government is subject to judicial review… Therefore the Court must ask itself – when reviewing the reasonableness and proportionality of the government’s decisions – whether the decision is one that a reasonable government would be permitted to make. The Court should not ask itself what decision it would have made had it been in the government’s place.

See Weiss [8], at 470.

We review decisions of the government and the Prime Minister, just as we review decisions of any other administrative body.

The government’s discretion, like the discretion of any minister within the government or any other authority, is constrained by legal guidelines, and the Court is charged with upholding these guidelines. Among other things, the government must exercise its authority based on relevant considerations, not on external factors. These must fall within the range of reasonableness and proportionality.

Id, at 477-78. Any authority may at some point make a decision which is not reasonable or is not in line with administrative law. The government is no exception. See CA 492/73 Schpeizer v. Israeli Sports Betting Council [28], at 22, 26.

Much authority is vested in the hands of the government. The exercise of its powers is examined by the Court, pursuant to the principles of administrative and public law. As with the legislature, here too the extent of our review depends both on the status of the body under review as well as on the character of the decision being scrutinized.

With regard to the status of the body under review:  This Court must be mindful of the status of the government. This is especially true when speaking of the “core” meaning of the term “government” – “government in the sense of ‘Cabinet,’ or group of ministers; the  body that is  responsible for defining the policy of the executive branch.” See II Amnon Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 687 (5th ed. 1997) [97]. The government is the executive arm of the State. See section 1 of Basic Law: The Government. In examining the discretion of the government, the Prime Minister, and other ministers, this Court must consider their status at the highest tier of the executive branch. See Mitrael [21], at 497; HCJ 162/72 Dr. Kinross v. The State of Israel [29], at 238. Similarly, this Court must delve deeply into the nature of the action or decision under judicial review. The bounds of the “range of reasonableness” regarding decisions of the government or any of its members widen or narrow depending on the type of the power exercised. See APP 7440/97, LCA 6172 State of Israel v. Golan [30], at 17-18. Indeed, at the outset of any judicial review of decisions or actions of the government, this Court adjusts its sights according to the act. Hence, in certain contexts, the power of judicial review is exercised with great caution.

Thus, for example, all governmental acts enjoy a presumption of legality, see RAP 1088/86 Mahmud v. Local Council for the Planning and Construction of the Eastern Galilee [31], at 417. This assumption applies with even greater force to regulations. See HCJ 98/54 Lazerovitz v. Food Inspector, Jerusalem [32], at 48; compare Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of Regulations  , 21 HaPraklit 463 (1965) [99]. The courts have developed different principles for review.

The purpose of these principles, at the heart of judicial policy, is to protect the constitutional standards laid down by an administrative authority. Their purpose is also to protect the expectations of the general public which created these standards.

See HCJ 4769/90 Zidan v. The Minister of Labor and Social –Welfare [33], at 171-2.

The Court will not rush to strike down regulations as unreasonable, and will not usurp the place of another authority. Therefore, this Court will strike down regulations only if they are found to be totally unreasonable. Id. See also CA 184/80 Eigler v. Magen Insurance Company [34], at 523; Kinross [29].

On another level, when this Court examines the working methods of the government and its committees, it must act similar to when it reviews the Knesset’s intra-parliamentary processes. Regarding the working methods of the government, see section 31(e) and (f) of the Basic Law. See also Rubinstein, [99] at 720-24. This being an internal matter of the government, and in light of the political implications that the issue may have, this Court only exercises judicial review with the utmost caution.

15. Such caution is also employed when dealing with basic matters of policy. The Court is not accustomed to intervening in “patently political matters.” See HCJ 3687/00 Ashkenazi v. Prime Minister Ehud Barak [35], at 1040. The Court is not a part of the government, and it will not manage its affairs.  See HCJ 6029/99 Jonathan Pollard v. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak [36], at 241. This is especially true concerning the power of the government to manage foreign policy and the security of the State.

The strength of the government’s authority, and the nature of the issue at hand – foreign relations and security, war and peace – imply that the judiciary must grant the government wide latitude in such areas. Within that range the Court will not substitute the government’s discretion with  its own.

See Weiss [8], at 471-72.

With respect to decisions on political matters, or decisions pertaining to economic policy, the Court will intervene only in very exceptional circumstances. For the most part it will leave these matters to the political arena.

The choice between different policies is a matter for the government, and policy is clearly the Knesset’s domain. A choice which falls within the range of reasonableness is not a matter for the Court .

See Weiss [8]. Therefore,

The Court will not instruct the Prime Minister or the members of his government to adopt a policy of privatization or nationalization. A matter that lies within the government’s power is a matter for the government and its ministers to decide, not for the Court.

Id. See HCJ 4769/95 Ron Menachem v. The Minister of Transportation [37], at 235; HCJ 561/75 Ashkenazi v. The Minister of Defense [38], at 309; HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. The Prime Minister [39], at 37; HCJ 8666/99 Temple Mount Faithful Movement v. The Attorney-General [40], at 199; HCJ 46/00 Ayalon Jordan, Adv. v. The Prime Minister [41], at 5; HCJ 6057/99 Victims of Terror Staff v. The Government of Israel [42], at 284; HCJ 7307/98 Pollack v. The Government of Israel [43], at 424; HCJ 2455/94 “B’tzedek Organization v. The Government of Israel [44], at 292; HCJ 4877/93 Victims of Arab Terror v. State of Israel [45], at 257; Itzchak Zamir, “Law and Politics,” in Klinghoffer’s work on Public Law 209 (1993) [100].

16. This brings us to another matter, where this Court has only limited powers of intervention. I refer to the formation of a government. This includes the building of a coalition, the appointment of ministers and deputy-ministers, the addition and removal of ministers, the distribution of tasks among the ministers, the transfer of power from one minister to another, the consolidation, division, termination and formation of ministries, and the transfer of responsibilities from one ministry to another. See section 31 of the Basic Law. Compare  HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. The President of Israel [46], at 814 (Smoira, J.). We will focus on one of these powers – the power of the Prime Minister to choose ministers and assign them roles.

Judicial Review of Decisions Relating to the Formation of the Government

17. The discretion of the Prime Minister regarding the appointment of a minister is certainly subject to the review of this Court. This applies to any kind of appointment. In terms of the fundamental power of judicial review, the selection of a minister is no different from any decision made by the Prime Minister, or any other minister or public authority. All these decisions are examined in light of the principles of administrative law. It should be noted that:

Not only the exercise of authority in unreasonable circumstances, but also the failure to exercise a discretionary power due to unreasonable considerations, can lead to the conclusion that the decision is invalid.

See 3094/93 Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. State of Israel [hereinafter: Deri [47]], at 419-20. Therefore, both the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a person and his decision not to remove one from office are subject to the accepted standards of reasonableness, integrity, proportionality, good faith, and the absence of arbitrariness or discrimination.

The importance of judicial review in this context stems from the fact that the Prime Minister’s decision that a particular individual shall serve in a particular position, or that one person shall replace another, may have a large influence both on the functioning of a public authority and the public’s confidence in that authority. With respect to the latter, it has already been held that:

The key to the existence of a public service worthy of the title is the public’s confidence in its integrity… Public confidence is the backbone of public authorities, and it enables them to fulfill their function.

See Eisenberg [6], at 261 (Barak, P.); see also Itzchak Zamir, Political Appointments, 20 Mishpatim 23 (1990) [101]. It was therefore held that:

The appointment of a person with a criminal past – especially a serious criminal past, such as a person who committed an offense involving moral turpitude – harms the essential interests of the public service. It undermines its proper functioning. It undermines the moral and personal authority of the office holder and his ability to convince and lead. It undermines the confidence that the general public has for the organs of government.

See Eisenberg [6], at 261. It is therefore clear that a person’s criminal past is an important consideration concerning his suitability for public office. Eisenberg [6] addressed the government’s decision to appoint Yosef Ginosar as director-general of the Ministry of Construction & Housing, despite his involvement in the “Bus 300” and Nafso affairs. The judgment referred to the trustee status of public authorities, and their duty to consider the criminal past of a potential public servant.

A public authority is a trustee and it has a duty to consider the criminal past of a candidate before making an appointment. The appointment of a public servant with a criminal past affects the functioning of a public authority and the attitude of the public to it. It has both direct and indirect ramifications on the public’s confidence in the authority. The authority making the appointment must take these considerations into account … A public authority does not run like a business, and it has a duty of trust to the public. It may employ workers with a criminal past, and the consideration of rehabilitating the criminal should be taken into account. Nonetheless, it is not the only consideration. The public authority must review an intricate and complex array of considerations, including the consideration relating to the effect of the appointment on the civil service and the public’s confidence in it.

Id. at 258 (Barak, P). In another case, which dealt with the appointment of Itamar Rabinovitz as Israeli ambassador to the United States, the Court ruled:

A criminal past does not disqualify the candidate. It merely influences the decision of the appointing authority. See HCJ 727/88 Awad v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at 491. When exercising its discretion, the appointing authority – the Prime Minister in the present case – must take into account a host of factors. Assuming that the candidate is fit for the post in all other respects, the appointing authority must also give weight to the criminal past of the candidate.

The weight given to a criminal past is not set in stone. It varies according to the nature of the criminal past and its circumstances on the one hand, and the nature of the office and its essential objectives on the other. When the different considerations point in different directions, balance must be sought according to the basic axioms of Israeli law… Sometimes the case is a borderline one. The criminal past is weighed against all the other considerations. In such cases, any decision made by the appointing authority is legitimate, and this Court will not substitute the discretion of the public authority with its own.

See HCJ 194/93 MK Gonen Segev v. Minister of Foreign Affairs [48], at 61-62.

18. The same applies when considering the candidacy of an publicly elected official for the office of minister or deputy-minister. There, too, the Prime Minister is entitled – and at times even required – to take into account the candidate’s involvement in criminal proceedings. This was noted in Pinhasi [5]:

We accept that an elected public official is not the same as a civil servant. The elected official is chosen by the people and is subject to their evaluation. The civil servant is chosen by the people’s representatives and is subject to their evaluation. However, this does not mean that the elected official is accountable to the voter alone and is not bound by the law. The opinion of the voters does not influence the evaluation of the courts, and it is unable to change this evaluation. The very fact that he is chosen by the people requires him to act in a more exacting and ethical manner than a ‘regular’ civil servant. Someone elected by the people must be a model citizen. He must be accountable to the public and deserving of the trust the people place in him. Therefore, when a government authority is granted the power to terminate an office, it must exercise this power where the official undermines the public’s trust in the authority. This applies whether the official is elected – as in a Member of Knesset serving as a deputy-minister – or is a public servant who may be dismissed by a minister.

Id. at 470 (Barak, P). Therefore:

The differentiation between an elected official and a public servant, though important, does not grant the elected official immunity against the termination of his tenure if he is suspected of committing serious crimes.

Id. at 472. The efficient functioning of the government, the integrity of its members, and the confidence of the public in them, are all cornerstones of Israel’s system of governance.

In an enlightened democratic society, public officials, who are elected by the people and enjoy the confidence of the people, are required to conform to a high standard of ethical behavior – both on the personal and public planes – to enable them to continue to serve in office.

See HCJ 251/88 Wajia Udeh v. The Head of the Jaljulia Local Council [49], at 839. These fundamental concepts also received expression in the words of President Shamgar, regarding the objectives of the version of the Basic Law: The Government which was current at that time, which granted the Prime Minister the power to remove a minister from office.

The provisions of the said law are also intended to facilitate a proper response – through removal from office – to a serious affair in which the minister was involved. This applies when the incident, being an act or a failure to act, has ramifications for the status of the government or the public’s perception of it. It also applies if the affair undermines the government’s ability to lead and serve as an example, or its ability to instill fitting modes of conduct. Most importantly, the provisions apply when the affair has ramifications for the public’s trust in the system of governance and law, its values, and the duties which the average citizen must fulfill as a result.

See Deri [47], at 404.

The powers granted to the Prime Minister to appoint and dismiss ministers thus serve to improve the government’s image and functioning, and public confidence in it. A radical deviation from the range of reasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of these powers constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.

19. There is no doubt that the range of reasonableness afforded to Prime Minister when determining the composition of his government is very wide. This is due both to the status of the Prime Minister as head of the executive branch and the nature of the power with which we are dealing. The wide leeway afforded to the Prime Minister in this regard is a direct result of the lack of legal principles which are effective tools in the administration of the executive branches in the modern state.

The power of the Prime Minister to determine the composition of his government is a:

[S]pecial type of power, due to both the Prime Minister’s role in the formation of the government and to the political character of the government. It encompasses a vast array of considerations and spans a wide range of reasonableness.

Bar-On  [3] at 58 (Zamir, J.). After all, who could be better placed than the Prime Minister to divide up the appointments in the government he is forming? Who other than the Prime Minister could take into account all the delicate balances and differing needs of forming a government? Who other than the Prime Minister could weigh all the parliamentary, political, and factional considerations which are an inextricable part of the process? On the last question, it has been remarked:

Parliamentary and political considerations may be legitimate under certain circumstances, though they must be examined as part of a proper balance of the other considerations.

Deri [47], at 423 (Shamgar, P). To these words, Justice Levin added:

When the Prime Minister is required to exercise his discretion [regarding the dismissal of a minister – E.R.], he may consider parliamentary and political aspects. As stated above, the function of a minister is both political and administrative. I consider it natural and self-evident that the Prime Minister will seek to preserve his government from disintegration. For the sake of this vital aim he may, in an appropriate case, overlook ‘deviations’ in the conduct of his ministers, such as outbursts against the binding decisions of the government and even antagonism towards such decisions. These things are a function of politics whose credibility is examined by the Knesset and the voter.

Id. at 427. In the same case it was noted:

As distinct from civil servants, who are subject to the State Service Law (Appointments), 1959, ministers and deputy-ministers are not appointed solely on the basis of their abilities, talents and personal qualities. Rather, party and coalition interests are at the basis of these appointments. The structure of public life is not weakened by the appointment of a minister or deputy-minister who is not endowed with especially superior character traits, or who is not appropriate for the position.

Id. at 428 (Goldberg, J). In a similar vein:

The discretion granted in the Basic Law: The Government regarding the dismissal of a deputy-minister is extremely wide. Among other considerations, the authority holder is permitted, and even obligated, to consider the deputy-minister’s performance and success in the job. “Political” considerations, which may be invalid in other contexts, are appropriate reasons for dismissing a deputy-minister. The need to form a coalition and to guarantee the continuing confidence of the Knesset is certainly a pertinent consideration.

See Pinhasi [5], at 463 (Barak, P).

20. The Prime Minister is thus empowered with the authority to form the government. This is the law, as evidenced clearly by sections 7, 13 and 22 of the Basic Law, and it is also the natural state of affairs. The power to appoint and dismiss ministers is a discretionary one. This discretion is wide, as it encompasses a host of considerations and a significant political dimension. It is regarding such discretion that the Court recognizes a wide “range of deference.”

Accordingly, the Court must set itself a narrow range of intervention regarding the Prime Minister’s decisions on the formation of his government, and exercise its powers of judicial review with caution.

The balance necessitates that this Court’s intervention in the discretion of those authorized to remove a minister or deputy-minister from office should be sparing and limited to those situations where the gravity of the offense cannot be reconciled with his continued service.

See Deri [47], at 429 (Goldberg, J.). This is how the appropriateness of intervention should be decided. The Prime Minister’s discretion, so long as there is no radical deviation from the standard of reasonableness, should not be scrutinized by the Court. The public should examine the Prime Minister’s discretion using the means available to it in a democratic society, as should the Knesset, via the powers granted it by law. Justice Zamir noted this in Bar-On  [3]:

The section which grants the Prime Minister the power to remove a minister from office is intended mainly to prevent “corruption” in the government. For this purpose the law has afforded the Prime Minister discretion so wide that any decision to dismiss a minister whose conduct has deviated from the norm will fall, generally speaking, within the range of reasonableness. The Court will not intervene in such a decision. Similarly, the Prime Minister’s decision not to remove a minister from office will also generally fall within the range of reasonableness. In such cases the Court will also not intervene in this decision. Both of these decisions were entrusted by law to the Prime Minister, and not to the Court. The Prime Minister will be held accountable for his decision by the Knesset and by the public, and they may respond, should they so desire, via avenues which the law opens to them.

Id. at 59-60.

It should be emphasized that appointments of government ministers must be approved by the Knesset, as provided in section 13(d) of the Basic Law. This states that:

The government is constituted when the Knesset has expressed confidence in it, and the ministers shall then assume office.

The fact that every minister’s appointment has received parliamentary approval should not be discounted.

Improper Conduct of a Minister

21. We stated above that the range of prime ministerial discretion with regard to the formation of a government is wide. In contrast, the place for judicial intervention in this discretion is narrow. Nevertheless, the Court’s powers of intervention in a decision of the Prime Minister to appoint or dismiss a minister whose conduct has been improper are not limited to a case where the minister has actually been convicted of an offense. Nor are they limited to cases where an indictment was filed against the minister or where he was the subject of a police investigation. The Court has held:

The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case may be so serious that it would be extremely unreasonable to permit him to continue his tenure. This could apply even in cases when no criminal offense was actually committed.

Bar-On  [3], at 64. However, it is clear that a conviction of a serious crime cannot be compared to a conviction of a minor crime. It is also clear that being convicted is not the same as being indicted, and being indicted is not the same as being investigated by the police. Finally, none of these are comparable to situations in which it is found that no grounds exist for prosecuting an individual, or where the actions attributed to that individual are within public ethical norms. The balance between the various considerations depends on the severity of the acts attributed to the candidate, and whether the suspicion is sufficient to warrant a charge or conviction. As was noted in Eisenberg [6]:

Someone who committed an offense in his childhood cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense as an adult; someone who committed one offense cannot be compared with someone who committed many offenses; someone who committed a minor offense cannot be compared with someone who committed a serious offense; someone who committed an offense in mitigating circumstances cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense in aggravating circumstances; someone who committed an offense and expressed regret cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense and did not express any regret for it; someone who committed a ‘technical’ offense cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense involving moral turpitude; someone who committed an offense many years ago cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense only recently; someone who committed an offense in order to further his own agenda cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense in the service of the State.

 

Id. at 261 (Barak, P.). In the two cases where this Court determined that the Prime Minister had an obligation to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister, an indictment alleging serious crimes had been filed against that minister or deputy-minister. Thus, in Deri [47], it was determined that the Prime Minister’s failure to remove Arye Deri from the post of Minister of the Interior constituted extreme unreasonableness. An indictment had in fact been filed against Deri, accusing him of corruption which was “extremely severe.” In that case, the Court noted that a guilty verdict had not yet been handed down against Deri.

 

An indictment is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collated by the prosecution. However, as far as continued office in the government is concerned, even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, which has now become public knowledge, is of significance. There are circumstances which are significant in terms of the reasonableness [of continuing office], not just a conclusive judicial ruling but also the nature of the actions attributed to someone, since they wear the official dress of an accusation ready for presentation to the court.

[I]f a minister who is charged with receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels in bribes, and other forms of abuse of public office, continues to serve in the government, this could have serious ramifications for the image of government in Israel, and for its good faith and integrity. This has a direct effect on the question of reasonableness pursuant to the provisions of law.

Id. at 422-23. Justice Levin commented on this issue:

There are situations in which, due to the nature of the offense and the circumstances in which it was committed, it must be asked whether [the minister] should continue serving in his position.

I do not suggest that we lay down any hard and fast rules on this subject and decide in a sweeping manner when and how conclusions should be drawn. For, first and foremost, it is the political system which must react, within the framework of the proper political-democratic process. But there may be exceptional situations, such as the one before us, when our intervention is required, in order to lay down specific standards of conduct.      

It seems to me, for example, that if, heaven forbid, an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offenses ignominious in nature and circumstance – such as, purely for illustration purposes, if a minister is charged with accepting bribes, with fraud, with cheating state authorities, with lying or with making falsifying documents – then it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office.

Id. at 426-27.

22. The Pinhasi case [5] also concerned the continuation of tenure of a deputy-minister who was indicted for allegedly making false entries in corporate documents, false testimony, and an attempt to receive goods by fraud. The Court related to the impact of an indictment upon the discretion of the Prime Minister:

Clearly a public servant who has been convicted of an offense is not the same as one who has only been indicted. The difference is expressed in the weight to be attached to considerations of public confidence, but not in the actual requirement to take such a consideration into account.

Id. at 462 (Barak, P). Furthermore:

Weight must be attached to the consideration of the public’s confidence in the public authorities when a public servant is convicted or confesses to the deeds attributed to him. But this differs from the weight attached when the issue is merely the filing of an indictment in a case where the accused insists on his innocence. Nonetheless, this should not be the deciding consideration. The issue at hand concerns the act of termination of office by the government authority. No criminal conviction is necessary to substantiate this act. The pressumption of innocence granted to every accused does not prevent the termination of tenure of a government official. The only condition is that the government authority making the decision must have evidence which, in light of the circumstances, is such that “any reasonable person would see its probative value and would rely on it.”

Id. at 467-68. Indeed, in that case, it was determined that the offenses allegedly committed by the deputy-minister indicated a “moral defect” in his conduct. Therefore, it was held, the offenses could be classified as “offenses of moral turpitude in the particular circumstances.” In light of this, it was concluded that for the deputy-minister to continue in his tenure, after being charged with such serious offenses, would harm both the respect that the citizen feels towards the government and the public’s confidence in the government authorities. The government’s paradigm of leadership would be undermined, and the credibility of the deputy-minister would be significantly damaged. The Court therefore determined that the only reasonable recourse was to terminate the deputy-minister’s tenure. Id. at 469. See also Avigdor Klagsbald, Public Duty, ‘Criminal Past’ and Administrative Evidence, 2 HaMishpat 93 (1995) [102].

The conclusion which follows from all this is that, even though an indictment carries less weight than a conviction, indictment for a serious offense may obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister. Deri and Pinhasi show that the existence of an indictment alleging serious offenses, based on prima facie evidence, is sufficient to harm the public’s trust and the integrity of the public service and, as such, necessitates the dismissal of the minister or deputy-minister.

23. What, therefore, would the law be in those cases in which no indictment was filed? This Court could be required to review the Prime Minister’s discretion concerning the tenure of an individual guilty of unacceptable, but not criminal, conduct. Before us we have a case in which the law enforcement authorities have decided not to press charges against a minister due to the lack of a reasonable chance of a conviction. To the best of their professional knowledge, the defendant would be acquitted in court if there was an indictment. In such cases, I am of the opinion that it would require truly extreme and exceptional circumstances in order for the Court to obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from making an appointment or to terminate one.

It is worth pointing out here that, as we have already detailed, the Basic Law: The Government outlines, in subsections 6(c) and 23(b), the concerning the appointment and dismissal of a minister. These sections explicitly provide the ramifications of a minister’s conviction of an offense. The Deri and Pinhasi cases also set out the law governing the termination of tenure. When those cases were decided, the 1997 version of the Basic Law, which contained no provision requiring the dismissal of a minister convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, was in effect. The Court, in making these rulings, acted without recourse to any of the statutory criteria which now exist. Sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law of 2001 pertain to the fitness of a minister to serve. As we have seen, these sections do not rule out judicial review of the Prime Minister’s discretion even in cases that do not fall within the categories mentioned. Therefore, the precedents of Deri and Pinhasi still stand.

In this manner, the court has created a fine balance between the obligation of deference which applies to situations such as these, and the other considerations with which this Court is charged. However, the further we depart from the statutory criteria of fitness, the harder it will be, according to the existing law, to regard the appointment of a minister, or the non-termination of his tenure, as an extreme deviation from the range of reasonableness. The loss inherent to expanding the limits of the precedents set by this Court is liable to be greater than the gain.

24. In examining the Prime Minister’s discretion to appoint a minister who was investigated but not indicted, we need not look far for a precedent. Respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, was himself the subject of a ruling of this Court approximately six years ago, in Bar-On [3]. At that time, the same petitioner requested that we order the Prime Minister to dismiss Hanegbi from the post of Minister of Justice. As explained above, Hanegbi’s name was at that time linked to three out of the four affairs which petitioner brings against him today, namely: the “brawling affair” of 1982; the ISTA affair, which lasted from 1982 to 1992; and the Bar-On affair of 1997. No one argues that there is any material difference between the Ministry of Justice, which Hanegbi led during Bar-On [3], and the Ministry of Public Security, which he now heads. Therefore we can shed light on the case at hand using the previous ruling.

In Bar-On [3] this Court determined that:

There never was and never will be a situation in which a sullied reputation is enough to obligate the Prime Minister by law to remove a minister from his position.

Id. at 57 (Zamir, J.). The Court further expounded:

There is no doubt that it is legitimate to demonstrate disapproval of a minister’s conduct if it diverges from the standards of what is right and proper. The public expects that every minister, as a leader of the public, shall set an example of proper conduct. This applies even more to the public’s expectations of the Minister of Justice.

Id. at 59 (Zamir, J.). As emphasized by Justice Zamir, the power to appoint ministers belongs to the Prime Minister and it is an undeniably broad power. The Prime Minister may decide to dismiss a minister whose conduct diverges from acceptable standards, or he may decide to retain such a minister. Both decisions will generally be within the range of reasonableness.

The responsibility for either of these decisions was entrusted by the law to the Prime Minister, and not to the Court. The Prime Minister is held accountable for his decisions by the Knesset and by the public, and these bodies may respond, if they so desire, using the means provided by law.

Id. at 60. Moreover:

The Court may refrain from intervening in the Prime Minister’s decision on whether or not to remove a minister on account of unacceptable conduct. However, by so doing the Court does not imply that the Prime Minister’s decision is correct and appropriate, any more than it implies that the minister’s conduct itself is appropriate. The Court merely affirms that the Prime Minister’s decision and the minister’s conduct have not broken the law. It does not mean that they are not unethical. It is certainly possible that were the Court in the Prime Minister’s shoes, it would made a different decision, and it is also possible that the Court does not approve of the minister’s conduct. However, the ethical responsibility for the administrative authority, as well as the responsibility for its efficiency and wisdom, as distinct from its legal responsibility, is not entrusted to the Court.

Id. at 61 (Zamir, J.). Furthermore:

The court system aspires, by means of legislation and precedent, to raise the ethical standards of society, and also improve the conduct of the public administration. This is its purpose. It is a worthwhile purpose and one it performs well. It has succeeded in promoting values and inculcating the standards of a civilized society.

However, the law cannot and should not replace ethics – except to a limited extent, on a case-by-case basis, in a controlled and cautious manner…

The same applies regarding the conduct of publicly elected officials. The law does not respond to the conduct of elected public officials except in very serious situations, where unethical conduct is likely to become illegal conduct…

The Court’s decision that a minister or deputy-minister is unfit for service creates tension between the law and the democratic system. The law is built, to a large extent, on values, whereas democracy is built, first and foremost, on representation… The Court is required to achieve a balance between these two interests.

Id. at 62-63. In a different context Justice Zamir emphasized:

The Court must also take into account the fact that every so often the public desires to be represented by an individual who is known not to be of sterling character.

See Dis.App. 4123/95 Or v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner [50], at 190.

25. Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice Dorner, in a separate case concerning the eligibility of MK Pinhasi to serve as chairman of the Knesset Committee. Pinhasi had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Justice Dorner pointed out that:

It is indeed legitimate for there to be a review of the reasons why respondent, who has been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, was elected chairman of a committee which possesses quasi-judicial powers.

It is possible that this choice carries an undesirable message. But this is a matter of taste, which is given over to the discretion of the Knesset Committee. And when the time comes this discretion will be subject to the public’s approval.

See HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney-General [51], at 557-58. It was also noted:

The issue is not whether the Knesset Committee’s decision to appoint MK Pinhasi as its chairman was a good one or not. This is a matter of rights and obligations, authorities and powers. It is true that the Knesset Committee’s decision sent shockwaves beyond the realm of the Knesset; but these shockwaves are still too weak to require the exercise of power in the judicial realm.

Id. at 562-63 (Cheshin, J).

26. It is clearly no simple matter for the law to deal with conduct that is improper but not illegal. It is even more of a stretch to impose an obligation on the Prime Minister, on grounds of reasonableness, to remove a minister accused of such conduct from office. As Justice Zamir pointed out in Bar-On [3], the balance that must be struck is substantive and not mechanical in nature. Therefore, we must not ignore the possibility – albeit a remote one in my eyes – that even conduct of a minister or deputy-minister that does not amount to a criminal offense, can obligate the Prime Minister to remove him from office. However, in order for this Court to rule in this manner, the conduct of this minister must be

[S]o extremely severe as to be extremely unreasonable to permit him to continue in office.

Id. at 63-64. In order for the Court to conclude that it must order the Prime Minister to remove a minister from office, despite the fact that the latter has not been convicted or even indicted, the circumstances must be exceptional and extreme.

There exists a vast difference between an extreme situation like this, which forms an exception to the law, and a broad ruling which would render unfit any minister or deputy-minister whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards. The proposal to expand the existing ruling so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss the minister or deputy-minister, even though it has good intentions, is not appropriate. It is likely to do more harm than good.

Id. And in the same case, it was also noted:

Only in the most extreme cases would the Court require the Prime Minister to exercise his power [to remove a minister from his position]. These cases would involve the existence of administrative evidence of serious criminal offenses. Such a situation would constitute a serious risk to public confidence in the government authorities. To this might also be added cases of extreme deviation from the integrity required of individuals in the high office of minister.

Id. at 68 (Or, V.P.).

Do Tzahi Hanegbi’s actions constitute such extreme circumstances?

Hanegbi’s Actions

27. I have repeated dicta from Bar-On [3] concerning the Prime Minister’s decision to retain Hanegbi as Minister of Justice. I did so because I believe that there is no alternative other than to reach a similar conclusion in the case at hand.

As stated above, four affairs have been cited to discredit Hanegbi. The brawling affair resulted in Hanegbi’s conviction in 1982 for brawling in a public place, for which he received a suspended prison sentence and a fine. There is no doubt that for our purposes this is a trivial and ancient affair. The events at the basis of the “ISTA affair” also occurred more than twenty years ago, and culminated in the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute Hanegbi. The Court did not see fit to intervene in this decision. See Maoz [1], at 423. With regard to these two affairs, the words of President Barak in Eisenberg [6] are enlightening:

The lapse of time between the offense and the proposed appointment is an important factor. The more years that have passed, the weaker the link between the person and his crime. His appointment to public office will therefore not harm its functioning and the public’s confidence in him and the civil service. Indeed, a criminal past, even with regard to a serious offense, is not an absolute bar to appointment to public office. This applies even to a senior position. Time heals wounds. The candidate is rehabilitated. The “enlightened public” will no longer feel that his appointment harms the integrity of the service and its ability to function, but rather [that his disqualification is] a vindictive and inappropriate execution of “judgment.” In such circumstances, there can be no basis for regarding the appointment of such a candidate to public office as unreasonable. The period of time that must pass between the crime and serving the sentence and the appointment varies according to the circumstances.

Id. at 267. The third affair, the Bar-On affair, also did not culminate in an indictment against Hanegbi, due to lack of evidence. The State Attorney’s Office published its opinion, in which it condemned Hanegbi’s behavior, calling it “a deviation from the accepted standards of conduct.” Nonetheless, it concluded that such conduct did not amount to a criminal offense.

The point is that all three affairs were presented to the Court in Bar-On [3]. Yet the Court concluded that there was no reason to intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision not to remove Hanegbi from the office of Minister of Justice.

28. This leaves us with the fourth affair, the “Derech Tzleha” affair. We should recall that Hanegbi faced a Knesset Ethics Committee hearing on this matter, and as a result he was censured and his pay docked for two months. In terms of the criminal investigation, it was decided not to prosecute Hanegbi since the Attorney-General believed that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction, not even for breach of trust. In his report, the Attorney-General revealed that:

The scenario did, in our opinion, justify an inquiry, and we even considered that grounds existed for an indictment. However, there had to be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, which, with the completion of the file, was ultimately not the case.

 

It should also be noted that the Derech Tzleha investigation of Hanegbi took place while he was still Minister of Justice. For our purposes, the major differences between then and now are the final decision not to prosecute Hanegbi and the passage of time since the affair.

 

Under these circumstances, I believe that there is no justification whatsoever for differing from the conclusions of Bar-On [3]. It is true that the Derech Tzleha affair occurred since then, but this affair, like the Bar-On affair, did not culminate in an indictment. It may therefore be stated that the only thing that has changed since the ruling on Bar-On [3], is that once again the decision was made not to indict Hanegbi. This fact alone, based on the previous judgment concerning Hanegbi, is not sufficient to render a candidate unfit to serve as a minister. It seems to me, therefore, that if we are to follow the course charted by this Court – not so long ago and in a case pertaining to Hanegbi himself – in this case we must not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision.

The Derech Tzleha affair concluded with a “public report” published by the Attorney-General. The question must be asked: How else should the conclusions of the public report be acted upon, if not through the voter’s discretion in casting his vote, and the Prime Minister’s discretion to appoint the members of his government? The Derech Tzleha affair did not culminate in an indictment. It is therefore fitting that Hanegbi’s involvement in it should be resolved on the political level.

In any event, this affair does not constitute the necessary “extreme and exceptional circumstances” which would obligate the Court to intervene and order the Prime Minister to remove the minister. It should be emphasized that we do not turn a blind eye to the affairs in which Hanegbi has been involved. Not everything that we have seen pleases us. However, we must always remember that the public is also watching. Hanegbi’s actions, and the Prime Minister’s decisions regarding these, are under public scrutiny. The public will ultimately have its say about all it has seen.

29. Petitioner alleges that the cumulative force of these affairs is enough to push the Prime Minister’s decision regarding Hanegbi outside the range of reasonableness. This claim raises the question – what is this “cumulative force” which can topple the appointment of a minister? The cumulative force of the brawling affair, the ISTA affair and the Bar-On affair was not enough to render Hanegbi unfit to serve as Minister of Justice. Why then, when the weight of the Derech Tzleha affair is added, are the scales tipped towards the invalidation of Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security? No one can claim that this fine line is clearly demarcated. And it is apparent that in such cases we should aspire to find a guiding line. This line should, on the one hand, be flexible and enable a substantive examination of cases which arise in the future. On the other hand, its criteria must be as clear as possible, so that they may be applied in the future and acted upon accordingly. It is wrong to send a message which is unclear. Rather we ought to strive for a general precedent which will pave the way for future rulings. Therefore, we must be fully convinced that the situation requires the candidate be disqualified in order to interfere with the Prime Minister’s power to appoint ministers. The Court is not required to give its stamp of approval to the appointment of every public official who has behaved improperly or is suspected of such conduct. Nor is the candidate required to seek this approval before assuming the office designated by the Prime Minister.

30. It is noteworthy that the circumstances of Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair, as well as the Attorney-General’s opinion regarding his appointment as a minister, were brought to the Prime Minister’s attention after the elections for the Fifteenth Knesset. At that time the Prime Minister accepted the Attorney-General’s counsel – “counsel which was mainly from a civic perspective” – and refrained from appointing Hanegbi as a minister in any ministry responsible for law enforcement. After the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset, the Attorney-General once again offered his opinion to the Prime Minister. He stated that even though there existed no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, from a civic perspective, “the appointment itself is prima facie problematic.” After weighing all the considerations, the Prime Minister did decide to appoint Hanegbi to that office, and the reasons for his decision are detailed in his affidavit. The Prime Minister believed that Hanegbi had a number of points in his favor, including natural talents, vast knowledge and experience amassed during many years in senior public and state positions, and professional accomplishments. Additionally, the Prime Minister believed that Hanegbi’s personal philosophy and the nature of the position, besides the political and coalition considerations, made him the preferred candidate for Minister of Public Security.

The Prime Minister explained that he considered the various affairs to which Hanegbi’s name was linked, as well as allegations of the danger of a conflict of interest were Hanegbi to serve as Minister of Public Security. According to his affidavit, the Prime Minister also considered the Attorney-General’s position regarding the prima facie problem with the appointment. According to the Attorney-General, this problem remains from a civic perspective. Compare Daphne Barak-Erez, The High Court of Justice as Attorney-General, 5(2) Plilim 219 (1997) [103]. According to the Prime Minister, the scales were ultimately tipped in favor of appointing Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. The appointment was then approved by the Knesset, as provided in section 13(d) of Basic Law: The Government.

31. It is true, of course, that that the Court’s scales could have tipped the other way. The weight attached by the Court to the various considerations taken into account by the Prime Minister could have been different. But this Court is not a “supra-prime minister.” It is not for the Court to decide those matters which the Prime Minister is authorized to decide. The Court will not substitute its own discretion for that of the authorized power. The Court will not ask itself whether it would have acted in the same manner if the power were in its hands. The Court does not scrutinize the wisdom of the other government authorities, only the legality of their actions. See also Aharon Barak, On Power and Values in Israel, in I A Collection of Writings 382 (H. H. Cohen & Y. Zamir ed. 2000) [104]. When the Court examines the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decisions regarding the formation of his government, it recognizes that only in exceptional and rare cases should the Prime Minister’s discretion be replaced by that of the Court. The case at hand does not fall into that category.

32. Petitioner focuses on two reasons why Hanegbi should be dismissed: first, the possible damage to public confidence as a result of his appointment as minister in charge of public security and the police; and second, the risk of a conflict of interest in performing certain duties of the minister. With regard to the first reason, this is not enough to constitute grounds for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. We related to this above, and we would only add here that petitioner takes issue specifically with Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As far as this line of reasoning is concerned, there is nothing to stop Hanegbi from being appointed as a minister in a different ministry – except, perhaps, the Ministry of Justice. This position raises a difficulty. It is hard to imagine that an individual whose appointment as Minister of Public Security would cause such severe damage to the public’s trust that we must strike down the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him, would be able to head another ministry – such as the Ministry of Education or the Finance Ministry. It is difficult to accept that an individual who is so patently unfit to serve in a ministry responsible for law enforcement could, without any hindrance, serve in a ministry entrusted with the state’s foreign policy or its security.

We thus come to the second part of this petition, the concern regarding a conflict of interest. We shall assume that petitioner’s only claim against Hanegbi’s appointment specifically as Minister of Public Security is the fear of a conflict of interest in context of the minister’s role. Petitioner takes issue with Hanegbi’s ability to function as Minister of Public Security in light of his drastic change in status – from being interrogated by the police to leading the police as Minister of Public Security. Petitioner is of the opinion that ill will may remain between Hanegbi and those who investigated him. This being the case, the appointment of Hanegbi as overseer of his investigators may do irreparable harm to the functioning of the police, along with the public’s faith in it. Petitioner raises the possibility of a conflict of interest if and when the minister exercises his power regarding senior appointments in the Investigations Branch, as pursuant to section 7 of the Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971.

33. We would first state that respondents have raised doubts as to whether petitioner’s claim actually constitutes a conflict of interest. Indeed, this category is usually reserved for cases in which an individual has been entrusted with a certain interest, and there exists a substantial possibility of conflict between this interest and another. This could be either a proprietary or personal interest of his own, or another interest with which he has been entrusted. See CA 6763/98 Ram Carmi v. State of Israel [52], at 427-28; HCJ 531/79 Likud Faction of Petah Tikva v. City Council of Petah Tikva [53], at 566; Aharon Barak, Conflict of interest in the Performance of Office, 10 Mishpatim 11 (1980) [105].

The principle regarding conflicts of interest, as interpreted by the courts, prohibits a public servant from being in a situation of conflict between a government interest and a personal interest, or between two different government interests. See HCJ 244/86 Revivo v. The Head of the Ofakim Local Council [54], at 183. Apparently, in our case, petitioner’s allegation does not relate to an interest in conflict with the minister’s public duty. Rather, it relates to the possibility that Hanegbi may harbor a grudge against his investigators. Such feelings might influence decisions made by him concerning those investigators.

It should be made clear that the prohibition against conflicts of interest is intended to prevent decisions which are influenced by conflicting interests:

The fundamental purpose of the prohibition of conflict of interest is to guarantee public duty’s are fulfilled out of relevant considerations of the public good alone, and not out of outside influences and considerations. It also aims to ensure that the public’s confidence in the public authority is not damaged because the latter’s actions are liable to be influenced by outside considerations.

CA 6983/94 Shimon Pachima v. Michael Peretz [55], at 835. The following explains the reasoning behind the rule concerning conflicting interests:

First of all, there is a pragmatic reason. The public servant who has been entrusted with a certain power is required to exercise that power after reviewing all relevant considerations – and only these considerations. When the public servant is put into a situation of a conflict of interest, there is a concern that he may also take into account the conflicting interest when exercising his power. This may result in an improper use of the power. The law is designed to prevent this risk. Secondly, there is a matter of values. The existence of an orderly, fair and responsible public service requires the public’s faith that decisions taken by civil servants are germane and honest. A civil servant found in a situation of conflicting interests damages the public’s faith in the system of governance. The public begins to suspect that outside considerations are influencing civil servants and his faith in the system of governance is shaken. The law is designed to prevent this.

See Likud [53] at 571. It is clear that there exists a link between a conflict of interests and outside considerations.

When a public official is involved in a conflict of interest, the concern is raised that outside considerations may be guiding him. These outside considerations are likely to influence the functioning of the body he leads; to sway his decisions through irrelevant considerations; and cause him to stray from the path of proper administration.

HCJ 7805/00 Roni Aloni v. Comptroller of the Jerusalem Municipality [56], at 1121. The prohibition against conflicting interests comes, in other words, to prevent the damage caused by outside considerations, which stem from the conflicting interest.  Situations of possible conflicts of interests are frequently examined, and when there exists a reasonable concern of such a conflict, the result tends to be termination of office. “The goal is to prevent the trouble before it occurs.” See Likud [53], at 572.

On the other hand, there are situations where there is no concern of a conflict of interests, but only of an outside consideration which does not flow from a conflicting interest. In such cases, a post factum check will be performed. In general, we do not speak of a “concern (in advance) of outside considerations,” but rather of a post factum examination of whether the considerations behind the decision or action were appropriate or extraneous. See, Ron Menachem [37], at 235; HCJ 3975/95 Prof. Shmuel Caniel v. The Government of Israel [57], at 459. Regarding appointments to the civil service the Court has stated:

When a public official appoints a civil servant out of extraneous considerations of party-political interests, this appointment is invalid. It constitutes a betrayal of the public which authorized the appointing power.

HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance [58], at 35; see also HCJ 6673/01 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Minister of Transportation [59], at 808-9. The same applies with respect to outside considerations of vengefulness or grudges. There exists a dichotomy between the prevention of conflicting interests and the post factum inquiry into extraneous considerations. And the case at hand would apparently fall into the category of extraneous considerations.

However, regardless of whether we classify the case before us as a conflict of interests or a more general concern for outside considerations influencing the decisions of a minister – the end result will be the same. This is because it is clear to us that, in this case, petitioner’s claim does not carry the required weight to render the Prime Minister’s decision unreasonable.

We are not saying that vengefulness or a personal grudge, which influences the decision of an authority to appoint an individual to a particular position, does not constitute an extraneous consideration. It certainly is an extraneous consideration, and may thus cause the decision to be struck down. It is true that Hanegbi was investigated in the past by the police, who recommended he be tried. However, it is also true that the Attorney-General did not adopt the recommendation because he concluded that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction. This being the case, the facts are unable to substantiate a genuine concern – which is not merely theoretical – of any outside considerations guiding Hanegbi’s actions. We are not entitled to assume the existence of such a concern, which would render the Prime Minister’s decision unreasonable in the extreme.

A person’s anger can fester into a grudge, and a grudge into to feelings of vengefulness towards the object of the anger. By the same token, satisfaction with the conduct of a person or body can result in gratitude, which could lead to partiality and favoritism. But this is a mere possibility, and not a certainty. We have determined that the circumstances of this petition are not substantial enough to establish a factual presumption of any real concern that future actions of respondent 3 , will be tainted by extraneous considerations. In the absence of any evidence to substantiate the petitioner’s concern, there is no reason for this Court’s intervention.

Respondent 3 wishes to reinforce this conclusion with a theoretical example. Assume that the police investigated a case and reach the conclusion that there was nothing untoward in the actions of the individual under investigation. It would be ludicrous to argue, claims Hanegbi, that this person should not be appointed as the minister in charge of his former investigators, due to the concern that he might show partiality towards them. This example is somewhat divorced from the case at hand. It could be more closely likened to a case where an individual was prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor and was acquitted. The appointment of the acquitted individual to the position of Minister of Justice, the minister in charge of the Public Prosecutor, is not merely a  theoretical example. It has happened. And no one claimed that the appointment could not stand.

Hanegbi was not prosecuted. The reason for this was that the Attorney-General believed that he would have been acquitted. He notified the Prime Minister of his opinion. He also informed the Prime Minister that there was no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security. The Prime Minister refused to adopt the Attorney-General’s “civic” recommendation. This was his prerogative and does not constitute a cause for intervention under the circumstances.

We have already stated that the considerations which play a part in the decision to appoint a minister to a particular governmental position are many and varied. A sizeable portion of these are political considerations. The Court does not put itself in the Prime Minister’s shoes. It does not scrutinize the wisdom of the decision, it merely reviews its legality. In the circumstances of the case at hand, pursuant to the law as interpreted in previous rulings, we find it difficult to point to any illegality.

34. This decision also takes into account the nature of the minister’s powers in the matter at hand. We must not demean or belittle the importance of these powers. However, the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-director-general,” and in the context relevant to this case he has powers of supervision, authorization and the determination of policy. In its response to the petition, the state points out that with regard to the process of appointing high-ranking police officers, the minister’s exercise of his power is:

[S]ubject to the principles of administrative law. As such it is contingent on obligatory consultation, and consideration of the opinion the inspector-general of the police and additional professional bodies, prior to the appointment. As a rule, it is the police inspector-general who makes recommendations to the minister with respect to the

 

candidates for each and every position. This is because the inspector-general, as the head of the police system, will need to work with the officer who is appointed. The minister may only reject the inspector-general’s candidate, or the appointment of an individual to a position against the inspector-general’s recommendation, for very serious reasons. Such reasons are subject to judicial review.

It goes without saying that if, in the future, anyone should feel that a certain decision of Hanegbi regarding a particular officer was tainted by an administrative defect, such as a conflict of interest, partiality, or extraneous considerations, the doors of this Court are open to him.

35. In conclusion, we have not been convinced that the Prime Minister’s decision regarding Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security was extremely unreasonable to a degree that would warrant the Court’s intervention. As a result, we have no choice but to reject the petition. Under the circumstances, I would make no order for costs.

Vice-President T. Or

I have studied the opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, in depth, and I concur with his conclusion. My colleague set forth a broad thesis addressing the principles guiding the exercise of judicial review over administrative bodies. I agree with the majority of his findings. However, I wish to condense the scope of his thesis and apply it to the case at hand.

1. The petition before us was filed by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel. The petition is directed against the decision of respondent 1, the Prime Minster, to appoint respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the position of Minister of Public Security in the government formed after the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset. The central question of the petition is whether this Court should intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision and annul the appointment. It should be emphasized that the key word here is “intervention.” Our purpose here is not to decide whether the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security was appropriate. That role is entrusted by law to the Prime Minister. Our task is to decide whether the appointment was flawed, in which case we have no choice other than to intervene and revoke it.

