State of Emergency and National Security

Temple Mount Loyalists Society v. Police Commander of the Jerusalem Region

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 292/83
Date Decided: 
Friday, May 18, 1984
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The petition concerned the Respondent’s refusal to permit the Petitioners to pray beside the western entrance to the Temple Mount (the Mughrabi Gate) on Jerusalem Day, out of concern that conducting prayer at that particular site would lead to a breach of public order.

 

The High Court of Justice held:

 

A.        (1)        The right to assemble and demonstrate is a basic human right in Israel. It is not an absolute right, but rather a relative right, and when it comes into conflict with other rights or interests, it must, at times, retreat in accordance with an appropriate balancing formula.

            (2)        The appropriate balancing formula between the right to assemble and demonstrate, on one hand, and public safety, on the other, is that of “near certainty”. If harm to public safety in the form of physical injury to the assembled and the demonstrators is nearly certain, that probability is sufficient to justify the denial or restriction of the right to assemble and demonstrate. That is not the case when the harm to public safety is of a lesser degree of probability.

 

B.        (1)        Every person in Israel enjoys freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship as one of the fundamentals upon which the State of Israel is founded.

            (2)        That freedom is partly anchored in sec. 83 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, while the other part constitutes one of the unwritten basic rights. By virtue of these laws – and in accordance with what is stated in the Declaration of Independence – every law and every power will be construed as recognizing freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship.

            (3)        Freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is a relative freedom that must be balanced against other rights and interests that are also worthy of protection, such as the right to property, both private and public, and freedom of movement. One of the interests that must be considered is that of public order and safety.

            (4)        Freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is limited and classified to the extent required and necessary for the protection of public order and safety. Before taking any action that might infringe or restrict this right due to harm to public safety, it is proper that the police adopt every reasonable means at its disposal in order to prevent the harm to public safety without infringing the right to freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship.

 

C.        (1)        Even in circumstances in which it is possible to show a concern for public safety, but where actual harm to public safety cannot be proven as a certainty, the police must adopt all the reasonable measures, subject to its abilities, in order to remove or mitigate the said concern. The police must not be deterred by violent elements that seek to harm the realizing of human rights, and a hostile crowd should not be granted a veto over the exercise of basic legal rights.

            (2)        Protecting freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is the duty of the police, but not its only duty. It must also protect other freedoms, as well as the freedom of conscience and religion of other people.

 

D.        (1)        The influence of a threat to public safety upon the exercise of a basic constitutional right is not particular to freedom of conscience and religion. It is common to that right and similar rights, such as freedom of expression and the freedom to assemble and to demonstrate.

            (2)        The principle is that freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrate must retreat before considerations of public safety only when the probability for harm to public safety is at the level of “near certainty”. It is proper that the “near certainty” test should also serve to establish the balancing formula between freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship, on the one hand, and public safety on the other. Thus, similar rights will receive similar protection.

 

E.         (1)        The Petitioners do not have a vested right to pray at the Mughrabi Gate under all circumstances and at any price. They have a right to pray at the Mughrabi Gate as long as that prayer will not create a nearly certain danger of harm to public safety. Such a danger does not exist under the circumstances of this matter.

            (2)        The police must – in the framework of the forces at its disposal – also prepare to confront threats that are not nearly certain. The Respondent must examine the situation as it changes, and if it finds that holding prayer services at the Mughrabi Gate creates a new danger that was not previously present, it has the power to take new action.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Non-writer
majority opinion
Non-writer
majority opinion

Gharis v. Haifa District Commissioner

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 253/64
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, November 11, 1964
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The Petitioner sent the Respondent (the Haifa District Commissioner) notice of the establishment of an association named “The El-Ard Movement”, as required under secs. 2 and 6 of the Ottoman Associations Law, 1909. In his reply, the Respondent noted that it was clear from the articles of association that the association was established with the intent to harm the State of Israel, and is therefore prohibited under sec. 3 of the aforesaid law. The Petitioner filed a petition with the High Court of Justice for an order nisi against the Respondent.

 

In denying the petition, the Supreme Court held:

 

A.        Under sec. 3 of the Ottoman Association Law, 1909, an association is prohibited if its purpose, or one of its purposes, is illegal or if it infringes the existing public order or the integrity of the state.

 

B.        (1)   The rule is that the decision as to the legality or illegality of an association’s purposes must be made, first and foremost, on the basis of the wording of the articles of association themselves. It is that wording that obligates the members of the association, and not the explanations and commentaries attributed to it by the founders.

            (2)  Where the illegal purpose is concealed or masked, hiding behind a smokescreen of flowery language, the government may certainly adduce material that may serve to reveal the true purpose. But when the illegality is manifest from the articles of association themselves, or where the articles are open to interpretation and raise serious doubt in the reader’s mind, the founders of the association should not be permitted to launder them by means of caveats and commentaries.

 

C.        It is a fundamental rule that only weighty considerations can serve to prohibit an association. Freedom of association is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic regime and one of its basic civil rights. But no free regime can lend its hand to the granting of recognition to a movement that seeks to undermine that very regime. It is an elementary right of every state to defend its liberty and its very existence against foreign enemies and their domestic adherents.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Non-writer
majority opinion

Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Knesset

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3091/99
Date Decided: 
Saturday, May 5, 2012
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The petition, filed in 1999, concerned the repeated renewal of the declaration of a national state of emergency under sec. 38 of Basic Law: The Government. The petition asked that the Court revoke  the declaration of a national state of emergency.

 

The High Court of Justice (per Justice Rubinstein, President (Emerita) Beinisch and Justice Arbel concurring) dismissed the petition, holding:

 

Although the work is not finished, the petition has exhausted its purpose. The state authorities should be allowed to work toward completing the legislative processes that the Petitioner helped advance by means of its petition. While this was, indeed, a worthy petition, we cannot ignore the fact that Israel has not yet arrived at its safe haven. Israel’s situation was and continues to be sensitive and complex, and it does not allow for depriving the state authorities of necessary emergency powers. However, we cannot abide the long exploitation of the declaration of a state of emergency in situations that require balanced, up-to-date legislation rather than emergency measures.

 

Under the current circumstances, and in light of all the steps that have been adopted, there is no longer a need for the intervention of the High Court of Justice in regard to the authority’s declaration of a state of emergency, but the gates are not barred before future petitions as may be necessary. A special team is currently acting in regard to the matter of the declaration of a state of emergency, which supervises the progress of the government’s work toward disengaging legislation from the declaration of a state of emergency. Additionally, a number of legislative proceedings have reached their appropriate conclusion in the course of the years during which this petition has been pending. Additional bills have passed their first reading, while others that are in various stages of legislation are intended to rescind or amend existing legislation in order to uncouple the historical connection, whose justification has dwindled, to the declaration of a state of emergency. These legislative processes are indicative of a trend and understanding that the time has come to say farewell to the vestiges of emergency legislation that has been with us since the state’s inception. The Court added that, as a rule, it does not replace the discretion of the competent authorities with its own, and that this rule is all the more appropriate when we are concerned with a dynamic security situation that is difficult to predict.

 

The High Court of Justice noted that the procedures for changing the current situation and for disengaging the connection between extant legislation and the declaration of a state of emergency should continue, but for the time being, the continuation of the process should be left to the competent authorities, along with the message that it would be proper that what began over ten year ago should be brought to an end in the not-distant future.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Non-writer
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

In the Supreme Court sitting as High Court of Justice

 

HCJ 3091/99

 

Before:                                    President (Emerita) D. Beinisch

                                    Justice E. Arbel

                                    Justice E. Rubinstein

           

 

Petitioner:                    Association for Civil Rights in Israel

 

                                                            v.

 

Respondents:                          1.         The Knesset

2.         Government of Israel

 

Attorney for the Petitioner:    Adv. Dan Yakir

Attorney for the Respondents: Adv. Osnat Mendel

                                   

 

 

Judgment

 

Justice E. Rubinstein:

 

1.This Petition concerns the repeated extension of the declaration of a national state of emergency under section 38 of Basic Law: The Government (hereinafter also: the Basic Law). 

 

General Background

2.As we all know, since the founding of the state, Israel has been under a state of emergency that was originally declared by virtue of sec. 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948. It has since continued by virtue of the various amendments to Basic Law: The Government, eventually sections 49-50 of the Basic Law, and ultimately the current source of authority under sec. 38 of the Basic Law:

“(a) Should the Knesset ascertain that the State is in a state of emergency, it may, of its own initiative or, pursuant to a Government proposal, declare that a state of emergency exists.

(b) The declaration will remain in force for the period prescribed therein, but may not exceed one year; the Knesset may make a renewed declaration of a state of emergency as stated.

(c) Should the Government ascertain that a state of emergency exists in the State and that its urgency necessitates the declaration of a state of emergency, even before it becomes possible to convene the Knesset, it may declare a state of emergency. The declaration's validity shall expire upon 7 days from its proclamation, if not previously approved or revoked by the Knesset, pursuant to a decision by a majority of its members; should the Knesset fail to convene, the Government may make a renewed declaration of a state of emergency as stated in this subsection.

(d) The Knesset and Governmental declarations of a state of emergency will be published in Reshumot [the Official Gazette]; should publication in Reshumot not be possible, another appropriate manner will be adopted, provided that notification thereof be published in Reshumot at the earliest possible date.

(e) The Knesset may at all times revoke the declaration of the state of emergency; notification of its revocation will be published in Reshumot (sec. 38 of the Basic Law).

 

The Basic Law limited the declaration of a state of emergency to a period of one year. That is a conceptual statement that expresses hope, but that grants  authority for extension in recognition of reality. The current state of emergency was extended by the Knesset on May 25, 2011, to remain in effect until May 25, 2012, and I am afraid that, conceivably, this extension will not be the last, despite the obvious aspiration that such extensions will become unnecessary. In addition to the provisions of the Basic Law, the Knesset Rules of Procedures (following amendment no. 52 which came into effect on March 16, 1998) include instructions as to the decision-making procedure required prior to a declaration of a state of emergency (chap. 7 of the Knesset Rules of Procedure). The declaration of a state of emergency grants the competent authorities extensive emergency powers designed, according to their titles and headings, to protect state and public safety, and to maintain essential services in times of need (sec. 39 of the Basic Law). The declaration has two operative effects: the first is the authority to make emergency regulations, and the second is the granting of force to  legal arrangements that are contingent upon a declaration of a state of emergency (specific laws and authorities, such as the Commodities and Services (Control) Law, 5718-1957, a pivotal statute in terms of back-to-work orders in cases of strikes in the essential public services sector; the Powers of Search (Emergency) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5729-1969; Emergency Regulations (Control of Ships) (Amendment) (Extension of Validity Law), 5733-1973; and other statutes addressed in the hearings, as detailed below). Thus, the declaration of a state of emergency has had, and continues to have real implications for many of the state’s legal arrangements.

 

The Petition and the Proceedings

3.Against this background, a petition was already filed in 1999, by which we were requested to order the repeal of the declaration of the national state of emergency at the time (which came into effect on February 1, 1999). The Respondent in the original petition was the Knesset of Israel. In brief, the Petitioners claimed there was no actual extreme situation that would justify the declaration of a state of emergency. In their arguments, the Petitioners relied upon this Court’s decision in HJC 6971/98, Paritzky v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 53(1) 763 (hereinafter: the Paritzky case), in regard to barring the Knesset from enacting legislation in security or other emergency circumstances. The Petitioners further maintained that the consequences of the declaration continually compromise the rule of law, the separation of powers, and basic rights. It was also argued that the declaration of the state of emergency was made without authority, on the basis of irrelevant considerations, without a satisfactory factual foundation, and that it was unreasonable and inconsistent with the state’s international obligations. In the Petitioners’ view, proper emergency legislation – by virtue of it being legislation in extreme circumstances of distress – should allow state authorities to quickly adopt limited legal arrangements in relation to a concrete situation until the storm has passed. As opposed to this, the Petitioners argued that the Israeli emergency legislation, which they challenged, is characterized by creating an ongoing and unrestrained reality in this regard.

 

4.The Respondent’s position was that the Petitioner did not lay an adequate foundation for revoking the declaration of a state of emergency, and thus there are no grounds for judicial intervention. The Respondent noted that we are dealing with a complex issue that should be treated with sensitivity and caution, and that even prior to the filing of the Petition, Israel had been gradually working toward changing the current state of affairs, such that security interests will be protected while the state of emergency will not continue. The Respondent explained that the Knesset recognizes Israel’s unique security situation, as well as the need to afford the Government effective tools to contend with this state of affairs. At the same time, it was argued that the government agencies – led by the Ministry of Justice – are acting to reduce, as far as possible, reliance upon legislation that is contingent upon a declaration of a state of emergency, in order to create the legal infrastructure required for the revocation of the declaration. On the merits, the Respondent argued that the declaration is not inconsistent with the rule of law or the separation of powers. In realizing the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly to set the course of the existing arrangement in the Basic Law, there is awareness of the potential for harm and deviation, and therefore there are arrangements in regard to restricting the authority granted to the Government: the legislative branch’s authority to declare a state of emergency, to invalidate the declaration at any time (secs. 38(a) and 38(e)), and to oversee the exercise of authorities through its subsidiary organs under the Knesset Rules of Procedures. These arrangements – so it was argued – provide a justification in principle for emergency legislation. In addition to all this, of course, the declaration is subject to judicial review. Additionally, the Respondent claimed that the arguments as to lack of authority are not grounded, and that the Petitioner erred in terms of the interpretation of the Paritzky decision, which addressed exercising the authority to promulgate emergency regulations and not the actual declaration of a state of emergency by the Knesset. Finally, the Respondent added that the declaration, itself, does not violate basic rights, and that it meets the tests of reasonableness and the state’s international obligations.

 

5.An  order nisi was issued on October 4, 1999, whereby the response must also include “updated information as to the steps taken in the area of legislation…”. At the end of the hearing held on September 20, 2000, the Respondent’s attorneys were requested to give notice of a “working plan and timetable on the subject of the Petition” within 90 days. In a supplementary notice dated January 21, 2000, an update was submitted as to the progress of the legislative processes that were mentioned in the Response to the Petition (however without a detailed plan). Pursuant to that, two further updated notices were submitted on June 14, 2001 and December 20, 2001.

 

6.This Petition originated in 1999, at a time of relative calm. But the situation quickly changed, since the fall of 2000, in light of severe terror attacks on Israel in the course of the events known as “the Second Intifada.” In this period, and thereafter, several chambers conferences were held before President (Emeritus) Barak, and due to the security situation (at the time of the conference on March 25, 2003), the question was raised whether it would be appropriate to dismiss the Petition without prejudice. Since the Petitioner insisted upon maintaining the Petition, it was decided that “in light of the State’s arguments as to the need for the declaration of a state of emergency to remain in force, and upon the recommendation of the Court, the Petitioner shall amend its Petition and consider the possibility of invalidating the declaration of a state of emergency even in the current security situation” (decision dated March 25, 2003). Following this decision, an amended petition was submitted on July 24, 2003, which almost precisely repeated the arguments made in the original petition, while additionally addressing the state of affairs that existed in the country at the time. On May 15, 2004, the Respondents’ Reply was submitted (at this stage the Government of Israel was added as a respondent) arguing that the amended petition added nothing new. Moreover, beyond what the Respondents believed necessary for their reply,  they emphasized the real security need and concern about creating a legal vacuum that would leave authorities without the means to respond to the rising wave of terrorism. The Respondents added that the legislature would continue to work toward completing the process of adjusting legislation that relies on the existence of a state of emergency.

 

7.Pursuant to the above, many decisions that maintained the Petition were handed down, allowing the Court to remain informed about developments. We did this on the assumption that, on one hand, the current situation could not be remain unchanged, and on the other hand, that the ability of the authorities to carry out their duties in protecting state security in regard to  the dynamic security situation must be preserved. In parallel to the hearings and decisions in regard to the petition, the Knesset – primarily the Joint Committee of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, which oversees the preliminary process for examining the Government’s requests to declare a state of emergency (under the Knesset Rules of Procedures) (hereinafter also: the Committee) – continued to urge the Government’s representatives to report on the progress of the procedures.

 

8.Thus, in a hearing before the Committee on May 29, 2006 (when a hearing was also held before this Court), a representative of the Ministry of Justice described progress in regard to more than ten statutes in civil areas of the law, and reported that the work plan for that year was fully accomplished (minutes of hearing of the Joint Committee, dated 4th Sivan, May 29, 2006). The report that was annexed to the update notice of May 25, 2006 by Adv. Yaacov Shapira, then director of counseling and legislation in the Ministry of Justice, reviewed the inter-ministerial work regarding emergency legislation. The report detailed that the Knesset passed the Powers for Protecting Public Safety Law, 5765-2005, which repealed the abovementioned Powers of Search (Emergency) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5729-1969; passed the Shipping (Foreign Vessels under Israeli Control) Law, 5765-2005, which repealed regulation 7A of the Schedule to the Emergency Regulations (Control of Vessels) (Consolidated Version) Law, 5733-1973; passed an amendment to section 32 of the Annual Leave Law, 5711-1952, in in a first reading. Several statutes, including the Apprenticeship Law, 5713-1953, the Youth Labour Law, 5713-1953, the Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law, 5714-1954, the Firearms Law, 5709-1949, the Israeli Defence Forces  (Equipment Registration and Mobilisation) Law, 5747-1987 were all in various stages of legislation (a draft law, a legislative memorandum, and  so forth).

 

9.The Respondents continued to submit updating notices. On August 1, 2006, a hearing was adjourned for another six-month period. Our decision noted as follows:

We believe the Petition should not be dismissed or denied, but neither should it be decided at this time. The issue is complex and sensitive. On one hand, contrary to the Petitioner’s view, the state of emergency sadly persists, and the war on terror continues in full force. This cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, the declaration of a state of emergency has been used for legislation that could have long been replaced by balanced legislation, such as the Commodities and Services Control Law, 5718-1957, the Youth Labour Law, 5713-1953 and others, and the Ministry of Justice, and other government ministries, are aware of this, as is the Knesset. The result is that we are adjourning further hearings in the Petition. The Respondents shall submit supplementary notices within six months… (para. 6).

 

The last hearing before us was held on September 8, 2008. The Respondents’ attorney then submitted updated data, which reflected more significant progress in the area of civil legislation. In our last decision (dated December 7, 2011) we held that:

There has been progress in the legislative processes. A portion of the legislation that was contingent upon a state of emergency has been changed and amended, another portion of it is in various stages of legislation, and as for the remainder, there is an intention to address it […] Accordingly, the State’s notice now reveals a willingness and ongoing commitment to readdress the dependence of vast legislation upon a state of emergency regardless of the existence of a pending Petition in this Court.

 

The contribution of this Petition and of the Petitioners to motivating legislative procedures over the years was significant. Still it seemed at the time that the continuation of the proceedings should be reconsidered, and thus we asked the Petitioners to notify the Court whether they wished to insist upon the Petition. As a result of this decision and an additional updating notice from the Respondents, the Petitioner notified the Court (on February 1, 2012) that in light of the infringement of basic rights and the principles of democratic government as detailed in the amended Petition, and the fact that, in over a decade, the legislative processes have not come to an end, the current declaration of a state of emergency must be revoked (while staying the revocation for a period of six months in order to allow the necessary preparations to be completed).

 

10.In summary, there have been twelve hearings on this Petition, and upward of thirty decisions, which led the Respondents to repeatedly provide answers as to the progress of legislative processes and the reexamination of the matter.

 

Discussion and Decision

 

11.Upon review, we have come to the conclusion that the Petition has exhausted its purpose, although, indeed, the work has not been completed. We believe that the state authorities must be allowed to act toward concluding the legislative processes, which the Petitioner helped to advance by its Petition. Indeed, this Petition was worthy, and its core message was not delivered in vain. However, as we noted in the decision dated August 1, 2006, we cannot ignore the fact that Israel has not yet come to its safe haven. Indeed, Israel has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy extended periods of relative security, but the winds of war have never quite calmed, and sadly that relativity persists. This is not the place to elaborate in regard to attacks by air and by land, from the north and the southwest, resulting in loss of life and property, or to elaborate on the relentless threats from our enemies near and far. Even in looking back over the period that this Petition has been pending before Court, we see that the Israeli reality was and continues to be sensitive and complex, and does not permit depriving the state authorities of necessary emergency powers. The Second Lebanon War, Operation “Cast Lead”, the recent events of the revolutions referred to as the “Arab Spring” in neighboring countries, the acts of Hamas and threats by Iran and Hezbollah are ongoing reminders of the security situation. Long ago, Justice Yitzhak Kahan explained:

As stated, the provisions of the Arrests Law came to replace the provisions of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations in regard to arrests and deportations. The preamble of the bill stated that ”in the stage of siege in which the State has been since its founding, we cannot forego special means that would ensure proper defence of the state and the public in the face of whomever conspires to annihilate it.’ According to section 1 of the Law, it is in force when there is a declared state of emergency  under section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948. As known, this state of emergency has been ongoing for over thirty years, and who knows how much longer it may continue. This fact of the ongoing state of emergency requires, on one hand, restricting the emergency measures undertaken by the State in order to defend its existence, such that, to the extent possible, these measures do not violate civil rights, but on the other hand, the fact that the state of emergency persists for well-known reasons and circumstances, points to the fact that, throughout its existence, the State of Israel has been in a situation that is difficult to compare to that of any other state” (ADA 1/80, Kahana v. The Minister of Defence, IsrSC 35(2) 253, 257).

 

This was said over thirty years ago, yet in every generation we face existential threats. As Justice Hayut explained in the first half of the previous decade:

 

The armed struggle waged by the Palestinian terrorist organizations against the citizens of Israel and its Jewish residents requires a proper response. It requires the adoption of all the measures available to us as a state, in order to contend with the security risks to which the Israeli public is exposed as a result of this terrorist activity. Enacting laws that will provide a response to security needs is one of those measures, and this is the purpose of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law.… The difficulty in taking risks in matters of security and matters involving human life is clear and obvious and it increases in times of crisis and prolonged danger that necessitate making the security measures more stringent and inflexible (HCJ 7052/03, Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 61(2) 202, paras. 3-4 of the opinion of Justice E. Hayut (Emphasis added – E. R.)

[English: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/adalah-legal-center-arab-minority-r...).

 

And recently, as Justice Melcer summarized, specifically in a situation of relative calm:

 

The above reveals that, in contrast to the impression regarding the relative quiet which the Petitioners claim exists – the Palestinian terrorist organizations, including those active in the Judea and Samaria Area, constantly attempt to initiate and execute painful attacks in the heart of the State of Israel. In order to execute attacks in the form of mass murder…” (HCJ 466/07, MK Zehava Galon – Former Chair  of the Meretz-Yahad Party v. Minister of Interior, IsrSC 65(2) 44,  para. 13  (hereinafter: the Citizenship Law case) [English summary: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/gal-v-attorney-general-summary]).

 

This also arises clearly from both unclassified and classified materials presented to this Court in many security-related cases.

 

12.As opposed to this, as we discussed throughout the proceedings here, there can be no justification for the use made over the years of the declaration of a state of emergency in situations that required balanced, up-to-date legislation that was not emergency legislation. This was also our approach in narrowly construing the authority to issue supervision orders under the Commodities and Services Control Law, 5718-1957, under which many orders were issued (as was  mentioned in the Petition as one of the central difficulties resulting from the current situation). In this regard, see the words of (then) Deputy President Agranat, from nearly half-a-century ago:

[I]t would be well for the Minister possessing the power to consider seriously whether the said state really requires the exercise thereof in this or another concrete situation. … it is desirable that those matters requiring regulation without any connection to the dangers stemming from the state of emergency should be regulated by ordinary legislation of the Knesset which is not necessarily intended for a state of emergency … it would be well for the Ministers to exercise sparingly the broad and drastic powers granted them in the Control Law… (CrimA 156/63, Attorney General v. Oestreicher, IsrSC 17(3) 2088, 2096 [English: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/attorney-general-v-oestreicher).

 

In this regard, see also HCJ 344/89, H.S.A. – International Trade Ltd. v. Minister of Industry and Trade, IsrSC 44(1) 456; HCJ 266/68, Petach Tikvah Municipality v. Minister of Agriculture, IsrSC 22(2); HCJ 2740/96, Aziz Shansi v. Supervisor of Diamonds, IsrSC 51(4) 481; and see and compare in regards to the military censorship under the Defence Regulations, HCJ 680/88, Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, IsrSC 42(4) 617 [http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/schnitzer-v-chief-military-censor].

 

13.As noted, we are called upon to examine whether there are grounds for our intervention in the authority’s declaration of a state of emergency at present. We are persuaded that under the present circumstances, and in light of all the steps taken, our intervention is no longer necessary at this time, without barring our doors before future petitions, as may be required. As I noted in another case:

 

Naturally, the role of a court such as this is, at times, to serve as a “babysitter” of sorts to state authorities (HCJ 5587/07 Uziel v. Property Tax and Compensation Fund (unpublished)), in order to supervise the following of the provisions of the law and to realize human rights. It seems that in this case, the Petition served as a catalyst for activity of various kinds… This certainly bore certain fruits, and it seems that we can now conclude the adjudication of this Petition, while taking note of the Respondents’ commitments (HCJ 1527/06, Movement for Fairness in Government v. Minister of Transportation (unpublished) para. 12.)

 

14.The State’s last update, dated November 29, 2011, mentioned the establishment of a special taskforce in regard to the declaration of the state of emergency, which began operating on June 22, 2009, and supervises the progress of the governmental work toward unlinking legislation from its reliance upon the declaration of a state of emergency. Additionally, the last update detailed the ongoing legislative processes in many areas – and we shall again make particular note of the matter of the orders issued, inter alia, under the Commodities and Services Control Law, 5718-1957. According to this last update, out of the 160 orders that were in force, some 91 orders have been rescinded during the period that the Petition has been pending, and out of the 69 remaining orders, dozens are expected to be revoked in the near future. This issue was the most painful of all emergency arrangements, in light of the tenuous link between many orders and their origin in matters of emergency. In this area, too, we see the light at the end of the tunnel.

 

15.We would note that a number of legislative processes have come to their conclusion over the years in which this Petition has been pending. For example, the Emergency Regulations Extension (Control of Vessels) Law (Consolidated Version), 5733-1973, was replaced by two new pieces of legislation: the Shipping (Foreign Vessels under Israeli Control) Law, 5765-2005, and the Shipping (Offenses against International Shipping Safety and Sea Facilities), 5768-2008. Another law that is destined for completion is also under legislation (according to the last update, the Shipping (Security) Law Memorandum, 5768-2008, was published and in currently being prepared as a bill). Additional bills passed their first reading, and others are in various legislative stages whose purpose is to repeal or amend existing legislation in order to disconnect the historical link, the validity of which has been gradually reduced, between them and the declaration of a state of emergency.

 

16.At the same time, we have been notified that the legislative processes have penetrated the margins of the hard core of the emergency legislation. A report from the Counseling and Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, dated May 19, 2011, stated that the Combating Terrorism Bill, 5771-2011, is in its initial legislative stage and is intended to replace the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948, and to amend the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739-1979, as well as other emergency laws. In this context, a memorandum was recently published regarding the amending of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations,  1945 (hereinafter: the Defence Regulations). As we know, the Defence Regulations were promulgated during the British Mandate for Palestine by the Mandatory Authorities as a means for grounding the powers of the High Commissioner (sec. 6 of Palestine (Defence) Order in Council, 1937, and included provisions regarding many areas, including arrest and deportation, seizure and confiscation of properties by the government, adjudication and penalties in civilian and military courts, military censorship, imposition of taxes, and more. These regulations were incorporated into Israeli law after the Mandate ended, by virtue of section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance. These Defence Regulations, despite their name, constitute primary legislation, and their validity is not contingent upon the existence of a declaration of a state of emergency. However, the above move seems to indicate, once again, a mindset and understanding on the part of authorities that the time has come to do away with vestiges of emergency legislation that has accompanied us since the establishing of the state, and that, of course, seems in part to be anachronistic and even draconian after 64 years.

 

17.We should further bear in mind that this Court does not, as a general rule, substitute its discretion for that of the competent authorities. This rule is of greater force when we are concerned with a dynamic, unpredictable security reality. I have previously had the opportunity to say:

 

For years we have been in a fluid situation, shifting sands, which as judges we do not know how to assess correctly. The Hamas takeover of Gaza… long periods of fire on Sderot and the towns around Gaza, the agreement between Hamas and Fatah (from April 2011) whose significance we cannot know, and the events that were termed the “Arab Spring” (beginning in December 2010). Do we have the capability to determine their security significance better than the security agencies and the Government? In my view, the answer to this cannot be in the affirmative. Indeed, this is temporary legislation – and so it should be – in order that it be closely reconsidered from time to time. But, unfortunately, temporary is not short, due to many unknown factors and rapid changes” (the Citizenship Law case, para. 43).

 

18.In conclusion we will state that although we welcome the progress, the work is far from completion, and the pace of change is  not satisfactory. The State declared long ago the need to change the current situation and to decouple existing legislation from the declaration of a state of emergency. It must complete this task, and the sooner the better. In this context, as in many others, the security situation takes a toll on Israeli democracy: “Israel combats a situation that may be the most difficult [among other democratic states – E. R.]; it attempts to do as best it can, even if this is not perfect, and supervision is regularly necessary” (Public Law in Times of Crises and Days of Warin (2003) 16, 20 (Hebrew)). But the cost, as stated throughout this proceeding, is not inevitable in all contexts. There is progress, although the pace can be improved. Much remains to be done, but at this time we must allow the competent authorities to complete the process, with the understanding that what commenced over ten years ago should reach its near conclusion. Israel is a normal country that is not normal. It is normal because it is an active democracy where basic rights, including liberties such as freedom of speech, independence of the courts and legal counsel are preserved and protected. It essentially fulfills its purpose as a Jewish and democratic state. It is not normal because the threats to its existence have yet to be removed. It is the only democratic state that exists under such threats, and its relationship with its neighbors, too, has yet to be arranged, notwithstanding peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and some agreements with the Palestinians. The struggle against terror persists and will likely continue for the foreseeable future. We do not yet sit every man under his grape vine or fig tree. The “road to normalcy” suffices to ask that emergency legislation be adapted to a 64 year old democracy. The challenge is to design a legal system, even in this regard, that contends with the normal aspect and the abnormal aspect as one. This goal is achievable. It is not in Heaven.

 

19.In conclusion, the order nisi shall be rescinded and the Petition dismissed, subject to the foregoing.

 

 

 

                                                                                               

Justice E. Arbel:

 

I concur.

 

 

                                                                                               

 

President (Emerita) D. Beinisch:

 

I concur with the conclusion reached by my colleague Justice E. Rubinstein, whereby we should, at present, rescind the order nisi because the Petition has exhausted itself and should be dismissed subject to what is stated in paragraph 18 of his opinion, and in view of the possibility to return to this Court should there be no progress in regard to the emergency legislation.

 

Over the course of the many deliberations and hearings that we held in this case, we  found it practical to separate the declaration of a state of emergency from the use made of this state and the extensive legislation dependent upon its continuation. The state of emergency has persisted since the inception of the State of Israel, and following Basic Law: The Government, its extension requires annual reconsideration by the Government and the Knesset. The state of emergency declared under law is, to a large extent, the result of a policy conception, and of status evaluations by the Government and the Knesset. For historical reasons, the approach regarding the state of emergency led to an inappropriate scope of legal mechanisms that need not be addressed here. Sadly, to this day, no proper framework has been established  to express the appropriate relationship between a concrete state of emergency and the possibility of granting the executive tools to act in such circumstances. The Petition, in its various incarnations, remained pending only because we saw the undisputed inadequacy of the long trail of legislation that followed the declaration of a state of emergency since the State’s inception. There is only a tenuous connection between a significant portion of legislation – which comprises orders and regulations issued decades ago  in reliance upon the existence of a state of emergency – and the state of emergency. This Court addressed this as early as some 50 years ago, as was noted in the opinion of my colleague E. Rubinstein. This Court also addressed the need to oversee the separation of the extensive emergency legislation from the framework of a declaration of a state of emergency in the areas of economics and consumer affairs, and even in matters of security. We noted this the past, as well as in our decisions on this Petition.

 

As noted, there was no dispute between the Parties as to the need to disconnect this legislation from the historical declaration of a state of emergency, so that the legislation in the relevant fields stand on its own independent feet, in accordance with proper legislative procedures. This process, as revealed from the updates we received, is taking place, although too little and too slowly. In this regard, I concur in the position of my colleague as expressed in para. 18 of his opinion, and I can only express my hope that the proper legislative processes will continue without the need for the intervention of this Court.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Decided in accordance with the opinion of Justice E. Rubinstein.

 

Given this day, 16 Iyar 5772 (May 5, 2012)

 

 

 

 

Shnitzer v. Chief Military Censor

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 680/88
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, January 10, 1989
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

This petition concerns the decision by the First Respondent to prohibit, under its authority according to Regulation 87(1) of the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) 1945, the publication of a newspaper article criticizing the functioning of the Director of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations (the “Mossad”,) while noting the upcoming change in Mossad directors. After submitting to the First Respondent different versions of the article and after the Petitioners withdrew several portions of it, excerpts discussing two matters were prohibited for publication: the first topic was criticism of the Director of the Mossad and questioning his efficiency. In the First Respondent’s opinion, such criticism may compromise the functionality of the entire Mossad, on all levels of its ranks. The other topic concerns the timing of the change of directors while emphasizing the public importance of the Mossad Director’s role. The First Respondent’s position is that such publication may focus attention onto the Director of the Mossad, which creates real danger to his safety. The Petitioners maintain that the excerpts of criticism in regards to the Director of the Mossad and the timing of changing the director are worthy of publication and that their prohibition is unlawful. The Petitioners rely on the importance of freedom of expression and the public’s right to know in a democracy, and in their view the publication does not create a near certainty for harm to state security that justifies limits to free expression.

 

The High Court of Justice ruled:

 

A.         1.         The Interpretation that must be given to the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) in the State of Israel is not identical to the interpretation that must be given to them at the time of the British Mandate. The Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) are currently part of the laws of the democratic state, and they must be interpreted in light of the fundamental principles of the Israeli legal system.

            2.         The Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) concern state security. This fact impacts the way the system’s fundamental principles are implemented but it does not impact the mere application of these fundamental principles. The state security and the public order do not outweigh or negate the application of fundamental principles. They are weaved into them, influencing their shape and content, and are balanced against them.

            3.         The fundamental principles that shape the interpretation of the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) are, first and foremost, considerations of security, which cover the entire scope of the Regulations. Realizing the interests in state security, public safety and public order are at the basis of the purpose for which the Regulations were enacted and they must be interpreted according to this purpose.

            4.         Alongside the security considerations (in their broad sense) stand additional values that any piece of legislation in a democratic society must be interpreted in their light and which are implicated by the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency).

 

B.         1.         It may so happen that fundamental principles conflict with each other. The principles in terms of state security, public safety and public order may conflict with values such as the freedom of movement, free expression, and human dignity. In each of these cases the Court must balance between the conflicting values.

            2.         The “balancing formula” in the conflict between state security and free expression presupposes realizing the values of state security.

3.         Because of the centrality of the fundamental value of free speech the infringement of this fundamental value must be as limited as possible, and only when the infringement of free speech is essential in order to realize the value of state security is this infringement permitted.

4.         The likelihood that justifies limits on free expression is that of a “near certainty.” There must be extreme circumstances that create a real and almost certain danger to the safety of the general public.

5.         This likelihood does not exist where other means – aside from limiting personal liberty and aside from limiting free expression – may be employed in order to reduce the danger. Infringing free expression need not be the first resort; it must be the last resort.

 

C.         1.         Subjective discretion must be applied within the contours of the authorizing statute. Therefore those who were empowered under the Defense Regulations (State of Emergency) may apply this authority in order to realize the purposes behind the Regulations rather than realizing irrelevant purposes.

            2.         Any governmental authority is based on conditions and requirements as to its implementation, and lawful implementation of the authority requires that such conditions be actually realized. Therefore, to the extent that the correct interpretation of Regulation 87 of the Defense Regulations (state of Emergency) is that a publication in a newspaper may be prohibited only if the Censor believes there is near certainty that the publication would cause real harm to security, then the Censor’s must give thought to the existence of such near certainty. Should the Censor prohibit a publication without being persuaded that the publication creates the required near certainty it did not exercise its discretion lawfully.

            3.         Discretion assumes freedom to select between lawful options.  Subjective discretion assumes that the competent authority makes the choice between the options according to an evaluation of each option’s benefits. This evaluation must be made according to the rules of administrative law: in good faith, without arbitrariness or discrimination, and following consideration of all relevant factors and only relevant factors.

            4.         The Censor’s decision must be reasonable, that is that any reasonable Censor would reach such decision under the circumstances. The question in each case is whether a reasonable military Censor may reach the conclusion that, on the basis of a given set of facts, there is near certainty that the publication would cause a severe or real harm to state security.

            5.         The determination that were the publication not prohibited there would be near certainty for real harm to state security must be based on clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.

 

D.         1.         There is no basis to the approach that the subjectivity of the administrative discretion restricts judicial review to only a limited number of grounds for review. The proper approach is that the theory of discretion establishes the conditions for the lawfulness of the use of discretion and the theory of adjudication establishes that the court is authorized to examine the existence of such conditions.

            2.         The principle of separation of powers requires the court to review the lawfulness of the administrative entities’ decisions. Security factors hold no unique status in this sense. Just as the courts are able and obligated to examine the reasonability of professional discretion in each and every area, so they are able and obligated to examine the reasonability of discretion in terms of security. There are no unique restrictions on the scope of judicial review over administrative discretion that concerns state security.

            3.         Under the circumstances here, once the First Respondent gave reasons for its decision, these reasons are subject to judicial review, just like any other administrative discretion.

 

E.         1.         The First Respondent’s distinction between criticism of the Director of the Mossad, which he believes compromises state security rendering prohibiting its publication and criticism of the Mossad itself, which must not be prohibited, is unacceptable. Publishing criticism of the functioning of the Director of the Mossad causes no near certainty of real harm to state security.

            2.         In a democratic society, criticism of people who hold public roles should be possible. Free expression includes the freedom to criticize and the freedom to pose difficult questions to those in government. Discomfort regarding criticism or the harm it may cause cannot justify the silencing of criticism in a democracy, which is founded on the exchange of idea and public discourse.

            3.         In deciding to prohibit the publication of criticism over the functioning of the Director of the Mossad, the First Respondent did not attribute sufficient weight to the principle of free expression. A free society cannot exist without a free press, therefore the press must be allowed to fulfill its function and only in special and extreme cases, where there is near certainty for real harm to state security, is there place for prohibiting news articles.

            4.         Under the circumstances here, the First Respondent did not meet the heavy burden of showing that advance restriction of free expression is lawful.

 

F.         1.         The First Respondent’s reasoning to prohibit the Petitioners to publish in an article details as to the timing of the change in the directors of the Mossad does not withstand the test of review. The possibility that publishing the timing of the impending change in the directors of the Mossad increase the risk to the outgoing Director’s safety is merely speculative.

            2.         There is public importance to the fact that the public is aware of the upcoming appointment. This reflects one of the aspects of the great importance of free expression and the public’s right to know.

            3.         Under the circumstances here, there position and the estimations of the First Respondent are unreasonable. In its approach, the Court does not appoint itself super-censor, but it finds that a reasonable censor, operating in a democracy and required to balance security against free expression, would not reach the conclusion reached by the First Respondent. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion

Daka v. Minister of the Interior

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7444/03
Date Decided: 
Monday, February 22, 2010
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioners were married in 1996; petitioner 1 is an Israeli citizen and petitioner 2 was born abroad and at the time of their marriage was a resident of the occupied territories. Following the couple’s marriage, petitioner 2 lived in Israel pursuant to limited duration permits to stay in Israel granted through a family unification process. These permits were regularly renewed until 1999, when she received a permit granting her temporary residence status. In 2003, a government resolution that had been adopted in 2002 and which had reversed previous policy on family unification approvals, was legislatively enacted in the form of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003. That same year, the couple was informed that petitioner 2’s most recent application for the renewal of her residence permit had been denied for security reasons. 

 

Held: (Justice Procaccia). Constitutional rights are not absolute, and the legitimacy of the violation of such a right is determined through a two stage process. The first stage involves a theoretical balancing of the violated right against the values that the government seeks to protect by using the measure that creates the violation. The second stage consists of a second balancing ― based on the results of the theoretical balancing conducted in the first stage ― of the concrete facts involved in each side of the equation in the particular case. In this case, the government’s 2002 resolution and the 2003 Knesset law changed the existing policy regarding family unification, such that the starting point in all such decisions was now that all applications for family unification would be denied unless they fall within certain exclusions including transitional provisions included in the statute. Because the denial of family unification status violates the constitutional right to a family life with a spouse who is or was a resident of the territories, these exclusions must be construed purposively, so that they provide the required balancing. The transitional provision applicable to the petitioners’ particular case is the provision applying to an extension of a residency status that had been granted prior to the new government resolution, and states that such a status “may” be extended ― ruling out an automatic denial of applications for renewal. The provision further stipulates that such extensions are to be allowed “while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment” ― indicating that a security impediment will be a factor to be weighed, but not an automatic ground for denial. Thus, in the case of an application from a non-Israeli spouse who has already lived in Israel for several years pursuant to a valid permit, the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is to be balanced against the strength of any security-related impediment that may be present in the particular case. If the applicant has already been living in Israel for several years and has children who have been born in Israel and are being educated there, the non-renewal of a residence permit is a severe violation. A security-related impediment will justify such a violation only when it is also of great weight. The efficacy of measures less drastic than the non-renewal of the permit must also be considered.

 

In this case, the applicant had been living, working and raising a family in Israel for seven years by the time the application for an extension of her residency status had first been denied. Her family’s strong expectation and interest in continuing their united family life needed to be weighed against the serious security concern raised by the fact that several members of her family were involved in terrorist activity; however, that security interest was an indirect one, because it did not involve the applicant herself and instead involved only her relatives, while there had been no evidence regarding her own involvement in dangerous activity. In such a situation, the state would need to establish that the probability that she herself would present a danger reached the level of near certainty in order to justify the violation of the right to a family life, but no such probability had been proven here. A proper weighing of the intense violation of a right to a family life against an indirect security danger presented by relatives of one applicant would indicate that the applicant should be permitted to stay in Israel, subject to a set of conditions which would include a commitment on her part to cut off all contact with the relatives involved in terrorism and not to visit the territories. In addition, the applicant should receive only permits to stay in Israel that would require renewal every six months, in order to allow proper monitoring of her behavior.

 

(President Beinisch, concurring). The result achieved through the theoretical and concrete balancing presented in Justice Procaccia’s opinion is correct. However, in weighing the interests involved, evidence presented by the security establishment need not be examined on any level higher than a prima facie review of correctness, due to the presumption of propriety that applies with regard to the findings of an administrative authority. In this case, the strength of the evidence of risk presented by the security establishment was clear. However, a proper weighing of the indirect risk against the harm done to the petitioners’ rights would nevertheless lead to the same practical conclusions described in Justice Procaccia’s opinion.

Petition granted.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

            

HCJ 7444/03

 

1.Balal Masour Daka

2.Manar Rashad Daka

v.

The Minister of the Interior

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[22 February 2010]

 

Before President D. Beinisch and Justices A. Procaccia and S. Joubran

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioners were married in 1996; petitioner 1 is an Israeli citizen and petitioner 2 was born abroad and at the time of their marriage was a resident of the occupied territories. Following the couple’s marriage, petitioner 2 lived in Israel pursuant to limited duration permits to stay in Israel granted through a family unification process. These permits were regularly renewed until 1999, when she received a permit granting her temporary residence status. In 2003, a government resolution that had been adopted in 2002 and which had reversed previous policy on family unification approvals, was legislatively enacted in the form of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003. That same year, the couple was informed that petitioner 2’s most recent application for the renewal of her residence permit had been denied for security reasons. 