Factual Basis and Essence of the Petition

2. The facts as the basis of the petition have been detailed in the opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin. For sake of convenience, I shall briefly review these. Petitioner alleges that Hanegbi’s involvement in the four main affairs described in the petition makes him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

The first affair occurred in 1979. Respondent 3 was involved in a skirmish between students, as a result of which he was convicted, in 1982, of brawling in a public place. Hanegbi was fined and given a suspended prison sentence.

The second affair pertains to a complaint filed with the police in 1982 by Hanegbi and others. The complaint alleged that a number of leaders of the Student’s Union and of the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had perpetrated an act of fraud. As a result, a number of individuals were prosecuted, among them advocate Pinchas Maoz, who at the time served as external legal advisor to ISTA. Maoz was acquitted of all charges. In its judgment, the court related to the lack of credibility of Hanegbi’s testimony. As a result, Maoz and others asked that respondent 3 be charged with perjury. The Attorney-General decided not to file an indictment due to the small chance of a conviction. A petition against this decision was dismissed by this Court “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth.” See HCJ 3846/91 Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 439.

The third affair relates to the appointment of advocate Roni Bar-On to the position of Attorney-General. Respondent served at the time as Minster of Justice. As a result of allegations against Hanegbi regarding his involvement in this appointment, the police recommended that that Hanegbi be prosecuted for fraud and breach of trust. The Attorney-General decided to close the file for lack of evidence. The State Attorney’s Office issued a public report on the matter, criticizing respondent’s conduct. Nevertheless, it too maintained that his actions did not constitute a criminal offense. As a result of this affair, petitioner petitioned this Court requesting respondent’s removal from his position as Minister of Justice. The petition was rejected. See HCJ 2533/97 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [Bar-On [3]], at 46.

The fourth affair focuses on a non-profit organization by the name of Derech Tzleha which was headed by respondent. In a public report, the Attorney-General summarized the affair as follows: In 1994, respondent and MK Avraham Burg prepared a private bill aiming to enhance road safety. The draft legislation was placed before the Knesset and passed a preliminary reading, and was then transferred to the Finance Committee for deliberation. The committee put together a sub-committee, headed by Hanegbi, to work on the bill. While working to enact the National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, respondent established Derech Tzleha, which also promoted road safety. Initially, respondent served as chairman of the organization and at later became its director-general. For this he received a salary and other benefits from the organization. Directly and indirectly he ultimately pocketed most of the funds it had raised – some NIS 375,000. Hanegbi’s conduct in this matter was the subject of a hearing by the Knesset Ethics Committee. The committee decided that respondent had placed himself in a situation of conflicting interests and had benefited from work outside the Knesset while serving as an MK. Hanegbi was accordingly censured and his salary was frozen for two months.

Respondent’s actions were also investigated by the police, who recommended Hanegbi be indicted on several counts. Initially, the Attorney-General and the State Attorney maintained that respondent should be prosecuted for other offenses as well. However, following a further chain of events, the Attorney-General decided, with the consent of the State Attorney, not to file an indictment due to a lack of evidence.

In an amendment to its petition, petitioner detailed two further affairs in which the respondent was allegedly involved. One pertained to an advertisement in a propaganda newspaper disseminated to members of the Likud Party in the run-up to the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset. The ad praised Hanegbi’s efforts to appoint members of the Likud Party and Likud Central Committee to senior positions in the Ministry of the Environment. The other affair concerned a proposal which respondent brought before the government, while serving as Minister of Justice, regarding the appointment of members of the National Estates Commission. This proposal was adopted by the government. Petitioner maintains that respondent concealed the fact that those candidates had been declared unfit by the Appointments Review Committee. No order nisi was issued in either of the above two affairs. Furthermore, the factual basis that was presented before us was not sufficient to justify a detailed examination of the affairs.

3. Based on the above affairs, petitioner makes two central arguments against respondent’s appointment to the office of Minister of Public Security. Its first claim is that through his involvement in these affairs, respondent violated principles of ethics and sound administration, and therefore the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security was extremely unreasonable. Petitioner points to the affairs as a whole, alleging that their cumulative weight attests to respondent’s unfitness for the post of Minister of Public Security.

Its second claim is that as Minister of Public Security, respondent may find himself in a conflict of interest. He was investigated on more than one occasion by the police, who actually recommended that he be prosecuted – though this recommendation was not adopted by the Attorney-General. A conflict could arise if the minister were to find himself deciding the question of promotion for any of his former investigators. It would also arise when he has to allocate funds to various police departments and divisions under the charge of his investigators.

The Normative Framework

4. The normative framework for evaluating petitioner’s claims has been elucidated by my colleague, Justice Rivlin. In this matter too, I do not intend to repeat all that has been said, but only the essential parts necessary for a decision in this matter.

The task of forming a government is assigned by the President to the Member of Knesset who is the designated Prime Minister. The constitution of the government and the assumption of office by the ministers take effect when the Knesset expresses its confidence in the government. See sections 7(a), 13(c) and, 13(d) of Basic Law: The Government. Section 6 of Basic Law: The Government lists a number of criteria for the eligibility of ministers. See also section 23(b). None of the criteria for unfitness provided by the law have been found to apply to respondent. Nevertheless, the statutory criteria provided by law do not constitute an exhaustive list of causes for rendering a person unfit to be a minister. The appointing body must take into account a candidate’s criminal history and past conduct when considering whether or not to appoint them as minister, or to any other public position. See HCJ 6177, 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing [6], at 261-67. Should the appointing body ignore the relevant considerations, or ascribe inappropriate weight to all or some of them, this may be indicative of extreme unreasonableness, and the decision may be struck down by the Court on grounds of unlawfulness.

Whether the Court intervenes in an administrative decision or refrains from such intervention depends on the status and role of the body under review. The nature of the decision under scrutiny is also a consideration. The Court addressed this in Bar-On [3], where it stated:

The range of reasonableness of every administrative authority depends on the nature of its power, the language and purpose of its authorizing law, the identity of the authorized body, the issue addressed by the power, and whether the power is exercised mainly on the basis of factual considerations, policy considerations, or professional criteria, such as medical or engineering evaluations. The range of reasonableness varies according to these factors: it may widen or narrow depending on the circumstances. In accordance with this the judicial review varies as well. Even though the principle of reasonableness which governs the exercise of judicial review is the same with respect to each and every authority, the application of the principle may vary from authority to authority, depending on the range of reasonableness. The wider the range of reasonableness, the more limited will be the review.

Id. at 57; see also HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney [2],  at 28-32; HCJ 2624/97 Ronel Yedid. v. State of Israel [4], at 71.

5. No one disputes that the Prime Minister’s authority to form a government is discretionary in character and thus subject to the review of this Court. See HCJ 4267/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at 441 [Pinhasi [5]]; HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]], at 404. However, there is also no dispute that when the Prime Minister exercises his discretion to appoint a minister, there exists an extremely wide range of reasonableness within which the Court will not intervene. This is due both to the Prime Minister’s status as a publicly elected official and the head of the executive body, and the nature of this authority.

The unique character of a prime ministerial decision on the makeup of the government and its ramifications for the scope of judicial review were discussed in Bar-On [3] in connection to the dismissal of a minister. That case determined that the Prime Minister’s authority is one-of-a-kind, both due to the status of the Prime Minister in forming the government and the political character of the government. When exercising this authority, a plethora of considerations are taken into account. Id. 58-59. See also Yahav [2], at 28-32; and Deri [47] (Shamgar, P. and Levine, J. ).

We further note that, in the present case, the appointing authority was elected by the public and stands on the top rung of executive ladder. Additionally, his appointment of a minister requires the approval of the Knesset. In the case at hand, the Knesset expressed confidence in the government and caused the appointment to take effect. The judicial review is thus applied to a decision of the Prime Minister that has received the approval of the Knesset. As a result, the scope of the judicial review of this decision is narrow and restricted. Nonetheless, in cases where this Court is convinced that the Prime Minister’s decision showed extreme lack of reasonableness, it will not hesitate to exercise its powers of review.

Moving from the general to the specific, we will first evaluate the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decision in light of the past affairs in which respondent 3 was involved. We will then discuss the claim that respondent could find himself in a conflict of interest while occupying the position of Minister of Public Security.

Reasonableness of the Decision – Previous Affairs

7. In order to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision in the case at hand, we will first present the Prime Minister’s reasons for appointing Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. These considerations, detailed in his affadavit, were as follows:

16. My decision to appoint Minister Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security was made after I had evaluated all the relevant considerations, including the advice of the Attorney-General and the basis of this advice… and I struck a proper balance among these considerations. Among other factors, I took into account the minister’s many talents, his many years of experience in various demanding public and state offices, the gravity of the role of head of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as other coalition-related considerations, all of which are now detailed.

17. Minister Tzahi Hanegbi has served, over a continuous period of many years, in a number of high-ranking and demanding public and governmental offices. These have included: Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office; Minister of Health; Minister of the Environment; Minister of Transportation; Member of the Twelfth through Sixteenth Knessets inclusive; Chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee; Member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; and Member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

In addition, for a period of approximately three years, between 1996 and 1999, Hanegbi served as Minister of Justice, within which framework he served as a member of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs – the so-called “State Security Cabinet”; as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and Law Enforcement; as Chairman of the Committee for the Selection of Judges; as a Member of the Committee for the Selection of Military Judges; and as a Member of the Ministerial Committee for Privatization.

Over the last two decades, I have become personally acquainted with the abilities and talents of Minister Hanegbi. In view of Hanegbi’s many professional achievements in all of the offices in which he served as minister, I have chosen him to serve as the Minister of Public Security, an office which currently faces unique and extremely important challenges.

Minister Hanegbi has a broad national perspective, which was expressed during his years as Minister of Justice, notwithstanding his investigation during that term regarding the Derech Tzleha affair. He has a wealth of experience in the management of complex ministries; and a broad knowledge in the field of security, which he gained in a variety of public roles, as listed above. It is my belief that all this qualifies him to successfully run the Ministry of Public Security.

In my view, the nature of the position offered to Minister Hanegbi and the particular powers exercised by the Minister of Public Security do not create any significant concern of conflicts of interest which might affect the minister’s conduct or impair his professionalism and the integrity of his discretion when exercising his authority … We need to remember that the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-Inspector-General” who wields direct control over all matters pertaining to Israel Police, and this is true especially insofar as the Investigations Branch is concerned…

At the time of making the decision, I considered the position of the Attorney-General with respect to the Derech Tzleha affair. The Attorney-General regarded Hanegbi’s appointment as being prima facie problematic from a civic perspective, though from the strictly legal standpoint, according to statutes and case law, there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment.

In this regard, it should be noted that the actions attributed to Minister Hanegbi occurred between 1994 and the beginning of 1996. When Minister Hanegbi was interrogated, he did not take advantage of his right to silence. Rather he cooperated in full with his investigators. In my view, these facts were significant to the decision not to indict Hanegbi and for public confidence in him.

18. I have taken into account all of the relevant considerations, which include  the qualifications and abilities required of the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General’s position, and Minister Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair and the other affairs, Hanegbi’s capabilities and his experience, as well as political and coalition considerations. After giving these considerations their appropriate weight,, it cannot be said that the decision to appoint Hanegbi deviates in an extreme manner from the standard of reasonableness (emphasis not in the original).

As such, we see that the Prime Minister did not ignore respondent’s involvement in the various affairs cited by petitioner, including the Derech Tzleha affair. However, after he weighed respondent’s role in these affairs against other considerations, which included respondent’s qualifications, coalition-related needs, and other considerations mentioned by him, he decided to appoint respondent.

8. Among the considerations that an administrative authority, including the Prime Minister, must take into account when appointing a public official is the candidate’s criminal past. Clearly a criminal conviction is not required in order to justify a decision not to appoint a particular person. Convincing administrative evidence of serious crimes which pose a genuine risk to public confidence is all that is required. Moreover, an administrative authority must also consider behavior of the candidate that deviates from the norms of sound administration and ethics, even if these do not amount to a criminal offense. Nonetheless, the existence of administrative evidence of a crime, or of conduct that deviates from public norms or ethical principles, is not necessarily enough to force the administrative authority to not to make the appointment. The authority must consider the nature and severity of the acts attributed to the candidate and balance this against other considerations, such as the abilities of the candidate and his suitability for the position. See para. 17 of the decision of my colleague, Justice Rivlin.

There may be situations in which evidence exists of serious criminal offenses committed by a candidate and, as a result, his abilities or qualifications, manifold as these may be, do not justify his appointment as a minister. Therefore, the central question in this case is whether, in light of the evidence submitted by petitioner regarding the conduct of respondent 3, the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security is marred by an extreme lack of reasonableness and requires our intervention.

My answer to this is negative. I will now examine each piece of evidence adduced by petitioner. Later I will examine whether the cumulative weight of all the evidence should have caused the Prime Minister to decide against the appointment.   

9. With respect to the decision of conviction in the brawling affair, I concur with the conclusion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, that it is an “ancient and trivial affair.” The crime which respondent was  convicted of took place 24 years ago and he has served his sentence. The offense did not involve moral turpitude or lack of integrity. This conviction has been erased from legal memory. See sections 14 and 16 of the Criminal Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law, 1981.

Similarly, more than twenty years have elapsed since the ISTA affair, and it has been relegated to the history books. As stated above, the Attorney-General decided at the time not to prosecute respondent over the affair, and we did not see fit to intervene with his decision. In light of more than two decades of wide and varied public activity by respondent since then, including his appointment as Minister of Justice, I believe that the affair does not invalidate respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. 

10. We now consider the Bar-On affair. As was stated above, due to respondent’s involvement in this affair the police recommended that Hanegbi be charged with fraud and breach of trust. Ultimately the Attorney-General decided not to indict respondent. The State Attorney issued an opinion on the matter, noting that “even among us [in the State Attorney’s Office] there were those who maintained that there were grounds for prosecuting the Minister of Justice.” However, in the end, after evaluating the evidence, the final conclusion was that “respondent’s conduct did not amount to a criminal offense.”  Nevertheless, the State Attorney saw fit to express her own opinion regarding one of the affairs examined, saying that it was not a crime “even though it was a deviation from the norms of proper conduct.”

All of the evidence presented by petitioner in the case at hand was examined by this Court in Bar-On [3]. Yet, the Court decided, in light of the circumstances, that the Prime Minister’s decision not to dismiss respondent as Minister of Justice did not deviate from the range of reasonableness, and did not justify intervention.

As an interim conclusion, we note that none of the three affairs discussed until this point, whether viewed individually or cumulatively, disqualify respondent from service as a minister, not even as Minister of Justice or Public Security. This is clear in light of this Court’s decision in Bar-On [3].

We have yet to evaluate the fourth affair, the Derech Tzleha affair. This affair is most relevant to the case at hand, being the only addition to the factual basis which was previously presented to this Court in Bar-On [3]. Regarding this affair, petitioner adduces two pieces of administrative evidence which the Prime Minister should have considered when evaluating respondent’s candidacy for a ministerial position in his government. These are the opinion of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee. Is this evidence sufficient to justify respondent’s removal from the office of Minister of Public Security? We shall first consider the opinion of the Attorney-General.

12. At a certain point during the Derech Tzleha affair, the relevant bodies maintained that grounds existed for indicting respondent. The police recommended that respondent be charged with taking bribes, fraud, breach of trust, and other offenses. The evidence was examined by the State Attorney who decided to prosecute respondent for the offenses of fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, and falsifying corporate documents. After hearing respondent’s version of events, the Attorney-General, with the State Attorney’s consent, decided to prosecute respondent for fraud and breach of trust, as well as other offenses. The file was transferred to the Jerusalem District Attorney for the final preparation of the charge sheet. At this point, difficulties arose in proving the various elements of the crime and a decision was made not to prosecute respondent. In the report written by the Attorney-General on this matter, he summarizes his opinion as follows:

13. At the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest was strong enough to amount to a “corrupt” breach of trust which damages public confidence according to the criteria provided in the clause on the need for proof of suspected crimes. This is especially true regarding proof of the criminal intent required in these offenses, that MK Hanegbi was aware that he was acting in a corrupt manner which was detrimental to the public.

 

14. These evidentiary difficulties are primarily the result of the fact that the organization from which Hanegbi received benefit, which he had established with the aid of his friends and long-time associates, had no interests independent of his own, and certainly none which conflicted with his own. During the period of its operations, Hanegbi served as its chairman and subsequently as its director-general, and he dictated the agenda. Similarly, there is no evidence at all which indicates that the organization ever pressured Hanegbi regarding his activities as an MK nor was there even a suspicion of such pressure, which could have indicated the existence of a corrupt conflict of interest. On the contrary, it was MK Hanegbi who directed the other members of the organization in different activities.

 

15. In particular, an evidential doubt still remains regarding the criminal intent. The question is whether, by receiving benefits from the organization, Hanegbi was aware that he was placing himself in a conflict of interest which amounted to a corrupt breach of trust, in connection with the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, which Hanegbi initiated and promoted over a long period of time. Furthermore, assuming that the suspicion is that Hanegbi had “bribed himself” using the organization, it is impossible to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it fulfills the criteria of a crime by an MK in a matter related to advancing legislation in the Knesset. There is evidence of breach of trust, but it is weak…

 

19. All of the above deals with suspicions against MK Hanegbi even though the evidence was insufficient to substantiate a blatant conflict of interest – a criminal conflict of interest – in order to prove the crimes of fraud and breach of trust. An MK established an organization for an important public cause. He raised money which, as director-general of the organization, he was supposed to channel towards that public cause. Instead, with the consent of the organization’s members – who are his friends – he used most of the funds raised by the organization for his own benefit, in order to fund activities he performed in his capacity as an MK… Even so, regarding the aspect of intent of the offense, this was not the only organization that served as a tool for earning salary or benefits in the public sector. Moreover, MK Hanegbi reported his income from the organization to both the Knesset Speaker and the Knesset legal advisor, and this creates difficulties in proving the necessary criminal intent.

 

20. It should be noted that at that time, pursuant to the Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951, a Knesset Member was permitted to receive a salary for “an additional occupation” provided that it did not exceed half of his salary as an MK. The law stipulated that such payment should not engender “a potential conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as an MK.” In 1998, the section was amended and today it is prohibited for an MK to engage in any additional occupation for remuneration.

 

21. In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered filing an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied. (emphasis not in the original).

 

The facts of the affair demonstrate the shifting position of the prosecution regarding whether to prosecute respondent 3 for his involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair. This indicates that the case was reviewed and reconsidered by the prosecuting bodies. No doubt it was a difficult decision. But at the end of the day it was decided not to indict respondent. Petitioner is not challenging this decision –not even indirectly. Nor is petitioner arguing that, the Prime Minister, based on the facts he was presented, should have concluded that respondent had committed crimes during this affair. In any event, it is not likely that the Court would accept a claim that the Prime Minister should have reached a conclusion different from the Attorney-General. After all, the Prime Minister is not expected to study all of the complex investigative material in order to reach an independent conclusion in this matter. He was entitled to rely on the opinion of the Attorney-General, who possesses the authority and the appropriate tools to analyze the evidence and draw the necessary legal conclusions. The Attorney-General’s report indicates that the difficulty in proving that a crime was committed stemmed primarily from the need to show criminal intent. It is presumed that the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute respondent was grounded in the evidence – which he reviewed in full, unlike this Court. Under those circumstances he decided that the small chance of proving criminal intent meant that an indictment was unjustified.

 

It seems to me, therefore, that based on the facts before us we must assume that respondent committed no crime in the Derech Tzleha affair. Petitioner does not claim otherwise. But this does not mean the case is closed. Petitioner claims that the conduct attributed to respondent in the Derech Tzleha affair, as reflected in the Attorney-General’s public report and in the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee, violated the principles of sound administration and ethics. Despite this, the Prime Minister maintained that respondent was fit for office. In my opinion, this conclusion does not warrant the Court’s intervention. I shall now explain why.

13. The case at hand is similar to Pinhasi [5] and Deri [47]. All these cases deal with setting the boundaries between law and ethics. In this matter I refer to Bar-On [3] which explained that “the law cannot and need not replace ethics, except in part, on a case by case basis, in a cautious and controlled way.” Id. at 62 (Zamir, J.). The same applies to the conduct of publicly elected officials. A judicial decision whether to intervene in the discretion of a public body depends on the balance between the interest of representation – allowing the public to be represented as it wishes – and the ethical interest of preserving appropriate ethical standards among elected officials. See Or  v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner [50], at 191. This balance is not technical but rather substantive in nature. See Bar-On [3], at 63; Pinhasi [5], at 474 (Barak, J.).

In Bar-On, it was added:

Because the test is substantive and not merely formalistic in nature, it cannot be stated categorically that that only an indictment for a serious crime, or at least an investigation into such a crime, will justify termination of office. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case, even if it does not amount to a criminal offense, may be so very severe that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to remain in office. However it is still a long way between an extreme case of this sort, which would be exceptional, and a comprehensive rule which rendered unfit any minister or deputy-minister in case of conduct that deviated from proper behavioral norms. The proposal to expand the existing law, so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister, although well-intentioned, is inappropriate and liable to do more harm than good.

Id. at 63-64 (Zamir, J.).

14. It is true that when deciding whether or not to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security the Prime Minister should have considered respondent’s conduct in the Derech Tzleha affair, even if it did not amount to a criminal offense. However, in my opinion, the conduct was not severe enough for us to declare the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security extremely unreasonable, and strike it down. It should be recalled that the Attorney-General’s report determined: “At the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove, to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest was strong enough to amount to a ‘corrupt’ breach of trust which damages public confidence according to the criteria provided in the clause on the need for proof of suspected crimes.” See para. 13.

Furthermore, the Attorney-General makes it clear that respondent, in his capacity as MK, had no conflicting interest, and certainly none that conflicted with the interests of the organization which he headed. It was also noted that respondent reported his activities and income to the relevant authorities. The Attorney-General also emphasized that, at that time, a Member of Knesset was not barred from having an additional occupation. In terms of this report, it cannot be concluded that respondent’s conduct was severe enough to render him unfit, to assume the office of Minister of Public Security. There may be pros and cons regarding a particular individual’s appointment as minister. However, unless, that appointment deviates from the range of reasonableness in an extreme way, the decision is left to the Prime Minister, and the Court should not intervene. Only in extreme cases is it appropriate for the Court to intervene in the Prime Minister’s task of forming a government.

15. To this we add that the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decision is supported by the position presented to him by the Attorney-General prior to respondent’s appointment. It was the Attorney-General’s opinion that “despite the fact that according to statute and case law there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment is still problematic from a civic perspective...” See para. 15 of the Prime Minister’s affidavit. This may be understood to mean that, legally speaking, there is no impediment to respondent’s appointment, even though his conduct warrants criticism. The point is that the Attorney-General informed the Prime Minister that, in terms of the law, the appointment was legitimate. The Attorney-General reiterated this stance before the Court. The Prime Minister ultimately relied on the Attorney-General’s opinion, regarding both  the lack of “sufficient evidence of a criminal offense by respondent in the Derech Tzleha affair,” and the legality of respondent’s appointment in light of his conduct. Obviously if we were to conclude that the Attorney-General’s opinion was inappropriate and without basis, things would be different. However this is not our position.

16. The Knesset Ethics Committee addressed this case as follows:

20.A. MK Hanegbi served simultaneously as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of the Derech Tzleha organization and as Chairman of the Economics Committee. This created the possibility of a conflict of interest between the additional occupation and the his role as a Knesset Member, in violation of the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Knesset Members Immunity (Rights and Obligations) Law, 1951, as worded at that time.

B. MK Hanegbi received material benefit as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of Derech Tzleha, which had as one of its principle objectives the advancement of a law which Hanegbi himself had initiated. In doing so, he violated section 4 of the Rules of Ethics for Knesset Members, which prohibits a Member of Knesset from receiving any material benefit for an activities performed outside of the Knesset in his capacity as Knesset Member.

C. Towards the end of the term of the Thirteenth Knesset, MK Hanegbi returned to his position as Chairman of the Finance Committee. As such, a potential conflict of interest was created relating to the Fuel Economy Law, since MK Hanegbi was receiving benefits from Derech Tzleha, which had accepted contributions from major fuel corporations. In this situation, MK Hanegbi should have transferred the bill to another MK and, by failing to do so, violated the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Immunity Law, as worded at that time.

    D. As a result of the above, the Ethics Committee reprimands MK Tzahi Hanegbi and deprives him of his salary for a period of two months…

See The Decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee regarding the complaints of MKs Eli Goldschmidt and Haim Oron, and regarding the complaint of Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi against MK Eli Goldschmidt, dated May 24, 1999.

It is my opinion that the above decision does not justify our intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. This decision concerns the realm of ethics. Respondent’s conduct as described by the Ethics Committee is clearly unsatisfactory and deserving of criticism. However, it does not constitute the kind of severe deviation that would justify the intervention of this Court in the respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security.

17. Does the cumulative weight of the four affairs involving Hanegbi render the Prime Minister’s decision extremely unreasonable, even though no affair on its own is sufficient? Petitioner asserts that respondent’s conduct, as reflected in all the affairs put together, shows that he is unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

It is true that when an administrative authority considers a public appointment, it must weigh not only each individual piece of administrative evidence that the candidate committed a crime, but also the cumulative weight of the evidence. It is possible in certain cases that the sum total of the evidence will be greater than its parts. The appointing authority must take this extra weight into account during its deliberations. The Court will intervene in an authority’s decision only if the cumulative weight of all of the evidence undoubtedly has extra weight which, if ignored, renders its decision extremely unreasonable. This is not true of the present case. The brawling and ISTA affairs were too long ago to have any bearing on the later affairs. Regarding the Bar-On affair, this Court has already decided that it is no impediment to respondent’s remaining in the position of Minister of Justice. In my opinion, the cumulative evidence in the Derech Tzleha affair does not justify the intervention of the Court in the Prime Minister’s decision under the stated criteria for such intervention. I reiterate that the key term in this case is “intervention.” The question is not what the Court would have done in the Prime Minister’s stead. Rather it is whether the Court is obligated to intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security in light of the four affairs. Under the circumstance, my answer is no.

Claim of Conflict of Interest

18. As stated above, petitioner claims that respondent should not be appointed as Minister of Public Security for the additional reason that his appointment will create a potential conflict of interest. The source of this claim is that respondent was investigated by the police regarding the Bar-On affair and the Derech Tzleha affair. In both of these cases, the police recommended that Hanegbi be prosecuted, though this course was not adopted by the Attorney-General. In petitioner’s opinion, a conflict of interest is liable to arise with respect to promotions for high-ranking police officers  who have previously investigated him. A conflict may also arise when the minister allocates budgets to police departments under the charge of his former investigators. In other words, petitioner claims that respondent may not handle certain promotions or budgets objectively. He may not base his decisions only on the relevant and legitimate considerations and the best interests of the police. Instead he is liable to be swayed by his own personal “interest” which is to “get even” with his former investigators and to avenge himself on them.

Before we evaluate this claim, we note that respondents raised doubts as to the correct classification of this claim. They say that there is no conflict of interest since a “desire for revenge” does not constitute an interest that conflicts with Hanegbi’s public duties as minister. The concern is rather that extraneous considerations will play a part in Hanegbi’s decisions. On the other hand, it could be argued that if a minister wishes to get even with his investigators this can be construed as an interest in the broad sense of the word. Anyone serving in a public office is forbidden to enter a situation involving potential conflict of interest. This is to ensure that the official will be able to fulfill his duties according to those considerations and interests which are relevant to his role. He must not be influenced by potentially conflicting considerations, such as personal interests or those pertaining to another public post occupied by him. Therefore, a conflict of interest could arise where the official is prejudiced against certain people, where there exists a genuine risk that he will act on this prejudice, and where this conflicts with the interest of fulfilling his role properly. This would be a known and foreseeable risk that the official will be unable to ignore extraneous considerations in certain situations.

Returning to our case, at issue here is whether there is a genuine risk that respondent will find himself in a conflict of interest as Minister of Public Security. The person who fills this role wields considerable power over police appointments and budgets. Is a genuine risk posed by the fact that he was investigated by the police and his investigators recommended he be prosecuted? Is there a real concern that his decisions will not be based exclusively on relevant considerations, since they will directly affect his investigators?

19. My answer to this is no. Generally speaking, investigators do not embark on “crusades” against their subjects. They are not interested in harming them. Investigators do not deliberately choose, for non-material reasons, to investigate any particular individual. While conducting their investigation they perform their duties pursuant to the law. They exercise their professional discretion. In general, if they recommend that a suspect be prosecuted this stems not from their desire to unjustly or cruelly maltreat him, but to exercise their professional judgment to the best of their ability. Everyone, including respondent, presumably understands this situation. A suspect is presumed to understand that his investigators are just doing their job, and are fulfilling duties which must be performed. Therefore, the concern that a suspect will bear a grudge against his investigators is remote and weak. It does not justify the disqualification of the appointment.

Needless to say, the situation could be different if, during the investigation of the potential Minister of Public Security, the suspect had developed animosity towards his investigators. Such a case could be if the suspect claimed, during or following the investigation, that his investigators treated him in an unlawful manner or harassed him, or other similar claims. Under such circumstances, the risk of a conflict of interest is real, and various solutions would have to be considered for neutralizing that concern.

According to the evidence before us, this is not the case with respect to respondent. Despite the passage of years since his investigation, no such claim was ever made by him against his investigators, either prior to or following his appointment as Minister of Public Security. On the contrary, respondent states the following in his affidavit:

4. The concern that I might interfere with the appointment of one of my investigators, impede his advancement, or plot against him, is spurious. I have made it clear on more than one occasion, including to my investigators themselves, that I have no complaints about them, and that I respect their duty to fully investigate every case. This is certainly true since the Attorney-General instructed the police to open an investigation. Moreover, my investigators treated me in a sensitive and respectful manner.

5. The concern that due to a conflict of interest I will deprive any particular division of the Ministry of Public Security of its budget is neither reasonable nor realistic. The budget proposal is prepared by the ministry’s planning department, in conjunction with National Headquarters, under the supervision of the Police Inspector-General and in coordination with the Budgets Division of the Finance Ministry. The ministry’s budget requires the approval of the government, the Finance Committee and the Knesset plenum. Therefore, there is no basis for the concern that I might use the budget in order to “get even” with one division or other. Neither could I consider any extraneous factors whatsoever in connection with the ministry’s budget, whose preparation, approval, and execution are handled by so many bodies.

Petitioner fails to bring any evidence whatsoever to refute this claim, or to point to any action or statement of respondent that contradicts his stated position. Under these circumstances, there is no cause for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security. No genuine concern of a conflict of interest or extraneous considerations can be inferred solely from the fact that he was investigated in the past by the police.

In conclusion, I concur with the position of my colleague, Justice

 

Rivlin, according to which the petition is denied.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

 

1. I have read the opinions of my colleagues Justice Rivlin and Vice President Or. The comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, elucidates the basic principles governing the relationship between the judicial branch, the legislative branch, and the executive branch. It focuses on judicial intervention – specifically that of the High Court of Justice – in acts of the Knesset and the government. My description of some of these principles might have been structured differently, but on the substantive level I concur with my colleague and my reservations are secondary. Apparently, this was also the position of my colleague, the Vice President. However, I was unable to concur with my colleagues’ application of these principles to the case before us, and I therefore decided to write my own opinion.

2. This petition seeks to prevent the appointment of respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the office of Minister of Public Security, due to his involvement in four separate affairs, especially the Derech Tzleha affair. Hanegbi was indicted in only one of these four affairs, the earliest and the least serious of the four. Petitioner claims, however, that the effect of the cases must be considered cumulatively and points out that, as Minister of Public Security, Hanegbi will be in charge of the police officers who investigated his involvement and who recommended his indictment. They also note that the Attorney-General recommended that the Prime Minister withhold the appointment. All of these factors create a “critical mass” that render Hanegbi unfit to serve as minister in charge of the system of investigation and law enforcement in Israel. Petitioner therefore requests that we order the Prime Minister to not appoint Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

The Principal Facts

 

3.   Following the election of the Sixteenth Knesset on 28 January, 2003, and pursuant to section 7 of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, the President charged the incumbent Prime Minister and Knesset Member, Ariel Sharon, with the formation of a government. Once the ministers of the new government had been designated, the public was informed that Hanegbi, who had served as the Minister of Justice between 1996 and 1999, and as the Minister of the Environment in the previous government, was to be Minister of Public Security – the minister in charge of the Israeli Police.

4.   When the planned appointment of respondent as Minister of Public Security became public knowledge – prior to the establishment of the government – this petition was filed. Petitioners requested this Court to issue an order nisi and an injunction instructing the Prime Minister to abstain from making the appointment. Petitioner further requested an order instructing the Attorney-General to direct the Prime Minister not to make the appointment. The Court did not issue an injunction but, on March 10, 2003, several days after the formation of the government and Hanegbi’s induction as Minister of Public Security, the Court issued an order nisi against the Prime Minister instructing him to justify Hanegbi’s appointment. No order was issued against the Attorney-General.

5.   Petitioner argues that Hanegbi is not fit to serve as Minister of Public Security, primarily due to his involvement in four separate affairs. Petitioner also cites two additional dealings that came to light while the respondent was serving as Minister of Justice and as Minister of the Environment. Neither had criminal implications. These are of secondary importance, however, and we will not lump them together with the other four affairs upon which we now focus.

6. The first affair takes us back to 1982, when respondent stood trial and was convicted of brawling in a public place following a fight that he was involved in as a student. The Court imposed a suspended prison sentence and a fine. Today, the case is of marginal importance, due to both the passage of time as well Hanegbi’s age at the time of the offense. Notably, this is the only case in which Hanegbi stood trial and was convicted or sentenced.

7.   The second case, known as the “ISTA Affair,” began in 1980 and continued until 1992. It is described at length in HCJ 3846/91 Pinchas Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 423. For our purposes, these are the relevant facts: Respondent and others filed a complaint with the police that certain leaders of the Students Union and of the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had committed “the greatest act of fraud in the history of Israeli aviation.” [1], at 426. The complaint led to a police investigation, which culminated in the indictment of seven people, including Pinchas Maoz, an experienced advocate and law lecturer who also served as the external legal advisor to ISTA at the time. Maoz was acquitted of all charges by the Magistrate’s Court, and in its judgment the court noted with regard to Hanegbi that “factual truth was not always a guiding light in his testimony … the witness did not provide precise answers and avoided topics that did not square with his version of the events.” [1], at 428. Advocate Maoz then asked the Attorney-General to indict Hanegbi for lying under oath, for relaying misleading information, and for presenting contradictory testimonies, but the Attorney-General decided that the chances of conviction were too low to warrant a trial. Maoz petitioned the decision of the Attorney-General to the High Court of Justice. On December 7, 1992, the Court ruled “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth” that while an indictment could reasonably have been filed against respondent, it would not intervene in the Attorney General’s decision:

 

The Attorney-General weighed all of the facts and, in deciding whether or not to indict Hanegbi, and concluded that the small chance of a conviction did not warrant an indictment. On the basis of our comments above, it is easy to form the impression that, had he decided to indict Hanegbi, we would have regarded this as reasonable. But the question before us is not what this Court, or any of its judges, would have decided in the Attorney-General’s place.

Id. at 439 (Or, J).

 

8.   The third affair, known as the “Bar-On affair,” concerned the appointment of Advocate Roni Bar-On to the position of Attorney-General. It is alleged that respondent, then Minister of Justice, behaved unlawfully during the appointment process, and even misled the government and the Prime Minister regarding the position of the President of the Supreme Court on the appointment. The facts of the case were described at length in three Supreme Court judgments. See HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney [2]; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Israeli Government [hereinafter: Bar-on [3]]; HCJ 2624/97 Ronal v. The Government of Israel [4].

 

For our purposes we will content ourselves with a brief account of the principal elements. Respondent was suspected of fraud and breach of trust. The police recommended that an indictment be filed against him. The Attorney-General, however, with the consent of the State Attorney, recommended that the investigation file be closed for lack of evidence. The affair also dealt with the appointment of Bar-On as Attorney-General, and we shall now cite part of the State Attorney’s opinion on this matter, as quoted in Bar-on [3]:

 

The Minister of Justice [the respondent here] was aware that Bar-On’s name had been mentioned in the Prime Minister’s Office, prior to Michael Ben-Yair’s [the previous Attorney-General] notice of resignation. The Minister of Justice also knew that, within the Prime Minister’s Office, Bar-on was not considered the natural candidate, due his factional affiliation in the Likud.

No doubt the Minister of Justice had an interest in the appointment of Bar-On, who was his mentor and friend. Hanegbi also claims that, in his opinion, Bar-On was qualified for the position.

The Minister of Justice’s engineering of Bar-On’s appointment was concealed from the public eye at the time. Government ministers were apprised of it at a cabinet meeting, leaving them no time to conduct any discussions or investigation. The Minister of Justice repeatedly emphasized that, in the past, Attorney-Generals had been appointed in a similar manner, without the name of the candidate being presented to the cabinet.

The Minister of Justice received information from the President of the Supreme Court, A. Barak, that could have disqualified Bar-On, information that required consideration. He failed to present the true significance of these comments to the Prime Minister and merely informed the cabinet that President Barak was aware of the appointment. His manner of mentioning the subject could have led to the conclusion that President Barak had nothing to say about the appointment, and perhaps even assented to it. The truth, of course, was otherwise.

Id. at 50-51. It was further noted:

In our case, the Minister of Justice [the respondent here] failed to inform the cabinet of the Supreme Court President’s negative view of the appointment of Bar-On as Attorney-General. In this context, the State Attorney stated:

“During the Cabinet meeting, Minister Kahalani asked the Minister of Justice whether the Prime Minister had approved the appointment. Hanegbi replied, saying: ‘Yes. I also brought it to the attention of the President of the Supreme Court, and, naturally, also to the Attorney-General, who gave his approval’

Minister David Levi was asked how he had understood these words. He reported that his understanding was that the Minister of Justice had mentioned the names of Barak and Ben-Yair in order to show that the appointment had passed through conventional channels.

Considering what President Barak actually said about Bar-On’s appointment, merely mentioning that Barak had been informed of it, without reporting what he had actually said about it, is problematic. This statement creates the impression that President Barak had nothing to say about the appointment, or at least that he did not say anything which mattered one way or another.”

Id. at 65-66 (Goldberg, J.). As stated, the Attorney-General and the State Attorney decided that this evidence was insufficient to charge respondent with a criminal offense. But, at the same time, the State Attorney criticized respondent’s conduct, writing that this constituted a “deviation from appropriate norms of conduct” and that it was not “above criticism.” Id. at 52. Nonetheless, the State Attorney did not believe that respondent’s conduct amounted to a criminal offense.

These harsh words triggered a public outcry, which led to the filing of three petitions with the High Court of Justice. We will complete our review of the Bar-On affair by noting that the arguments made in Bar-On [3] – a petition which sought to remove respondent from the office of Minister of Justice – bear a striking resemblance to the arguments raised in the petition before us. The main difference lies in the addition of the Derech Tzleha affair to the previous three affairs.

9.   The Derech Tzleha affair began in July 1997. The case concerned respondent’s actions as the head of the non-profit organization known as Derech Tzleha. The facts were detailed at length in an opinion of the Attorney-General, which was published on March 6, 2001, following his decision not to indict respondent. We will present some of the comments stated in the report:

The Findings of the Investigation

h. In 1994, MK Hanegbi and MK Abraham Burg prepared a private bill in the Knesset entitled “The National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law.” The purpose of the draft legislation was to improve road safety, particularly by the establishment of a government body, which would consolidate all of the authorities, units and governmental bodies involved in the battle against traffic accidents. The bill was placed before the Knesset on July 25, 1994 and, on October 12, 1994, it passed a preliminary reading. It was then transferred to the Finance Committee for deliberation. A sub-committee was established, with Hanegbi as its chairman, with the task of preparing the bill for the next stages.

i. Concurrently, and in the framework of his public activities for the enactment of the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, MK Hanegbi established Derech Tzleha, which he and his colleagues registered as a non-profit organization on October 12, 1994. The object of the organization, according to its by-laws, was to reduce the carnage on the roads through education, public activism, and legislation. In practice, its principal and perhaps chief object was the promotion of the Traffic Accidents Law by public activism and enlisting the support of Knesset Members and ministers.

j. The organization’s activities were limited, comprising the following: sending letters to MKs, cabinet ministers, council heads, and other public figures, persuading them to support the Traffic Accidents Law; the production of three advertisements in support of the law; the publication of a pamphlet which brought together the protocols of the sub-committee headed by Hanegbi, and its dissemination among the Knesset Members; one-time correspondence with a medical organization regarding the establishment of a fund for road-accident victims; planning demonstrations; setting up a signing booth; initiating and organizing a special meeting of the Knesset Finance Committee on the Modi’in road; sending requests to hundreds of “famous” people from a number of fields, asking them to add their names to an advertisement in support of the law; and publication of a newspaper advertisement in support, after the law had passed the first reading.

 

The rules of the organization prohibited the distribution of profits or benefits to members, whose activities were supposed to be voluntary. Hanegbi initially served, until September 12, 1995, as chairman of the organization. On October 1, 1995, he resigned his membership of the organization, and was appointed as director, and began receiving a salary and other benefits. As a result, the vast majority of the organization’s resources went to his wages, company car, and expenses, all of these being related to Hanegbi’s public activities as an MK. After his appointment as Minister of Health following the elections to the Fourteenth Knesset in 1996, Hanegbi resigned from his position as director. A short time later, the organization entered into voluntary liquidation.

 

k. The organization raised approximately NIS 375,000. The findings of the investigation indicated that MK Hanegbi received the vast majority of this amount through his salary, company car, expenses, and cellular phone, as well as in the form of a notice of support which was published three days before the Likud primaries.

 

The report continues with a chapter entitled “Suspicions” where we read the following:

 

Suspicions

 

13. The investigation raised suspicions that MK Hanegbi received these benefits as payment for his activities as a Member of the Knesset, and especially for his efforts in promoting the Traffic Accidents Law. If this was found to be true, he would have been guilty of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust, and offenses connected to the management of a corporation.

 

After examining the evidence, we found that, while serving as an MK, Hanegbi functioned both as the chairman of the Finance Committee of the Knesset, and as the chairman of the sub-committee that was engaged in the promotion of a law. Concurrently, he also held a central position in the organization, whose main object was the enactment of the Traffic Accidents Law. This situation created a prima facie conflict of interests. While he did declare his income from the organization to the Knesset Speaker, Hanegbi failed to inform the committee members that he was both one of the founders of the organization and its chief. And, as we already stated, while serving as chairman of the sub-committee charged with the advancing the Traffic Accidents Law, and in his capacity as a Member of the Knesset, he was receiving a salary and significant benefits from the organization that he had established. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove, to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest amounted to a “corrupt” breach of trust. This is especially true regarding proof of the criminal intent required in these offenses: that MK Hanegbi was aware that he was acting in a corrupt manner which was detrimental to the public.

 

14. These evidentiary difficulties result primarily from  the fact that the organization from which Hanegbi received benefits, which he had established with the aid of his friends and long-time associates, had no interests independent of his own, and certainly none which conflicted with his own. During the period of its operations, Hanegbi served as the organization’s chairman and subsequently as its director-general, and he dictated the agenda. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that the organization ever pressured Hanegbi regarding his activities as an MK, nor was there even a suspicion of such pressure, which could have indicated the existence of a corrupt conflict of interest. On the contrary, it was MK Hanegbi who directed the other members of the organization in its different activities.

 

15. In particular, an evidentiary doubt still remains regarding the criminal intent. The question is whether, by receiving benefits from the organization, Hanegbi was aware that he was placing himself in a conflict of interest which amounted to a corrupt breach of trust, in connection with the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, which Hanegbi initiated and promoted over a long period of time. Furthermore, assuming that the suspicion is that Hanegbi had “bribed himself” using the organization, it is impossible to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that this fulfills the criteria of a crime by an MK in a matter related to advancing legislation in the Knesset. The case law regards the offence of “breach of trust” as a consciously corrupt conflict of interests. In the case at hand, however, there is insufficient evidence of that kind of conflicting interest. Moreover, the organization did not represent any particular, sectarian-interest group; its purpose was rather to rouse public interest in the battle against road accidents.

 

16. Fuel Economy Law – MK Hanegbi served in rotation with MK Gideon Pat as the chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee. This committee dealt, among other things, with the Fuel Economy Law. During the period in which MK Pat served as committee chairman, two months before MK Hanegbi became committee chairman, the organization received contributions from fuel companies.  The sum received amounted to about 10% of the total contributions received by the organization. According to the findings of the investigation, the overwhelming majority of the representatives of the fuel companies were unaware of Hanegbi’s involvement in the organization. None of them knew that Hanegbi was receiving benefits from the association to which they were contributing. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to prove that Hanegbi felt any sense of obligation to these companies. The intensity of the conflict of interests is therefore considerably weakened. Furthermore, during the relevant period, there was no chance of promoting the enactment of the Fuel Economy Law in view of the government’s opposition to that law. No evidence was found of Hanegbi having influenced the handling of the law.

 

17. The Knesset Ethics Committee reviewed two complaints concerning the benefits that Hanegbi received from the organization. It was alleged that the salary he received from the organization created a conflict of interest. This was in violation of the provisions of the Knesset Members Immunity Law, which forbids a Knesset Member from engaging in any occupation or additional occupation which creates a possible conflicting interests. It also contravened the Rules of Ethics for Members of the Knesset, which prohibit a Knesset Member from receiving, whether directly or indirectly, any material benefit for an act that he has performed within the framework of his duties or his status as a Member of the Knesset. On May 24, 1999, following its deliberations, the Ethics Committee found Hanegbi guilty. It ruled that the chairman of a Knesset Committee could not preside over deliberations of a particular issue while simultaneously occupying a key position in an organization whose chief aim was to promote that issue. This is true even if his duties in the organization were voluntary. The Committee further determined that the fact that MK Hanegbi was chairman and director-general of the organization while also serving as the chairman of the Finance Committee created the possibility of a conflict of interest between his additional occupation and his role as a Knesset Member. The Ethics Committee accordingly censured Hanegbi and docked his salary for two months.

 

18. However, the criteria for conviction in criminal proceedings differ from those governing disciplinary proceedings. People are frequently the target of disciplinary proceedings even when the allegations against them are not overtly criminal. The findings of the Ethics Committee, in accordance with the facts upon which they were based and the additional evidence gathered by the police, are insufficient to prove the offenses of fraud and breach of trust. Here, an MK dealing with the legislative arrangement for a particular cause was simultaneously the recipient of a salary and benefits from an organization which spearheaded the same cause, albeit with the association’s approval. It has long been our opinion that these facts may involve a breach of trust. However this is difficult to prove. We now confront the issue again, in view of the report given to the Knesset Speaker and his legal advisor, as detailed below.

 

19. The evidence against Hangebi was insufficient to substantiate a criminal conflict of interest in order to prove the crimes of fraud and breach of trust. An MK established an organization for an important public cause. He raised money for that cause which, as director-general of an organization, he was supposed to channel towards that public cause. Instead, with the consent of the organization’s members – who were his friends – he used most of the funds raised for his own benefit, in order to fund activities he performs in his capacity as an MK. All of this occurred after Hanegbi had submitted a private bill, which he believed to be tremendously important, as he admitted during investigations, and while he was receiving a salary in his capacity as an MK.  Even so, regarding the mens rea of the offense, this was not the only organization that served as a tool for earning salary or benefits in the public sector. Moreover, MK Hanegbi reported his income from the organization to both the Knesset Speaker and the Knesset legal advisor, and this creates difficulties in proving the necessary criminal intent.

 

20. It should be noted that, at that time, pursuant to the Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951, a Knesset Member was permitted to receive salary for “an additional occupation” provided that it did not exceed half of his salary as an MK. The law stipulated that such payment should not engender “a potential conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as an MK.” In 1998, the section was amended and today it is prohibited for an MK to engage in any additional occupation for remuneration.

 

10. As stated in the Attorney-General’s report, respondent’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair led to disciplinary proceedings in the Knesset Ethics Committee. The committee determined that Hanegbi had placed himself in a conflict of interest, in contravention of the Ethics Rules, and therefore imposed two penalties on him: a reprimand and a two-month salary freeze. In its decision of May 24, 1999, the committee wrote:

 

20.A. MK Hanegbi served simultaneously as chairman, and subsequently as director-general, of the Derech Tzleha organization, and as chairman of the Economics Committee. This created the possibility of a conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as a Knesset Member, in violation of the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Knesset Members Immunity (Rights and Obligations) Law, 1951.

 

B. MK Hanegbi received material benefit as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of Derech Tzleha, which had as one of its principle objectives the advancement of a law which Hanegbi himself had initiated. In doing so, he violated section 4 of the Rules of Ethics for Knesset Members, which prohibits a Member of Knesset from receiving any material benefit for an activities performed outside of the Knesset in his capacity as Knesset Member.

C. Towards the end of the term of the Thirteenth Knesset, MK Hanegbi returned to his position as chairman of the Finance Committee. This gave rise to a potential conflict of interest concerning the Fuel Economy Law, since MK Hanegbi was receiving benefits from Derech Tzleha, which had accepted contributions from major fuel corporations. In this situation, MK Hanegbi should have transferred the bill to another MK, and by failing to do so, violated the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Immunity Law, as worded at that time.

11. Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair were investigated by the police. In June 1999, they recommended to the State Attorney’s Office that Hanegbi be indicted for accepting a bribe, fraud, breach of trust, and related offenses. The evidentiary material gathered by the police was examined and considered by the Attorney-General and the State Attorney. At the beginning of 2000, the decision was taken to indict respondent for fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, and falsifying corporate documents, all subject to a preliminary hearing. The Attorney-General decided, with the consent of the State Attorney, that “after extensive legal deliberation … grounds exist to indict MK Hanegbi for fraud, breach of trust and additional offenses.”

In anticipation of the proceedings to remove Hanegbi’s immunity as a Member of Knesset, the file was transferred to the Jerusalem District Attorney’s Office. It was here that the tables turned. In the words of the Attorney-General in his report: “At this stage of the process, difficulties arose once again regarding proof of the components of the various offenses, primarily regarding fraud and breach of trust. In view of our doubts regarding the reasonable probability of a conviction, the State Attorney and I decided to close the file.”

As such, no indictment was filed; instead, a public report was issued. This report gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the case. Its first section stated: “We would emphasize that the events, for which MK Hanegbi was both convicted and penalized by the Knesset Ethics Committee in 1999, indicated impropriety which, in our view, reached the level of an offense. However, we ultimately decided that there was no reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction.” In conclusion, the Attorney-General wrote:

In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered that there ought to be an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied.

 

12. This concludes our review of the four cases upon which this petition is based.

13. The Attorney-General’s view was that respondent’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair made it inappropriate to appoint him as Minister of Public Security or to other positions connected with law enforcement. Accordingly, when he became aware of the intention to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General advised the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment, because “[a]lthough, according to statute and case law there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment itself is prima facie problematic from a civic perspective.” Notwithstanding this advice, the Prime Minister decided that it was appropriate to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. Notably, when the previous government was appointed in 2001, and in the direct aftermath of the Derech Tzleha case, the Attorney-General also advised the Prime Minister against appointing respondent to any ministry entrusted with law enforcement. The advice was given “primarily from a civic perspective” and, on that occasion, the Prime Minister accepted the advice.

 

The Dispute

 

14. We are confronted with three principal affairs: the ISTA affair, the Bar-On affair and Derech Tzleha affair. In all of these cases, Hanegbi was suspected of criminal offenses and, in the latter two, the police recommended that he be indicted. However, he was never actually indicted and, as such, he was not convicted. The question therefore arises: Can a person be prevented from serving as a cabinet minister on account of suspected criminal offenses? If so, can Hanegbi be prevented from serving as a cabinet minister because of his involvement in these affairs? Petitioner does not contest Hanegbi’s appointment as a cabinet minister per se. Rather, the claim is that he is unfit for service as a minister charged with law enforcement and, for our purposes, as Minister of Public Security. This, in turn, raises the following question: Assuming that Hanegbi is fit to serve as a member of the cabinet and a minister, is he nonetheless unfit to be Minister of Public Security? Is the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security so unreasonable as to require this Court’s intervention? Even at this early stage I would state that there is no dispute between the parties regarding facts or the law. They dispute, however, the application of the law to Hanegbi.

15. Petitioner’s claim, in brief, is that, under the circumstances, there is a legal impediment to Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. Though Hanegbi was not indicted in any of the three cases, his involvement in them makes the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as the “Police Minister” blatantly unreasonable. Petitioner argues that the appointment irreparably damage the public’s confidence in the system of government and the police. Furthermore, there is also a serious chance that the appointment will cause irreversible damage to the functioning of the police, even if only because of the “bad blood” between Hanegbi and the police officers who investigated him and recommended his indictment. Furthermore, the Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971, grants the Minister of Public Security extensive powers over the police. For example, the appointment and promotion of senior officers (section 7 of the ordinance), which includes the ability to appoint the Inspector-General of Israel Police. See section 8A (stating that the government appoints the Inspector-General pursuant to the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security). Respondent may frequently find himself in a serious conflict of interest when handling the promotion of those who investigated him and who recommended his indictment. The latter will fear, and rightly so, that he will take revenge even if they have discharged their duties properly. Therefore, maintains petitioner, the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, is unreasonable.

16. Respondents to the petition – the Prime Minister, Mr. Hanegbi, and the Attorney-General – oppose petitioner’s request. In their view, Basic Law: The Government grants the Prime Minister particularly broad discretion regarding the appointment and removal of ministers. Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between the breadth of the Prime Minister’s discretion and the constraints upon the High Court’s power to instruct him how to act. It is true that, in special circumstances, the Court can order the Prime Minister to remove a minister from his post, but an examination of the case law indicates that the Court can only exercise that power in rare and exceptional cases. See HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 404 [hereinafter: Deri [47]]; HCJ 4267/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at 441 [hereinafter: Pinhasi [5]]; and Bar-On [3]. These are cases where indictments – indictments alleging particularly serious offenses – were filed against a minister.

The Prime Minister and Attorney-General on the one hand, and Hanegbi on the other, continue to assert, each in their own way, that this is not one of those rare cases in which the Court will intervene with the Prime Minister’s discretion. How so? Hanegbi was not even indicted and, as such, was certainly not convicted. Consequently, there are no legal grounds for preventing him serving as a cabinet minister. Hanegbi is presumed innocent until proven guilty. To prevent him from serving in any particular position without having stood trial violates the principles of justice, even if only because he has never been given the opportunity to prove his innocence (and especially since he is under no obligation to do so). The appointment may indeed be “problematic on the civic level” (in the words of the Attorney-General). However, the Prime Minister was aware of this, and having considered all of the pertinent factors, he decided that Hanegbi, with his variety of talents and experience, was the best candidate for the job. With regard to concerns over conflicting interests in relation to those police officers who interrogated him, we have Hanegbi’s assurance that that he bears against them no grudge. Furthermore, adds Hanegbi, his power to intervene in the professional decisions of the police is limited. The conclusion dictated by all of the above is that the Prime Minister exercised his powers lawfully; his decision was a reasonable one, and, in any event, it does not deviate from the range of reasonableness.

 

17. This concludes our review of the basic issues in dispute and the central claims of the parties.

 

The Legal Framework

 

18. We must first establish the legal point of reference from which to begin our investigation. We were requested to order the Prime Minister to remove respondent from his position as Minister of Public Security. Two questions present themselves in this regard. First: is the Prime Minister empowered to remove Hanegbi from acting as the Minister of Public Security? Second: if so, should the Court, under the circumstances, order the Prime Minister to remove Hanegbi from his position? These questions raise the issue of fitness to serve as a minister. We will now address the concept of “fitness” in its broadest sense.

19.             The current version of Basic Law: The Government, the 2001 version, contains provisions concerning the fitness – or, more precisely the unfitness – of persons with a criminal record to serve as ministers. These provisions address a person’s non-appointment as a minister, as well as their dismissal. The unfitness of a person with a criminal past is regulated by section 6(c) of the Basic Law:

Fitness of Ministers

6. (a) …

…………….

(c) (1) A person who was convicted of an offense and sentenced to prison, and seven years have not yet passed since the day on which he finished serving his term of imprisonment or since the handing down of his sentence – whichever was later  – shall not be appointed minister, unless the Chairman of the Central Election Committee states that the circumstances of the offense do not involve moral turpitude.

(2) The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee shall not so rule if a court has determined that the offense involved moral turpitude.

 

As such, where a person was imprisoned for a crime involving moral turpitude, and seven years have not yet passed since the completion of the sentence (or the sentencing) – the conviction will prevent his appointment as a minister. Parenthetically, we would add that this provision replaced section 16(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 1992, which was even more stringent about membership in the cabinet.

 

Furthermore, pursuant to section 23(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, 2001, the office of a minister is terminated when he is convicted of an offense of moral turpitude.

 

Termination of the Tenure of a Minister Pursuant to an Offense

23. (a) …

(b) Should a minister be convicted by the court, it shall state in its verdict whether the offense involves moral turpitude; should the court so state, the minister’s tenure shall cease on the day of such verdict.

 

The language of the statute is unequivocal: Conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude means the termination of tenure, with no reservation or discretion. The statutory provision acts as a guillotine: once certain “objective” conditions exist, the law itself prevents the minister from continuing to serve in that capacity.

 

These are the explicit statutory provisions governing unfitness to serve as a minister due to criminal involvement.

 

20. Together with the above explicit statutory provisions, there are also provisions regulating the Prime Minister’s power to terminate the tenure of a minister. Section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001 provides:

 

Termination of the Tenure of a Minister

22. (a) …

(b) The Prime Minister may, by way of written notification, remove a minister from his post; the removal of a minister will take effect 48 hours after the letter notifying thereof was given to the minister, unless the Prime Minister retracts it prior to such time.

 

This statutory provision, with minor differences, was also contained in section 21A of Basic Law: The Government, 1968, following its amendment of 1981, and in section 35(b) of Basic Law: The Government of 1992.

 

  1. In light of these statutory provisions, the question is whether the unfitness provisions of sections 6(c) and 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, limit the discretion afforded to the Prime Minister under section 22(b) of the Basic Law? In other words, with respect to a minister or ministerial candidate with a criminal past, do sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law provide the sole and exclusive framework for the Prime Minister’s authority? It could be argued, for example, that the legislature went out of its way to specify certain preconditions to disqualify a minister with a criminal past from office. Can a negative inference be drawn from this that a minister will not be regarded as unfit to serve unless the statutory preconditions for unfitness are satisfied? Also, regarding a minister’s criminal past which does not fulfill the statutory conditions of unfitness specified in section 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, does the Prime Minister have no authority to terminate a minister’s tenure? If so, does it not follow that the person is a fit candidate for a ministerial post?

 

The above questions were discussed at length in Deri [47] and in Bar-On [3]. Pinhasi [5] discussed the same issues in relation to a deputy-minister. The Court’s answer was clear and unequivocal: the explicit statutory provisions cited above in no way restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion or the Court’s discretion to review the Prime Minister’s decision. It will be recalled that those cases involved the judicial review of the Prime Minister’s decision not to terminate the tenure of a minister. The Court ruled as follows: the Prime Minister is vested with the power to terminate, or retain, the tenure of a minister (or deputy-minister); the statutory provisions do not restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion to dismiss a minister; the additional statutory provisions do not limit the scope of section 21A of Basic Law: The Government (1968-1981; currently section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001); and no negative inference can be drawn from the absence of provisions governing the termination of tenure. See Deri [47], at 421; Pinhasi [5], at 456-57.

 

In this context the Court distinguished between unfitness for a particular office and discretion concerning an appointment to office or removal from office. Sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law deal with “fitness” and, as such, do not restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion regarding the non-appointment of a person to a particular office, or his removal:

 

We must distinguish between questions of fitness (or authority), and questions of discretion. The absence of any express statutory provision regarding the unfitness of someone with a criminal past establishes the candidate’s fitness. However, it does not preclude the possibility of considering his past within the framework of exercising the administrative discretion given to the authority making the appointment. Indeed, the criminal past of a candidate for public office is a relevant consideration, which the authority making the appointment is entitled and even obligated to take into account.

 

HCJ 6163/92, 6177 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing, at 256-57 [6]. This rule was actually established prior to the enactment of section 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001. However, not only does this statutory provision not touch on the issue of discretion – the wording of the law makes clear that the termination of tenure occurs automatically under certain circumstances – but the logic behind the law sheds light on our case.

 

22.             The general principle is, therefore, that the Prime Minister is empowered to refrain from appointing a person as a minister, or to dismiss a minister, even in cases not covered by the stringent conditions expressly stated in the law. Once it has been established that the Prime Minister has the power to remove a minister from office, it follows automatically, as a matter of principle, that this discretion is subject to the judicial review of the High Court of Justice.

 
The Exercise of Discretion
 
The Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers as Public Trustees

 

23. This brings us to the main point. There is no explicit statutory provision (not even in section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government) that sets out criteria governing prime ministerial discretion in determining the composition of the government. This is true of both appointments and dismissals. Nor is there any statutory restriction of the Prime Minister’s discretion. The discretion of the Prime Minister may therefore be based upon a variety of pertinent considerations. But, like any other legal discretion, it is constrained by the basic principles of administrative law, which form the foundation of public administration and inform it at all levels. First and foremost among these principles is the principle of trusteeship. All those empowered on behalf of the state are believed to exercise their powers for the good of all, and their status obligates them to act as trustees in the exercise of their powers. In the canonical words of Justice Cohen:

 

[T]he private sector differs from the public sector, for while the former acts as it pleases, giving and taking at will, the latter exists solely for the purpose of serving the public, and possesses nothing of its own. Whatever it has it owns as a trustee, and it has no rights or obligations in addition to, or distinct from, the rights of the trusteeship or those conferred or imposed by statutory provisions.

 

HCJ 142/70 Shapira v. Local Committee of Chamber of Advocates [60], at 331. See also Deri [47], at 417; Pinhasi [5], at 461-63; Bar-On [3], at 55-56; HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance [58], at 33.

 

24. In other words: Those exercising authority on behalf of the state or any other public authority – in our case, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Security – must constantly be aware that their affairs are not their own. They are dealing with matters that concern others and are obligated to conduct themselves with fairness and integrity, in strict compliance with the principles of public administration. Within the area of private law the individual can behave with a measure of the “caprice,” though such “caprice” is not what it used to be, nor should it be. But in the realm of public law – constitutional and administrative law – caprice is a terminal illness. Those who wield authority conferred on them by law, however insignificant that authority may be, must strictly scrutinize all their decisions and actions. They must never forget that all their decisions and actions are on behalf of others, not their own interests. Fortunate is the community whose leaders understand not only the prerogatives but also the limitations of their power. As the High Court recently stated:

 

When acting in the domain of public law, the appointing authority operates in the capacity of a public trustee. Just as a trustee possesses nothing of his own, so too, the appointing authority possesses nothing of its own. It must conduct itself in the manner of the trustee: acting with integrity and fairness, considering only relevant factors, acting with reasonableness, equality, and without discrimination.

 

Those with the power to appoint or decide must therefore act with integrity and fairness, without considering irrelevant factors, guided by principles of reasonableness and equality, and without discrimination. Any failure to discharge this duty opens the door to inappropriate appointments or decisions. The wrong people are appointed and the right people overlooked, and the public good is harmed. But the necessity of imposing these obligations on persons with the powers to make appointments or decisions relating to particular individuals extends beyond the propriety or legality of particular appointments or choices. The scourge of inappropriate appointments must be stopped, in order to preserve the very existence of the public service. Moreover, those appointed illegally are liable to adopt similarly illegal methods when they have to make appointments themselves. The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the sons who witnessed their fathers will also eat sour grapes. Cf. Ezekiel 18:2. And, we all know where this path leads.

 

HCJ 2671/98 Women’s Lobby v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare, [61] at 649-50. These words deal with appointments to the public service (specifically the deputy director-general of the National Insurance Institute), but also they also apply, under different circumstances, to the case before us.

 

25. We have seen that the Prime Minister and all ministers are in fact trustees, holding their offices in trust for the public. We can further infer from this that, when considering the appointment, or the continued service, of a minister with a criminal past, the Prime Minister must conduct himself as a trustee dealing with the public’s affairs. How does a trustee ensure the propriety of his conduct? My colleagues have elucidated the guiding principles, wisely and at length; adding to their comments would be superfluous. I will cite just a few of the comments made by them in this context, which will be instructive for our purposes. For example:

 

The statutory provision [empowering the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister] is also intended to constitute a response, in the form of removal from office, to a serious incident involving a minister. This applies when that occurrence, whether act or omission, affects the stature of the government, its public image, its ability to lead and serve as a role model and its capacity to inculcate proper behavioral norms. It applies primarily when the incident impacts the public’s confidence in our system of government, on the constitutive values of our system of government and law, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

Deri [47], at 422 (Shamgar, P). Furthermore:

 

The Prime Minister, the government, and all of its ministers are in the position of trustees. This position requires them to consider whether to terminate the tenure of a deputy-minister against whom an indictment has been filed, the offenses being particularly grave. The Attorney-General may decide that there is sufficient evidence for an indictment. Under these circumstances, the continued service of this minister is liable to diminish public confidence in the ruling authorities. The authorities must therefore consider the matter with the utmost gravity. For it must be remembered: the government’s ability to rule is based on the confidence of the public. Without public confidence, the government cannot function.

 

Pinhasi [5], at 461 (Barak, J). Similarly:

 

An elected public official is like a cantor leading the prayers. The cantor is the community’s mouthpiece. He presents himself as impoverished in deeds, humble and frightened. So, too, the public servant. Like the prayer leader, he possesses nothing of his own. What he has belongs to the community he serves. Decency, honesty, and purity of heart are the hallmark of a worthy cantor, and this is the pillar of fire which guides the public servant in his path. This is the only way in which he can properly serve the community that chose him as its leader, and the only way for him to win the public’s confidence. It is well known that if the nation lacks confidence in its leaders, disorder prevails and society disintegrates. The higher they ascend the ladder of leadership, the greater our demand for honesty and integrity from our leaders.

 

HCJ 103/96 Pinchas Cohen, Adv.  v. The Attorney-General [62], at 326.

 

The same applies to the government, which enjoys a particular status and image in the public eye. It must maintain public confidence in the Israeli system of governance and in our constitutive values. There is an inherent need for the government and the administration to conduct themselves in a manner that is ethical, decent and dignified. Hence, under certain circumstances, the duty of the Prime Minister to remove a minister from office becomes a duty, a power that the Prime Minister is obligated to exercise. What then are the particular circumstances that transform the Prime Minister’s power to dismiss a minister into a duty?

Indictment of a Public Trustee: Trusteeship and Public Confidence

26. In Deri [47], an indictment was filed against the Minister of the Interior, Aryeh Deri, for the offenses of bribery, breach of trust by a public servant, the fraudulent receipt of goods in aggravated circumstances, and falsifying corporate documents and theft by a director. See Deri [47], at 410. In Pinhasi [5] an indictment was filed against the Deputy-Minister of Religious Affairs, Raphael Pinhasi, for falsifying corporate documents, false testimony and attempting to receive goods by fraud. See Pinhasi [5], at 447. In both cases the Court was required to decide whether the indictments were sufficiently grave to compel the Prime Minister to remove the minister and the deputy-minister from office. The Court decided in the affirmative in both cases:

 

In summary, based on the Deri and Pinhasi cases, the rule is that where an indictment for a serious offense is filed against a minister or a deputy-minister, the Prime Minister is duty-bound to remove the minister or deputy-minister from their post. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister’s refusal to discharge that duty will be regarded as unreasonable in the extreme. Consequently, in the event of such a refusal, the Court can order the Prime Minister to exercise his power to remove the minister or deputy-minister from his position. Today, too, the Prime Minister’s refusal to remove a minister or deputy-minister who has been indicted for a serious offense will be regarded as extremely unreasonable, justifying this Court’s intervention.

 

See Bar-On [3], at 56 (Zamir, J.). The rule is crystal clear: “The Prime Minister’s refusal to remove from office a minister or deputy-minister who has been indicted for a serious offense will be regarded as extremely unreasonable, justifying this Court’s intervention.”

 

27. The duty of trusteeship owed by the Prime Minister and other ministers is inextricably linked to public confidence in the government. A trustee who behaves appropriately wins trust; a trustee who does not live up to the required standards will not enjoy the public’s confidence. The government needs the trust both of the Knesset and of the public as a whole. If it behaves as a trustee should, it becomes the repository of public confidence. Where the government betrays its trusteeship, public confidence in the government is shattered, and the Court will intervene. This is what the Court did when it forced the Prime Minister to dismiss Minister Deri and Deputy-Minister Pinhasi.

 

One might ask: why should the Court trouble itself with the question of public confidence in the government by directing the Prime Minister to remove officials from their positions, as it did in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5]? The public will presumably express its loss of confidence in the government at the ballot box. Why then should the Court issue orders concerning the relationship between the people and the government? Furthermore, the principle of decentralization and the relationship of respect owed by the judiciary to the executive and legislative branches, especially with respect to the internal management of these branches, obligates the Court to distance itself from the question of the composition of the government. This is the government’s exclusive domain, and it ought to remain that way, subject to the express provisions of the law.

 

28. This narrow conception of the relationship between the judiciary and the other authorities is one possible view – possible but undesirable. The Supreme Court rejected it – and rightly so – in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5], and Bar-On [3]. The Court premised its decisions on the issue of public confidence, and this too was the right path. The Court explained its position as follows:

 

Without public confidence in the public authorities, the latter become an empty vessel. Public confidence is the mainstay of the public authorities and enables them to discharge their functions.

 

Eisenberg [6], at 262 (Barak, J.). Later, in discussing public confidence in the government, the Court dealt with past actions that may tarnish the image of a candidate to public office:

 

Public confidence in the organs of government is one of the most important assets of the governing authority and of the state. When the public loses confidence in the ruling authorities, it also loses its belief in the social contract of communal life. Paramount importance ought to be given to maintaining, preserving, and promoting the feeling that public servants are not masters and that they discharge their duties for the sake of the public, honestly and incorruptibly. The purity of the service and of its members is the foundation of the civil service and the basis of our social structure …. This consideration is central and must therefore be accorded significant weight in the overall decision regarding the appointment of a candidate with a criminal past.

 

Id. at 262. This ruling was reaffirmed in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5], and Bar-On [3]. As stated in Pinchas Cohen [62]: “[I]t is well known that if the nation lacks confidence in its leaders, disorder prevails and society disintegrates.” Therefore, when confronted with a concern that a particular act or omission will severely impair the public’s confidence in its leadership, the Court cannot stand idly by, claiming that this matter is not its concern. Judicial intervention in such cases is a form of self-defense – the self-defense of the entire state, of which the judiciary itself is part. How would this Court respond if it was accused of being silent in the face of such a travesty? This was our holding in both Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], and we will be guided by it.

 

Indictment and Evidence in Support of the Indictment; Evidence without an Indictment

 

29. As we have already observed, the law provides that where an indictment for a serious offense is filed against a minister, the Prime Minister is obligated to remove that minister from office. By extension, his refusal to remove the minister under those circumstances is considered to be unreasonable in the extreme and warrants judicial intervention. Now, it could be asked: is this, in fact, the correct interpretation of the law?

 

30. An indictment is no more than a document bearing the signature of an attorney, the Attorney-General, or any other authority. The signatory affirms that to the best of his understanding, the police file contains prima facie evidence that the accused committed the offenses in the indictment. An indictment effectively amounts to an expert opinion of its signatory that, prima facie, the defendant has committed the offenses specified in the indictment. And the question necessarily arises: Is this sufficient? In other words, is the understanding of the signatory – however elevated his status may be – that a person has, prima facie, committed various offenses, sufficient to compel the minister or deputy-minister to step down, without giving them the  chance to present their case? Were this to be provided by statute, we would accept it (subject, of course, to the basic principles of fair procedure). However, should we make this our holding: that an indictment for serious offenses obligates the Prime Minister to remove a minister and deputy-minister from office? Was this the impact of the ruling in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5]? It is clear to us that this is not the law and that this was not the Court’s intention in those cases.

31. In our opinion, a correct understanding of those cases is that we cannot rely upon an indictment, even if it bears the signature of so exalted a personage as the Attorney-General himself. Rather, the indictment is a document that consolidates the evidence collected in the police file, evidence that prima facie incriminates the accused of the offenses ascribed to him. The indictment may be likened to a container with a label that attests to its contents. Its essence is the evidence gathered in the police file, and the basic assumption is that the indictment is a proper summation of that evidence. In both the Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], the Court was careful to emphasize this point. In Deri [47] the Court enumerated the offenses of which Deri was suspected, declaring immediately afterward that: “The facts, which reflect the prima facie evidence in the hands of the prosecution, are described at length in the indictment spanning 50 pages.” Id. at 410. The Court added:

 

We described the main points of the indictment presented to the Knesset in the case at hand. The indictment includes particularly serious allegations of corruption, but it is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution. But, for the purpose of continued service in the government, significance is also attached to prima facie evidence collected in the indictment, which has now become public knowledge. In terms of the reasonableness of certain actions, circumstances are not assessed solely in terms of their ability to generate a hard and fast judicial determination. It is also significant what type of actions have been attributed to an individual, when clad in the official dress of an indictment ready for filing before the courts.

 

Id. at 422-23. It was added:

 

[A]nd if, heaven forbid, an indictment is filed against a minister, based on prima facie evidence, which ascribes to the minister serious offenses that involve moral turpitude both by definition and under the circumstances – e.g. where a minister is charged with accepting bribes, fraud, deceiving state authorities, lying, or making false reports – then it would be neither appropriate nor reasonable for him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 427 (Levin, J.). In both Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], the basic assumption was that there was prima facie evidence in support of the accusations. The import of Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5] is that, where there is evidence in the police file in support of an indictment filed against a minister or deputy-minister for serious offenses, then such evidence may obligate the Prime Minister to remove the minister or deputy-minister from office. The salient element is not the indictment as such, but rather the prima facie evidence that has crystallized into an indictment.

 

32. This interpretation of the ruling is unavoidable. The other interpretation – that an indictment alone is sufficient to remove a minister from office – would deviate from basic legal principles of fairness and justice. Consider the case of a minister who is a candidate for removal exclusively because of the indictment filed against him for serious offenses. He wishes to argue that the indictment was based upon a mistaken understanding of the evidence collected in the police file, and that the charges against him are groundless. The most basic principles of justice require the Court to listen to his claims, and not to refer him to the criminal proceedings to assert his claims. Any other response would undermine the fundamental respect enjoyed by the Court. Furthermore, to confer on an indictment the status of a conclusive document, in terms of the termination of a minister’s office, is tantamount to divesting the Court of its discretionary power, and transferring this power to the attorney who signed the indictment. Such a divestment of judicial power is unacceptable. The Court cannot divest itself of its power to adjudicate and rule in accordance with the evidence submitted to it. Discretion in judicial proceedings belongs exclusively to the Court and the fundamental principle in that context is that the Court cannot delegate its discretion to others, be it to the Attorney-General, or to any of the attorneys in the State Attorney’s Office. By extension, it will not regard an indictment as an irrefutable, conclusive document. The indictment per se will not determine the fate of a minister.

 

33. To summarize: the rule is that an indictment for serious offenses may lead to a minister’s removal from office. The proper interpretation of this rule is that an indictment constitutes an expert opinion that the police file contains evidence which adequately supports the charges against the minister. It is the supporting evidence behind the indictment that weighs against the minister, and not the indictment itself. Concededly, the indictment adds a certain degree of weight to the probative power of the evidence in the police file, but it is by no means conclusive. An indictment for serious offenses, even particularly serious offenses, does not tip the scales against the minister. But, as we shall shortly observe, the reverse true is not true either – the absence of an indictment does not tip the scales in his favor.

 

34. We have established that the conclusive element – whether to the minister’s detriment or to his advantage – is not the indictment per se. Consequently, we must examine the evidence itself, and assess its importance for the case at hand. And we must also discharge another duty: an examination of the reasons and circumstances that convinced the Attorney-General, or the State Attorney’s Office, not to file an indictment. Consider a case in which the evidence collected justified an indictment for a particularly serious offense, but the key witness absconded from the country, as a result of which the Attorney-General refrained from filing an indictment. In that kind of case, can one say that the Court may in good conscience refuse to address the matter, and release itself from all responsibility, for the simple reason that no indictment was filed? I think not.

35. The above would also apply to a decision not to file an indictment, and even to a decision to close a police file. It will be recalled that police files are closed for a variety of reasons, and closing a police file without filing an indictment in no way indicates that no offense was committed, or that there is no evidence attesting to guilt. Thus, for example, the category of closing a file “for lack of evidence,” includes cases in which the prosecutor has evidence that connects a particular person with the commission of an offense, only that such evidence is insufficient to prove the commission of an offense beyond all reasonable doubt, the requirement in criminal law. This Court addressed this question in HCJ 7256/95 Fishler v. The Inspector General of the Israel Police [63]:

 

[F]iles which are closed for lack of sufficient evidence also include investigations of serious and even extremely serious offenses. There are cases in which the investigative bodies have information that leads to the re-opening of a file which was previously closed. This was referred to in the memorandum on the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders (Various Amendments) Law, 1996, which wasrecently disseminated by the Ministry of Justice:

 

Where prosecuting authorities close a file for lack of evidence, this does not mean that they have concluded that the suspect did not commit the offense. Closing a file on those grounds may occasionally be purely the result of technical factors, such as a doubt as to whether particular evidence will constitute corroboration, or where the key witness has left the country or otherwise absconded. Accordingly, information contained in these files may still be relevant for those bodies entitled to receive information on closed files, just as information regarding files closed on other grounds is relevant to such bodies.

 

Id. at 9-10, (Goldberg, J.). A similar argument was expressed in a later case:

 

On January 2, 1994, the State Attorney issued guidelines regarding the exercise of discretion (Guideline No. 1.3 “The Closure of Files Due to Insufficient Evidence and Due to Lack of Guilt.” The Guidelines clarify the procedure of closing a file due to insufficient evidence. Within the basic framework which governs the closure of files on the statutory grounds of “insufficient evidence,” the guidelines establish a secondary category – the grounds of “lack of guilt.” According to the Guidelines, when a prosecuting attorney concludes “…that there is evidence in the investigation file which raises the suspicion that a person has committed a certain offense, but the evidence is not sufficient for proof of guilt, and is therefore insufficient for indictment – the file regarding that suspect will be closed on the grounds of ‘insufficient evidence,’ and the reason for closing the file will be recorded accordingly.” (para. 2). Where, however, the attorney is convinced “that no offense was committed in the same matter, or that there is no trace of evidence as to its commission, the file will be closed due to a ‘lack of guilt,’ and not due to ‘insufficient evidence’” (para. 6). The Guidelines clarify that the closure of a file due to a lack of guilt – a category not mentioned in the statute – is intended “to prevent the perception of there being any element of doubt as to the innocence of a person suspected of a particular matter, which would cause him unjustified harm” (para. 7). This Court adopted the distinction between a file closed due to “insufficient evidence” and a file closed due to “lack of guilt,” and has ruled that it is justified to close a file for “insufficient evidence” and not “lack of guilt” when the existing evidence leaves a reasonable doubt regarding the suspect’s innocence.

HCJ 2682/98 Appel v. The State Attorney [64], at 137-38 (Strasbourg-Cohen, J.). Compare HCJ 4539/92 Kablero v. The Attorney-General [65], at 56. As stated above: the Court will decide, based on the evidence before it, and not merely because an indictment was filed. Similarly, the Court will examine the reason for not filing an indictment, and this reason will be an apposite consideration in its examination of the entirety of considerations, but no more than that.

36. The rule is that the power to remove a minister from office – which may occasionally become mandatory – is not restricted to cases in which an indictment was filed against the minister. As stated in Pinhasi [5]:

[C]ircumstances may arise in which the mere opening of an investigation justifies the termination of tenure. By contrast, circumstances may arise in which even a conviction does not justify the termination of tenure. In this respect, the particular section under which the indictment is filed is not conclusive. The determinative factors are the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense and the other circumstances of the case.

Id. at 474 (Barak, J.). In Bar-On [3] it was noted:

 

Because the test is substantive and not merely formalistic in nature, it cannot be stated categorically that that only an indictment issued with respect to a serious crime, or at least an investigation with respect to the performance of such a crime, are capable of justifying termination of office. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case, even if it does not amount to a criminal offense, may be so very severe, to the point that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 63-64 (Zamir, J.). But these comments were soon qualified:

 

But there exists a vast difference between an extreme situation like this, which forms an exception to the law, and a broad ruling which would render unfit any minister or deputy-minister whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards. The proposal to expand the existing ruling so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss the minister or deputy-minister, even though that proposal is motivated by good intentions, is not appropriate. It is likely to do more harm than good.

 

Id. (Zamir, J.). We unreservedly concur with these comments, but every case must be determined according to its particular circumstances. We must distinguish between two different types of cases. The first is of a minister or deputy-minister “whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards.” On this basis alone, he cannot be allowed to remain in office. The second is of a minister who has not been indicted due to lack of evidence, even though there exists reliable administrative evidence that he committed a particularly serious offense. The reason he was not indicted was because in the offense could not be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

Administrative Discretion; Administrative Evidence; “Criminal Past”; Presumption of Innocence

37. Our position is that the evidence in the police file is the primary determinant of the parameters of discretion. This places us firmly in the realm of administrative discretion and judicial review of the discretion exercised by a competent authority. To avoid any suspicion of intentional disregard, we would hasten to add the following: we are aware that the procedure confronting us is not a regular administrative procedure, like the denial of a license to grow cabbage (a subject of great importance to the applicant). And yet, the guiding principles are identical, whether the case is momentous or trivial in nature. The manner of implementation may change, as we will shortly show, but the principles are the same.

38. It is well known that the rules of evidence in administrative law differ from the rules of evidence in criminal and civil law. An administrative authority is entitled, and indeed obligated, to consider evidence that would not be admissible in a criminal or civil proceeding. For example, where a person’s candidacy is being considered for an office or a job, the reasonableness of the appointment will be assessed in accordance with the rules of administrative evidence. These rules of evidence are less strict than their counterparts in civil and criminal judicial procedures. Administrative evidence is evidence which “any reasonable person would regard as having probative value and would rely upon to any particular degree.” See HCJ 442/71 Lanski v. Minister of the Interior [66], at 357. The well of potential evidence is bottomless, and clearly includes evidence that is not admissible in criminal or civil judicial proceedings. Compare Lanski [66]; CA 5709/95 Ben-Shlomo v. Director of The Value Added Tax Authority [67], at 251; II Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority 751 (1996).

This type of framework is capable of accommodating findings in a judgment made against a third party, to which the candidate himself was not a party. Compare Eisenberg [6], at 272. This includes findings of a police investigation, and decisions of the State Attorney which did not crystallize into an indictment. Compare Fishler [63], Kablero [65], and Appel [64]. The question is whether the competent authority was presented with “sufficient evidence on which a reasonable person could rely, under the circumstances, in order to adopt the decision in question.” See HCJ 164/97 Kontram Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance [68], at 332.

In the administrative realm, therefore, the litmus test is neither technical-legal nor mechanical in nature. The test is one of reasonableness, of common sense. This applies both to the selection of the information on which the authority chooses to rely, and to the weight of the various factors under consideration. This point has been noted by the Court:

In order for an authority to rely on a particular piece of information, the latter must satisfy the test of admissibility for administrative evidence. This test is a flexible one. It allows the administrative authority to consider evidence that is not admissible in court, such as hearsay. Even so, not every wild rumor provides sufficient basis to substantiate a finding. The test is therefore one of reasonableness: the administrative authority is entitled to rely on information that relates to a matter on which a reasonable person (or more precisely – a reasonable authority) would rely in order to reach a decision regarding the matter in question.

The relevant information, which is the information that satisfies the test of administrative evidence, becomes the foundation of the decision. This foundation must be sufficiently sturdy to support the decision. What is the meaning of “sufficiently” for this purpose? Here, too, the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence is a question of reasonableness. In other words, the nature of the facts must be such that a reasonable authority would rely upon it in order to adopt the decision.

HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, [69] at 424-25 (Zamir, J.). Regarding the distinction between the filing of an indictment and a conviction, compare Deri [47], at 422-23, and Pinhasi [5], at 462.

39. The boundaries of administrative evidence also cover a person’s “criminal past.” As is well known, in criminal proceedings, at the crucial sentencing stage importance is often attached to the offender’s past criminal convictions in order to show his “criminal past.” This is not the case in administrative procedure: a person’s “criminal past” can also be proven on the basis of administrative evidence, not just a judicial conviction. This point was made in Bar-On [3]:

Only in the most extreme cases will the Court compel the Prime Minister to exercise this power [to remove a minister from office]. These are cases in which there is administrative evidence of the commission of serious criminal offenses and a threat of serious damage to public confidence in the government authorities. One could perhaps add cases of extreme deviation from the moral integrity required of a person serving as a minister.

Id. at 68 (Or, J.). The Court related to this again more recently:

 

Generally, an administrative authority establishes facts on the basis of administrative evidence. Administrative evidence is evidence that a reasonable person (or reasonable administrative authority) would rely upon under the circumstances. This rule was established long ago and is now generally applied in all matters. The Court has also affirmed its application in various contexts with regard to the proving a person’s criminal past or criminal conduct. The Court has affirmed its application regarding decisions of the Parole Boards to revoke a prisoner’s leave pass, due to the commission of an offense; regarding the decision of a military commander to destroy a building following a murder; regarding the President’s power to pardon “criminals;” and similarly regarding the appointment of a person with a criminal past to public office.

HCJ 1227/98 Malevsky v. Minister of the Interior [70], at 715-16.

As we have already determined, these rules fully apply to an appointment to a public office, and in this context, ex hypothesi, there is no room for a strict application of the “presumption of innocence.” This presumption informs us that a person is presumed innocent until convicted. It applies to the criminal procedure and to the punishment of an offender in the manner set out by law. As for the administrative procedure when an authority is required to rule regarding a person’s “criminal past,” it can do so on the basis of administrative evidence, without a criminal conviction. This rule was dealt with at length in Eisenberg [6], where the Court distinguished between a criminal conviction, and a person’s “criminal past” under administrative law. The Court stated:

 

A criminal past for purposes of a particular appointment is not to be identified with a criminal conviction. We are dealing with an administrative decision of the government to appoint a particular person to a public position. This is not a decision to a statutory penalty. While there can be no criminal punishment without a conviction, this does not apply to an appointment. With respect to an appointment, it is the factual picture with which the appointing authority was presented that is relevant. The relevant question is, therefore, given the facts as presented to the authority, could a reasonable authority have deduced the commission of a criminal offense? If so, this would be sufficient in order to establish “a criminal past” for purposes of deciding the reasonableness of the appointment. Of course, for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the administrative decision, the commission of the criminal offenses attributed to the candidate is the decisive factor. A criminal conviction is clearly sufficient “evidence” of this, but there are other forms of evidence, such as a confession before a competent authority.

The applicable rule in the case before us is the “principle of administrative evidence.” A governmental authority is permitted to base its findings upon evidence which, under the circumstances, is such that “any reasonable person would have regard to its probative value and would have relied upon it.” An administrative finding may be based upon “material whose evidential value is such that reasonable people would regard it as sufficient to draw conclusions regarding the nature and occupations of the persons concerned.”

Id. at 268. This ruling has embedded itself deep within Israeli law. See  HCJ 932/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Chairman of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments [71], at 769; HCJ 4668/01 MK Yossi Sarid v. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon [hereinafter: Bus 300 [72]], at 265; HCJ 5795/97 MK Yossi Sarid v. Minister of Defense [73], at 799. And, in accordance with Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], this is also the rule for the examination of appointments and the tenure of ministers and deputy-ministers:

[W]e must consider the fact that we are only concerned with an indictment prepared by the Attorney-General. Deputy-Minister Pinhasi has not been convicted, and continues to protest his innocence. The weight attached to the concern for the public’s confidence in the authorities when a public figure has been convicted or admits to an offense is not the same as the weight of that consideration when there is only an indictment, and when the accused protests his innocence. Even so, this consideration should not be given conclusive weight. Our concern is with a governmental act of termination of office. In order to justify such an act, there is no need for a criminal conviction. While every accused person enjoys a presumption of innocence, that presumption does not prevent the termination of the office held by the accused. The only condition is that the governmental authority making the decision must have evidence, which under the circumstances is such that “any reasonable person would regard it as having probative weight and would rely upon it.” Justice Shamgar also made this point, ruling that an administrative finding can be based on:

“ [M]aterial whose evidential value is such that reasonable people would regard it as sufficient for drawing conclusions regarding the character and conduct of the persons concerned.”

And Justice Sussman commented in a similar vein:

“[T]he rule that a person is presumed innocent in the absence of evidence to the contrary, does not imply – and nor am I aware of any other legal principle which implies – that an administrative authority which must be convinced of a person’s criminal past may only determine that he has a criminal past if he was convicted by the courts.

Should we strike down the commissioner’s refusal to appoint a candidate as a civil servant when such refusal was based on reasonable evidence of a criminal past, simply due to the lack of a conviction? Let us assume that this applicant desired to be accepted into the public service, and the Commissioner refused to accept him for the above reasons. Would we force the Commissioner to accept him due to the lack of a conviction?

An administrative authority is empowered to make a decision regarding an individual’s personal history, but is not empowered to swear in witnesses and collect evidence in the manner that it is collected in court. Therefore there it is appropriate that its decision be based on evidence which would persuade a reasonable person as to the applicant’s past. This will apply even where the evidence is not admissible in a court of law, and even where it lacks significance in judicial proceedings.”

I also addressed this issue in Eisenberg, at 268:

“[W]hen assessing the reasonableness of a decision of an appointing governmental authority, the decisive factor is the criminal offenses attributed to the candidate. A criminal conviction is certainly an appropriate “proof,” but there are other means of proof.

       The relevant principle in our case is the “principle of administrative evidence.”

Pinhasi [5] at 467-69.

40. In this context we would do well to recall respondent’s claim regarding the presumption of innocence. Respondent informs us:

The presumption of innocence is one of the most basic rights conferred on all citizens in any democratic regime. It is intended to protect a person who has not yet been convicted from restrictions and sanctions which express his status as a criminal. The principle is well-known and well-established. Any determination regarding Hanegbi’s unfitness to serve in particular positions necessarily expresses at least a limited presumption of his guilt, and diminishes the presumption of his innocence.

Moreover, respondent claims that it is an elementary human right that a person be allowed to defend himself against an accusation. Respondent claims:

[T]his elementary right, “a person’s lawful right to defend himself,” was effectively denied to Minister Hanegbi due to the decision not to file an indictment or try him. Paradoxically, if petitioner’s claim is accepted, the result will be that this decision was the most damaging of all, because he no longer has the legal means to prove his innocence.

Respondent here confuses two distinct issues, and hence his conclusion is mistaken. A clear distinction must be made between respondent as a private individual, and respondent as a minister. Furthermore, he is not just any minister, but the Minister for Public Security, in charge of law enforcement. The presumption of innocence resembles the right to silence. Both are granted to a person as a private individual. Consequently, as long as a person’s guilt has not been proven beyond all reasonable doubt, and with due legal process, he is presumed to be innocent of any crime, and no penal sanction may be imposed upon him. But there is no connection between criminal proceedings – the object of which is the imposition of sanctions – and a person’s appointment as a public official. Is the mere fact that a person has not been indicted sufficient, in and of itself, to render him “fit” to be a minister? From the legal standpoint, surely more is required? If this is respondent’s view, then it contradicts the law. “The presumption of innocence – enjoyed by every accused person – does not prevent the termination of service of a public official.” See Pinhasi [5], at 468. Following this holding, I declare that, for our purposes, there is no requirement for evidence beyond all reasonable doubt in order to render a person unfit for service as a minister. As noted in Bar-On:

It cannot be stated in an unequivocal manner that a person’s removal from office can only be justified where an indictment has been filed or an investigation has begun.

Id. at 63. Even evidence of less import than that obtained in a criminal investigation may be sufficient. This is even more true in our case, especially when we consider two elements. First, the cumulative effect of the accumulated cases against respondent. Second, the fact that the Prime Minister insists that respondent not only be a minister, but specifically the Minister of Public Security, the minister in charge of the police and law enforcement.

 “Political” Considerations; Intervention in the Prime Minister’s Discretion

41. Until now we have referred to considerations of a person’s “criminal past.” But these are just a small part of the whole picture that the Prime Minister must consider when making a ministerial appointment, or when considering whether to remove a person from office. We all know that a person’s “criminal past” is not the only factor which the Prime Minister is permitted and obligated to consider when deciding whether a particular person will be a minister, or will be removed from office. Furthermore, in the political reality with which all are familiar, these are not even the main considerations. The parameters of the Prime Minister’s discretion are very broad, and take in a wide array of considerations, among them the candidate’s suitability for the office, the best interests of the public in the broad sense, and others.

42. In this question – whether to appoint or dismiss a minister – the Prime Minister is entitled to consider a wide range of factors. Furthermore, the political context of the appointment means that the Prime Minister’s considerations also include “political” considerations such as the formation of a stable and viable coalition. For our purposes, these considerations are entirely legitimate. In fact, these considerations are central to the establishment of a government and its continued existence. In this regard, Justice Barak stated the following:

“Political” considerations – which may be illegitimate in other contexts – are appropriate when considering the removal of a deputy-minister from office. The need to maintain a coalition and to secure the continued confidence of the Knesset is certainly a relevant consideration. Similarly, weight must be given to the fact that the deputy-minister has not been convicted in court. All that there is against him is an indictment, and an indictment does not amount to a conviction.

Pinhasi [5], at 463. See also Deri [47], at 423, 427, 429.

43. The range of reasonableness is as broad as the power itself, and the court’s power to intervene in the Prime Minister’s discretion is limited to the same degree. Accordingly, deciding whether the Prime Minister deviated from the range of reasonableness is particularly difficult. In fact, it is only in rare and exceptional cases that the Court will see fit to intervene in the acts of the executive regarding cabinet appointments.

The breadth of the Prime Minister’s discretion requires our special attention. His power is unique. Compare Bar-On [3], at 57-59. The scope of judicial intervention is inversely related to the scope of the Prime Ministerial discretion; the latter expands as the former contracts. The fact that we do not agree with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a particular individual as a minister or to a particular ministry is not enough to strike down the decision. It is not our role, nor is it within our power, to evaluate the merits of a decision. We must confine ourselves to the question of its legality. Accordingly, the Court may only strike down a prime ministerial decision concerning the removal or retention of a minister allegedly involved in criminal acts in unusual and exceptional circumstances.