 

Held: (Justice Procaccia). Constitutional rights are not absolute, and the legitimacy of the violation of such a right is determined through a two stage process. The first stage involves a theoretical balancing of the violated right against the values that the government seeks to protect by using the measure that creates the violation. The second stage consists of a second balancing ― based on the results of the theoretical balancing conducted in the first stage ― of the concrete facts involved in each side of the equation in the particular case. In this case, the government’s 2002 resolution and the 2003 Knesset law changed the existing policy regarding family unification, such that the starting point in all such decisions was now that all applications for family unification would be denied unless they fall within certain exclusions including transitional provisions included in the statute. Because the denial of family unification status violates the constitutional right to a family life with a spouse who is or was a resident of the territories, these exclusions must be construed purposively, so that they provide the required balancing. The transitional provision applicable to the petitioners’ particular case is the provision applying to an extension of a residency status that had been granted prior to the new government resolution, and states that such a status “may” be extended ― ruling out an automatic denial of applications for renewal. The provision further stipulates that such extensions are to be allowed “while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment” ― indicating that a security impediment will be a factor to be weighed, but not an automatic ground for denial. Thus, in the case of an application from a non-Israeli spouse who has already lived in Israel for several years pursuant to a valid permit, the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is to be balanced against the strength of any security-related impediment that may be present in the particular case. If the applicant has already been living in Israel for several years and has children who have been born in Israel and are being educated there, the non-renewal of a residence permit is a severe violation. A security-related impediment will justify such a violation only when it is also of great weight. The efficacy of measures less drastic than the non-renewal of the permit must also be considered.

 

In this case, the applicant had been living, working and raising a family in Israel for seven years by the time the application for an extension of her residency status had first been denied. Her family’s strong expectation and interest in continuing their united family life needed to be weighed against the serious security concern raised by the fact that several members of her family were involved in terrorist activity; however, that security interest was an indirect one, because it did not involve the applicant herself and instead involved only her relatives, while there had been no evidence regarding her own involvement in dangerous activity. In such a situation, the state would need to establish that the probability that she herself would present a danger reached the level of near certainty in order to justify the violation of the right to a family life, but no such probability had been proven here. A proper weighing of the intense violation of a right to a family life against an indirect security danger presented by relatives of one applicant would indicate that the applicant should be permitted to stay in Israel, subject to a set of conditions which would include a commitment on her part to cut off all contact with the relatives involved in terrorism and not to visit the territories. In addition, the applicant should receive only permits to stay in Israel that would require renewal every six months, in order to allow proper monitoring of her behavior.

 

(President Beinisch, concurring). The result achieved through the theoretical and concrete balancing presented in Justice Procaccia’s opinion is correct. However, in weighing the interests involved, evidence presented by the security establishment need not be examined on any level higher than a prima facie review of correctness, due to the presumption of propriety that applies with regard to the findings of an administrative authority. In this case, the strength of the evidence of risk presented by the security establishment was clear. However, a proper weighing of the indirect risk against the harm done to the petitioners’ rights would nevertheless lead to the same practical conclusions described in Justice Procaccia’s opinion.

Petition granted.

 

Legislation cited

 

Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision Law), 5763-2003, ss. 3d, 4.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited

 

[1] ..... HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. (2006) (unreported).

[1A] .. HCJ 466/07 MK Zehava Galon v. Attorney General (2012) (unreported).

[2] ..... HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241.

[3]...... HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset (2006) (unreported).

[4] ..... HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352.

[5] ..... HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. MK Rubinstein [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 800.

[6] ..... HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 950.

[7] ..... HCJ 2028/05 Amara v. Minister of the Interior (2006) (unreported).

[8] ..... HCJ 4541/41 Miller v.Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49 (4) 94.

[9] ..... HCJ Horev v. Minister of Transportation [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1.

[10] ... HCJ 6358/05 Vanunu v. Home Front Commander (2006) (unreported).

[11]     HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister (2006) (unreported).

[12]     HCJ 59/83 Cohen v. Jerusalem Municipality [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 318.

[13]     HCJ 237/81 Dabul v. Petah Tikva Municipality [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 365).

[14] ... HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. IDF Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[15] ... HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] 49(4) IsrSC 221.

 

For the petitioners ― R. Cohen.

For the respondent ― Y. Gensin, State Prosecutor’s Office.

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice A. Procaccia

1.    In this petition we are asked to order the Minister of the Interior to reverse his decision to cancel the approval that had been granted for the unification of the petitioners’ family, and to re-issue to petitioner 2 an approval for permanent residency in Israel and prevent her deportation from Israel.

The factual background of the petition

2.    Petitioner 1 was born in Israel and is an Israeli citizen. Petitioner 2 was born in Syria and was a resident of the territories [a term defined by law as referring to a resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria or the Gaza Strip] before she came to Israel. The petitioners were married in January 1996, and subsequently submitted an application for family unification and for petitioner 2 to be granted a permit for permanent residency in Israel. The couple have several children who were born in Israel and who are Israeli citizens. In 1998, the petitioners’ application for family unification was approved, and the “gradual procedure” [regarding residence status for spouses from the territories] was applied to petitioner 2’s case. At first, petitioner 2 was given DCL [District Coordination and Liaison Office] permits valid for a period of 12 months each, and later, in November 1999, she was given an A-5 temporary residence permit. The permit expired on 14 November 2001. On 4 November 2001 the petitioners applied for the permit to be extended. They were told to produce documents attesting to the locus of the center of their lives. Their documents were produced on 18 February 2003. On 12 March 2003, the security establishment stated its opposition to the extension of petitioner 2’s permit to reside in Israel. Consequently, on 24 April 2003, the respondent informed the petitioners that their application for the renewal of petitioner 2’s residence permit had been denied for security reasons. The petition before us followed.

The parties’ arguments

3.    The petitioners ask that we order the respondent to reverse his decision to discontinue the approval of the application for family unification, and to grant petitioner 2 a permit allowing permanent residence in Israel. They argue that the respondent’s cancellation of the family unification approval, which had been granted previously, was extremely unreasonable and disproportionate, as was his refusal to renew petitioner 2’s temporary residence permit. They argue that the Minister is both authorized and required to balance the relevant interests when making decisions on this matter. He has the authority, and the obligation, to consult with expert parties, and to weigh the applicable security considerations among the totality of his considerations and balance them against each other. In this case, they argue, the Minister divested himself of his duty to decide the petitioners’ matter himself, and essentially transferred the decision-making power to the security establishment. According to the petition, the respondent’s considerations in deciding whether or not to cancel a residence permit or to retract a previously granted family unification approval must be different from the considerations he is required to weigh in a preliminary examination of an initial application for family unification. The difference in the type of considerations to be weighed is required by the principle of proportionality, and by the different nature of the harm that can be inflicted on the applicants in the two situations. When approval has previously been given for family unification, only significant and weighty findings, based on the most solid of evidence, will constitute a reasonable ground for the cancellation of an approval or residence permit that have already been issued previously.

According to the petitioners, petitioner 2 presents no security risk for the State of Israel under the circumstances of this case. She has lived in Israel with her husband, studied Hebrew and trained to work as a cosmetician and as an optician; she was licensed to work as an optician by the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. The couple paid a considerable amount for her studies. She had worked previously as a secretary to the President of the Appellate Sharia Court ― a job from which she was dismissed following the intervention of the respondent’s representative. She recently completed a community leadership course organized by the Shatil organization, and she has been socially active and is a member of the Zemer Women’s Council, a position to which she was appointed by the head of the Zemer Local Council. Petitioner 1 has been a government employee for many years and serves as the secretary of the Regional Building and Planning Commission for the Eastern Sharon Region. In reliance on the family unification approval and the residence permit granted to petitioner 2, the couple changed their situation, set down roots, and settled and raised a family in Israel. They argue that cancellation of the family unification approval and of petitioner 2’s residence permit is unreasonable and disproportionate, and signifies the dissolution of their family and a violation of their legitimate expectation to realize their right to a family life, to equality and to protection against discrimination based on nationality or religion.

With regard to the respondent’s arguments, which will be described below, the petitioners reject the argument that the continuation of petitioner 2’s stay in Israel constitutes a risk to public security in light of the involvement of her three brothers in terrorist activity. Petitioner 2 presents no danger, it is argued. The petitioners note that the approval of the family unification application, as well as the renewal of petitioner 2’s temporary residence permit, both occurred while her father was serving in a senior security position in the Palestinian Authority as Chief of Police in Tul-Karem; moreover, both approvals were granted after one of her brothers had been arrested by the Israeli security forces and another brother ― according to information provided by the state ― had undergone military training in Afghanistan. Despite this, there has never been any suspicion that petitioner 2 herself has been involved in any hostile activity against Israel, or that she supports such activity. Moreover, petitioner 2’s father, who had in previous years served as an assistant to the Civil Defense Commander in Tul-Karem, has recently retired, and she is not in regular contact with her brothers, although she did visit with one of them while he was imprisoned in Israel, and is in telephone contact with her parents.

The petitioners expressed their willingness to accept a series of restrictions as a condition for petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel, including an undertaking to break off any contact with her father and her brothers, in response to the concern expressed by the state that her relatives who are involved in terrorism may attempt to draft her to engage in activity against the State of Israel. They also offered to undertake not to enter the territories, to notify the security establishment of any plan to leave Israel and to provide the details of any planned travel, and to undertake that they would not, by either act or omission, act against the security of the State of Israel or against the public peace, or assist any other party in doing so.

4.    The respondent, on his part, argued that the security reasons that give rise to a substantial concern regarding national security and the public peace provide a reasonable and relevant basis for his decision not to renew petitioner 2’s Israeli residence permit in the framework of family unification. According to the respondent, his decision is mainly based on information received to the effect that petitioner 2’s father is in contact with the heads of the Palestinian security forces, and that her three brothers are involved in terrorist activity ― two of them in the framework of organizations operating in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, and the third in the framework of the Islamic Jihad organization. The brothers are involved in terrorist activity at a high risk level, which is directed against the security of the State of Israel and against its existence. This involvement also creates a risk with respect to petitioner 2 as their relative, whose residence in Israel could be exploited by parties who are endangering the Israeli public.

5.    Respondent’s counsel stressed repeatedly in her arguments that the discretion granted to the Minister of the Interior with respect to the examination of an application from a foreign resident for an Israeli residence permit is very broad, and the scope of permissible review of that discretion is very narrow. In the framework of this exercise of discretion, the Minister can and must consider, inter alia, the danger that could be presented to the Israeli public and to the security of the state or to its vital interests as a result of the granting of the application. For the purpose of assessing this danger, the Minister of the Interior is required to consult with experts. When, in the view of the experts, there is a real possibility that such a danger will arise, the Minister of the Interior may take this assessment into consideration, and give it serious weight in his calculation.

6.    The respondent argues that the accumulated experience of the security establishment indicates that terrorist organizations customarily look for relatives of those activists who are residents of the territories ― relatives who live in Israel and carry Israeli papers as a result of a family unification process ― and recruit them in order to promote their objectives. These relatives are an attractive target for the terrorist organizations because of their freedom of movement within the territory of the state, and because of their close familiarity with the area. These relatives can become victims of exploitation by the terrorist organizations, completely unknowingly and innocently. The security risk presented by these relatives is therefore no less than the risk presented by a person who is directly involved in terrorist activity. The nature of the family relationships of those seeking residency status in Israel is relevant to the considerations of the authorized party and should be given proper weight. The relevant question to be considered is whether the residency status and freedom of movement within Israel that will be granted to the applicant are likely to endanger the public peace in light of the applicant’s family connections with terrorist organizations. The respondent’s position is that these connections are sufficient to establish a danger to public peace, especially when there are several relatives who are involved in terrorism, and that it is not necessary for there to have been any negative intelligence information relating directly to the applicant himself. The reasonableness of this position, they argue, is even clearer in light of the severity of the country’s security situation, and the real danger to public peace and state security that arises as a result of an Israeli resident’s connections to terrorists.

7.    The state notes that the main danger presented by petitioner 2 relates to her connection to her three brothers who are actually involved in terrorist activity, both in fundamentalist organizations in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, and in the framework of the World Jihad organization’s activity abroad.

Petitioner 2’s brother, Wa’al Daka, born in 1974, is an activist in World Jihad. He is currently located in the United Arab Emirates and is in contact with various terrorists, including activists in the Al Qaida terrorist organization. He is a member of that organization’s military wing. Wa’al remains in contact with his relatives and with additional terrorists who come to visit him abroad.

Basl Daka, another brother, is a Hamas military activist in Tul-Karem and belongs to the extremist Islamist religious stream. He underwent military training in Afghanistan, and during his interrogation he acknowledged that he had been recruited to the Al Qaida organization and that the training that he underwent there was meant to further the organization’s war of jihad. After his release from prison, he continued his activity on behalf of the Hamas organization in the territories, and is in constant contact with Wa’al and with other Hamas operatives.

Yet another brother, Walid Daka, is a Hamas military operative, who, during his interrogation following his arrest, acknowledged that he had been recruited by the Hamas organization and had taken part in checking out a route in anticipation of a terrorist attack; that he had been given weapons, fired a pistol, and purchased materials for the preparation of bombs and for the purpose of planning attacks, including a plan to poison the water in an Israeli settlement. He was convicted of having committed a series of crimes against regional security in the context of his membership in Hamas. After his release from prison in 2004, he continued his activity in the Hamas organization.

Petitioner 2’s father served as a high level officer and in a senior position within the Palestinian Authority. He served until recently as the Civil Defense Commander in Tul-Karem, and was in contact with the heads of the Palestinian security forces.

The family members are in ongoing contact with each other, and according to the respondent, petitioner 2 has been in continuous contact with the members of her nuclear family and even visited Basl while he was in prison. The respondent argued that petitioner 2 lied when she told the Court that she had severed ties with her family.

The respondent argues that in light of these family connections, petitioner 2 presents a high-level security risk. The serious information regarding her brothers, based on their status and activity in various terrorist entities, and the untrustworthiness of her declarations regarding her connections with them all serve as a proper basis for the respondent’s decision not to allow her continued residence in Israel. The state also notes that since the respondent refused to renew petitioner 2’s residence permit in April of 2003, she has been residing in Israel illegally and has also tried to obtain a job in the Ministry of Justice while using an identity number that was no longer valid.

The course of the deliberations

8.    Several hearings were held regarding this petition, over an extended period of time, during the course of which efforts were made to find practical solutions to which the parties would agree. Unfortunately, these attempts were unsuccessful. Consequently, on 8 July 2008, we issued an order nisi ordering the respondent to show cause why he should not approve petitioner 1’s application for family unification and grant petitioner 2 permanent residency status in Israel. In this context we asked ― that the respondent also consider the possibility of reaching a proportionate arrangement, the crux of which would be to grant petitioner 2 a DCL type temporary residence permit ― one which could be renewed from time to time ― and, if needed, to attach further conditions that would facilitate the monitoring of her conduct and the conduct of her family members. We added that in time, consideration should be given to the possibility of reissuing an A-5 residence permit to petitioner 2, if her circumstances should justify it. The respondent rejected the proposed arrangement. Following this, we heard supplementary oral and written arguments from the parties, and we viewed, ex parte and with the petitioners’ consent, the classified material presented by the state with regard to petitioner 2’s case.

Decision

The question

9.    The question to be decided in this case is whether and in what circumstances the competent authority may cancel a permit that was issued in the past allowing for family unification and for permanent residence in Israel for a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, due to a family relationship between the said spouse and terrorist activists, when there is no security-related intelligence regarding the spouse’s own direct connection with any activity directed against Israel’s security. This question involves a constitutional aspect relating to the basic human right to a family life —in this case, the right of an Israeli citizen to establish a family with a spouse from the territories ― which is juxtaposed against a public interest, the main part of which is the protection of the country’s citizens. An examination of these contrasting interests, and of the manner in which they should be reconciled for the purpose of the exercise of the respondent’s authority, lie at the heart of this petition.

We will first examine the issue in principle, and then the manner in which the principles are to be applied in the case before us.

The constitutional aspect

10.  It is a basic principle that constitutional human rights, although they are given preferred status in the constitutional regime, cannot be implemented in an absolute manner. They are afforded only relative protection when they are set against general interests or contrasting constitutional rights. The required balancing between basic rights and conflicting values requires, first and foremost, a theoretical balancing which views the range of values that are confronting each other conceptually, and which determines their relative weight in the realm of values. After this theoretical balancing is carried out, a more concrete balancing is required ― one that examines the ramifications of the theoretical balancing for the specific circumstances of the case.

The theoretical balancing

11.  The Israeli legal system recognizes the right to a family life as a basic human right; the right of every Israeli spouse to establish a family unit in Israel, under conditions of equality in relation to other Israeli spouses, is a part of human dignity. The right to a family life under conditions of equality is a protected constitutional right pursuant to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003 (hereinafter: “the Temporary Provision Law”), involves a severe violation of the right to a family life of an Israeli spouse who is not permitted to realize his right to a family life in Israel with his spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories. The Temporary Provision Law negates the rights of thousands of Israeli Arabs to realize their rights to family life in Israel and thus violates their rights to human dignity (HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [1]).    

12. In Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], an expanded panel of this Court, consisting of 11 justices, dealt with a series of petitions filed against the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law. We examined the Law from the perspective of the limitations clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and we examined in depth the matter of whether the Law was directed at a proper purpose, and whether it complies with the various aspects of the proportionality test. This examination was conducted against the background of the conflict between the constitutional human right to a family life and to equality, on the one hand, and the security consideration arising under the difficult political and security circumstances that Israeli society is forced to face, on the other. By a single vote, the Court took the position that the Law was constitutional at that time, and that the petitions in that case should be denied. The issue of the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law again became the subject of deliberations in this Court in a case that is currently pending before an expanded panel (HCJ 466/07 MK Zehava Galon v. Attorney General [1A]).

13.  Under these circumstances, and on the assumption that the Law is constitutional under the current legal situation, it falls to us to interpret the Temporary Provision Law and to apply its provisions in a manner that will properly express the conflict between the right to a family, to which all citizens and residents of Israel are entitled, on the one hand, and national security considerations, on the other hand ― while establishing the proper weighting of a basic human right that enjoys a superior position within the range of human rights, and of a public interest with which it is in conflict. The interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the Law under discussion are affected by the constitutional duty to protect the right to a family as a superior right within the range allowed by the law, while providing a correct and proportionate response to the security concern as required by the reality of the current situation, but not beyond the extent that is necessary. The proper balancing between the basic human rights and the security value is necessary not only for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law, but also for the purpose of construing and implementing the Law’s provisions, as a practical matter.

Indeed,

‘[a] violation of a human right will be recognized only where it is essential for realizing a public interest of such strength that it justifies, from a constitutional viewpoint, a proportionate reduction in the right’ (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 4)).

14. The more significant the right that has been violated, and the more serious the violation, the more substantial the opposing public interest must be in order for the violation to be justified and proportionate. The violation of the basic right can be justified only if there is a correlation between the importance of that right and the weight of the contrasting public interest. The level of the violation must also fit into this correlation:

‘A serious violation of an important right which serves no purpose other than to protect a weak public interest would be considered to be an excessive violation’ (HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at p. 273 (per Justice Zamir)).

At issue in the instant case is the proper balance the right of an Israeli spouse to realize, under conditions of equality, a family life with his spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, on the one hand, and, on the other, the interest of protecting public security. This balance can only be achieved through the application of relative criteria, rather than through the use of absolute values. It is built on a determination of the probability of the degree of danger to life and security on the one hand, versus the importance of the human right to maintain a family on the other hand. In determining the proportionate relationship between the two conflicting values, we must assess, on the one hand, the strength of the public interest ― in terms of the likelihood of a danger to public peace being presented in these situations by the realization of the human right to maintain a family; on the other hand, the level of the violation of the right to a family life resulting from the restriction that the security establishment seeks to impose here must also be assessed. We must examine whether there exists, in the balance that is being sought, an appropriate correlation between the strength of the basic right both in terms of principle and practice, and the level of the security need, and whether the violation of the human right that will result is proportionate under the circumstances.

15.  The human right to a family life is one of the basic elements of human existence; its realization is a condition for reaching fulfillment and a meaningful existence; it is a condition for a person’s self-fulfillment, and for his or her ability to tie his or her life to that of a spouse and children in a true sharing of their fates. It reflects the essence of the human experience and the embodiment of a person’s strivings. The right to a family life is placed at the highest ranking on the scale of human rights. A restriction of this right is permissible only when it is set against a value which is of special power and importance. In the conflict between the value of security and other human rights, including the right to a family life, the security consideration will be the prevail only when there is a near certainty that if the measures leading to the restriction on the right to a family life are not imposed, the public peace will be substantially harmed.

16. The state bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of the probability of a security risk at a level that justifies a restriction of a human right (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 9); HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset [3] (per President Barak, at paras. 21-22 and 49); Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at pp. 268-269 (per Justice Zamir)). The state must persuade the court that the probability of the public peace being endangered is at least at the level of near certainty, and that it will not be possible to protect against that danger without violating the human right.

17. It has been said, on several occasions, that the “security need” argument, when made by the state, is not a magic formula which is to be accepted without question as soon as it is raised. Although the Court does generally act with restraint when examining the government’s security considerations, the reasonableness of the authorities’ arguments as well as the proportionality of the measures that the authorities seek to implement must nevertheless be examined in depth, whenever the security policy violates human rights (HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4], at pp. 375-376; HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. MK Rubinstein [5], at p. 810). The security risk must be assessed, in the context of this examination, in terms of the probability of its realization, as compared to the magnitude of the violated individual right confronting it, and with respect to the proportionality of the violation of the right which is to be permitted for the purpose of realizing a public interest. The security consideration is examined in a two-stage process: first, the credibility of the security argument is tested; next, the strength of the security interest in terms of the probability that the security risk will in fact be realized is reviewed (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 11)).

18.  The work of carrying out a constitutional balancing is done first on the theoretical level; the next step must be a specific-individual examination with respect to the particular case. A sweeping denial on the part of the authorities of the rights of individuals who wish to realize their basic rights, without carrying out an individual constitutional balancing based on specific information that is unique to the case, is a violation of constitutional principles ― principles that require both a theoretical and a specific balancing. Such a sweeping violation obscures the duty imposed on the administrative authority to give proportionate consideration to all the information that is relevant to the administrative decision, and to reach a decision based on the proper balancing of all the data. It is liable to cause the attribution of a determinative value to one consideration, and a disproportionate discounting of a human right which is of central importance. It can lead to a severe impairment of the values of life and of culture, and to violations of the principles of a democratic regime, which is based on the protection of human rights.

Thus:

‘No one will deny the seriousness of the security situation in which we find ourselves, and the supreme task imposed on the state to protect the lives of its citizens. At the same time, just as we must confront the danger to life and defend ourselves against it, so too we must protect ourselves against the danger of losing security in our values and in the protection of human rights. We must beware the erosion of human rights against the background of security arguments by not maintaining the proper proportion between them. Without insisting on this proportionality, the constitutional approach that protects human rights may be eroded; consequently, cracks may appear in the foundations of our constitution; democratic patterns of life in Israel may be prejudiced and the recognition of human dignity and the right to realize one’s identity may be undermined. We must take care not to be carried away by security arguments like blind persons in the dark, where doing so leads to a violation of a human right. We must examine their credibility and strength in accordance with reliable figures, and assess it in accordance with the tests of logic, common sense and the rules of probability.’ (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 22)).

These principles also apply to an examination of the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the Knesset, and they apply equally to the interpretation of a law and to its practical implementation, where the law itself has been found to be constitutional.

Background and main policy principles of the Temporary Provision Law

19.  On 12 May 2002, the government adopted Resolution 1813 which set in place a new procedure for handling applications for family unification pertaining to Israelis whose spouses are residents of the territories (hereinafter “the Government Resolution”). As of 6 August 2003, the government’s policy has been anchored in the Temporary Provision Law, which has been extended from time to time. The Government Resolution and the enactment of the Temporary Provision Law brought about a change in the family unification policy that had been followed until that time. In the past, the starting point had been that an Israeli citizen could be united with a spouse who had the status of a resident of the territories, absent a ground that nullified such unification, such as a criminal or security-related impediment. This starting point was turned around, and since the enactment in the Law of this policy change, applications for family unification have been rejected, subject to exclusions listed in the Law.

20.  The entry into force of the Government Resolution and the Temporary Provision Law inflicted a serious blow to the constitutional rights of Israeli Arabs ― to their right to create a complete family unit within Israel’s borders with spouses who are residents of the territories. According to the existing legal situation, this violation has been recognized in the case law of this Court as a proportionate violation according to constitutional principles, in light of considerations relating to the security of the state and to the need to protect the citizens of the State of Israel from the potential danger presented by terrorist forces in the territories. The conflicting values that are involved in the right to a family life, on the one hand, and the security interest on the other, underlie the policy against the background of which the Temporary Provision Law was formulated, and this conflict of values affects the correct interpretation of its provisions. Given this situation, in which the basic right of spouses who are residents and citizens of Israel to unite with spouses from the territories is violated, it is necessary to construe the Temporary Provision Law purposively, in a manner that limits the scope of this violation to the degree that is absolutely necessary in order to realize the security objective. Given the strength of the basic right to a family life as an individual constitutional right of the highest order, only a security interest of truly substantial weight will justify its violation; a theoretical and abstract security interest will not justify such a violation. Alongside the principle that the legitimacy of the violation of the right to family life must require the existence of an especially powerful security interest, there is also a need for a narrow interpretation of the scope of the permissible violation of the right to a family life, as well as a liberal interpretation of the exceptions listed in the Temporary Provision Law which allow, within limited boundaries, a deviation from the general policy of rejecting family unification. These exceptions allow the realization of the right to a family life through the grant of an Israeli residence permit to a spouse from the territories, under certain circumstances. The requirement that a violation of the right to a family life be conditioned on the presence of a substantively weighty security interest, and an expansive interpretation of the exceptions in the Law which make possible, under certain conditions, the realization of this right, are the inevitable consequences of the constitutional clash of values involved in the Law’s operation.

The interpretation of the Law and its mode of implementation must reflect the deep constitutional tension that is created as a result of the acute conflict between the right to a family life and the importance of the security consideration under the actual circumstances that characterize Israeli society.

The transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law

21.  The application of the new policy, which prohibits family unification as a rule, necessitated transitional arrangements for residents of the territories who had been granted, prior to the Law’s entry into force, a residence permit or a permit allowing the person to remain in Israel in a family unification framework. A transitional arrangement was also required for those residents of the territories who had submitted an application for family unification prior to the date of the Government Resolution regarding the prohibition on family unification dated 12 May 2002 (hereinafter: “the determinative date”).

 

22.  The following is the text of the transitional provisions:

 

Transition provisions

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Law ―

 

(1) The Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, may extend the validity of a license to live in Israel or of a permit to stay in Israel, which were held by a resident of the area prior to the commencement of this Law, while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment as stated in section 3D.

 

 

(2) The area commander may give a permit for a temporary stay in Israel to a resident of an area who filed an application to become a citizen under the Citizenship Law or an application for a license to live in Israel under the Entry into Israel Law, before the first of Sivan 5762 (12 May 2002) and with regard to which, on the date of commencement of this law, no decision had been made, provided that a resident as aforesaid shall not be given citizenship, under the provisions of this paragraph, nor shall he be given a license for temporary residence or permanent residence, under the Entry into Israel Law (emphasis added).

     

23.  The transitional provisions are part of the exceptions adopted in the Law which permit, even after the determinative date, the granting, under certain circumstances, of a residence permit to a spouse from the territories, or of a permit allowing the spouse to remain in Israel for the purpose of family unification. Because these exceptions, and the transitional provisions as a whole, are provisions that promote and are suited to the realization of the constitutional right to a family life, they must, in the context of legislation that violates the basic human right to a family life, be construed and applied broadly. The purpose of the transitional provisions is to uphold the Israeli spouse’s right to a family life under factual circumstances that give rise to a reliance interest and to legitimate expectations regarding that right. Although the legislature has adopted, with regard to new applications for family unification, a policy of a sweeping prohibition on the basis of security considerations, the transitional provisions preserve a certain correlation between the right to a family life and the issue of security considerations, based on individual circumstances. The balance that the legislature found to be proper for the purpose of the transitional arrangement involves, first of all, the possibility that an Israeli residence permit can be extended for a person whose residence in Israel had been permitted prior to the determinative date in the context of family unification. This possibility was also prescribed for a person who had submitted an application for family unification prior to the determinative date and regarding whom a decision had not been reached by that time. However, the permits are to be granted pursuant to the transitional provisions only when there is no security-related impediment relating to the particular individual applicant that justifies a refusal to grant or renew a permit. The transitional provisions also establish that the extension of a residence permit that has already been granted will not allow for the upgrading of the applicant’s status, and the grant of a first-time permit will be limited to a temporary stay permit which may not be upgraded to a higher residency status, as long as the arrangements in the Temporary Provision Law remain in place (HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior [6]).

The security-related impediment in the transitional provisions

24.  The existence of a security-related impediment is liable to prevent the application of the exception incorporated in the transitional provisions which enables the extension, under certain conditions, of an existing residence permit that had been granted to a spouse from the territories in the context of family unification, or which allows for the grant of a new permit to an applicant who had submitted an application prior to the determinative date and regarding whom a decision had not been reached prior to that date. In implementing the transitional provision, the competent authority is required to decide the proportionate relationship between the Israeli spouse’s legitimate expectation to realize his right to be united with a spouse from the territories, as derived from his constitutional right to a family life, on the one hand, and the scope and level of the existing security-related impediment regarding the spouse from the territories, on the other hand. The concept of a “security-related impediment” is not a single-value concept, and its nature can change from case to case, in view, inter alia, of the nature and strength of the conflicting values. The concept of a “security-related impediment” is a framework concept, and its content and weight are affected by the specific context in which it arises. The more concrete the Israeli spouse’s interest is in realizing his right to a family life, the greater the weight that is required of the security-related impediment in order to justify the denial of an application for family unification in the framework of the transitional provisions, in terms of either the extension of an existing residence permit or the approval of an application for a permit that had been submitted prior to the determinative date regarding which a decision had not yet been reached by that date.

A concrete expectation regarding the realization of the right to a family life when a permit for family unification had already been granted and a request has been made for its renewal has a different import than the expectation that exists when no such permit has ever been granted.

25.  Of the two situations to which the transitional provisions relate, it is clear that a couple’s expectation with respect to the renewal of a residence permit when such a permit had already been issued previously is one of great strength. The strength of such an expectation will be greater than that of a couple that has not yet been allowed to enjoy family unification, and whose application for such unification had not yet been answered by the determinative date. Moreover, there may be a difference in terms of the strength of the expectations of a family that has lived in Israel for many years and has set down roots in terms of their life in Israel and who have a number of children who are being raised and educated in Israel, as compared to the strength of the expectations of a young couple that has only recently been permitted to stay together through family unification and who have only been in Israel for a short period and have not yet built a complete family unit or integrated into work and life in Israel. There must be a correlation between the strength of the expectation for a permit pursuant to the transitional provisions, and the special weight of the security-related impediment ― the weightier the expectation for family unification in light of the specific circumstances, the greater the security interest must be to justify the violation of that expectation.

26.  The Temporary Provision Law refers to the security-related impediment in s. 3D as follows:

‘A permit to stay in Israel shall not be given to a resident of the territories pursuant to s. 3, 3A(2), 3B(2) and (3) and 4(2), nor shall a permit to reside in Israel be granted to any other applicant who is not a resident of the territories, if the Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, determines, in accordance with an opinion from the competent security authorities, that the resident of the area or the other applicant or the family member of these are likely to constitute a security risk to the State of Israel; in this section, ‘family member’ shall mean a spouse, parent, child, brother, sister and their spouses. For this purpose, the Minister of the Interior may determine that a resident of the territories or other applicant is liable to constitute a security risk to the State of Israel, on the basis of, inter alia, an opinion by the security personnel that, within the country or territory in which the resident of the territories or the other applicant resides, activity is carried out which is liable to endanger the security of the State of Israel or of its citizens’ (emphasis added).

 This provision authorizes the competent authority to refuse to grant a permit under the exceptions prescribed in the law ― including pursuant to the transitional provisions, with regard to an application for a new permit pursuant to s. 4(2) of the Law ― if the applicant for the permit, or a family member, is liable to present a security risk to the state. The concept of a “family member” for this purpose is defined broadly, and it includes various degrees of family relationship within the nuclear family circle and within a broader circle as well ― a spouse, parent, child, or sibling, or their spouses. Thus, the legislature defined a “security-related impediment” broadly, and includes in it not only a direct risk presented by the permit applicant himself (hereinafter: a “direct security-related impediment”) but also an indirect risk presented by the applicant’s close relatives (hereinafter: an “indirect security-related impediment”).

The security-related impediment in relation to the two alternatives in the transitional provisions

27.  The Law, in its content and its formulation, creates a certain distinction between the manner in which, pursuant to the first transitional provision in s. 4(1) of the Law (hereinafter: the “first transitional provision”), the presence of a security-related impediment affects an applicant seeking a renewal of a residence permit that had been issued in the past, and the manner in which such an impediment affects an applicant seeking a permit for the first time, regarding whom a decision had not yet been rendered prior to the determinative date, and who is therefore subject to the transitional provision in s. 4(2) of the Law (hereinafter: the “second transitional provision”).

28.  The provision in s. 3D of the Law regarding the “security-related impediment” applies directly, pursuant to the text of the second transitional provision in s. 4(2) of the Law ― i.e., to an applicant for a new permit whose application had not yet been approved by the determinative date. For this purpose, the beginning of s. 3D provides that “a permit to stay in Israel shall not be given to a resident of the territories pursuant to . . . s. 4(2)” if the competent authority determines that there is a security-related impediment in the sense of there being a security risk that is presented by the permit applicant or by his family member. Regarding an applicant for a new permit whose entry into Israel has not yet been approved but whose application was pending prior to the determinative date, the Law provides, categorically, that “a permit . . . shall not be granted” in the event that there is a security-related impediment, as defined there.

29.  The first transitional provision, in s. 4(1) of the Law, operates differently. This provision deals with an extension of an existing permit held by a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, and who has been living in Israel by virtue of that permit. The section provides as follows, regarding such a case:

‘The Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, may extend the validity of a license to live in Israel or of a permit to stay in Israel, which were held by a resident of the area prior to the commencement of this law, while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment as stated in section 3D (emphasis added).. 

30.  The difference in the statutory language in each of the two situations is not accidental. It indicates that the security-related impediment is relevant to both the first and second transitional provisions, but the manner in which it is applied in the two situations in terms of the balancing that is to be carried out between the security risk and the level of the violation of the legitimate interest in the realization of the right to a family life differs. Regarding the second transitional provision, which deals with an applicant for a new permit whose entry into Israel, has not yet been allowed and whose application for a family unification permit was pending and undecided as of the determinative date, s. 3D provides that a permit will not be granted if there is a security risk. In contrast, with regard to an applicant for an extension of a family unification permit that was given in the past, the Law provides that the competent authority may extend the duration of the permit “taking into consideration, inter alia, the presence of a security related impediment, as described in s. 3D of the Law.” It appears that this language indicates that in the context of the balancing between the conflicting values, greater weight will be given to the expectation interest of a couple who have already been allowed to unite in the framework of family unification and who wish to continue this shared life, as compared to the weight given to the interest of a couple whose application has not yet been approved prior to the determinative date. Regarding the first transitional provision, only the existence of a security interest which is especially strong will provide a constitutional justification for a violation of the right to family life, if approval for family unification has been granted in the past and the couple is now seeking an extension of such approval. Regarding an applicant whose entry had not yet been allowed prior to the determinative date, a weaker security-related impediment is likely to be sufficient in order to justify a refusal to grant a permit, pursuant to the second transitional provision.

31.  It therefore appears that according to the statutory language and in light of the purpose of the Law, and in light of the constitutional principles governing its mode of implementation, a first-time applicant to whom the second transitional provision in s. 4(2) applies will be directly subject to the provisions of s. 3D of the Law with regard to a security-related impediment. If the Minister of the Interior determines that either such an applicant, who is a resident of the territories, or a family member of such an applicant, is likely to constitute a security risk for the State of Israel, then, according to this provision, a permit to stay in Israel temporarily will “not be granted.” Invocation of this authority does involve the exercise of discretion ― however, when the considerations are balanced, special weight will be granted to the security aspect. In contrast, the provisions of the first transitional provision in s. 4(1) of the Law will apply to an application for an extension of a residence permit, which is submitted by an applicant who has already been granted a family unification permit in the past and who is living in Israel pursuant to that permit. According to that provision, the security-related impediment factor described in s. 3D of the Law constitutes only one of several factors that the Minister of the Interior is required to consider in reaching a decision as to whether to extend the existing Israeli residence permit. In accordance with this provision, the Minister of the Interior, in the framework of the exercise of his authority and judgment, is authorized to and may extend the existing residence permit even if there is a security-related impediment, as stated in s. 3D of the Law. All this is subject to the entire array of circumstances, and to the relative weight to be attributed to each of the relevant factors that are considered in the framework of the constitutional and concrete balancing ― a balancing which is also required in light of the reasonableness standard that must be followed with respect to any administrative decision.

32.  The exercise of the Minister of the Interior’s authority regarding the transitional provisions must comply with the principles of administrative law. Therefore, the Minister of the Interior’s decision must be reached through a proper administrative process, and it must be free of any irrelevant considerations, and of any arbitrariness or any violation of the principles of natural justice. It must be a reasonable decision. Within the bounds of the reasonableness requirement, the decision must be based on an appropriate factual underpinning, and it must be based on all relevant considerations and on those considerations only, and it must be reached by establishing a proper balance among those considerations, within the boundaries of reasonableness. Since the significance of the decision is likely to involve a possible violation of the Israeli spouse’s high-ranking basic constitutional right, it must also satisfy the proportionality requirement established in the limitations clause (HCJ 2028/05 Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at paras. 9-17); HCJ 4541/41 Miller v. Minister of Defense [8]; HCJ Horev v. Minister of Transportation [9], at p. 41; HCJ 6358/05 Vanunu v. Home Front Commander, at para. 12 [10]; HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [11] (per President Barak, at para. 22)).

The relevant and contrasting considerations in the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law

33.  The significance of the refusal by the competent authority to grant or to renew an Israeli residence permit in the case of a spouse who falls within the purview of the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law in the context of a family unification process is that the right of the Israeli family members ― a spouse, and any minor Israeli children ― to conduct a unified family life will be denied. Juxtaposed against this denial of a right is the purpose of the Temporary Provision Law, which is to protect the security of the Israeli public. Although our case involves a review of the administrative discretion exercised by the administrative authority, the criteria for examining such discretion are also affected by the principles of constitutional law, as the exercise of this authority involves a violation of a basic human right ― i.e., the right to a family life. In light of this, the authority may only be exercised in a manner that satisfies the relevant constitutional tests. The security objective, which underlies this use of the administrative authority, must comply with the tests set out in the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, when such use is likely to violate the basic right to family life. As a rule, the violation of a basic right for the purpose of protecting the security of the state and that of its residents is deemed to have a proper purpose and to conform to the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state. The key question, then, is whether the requirement of proportionality has been satisfied with respect to the manner in which the authority has been exercised pursuant to the Temporary Provision Law, when it involves a violation of a basic right to a family life for the purpose of responding to a security need. In such a case, proportionality must be examined according to the sub-tests that have been developed in the case law. The rational connection test, the less-violative means test and the narrow proportionality test are the guiding tests in determining the proportionality of a violation of a constitutional right. The application of these tests to our matter involves the following: first, when the security-related impediment consideration arises in connection with spouses to whom the transitional provisions apply, a correlation is required between, on the one hand, the measure that has been used which prevents family unification, and, on the other hand, the objective of protecting the security of the state and the public peace. Next, it must be the case that the security-related purpose cannot be achieved through the use of any other measure that involves a lesser violation. Finally, the nature and level of the violation of the right to family life and to equality must be in proper proportion to the security objective that is being pursued through the implementation of the measure that prevents the requested unification (Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at para. 11)). For the purpose of applying the narrow proportionality test, it is not necessary to examine the entire range of the security benefits that will be achieved, in comparison to the situation that would prevail if no other measure was taken to prevent the security risk. All that is needed is an examination of the marginal additional benefit to security that is achieved through the termination of the family unification process, compared to the possibility of using alternative security measures ― such as the grant of temporary renewable permits for staying in Israel, which allow the for periodic official review by the true level of danger anticipated from the spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories and who is living in Israel; increased supervision of the spouse staying in Israel; and a commitment from that spouse (whose compliance with such commitment will be tested regularly) to cut off all contact with any hostile elements, along with other possible measures. In applying the proportionality test as stated, there may be a difference in the relative weight to be attributed to a violation of the right to a family life as compared with the security advantage to be gained from the violation in the context of a refusal to renew a residence permit to one who has already received such a permit in a family unification context and is already legally living in Israel, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the relative importance to be attributed to these values in a situation in which the person has not yet been granted such unification status, and has submitted an application prior to the determinative date which had not yet been decided by that date. In the following discussion, we will discuss briefly each of the values that the competent authority is required to consider for the purpose of applying the transitional provisions; we will then discuss whether it would be appropriate to intervene in the authority’s decision under such circumstances.

The violation of the constitutional right to a family life in the context of the transitional provisions

34.  The refusal to grant a first-time family unification permit, or to renew such a permit when one had been granted previously, is a severe violation of the right to a family life ― one which violates a person’s dignity, his personal autonomy and the meaning of his life which is inextricably tied to his ability to realize a full life in the framework of family, with a spouse and children. This violation cuts through the length and breadth of a person’s life, and affects all aspects of his life, as well as his ability to realize his independence fully and completely. It detracts from the person’s ability to fully experience happiness in life, and sentences him to a life of loneliness, detachment and sadness during the best years of his life. The refusal to extend an Israeli residence permit to a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, and who is living in Israel in the framework of family unification, is one of the most severe blows that can be inflicted on the fabric of family life and on the spouse who is an Israeli resident. As a rule, it is a more serious violation than that suffered by a couple who have not yet been allowed to unite and live together in Israel (HCJ 59/83 Cohen v. Jerusalem Municipality [12], at 320; HCJ 237/81 Dabul v. Petah Tikva Municipality [13]). When a first-time permit for family unification has been granted, a family unit begins to be established, and the united family begins to put down roots in Israel. The spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories studies Hebrew and integrates himself or herself into the labor market, children are born, these children receive Israeli citizenship and are educated and study in Israeli schools, and the family becomes integrated into Israeli society. The refusal to extend an Israeli residence permit for a person who fulfils the conditions of the first transitional provision thus causes the family to face a tragic decision. They must choose between two alternatives. The first would be the entire family’s removal from Israel, from their relatives, extended family and from their friends; from their life in Israel and from the culture and sources of employment on which they rely ― a removal which would mean the familial, social, economic and cultural disconnection of a unified family that has lived and put down roots in Israel, sometimes for a period of many years. The second possibility is for the couple to separate, with the Israeli spouse remaining in Israel and the foreign spouse returning to his or her original place of residence within the territories, and with the children being separated from one or the other of their parents. The separation of the family members from each other under such circumstances is difficult for all involved ― for the couple and for their children ― and it involves the fracturing of the family’s human, social, cultural, and economic frameworks.

35.  The refusal to grant an application submitted by a resident of the territories to enter into Israel for the purpose of family unification, when no such application has been approved in the past, also carries severe consequences from the perspective of the family that has not yet had the opportunity to build a unified family unit. However, the violation involved in this refusal is of lesser magnitude than that of the violation caused to a party whose residence in Israel has already been approved, and which has already established a full family life in Israel, with all that this implies. This difference in the strength of the expectation of family unification and the extent of the violation of that expectation in the two situations affects the determination of the proper balance between the violation and the level of the security-related impediment in the framework which is necessitated by the proportionality test. This difference finds expression in the wording and purpose of the Law.

The security-related impediment in relation to the transitional provisions in the Temporary Provision Law

36.  The duty of the state to protect its citizens’ lives places the security consideration at the highest level of importance. This consideration has two aspects: a social aspect, which impacts on the state’s duty to protect its citizens’ security; and an individual aspect, which impacts on the right of the individual within the society to enjoy adequate protection of his life and of his well-being ― protection that the government has a responsibility to provide. The right to life is a constitutional human right of the highest order and it ranks first among the human rights protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Nevertheless, the value of protecting life is not a single absolute concept. Its relative weight varies from case to case, according to the probability of the realization of the danger to life that arises in the specific context. Occasionally, the security value will also need to be weighed against other values of special importance, according to their relative weight.