44. It is certainly conceivable that the Court might be averse to a particular decision of the executive branch. But it is incumbent upon us to make a clear distinction between those acts and omissions which belong to the ethical realm and do not enter the realm of the law, and those that belong to both the ethical and legal realms. The latter are acts and omissions flawed by extreme unreasonableness which may thus be subject to judicial annulment. Particular acts or omissions of the executive branch may be ethically problematic, but the Court will not interfere with them unless they are also illegal. “[T]he law cannot, and should not replace ethics, except to limited extent, on a case-by-case basis, in a controlled and cautious process.” See Bar-On [3], at 62. Hence, where a decision is unethical, but remains a matter of ethics, we are not empowered to intervene. Compare also Itzchak Zamir, Ethics in Politics, 17 Mishpatim 255-58 (1988) [106].

We must remember that the judicial branch is charged exclusively with upholding the law and of those ethical areas that have been incorporated into the law. See Bar-On [3], at 61; HCJ 1635/90 Zersevsky v The Prime Minister [74], at 764; HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel [10], at 698-99; HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party [75], at 818; HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Attorney-General [51], at 561.

“It’s Not Done”

45. All the same, it must be remembered that the intensity and the scope of judicial intervention in acts of the executive depends on the executive’s conduct. Ideally, a government is meant to operate in compliance with the principle that “it’s not done.” This is essentially a concept of governmental culture as distinct from a legal concept. What it means is that there are certain things that the executive should not do simply because they are not done, according to the appropriate norms of conduct in society. A person who is act in contravention of these norms is to be condemned. As the scope of “it’s not done” expands, the scope for judicial intervention contracts. Fortunate is the society whose government has internalized the culture of “it’s not done.” Fortunate is the Court that is not required to decide matters relating to the culture of “it’s not done.”

From the General to the Specific

46. This completes our discussion of the basic legal framework. Applying these principles to respondent’s case, we ask ourselves the following question: was his appointment as Minister of Public Security so flawed that it must be regarded as an invalid appointment, or an appointment which should be invalidated? Was the respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security so extreme a deviation from the range of reasonableness as to warrant a ruling that, from the legal standpoint, respondent is not worthy of continuing to hold that office?

47. This Court issued an order nisi directing the Prime Minister to explain his reasons for appointing respondent as Minister of Public Security despite the fact that, from a legal standpoint, the appointment was fundamentally flawed. Both the Prime Minister and respondent replied to the order nisi, but the Prime Minister’s response is the crucial one. In our comments above we surveyed the principle factors that should govern the Prime Minister’s discretion when deciding on the appointment of a minister, or on his removal from office. We will now examine the considerations that led the Prime Minister to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, and why, in his opinion, Hanegbi is fit to continue serving in that capacity. However, instead of describing and summarizing the Prime Minister’s comments, we will let the Prime Minister speak for himself, and we will simply listen. In his affidavit to the Court, the Prime Minister informed us as follows:

 

16. My decision to appoint Minister Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security was made after I had evaluated all the relevant considerations, including the advice of the Attorney-General and the basis of this advice, as detailed above, and I struck a proper balance among these considerations. Among other factors, I took into account the minister’s many talents, his many years of experience in various demanding public and state offices, the gravity of the role of head of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as other coalition-related considerations, all of which are now detailed.

 

17. Minister Tzahi Hanegbi has served, over a continuous period of many years, in a number of high-ranking and demanding public and governmental offices. These have included: Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office; Minister of Health; Minister of the Environment; Minister of Transportation; Member of the twelfth through sixteenth Knessets inclusive; Chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee; Member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; and Member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

In addition, for a period of approximately three years, between 1996 and 1999, Hanegbi served as Minister of Justice, within which framework he served as a member of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs – the so-called “State Security Cabinet”; as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and Law Enforcement; as Chairman of the Committee for the Selection of Judges; as a member of the Committee for the Selection of Military Judges; and as a member of the Ministerial Committee for Privatization.

Over the last two decades, I have become personally acquainted with the abilities and talents of Minister Hanegbi. In view of Hanegbi’s many professional achievements in all of the offices in which he served as minister, I have chosen him to serve as the Minister of Public Security, an office currently faces unique and extremely important challenges.

Minister Hanegbi has a broad national perspective, which was expressed during his years as Minister of Justice, notwithstanding his investigation during that term regarding the Derech Tzleha affair. He has a wealth of experience in the management of complex ministries; and a broad knowledge in the field of security, which he gained in a variety of public roles, as listed above. It is my belief that all this qualifies him to successfully run the Ministry of Public Security.

In my view, the nature of the position offered to Minister Hanegbi and the particular powers exercised by the Minister of Public Security do not create any significant concern of conflicts of interest which might affect the minister’s conduct or impair his professionalism and the integrity of his discretion when exercising his authority … We need to remember that the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-Inspector-General” who wields direct control over all matters pertaining to Israel Police, and this is true especially insofar as the Investigations Branch is concerned. The minister’s powers consist of broad powers of supervision, approval, planning, and the provision of guidance where necessary. In discharging his duties it is essential that there be a close and ongoing connection with police bodies. The decisions and actions of the Minister of Public Security are not the product of his personal preferences; they are the product of cautious and calculated discretion, backed up by extensive data provided by the police bodies. With respect to investigations, the minister is not involved in specific cases; his concern is exclusively with matters of policy.

At the time of making the decision, I considered the position of the Attorney-General with respect to the Derech Tzleha affair. The Attorney-General regarded Hanegbi’s appointment as being prima facie problematic from a civic perspective, though from the strictly legal standpoint, according to existing statutes and case law, there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment.

In this regard, it should be noted that the events relating to Minister Hanegbi occurred between 1994 and the beginning of 1996. When Minister Hanegbi was interrogated, he did not take advantage of his right to silence. Rather he cooperated in full with his investigators. In my view, these facts were significant to the decision not to indict Hanegbi and for public confidence in him.

18. I have taken into account all of the relevant considerations, which include  the qualifications and abilities required of the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General’s position, and Minister Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair and the other affairs, Hanegbi’s capabilities and his experience, as well as political and coalition considerations. After giving these considerations their appropriate weight, it cannot be said that the decision to appoint Hanegbi deviates in an extreme manner from the standard of reasonableness.

48.The Prime Minister thus informs us that he considered Hanegbi’s manifold talents, his many years of experience in demanding public and government offices, and his professional achievements in all of his roles. The Prime Minister expresses his confidence that there is no real concern of a conflict of interest in Hanegbi’s duties as Minister of Public Security, and in this context he also explains that the Minister of Public Security, is not a “supra-Inspector-General.” The Prime Minister also informs us took the Derech Tzleha case into consideration, but he did not find it to be an impediment to Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As for the concern that Hanegbi will face a conflict of interest as Minister of Public Security, the Prime Minister refers to the numerous statutory supervisory mechanisms, and faithfully assures us that this fear has no basis. Once again, we will let the Prime Minister speak for himself:

21. Regarding the claim of conflicting interests: petitioner is concerned that a possible conflict of interest will arise whenever the promotion of any of Hanegbi’s investigators is on the agenda, when allocating budgets for certain branches or departments, and in relation to the disciplinary powers conferred upon the minister. In this context, it should be mentioned that during the entire period of Hanegbi’s service as Minister of Justice, no claim was ever made which could have substantiated the fear raised by petitioner.

First, it should be made clear that ever since the 1988 Amendment to the Police Ordinance (Amendment No. 9), the Minister of Public Security does not have any powers in matters of disciplinary adjudication.

It should be emphasized that, notwithstanding the minister’s overall ministerial responsibility, which finds expression in various provisions of the Police Ordinance, the Israel Police and those at its helm are managerially independent. This is evidenced both in explicit provisions, such as section 9 of the Ordinance, and on a practical level – in working procedures which express the principle of the independence of the police.

Regarding the appointment process, section 7 of the Police Ordinance establishes and regulates the minister’s power to appoint a senior police officer, i.e. an officer from the rank of deputy commander upwards. The manner of exercising the power is subject to the rules of administrative law, including the duty of consultation with the Inspector-General of the police and additional professional bodies, prior to making the appointment. As a rule, the Inspector-General of the police submits his own candidates to the minister for each particular role; for as head of the system, it is the Inspector-General who has to work with the particular officer who is chosen. Rejection of the Inspector-General’s candidate and appointments that are made against the Inspector-General’s judgment, require weighty considerations, all of which are subject to judicial review in accordance with the principles of administrative law.

Regarding the budgetary issue, section 9 of the Ordinance makes the Inspector-General responsible for all expenditures connected to the administration and operation of the police. Besides this section, the provisions of the Foundations of the Budget Law, establish the responsibility of the Minister of Public Security, like any other minister, for the budget of the ministry over which he is charged. For our purposes, this also includes responsibility for the budgets of auxiliary units – Israel Police and the Prison Services.

The Ministry of Public Security’s Director-General, through the Planning, Budgeting and Inspection Department, is charged with the formulation of the ministry’s budget. Before preparing the budget proposal, the minister and the Inspector-General determine the priorities and policies for the coming year. They work closely together on this task. On the basis of these policies, the budget proposal is prepared by the planning division in coordination with the various police departments. The budget proposal is then presented for the approval of the Inspector-General, the Director-General and the minister.

Like the Director-General and the Inspector-General, the minister does not interfere with the budget’s particulars. Their role is to assess whether the budget proposal that was prepared in fact expresses the policies and the priorities determined by them.

Once the budgetary framework for each department has been fixed, the head of each police branch is responsible for the allocation of the budget within his branch, and within its auxiliary and subordinate units, down to the level of the individual police station and the individual policeman. In this respect, the head of a police branch has independent discretion.

The coordination required between the Inspector-General and the minister at the level of policy and priorities, together with the independent discretion of the police in budgetary details, remove any basis for concerns of conflicts of interest, or inappropriate considerations.

Therefore, there exists an array of internal mechanisms governing all matters relating to the minister’s functions. Respondents wish to reiterate that with respect to investigations, the Minister of Public Security deals exclusively with matters of policy, and does not interfere with specific investigations.

49. Hangebi also made various declarations similar to those of the Prime Minister and, like the Prime Minister, he stresses that his role is to set out policy. He does not regard himself as authorized to interfere with the decisions of the police taken at the professional level. In the words of his affidavit:

The internal management of the Israel Police and its head [the Inspector-General] is totally independent of the Minister of Public Security has ministerial responsibility for the police, but he is not a “supra-Inspector-General”; he has no disciplinary powers of adjudication, and no power to intervene in particular investigations. The police budget proposal is drawn up by the planning division in cooperation and coordination with headquarters and the budget division of the Finance Ministry. In addition to the minister’s approval, the ministry budget also requires the approval of the Finance Committee and the Knesset.

50. Respondents’ claims – both those of the Prime Minister and of Hanegbi himself – aim to minimize  respondent’s authority as the Minister of Public Security as much as possible. In support of their position they cite the lack of authority for disciplinary adjudication, the Inspector-General’s independence with respect to the management of the police, the fact that ministerial powers are subject to consultation, consideration of the views of the Inspector-General and other professional bodies, and the extreme difficulty of making any appointment without the Inspector-General’s consent. Regarding the budget, the planning division handles its preparation, with the cooperation of the other police departments; the Inspector-General is responsible for supervision of expenditure; and he does not intervene in the details of the budget. On the policy level, there must be coordination between the minister and the Inspector-General. Regarding investigations, the minister deals exclusively with determinations of policy. These claims attempt to demonstrate that there is no fear that the minister will act illegally.

Hanegbi further informed us that he bears no grudge against those police officers who investigated him, and that he has no intention of impeding their promotion or harming them in any other way. In his own words:

 

The concern that I might interfere with the appointment of one of my investigators, impede his advancement, or plot against him, is spurious. I have made it clear on more than one occasion, including to my investigators themselves, that I have no complaints about them, and that I respect their duty to fully investigate every case. This is certainly true since the Attorney-General instructed the police to open an investigation. Moreover, my investigators treated me in a sensitive and respectful manner.

51. Do the Prime Minister’s words, reinforced by Hanegbi’s own comments, place Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security within the legal range of reasonableness? Do Hanegbi’s virtues, combined with his accumulated achievements in public office, tip the scale in his favor? When assessing pros and cons, duties and responsibilities, we must remember that the scope of discretion here is particularly broad, comprising a wide range of legitimate considerations, including “political” considerations, such as the candidate’s electoral power and the ability to put together a coalition and establish a government. In Bar-On [3] we stated:

Petitioner claims that the Justice Minister’s “was found to have behaved in contravention of the standards of proper public administration by applying defective criteria which violate the principles of integrity.” Petitioner claims that “a minister may have no blot on his character,” especially the Minister of Justice. Petitioner concludes, therefore, that since the Minister of Justice is tainted, the Prime Minister is obligated to remove him from office.

Without deciding whether petitioner’s presentation reflects the desirable law, it is definitely an incorrect presentation of the existing law. In our less-than-ideal world, the mere fact that a minister’s record is blemished is not sufficient to legally obligate the Prime Minster to remove him from office. The Prime Minister is only obligated to dismiss a minister, under section 35(b) of Basic Law: The Government, when his refusal to do so would be unreasonable in the extreme.

Id. at 57 (Zamir, J.). Evidently, a blemished record is not sufficient in this case. The blemish must be serious, perhaps even a permanent stain, in order to obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from appointing a minister or to remove a minister from office. Personally, I am not certain I can give my unreserved agreement to this formulation. “A respected scholar whose cloak is stained – is liable to the death penalty.” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 114A [108]. A minister must be above reproach. In this context we should recall that not just a conviction, or a pending indictment, but also less severe circumstances may obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from appointing that person as a minister, or to remove a minister from office. See para. 22 above.

52.The Prime Minister’s affidavit (and also Hanegbi’s) contains a lengthy description of Hanegbi’s virtues and merits, and only relates sparingly to his faults and failures. Regarding the Derech Tzleha case, the Prime Minister informs us as follows:

15. As indicated in the Attorney-General’s opinion of 2001, which is appended in full to this affidavit, the events at the basis of the Derech Tzleha case, occurred between 1994 and 1996. In 1999, the Knesset Ethics Committee found Hanegbi to be at fault, and he was punished. The Attorney-General claimed that these acts indicated impropriety, which according to those concerned, constituted an offense. At the end of the day, the decision was made that there was no reasonable chance of conviction, and it was decided to close the file for lack of evidence. Notably, the entire investigation was conducted at a time when Hanegbi was serving as Minister of Justice.

In March 2001, immediately prior to the formation of the government (following the elections of February 2001), the Attorney-General informed the Prime Minister of Minister Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha case. He advised the Prime Minister, for reasons primarily from a civic perspective, not to appoint Hanegbi to any of the ministries dealing with law enforcement. The reason for this was that the file had been closed relatively recently. At that time, I did not appoint Minister Hanegbi to one of these offices.

This time around, immediately after being informed, post factum, of the decision to appoint Hanegbi as the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General appraised Dov Weisglas, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, of his position regarding the appointment. The Attorney-General said that while strictly speaking there was no legal impediment to the appointment, it was nonetheless problematic, prima facie, from a civic perspective. The Attorney-General also discussed the matter with Minister Hanegbi, and heard his position that there were no grounds for blocking the appointment, since the closure of the file for lack of evidence had prevented him from proving his innocence. He further stressed that the Minister of Public Security is not responsible for specific investigations and does not interfere with them.

It should be clarified here that, it is part of the role of the Attorney-General to express his opinion about governmental deliberations, orally or in writing, regarding public ethical issues, including non-legal matters. It is then up to the executive branch to take this position into consideration.

The other three affairs are only mentioned in the Prime Minister’s affidavit, in the context of an assortment of legally related claims. One can only wonder, is a police recommendation to indict a minister a regular every-day situation? Does the Attorney-General make a habit of writing long and detailed opinions regarding his decision not to indict a minister? It would have been appropriate for the Prime Minister to elaborate and explain his decision to ignore the Attorney-General’s recommendation, just as he elaborated on Hanegbi’s talents and merits. Ultimately, this matter is not a formal legal issue. Rather it is a matter of basics principles, running deep to the very foundations of our self-image. Our way of life as individuals and as a society depends on such a decision.

53. All agree that the realm of politics differs from the realm of law. The considerations may be the same in each realm, but the weight given to these considerations. “We accept that the Court should be guided by the formula of what is ”just and efficienct,” except that justice must precede efficiency.” See CA 4012/96 Benny Shachaf Freights and Investments (1976) Ltd v. First International Bank of Israel [76], at 505; CA 3602/97 Income Tax and Property Tax Commissioner, Minister of Finance, State of Israel v. Daniel Shachar [77], at 331-32. This principle holds in the realm of law, but not in the realm of politics. This is clearly evidenced in the Prime Minister’s affidavit, which elaborates on the appointment, while devoting minimal attention to the principle of justice in its broader sense. Here we must add that a person’s efficiency and his broad experience in government service are certainly valid and appropriate considerations. However, they do not necessarily tip the scales when weighed against serious considerations concerning improper actions on a public-ethical level. The Court made this point in Bus 300 [72]:

Where there is a clear and direct connection between past offenses committed by the candidate, and the post he is designated to fill, the conclusion may be that his criminal past renders him absolutely unfit for that particular position. Under these circumstances, considerations that might have been regarded as supporting his appointment had he been a candidate for another position (for example the passage of time since the execution of the offense, his regret, his efficient functioning since the offense, and his professional talents) will be of no avail, and his candidacy will be rejected. In determining whether such a connection exists, the considerations cannot be limited to the essence of the offenses and their circumstances, the position in which he committed the offenses and the position now designated for him. Consideration must also be given to the gravity of the moral blemish of the offense. In other words, a connection which renders a candidate unfit is not only a function of the weight ascribed to his criminal past in assessing his professional ability to serve in the new position, but also of his moral stature in respect to the position. Where a close connection exists between the candidate’s criminal past and the position for which he is a candidate, his candidacy should be disqualified, unless there is a real and pressing state of emergency that necessitates his appointment as a uniquely qualified candidate.

See also HCJ 7279/98 MK Sarid v. The Government of Israel [78], at 762.

54. I confess that respondent’s case bothers me deeply. I cannot agree with the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General, and certainly not with respondent, that the matter is clear from a legal standpoint. I cannot agree that judicial intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision is forbidden by law. At the same time, even if our intervention is permitted, we will not rush to instruct the Prime Minister what to do and what not to do. During these proceedings it has been mentioned on a number of occasions that a “cloud” hovers over respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. But a single cloud is insufficient to strike down a person’s appointment as minister. A gathering of many dark and threatening clouds is necessary. 

55. Are there dark clouds gathered over respondent? Regarding his manifold and proven executive talents, as manifested by his years in the public service, I have no quarrel with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister believes that respondent has proven himself as an effective executive figure. Petitioner did not contest this assertion, and we too can accept it. This assessment, however, relates only to his executive capabilities; it does not reflect the ethical problems with respondent’s actions, which we dealt with at length above. When assessing the undisputed acts of respondent, even if the Attorney-General does not consider them sufficient for a criminal conviction, I have difficulty in agreeing with my colleague, Justice Rivlin, that there is absolutely no justification for interfering with the Prime Minister’s discretion. We can accept the Attorney-General’s determination that there was insufficient evidence in the police file for a conviction in court, but we have difficulty in accepting that there is no hard and convincing administrative evidence for the purposes of this case. In this context, it is appropriate for us to recall comments made in Eisenberg [6]:

 

For this purpose, the gravity of the offence is determined not by its ”position” in the Penal Law, but by its implications on considerations that underlie the appointment. Consequently, an offence should be regarded as serious where its very essence and the circumstances of its commission not only undermine law and order in general (such as murder, robbery, or rape) but also the foundations of government structure (such as bribery, fraud and breach of trust, perjury, fabricating evidence, or obstructing the course of justice). A candidate who has committed these offences and holds a senior office in the civil service undermines the public trust in the executive authority and the civil service. He will have difficulty in serving as an example and a model for his subordinates. He will have difficulty requiring of them what is required of every civil servant but which he himself has profaned. He will have difficulty in radiating fairness, trust, prestige, honesty and integrity to the general public. All of these will affect, to a large degree of certainty, the status, functioning and position of the civil service in a democratic society.

 

Id. at 266.

 

56. This is the general rule guiding the judicial assessment of respondent’s actions. And it is even more true when applied to the complex relationship between respondent and the police. In this respect, we should recall the police investigations that led to the recommendations to indict him.

 

The cases against respondent, and their cumulative weight in particular, enjoin us from ignoring the “critical mass” that was created by the Derech Tzleha affair, which came to light after the Bar-On case was closed. Even if we ignore the first affair (the brawling), the cumulative weight of the other three cases, and especially the last two, removes the question of respondent’s appointment from the realm of ethics and public morality, and places it squarely in the realm of law. There exist considerations which may necessitate the termination of a minister’s service in the government, such as the stature of the government and its public image, public confidence in the government, and the need for the government and the administration to conduct itself in a manner which is honorable, fair and worthy of respect. The more we examine these cases, the harder it is to understand how respondent can function as Minister of Public Security. In making these comments we also take into consideration the gradual deterioration of the standards of conduct of public figures and leaders, a decline that has led to desensitization and the lowering of national standards of public morality.

57.We are also witness to a conflict between considerations of efficiency and executive abilities on the one hand, and the morality of respondent’s actions, his stature and his dealings with the police, on the other hand. Which of these considerations outweighs the others? Is there a possibility for some kind of compromise between the conflicting considerations? We should remember that the Court is not empowered to decide; that role belongs to others. The Court’s role rather is to supervise and review compliance with principles of law and justice.

 

58. As for the judicial evaluation of respondent’s actions, we will not add any further explanations of the affairs. We will concentrate primarily on the relations between respondent and the upper echelons of Israel Police, particularly with the Investigations Branch. As noted above, the police investigated respondent and, on more than one occasion, recommended that he be indicted. Respondent informs us that he bears no grudge against the investigators. Regarding the future, respondent adds that all of his actions will be closely watched, and that there will be no abatement of public scrutiny. Respondent declares in his affidavit:

 

In the event that any of my future actions provide any substantial concern regarding a conflict of interest or the involvement of extraneous considerations in my decisions, I am absolutely certain that the doors of this Court will be open to petitioners. My actions will be the test. I see no reason for discussing hypothetical and far-fetched possibilities at this time. We will cross each bridge as we come to it. From that perspective, the petition is premature and theoretical, and should be dismissed.

 

This is a fine declaration, and it is correct, on the whole. Nevertheless, the fact remains that respondent was until recently the subject of a police investigation, in which evidence was collected, and which culminated in the investigators’ recommendation to indict him for offenses involving moral turpitude. This being the case, we cannot agree that he should now be placed in charge of the police, including his investigators and their superiors. Presumably, police investigators are uncomfortable when requested to investigate a minister suspected of committing an offense, whether by act or omission. I need not explain why. However, the entire matter becomes surreal when the subject of the investigation, shortly after the investigators recommend his indictment, becomes their superior. Yesterday, the investigator sat in the director’s chair, interrogating the minister. Today, the former suspect sits in the director’s chair and the interrogator is subordinate. My colleague, Justice Rivlin referred to the “bounds of deference” that inform the relationship between the authorities. I would sooner talk in terms of human dignity. Does not this role reversal, where the suspect has so soon become the boss and the investigator his subordinate, thoughtlessly trample on the dignity that should inform the relationship between people? Both the investigator and the suspect are human beings. Should we deal such a blow to the dignity of the police investigator?

59. In the Derech Tzleha affair, the police investigation culminated in 1999 in a recommendation to indict respondent. At the beginning of 2000, the prosecution, headed by the Attorney-General, decided to indict respondent for a number of offenses, subject to a preliminary hearing (see para. 11 above). The preliminary hearing was conducted in September 2000. While justifying the investigation, the Attorney-General decided in March 2001 against an indictment, given that there was no reasonable chance of conviction. The Bar-On affair occurred in January through April 1997, with the judgments on the petitions that challenged the Attorney-General’s decision being handed down in June 1997. In addition to these two cases, we should also mention the ISTA case, which was closed in 1992. Parenthetically, it could be said that a person who holds himself up as a trustee – and ministers all have this status, as we have seen – should voluntarily declare himself unfit to act as the superior of those who recently investigated him for criminal offenses. All the more so in light of the fact that the investigators recommended that he be indicted. After all, human beings are not angels.

60. The conflict of interest between respondent and the higher echelons of Israel Police, particularly the upper ranks of the Investigations Branch, cannot be ignored. The Minister of Public Security is empowered to appoint police officers from the rank of deputy commander upwards (section 7 of the Police Ordinance). The Inspector-General of the Police is appointed by the government, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security (section 8A of the Police Ordinance). Of course, the minister’s power in making appointments is subject to particular conditions (as claimed by the Prime Minister): administrative law, hearing the position of the Inspector-General, and others. Still, we find it difficult to accept that these factors alone obviate all concerns regarding conflicts of interest in the relations between respondent and the Police Investigations Branch. In light of all this, we find it difficult to understand how respondent is capable of being unbiased in making senior appointments, promotions of officers, and dismissals in the Investigations Branch.

 

61. Respondent claims that his investigators numbered no more than five or six, and he therefore asks: can he be prevented from serving as Minister of Public Security because of five or six people. There are two answers. First, as we observed, our concern here is not with a conflict of interest alone, but rather with respondent’s behavior in general. Second, and most importantly: indeed there were five or six people who directly interrogated respondent, but what about their superiors? And the superiors of their superiors? Each rank has a rank above it, to which it is answerable and subordinate. We know that respondent was a minister at the time of both the Bar-On and Derech Tzleha investigations. Presumably, his interrogation was authorized by the upper echelons of the Investigations Branch. In other words, the tension between respondent and the police is not confined to only five or six police personnel.

 

62. The Investigations Branch of the Police forms a central part of the Ministry of Public Security and, by definition, the Minister of Public Security is in charge of this branch. We agree that the minister is not personally involved in particular investigations being conducted by the branch. Respondent explicitly declared that he has “no power to intervene in particular investigations.” However, respondent is neither able nor empowered to divest himself of the power to make appointments in the Investigations Branch, and this is the pitfall. On the one hand, respondent is both empowered and obligated to appoint officers in the Investigations Branch. On the other hand, the past relations between the Investigations Branch and respondent make it difficult to accept that respondent is capable of making totally unbiased appointments. The conflict of interest is inescapable. We must add to this equation the considerations, detailed above, which disqualify a person from appointment to a particular office. The combination of all of these leads us to the conclusion that, from a legal standpoint, respondent’s service as Minister of Public Security is inappropriate and unacceptable.

 

63. This conclusion, based on the law and the facts presented to us, was difficult one and, even in writing this judgment, I wavered. For example, it was extremely difficult to weigh the conflicting considerations – efficiency on the one hand and morality on the other – because these considerations are not comparable. Like oil and water – they do not mix. Ultimately I decided that we should be guided by legal principles, which have long been firmly entrenched in our system. The first and most important rule is that the Court will not invalidate an executive-administrative act unless all other alternatives have been exhausted, and there is no other option. Accordingly, where there is a request to render a person unfit for a public office, “the tendency is to initially consider more moderate means, and only to implement the extreme measure as a last option.” See MK Sarid [78], at 758 (Or, J.). The tendency is to “try to limit the use of the extreme measure of disqualification, save as a last resort, if there is no other more moderate way of neutralizing the fear of conflicting interests.” Id. at 762-63. Furthermore:

 

The rule [concerning conflicting interests] should be implemented in a responsible and cautious manner, because to use it recklessly, without the proper balance, may deter talented and capable people from seeking offices that they are qualified to fill, even when there is no serious threat to their honesty and integrity.

 

CA 6983/94 Pachima v. Peretz [55], at 835 (Strasbourg-Cohen, J.). As such, “it is better to eliminate the potential conflict of interest and limit activity or prevent it in a particular area, and not remove a person from office.” Id. at 838.

 

This was also the opinion of Justice Beinisch (whose opinion was the minority view):

 

The mere determination that there is a conflict of interest does not automatically necessitate the person’s removal from office. This solution is the last and most extreme resort, only to be adopted in those cases where the conflict of interest is so intense that there is no other way to prevent it. There are a number of intermediate solutions between removal from office and full service in an office, and the decision should be based on the degree of the conflict, its intensity and its centrality to the role of the public official.

 

Id. at 854. In a similar vein:

 

The picture is not entirely “black and white.” The solution to a conflict of interest is not necessarily disqualification from a particular office. There are a number of other options that can be exercised at different levels, ranging from full service in a particular office to outright disqualification from that office. Removal from office should not be the first solution, but rather the last resort. Prior to disqualifying a person, there must be an assessment whether other less drastic measures might not fulfill the criteria at the basis of the laws against conflicting interests.

 

HCJ 595/89 Shimon v. Appointee of Ministry of the Interior, Southern District [79], at 418 (Barak, J.).

 

In this sense, the Court’s role is to “find the cure that fits the disease,” which each problem having its own solution. See also CA 6763/98 Carmi v. State of Israel [52] (Rivlin, J.).

 

64. It is obvious that this rule has the same basis as other legal principles. The “blue pencil rule,” for example, directs us, wherever possible, to differentiate between the diseased organs and the healthy organs of a body. The same rule applies to law, contracts and all other legal mechanisms. After the differentiation, we proceed to ignore the diseased parts, and emphasize the healthy parts. See HCJ 1715/97 The Israel Association of Investment Managers v. The Minister of Finance [80], at 413-14. This is similar to the legal principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which means that where a text containing a legal norm allows two interpretations, then the interpretation supporting the norm is chosen over the interpretation negating it. See HCJ 288/00 Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Minister of the Interior [81], at 696-97. These principles are almost self-evident and may also contain elements of natural law. On an abstract level they are all derived from the principle of proportionality, a principle that guides us in all our paths.

 

65. Having considered these principles, I initially thought that the solution to the question at hand lay between two polar opposites. The first is petitioner’s position, which would have respondent disqualified outright. The second is respondents’ position, which maintains respondent is perfectly fit for the office. I thought that the appropriate solution could be a differential one, which means making a rough distinction between Hanegbi’s various activities, the aim being to avoid having to disqualify him from service as Minister of Public Security. I did attempt to differentiate between the activities, but this proved impossible. The different roles of the Minister of Public Security are interdependent, and the various departments of the Ministry of Public Security are closely intertwined. Any separation between the areas would effectively create a new system, which we have no power to establish. There is no escaping the conclusion that respondent cannot properly fulfill the role of Minister of Public Security.

 

66. I would not be doing my job faithfully if I did not now briefly relate to three additional issues which arose during the proceedings.

 

Appointment and Election

 

67. Respondent and the state claim that, by expressing confidence in the government in office, the Knesset also expressed its confidence in respondent, and we must therefore refrain from interfering with the Knesset’s discretion. I cannot accept this claim. First, the Knesset expressed its confidence in the government in general. Second, it is not disputed that the Prime Minister is currently empowered to remove respondent from office without receiving Knesset approval. It is his exercise of that discretion which we review. Consequently, the Knesset is not involved in the case before us.

 

68. In this context we will add that we are not speaking of respondent as an elected Member of the Knesset. We have not been asked to interfere with respondent’s status as an MK, and it is doubtful whether we have any power in that respect. HCJ 7367/97 See The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Attorney-General [51], at 547 which deals with the appointment of MK Pinhasi as the chairman of the Knesset Committee. Our concern here is with respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security and not with his status as an elected Member of Knesset. As Minister of Public Security, respondent is subject to the same rules that would apply to a minister who is not a Member of the Knesset.

 

The Difference between the Minister of Public Security and Other Ministers

 

69. Petitioner’s claims focus on respondent’s fitness as Minster of Public Security specifically. It has no issue with him serving in any other ministerial role, except perhaps as Minister of Justice, who is charged with law enforcement, like the Minister of Public Security. My colleague Justice Rivlin takes issue with this proposition. For if indeed respondent is unworthy of serving as Minister of Public Security, how can he serve as a minister in charge of any other area? In the words of my colleague (para. 32 of his opinion):

 

Petitioner focuses on two reasons why Hanegbi should be dismissed. First, the possible damage to public confidence as a result of his appointment as minister in charge of public security and the police. Second, the risk of a conflict of interest in performing certain ministerial duties. As to the first reason, this is not enough to constitute grounds for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. We related to this above, and we would only add here that petitioner takes issue specifically with Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As far as this line of reasoning is concerned, there is nothing to stop Hanegbi from being appointed as a minister in a different ministry – except, perhaps, the Ministry of Justice. This position raises a difficulty. It is hard to imagine that an individual, whose appointment as Minister of Public Security would cause such severe damage to the public’s trust that we must strike down the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him, would be able to head another ministry – such as the Ministry of Education or the Finance Ministry. It is difficult to accept that an individual who is so patently unfit to serve in a ministry responsible for law enforcement could, without any hindrance, serve in a ministry entrusted with the state’s foreign policy or its security. We thus come to the second part of this petition, the concern regarding a conflict of interest (emphases in the original – M.C.).

 

There are three answers to this question. First, petitioner confined itself to the role of Minister of Public Security because respondent is currently serving in that capacity. Neither this self-imposed limiting of the petition nor our judgment can determine that respondent is able to serve in a different ministerial role. The question was not asked, and as such, we will not rule on it. Second, in our case there is the additional concern of conflicting interests due to the particular relationship between respondent and the police (a point dealt with by my colleague). Finally, according to the principle of proportionality, there must be a correlation between the substance of the claims that render a person unfit for a particular public office, and the office that he actually holds, or for which he is a candidate. Each office is different, and the principle of proportionality obliges us to limit the harm caused to a particular person. A “balance” must be struck between conflicting considerations, and the considerations themselves differ from case to case. According to Eisenberg [6]:

 

[T]he nature of the position to be filled by the public servant will also influence the weight accorded to a criminal past in the filling of the post. A junior position is not comparable to a senior position. A position that does not involve the control, supervision, direction and guidance of others is not comparable with a position involving authority and responsibility for other people and responsibility for discipline. The job of a leader cannot be compared with the jobs of those being led. An office with no special ethical requirements cannot be compared to an office whose essence demands high ethical standards.

Id. at 263. The Minister of Public Security is the minister in charge of law enforcement. As such, comments made regarding the Minister of Justice are also applicable to him:

 

Clearly, there is room for reservations regarding the minister’s conduct, to the extent that it diverges from the norm of appropriate conduct. The public expects that any minister, being a public leader, will provide an example of appropriate conduct. This is especially true in the case of the Minister of Justice, from whom the public expects this kind of conduct. More than any other minister, the Minister of Justice is responsible for the rule of law and the values of the law. In his personality and in his conduct he symbolizes not only the preservation of the law, but also that which is good and honest beyond the letter of the law.

 

Bar-On [3], at 59 (Zamir, J.).

 

Differences of Opinion Regarding the Scope of the Range of Reasonableness

 

70. Respondent has made the following argument: The question here is whether, by refusing to dismiss respondent as Minister of Public Security, the Prime Minister deviated from the range of reasonableness in an extreme manner. Some of the justices on this panel feel that the Prime Minister acted reasonably; at the very least they consider that there was insufficient proof to warrant intervening in his discretion. This view inevitably influences the decisions of other justices. Judicial intervention in the discretion of an authority is only warranted when that discretion is an extreme deviation from the range of reasonableness. If some of the justices maintain that the discretion does not deviate from the range of reasonableness, then how can other justices on the same panel rule that his discretion is an extreme deviation? Under these circumstances the rulings of the other justices could themselves be regarded as unreasonable. Alternatively, it indicates that those rulings based on the judgments of the other justices are unreasonable. Hanegbi claims that this reasoning is not applicable in a criminal procedure. He agrees that where one judge has doubts regarding the guilt of the accused, that doubt should not affect his colleagues on the panel. However, he claims that the rule is different in an administrative procedure.

 

71. I see no reason for distinguishing between a criminal procedure and an administrative procedure. In both, doubt and reasonableness are given over to the individual discretion of each judge, within the bounds of the overall legal context. Administrative law and assessments of reasonableness have often been a source of dispute between judges. See CrimA State of Israel v. Zeguri [82], at 427. Furthermore:

 

Every judge decides individually; and his decision in a trial is the product of his own conviction and his own conscience.

 

Every judge decides individually. The fact that my colleagues on the panel have doubts regarding whether the accused committed the offense of which he is accused does not cause me to have doubts too. It is forbidden for me to doubt solely because my colleagues doubt. My colleague’s doubt is not infectious, and does not pass from one heart to another, from one conscience to another, even if my colleague is greater, wiser, older, or more experienced than me. This is the independence of a judge in its deepest sense, the inner independence of the judge.

 

CrimA 6251/94 Ben-Ari v. State of Israel [83], at 107-8. In the words of the Court, “[e]ach and every judge is a lone knight wandering the plains of law and justice.” See HCJ 3679/94 National Association of Directors and Authorized Signatories of the First International Bank of Israel v. Tel Aviv/Jaffa District Labor Court [84], at 593. It is true that:

 

The judge must always be receptive to the opinions of others, and be prepared to listen to other people. However, the simple fact that another person has a different opinion, however important this dissenter may be, must not affect his own discretion (all subject to explicit legal provisions, such as binding precedents).

 

As Maimonides taught (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 10:1 [109]):

 

A judge in a capital case who rules guilty or not guilty not due to his own reasoning, but because he followed the view of his colleague, has transgressed. Of this the Torah said: Do not respond to grievance by yielding to the majority to pervert the law. From tradition we learn that at the moment of deciding you must not say, it is sufficient that I am like another – rather you must say what you believe.

 

In Conclusion

 

72. In considering Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public security, or his removal from the position, the Prime Minister was presumably confronted with two conflicting categories of considerations. On the one hand: public considerations against the appointment due to the concern that his past would conflict with his role as Public Security Minister and lead to the improper management of the police, and the loss of public confidence in the government. And on the other hand: political considerations relating to the need to establish a stable coalition to support the government and preserve its structure, including respondent’s proven executive talents. The Prime Minister chose the latter considerations over the former, and decided to appoint respondent to the office, and, later on, to allow him to remain in office. In my colleagues’ view, having regard for the political nature of the case before us, the Prime Minister’s decision did not deviate from the legal boundaries of reasonableness. I cannot agree.

When the President charges a Knesset Member with the formation of a government with himself at its head, the Knesset Member will do his best to fulfill that task by forming a stable government that can weather the storms. The consideration of forming a government that will win the Knesset’s confidence becomes a primary consideration for the Prime Minister-elect, after having agreed upon the policies acceptable to prospective coalition partners. Generally, the other relevant considerations play a secondary role in the forming of a government. In other words:

As distinct from public servants, who are subject to the provisions of the State Service Law (Appointments) 1959, a minister and deputy-minister are not appointed to their positions exclusively by virtue of their qualifications, talents and personal virtues. Party and coalition interests form the basis of these appointments.

Deri [47], at 428 (Goldberg, J.). These comments were made regarding the formulation and appointing of the government. Nonetheless, in conducting a judicial review of the final composition, the Court must assess whether the considerations which were secondary in the eyes of the Prime Minister were in fact given appropriate weight. If these considerations were overlooked to a great extent it could render the decision a deviation from the boundaries of discretion. If the Court does not uphold the basic principles of public law and morality, then who will?

73. Under these circumstances, our concern is with the candidate’s moral suitability to be a minister, as well as his relations with the police over whom he has been appointed. Were these considerations given the weight they deserve? We have observed that, in reality, these considerations were allocated but a small part of their deserved weight. We also observed that these factors ought to have been given far more consideration. The unavoidable conclusion is therefore that the Prime Minister’s discretion was fatally flawed.

 

 

74. Judicial invalidation of the Prime Minister’s discretion does not make the Court a “supra-Prime Minister,” as my colleague Justice Rivlin put it. The Court did not attain that status in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5] and Eisenberg [6], and in a not insignificant number of other cases. Striking down a prime ministerial decision falls within the boundaries of legitimate judicial review of the administration’s activities. It is part of the “checks and balances” which exist in a democratic system characterized by the principle of the separation of powers between the authorities. I think that it is our duty, the duty of the Court, especially in these times, to protect the police in general, and the Investigations Branch in particular. This is the reasoning for my conclusion.

 

Epilogue

 

75. Our decision in this case has been far from simple and straightforward. Of this, I am well aware. Yet I could not allow myself to just let things slide, to avert my gaze and pretend nothing has happened.

 

76.            On the basis of the above, I propose to my colleagues that we make the order final, and declare that the Prime Minister is obligated to exercise his power under section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, and remove Minister Tzahi Hanegbi from his position as Minister of Public Security.

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch

 

1. We have been asked to deal with the question of whether the appointment of respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security is so unreasonable as to warrant the Court’s intervention to strike down this decision. This is a very important question. We must be very sensitive when interfering in the decisions of the executive authority and of the Prime Minister, who have been granted broad discretion. The utmost caution and a meticulous examination of the legal issues is necessary in ruling in this petition. This is especially true since this petition concerns the process of forming the government and appointing its ministers.

 

Prior to reaching my own conclusions on the subject, I reviewed the opinions of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin, Vice-President Or and Justice Cheshin. The first opinion deals with the rather broad topic of deference between the authorities. My opinion will deal exclusively with the question the Vice-President posed in his opinion – judicial intervention in the circumstances here. My colleague, Justice Cheshin, thoroughly analyzed the issues raised by the appointment, as well as the normative legal framework, and concluded that the decision to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security should be struck down due to the fact that it is unreasonable in the extreme. It should be mentioned, at the outset, that I agree with my colleague, Justice Cheshin: under the circumstances and at the present time, respondent’s appointment is not compatible with the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest.

 

2. From a reading of the opinions in this case, it becomes clear that there exists no fundamental dispute as to the nature or quality of the statutory power granted the Prime Minister to appoint ministers and dismiss them, pursuant to Basic Law: The Government. This is also true regarding the extent to which this Court can review this power. The statutory discretion granted to the Prime Minister to fill cabinet posts and remove the occupants of these posts is extremely broad. Our rulings have already established, undisputably, that the factors the Prime minister may consider when deciding whether to appoint or dismiss ministers include political considerations such as the stability of the government and the formation of a viable coalition. These and other political considerations are legitimate, and even essential, in the process of establishing a government and appointing ministers.

 

Accordingly, and in light of the nature of the Prime Minister’s power to appoint and dismiss ministers, it would take a radical deviation from the range of reasonableness for the Court to intervene in these decisions. Having said that, my colleague Justice Rivlin, who emphasizes the limits of intervention and their narrow scope, also notes that:

 

The discretion of the Prime Minister regarding the appointment of a minister is certainly subject to the review of this Court. This applies to any kind of appointment.

 

He further stated that:

 

The powers granted to the Prime Minister to appoint and dismiss ministers serve to improve the government’s image and functioning, and public confidence in it. A radical deviation from the range of reasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of these powers constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.

 

See paras. 17 and 18 of Judge Rivlin’s ruling. There is obviously nothing innovative about these findings; they merely reflect the precedents set forth by this Court in a number of rulings that deal with judicial intervention to remove ministers. The primary cases are: HCJ 3094/93, 4319/93, 4478/93; HCApp 4409/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]]; HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93, 4634/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel [Pinhasi [5]]; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Bar-On [3]].

 

We also agree that the question is not whether the Court feels comfortable with the Prime Minister’s appointment of a certain person to a specific post. Such a question does not constitute a cause for judicial review. It is not the Court’s role to examine the wisdom of the appointment, the suitability of the person for the post, or his likelihood of success. These considerations are entrusted to the elected Prime Minister, and it is up to the Knesset and the voter to redress such decisions. Therefore, we will act with much caution and restraint when considering the disqualification of an appointment. Disqualification can only be justified in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, where there was a legal defect either in the appointment process or the appointment itself. This defect must be at the core of the administrative discretion afforded to the authority, no matter how broad his powers may be.

 

My colleagues, each in their own way, have laid out the factual details of this petition. This mainly concerns the criminal affairs in which Hanegbi has been involved as a suspect or subject of investigation despite the fact that, at the end of the day, he was not tried concerning these affairs. So, too, my colleagues have already discussed the normative framework in which the Prime Minister exercises his power to appoint ministers or to remove them from their posts, as well as the grounds which would enable this Court to exercise judicial review. Therefore, I will refrain from expanding on these matters and will instead limit myself to a discussion of the flaw which I see in the appointment here.

 

3. The petition is based on two principal claims. The first claim is that Hanegbi is not fit to act as Minister of Public Security due to his involvement in a number of criminal affairs, the latest and most central being the so-called Derech Tzleha affair. In a previous petition filed by petitioner – Bar-On [3] – it was already determined that that there was nothing in the first three affairs to render respondent unfit for the post held by him at the time – that of Minister of Justice. This includes the affair in which Bar-On was appointed to the position of Attorney-General. Petitioner now claims that the latest affair, which concerns Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha organization, when added to the previous affairs, tips the balance and renders him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

 

The other grounds for the intervention of the Court, according to petitioner, are that the appointment of respondent as Minister of Public Security contravenes the rule against conflicts of interest. As a result, petitioner asserts he is not fit for the office.

 

4. As to petitioner’s first claim, regarding the criminal affairs Hanegbi was allegedly involved in, or investigated about, I take issue with those who feel this is insufficient to warrant judicial review of the decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security.

 

I agree with my colleague Justice Cheshin, that one must distinguish between the presumption of innocence to which a person who has neither been tried nor convicted of a crime is entitled, and the question of whether he is suited for public office in light of such allegations. I also agree that, in appointing someone to public office, the authorities are permitted and even required to take into account a person’s “criminal past” based on administrative evidence. It should not be said that this decision rests solely on whether the public prosecutor’s office filed an indictment. The discretionary power exercised by the public prosecutor’s office when deciding whether or not to indict someone serves a different purpose than that exercised to prevent an appointment or remove a person from public office. See HCJ 6163/92, 6177/92 Eisenberg v. The Minister of Housing and Construction [6], at 268; Pinhasi [5], at 467-69.

 

This Court has already determined that there are no hard and fast rules pertaining to when it is appropriate to bar a person from public office. On one hand, it would be erroneous to hold that an indictment automatically renders a person unfit for such a post. At the same time, however, the lack of an indictment is not the hallmark of fitness. There are a host of factors which must be taken into account when considering disqualification. These include the type of office, the type of misconduct attributed to the official, how strongly such behavior reflects on the person’s fitness, and the strength of the evidence for the alleged wrongdoing. See Bar-On [3], at 62-63 (Zamir, J.).

 

We must take into account that the other criminal affairs in which Hanegbi was allegedly involved, as well as the impact these affairs on his role as Minister of Justice, have already been examined by this Court in Bar-On [3]. The Court expressed its opinion on the issue, and did not see fit to interfere with Hanegbi’s tenure as Minister of Justice.