37.  The assessment of the degree of danger presented by a particular person is a complex task. It becomes especially difficult, given the security situation that Israel is currently facing, when what must be assessed is the danger presented by a resident of the territories. The forces battling against Israel are terrorist forces that are frequently assisted by the civilian population. The source of the security danger is likely to relate directly to the spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories ― the spouse who is applying for a family unification permit or an extension of such a permit. This is the case when the applicant for the permit is himself connected to or involved in terrorist activity. However, the danger may relate not to the applicant for the permit himself or herself, but rather, to the applicants’ relatives and family members who are themselves connected to terrorist activity; in these circumstances, the concern is that such family members might make use of their relatives who have been granted family unification status in order to promote their dangerous activities (Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at para. 14); Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4]). Therefore, in an assessment of the security risk presented by a resident of the territories seeking family unification status, the evaluation must be not only of the direct danger presented by the applicant himself. Relative weight must also be given to the applicant’s family connections to elements that are involved in terrorism, in light of the potential danger involved in the exploitation of these connections by elements that endanger the security of Israel’s residents. Thus, the definition of the security-related impediment provided in s. 3D of the Law relates not only to the direct security danger presented by the applicant for the permit himself, but also to the indirect security risk presented by the permit applicant’s family connection to elements that endanger the security of the state.

38.  However, it must be stressed that the subject of the security-related impediment referred to in the statutory language is, in all circumstances, the security danger presented by the applicant for the permit himself, whether a direct danger, relating to a concern of direct involvement on the part of the applicant himself in terrorist activity, or an indirect danger, relating to a concern arising from the possibility that the applicant will be wrongfully exploited by family members who are involved in terrorism. The purpose of the analysis of the security-related impediment is not to prevent a danger presented by a relative of the applicant alone; rather, it relates to the effect that this danger will have on the security danger presented by the applicant as a consequence of possible exploitation of the applicant by terrorist elements, for harmful purposes (Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4], at pp. 370-371; HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. IDF Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region [14], at p. 364). The explanatory notes accompanying the draft version of s. 3D of the Law clearly indicated that the purpose of weighing the danger presented by a family member of an applicant who is a resident of the territories is that it can indicate, in an indirect manner, the level of danger presented by the applicant himself, in light of the general professional assessment of the security establishment that “such a connection between a resident of the territories and a family member, from which a security risk may result, can be exploited, as has often been proven in the past” (explanatory notes to s. 3D, Government Draft Laws, 16 May 2005, at p. 626). Since the level of danger presented by a family member is only a possible indicator of the level of danger presented by a resident of the territories applying for family unification, it is understood that for the purpose of implementing s. 3D of the Temporary Provision Law, the weight of a direct security risk presented by the resident of the territories (which would justify the denial of an application for an Israeli residence permit because of a direct security-related impediment) cannot be compared to the weight of an indirect security-related impediment that arises from the danger presented by the possible potential influence of the foreign spouse’s relative. Naturally, the direct impediment clearly outweighs the indirect impediment, and this disparity between the two situations must be considered on its own merits when the competent authority weighs the particular security risk presented by the spouse who is a resident of the territories against the level of the violation of the right to a family life caused by the refusal to grant a residence permit.

Weighting of the relevant values in applying the transitional provisions

39.  The competent authority that must render a decision regarding the application for a residence permit in the framework of the transitional provisions of the Law must base his decision on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Reasonableness is a criterion that is used when reviewing an exercise of administrative discretion; when such exercise of discretion involves a possible violation of basic rights, it must also comply with the proportionality test, as established in constitutional principles and in the limitations clause.

40.  In deciding whether to grant a residence permit within the framework of the transitional provisions, the competent authority must engage in a reasonable and proportionate weighing of the various relevant values that compete with each other with respect to this issue. On the one hand, the authority must weigh the severe violation of the right to a family life that is inflicted on the Israeli resident or citizen if the application is denied. In this context, the authority must take into consideration the violation of the principle of equality that is thus caused, and the strength of the anticipated consequences that the couple and their children will experience, on a human level, as a result of the inability to establish a unified and complete family unit in Israel, which is the permanent place of residence of one of the spouses. In the context of this consideration, and given the policy that has been anchored in the Temporary Provision Law, there is likely to be a difference in the strength and the weight of the harm done to an existing family unit that has been granted unification status in the past and wishes to continue thus, on the one hand, and the harm done to a family that has not yet achieved that status, and whose application for unification was pending and not yet decided on the determinative date. The level of the harm done in the first case is greater, because the significance of the non-renewal of the permit is the dissolution of a family unit that has already been established, the removal of the family from the familial, social and economic roots that have been laid down since the original permit was granted, and the delivery of a heavy blow to the fabric of family life that has developed over the years. In assessing the level of the damage to the family life of an applicant who seeks to extend a residence permit that had been issued in the past for the purpose of family unification, the authority must consider, inter alia, the number of years that the permit holder has resided in Israel, the level of his involvement in life in Israel, the size of his family, the chance that the Israeli spouse will be able ― in the event that they are forced to separate ― to bear the burden of maintaining the family if the other spouse is forced to leave Israel, and the overall significance of the couple’s separation for the existential fate of the family and of the children. Regarding an application for family unification that has not yet received initial approval, what must be weighed is the level of the damage caused if, from the outset, the couple’s establishment of a complete family unit is prevented, as well as the consequences of this damage for the couple and for their children.

41.  The competent authority must weigh the factor of the violation of the right to a family life against the existence of a security-related impediment pertaining to the applicant for the permit ― a direct impediment with regard to the applicant himself, or an indirect impediment that may arise due to the applicant’s connections with family members who present a security risk. Naturally, there will be a difference in the strength and weight of a direct security-related impediment and that of an indirect security-related impediment. The existence of a direct and substantial security-related impediment will justify a refusal to grant approval for family unification, despite the severe violation of the right to family life, regardless of whether the family has already been unified in the past or has not yet been granted unification status. The issue is different when the security-related impediment is indirect. The risk presented by a permit applicant, when such risk stems from the applicant’s family relationship to parties that are connected to terrorism, is a complex matter; the probability of its realization is subject to assessment, and it requires the cautious exercise of judgment. The indirect danger must be measured carefully, and only the proper relative weight ― and not more than that ― must be attributed to it. We must take care to avoid reaching a sweeping conclusion to the effect that every permit applicant whose relative is connected to terrorist activity is totally disqualified for family unification status. Instead, the competent authority must assess the case-specific probability that the permit applicant himself will be subject to influence and pressure from family members and will thus become a direct source of a security danger. In making this assessment, the authority must rely as much as possible on objective data such as the length of the foreign spouse’s stay in Israel during which, notwithstanding the family connections to terrorist groups, there has been no information whatsoever indicating any involvement on the part of the applicant in any activity directed against Israel. Such information could, at least on a prima facie basis, refute an assumption that there is an indirect security-related impediment; when the case involves a wife from the territories who has lived in Israel for many years in a family unification framework and who is raising several children and takes part in supporting the family financially, there is a minimal likelihood that the potential risk of the person’s involvement in hostile activity due to a family connection to individuals involved in terrorism will be realized. The authority should not dismiss the significance of statistical data regarding the number of cases in which it has actually been proven that such a family connection led to the involvement of such residents of the territories in hostile activity against Israel. Such statistical data have not been shown to the Court. It should be noted further that the level of contact that is maintained between a permit applicant and his or her family members who are involved in hostile activity is not necessarily to be given determinative weight, by itself, as a factor that indicates the potential for danger ― although a lowering of the level of such contact, or a breaking off of all such contact, may be required in order to reduce the concern regarding an indirect security risk.

42.  The authority must assess the magnitude of the violation of the right to a family life against the direct or indirect security-related impediment, in view of all the details that are relevant to the case. The greater the impact on the right to a family life, the more substantial the security risk presented by the permit holder must be, whether direct or indirect. Just as the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is not the same in the case of an application for an extension of a permit that had been given in the past as it is in the case of an application for a permit that had not been approved in the past, the strength of the security danger involved in a direct security risk is different than that which is involved when a permit applicant presents only an indirect security risk. The weighting of the contrasting values must be executed carefully. A proper balancing of these elements may in appropriate cases justify the use of proportionate measures in order to achieve the security-related goal ― measures that do not involve an absolute prevention of family unification, and which will enable such unification to take place subject to various conditions, such as the granting of short-term temporary permits that allow for ongoing monitoring of the manner in which the spouse and the family conduct themselves; the stipulation of restrictive conditions regarding continued contact with the family members who are involved in terrorism; and the prohibition of visits within the territories, supervision and ongoing monitoring by the authorities, etc.

Burden of persuasion

43.  The burden of persuasion regarding the probability of the realization of the security risk at a level that justifies the violation of a human right is generally imposed on the state (Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset [3] (per President Barak, at paras. 22 and 49); A. Barak, Legal Interpretation (vol. 3, ‘Constitutional Interpretation,’ (1994); HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [15], at pp. 428-429; HCJ Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at pp. 268-269 (per Justice Cheshin)). The state bears the burden of persuading the court that the need to protect the public against a substantive security risk necessitates a substantive violation of a human right, and that the said public need could not be met without causing that violation, or at least that it would not be met by a more moderate violation that does not involve the prevention of family unification. The state must persuade the court that the likelihood of the realization of the security risk is high enough to necessitate the adoption of measures that protect life and security even when such measures violate human rights of the highest constitutional order. When the probability of danger to life is close to certainty, even the most important of constitutional human rights will retreat before these measures. If the probability that the danger will be realized is lower, it may be the case that the security value will not justify any violation whatsoever of a human right, or that it will justify only a lesser violation. The level of the probability of the realization of the danger is juxtaposed against the importance of the values that are violated ― all in accordance with the range of the circumstances that are unique to the case under discussion.

From the general to the specific

44.  In light of the theoretical criteria for applying the transitional provisions of the Law, the question arises as to whether the Minister’s refusal to extend petitioner 2’s Israeli residence permit meets the judicial review test.

The details regarding petitioner 2’s family

45.  Petitioner 1 is a citizen and resident of Israel. He was married to petitioner 2, a resident of the territories, in 1996, and in 1998 their application for family unification was approved. Their children were born in Israel and they are Israeli citizens. At the time that the Minister decided not to renew petitioner 2’s residence permit, they had been married for seven years. Fourteen years have now passed since the beginning of the family’s life in Israel. Over the course of the years, the family has set down roots in Israel. Petitioner 2 studied Hebrew, learned a profession and became involved in public activity. Petitioner 1 is a state employee working at a Building and Planning Commission. The couple’s children were born in Israel, where they are growing up and receiving their education. Israel is the children’s natural environment and it is petitioner 1’s homeland, and the family, as a full and unified unit, wishes to continue to conduct its life in Israel.

This case is covered by the first transitional provision ― meaning that it is an application for an extension of a residence permit that had already been issued in the past, and that the extension is for the purpose of allowing petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel in the framework of family unification. Section 4(1) applies to this case, which gives significant weight to the applicant’s expectations regarding the renewal of the permit and establishes the security-related impediment as only one of a range of additional considerations to be weighed in this matter.

Information regarding the security risk

46.  The state has provided substantial detail regarding the significant security risk presented by petitioner 2’s relatives, who live outside of Israel and are involved in activity in terrorist organizations at a very high risk level. The state specified, in this regard, petitioner 2’s father, since retired, who was employed by the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, and primarily, the involvement of her three brothers in Palestinian and international terrorist organizations, regarding whom the security danger is at a very high level.

The state noted the existence of a potential risk presented by petitioner 2, in the event that her close relatives who are involved in terrorism might influence her and recruit her for their purposes, causing damage to the security of the state. This is a high level indirect security-related impediment with regard to petitioner 2, in light of the nature of the involvement of a number of her relatives in a wide range of terrorist activity.

47.  We reviewed the confidential material that the state provided for our perusal. All that can be said following this review is that the risk from the relatives ― especially on a cumulative basis, given the number of such relatives who are involved ― is high. Nevertheless, it can also be said that petitioner 2 herself is not directly involved in any anti-Israel behavior, and over the course of the years of her stay here ― and as of the current time, she has been here for 14 years ― no direct substantive information has accumulated against her. The family relationship that she maintains with her relatives should not, by itself, be seen as a type of anti-Israeli activity in which she has been engaged. Her visit with her jailed brother does not necessarily indicate that she identifies with his activity ― it is only an expression of her natural family connection with him. In any event, nothing else has been proven regarding this visit. The security risk from petitioner 2’s perspective is thus primarily focused on the indirect risk presented by her relatives, and on the potential danger that her relatives will exploit her to promote objectives that are directed at causing harm to the security of the State of Israel and to its citizens.

The balance between the contrasting considerations

48.  This case is complex, in light of the existence of the petitioners’ high level right to continue their family unification, on the one hand, which stands against an indirect security-related impediment, on the other hand ― albeit one that carries substantial weight, in light of the intense involvement of petitioner 2’s three brothers in a broad and dangerous range of terrorist activity.

49.  The magnitude of the violation of the right to a family life that will follow from the respondent’s refusal to grant renewable permits to remain in Israel is too high in this case. It requires the family, as a complete unit, to either move to a different country ― even though the father and the children are citizens of Israel, the family has established roots in Israel over the course of fourteen years, and the locus of the center of the family’s life is in Israel. The alternative consequence would be the couple’s separation from each other and the division of the family unit into two ― one spouse and the children in one grouping, and the other spouse in the other. It goes without saying that the dissolution of a family unit in this manner will constitute a permanent blow to the family’s unity, to its welfare and to the children’s well-being, and only a very weighty reason can justify such an action.

50.  On the other hand, we cannot make light of the potential security risk generated by the involvement of petitioner 2’s close relatives in terrorist activity. We cannot rule out the possibility that in the context of their activity, they may try to exploit their sister’s family in Israel to promote their objectives. This possibility does exist and cannot be denied, but the probability of its realization remains unclear, in the absence of any direct information indicating the potential for a real risk presented by petitioner 2 from this direction. Petitioner 2’s case is not the same as her brothers’ case, and the potential risk that they present is not the same as the indirect potential risk that she presents. Over the course of the fourteen years that she has lived in Israel, no security-related information whatsoever concerning petitioner 2 has come to the attention of the authorities, other than the fact of her family connections with her parents and with her brothers who have been involved in terrorism for many years.

51.  Under these circumstances, a balancing of the strength of the petitioners’ family right to maintain that family against the indirect potential risk presented by petitioner 2 due to her family connections with her father and her brothers who are involved in terrorism ― while the probability and actual level of that risk remain matters of speculation only ― indicates that there is no justification at the current time for a general cancellation of the Israeli residence permit that was previously issued to petitioner 2 in a family unification framework. Even if a certain level of risk is presented by petitioner 2, which is something that cannot be denied, the risk margin is a tolerable one, and it is a risk that should be taken in order to prevent the break-up of the family or its removal from its environment ― as part of the risk inherent to the maintenance of a constitutional regime that protects human rights.

Nevertheless, a proportionate balancing of the contrasting considerations ― one which assigns the proper weight to the security risk presented here by the protection of the right to family life ― justifies subjecting petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel to various conditions that will address the security concern that arises with regard to her. These terms are intended, on the one hand, to have a deterrent effect and to serve as a warning to petitioner 2 against continued family contact between her and her family in the territories, some of whom are involved in terrorism, and, on the other hand, to give the security establishment effective means for supervising and monitoring her conduct, in light of the indirect potential risk that she does present. In this manner, there will be a correlation between the strength of the right to a family life and the existing security risk, created by a solution that reflects a proper weighing of the conflicting considerations involved in the matter.

Result

52.  The proper balancing between the contrasting considerations leads to the following results:

As it has not been proven that petitioner 2 presents a security risk that justifies the severe blow involved in a cancellation of the residence permits that had been issued to her in the family unification framework, the Minister of the Interior’s decision not to renew her family unification Israeli residence permit must be reversed.

53.  Nevertheless, in light of the indirect security risk that petitioner 2 presents, her residency status in Israel as of the present time will be approved pursuant to DCL permits that will be issued for six-month periods and which will be renewed from time to time, subject to the continued absence of new circumstances that justify their cancellation.

The issuance of the DCL permits as stated will be conditioned on petitioner 2’s signing of a declaration, to be made to the competent authority, in which she undertakes to comply with the following conditions:

  1. To refrain from maintaining any contact whatsoever ― either direct or indirect ― with any members of her family in the territories, and with other acquaintances and relations in the territories;
  2. To refrain from entering the territories for any purpose and for any length of time whatsoever;
  3. To notify the competent authority in advance of any intention to leave Israel, and to provide full details regarding the planned trip;
  4. To refrain from any act or omission which could directly or indirectly cause harm to the security of the state or the public peace.

The respondent may add additional conditions to these undertakings, to the extent he sees fit.

With the passage of time, and subject to changing circumstances and at his discretion, the respondent may consider restoring the A-5 residence permit that petitioner 2 had held prior to its non-renewal, or he may ease the restrictions involved in the undertakings mentioned above, as he sees fit.

Obviously, if petitioner 2 violates any of these undertakings, such a violation will constitute grounds for cancellation of the permit for remaining in Israel that has been issued to her.

54.  The petition is therefore granted, and the order is made absolute, subject to the conditions described above.

 

Justice S. Joubran

I concur in the opinion of my colleague Justice A. Procaccia, and in the result she has reached in her judgment. Indeed, as my colleague has noted, even the respondent does not claim that petitioner 2 presents a direct security risk, and argues only that her family ties give rise to a concern that she may be exploited by others. Although this concern cannot be ruled out, it does not, by itself, justify the infliction of such significant harm on petitioner 2 in the form of the cancellation of the permits that have been granted to her to remain in Israel as part of the life that she shares with petitioner 1. The concern that others will exploit petitioner 2 as a means for realizing their objectionable purposes does justify an arrangement that provides the security establishment with tools to prevent the danger involved in this situation, by continuing the restrictions on petitioner 2’s stay in Israel and by stipulating conditions for its continuation. It does not, however, warrant a measure that forces petitioner 2 to bear the cost of the actions of the members of her family, through the infliction of such severe harm to her and to her spouse, petitioner 1.

 

President D. Beinisch

I agree with the result reached by my colleague, Justice A. Procaccia, under the circumstances of the petitioners’ case. I also agree with her position that a distinction must be made between a party who seeks the renewal of a residence permit and a party to whom such a permit has not yet been issued ― a distinction which I will discuss below. Together with this, I wish to emphasize a number of points of my own, relating primarily to the criteria that should guide the exercise of judicial review of a decision by the Minister of the Interior not to allow the continued stay in Israel of a person with the status of a resident of the territories who is married to an Israeli, against a background of security-related reasons pertaining to a close relative.

1.    The starting point in an examination of the issue we face in the context of this petition is the determination in the majority opinion in this Court’s judgment in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], that the Temporary Provision Law ― including all of the arrangements contained within it ― is, at present, in compliance with all constitutional tests.

2.    Regarding what is relevant to our case, s. 3D provides expressly that a security-related impediment to the grant of a new permit or to the extension of an existing permit can be based on the presence of a security risk to the State of Israel, the source of which is the resident of the territories or a member of his or her family ― and for this purpose a family member is defined as “a spouse, parent, child, brother and sister and their spouses.” With this formulation, the legislature sought to express the position taken by the security establishment, as was also presented to us at length in the written and oral pleadings, that even when the source of a risk is a close relative and not the foreign spouse himself or herself, harm may be caused to the security of the state. In the words of my colleague Justice Procaccia, this is an “indirect security impediment”. This determination is not new to us, and in Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7], President Barak held that —

‘ . . . a refusal to grant legal status in Israel, due to a security-related impediment connected to the applicant himself, presents no difficulty, provided that the refusal has a proper factual basis. The Temporary Provision Law (emphasis in the original - D.B.) extends the security risk qualification to the members of the applicant’s family as well. Therefore, the consideration of an existing risk involving a close relative is not inherently improper. In the current reality, in light of the serious security dangers that Israel is facing, a security risk presented by a family member of the resident of the territories can establish a basis for rejecting an application for legal status in Israel . . .’ (emphasis added - D.B.).

In light of the above, we must begin with the assumption that a decision not to permit a foreigner’s stay in Israel because of a risk presented by the applicant’s family members is possible, and will, in certain circumstances, overcome any constitutional challenges. (See also para. 94 of President Barak’s opinion in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior et al. [1].) In any event, we may also conclude that the theoretical balancing that is indicated by the provisions of ss. 3D and 4 of the Temporary Provision Law, between the realization of the constitutional right to a family life and the protection of a public security interest (in which additional basic rights are incorporated) is possible, but is subject to the individualized examination of such applications, in the context of the exceptions to the sweeping rule established in s. 2 of the Temporary Provision Law.

3.    I would also add that even though according to the majority opinion in this Court’s decision in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], the theoretical foundation upon which the sections under discussion is based does not indicate a built-in constitutional difficulty, it is nevertheless the case ― and my colleague discussed this at length ― that any decision not to allow the foreign spouse of an Israeli to remain in Israel will constitute a serious violation of the constitutional right to a family life, as discussed at length and as held in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (see, for example, paras. 6-7 of my opinion there), and as such, a careful examination of any such decision is required. In this context, it was held in Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] ― and the holding applies to this case as well ― that the Minister of the Interior must exercise his authority pursuant to the provisions of s. 3D “in accordance with the basic principles of Israeli administrative law. He must exercise any powers that may infringe basic constitutional rights in accordance with the criteria prescribed in the limitations clause of the Basic Laws concerning human rights . . . the Minister of the Interior’s determination pursuant to s. 3D must therefore comply with the requirement that it be proportionate.”  

 Thus, for example, if a decision not to extend a residence permit that had been granted in the past is based on the security establishment’s reliance on an issue pertaining to a close relative of the applicant as a ground for refusing the extension, the Minister of the Interior must, in order to ensure that the decision complies with the proportionality test, carry out a meticulous and careful examination of the administrative evidence that has been presented to him and on the basis of which he seeks to define the scope and the degree of the potential danger presented by the foreign spouse for whom residency status is requested. The Minister must establish, through the presentation of substantial administrative evidence, that the applicant does indeed present a security risk, because of the risk presented by his or her family member. (See also Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7], para. 17.) In this context, I would adopt my colleague’s comments in para. 41 of her opinion regarding the set of information to be considered in the context of assessing the danger presented by the applicant, as well as regarding the appropriate weight to be ascribed, in terms of the assessment of the level of the risk, to information indicating a direct security risk coming from the applicant as compared to information regarding an indirect risk based on characteristics of members of the applicant’s family. Nevertheless, I would leave ― as an issue needing further review ― the question of the probability test that my colleague wishes to adopt, as I do not see the need to decide that matter in this context. Additionally, there is no doubt that my colleague is correct in stating that an argument based on a security need should not be accepted without question and that it should instead be examined on its own merits, in accordance with all the details of the specific case. Regarding the two-stage test for examining the security consideration, which my colleague explains in para. 17 of her opinion, it appears that the threshold requirement involved in the first stage would need to be examined on a prima facie basis only, in light of the presumption of propriety enjoyed by an administrative authority. Under these circumstances, the main examination will focus on the strength of the security-based argument, since even when true security considerations have guided the authority in reaching the decision, such considerations can still be subjected to review in order to determine whether they were given disproportionate weight in that the security establishment allowed for excessively wide safety margins. In any event, this issue does not arise to a full extent under the circumstances of this case, since even my colleague acknowledges that we have been presented here with a significant amount of substantial security-related material, and there is no doubt that true security considerations were at the basis of the position taken by the security establishment and that these considerations provided the foundation for the Minister of the Interior’s decision not to extend petitioner 2’s residence in Israel.

On the other hand, and in juxtaposition to any assessment of the risk presented by the applicant for a residence permit in Israel, the Minister of the Interior must, as stated, attribute significant weight to the violation of the right to a family life caused by the decision to disallow the permit. In this context ― and here I share my colleague’s view ― the Minister of the Interior must give significant weight to the applicant’s situation and to the type of application that has been submitted, i.e., to the issue of whether the applicant is requesting, for the first time, permission to stay in Israel, or whether ― as is the case here ― the applicant has already been given a permit in the past pursuant to the criteria that were then applicable, and now seeks to renew that permit. My colleague bases this determination on, inter alia, an interpretation that distinguishes between s. 4(1) and s. 4(2) ― the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law. Such a distinction is also required in accordance with the basic concepts of administrative law, which distinguishes between the non-renewal of a license and the issuing of a new license. At the same time, I believe that in addition to the distinction that my colleague makes between the provisions of s. 4(1) and s. 4(2), an additional distinction should also be made, relating to yet another group, and that this distinction should also be given weight in a review of the application: the distinction between those applicants who had submitted their application prior to the adoption of the Government Resolution in May 2002 and whose matter had not yet been decided (applicants who are covered by s. 4(2) of the Temporary Provision Law) and applicants who have submitted a new application for a residence permit after the Temporary Provision Law entered into effect (and in the context of the exceptions that had been prescribed in that Law over the years). All of these fall within the category of applicants who have not yet been issued a permit, but it would appear that greater weight should be given to the rights of those who had submitted their application many years before, and whose applications had not been answered because of a delay in the progress of the competent authority’s work.

4.    Moving from the general to the specific, the circumstances of this case present a difficult situation, containing various elements that stand at opposite ends of the scale of matters that are to be considered. At one end, there is the substantial information available to the security establishment, to the effect that petitioner 2’s father and brothers are involved in terrorist activity which presents a high risk potential. Thus, the state noted that petitioner 2’s father was, in the past, employed by the Palestinian Authority’s security establishment and that her three brothers are involved in the activity of Palestinian and international terrorist organizations (the latter element being the primary factor to be considered). This involvement of petitioner 2’s family members does indicate a substantial potential risk which could be presented by petitioner 2, primarily due to a concern that her family or possibly the terrorist organizations could exploit her status in Israel and attempt to recruit her to advance their goals. At the other end, there is the fact that petitioner 2 has lived in Israel for many years, and that during some of them she lived here pursuant to a residence permit granted to her by the Minister of the Interior. During the course of these years, she and her Israeli spouse had several children who are Israeli citizens and who are being raised and educated in Israel; she studied Hebrew, acquired professional skills and worked as the secretary to the President of the Sharia Appellate Court. Petitioner 2 is currently active socially in the Women’s Council in Zemer. This indicates that this is a petitioner whose life is bound tightly to the State of Israel, and that she and her Israeli husband have established a family unit here over the course of many years, and the respondent’s decision will cause the dissolution of that unit, while doing much harm to her, her spouse and their children. Under this complex set of circumstances, I agree with my colleague that the proper balancing of all the considerations requires that a solution be found that will allow her to stay in Israel at this time, while creating a framework that will help to reduce the indirect potential security risk that is involved in allowing her to stay. In my view, my colleague’s proposal, according to which, at this time, petitioner 2 will be allowed to stay in Israel through the issuance of permits allowing her to remain in Israel (i.e., DCL permits), which will be valid for six months each and renewable from time to time subject to ongoing reviews to be based on updated information, and that this arrangement will be subject to the range of conditions specified by my colleague in para. 53 of her judgment, expresses a suitable balance for these complicated circumstances.

Therefore, and in light of the above, I concur in my colleague’s conclusion that the petition should be granted.

Petition granted, per the opinion of Justice Procaccia.

 

8 Adar 5770.

22 February 2010.

 

Wasser v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 8397/06
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, May 29, 2007
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: For many years ‘Qassam’ rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip at the town of Sederot and settlements in Israel near the Gaza Strip. The government decided to equip the schools in the area with protection against the rockets. The method of protection decided upon by the respondents for the classrooms of students in grades 4-12 was the method of ‘protected areas.’ According to this, whenever the alarm is sounded that rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip, the students are required to leave their classrooms and go to a protected area. The petitioners challenged this decision, on the ground that it did not provide adequate protection for the students in those classrooms.

 

Held: The respondents’ decision was extremely unreasonable and should, therefore, be set aside.  According to the respondents’ experiments, only in 70-75% of cases did the students reach the ‘protected area’ within fifteen seconds - the critical period of time for doing so.  Moreover, in some cases when rockets were fired no alarm was sounded. Although the cost of providing full protection for all the classrooms is considerable, and even though the court does not lightly intervene in matters of budgetary considerations, in view of the extent of the threat, the likelihood it will be realized, and the number of students exposed, the decision not to equip the classrooms with full protection is so unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 8397/06

Advocate Eduardo Wasser

v.

1.         Minister of Defence

2.         State of Israel — Ministry of Defence

3.         Minister of Education

4.         State of Israel — Ministry of Education

5.         Head of Shaar HaNegev Regional Council

6.         Shaar HaNegev Regional Council

HCJ 8619/06

1.  Sederot Municipal Parents’ Committee

2.  Headquarters for the Struggle to Re-establish Security in Sederot

3.  Batya Kattar

4.  Alon Davidi

5.  Movement for Quality Education in Israel

v.

1.         Minister of Defence

2.         Minister of Finance

3.         Ministry of Education

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[29 May 2007]

Before President D. Beinisch and Justices S. Joubran, D. Berliner

 

Petitions to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: For many years ‘Qassam’ rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip at the town of Sederot and settlements in Israel near the Gaza Strip. The government decided to equip the schools in the area with protection against the rockets. The method of protection decided upon by the respondents for the classrooms of students in grades 4-12 was the method of ‘protected areas.’ According to this, whenever the alarm is sounded that rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip, the students are required to leave their classrooms and go to a protected area. The petitioners challenged this decision, on the ground that it did not provide adequate protection for the students in those classrooms.

 

Held: The respondents’ decision was extremely unreasonable and should, therefore, be set aside.  According to the respondents’ experiments, only in 70-75% of cases did the students reach the ‘protected area’ within fifteen seconds - the critical period of time for doing so.  Moreover, in some cases when rockets were fired no alarm was sounded. Although the cost of providing full protection for all the classrooms is considerable, and even though the court does not lightly intervene in matters of budgetary considerations, in view of the extent of the threat, the likelihood it will be realized, and the number of students exposed, the decision not to equip the classrooms with full protection is so unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention.

 

Petition granted.

 

Legislation cited:

Civil Defence Law, 5711-1951, s. 9C(b)(1).

Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949.

Students Rights Law, 5761-2000.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 3930/94 Jazmavi v. Minister of Health [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 778.

[2]        HCJ 82/02 Caplan v. State of Israel, Ministry of Finance, Customs Department [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 901.

[3]        HCJ 7510/05 Lotan v. Minister of Industry, Trade and Employment (not yet reported).

[4]        HCJ 3472/92 Brand v. Minister of Communications [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 143.

[5]        HCJ 4613/03 Shaham v. Minister of Health [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 385.

[6]        HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164.

[7]        HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834.

 

The petitioner in HCJ 8397/06 represented himself.

For petitioners 1-4 in HCJ 8619/06 — O. Keidar, K. Raz-Morag.

For respondents 1-4 in HCJ 8397/06 and respondents 1-3 in HCJ 8619/06 — R. Giladi.

For respondents 5-6 in HCJ 8397/06 — S. Kedem.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

President D. Beinisch

The towns in the area near the Gaza Strip, including the town of Sederot, and the settlements within the jurisdiction of the Shaar HaNegev Regional Council, have suffered for years from attacks by ‘Qassam’ rockets fired from the Gaza Strip. The two petitions before us concern the question of whether the state has a duty to protect the educational institutions in the towns near the Gaza Strip.

1.    The petitioner in HCJ 8397/06 is a resident of the Kefar Gaza Kibbutz, which belongs to the Shaar HaNegev Regional Council. The petitioner’s two children study at the Shaar HaNegev Regional School, where approximately 1,200 students from settlements in the area study. No one disputes that this school is within the range of the ‘Qassam’ rockets that are fired from the Gaza Strip. The petitioners in HCJ 8619/06 are the Sederot Municipal Parents’ Committee and other parties that are interested in protecting schools and kindergartens in the town, which are are of course also under threat from the ‘Qassam’ rockets. The two petitions before us raise the question of the reasonableness of the method of protection decided upon by the respondents in HCJ 8619/06 and respondents 1-4 in HCJ 8397/06 (hereafter: the respondents) with regard to the schools near the Gaza Strip.

2.    In June 2006, following an incident in which a ‘Qassam’ rocket fell inside the grounds of a school in Sederot, the Minister of Defence decided that action should be taken to protect the schools in settlements near the Gaza Strip. On 2 July 2006, the government (in government decision no. 219) adopted the protection plan prepared by the Home Front Command, according to which twenty-four schools in settlements near the Gaza Strip, which included sixteen primary schools and eight secondary schools, should be protected by means of the ‘protected area’ system. This system of protection is not based on the complete protection of all the classrooms in the various schools.  Rather, under this system some of the classrooms are protected and others are not.  The unprotected classrooms are close to protected areas -  a proximity which enables the students in these classes to reach the protected area when they hear a warning that a ‘Qassam’ rocket has been fired. It should be noted that the protected areas on which this system of protection is based include classrooms, as well as areas in the school that are not classrooms, such as protected corridors. According to the timetable determined in the government decision, protection for two-thirds of the schools (the sixteen primary schools) should have been completed by the beginning of the 5767 academic year on 3 September 2006, whereas the protection for the remaining third of the schools (the eight secondary schools) should have been completed by the end of the religious holidays in Tishrei 5767, namely on 16 October 2006. According to the government decision, a budget of NIS 75 million was allocated in order to implement the protection plan. According to the respondents, this budgetary allocation only made it possible to protect (by means of the ‘protected areas’ method) the main classrooms in each of the schools (i.e., the ordinary classrooms where most of the studies take place), but not the special classrooms, such as laboratories and computer rooms.

3.    For various reasons the protection of all the schools in the settlements near the Gaza Strip was not completed by the time determined in the government decision. The two petitions before us were filed in October 2006. The petition in HCJ 8397/06 relates to the failure to complete the protection of the Shaar HaNegev Secondary School and includes claims with regard to the manner in which the studies were taking place in the school on the date when the petition was filed. It should be noted that the fifth and sixth respondents in this petition, which are the regional council and the head of the council, raised in their pleadings various arguments against the state’s original decision not to protect the special classrooms in the Shaar HaNegev Secondary School. The petition in HCJ 8619/06 relates to the failure to complete the protection of the schools and kindergartens in the town of Sederot.

4.    On 15 November 2006 a joint hearing of the two petitions was held (before Justices D. Beinisch, E. Arbel and D. Cheshin). The two main issues that arose during the hearing were the planned date for completing the protection works and the method of protection that was chosen. With regard to the completion of the protection works, before the date of the hearing there was significant progress in protecting the educational institutions in the settlements near the Gaza Strip. These works, however, had not yet been completed. With regard to the system of protection, it was argued in the hearing by counsel for the petitioners that the method of ‘protected areas,’ according to which all of the classrooms were not fully protected, was not suited to a situation in which the warning before ‘Qassam’ rockets fell was approximately fifteen seconds only.  This is because fifteen seconds is not enough time to evacuate an entire class and move it to the protected area. We, therefore, decided at the hearing on 15 November 2006 to issue an order nisi with regard to the two reliefs sought. The first ordered the respondents to explain why the whole protection process for the educational establishments in the settlements near the Gaza Strip, including the town of Sederot, should not be completed within a short period of time in view of the pressing circumstances.  The second ordered the respondents to explain why they should not replace the ‘protected area’ method with a system fully protecting all the classrooms.

5.    The respondents’ affidavits in reply to the order nisi were filed on 20 December 2006. The affidavits were given by the Home Front Commander, General Yitzhak Gershon,  and by the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mr Raanan Dinor.  According to the Home Front Commander, the protection of the main classrooms in the schools had been completed subject to certain protection improvements that were still needed on that date. These protection improvements, which originated in the comments of the protection consultants employed by the Home Front, mainly included additional doors that needed to be made to the classrooms in order to facilitate the quick evacuation of students on their way to the protected area when they heard the warning that a ‘Qassam’ rocket had been fired. The Home Front Commander’s affidavit-in-reply also stated that it had been decided to protect the kindergartens in the area near the Gaza Strip fully, and that by the date when the affidavit was filed the protection for eighty-one out of one hundred and fifty-one kindergartens in the area had been completed. Protection for most of the other kindergartens would be completed by the end of March 2007. It was also argued in the affidavit-in-reply that the project of protecting the educational institutions around the Gaza Strip was an expensive and unprecedented project given the scope of the work, the engineering and logistic complexity required, and the almost NIS 180 million invested in accordance with timetables that were almost unattainable. Therefore, it was argued that the state was acting in accordance with the standard set out in the first part of the order nisi of 15 November 2006 (completing the protection process within a short time in view of the pressing circumstances), and that the petitions should be denied in so far as this aspect was concerned.

The affidavit-in-reply filed by the Home Front Commander also addressed in detail the second part of the order nisi, explaining the respondents’ position that the schools (as distinct from the kindergartens) should be protected by the ‘protected areas’ method and not under a fully protected system. As we have said, according to the ‘protected areas’ method only certain classrooms are fully protected.   The students in the other classrooms are required to go to the ‘protected area’ when they hear the warning that a ‘Qassam’ rocket has been fired. According to the affidavit-in-reply, the ordinary warning time for the ‘Code Red’ system, which gives warning that a ‘Qassam’ rocket has been fired, is between fifteen and thirty seconds, and after all the extra doors that are required for the classrooms have been added,  a period of fifteen seconds will remain, which is  a realistic time for evacuating the students of all ages to the protected areas.  This, according to the affidavit-in-reply, means that the ‘protected areas’ method is a satisfactory solution to the security threat. It should be noted that this time assessment is based on the results of two different series of tests that were carried out in the months of September and November 2006 in various schools in the area near the Gaza Strip.

The Home Front Commander admitted in his affidavit that the ‘full protection’ method is the preferred method from a security viewpoint, but he argued that the major disadvantage of the system is its high costs. . On the date of filing the affidavit-in-reply, the total cost of protecting the main classrooms only (in grades 1-12) by means of the ‘full protection’ method was estimated at approximately NIS 162.5 million. Because of this cost, it was argued that implementing the ‘full protection’ system with regard to the schools in the area near the Gaza Strip might constitute a precedent of great consequence with regard to schools in other areas in Israel which are currently or may in the future be subject to a similar threat. This is because the only protection approach used hitherto for schools in Israel is the ‘protected areas’ method.  To change the method of protection with regard to schools may have repercussions for the state’s protection approach with regard to other institutions such as hospitals and senior citizens’ homes.

An additional issue that was addressed by the Home Front Commander in his affidavit was the protection of the special classrooms (by means of the ‘full protection’ method or the ‘protected areas’ method). On the date of the affidavit-in-reply filing, the protection plans for the schools near the Gaza Strip did not include the protection of the special classrooms. The cost of protecting the special classrooms in the primary and secondary schools was estimated (as of the date of filing the affidavit-in-reply) at approximately NIS 58 million for the ‘protected areas’ method and approximately NIS 144 million for the ‘full protection’ method.

According to the affidavit-in-reply from the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, which was also filed on 20 December 2006, following a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister on 19 November 2006, work was done by several ministries with regard to the question of the full protection of the main classrooms of students in grades 1-6.  This was done so that the government could make a final decision on this matter.  The need for further work was to be considered with regard to protection for the special classrooms for students in grades 7-12 by means of the ‘protected areas’ method.

6.    On 8 February 2007 a hearing took place before us with regard to the opposition to the order nisi. In a revised statement of 6 February 2007, which the respondents filed before the hearing, they addressed the changes that had occurred since they had filed the affidavits in reply to the order nisi. The respondents said that the work of carrying out the protection improvements for the schools, which had been known on the date of filing the affidavits in reply to the order nisi, had been completed.  According to the statement new improvements would be carried out within about one month, the need for which emerged in an inspection by the protection consultants conducted in the schools at the beginning of January 2007. In addition, the respondents said that on 18 January 2007 the Prime Minister’s Office decided to change the protection policy for the schools so that the main classrooms for students in grades 1-3 would be fully protected, while the main classrooms for students in grades 4-12 would continue to be protected by means of the ‘protected areas’ method.  The special classrooms, which as a rule were not protected, would also be protected by means of the ‘protected areas’ method, subject to pedagogic priorities that would be determined by the Ministry of Education. The target date for completing these additional protection works was just prior to the beginning of the forthcoming school year (5768). In addition, the respondents said in their statement that the estimated revised cost of providing full protection for the main classrooms of students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms (as the petitioners requested) would be approximately NIS 106 million for grades 4-12 classrooms and approximately NIS 86 million for the special classrooms.

With regard to the protection of kindergartens near the Gaza Strip, one hundred and three kindergartens out of one hundred and fifty-one were protected. Protection and reconstruction works for most of the remaining kindergartens would be completed by the end of May 2007, with the vast majority completed by the end of March 2007. As for an additional group of twenty-nine kindergartens whose security needs emerged only after the petitions were filed, it was stated also in the revised statement that it had been decided by the Prime Minister’s Office together with relevant government ministries that only kindergartens that were the responsibility of the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment would be protected, as well as kindergartens that were located in public buildings designed for kindergartens (but not kindergartens that were located in private residential buildings).

As a result of the hearing held before us on 8 February 2007, we ordered the state to file another revised statement with regard to the work that had been carried out in enlarging the doors between the unprotected classrooms and the protected areas, and with regard to completing the protection of the special classrooms. We also recommended to the state that it reassess the question of the ‘protected areas’ in view of the short warning time given to the students to evacuate the unprotected classrooms. We also ordered the respondents to deliver to petitioners’ counsel a list of all the places where according to the respondents project had been completed, so that the petitioner could respond or draw the respondents’ attention to special needs.

7.    The respondents filed an additional revised statement on 15 April 2007. According to the statement, following the court’s recommendation to re-examine the ‘protected areas’ system, a large-scale experiment was carried out in the schools near the Gaza Strip between 18 March 2007 and 23 March 2007. This experiment included one hundred and fifty-two main classrooms, approximately 75% of the main ‘white’ classrooms in the schools near the Gaza Strip (‘white’ classrooms is the code name for classrooms that are not protected fully, but where the protection is based on the ‘protected areas’ system). Of the one hundred and fifty-two classrooms that took part in the experiment, thirty-six were classrooms for students in grades 1-3, which, as we have said, should be fully protected. From the results of the experiment it can be seen that for 57% of the classrooms examined, the students succeeded in reaching the protected areas within fifteen seconds or less.  For 23% of the classrooms examined, the students succeeded in reaching the protected areas within sixteen to nineteen seconds. For the other classrooms, which were 20% of the classrooms examined, it took twenty seconds or more to reach the protected areas. According to the respondents, the results of the experiment were adversely affected because in many of the classes in the secondary schools there was a clear lack of cooperation, as well as a blatant disrespect on the part of the students when the experiments were carried out. According to the respondents, this could be seen from the fact that among students in grades 1-6 the amount of main ‘white’ classrooms where the students succeeded in reaching the protected areas within fifteen seconds or less was 71%-75%, whereas for grades 7-12 the rate was between 39-45% of the classrooms. The respondents further argue that it may be assumed that had the students in the higher grades cooperated fully with the experiment, their results for reaching the protected areas within fifteen seconds or less would also have been approximately 70-75%.  In order to achieve complete success in reaching the protected areas within fifteen seconds, the respondents said the experiments showed the necessity of widening and adding dozens of more doors between the main ‘white’ classrooms and the protected areas. Therefore, at a 1 April 2007 meeting, a list was drawn up for ninety doors that needed to be added or widened. According to the respondents these efforts had already begun and that the work was expected to be completed by the end of May 2007. The respondents also said that guidance from the teachers and increased drills by the students would also improve results. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that with regard to some of the classrooms there was a degree of positive bias in the experiment results since fewer students than normal were present when the experiments were conducted. In reliance on the results of the experiments set out above, the respondents claim that the results empirically proved the effectiveness of the basic premise of the ‘protected areas’ method, according to which as a rule the students could reach the protected areas within fifteen seconds.

With regard to the special classrooms, according to the respondents’ 15 April 2007 revised statement approximately seventy special classrooms required protection at this stage (according to the ‘protected areas’ method), and that following the current timetable most of the protection works would be completed in so far as possible by the beginning of the next school year.  The remainder of the works would be completed by the end of the religious holidays in October 2007. With regard to the kindergartens, the respondents said that the protection works (according to the full protection method) had been completed for one hundred and seventeen out of one hundred and fifty-one kindergartens. With regard to the remainder of the kindergartens, the respondents said that there was a delay in the timetable become it had become clear that additional budget funds were required. In their statement the respondents also provided details of the expected dates for completing the protection works. Two kindergartens would be completed by the end of April 2007; thirteen kindergartens would be completed by the end of May 2007; three kindergartens would be completed by the end of July 2007; and eight kindergartens would be completed by the end of the religious holidays in October 2007. As for the eight additional kindergartens in Sederot, work had been frozen for reasons that were not within the state’s control – because of claims raised by a contractor who lost the tender held by the municipality.

In addition, the respondents said in their statement of 15 April 2007 that on 1 April 2007 the government decided to budget an additional amount of NIS 135.15 million for protecting the educational institutions in Sederot and settlements near the Gaza Strip (government decision no. 1528). This amount was intended for the protection of kindergartens, the complete protection of main classrooms for students in grades 1-3, and the protection of the special classrooms in the primary and secondary schools. The respondents also pointed out in their statement that these funds were in addition to the approximately NIS 200 million already invested by the government in protecting these educational institutions.

Shortly before writing this judgment, the respondents filed on 24 May 2007 a revised statement in which they responded to our request that they answer whether in view of the change in the security situation in the area of Sederot there was a change in their approach to protecting the classrooms.  They clarified that there was no change in their position. Notwithstanding, in view of the situation that prevails at the moment in the area, the Minister of Defence declared a ‘special situation on the home front’ by virtue of the power given to him under s. 9C(b)(1) of the Civil Defence Law, 5711-1951. The government extended this declaration, and the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset approved the extension.

8.    Thus, we see that the question that lies at the heart of the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents is whether the state should be required to protect the main classrooms for students in grades 4-12 in Sederot and the other settlements near the Gaza Strip by the full protection method, or whether it is possible to make do with the protection of these classrooms by means of the ‘protected areas’ method. A similar question also arises with regard to the protection of the special classrooms in the primary schools and secondary schools near the Gaza Strip.

According to the petitioners, the results of the large-scale experiment that the respondents conducted (described in paragraph 7 above), which shows that approximately 43% of the students did not succeed in reaching the protected areas within fifteen seconds, prove that the ‘protected areas’ method is not a reasonable protection method.  This is especially so in view of the fact that at least in some cases no warnings were given that ‘Qassam’ rockets had been fired. The petitioners also claim that the total budget required for the complete protection of the main classrooms for the students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms (as can be seen from the respondents’ statement of 6 February 2007) of approximately NIS 192 million, is not an unreasonable expense in order to avert the danger that threatens the lives of hundreds of students. The petitioners further claim that the respondent’s protection policy violates the right to life, the right to physical integrity, and the right to education of the students who study in classrooms that are not properly protected. Such violations are  inconsistent with the duties of the state under the Compulsory Education Law, 5709-1949. According to the petitioners, the budgetary considerations raised by the respondents do not justify a violation of these human rights.

The respondents argue in response that the results of the experiment that was conducted in March 2007 show that the ‘protected areas’ method provides a satisfactory security solution to the classrooms, especially in view of the significant negative biases they claim affected the experiment (as set out in paragraph 7 above). The respondents further argue in this regard that the position of the Home Front Commander, according to which the ‘protected areas’ method provides a satisfactory solution from a security viewpoint, is the professional opinion of the administrative authority in the case before us.  As such, it enjoys a presumption of administrative propriety and very weighty evidence is required to rebut this presumption. The respondents also claim that although the state undertook on its own initiative the responsibility for protecting the educational institutions near the Gaza Strip, the assumption that it has a legal duty to do so, and especially to finance the whole cost of the protection, is not self-evident. The respondents admittedly recognize the fact that the state has a general duty to ensure the security of its citizens, but they claim that this is a duty with regard to which the state has broad discretion in determining how it is achieved, and that this discretion is subject inter alia to budgetary considerations. In this regard, the respondents claim that even if the petitioners were to prove that the protection solution proposed by the state was unsatisfactory from a security perspective, that this would be insufficient to entitle them to the relief they seek.  This is because a question of budgetary allocations based on budgetary priorities is essentially a matter of government policy and not one of law. The respondents say further that the state has allocated the unprecedented sum of more than NIS 330 million to protect educational institutions near the Gaza Strip, and that the economic significance of granting the petitions would be an additional budgetary cost of hundreds of millions of sheqels in the short term, and apparently billions of sheqels in the long term.

9.    The question before us, therefore, is whether the respondents’ decision not to protect the main classrooms of students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms fully, but rather to make do for this purpose with the ‘protected areas’ method is a decision that falls within the margin of reasonableness. We should point out that in this case we are not required to make any firm determinations with regard to the question whether in principle the state had a duty under the Compulsory Education Law or under any other normative source to ensure the protection of the educational institutions near the Gaza Strip and to fund the necessary protection works.  Since in so far as the town of Sederot and the other settlements near the Gaza Strip are concerned, the state took upon itself the responsibility for protecting the educational institutions. Once the state decided to take upon itself the professional and budgetary responsibility for protecting the educational institutions near the Gaza Strip, it had the duty to adopt a reasonable protection policy with regard to these educational institutions.

10.  The premise for examining the respondents’ choice of basing the protection of certain classrooms in the schools near the Gaza Strip on the ‘protected areas’ method is that this choice reflects the professional position of the administrative authority, which has expertise in this matter, and therefore a court that scrutinizes the discretion of that authority will not intervene in its professional decision lightly (see, for example, HCJ 3930/94 Jazmavi v. Minister of Health [1], at pp. 785-786; HCJ 82/02 Caplan v. State of Israel, Ministry of Finance, Customs Department [2], at pp. 908-910; HCJ 7510/05 Lotan v. Minister of Industry, Trade and Employment [3], at para. 23 of the judgment). Moreover, the fact that the choice between the various methods of protection has significant financial consequences, and that this choice reflects, inter alia, certain budgetary priorities concerning the manner of distributing the resources in society, affects the degree to which the court will tend to intervene in that choice (see, for example, HCJ 3472/92 Brand v. Minister of Communications [4], at pp. 152-153; HCJ 4613/03 Shaham v. Minister of Health [5], at pp. 393-394). On the other hand, it should be remembered that no sphere of activity of the authority is absolutely immune from judicial scrutiny, and this is certainly true when we are speaking of areas concerning the fulfilment of the authority’s duties to the citizen and when the scrutiny concerns the executive decisions of the authority. The scope of the scrutiny depends on the matter and the circumstances.  With regard to the allocation of budgetary resources, the scope of the scrutiny is admittedly narrower, but it is based on the weight of the considerations, rights and interests that are balanced against the budgetary considerations (see, for example HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [6]; HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [7]). Therefore this court will intervene — albeit on rare occasions and with restraint — even in decisions concerning the professional discretion of the authority or the budgets allocated by it, if these decisions depart in an extreme manner from the margin of reasonableness given to the administrative authority. It will be self-evident when the court will be called upon to intervene — to a greater degree where we are concerned with decisions that may affect human rights in general, and risks presented to human life in particular. The reasonableness of decisions of this kind will of course be examined, first and foremost, on the basis of the facts that were before the authority when it made the decision.

11. In this case, after presented with the relevant factual basis on which the decision not to protect the main classrooms of the students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms with full protection but only by means of the ‘protected areas’ method, there is no avoiding the conclusion that this decision departs from the margin of reasonableness. The two main considerations on which the state’s decision not to equip the aforementioned classes with full protection rests upon are  professional-security considerations and budgetary ones. In so far as the professional-security consideration is concerned, the respondents do not dispute the fact that full protection of the classrooms provides a better security solution to the threat of the ‘Qassam’ rockets in comparison to the ‘protected areas’ solution. The question that arises in this context is whether the ‘protected areas’ method provides a reasonable security solution for the students who study in those classes. It should be noted that the respondents do not have an absolute duty to protect the students against any and all threats or dangers. Imposing a duty of this kind is impossible from a practical perspective, and it is questionable whether it is desirable from a theoretical perspective. The respondents’ duty, once the state took upon itself the responsibility for protecting the educational institutions near the Gaza Strip, is to provide a reasonable security solution for the students in the schools who are exposed to the threat of ‘Qassam’ rockets.  This duty lasts as long as the students are required to attend lessons at these educational institutions.

12. In our opinion, the results of the large-scale experiment conducted in March 2007 with regard to classrooms where the protection is based on the ‘protected areas’ method (explained in paragraph 7 above) support the petitioners’ claim that this method of protection does not provide a reasonable and satisfactory security solution to the risks faced by the students. Approximately 43% of the classes that took part in the experiment did not succeed in reaching the protected areas within a period of time of up to fifteen seconds, which according to the respondents is the relevant time period in this case. In their 15 April 2007 statement, the respondents gave various explanations with regard to the results of the experiment and they attributed the results, inter alia, to the lack of cooperation on the part of the students who took part in the experiment and to the lack of sufficiently wide doors in the various classrooms. These explanations, which are really only suppositions, cannot convince us that the ‘protected areas’ method provides a proper security solution to the threat faced by the students. First, even according to the respondents, had the students in grades 7-12 cooperated fully with the experiment, the amount of classes (among these grades) that would have succeeded in reaching the protected areas within the time period of fifteen seconds would have been approximately 70-75%, like the corresponding rate among students in grades 1-6. Second, we have not been persuaded that the widening and adding of doorways, which the respondents intend to make, will significantly reduce the number of classes that will not succeed in reaching the protected areas within the stipulated period of time. The respondents did not submit any evidence that supports this supposition, whereas the results of the experiment that took place show that the students in grades 1-6 only succeeded in reaching the protected areas on time in 70-75% of cases, even though prima facie the problem of the width of the doorways should affect them less than the older students.

In addition it should be remembered — and this is very important — that at least in some cases there is no advance warning at all that the ‘Qassam’ rockets have been fired. In these cases, there is no doubt that the risk faced by the students in the classrooms where there is no complete protection is more significant than that faced by students in the classrooms that have this protection, even though the latter, as can be seen from the respondents’ claims, also face a considerable degree of risk.

13. The conclusion that follows from the aforesaid is that the ‘protected areas’ method does not provide a proper security solution for the classrooms. Notwithstanding, this alone is insufficient to determine that the respondents’ policy is so unreasonable that it justifies being set aside. In order to reach such a conclusion, we should examine what additional considerations lie at the heart of the respondents’ decision. The consideration that the respondents weighed, as they themselves argued before us, against the professional-security concern was the budgetary one. This consideration is legitimate and it is not irrelevant to the matter here. This consideration may also sometimes override various security concerns. The state does not have an absolute duty to protect every citizen, or even every student, at any price against all personal security threats. Whenever the state is required to decide whether to allocate a certain sum of money in order to reduce one security threat or another, it should weigh up the likelihood that the security threat will be realized, the risk that can be anticipated to human life if that risk is realized, the financial cost involved in preventing or reducing that threat and other considerations that may be relevant in the specific circumstances of a particular case. The balance between the considerations should be made within the scope of the margin of reasonableness given to the administrative authority.

14. In this case, as can be seen from the respondents’ statement of 6 February 2007, the expected cost of equipping the main classrooms of students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms with full protection amounts to approximately NIS 192 million. This is not an inconsequential amount. This court will not lightly order the state to allocate a sum of this magnitude for a specific purpose, when the state has previously decided not to allocate it for that purpose. On the other hand, in the circumstances of the case before us, the allocation of the aforesaid sum is required in order to protect human lives against a security threat that is not merely a potential or theoretical one. We are speaking of a daily, real and concrete threat to which thousands of students in the schools near the Gaza Strip and in Sederot are exposed. This threat hovers over the heads of children in schools that are situated not far away from the centre of the country.  This threat has continued for a long period because these students and their families live in an area where the inhabitants face a risk to their lives and unceasing tension. This is a threat not faced by students in other schools in Israel. The duty to go to school that applies to the vast majority of students under the Compulsory Education Law, and their right to study at the official educational institutions under the Compulsory Education Law and the Students Rights Law, 5761-2000, justifies in these circumstances imposing a duty on the state to provide protection for their lives and physical integrity.  Even if this is not an absolute duty, it is without doubt a very major duty in the circumstances that have arisen. It is not reasonable to force parents with the dilemma of choosing between realizing their children’s right to education and protecting their children’s lives. Equipping the main classrooms for students in grades 4-12 and the special classrooms in the schools near the Gaza Strip with full protection and not by means of the ‘protected areas’ method will provide better protection against the risk that is presented to the students’ lives and physical integrity. In these circumstances, and especially in view of the degree of the threat, the likelihood that it will be realized, the number of students exposed, and the practical possibilities that can be adopted to improve this security risk, we have reached the conclusion that the balance struck by the respondents in this case between the professional-security considerations and the budgetary considerations significantly departs from the margin of reasonableness. In other words, the decision not to equip the aforesaid classrooms with full protection and to protect them solely by means of the ‘protected areas’ method is such an unreasonable one that it justifies judicial intervention.

We should also point out that this judgment is limited to the circumstances of this case, as can be seen from the factual basis presented before us. We are not today determining that there is a duty to provide full protection for all the classrooms in every school in Israel that faces a security threat of any kind where full protection of the classrooms would be relevant to contend with that threat, or that the ‘protected areas’ method is a method that may not be used to protect schools or other public institutions in Israel. The concern that the respondents raised in the affidavit-in-reply that the decision to protect the schools in Sederot and the western Negev will lead to the protection of schools throughout Israel is not a sufficient reason for refusing to protect them when the lives of the students are in such serious danger. The conclusion that we have reached in the matter before us is based entirely on the specific facts concerning the risks that the schools in Sederot and the other settlements near the Gaza Strip confront, and the threats facing the students in these schools.

15. I, therefore, propose to my colleagues that we make an absolute order that the respondents shall equip all the main classrooms in the schools in Sederot and the other settlements near the Gaza Strip with full protection, and not by means of the ‘protected areas’ method. The respondents shall complete the protection works for these classrooms by the beginning of the 2007-2008 academic year. The respondents are also required to equip the special classrooms in these schools with full protection, and not by means of the ‘protected areas’ method. The special classrooms that will be equipped with this protection are those listed, according to pedagogic priorities determined by the Ministry of Education, in the director-general of the Ministry of Education of 13 March 2007 letter (attached as appendix 4 to the respondents’ statement of 14 April 2007). The protection for these special classrooms shall be completed by the end of the religious holidays in October 2007. With regard to the kindergartens near the Gaza Strip, we see no reason to make an absolute order because there is no disagreement that they should be equipped with full protection and because the work to protect them is being carried out at a reasonable rate.

 

 

Justice D. Berliner

I agree with the result reached by my colleague the president, and I would like to add the following few remarks.

It seems to me that within the margin of reasonableness in the circumstances that prevail at the current time in the settlements near the Gaza Strip and the town of Sederot especially, it is also possible to include considerations that we ought to give encouragement to the local inhabitants and show our concern for their fate and for their feeling of maximum security, in so far as this is possible, especially where children are concerned. This is in addition to the considerations set out by my colleague with regard to the degree of security provided by the proposed method of protection.

I accept that as a rule these are not considerations that should be included within the margin of reasonableness for examining different methods of protection. But the times are exceptional and the suffering being experienced by the town of Sederot and the additional settlements is of unusual proportions, both from the viewpoint of the period during which the inhabitants have been exposed to the threat of the ‘Qassams’ and from the viewpoint of the number and extent of the injuries.

Exceptional times justify exceptional measures, and the margin of reasonableness should, as I have said, also reflect this outlook                 

 

Justice S. Joubran

I agree.

 

 

 

Petition granted.

12 Sivan 5767.

29 May 2007.

 

 

A v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CA 8823/07
Date Decided: 
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The appellant was arrested on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization, and had been the subject of: a. a decision by the authority in charge to postpone the appellant’s first meeting with an attorney by three days; and b. a decision, rendered two days after his arrest, to extend his detention by an additional ten days. The Jerusalem District Court rejected the state’s request to have the appeal of the detention extension decision deliberated in the absence of the appellant; and the state successfully appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal against the extension of the detention was thus deliberated in a hearing conducted in the appellant’s absence, in which the appeal was denied. The respondent next requested that the hearing regarding a second extension of the detention be conducted in the appellant’s absence, and in response the appellant argued in the Magistrates Court against the constitutionality of the statutory provision allowing for such a hearing.  The Magistrates Court rejected this argument, and the District Court upheld its decision. An appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

 

As an arrestee suspected of having committed a security offense, the appellant was subject to the possibility of having detention hearings and appeals thereof held in his absence, pursuant to s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006. The constitutionality of this section was attacked indirectly in the appeal originally heard by the Supreme Court, but not considered by the Court because it had not been raised in the earlier stages of litigation. The issue had become moot by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.

 

Held: (Vice President Rivlin) First, the Court could consider the constitutional issue despite its mootness, in light of the importance of the issue and the likelihood of its recurrence in other situations in which it would also become moot by the time its constitutionality could be determined by the Supreme Court. Next, regarding the substance of the appeal, the right to be present at a criminal proceeding (including at the detention hearing stage) is a core part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, as currently established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The right applies at all stages of a proceeding, including detention hearings. Because it is a constitutionally protected right, the denial of the right is permissible only if it meets the four conditions established in the limitations clause of that Basic Law. Here, compliance with the first two conditions (a legislative basis, and conformity with the values of the State of Israel) was not in question. The purpose of the section (the enabling of a continuous and effective interrogation of the suspect, without there being a need for an interruption for the purpose of bringing the suspect to court) is an appropriate one, and the third condition is thus met. The constitutional status of section 5 therefore depends on its compliance with the proportionality condition of the limitations clause, which it fails.

 

Compliance with the proportionality condition has been determined through the use of three sub-tests: a. whether there is a rational relationship between the measure that violates a right and the appropriate purpose it is intended to help achieve (a test which was met here); b. whether the measure involves the least possible violation of the right, in light of the purpose it is intended to achieve; and c. the “narrow sense” proportionality test which requires that the measure be one that creates a violation which is proportionate in terms of the appropriate purpose that is being achieved.

 

The measure here fails the last two sub-tests because of the depth of the violation involved — it is thus neither a measure that causes the least possible violation, nor is it one that represents a proportionate balancing between a violation of a right and the need to achieve a legitimate purpose. The depth of the violation involved is especially marked, given that the measures described in s. 5 of the Temporary Provision can be combined with a measure established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, which establishes the possibility of delaying a meeting between a suspect and his attorney. The suspect can thus be prevented both from appearing in court at a hearing regarding his case, and from meeting with an attorney in order to assist in presenting his case — leading to his utter inability to enjoy due process during the proceedings held in his absence. The section is therefore an impermissible violation of a constitutionally protected right, and the Arrests Law is to be interpreted as if s. 5 had not been enacted.

 

Justice Naor, concurring in part, wrote that while s. 5 was invalid on constitutional grounds, the Knesset should be given a six month period in which to enact a more proportionate arrangement. Justice Naor considered the option of allowing the provision to stand in cases of a near certainty of frustration of the prevention of harm to human life, but ultimately decided that a full invalidation was necessary because there would always be the potential for disproportionate periods of detention. In Justice Naor’s opinion, the decision that a statutory provision is unconstitutional as a result of its “cumulative effect” when combined with another statutory provision is a complex issue that should be left for further discussion. President Beinisch and Justice Rubinstein took a different view regarding the need for deferment and the utility of a new legislative arrangement, both finding that any alternative proportionate legislation would cover such a small number of cases that it would be pointless. Justice Grunis wrote that alternative legislation could be enacted, but that there was no need to defer the declaration of the section’s invalidity for any period of time; to the contrary, an immediate invalidation would provide an incentive for the legislature to act promptly.

 

Appeal allowed.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

CrimApp 8823/07

 

A

 

v.

 

State of Israel

 

The Supreme Court

[4 January 2009]

[24 March 2009]

 

Before President D. Beinisch, Vice President E. Rivlin, and Justices A. Procaccia, E. Levy, E. Grunis, M. Naor, E. Arbel, E. Rubinstein, S. Joubran

 

Appeal of a decision of the Jerusalem District Court dated 18 October 2007 in MApp 10116/07, issued by the Honorable Judge H. Ben Ami

 

Facts: The appellant was arrested on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization, and had been the subject of: a. a decision by the authority in charge to postpone the appellant’s first meeting with an attorney by three days; and b. a decision, rendered two days after his arrest, to extend his detention by an additional ten days. The Jerusalem District Court rejected the state’s request to have the appeal of the detention extension decision deliberated in the absence of the appellant; and the state successfully appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal against the extension of the detention was thus deliberated in a hearing conducted in the appellant’s absence, in which the appeal was denied. The respondent next requested that the hearing regarding a second extension of the detention be conducted in the appellant’s absence, and in response the appellant argued in the Magistrates Court against the constitutionality of the statutory provision allowing for such a hearing.  The Magistrates Court rejected this argument, and the District Court upheld its decision. An appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

As an arrestee suspected of having committed a security offense, the appellant was subject to the possibility of having detention hearings and appeals thereof held in his absence, pursuant to s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006. The constitutionality of this section was attacked indirectly in the appeal originally heard by the Supreme Court, but not considered by the Court because it had not been raised in the earlier stages of litigation. The issue had become moot by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.

Held: (Vice President Rivlin) First, the Court could consider the constitutional issue despite its mootness, in light of the importance of the issue and the likelihood of its recurrence in other situations in which it would also become moot by the time its constitutionality could be determined by the Supreme Court. Next, regarding the substance of the appeal, the right to be present at a criminal proceeding (including at the detention hearing stage) is a core part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, as currently established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The right applies at all stages of a proceeding, including detention hearings. Because it is a constitutionally protected right, the denial of the right is permissible only if it meets the four conditions established in the limitations clause of that Basic Law. Here, compliance with the first two conditions (a legislative basis, and conformity with the values of the State of Israel) was not in question. The purpose of the section (the enabling of a continuous and effective interrogation of the suspect, without there being a need for an interruption for the purpose of bringing the suspect to court) is an appropriate one, and the third condition is thus met. The constitutional status of section 5 therefore depends on its compliance with the proportionality condition of the limitations clause, which it fails.

Compliance with the proportionality condition has been determined through the use of three sub-tests: a. whether there is a rational relationship between the measure that violates a right and the appropriate purpose it is intended to help achieve (a test which was met here); b. whether the measure involves the least possible violation of the right, in light of the purpose it is intended to achieve; and c. the “narrow sense” proportionality test which requires that the measure be one that creates a violation which is proportionate in terms of the appropriate purpose that is being achieved.

The measure here fails the last two sub-tests because of the depth of the violation involved — it is thus neither a measure that causes the least possible violation, nor is it one that represents a proportionate balancing between a violation of a right and the need to achieve a legitimate purpose. The depth of the violation involved is especially marked, given that the measures described in s. 5 of the Temporary Provision can be combined with a measure established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, which establishes the possibility of delaying a meeting between a suspect and his attorney. The suspect can thus be prevented both from appearing in court at a hearing regarding his case, and from meeting with an attorney in order to assist in presenting his case — leading to his utter inability to enjoy due process during the proceedings held in his absence. The section is therefore an impermissible violation of a constitutionally protected right, and the Arrests Law is to be interpreted as if s. 5 had not been enacted.

Justice Naor, concurring in part, wrote that while s. 5 was invalid on constitutional grounds, the Knesset should be given a six month period in which to enact a more proportionate arrangement. Justice Naor considered the option of allowing the provision to stand in cases of a near certainty of frustration of the prevention of harm to human life, but ultimately decided that a full invalidation was necessary because there would always be the potential for disproportionate periods of detention. In Justice Naor’s opinion, the decision that a statutory provision is unconstitutional as a result of its “cumulative effect” when combined with another statutory provision is a complex issue that should be left for further discussion. President Beinisch and Justice Rubinstein took a different view regarding the need for deferment and the utility of a new legislative arrangement, both finding that any alternative proportionate legislation would cover such a small number of cases that it would be pointless. Justice Grunis wrote that alternative legislation could be enacted, but that there was no need to defer the declaration of the section’s invalidity for any period of time; to the contrary, an immediate invalidation would provide an incentive for the legislature to act promptly.

Appeal allowed.

Legislation cited:

 

Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006, s. 5.

Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], 5742-1982.

(Emergency) Defense Regulations — 1945, Reg. 85.

Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 44, 45.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, ss. 35, 38.

Criminal Procedure Regulations (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Deferral of a Security Offense Arrestee’s Meeting With Attorney), 5757-1997.

Military Jurisdiction Law, 5715-1955.

Penal Code, 5737-1977, s. 34K.

Rabbinical Tribunals Regulations, 5733, Reg. 57.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

 

[1]        HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241.

[2]        HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141.

[3]        HCJ 1581/91 Salahat v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 837.

[4]        HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 811.

[5]        CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor (2006) (not yet reported).

[6]        CrimA 152/51 Trifus v. Attorney General [1952] IsrSC 6(1) 17.

[7]        CrimA 353/88 Wilner v. State of Israel [1991] IsrSC 45(2) 444.

[8]        HCJ 7457/95 Barki Petra Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 769.

[9]        CrimA 1741/99 A v. State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 43(4) 750.

[10]     FH 3032/99 Baranes v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 354.

[11]     CrimA 1632/95 Meshulam v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 534.

[12]     CrimA 951/80 Kanir v. State of Israel [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 505.

[13]     CrimApp 4586/06 Halido v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[14]     CrimApp 1097/06 Bineib v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[15]     HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1.

[16]     HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[17]     HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiya v. Israel Police [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 209.

[18]     CrimApp 1144/06 Ziyad v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[19]     LCrimA 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist (not yet reported).

[20]     HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817.            

[21]     HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349.

[22]     HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel (2006) (not yet reported).

[23]     HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30.

[24]     HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352.

[25]     HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[26]     CrimApp 8473/07 State of Israel v. A (2007) (unreported).

[27]     HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871.

[28]     HCJ 243/62 Israeli Film Studios v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.

[29]     CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 535.

[30]     HCJ 253/88 Sejadia v. Minister of Defense [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 801.

[31]     HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2004] IsrSC 59(4) 241.

[32]     HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 793.

[33]     CrimA 6659/06 A. v. State of Israel (2008) (unreported).

[34]     HCJ 10203/03 “Hamifkad Haleumi” Ltd. v. Attorney General [2008] (unreported).

[35]     HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister (2006) (unreported).

[36]     HCJ 366/03 Society for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. Minister of Finance (2005) (unreported).

[37]     HCJ 10578/08 Legal Institute of Terrorism Studies v. Government of Israel (2006) (unreported) 

[38]     HCJ 801/00 Bassam Natshe and The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Erez Military Court (2000) (unreported).

[39]     HCJ 320/80 Kawasme v. Minister of Defense [1980]. IsrSC 35(3) 113.

[40]     HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. (2006) (unreported).

[41]     HCJ 951/06 Stein v. Police Commissioner (2006) (unreported).

[42]     HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister (2005) (unreported).

[43]     HCJ 7862/04 Abu Daher v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria Area [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 368.

[44]     HCJ 9441/07 Igbar v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (2007) (unreported).

[45]     HCJ 1546/06 Gazawi v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria (2006) (unreported).

[46]     CrimApp 10879/05 Al-Abid v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[47]     HCJ 7932/08 Al-Harub v. Commander of the Military Forces in Judea and Samaria (2009) (unreported).

[48]     LCrimA 7284/09 Rosenstein v. State of Israel (2009) (unreported).

[49]     CrimApp 4857/05 Fahima v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[50]     MApp 838/84 Livni v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 729.

[51]     CrimApp 9086/01 Raviv v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 163.

[52]     CrimApp 7200/08 Sa’id v. State of Israel (2008) (unreported).

[53]     CrimApp 5114/97 Salimani v. State of Israel [2001] IsrSC 55(2) 721.

 

U.S. Supreme Court cases cited

[54]     Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[55]     United States v. W.T. Grant Co. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).

[56]     Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).

[57]     United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

[58]     U.S Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership 513 U.S. 18 (1994).

[59]     Kentucky v. Stincer 482 U.S. 730 (1987).

[60]     Snyder v. Massachusetts 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

 

For the appellant — R. Zoabi; D. Halevy.

For the respondent — M. Karshen.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Vice President E. Rivlin

1.    The Jerusalem District Court (Judge H. Ben Ami) denied an appeal of two decisions issued by the Jerusalem Magistrates Court: the first was a decision by Judge R. Winograd, to hold a hearing regarding the extension of the appellant’s detention, rendered in the appellant’s absence; the second was a decision issued by Judge D. Pollock to extend the appellant’s detention by an additional eight days. We first note that the issue arising in the appellant’s own particular case — as is the case with deliberations of all cases of a similar nature within this context — became moot long ago due to the passage of time. But this does not bring the discussion to an end, as will be explained below. The appellant argues that the statutory provisions on which the lower courts based their decisions to deliberate the extension of the detention in the arrestee’s absence — s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 (hereinafter, “the Statute” or “the Temporary Provision”) — is unconstitutional in that it violates the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter also: “the Basic Law”). It is this constitutional issue that arose indirectly in the appeal that we face today; because of the nature of the matter, as will be explained below, we have seen fit to hear the case, despite its being a purely theoretical issue with respect to the appellant’s case.

Background and the parties’ arguments

2.    The appellant was arrested on 5 October 2007 on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization (pursuant to Regulation 85(a) of the (Emergency) Defense Regulations — 1945). On 6 October 2007, the authority in charge decided to prevent the appellant’s meeting with an attorney for three days (pursuant to authority established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) Law, 5756-1996 (hereinafter, “the Arrests Law”) and in the Criminal Procedure Regulations (Powers— Arrests) (Delay of a Security Offense Arrestee’s Meeting With Attorney), 5757-1997)). On 7 October 2007 the Jerusalem Magistrates Court decided to extend the appellant’s detention until 17 October 2007. The appellant appealed this decision and the respondent, on its part, requested that the appeal be heard in his absence, pursuant to s. 5(2) of the Statute. That section is quoted here in full, as follows:

5. Hearing held in the absence of an arrestee suspected of committing a security offense

The provisions of ss. 16(2) and 57 of the Arrests Law, with regard to the presence of an arrestee during deliberations as described in those sections, will apply with regard to the presence of a security offense arrestee during his detention, as stated in s. 4(1), with the following changes:

(1) If the court orders, in the presence of the security offense arrestee, an extension of the detention for a period of less than 20 days, the court may, in the arrestee’s absence, extend his detention for a period that does not exceed the balance of the days remaining until the end of 20 days from the date of the hearing that was held in the security offense arrestee’s presence — if an application for such has been filed with the approval of the supervisor, and if the court has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of a commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life;

(2) The court may order that a hearing concerning an application for a rehearing pursuant to s. 52 of the Arrests Law or of an appeal pursuant to s. 53 of the said statute be held in the arrestee’s absence — if an application for such has been filed with the approval of the supervisor, and if the court has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the investigation;

(3) The provisions of s. 15(c) through (h) of the Arrests Law will apply, mutatis mutandi, to a deliberation about whether to permit the presence of the arrestee in the proceedings described in this section;

(4) A security offense arrestee will be made aware of a court decision reached in a deliberation that was held in his absence as soon as is possible, unless the court orders otherwise at the request of the State’s representative, if the court is persuaded that disclosure to the arrestee is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or the ability to prevent harm to human life;

The District Court rejected the request for the hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence, noting that after reviewing the classified report attached to the application, it was not persuaded that the suspension of the interrogation for the purpose of having the arrestee present at the deliberation of the appeal would likely  cause material harm to the investigation. The state appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (per Justice Fogelman) granted the appeal. The Court reasoned that ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute do violate the suspect’s right to be present at his detention hearing. The Court emphasized that the combination of these provisions with the possibility that the suspect may be prevented from meeting with his attorney, “leads to a situation in which, as a practical matter, the respondent’s ability to present his position at the hearing is very limited”. This, the Court noted, constituted a material violation of the arrestee’s right to be present at the deliberation of his case, to defend himself and to present his position. The Court emphasized the severity of this violation in light of the fact that the deliberation dealt with the restriction of a person’s liberty in the form of his arrest —liberty being a basic right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

3. Despite the constitutional context, the Supreme Court did not discuss the argument that the Statute is unconstitutional, because the arguments concerning that issue were first raised only in the context of the appeal, without a proper background having been presented and without the state having been given an opportunity to relate to the issue. The Court therefore discussed only the matter of implementation, and in this connection noted that in light of the violation of the arrestee’s rights, it was necessary to determine that the violation was no greater than absolutely necessary. The Court further noted that the legislature had made a distinction between s. 5(1), dealing with the extension of detention, and s. 5(2), dealing with the deliberation of an application for a rehearing or an appeal. In the first case, the ability to hold the deliberation in the arrestee’s absence is very limited — in fact, this can only be done in a case in which the court “is persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life”; in contrast, the requirement in s. 5(2) is that the suspension of the interrogation is likely to “cause material harm to the investigation”. The Court also found that, in connection with the implementation of the provisions of the Statute,  consideration must be given to the interest in preserving public welfare and security on the one hand, and on the other, to the need to protect the arrestee’s rights. The court must determine, inter alia, the severity of the harm done to the investigation, the likelihood that such harm will occur, the gravity of the suspicions and the potential danger inherent in the matter under investigation. As Justice Fogelman wrote: “The more severe the suspicions attributed to the arrestee, and the greater the potential danger to public welfare and security that is involved in the matter under investigation, the greater the tendency is towards granting the said request. And the reverse is true as well.”  

Moving from the general to the particular: the Supreme Court, in considering the standard to be applied in the petitioner’s case — i.e., the possibility of “material harm to the investigation” — determined that the evidentiary and intelligence foundation that had been laid before it, which included additional information beyond that which had been presented to the District Court, indicated a high probability that the investigation would be substantively and materially impaired if it was suspended in order to allow the detainee to appear at the hearing  of his appeal. The state’s appeal was therefore allowed, and it was held that the hearing of the appellant’s appeal regarding the extension of his detention could be held in his absence.

4.    On 11 October 2007, the District Court heard the appellant’s appeal regarding the extension of his detention, but without the appellant being present. The appeal was denied. In the meantime, it was also decided that the period during which he could not meet with his attorney would be extended for an additional six days (beginning on 16 October 2007).

In anticipation of the hearing regarding the extension of the appellant’s detention on 17 October 2007, the respondent filed a request to have that hearing held in the appellant’s absence, pursuant to s. 5(1) of the Statute. The appellant, on his part, raised the argument that the statutory provisions on which the respondent relied were unconstitutional and that they should therefore be declared invalid. The Magistrates Court, in its decision dated 17 October 2007, rejected the constitutional argument and held that the Statute satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause of the Basic Law (s. 8 of that Law). The Statute, it was noted, was designed to prevent harm to human life in circumstances in which the suspect is a “ticking bomb” or in which his interrogation could prevent the “explosion of a ticking bomb”. This purpose, it was held, is a proper one. The Magistrates Court added that the violation of the arrestee’s rights caused by s. 5 of the Statute is proportionate — in light of the fact that the first order for the suspect’s detention had been issued in his presence, that the right had only been denied later on (at the point when the court was deciding whether to extend the remand and during the rehearing and appeal), and in light of the high level of proof that the respondent was required to meet in order to establish a ground for applying s. 5(1). Regarding the appellant, the Magistrates Court held that the material that had been presented in his case met the narrow test established in s. 5(1) of the Statute, and that the hearing regarding the request for an extension of the remand could be held in the appellant’s absence. The same day, the Magistrates Court issued another decision, to the effect that the appellant could be detained for an additional eight days (through 24 October 2007).

5.    An appeal was filed with the District Court against all these decisions, and it was denied on 18 October 2007. The District Court also recognized that s. 5 of the Statute violates an arrestee’s basic right — the same as that of an indicted defendant — to be present at his own trial. This violation, the District Court held, has a justifiable purpose, and it is also proportionate: “because, unfortunately, the State of Israel has officially declared a state of emergency and the right to life of the residents of the country hangs in the balance, and it is also beyond doubt that the reasonableness and proportionality requirements have been satisfied.” The District Court also did not see fit to intervene in the specific holdings in the appellant’s case.

An appeal against this decision — the appeal now pending before us— was filed on 21 October 2007. Several general questions were raised in the appeal relating to the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Statute, as were various specific questions regarding the implementation of the section in the appellant’s particular case. Naturally, our case focuses on the constitutional claims. The appellant believes that ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute violate an arrestee’s right to be present at his trial, as well as his rights to due process, dignity and  liberty. This violation, it is argued, is inconsistent with the provisions of the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, particularly when combined with other violations of the rights of a security offender, in particular, of the right to meet with an attorney. The appellant also believes that s. 5 of the Statute conflicts with the State of Israel’s obligations pursuant to international humanitarian law.

When this case was brought to this Court, it was determined that a panel of three judges would deliberate it on the following day. The Court (Justices Arbel, Joubran and Fogelman) noted, in a decision dated 22 October 2007, that the grounds on the basis of which the arrestee was prevented from attending his hearing were no longer valid, and that given this fact, the deliberation of the issue of the appellant’s detention would be returned to the Magistrates Court to be reheard in the presence of the appellant. Nevertheless, the Court held that this Court would deliberate the constitutional matter separately, after the parties had submitted their written positions.    

6.    The respondent, in its written arguments, did not dispute the importance of the right of an arrestee to be present during deliberations regarding his detention. However, the respondent argued that even if the right is a constitutional one — and it raises certain questions regarding that point — its violation within the framework of s. 5 of the Statute is permissible pursuant to the provisions of the limitations clause. The respondent argued that the Statute was enacted in response to the needs of the time, as a means of coping with the security situation prevailing in Israel following, inter alia, the implementation of the disengagement plan and the establishment of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. The respondent also argues that s. 5 of the Statute does not conflict with the State of Israel’s obligations pursuant to international humanitarian law and that even if  such a conflict existed, it would not be sufficient to justify a nullification of the Statute.

7.    The case was scheduled to be heard before a panel of three justices in the middle of 2008. Even before the date set for the hearing, a number of human rights organizations submitted a petition to this Court seeking to invalidate the Statute in its entirety on constitutional grounds (HCJ 2028/08 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Justice). A decision was made to consolidate the two cases and on 27 July 2008, the Court ruled that the deliberation would proceed before an expanded panel. On 4 January 2009, a deliberation was held before the expanded panel, and oral arguments continued on 24 March 2009. In the course of the deliberation held on that date, a majority of the panel decided to review, ex parte, the classified material that the respondent wished to present. After the review, the parties returned to the courtroom and the Court informed them of the main points of the material that had been presented ex parte. Only then did the petitioners in HCJ 2028/08 state that they were withdrawing their petition in light of the decision to review the material ex parte. The petition was therefore withdrawn and only the appeal before us remained in place. As stated, this appeal raises, indirectly, the question of the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Statute.

Theoretical appeal

8.    The appeal before us was filed by a person — the appellant — who believed that he had been harmed by the implementation of s. 5 of the Statute; the appeal attacked the section’s constitutionality indirectly. The appellant raised various arguments regarding the constitutionality of the section in the earlier stages of litigation as well. The earlier panels responded to these arguments by rejecting the contention that s. 5 is unconstitutional (regarding indirect attacks on statutes in trial courts, see A. Barak “Judicial Review of a Law’s Constitutionality: Centralized or De-Centralized,” 8 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 13 (2005)). When the question reached this Court in the context of the appeal of the first round of litigation, it was still relevant to the appellant’s case. However, as indicated in this Court’s ruling dated 22 October 2007, the grounds for the non-appearance of the appellant in court had lost their force before this Court had the opportunity to decide the constitutional issue. The significance of this is that the constitutional issue became moot with respect to the appellant’s specific case. The Supreme Court therefore returned the appellant’s case to the Magistrates Court to be deliberated there in the appellant’s presence. Nevertheless, the Court decided to retain its focus on the constitutional issue.

9.    It often happens that a discussion of a theoretical issue emerges  in the framework of the process of an appeal to the High Court of Justice. The rule is that the Court does not customarily discuss a theoretical issue and it will  prefer to wait until an appropriate specific case arises before it prescribes a particular rule. However, in certain cases, the Court is nevertheless  required to deal with a petition that is only theoretical in nature. Justice Y. Zamir stressed this point in HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1]:  

‘There have been instances in which the Court was prepared to discuss a theoretical question, of a general nature, even though it was not connected to a specific case. These were mostly cases in which the petition raised an important question and as a practical matter, the Court could not issue a ruling on it, except when it was presented as a general question that was not connected to a specific case. See, for example, HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset [2], at pp. 145-146; HCJ 1581/91 Salahat v. Government of Israel [3], at p. 841; HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defense [4].’

In that case, the Court discussed the constitutionality of a provision of Military Jurisdiction Law, 5715-1955, which prescribes the period of time during which a soldier may be detained by a military policeman before being brought before a military judge. The Court held that despite the theoretical aspect of the petitions, they should be deliberated in light of the importance of the question related to the basic principles of the rule of law, the frequency with which the question arises, and the “short life-span” of the issue as a practical question; “it arises when a soldier is arrested by a military policeman; it continues to be relevant for only a few days, until the soldier is released or brought before the military court for an extension of his arrest; and then it expires”. The same point is true, in principle and with the necessary changes, with respect to the instant case.

In this case, there has been no petition to the High Court of Justice that attacks the Statute’s constitutionality directly. As stated, the petition submitted by the human rights organizations has been withdrawn. What remains before us, therefore, is an individual appeal that raises the constitutional issue only indirectly. However, it seems to me that for the purpose of the question that we are to decide here, we need make no distinction between the two situations, and in appropriate cases it is proper to discuss a fundamental-constitutional question that has been raised indirectly in a specific case even if it has been rendered moot with respect to the specific appellant. Indeed, if the constitutional question had lost its relevancy with respect to the appellant during the earlier proceedings, the lower courts might not have considered it, and the appropriate way for the appellant — if he had wished to present a fundamental question regarding the Statute’s constitutionality — would have been to petition this Court. I note in this context that in certain respects, the indirect attack is the most appropriate manner in which to test the constitutionality of a statute’s provisions, and an appeal of the type presented here, even if it has become theoretical since the time it was originally brought, is an appropriate manner in which to present a constitutional question to the Supreme Court.

10.  It should be noted that the federal courts in the United States follow a rule (known as the mootness doctrine) according to which a claim must be dismissed when a judicial decision will no longer have any effect on the rights of the parties to the proceeding and the only question remaining before the court is one that is purely hypothetical or academic. The courts have recognized a number of exceptions to this rule. The first applies when there is an expectation that the legal question under discussion will arise again in the future, with regard either to the parties to the specific proceeding or with regard to others, although — because of the question’s temporary character — it will always become a purely theoretical question during the time required for the question to be adjudicated. Thus, for example, in Roe v. Wade [54], which dealt with the right to an abortion, the United States Supreme Court held that although its decision would not impact on the specific appellant’s rights — the appellant having given birth already as the proceedings in the case had continued — it would be inappropriate to deny the appeal on the basis of the mootness doctrine because the problem of potential mootness was inherent to the issue of the constitutionality of a prohibition against abortions, in the sense that legal proceedings would never be relevant with respect to the actual parties for more than the nine months of a pregnancy. A second exception to the doctrine arises when a defendant ceases to engage in a wrongful activity due to the initiation of the legal proceeding, but a need remains to deter the party from returning to such wrongful activity in the future. In such a case, the concern arises with respect to the possibility that the defendant has discontinued the questionable actions as a strategic measure only, in order to lead to the dismissal of the claim brought against it, and will afterward return to its earlier path (see, for example — United States v. W.T. Grant Co. [55]). An additional exception applies when a rejection of the complaint on the basis of the mootness doctrine is likely to expose one of the parties to criminal proceedings or to a civil claim (Edgar v. MITE Corp. [56]).

In some cases, it may still be important, even when a claim has become theoretical at the stage of an appeal, to overturn the trial court’s ruling in order to deny precedential value to that ruling and remove any possible implications for future proceedings between the parties. In the American legal system, this remedy is known as vacatur, and its significance is that it nullifies the lower court’s decision completely. One of the key considerations in determining whether this remedy should be used is whether the claim had become moot due to a voluntary waiver of claimed rights by the appellant at the appellate level (such as in the case of a settlement) or whether it had become moot because of changes in circumstances that are external to the parties or because of an independent move made by the respondent at the appellate level. (See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. [57]; U.S Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership [58]. See also the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision (per President Beinisch) in CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5]).