 

As to the Derech Tzleha affair, this should not be viewed as my colleague Justice Rivlin sees it, as yet another chapter in the affair that was already judged by this Court in Bar-On [3]. This affair involved an extensive investigation. From the outset, the police recommended the indictment of respondent, and even the Attorney-General was in favor of this after an initial examination of the evidence. The evidence was then once again examined by the Attorney-General himself, as well as by a contingent of attorneys. It is apparent from the report that the evidence was repeatedly inspected with great thoroughness. At the end of the day, however, the evidence was not deemed sufficient to indict respondent. The close examination of the evidence, as detailed in the Attorney-General’s report, and the high professional caliber of those who performed the examination, begs the conclusion that there is no evidentiary basis for the criminal involvement of respondent in this affair. Under the circumstances, and after having examined the opinion of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee, I have not been convinced that the factual basis presented to me is sufficiently grave as to render respondent unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security. It is true that the largely undisputed facts, which are apparent in the opinions of the Attorney-General and the Knesset Ethics Committee, indicate unethical behavior by respondent. Nevertheless, I do not believe that, based on the Derech Tzleha affair, the decision to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security is extremely unreasonable on the legal level.

 

5. The petition’s second claim troubled me. According to this claim, following the investigation in the Derech Tzleha affair, there exists a conflict of interest between respondent’s ability to fulfill his position as Minister of Public Security, charged with the public interest in the investigative field, and his relationship with the Investigations Branch of the police. After much deliberation, I have arrived at the conclusion that respondents did not supply a satisfactory answer to why this does not constitute a conflict of interest.

 

First, it must be stated that respondents did not convince us that petitioner’s claim should not be classified as a conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflicts of interest is predicated on the principle that a person in a public role should avoid the “prejudice” or “bias” which results from the conflict between the faithful execution of his public duties and an interest of his own. There is a substantive and foreseeable a priori concern regarding the existence of an extraneous consideration and this concern falls under the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest. If such a concern exists on the basis of objective criteria, respondent need not actually be put to the test in order to determine if an actual conflict of interest exists. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject, see HCJ 531/79 The Likud Faction of the Petach Tikva Municipality v. The City Council of Petach Tikva [53], at 569-76; see also CA 6983/94 Pachima v. Peretz [55], at 835-36.

 

In his affidavit, the Prime Minister expanded at length on respondent’s fitness for senior and demanding public offices. He emphasized his vast experience in the administration of complex departments and the “broad knowledge of the field of security.” All of these qualify respondent 3, in the Prime Minister’s opinion, to “lead the Ministry of Public Security in the best possible manner.” The Prime Minister’s statement focuses a considerable amount of attention on Hanegbi’s organizational skills and his ability to cope with the security roles entrusted to the Ministry of Public Security. All these considerations are part of the Prime Minister’s discretion and it is not our place to interfere with them. Nonetheless, the Minister of Public Security is responsible to the public on behalf of the government concerning all aspects of Israel Police; security operations constitute only one facet of this post, albeit an important one, especially nowadays. It is well-known that the Israel Police is also empowered to carry out investigations and to enforce the law in Israel. In this respect, petitioner claims that respondent 3 is liable to find himself in a conflict of interest when placed in charge of the very people who investigated him not so long ago in the Derech Tzleha affair and who recommended that he be brought to trial. Respondents countered this by pointing out that the minister is not a “supra-Inspector-General,” “with direct control or authority over everything that happens in the Israel Police, and this is especially true regarding everything that occurs in its Investigations Branch.”

 

It is true that the minister is not in charge of individual police investigations and is not even involved in them. He is also not a “supra-Inspector-General,” as respondents maintain. Yet the import, stature, and influence of the minister on the structure of the police and its budget should not be ignored. After all, the minister is responsible for setting the working priorities of the police and, most importantly, for the appointment and dismissal of senior officers. According to the Police Ordinance (New Version), the minister is in charge of appointing every senior police officer from the rank of deputy commander upwards. Accordingly, the minister appoints the senior officers of the Investigations Branch, including the head of this branch, and he also has the power to fire them. He is also responsible for recommending who should fill the office of Inspector-General. Indeed, respondents are correct in their assertion that a duty of consultation applies to the minister pursuant to the rules of administrative law, prior to deciding who will fill the senior ranks of the Investigations Branch. However, this duty is not sufficient, by itself, to negate the existence of a conflict of interest.

 

As part of his role as Minister of Public Security, it is necessary for respondent 3 to set police policy, including policy for the Investigations Branch, and it is in his power to influence the stature of this branch, its standards, and its work assignments. Yet, only a short while ago he himself was the subject of a series of investigations which, despite being essential and permitted by the law, were substantially damaging for him. It should be recalled that, at the conclusion of the previous two investigations, the Investigations Branch recommended that respondent be indicted.

 

To this, we note that the the situation in which the senior officers involved in the investigation of respondent find themselves in. Even though there is no doubt these people have no personal grudge against respondent, since they were merely doing their job, respondent still has significant powers to decide their fate and influence their rank and place in the police hierarchy. How will this conflict affect their trust in respondent’s decisions, and how will he exercise the hierarchical authority he wields over them?

 

This is not to infer that we believe that respondent seeks vengeance against his interrogators. Not in the least. He has declared that this is not the case and I am willing to assume that he will make every effort to ignore his personal feelings. However, an actual conflict of interest exists when there a near certainty of “prejudice” or “bias,” even “unintentionally and unknowingly.” As stated by Justice Cohen:

 

We will state at once that we have not had even a shred of evidence presented to us that would cause us or petitioner to have even the slightest doubt as to whether respondent has not or will not carry out his role of Chairman of the Appeals Committee in absolute good faith and objectivity, to the best of his knowledge and capabilities. Even according to petitioner, there is no requirement that the “corrupt viewpoint” or bias actually exist or be proven. The claim is that even though these do not actually exist, “a reasonable person would consider that, under the circumstances, there exists a real possibility of bias or prejudice.”

 

HCJ 279/60 Gil Theaters v. Ya’ari [85], at 675-76. Furthermore:  

 

When we apply the term bias, this should not be taken to mean that respondent will knowingly or intentionally favor a certain side. When we talk of a corrupt viewpoint, this should not be misconstrued as implying that respondent’s viewpoint has been corrupted through the accepting of actual bribes. The intention is that bias, by its very nature, is inevitable or probable, even if it is not willful or intentional, since every person favors his own interests.

 

Likud Faction [53], at 570.

6. I am aware that the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest should be interpreted with prudence and moderation. I can accept that, just because a person has been investigated, this should not necessarily prevent him from subsequently serving as the minister in charge of the Investigations Branch. Yet in the case of respondent 3 we are not talking about events that occurred in the dim and distant past. Respondent’s encounter with the Investigations Branch ended only in June 1999, at which point it was recommended to the prosecuting authorities to indict him. This case was only closed in March 2001. The investigation of respondent by officers of the Investigations Branch has not yet been relegated to the history books of the Israel Police. Respondent also possesses no small amount of prior experience with the investigators of the Investigations Branch. Can it be said that he is so divorced from the past that he would be capable of fulfilling his post with complete objectivity? According to the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest, a person should not be placed in a situation in which he is liable to be influenced by extraneous considerations in the line of duty.

 

I would also like to add that we have already noted that the rule against conflicts of interest will not necessarily bring about a person’s disqualification from a post, provided that less drastic means can be found to circumvent the specific problem. There is a tendency to utilize such extreme measures only as a last resort, when there is no other way to neutralize the concern about a conflict of interest. As I mentioned elsewhere:

 

The mere determination that there is a conflict of interest does not automatically necessitate removal from office. This solution is the last and most extreme resort, only to be adopted in those cases where the conflict of interest is so intense that there is no other way to prevent it. There are a number of intermediary solutions between removal and full service in an office, and the decision should be based on the degree of the conflict, its intensity, and its centrality to the role of the public official.

 

In general, conflicts of interests can only be isolated when they appear in an institutional setting, in which it is possible to pinpoint where the interests overlap and to prevent this. Indeed, it is possible to neutralize a conflict of interest even when the conflicting interest is personal. For this to be the case, however, the public servant’s interest must be one that can be avoided or which can be isolated from those areas of overlap with his public role.

 

Pachima [55], at 854.

In light of the above, I, like my colleague, Justice Cheshin, considered the possibility of keeping respondent 3 in his post as Minister of Public Security, while eliminating the conflict of interest. Had respondents shown me such a way, it is possible I would have avoided the decision that Hanegbi is unfit to continue as Minister of Public Security. In its place, I may have considered it sufficient to merely ban him from serving in ministerial roles pertaining to the Investigations Branch, in a manner that would ensure there were no conflicts of interest. However, no such solution was presented to me. Moreover, as stated above, it is difficult to find such a solution. The Minister of Public Security’s powers over the Investigations Branch are, in part, statutory; an example of this is his authority to appoint the upper echelon of police officers. The investigations system is an integral part of the Israel Police, and the minister is in charge of setting general policy, priorities, and budget for the police. In light of this, to take away the control of investigative matters from the Minister of Public Security is liable to be harmful both to the minister and to his general ability to function in his role. It seems difficult, therefore, to separate him from these issues so long as he is an acting minister. In any event, such a course would apparently require a shift in the division of the labor and the intra-governmental responsibilities of ministers. This is something we will refrain from interfering with.

 

It should be noted that, in the main arguments of respondent 3, he reiterated that the claim of a conflict of interest should be rejected. At the conclusion of his argument, in para. 20.12., he stated: “[e]ven if there does exist a conflict of interest, there are much less drastic ways of neutralizing it and these should be preferred.” Despite searching, I could not find what alternative means were being referred to here which would properly address the problem of the conflict of interest. Had my colleagues shared in my opinion, there may conceivably have been room to ask respondent 3 to set forth arguments regarding this issue, and to propose a solution which would neutralize the conflict of interest without the need to remove him from his office. As long as no such solution is found, I feel that there is no way to avoid removing Hanegbi from his office as Minister of Public Security.

Justice E. Mazza

Like my colleagues Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, I feel that petitioner did not present us with a clear justification for intervening in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the office of Minister of Justice. Based on their well explained and properly detailed reasons – in most of which, if not all, I concur – I hereby join them in concluding that this petition should be denied.                               

Justice Y. Türkel

1. In my opinion, the petition should be denied. I concur with the opinion of my esteemed colleague, Justice Rivlin, who laid out the appropriate reasoning. I also concur with the reasons laid out by my esteemed colleague, Vice-President Or. In my opinion, it would have been sufficient to predicate the denial of this petition on two grounds:

a) The first ground is that approximately six years ago this Court, in a panel of five Justices, dealt with a petition requesting that respondent be removed from his post as Minister of Justice. It decided, by a majority of four, to reject the petition without granting an order nisi. See HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [3], at 46. That petition concerned three out of the four affairs raised by the petition here – the “brawling affair,” the “ISTA affair,” and the “Bar-On affair” – and it dealt with the fundamental questions currently under discussion. In that petition, the Court found no adequate reason to remove respondent 3 from his post. The only new factor here is the fourth affair – the “Derech Tzleha affair” – and the appointment of respondent to the post of Minister of Public Security. I believe that this fourth affair, per se, and even in conjunction with the previous affairs, does not amount to a justification for respondent’s removal from office. It should also be mentioned that the distinction that petitioner draws between the office of the Minister of Justice and the office of the Minister of Public Security is, unfortunately, erroneous.

 

b) There is a midrash in the Talmud that can shed light on the second reason, which is more at the heart of the dispute than the first one. This midrash states that no appointments to high offices can be made unless the public is consulted first. This midrash is based on the two biblical verses: “And the Lord spoke unto Moses saying: See, I have called by name Bezalel the son of Uri, the son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah.” (Exodus 31:2) [110], and “And Moses said unto the children of Israel: See, the Lord hath called by name Bezalel the son of Uri” (Exodus, 35:30) [110].

 

Said Rabbi Isaac: A public appointment is not made without first consulting the public, in accordance with the text: “See, the Lord hath called by name.”

 

Said the Holy One, Blessed be He, to Moses: Moses! Is Bezalel acceptable to you? He answered: Lord of the Universe! If he is acceptable to Thee, all the more so to me! The Lord replied: Even so, go and tell the Israelites. He went and asked the Israelites: Is Bezalel acceptable to you? They answered him: Moses, our teacher! If he is acceptable to the Almighty and to you, he is certainly acceptable to us!

 

Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 55a [111]. On the requirement to consult with the public, see also Shulkhan Arukh, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:4 [112]; Arukh Hashulkhan, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:8 [113]; Ribash, Responsa 271 [114]; Rabbi A.Y. Kook, Be’er Eliyahu, commentary on the Biur HaGra [115], as well as other sources. See also my comments in HCJ 6499/99 The National Religious Party v. Rabbi Shlomo Ben-Ezra [86], at 624.

 

It seems, therefore, that no appointment could be made unless the public was consulted, despite the fact that both the Lord and Moses expressed their views about the appointment. Regarding the removal of officials who have been the subject of defamation, compare Exodus 18:21 [110]; Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 7b [116]; Maimonides, Laws of Temple Vessels, 4:21 [117]; Maimonides Reponsa, Chapter 111 [118]; Shulkhan Arukh, Chosen Hamishpat, 53:25 [119]; Zaken Abraham Responsa, Yoreh Deah, 30 [120].

 

Respondent 3 was elected to the first slot in his party’s primary elections. He placed third on his party’s list for the elections to the Knesset, and was nominated by the Prime Minister to serve as Minister of Public Security. This appointment was ratified by the Knesset. Therefore, “consultation” with the public did occur and the public had its say. Is our power greater than that of the people? I believe that we can overrule the choice of the people, as expressed through elections to the Knesset, only in rare and extraordinary circumstances. Save with respect to the legality of the appointment, it is not our place, but the public’s, to take issue with the wisdom and ethics of the administrative authority making the appointment. This is not to say that I wish to detract from the Court’s power to speak its mind on issues of ethics and morality. See Bar-On [3], at 61-64 (Zamir, J.). Sometimes it is appropriate that it should do so. But the proposal to expand the rule so that respondent 3’s conduct, as discussed in that case, would “obligate the Prime Minister to remove a minister or deputy-minister from his post, though well-intentioned, would be improper and likely to cause more harm than good.” Id. at 64. There is much to be said for the view that the morals and

 

character of public representatives should be subject to painstaking scrutiny. But in the world in which we live, this goal is unattainable.

 

  1. Therefore, the petition should be denied.

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

I agree with the rulings of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, who hold the petition should be denied. I wish to add three comments to the rulings of my two colleagues.

 

1. Indeed, the discretionary authority for appointing and removing ministers (and deputy-ministers) is not absolute. In addition to the grounds for removal expressly provided in the Basic Law: The Government, there are also the grounds established by HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]] and HCJ 4267/93 Amitai v. The Prime Minister of Israel [Pinhasi [5]]:

 

When a minister or deputy-minister has been indicted for a serious crime, it is incumbent upon the Prime Minister to remove him from his post. The failure of the Prime Minister to do so will be regarded, under such circumstances, as extremely unreasonable.

 

HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 56 [Bar-On [3] (Zamir, J.). The Court added that:

 

There is a possibility that, even if a minister’s behavior does not amount to criminal conduct, it may still be so serious that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to continue in his post. Even so, this possibility is still far from constituting a sweeping rule that a minister must be removed from office in every instance of behavior that deviates from the norms of appropriate conduct.

 

Id, at 63.

 

As mentioned in my colleagues’ opinions, the fact that legal grounds for removal are limited is a result of the fact that the constitutional authority for the appointment and removal of ministers enables the implementation of policy objectives, including policies that are political in nature. This includes the need to appoint ministers with the proper skills and experience – which is the Prime Minister’s responsibility. From this it follows that it is, first and foremost, the responsibility of the Knesset and the public to review these political appointments. Moreover, restraint is necessary due to the damage that removal from a senior political position causes to a public figure, to his presumption of innocence, and to his ability to accomplish his life’s work. Of course, this fear does not supersede the prohibition against appointments which severely impair the public’s trust in the government. However, there is no room to expand the grounds for removal beyond those already set down in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5].

 

2. The grounds of removal established in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5] are based on two elements. The first element is that there must be sufficient evidence to justify an indictment, such as evidence that creates a reasonable chance of conviction:

 

An indictment is not a verdict. It only reflects the prima facie evidence that has been collected by the public prosecutor’s office. Yet, continued tenure in the government is impacted even by the prima facie evidence of the indictment. Under certain circumstances, the nature of the individual’s alleged offenses – in addition the final legal ruling – is also significant, as these offenses have been officially presented in the indictment ready for filing with the courts.

 

Deri [47], at 422-23 (Shamgar, P.). The second element is that the evidence must point to the commission of a serious crime, one which involves moral turpitude. Such crimes, including the receipt of bribes, acts of fraud, defrauding state authorities, and the filing of false reports, caused Minister Aryeh Deri and Deputy-Minister Raphael Pinhasi to be declared unfit for office, As stated there:

 

[I]f, heaven forbid, an indictment is filed against a minister, which charges the minister with serious offenses that involve moral turpitude – such as the acceptance of bribes, acts of fraud, deceiving state authorities, lying or with making false reports – then it would be neither proper nor reasonable for him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 427 (Levin. J). Minister Tzahi Hanegbi’s part in the Derech Tzleha affair is the decisive affair in the petition before us. As my colleagues have already indicated, the legality of Hanegbi’s appointment, as affected by the other three affairs, was already dealt with by this Court in Bar-On [3]. In that case, not only was there no indictment, but Hangebi’s file was closed due to the lack of a reasonable chance of a conviction.

 

Indeed, the facts of the crimes Hanegbi is alleged to have committed are not in dispute. Proving the criminal intent, however, turned out to be the primary difficulty. This intent is usually what determines the nature of the behavior and the level of moral turpitude associated with it. See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 22 (2d ed. 1961) [107]; compare also CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. The State of Israel [87], at 319. This intent particularly influences the anti-social element of the crimes of fraud and breach of trust, which are attributed to the minister. As Justice Goldberg stated:

 

The crime of breach of trust is a general offence, yet its factual basis is not adequately defined. As a result, moral guilt is one of the mechanisms for defining the boundaries of this crime. Since moral guilt constitutes a main element of the crime, there are instances where it is necessary for the Court to investigate the defendant’s motives.

 

See HCJ 2534/97 Yahav v. The State Attorney [2], at 16.

 

The Prime Minister saw the Attorney-General’s report, including its conclusion that the file against the minister should be closed due the fact that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction. Certainly, he was obligated to make use of the Attorney-General’s conclusion – and its reasoning – even if the report did not detail the evidence on which this conclusion was founded. Compare HCJ 320/96 Yael German v. The Municipal Council of Herzliya [88], at 239. In any event – and this is the significant factor – petitioner did not attack this report and we have no choice, therefore, other than to accept the Attorney-General’s conclusion.

 

An indictment does not require evidence that guarantees a conviction. When an indictment is filed, the chance of conviction can only be estimated. Moreover, an indictment is only based on the evidence obtained by the police – the defense does not cross examination or present its own evidence. See CrimApp 8087/95 Za’ada v. The State of Israel [89], at 148-49; and Yahav [2], at 12-13. Most significantly, it is possible to indict a suspect even when existing evidence does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is to say, there may be a reasonable chance for conviction, which is what justifies the filing of the indictment, even if the evidence does not rule out every reasonable doubt. It goes without saying, therefore, that the decision not to file an indictment due to the lack of a reasonable chance of conviction possesses, as a rule, an “acquittal value” greater than an acquittal in court. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the appointment of a minister would be proscribed on account of an act for which he was acquitted in court, even if only due to the existence of reasonable doubt. In any event, such a proscription would be all the more inappropriate where the Attorney-General – whose discretion has not been assailed here – has not even filed an indictment, due to the lack of a reasonable chance of conviction.

 

3. It is the conclusion of my colleague, Justice Beinisch, that the petition should be accepted, because of the conflict of interest that exists between Hanegbi’s post as Minister of Public Security and his alleged desire to get revenge on his interrogators and the Investigations Branch. In this regard, I am in agreement with my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, that it is extremely doubtful that a conflict of interest actually exists. Even if there is some type of conflict of interest, it is very slight and does not give rise, under the circumstances, to any reasonable concern that extraneous considerations will hamper the functioning of the Ministry of Public Security and of the police. See HCJ 3132/92 Mushlav v. The District Committee for Planning and Building, Northern District [90], at 747, for an explanation of what constitutes a reasonable concern of an extraneous consideration.

 

Yet, even if the case had been borderline, there would be cause for great hesitation before granting the petition. Granting the petition would mean harming a public figure merely on the basis of a police recommendation to put him on trial, a recommendation rejected by the Attorney-General. The result would be that the very fact of a police recommendation, even if unfounded, would be sufficient to render a person unfit for office or to remove him from a ministerial post. Certainly, had a clear-cut case of conflict of interest been created, due to the police recommendation, it is possible there would be no way of escaping this result. Yet, this is not so in a borderline case.

 

As such, I join the opinion of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, that this petition be denied.

 

 

*******

 

Petition denied according to the majority opinions of Justices Rivlin, Or, Mazza, Turkel and Dorner, against the dissenting opinions of Justices Cheshin and Beinisch.

 

Under the circumstances, no party was ordered to bear costs.

October 9, 2003

 

Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 9593/04
Date Decided: 
Monday, June 26, 2006
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioners, who represent five Arab villages in the territory of Judaea and Samaria, claimed that the respondents unlawfully deny Palestinian farmers in those villages access to their agricultural land. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents do not act to prevent attacks and harassment perpetrated by Israeli inhabitants of the territory of Judaea and Samaria against Palestinian farmers and do not enforce the law against the Israeli inhabitants. In reply, the respondents explained that the agricultural land was closed only when it was necessary to protect the Palestinian farmers from harassment by Israeli inhabitants. The respondents also notified the court of the actions taken by them to enforce the law against Israeli inhabitants in Judaea and Samaria.

 

Held: The measure of denying Palestinian farmers access to their land for their own protection is disproportionate. The proper way of protecting Palestinian farmers from harassment is for the respondents to provide proper security arrangements and to impose restrictions on those persons who carry out the unlawful acts.

 

Law enforcement in Judaea and Samaria is insufficient and unacceptable, since the measures adopted have not provided a solution to the problems of harassment. The respondents were ordered to improve law enforcement procedures to deal with the problem properly.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 9593/04

Rashed Morar, Head of Yanun Village Council

and others

v.

1.         IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria

2.         Samaria and Judaea District Commander, Israel Police

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[26 June 2006]

Before Justices D. Beinisch, E. Rivlin, S. Joubran

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioners, who represent five Arab villages in the territory of Judaea and Samaria, claimed that the respondents unlawfully deny Palestinian farmers in those villages access to their agricultural land. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents do not act to prevent attacks and harassment perpetrated by Israeli inhabitants of the territory of Judaea and Samaria against Palestinian farmers and do not enforce the law against the Israeli inhabitants. In reply, the respondents explained that the agricultural land was closed only when it was necessary to protect the Palestinian farmers from harassment by Israeli inhabitants. The respondents also notified the court of the actions taken by them to enforce the law against Israeli inhabitants in Judaea and Samaria.

 

Held: The measure of denying Palestinian farmers access to their land for their own protection is disproportionate. The proper way of protecting Palestinian farmers from harassment is for the respondents to provide proper security arrangements and to impose restrictions on those persons who carry out the unlawful acts.
Law enforcement in Judaea and Samaria is insufficient and unacceptable, since the measures adopted have not provided a solution to the problems of harassment. The respondents were ordered to improve law enforcement procedures to deal with the problem properly.

 

Petition granted.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, ss. 2, 3, 4.

Security Measures (Judaea and Samaria) (no. 378) Order, 5730-1970, s. 90.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 302/72 Hilo v. Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(2) 169.

[2]        HCJ 6339/05 Matar v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 846.

[3]        HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 443; [2004] IsrLR 53.

[4]        HCJ 2612/94 Shaar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 675.

[5]        HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister [2005] (2) IsrLR 106.

[6]        HCJ 3680/05 Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

[7]        HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [2005] (2) IsrLR 206.

[8]        HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[9]        HCJ 2753/03 Kirsch v. IDF Chief of Staff [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 359.

[10]     HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 736; [2005] (1) IsrLR 98.

[11]     HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324.

[12]     HCJ 7862/04 Abu Dahar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 368; [2005] (1) IsrLR 136.

[13]     HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem District Police Commissioner [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 449.

[14]     HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Interior [2006] (1) IsrLR 443.

[15]     HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

[16]     HCJ 2725/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 366.

[17]     HCJ 531/77 Baruch v. Traffic Comptroller, Tel-Aviv and Central Districts [1978] IsrSC 32(2) 160.

[18]     HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.

[19]     HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235.

[20]     HCJ 61/80 Haetzni v. State of Israel (Minister of Defence) [1980] IsrSC 34(3) 595.

[21]     HCJ 551/99 Shekem Ltd v. Director of Customs and VAT [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 112.

[22]     HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 393; IsrSJ 7 109.

[23]     HCJ 2431/95 Salomon v. Police [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 781.

[24]     HCJ 3641/03 Temple Mount Faithful v. HaNegbi (unreported).

[25]     HCJ 166/71 Halon v. Head of Osfiah Local Council [1971] IsrSC 25(2) 591.

 

For the petitioners — L. Yehuda.

For the respondents — E. Ettinger.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch

The petition before us concerns the right of access of the residents of five Arab villages in the territory of Judaea and Samaria (hereafter: the territory) to their agricultural land. The original petition was filed on behalf of the residents of three villages (Yanun, Aynabus, Burin) and later the residents of two additional villages (A-Tuani and Al-Jania). According to what is alleged in the petition, the respondents — the IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (‘the IDF Commander’) and the Commander of the Samaria and Judaea District in the Israel Police (‘the Police Commander’) are unlawfully preventing Palestinian farmers, who are residents of the petitioning villages, from going to their agricultural land and cultivating it. They claim that the respondents are depriving them of their main source of livelihood on which the residents of the petitioning villages rely and that this causes the residents serious harm. It is also alleged in the petition that the respondents are not acting in order to prevent attacks and harassment perpetrated by Israeli inhabitants of the territory of Judaea and Samaria against Palestinian farmers and that they do not enforce the law against the Israeli inhabitants.

The course of the proceedings in the petition and the arguments of the parties

1.    Since the petition was filed at the end of 2004, it has undergone many developments. We shall discuss below, in brief, the main events in the course of the petition.

On 24 October 2004 the petition was filed for an order nisi ordering the respondents to show cause as to why they should not allow the residents of the petitioner villages, and the residents of the territory of Judaea and Samaria in general, to have access to their land throughout the year, and particularly during the olive harvest and the ploughing season. The court was also requested to order the respondents to show cause as to why they should not take the appropriate action in order to ensure the security of the Palestinian farmers when they cultivate their land.

The petition that was filed was of a general nature but it also contained an application for concrete and urgent relief, since at the time when the petition was filed the olive harvest had begun. After an urgent hearing of the petition was held on 1 November 2004, arrangements were made between the parties in order to resolve the existing problems and to allow the harvest to take place in as many areas as possible. These arrangements were successful and from the statements that were filed by both parties it appears that a solution to the petitioners’ problems was found and that the specific difficulties that were raised in the petition were mostly resolved.

2.    On 9 December 2004 an application was filed by the petitioners for an order nisi to be made in the petition. In this application the petitioners said that although the urgent and specific problems that arose during the current harvest season had been resolved, the petition itself addressed a ‘general modus operandi, which was practised by the security forces in extensive parts of the territory of the West Bank, as a result of which residents are denied access to their land.’ It was alleged that because the IDF Commander was afraid of violent confrontations between Palestinian farmers going to work on their land and Israeli inhabitants, the IDF Commander is in the habit of ordering the closure of Palestinian agricultural areas, which are defined as ‘areas of conflict.’ This denies the Palestinians access to their land and deprives them of the ability to cultivate it. It was argued that denying them access to their land is done unlawfully, since it is not effected by means of an order of the IDF commander but by means of unofficial decisions. It was also argued that the justification given for closing the area is the need to protect the Palestinian farmers against acts of violence against them by Israeli inhabitants. In addition to this, it was argued in the petition that the respondents refuse to enforce the law against the Israeli inhabitants who act violently towards the Palestinian farmers and their property.

On 14 January 2005 the respondents filed their response to the application. In the response, it was emphasized that according to the fundamental position of the Attorney-General, the rule is that the Palestinian inhabitants in the territory of Judaea and Samaria should be allowed free access to the agricultural land that they own and that the IDF Commander is responsible to protect this right of access from hostile elements that seek to deny the Palestinians access to their land or to harm them. The respondents stated that following meetings between the defence establishment and the Attorney-General, a comprehensive examination of the areas of conflict was made, and the purpose of this was to examine whether it was essential to continue to impose restrictions on access to agricultural areas and on what scale and for how long such restrictions are required. The respondents also said that where it transpires that areas of conflict make it necessary to continue to impose restrictions upon access, these will be declared closed areas and a closure order will be made with regard thereto in accordance with s. 90 of the Security Measures (Judaea and Samaria) (no. 378) Order, 5730-1970 (the ‘Security Measures Order’). At the same time it was stated that nothing in the aforesaid would prevent the closure of an area by virtue of an unwritten decision when the defence establishment had concrete information of an immediate and unforeseen danger to the Palestinian residents or the Israeli settlers in a specific area, if the entry of Palestinian farmers into that area would be allowed. In conclusion it was argued that in view of the fact that the immediate needs of the petitioners had been satisfied and in view of what is stated above with regard to the issue of principle addressed by the petition, there was no basis for examining the petitioners’ arguments within the scope of this proceeding and the petition should therefore be denied.

3.    On 1 March 2005 a hearing was held in the presence of the parties, at the end of which it was decided to make an order nisi ordering the respondents to show cause as to why they should not allow the residents of the villages access to their agricultural land on all days of the year and why they should not adopt all the measures available to them in order to prevent the harassment of the residents of the petitioning villages and in order to ensure that they could work their land safely.

4.    In their reply to the order, the respondents discussed the difficult security position in the area and reviewed some of the serious security incidents that recently took place in the areas adjacent to the petitioners’ villages. The respondents said that in many places in Judaea and Samaria Israeli towns had been built close to Palestinian villages and that this proximity had been exploited in the past to carry out attacks against the Israeli towns. The respondents also said that during the ploughing and harvesting seasons the fear of attacks increases, since at these times the Palestinian farmers wish to cultivate the agricultural land close to the Israeli towns and hostile terrorist elements exploit the agricultural activity in order to approach the Israeli towns and attack them. In view of this complex position, the respondents discussed the need to impose balanced and proportional restrictions on both the Israeli and the Palestinian inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria in order to minimize the loss of human life on both sides. The respondents again emphasized that the principle that guides their action is the duty to allow the Palestinian residents in Judaea and Samaria free access to their agricultural land and the duty to protect this right. The respondents gave details in their reply of the rules that they have formulated in order to implement this principle and the respondents mainly emphasized the change that has occurred in the security outlook in so far as dealing with the areas of conflict is concerned: whereas in the past the prevailing outlook was that all the areas of conflict — both those characterized by harassment of Palestinians by Israelis and those where the presence of Palestinians constituted a danger to Israelis — should be closed, now areas of conflict are closed only where this is absolutely essential in order to protect Israelis (para. 16(a) of the statement of reply). According to the reply, the Palestinians will no longer be protected against harassment by Israeli residents by means of a closure of areas to Palestinians but in other ways. The methods that will be adopted for the aforesaid purpose are an increase in security for the Palestinian farmers, operating a mechanism for coordinating access to the agricultural land and closing the areas of conflict to prevent the entry of Israelis into those areas at the relevant times. The respondents also said that the problematic areas of conflict, whose closure was required in order to protect the Israeli residents, would not be closed absolutely during the harvesting and ploughing seasons, but in a manner that would allow the Palestinian farmers access to them, by coordinating this and providing security. During the rest of the year, the Palestinians would only be required to advise the DCO of their entry into the areas of conflict. The respondents argued that the aforesaid principles have led to a significant reduction in the restrictions on the access of Palestinians to their land, both with regard to the size of the area that is closed and with regard to the amount of time during which the area is closed. Thus, with regard to the village of Yanun (which is represented by the first petitioner), it was decided to close a piece of land with an area of only 280 dunams, instead of 936 dunams in 2004; with regard to the village of Aynabus (the second petitioner), no land would be closed at all (after in the original reply of the respondents it was said that an area of 218 dunams would be closed); with regard to the village of Burin (the third petitioner), two areas amounting to only approximately 80 dunams would be closed; with regard to the village of A-Tuani (the sixth petitioner), three areas amounting to approximately 115 dunams would be closed; and in the area of the village of Al-Jania (the seventh petitioner), several pieces of land with a total area of 733 dunams would be closed.

With regard to the second part of the petition, which concerns law enforcement against Israeli residents, the respondents discussed in their reply the efforts of the police to prevent acts of harassment at the points of conflict, both from the viewpoint of prevention before the event (which mainly concerns increased deployment in the areas of the conflict at the relevant times) and from the viewpoint of law enforcement after the event (by maximizing the investigation efforts and filing indictments).

 5.   The petitioners filed their response to the respondents’ reply, in which they claimed that nothing stated therein changed the prevailing position, in which the Palestinian residents were refused free access to their land. The alleged reason for this is that they continue to suffer a de jure denial of access to their land — by virtue of closure orders, which the petitioners claim do not satisfy the tests of Israeli and international law — and a de facto denial of access, as a result of attacks and harassment on the part of Israeli inhabitants. The petitioners also complained of the continuing ineptitude of the police treatment of Israeli lawbreakers.

6.    After receiving the respondents’ reply and the petitioners’ response to it, two additional hearings were held in the case, and at the end of these the respondents were asked to file supplementary pleadings, including replies to the petitioners’ claims that there is no access to the agricultural land during the current harvesting season and that nothing is done with regard to the complaints of residents of the petitioning villages with regard to harassment against them. In the supplementary pleadings of 26 September 2005, the respondents discussed at length the deployment of the army and the police for the 2005 olive harvest. In reply to the questions of the court, the respondents said, inter alia, that in the course of the deployment a plan is being put into operation to determine days on which security will be provided for the areas of conflict, which has been formulated in coordination with the Palestinians; that several control mechanisms have been formulated with the cooperation of the civil administration, the police and the Palestinian Authority, whose purpose is to provide a solution to the problems that arise during the harvest; that the forces operating in the area will be strengthened in order to guard the agricultural work; that the police forces have taken action to improve their ability to bring lawbreakers to justice; that orders have been issued to the IDF forces, emphasizing the fundamental principle that the farmers should be allowed to go to harvest the olives and that they should ensure that the harvest takes place in a reasonable manner; and that there was an intention to make closure orders for Israeli areas only, together with restriction orders for certain Israeli inhabitants who had been involved in the past in violent actions.

In addition to the aforesaid, the respondents said in their reply that following another reappraisal of all the relevant factors and circumstances in the area, they had revised their position with regard to the use of closure orders directed at the Palestinian residents. The respondents said that the reappraisal was carried out against the background of the tension anticipated during the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and in view of the concern that the olive harvest was likely to be characterized by many attempts on the part of Israeli inhabitants to harm Palestinian residents. According to the revised position, in addition to the security need to make use of closure orders where this was required in order to protect the security of the Israeli inhabitants, there was also a security need to make use of closure orders when the main purpose was to protect the Palestinian residents. At the same time the respondents informed the court that, in view of the aforesaid parameters, it had been decided in the reappraisal of the issue not to make closure orders for the land of the villages of A-Tuani and Yanun. The respondents also said that in the land of the villages of Burin and Al-Jania only areas amounting to approximately 808 dunams would be closed. Against the background of all of the aforesaid, the respondents were of the opinion that there was a significant improvement in the access of the Palestinian farmers to their land.

In an additional statement of the respondents, it was argued that the question of law enforcement against the Israeli settlers was being treated seriously both by the defence establishment and by the interdepartmental committee for law enforcement in the territories, which operates at the State Attorney’s Office. In this context the respondents discussed, inter alia, the efforts that were made to increase the supervision of security officers in Israeli towns and to increase supervision of the allocation of weapons to Israelis in the area, and the steps taken by the police in order to deal with offences carried out by Israeli inhabitants. They also addressed the handling of specific complaints that were made with regard to the villages that are the subject of the petition.

7.    The petitioners, for their part, filed on 30 November 2005 an additional supplementary statement, in which they said that during the olive harvest season of 2005 there had indeed been a certain change for the better from the viewpoint of the respondents’ deployment. In this regard, they discussed how greater efforts had been made by the civil administration to coordinate with the Palestinians the dates of the olive harvest, and that more requests by Palestinians to receive protection were granted. At the same time, the petitioners said that the results on the ground were not always consistent: whereas in the villages of Yanun and Al-Jania most of the farmers did indeed succeed in obtaining access to their land in order to carry out the harvesting on certain days during the season, this was not the case in the other petitioning villages, in which there was no real change in the access to the land. In any case, the petitioners argued that in general the situation remained unchanged, since the Palestinian farmers cannot access their land in the areas of conflict freely on a daily basis, both because of violence on the part of the Israeli inhabitants and because of various restrictions that the army imposes. The petitioners emphasized that this modus operandi, whereby as a rule the Palestinians are denied access to their land, except on certain days when protection is provided by the forces in the area, is the complete opposite of the right to free access, since, in practice, preventing access is the rule whereas allowing access is the exception.

8.    Shortly thereafter, on 2 January 2006, the petitioners filed an application to hold an urgent hearing of the petition. This was in response to several very serious incidents in which more than two hundred olive trees were cut down and destroyed on the land of the village of Burin. In the application it was stated that despite repeated requests to the respondents, no activity was being carried out by them at all to protect the petitioners’ trees and that no measures were being taken to stop the destruction of the trees. It was also claimed in the application that the ploughing season was about to begin and that the respondents were not taking the necessary steps in order to allow the residents of the petitioning villages safe access to their agricultural land and were not taking any action to prevent attacks and harassment by the Israeli inhabitants.

9.    In consequence of what was stated in the application, the petition was set down for a hearing. Shortly before this hearing, a statement was filed by the respondents, in which it was claimed that the incidents in which the olive trees were ruined were being investigated intensively by the competent authorities, but at this stage evidence has not been found that would allow the filing of indictments in the matter. It was also stated that the phenomenon of violent harassment by Israeli residents against Palestinian farmers had recently been referred to the most senior level in government ministries and that a real effort was being made to find a solution to the problem. In addition, it was stated that the Chief of Staff had orders several steps to be taken in order to reduce the phenomenon of the harassment of Palestinian farmers, including increased enforcement at the places where law and order were being violated, adopting administrative measures against lawbreakers and reducing the number of weapons held by the Israeli inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria. It was also stated that the deputy prime minister at that time, Mr Ehud Olmert, ordered the establishment of an inter-ministerial steering committee that would monitor the law enforcement operations carried out as a part of the measures taken to prevent acts of violence perpetrated by Israeli inhabitants in Judaea and Samaria.

10. At the last hearing that was held before us on 19 January 2006, the parties reiterated their contentions. The petitions again argued against the ineffectual protection afforded by the respondents to the Palestinian farmers who wish to have access to and cultivate their agricultural lands and against the forbearing approach adopted, according to them, towards the lawbreakers. The petitioners indicated in their arguments several problematic areas, including improper instructions given to the forces operating in the area, a failure to make orders prohibiting the entry of Israelis into the Palestinian agricultural areas, and so forth. The respondents, for their part, discussed the steps that were being taken and the acts that were being carried out in order to ensure that the residents of the petitioning villages had access to their lands and that they were protected.

Deliberations

General

11. The petition before us has raised the matter of a very serious phenomenon of a violation of the basic rights of the Palestinian residents in the territories of Judaea and Samaria and of significant failures on the part of the respondents with regard to maintaining public order in the territories. As we have said, the claims raised by the petitioners are of two kinds: one claim relates to the military commander denying the Palestinian farmers access to their land. In this matter, it was claimed in the petition that the closure of the area deprives the Palestinian residents of their right to freedom of movement and their property rights in a manner that is unreasonable and disproportionate and that violates the obligations imposed on the military commander under international law and Israeli administrative law. It was also claimed that it was not proper to protect the Palestinian farmers in a way that denied them access to their land. In addition it was claimed that closing the areas to the Palestinians was done on a regular basis without a formal closure order being made under section 90 of the Security Measures Order and therefore the denial of access to the land was not based upon a lawful order. The main additional claim that was raised in the petition addressed the failure of the respondents to enforce the law in the territories of Judaea and Samaria. The essence of the claim was that the respondents do not take action against the Israeli inhabitants in the territories that harass the Palestinian farmers and harm them and their property. In addition to these general claims, the petition also includes specific claims that required immediate action in concrete cases where access was being denied, and these claims were dealt with immediately (see para. 1 above).

The proceedings in the petition before us were spread out over several hearings; the purpose of this was to allow the respondents to take action to solve the problems that were arising and to find a solution to the claims raised before us, under the supervision of the Attorney-General and subject to the judicial scrutiny of the court. We thought it right to give the respondents time to correct what required correction, since there is no doubt that the reality with which they are confronted is complex and difficult and that the tasks imposed on them are not simple. Regrettably, notwithstanding the time that has passed, it does not appear that there has been any real change in the position and it would seem that no proper solution has been found to the serious claims of the Palestinian farmers concerning the violation of their right to cultivate their land and to obtain their livelihood with dignity, and to the injurious acts of lawbreaking directed against them. At the hearings that took place before us, a serious picture emerged of harm suffered by the Palestinian residents and contempt for the law, which is not being properly addressed by the authorities responsible for law enforcement. Therefore, although some of the claims that were raised in the petition were of a general nature, we have seen fit to address the claims raised by the petitioners on their merits.

Denying access to land

12. The territories of Judaea and Samaria are held by the State of Israel under belligerent occupation and there is no dispute that the military commander who is responsible for the territories on behalf of the state of Israel is competent to make an order to close the whole of the territories or any part thereof, and thereby to prevent anyone entering or leaving the closed area. This power of the military commander is derived from the rules of belligerent occupation under public international law; the military commander has the duty of ensuring the safety and security of the residents of the territories and he is responsible for public order in the territories (see art. 23(g) and art. 52 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which are annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 (hereafter: ‘the Hague Regulations’); art. 53 of the Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, 1949 (hereafter: ‘the Fourth Geneva Convention’); HCJ 302/72 Hilo v. Government of Israel [1], at pp. 178-179). This power of the military commander is also enshrined in security legislation in section 90 of the Security Measures Order (see, for example, Hilo v. Government of Israel [1], at pp. 174, 179; HCJ 6339/05 Matar v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2], at pp. 851-852). In our case, the petitioners do not challenge the actual existence of the aforesaid power but the manner in which the military commander directs himself when exercising his power in the circumstances described above. Therefore the question before us is whether the military commander exercises his power lawfully with regard to the closure of agricultural areas to Palestinian residents who are the owners or who have possession of those areas.

In order to answer the question that arises in this case, we should examine the matter in two stages: in the first stage we should seek to ascertain the purpose for which the power to close areas is exercised by the military commander, and we should also examine the various criteria that the military commander should consider when he considers ordering a closure of areas in the territories. In the second stage we should examine the proper balance between these criteria and whether this balance is being upheld in the actions of the military commander in our case.

The purpose of adopting the measure of closing areas

13. According to the respondents’ position, the purpose of adopting the measure of closing areas is to help the military commander carry out his duty of maintaining order and security in the area. Indeed, no one disputes that it is the duty of the military commander to ensure public order and the security of the inhabitants in the area under his command. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations sets out this duty and authorizes the military commander to take various measures in order to carry out the duty:

     ‘The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’

See also HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at pp. 455-456 {64-65}. It should be emphasized that the duty and authority of the military commander to ensure security in the territory apply with regard to all the persons who are present in the territory that is subject to belligerent occupation. This was discussed by this court, which said:

     ‘… In so far as the needs of maintaining the security of the territory and the security of the public in the territory are concerned, the authority of the military commander applies to all the persons who are situated in the territory at any given time. This determination is implied by the well-known and clear duty of the military commander to maintain the security of the territory and by the fact that he is responsible for ensuring the safety of the public in his area’ (per Justice Mazza in HCJ 2612/94 Shaar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [4], at p. 679).

(See also HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister [5], at para. 18, and HCJ 3680/05 Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [6], at paras. 8-9).

As we have said, the respondents’ argument is that the closure of the areas is done for the purpose of maintaining order and security in the territories. It should be noted that within the scope of this supreme purpose, it is possible to identify two separate aspects: one concerns the security of the Israelis in the territories and the other the security of the Palestinian residents. Thus in some cases the closure of the areas is intended to ensure the security of the Israeli inhabitants from the terror attacks that are directed against them, whereas in other cases the closure of the areas is intended to ensure the security of the Palestinian farmers from acts of violence that are directed against them. We shall return to these two separate aspects later, but we should already emphasize at this stage that in order to achieve the two aspects of the aforesaid purpose the military commander employs the same measure, and that is the closure of agricultural areas owned by the petitioners and denying the Palestinian farmers access to those areas.

The relevant criteria when exercising the power to close areas

14. As a rule, when choosing the measures that should be adopted in order to achieve the purpose of maintaining public order and security in the territories, the military commander is required to take into account only those considerations that are relevant for achieving the purpose for which he is responsible. In our case, when he is called upon to determine the manner of adopting the measure of closing areas, the military commander is required to consider several criteria.

On the one hand, there is the value of security and the preservation of the lives of the residents of the territories, both Israelis and Palestinians. It is well-known that the right to life and physical integrity is the most basic right that lies at the heart of the humanitarian laws that are intended to protect the local population in the territories held under the laws of belligerent occupation (see HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [7], at para. 23 of the opinion of President Barak). This right is also enshrined in Israeli constitutional law in ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and there is no doubt at all that this is a right that is on the highest normative echelon (see HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 368; HCJ 2753/03 Kirsch v. IDF Chief of Staff [9], at pp. 377-378). All the residents of the territories — both Palestinians and Israelis — are therefore entitled to enjoy the right to life and physical integrity, and a fundamental and primary criterion that the military commander should consider when deciding to close areas is the criterion of the protection of the life and physical integrity of all the residents in the territories.

The petition before us concerns agricultural areas that are owned by Palestinian inhabitants and that are closed by the order of the military commander. Therefore, the right to security and the protection of physical integrity is opposed by considerations concerning the protection of the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants, and in view of the nature of the case before us, we are speaking mainly of the right to freedom of movement and property rights. In the judgment given in HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel [10], we said that the freedom of movement is one of the most basic human rights. We discussed how in our legal system the freedom of movement has been recognized both as an independent basic right and also as a right derived from the right to liberty, and how there are some authorities that hold that it is a right that is derived from human dignity (see para. 15 of the judgment and the references cited there). The freedom of movement is also recognized as a basic right in international law and this right is enshrined in a host of international conventions (ibid.). It is important to emphasize that in our case we are not speaking of the movement of Palestinian residents in nonspecific areas throughout Judaea and Samaria but of the access of the residents to land that belongs to them. In such circumstances, where the movement is taking place in a private domain, especially great weight should be afforded to the right to the freedom of movement and the restrictions imposed on it should be reduced to a minimum. It is clear that restrictions that are imposed on the freedom of movement in public areas should be examined differently from restrictions that are imposed on a person’s freedom of movement within the area connected to his home and the former cannot be compared to the latter (see HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [11], at p. 475).