11.  In the case before us, there is no need to establish a fixed rule regarding any of these matters. Given the development of the situation in our case, it is of no real consequence whether a distinction is drawn between a direct attack and an indirect one, since the case became theoretical after it was brought before the Supreme Court. And indeed, as stated, the Supreme Court held on 22 July 2007 that the constitutional question, which from the beginning had been raised only indirectly in the context of the specific matter, remained an open question in the case. It is clear that the constitutional question remains a valid issue vis-à-vis all potential parties because a decision regarding the matter will constitute a binding precedent..

We must now deal with the constitutional question on a substantive level.

The temporary provision

12.  The government’s draft law establishing special powers relating to the arrest of security offense suspects, was published toward the end of 2005 (Draft Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Non-Resident Arrestee Suspected of Security Offense — Temporary Provision) 5766-2005, Draft Laws 206). This Draft Law granted powers regarding arrestees who are not residents of Israel and who are suspected of having committed security offenses (according to a list of such offenses set out in s. 1 of the Draft Law). The explanatory material stated that the interrogation of a security offense arrestee, which is conducted for the purpose of bringing the arrestee to trial and thwarting terrorist activity, has special features that justify the grant of special powers to the enforcement authorities.

Among these special features, the explanatory material lists the following — first, regarding an arrestee who prior to his arrest was not a resident of the State of Israel, the investigating authority will have only a limited ability to collect evidence and establish a factual background, as compared to the ability to do so with respect to those who are residents of the State. Second, when the offense involved is a security offense, potential witnesses — when there are any — often do not cooperate for ideological or nationalistic reasons—; this is because of the sympathy such witnesses have for the suspects, or because they are hostile to the State of Israel. The nationalistic or ideological motive — it is further argued — generally means that those being interrogated are themselves uncooperative, and it is therefore necessary to conduct the interrogation for a more extended and uninterrupted period than is usually the case, so that the interrogators can arrive at the truth. Third, some of the interrogations must be held continuously and without interruption, especially at an initial stage, so that the investigating authorities can thwart terrorist attacks before they are carried out.

The explanatory material indicated that the need to grant broader enforcement powers in connection with the interrogation of a security offense arrestee who is not a resident of Israel is also derived from the fact that since the end of the military administration in the Gaza Strip, the investigative authorities can no longer exercise the powers that they previously could pursuant to security legislation enacted by the commander of the IDF forces in the region.

The Draft Law therefore included provisions that expanded the powers of the enforcement authorities beyond the regular powers established in the Arrests Law. Thus, the Draft Law contained provisions that extended the period of time before an arrestee must be brought before a judge, the duration of a detention that can be ordered ex parte, the period of time allowed before an indictment must be brought, and the period of time during which the arrestee may be prevented from meeting with an attorney. The Draft Law also included — as is relevant to this case — a provision that allowed the court to hold a detention hearing without the arrestee being present. Regarding s. 6 of the Draft Law, which is now s. 5 of the Statute, the explanatory material included the following:

‘The right of a person to be present in the court that hears his case is  a very important right under the Israeli legal system, and certainly when the matter involves his detention. It is nevertheless the case that the removal of a security offense arrestee from the interrogation facility for the purpose of bringing him to court can, in certain cases, do serious damage to the interrogation and at times can even lead to the frustration of its purpose. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to balance the protection of the rights of the arrestee against the need to allow the enforcement authorities to carry out their investigative activities continuously, in a manner which leads to the thwarting of terrorist activity or otherwise prevents a danger to human life and the security of the public.’

The law that was eventually enacted is broader than the proposed Draft Law, in the sense that it applies to any person suspected of committing a security offense — whether or not such person is a resident of the state of Israel. In other ways, the law is narrower in scope than the Draft Law — for example, with regard to the type of security offenses to which it applies. The Statute, as currently worded, includes a number of key components. One component deals with the extension of time during which it is permissible to delay the arraignment of a security offense arrestee before a judge — 96 hours instead of the 24 hours or 48 hours provided in the Arrests Law (s. 3). A second component grants the court the power to extend the detention of a security offense arrestee for a period of no more than 20 days, each time — instead of the 15 day period prescribed in the Arrests Law (s. 4(1)). A third component extends the period of time regarding which an application for an additional arrest will not require approval of the Attorney General — up to 35 days, instead of 30 days as established in the Arrests Law (s. 4(2)). The fourth component relates to the matter that arises in the instant case — the holding of detention hearings in the absence of the arrestee (s. 5). The Statute further provides (in s. 6) that the arrestee must be represented by defense counsel at a hearing pursuant to s. 5. The Statute also includes provisions that require reports concerning the implementation of the Statute (s. 8) from the Minister of Justice to the Knesset’s Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice.

13.  The provisions of the Draft Law, which originally applied only to arrestees who were not residents of the state because of the special difficulties involved in interrogating such arrestees and in collecting information about them, were eventually consolidated into a piece of legislation that applied to all security offense suspects. This legislation established various powers that were mainly intended to enable a more continuous interrogation of such suspects, and to minimize “interruptions” and delays in the interrogation process. The legislation narrows the power of the Attorney General and the court to review an arrest in such cases, and limits the arrestee’s ability to object to the arrest. The main objective of these measures is to improve the enforcement authorities’ ability to carry out effective interrogations regarding security offenses, given the special characteristics of such offenses. The main difficulty in these cases arises in connection with the gathering of information and the need to take action in order to thwart acts of terrorism. The Draft Law and the Statute both reflect the fact that those involved in this work wished to establish a balance between these objectives and the rights of the suspects. In the words of the explanatory material:

‘The provisions of the law reflect a consideration of the required balance between the guiding principles of the Israeli legal system regarding suspects’ rights in criminal proceedings — on the one hand — and, on the other hand, he law enforcement authorities’ special need for broader powers with respect to security offense arrestees, because of the danger they pose and the special characteristics of their interrogation.’

14.  Eighteen months before the Temporary Provision was set to expire, the Knesset decided (on 18 December 2007) to extend it for an additional three years, while introducing certain minor changes to the Knesset reporting mechanism. The explanatory material to the Draft Criminal Procedure (Arrestee Suspected of a Security Offense) (Temporary Provision) (Amendment) Law 5765-2005, SH 340, includes the following:

‘During the period in which the law has been in force, it has been found that the provisions established in it were most essential to the law enforcement authorities involved in the investigation and thwarting of terrorist offenses, and that the use of the powers established therein were often helpful in thwarting terrorist attacks, finding offenders, and bringing them to trial. It should be noted that the security forces have used the special provisions established in the law proportionately and cautiously — using them only in cases in which they were needed in order to achieve the said purposes.

It should also be noted that the need for the Statute became even more essential after the Hamas organization came to power in the Gaza Strip.’

The significance of this is that the Temporary Provision will remain in effect until at least 29 October 2010.

The constitutional right to be present at one’s criminal trial and detention proceedings

15.  The appellant argues, correctly, that the Temporary Provision violates fundamental rights that are protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. It is a basic rule of criminal law that no person may be judged other than in his presence. This rule is anchored in the Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], 5742-1982, which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this law, no person will be criminally tried in his absence”. This rule expresses the right of any defendant to be present at his criminal trial — a presence which is “essential”, as was noted in CrimA 152/51 Trifus v. Attorney General [6], at p. 23. This Court has reiterated the importance of the defendant’s right to be present at his trial. A court’s obligation to respect that right, it has held, “is one of the most basic obligations in terms of maintaining the appearance of justice and regarding the holding of proper proceedings” (CrimA 353/88 Wilner v. State of Israel [7], per Justice Mazza at p. 450). The right of a defendant to be present at his own trial, it was held, ensures that “a defendant will not be tried ‘behind his back’ and that he will be given the opportunity to face the prosecution’s evidence and to put forth his defense” (HCJ 7457/95 Barki Petra Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8], per Justice Dorner at p. 775).

16.  Is the right of a defendant to be present at his trial — which all agree is an important fundamental right — also a constitutional and supra-constitutional right? It is. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to due process as being a protected constitutional right, at least with regard to some of the components thereof. “The Basic Law,” it has been held, “has fortified the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This is done in s. 5 of the Basic Law, which anchors the right of each person to liberty, through the constitutional recognition of human dignity, of which the defendant’s right to a fair trial is a part” (CrimA 1741/99 A v. State of Israel [9], per Justice Turkel at para. 3). Indeed, the right to the core elements of due process is an essential element of the defense of liberty. The right to liberty is a fundamental constitutional right:

‘Personal liberty is a first tier constitutional right, and it is, as a practical matter, a necessary condition for the exercise of all other basic rights. The violation of personal liberty, like a stone thrown into a body of water, creates a ripple effect, widening the circle of violations of additional basic rights: violations of not only the right to freedom of movement, but also of the right to freedom of expression, and of the rights of individual privacy and of property and of additional rights as well. . . . Only a person who is free can fully and properly exercise his basic rights. And personal liberty, more than any other right, is what makes a person free. For that reason, the denial of personal liberty is an especially severe violation’ (Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], per Justice Zamir at para. 17).   

Moreover, the right to due process is closely tied to the right to dignity, since the denial of due process “may also harm the accused’s self-image and give him a feeling of degradation and helplessness, as if he is a plaything in the hands of others, to the extent that there is a violation of his constitutional right to dignity under ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law” Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 67). Thus, “the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, enacted in 1992, recognized the right to due process in the criminal law context as having the status of a protected constitutional right. This recognition is accomplished primarily through s. 5 of the Basic Law, which establishes the right to liberty, and through ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law, which establish the right to human dignity. In s. 11, the Basic Law obligates all the branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial — to honor the rights established in the Basic Law” (RT 3032/99 Baranes v. State of Israel [10], at p. 375).

17.  The above discussion demonstrates that the right to those core elements of due process that relate to the protection of liberty and dignity is a protected constitutional right. The defendant’s right to be present at his trial is a core element of the right to due process, and it is therefore a protected constitutional right pursuant to the Basic Law. Justice Dorner has noted the connection between the right to due process and the right to be present at one’s own criminal trial:

‘As a rule, there is an overlap between the right to be present and the public interest in the holding of a fair trial. Indeed, the defendant’s presence upholds the image of justice and ensures an effective defense against incriminating evidence, and thus enables proper clarification of the facts’ (CrimA 1632/95 Meshulam v. State of Israel [11],  at p. 547).

Indeed, the right to criminal due process is a broad right that includes various derivative rights. Among these rights is the right of a defendant to be present at his trial. President Beinisch noted this, as follows:

‘[T]he right to a fair criminal trial is a multifaceted right, which may serve as a basis for deriving many of the procedural rights of the person under interrogation, the suspect and the accused in criminal proceedings. Without exhausting the issue, we should point out that in foreign legal systems that are similar to our own and even in international conventions, the right to a fair criminal trial includes the right of the accused to know why he was arrested and what are the charges against him, the right to be represented by a lawyer, the right to be present at the trial, the right to an open trial by an unbiased and neutral tribunal and the right to defend himself at the trial and to present relevant evidence. The aforesaid right also includes the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and the prohibition of placing the accused in double jeopardy of a conviction for the same act’ (Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 66, emphasis added).

 

The right of a defendant to be present at his trial is an important condition for “ensur[ing] a fair procedure and proper procedural safeguards for the fairness of the criminal trial vis-à-vis the accused” (ibid. [5], at para. 66). This right is not only the right of the individual — it is also an expression of a general public interest in maintaining a criminal justice system that determines a person’s fate only in accordance with due process, in a proceeding in which a defendant is given a full opportunity to present a defense (see CrimApp 2043/05 State of Israel v. Zeevi [12], per Justice Procaccia at para. 12). Indeed, the exercise of a defendant’s right to be present at legal proceedings helps to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of a proceeding whose purpose is to determine the truth. Although it is frequently the case that a criminal proceeding is carried out through agents and representation by attorneys, and the voice of the individual on trial is not heard in the courtroom (or is at least heard only as a whisper) — this does not minimize the importance of the defendant’s presence at his trial, and particularly the importance of the defendant at his criminal trial. A person has an interest in protecting his own position, and desires to be present at the proceeding in which his fate will be determined. If he is prevented from being present, there may be a diminution of justice, because of the possible impact on the defendant’s ability to defend himself. The legal proceeding does not deal with elements that are absent — it deals with elements that are present. Generally, it is appropriate that a defendant should experience, with his own senses, the criminal proceeding. It is fitting that the judge should see, with his or her own eyes, the individual who is on trial. All these are built-in components of the legal process and important conditions for maintaining the defendant’s faith and that of the public in the criminal process. In light of all these factors, it is not surprising that President Barak has directed that the defendant’s right to be present at his own trial is a “constitutional right” (Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8], at p. 780).

18.  It should be noted that the right of every individual to be present at his own criminal trial is also recognized in other legal systems. In the United States it is understood to be an inseparable part of criminal due process (see J. Boeving, “The Right to be Present Before Military Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National Security in an Age of Classified Information,” 30 Harv. J.L. & Publ. Pol’y 463 (2007). There, the right is anchored in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, pursuant to both the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and pursuant to s. 43(A)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a defendant must be present at all stages of his trial. Within this normative framework, the right to be present at trial has been analyzed as both part of the ability to hold an effective cross-examination, and, more broadly, as part of due process. The obligation to maintain this right, it has been held, remains in place, for so long as the defendant’s presence can contribute to a just proceeding. The courts have, however, recognized that it may be permissible to hold a hearing when the defendant is not present, if his presence at the proceeding serves no purpose and will do nothing to assist in his own defense (see Kentucky v. Stincer [59]; Snyder v. Massachusetts [60]).

19.  Does a suspect or arrestee also have a constitutional right to be present at his detention hearings, as part of the right to due process? I believe that he does. As a rule, the right to criminal due process applies to all stages of the criminal proceeding — “both at the interrogation and at the trial stage” (CrimA 951/80 Kanir v. State of Israel [12], per Justice Barak at p. 516; Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 66). These words apply especially with regard to a hearing regarding detention, which is “the most difficult form of violation of personal liberty” (Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], per Justice Zamir at para. 17). The detention hearing itself is a proceeding that involves a serious violation of the rights of the suspect or defendant. Effective judicial review is an inseparable part of a detention hearing that complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the need to maintain due process in the context of a detention hearing is a fundamental constitutional right which is necessitated by the need to protect the right to liberty and dignity. The presence of the suspect or defendant at a detention hearing is part of due process; this right to be present at the detention hearing is anchored in ss. 16(2) and 57 of the Arrests Law and also constitutes — in light of the reasons listed above — a constitutional right which is protected by the Basic Law (see also CrimApp 4586/06 Halido v. State of Israel [13], opinion of Justice Hayut; regarding the care to be taken in implementing s. 57 of the Arrests Law, see CrimApp 1097/06 Bineib v. State of Israel [14], opinion of Justice Rubinstein).

20.  The importance and longevity of the principle regarding the arrestee’s physical presence in court is indicated by the doctrine whose name indicates its logic — habeas corpus (“bring the body”). This common law doctrine allows the court to be petitioned to issue an order by which the authorities are directed to bring before the court a person who has been imprisoned by those authorities, so that he can be released if it discovered that the arrest was illegal. This power, which in Israel is conferred on the High Court of Justice, reflects the fundamental perception that the court that is deciding the matter of a person’s liberty will generally be required to see the person and hear his arguments regarding the legality of his detention.

21.  The respondent does not deny that the arrestee’s right to be present at the proceedings for an extension of his detention is an important fundamental right, as defined, and that this right’s importance is derived from reasons that are similar to those that form the basis of the defendant’s right to be present at his own trial. Nevertheless, the respondent argues, the former right is not the same as the latter one — because there is a built-in violation of important rights at the interrogation stage, due to the need to determine the actual truth. Thus, for example, a person’s liberty may be denied initially on the basis of a lower evidentiary standard; the suspect is also not exposed to the main elements of the evidence that is being brought against him. In light of this, the state argues that it is not possible to have an “ideal exercise of the right to due process” at the interrogation stage. It further argues that because at that stage, main elements of the evidence are not disclosed to the suspect, his absence at the detention hearing will not cause any great violation of his rights; this is especially so with respect to a security offense suspect, regarding whom it is often the case that the evidence will be presented to the court ex parte.

I have difficulty accepting this argument. The respondent seems to suggest that it is easier to add another violation, to a situation in which there is already a violation of other rights. But this is not correct. The balance between human rights and other rights and interests is delicate and sensitive. As the respondent correctly notes, the criteria that are applied at the interrogation stage and at the stage of the initial detention are different in certain respects from those that apply at other stages of the criminal proceedings. At these earlier stages, there are also — alongside the possible restriction of the suspect’s or arrestee’s ability to defend himself — various protective mechanisms (for example, the periods of time during which the suspect may be detained during the interrogation stage are shorter, and there is close judicial supervision of the proceedings). However, each additional violation of the suspect’s/arrestee’s rights, particularly when it is expressed by a limitation of the ability to maintain judicial supervision, can undo the balance and undermine the fairness of the process. To the contrary, it is particularly in a proceeding in which there are increased restrictions on the suspect’s/arrestee’s ability to defend himself and to respond to the charges levelled against him that it is necessary to take an especially protective stance against the addition of further difficulties, and against the suspect’s further exclusion from the process. I will return below to the specific argument relating to the existing legal restrictions that apply to security offense suspects, and their implications for the determination of the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision.

In summation, s. 5 of the Temporary Provision violates the right of a security offense suspect to be present at his own detention hearing.

22.  Indeed, the right to due process, including the arrestee’s right to be present at his detention hearing, is not an absolute right. It should be noted that s. 16(2) of the Arrests Law makes it possible for a detention hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence if the arrestee cannot attend the hearing because of the state of his health (see also s. 57 of the Arrests Law, regarding the deliberation of a petition for a rehearing and appeal). The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that the arrestee himself, may, in certain cases, waive his right to be present at trial (Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8]). In terms of the constitutional aspect, person’s right to be present at the proceedings involved in his own case may be restricted pursuant to a law that complies with the tests established in the limitations clause — s. 8 of the Basic Law. The limitations clause allows for a violation of the right to due process if all the following four conditions are met: the violation is prescribed by a law or pursuant to a law, by virtue of an authorization that is expressly established in the law; the law that creates the violation conforms with the values of the State of Israel; the objective of the law that creates the violation is an appropriate objective; and the violation is not greater than           is necessary. In our case, the main question relates to the last condition — the proportionality condition — and we will therefore focus on that requirement. However, before we reach that point, we must examine and describe the statute’s objective, in light of the close connection between a legislative objective and the means that are designed to be used for achieving that objective.

The objective of the Temporary Provision

23.  The key objective of the Statute, as stated, is to improve the ability of the enforcement authorities to carry out an effective interrogation in connection with security offenses, taking into consideration the special characteristics of these offenses, including the difficulty involved in gathering information and the need to take action to thwart terrorist attacks. This is also the objective of s. 5, the constitutionality of which we are examining in the instant case. As stated, the Draft Law originally focused on arrestees who had not been residents of the State of Israel prior to their arrests, and the reason given for this focus was that  the investigative authorities have a relatively limited ability to gather evidence and information with regard to this class of arrestees. By the time the Temporary Provision was enacted in its final form, the above-mentioned distinction had been removed, and the Statute was written so as to apply to all security offense suspects — regardless of whether or not they are residents of Israel. It has been argued before us that as a practical matter the Statute is used only against Palestinian suspects and that this reflects a violation of the right to equal treatment, but this issue was not sufficiently discussed in the framework of the proceeding here, and in light of the conclusion that we have reached, we see no need to expand on this particular issue.

24.  The main emphasis of the Temporary Provision and of s. 5 in particular, is the need to carry out a quick, continuous and effective interrogation. The respondent explains that the General Security Service’s main and central purposes in carrying out interrogations in connection with security offenses are to discover terrorist organizations and to thwart future terrorist attacks. An interrogation of this type, which looks to the future, must be carried out quickly so as to — among other things — prevent planned terrorist acts in time, or to locate and catch additional terrorists, weapons and explosive materials, all before they can be transferred to a new hiding place. The respondent also informed us, ex parte, of the operational elements, which, according to the respondent, necessitate a proper, continuous and quick interrogation — one that is carried out without delay or interruptions. The respondent also described, primarily in the arguments that were made ex parte, the special methods that characterize this type of interrogation; these methods require time and an uninterrupted interrogation.

Section 5 meets this objective, the respondent explained, as it is often the case that the need to bring a security offense suspect to court will hamper the interrogation of the suspect and may even hinder its purpose completely. The extension of a security offense suspect’s detention in his absence makes it possible, in appropriate cases, to carry out the interrogation continuously and quickly, using special interrogation methods.

25.  In light of these explanations, we can state that s. 5 was enacted in order to achieve an appropriate purpose. Nevertheless, we must note the restrictions to which this appropriate purpose is subject. The instant case deals with the interrogation of those suspected of criminal offenses. The framework in which the suspect’s detention is being sought is a criminal framework. Although this is a special context which presents unique challenges, such uniqueness does not justify an avoidance of the fact that in all these cases the suspect is being questioned regarding his own involvement in security offenses. During the interrogation, a suspect may be asked questions relating to future terrorist activity — but this does not mean that these are “preventative arrests” only, since the interrogation and the detention must rest on grounds relating to the suspect’s involvement in security offenses. With respect to this issue, an arrestee falls within the category of a suspect, and his rights as a criminal suspect must therefore be protected.

 In light of this, and in light of our holding that the Statute does have a proper purpose, we can now turn to the question of its proportionality.

Proportionality

26.   Pursuant to the provisions of the limitation clause, a law that violates the right to due process — and such is the Statute that we are examining here — will be constitutionally valid only if the violation it entails is no greater than is necessary. The question raised here is whether the means chosen by the legislature is proportionate in relation to the Statute’s proper purpose. The case law in Israel, as well as in other legal systems, has examined proportionality on the basis of three sub-tests, which serve to concretize the general standard (see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [15]). The three sub-tests are the following: the rational relationship test, referring to the relationship between the means chosen and the violation of the right which is involved and the statute’s purpose; the minimal violation test; and lastly — the proportionate means test, within the narrow meaning thereof (Professor E. Bendor has called this the relativity test). President Barak discussed these tests in HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [16], at p. 385:  

‘The first sub-test is that of a rational correlation or connection. A legislative measure that violates a constitutional human right —in our case, one that violates the right to freedom of employment — is permissible if there is a correlation between it and the achievement of the purpose. A correlative relationship is required between the purpose and the means. The legislative means must lead, in a rational manner, to the achievement of the statutory purpose . . . ; the second sub-test is the test of whether the means involve a minimal infringement. A legislative measure that violates a constitutional human right — in our case, one that violates the right to freedom of employment — is permissible only if the statutory purpose cannot be achieved through some other measure that leads to a lesser violation of the human right . . . the legislative measure can be compared to a ladder, which the legislature climbs in order to achieve the legislative purpose. The legislature must stop on the rung at which the legislative purpose is achieved, and on which the violation of the human right is the least. “The legislature must begin at the ‘rung’ that causes the least infringement and move up the rungs slowly, until it reaches the rung at which the proper purpose is achieved without infringing more than necessary on the human right” . . . “If under the circumstances of the case the moderate measure, the measure that causes the least damage, is not sufficient to achieve the purpose, the authority may prescribe a more severe provision, to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose” . . . . The third sub-test is the proportionate measure test (in the narrow sense thereof). Even if the measure that has been chosen is appropriate (rational) for the achievement of the purpose, and even if there is no more moderate measure, there must be a proper relationship between the benefit achieved from the use of the measure to the scope of the violation of the constitutional human right . . . this test examines the result of the legislation, and the effect it has on the constitutional human right. If the use of the legislative measure causes a severe violation of a human right, and the expected public benefit to be achieved from such violation is minimal, it is possible that the legislation is disproportionate (in the narrow sense)’.

In our case, we have been persuaded by the material presented to us that there is a correlative relationship between the achievement of the Statute’s purposes and the use of the measure that consists of preventing an arrestee from being present at his detention hearing. Section 5 itself provides that the arrest may be extended without the arrestee being present only when the court “has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of a commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life” (sub-section (1)); and that the hearing of a petition for a further hearing or for an appeal can be held in the arrestee’s absence only when the court is “persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the investigation” (sub-section (2)). Thus, s. 5 itself creates a connection between the violation of the right and the realization of the objective of carrying out an effective interrogation for the purpose of thwarting the commission of security offenses and preventing harm to human life. Indeed, the interruption of an interrogation for the purpose of having the arrestee appear in court is likely to cause difficulty for the interrogators. As we have been told, it can disrupt the implementation of a particular interrogation method. It can therefore be said that there is a rational relationship between the need to prevent the interruption of an interrogation (for a specific period of time) and the achievement of the objectives of the interrogation.

27.  Nevertheless, we have not been persuaded that the means prescribed in s. 5 will cause only a minimal violation, or that the section presents a proper balance between the violation of the right to due process — in the sense that this right is embodied in the arrestee’s presence at detention hearings — and the achievement of the objectives of the interrogation. Viewed cumulatively the following elements form the basis of our position regarding this matter.

28.  The first element relates to the scope of the violation of the right to due process and of effective judicial supervision. The violation of the right to due process which the operation of s. 5 of the Statute can cause is severe. The arrestee’s presence at his detention proceedings is, as stated, a key element of the realization of his right to due process. When he is absent from the proceeding, a concern arises that his ability to defend himself against the claims that establish the ground for his arrest will be impaired, along with his ability to argue before the court about the terms of his detention and the manner in which the interrogation is being carried out. This absence also denies the court the ability to look the arrestee in the eye and to take note of his condition. The severity of this concern increases greatly when the suspect is detained in connection with a security offense — since, in such cases, the suspect’s ability to defend himself at the detention hearings is restricted by various additional measures that can be used against him.

The provisions of s. 38 of the Arrests Law should be noted in particular. This section provides that an arrestee who is suspected of having committed a security offense may be prevented from meeting with a lawyer when such meeting is likely to disrupt the arrest of other suspects, interfere with the discovery or seizure of evidence, or disrupt an interrogation — or when the prevention of such a meeting is necessary in order to thwart the commission of a crime or in order to preserve human life. “The prevention of a meeting between an arrestee and his attorney” — it has been held — “is a serious violation of the arrestee’s right. This violation is tolerated only when it is essential from a security perspective and necessary in terms of the conduct of a successful interrogation” (HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiya v. Israel Police [16], at p. 13). The combination of the provisions regarding the prevention of a meeting with an attorney with the provisions that are the subject of the constitutional examination here is likely to deny an arrestee any possibility of presenting a position to counter the government’s stand regarding his detention. At the same time, it eliminates the court’s ability to exercise any effective control over the interrogation or the detention for the purpose of interrogation. Justice Fogelman noted this in the judgment rendered in the appellant’s case:

‘A hearing which is not held in the presence of the arrestee is not an ex parte hearing, since the arrestee may, it would seem, argue his case through his counsel. At the same time, in the case before us (and as may be presumed, in other cases in which the powers granted pursuant to the Temporary Provision are exercised), the respondent has been prevented from meeting with his attorney. This combination leads to a situation where, as a practical matter, the respondent’s ability to present his case at the hearing is extremely limited. This is a material violation of the arrestee’s rights. His right to be present at his hearing is violated, as is his right to defend himself and to present his position, and in effect, his right to present his arguments to the court has been materially violated . . . The said violation becomes more serious, since within the framework of the proceeding that is being conducted, it is necessary to restrict the person’s freedom through the use of detention — and as is known, freedom from detention is a basic right which is contained in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.’

In CrimApp 1144/06 Ziyad v. State of Israel [17], at para. H, my colleague Justice Rubinstein wrote as follows: “ . . . It is axiomatic, in any event, that the defense of a party who cannot consult with his attorney is likely to be impaired to a certain degree, and not only temporarily. The suspect is not always aware of his procedural and substantive rights, and an effective legal defense often depends on a combination of the suspect’s factual knowledge and of his lawyer’s legal knowledge.” The provisions of the Statute under discussion here further restrict the arrestee’s ability to conduct a defense in terms of reducing the ability to present to the court the arrestee’s factual knowledge — and this is a restriction that is in addition the violation that results from the prevention of a meeting with an attorney. Thus, both the legal and factual aspects of the defense are weakened.

29.  Indeed, the harm done to a person who cannot protest his detention either through his own presence or through an “intelligent representative presence” is a very severe human rights violation. It is likely to invalidate the legal proceeding and strip it of any content. This is, in effect, an ex parte proceeding. The European Court of Human Rights, in a decision dealing with art. 5(4) of the European Convention of Human Rights, held as follows: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” In that case, an arrestee claimed that she had not been permitted to be present at the proceedings in which the court deliberated regarding objections to her detention — proceedings at which she wished to present arguments with respect to the conditions of her detention. The court ruled as follows:

‘The Court recalls that by virtue of Article 5(4), an arrested or detained person is entitled to bring proceedings for the review by a court of the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of Article 5(1), of his or her deprivation of liberty… The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure equality of arms between the parties… The possibility for an arrestee to be heard either in person or through some form of representation features among the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty . . . ‘

The Court was aware that the arrestee had been represented by counsel at the proceeding, but that such representation was not a sufficient alternative for her own presence, because of the attorney’s ignorance of facts known only to the arrestee:

 ‘The Court notes at the outset the applicant sought leave to appear before the appeal court in order to plead her release on the grounds intimately linked to her personal situation. She planned, firstly, to describe the appalling conditions of her detention, of which her counsel did not have first-hand knowledge. Only the applicant herself could describe the conditions and answer the judges’ questions, if any. . .

The court therefore held that the refusal to allow the arrestee to appear in court denied her effective control of the legality of her detention, as required pursuant to art. 5(4) of the Convention.

30.  All of the above leads to the conclusion that s. 5 of the Statute can only be examined upon consideration of the overall normative framework dealing with the interrogation and detention of security offense suspects. When the arrestee has not met with an attorney, and the court is unable to direct questions to the arrestee in order to clarify matters that require clarification, the court’s ability to conduct fair and effective review of the matter is substantially restrained. The court, in effect, relies on the position and statements of only one of the parties. This is a harsh result in light of what is necessary for legal proceedings to be proper and in light of the subject under discussion here — the curtailment of a person’s liberty.

Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that according to the law in its current state, it is frequently the case that during detention hearings, courts will be presented with material on an ex parte basis. Needless to say, this fact alone causes some form of a violation of the arrestee’s ability to defend himself. By itself, this is a practice which, although necessary in certain cases, creates difficulty for the arrestee who seeks to conduct a defense and for the court that wishes to rule in accordance with the normal rules that guide us. The courts use various methods to minimize the violation of the arrestee’s rights — such as, inter alia, providing either the arrestee’s lawyer or his counsel with any information that has been presented to the court ex parte and which may be disclosed. It is clear that the ability to minimize the violation of the arrestee’s rights, in terms of allowing the arrestee the opportunity to respond to such information, is weakened when the arrestee is not present and his counsel — as is frequently the case — has not yet met with him.

As noted above, the respondent’s argument that in light of the various restrictions imposed by other laws on the suspect’s ability to defend himself — such as the restricted exposure to the main points of the evidence presented against him — the additional violation caused by his absence from the legal proceeding “is not great”. The reasoning seems to be that an already existing violation of a suspect’s rights and of the propriety of the legal proceeding weakens the argument against a further violation of the suspect’s ability to defend himself, and against a further limitation of the court’s ability to clarify the true facts and information. If the respondent did intend to make that argument, it must be utterly rejected. Even in a proceeding involving the detention of security offense suspects, substantive judicial supervision remains necessary. The arrestee’s presence is especially important in a proceeding such as this one — i.e., the detention hearing — which anyhow involves various restrictions. In any event, when a basic right is violated from a number of perspectives, or gradually, it is certainly possible that the cumulative effect will be that the various violations will cross the threshold of constitutionality, such that the last “marginal violation” will not be permissible.

31.  All of the above indicates that s. 5, especially in combination with other provisions contained in the law, can lead, de facto, to the arrestee being isolated from the legal proceeding being conducted in his case — a proceeding that revolves around a basic impairment of the right to be free of detention. The various provisions relating to the preliminary stages of the interrogation of security offense suspects is likely to mean the loss of any ability to maintain minimally effective control over the protection of an arrestee’s rights in the framework of the detention hearings and interrogation proceedings. In effect, these provisions leave the court, as a reviewing entity, with only a partial view of what it needs to see, and thus impairs an integral and essential aspect of the constitutionality of an investigative detention. As President Barak has stated in another context:

‘The degree of a society’s sensitivity to the need to protect the liberty of the individual is expressed in the scope recognized by the government authority of the judicial review that can be exercised over a decision by the said authority that violates one of a person’s freedoms. Indeed, the protection of the individual’s freedom is too precious to us for it to be left in the hands of the government authorities. I am aware that judicial supervision does not always ensure that human rights will be protected. However, I am persuaded that the absence of judicial supervision will end in the violation of human liberty. When there is no judge, there is no law’ (LCrimA 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist [18].

The provision contained in s. 5 is therefore likely to cause severe damage to the legal proceeding itself, and to its effectiveness and its fairness. The provision violates the arrestee’s right to due process, which is derived from his right to freedom and dignity. I note that the violation is reduced somewhat by the provision in s. 5 of the Statute that allows the arrestee to be kept from attending his detention hearings only after the first detention hearing has been held in his presence — but the provision does no more than that. The ongoing supervision of the proceedings relating to an investigative detention is important for the protection of human rights — at least as important as the ongoing investigation is for the realization of the goals of the interrogation.

32.  The second element relates to the disruption of the interrogation that s. 5 is intended to prevent. There is no doubt that a continuous interrogation — conducted without any impedance, delay or interruption — is likely to be useful in terms of the realization of its objectives. The expansion of the interrogator’s powers is likely to make it easier to discover the truth. The fast and efficient discovery of the truth is especially important when the security of the state and its citizens is at stake. I note that the power to order the holding of a hearing without the arrestee being present is limited to those situations in which the court is “persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life” (for the continuation of a detention) or when the court “is persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the interrogation” (rehearing or appeal). The provision is therefore intended to be used in situations in which, from the perspective of the objectives of the interrogation, it is of great importance to allow the interrogation to be carried out without interruption.

Nevertheless, “a democratic society — one that supports freedom — does not allow interrogators to use any and all methods to disclose the truth . . . sometimes the price of the truth is so high that a democratic society cannot pay it” (HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], per President Barak at para. 22). Thus, an effective interrogation, carried out while the person being questioned is being detained, must be combined with substantive judicial supervision. The conduct of a proper legal proceeding is essential, so as to ensure that the investigative detention is proportionate and constitutional. As a matter of principle, the suspect’s appearance before a judge should not be viewed as an obstacle, but rather as a basic element of an effective and constitutional investigative detention. “The accepted approach is that judicial review is an integral part of the detention process . . . at the basis of this approach lies a constitutional perspective which considers judicial review of detention proceedings essential for the protection of individual liberty” (HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [21]). The significance is that the interrogation methods must be adjusted so that they can be halted in order to allow an effective and fair judicial proceeding to be conducted. An interrogation that takes place over time, while the interrogated party is held in custody and prevented from being brought before a court and to state his case before that court, is likely to reach the level of constituting a violation of human dignity and liberty.

To the extent that the objective is to reduce the harm done to the interrogation due to its interruption for the purpose of holding a judicial proceeding, it is necessary to examine the possibility of minimizing that harm through means that cause a lesser violation of the arrestee’s rights. If it is difficult to interrupt the interrogation in order to bring the arrestee to court, it is also necessary to find ways to reduce this difficulty — ways that are more proportionate than preventing the arrestee’s presence at the hearing. Regarding the proportionality sub-test, we note that the respondent was unable to persuade us that no other methods are available that cause a lesser violation of the arrestee’s rights and which can, at the same time, achieve the objective that the legislation was enacted to achieve; such methods, which involve a lesser violation of a right, would be added to the special methods that are already established in the legislation — those measures that are already available to the authorities conducting the interrogation as well as to the enforcement authorities, pursuant to the existing Arrests Law, and pursuant to the other sections of the Temporary Provision (other than s. 5, which is the subject of discussion here).

33.  An examination of both the degree of the violation of the interrogated party’s fundamental rights — on the one hand — and of the interrogation advantage derived from the provision of s. 5 on the other, leads to the conclusion that this measure is not proportionate. An additional piece of information supports this conclusion — the  frequency with which the measure established in s. 5 is used. The respondents argued that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision is used relatively rarely, and presented data to support this claim. According to them, the data prove that the implementation of s. 5, as a practical matter, is limited to only a few cases each year. However, this argument, which points to the rarity of the need to hold hearings at which the arrestee is not present, only strengthens the constitutional difficulty resulting from the enactment of s. 5. The remarks made by Justice Zamir in the above-mentioned Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1] are pertinent here as well:

‘Even if we had been shown data indicating that only a relatively few soldiers are held in custody until the end of the maximum time period, this is not a sufficient response to the argument that the maximum detention period is longer than necessary . . . The test of the detention period’s proportionality also relates to the maximum period of detention — the period established by law, and not only to the actual period during which a particular person has been detained. If the maximum period causes a violation of personal liberty which is greater than is required, the fact that it violates the liberty of only a few of them makes no difference. The liberty of a single person is as deserving of protection as is the liberty of the entire world’ (ibid, at para. 33).

The same is true in our case.

In light of this, we believe that the Temporary Provision does not satisfy the proportionality test — either from the perspective of the second sub-test (the minimum violation test) or from the perspective of the third test (the relativity test, or as it is also called, the narrow proportionality test).

Conclusion

34.  The Supreme Court has emphasized more than once the need to act with maximum restraint in exercising the power to invalidate laws on the ground that they violate the provisions of the Basic Laws dealing with human rights. “The declaration that a law or a part thereof is invalid is a serious matter. A judge may not do this lightly . . . when he invalidates a piece of primary legislation, the judge frustrates the will of the legislature. This is justified only by the fact that the legislature is subject to constitutional/supra-constitutional provisions that the legislature has itself established . . . At the same time, the courts must exercise significant judicial caution” (HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [16], per President Barak at para. 19). This is how we have acted in this case as well.

 

We have also taken into consideration the special constitutional challenge faced by a democratic state which is fighting against terrorism. A situation involving hostilities in general, and of hostilities in a struggle against terrorism in particular, disturbs the balance between human rights and the security of the state and of the public. Human rights are intended to be basic principles that can withstand such disturbances, but the struggle against terrorism requires — in Israel as in other countries — an adjustment of the implementation of the constitutional criteria for the purpose of dealing with the threat of terrorism. The main principle of Israel’s legal system is to maintain the constitutional requirements even in the face of the terrorist threat. Indeed, “[t]his is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back” (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel [23], per Justice Barak at para. 39). This is the secret of the strength of a democratic regime, which maintains its unyielding support of its fundamental principles and values even when it is engaged in a conflict against a party lacking those same values (see also HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [22]).

35.  In conclusion, and in light of all this, we believe that the provision of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision on which the lower courts relied when deciding the appellant’s case cannot be allowed to stand, because it violates the fundamental constitutional principles established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The significance therefore is that the appellant’s detention hearing should have been held in his presence. From a constitutional perspective, the significance of our holding is that the Arrests Law must from this point forward be interpreted in accordance with its formulation prior to the enactment of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision.

Justice E. E. Levy

 

I concur.

President D. Beinisch

I concur in the opinion of my colleague, Vice President Rivlin, and in his conclusion that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision Law violates, to a greater extent than is necessary, the constitutional right of an arrestee to be present at his detention hearings — which is a core component of the right to due process.

After concurring in this opinion, I received the opinions of my colleagues, Justices Naor and Grunis, who believe that legislation can be used to regulate the issue, which can be a proportionate measure in certain circumstances. Indeed, there may be some exceptional and rare situations in which it may be necessary, in order to prevent an immediate and concrete danger, to refrain from bringing an arrestee before a judge for a detention hearing— but this will be the case only rarely, when the very fact that an interrogation is halted for the purpose of bringing the arrestee to court is likely to lead to immediate harm to human life, and the risk is at the level of great certainty, as in the case of a “ticking bomb”. I myself believe that such rare cases can be resolved through what is at least a partial legal solution that can be found in other existing arrangements. Regarding this matter, I join in the position taken by my colleague Justice Rubenstein in para. 26 of his opinion, in which he expresses doubt that such legislation is worthwhile for the purpose of providing a solution for such rare cases. Indeed, I wonder whether there is any justification for providing a response to these rare cases through a unique piece of legislation such as the Temporary Provision which is the subject of the appeal before us, and whether such legislation will not present a “slippery slope” of constitutional difficulties. These questions are not before us here, and I see no reason to take any position regarding them.    

Justice E. Arbel

 

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Vice President Rivlin.

Section 5 of the Temporary Provision, as well as the entire Temporary Provision, is the result of the complex security situation that prevails in our region — a situation in which, unfortunately, terrorism has become a permanent fixture. The security forces stand at the frontline of the struggle against terrorism; their task is to deal with the challenges and threats presented by terrorism on a daily basis, and the state provides them with appropriate tools for this purpose. The Temporary Provision is one of those tools, given to the security forces in order to allow them to carry out their function. The purpose of the Temporary Provision is to provide the security forces with the appropriate tools for carrying out their function, based on an understanding that the interrogation of those suspected of having committed security offenses differs from an ordinary police interrogation of a criminal suspect. Indeed, the interrogation of a security offense suspect is unique in that its main purpose is usually to prevent activity that is directed against the security of the state. These are offenses that are generally committed against an ideological background, and this frequently means that the suspects or other relevant individuals who are being interrogated refuse to cooperate with those conducting the interrogation. Furthermore, when the parties being interrogated are not residents of the State of Israel, there is in any event an added difficulty in obtaining additional evidence, questioning relevant witnesses, information-gathering, etc. Each one of these factors alone leads to a situation in which the interrogations of those suspected of committing security offenses are very complex, frequently requiring both time and continuity — and this is even more so when the various factors are combined. Such interrogations are also often carried out under time pressure (see also the Draft Law).

At the same time, as my colleague has explained, even in these circumstances, Israel is required to conduct the struggle for its security and for the security of its citizens in a manner that maintains its character as a democratic and Jewish state. In other words, the battle against terrorism and against all the security threats faced by Israel must be fought within the boundaries outlined in the law (HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense [23], at pp. 34-35; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [24]; HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [25]). The objective does not validate all possible means. Indeed, the explanatory material to the Draft Law, as well as the explanatory material to the Draft Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) (Amendment), 5768-2007) (Draft Laws 340), pursuant to which the Temporary Provision’s force was extended, indicate that the drafters sought to take into consideration the guiding principles of our system regarding the rights of criminal suspects, while regulating the powers given to the investigative authorities with regard to the investigation of security offenses. Thus, the legislature was also aware that because of Israel’s character as a state that upholds the law, the limitations on permissible government action remain in place — and that special care must be taken regarding the rights of a suspect who is held by the state and is in its custody, whenever a measure is considered which contains within it a violation of a suspect’s rights.

For these reasons, I find it difficult to accept the state’s argument that because a suspect whose liberty has already been restricted in order to serve the public interest of clarifying the truth will already have lost significant rights during the interrogation stage, the temporary loss of his right to be present at a detention hearing will not constitute a significant additional violation. The guideline in this matter should be the opposite: although there are indeed situations in which it is not possible to avoid certain violations of the rights of a security offense suspect — in that the main evidence against him is not disclosed to him and in that he is sometimes prevented from meeting with an attorney for a set period of time etc. — these violations should be viewed as exceptional, as measures that are to be used cautiously and with restraint. We therefore cannot argue that an additional violation of the suspect’s rights is permissible and justified, due to its mildness in light of the other violations that take place in any event.

In conclusion, I also believe that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision lacks proportionality, for the reasons that the Vice President noted. The legislature’s intent, which was to create a reasonable and appropriate balance between the need to create tools that would be suitable for the interrogation of a security offense suspect and our fundamental principles regarding the rights of a suspect and of an arrestee, has not been realized in practice.

Justice M. Naor

 

1.    I agree with my colleague, Vice President Rivlin, that s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision), 5766-2006 (hereinafter: the Statute) impinges upon the right to a fair criminal proceeding — a right which is closely connected to the constitutional right to human dignity  established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In order to pass the constitutionality test, this infringement  must satisfy the tests set out in the limitations clause. I agree that s. 5 of the Law, as currently formulated, does not satisfy the tests of the limitations clause. Nevertheless, my position is that the declaration that the statute is void should be postponed for six months. This will allow the legislature to determine, if it chooses to do so, narrower and more proportionate limits on the conduct of a detention extension hearing, an appeal or a review in the absence of the arrestee — all in the spirit of my remarks below. In my view, the possibilities for allowing a hearing to take place without the detainee being present must be limited to a narrow range of possibilities, which I will define below. In short, according to my view, in rare cases, the right to due process must retreat for a short time in the face of the need to prevent — at the level of near certainty — harm to human life. As my view is the minority view, I will state my position in brief.

2.    I will first clarify the demarcation of time during which it is permissible, pursuant to the Statute that we are examining here, to hold a hearing without the detainee being present. The first judicial determination regarding the detention of a security offense suspect takes place in the presence of that suspect, and the constitutionality of that first proceeding (hereinafter, “the first detention decision”) has not been challenged by any argument raised before us. The first detention decision may include an order that the suspect be held for up to twenty days (hereinafter: “the maximum period”). Where the court has ordered, in the framework of the first detention decision, a detention period of less than 20 days, section 5 “kicks in” ’and allows a judge to extend the detention up to the maximum period, in a proceeding conducted in the detainee’s absence (hereinafter, “the detention extension decision”). The infringement of the constitutional right therefore occurs within the period in which s. 5 of the Statute grants the court jurisdiction to decide the matter of the extension of the detention, under certain conditions, without the detainee being present; in other words,  the number of days that completes the maximum period of 20 days, and no more. As I have suggested, even this period might be too long, and I will discuss this below.

3.    The rule under the Statute is that a hearing must be held in the presence of the detainee, and the hearing in the absence of the detainee is the exception to that rule. As my colleague the Vice President noted, the purpose of the exception — improving the enforcement agencies’ ability to carry out effective investigations of security offenses — is an appropriate purpose (see paras. 23 and 25 of my colleague’s opinion). The key to its constitutionality is the requirement of proportionality. The state’s argument that the practical implementation of the Statute, is “limited and proportionate” (para. 41 of the written pleadings) is not sufficient. The statute that creates the power that infringes upon a constitutional right must itself be “limited and proportionate”. Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute define different “balancing formulas” for the application of the exception, and I will describe them, moving from the most stringent to the most lenient: the frustration of prevention of harm to human life (regarding an extension of detention); the thwarting of a security offense (regarding an extension of detention); or material harm to the interrogation (regarding a review or an appeal). The most stringent test is the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life. It is stringent in comparison with the test involving the prevention of a security offense, given that the definition of a “security offense” in s. 1 of the Statute does not necessarily require proof of a concern regarding harm to human life, and instead refers to a concern regarding harm to the security of the state (see s. 3 of the state’s written pleadings). It is also more stringent in comparison to the test regarding substantial harm to the investigation (see CrimApp 8473/07 State of Israel v. A [26], per Justice Vogelman at para. 5). Regarding the last two balancing formulas, the least stringent ones, I accept the conclusion reached by my colleague the Vice President — that they do not satisfy the proportionality requirement, because they allow for too broad a range of possible  infringements of a constitutional right. Section 5(2) of the Statute should therefore be declared invalid. The possibility of holding a hearing in the detainee’s absence in order to thwart a security offense, as described in  s. 5(1), must also, in my opinion and in the opinion of my colleague the Vice President, be eliminated.

4.    I take a different position, as a matter of principle, regarding the more stringent balancing formula appearing in s. 5(1), which requires that the court be persuaded that the interruption of the interrogation is likely to hinder the prevention of harm to human life. Such a requirement may indeed be proportionate if additional limitations are imposed. One limitation could be achieved by way of interpretation: the expression “likely to” could be interpreted as a test requiring near certainty that the presence of the detainee at the hearing in court will lead to the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life (regarding the near certainty test, see HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior [27]; A. Barak, A Judge in a Democratic Society, at pp. 273-274 (2004)). A “near certainty” requirement expresses a formula that “has been established on a broad conceptual basis” (HCJ 243/62 Israeli Film Studios v. Gary [28], per Justice Landau, at 2418G). The case law has accepted near certainty as a balancing formula regarding prior restraint on a right, as opposed to its restriction after the fact (see CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel [29], per President Barak at paras. 10 and 11). The near certainty requirement makes clear that the exception can only be used if there are critical, necessary and “decisive” reasons for its use, in order to prevent the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life (see and compare President Shamgar’s remarks in HCJ 253/88 Sejadia v. Minister of Defense [30], at p. 821, at the B-C margin marks). The typical case in which such reasons are present, but not necessarily the only one, is when there is a “ticking bomb”, when “there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence” (see and compare: Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], at p. 841).

5.    In general, a possible interpretation can be used to conform a statute to the constitutional requirements (see: HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [31]; HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [32]; CrimA 6559/06 A. v. State of Israel [33], per President Beinisch at paras. 7-8). There is a connection between the interpretative balancing formulas, such as the near certainty test, that were formulated in the case law prior to the “constitutional era”, and the proportionality principle established in the constitutional limitations clause. In my view, the case law balancing formulas can be properly placed, mutatis mutandi, within the framework of the third sub-test of proportionality, which is based on a balancing of values (see HCJ 10203/03 “Hamifkad Haleumi” Ltd v. Attorney General [34], at par. 55 of my opinion). This is the position taken by Professor Barak, as he recently described it (A. Barak, “Principled Constitutional Balancing and Proportionality: the Doctrinal Perspective,” Barak Volume - Studies in the Judicial Work of Aaron Barak 39 (E. Zamir, B. Medina and C. Fassberg, eds., 2009), at pp. 94-96). If the only difficulty I found in s. 5(1) of the Statute regarding the more stringent test was that it does not expressly refer to the near certainty test, that test could be prescribed by way of  interpretation (while eliminating the test relating to the thwarting of  a security offense).

However, in our case, the said interpretation technique is not sufficient to allow the Statute to satisfy the constitutional requirement, even regarding the stringent test. Even if a stringent interpretative criterion were to be adopted regarding s. 5 of the Statute, requiring near certainty that the interruption of the interrogation would frustrate the prevention of harm to human life (while eliminating the other less stringent tests), the section would still be tainted by a constitutional defect that cannot be remedied other than through the legislature’s intervention, should the legislature decide to so intervene: the Statute still grants the power to establish, in the context of a detention extension decision, a duration for the detention which is liable to be disproportionate  — even one that is as long as the maximum period. An extension of detention until completion of the full continuous maximum period, in the absence of the detainee, is liable to infringe upon the constitutional right beyond the extent that is necessary — particularly if the initial detention period  was a short one. I have therefore concluded that there is no choice but to declare the invalidity of s. 5(1), as my colleague has proposed.

6.    The invalidation of a statute is a measure of last resort. The constitutional aspiration is to strike a balance between conflicting values, rather than to decide between them. “A balance must be struck between security needs and the rights of the individual. This balance imposes a heavy burden on those involved in the defense of the state. Not every effective measure is also a legal one. The end does not justify the means . . . This balance imposes a heavy burden on the judges, who must determine, on the basis of existing law, what is permitted and what is prohibited”  (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [22], per President Barak, at para. 63).

Against this background, I considered the possibility of finding the Statute constitutional with respect to the more stringent balancing formula only, as per the interpretation requiring near certainty, in reliance on the assumption that in all cases, a judge deliberating a case in the absence of the arrestee will reach a proportionate result concerning the duration of the detention  (see and compare A. v. State of Israel [33], per President Beinisch at para. 46). However, I concluded, ultimately,  that such an attempt cannot succeed. If, as per my view, s. 5(2) needs to be invalidated in its entirety, there is no point, in any event, in allowing a detention hearing to be held without the detainee being present: an appeal will be submitted immediately, requiring the detainee’s presence by virtue of the general law regarding appeals as established in s. 53 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers – Arrests), 5756-1996 — and the detainee’s interrogation will be halted for that purpose. Furthermore, the determination of the duration of the maximum period is primarily the job of the legislature, and it should be allowed a reasonable amount of time to establish an arrangement that will satisfy the constitutionality threshold (compare Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], at p. 284; Marab v. IDF Commander in  Judea and Samaria [18]; Y. Mersel, “Suspension of a Declaration of Invalidity,” 9 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 39 (2006).

7.    I therefore agree with the bottom line expressed in the decision of my colleague the Vice President. I nevertheless believe that we can leave for further discussion the Vice President’s view that in this case the “cumulative effect” of the provisions regarding the denial of attorney-client meetings, together with s. 5 of the Statute, crosses the constitutionality threshold (paras. 28 and 30 of his opinion). I emphasize that in this proceeding the appellant did not attack the constitutionality of s. 35 of the Arrests Law — the section dealing with the prevention of meetings with an attorney (and see also s. 35(g) of the Arrests Law which allows for  hearings to be held in the presence of the detainee and of his attorney, separately). I believe that the bottom line can be reached through a direct analysis of s. 5 of the Statute in and of itself.

In light of the novelty of my colleague’s approach, I wish to note regarding this matter that the argument concerning the “cumulative effect” of two legislative measures is a consequential argument (see, in the context of a discrimination claim, HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [35]). As a consequential argument it cannot be examined abstractly, and instead it is always applied in the context of a concrete case (see and compare HCJ 366/03 Society for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. Minister of Finance [36], per President Barak, at par. 19). The use of the “effect” argument in the context of this case means that a claim is being made that the manner in which the measures are employed, when combined together, amounts to an unnecessarily excessive infringement of a constitutional right. The argument is not made against the very existence of each of these powers, in and of itself and separately. The rule is that the burden of proof in the first stage of a constitutional review is imposed on the party arguing against constitutionality, and it is that party that must prove that a constitutional right has been infringed upon. The rationale at the basis of this requirement is the presumption of constitutionality (A. Barak, “The Burden of Proof and the Infringement of Constitutional Rights,” Trends in the Evidentiary Rules and in the Criminal Procedure Law — Collection of Articles in Honor of Professor Eliahu Harnon 53 (A. Horowitz and M. Kremnitzer, eds., 2009), at p. 71). This is also true with regard to the “effect” argument. Moreover, the acceptance of an “effect” argument” as a ground for invalidating the particular legislative measure that the party making the argument has chosen to attack, would involve, necessarily, a degree of arbitrariness. Such acceptance relies on the preliminary choice made by that party to attack a specific measure and reflects indifference regarding the other measure, even though it is the combination of the two both measures together that provides the basis for the “effect” argument. It is thus possible that the dominant cause of the “effect” — the cause that forms the source of the unconstitutionality — is not even brought before the court for review, and the court is presented with a deficient factual and legal picture. Therefore, in my opinion, the invalidation of a particular legislative measure which has been established through primary legislation, on the basis of an “effect” argument, requires an overall examination of all the legislative measures that give rise to the claimed “effect”. It is clarified that the party making the argument must do so in a reasoned and focused way, and not as a general claim. (The burden of proof requirement mentioned above necessitates this as well.) In my view, we have not been presented here with arguments that justify the acceptance of such an “effect” argument.

And note, even if the appellant had carried the burden of proof described above, I would still be of the opinion that there is no obvious answer to the question of whether the combination of two measures — which are each constitutional on their own — is likely to cause an unconstitutional “effect” on a cumulative basis. The answer to the question depends, inter alia, on the manner in which the measures are actually implemented in practice; on the purpose constituting the basis for each measure; and on the ability to identify the measure which is dominant in  causing the said effect. Thus, for example, when the purposes of the measures are connected, the invalidation of one of the measures is likely to eliminate the justification for the use of the other measure (see and compare HCJ 801/00 Bassam Natshe and The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Erez Military Court [38]). Of course, this examination of the legislative measures will also impact upon the proper constitutional remedy. These issues are complex and require in-depth examination. I prefer to leave them for further review at the appropriate time, having reached the conclusion that the legislative measure prescribed in s. 5 of the Statute, in and of itself, is unconstitutional.

8.    To sum up, if my view is accepted, s. 5(1) and s. 5(2) will be found to be invalid. This leads to the invalidation of the entire s. 5 of the Statute, since s. 5(3) and s. 5(4) do not stand alone. My position is that the legislature should be given six months during which, if it wishes to do so, it may establish a different arrangement that restricts the ability to hold detention extension hearings, reviews and appeals in the absence of the detainee. In my view, such an arrangement may be based on the presence of a danger – at the level of near certainty – that the prevention of harm to human life will be frustrated; the arrangement will relate to a limited period which will meet the criteria for constitutionality. I therefore propose to my colleagues to delay the declaration of the Statute’s invalidation that is contained in our judgment, for a period of six months from the date on which the judgment is rendered.

 

 

Justice S. Joubran

I concur in the decision of my colleague, Vice President E. Rivlin. We cannot ignore the needs of the hour and the need to allow the security forces to use effective means for protecting public welfare and security. However, as my colleague the Vice President notes, the normative framework that we are discussing here is a criminal proceeding. Even in times of emergency, we must not forget the primary principle, that the purpose of a criminal proceeding — the purpose without which there may not be a proceeding — is the punishment of a person for offenses that he has committed and regarding which his guilt has been established. It is often necessary, in the context of such a proceeding, to use secondary measures, the primary example of which would be an arrest and an interrogation, but these are required only for the purpose of realizing the final purpose of the proceeding. The defendant who has been prosecuted is the center of the criminal proceeding, and the questions that are asked of him will all relate to his own acts and liability for that which is attributed to him. Alongside this is the state’s duty to make use of its powers for the purpose of punishing him. It is therefore not for nothing that one of the key requirements, one to be found at the core of the criminal proceeding, is the presence of the defendant in the court where he is being brought to trial. When a defendant is prevented from exercising this right — to be present at the place where he is being judged — his right to human dignity has been severely violated. It would seem that the best description of this situation would be that of Josef K’s experience, and of his extreme despair after having been tried in secret, until his bitter end:

Were there objections that had been forgotten? Of course there were. Logic is no doubt unshakable but it can’t withstand a person who wants to live. Where was the judge he’d never seen? Where was the high court he’d never reached? He raised his hands and spread out all his fingers. But the hands of one man were right at K’s throat while the other thrust the knife into his heart and turned it there twice. With failing sight K. saw how the men drew near his face, leaning cheek-to-cheek to observe the verdict. “Like a dog!” he said; it seemed as though the shame was to outlive him.

[Translator’s note — excerpt from “The Trial, published by Tribeca Books, April 2012, translation copyright by David Wyllie]

Unlike the Kafkaesque legal world, it is unimaginable in the modern liberal world of law that a person would be tried for his actions without being given the opportunity to be present at the time that his guilt is being determined, and this is not disputed in the case before us either.

 

The state’s position on this is incorrect: these matters are just as relevant at the stage of a pre-trial arrest. In contrast to the state’s position, it is when a person is in custody in anticipation of his trial, at a time when the presumption of his innocence remains in full force, that it is especially necessary that he himself be brought before the court in order to refute what has been attributed to him and to seek his freedom. Despite all the significance of an intensive and effective interrogation of security offense arrestees — arrestees whose interrogation can often prevent harm to the lives of innocent people — the purpose of an interrogation in the context of a criminal proceeding is the clarification of those acts that the person being interrogated committed in the past, in anticipation of the person being brought to trial for the commission of such acts. The limitations imposed on the person’s freedom are derived from this purpose — such limitations being a consequence of the acts the person is suspected of having committed. The denial of the rights of these arrestees to come before court and argue against their detention — at a time that the evidence against them is only at the prima facie level and has not yet been formed into the basis for an indictment — constitutes a direct contravention of the most basic principles of criminal law, and we cannot accept it.

I therefore agree with the view that the Temporary Provision must be invalidated, as it does not satisfy the requirements of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

Introduction

1.    I join in the comprehensive opinion of my colleague the Vice President, subject to my following comments. I first wish to express my surprise regarding the petitioners’ decision to withdraw their petition in HCJ 2028/08 because of the hearing held partially in camera (albeit by majority decision), at which the representatives of the defense establishment presented their positions. Section 15 of the Arrests Law does allow for the presentation of confidential information regarding particular individuals on an individual basis, as counsel for the petitioners argued, but I do not believe that this option is unavailable when the case is a “general” and constitutional case being deliberated by the High Court of Justice. Indeed, this is not a routine matter; it is instead a non-routine decision regarding the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision which relies on, inter alia, “the ? hindrance of the prevention of harm to human life” (s. 5(1) and s. 5(4) of the Temporary Provision, with which we are dealing), and requires precise and sophisticated consideration. The court must be presented with the complete picture, particularly when the argument being made involves the proportionality of the legislation. The Knesset sub-committees also view confidential information. As some of my colleagues have noted during the deliberations in this Court, this viewing of confidential information was necessary in order for our decision to be responsible and concrete, rather than abstract.

2.    My colleague the Vice President considered the question of whether the issue should be dealt with as a theoretical one, and I will add, as a further reason for dealing with this case (beyond his reasons, with which I agree) that given the Israeli reality, and especially the reality relating to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian population, it is frequently the case that an immediate decision is required. This immediacy does not allow for an organized and in-depth response to  a particular case, so that the discussion of the principles of the subject must be conducted after the operative matter has come to an end; see the matter of the release of the Palestinian prisoners in the context of negotiations, in HCJ 10578/08 Legal Institute of Terrorism Studies v. Government of Israel [37], decision dated 15 December 2009, and the unreported opinion of Justice Arbel, dated 3 November 2009).

Section 5 and interrogation methods

3.    Regarding the decision itself, it is not a simple one. The subject was discussed at length in the Knesset (as will be partially described below) and the legislature was persuaded by the needs of the security establishment. Our approach here is not based on self-righteousness; we are aware of the burdensome tasks faced by the security establishment in terms of the interrogations that are carried out for the purpose of thwarting acts of terrorism; we do not live in an ivory tower or in a bubble, as we are citizens, whose people and whose country are exposed to security dangers. We believe that the explanatory material accompanying the Draft Law (Draft Laws 206, supra, at p. 1) reflected, per the government, a necessity; we have learned from experience that even if some of the measures that the legislature has made available to the authorities who conduct the security interrogations – such as the prevention of meetings with attorneys (see s. 35 of the Arrests Law) – intrude on the array of rights of those who are subject to such measures, there are good reasons for these measures to be used, reflecting legitimate interrogation needs. As my colleague the Vice President noted, the purpose for the enactment of s. 5 is appropriate, on a prima facie basis. However — and I say this now and I will repeat it below — the measure which is prescribed in s. 5 (i.e., the holding of a hearing in the arrestee’s absence) is rarely used. Its rarity, which none dispute, indicates that the interrogation authorities — and this is a fact to be appreciated — generally do their work by relying on other measures that are available to them. The concern that a judicial decision will prevent the security forces from doing their job well also arose after the decision in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] — that case being one which prohibited the use of a substantial portion of the measures that the parties conducting security investigations had used until that time. This concern eventually dissipated because of the professional wisdom that the authorities displayed following the issuance of that decision (a matter to which I will return). The need for a decision in our case arises from the fact that the State of Israel is a country in which human dignity is a constitutional value — and it is a value which contains within it the right to due process.

4.    I agree with the Vice President that we should not distinguish between the presence of the defendant at his trial and his presence at the detention hearings. As the sage Hillel said: “What is hateful to you, you must not do to your friend” (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a). It is true that those who are interrogated under the circumstances under discussion here are generally not our “friends” and they are often in fact our enemies; but we must recall the classic comments of the then Vice President Haim Cohen:

‘What is the difference between the way the state fights and the way its enemies fight — that the state fights while observing the law and the enemies fight while violating it. The moral strength and substantive justice of the fighting engaged in by the authorities is entirely dependent on the observance of the law of the land’ (HCJ 320/80 Kawasme v. Minister of Defense [38], at p. 132).

These remarks are true, a fortiori, with respect to hostilities that are conducted while complying with the Basic Laws and with the constitutional rights — meaning also the right to due process. When we speak of those being detained in connection with security offenses — who are subject, by law, to several unique restrictions (see, as stated, s. 35 and s. 36 of the Arrests Law) — any addition to the existing restrictions must be considered properly in terms of its proportionality, so that the result will not be like that of the mythological beast of burden who was given such a heavy load that any addition to it would cause the beast to collapse.

On security and rights

5.    The decision to be reached in this case is one part of this Court’s effort to deal with security matters, as set against various types of rights of Palestinians and Israelis. As President Barak wrote in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] at p. 895, “[a] democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back” (see also CrimA 6659/06 A v. State of Israel [33], at para. 30; HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [40]; HCJ 951/06 Stein v. Police Commissioner [41]; HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister [42], at para. 29; HCJ 7862/04 Abu Daher v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [43], at paras. 7-8).

6.    More than twelve years ago, I wrote the following:

‘The relationship between human rights issues and the security challenge and security needs will remain on the agenda of Israeli society and of the Israeli courts for many years. Israel is at the height of peace negotiations, but even the most optimistic do not expect that Israel will come to enjoy full peace and security during the foreseeable future. The tension between security and rights will remain, and its key legal expression will be the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; the discussion will continue regarding questions such as when do security concerns prevail over rights, and what is the proper balance between protecting existence and protecting the human essence — a formulation which reaches the core of the dilemma. We will continue to deliberate the question of what is the range between the commandment “take therefore good heed unto yourselves” (Deuteronomy 4, verse 15) in a group sense, and “man was created in the image of God” (Genesis 9, verse 6) and “the honor of human beings is great in that it annuls even a negative commandment of biblical origin” (Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 19b). The court seeks to find the balance between security and rights, such that the word security is not used in vain, but security is also not forgotten’ (E. Rubinstein, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Security Establishment,” 21 Tel Aviv Univ. L. Rev. (Iyyunei Mishpat) 21 (1998), at p. 22; E. Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law (2003), at p. 226).

This matter is especially obvious when we speak of the General Security Service. (See my remarks in my above-mentioned book, at pp. 268, 270-271, originally published in E. Rubinstein, “Security and Law: Trends,” 44 Hapraklit 409 (October 1999); see also E. Rubinstein, “On Security and Human Rights During the Struggle Against Terrorism,” 16D Law and the Military 765 (2003). As N. Alterman wrote, as quoted in Paths of Government and Law, supra, at p. 271, in his poem “Security Needs, Following One of the Searches, 1950” (Seventh Column 1, at p. 3279): “A state is not built with white gloves and the work is not always clean and pure-hearted — this is true! It seems that to some degree, we allow ourselves a small luxury of dirt.” Long before the “age of human rights”, the poet warned us against sliding into the commission of improper acts. And I would bring a “general” parallel from another piece of his poetry, which refers to the concealment of information from the public regarding a security trial (see, as background, M. Finkelstein, “The ‘Seventh Column’ and ‘Purity of Arms’ — Nathan Alterman on Security, Morality and Law” ?20(a) Law and the Military 177 (2009)). The poet wrote the following words (Seventh Column 2, at p. 358):

‘Thus, it is not only that these matters should not be kept confidential, not only that the doors of the courtroom may not be locked . . . the deliberation must go beyond its framework, all must be dealt with under the light of day.’

And the words of the American Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, are often recalled and cited “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . .”.

7.    Indeed, the struggle to arrive at  a balance between security and rights, using a sensitive scale and fine-tuned tools, runs like a shining light through this Court’s case law. Because Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, its approach to the matter of the ethics of the struggle against terror must draw inspiration from Jewish law as well. In HCJ 9441/07 Igbar v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [44], Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein’s remarks (from “The Patriarch Abraham’s Ethics of War,” Parshat Lech Lecha, 5766, websitehanas of Yeshivat Har Etzion) are cited:

‘We must continue to walk in the path outlined for us by our father Abraham (regarding the way he conducted his war — E.R.) and be sensitive to morality and justice even in the middle of a just war and struggle, which are themselves correct.’

See also J. Ungar, “Fear Not Abraham — on Jewish Military Ethics,” Portion of the Week (A. Hacohen and M. Wigoda, eds.), at p. 30; A. HaCohen, “‘I am for Peace; But When I Speak, They Are For War’: Law and Morality at a Time of War,” Portion of the Week, at p. 260.

8.    In HCJ 1546/06, Gazawi v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria [45], the Court, referring to the need for a substantial interrogation of every detainee, held as follows:

‘Within the basic boundaries of human dignity — and the rules relating to this apply to all, even to those who are suspected of having committed the most serious and even despicable and depraved crimes, acts committed by those who are as far from human dignity as east is from west — there is an obligation to interrogate a person shortly after his arrest, while presenting to him the information that can be shown to him, the information which is not classified and which may therefore be disclosed. The purpose of allowing this, beyond the provision of the opportunity to raise arguments concerning mistaken identity, etc., is that a person may not be detained without having been given every opportunity, even if he does not make use of it, to present a version that refutes the justification for his arrest, and to attempt to persuade . . .’

As Professor A. Rosen-Tzvi wrote (Hapraklit, Jubilee Volume -1993, ed. in chief, A. Gabrieli, ed., M. Deutsch), 77, at p. 78:

‘ . . . The reality of security dangers does not negate the law, just as the enormity of crime does not cancel the need to grant basic rights to the person being interrogated, or to a defendant. The law is not silenced by security needs. Security must also adapt itself to law, but at the same time, a particular security situation requires the law to adjust itself within the framework of the proper balancing between law and life’.

See also CrimPet 10879/05 Al-Abid v. State of Israel [46]:

‘The security reality of the state involves real security needs, and the enemies of the state and those who help them or those involved in terrorism . . . often act in a sophisticated manner while presenting new challenges to the security and enforcement authorities . . . the security challenges weigh in on one side, and the need to guard the rights of the defendant, including his constitutional rights, weighs in on the other side; each case requires a careful balancing’.

We are faced, in examining the proportionality of the Temporary Provision in this proceeding, with the duty to act fairly, on the one hand, and the need to find a balance, on the other hand.

Legislative proceedings and parliamentary supervision

9.    It is now necessary to note, in brief, that the Knesset deliberations regarding the legislation that is the subject of this case — deliberations that were held in the plenum and in the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice — involved a great deal of discussion of s. 5 (s. 6 of the Draft Law). The Draft Law was submitted along with a great emphasis on the necessity of continuous interrogations (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 16.3.2006, at p. 2) and the change that had taken place when the military administration of Gaza ended in the summer of 2005. During the Committee’s hearing on 16 March 2006, the Committee’s chairman, MK Michael Eitan, stressed the challenge presented by the need to strike a proper balance (ibid., at p. 3). At the same session Dr. Yuval Shani of the Hebrew University noted (ibid., at p. 14) the difficulty presented by the combination of a hearing held in the defendant’s absence — something which can, by itself, be justified by special security needs — and a situation in which the defendant has been prevented from meeting with an attorney. The representative of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Attorney Lila Margalit, asked whether it was legitimate for a democratic state not to allow a suspect to appear in court because of the need for a continuous interrogation since “judicial supervision has an additional function [beyond the extension of the detention — E.R.], which is the viewing of the suspect. The fact that the suspect is removed from the interrogation unit and physically reaches the court has great significance with respect to his ability to present complaints . . . ” (ibid., at p. 23). Chairman Michael Eitan responded (ibid., at p. 24) that the matter should be the subject of judicial discretion, since the court has the tools to determine when it needs to see the individual. The legal adviser to the General Security Service noted (ibid., at p. 32) that after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the physical disconnection had caused great difficulty with respect to interrogations. The Deputy State Prosecutor, Attorney Shai Nitzan, noted (ibid., at p. 44) that it would be necessary to attempt to persuade a judge, who wishes to be made aware of all, to allow the arrestee not to be present so as not to hamper the interrogation.

10.  The discussion of this subject was not concluded during the sixteenth Knesset’s term, and it was deliberated again by the seventeenth Knesset on 20 June 2006. The deputy legal adviser to the Knesset, Attorney Sigal Kogut, presented (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 20.6.2006, at pp. 2-3) the Draft Law as it was at that time (the proposal had been changed in the meantime), including the framework for the exercise of judicial discretion through which the court would determine whether it was persuaded that the interruption of the interrogation would be likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense, or the ability to prevent injury to human life (ibid., at p. 5). Several Knesset members discussed the question of the arrestee’s presence at a trial, as did Attorney A. Avram, from the Public Committee Against Torture (ibid., at p. 11-12) and the Deputy State Prosecutor, Attorney Nitzan (ibid., at pp. 27-28). Attorney Nitzan agreed (ibid., at p. 28) that s. 5 was problematic, but described the many difficulties involved in conducting a reasonable interrogation if the arrestee is required to be brought every day or two to court — “we therefore sought a solution for the matter . . . that it will be necessary to persuade the court to allow the hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence. If we wish to enable the conduct of reasonable interrogations, we must provide a tool . . . I ask that you rely on Israel’s judges that if they are being sold a story . . . they will know not to buy it”. At the Committee vote on the section (on 20 June 2006), the Meretz, Chadash and Ra’am-Ta’al factions expressed reservations, seeking to delete s. 5, but these were not accepted. Reservations regarding this subject were expressed in the Knesset plenum (on 27 June 2006), when the Temporary Provision was approved.

11.  During the deliberation preceding the first reading of the matter of the extension of the Temporary Provision (on 12 November 2007), Justice Minister Daniel Friedman stated as follows: “It has become clear that the provisions prescribed in the Temporary Provision have been most essential for the enforcement authorities who are engaged in the investigation of terrorism crimes and in thwarting them.” At the discussion held by the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice (on 3 December 2007), the head of the interrogations department of the General Security Services stated, regarding s. 5, that it had been used on seven occasions through that time. Attorney Avram of the Public Committee Against Torture again noted (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 3.12.2007, at pp. 8-9) that “the hearing of the two sides is the moral basis for an adjudication . . . we are tying the judge’s hands. The arrestee finds himself in a position of inferiority and remains in a truly inhumane situation. He cannot go to court and state his position, and he cannot tell anyone of the manner in which he is being interrogated, he cannot tell anyone of any mistake that he has found . . . nor can he speak of any other matter . . .” On the other hand, the head of the interrogations department of the General Security Service stated that “without this, it is impossible” (ibid., at p. 123). At a different Committee hearing (on 12 December 2007) the issue of s. 5 arose again (in particular, s. 5(4), dealing with the possibility of concealing from the arrestee the decision in his case if the court is persuaded that “disclosure to the arrestee is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder an ability to prevent harm to human life”). It was again proposed that s. 5 should be omitted, but the reservation was not accepted. When the extension of the Temporary Provision came up for second and third readings (on 18 December 2007), MK Y. Levy stated, in the name of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice, that “the Committee  . . . had received a detailed report from the Ministry of Justice and from security forces involved in the matter, and we had the impression that the security forces were using this law in a proportionate manner. The security forces had used these sections only in what appeared to be exceptional cases, which were few in number.”

12.  To complete the picture, it is noted that the semi-annual report to the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice regarding the exercise of the powers that had been granted, dated 9 September 2008, stated that s. 5 had been used twice (including the use of more than one sub-section). The Committee’s legal adviser noted that there has been “a substantial decline, primarily in the use of s. 5, which is at the center of the petition.”

13.  We see that the legislative branch considered the issue of s. 5 at length. However, I suspect that the transcripts of the Knesset proceedings indicate that the state’s representatives did not provide any information regarding the way in which the interest in saving human lives that are at risk is truly weakened if the security establishment does not have available to it the ability (even if it is dependent on the court’s approval) to conduct a legal proceeding in the absence of the arrestee, as described in s. 5. The Temporary Provision designed by the legislature is not limited to cases of “ticking bombs” and the protected value which is under discussion here is not limited to human life. The issue thus does not reach the level of near certainty and substantial and immediate concern for human life, and I do not consider here the question of whether, in certain circumstances, the necessity defense established in s. 34K of the Penal Code, 5737-1977 would be available. Thus, when considering the section in terms of the constitutional balancing, it would seem that the scales have tipped, disproportionately, in favour of one side — with harm being done, from the suspect’s perspective, to the significant value which is his right to due process — and this does not, heaven forbid, reflect on the court’s decency or that of the authorities conducting the interrogation and the prosecution. Instead, it relates to the condition of the suspect. We understand the difficulties noted by the security establishment in connection with the need to conduct continuous interrogations, and we cannot say that these are not significant in certain cases, but there are not many such cases, and in any event the duration of the first detention will have been determined by a judge who has examined the interrogation needs in the specific case, in view of the specifics of the party being interrogated. I would emphasize the following: the need to bring the arrestee before a judge is a fundamental principle in any proper legal system and is a part of the judicial genetic code without which there is no due process. Thus, this legislation lacks proportionality, as my colleague the Vice President described. Moreover, we note, simply, the principle of human dignity has shown us that an issue which can be resolved through other measures does not comply with the limitations clause, even if the particular matter has been enacted through legislation, even in only a Temporary Provision — when the constitutional right to due process has been violated.

Dealing with terror and legal limitations

14.  Here I wish to placate the respondents, to a certain degree, by adding that after the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] in 1999 — only a little more than ten years ago — the security establishment was very concerned (to put it mildly). I served, at the time, as the Attorney General, and many discussions were held in various forums regarding the implementation of the decision and the new situation that had been created, and various legislative initiatives were considered that were intended to make it possible “to survive the harsh decree”. And fortunately, the establishment has, over time, found solutions to the difficulties, through various forms of creativity. One year after the decision was issued, the difficult period entitled the “second intifada” began, and the tasks with which the security establishment was charged were very difficult; but it dealt with them, within the limitations established in that decision, with considerable success. The immediate aftermath of the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] was described as follows (Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law, supra, at pp. 273-274):

‘After the decision, the establishment faced a dilemma; on the one hand, the General Security Service believed that the decision had dealt a harsh blow to the effectiveness of its interrogations during a period in which, in any event, in light of the agreements with the Palestinians and the withdrawals that were taking place, its ability to interrogate had become limited; it therefore believed that regulatory legislation was necessary. This position is worthy of examination. Many believed otherwise, and that there was no chance that any effective legislation would comply with the limitations clause. One of the dilemmas that we also face is the matter of the protection of the interrogator who carries out his job honestly, as the decision prohibits the use of the necessity defense as a sword, and allows it to be applied only as an “after the fact” shield. I myself believe that it will be of the utmost importance that there be as broad a consensus as possible for any solution that is found, since I believe that in terms of values, there are none who are more concerned about security than are others, and none who are more concerned with rights than are others.

After the decision was rendered, a committee headed by the Deputy State Prosecutor, Rachel Sucar, and the Deputy Attorney General, Meni Mazuz, discussed the question of whether there was a need for legislation, and if there was, what kind of legislation was needed. The questions are difficult to ask, and they are questions of the “squaring the circle” type . . . . In the end, after all this, the events of Tishrei 5761 (October 2000) occurred, with the ensuing eruption of violence, which significantly sharpened all these questions concerning the relationship between security and rights, as well as other questions.’

In the end, the decision was made not to pursue legislation, and the security establishment found methods and channels of interrogation that fell within the boundaries of the existing law.

15.  We are aware that some of the interrogation methods that are currently used were developed as a consequence of the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] and that our current decision will necessitate another round of creative thinking. It can be presumed that the security establishment will buckle down following the issuance of this judgment, and will find ways that comply with the law’s requirements to improve the interrogations and to achieve its objectives. We note, nevertheless, that the situation here, and that which followed the 1999 decision, are not at all the same. In Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], this Court disallowed various interrogation methods that had been used for years — but in this case we are dealing with interrogations that had been conducted for years without the additional tools provided in the Temporary Provision. It is true that after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, there were more individuals whose interrogations were subject to Israeli law (and not to the region’s [military administration] law, which had applied in the past), but there is no reason not to apply to them the rules that applied prior to the Temporary Provision.

16.  In this context, I would add, that if the text of s. 5(1) had been such that its application was limited to cases involving the hindrance of the prevention of nearly certain injury to human life in the soon or near future, (which is not the case given the actual text of the section) — meaning that it would cover a “ticking bomb” situation (see also Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], at p. 845; Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law, supra, at pp. 275-277) — it may very well have been able to pass muster from a constitutional perspective. This would be so even if in situations like this, the processes are generally urgent and rushed, with tight schedules that are likely to create problems of a different kind (see also paragraphs 22 through 27 below). However, constitutional judicial review can deal with a specific legislative arrangement, by approving or disapproving it, but such review cannot — either legally or practically — propose a more proportionate arrangement.

17.  We must take the bull by the horns. On a prima facie level, the authority granted in s. 5 is given to the court dealing with the detention, and the court can exercise discretion; the court, carrying out its function as a filter, will consider the circumstances and will ask the right questions before making a decision about whether to be satisfied with a proceeding at which the suspect is represented, but not present. And we must not forget that representation has its own value, and is also a basic right of a constitutional nature. Judicial intervention in such a case is not a simple matter (see, as a comparative parallel situation, HCJ 7932/08 Al-Harub v. Commander of the Military Forces in Judea and Samaria [47]). Nevertheless, I believe that the value of due process for one who is likely to be a serious offender, but who still enjoys a presumption of innocence and against whom no indictment has yet been issued, should tip the scales in the framework of proportionality. This section allows for detention to be extended without the suspect being present even when the interrogation involves a security offense that does not include a near certainty of danger to human life. Furthermore, the judge who determines the length of the first detention period will not necessarily be the one who will waive the need for the presence of the suspect later on, for the maximum of 21 days (which is a long period) — and this is a built-in difficulty. A situation can arise in which a second judge, sitting in the same court, can change the decision reached by his predecessor who had ruled that the court must see the suspect. In substance  — and this is the heart of the matter — it may be that the first judge, at the time that he determines the length of the initial detention, will receive a particular impression regarding the suspect’s situation, but the second judge will not receive this impression when the suspect is absent. I am also aware that this is a Temporary Provision, and that the level of the violation is therefore likely to be less. However, since this a constitutional right, the measure still impairs the concept of proportionality; the degree of harm to a right here is greater than is necessary.

The position of Jewish law regarding the presence of a litigant at his trial

18.  My colleague the Vice President has examined, from the perspectives of Israeli law and of comparative law, the issue of an arrestee’s presence at detention proceedings — both in terms of legislation and case law. I wish to look at the living sources of Jewish law regarding the matter. Although Jewish law does not deal directly with detention hearings, its clear position regarding the presence of a litigant at his trial, either civil or criminal, can be a source of inspiration in our case.

19.  Generally, this is an issue involving equality and fairness, and together with these two values — of justice. Its basis is biblical, coming from the language in Deuteronomy 1, verses 16-17:

‘I further charged your magistrates as follows, “Hear out your fellow man, and decide justly between any man and his fellow or a stranger [‘ger’].” You shall not be partial in judgment, hear out low and high alike. Fear no man, for judgment is God’s’ (emphasis added).

Note that the verse recalls not only the man and his fellow, but also the stranger; and although Rashi [an eleventh century major Biblical and Talmudic commentator – E.R.] explained the term “the ger”, according to the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 7b) as meaning a litigant who “collects much material against him”, the term “stranger” was translated by Onkelos [the Aramaic translator – E.R.] according to its plain meaning [namely, a convert – E.R.], and Rabbi Saadiah Gaon [a tenth century scholar] interpreted the term as meaning a “resident stranger”. And this is relevant to our matter, in which most of the arrestees involved — if not all of them — are Palestinians. Maimonides (the important twelfth century codifier and philosopher) ruled similarly (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 21, 7): “A judge may not hear the words of one of the litigants before his co-litigant arrives, or before the co-litigant was told ‘hear out your fellow man’.” In the same spirit, the Shulkhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 16, 5) provides that “a judge may not hear the remarks of one litigant other than in the presence of the other litigant, and that litigant too has been cautioned regarding this.”

20.  It should be noted here that in Jewish criminal law, with respect to capital cases (dinei nefashot) (in which the punishment is capital punishment ordered by a court, and I stress this, because the phrase dinei nefashot is currently normally used to refer to criminal law in general) — it is required that the defendant be present. (See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 79B: “a person’s judgment may not be concluded other than in his presence” — and this applies as well to an animal who is, under certain circumstances, brought to trial — “the animal’s execution is [treated] like its owners”; see also, Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 45A). Maimonides (in Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life, 4, 7) ruled — for example — as follows: “If a murderer who was sentenced to execution becomes intermingled with other people, they are all absolved. Similarly, when a murderer who was not convicted becomes intermingled with other murderers who were sentenced to execution, none should be executed. The rationale is that judgment can be passed on a person only in his presence. All the killers should, however, be imprisoned” (emphasis added — E.R.); see also Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 14, 7 “. . . we complete the judgment of a person only when he is present.” Note that, according to Jewish law, a trial in capital cases is ended on the day of the judgment in the event of an acquittal, and on the day afterwards if there is a conviction (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4, 1; Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 11, 1). This indicates that even a murderer will actually be exempt from execution if the judge was not able to see him at the time judgment was completed. The Bible states as follows (Numbers 35, 12) “the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly”; and the law is as Maimonides wrote: “How are cases involving capital punishment judged? When the witnesses come to the court and say: ‘We saw this person commit such-and-such a transgression’, the judges ask them: ‘Do you recognize him? Did you give him a warning?’ (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 12, 1), which is based on the language of the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 5, 1, which includes (per Rabbi Yossi) the following language among the questions that are asked of witnesses: “Do you know him? Did you warn him?” It is clear that this involves the presence of the defendant. See also Maimonides, Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life, 1, 5; Sefer Hachinuch, 409. Indeed, it is not for nothing that in the context of the “capital laws” of our time, s. 126 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Integrated Version), 5742-1982, provides that “[i]n the absence of another provision in this Law, a person may not be judged in a criminal proceeding other than in his presence.”

21.  As Professor E. Shochetman wrote (“‘Hear Out Your Fellow Man’ — Rules of Natural Justice and the Principle of Equality in Arguments Brought by Litigants,” Portion of the Week 36), we are dealing with the principle of equality before the court. As he stated, “the reason for this rule is that in the absence of the opposing party, the litigant who is making his arguments can formulate lies as if they were the truth . . . after the judge has heard the words of this litigant, and has already leaned towards ruling in his favor, it will be difficult for the judge to change so as to rule in favor of the opposing party after he hears the arguments put forth by that party”. I do not say that the government authorities would not tell the court the truth, but I do wish to note the dilemmas involved when only one side is heard. Regulation 57 of the Rabbinical Tribunals Regulations, 5733, provides that “the litigants are to be present throughout the entire trial, even if they have representatives, unless the tribunal decides that their presence is not necessary . . .” Professor Shochetman also noted that the “denial of a litigant’s right to be present at the time that the claims and evidence of the other side are presented is a violation of the right to a fair hearing . . . this is one of the principles of natural justice”. And he concludes by stating that “the commandment of ‘hear out your fellow man’ involves many rules, and the purpose of all of them is ‘and you shall judge with justice’”. He cites Maimonides, as follows (from Laws of the Sanhedrin, 21, 1): 

‘It is a positive commandment for a judge to adjudicate righteously, as it is written: “Judge your fellow people with righteousness.” What is meant by a righteous judgment? It is when the two litigants are made equal with regard to all matters.’

See also Shochetman, Litigation Procedure (1988), at p. 220, citing the responsum of Rabbi Moshe Isserles (the Rama), who lived in Poland during the sixteenth century:

‘Obviously, a matter may not be judged without the defendant’s claims being heard, because the Torah commands “hear out your fellow man”, and although the matter is simple, we can learn it from God’s behavior, because all He does is justice and His ways are pleasant and His directions are of peace; He began with Adam (the first man) by asking him “Who told you that you are naked” and He asked Cain “where is your brother Abel,” so that He could hear his arguments. A fortiori, [the rule applies] to a regular person. And our rabbis learned from the verse “I will go down and see” — that He taught the judges that they should not judge until they hear and understand, and it is learned [from here]. And even if it is clear to the judge that the defendant is guilty, he must in any event hear his claims first.’

This is natural justice in its essence — see also LCrimA 7284/09 Rosenstein v. State of Israel [48], at para. 9; H. Shain, Justice in Jewish Law (2004), at pp. 98-99.

22.  The matter is summed up in Vol. 4 of the Talmudic Encyclopedia, “Litigant” (Column 105): “A litigant may not present his arguments to the judge until the other litigant has arrived, as it is said ‘keep away from lies’ (Exodus 22, verse 7). When a litigant argues in the absence of the other litigant, he is not ashamed of telling a lie. Rabbi Hanina said this, based on the verse ‘hear out your fellow man’ (Deuteronomy 1, verse 16), and this includes the following as well: the word hear means to make it be heard, between the parties, when both are present together” (in accordance with the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 7b, and Rashi’s commentary there).

23.  We see that Jewish law is very concerned with the rules of natural justice; it is true that the rabbinical judges had not been dealing, over the years, with the struggle against terrorism; but the litigation framework is clear and covers all. This Court cannot support a disproportionate weakening of the rules of natural justice.