As we have said, an additional basic right that should be taken into account in our case is, of course, the property rights of the Palestinian farmers in their land. In our legal system, property rights are protected as a constitutional human right (s. 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). This right is of course also recognized in public international law (see HCJ 7862/04 Abu Dahar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [12], at para. 8 and the references cited there). Therefore, the residents in the territories held under belligerent occupation have a protected right to their property. In our case, there is no dispute that we are speaking of agricultural land and agricultural produce in which the petitioners have property rights. Therefore, when the petitioners are denied access to land that is their property and they are denied the possibility of cultivating the agricultural produce that belongs to them, their property rights and their ability to enjoy them are thereby seriously violated.

15. Thus we see that the considerations that the military commander should take into account in the circumstances before us include, on the one hand, considerations of protecting the security of the inhabitants of the territories and, on the other hand, considerations concerning the protection of the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants. The military commander is required to find the correct balance between these opposite poles. The duty of the military commander to balance these opposite poles has been discussed by this court many times, and the issue was summarized by President Barak in Marabeh v. Prime Minister [5] as follows:

     ‘Thus we see that, in exercising his power under the laws of belligerent occupation, the military commander should “ensure public order and safety.” Within this framework, he should take into account, on the one hand, considerations of the security of the state, the security of the army and the personal safety of everyone who is in the territory. On the other hand, he should consider the human rights of the local Arab population’ (para. 28 of the judgment [5]; emphases supplied).

See also Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at pp. 455-456 {64-65}.

16. There is no doubt that in cases where the realization of human rights creates a near certainty of the occurrence of serious and substantial harm to public safety, and when there is a high probability of harm to personal security, then the other human rights yield to the right to life and physical integrity (HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem District Police Commissioner [13], at p. 454; Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [3], at p. 465 {76}). Indeed, in principle, where there is a direct conflict, the right to life and physical integrity will usually prevail over the other human rights, including also the right to freedom of movement and property rights. The court addressed this principle in HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Interior [14], where it said:

     ‘When there is a direct confrontation and there is a concrete risk to security and life, the public interest indeed overrides protected human rights, and the same is the case where there is a concrete likelihood of a risk to life’ (para. 11 of my opinion [14]).

Notwithstanding, the balance between the various rights and values should be made in such a way that the scope of the violation of the rights is limited to what is essential. The existence of risks to public safety does not justify in every case an absolute denial of human rights and the correct balance should be struck between the duty to protect public order and the duty to protect the realization of human rights. The question before us is whether the manner in which the military commander is exercising his power to close areas for the purpose of achieving security for the Israeli residents on the one hand and the Palestinian residents on the other properly balances the conflicting considerations. We shall now turn to consider this question.

The balance between the relevant considerations

17. As we have said, in order to achieve the purpose of preserving security in the territories, the military commander adopts the measure of closing agricultural areas that are owned by Palestinians and in doing so he violates the right of the Palestinian residents to freedom of movement on their land and their right to have use of their property. We therefore discussed above the purpose for which the military commander was given the power to close the areas and the relevant criteria for exercising this power. Now we should consider whether the military commander properly balanced the various criteria and whether the measures adopted by the military commander satisfy the principle of proportionality that governs him in his actions.

18. The centrality of the principle of proportionality in the actions of the military commander has been discussed by this court many times (see, for example, HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [15], at pp. 836-841 {293-298}). The manner in which the military commander exercises his power to close agricultural areas in the territories inherently results in a violation of the rights of the Palestinian residents and therefore this violation should satisfy the principle of proportionality. According to the proportionality tests, the military commander has the burden of showing that there is a rational connection between the measure adopted and the purpose (the first subtest of proportionality); he is required to show that, of the various appropriate measures that may be chosen, the measure adopted causes the least possible harm to the individual (the second test); and he is also required to show that adopting the aforesaid measure is proportionate to the benefit that arises from employing it (the third subtest).

19. According to the aforesaid tests, is the harm caused to the petitioners as a result of the closure of the agricultural land by the military commander proportionate? The proportionality of the measure is examined in relation to the purpose that the military commander is trying to achieve with it. ‘The principle of proportionality focuses… on the relationship between the purpose that it wants to realize and the measures adopted to realize it’ (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [15], at p. 839 {296}). In our case, the respondents claim that the closure of the areas is done for one purpose, which has two aspects: in certain circumstances it is for the protection of the Israeli inhabitants and in other circumstances it is for the protection of the Palestinian farmers. There are cases where the purpose is a mixed one, and the closure is intended to protect the lives of all the inhabitants, both Israeli and Palestinian, and in these circumstances the discretion of the military commander will be examined in accordance with the main purpose for which the power was exercised. Accordingly, we should examine the manner in which the military commander exercises the power of closure with regard to all of the aforesaid circumstances. First we shall examine the proportionality of the use of the power to close areas with regard to the purpose of protecting the security of the Israeli inhabitants and afterwards we shall examine the proportionality of the use of this measure with regard to the purpose of protecting the security of the Palestinian farmers.

Protecting the security of Israeli inhabitants

20. In so far as the protection of the security of the Israeli residents is concerned, the respondents argued that in order to achieve this purpose, in a period when brutal and persistent terrorist activity is taking place, the closure of areas near Israeli towns so that Palestinians cannot enter them is needed in order to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into those towns and the perpetration of acts of terror against the persons living there. The respondents explained that the access of the Palestinian farmers to agricultural land adjoining the Israeli towns is exploited by the terrorist organizations to carry out attacks against the Israeli towns, and that the presence of the Palestinian farmers on the land adjoining the Israeli towns serves the terrorists as a cloak and helps them to infiltrate those areas. The proximity of the agricultural land to Israeli towns is exploited particularly in order to carry out attempts to infiltrate the Israeli towns, for the purpose of carrying out attacks in them, and also for the purpose of long-range shooting attacks. Because of this, the respondents explained that there is a need to create a kind of barrier area, into which entry is controlled, and thus it will be possible to protect the Israeli inhabitants in an effective manner.

After considering the respondents’ explanations and the figures presented to us with regard to the terror activity in the areas under discussion in the petition, we have reached the conclusion that the measure of closing areas adjoining Israeli towns does indeed have a rational connection with the purpose of achieving security for the inhabitants of those towns. As we have said, the protection of the security of the Israeli inhabitants in the territories is the responsibility of the military commander, even though these inhabitants do not fall within the scope of the category of ‘protected persons’ (see Marabeh v. Prime Minister [5], at para. 18). The proximity of the Palestinian agricultural land to the Israeli towns, which is exploited by hostile terrorist forces, presents a significant risk to the security of the Israeli residents, and contending with this risk is not simple. The closure of the areas from which terrorist cells are likely to operate, so that the access to them is controlled, is therefore a rational solution to the security problem that arises.

With regard to the second test of proportionality — the least harmful measure test — according to the professional assessments submitted to us, no other measure that would be less harmful and that would achieve the purpose of protecting the security of the Israeli residents was raised before us. The military commander is of the opinion that the unsupervised access of Palestinians to areas that are very close to Israeli towns is likely to create a serious threat to the security of the Israeli inhabitants and there is no way to neutralize this threat other than by closing certain areas to Palestinians for fixed and limited periods. The military commander emphasized how the closure of the areas to the Palestinians will be done only in areas where it is absolutely essential and that there is no intention to close areas of land beyond the absolute minimum required in order to provide effective protection for the Israeli inhabitants. The military commander also said that the period of time when the areas would be closed to the Palestinian residents would be as short as possible and that the periods when access was denied would be limited. The military commander emphasized that he recognizes the importance of the right of the Palestinian farmers to have access to their land and to cultivate it and that making closure orders from time to time would be done while taking these rights into account and violating them to the smallest degree. The military commander also emphasized the intention to employ additional measures in order to ensure the protection of the rights of the Palestinians and that by virtue of the combination of the various measures it would be possible to reduce to a minimum the use of closure orders. From the aforesaid we have been persuaded that the military commander took into account, in this regard, the absence of any other less harmful measure that can be used in order to achieve the desired purpose. The other measures discussed by the respondents are insufficient in themselves for achieving the purpose and therefore there is no alternative to using also the measure of closing areas that adjoin Israeli towns for a limited period, in order to provide security.

With regard to the third test of the principle of proportionality — the proportionate or commensurate measure test — the benefit accruing to the Israeli inhabitants from the closure of the areas, from a security perspective, and the protection of the value of preserving life without doubt exceeds the damage caused by employing this measure, provided that it is done in a prudent manner. It should be remembered that, according to the undertaking of the military commander, the closure of the area will not cause irreversible damage to the Palestinian farmers, since by prior arrangement they will be allowed to have access to all of the agricultural land and to carry out the necessary work.

Consequently our conclusion is that subject to the undertakings given by the respondents, exercising the power to deny the Palestinians access to the areas that are very close to Israeli towns, in so far as this derives from the need to protect the Israeli towns, is proportionate. Indeed, the use of the measure of closing the areas inherently involves a violation of basic rights of the Palestinian residents, but taking care to use this measure proportionately will reduce the aforesaid violation to the absolute minimum.

21. It should be re-emphasized that the actual implementation of the military commander’s power to close areas should be done proportionately and after a specific and concrete examination of the conditions and character of the risks that are unique to the relevant area (cf. HCJ 11395/05 Mayor of Sebastia v. State of Israel (not yet reported)). In this regard it should be noted that, before filing the petition, the respondents defined a range of 500 metres from the boundaries of an Israeli town as the necessary security limits for the closed area, but following the hearings that took place in the petition this range was reduced and in practice areas were closed within a range of between only 50 and 300 metres from Israeli towns, as needed and according to the topography of the terrain, the nature of the risk and the degree of harm to the Palestinian residents in the area. Determining the security limits in the specific case is of course within the jurisdiction of the military commander, but care should be taken so that these ranges do not exceed the absolute minimum required for effective protection of the Israeli inhabitants in the area under discussion, and the nature and extent of the harm to the Palestinians should be examined in each case. In addition, whenever areas are closed it should be remembered that it is necessary to give the Palestinian residents an opportunity to complete all the agricultural work required on their land ‘to the last olive.’ It should also be noted that closing the areas should be done by means of written orders that are issued by the military commander, and in the absence of closure orders the Palestinian residents should not be denied access to their land. Nothing in the aforesaid prejudices the commander’s power in the field to give oral instructions for a closure of any area on a specific basis for a short and limited period when unexpected circumstances present themselves and give rise to a concern of an immediate danger to security that cannot be dealt with by any other measures. But we should take care to ensure that the power to order the closure of a specific piece of land without a lawful order, as a response to unexpected incidents, should be limited solely to the time and place where it is immediately required. In principle, the closure of areas should be done by means of an order of which notice is given to whoever is harmed by it, and the residents whose lands are closed to them should be given an opportunity to challenge its validity. Within the limitations set out above and subject thereto, it can be determined that closing areas close to Israeli towns is proportionate.

Protecting the security of Palestinian farmers

22. As we said above, the purpose of maintaining order and security in the territories has two aspects, and for each of these we should examine the proportionality of the use of the measure of closing areas. We discussed above the proportionality of the military commander’s use of the power to close areas to achieve the first aspect — the protection of the security of the Israeli inhabitants. Now we should consider whether the military commander has exercised his power proportionately also with regard to the second aspect of the purpose — providing protection for the security of the Palestinian farmers.

23. According to the respondents’ explanations, there is no alternative to closing off the agricultural areas to their Palestinian owners, since the Palestinian farmers often suffer from harassment by the Israeli inhabitants when they enter their land. The respondents said that every year the olive harvest is a focal point for conflicts between Israeli settlers and Palestinian farmers and that in a large number of cases these conflicts result in serious harm to the lives and property of the Palestinian farmers. Because of the aforesaid, the military commander adopts the measure of closing areas to the Palestinian farmers in order to realize the purpose of protecting them against attacks directed at them.

24. The question of denying a person access to certain land, when he has a right of access to it, for the purpose of protecting his security and for the purpose of preserving public order is not new in Israel and it has been considered in our case law several times (see, for example, Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem District Police Commissioner [13]; HCJ 2725/93 Salomon v. Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [16]; HCJ 531/77 Baruch v. Traffic Comptroller, Tel-Aviv and Central Districts [17]; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [18]). In these judgments and others, the court considered the question of the conflict between the public interest of order and security and the duty of protecting basic human rights such as freedom of worship, freedom of movement and freedom of expression.

In our case, as we have said, assuming that the violation of the Palestinians’ right of access to their land is done for the proper purpose of protecting their lives, we should consider whether the closure of the agricultural areas to the Palestinians in order to protect them is a proportionate violation of their rights. After studying the written pleadings and hearing the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that in the prevailing circumstances the exercising of the military commander’s power to close land to Palestinians for the purpose of protecting them is disproportionate. Of course, no one disputes that closing the area and preventing the access of Palestinians to their land does achieve a separation between them and the Israeli inhabitants and thereby protects the Palestinian farmers. But the use of the power of closure for the purpose of protecting the Palestinian inhabitants violates the right of the Palestinian inhabitants to freedom of movement and their property rights to a disproportionate degree and it does not satisfy the subtests of the principle of proportionality. We shall explain our position below.

25. Exercising the power to close areas that are owned by Palestinians for the purpose of protecting them does not satisfy the first subtest of proportionality, since there is no rational connection between the means and the end. The rational connection test is not merely a technical causal connection test between means and end. Even when use of a certain measure is likely to lead to realization of the desired purpose, this does not mean that there is a rational connection between the means and the end and that the means is suited to achieving the end. The emphasis in the rational connection test is whether the connection is rational. The meaning of this is, inter alia, that an arbitrary, unfair or illogical measure should not be adopted (see HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [19], at p. 279; A. Barak, Legal Interpretation — Constitutional Interpretation, at pp. 542, 621). In our case, the areas that are closed are private areas that are owned by Palestinians whose livelihood depends upon their access to them. On the other hand, the threat to the security of the Palestinians is the perpetration of acts of harassment by Israeli lawbreakers. In these circumstances, the closure of the areas to the Palestinian farmers in order to contend with the aforesaid threat is not rational, since it is an extremely unfair act that results in serious harm to basic rights while giving in to violence and criminal acts. Admittedly, closing the areas is likely to achieve the purpose of protecting the Palestinian farmers, but when the discretion of the military commander in closing the areas is influenced by the criminal acts of violent individuals, who violate the rights of the inhabitants to their property, the discretion is tainted (see Baruch v. Traffic Comptroller, Tel-Aviv and Central Districts [17], at p. 165; Horev v. Minister of Transport [18], at pp. 77 {235} and 118-120 {286-290}). A policy that denies Palestinian inhabitants access to land that belongs to them in order to achieve the goal of protecting them from attacks directed at them is like a policy that orders a person not to enter his own home in order to protect him from a robber who is waiting for him there in order to attack him. In the circumstances of the case before us, it is not rational that this policy should be the sole solution to the situation in the area, since it violates the rights of the Palestinian farmers to freedom of movement and their property rights disproportionately.

The use of the measure of closing the area to Palestinians for the purpose of protecting the Palestinians themselves is inconsistent with the basic outlook of the military commander with regard to protecting the inhabitants against harassment. When the military commander seeks to protect the security of the Israeli inhabitants he takes the step of closing the area to Palestinians, whose entry into the area may be exploited by terrorists. With regard to this purpose we said that the measure chosen is proportionate since placing a restriction on the party from which the danger may arise achieves the purpose of protecting the Israeli inhabitants by means of a proportionate violation of the protected rights of the Palestinian farmers. By contrast, when the purpose sought is to protect the security of the Palestinian farmers from acts of violence directed against them, it is right that the appropriate measure should be directed against the party causing the danger, i.e., against those persons who carry out the attacks on the Palestinian farmers. The problem is that when he seeks to protect the Palestinian farmers, the military commander has once again chosen to act against them, even when they are the victim of the attacks. It is clear therefore that the use of the measure of closing the area to the Palestinian farmers when the purpose is to protect the Palestinians themselves is not an appropriate use of the aforesaid measure, and it is contrary to our sense of justice. This situation is not proper and therefore the use of the measure of closing areas as the standard and only measure for protecting Palestinian inhabitants who are attacked on their land is a use that is disproportionate and inconsistent with the duties imposed on the military commander.

26. It should be noted that now we have found that the measure adopted is not at all appropriate or suited to the purpose for which it was intended (the first test of proportionality), we are not required to examine whether the measure is consistent with the other tests of proportionality. Nonetheless we should point out that in the circumstances of the case it is also clear that the measure adopted is not the least harmful measure, nor is it proportionate to the benefit that arises from it (the two remaining tests of proportionality). In this regard, it should be stated that the respondents themselves discussed in their responses other measures that could be adopted in order to realize the purpose of protecting the Palestinian inhabitants when they wish to cultivate their land. Inter alia, the respondents mentioned their intention to increase the security given to the Palestinian inhabitants when carrying out the agricultural work by means of increasing the forces in the area, and also their intention to issue restriction orders against certain Israeli inhabitants who were involved in the past in acts of violence and who, in the military commander’s opinion, present a danger. The use of these measures and other additional measures that were mentioned by the respondents is likely to achieve the purpose of protecting the Palestinian inhabitants who wish to cultivate their land without disproportionately violating the right of the Palestinian farmers to freedom of movement on their land and their property rights.

27. Naturally, it is not possible to rule out entirely the use of the measure of closing an area to the party that is being attacked in order to protect him (see Salomon v. Jerusalem District Commissioner of Police [16]). The matter depends on the circumstances of the case, the human rights that are violated and the nature of the threat. This is for example the case when there is concrete information of a certain risk and according to assessments it is almost certain that it will be realized and it is capable of seriously endangering security and life. In our case, these conditions are not satisfied. In the case before us the violation of the rights is serious, whereas the threat is one which from the outset can and should be handled in other ways that violate rights to a lesser degree. In addition, the closure of the areas was done in our case in a sweeping manner for prolonged periods, on the basis of a general assessment, and not pursuant to a specific concrete assessment. Therefore, the relevant circumstances in our case are what make the use of the measure of closing the area to the Palestinian farmers in order to protect them disproportionate.

Denying access — summary

28. The inescapable conclusion is therefore that the manner in which the military commander exercised his discretion to deny Palestinians access to agricultural areas that belong to them, in order to realize the purpose of protecting their security, is not consistent with the proportionate measure test that governs the respondents, and therefore it is unacceptable. As a rule, the military commander should carry out his duty to protect the security of the Palestinian inhabitants in another manner, and not by closing the agricultural areas, provided that his command responsibility is not prejudiced. The ‘conflict areas,’ which are closed to the Palestinians in order to protect the Palestinians themselves, should therefore remain open to the movement of Palestinians and the respondents should adopt all the measures that are required in order to ensure the security of the Palestinians farmers in those areas. The protection of the Palestinians should be afforded by providing proper security, giving clear instructions to the military forces and the police with regard to how they should act, and imposing restrictions that will be effective against those persons who harass the Palestinians and break the law. With regard to the closure of areas belonging to Palestinian inhabitants when the purpose that is being sought is the protection of the Israeli inhabitants against terrorist activity, in such a case the measure of closure may be proportionate, provided that the military commander exercises his power on the smallest scale possible and while observing the rules set out above.

Law enforcement in the territories of Judaea and Samaria

29. As we have said, the second head of the petition was directed against the respondents’ failures to enforce the law in the territories against the Israeli inhabitants. The petitioners claim that the respondents are not doing enough in order to prevent the Israeli inhabitants from harassing the Palestinian farmers who are cultivating their land and that they are not taking action to prevent harm to the Palestinians and their property. We shall now turn to examine these contentions.

30. As we said in para. 13 above, article 43 of the Hague Regulations sets out the duty and power of the military commander to maintain order and security in the territory under his control. There is no doubt that one of the main duties for which the military commander is responsible within this framework is the duty to ensure that the law is upheld in the territories (see HCJ 61/80 Haetzni v. State of Israel (Minister of Defence) [20], at p. 595; Abu Dahar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [12], at para. 7).

A discussion of the general subject of law enforcement in Judaea and Samaria and the many problems that this entails falls outside the scope of the petition before us. This is without doubt a serious problem with which the State of Israel has been contending for many years. A detailed review and recommendations on this issue can be found in the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Hebron Massacre (1994), at pp. 157-200, 243-245 and 250-251 (hereafter: ‘the Shamgar Commission report’). It should be noted that the Shamgar Commission report extensively considered the problem of law enforcement against the Israeli settlers in the territories and several specific contentions were raised with regard to the harassment of Palestinians by Israeli inhabitants by means of physical attacks, the destruction of property and uprooting orchards. The Shamgar Commission report also gives details of claims concerning the ineffective handling of law breaking and inter alia the report discusses the phenomena of not carrying out police investigations, delays in carrying out investigations, not filing indictments and so on (see pp. 192-193 of the Shamgar Commission report). The Shamgar Commission made its recommendations and these led, inter alia, to the creation of the Samaria and Judaea division of the police, which operates in the territories under the control of the military commander and deals with all the issues that concern policing in those territories.

But notwithstanding the repeated discussion, both in the report and on other additional occasions, of the problems relating to law enforcement in the territories, and notwithstanding the steps taken in this field in the past, the petition reveals the ineffectiveness of the respondents in enforcing the law against those persons who break it and cause physical injury to the Palestinian farmers and damage to their property. The physical security of the Palestinian farmers is in real danger when they go to cultivate their land, because of serious acts of violence on the part of Israeli settlers. The property of the Palestinian farmers also suffers from lawlessness when, after a day’s work, under the cover of night lawbreakers return to the agricultural land in order to uproot trees and damage agricultural implements.

No one disputes that the petitioners are deprived of their basic rights to security and property because of these lawbreakers. Moreover, no one disputes that it is the duty of the respondents to prevent this infraction of security and public order. This duty is enshrined in the rules of international humanitarian law; see, for example, art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention that states with regard to ‘protected persons’ that:

     ‘Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity’ (emphasis supplied).

Maintaining an effective law enforcement system in the territories of Judaea and Samaria is naturally mandated also by the duties imposed on the respondents under Israeli law.

31. It is important to emphasize that the lawbreaking acts that are perpetrated against the Palestinian farmers are carried out by a small and extreme group of Israelis who by their acts stain the reputation of all the Israeli settlers in Judaea and Samaria. The acts of the extremists harm not only the security, safety and property of the local inhabitants but also sully the image that the Israeli settlers wish to nurture, an image of law-abiding citizens, and they also taint the image and reputation of the whole of the State of Israel as a state that respects the supremacy of law and justice. The respondents ought therefore to act with greater force against the lawbreakers so that this phenomenon is eradicated.

32. In their most recent statements, the respondents described the measures that were being adopted in order to re-establish order. To this end, we were presented with affidavits of the senior commanders in the area both from the police and from the army. In one of the hearings that took place, the Samaria District Commander was present and he described the treatment of the phenomenon of harassment of Palestinian famers, and we made a note of his undertaking to act in so far as possible to protect the Palestinian farmers when they go to cultivate their land. In addition, as we said in para. 9 above, it would appear that the matter is being considered at the highest level, as it ought to be. Nonetheless, despite the declarations that were made by the respondents in their responses, it would appear that no solution has yet been found to the problem of the repeated harassment of Palestinians when they go to their land in order to cultivate it and to the problem of the damage to the farmers’ property, and especially the uprooting of the trees. Notwithstanding the steps that have been adopted in order to ensure the security of the Palestinian farmers, and a certain improvement that has taken place, the position is far from satisfactory. As we described in para. 8 above, recently — while the petition was pending — we witnessed a significant increase in the violent acts against the farmers and their crops. Because of this deterioration, on 2 January 2006 the petitioners filed the application mentioned in para. 8, in which an urgent hearing of the petition was sought. At the hearing that was held, the respondents once again described the measures that have been taken, but it would appear that the facts on the ground speak for themselves and that too little has been done in order to protect the rights of the petitioners. This situation is intolerable and unacceptable and the respondents should take action in order to put matters to rights immediately.

33. In view of the aforesaid, we pondered at length the order that this court should issue with regard to enforcement of the law in the territories. ‘Law enforcement is a fundamental element of the rule of law… it is one of the main functions of any government. The competent authorities may not shirk this duty’ (HCJ 551/99 Shekem Ltd v. Director of Customs and VAT [21], at p. 125). It need not be said that there is no need for this court to issue an order that directs the respondents to enforce the law and carry out their duties (ibid.). This is especially the case where the respondents themselves confirm their commitment to protect the rights of the petitioners and promise to act in so far as possible in order to carry out their duties. There is therefore no doubt that the respondents should act with all the means at their disposal in order to protect the security of the Palestinian farmers who come to work on their land and they should act in order to protect the property rights of the petitioners so that they are not violated unlawfully. Even though the court does not have the power to determine the size of the forces that will be allotted for these tasks and what operations will be carried out, we do have the power to say that the protection of the security and property of the local inhabitants is one of the most fundamental duties imposed on the military commander in the territories. We are aware that the declaration of intentions made by counsel for the respondents in this matter is not mere words. We are persuaded that the establishment of the inter-ministerial committee and the experience in dealing with law enforcement in the territories are steps that were chosen in good faith and in recognition of the duty of imposed on the army and the police operating in the territories. But plans and intentions are one thing and results another, and the results do not indicate success in the field of enforcement.

Therefore, notwithstanding the difficulty in giving judicial directions in this matter, we have seen fit to address in general the principles that should guide the respondents in dealing with this matter. First, action should be taken to ensure the security of the Palestinian farmers when they go to work on the land and, if necessary, to protect them when the agricultural work is being carried out. Second, clear and unequivocal instructions should be given to the forces operating in the field as to how to act in order not to prevent those inhabitants who are entitled thereto from having access to their land, unless there is a lawful ground for doing so. Third, forces should be deployed in order to protect the property of the Palestinian inhabitants. Fourth, complaints that are made by the Palestinian inhabitants should be investigated on their merits and the investigation should be completed as soon as possible. Investigations should be made immediately when information is received with regard to acts of harassment, and patrols should be deployed by the army and the police in order to discover such acts. It should be noted that in the current situation it is very doubtful whether the police units that were established for this purpose in the territories have been given all the resources required in order to carry out the enforcement. The enforcement mechanisms — investigations and indictments — should be improved. The respondents should act on their own initiative in order to discover the lawbreakers and bring them to justice and they should consider which measures should be adopted in order to prevent recurrences of the blatant acts of lawbreaking.

34. Subject to the aforesaid guidelines and the right of the petitioners to apply once again to this court with concrete problems at any time, if these guidelines are not upheld, we are of the opinion that the second part of the petition has been addressed. We can merely reiterate the remarks that were written in the summary of the Shamgar Committee Report in the chapter dealing with law enforcement, which is no less relevant today and has not yet been properly implemented:

     ‘We accept the premise that in the absence of effective law enforcement there is also no effective government. In an atmosphere in which everyone does what seems right in their own eyes, without being subject to any real risk that he will be brought to justice if he oversteps what is permitted, the propriety of the actions of the authorities responsible for effective control of the territories is impaired. The Supreme Court said years ago that the rule of law cannot be created ex nihilo and is not merely a matter of theory. It should be expressed in a concrete and daily manner in the existence of binding normative arrangements and in enforcing these in practice with respect to everyone…’ (p. 243 of the Shamgar Committee Report).

Summary

33. The result is that we declare that except in cases of a concrete need, which arises from reliable information or real warnings in the field, the military commander should, as a rule, refrain from closing areas in a manner that prevents the Palestinian inhabitants from having access to their land for their own protection, since the use of this measure in these circumstances is disproportionate. Adopting the measure of closing areas, which should be restricted to the absolute minimum, may be proportionate only when it is done in order to protect the Israeli inhabitants, subject to the restrictions and the conditions that we discussed in paras. 20-21 above.

With regard to the deficiencies in the field of law enforcement in the territories, the handling of these complaints is within the jurisdiction of the respondents and the whole issue is being considered by the most senior decision makers in the State of Israel. It is to be presumed that they will have the wisdom to deal with the complaints that the petitioners have raised and that they will do so with the speed and efficiency required by the nature, character and importance of law enforcement.

 

 

Justice E. Rivlin

I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice D. Beinisch and its reasoning in every respect.

The response to the violation of the right of Palestinian inhabitants not to be harassed when cultivating their land does not lie in placing restrictions upon the Palestinians themselves. An aggressor should not have the right to ‘veto’ the right of his victim. Therefore I agree with my colleague’s declaration that, as a rule, the military commander should refrain from closing areas in a manner that denies the Palestinian residents the possibility of access to their agricultural land for their own protection. I also agree with her remarks with regard to the deficiencies in law enforcement.

 

 

Justice S. Joubran

1.    I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice D. Beinisch and all of the reasoning that appears in her opinion.

2.    I think that there is no need to speak at length on the harm that is likely to be suffered by the Palestinian inhabitants if they are denied access to the agricultural land that they own. Here it should be emphasized that in most cases these are inhabitants whose land serves as the main if not the only source of livelihood for them and their families. It is clear that during periods of intensive agricultural work, such as during the olive harvest season, the damage that may be caused to the livelihood of these inhabitants is far greater. Therefore, the court has the duty to ensure that the violation of these rights of the Palestinian inhabitants is proportionate and not excessive (cf. and see Marabeh v. Prime Minister [5]).

3.    My colleagues rightly reached the conclusion that in general there is no basis for allowing a violation of the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants to cultivate their land merely because of the desire to protect their lives from persons who wish to harass them. This conclusion is consistent with the principle that this court has stated time and again in a whole host of judgments that ‘a person should not be deprived of his liberty because of the violent opposition to the exercising of that liberty’ (HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [22], at p. 404 {120}; see also HCJ 2431/95 Salomon v. Police [23]; Horev v. Minister of Transport [18]; HCJ 3641/03 Temple Mount Faithful v. HaNegbi [24]). Even though most of the aforesaid cases mainly concerned the protection of the rights of freedom of worship, freedom of movement and freedom of speech, no one denies that what was said there applies to our case too, mutatis mutandis, especially in view of the importance attributed to the protection of property rights in our legal system.

4.    Imposing severe restrictions on the Palestinian inhabitants by closing agricultural areas, even as a result of a concern that they may be harmed by the criminal acts of violent persons, amounts de facto to placing the keys to exercising the right of freedom of movement and property rights in the hands of those lawbreaking persons, who wish to prevent the Palestinian inhabitants from cultivating their land. Moreover, imposing such restrictions on the Palestinian inhabitants is tantamount to rewarding violence, and it sends the wrong message of surrender and capitulation to those lawbreakers, even at a cost of a violation of the fundamental principles on which our system of government is based. In this context I think it appropriate to cite the remarks of President Barak in Horev v. Minister of Transport [18]:

‘A government authority whose path is influenced by violence on the street will ultimately lose its way’ (ibid. [18], at p. 80 {235}).

5.    I agree with the view that maintaining public order and the security of the Palestinian inhabitants should be done by means of adopting appropriate measures against those lawbreakers and not by imposing additional restrictions on the victims of the violence. Similar remarks have been uttered by this court elsewhere, when it said:

‘Keeping the peace does not mean capitulating to those who threaten to breach it, but the opposite: giving shelter and protection to their victims’ (HCJ 166/71 Halon v. Head of Osfiah Local Council [25], at p. 594).

Indeed, one of the duties of the military commander, who is responsible for upholding the law and keeping the peace in the territories, is to adopt reasonable measures in order to prevent those persons from stopping the Palestinian farmers from cultivating their land, while realizing their right to freedom of movement and their property rights. The military commander has many different ways of protecting the security of the Palestinian residents, including by increasing the security presence or closing areas of conflict to prevent the entry of Israelis. Denying the Palestinian inhabitants access to their land should be the last resort, not the first.

6.    In this context I accept the determination that there may be exceptional cases in which the great probability of danger to human life, as well as the scope of the anticipated harm, may justify closing a certain area for fixed period on the basis of definite and specific intelligence. But in order that these exceptional cases do not become the rule, we cannot agree to preventative measures of a sweeping closure of large areas for lengthy periods of time.

 

 

Petition granted.

30 Sivan 5766.

26 June 2006.

 

Miller v. Minister of Defence

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 4541/94
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, November 8, 1995
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner asked the army to assign her to the air force for training as a pilot. The army refused, since it was established policy not to train women as pilots. The army’s reasoning was based on the length of service: by law, men are obliged to serve until the age of 54, whereas women are only obliged to serve until the age of 38, and they are exempt if they are pregnant or have children. Consequently, the army argued, the huge investment involved in training a pilot could not be justified for women, and planning for the deployment of pilots in the air force units would be complicated by the integration of women pilots who could be expected to be absent for significant periods of time because of pregnancy and childbirth.

 

Held: The majority held that the budgetary and planning considerations did not justify a general policy of rejecting all women from aviation courses. The minority held that intervention of the High Court of Justice was not justified in view of these considerations.

 

Petition granted by majority decision (Justices E. Mazza, T. Strasberg-Cohen, D. Dorner), Justices Y. Kedmi, Ts. E. Tal dissenting.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 4541/94

Alice Miller

v.

1.     Minister of Defence

2.     Chief of Staff, IDF

3.     Head of Manpower Department, IDF

4.     Chief Officer of Women’s Corps, IDF

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[8 November 1995]

Before Justices E. Mazza, Y. Kedmi, T. Strasberg-Cohen, Ts. E. Tal, D. Dorner

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner asked the army to assign her to the air force for training as a pilot. The army refused, since it was established policy not to train women as pilots. The army’s reasoning was based on the length of service: by law, men are obliged to serve until the age of 54, whereas women are only obliged to serve until the age of 38, and they are exempt if they are pregnant or have children. Consequently, the army argued, the huge investment involved in training a pilot could not be justified for women, and planning for the deployment of pilots in the air force units would be complicated by the integration of women pilots who could be expected to be absent for significant periods of time because of pregnancy and childbirth.

 

Held: The majority held that the budgetary and planning considerations did not justify a general policy of rejecting all women from aviation courses. The minority held that intervention of the High Court of Justice was not justified in view of these considerations.

 

Petition granted by majority decision (Justices E. Mazza, T. Strasberg-Cohen, D. Dorner), Justices Y. Kedmi, Ts. E. Tal dissenting.

 

Basic Laws cited:

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, ss. 1, 3.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11.

 

Statutes cited:

Defence Service (Volunteering for Defence Service) Regulations, 5734-1974.

Defence Service (Women’s Jobs in Compulsory Service) Regulations, 5712-1952.

Defence Service Law (Amendment no. 2), 5747-1987.

Defence Service Law (Amendment no. 7 and Temporary Provisions) (Police Service and Recognized Service), 5755-1995, s. 4.

Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version], 5719-1959, s. 16(b).

Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version], 5746-1986, ss. 1, 12, 15, 16, 17, 17(e), 21(b), 24, 29, 34, 39.

Defence Service Law, 5709-1949, s. 6(f).

Discharged Soldiers (Return to Work) Law, 5709-1949.

Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 5748-1988, s. 2(a).

Equal Remuneration for Female and Male Employees Law, 5724-1964, s. 1.

Government Corporations Law, 5735-1975, s. 18A.

Work and Rest Hours Law, 5711-1951, s. 9(c).

Women’s Employment Law, 5714-1954, ss. 6(a), 7(c)(1), 7(d)(1).

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, s. 1.

 

Regulations cited:

Employment of War Invalids Regulations, 5711-1951.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [1971] IsrSC 25(1) 7.

[2]        HCJ 720/82 Elitzur Religious Sports Association, Nahariya Branch v. Nahariyah Municipality [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 17.

[3]        HCJ 721/94 El-Al Israel Airways Ltd v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749; [1992-4] IsrLR 478.

[4]        HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13.

[5]        HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.

[6]        HCJ 453/94 Israeli Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 501; [1992-4] IsrLR 425.

[7]            CrimA 5/51 Steinberg v. Attorney-General [1951] IsrSC 5 1061.

[8]        HCJ 3627/92 Israel Fruit Growers Organization Ltd v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 387.

[9]        HCJ 734/83 Shine v. Minister of Defence [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 393.

[10]     HCJ 329/87 Sorko-Ram v. Minister of Defence [1992] IsrSC 46(5) 301.

[11]     HCJ 3246/92 Har-Oz v. Minister of Defence [1992] IsrSC 43(4) 873.

[12]     HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[13]     HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 393; IsrSJ 7 109.

[14]     HCJ 987/84 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 441.

[15]     HCJ 1255/94 Bezeq, the Israel Telecommunication Corporation Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 66.

[16]     HCJ 726/94 Klal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 441.

[17]     HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186.

[18]     HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. National Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4) 749; IsrSJ 10 136.

[19]     FH 36/84 Teichner v. Air France Airways [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 589.

[20]     HCJ 637/89 ‘Constitution for the State of Israel’ v. Minister of Finance [1992] IsrSC 46(1) 191.

[21]     HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 1; IsrSJ 8 21.

[22]     HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.

[23]     HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 429.

[24]     HCJ 200/57 Bernstein v. Bet-Shemesh Local Council [1958] IsrSC 12 264.

[25]     HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.

[26]     CA 732/74 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Israel Electricity Co. Ltd [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 281; IsrSJ 5 30

[27]     HCJ 301/63 Streit v. Chief Rabbi [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 598.

[28]     CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 355.

[29]     CrimApp 4595/94 (unreported).

[30]     CApp 4459/94 Salomonov v. Sharabani [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 479.

[31]     HCJFH 3229/93 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 195.

[32]     CrimApp 2169/92 Suissa v. State of Israel [1992] IsrSC 46(3) 338.

[33]     HCJ 389/90 Golden Pages Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(1) 421.

[34]     HCJ 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Lands Administration [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 853.

[35]     HCJ 231/63 Ratef Food Supply Ltd v. Ministry of Trade and Industry IsrSC 17 2730.

[36]     HCJ 5510/92 Torkeman v. Minister of Defence IsrSC 48(1) 217.

[37]     HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 1.

[38]     HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255.

[39]     HCJ 1452/93 Igloo Plumbing Works, Building & Development Contracting Co. Ltd v. Minister of Industry and Trade [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 610.

[40]     HCJ 80/70 Elitzur v. Broadcasting Authority [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 649.

 

American cases cited:

[41]         Faulkner v. Jones 10 F. 3d 226 (1993).

[42]         Faulkner v. Jones 51 F. 3d 440 (1995).

[43]         Bradwell v. The State 83 U.S. 130 (1872).

[44]         Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[45]         Frontiero v. Richardson 411 U.S. 677 (1986).

[46]         Muller v. Oregon 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

[47]         Hoyt v. Florida 368 U.S. 57 (1961).

[48]         Rostker v. Goldberg 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

[49]         Getz v. Con. of Pa., Dept of Public Welfare 802 F. 2d 772 (1986).

[50]     Shapiro-Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 810 F. Supp. 574 (1993).

[51]         Railway Express Agency v. New York 336 U.S. 106 (1949).

[52]         Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia 427 U.S. 307 (1976).

[53]         Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

[54]         Craig v. Boren 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

[55]         Mississippi Univ. v. Hogan 102 S. Ct. 3331 (1982).

 

Canadian cases cited:

[56]         Gauthier & an. v. Canadian Armed Forces — unreported.

[57]         Re Blainey and O.H.A. (1986) 54 O.R. 2d 513.

[58]         R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 108.

[59]         Singh v. M.E.I. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.

[60]         R. v. Lee [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384.

 

Jewish Law sources cited:

[61]         Psalms 45, 14.

 

For the petitioner — N. Ziv, R. Benziman.

For the respondents — U. Fogelman, senior assistant and director of the High Court of Justice Department at the State Attorney’s Office.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice E. Mazza

1.    At the heart of this petition lies the question whether the policy adopted by the IDF, not to recruit women soldiers to the profession of aviation, should not be disqualified because it is tainted by improper discrimination on the basis of the sex of the candidates. When the petition was filed, an order was made, ordering the respondents to show cause why they should not summon the petitioner for aptitude tests for an aviation course, and why they should not allow her to participate in the aviation course if she is found suitable for it.

The facts

2.    The petitioner (an Israeli citizen, born on 23 January 1972), was born and grew up in South Africa. Since her youth, in South Africa, she showed great interest in aviation. She trained for this and received a pilot’s license, which is recognized as valid in many countries, but she has not yet completed the requirements for receiving a civil aviation licence in Israel. On 13 December 1990 the petitioner was enlisted in the IDF. Her enlistment took place within the framework of the academic reserves, and the beginning of her service was postponed. For four years the petitioner studied aeronautic engineering at the Technion in Haifa. She successfully completed her studies and on 1 January 1995 she reported for active service.

            In November 1993 (more than a year before the beginning of her military service) the petitioner informed the commander of the academic reserves that she wanted to volunteer for service in the air crew professions and she asked to be summoned to aptitude tests for an aviation course. The petitioner thought that she had promising basic qualifications for succeeding in the role of pilot; but her request was denied. In her letter to the petitioner (dated 15 December 1993), the commander of the reserves wrote that according to the directives of the high command, women were not to be assigned to ‘combat professions’; and since aviation was classified as a combat profession, the army does not accept women for aviation courses. The petitioner gave notice that she challenged the legality of the refusal and gave her reasons. As a result, she was invited to a meeting with the Commander of the Air Force. However, this meeting too, which took place in December 1993, did not further her cause; on 15 May 1994 the army once again informed her that in view of established policy ‘not to assign women to combat professions’, there was no basis for assessing her aptitude for an aviation course.

            This was the background to the petitioner filing (in August 1994) the petition before us. It should be noted that prior to the date of hearing the objection to the show cause order (which took place on 21 June 1995), the petitioner successfully completed an officers’ course and was given the rank of an officer, but her desire to be accepted to an aviation course and to serve as a pilot remained as strong as ever.

            The legal framework

3.    The Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version], 5746-1986, regulates compulsory service in the IDF. In three main areas relating to the scope of compulsory service, the law makes a different provision for men and women. The most noticeable differences relating to the sex of young persons being enlisted — as can be seen from the law alone, without taking into account additional arrangements prescribed in subordinate legislation and in army regulations — are as follows:

(a) Duration of regular service: Men are liable for thirty months of service, whereas women are liable for compulsory service for a period of only twenty-four months (ss. 15 and 16 of the law);

(b) Reserve duty: Men who are not in compulsory service are liable for reserve duty until the age of 54, whereas women are only liable until the age of 38 (see section 29 of the law and the definition of ‘person of military age’ in section 1 of the law);

(c) Exemption from defence service: In addition to the grounds for exemption from security service available to men, married woman are entitled to an exemption from compulsory service and pregnant women and mothers are also exempt from reserve duty (s. 39 of the law).

4.    Alongside the provisions with regard to compulsory defence service, the law also makes it possible (in section 17) to volunteer for service (with the approval of the Minister of Defence). The possible volunteer tracks are for ‘compulsory’ service, by those who are not liable for such service; for additional ‘compulsory’ service (‘permanent service’), beyond the period of compulsory service; and for reserve service, by those who not liable for such service, or beyond the amount for which a person is liable. From the provisions of section 17(e) of the law it appears that volunteering for ‘compulsory’ service imposes an obligation to serve until the end of the period stipulated in the declaration of voluntary service, and the Minister of Defence has the authority to shorten the period, but someone who volunteers for reserve duty will be discharged even before the end of the period stipulated in the declaration, if he submits a written notice of his desire to be discharged (at the times stipulated in the Defence Service (Volunteering for Defence Service) Regulations, 5734-1974).

5.    With regard to the kinds of jobs that can be imposed on soldiers, the law no longer distinguishes between men and women. However, such a distinction — which serves as the guideline for the army authorities — is found in the High Command Regulations which regulate the service of women soldiers. In sections 4 and 5, which are entitled ‘Jobs’, the regulations state as follows:

‘4.          Women soldiers in the IDF shall be employed in all military professions that are defined in the list of military professions as professions to which women may be assigned, with the exception of field, combat professions, taking into account their credentials, capabilities and their special service conditions as women.

5.            A woman soldier may volunteer for jobs that are outside the framework of the definition in section 4 above, after she signs a suitable declaration to volunteer, and her voluntary service for the job is approved by the Chief Officer of the Women’s Corps and the Head of the Manpower Division.’

It should be noted that in the past, women’s jobs were determined by the Defence Minister, in the Defence Service (Women’s Jobs in Compulsory Service) Regulations, 5712-1952. These regulations list the jobs to which the army may assign women. The list, which specifies twenty-five different possible jobs, does not include jobs in the sphere of combat professions, and assigning a woman to a job that is not mentioned in the list was permitted under the regulations only ‘if the woman consented thereto in a written declaration’. The regulations still appear in the statute book, but the legal basis for enacting them was removed by the repeal (within the framework of the Defence Service Law (Amendment no. 2), 5747-1987) of section 21(b) of the law, which by virtue of its parallels in previous wordings of the law (s. 6(f) of the Defence Service Law, 5709-1949, and section 16(b) of the Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version], 5719-1959) gave the Minister of Defence authority to enact regulations in this respect. It appears that the only distinction between men’s jobs and women’s jobs that the law left intact was in section 24, in which the Minister of Defence was authorized, in consultation with the Minister of the Police or someone authorized by him, to direct in an order that men of military age who have certain qualifications may serve in the Border Patrol of the Israeli Police. But recently the legislator repealed even this distinction (see section 4 of the Defence Service Law (Amendment no. 7 and Temporary Provisions) (Police Service and Recognized Service), 5755-1995).

The petitioner’s arguments

6.    The petitioner claims that the respondents’ position, which is based on a policy of an absolute disqualification of women for the profession of aviation, violates the basic right of equality between the sexes. The admission of men to an aviation course is considered, subject to the requirements of the army, on the basis of the personal details and qualifications of the candidates. A soldier who volunteers to serve on an air crew and who complies with the minimum requirements is referred for aptitude tests. If he is found to be suitable, he is accepted into an aviation course; and if he successfully completes the aviation course he will be assigned (according to his talents and the degree of his success) to one of the air crew professions. But women are denied the opportunity and the right at the outset. They are disqualified because they are women. The question of their talents and suitability does not interest the army. For this reason the army refuses to test the level of the personal qualifications of any woman candidate.

The petitioner claims that this policy is a discriminatory one. Its implementation violates her right (and the right of all women) to equality. This violation is expressed, first and foremost, in denying a woman the equal right and opportunity to serve in the army as a pilot, if she is found to have the requisite qualifications, and thereby to make her contribution to the defence of the State, to achieve her aspirations and to make the most of her potential. But denying the possibility of serving as a pilot has additional ramifications. The disqualification in limine of women for positions, even when they are suitable and have the necessary qualifications, harms their social image. It also blocks their prospects of promotion to senior positions in the air force and in the army as a whole. Being in a combat unit is, usually, a precondition for promotion in the army. For this reason, most positions of senior staff officers in the IDF are, de facto, closed to women. But this is not all: it is usual in Israel that having a professional position in the army constitutes a springboard for obtaining employment in the civil sector. This is especially obvious for pilots, since obtaining a job as a pilot for the El-Al company is de facto conditional upon serving as a pilot in the air force; by denying the petitioner an equal opportunity to serve as a pilot in the air force, she is also, de facto, being denied the equal opportunity to work and make the most of her talents as a civil pilot.