Further comments on proportionality

24.  I also note that Professor Aaron Barak has examined the third sub-test as being among those suitable to be used in testing for constitutionality; he termed this test — following Vice President Cheshin  (in Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [40], at para. 109)  — “the test of proportionality in the value sense”  (see A. Barak, “The Test of Proportionality in the Value Sense,” Mishael Cheshin Volume, (2009) A. Barak, Y. Zamir, Y. Marzel (eds.), at pp. 201, 206). He terms this test “the absolute core of proportionality” (ibid., at p. 209), which, according to his view, “brings an aspect of reasonableness into the concept of proportionality” (ibid., at p. 211). Furthermore, in his article “A Principled and Proportionate Constitutional Balancing: A Doctrinal Perspective,” Barak Volume - Studies in the Judicial Work of Aaron Barak, supra, Professor Barak examines balancing — the metaphorical rule which is at the basis of the normative approach (see ibid., at pp. 53, 55), which is the “balancing between the importance that the single principle is given (beyond the proportionate alternative) and the importance of the prevention of harm to a constitutional right resulting from it” (ibid., at p. 63). The concept of the function of the balancing act, in his view, “is not to establish the scope of the right, but rather the justification for its protection or for its violation” (ibid., at p. 98). These comments are particularly apt in our case, and there is no need to expand.

25.  Jewish law also requires that a balancing be carried out. The basic rule, established by Rabbi Judah Hanasi [the President - E.R.] in Ethics of the Fathers 2, 1, provides as follows: “What is the straight path that a person should choose . . . calculate the loss generated by a commandment against its reward and the reward generated by a sin against its loss”. We can see this as being, in brief, a balancing, since here as well we are dealing with a matter that is given over to discretion, where there are more than a few unknown factors; see also Rashi’s commentary to the verse in Proverbs 4, verse 1, which reads as follows:  “Survey the course you take, and all your ways will prosper”; see also Rashi’s commentary to Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 8A, to the phrase beginning “and he who chooses the way. . .”. See also Dr. A. Hacohen, “The Principle of Proportionality in Jewish Law,” Portion of the Week 342, and the examples brought there regarding the need to minimize the harm done to human dignity; Rabbi S. Dichovsky “Proportionality and Coercion Regarding the Granting of a Divorce,” 27 T’humin 300.

Justice Naor’s position

26.  Before concluding, I will address the thorough opinion written by my colleague Justice Naor, which arrived after I had written my remarks. As noted, I also wrote (in paragraph 16 above) that it is very likely that a narrower version of s. 5(a) — dealing only with “ticking bomb” situations — could be found to be constitutional. My colleague also stresses that this type of restriction would involve a situation of a near certainty of harm. Even if such a legislative process is possible, I doubt whether, on a practical level, it would serve much purpose except in rare cases, and the question is whether it would be worthwhile to enact such legislation specifically for those cases.

27.  In any event, even if legislation regarding this matter is considered, it is doubtful whether the factual information that we have been shown here, with respect to the degree to which s. 5 is used as described above, necessitates the delay proposed by my colleague Justice Naor. Furthermore, my colleague discussed, persuasively, the matter of the “cumulative effect”, i.e., the question of why we are invalidating specifically this measure — the absence of the arrestee in court — and not, for example, the process for not allowing a suspect to meet with his attorney. She also discussed the question of whether  the “combination of two measures — which are each constitutional on their own — is likely to cause an unconstitutional ‘effect’ on a cumulative basis” (emphasis in the original); this question is indeed a valid one, although the accumulation of several factors often determine the balancing result in administrative law; but it is possible that the matter can be left as requiring further discussion, in light of the specific constitutional flaw we identified with regard to s. 5.

Conclusion

28.  Based on all of the above, I agree with the opinion of my colleague the Vice President, and I repeat my hope and belief that the security establishment can find appropriate solutions for the difficulty that it has noted, even though it appears that the practical scope of this difficulty is limited.

Justice E. Procaccia

 

I have given much consideration to the question of whether the constitutional difficulty regarding s. 5 of the Temporary Provision should bring about the complete invalidation of its provisions, or whether, in the spirit of the comments of my colleague, Justice Naor, the proper balance between the conflicting values justifies a decision to leave open a narrow possibility of permitting a deliberation in a criminal proceeding in the arrestee’s absence, under circumstances in which the needs of the interrogation involve the prevention of a danger of harm to human life, at the level of near certainty.

The ethical balancing required under the circumstances in this case is difficult and complex. It sets against each other the values of due process in criminal proceedings — which involves, at its core, the presence and involvement of the arrestee — and the needs of a criminal investigation, and in particular the he security aspects involved in the protection of human life which can often present substantial difficulties in terms of bringing the arrestee to the hearing of his case.

The decision to be made regarding these balancing questions is one of the most difficult of the decision-making processes. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable in a country in which there is a constant clash between the struggle for existence on the one hand, and a continuous striving to preserve human rights, on the other — and in which, each day, this conflict sharpens the proportions that must be maintained between protecting life and protecting life values.

The conduct of a fair trial for every person is part of the foundation of a constitutional regime. This is especially the case when the legal proceeding can lead to the restriction of a person’s liberty. The violation of this value of a fair trial touches on the deepest core of the human right to liberty — a right which is ranked highest among all human rights.

A fair trial requires due process. The value of due process in a criminal proceeding is a complex concept, comprised of more than one element. It contains many layers of procedural and substantive rights that are given to a person who is subject of the proceeding, and not all of these are of identical weight and status. Within the rich texture of the procedural rights and super-rights that are involved in a criminal proceeding, which together guarantee at a basic level that the proceeding will be based on due process, the presence and involvement of the arrestee or the defendant at the hearing of his case is one of the most important — if not the most important. The ability to realize these rights stands at the heart of due process. Without these rights, the person being judged is not involved in the determination of his fate; he is unable to make arguments in his defense; and the court is denied the opportunity to receive an impression regarding the conditions under which the person is being held, and of his physical and mental condition. Without these rights, there is a violation of a basic human right, which involves the possibility of a person’s liberty being denied. Without these rights, the judicial process loses an essential tool on its road to discovering the truth, and it loses all ability to examine and to supervise, as it moves towards a correct decision of the matter. The conduct of a criminal proceeding in the absence of the arrestee or of the defendant speaks of judicial proceedings held in the shadows; the horrors of such a phenomenon are an aspect of those dark regimes in which nothing is known of human rights or of judicial due process. The presence of a person at a hearing in his own criminal case is, indeed, one of the main aspects of due process, and without it, an important guarantee of the conduct of a fair trial is removed.

It is undisputed that an improvement of the means given to law enforcement authorities for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the interrogations they carry out in the area of security offenses is a most important goal — especially when those authorities are dealing with matters involved in the thwarting of possible dangers to human life. Under certain circumstances, the interrogation can become substantially difficult if it must be interrupted in order to bring the interrogated person to court for a hearing. The difficulty is material when the interrogation involves the thwarting of the commission of security offenses, and the prevention of danger to human lives.

The balancing of the right of the arrestee to be present at a hearing in his criminal case, as part of his basic right to criminal due process, on the one hand, and the needs of a security interrogation, given its objectives and its importance — on the other hand — is complex and difficult.

Despite the special complexity involved in the balancing of values that is required in this matter, the violation of the arrestee’s right to due process caused by his absence from the judicial hearing being conducted in his case is so deep and so basic that it cannot be left to stand, even if it creates substantial difficulty for the security forces in conducting their law enforcement activities and their activity involving the security of the state. Justice for the individual — which is dependent on, inter alia, the individual’s presence at his hearing, and on his ability to exercise his right to defend himself properly against the suspicions and accusations brought against him — is one of the signs that identifies a constitutional system of law, and without it the value of due process is dealt a mortal blow. The value of needing to do justice, which cannot be realized in full due to the arrestee’s absence at his hearing, will have, in this context, greater importance than even enforcement and general security considerations — no matter how important and substantive they are. The weight of the value of doing justice and of maintaining criminal due process is so great that it outweighs even the public interest involved in a criminal-security interrogation. Israeli law has expressed this value preference — for protecting the rights of an individual within law enforcement proceedings, as being above considerations related to the public-general security interest — in other contexts as well. Among other matters, the use of harmful interrogation methods even in security cases has been restricted, with the courts giving clear preference to the protection of the rights of the interrogated individual over the security considerations (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [20]); the legislature also determined that evidence which is confidential because of security reasons must be disclosed if it is material to the defendant’s defense, even if its disclosure can do harm to a general public interest, including a security interest (ss. 44 and 45 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971; CrimApp. 4857/05 Fahima v. State of Israel [49]; MApp 838/84 Livni v. State of Israel [50], at pp. 737-738; CrimApp 9086/01, Raviv v. State of Israel [51]; CrimApp 7200/08 Sa’id v. State of Israel [52]; CrimApp 5114/97 Salimani v. State of Israel [53], at p. 725.

In the context of the dilemma that arises concerning this issue, the value of doing justice and of maintaining due process in an individual’s case will outweigh even the public interest considerations involved in the use of the most efficient interrogation and enforcement methods, even in extreme situations involving danger to life, when the appearance of the arrestee in court can cause significant difficulty for the activity of the authority carrying out the interrogation. We can hope that these authorities will be able to adjust their operation system intelligently to the framework of rules that are intended to protect the arrestee’s rights in criminal proceedings, in a manner that will best coordinate between the needed protection of human rights in the context of a judicial proceeding and the need to deal with criminal-security interrogation needs, and to maintain the level and efficiency of such interrogations.

I therefore concur in the opinion of my colleague Vice President Rivlin, according to which s. 5 of the Temporary Provision must be completely invalidated, without leaving any margin that would allow for the conduct of a judicial hearing in a criminal proceeding in the arrestee’s absence, subject to the general provisions of the Arrests Law.

Justice A. Grunis

 

1.    I agree with the conclusion of my colleague, Vice President E. Rivlin, to the effect that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision should be invalidated. This is because of the conflict between the section and the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. More specifically, I note that in my view, the provisions of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision are inconsistent with the principle of human liberty as it pertains to freedom from detention, as described in s. 5 of the Basic Law. I do not see any need to state my position regarding the question of whether the section in the Temporary Provision is also in conflict with other provisions of the Basic Law, especially regarding human dignity.

2.    Section 5 of the Temporary Provision effectively suspends the right of a suspect to be present at the detention proceedings being conducted against him. In my view, the suspect’s right to be present in court is derived from the right to liberty, either directly, or pursuant to the right to due process. What makes the case before us unique is that along with the denial of the said right, the law also allows for the possibility that another right will also be denied — the right of a criminal suspect to be in contact with his attorney (s. 35 of the Arrests Law). This right is a critical element of the right of any suspect to be represented by an attorney that he has chosen. In my view, this last right is also derived from the right to personal liberty, and it makes no difference whether the derivation is direct or pursuant to the right to due process.

3.    Theoretically, the authority to deny the two mentioned rights — the right to be present at the detention hearings and to be in contact with an attorney — can be exercised separately, rather than simultaneously. There is certainly the possibility of communication between the suspect and his attorney being prohibited, while the suspect is nevertheless permitted to be present in court. Section 35(g) of the Arrests Law expressly provides that when it has been decided to refuse to allow a suspect to meet with his attorney, the hearing regarding a request for detention or release or regarding an appeal, will be conducted separately for the arrestee and for his attorney “in a manner that prevents contact between them”, unless the court decides otherwise. In such a case, the judge must also serve as a type of go-between for the suspect and his attorney. What is clear is that in such cases the suspect may be present in court and can present his arguments before the judge, even if he is not permitted to communicate with his attorney. It is theoretically possible for a suspect’s right to be present in court to be denied, without his right to meet with his attorney having been suspended ― but this does not occur in reality, for various reasons. It appears that in every instance in which the right to be present in court during a detention hearing has been denied, the suspect’s right to meet with his attorney has also been denied. The significance of this simultaneous denial of the two rights (or, as my colleague Justice Naor calls it, the “cumulative effect”) is clear. In a formal sense, the lawyer may represent the suspect during the detention proceedings, but it is understood that the ability to provide proper representation under such circumstances is extremely difficult. This difficulty is added to the fact that the suspect is himself unable to be present in court. The judge therefore rules on the matter, in such a case, even though he is unable to hear the suspect’s statements. Although it cannot be said that the proceeding becomes an ex parte proceeding, since the suspect’s attorney is present, it does become a proceeding in which that attorney is acting with one hand tied behind his back and the court is provided with only a partial picture (as my colleague the Vice President wrote in para. 31 of his opinion). It should be noted that in the instant case, the two rights were suspended simultaneously. Nevertheless, we have not been provided with information regarding the duration of the period in which there was an overlap between the denial of both rights.

4.    There is no need to explain that under such circumstances, in which the two mentioned rights are both denied, there is a built-in danger that the process will not fulfill the due process requirement. However, even if there has been a violation of a fundamental right to personal liberty, this is not all that is be said of the matter — instead, it is necessary to examine whether the violation satisfies the tests prescribed in the limitations clause in s. 8 of the Basic Law. This examination must, in my view, relate to the period of time in which the mentioned rights are both denied simultaneously. It cannot be that a suspension of a right for a period of forty-eight hours is to be equated with its suspension for a period of twenty days. More concretely, it can be said that the proportionality requirement of the limitations clause requires an investigation of the degree of the possible violation of the right due to the simultaneous suspension of the right to meet with an attorney and the right to be present at detention hearings, arising from the length of time involved.

5.    The maximum period in which it is permissible to deny a meeting between a suspect and his attorney is twenty days (s. 35(d) of the Arrests Law). Regarding the prevention of a suspect’s presence in court, the maximum period is nineteen days (s. 5(1) of the Temporary Provision, which states that the period of detention that a court can order may be for less than twenty days; on the assumption that the day of the hearing is not included, we thus arrive at a maximum period of nineteen days). Thus, there is authority to prevent a suspect from meeting with his attorney, and to prevent his presence at the detention hearings, for a period of eighteen days. In my view, a period of such length does not comply with the proportionality requirements of the limitations clause — either with respect to the least violative measure test or the narrow proportionality test.

6.    Because the defect in the provisions of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision arises from the above-mentioned lack of proportionality (in its broader sense), I do not believe that as a matter of principle, there is any impediment preventing the legislature from adopting a different arrangement regarding the prohibition of the suspect’s presence at the detention hearings. Of course, any new arrangement of this matter must take into consideration the existing arrangement regarding the prevention of the suspect’s meeting with his attorney. In other words, in order for the new arrangement to comply with the proportionality principle of the limitations clause, care must be taken regarding the simultaneous application (or the cumulative effect) of the provisions regarding the prohibition against the suspect’s meeting with an attorney and the ability to conduct hearings in the suspect’s absence. A new and proportionate arrangement may take various forms. We note, inter alia, the possibility of shortening the period of time during which the two restrictions — the denial of the suspect’s ability to appear in court and the prohibition against his meeting with an attorney — would apply simultaneously. In my opinion, it is doubtful that the shortening of the period in which both applied would be sufficient. An additional possibility would be a significant limitation of the grounds that could be used to justify the prohibition of the suspect’s presence at his detention proceedings (see also Justice Naor’s opinion). It is important to find a solution that combines the two possibilities noted here.

7.    I do not agree with the view expressed by my colleague, Justice Naor — to the effect that our holding regarding the invalidity of s. 5 of the Statute should take effect six months from now, in order to allow the legislature time in which to respond. As we have been told, the authority to prohibit a suspect’s presence during detention hearings is exercised only rarely. For any particular suspect being discussed, it makes no difference at all that his case is unusual or even unique. What is important for the particular suspect is that there has been a disproportionate violation of his right to personal liberty. Thus, the rarity of such cases — those involving the use of the said — is not sufficient to qualify a defective arrangement. To the contrary, the fact that there are only few such cases justifies the immediate implementation of the decision to invalidate the arrangement. Furthermore, such immediate implementation will provide an incentive for the parties involved to act quickly and energetically so as to find an alternative arrangement which will be proportionate, and which will pass constitutional muster.

Decided as stated in the opinion of Vice President E. Rivlin, to allow the appeal as described in para. 35 of his opinion, holding that s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 is invalid.

27 Shvat, 5770.

11 February 2010.

 

 

Full opinion: 

State of Israel v. Jabarin

Case/docket number: 
CrimFH 8613/96
Date Decided: 
Monday, November 27, 2000
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: A further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel in which the appellant was convicted of an offense under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 for an article he had published.  This further hearing addresses the question whether the construction of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance requires a causal connection   between the publication of the words of praise, sympathy, or encouragement and the risk of the occurrence of acts of violence pursuant to the publication, for a conviction.  The court further addresses the question whether section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance relates only to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization or to any “acts of violence”.

 

Held: The Court held in an opinion by Justice T. Or that section 4(a) relates to acts of violence of a terrorist organizations and the words of praise and encouragement relate to acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Justice Or further held that the words and praise and encouragement in the publication which was the subject of the conviction do not constitute acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Therefore, the Court held that the defendant was to be acquitted of the offense under section 4(a) of the Ordinance.

Justice Y. Kedmi in a separate opinion was of the view that the further hearing should have been denied.  Justice Kedmi agreed with the construction given to section 4(a) in the Elba case [2], as it was adopted by the Justices in the panel in the first hearing of this matter.  Justice Kedmi was therefore of the opinion that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld.  Justice Kedmi further stated that even according to the narrower construction of section 4(a), the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld as the actions for which the appellant showed support, also meet the requirements of section 4(a) when narrowly construed.   

Vice-President S. Levin in a separate opinion stated his general agreement with Justice Or and disagreed that section 4(a) is to be interpreted as referring to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization alone, but rather should include the type of violent activity that characterizes terrorist organizations.  In his view the appellant’s article satisfied this definition and therefore the conviction should have been upheld.

Justice E. Mazza in a separate opinion was of the view that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld and referenced his judgments in CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. State of Israel and in CrimA 4147/95 Jabarin v. State of Israel which was the subject of the further hearing.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
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dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

CrimFH 8613/96

 

State of Israel

v.

Jabarin

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals

[November 27, 2000]

Before President A. Barak, Vice-President S. Levin, Justices T. Or, E. Mazza, Y. Kedmi, D. Dorner J. Türkel

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

A further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court (Justices E. Goldberg, E. Mazza, and Y. Kedmi) in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel on October 20, 1996.

 

Facts: A further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel in which the appellant was convicted of an offense under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 for an article he had published.  This further hearing addresses the question whether the construction of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance requires a causal connection   between the publication of the words of praise, sympathy, or encouragement and the risk of the occurrence of acts of violence pursuant to the publication, for a conviction.  The court further addresses the question whether section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance relates only to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization or to any “acts of violence”.

 

Held: The Court held in an opinion by Justice T. Or that section 4(a) relates to acts of violence of a terrorist organizations and the words of praise and encouragement relate to acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Justice Or further held that the words and praise and encouragement in the publication which was the subject of the conviction do not constitute acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Therefore, the Court held that the defendant was to be acquitted of the offense under section 4(a) of the Ordinance.

Justice Y. Kedmi in a separate opinion was of the view that the further hearing should have been denied.  Justice Kedmi agreed with the construction given to section 4(a) in the Elba case [2], as it was adopted by the Justices in the panel in the first hearing of this matter.  Justice Kedmi was therefore of the opinion that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld.  Justice Kedmi further stated that even according to the narrower construction of section 4(a), the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld as the actions for which the appellant showed support, also meet the requirements of section 4(a) when narrowly construed.   

Vice-President S. Levin in a separate opinion stated his general agreement with Justice Or and disagreed that section 4(a) is to be interpreted as referring to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization alone, but rather should include the type of violent activity that characterizes terrorist organizations.  In his view the appellant’s article satisfied this definition and therefore the conviction should have been upheld.

Justice E. Mazza in a separate opinion was of the view that the appellant’s conviction should have been upheld and referenced his judgments in CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. State of Israel and in CrimA 4147/95 Jabarin v. State of Israel which was the subject of the further hearing.

 

 

For the petitioner—Dan Yakir

For the respondents —Talya Sasson, Eyal Yannon

 

Legislation cited:

Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948, ss. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), 4(d), 4(e), 4(f), 4(g).

Penal Law 5737-1977, ss. 136(c), 144B(a), ch. H, sections A, A1.

 

Regulations cited:

Emergency Regulations for Prevention of Terrorism 5708-1948

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

  1. CrimA 4147/95 Jabarin v. State of Israel (not yet reported).
  2. CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. State of Israel IsrSC 50(5) 221.
  3. HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of Interior IsrSC 23(2) 477.
  4. CrimA 317/63 Tzur v. Attorney General IsrSC 18(1) 85.
  5. CrimA 697/98 Susskin v. State of Israel IsrSC 52(3) 289.
  6. CA 2000/97 Lindorn v. Karnit, Fund for Compensation of those Injured in Traffic Accidents IsrSC 55(1)12.
  7. CrFH 1789/98 State of Israel v. Benyamin Kahane (not yet reported).
  8. CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel IsrSC 52 (1) 535.
  9. CrimA 401/79 Lamdan v. State of Israel IsrSC 34(4) 46.

 

Israeli books cited:

  1. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2, Statutory Construction (1993)

 

Foreign books cited:

  1. D.E. Long The Anatomy of Terrorism (New-York, 1990).

 

Jewish law sources cited:

  1.  Ecclesiastes 8, 8.

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice T. Or

A  further hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court (Justices E. Goldberg, E. Mazza, and Y. Kedmi) from October 20, 1996 in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel [1] (hereinafter: “the Jabarin case [1]”).  In the judgment the appellant (hereinafter: “Jabarin”) was convicted of the offense established in section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 (hereinafter: “Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance” or “the Ordinance”) of support of a terrorist organization.  This further hearing revolves around the question of the construction of this offense.  The special importance of the issue stems from its ramifications for freedom of expression, as this freedom retreats within the borders of the deployment of this offense.

The Facts and the Processes

1.  Over the course of the years 1990-1991, Jabarin, a reporter from Umm El Fahm published three articles.  In the third article which, as we shall clarify below, was the only article that remained relevant to our matter, Jabarin wrote, among other things:“Truth be told, I will tell you my friend, that whenever I said: ‘hurray’, ‘hurray’ and threw a stone I was overwhelmed by the feeling that victory was calling us: ‘continue to throw, increase the patience, contribute and insist more, and the dawn will come which you have been awaiting for so long’ I will not deny my friend, that whenever I shouted: ‘hurray, hurray’ and threw a Molotov cocktail I feel that I am adorned in majesty and splendor, I feel that I have found my identity and that I am taking part in defending that identity and that I am a person worthy of leading a respectable life.  This feeling awakens within me beautiful feelings.”Consequent to the publication of the three articles Jabarin was charged with support of a terrorist organization, an offense under section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.  This offense establishes:

“4. A person who:

(a)  Publishes either in writing or orally praise of, sympathy for, or encouragement of acts of violence that may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury, or of threats of such acts of violence;

. . .

will be prosecuted and if found guilty will be liable for imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine of 1000 Israeli lira, or both.”

The Magistrate’s court convicted Jabarin of the offense attributed to him.  Jabarin appealed to the District Court.  His appeal was denied.  The applicant filed leave to appeal to this court and was granted leave as requested.  In the framework of consideration of the appeal, the respondent informed the court that it agrees to the acquittal of the applicant for his conviction as far as it relates to the first two articles he published, however, it supports his conviction as to the third article.  In reliance on the case law decided in CrimA  2831/95 Rabbi Ido Elba  v. State of Israel  [2] (hereinafter: “the Elba  Case”) as relates to the construction of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, the Court denied Jabarin’s appeal of his conviction for publication of the third article.

Jabarin filed an application for a further hearing on the judgment.  In his decision the President determined that it would be proper to grant the application and hold a further hearing on the question:

“whether the interpretation of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 requires that there exist a causal connection   -- and if so what is it – between the publication of the words of praise, sympathy, or encouragement and the risk of the occurrence of acts of violence pursuant to the publication.”

On February 16, 2000 we asked the parties to relate, by way of written summations, to an additional question and that is: whether section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance   relates to any “acts of violence” or only to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization.   As far as I have been able to ascertain, this question has not yet arisen and has not been considered until the proceedings in this case.

The Positions of the Judges as to the Construction of Section 4(a) in the Elba [2] and Jabarin [1] Judgments

2.  The further hearing before us in fact focuses on the Jabarin case [1], however, its foundations are anchored in the case law regarding section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance   in the Elba judgment [2].  The Elba judgment [2] was handed down by a special panel of seven judges.  The core of the discussion in the Elba case [2] surrounded the offense of incitement to racism established in section 144B (a) of the Penal Law 5737-1977, however it included reference by some of the Justices to the offense we are dealing with.

In the Elba case [2] Justice Mazza determined that the prohibition specified in section 4(a) includes among its elements, a probability potential for risk.  In his view, the phrase “may” that is in the section relates to “acts of violence” and not to the published words.  The expression “the death of a person or his bodily injury” which appears after the phrase “may” was intended only to describe the type of acts of violence.  Justice Mazza determined further that the prohibition specified in section 4(a) is derived from the character of the violent activity and not from its attribution to a terrorist organization.

“For the realization of the offense according to section 4(a) it is sufficient that the words of praise, sympathy, or encouragement relate to the type of activity which characterizes a terrorist organization, meaning ‘acts of violence that may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury, or of threats of such acts of violence.’  However, it is reasonable  to think that not every publication of a word of praise or encouragement for an act of violence which may, by its nature, cause the death of a person,  can constitute an offense according to section 4(a) of the Ordinance (while it is possible it will  constitute another offense).  From the purpose of the Ordinance it ostensibly necessarily arises that only publications which praise or encourage acts of violence of the type that characterize terrorist activity will be included in the framework of said prohibition.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the prohibition also applies to the publication of words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for violent activity of this type, even if the activity is by an individual, or a group that is not identified as a member of a terrorist organization.  Meaning: the prohibition on publication is derivative of the terrorist character of the violent activity, and not from its attribution to a terrorist organization, or from its doers belonging to such an organization.” (para. 44 Ibid. emphasis in the original.)

In conclusion Justice Mazza determines that:

“. . .  the risk that pursuant to the publication defined as prohibited, violent activity will actually take place is not of the elements of the offense.  The presumption inherent in the prohibition is that the very publication of words of support of activity which characterizes a terrorist organization can endanger the peace and security of the public.  We find that the prosecution meets its obligation by proving the publication and that it supports (via words of praise, sympathy or encouragement) the types of activities that are characteristic of a terrorist organization; and it does not have to prove that the publication itself may (at a certain level of probability)  cause violent action” (para. 45 of his opinion).

Justice Goldberg supported the view of Justice Mazza both relating to the attribution of the phrase “may” to “acts of violence” and to the absence of a probability test.

President Barak agreed with the view of Justice Mazza according to which the phrase “may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury” relates to the “acts of violence” and not to the words of praise.  From hence, that even in his view the section does not include within it an element of potential risk of the occurrence of acts of violence pursuant to the publication.  However, and in contrast to Justice Mazza, the President was of the view that the section includes within it, in the framework of the circumstantial element, a probability test.  This test relates to the character of the actions described and its function is to examine whether acts of the type described may cause death or severe injury. The judgment in the Jabarin judgment [1] was handed down about five months after the Elba judgment [2].  Justice Mazza referred to that case and adopted the interpretation given there to section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.  Justices E. Goldberg and Y. Kedmi shared his view.

The Position of the Parties in the Further Hearing 

3.  Counsel for Jabarin claims that the construction the court adopted in the matter of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance is an overly broad construction that does severe and unjustified harm to the foundational principles of our legal system.  According to his claim, the status of freedom of expression, which constitutes a “supra” value in our law, necessitates narrowing the area of deployment of the offense, in order not to harm it more than is necessary.  It is justified to harm this freedom only when there is a probability that a danger is posed from the expression.  As to the degree of probability of the danger, in his view the test of near certainty is to be adopted, a test that was adopted in Israeli case law as the balancing formula that is to be preferred when freedom of expression on the one hand and public peace on the other are placed on the scales.  The respondent, for its part, seeks to adhere to the construction given to section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in the Elba judgment [2] and the Jabarin judgment [1].  Although it makes a point of emphasizing that it is not oblivious to the importance of freedom of expression, nonetheless, in its view, this principle does not have ramifications for the question of the existence of a probability test in the framework of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance and does not constitute grounds for narrowing the limits of the prohibition beyond that which is established in it.  In the balance between the system of values the section protects and freedom of expression, the first prevails.  The State also claims that applying a probability test that analyzes the influence of the words of praise on an audience exposed to it will place an unreasonable, if not impossible, burden of proof on the prosecution.

As for the Court’s question whether section 4(a) is to be interpreted as relating to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization only, the position of Jabarin’s  counsel is that such construction is indeed consistent with the foundational principles of the system and with the purpose of the Ordinance.  On the other hand, the respondent is of the opinion that giving a narrow definition of the expression “acts of violence” in the section such that it relates to terrorist organizations only, is not consistent with the purpose of the provision in the section and therefore objects to it.

I will preface and say that I reached the conclusion that Jabarin is to be acquitted of the offense according to section 4(a) of the Ordinance.  In my view section 4(a) relates to acts of violence of a “terrorist organization” according to its meaning in the Ordinance (hereinafter: “terrorist organization”) and the words of praise and encouragement for acts of violence that were described in said publication do not satisfy this requirement.  I will preface and explain my rationale for limiting the range of deployment of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance to words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Following that, I will examine whether the words of praise and encouragement in said publication constitute acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  As said, my answer to this is in the negative.

Attributing the Provision in Section 4(a) to Acts of Violence of a Terrorist Organization

4.  Section 4(a) deals with the prohibition of a publication which relates to “acts of violence that may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury, or of threats of such acts of violence.”   From a textual standpoint, when one reads section 4(a) on its own, the section does not include a limitation according to which the acts of violence mentioned in it include only acts of violence of a terrorist organization or acts which are characteristic of a terrorist organization.  However, my colleague Justice Mazza was of the opinion, as quoted above, that the section is not to be interpreted in such a broad manner, and that according to the purpose of the Ordinance the acts mention in section 4(a) are to be limited to actions and activities which characterize terrorist activity, even if they are done by an individual who is not connected to a terrorist organization.

I accept my colleague’s view that the deployment of section 4(a) is not to be broadened to include any acts of violence which may cause a person’s death or injury.  But, in my opinion, the application of the clause is to be limited further, such that it will apply only to acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  While my colleague is of the opinion that the section deals with terrorist activity, in my opinion it deals with the activity of terrorist organizations.   I will detail my reasoning below.

5.  In construction of a section in a statute it is not sufficient to examine a given statutory provision detached from the overall statute in which it appears.  It is not a “lonely island” which stands on its own detached from its surroundings.  The law is “a creature living within its environment” (Justice Sussman in HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of Interior [3] at 513).  The proximate environment of the statutory sections is the overall statute within which they are found.  Such a  statute radiates and affects the manner of construction of each of the sections which make it up:

“. . .  the interpreter must review the legislation in its entirety.  The words of Justice Frankfurter are well known that there are three laws to statutory construction: “read the law, read the law, read the law.”  Indeed, the organic unit which the judge interprets directly was not legislated on its own.  It was legislated as part of a broader unit – the entire piece of legislation.  Just as one is not to interpret a section in a literary or musical composition without looking at the entire composition, so too one is not to interpret a provision in the law without reviewing the law in its entirety.”  (A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 2, Statutory Construction (1993) [10] at p. 308)

When examining the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in its entirety it is immediately apparent that the phrase “terrorist organization” is scattered throughout it.  All the offenses established in the Ordinance, including section 4, apart from subsection (a) in it, relate directly to terrorist organizations.  The Ordinance does not make do with dealing with the direct doers of the acts of violence who act on behalf of terrorist organizations.  The prohibitions established in it are directed at the broad foundation of these organizations; it also covers members of terrorist organizations who are not direct partners of the acts of violence and their supporters and accomplices from without.  Reading the Ordinance as one unit reveals a clear and unified picture as to its purpose.  This purpose is dealing with terrorist organizations with the goal of eliminating them.

The purpose of the Ordinance also radiates on identification of the purpose of section 4(a).  Indeed, section 4(a) according to its text, when it is examined on its own, does not associate the words of praise and encouragement to the acts of violence of a terrorist organization specifically.   However, when section 4(a) is read as one unit with the rest of the provisions of the Ordinance, it becomes apparent that the offense specified in it is to be related to the context of terrorist organizations.

6.  This conclusion is supported by the language of the margin headings of the sections of the Ordinance.  Most of the margin headings, including the margin heading of section 4, include the phrase “terrorist organization”.  For example, the margin heading of section 2 is “Activity in a Terrorist Organization”; the margin heading of section 3 is “Membership in a Terrorist Organization”; the margin heading of section 4 is “Support of a Terrorist Organization” and the like.  As to the role of margin notes in the framework of statutory construction, it has already been said:

“. . .although it is true that neither chapter headings nor margin headings add or detract as compared with the clear and unequivocal language of the law’s provision itself. .  .  where it arises from the statutory provision itself the possibility of a limiting interpretation which is consistent with the goal that was expressed in the heading of the chapter or the margin heading it is my view that it is proper to interpret the statute narrowly as aforesaid, in particular when it is a matter of criminal law” (my emphasis T.O) (CrimA 317/63 Tzur v. Attorney General [4] at 95 and see A. Barak, supra at pp. 316-321 and references there).

Indeed, the weight of margin headings in legal interpretation is not substantial, but it certainly may shed light on the purpose of legislation (Ibid.).  In our matter the consistent use of the phrase “terrorist organization” in the margin headings of the sections of the Ordinance, strengthens the construction according to which the Ordinance overall deals with overcoming terrorist organizations.

7.  Even the analysis of section 4, including all of its alternatives, supports this conclusion.  As said, the margin heading of this section is “Support of a Terrorist Organization”.  Indeed, all of its subsections, apart from subsection (a), deal with a type of support of a terrorist organization.  It prohibits support of a terrorist organization by way of publication of words of praise, sympathy or encouragement of its acts of violence.  The section does not deal with publication of words of praise, encouragement or sympathy for acts of violence which are not attributed to such an organization.  In short, the protected value in section 4 is the prevention of support of a terrorist organization, and this as part of the overall layout of the Ordinance, whose purpose is elimination of the foundation of these organizations.

It should be noted in this context that even in the text of section 4(a) there is a hint to the fact that the publication of the words of praise, sympathy or encouragement dealt with within it relate to acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  The section deals with publication of words of praise, encouragement or sympathy for “acts of violence which may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury”.  The definition of terrorist organization in section 1 of the Ordinance is “a group of people that in its operations makes use of ‘acts of violence which may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury’”.  Section 4(a) uses the very same words which constitute the backbone of the definition of “terrorist organization” in section 1.  This rationale also provides support for the argument that the legislator specifically directed section 4(a) of the law at words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for violent activity of a terrorist organization.

8.  The conclusion that the provision of section 4(a) relates to encouragement of acts of violence of a terrorist organization is only strengthened when one examines the historical background and the legislative history of the Ordinance.  The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was legislated under the dark shadow of the murder of Count Bernadotte, representative of the United Nations Assembly and his aide Colonel Serot in Jerusalem on September 17, 1948.  This murder hastened the legislation of the Ordinance, but its legislation had a broader background which was the attempt of the provisional government, after the government was established, to bring about the disbandment of the Jewish underground.  Several days after the murder, on September 20, 1948, the Emergency Regulations for Prevention of Terrorism 5708-1948 were passed.  On September 23, 1948, members of the Provisional Council of State gathered for their 19th meeting, in the framework of which said regulations were repealed and replaced with the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance.  The meeting was opened with the notice of the then-Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, as to the murder and a sharp condemnation of the act (see: Minutes of the Meeting of the Provisional Council of State of September 23, 1948, The  Council of the Nation and the Provisional Council of State, Minutes of Discussions, Volume A at p. 31).  From this notice, detailed below we learn of the purpose for which the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was passed:

“After consulting with several members of the government – those members that I could reach on Friday evening and Saturday morning – I approached the Ministry of Justice, to immediately prepare emergency regulations against terrorist organizations, according to which it would be possible to punish not only those who commit acts of terrorism – for this the existing laws suffice – but also members of the terrorist organization, even if they themselves do not participate in the terrorist act, and their helpers, and those encouraging them with money, propaganda or other assistance.

On Saturday night the government convened at the Ministry of Defense, heard a detailed report from me as to these activities and decided to proceed with them with full vigor, until the criminals will be caught and brought to justice and the terrorist organizations uprooted.  The government dealt that evening with the proposed Emergency Regulations against Terrorist Organizations, prepared by the Ministry of Justice, ratified it in principle, and assigned a committee of three ministers to draft a final draft for publication in the Official Register as an emergency regulation.  The government weighed whether to delay the publication until the meeting of the Council of State and reached the conclusion – that delay would be wrong and that immediate action was necessary, and it was to publish the regulations within the authority it had, as emergency regulations, however, with the convening of the Council of State the government submits the regulations for the Council’s approval so that the regulations will be made into an ordinance on behalf of the Council of State.” (Emphases mine-- T.O.).

From these words it arises that the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance was legislated in order to combat the phenomenon of terrorist organizations.  This historical background strengthens the conclusion I reached according to what is said in the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance overall, that the Ordinance deals exclusively with offenses which relate to terrorist organizations.

9.  The conclusion I reached clarifies and provides a satisfactory explanation for the severity of the criminal prohibition established in section 4(a), a prohibition that contains an infringement on freedom of expression.  When this section is examined detached from its legislative environment and from its historical and legislative background, the impression is created that the infringement on freedom of expression is severe and disproportionate in its degree.  However, this first impression changes, when the section is examined against the background of its context the purpose is understood and the borders of its deployment are clarified.  The prohibition specified in section 4(a), as the rest of the prohibitions in the Ordinance, was intended to defeat the foundation of terrorist organizations.  Against the background of the special severity of this risk, the legislator was of the view that it would be proper to go even further and to also consider publication of praise for violent acts of a terrorist organization as an offense, even if they were done in the past, and even if the publisher of the words of praise is not a member of such an organization himself and does not pose a danger himself.  Moreover, and this is to be emphasized, the section does not require the existence of potential for the realization of any harm as a result of the publication.  One can become accustomed to such a prohibition in a democratic society, although it contains a significant infringement on freedom of expression, when we are dealing with terrorist organizations, with the great and unique risk they embody.

10.  The respondent is aware of the historical background for legislating the Ordinance, but according to its claim, the language of section 4(a) enables its interpretation in a manner that does not limit the prohibition established in it to the description of violent acts of a terrorist organization, and in its view, such an interpretation is more desirable.

As for the language of the article, it is the claim of the respondent, that from review of section 4 one can reach a conclusion opposite to the one reached above.  First, as opposed to each of its subsections, in subsection (a) it is not explicitly noted that the prohibition specified in it refers to a terrorist organization.  From this it can be concluded that there was no intention to limit what was said in it to acts of a terrorist organization.  Moreover, the respondent also claims that limiting the scope of section 4(a) to describing acts of violence of a terrorist organization, will in fact make superfluous the prohibition found in it as this prohibition is covered by other alternatives in section 4.  For example, section 4(b) establishes that a person will be charged with an offense who:

“publishes, in writing or orally, words of praise, sympathy or calls for help or support of a terrorist organization.”

It is the claim of the respondent, that words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for undertaking acts of violence by a terrorist organization are included within this general prohibition of publication of words of praise and encouragement of a terrorist organization.  This act is in its view also covered by section 4(g) of the Ordinance which establishes that a person will be charged with an offense who:

“commits an act that contains an expression of identification with a terrorist organization or sympathy for it, by waving a flag, presenting a symbol or a slogan or voicing an anthem or slogan, or any similar expressive act which clearly reveals such identification or sympathy, and all this in a public place or in a manner that people who are in a public place can see or hear this expression of identification or sympathy.”

Such arguments are to be rejected.  First, the argument according to which the interpretation which bounds the definition of section 4(a) to a terrorist organization, makes the prohibition established in it superfluous, is not to be accepted.  The distinction between the prohibitions established in the various alternatives of section 4 is clear.  The prohibition specified in subsection (b) prohibits publication which contains words of praise, sympathy or calls for help or support of a terrorist organization.  On the other hand, subsection (a) relates to a publication which contains words of praise, sympathy or encouragement of violent acts of a terrorist organization.  The emphasis is on acts of violence of a terrorist organization, and not the terrorist organization itself.

Second, as to section 4(g), from review of the case based description of the type of activities it applies to it is apparent that the section deals with expressions of support and identification via symbolic means, such as anthem, flag waving, slogan and the like (see on this issue CrimA 697/98 Tatiana Susskin v. State of Israel [5] at para. 35). It does not deal with a publication that contains direct literal support of acts of violence of a terrorist organization.

Third, indeed the language of section 4(a) itself can also be interpreted as applying to the type of violent activity that defines terrorist organizations, or even to any violent activity and not necessarily the violent activity of terrorist organizations.  As I noted in the beginning of my words, from a textual standpoint, this possibility is not to be ruled out.  However, as explained above, this interpretation is not consistent with the purpose of the Ordinance, its margin headings, its historical and legislative background and the alternatives of section 4.

11.  According to the respondent’s claim, it is desirable to dismiss the interpretation that limits section 4(a) to publication of words of praise for terrorist acts of a terrorist organization alone also for the reason that it leads, in its view, to an unwanted result.  The respondent brings as an example in support of this argument the fact that the publisher, for example, of words of praise for the massacre at the Cave of Mahpelah or the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, could not be charged with an offense according to section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, and this because these terrorist acts were not carried out by agents of a terrorist organization but by individuals.  In this context, the respondent emphasizes that the reality in Israel proves that the threat that is posed from individuals is no less tangible than the threat posed by organized groups.  In its view, the special importance of section 4(a) of the Ordinance is to be understood in light of this reality.  The prohibition on publishing publications which incite to severe acts of violence on an ideological background, established in section 4(a) of the Ordinance, constitutes a central tool in the effort to prevent terrorist acts in general and those by individuals in particular.  Its importance stems from the fact that its task is to prohibit these seditious publications and thereby prevent an atmosphere which grants the lone damaging person the necessary support to carry out the terrorist act.  In the view of the respondent, accepting the proposed interpretation will leave the prosecution without the tools to cope with the phenomenon of incitement by individuals to commit severe acts of violence with terrorist characteristics.

The respondent proposes to adopt the view of Justice Mazza, which was expressed in the Elba judgment [2] and the Jabarin judgment [1], according to which within the framework of the prohibition in section 4(a) will be included publications which praise or encourage acts of violence of the type that characterizes terrorist activity.  The respondent even suggests a number of central components which make such activity unique in its view, and which distinguish it from “regular” acts of violence.

12.  As I have shown above, the Ordinance was legislated in order to fight against terrorist organizations.  However, the law is that a statute is to be given an updated meaning, in accordance with the changing reality (see A.Barak in his book supra, at p. 264; and see also, for example, CA 2000/97 Lindorn Nicole v. Karnit, Fund for Compensation of those Injured in Traffic Accidents [6] at paragraph 17).  If this is the case, is it not desirable, in the face of the argued change in the character of terrorist activity over time, to walk in the pathway the respondent suggests and broaden the boundaries of the deployment of the prohibition specified in section 4(a) beyond the boundaries originally delineated?  My view is that we are not to do so.  The Ordinance deals with organized terror, and not with acts of violence undertaken by individuals.  It deals with the risk entailed in the joining together of a band of people who undertake in their activities acts of violence which endanger human life.  Organizations of this type, to the extent that they are not cut off at their core, may spread like a cancer in the body of society, and endanger its foundations, and possibly even sabotage the foundations of the regime.  In light of the severity of this risk, primarily during a period of emergency, the use of the severe means utilized by the Ordinance to eliminate this blight is understandable.  I have clarified above, that the special severity of the means utilized  are to be understood against this background, as this is also reflected in the essence of the prohibition established in section 4(a).  Broadening the scope of 4(a) to additional circumstances, which it did not purport to deal with, may destroy the balance established in it, which enables severe infringement on freedom of expression, but only for the purpose of dealing with the extreme phenomenon of terrorist organizations.