            7.         The petitioner is aware that the exclusion of women from combat professions may be based on relevant considerations. Thus, for example, she is prepared to assume that in many combat roles in the field corps, there is no practical possibility of integrating women. Therefore she does not argue that the existing restrictions on the recruitment of women for combat units should be cancelled entirely. Nonetheless, the petitioner argues that an all-embracing disqualification of the integration of women in combat positions is an unacceptable position. Experience, both generally and in the army, shows that it is possible to integrate women in some combat positions. Aviation professions are an obvious example of this. This has been done, with great success, in the armies of other countries, and even in the IDF several women pilots have served in the past. Therefore the petitioner argues that the policy of the army with regard to the integration of women in combat positions should be an all-embracing one, but it should consider, on an individual basis, the nature of the position, the combat unit and the corps in the relevant case. This approach is mandated by the principle of equality. As long as there is no objective and relevant reason for distinguishing between men and women for the purpose of carrying out a particular job, both sexes should be treated according to the same criterion. The law does indeed distinguish, in some matters, between men and women soldiers, but the distinctions of the law are not relevant for the purpose of the jobs which it is permitted and possible to assign to women. Moreover, the aforesaid regulations of the High Command, which were the basis for rejecting her application to volunteer for an air crew, allow a woman soldier to volunteer for tasks that are not included among the jobs that the army may impose on her. It follows that neither the law nor army regulations place an obstacle in the way of implementing a policy of selection and assignment that respects the right of women soldiers to equality.

The position of the respondents

8.    In the affidavit in reply to the petition, which was submitted by the Air Force Commander, General Herzl Bodinger, the reasons of the respondents that justify the policy of the army with regard to the military service of women and the question of integrating them in combat positions are set out — at great length. From the affidavit it emerges that the basis for this policy lies in the distinction that the law makes between men and women with regard to the extent of their duty to serve. On the basis of this distinction it is argued that the service conditions for women, as dictated by law, have implications for the nature of their service, both in the regular forces and the reserve forces. Because of the difference in the relevant characteristics of men and women, the principle of equality does not apply. The different treatment of the service of women is based on relevant differences in their personal details, and therefore it is not an improper discrimination but a permitted distinction.

            9.         A preliminary comment should be made regarding the scope of the dispute.

In his reasons for disqualifying the integration of women in combat professions in the wider sense, the deponent discussed, inter alia, the socio-ethical aspect. This is what he said:

‘The question of integrating women into combat professions is problematic, and ultimately it is also a social, cultural and ethical question that has been pondered in many countries. It also arises from time to time in Israel and the solution to it is not merely in the hands of the defence establishment.

Until now it was accepted, in the security situation prevailing in Israel, that men are the ones who go to the front, in view of the element of danger involved in the combat professions, the risk of combat against the enemy and the danger of falling into captivity. Obviously weight was given to public opinion on this matter, since the decision is one of life and death in view of the dangers prevailing in the daily security reality, which even with the passage of time have not yet disappeared.’

However, at the beginning of the hearing before us, counsel for the State, Mr U. Fogelman, declared that the respondents wished to rely, in their opposition to the petition, only on the considerations because of which the army decided — within the framework of section 5 of the aforesaid High Command regulations — to reject the petitioner’s request to volunteer for an air crew. It soon became clear that the respondents’ position in this respect relied mainly on what in his affidavit the Air Force Commander referred to as  ‘planning considerations’. To remove all possible doubt regarding the decision we are asked to make in this petition, Mr Fogelman reiterated and emphasized the following two points: first, that the respondents limit their opposition to the specific issue raised by the petition — i.e., the integration of women as pilots in the air force — without including this as part of their approach to the general question of principle with regard to the possibility of integrating women in other combat professions; second, that even though with regard to the integration of women pilots the respondents are not unaware of the (in his words) ‘paternalistic’ aspect — i.e., the social approach that holds that women should not be exposed to the risks of combat against the enemy and falling into captivity — it was not this criterion that led to the decision in the case of the petitioner, and the question of whether this approach is correct, and to what degree, is not what requires clarification and elucidation from us. It follows that the petitioner was rejected on the basis of the ‘planning considerations’; we only need to consider whether these are justified, and we only need to give a decision on this point.

            10. I will therefore return to the affidavit-in-reply, in order to ascertain and clarify the nature and scope of the planning reasons, on which basis the respondents wish to justify an all-embracing and absolute disqualification of all women soldiers from the aviation courses of the air force. I will first say that that not everything that has been brought to our attention in this sphere can be revealed within the framework of the judgment. The information submitted to us concerns, to no small degree, the structure of the air force’s deployment for operations and training, the financial costs of training pilots, the average service periods of pilots in the regular army and in reserve duty, the standard call-up of pilots for active reserve duty and its frequency and other matters. Obviously, since all these constitute fragments of information about the planning of the air force, the less said the better. In submitting them to us — partly in an additional (privileged) affidavit from the Air Force Commander, partly in explanations given orally, in camera, by the Head of the Manpower Division at Air Force Headquarters — the respondents wanted to put before us the factual basis needed to appraise the validity of the considerations that led to the rejection of the petitioner’s request without considering her suitability and her qualifications. Only those considerations which the respondents stated publicly may be mentioned by us, for the planning considerations relevant to the rejection of the petitioner’s request are not part of the planning, but considerations based on the planning.

            11. What, then, are the planning considerations? From the affidavit-in-reply it transpires that these concern considerations of overall viability and also organizational limitations involved in the integration of women into the air combat alignment of the air force. In fact, these reasons form the basis for the policy of disqualifying the integration of women in many other combat professions as well. However, in the opinion of the Air Force Commander, these reasons are particularly valid for justifying the viewpoint that women should not be trained as pilots.

            The training of a pilot is a lengthy process, and the financial investment in funding it is huge. The training of a pilot therefore looks towards the future. It is based on the assumption that the candidate will serve for a long period, beginning with compulsory service and thereafter in reserve duty. Because of this, army regulations provide additional age limits and preconditions for accepting a candidate for an aviation course. The length of compulsory service for women, the limited obligations for reserve duty imposed upon them and their entitlement to an exemption from defence service as a result of marriage, pregnancy and childbirth make it impossible to integrate them in an aviation course and for them to serve in an air crew. Even volunteering for additional regular service and reserve duty by those women wishing to serve as pilots provides only a partial solution to the problem, both because of the statutory distinction between a volunteer who is liable to serve and a volunteer who is not liable to serve and also because of the reduced capacity to continue to serve in situations of pregnancy and childbirth.

            Indeed, in the course of argument before us, Mr Fogelman conceded that with respect to an undertaking for additional regular service, there is no real basis for distinguishing between women and men, since a woman candidate for an aviation course who commits herself (in the same way as male candidates) to additional regular service, would be obliged to complete her term of service in full, even if she marries, becomes pregnant or gives birth during the period of service. This is not the case with respect to the obligation of reserve duty for a woman pilot, who has completed her term of additional regular service to which she committed herself. She is bound by this obligation only until she becomes pregnant, gives birth or reaches the age of 38, whichever is the earliest. Even if she volunteers for reserve duty for which she is not liable (such as because of pregnancy or childbirth), she can at any time retract her volunteering for reserve duty, and the army will be bound to release her. Counsel for the respondents argues that the selection of candidates for assignment to any military function must be based solely on army needs, and the assignment of women to positions as pilots is inconsistent with those needs. Even if a woman pilot is able and willing to carry out all her obligations, her temporary absence from service, due to pregnancy for example, could disrupt the viability of her unit. As a result, planning and operational capacity will be compromised. And if the planning considerations are insufficient to tip the scales, they are supplemented by budgetary and logistic considerations. These involve the necessity of adapting existing military facilities for the inclusion of women.

            It should be noted that the Air Force Commander (as can be seen from his affidavit) does not dispute that a woman may have all the qualifications required for success as a pilot. In his affidavit, he also addresses the fact that in some other armies several combat professions (including aviation) have been opened up to women. However, in his opinion, one cannot use the experience of other armies to draw conclusions for the IDF, both because of the unique emergency conditions under which the IDF is required to act, and also because of the difference in the service conditions of women between the IDF and other armies. In conclusion, with regard to the rejection of the petitioner’s request, the Air Force Commander says:

‘The petitioner’s request to volunteer for an aviation course was rejected despite her excellent and admirable qualifications, not because she is a woman, but mainly because her anticipated length of service (placing an emphasis on reserve duty) is inconsistent with the army’s preconditions for the training of a member of an air crew.’

            Relevant difference and improper discrimination

12. The petitioner’s position relies on the principle of equality. Her argument is that her rejection as a candidate for an aviation course, merely because she is a woman, discriminates against her in relation to men soldiers. This discrimination violates her right to equality of the sexes, and the decision must therefore be disqualified. In replying to this argument, counsel for the respondents hoped to persuade us that in our case, the question of violation of the principle of equality does not arise at all. In his opinion, this is a necessary implication of the provisions of the law which, in so far as the extent of the obligation to serve and the conditions of service are concerned, clearly distinguish between men and women. This means that the legislator recognized that the difference between the sexes is relevant with respect to their military service. It follows that this difference is relevant also in determining the nature of the military jobs and professions that the army assigns to men and women soldiers.

            13. I cannot accept this position. It is true that a relevant difference may justify a distinction. This indeed is the root of the difference between improper discrimination and a proper distinction. In the words of Justice Agranat in FH 10/69 Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [1], at p. 35:

‘The principle of equality, which is merely the opposite of discrimination and which, for reasons of justice and fairness, the law of every democratic country aspires to achieve, means that people must be treated equally for a particular purpose, when no real differences that are relevant to this purpose exist between them. If they are not treated equally, we have a case of discrimination. However, if the difference or differences between different people are relevant for the purpose under discussion, it is a permitted distinction to treat them differently for that purpose, provided that those differences justify this.’

            However, as a condition for achieving real equality, we must determine that the relevance of the difference, and its degree, should be examined, in every case, in view of the specific purpose that the distinction is intended to achieve. In other words, the relationship required between the special characteristics possessed by one person and not by another, and the purpose for which it is permitted to prefer one person to another, must be direct and concrete (vid. et cf. the remarks of Justice Netanyahu in HCJ 720/82 Elitzur Religious Sports Association, Nahariya Branch v. Nahariya Municipality [2], at p. 21). The mere existence of a difference between two people does not justify a distinction. Compare HCJ 721/94 El-Al Israel Airways Ltd v. Danielowitz [3], the remarks of Vice-President Barak, at pp. 760-764 {488-494}, and the remarks of Justice Dorner, at pp. 782-783 {519-520}. On the contrary; wherever possible, even different people should be treated equally, while taking into account their being different.

            14. In establishing the duty of service and the conditions of service, the law distinguished between men and women. Does this not imply that there is a difference between the two sexes that is relevant for the absolute disqualification of all women soldiers from fulfilling various jobs? The answer must be no. The statutory distinction between men and women with regard to the duty of service and conditions of service was intended as a concession to women, presumably in view of the biological differences between the sexes. This concession regarding the service conditions of women constitutes a factor to be considered by the army when planning its manpower arrangement; but it cannot be a reason for permitting discriminatory treatment of women soldiers. Note that the law says nothing about assigning certain jobs to women, or their disqualification for other jobs; even the provision that used to be in the law, which authorized the Minister of Defence to enact regulations about what jobs the army could assign to women soldiers, was repealed and no longer exists (see paragraph 5 above). In these circumstances, and in the absence of any contrary indication in the language or purpose of the law, the presumption is that the law should be construed in a way that is consistent with respect for the right to equality between the sexes and that it is intended to achieve it (see A. Barak, Judicial Interpretation, vol. 2, Statutory Interpretation, Nevo, 1993, at pp. 435-436). This approach is even more compelling when we acknowledge that, since the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the normative status of the principle of equality — which had already been described as ‘the heart and soul of our constitutional regime…’ (Justice Landau in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Finance Minister [4], at p. 698 {17}) — has become elevated and has become ‘a principle with constitutional, super-legislative status’ (in the words of Justice Or in HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v. ‘Yad VaShem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [5], at p. 363. See also: Barak, supra, at pp. 565-566; HCJ 453/94 Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [6], at pp. 525-526 {451-454}).

            15. In the affidavit-in-reply it was hinted that the fact that the petitioner does not argue that women should be submitted to the same duties of military service that the existing law imposes only on men, is tantamount to seeking a privilege for women. Counsel for the respondents did well not to repeat this argument during the hearing before us. There are some who see in the law a defect of discrimination against men (see Dr C. Shalev, ‘On Equality, Difference and Sex Discrimination’, The Landau Book, Boursi, vol. 2, ed. A. Barak and A. Mazoz, 1995, 893, at pp. 900-902, and what is stated in footnote 42); this is certainly the opposite of the approach that holds that the distinction in the law between men and women is justified since it is based upon a relevant difference between the sexes (see the remarks of Justice Sussman in CrimA 5/51 Steinberg v. Attorney-General [7], at pp. 1067-1068). However, even if we do not stick to the traditional view and assume that the law is indeed defective to some extent in discriminating against men, I do not see how this argument can be used specifically against the petitioner who is seeking for herself the right to take upon herself a burden that according to the approach of those making this argument was designated only for men.

16. Therefore the construction of the law in accordance with its language and purpose leads to the conclusion that the law does not permit the total disqualification of women, because of their sex, from holding any particular job in the army. To remove doubt, I wish to add that even under the Defence Service (Women’s Jobs in Compulsory Service) Regulations — which after the repeal of the section in the law authorizing the regulations are no longer valid — it was not possible to reach a different conclusion. Even in the regulations there was a possibility for women soldiers to volunteer for jobs not included in the list of jobs that the army was allowed to assign to women. The same is also true under the aforesaid regulation of the Supreme Command, according to which the army continues to direct itself in assigning the jobs of women soldiers; even this, like the regulations when they were valid, leaves an opening for women to volunteer for jobs outside the scope of the jobs that the army normally assigns to women. Note that this does not mean that the difference between the sexes is never relevant with regard to the suitability of a woman soldier for a specific job. Even I think that it is indeed possible that a woman soldier will be disqualified, because of her sex, from holding various jobs, but a disqualification for this reason is permitted only where the sex of the candidate creates a difference that is relevant to her holding the specific job.

            Women as Pilots

17. No-one disputes that the capabilities required for operating military aircraft may be found equally among men and women. Much material has been submitted to us with regard to the successful integration of women pilots in the air forces of other countries. Admittedly, the practical experience in the air units of the United States Air Force (from 1942 onwards) was based mainly on the use of women pilots in reconnaissance, training and indirect assistance only (see the chapter ‘Women in Aviation’ in J. Ebbert & M. Hall, Crossed Currents: Navy Women from WWI to Tailhook, Brassey’s, 1993, at pp. 241-327). However, there is evidence that in the Red Army, during the Second World War, woman pilots were used with great success even in combat operations against enemy planes (see J. Holm, Women in the Military  An Unfinished Revolution, Presidio, 1982, at p. 315). In fact, no-one any longer disputes that women are capable of operating successfully in air crews to the same degree as men. It should be noted that the question of integrating women pilots in the United States Army in combat operations was recently examined by a presidential commission that was appointed to examine all the questions arising from the participation of women in combat units, including issues relating to the pregnancy and childbirth of women in active military service. The commission, whose investigations also included the lesson learned from the participation of women in the Gulf War, recommended (by a majority of eight to seven) not to allow women to participate in combat aviation (see the Commission’s report: The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, Report to the President: Women in Combat, Brassey’s, 1992). But it appears that on this issue it was precisely the minority opinion of seven of the commission’s members (see, ibid., p. 80-83) that prevailed: the Secretary of Defence at that time, Les Aspin, decided to adopt the minority opinion, and in April 1993 he ordered the restriction against the participation of women in combat operations of the airborne units of all forces to be lifted. The active integration of women as pilots is today common in the air forces of other countries. It seems that the prominent examples in this field from our viewpoint are Canada and Australia, where openness on this subject increased and received an impetus as a result of the constitutional development of human rights and the prevention of discrimination against women (in this respect, see the research of A. Ayalon, Women in Combat Positions — A Theoretical Comparative Survey, The Israel Institute for Democracy, 1994, at pp. 21-28).

            18. But why should we search so far away? The material submitted to us shows that at least in the first decade of the air force’s existence several women pilots were integrated into its ranks. Before and during the Kadesh operation, women received assignments as pilots of transport aircraft. But in subsequent years the army stopped accepting woman for aviation courses. The change in policy is attributed to budgetary considerations: the training of women as fighter pilots in order to be assigned merely as transport pilots, for a relatively short period, was considered to be cost-ineffective. In one exceptional case, during the seventies, several women were accepted as cadets for an aviation course. But since then the doors of the course were closed once again to women soldiers (on this issue, see N. L. Goldman & K. L. Wiegand, ‘The Israeli Woman in Combat’, The Military, Militarism and the Polity, The Free Press, N.Y., 1984, at pp. 220-221). It should be noted that not all professionals accepted this approach. In support of her petition, the petitioner submitted, inter alia, also an affidavit of Col. (Res.) Ze’ev Raz who served in the air force as a combat pilot, and during the years 1986-1989 served as Commander of the Aviation School. The deponent testified that, subject to the difficulty that he sees in the participation of women in combat operations (which he attributes to the difficulty that exists in the attitude of the public to the possibility of women falling into captivity), he supports the integration of women in an aviation course; moreover, even when he was in active service he tried to change the army’s policy in this matter. In his opinion, women can be integrated in flying Boeing transport aircraft and in service flights in Skyhawk aircraft. Women can serve as pilots both in compulsory service and also (on a voluntary basis) in reserve duty, as is the case with men pilots. In his estimation, the integration of women in a flight course and in the units will not only not impair the ability of the units to carry out the missions which they are assigned, but will even make a positive contribution in this direction. Moreover, he does not expect the integration of women to create difficulties in logistic and organizational deployment that are insurmountable. Support for the integration of women in aviation courses is expressed also in the affidavit of Major-General (Res.) Amira Dotan, who served as the Chief Officer of the Women’s Forces during the years 1982-1987. The deponent testified to the successful integration of women soldiers in units that operated beyond the borders of the State (such as in Lebanon in Operation Peace for Galilee) and to a positive development taking place in the IDF in recent years, whereby jobs and service tracks that in the past were considered the sole prerogative of men soldiers have been opened up to women. It is not redundant to point out that confirmation of the existence of this new approach in army deployment can be found also in the affidavit of the Air Force Commander, but in his opinion what is desirable in other army professions cannot apply to the profession of aviation.

            Counter-arguments: planning, logistics and budget

19. The respondents, as stated, do not dispute that from the viewpoint of the qualifications that are prerequisites for suitability for an aviation course, there is no difference between women and men. Both of these alike may be suitable or unsuitable for the profession of aviation; the sex of the candidates and the talents required for their suitability are totally unconnected. Nonetheless the respondents are adamant in their refusal to train women for aviation and to integrate them as pilots in air force units. Their argument is that there is nonetheless a difference between the two sexes which is relevant in making their decision. This difference is what leads to the distinction underlying the army’s policy that only men are accepted for aviation courses and jobs as pilots.

            The respondent’s position remains unchanged. But we should mention once again that there has been a change in their reasoning. It will be remembered that the petitioner’s request was rejected on the basis of the regulation of the High Command that women are not to be assigned to combat professions; and since aviation is classified as a combat profession, the army does not accept women for aviation courses. In the Air Force Commander’s affidavit-in-reply, the socio-ethical aspects of the participation of women in combat missions was also addressed (and cited above in full). But in oral argument counsel for the respondents limited the reasons for his opposition to practical considerations relating to the deployment of the air force for carrying out its missions. In defining the obstacle to accepting women as pilots, the emphasis has now been placed on planning considerations, but  ‘logistic’ and ‘budgetary’ considerations were also mentioned. I do not think that I need to dwell on these additional reasons, which have in common the unsurprising revelation that the absorption of women will necessitate the investment of additional financial resources. This is not because no approximate valuation of the size of the additional investment required was appended to this argument; nor even because budgetary considerations, in themselves, are unimportant; but because the relative weight of such considerations, in making an executive decision, is measured and determined when balanced against other considerations (see HCJ 3627/92 Israel Fruit Growers Organization Ltd v. Government of Israel [8], at pp. 391-392, and the references cited there). In any event, when we are concerned with a claim to exercise a basic right — and such is the case before us — the relative weight of the budgetary considerations cannot be great, since:

‘The rhetoric of human rights must be founded on a reality that sets these rights on the top level of the scale of national priorities. The protection of human rights costs money, and a society that respects human rights must be prepared to bear the financial burden’ (Barak, in his book supra, vol. 3, Constitutional Interpretation, Nevo, 1994, at p. 528).

See also: P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Toronto, 3rd ed., 1992, at p. 873. Indeed, even counsel for the respondents conceded that not much weight should be attached to these considerations, and he preferred to concentrate his arguments almost exclusively on the reasons that the Air Force Commander stated in his affidavit as the main reasons. These, as we have already said, are the planning considerations.

            20. The planning considerations which we have already discussed (in paragraph 11, supra) were intended to persuade us that the integration of women in the active planning framework of air crews is impracticable. The huge investment in training pilots is based on a long-term projection. The candidates for aviation courses commit themselves to serving in the regular army for a number of years (which is determined and stipulated in advance) from the date that they qualify as pilots. They also commit themselves (voluntarily) to annual amounts of reserve duty that in most cases exceed the statutory requirement and comply with requirements determined by the air force according to its needs and the types of activity required. The statutory arrangements with respect to the extent of women’s compulsory service — and mainly their limited obligation for reserve duty, which is also subject to clear grounds for an absolute exemption as a result of pregnancy or childbirth — make it impossible to integrate them within this planning framework. Admittedly a woman candidate for an aviation course can be required to do additional ‘compulsory’ service, as is usual with regard to men candidates, and she can also be required to undertake voluntarily to do reserve duty for which she is not liable. But even these cannot ensure the regularity and continuity of her service. Even a temporary absence of a woman pilot during her compulsory service, as a result of pregnancy or childbirth, can disrupt the planned daily activity of the whole airborne unit. And perhaps the main difficulty lies in the inability to rely on her undertaking to continue the reserve duty for which she is not liable, since, if she becomes pregnant or gives birth, and gives notice that she retracts her commitment to volunteer, there will be no legal possibility of compelling her to serve.

            21. I doubt whether these fears have a solid basis. The premise is that women who offer themselves as candidates for an aviation course will, like men candidates, be required to make commitments both for ‘compulsory’ service and for reserve duty. As a rule, it is correct to assume that someone who commits himself to such an undertaking will want and be able to perform it. Even if the assumption is that the average total contribution of a woman pilot — in terms of the length and continuity of service — will be less than that of men pilots, this is a difference resulting from her being a woman. This difference, which should not be held against her, can be taken into account within the framework of planning. The army can learn, in this respect, from its rich experience with regard to its personnel in permanent service. There are doubtless cases in which soldiers ask, for a variety of reasons, to be released from their commitments for continued service. With respect to the scope of this phenomenon, among men and women, figures must be available, and it stands to reason that in planning its activity the army also takes these figures into account. The air force can also rely, at least to some extent, on its experience with reserve pilots. It may be assumed that the majority of pilots indeed carry out the extra amounts of service, in excess of the statutory requirement, and continue to do so throughout the whole period of their undertaking with hardly any interruption. But even in this group there are certainly cases of prolonged absence from reserve duty, for personal reasons, long periods spent overseas and similar circumstances; even the figures relating to this phenomenon, the extent of which is certainly well-known, can be assumed to be taken into account by the air force in planning its missions. Is there any reason to suppose that, with respect to the proper discharge of compulsory service and the voluntary reserve duty, the distribution among women pilots will be significantly different from that among women soldiers who serve in other professions and among men pilots in the reserves? In so far as we can learn from the experience of air forces in countries like the United States and Canada, the effect of specific factors, such as pregnancy and childbirth, as a disturbance to the regularity of service of women pilots is not significant. Can we not learn anything from this? The respondents’ reply to this is that the successful absorption of women pilots in the air forces of other countries is no evidence of the anticipated success of a similar process in Israel. The conditions of service are different, the conditions on the ground are different and the conditions of permanent readiness are also different. All of these are likely to have an effect.

            The main and striking weakness in this argument is that it is entirely based on theories and hypothetical assessments and not on lessons learned from accumulated practical experience. It is true that most women pilots in the air forces of other countries regard military aviation as their profession and choose a military ‘career’. But who can say that the integration of women in the profession of aviation in the IDF will not lead also to a similar tendency in Israel, among most of the women seeking this special job? It should be noted that in the air forces of other countries the process of integrating women was carried out gradually. In the judgment of the Canadian Court of Human Rights in Gauthier & an v. Canadian Armed Forces [56] — a transcript of which was submitted to us by the petitioner — there was a survey of the absorption processes of women in combat positions in the various parts of the army (and it should be noted that one of the several claims considered in that judgment was of a qualified civil pilot whose candidacy for the position of pilot in the air force was rejected because of her sex). From the survey it emerges that the question of the suitability of women for integration into combat roles was examined very carefully. After the Royal Commission, which examined the issues relating to this, submitted its recommendations, five whole years were devoted to conducting practical tests. With the help of these tests — which were named, for short, ‘SWINTER’ (Service Women in Non Traditional Environments and Roles) — the implications of the integration of women in roles that previously were not open to them were examined. In order not to prejudice defence preparedness even to a small degree, the army allowed, at the beginning of the process, the absorption of women in a limited and controlled fashion. The tests referred to groups of women who were absorbed, in the various professions, in this format. The tests conducted in the air force proved that women who were admitted into the roles of pilots integrated successfully in the units, performed their duties well and were respected both by their commanders and by the members of their crews. These conclusions led to the cancellation of the restrictions on the enlistment of women to combat aviation roles. When the women were admitted, rules were established for regulating various issues, including absence from flying as a result of pregnancy and childbirth.

            Such an experiment, or something similar, has not yet been conducted in the IDF; in my opinion, it should be conducted. It is indeed possible — as the respondents claim — that the encouraging experience of other armies does not constitute evidence as to the success of a similar plan in our air force. But as long as the air force does not allow the experimental integration of women into a track of the aviation profession, and as long as it does not carry out a systematic and intelligent assessment of their functioning in the course and in the units, we will never be able to know whether, in the special conditions that prevail in Israel, women may be integrated in the air crews. Indeed, preserving the readiness and deployment of the air force is an important and essential asset. But what is required for readiness and deployment is likely to be given the full attention of the professional personnel at air force headquarters, even if air crews include a few women who are absorbed in an experimental and controlled manner, and an assessment is made that will lead in the end to lessons being learned and conclusions being drawn for the future. Such experience can be based on a small number of women candidates who would be taken in gradually over a sufficiently long period that will allow conclusions to be drawn with regard to the degree of success in standing units and reserve units. It can be assumed that demand — at least in the beginning —will not be great. But within the framework of the experimental integration of women into the aviation course I would not consider it a defect if quotas were set for women candidates. Setting quotas is by definition unequal. This is not the case when they are set within the framework of an experiment whose purpose it to promote equality, without prejudicing thereby an essential security interest.

Intervention in the assignment policy of the army

22. This court does not tend to intervene in professional-planning decisions of the army authorities. In the words of Vice-President Elon in HCJ 734/83 Shine v. Minister of Defence [9], at p. 399:

‘It is a rule of case-law that this court does not put its discretion in place of the discretion of the competent authority, and this rule applies especially when it concerns this court’s review of professional-planning decisions of the army authorities.’

            See also: HCJ 329/87 Sorko-Ram v. Minister of Defence [10], at p. 879, and also the remarks of Justice Goldberg in HCJ 3246/92 Har-Oz v. Minister of Defence [11], at p. 307, regarding ‘… the power of the IDF to exercise its authority in assigning each soldier in accordance with its own considerations and the needs of the army’, since ‘the assignment naturally relates to the structure of the army and its military deployment’. But there has never been any doubt, and counsel for the respondents conceded this unhesitatingly, that army decisions and army regulations, which reflect the policy of the IDF, are subject to the judicial review of this court. Personally, I see no basis for doubting that a policy involving a violation of a basic right gives rise to proper grounds for the intervention of the court. A violation of equality, because of discrimination on the basis of sex, is a typical example of a case that justifies and requires intervention. Such is the case before us. The IDF cannot succeed with an argument that women are disqualified for a specific job because they are women. The argument that the training of women for jobs as pilots is not cost-effective, notwithstanding their having suitable qualifications for this, is an outrageous argument. Declarations supporting equality of the sexes are insufficient, for the real test of equality lies in its realization, de facto, as an accepted social norm (cf. Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [6]). This normative obligation also applies to the IDF. It is well-known that the policies of the army have a very major effect on our life styles. In strengthening the recognition of the importance of basic rights, the IDF cannot be left out of the picture. It too must make its contribution.

            23. I propose to my esteemed colleagues that an absolute order is made in this petition. This order will require the respondents to summon the petitioner for aviation aptitude examinations. If she is found to be suitable, and meets all the other usual preconditions for men candidates, she will be allowed to participate in an aviation course. In this way the air force will begin an experimental procedure, and it can be presumed to determine the remaining aspects and details professionally and fairly, after taking into account the requirements of deployment and vigilance on the one hand, and the criteria required for deriving fair conclusions from the experiment on the other. As a result of the decision, the respondents will be liable to pay the petitioner the costs of the petition in a sum of NIS 10,000.

 

 

Justice Y. Kedmi

            1.         I regret that I am unable to add my voice to the opinion of my colleague, Justice Mazza, as it stands; the following, in brief, are my main reasons:

            (a) In my opinion, we should attribute to policy decisions made by those responsible for national security, in so far as these concern security requirements and the methods of achieving the proper level of security, a high level of reasonableness, such that those challenging this bear a heavy burden of persuasion, equivalent to the burden borne by someone who wishes to rebut a presumption of law.

            (b) I would hesitate before intervening in such decisions, as long as I am not convinced that they are tainted by extreme unreasonableness, arbitrariness, a lack of good faith and unclean hands. As stated, my premise is that this is not the case, and that the persons making decisions of this kind can be presumed to have carried out all the necessary investigations and considered all the relevant factors, and to have acted conscientiously throughout, consonant with their positions and the powers granted to them.

            (c) In our case, the representative of the air force concentrated his argument on the needs of national security, putting the emphasis on the extended and intensive service expected of a combat pilot in the air force, against the background of the cost of his basic training, and in view of the continued effort required for ensuring the level of his operative ability. The working assumption of the security authorities charged with this function is that in the prevailing circumstances, it is almost certain that a woman pilot will be unable to comply in full with these expectations as to the length of service, and will have great difficulty in bearing the burden of maintaining operative ability over the years; between the lines I believe that I can hear the argument that it will also not be right to put her in a position of having to choose between continuing her service and ensuring operative capacity and the demands that she will surely make of herself when the time comes with respect to starting and caring for a family. It seems to me that this outlook, inter alia, underlies the distinction between men and women with respect to reserve duty; and I do not think that it is outdated.

In any case, I do not think that I have the tools — and more importantly, the expertise — required to examine the ‘reasonableness’ of the said working assumption; moreover, I am not prepared to lighten the heavy burden of responsibility borne by air force headquarters in its commitment to national security and to impose upon it a pattern of behaviour which conflicts with its own outlook.

            (d) I fear that the attempt to learn from the experience of other countries in this sphere will not succeed, for a simple reason: our security situation is entirely different from the security situation prevailing in those countries; the situation in which we find ourselves requires readiness for risks that are entirely different from the risks expected there, and a ‘mistake’ made by us in this respect could well have far-reaching ramifications.

            (e) I do not believe, as does my esteemed colleague, Justice Mazza, that the decision not to train women combat pilots, at this stage, contains a hint of illegitimate discrimination. What emerges from my remarks above is that there is no ‘discrimination’ here, but rather a ‘distinction’ based on the continuing requirements of national security.

            One cannot speak of improper ‘discrimination’ when the ‘choice’ between equals is based on essential needs of national security. A difference deriving from these needs — when speaking, of course, about genuine needs — not only does not indicate any ‘discrimination’, but also contains an expression of the ‘equality’ of the requirement made of each of us to contribute what that person is able to contribute to the security of the nation; and the ‘ability’ of the man in this context — according to the working assumption of the air force — is different from the ‘ability’ of the woman.

2.    Nonetheless, I agree with the position of my esteemed colleague, Justice Mazza, that the fears on which the outlook of the security authorities in this matter is based ought to be put to a real test; and that it is proper to take the first step in this direction soon, in so far as security considerations allow. However, I would leave it to the Air Force Command to decide when and how security requirements make it possible to conduct this test; I would not ‘dictate’ to them the date when it should be held, as long as they are not convinced that it would not harm the current needs of national security.

 

 

Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen

In the disagreement between my colleagues, I agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Mazza, and wish to shed some more light on the subject from my own perspective.

1.    The Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version] of 1986 (hereafter — the law) (which replaced the Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version] of 1959) created a distinction between men and women that makes the service conditions of women more lenient.  The distinction finds expression in the length of compulsory service and reserve duty for women which is shorter than that for men, in exempting married women from compulsory service and in exempting pregnant women and mothers from reserve duty, all of which as set out by my colleague, Justice Mazza (hereafter — service conditions).

            2.         The law does not contain any provision directly violating the equality of men and women soldiers with respect to the nature of the jobs to which they can be assigned, but as a result of the distinction that the law created in the service conditions, there arose — as a matter of policy — an inequality which, for our purposes, is the refusal to accept women for an aviation course. In my opinion, the distinction created by the law should not be perpetuated by discrimination built on its foundations.

            The sources for the distinction that the law created in service conditions derive, apparently, from an outlook on the biological difference between women and men and the legislator’s opinion of the different roles of women and men in the family, society and the army. There are some who see the provisions of the law as a paternalistic attitude towards women, who are perceived as weaker, more fragile and in need of protection, and whose purpose is to create and care for a family. Others believe that the law benefited women by being lenient with regard to their service conditions. Whatever the historical, psychological and sociological reasons for the outlook underlying the distinction created by the law, the distinction created by the law should be accepted as a fact that we are not required to review, since the law itself is not challenged on the grounds of illegality. Its provisions, which create the said distinction, are a given factual premise, as a result of which a policy not to accept women for aviation was formulated. The petitioner has sharply contested this policy by alleging discrimination and violation of the principle of equality. The respondents, in reply, concentrate on the argument that the law created a distinction between men and women with regard to service conditions, that this distinction creates a difference between them, that the difference is relevant with regard to the assignment of women to aviation and that when the difference is relevant, we are not faced with improper discrimination between equals but with a valid distinction between those who are different.

            We must examine this policy with the tools that are available to us for examining the policy of any government authority. As I will clarify below, this policy does not pass the test and it should not be given legal force.

            3.         The respondents’ position is unacceptable to my colleague, Justice Mazza, for the reasons that the difference in this case is irrelevant and therefore the discrimination is improper.

            I too am of the opinion that the aviation course ought to be opened up to women, but I do not think — as does my colleague Justice Mazza — that the difference between women and men regarding the service conditions is irrelevant. In my opinion, the difference between the service conditions of men and the service conditions of women, as stipulated in the law, creates a real and difficult problem for the training and service of women as pilots. The continuity of a woman pilot’s military service may be affected and her military service is liable to end if she marries, becomes pregnant or becomes a mother, and she can be released from reserve duty at the age of 38 (a man – at the age of 54), by giving unilateral notice, even if she volunteers for such service above that age. I think therefore that this difference, created by the law, is indeed relevant for the acceptance of women for aviation and the reasons for not admitting them are objective and not arbitrary. Therefore — prima facie — the distinction does not create improper discrimination; but in my view this is only the case prima facie, because in my view it is not sufficient for a difference to be relevant in order to rebut a claim of discrimination, since a relevant difference that can be amended or neutralized in order to achieve equality should be amended or neutralized, although not at any price.

            4.         Differences for the purpose of discrimination have been divided into two categories: a relevant difference that does not create discrimination and an irrelevant difference that does (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [12], at p. 332; El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd v. Danielowitz [3]). As with any classification into groups, there are no two groups that fit the whole spectrum of cases between the two extremes. There are cases that clearly fall into one of the groups and it can be clearly established whether or not there is discrimination. However, there are cases where ascribing them to one of the two groups is not self-evident and is insufficient. Such cases require a sub-classification. It seems to me that the category of cases where the difference is relevant should be divided into two subgroups: first, a group where the relevant difference cannot be, or should not be, neutralized; second, a group in which the relevant difference can and should be neutralized in order to achieve equality.

In this classification we are not dealing with affirmative action in its classic sense, where a particular field is opened up to a group for which it was previously closed, even if the members of that group are less suited than others to function in that field. This method is used to correct an historic aberration, a social stigma, prejudice and the like. Such affirmative action is often carried out through legislation and through case-law (see, for example: the Employment of War Invalids Regulations, 5711-1951; the Discharged Soldiers (Return to Work) Law, 5709-1949; section 18A of the Government Corporations Law, 5735-1975 as applied in Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [6]. With regard to affirmative action, see also: F. Raday, ‘On Equality’, The Status of Women in Society and Law, Shoken, ed. F. Raday, C. Shalev, M. Liben-Koby, 1995, at pp. 19, 36-39).

            Affirmative action requires the avoidance of a distinction between persons who are not equal in their qualifications or in their suitability and treating them equally, in order to rectify an historic aberration. My position — with respect to the facts before us — is different in that it makes a demand to neutralize the difference between persons with equal qualifications by allocating resources that will create conditions that establish an equal starting point for two persons who are equally suitable for the same job, but factors that are irrelevant to the job block the path of one of them. Our case falls into the second category, in which the relevant difference can be neutralized and it ought to be remedied.

            How is this to be done?

            6.         If, for example, it is found that dark-skinned or blue-eyed persons are not accepted for a certain job, when the colour of the skin or the colour of the eyes has no connection with the job, it will be absolutely clear that this is an irrelevant difference that creates improper discrimination. This is the case for every arbitrary distinction based upon differences of race, religion, sex and the like, where the distinction is arbitrary and irrelevant. If, however, a certain job requires tall people or people with academic education or people in good health, it will not be improper discrimination if short people, uneducated people and people in poor health are not accepted for those tasks. If the path to a specific job was closed to women, and it is opened up to them, either by case-law or statute, even if their experience and qualifications are less than those of the men competing for the same job, this would constitute affirmative action.

            What is the law when the qualifications are equal, but there is a difference and the difference is albeit relevant, but it can be and should be neutralized in order to achieve equality? If, for example, a disabled person in a wheelchair wants to be accepted for work in a public institution, and his qualifications fulfil the requirements of the job, but the access to the office is by way of stairs; the restriction in the physical conditions allowing access to the place of work creates a relevant difference, but it can be neutralized at a reasonable price, and it should be remedied in order to achieve equality of opportunities. Therefore we would require an investment of resources in order to neutralize the difference and remedy it by means of an elevator or in some other way that will allow the disabled person to reach that office.

            It seems to me, therefore, that a difference that causes relevant and genuine difficulties in applying the value of equality, such as physical, economic, logistic and similar difficulties, is a relevant difference. Nonetheless, in those cases where it can be neutralized at a reasonable price, it should be remedied and neutralized in order to achieve equality.

7.    Establishing a requirement for neutralizing a difference in order to achieve equality is not foreign to Israeli law. More than once the legislator has shown that he is aware of the need to prevent discrimination as a result of a difference between persons who are suitable for carrying out a job, where external factors create a distinction between them and lead to the preference of one group over another or one person over another because of differences which have economic, budgetary and organizational implications, particularly in the workplace. In such cases, the legislator has on several occasions seen fit to impose duties, mainly on employers, which were designed to neutralize or remedy a difference, in order to achieve equality of opportunity. An example of this can be found in the Women’s Employment Law, 5714-1954, and the various regulations enacted thereunder; the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 5748-1988; in these laws, factors and characteristics that created differences between people were taken into account, and the laws were designed to achieve equality notwithstanding the differences. The legislator imposed economic burdens upon various public sectors in order to create equality, including equality of opportunity, not because there was previously no relevant difference, but because even though there was a difference, the legislator saw fit to remedy it by spreading the burden amongst different sectors of the economy. With regard to equality of the sexes, F. Raday says in her article ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations — Trends and Changes in 1988’, Labour Law Annual Vol. 1, 1990, 161, 172, on the subject of equal opportunities for women:

‘The biological difference between the sexes with respect to pregnancy, childbirth or nursing is a difference that may be a relevant difference in the workplace. The possibility of certain absences is required in order to allow the working woman to function not only as an employee but also as a mother of a newborn. “Equality” that does not take into account the need for the integration of these roles is not real equality and is mere lip service’ (emphasis added).

See also F. Raday, ‘Women in the Work Force’, The Status of Women in Society and Law, supra, at p. 64.

8.    The respondents do not dispute the ability of women to fulfil the role of a pilot. From their affidavits and pleadings it emerges that the considerations guiding the policy-makers in not recruiting women for aviation do not derive from a belief that women are inferior or from archaic concepts that a woman’s place is in the home and that she is not suited for ‘men’s’ professions such as aviation. From what they say it appears that their considerations are sincere and relevant, and that they are motivated by the army’s interests and needs. I accept the respondents’ contention that the difference created by the law in service conditions and the resulting restrictions make it difficult for the air force to recruit women as pilots. The respondents claim, as can be seen in the affidavit of the Air Force Commander, General Bodinger, that the difference between men and woman in the law is based on strong statutory language, an unwavering statutory history and a particular statutory purpose, which is the realization of the needs of the army that require different rules to be created for the service of men and women. According to him, the refusal to integrate women into aviation courses derives from planning, logistic, strategic and economic considerations, according to which the needs of the army would be prejudiced if it is compelled to assign women for aviation.

            The IDF places the ‘blame’ for closing the aviation course to women on the legislator, who created the difference in service conditions, and so it feels itself justified in creating discrimination. I do not think that this position should be legitimized. The IDF, as one of the organs of State, is not entitled to shirk its responsibility and the obligation to close the gap between the factors determined by the law and what is needed to achieve equality. This requires a sacrifice. The IDF and the various organs of State must pay this price, provided that it is not too high and is not unreasonable, and this is really not so in the present case.

            9.         General Bodinger recognizes that even though the issue of integrating women in combat professions is problematic, it is ultimately also a socio-cultural and ethical question. Indeed, we are dealing with an issue that is first and foremost socio-cultural and ethical. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance and stature of the principle of equality in any free, democratic and enlightened society. The supreme status of the principle of equality as a supreme value in Israeli society finds expression and a place of honour in case-law and law books. A society that respects its basic values and the basic rights of its members must be prepared to pay a reasonable price so that that the value of equality does not remain an empty shell, but is given expression and applied in practice.

            10. Confronting the problem of discrimination in general, and with regard to differences between the sexes in particular, is not only our concern. It concerns every free society where the principle of equality is one of its foundations. Discrimination derives from a perception that was accepted in human society as part of an outlook that for generations regarded the status of women as inferior and without rights. The development of granting women rights has progressed little by little. It received impetus and strength in this century as part of the ideological and practical renaissance aimed at eradicating discrimination between people. This struggle to eradicate discrimination against women because of their sex is fought on various battlefields and with a wide range of weapons. It occupies a place of honour in literature, philosophy, articles, the media, political frameworks and various public fora. I refrain from expanding on this topic, for which this platform is too narrow, and elaboration is not needed to decide this case. I will satisfy myself by referring to several cases considered in American and Canadian case-law.

The issue of discrimination against women — for the purpose of admission to a military academy where only men studied — was recently considered in the United States in the case of a petitioner who wanted to be admitted as a cadet into the South Carolina Military Academy where only men studied, and who was rejected because she was a woman. The Federal Court considered the matter in two stages. In the first stage, a temporary order was issued ordering the authorities to prepare a parallel study program for women cadets, and in the interim, the woman cadet could be integrated in the studies on a partial basis (within the framework of day studies) (Faulkner v. Jones (1993) [41]). Two years later, when the program outlined was not put into practice — inter alia because of considerations relating to the economic costs —the court ordered the full integration of the petitioner in the military program. The Federal Court recognized the existence of relevant differences between men and women even with respect to methods of education in military institutions, but it limited the expression that could be attached to such differences and subordinated it to the principle of equality. The court did not ignore the complexity and difficulties that applying the principle of equality sets before society at times, and it dealt with these difficulties one by one. It set against them the importance and supremacy of the principle of equality and the duty of society to uphold it in practice, even if this involves difficulties and expense. In weighing all the considerations against the principle of equality it reached a conclusion that lead to the result of issuing an order that the petitioner should be fully integrated into the military program (Faulkner v. Jones (1995) [42]).

            In Canada, a judgment was given with regard to the same issue; in it the court found that the balance that was made between the purpose of giving sports training and the means chosen to do this — the existence of men-only sports associations — was an improper balance and was disproportionate to the damage caused by shutting women out of the association. In that case, a girl was prevented from taking part in the sporting activity of an ice hockey association, because of her sex, and irrespective of the specific talents required for such participation. The court was required to interpret the sport regulations and it abolished the said discrimination (Re Blainey and O. H. A. (1986) [57]).

            Now let us return to our case.

            11. Not recruiting women for aviation violates the principle of equality between the sexes. The problem is that this is not the only principle involved. There are two conflicting principles involved: one is equality and the other is public security as a result of military needs. In a conflict between two values, the conflicting values must be given the proper weight and a balance made between them. There are cases where such a conflict occurs between values of equal status, and there are cases where this occurs between unequal values where one of them is more important than, and has preference over, the other (on the difference between the two kinds of conflicts and the status of the conflicting values, and on the method of balancing them, see: Barak, in his book supra, vol. 3, p. 220; vol. 2, pp. 688-693 and the references cited there).

            12. With regard to a conflict between public safety and the freedom of speech, Prof. Barak says in his book, supra, vol. 2, at p. 693:

‘It follows that the central problem confronting us is this: in what circumstances and according to what criteria is it permissible to limit the freedom of speech in a society that respects human rights, in order to protect and maintain public safety? What is the “balancing formula” in the conflict between public safety and the freedom of speech? In this context, two main questions were before the Supreme Court: first, the anticipated degree of harm to public security that can justify a violation of the freedom of speech; second, (emphasis in the original) the likelihood that an infringement of public safety will occur if freedom of speech is not limited. The Supreme Court’s reply to these two questions is this: freedom of speech gives way to public safety only if the harm to public safety is severe, serious and critical, and only if it almost certain that allowing the freedom of speech will result in this harm…’ (emphasis added).

These comments are appropriate in this case.

            In the conflict between the value of equality and the value of national security as the result of military requirements, national security may be regarded as the preferred value and of a higher status than the value of equality, notwithstanding the importance of equality. But national security is not a magic word; it does not have preference in every case and in all circumstances, nor is it equal for every level of security and for every harm thereto. The balancing formula between conflicting values that are not of equal status is not uniform and it varies significantly according to the status of the values and the relationship between them. There are cases where a reasonable possibility of real harm to the preferred value is sufficient, and there are cases where a near certainty and a real danger of harm are required.

            In our case, the higher value (military and security requirements) prevails over the lower value (equality), only if there is near certainty of real harm and real damage to national security. The policy of the air force with respect to the recruitment of women for aviation does not pass these tests. It does not even stand up to a more lenient balancing formula, which is a reasonable possibility of real harm. The difficulties indicated by the respondents under the title of logistic and deployment difficulties are partly economic and partly based on speculations as to the future. The IDF authorities have no prior experience that confirms their fears — neither with respect to the ability of the air force to absorb women pilots, nor with respect to the number of applications that will be received for an aviation course or with respect to the number of persons completing it successfully, nor with respect to the anticipated damage if the aviation course is opened up to women. Moreover, in examining the anticipated damage, we must examine whether, when this is offset against the chance that it will not take place, the violation of the citizen’s right is still justified in order to prevent the danger. In our case, there is a reasonable chance that there will be no harm at all.

            13. If this is insufficient, I would point out that even when there is a near certainty of damage and real harm, the work of examination and balancing is not finished. ‘In all these cases, we must ascertain and examine the existence of alternative measures that could prevent the near certainty of the serious danger, without violating the freedom of speech’ (Barak, ibid.). Indeed —

‘… When we are dealing with a lawful denial or restriction of a person’s basic right, the government must choose — from among all the measures that can be adopted to protect national security — that restrictive measure that violates the basic right to the smallest degree. Of all the drastic measures, the least drastic should be chosen…’ (HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [13], at p. 412 {127}).

I would reach the same conclusion with the principle of proportionality, which is accepted as an important principle in Western legal systems and our own system. According to this principle, when a basic right is violated, we must demand that the violation is of a proper degree and is not excessive. This requirement reflects the proper relationship between the measure and the goal (see the remarks of Justice Zamir in HCJ 987/84 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [14]).

            One can draw an analogy in our case from the ruling made with regard to the freedom of occupation, whereby one should regard with particular severity a restriction on entry into an occupation, as opposed to imposing restrictions on the methods of realizing this freedom (see HCJ 1255/94 Bezeq, the Israel Telecommunication Corporation Ltd v. Minister of Communications [15], at pp. 686-687; HCJ 726/94 Klal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [16], at pp. 484-485; Barak, supra, vol. 3, at p. 657).

            14. Does the case before us comply with the balancing standards and emerge from them unscathed? I think this is not the case. From the affidavits submitted, it would appear that the defence establishment itself does not believe in a near certainty of real harm to security and of real damage, nor even a reasonable possibility of real harm. Admittedly, the deponents indicated difficulties — including economic ones — that the air force will face if it is compelled to integrate women in aviation; but it would seem that opening up the aviation course to women in a controlled and limited manner for an appropriate number of women pilots, while examining the ramifications that this has on the requirements of the air force and the assignment of women pilots to jobs that they can fulfil over a long period of years, will significantly reduce the risk of harm and damage, if these are not entirely cancelled. Instead of blocking the path of women to aviation courses, it is possible — in the first stage —to adopt less drastic restrictive measures as stated, and to follow the path of trial and error.

            15. The petitioner before us declares that she is prepared to undertake any service for any period of time required by the air force, similar to the service of any other pilot. There is no reason to assume ab initio that she will not honour her undertaking. There is no reason to suspect that her declarations are not genuine. If, notwithstanding all this, it happens in the future that she is unable, for personal reasons, to fulfil those undertakings, her situation will be similar to those cases in which men pilots are unable, for various reasons, to fulfil their undertakings over the years. In the words of my colleague, Justice Mazza, from a planning perspective, the IDF authorities must take into account such possibilities and prepare accordingly; and, as the Air Force Commander said, the problem is one of society as a whole, not merely of the defence establishment. If financial resources are required for this, the State must provide them, within reason.

16. Before concluding, I would like to quote the words of the American philosopher, Ruth Bleier:

‘Though there are biologically based gender differences, they do not imply superiority or inferiority not do they justify inequities in social, economic, and political policy and practice. Rather they call for public education and reform of sexist policies, laws and practices… In the absence of clear paths to truth and social justice, the one hope for bringing about change for the better lies in the capacities of the human brain to make it possible to break out of the cultural constraints that some human beings have constructed to the detriment of others’ (Ruth Bleier, ‘Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and its Theories On Women,’ in Sneja Gunew (ed.), A Reader in Feminist Knowledge, Routledge, 1991, 249).

17. In conclusion, the aviation course should be opened up to women who have the requisite talents, in order to allow women to realize their basic right to equality between themselves and men in this field also. I therefore add my voice to the voice of Justice Mazza, and I too am of the opinion that the show cause order should be made absolute.

            18. After writing my opinion, I received the illuminating opinion of my colleague, Justice Dorner. Her survey of the roots of discrimination against women on the basis of their sex and of the obligation of every enlightened society to recognize the basic right of every person to dignity and equality and to implement this recognition in practice is a work of art. But to do justice to the respondents it should be noted that, according to their position as presented to us — and there is no reason to regard this as mere lip service — they espouse these very same principles, and even they — as a mouthpiece of the State of Israel — do not dispute the right of women to equality and dignity and the duty of the State to implement these principles in practice. Not only this; they also agree that there is no difference between men and women from the perspective of the talents required to be accepted into an aviation course and that among women, as among men, there are those who are suitable for this. The difficulty that confronts them is the law that provided special service conditions for women, which results in logistic and deployment difficulties which will affect the preparedness and strength of the air force. In this respect, the position of the respondents was unacceptable to me and to my colleagues Justice Mazza and Justice Dorner, and therefore I am pleased that we have reached, by a majority, the result that the petition should be granted.

 

 

Justice Ts. E. Tal:

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Justice Kedmi, and I would like to add to it. We still hold by the rule that discrimination because of a relevant difference is not discrimination. This rule leads me to think that the petitioner’s petition should not be granted, for we are concerned with a distinction and not discrimination. There are two reasons for this: the budgetary consideration and the planning consideration.

The budgetary consideration

The difference, created by the law, between men and women soldiers is in the length of their service, and the emphasis is on reserve duty. The cost of preparing and training a pilot is huge. However short a pilot’s period of service is, we pay the same cost for his training, but we receive less in return.

If the IDF had an unlimited budget at its disposal, we could rule that we should pay the price for the value of equality between men and women. My colleague, Justice Mazza, cites the remarks of Prof. Barak:

‘The protection of human rights costs money, and a society that respects human rights must be prepared to bear the financial burden’ (Barak, in his book supra, vol. 3, at p. 528).

Indeed, when the considerations are only financial, then it can be said that society must pay the price, in the words of Prof. Barak:

‘Administrative convenience or financial economy are not, in themselves, social goals justifying a restriction or violation of a human right’ (ibid., at p. 528) (emphasis added).

It is also worth mentioning the example brought by Prof. Barak, ibid.:

‘In one case, the question arose whether an oral hearing should be granted to everyone arriving in Canada, claiming to be a refugee. The Canadian Attorney-General argued that granting the right of an oral hearing would involve heavy financial costs and therefore this (natural) right should be waived. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this argument.’

These remarks are apposite in such cases, where the only consideration standing against equality is the financial consideration. That is not so in the case before us.

The reality is that the defence budget is finite and limited. Within the limited framework of the budget, any huge expense made for the value of equality must come at the expense of other essential security needs. The protection of life is also one of the basic values (s. 4 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), and as such it can prevail over the value of equality.

            If one argues that the value of equality cannot be overridden by any other value, however important it is, this undermines first principles and cancels the doctrine of a relevant difference. The result would be that in any case of a relevant difference it would be possible to say that the difference has ceased to be relevant, because we have set ourselves a goal of implementing the value of equality, in view of which a difference no longer has any importance.

            Take, for example, the issue of equal work opportunities. There are jobs where the difference is characteristic. An advertisement seeking only women candidates for a job in a public bath house for women will not be improper. Equal work opportunities are overridden by the value of the privacy of the women bathing there. In the same way the value of equality is overridden by the value of personal and national security.

            It therefore seems to me that the budgetary consideration is also a reasonable consideration of relevant difference. This is true even if we assume that a woman will serve full reserve duty until the age of 38.

            But there is a significant possibility that the reserve duty of a woman will be reduced considerably on account of pregnancy and childbirth. This means that all of the huge investment in training a woman as a pilot will only bear fruit for a very short time, and, in practice, the investment will be, for the most part, lost.

            Planning

The army claims that it is very difficult to plan for units when some of its members are likely to be neutralized at different times and for different periods of time as a result of marriage, pregnancy and birth. This is an important and pivotal consideration. Even in units comprised of men, planning must take account of periods of temporary incapacity (sickness, travel overseas). But if women are to be assigned to these units, the army will need to take into account — throughout their service which is in any event a short one — incapacity for long periods as a result of pregnancy and childbirth.

            Appendix Res/3 of the affidavit-in-reply is a report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, supra, that was submitted to the President of the United States. On pp. 19-20 of the report, medical limitations resulting from pregnancy and childbirth are stated. According to this report, the period of time during which woman cannot be assigned for readiness and operational deployment because of various factors, including pregnancy and childbirth, is four times greater than the period of time during which men cannot be assigned to these tasks (section 44 of the affidavit-in-reply).

            My colleague, Justice Mazza, believes that this argument cannot succeed because —

‘It is entirely based on theories and hypothetical assessments and not on lessons learned from accumulated practical experience.’

I do not agree. A statistical fact based on a reasonable and logical assessments and which is also based on the said report of the Commission is not a mere speculation but rather a fact that should ideally be taken into account.

            With regard to the case before us: if the petitioner is trained as a pilot in the air force, she will serve — as a volunteer in regular and permanent service — for five years, and she will be discharged from the IDF at the age of 29. She will then have only nine years to be integrated into the reserves, and during these nine years we must take into account periods of incapacity as a result of pregnancies and childbirths.

            Even volunteering for additional service will not overcome the natural limitations of pregnancies and childbirths.

            It follows that we are not concerned with discrimination between equals but with a distinction between persons who are not equal. Therefore I would recommend that the petition is denied. Like my colleague, Justice Kedmi, I would allow the Air Force Command to decide how to the conduct the experiment of integrating women as pilots at such time and in such circumstances as in their discretion will not harm the needs of national security.

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

1.  ‘Man kann von einem Ding nicht aussagen, es sei 1 m lang, noch, es sei nicht 1 m lang, und das ist das Urmeter in Paris’ (L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus — Philosophische Untersuchungen, 1960, 316).

(‘There is one thing of which it cannot be said that its length is one metre, or that its length is not one metre, and that is the original metre in Paris’).

            Indeed, many criteria are accepted by society as absolute, but they are in fact arbitrary. But it is not decreed that all criteria must be arbitrary, like the original metre mentioned by Witgensttein. There are matters where it is possible —and if it is possible then it is also proper — to endeavour to establish just criteria.

            The petition before us concerns criteria for translating the difference between men and women into legal norms. These criteria can and should be just.

            2.         Women are different from men. In general their physical strength is weaker than that of men. They are restricted by the necessity of their natural roles — pregnancy, childbirth and nursing. These differences were, apparently, the basis for the division of roles between the sexes in primitive human society, which gave birth to the patriarchal family. The man, who was both stronger and also free from the restrictions involved in childbirth, took charge of providing food and defending the family.

            This division of roles remained unchanged even when, as a result of economic and technological developments, it no longer had an objective basis. In the entry for ‘Woman’, the Hebrew Encyclopaedia says as follows:

‘Combat remained within the sphere of men’s activity even when exhausting and prolonged guard duty replaced the outburst of a reckless operation, and the dropping of bombs by pressing a button or dialling numbers on a control panel replaced the throwing of the spear or a face-to-face battle of swords… it should also be noted that a woman’s strength, stamina and ability to exert herself are usually assessed by the abilities of the woman who is pregnant, nursing and caring for her children; whereas the abilities of young women, on the one hand, and women after menopause, on the other hand, are also determined according to the weakness and cumbersomeness of the woman during her period of fertility. The criterion for assessing the strength of men, however, is the ability of the young, model fighter, i.e., of the young and unmarried man. It can be said that many of our professional ideals are determined for a man in accordance with his role as a man and not as a father, whereas for a woman — in accordance with her role as a mother, and not as a woman’ (Hebrew Encyclopaedia, the Encyclopaedia Publishing Co., vol. 7, 1954, at pp. 341-342).

In the patriarchal family, the family property belonged to the husband-father. A married woman could not own property and her status was like that of a minor. The woman had no right to vote or to be elected, and she was even forbidden from holding any position outside her home. Involvement in war and politics was considered to be contrary to the nature of women. See J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women, New York, 1986, at pp. 8, 33; S. De Beauvoir, Le Deuxième Sexe, vol. 1, 1976, at pp. 164-165; D. L. Rhode, Justice and Gender, Cambridge, 1989, at pp. 9-28).

            In our own sources it is said of the woman that ‘the honour of a king’s daughter is inward’ (Psalms 45, 14 [61]).

            As recently as the end of the nineteenth century, the English poet Alfred Tennyson wrote a sonnet that reflects the accepted social norms of that time:

‘Man for the field and woman for the hearth;

Man for the sword, and for the needle she;

Man with the head and woman with the heart;

Man to command and woman to obey.

                        All else confusion.’

(A. Tennyson, The Princess, 2nd song, 5, 427).

These norms were also expressed in the constitutional case-law of the United States. Thus, for example, in a judgment given at the end of the nineteenth century it was held that that a woman has no constitutional right to be a lawyer. The Supreme Court held, in the opinion of Justice Bradley, as follows:

‘The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood… [and] is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her husband’ (Bradwell v. The State (1872) [43], at 141).

3.    All of this has changed greatly. In the State of Israel, as in other democratic states, the rule forbidding discrimination against women because of their sex is continually winning ground as a basic legal principle, and the legal rhetoric is continually being translated into reality.

            In the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel (‘the Declaration of Independence’) it was stated that ‘the State of Israel will uphold complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens irrespective of… sex.’ In the Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, section 1 provides that  ‘There shall be one law for men and women for every legal act; and any provision of law that discriminates against women as women, for any legal act, shall not be followed’. In the Equal Remuneration for Female and Male Employees Law, 5724-1964, section 1 provides that ‘An employer shall pay a woman employee remuneration that is equal to the remuneration of an employee who is a man at the same place of employment for the same work.’ In the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, section 2(a) provides, inter alia, that ‘An employer shall not discriminate between his employees, or between candidates for employment on the basis of their sex…’. Case-law has played its part in establishing a substantive-interpretative principle, according to which, in the absence of any contrary statutory provision, the authorities (and in certain cases, even private individuals and bodies) are prohibited from discriminating against women because of their sex, and that statutes will be construed — in so far as possible — as consistent with this prohibition. See, for example, HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [17]; Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [12]; HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. National Labour Court [18].

            4.         The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter – the Basic Law) gave a constitutional, super-legislative status to the prohibition of discrimination against women. This status derives from both of the following:

First, section 1 of the Basic Law (which also appears as section 1 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) provides:

‘Basic human rights in Israel are founded on the recognition of the worth of man, the sanctity of his life and his being free, and they shall be respected in the spirit of the principles in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.’

This section provides, at least, that basic rights are to be upheld in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, including the equality of citizens irrespective of sex. Therefore, for example, there can be no discrimination of women with respect to their right to property (a right enshrined in section 3 of the Basic Law) or in respect of their freedom of occupation (a right enshrined in section 3 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation).

Second, the prohibition of discrimination against women is included in the right to dignity enshrined in sections 2 and 4 of the Basic Law.

The question whether the principle of equality in its entirety is encompassed in the right to dignity, within the meaning thereof in the Basic Law, has been discussed in several obiter dicta in the rulings of this Court. See, on the one hand, the remarks of Justice Or in HCJ 5394/95 [5], at pp. 360-363; the remarks of Vice-President Barak in El-Al Israel Airlines v. Danielowitz [3], at p. 760 {488}; and the remarks of Justice Mazza in Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [6], at pp. 521-523 {447-449}. On the other hand, see the remarks of Justice Zamir in Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [6], ibid.. See also: F. Raday, ‘On Equality’, 24 Mishpatim, 1994, 241, 254; Y. Karp, ‘Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom — A Biography of Power Struggles’, 1 Law and Government, 1992, 323, 345-361.

            The legislative history of the Basic Law indicates that the omission of the general principle of equality was intentional. In the Knesset debate on the draft Basic Law, MK Shulamit Aloni and MK Moshe Shahal argued against the omission in the Basic Law of a section about the right of equality (see Knesset Proceedings vol. 123, 1992, at pp. 1241, 1244). In reply to these arguments, (ibid., at p. 1532) MK Amnon Rubinstein, who proposed the Basic Law, said the following:

‘There is no section about general equality, that is correct, because that section of general equality was a stumbling block, an obstacle that prevented the passing of the comprehensive draft proposal.’

See also Karp, in her article, supra, at pp. 345-346.

            In view of this background, I doubt whether it is possible — or at least, whether it is proper — to hold by means of construction that the purpose of the Basic Law is to provide constitutional protection to the principle of general equality. The clear intention of the legislator, as can be seen from the drafts versions, was precisely not to enshrine this general principle in the Basic Law. The draft versions of a law are a factor in determining its purpose. See the remarks of Justice Barak in FH 36/84 Teichner v. Air France Airways [19], at p. 619; Barak, in his book, supra, vol. 2, at pp. 191, 215. Admittedly, the significance of the draft versions — which reveal the intentions of the members of the Knesset who enacted the Law — decreases with the passage of time since the legislation was passed, and the occurrence of political, social or legal changes that may justify a deviation from these intentions. But only a few years have passed since the enactment of the Basic Law, and prima facie the Basic Law should not be construed in a way that conflicts with its purpose as can be seen from the draft versions.

            Notwithstanding, there can be no doubt that the purpose of the Basic Law was to protect people from degradation. The degradation of a human being violates his dignity. There is no reasonable way of construing the right to dignity, as stated in the Basic Law, such that the degradation of a human being will not be considered a violation of that right.

            Indeed, not every violation of equality amounts to degradation, and therefore not every violation of equality violates the right to dignity. Thus, for example, it was held that discrimination against small political parties as opposed to large parties, or against new parties as opposed to old parties, violates the principle of equality. See, for example: HCJ 637/89 ‘Constitution for the State of Israel’ v. Minister of Finance [20]; HCJ 98/69 [4], at p. 698; HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [21], at pp. 13, 15, 21 {32, 34, 41}; HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Chairman of the Knesset [22]; HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [23]. Notwithstanding, such infringements of the principle of equality, which have even led to the disqualification of Knesset laws, did not constitute a degradation, and so they also did not involve a violation of human dignity.

            This is not the case with certain types of discrimination against groups, including sex discrimination, and also racial discrimination. Such discrimination is based on attributing an inferior status to the victim of discrimination, a status that is a consequence of his supposedly inferior nature. Thus, for example, in the famous judgment of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Brown v. Board of Education (1954) [44], at p. 494, the approach that had been accepted until that time with regard to separate and equal education was rejected. With regard to the influence of separate education, Chief Justice Warren wrote as follows:

‘To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.’

And in the judgment in Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) [45], at pp. 686-687, when discussing the influence of different treatment of women in legislation, Justice Brennan wrote:

‘… Sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth… the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.’

Closing a profession or a position to a person because of his sex, race or the like sends a message that the group to which he belongs is inferior, and this creates a perception of the inferiority of the men and women in the group. This creates a vicious cycle that perpetuates the discrimination. The perception of inferiority, which is based on the biological or racial difference, causes discrimination, and the discrimination strengthens the deprecating stereotypes of the inferiority of the victim of discrimination. Therefore the main element in discrimination because of sex, race or the like is the degradation of the victim.

My opinion is therefore that the Basic Law protects against a violation of the principle of equality when the violation causes degradation, i.e., an insult to the dignity of a human being as a human being. The same is true when a woman is a victim of discrimination because of her sex.

5.    Enshrining the prohibition against discrimination of women in the Basic Law has two consequences, which are mutually connected: first, inclusion in a Basic Law has significance for the definition of the right, and especially for the distinction between the definition of the right and the definition of the conditions in which it is permitted — if at all — to violate it; second, in exercising executive discretion — including discretion enshrined in a law that existed before the Basic Law came into effect — extra weight should be given to a right enshrined in the Basic Law.

            6.         The classic definition of equality was coined by Aristotle. According to this definition, equality means equal treatment of equals and different treatment of those who are different according to the extent of their difference (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, book 5, par. 1131). In my opinion, this definition, which has been incorporated in our case-law (see, for example, Boronovski v. Chief Rabbis [1], at p. 35), borders on tautology.

            The definition permits, and even necessitates, different treatment when the ‘difference’ is relevant, but it does not contain criteria for determining that relevance. In the absence of such criteria, there is a danger — which has frequently been realized — that the criteria applied in each case will reflect the degrading stereotypes which the prohibition of discrimination was originally intended to prevent. In our case, the prohibition against the discrimination of women is likely to be rendered meaningless by a determination — based on accepted degrading stereotypes —that the difference between women and men justifies, and even necessitates, different treatment of women. Thus, for example, in the judgments in Muller v. Oregon (1908) [46] at 427; Hoyt v. Florida (1961) [47], at 62, laws that provided for different treatment of women were upheld, for the reason that the difference was relevant in view of the woman’s roles as a mother and housekeeper. For the same reason a law was approved that made only men liable for military service, notwithstanding the fact that the chiefs of staff of the American army were interested in applying the law to women also. See Rostker v. Goldberg (1981)[48], at p. 74. Even in Israel it was held in Steinberg v. Attorney-General [7], at pp. 1067-1068, that different treatment of women, based on the duties of the married woman, falls into the category of permitted distinctions, since it is based on a relevant difference between women and men.

            Moreover, the definition also obscures the distinction between the actual relevance of the difference and its proportionality, in the sense of restricting the violation of human rights to cases where it is required, or to the required degree.

The Aristotelian definition has also been criticized in legal literature. Prof. Rhode wrote the following:

‘American equal-protection analysis has developed largely within an Aristotelian tradition that defines equality as similar treatment for those similarly situated. Under this approach, discrimination presents no legal difficulties if the groups differ in ways relevant to a valid regulatory objective… challenges to gender classifications underscored the theoretical and practical limitations of this approach… Contemporary gender-discrimination analysis has presented difficulties along several dimensions. At the most basic level, traditional approaches have failed to generate coherent or convincing definitions of difference. All too often, modern equal-protection law has treated as inherent and essential differences that are cultural and contingent. Sex-related characteristics have been both over- and undervalued. In some cases, such as those involving occupational restrictions, courts have allowed biology to dictate destiny. In other contexts, such as pregnancy discrimination, they have ignored women’s special reproductive needs. The focus on whether challenged classifications track some existing differences between the sexes has obscured the disadvantages that follow from such differences.

Although discourses of difference must sometimes have a place, they should begin, not end, analysis. As deconstructionists remind us, women are always already the same and different: the same in their humanity, different in their anatomy. Whichever category we privilege in our legal discourse, the other will always be waiting to disrupt it. By constantly presenting gender issues in difference-oriented frameworks, conventional legal discourse implicitly biases analysis. To pronounce women either the same or different allows men to remain the standard of analysis.

Significant progress toward gender equality will require moving beyond the sameness-difference dilemma. We must insist not just on equal treatment but on woman’s treatment as an equal’ (Rhode, supra, at pp. 81-82)

            See also Raday, in her article, supra, 24 Mishpatim, at p. 255.

In my opinion, in our case (i.e., in circumstances where a decision is based on considerations of sex or similar considerations based on belonging to a group, such as race), it is possible to overcome the difficulties raised by the Aristotelian definition — or at least some of them — by replacing this definition with a twofold test: first, is the consideration of sex relevant? Second, assuming that the consideration is relevant, is it justified to take account of it in the circumstances of the case?

In my opinion, as stated, discrimination against a person because he belongs to a group, and in our case discrimination against women, violates the right to dignity. However, like every right, the right to dignity (including the prohibition of group discrimination derived from it) is also not an absolute right but a relative one, and a balance must be struck between it and other legitimate values and interests. Therefore, in special cases a violation of women’s right of equality may be justified, if it complies with criteria that reflect the proper balance between this right and other legitimate values and interests.

A good example of the application of this approach can be found in Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [12]. This case considered a decision of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality not to appoint women to the body that appointed the city’s chief rabbi. The decision was based upon considerations recognized by the court as relevant considerations (which were called by the court ‘particular considerations’), which were the fear that the participation of women on the body making the appointment would prevent suitable rabbis from presenting themselves as candidates and would make the functioning of the rabbi that would be elected more difficult. Prima facie, according to the Aristotelian definition — which the Court both cited and relied upon — this should have been sufficient to deny the petition and to uphold the decision of the Municipality. But the court held that the discrimination against women itself constituted a violation of the right to equality. In such a case, the court held, in the opinion of Justice Barak, that:

‘… we must balance the general principle of equality on the one hand against the particular consideration of the appointment of an electoral assembly that can properly carry out its office on the other’ (supra, at p. 336).

From this we can infer that even when ‘discrimination against women is a relevant consideration’ (ibid.), the discriminatory decision violates the right of equality, and we must examine whether this violation is justified. On the other hand, according to the accepted Aristotelian definition, a statement that ‘discrimination against women is a relevant consideration’ is inherently contradictory, for, according to that definition, if the consideration is relevant, there is no discrimination at all.

8.    The distinction between discriminatory treatment and its justification also requires a distinction regarding the burden of proof, between the woman claiming discrimination and the executive authority. A woman claiming discrimination must prove that the authority treated her differently because of her sex (or her belonging to another group). On the other hand, the burden of proof that discriminatory treatment is justified lies with the authority. Thus for example, in the United States, in lawsuits of observant Jews against their employers on the grounds that they were the victims of discrimination because they observed the Sabbath, it was held that when the plaintiffs proved the actual discriminatory treatment, the employers had to prove that they took all the reasonable measures for integrating the persons who observed the Sabbath in the work. See Getz v. Com. of Pa., Dept. of Public Welfare (1986) [49]; Shapiro-Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. (1993) [50].

The proper degree of proof is the usual one in civil law, namely, the balance of probability in favour of the contention that must be proved. Cf. R. v. Oakes (1986) [58], at p. 107; P. A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, Sydney, 1993, at pp. 861-862; Hogg, supra, at pp. 857-858.

9.    Section 11 of the Basic Law requires all Government authorities to uphold the rights enshrined therein. Notwithstanding, the section does not stipulate the criteria for upholding the rights. How then are these criteria to be determined?

In the United States, in the absence of a provision of the Constitution in this respect, the criteria for examining the constitutionality of the violation of human rights have been formulated in case-law. These criteria do not make a clear distinction between the purpose of the norm that violates a basic right and the proportionality of the violation. American case-law developed a doctrine of levels of scrutiny, which is based on an examination of the importance of the social values at the heart of the right. The most lenient level of scrutiny in terms of the restrictions it imposes on the authorities, applies to acts (including laws) that violate economic rights. The level of scrutiny of these activities is minimal scrutiny. According to this, a violation of a right will be found to be justified if the violation is rationally related to a legitimate State interest. See: Railway Express Agency v. New York (1949) [51]; Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia (1976) [52].

The strictest level of scrutiny applies to acts that violate fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement and the right to vote. This criterion also applies to the examination of the constitutionality of actions based on a suspect classification. In examining the constitutionality of such actions there is a need for strict scrutiny, which imposes a heavy burden of persuasion — substantive and probative — to justify the violation of the right. Only an essential public interest, which cannot be achieved by less discriminatory measures, may justify such a violation. See Korematsu v. United States (1944) [53]; Brown v. Board of Education [44].

            Notwithstanding, the level of scrutiny of classifications based on sex was a subject of dispute. In the judgment in Frontiero v. Richardson [45], at pp. 682, 685, Justice Brennan, supported by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall, was of the opinion that classifications based on sex — like classifications based on race — were suspect classifications, and they should be subject to the highest level of scrutiny. He wrote:

‘At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage and national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. We agree…

… Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children… And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right…’

But in a later judgment it was held that the constitutionality of classifications based on sex, which were defined as ‘quasi-suspect’, will be examined on the basis of an intermediate level of scrutiny (intermediate scrutiny). According to this level of scrutiny, a classification based on sex will be considered to be justified if it has a substantial relationship to an important Government objective. See Craig v. Boren (1976) [54]; Mississippi Univ. v. Hogan (1982) [55].

            In Canada, in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there is a limitation clause that distinguishes between the purpose of the action that violates the right and the proportionality of the violation (s. 1 of the Charter). Canadian case-law developed a standard level of scrutiny for all basic rights. It was held that legislation has a proper purpose if it is intended to realize social needs of fundamental importance, and that the violation should not be excessive for achieving the purpose. In the latter case, secondary tests were established. The following was stated in the leading judgment R. v. Oakes [58], at 139:

‘There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question… Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance”.’

            In Germany, the Constitutional Court ruled that a strict level of scrutiny is required for legislation that discriminates on the basis of sex, that only an essential purpose justifies such a discrimination, and even this on condition that the extent of the violation is not excessive. See D. P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chicago, 1994, at p. 328.

            The principle of proportionality, which was developed in German administrative law as early as the eighteenth century, is comprised of three elements that are in principle similar to the secondary tests in the Canadian ruling in R. v. Oakes [58]. First, the violating measure must be appropriate (geeignet) for achieving the purpose. Second, the measure must be required (erforderlich) for achieving the purpose, in the sense that of the suitable measures, the measure chosen is the most moderate one that can achieve the purpose (the element of necessity). Third, the measure must not be excessive (unzumutbar) in its violation, in comparison with the benefit deriving from it. In other words, the relationship between the measure and the purpose must be proportional (Currie, in his book, supra, at pp. 309-310). See also Y. Zamir, ‘Israeli Administrative Law in comparison with German Administrative Law’, 2 Law and Government, 1994, at pp. 109, 131.

10. In Israel, the criteria for upholding rights, mutatis mutandis, should be derived from section 8 of the Basic Law (hereafter — the limitation clause). This section provides:

‘The rights under this basic law may only be violated by a law that befits the values of the State of Israel, is intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent that is not excessive, or under a law as stated by virtue of an express authorization therein.’

Indeed, the limitation clause applies only to powers deriving from laws passed after the enactment of the Basic Law. However, it is appropriate, by way of analogy, to apply its principles to the duty of executive authorities by virtue of section 11 of the Basic Law, which also applies to powers based upon laws that preceded the Basic Law. There are two reasons for this: first, the protection of basic rights in Israel should be carried out on the basis of similar criteria, whether the legal norm whose validity is being examined is a statute or whether it is another legal norm. Second, the arrangement provided in the limitation clause — which distinguishes, inter alia, between the purpose of the violation of the right and the extent of the violation — is in principle appropriate for all legal norms, and not merely statutes. The suitability of the criteria in the limitation clause for the scrutiny of the validity of legal norms that are not statutes was discussed by Vice-President Barak in El-Al Israel Airlines v. Danielowitz [3] (in which a discriminatory collective agreement was considered), at p. 760 {488}:

‘Equality may be lawfully restricted if this is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, is for a proper purpose and if equality is not restricted more than necessary.’

The elements of the limitation clause are very similar to the criteria developed in case-law for a violation by an administrative authority of a basic human right.

11. The first element, which reflects the principle of legality, provides that the violation must be in a law or under a law by virtue of an express authorization therein. In this respect, in case-law laid down before the Basic Law was passed, it was held, inter alia:

 (1) A basic human right may not be restricted without the clear authorization of the primary legislator. See, for example: the remarks of Justice Berinson in HCJ 200/57 Bernstein v. Bet-Shemesh Local Council [24], at p. 268; Justice Shamgar in HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [25], at p. 359.

 (2) Legislation that violates a basic human right must be construed narrowly, ‘with the aim of giving the said right maximum application and not limiting it in any way beyond what is clearly and expressly implied by the legislation’ (the remarks of Justice Shamgar in CA 732/74 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Israel Electricity Co. Ltd [26], p. 295 {243}).

 (3) Laws should be construed on the assumption that it is not their aim to violate the principle of equality. The following was written by Justice Haim Cohn in HCJ 301/63 Streit v. Chief Rabbi [27], at p. 612:

‘… this court will always presume that the Israeli legislator does not intend to violate, by an act of legislation, the basic principles of equality, freedom and justice…’

            In another context, Justice Barak wrote in Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa [12], at p. 612:

‘… we must presume [that] the primary legislator and the secondary legislator [wished] to uphold the principle of equality… we must construe this authority in a way that the power to enact subordinate legislation is not exercised in a manner that violates the principle of equality’ (square parentheses added).

The power to discriminate against women must therefore be expressly stated in a law, and a general provision giving an authority discretion is insufficient. This is because the assumption is, as stated, that the authority should exercise its powers while upholding basic human rights — including the prohibition of discriminating against women — unless it is expressly authorized not to do so.

These rules of interpretation were reinforced with the enactment of the Basic Law. It was held that even legislation that is protected by section 10 of the Basic Law against being held invalid should be interpreted in the spirit of the provisions of the Basic Law, and the same applies also to discretion exercised under legislation whose validity was protected. It was also held that there should be a re-examination of existing case-law to assess whether it was consistent with the provisions of the Basic Law. See CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [28], and the remarks of Vice-President Barak, at p. 419:

‘… There are rulings that were made in the past, and which are inconsistent with the new balance. These rulings can no longer be used for the construction of a new law. Moreover, these rulings should no longer be used for the construction of the old law. This law should be construed in the spirit of the new basic laws. The purpose of the old legislation and executive discretion enshrined in old legislation must be construed according to the new balance between human rights and the needs of society, provided that this new interpretation is possible.”

            See also: the remarks of Vice-President Barak, ibid., at pp. 423-424; and my own remarks, ibid., at p. 375; and also CrimApp 4595/94 [29]; CApp 4459/94 Salomonov v. Sharabani [30]; HCJFH 3299/93 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [31].

            12. The second element requires that the violation befits the values of the state of Israel. It may be assumed that the intention is to its values as a Jewish and democratic State, as stated in section 1 of the Basic Law. See Barak, in his book, supra, vol. 3, at p. 157; H. H. Cohn, ‘The Values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State — Studies in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty’, 9 HaPraklit — Jubilee Volume, Israel Bar Association Publications, 1994, at p. 9. Even this element should be applied (subject to section 10 of the Basic Law) to all executive decisions. See the remarks of Vice-President Elon in CrimApp 2169/92 Suissa v. State of Israel [32], at p. 341.

            13. The third requirement in the limitation clause requires that the violation of the right is for a proper purpose. The meaning of ‘a proper purpose’, with regard to a decision of an administrative authority, is different from its meaning with respect to a statute. While with respect to a statute we should examine whether its purpose serves a public purpose whose realization might justify a violation of a basic right, with respect to an administrative decision we should examine, first and foremost, whether its purpose is one of the general or particular purposes of the law authorizing the decision. I discussed this in El-Al Israel Airlines v. Danielowitz [3], at p. 782-783 {519-520}, with regard to discrimination based on sexual orientation:

‘According to this test, no distinction should be made between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples, if the spousal relationship between the spouses of the same sex meets the criteria that realize the purpose for which the right or benefit is conferred. By contrast, when the sexual orientation is relevant to realizing the purpose of the benefit, for instance if the purpose is to encourage having children, withholding the benefit from a same-sex spouse will not constitute discrimination’ (square parentheses added).

            See also HCJ 389/90 Golden Pages Ltd v. Broadcasting Authority [33], at p. 435; HCJ 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Lands Administration [34], at p. 858.

In our case, legislation whose purpose is to protect women cannot be used as a basis for discriminating against women, if she has waived the protection (provided, of course, that the protection is not forced on her by a law whose validity is preserved under section 10 of the Basic Law). See HCJ 231/63 Ratef Food Supply Ltd v. Ministry of Trade and Industry [35], at p. 2733.

            14. The fourth element — which, in my opinion, is the most important — is the requirement that the extent of the violation of the right is not excessive. This principle is expressed by adapting the means to the purpose, in adopting a measure that violates a basic right only as a last resort and in the absence of another reasonable measure, and in adopting a measure of violating a basic right only where the importance of the purpose of the violation (‘the purpose’), and the severity of the damage that will be caused if the purpose is not realized, justify it. See: HCJ 5510/92 Torkeman v. Minister of Defence [36]; HCJ 987/94 [14]; HCJ Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [37]. See also Z. Segal, ‘The Grounds of Disproportionality in Administrative Law’, 39 HaPraklit, 1990, at p. 507. In the latter case, balancing formulae were established, based on the special weight of the violated human right on the one hand and the conflicting interest (in the terminology of the limitation clause — ‘the purpose’) on the other. These formulae are expressed in the tests that concern the extent of the violation of the basic human right and its probability. See the remarks of Justice Barak in 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [38], at p. 284. The probability formula is determined, on the one hand, in accordance with the importance of the basic right and its underlying reasons, and, on the other hand, in accordance with the importance of the conflicting interest, the realization of which is the purpose of the violation. For this latter issue, see HCJ 1452/93 Igloo Plumbing Works, Building and Development Contracting Co. Ltd v. Minister of Industry and Trade [39], at p. 617.

            The right to dignity — which enshrines the prohibition of discrimination against women — is one of the most important basic human rights. In general, the degradation of a woman by discriminating against her merely because she is a woman is very hurtful to her. Moreover, important social interests are also a basis for the right. In the words of Justice Bach in Nevo v. National Labour Court [18], at p. 760 {150}:

‘A society that practises discrimination is not a healthy one, and a State that practises discrimination cannot be called a civilized State.’

The individual and social reasons that are the basis for the prohibition of discrimination against women require that we apply in this respect the strict test of a near certainty of serious danger.

            15. In cases where the difference of women is a relevant consideration for realizing the purpose of the power, there is a spectrum of possible measures for achieving that purpose. At one extreme of the spectrum, there is the asymmetric model of the  ‘special protection rule’. This model holds that women have special characteristics and roles, which justify their being discriminated against in comparison with men, and inter alia they are prevented from being employed in various jobs. The proper purpose — which is the proper exercise of the said roles — is therefore realized by closing the door to women who wish to serve in those jobs.

            At the other end of the spectrum, there is a symmetric model known as ‘gender neutrality’. This model advocates equal treatment of men and women, and it assumes that both sexes have identical functional capacity. According to this approach, pregnancy is considered as a constraint equivalent to a man being sick. Adopting this model usually involves building the system according to the ability of men. In its planning, naturally account is taken of various needs that are common to all human beings, whether women or men, but no account is taken of the special needs of women. According to this model, society may close to women the door of an organization whose optimal operation is in the interests of society, if it transpires that because of the needs and characteristics of women their period of activity is expected to be shorter than the activity of men (and this also as a result of women exercising privileges that the law grants them, with regard to pregnancy, childbirth and the other roles of women). The symmetrical model is therefore likely to prevent or to reduce to a large degree the employment of women in essential organizations.

            This problem raised by the ‘gender neutrality’ model was succinctly described by Prof. MacKinnon:

‘Under the sameness rubric, women are measured according to correspondence with man, their equality judged by proximity to his measure; under the difference rubric, women are measured according to their lack of correspondence from man, their womanhood judged by the distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is the male standard. The special protection rule is the female standard. Masculinity or maleness is the referent for both’ (C. A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press, 1989, at p. 221).

16. In my opinion, the solution to the difficulties raised by both of the extreme models lies in an intermediary model. According to this model, achieving equality between the sexes requires organizational planning that takes the unique needs of women into account. The interest in ensuring the dignity and status of women, on the one hand, and in the continued existence of society and the raising of children, on the other hand, makes it necessary — in so far as possible — not to deny women the possibility of realizing their abilities and ambitions merely because of their special natural functions, and thereby discriminating against them in comparison with men. Social institutions — including legal arrangements — should be adapted to the needs of women.

            This intermediary model, whereby every employer must take into account that the years of a woman’s activity are likely to be disrupted by pregnancy, childbirth, nursing and childcare, has been enshrined in Israel in labour law. Thus, for example, the Women’s Employment Law provides that a woman has a right of maternity leave (s. 6(a)), a right of absence from work during the pregnancy if there is a medical need (s. 7(c)(1)), and a right to return to work after childbirth following an absence that does not exceed twelve months (s. 7(d)(1)).

            Naturally, the implementation of the intermediary model costs money and complicates planning. These costs must be borne — sometimes with the participation of National Insurance — also by private employers. This obligation is imposed, all the more so, also on the State.

            The demand to consider the special needs of women is similar to the demand to consider a person’s religious belief. Such a demand is accepted in the United States. See Getz v. Con. of Pa., Dept of Public Welfare [49]; Shapiro-Gordon v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. [50]. In HCJ 80/70 Elitzur v. Broadcasting Authority [50], at p. 666, Justice Kister wrote that the approach of American case-law should be adopted:

‘… we may learn some things from the American approach in law and case-law:

a.            An approach that has maximum consideration for the religious persuasion of the employee; even if he has undertaken to work overtime, he should not be required to do this on his day of rest, and he even cannot be required to find a replacement if this is contrary to his religious belief, and the employer must adapt himself, in so far as possible, to his religious belief; I emphasize that we are speaking here of a private factory…’

It will be noted that in 1981 the Work and Rest Hours Law, 5711-1951, was amended, and in section 9(c) an employer was forbidden to refuse to accept someone for employment merely because he is not prepared to work on the weekly rest days prohibited by a precept of his religion.

17. From the general to the specific:

            My colleague, Justice Mazza, set out the facts underlying the petition. As stated, the respondents rejected the petitioner’s request to invite her for aptitude tests for an aviation course because of planning reasons, which were mainly considerations of organizational feasibility. The basis for these considerations is the large cost of training pilots, which makes — so the respondents argue — the training of someone whose service for many years is not guaranteed by law not worthwhile, and it also makes it necessary to train a larger number of pilots. An additional reason given by the respondents was the cost required for adapting the facilities at the camp where the flight course takes place to absorb women.

The respondents’ considerations are based on the assumption that the petitioner, being a woman, can be expected to serve fewer years than a man. In this respect, they relied on the provisions of the Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version] (hereafter — the law), which obliges men to do reserve duty until the age of 54, whereas women are liable for reserve duty only until the age of 38 (s. 29), and pregnant women and mothers are exempt altogether from reserve duty (s. 34). The law does not prevent a woman volunteering for reserve duty (s. 12), nor does it even distinguish between men’s jobs and women’s jobs. But in the respondents’ opinion, in view of the pregnancies and childbirths that can naturally be expected in the life of a woman, one cannot rely upon voluntary service from which the woman can exempt herself at any time.

As my colleague Justice Mazza mentioned, the respondents did not rely on the existence, under High Command regulations, of restrictions in assigning women to combat roles, and I will therefore assume that these regulations have no implications with regard to the rights of the petitioner.

18. I have arrived at the conclusion that the respondents’ decision to reject the petitioner’s request because she is a woman, discriminates against her, and this discrimination — which constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right of dignity — does not satisfy the requirements of the limitation clause in the Basic Law, and it is therefore illegal and improper.

I will consider the elements of the limitation clause in order.

19. The first requirement — express statutory authorization: the law distinguishes between men and women in so far as the length of compulsory service is concerned, and in this way it discriminates between the sexes. In view of the provisions of section 10 of the Basic Law regarding the preservation of laws, we are not required to consider the validity of the law in this respect. In the absence of any other argument, I too am prepared to assume — without ruling — that the decision was made within the framework of the power that the law gave to the respondents.

20. The second element — befitting the values of the State: here too, in the absence of arguments to the contrary, I will assume — without ruling — that the respondents’ decision does not conflict with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

21. The third element — a proper purpose: the air force’s planning considerations, which, as stated, led it to make the decision that is the subject of the petition, serve important State interests, and in this sense they constitute ‘a proper purpose’. The problem is that these considerations were based on statutory provisions that were intended to protect women and grant them ‘privileges’. As stated, the law is not compulsory in this respect, and the petitioner gave notice that she is prepared to waive the privileges given to her. Therefore, in rejecting the petitioner’s request by relying on the protective provisions, the respondents applied considerations that were irrelevant for realizing the purpose of these provisions of law. In this sense, their considerations can therefore not be regarded as ‘a proper purpose’. Notwithstanding, there still remains the consideration that a woman, because of her biological functions, is expected to do less years of reserve duty than men, something that will make her training less worthwhile, and will, so they claim, adversely affect the possibility of planning. These considerations — of economy and facilitating planning — are relevant and legitimate, and constitute ‘a proper purpose’.

22. The fourth element — to an extent that is not excessive: in my opinion, the measure that the respondents chose in order to realize their purposes — closing the profession of aviation to women — does not comply with this element of the limitation clause. Closing the profession of aviation to women does not comply with the requirement of proportionality. As my colleague Justice Mazza has shown, it is possible to make plans — since in any event planning takes account of interruptions and stoppages for various reasons — in a way that takes into account the differences between men and women. As stated, the obligation to take account of women’s needs in planning is incumbent on all employers in the country by virtue of laws that prohibit refusing to accept a woman for employment because of her sex, and at the same time give her privileges that shorten her activities in a way liable to harm the employer. In these circumstances, where an extra financial burden is imposed on all private employers for the sake of achieving equality, considerations of budgeting and planning efficiency cannot justify a decision of the State that violates a basic right. See: Singh v. M. E. I. (1985) [59], at p. 218; R. v. Lee (1989) [60], at p. 1390; Barak, supra, vol. 2, at pp. 526-527.

Moreover, even if we assume that the planning consideration could justify discrimination against women, the State which seeks to justify the discrimination bears the burden of proof. But the respondents did not substantiate their arguments about the harm to planning on solid facts, but merely on a hypothesis whose correctness is not self-evident. The fact that in 1975 women soldiers were integrated into an aviation course on the respondent’s initiative, indicates precisely that the planning difficulties, in so far as they exist, are not insoluble.

            In addition to all the above, the damage caused by closing the aviation course to women exceeds the benefit of the planning considerations. First, closing the aviation course to women violates their dignity and degrades them. It also, albeit unintentionally, provides support for the degrading slogan: ‘the best men for the air force, and the best women for its pilots’.

            Second, the potential of half the population is not utilized, and this damages society. ‘The best women for the air force’ is also in the interests of society, and this was harmed by the respondents’ decision. This was discussed by the English philosopher, John Stuart Mill, in his book, supra, which was written over one hundred years ago. He wrote, on p. 57:

‘Nor is the injustice confined to [women]: it is shared by those who are in a position to benefit by their services. To ordain that any kind of persons shall not be physicians, or shall not be advocates, or shall not be members of parliament, is to injure not them only, but all who employ physicians or advocates, or elect members of parliament, and who are deprived of the stimulating effect of greater competition on the exertions of the competitors, as well as restricted to a narrower range of individual choice.’

Very recently this was explained in the United States by Justice Hall in his judgment in Faulkner v. Jones [42], at p. 451:

‘Though our nation has, throughout its history, discounted the contributions and wasted the abilities of the female half of its population, it cannot continue to do so. As we prepare, together, to face the twenty-first century, we simply cannot afford to preserve a relic of the nineteenth.’

Indeed, the experience of history in other countries and also in Israel shows that in times of emergency, when the enemy stood at the gates, accepted norms gave way and women took part in combat, on land and even in the air.

The policy of closing the doors also does not meet the accepted criteria in our law for violation of a basic right. In this respect the respondents needed to prove the existence of a near certainty that the integration of women in aviation will seriously harm national security. The respondents did not do this, nor do common sense and experience in themselves lead to a conclusion about the existence of such a near certainty.

For these reasons, I think that the petition should be granted and the show cause order be made absolute.

 

 

Petition granted by majority decision (Justices E. Mazza, D. Dorner, T. Strasberg-Cohen), Justices Y. Kedmi, Ts. E. Tal dissenting.

15 Heshvan 5756.

8 November 1995.

 

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