13.  As stated, the respondent expresses concern, that accepting the proposed construction will leave the prosecution without the tools to cope with the phenomenon of incitement to commit severe acts of violence with terrorist characteristics, when these are not connected to a terrorist organization.  This claim, to the extent that it reflects the face of reality, indeed is not to be belittled.  However, it cannot change the purpose of section 4(a) which was intended, along with the other offenses established in the Ordinance, to serve as a weapon in the fight against terrorist organizations.  This purpose has not lost its force.  Unfortunately, such organizations have not yet left this world.  Indeed, at the time the Ordinance was legislated it was intended to deal with organizations of a different identity than those we are familiar with today.  A change in times has also brought about a change in the identity of terrorist organizations which constitute a risk to the State.  However, the risk rooted in terrorist organization has remained, and therefore the original meaning of section 4(a) as described above has not faded.

It will be noted, that in existing legislation there exist a number of provisions which may serve the state in its war against the phenomenon of incitement, as the offense of sedition found in Title A of Chapter H of the Penal Law 5737-1977, and the offense of Incitement to Racism established in Title A1 in it.  According to the claims of the respondent the existing arsenal is not sufficient to battle the phenomenon of sedition.  If that is the case, this is a matter for the legislator to address and regulate the prohibition of incitement, in its various aspects.

Based on what has been said above, my conclusion is that the Ordinance only applies to situations in which terrorist organizations are involved.  It does not relate to violent activity, of any type, which has no connection to these organizations.  Therefore, section 4(a) is not deployed over publications which contain words of praise, sympathy or identification with violent acts which were committed by people who are not associated with a terrorist organization.  Limiting the scope of section 4(a) in such a manner, preserves the balance established in it between freedom of expression and the value protected within it.  This prohibition eliminates the concern of a disproportionate infringement on freedom of expression; the infringement is proportional in consideration of the special risk rooted in terrorist organizations.

The Question of the Association of the Described Acts of Violence with a Terrorist Organization

15.  In our matter, Jabarin published, during the Intifada, an article which expresses support, encouragement and sympathy for the throwing of stones and throwing of Molotov cocktails.  Did Jabarin commit an offense according to section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance   with this publication?  My answer to this is in the negative.

In order to establish whether a publication is included within the prohibition established in section 4(a), one is to examine whether the acts of violence described in it, which it praises, encourages or sympathizes, are the acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Section 1 of the Ordinance defines a “terrorist organization”:

“‘a terrorist organization’ is a group of people that uses in its operations acts of violence which may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury or threats of such acts of violence”

There is no doubt that throwing stones and throwing Molotov cocktails are activities which can endanger human life.  But the question is, does Jabarin’s article, which praises and encourages acts of violence, relate to the acts of violence of a terrorist organization?

The acts of violence of the type described in said article were undertaken, during the course of the Intifada, both by individuals and by organized groups that fall under the definition of “terrorist organization”.  Stones and Molotov cocktails were thrown in a disorganized manner, by individuals including children, who acted independently.  However, these activities were also undertaken by groups with an organized foundation that undertook acts of violence to achieve their goals.  I clarified above, that in order to apply section 4(a) of the Ordinance, it is not sufficient that the acts described in the publication are of the type that characterize terrorist activity, but it is necessary that they be the acts of such an organization.  Does section 4(a) apply to a publication of the type we are dealing with, a publication which praises and encourages acts of violence undertaken both by individuals and by terrorist organizations, and which in itself contains no indication, explicit or implicit, of whose activities it wishes to encourage and praise, and when the emphasis in it is on the acts of violence themselves without any connection to the characteristics of those undertaking them?

16.  It is my view that section 4(a) does not apply to said publication.  The reason for this is found in the purpose of section 4(a).  I clarified above, that its purpose is not to prohibit a publication which encourages, praises or sympathizes with acts of violence of the type which characterize terrorist activity.  It is intended, as are the rest of the alternatives of section 4, to prevent support of terrorist organizations, and this as part of an overall system in the Ordinance whose purpose is to eliminate the foundation of such organizations.  In order for a publication to be included in the framework of section 4(a), it is necessary, in my opinion, for it to be understood from it that it supports acts of violence of a terrorist organization.  Indeed, it is not necessary that the publication contain explicit reference to such an organization.  It is sufficient that it be implied from it that it supports violent activities undertaken by it.  For example, a publication which praises acts of violence without relating to those undertaking it, when it is known to all that a terrorist organization is behind the act, will fall within the framework of section 4(a) of the Ordinance.  However, a publication which praises and encourages acts of violence, from the content of which it is not to be understood that it is intended to support a terrorist organization, but the emphasis in it is on the acts of violence itself, without connection to the characteristics of those undertaking them, does not fall within the prohibition established in section 4(a).

In our matter, the publication includes words of praise and sympathy for acts of violence of the type of throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails.  As said, it contains no indication that it was intended to praise an act of violence of a terrorist organization.  My impression from reading the article is that the emphasis in it is on acts of violence, when the characteristics of those undertaking them do not add or detract.  Moreover, in the major portion of the article, as can also be seen from the section quoted in paragraph 1 above, Jabarin relates to acts of violence that he himself undertakes, or seeks to undertake.  The respondent is not claiming that Jabarin himself is a member of a terrorist organization.  Therefore, words of praise for his actions, or encouragement to act like him, are not included within the framework of words of praise or encouragement for acts of violence of a terrorist organization.

17.  In light of this, my conclusion is that the article does not support a terrorist organization, by means of sounding words of praise and encouragement for acts of violence undertaken by it.  From hence that the publication we are dealing with does not include the required elements for formation of the offense of support of a terrorist organization established in section 4(a) of the Ordinance.

18.  Based on the above, I will propose to my colleagues that the petitioner’s appeal be allowed and that he be acquitted of the charge he was convicted of.

 

President A. Barak

I agree

 

Justice D. Dorner

I agree

 

Justice J. Türkel

1.  I concluded my opinion in CrimA 2831/95 Rabbi Ido Elba  v. State of Israel [2] with the words: “it is said in the book of Kohelet that  “no man controls the spirit—to trap the spirit” [Ecclesiastes 8,8] Let us not hold back man’s spirit.” (Ibid. at 337)

In the view of the respondent’s counsel in the briefs they submitted “there are expressions, and the petitioner’s expression is included among these, that even if perhaps they express man’s spirit it is appropriate to place limitations on this spirit as the entire purpose and goal of that spirit is to incite harm to the spirit and body of other people.”

2.  I go in my way, as in the Elba case [2] and as in CrFH 1789/98 State of Israel v. Benyamin Kahane [7] the decision on which is to be given alongside the decision here.  In my opinion it is proper to narrow, by way of construction, the scope of deployment of the criminal law provisions which infringe on freedom of expression.  As I said in the Elba  judgment “according to my perspective, across the standard at one end of which is absolute freedom of expression and at the other end of which – its prohibition, the balancing point is to be set very close to the first edge.” (Ibid. at p. 331).

Indeed the words that the petitioner wrote in the article that was published, for which he was convicted in CrimA 4147/95 Muhammad Yousef Jabarin v. State of Israel [1] are deserving of serious condemnation; however, such things are not to be prevented nor is their sting to be dulled, using the authority of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5708-1948 (hereinafter:  “the section”).  In the battle for freedom of expression we should not lower our gaze to the close range of the throwing of a stone or hurling of a Molotov cocktail but rather raise our eyes to the horizon of Jewish and Democratic Israel, for which freedom of expression is one of its foundation stones.  Protection of the petitioner’s right to speak his words is not protection of his defamatory words, but it is protection of the right of the person holding another opinion to speak his mind.  Protection of the right of the petitioner is protection of my right to speak my words, to sound the poetry of the poets that speak from my heart, and to cry out my cry of truth.

3.  The construction of my colleague, Justice T. Or, narrows the range of deployment of the section and is favorable in my eyes.  I agree with his view.

 

Justice Y. Kedmi

I read through the opinion of my colleague Justice Or, and unfortunately I cannot agree with his view.  According to my approach, as it will be presented below, the construction that was given to section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in the Elba  case (CrimA 2831/95)[2] – by Justice Mazza – is the proper construction; and I have not found any justification to change it or deviate from it. Two topics are up for discussion in the case before us as to the construction of said section 4(a).  The one, which is the issue for which the further hearing was granted – deals with the question, whether a “causal connection” is needed between the publication of words of praise, sympathy or encouragement of acts of violence, and the occurrence of acts of violence in fact.  And the second -- deals with the question, whether section 4(a) speaks only of publication of words of praise for acts of violence that were committed by a terrorist organization; or whether in its framework are also included words of praise for acts of violence that were committed by private persons not on behalf of a terrorist organization when they satisfy the characteristics of the acts detailed in the body of the article.

As to the causal connection , I accept, in principle, the approach that states: that lacking an explicit statement, noting a prohibited “character mark” of a circumstance – in this case the publication – is not sufficient to convey a requirement for the presence of any particular level of probability of the actualization of that “character mark”; and that there is to be seen in noting the prohibited character mark a requirement which relates to an inherent trait of the circumstance as opposed to its potential to occur.  On this matter see the words of my colleague, Justice Mazza in CrimA 6696/96 [8] in connection with section 136(c) of the Penal Law: “the phrase ‘of a seditious nature’ is directed at the content of the publication and not the degree of probability that the publication will cause rebellion.”

However, when it has become clear that there is no debate that the requirement that the acts of violence which the petitioner’s article deals with, are acts of violence “which may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury” as in their meaning in said section 4(a), I do not find it appropriate to expand on this issue here; and in my view it remains “open for further discussion”.

As to limiting the application of the prohibition established in said section 4(a) to words of praise and encouragement of acts of a terrorist  organization only, I agree with the position that was presented by Justice Mazza in the Elba  case, according to which: this section relates to the publication of words of praise and encouragement for violence of the type that characterizes terrorist activity; and it is of no consequence whether these are committed by a terrorist organization or a private individual not on behalf of such an organization.

From a textual perspective, there are two rationales at the basis of my approach.  The first – the language of said section 4(a) does not include a requirement that the acts which are the subject of the encouragement and praise will be such that they are committed by a terrorist organization in particular; as opposed to all the other subsections of section 4, which speak specifically of terrorist organizations.  And the second – in describing the acts subject to the prohibition established in said section 4(a) – “that may cause the death of a person or his bodily injury, or of threats of such acts of violence”—the legislator repeated, with vigorous precision, the acts which characterize a terrorist organization, as per the definition in section 1 of the Ordinance; when the reference in that definition to a “band of people” as the doers of the actions, was dropped from section 4(a).  This situation teaches, in my approach, that the legislator intended to establish in said section 4(a) a general prohibition on words of praise and encouragement for acts which characterize a terrorist organization; and this – and Justice Or has described this at length – as an exception within its environment, which overall, speaks of the activity of a terrorist organization explicitly.

The language of section 4(a) is not suffering from a textual “failure” which must be healed by way of construction, as is necessitated by the approach of my colleague.  “Omission” of the requirement according to which it is a matter of praise and encouragement for acts “of” a terrorist organization, repeats itself twice:  first in the very absence of the mention of the terrorist organization; and later, in copying the definition of the acts which characterize a terrorist organization without mentioning the doer.  The language of section 4(a) is clear, and deliberately does not include the requirement that the doer of the actions the subject of the encouragement and praise will be a terrorist organization.  Adding the requirement which narrows the prohibition established in said section 4(a) as suggested by my colleague Justice Or, constitutes in the present case, “judicial legislation” as opposed to “construction”.

The result I have reached is not necessitated just from the textual aspect of the version of the provision, as detailed above, but also fits in -- in my approach – with the legislative purpose and the framework in which it is found.  Indeed, as is apparent from the legislative history of the Ordinance, the factor that led to its legislation was the need to create a tool to combat terrorist organizations; and apparently the conclusion is necessitated that section 4(a) is also directed to serve this tool.  However, at the end of the day, the struggle is not with an “organization” as such, but the “activity” for which the organization was set up and which it carries out; and it is not surprising, to see the “intertwining” of a provision which is directed at deterring from “activity” which characterizes the organization, even when this is not carried out by a member of the organization, in its name or on its behalf.  When the final result of the struggle is prevention of “terrorist activity”, we do not see an absence of logic– requiring repair -- in that among the rest of the prohibitions there has also been established a prohibition which speaks directly to preventing “activity” of the type that a terrorist organization carries out.  Prohibition of the publication of words of praise for “activity of a terrorist nature” that was carried out by one who was not a member of a terrorist organization, does not constitute, according to this approach, a “foreign seed” – lacking in logic – in the Ordinance – which is directed at blocking the activity of terrorist organizations.

Aside from and in addition to what is said above – and beyond what is needed – I feel it appropriate to add the following comment.  Even if the language of the provision were to leave room for a restricting definition, I would reject such construction due to the “change of circumstances” since the legislation of the Ordinance; and this by authority of the rule which denies reliance on historical construction which was good in its day and which ignores the development which has occurred in reality.

“legislative history must not control us ‘from the graves’; but we also must not build our legislative structure without roots.  The proper balance between past and future, between knowledge of what was, and knowledge of what should be, is what stands at the foundation of proper use of legislative history in establishing the purpose of the legislation.”  (A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Volume 2, Legislative Construction, 1993 [13] at p.  351).

The phenomenon of terror has undergone many changes over the years.  In the past, including at the time of legislation of the Ordinance, the phenomenon was focused on activity carried out by terrorist organizations; and the phenomenon of private terrorists – “freelancers” – was in its infancy.  However, today the phenomenon of terrorism has ceased to be the exclusive activity of terrorist organizations; and the role of individuals, who mimic the members of the organizations but act on their own accord, has reached significant proportions.  It is not without reason then, that the definition acceptable to the United States Government for terrorism also specifically includes within it reference to terrorism by individuals.

““Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for polotical [sic] purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.”  (D. E. Long, The Anatomy of Terrorism (1990) [11] at p. 3; emphasis added Y.K.).

Our State has recently witnessed the harsh dangers embedded in acts of terrorism of individuals – who do not act on behalf of an organization –with the murder of the prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (may his memory be a blessing), in the actions with a terrorist character by someone who was not acting on behalf of a terrorist organization.  The danger embedded within those “unorganized” terrorists is continually increasing and its strength has lately surpassed that embedded in terrorist organizations; experience has shown that the task of foiling the activities of those individual terrorists is particularly difficult given their seclusion.

In such a situation, there is no justification for the distinction between words of praise for violent acts of members of an organization and words of praise for actions of the same type that were committed by those who are not members of any organization; as the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent the existence of activity of a terrorist nature; whoever those carrying it out may be.

And finally, I am not oblivious to the fact that my position as to the construction of the provision of said section 4(a) clashes with the basic right of freedom of expression.  Indeed, such is the face of things.  However, said right is not an absolute right but a relative one; where the legislator gnaws away at it from the authority of the right to life and security while preserving the necessary “proportionality” we must honor its provision.  Said section 4(a) establishes such a provision.

Conclusion

According to my approach, the construction given to section 4(a) in the Elba case [2] is to be left standing as it was adopted by the Justices in the panel in first discussion in the matter before us; and it is not appropriate to intervene in the conviction of the appellant.

As an aside I would like to add that even if the opinion of my colleague Justice Or is accepted, according to which section 4(a) speaks only of words of praise for violent actions “of a terrorist organization” the appeal is still to be denied; and this, as the actions for which the appellant showed support, meet, at the end of the day, this requirement as well.  It is well known that throwing stones and Molotov cocktails during the intifada, was committed first and foremost by members of Palestinian terrorist organizations on behalf of their organizations; when individuals, who are not members of organizations, were dragged in after them.  The possibility and even the fact – that these acts were committed also by individuals who are not members of a terrorist organization, does not remove the words of praise the appellant published from the purview of said section 4(a) even according to the “restricting” formula proposed by my colleague.  Review of the appellant’s article shows, that it speaks of sweeping support of all acts of throwing stones and Molotov cocktails without distinction as to those committed by members of terrorist organizations and those committed by individuals that are not such; from hence that the support also  refers to activities of terrorist organizations.

 

Vice-President S. Levin

1.  I agree with my hon. colleague Justice T. Or that the language of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, on its own, can also encompass violent activity of the type that characterizes terrorist organizations, or even violent activity of any type, however, in my view, it must be so interpreted.  I do not agree with him that the said paragraph is to be interpreted as referring only to “acts of violence” of a terrorist organization.

The thesis which bases the acquittal on a narrow interpretation of section 4(a) relies on the purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, the margin heading of section 4 and other sections of the Ordinance, the similarity between the language of section 4(a) and the definition of “terrorist organization” in section 1 of the Ordinance, the historical background of the Ordinance and the need to interpret said statute as much as possible in a manner that does not infringe on freedom of expression.  I do not accept this position, for the purposes of the petition before us.

As to the purpose of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance said thesis creates circuitous reasoning (inextricabilis circulus):   if you start with the assumption that the purpose of the Ordinance is only war with terrorist organizations, then the thesis is well based; if you start from the conclusion that the Ordinance has an additional purposes which is also to fight against the actions of individuals who publish words of praise, sympathy or encouragement for acts of violence which may cause a person’s death or injury then the thesis is not well based and it assumes the desired result as the basis of its rationale.  Moreover, a similar question came before us in CrFH 1789/98 [7] and the court determined there that a broad construction was to be given to the offense of sedition although it was also possible there to interpret the wording “to incite to seditious acts” as referring to an act that that causes harm to the structure of the regime alone, and I do not see a significant difference in the means of interpretation of the two statutes.

2.  The value of a margin heading in the construction of section 4(a) of the Ordinance is minimal and it is given sufficient weight in the approach of Justice Mazza in CrimA 2831/95 [2], that section 4(a) speaks of types of activity that are characteristic of a terrorist organization and not violent activity when it stands on its own; even in the similarity between the grounds of paragraph (a) of section 4 and the definition of “terrorist organization” in section 1 of the Ordinance there is not in my view support of the acquitting result and vice versa; the fact that in section 4(b)(c)(d)(e)(f) of the Ordinance a “terrorist organization” is mentioned, as opposed to in paragraph (a), can teach, by way of evidence from the contrary, that paragraph 4(a) does not refer specifically to a “terrorist organization”; the examples from the legislative history which led to the legislation of the Ordinance are in my view of little weight, if they did not find expression in the wording of the Ordinance, that with its legislation became a living thing that carries its own weight.  Absent sufficient indication in the wording of section 4 of the Ordinance that the protected value in this section is only the struggle with a terrorist organization, it appears to me that text is to remain within its literal meaning and the protected interest in paragraph (a) is also the struggle with one who commits the types of activities that are characteristic of a terrorist organization.

3.  The central question in this further hearing is whether proper construction of section 4(a) of the Ordinance requires limiting the scope of deployment of the section only to activity of a terrorist organization although this was not said in paragraph (a) and that is – in order to defend freedom of expression.  The topic we are dealing with is the normative construction of a primary statute and not its application to a concrete instance, as in our matter it is possible that it will be necessary to utilize stringent criteria of probability in order to prevent infringement of freedom of expression.  All agree that the deployment of the principle of freedom of expression can be pushed back in the presence of restrictions and limitations which relate to considerations which may narrow the scope of its deployment.  Accepting the position of the petitioner in the normative sphere means closing off options for a conviction based on clear text for offenses of severe incitement to acts of violence characteristic of a terrorist organization, when, apparently there is no other statutory source to rely on in order to convict one who commits the act.  Under these circumstances I am not of the view that the interpreter has the option of applying a general norm of freedom of expression that can limit the statute’s words resulting in the release of the accused from criminal liability.  Just as it is true that the law is a “a “creature living within its environment” for the purpose of restricting the scope of its deployment  in the appropriate case in the face of the application of general principles, so too is it a “a creature living within its environment” for the purpose of applying its exacting words, if it turns out – in the appropriate case – that a restrictive construction of the section will harm the interest which the law comes to protect; compare: the judgment of Justice Landau in CrimA 401/79 Lamdan v. State of Israel [9] at p. 56 near the letter “a”.  Such, in my view, is the situation in the present case.

4.  Were my opinion to be heard we would therefore decide that section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance also applies to those who commit acts of terror which characterize terrorist organizations and I have no doubt that the content of the article meets this definition.  Therefore, in theory I should have expressed my view also as to the question for which the further hearing was granted which relates to the existence of a causal connection between the publication of the words of praise, sympathy or encouragement to the risk of the occurrence of acts of violence as a consequence of the publication; and the degree of its strength; as my honorable colleague, Justice Kedmi, I have been satisfied that the content of the articles also meets the more stringent test of “clear and present danger”.  Therefore I do not see a need to express an opinion as to the first question brought before us for determination.

I have therefore reached the conclusion that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the first hearing is to be upheld and the conviction of the petitioner is to be left as is.

 

Justice E. Mazza

I cannot agree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Or.  I have expressed my stance relative to the construction of section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance  5708-1948 in my judgment in CrimA 2831/95 Elba  v. State of Israel [2] at pp. 282-286, and in my judgment in the appeal which is the subject of the further hearing before us (CrimA 4147/95 Jabarin v. State of Israel [1])  The reasoning of my colleagues, the Vice-President and Justice Kedmi, only strengthened me as to the correctness of the position I expressed in these judgments.  If our views were to be heard, this appeal would be denied.

 

It has been decided by a majority of opinions as per the judgment of Justice T. Or.

 

29 Kislev 5760

November 27, 2000

 

Editor’s note:  Following this judgment and the Court’s determination that section 4(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance 5798-1948 applies only to sedition by a terrorist organization and does not apply to sedition by individuals, the Ordinance was amended such that section 4(a) of the Ordinance was nullified and in its stead an offense of sedition to violence or terror was established in the Penal Code.

Salama v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5784/03
HCJ 6024/03
HCJ 6025/03
Date Decided: 
Monday, August 11, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

 

Facts: Based on classified evidence tying them to terror organizations, detention orders were issued against the three petitioners. The orders were extended by respondent, and these extensions were confirmed by the Military Appeals Court. Petitioners claim that the extensions are not legal. They argue that respondents should corroborate the suspicions against them with further investigation. This would allow the detention orders to be replaced by a criminal proceeding.

 

Held: The Court noted that the basic premise of administrative detention is the need to prevent future danger to the security of the state of public safety. Administrative detention is not meant to be used in place of criminal proceedings. Such detention infringes the fundamental freedoms of the detainee. As such, in reviewing administrative detention orders, court must carefully and meticulously examine the evidence against the detainee. In extending a detention order, the security authorities must examine current and up-to-date evidence against the detainee. In light of these principles, and in light of the evidence upon which the administrative detention orders were based, the court  held that the decision of the Military Appeals Court to confirm them was a proper exercise of its judicial discretion.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

                                                                                                                HCJ 5784/03

HCJ 6024/03

HCJ 6025/03

 

  1. Louie Salama
  2. Abd al Razek Farg
  3. Hail Abu Hassen

v.                                

  1. Israel Defence Force (IDF) Commander in Judea and Samaria
  2. Judge of the Military Appeals Court

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[August 11, 2003]

Before President A. Barak, Justices J. Turkel and E. Rivlin

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: Based on classified evidence tying them to terror organizations, detention orders were issued against the three petitioners. The orders were extended by respondent, and these extensions were confirmed by the Military Appeals Court. Petitioners claim that the extensions are not legal. They argue that respondents should corroborate the suspicions against them with further investigation. This would allow the detention orders to be replaced by a criminal proceeding.

 

Held: The Court noted that the basic premise of administrative detention is the need to prevent future danger to the security of the state of public safety. Administrative detention is not meant to be used in place of criminal proceedings. Such detention infringes the fundamental freedoms of the detainee. As such, in reviewing administrative detention orders, court must carefully and meticulously examine the evidence against the detainee. In extending a detention order, the security authorities must examine current and up-to-date evidence against the detainee. In light of these principles, and in light of the evidence upon which the administrative detention orders were based, the court  held that the decision of the Military Appeals Court to confirm them was a proper exercise of its judicial discretion.

 

Israeli Statutes Cited:

Emergency Authority Law (Detentions), 1979

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 7015/02, Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, IsrSC 56(6) 352

[2]AA 2/82, Lerner v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 42(3) 529

[3]HCJ 554/81, Branssa v. OC Central Command, IsrSC 36(4) 247

[4]Crim FH, 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 54(1) 721

[5]AA 4/94, Ben Horin v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 48(5) 329

[6]HCJ 4400/98, Braham v. Judge Colonel Sheffi, IsrSC 52(5) 337

[7]AA 2/86, Anonymous v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 41(2) 508

[8]HCJ 3239/02, Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, IsrSC 57(2) 349

[9]HCJ 5994/03, Seder v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, IsrSC (unreported decision)

[10]HCJ 297/82, Berger v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 37(3) 29

 

Israeli Books Cited:

[11]II B. Bracha, Administrative Law (1996)

 

For petitioners 1-3—Tamar Peleg-Shrick

For respondents 1-2—Anar Helman; Yuval Roitman

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

 The three petitions before us deal with the question of the legality of the extension of petitioners’ administrative detention.

 

Facts, Proceedings and Arguments

 

1. Petitioner in HCJ 5784/03 [hereinafter – petitioner 1] lived in Ramallah and worked in the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of the Environment. In 1998 he served a sentence for his activity in the Jibril terror organization. Petitioner 1 was detained in Ramallah on March 12, 2003. He is being held in administrative detention (since March 18, 2003), pursuant to a warrant issued by the Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria [hereinafter – respondent]. His detention was extended by six months (until February 16, 2003), after which (on March 4, 2003) respondent issued another warrant extending the detention for a further six months (until September 15, 2003). Hearings regarding the second extension were held before the Military Court in Ketziot on March 17, 2003. During the hearing, in which petitioner was represented by an attorney, it was brought to his and his attorney’s attention that the classified information regarding his case ties him to the Jibril terror organization. After hearing the classified information concerning the petitioner, the Military Court authorized the extension of the administrative detention order. The Military Court noted that the detainee had been in administrative detention for a prolonged period of time, and that this fact necessitated “particular care in assessing the military intelligence which led to his detention.” Nevertheless, it was decided that the classified information presented a case of real danger to the security of the area and to public safety if petitioner 1 were to be released. The Military Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal (on May 4, 2003). It decided that the classified information pertained to a considerable period of time, and that the picture it painted justified the extension of petitioner’s administrative detention.

 

2. Petitioner in HCJ 6024/03 [hereinafter - petitioner 2] lived in the Ramallah Al Jalzoon refugee camp. Due to the suspicion of his involvement in the Popular Front terror organization he was placed in administrative detention between the years 1994-1996. Petitioner 2 was detained April 9, 2002 and interrogated by the security forces. Respondent ordered his administrative detention on April 24, 2002. His detention was extended (for the first time) until April 7, 2003. Respondent then ordered a second extension of the detention (until October 6, 2003). The Ketziot Military Court authorized the extension (on April 13, 2003) after hearing the arguments presented by petitioner 2. It ruled that the classified information was reliable, and tied petitioner 2 to the Popular Front terrorist organization. It ruled that the information pointed to the petitioner as posing a real danger to the security of the area. The Military Appeals Court dismissed the appeal submitted by petitioner 2 on June 16, 2003.

 

3. Petitioner in HCJ 6025/03 [hereinafter - petitioner 3] lived in the Jenin district, and did not have a criminal or security record. He was detained on October 5, 2001, and was sentenced to 45 days imprisonment for illegal entry into Israel. During the course of this sentence, respondent issued an order to place petitioner 3 under administrative detention. On April 16, 2003 respondent extended this detention for the third time, until October 27, 2003. The order was issued due to the suspicion that petitioner was an activist in the Hamas terror organization. The Ketziot Military Court authorized this extension (on April 29, 2003) after hearing petitioner’s arguments. The court acknowledged that the respondent had been under administrative detention for an extended period of time but decided that, in light of the classified information presented, he still posed a security threat to the region; accordingly, the court ruled that his detention could be extended. The Military Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal submitted by petitioner 3 (on June 4, 2003). It was determined that the classified material was reliable, and substantiated the danger presented by petitioner 3 to an extent that justified prolonging his administrative detention.

 

The petitions in this case contest the extensions of these administrative detentions.

 

The Arguments

 

4. Petitioners claim that there is no legitimate reason to extend the detention orders, and that their extension is against the law. They point to the clear violation of their basic rights by their extended administrative detention. They argue that the option of administrative detention should not be used where the detainee can be prosecuted by criminal trial. According to them, no substantial effort was made to investigate the acts they are suspected of having committed, nor was any new intelligence gathered about them; therefore, they should, after a time, be released. Petitioners argue that the Military Courts should have forced the security forces to corroborate the suspicions against them with further investigation, and to condition the authorization of the extension orders upon further investigation. According to them, this would have enabled proper criminal proceedings to replace the use of administrative detention. In addition, petitioner 3 points out that he has no record of being suspected of committing hostile acts, and so the prolonged detention is unjustified.

 

Respondent claims that the extension of the administrative detentions is legal. Furthermore, he argues that it is not the place of this court, the Supreme Court, to act as another level of appeal above the Military Courts. As to the merits of petitioner’s arguments,, respondent argues that the evidence against each of the petitioners justified the extension of their administrative detention, notwithstanding the length of detention time. Regarding the obligation to investigate the evidence, respondent maintains that the evidence accumulated against petitioners is reliable and from diverse sources. In the investigations carried out by the security forces, however, no unclassified information was gathered which could be used in criminal proceedings.

 

The Normative Framework

 

5. Respondent’s authority to order administrative detention is based on the Administrative Detention Order (Temporary Provision) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1226), 1988, which has been occasionally amended. Pursuant to this order, respondent can order an administrative detention if there is “a reasonable basis to suppose that the security of the area or of the public necessitates a certain person to be held in detention.” Section 1(a) of the order. According to the order, respondent shall not exercise this authority “unless he believes it to be absolutely necessary for clear security purposes.” Section 3 of the order. The detention order should be for no longer than six months. Respondent may order “from time to time the extension of the original detention order, for a period of no longer than six months.” Section 1(b) of the order. Respondent’s authority on this matter is subject to judicial review. A person who is placed in detention pursuant to this order must be brought before a judge with legal training within 18 days of his detention. The judge may authorize or refuse the detention, or shorten the duration of the detention. Section 4(a) of the order. The judge’s decision can be appealed to the Military Appeals Court. Section 5(a) of the order. These procedures also apply to decisions concerning the extension of detention time. Section 1(a) of the order. In the framework of these proceedings, the detainee has the right to be represented before the Military Courts by an attorney.

 

6. Petitioners’ principal argument is that the legality of extending administrative detentions is dependent upon a systematic investigation conducted by the security services to gather evidence; this would allow criminal proceedings to replace administrative detention, enabling each detainee to confront the evidence brought against him. Petitioners claim that administrative detention cannot be extended so long as an investigation of this kind is not being conducted. Indeed, it is preferable to take criminal steps against someone suspected of hostile activity of a security nature, rather than use the procedure of administrative detention. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, [1] at 373. In criminal proceedings the defendant, suspected of terror activity or of being an accomplice to such activity, can confront the evidence brought against him, a defense that is sometimes not possible in administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for reasons of protecting intelligence sources, it is not always possible to use criminal proceedings. Furthermore, it should be noted that administrative detention and criminal procedure work on separate plains. The basic premise is that administrative detention is meant to prevent future danger to the security of the state or to the public safety. Administrative detention is not meant to be a tool used to punish previous acts, or to be used in place of criminal proceedings. AA 2/82 Lerner v. Minister of Defense, [2] at 531. The authorities could gather reliable evidence that would justify placing a person under administrative detention “without the possibility of calling witnesses that would testify to what they saw or heard.” HCJ 554/81 Branssa v. OC Central Command, [3] at 251. Therefore, the use of administrative proceedings should not be conditioned on an investigation that could have bearing on the criminal plain.

 

7. All this, however, does not bring this case to its conclusion. This court has maintained that the purpose of the Emergency Authority Law (Detentions) of 1979 is to protect the security of the state but, at the same time, to also safeguard man’s dignity and freedom. See Crim FH 7048/97 Anonymous v. Minister of Defense, [4] at 740. This applies to the detention orders in the present case. The order did indeed come to protect the public’s safety and the security of the area, as per section 1(a) of the order. However, it is clear that the administrative detention severely violates the detainees’ freedom. The purpose of the order is to ensure that this violation is within legal and constitutional boundaries. Therefore, the order sets up judicial review over the decision to order administrative detention or to extend it. The information and evidence presented by the security forces should be “carefully and meticulously” examined. AA 4/94 Ben Horin v. The State of Israel, [5] at 335 (Levin, J.). Judicial review over the detention proceedings is significant. In the context of this review, the detainee is afforded the right to legal representation. The Military Court and the Military Appeals Court can question the reliability of the evidence, and not merely decide what a reasonable authority might be expected to decide, on the basis of the evidence presented. HCJ 4400/98 Braham v. Judge Colonel Sheffi, [6] at 346. This review is an internal and integral part of the administrative detention order’s legality, and of the legality of its extension. See AA 2/86 Anonymous v. Minister of Defense, [7] at 515-16; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, [8] at 368-69. Furthermore, respondent’s decision to place a person under administrative detention, and the extension of that detention, is subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court. This Court indeed is not an address for appealing the judgments of the Military Court or the Military Appeals Court. Nevertheless, in carrying out its judicial review, this Court takes into account any grave violation of the detainee’s human rights; this violation is given full weight when examining the reasons that brought the security forces to issue an order of administrative detention, as well as when examining the discretion of  the Military Courts.

 

8. The necessity of finding the right balance between the security of the state and the protection of the detainee’s human rights does not merely find expression in the existence of a channel of judicial review. It also finds expression in the manner of the activity of the security authorities, when they decide whether to place someone in administrative detention, or to extend that detention. This is especially true regarding the administrative evidence upon which these decisions are based. As Justice Mazza recently noted:

 

Evidence regarding a number of events is not the same as evidence regarding one specific event; evidence from one source is unlike information gathered from different sources; information based solely on agents and informers is not the same as information which is reinforced by documents obtained by the security services or by intelligence gained through special means.

 

HCJ 5994/03 Order v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, [9] at para. 6 (Mazza, J.). The strength of the evidence necessary to justify administrative detention could change over time. Evidence that would justify issuing an order of administrative detention might not constitute sufficient cause to extend that detention. And evidence justifying an extension of administrative detention might be insufficient for a further extension. The security services must assess whether the administrative evidence brought against the detainee justifies extending his detention. It is their responsibility to take into account new relevant information that can be obtained by reasonable means. HCJ 297/82 Berger v. Minister of Interior, [10] at 44. At the same time, this does not mean that a lack of current evidence would warrant, in and of itself, a dismissal of an extension; it all depends on the circumstances of the case. In any event, the evidence presented by the security services must be examined in order to assess whether it proves the danger of the detainee in a measure that justifies his further detention. The severity of the suspicions, for example, as well as the strength of evidence, among other things, must be taken into account. There will be cases in which a lack of current evidence relating to the detainee would be detrimental to the respondent wishing to extend the administrative detention. In these cases, we would say that the evidence gathered by the security services does not justify holding the detainee in administrative detention any longer. See II B. Bracha, Administrative Law 304 (1996) [11].

 

From the General to the Particular

 

9. The petitioners in this case are at the stage where an extension of their administrative detention has been requested. For petitioners 1 and 2 this would be a second extension, while for petitioner 3 it would be a third. The situation demands that we closely examine the evidence used to extend the detention. Petitioners and their legal representatives appeared before us. With their consent, we were exposed to the evidence upon which the decision to extend their detention was based. Respondent presented further evidence, relating to petitioners, in addition to the evidence that existed at the time the order of administrative detention was issued. The picture that emerges regarding petitioner’s arguments is that the security services have not been negligent in gathering evidence against them; on the contrary, such additional evidence continued to be collected. In light of the evidence, we are convinced that respondent did not act amiss in his decision to extend petitioners’ administrative detention, nor was the Military Courts’ decision to authorize this extension flawed in a way that would justify the intervention of this Court. Along with the Military Appeals Court, we were persuaded that the evidence existing today against petitioner 1 paints a “reliable, complete and consistent” picture, which justified the extension of his detention. See page 2 of the Military Appeals Court’s judgment of May 4, 2003. Furthermore, concerning petitioner 2, we concur with the Military Court, who regarded the evidence tying him to the Popular Front terror organization as being “very reliable.” See page 3 of the Military Court’s judgment from April 13, 2003. The same can be said of petitioner 3, whose security record indeed is less grave than the two other petitioners. The Military Court took caution in light of the extended period of time petitioner has been in administrative detention. See page 1 of the Military Court’s judgment from April 29, 2003. However, given the evidence with which we were presented, we found no cause to intervene in the conclusions of the Military Appeals Court, whereby “the administrative detention is the only means of neutralizing the danger of the appellant.” Page 2 of the Military Appeals Court’s judgment of June 4, 2003.

 

In light of the above, the petitions are denied.

 

Justice J. Turkel

 

I concur.

 

Justice A. Rivlin

 

I concur.

 

August 11, 2003

 

Galon v. Government Commission of Investigation

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 258/07
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, February 6, 2007
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The government set up a commission of investigation to examine what happened in the war in Lebanon in 2006. The commission decided to hold all of its proceedings in camera and not to publish any transcripts of the proceedings, on the ground that they were privileged for the reason of state security. This decision was challenged by the petitioner, who argued that the proceedings should only be held in camera if holding them in public would give rise to a near certainty of serious harm to state security, and that transcripts of those parts of the proceedings that did not satisfy this test should be published. The commission argued that it could not know in advance whether testimonies would contain privileged matters or not. It also argued that publishing the transcripts would require considerable work given the need to exclude matters that were privileged and proposed to do so only after presenting its final report, since to do so earlier would delay the preparation of the report.

 

Held: Most of the testimonies had already been heard by the commission when the petition was filed. Therefore, the question of hearing those testimonies in public was no longer relevant. The commission did not dispute that it was subject to the rule of publicity, according to which holding proceedings in public is the rule whereas holding them in camera is the exception. The presumption should therefore be that the commission would conduct itself accordingly, and would examine whether all or some of the testimonies that might be heard at a later stage could be heard in public. With regard to the publication of the transcripts of the commission’s hearings, the court held that the commission should publish those parts of the transcripts that were not privileged within a reasonable time, before the final report was presented to the government. Subject to these guidelines, the petition was denied.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 258/07

 

MK Zahava Galon

v.

Government Commission of Investigation for Examining the Events of the 2006 War in Lebanon

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[6 February 2007]

Before President D. Beinisch, Vice-President E. Rivlin

and Justice A. Procaccia

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The government set up a commission of investigation to examine what happened in the war in Lebanon in 2006. The commission decided to hold all of its proceedings in camera and not to publish any transcripts of the proceedings, on the ground that they were privileged for the reason of state security. This decision was challenged by the petitioner, who argued that the proceedings should only be held in camera if holding them in public would give rise to a near certainty of serious harm to state security, and that transcripts of those parts of the proceedings that did not satisfy this test should be published. The commission argued that it could not know in advance whether testimonies would contain privileged matters or not. It also argued that publishing the transcripts would require considerable work given the need to exclude matters that were privileged and proposed to do so only after presenting its final report, since to do so earlier would delay the preparation of the report.

 

Held: Most of the testimonies had already been heard by the commission when the petition was filed. Therefore, the question of hearing those testimonies in public was no longer relevant. The commission did not dispute that it was subject to the rule of publicity, according to which holding proceedings in public is the rule whereas holding them in camera is the exception. The presumption should therefore be that the commission would conduct itself accordingly, and would examine whether all or some of the testimonies that might be heard at a later stage could be heard in public. With regard to the publication of the transcripts of the commission’s hearings, the court held that the commission should publish those parts of the transcripts that were not privileged within a reasonable time, before the final report was presented to the government. Subject to these guidelines, the petition was denied.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Administrative Courts Law, 5752-1992, s. 25, 25(b)(1).

Basic Law: Administration of Justice, s. 3.

Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, ss. 68, 68(a), 68(d)(1), 68(d)(2).

Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1968, ss. 1, 9-11, 14, 15, 18, 18(a), 20, 20(a), 20(c), 22, 23, 27(a), 27(b).

Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, ss. 1, 9(a)(1).

Government Law, 5761-2001, ss. 8A, 8A(a), 8A(c).

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 6728/06 Omets v. Prime Minister [2006] (4) TakSC 2797.

[2]      HCJFH 10030/06 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

[3]      CrimA 152/51 Tripos v. Attorney-General [1952] IsrSC 6(1) 17.

[4]      HCJ 11793/05 Israel News Company Ltd v. State of Israel (not yet reported).

[5]      LCrimA 5877/99 Yanos v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 97.

[6]      AAA 9135/03 Council for Higher Education v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing [2006] (1) IsrLR 1.

[7]      AAA 6013/04 Ministry of Transport v. Israel News Co. Ltd (not yet reported).

[8]      HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 617; IsrSJ 9 77.

[9]      HCJ 243/62 Israel Film Studios Ltd v. Geri [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2407; IsrSJ 4 208.

[10]    HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 365.

[11]    HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 353; IsrSJ 10 204.

[12]    HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421.

[13]    HCJ 651/03 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 62.

[14]    CA 2800/97 Lipson v. Gahal [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 714.

[15]    HCJ 6005/93 Eliash v. Israel Bar Association [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 159.

[16]    CrimApp 5153/04 A v. Yediot Aharonot Ltd [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 933.

[17]    LCA 3614/97 Avi-Isaac v. Israel News Co. Ltd [1999] IsrSC 53(1) 26.

[18]    CrimA 11793/05 Israel News Co. Ltd v. State of Israel [2006] (2) TakSC 62.

[19]    LCrimA 1127/93 State of Israel v. Klein [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 485.

[20]    CA 6926/93 Israel Dockyards Ltd v. Israel Electric Co. Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 749.

[21]    LCA 1412/94 Hadassah Medical Organization v. Gilad [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 516.

[22]    HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 57.

[23]    EA 92/03 Mofaz v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 793.

[24]    CA 5185/93 Attorney-General v. Marom [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 318.

[25]    CrimA 353/88 Vilner v. State of Israel [1991] IsrSC 45(2) 444.

[26]    LA 176/86 A v. B [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 497.

[27]    CrimApp 2794/00 Aloni v. State of Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(3) 363.

 

For the petitioner — D. Holz-Lechner.

For the respondent — A. Helman.

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

President D. Beinisch

The Government Commission of Investigation for Examining the Events surrounding the 2006 Lebanon War has until now conducted its proceedings and heard all the testimonies in camera. The transcripts of the Commission’s proceedings have not been published. The Commission’s position is that only after the final report is presented to the government will it decide whether to publish those parts of the transcript that may be disclosed without harming the security of the state or other protected interests. The petition before us is directed at the commission’s position.

The main facts and the sequence of events

1.    On 12 July 2006, following terrorist operations carried out by the Hezbollah organization, in which eight IDF soldiers were killed and two others were kidnapped to Lebanon, fighting began in the north and this continued until 14 August 2006 when a ceasefire came into effect in accordance with decision no. 1701 of the Security Council of the United Nations (hereafter: ‘the Second Lebanon War’ or ‘the war’).

On 17 September 2006 the Government of Israel decided to authorize the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to appoint a government commission of investigation under s. 8A of the Government Law, 5761-2001 (hereafter: ‘the Government Law’), to examine the conduct of the political and defence establishments during the war. It was decided that the president emeritus of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court, Judge E. Winograd, would chair the commission (hereafter: ‘the Winograd Commission’ or ‘the Commission’). In the letter of appointment the Commission was authorized to determine findings and reach conclusions as to the readiness and conduct of the political and security establishment ‘with regard to all the aspects of the war in the north.’ The Commission was also authorized to recommended, in so far as it saw fit, ‘any improvement for the future decision-making processes of the political echelon and the heads of the security establishment, including the materials and advice given to the aforesaid authorities.’ The letter of appointment further determined that the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, civil servants, IDF and security establishment personnel would appear before the Commission at its request and would provide any information and documents that they would be asked to present. The Commission was given powers of a commission of inquiry under ss. 9 to 11 and 27(a) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1968 (hereafter: ‘the Commissions of Inquiry Law’ or ‘the law’). With regard to the publicity of the Commission’s work, the government determined in its decision — and an identical stipulation was also included in the commission’s letter of appointment — the following:

‘F.          The commission shall present its report or reports to the prime minister and the Minister of Defence and they will bring them before the government. The report or reports of the commission shall be published; the commission may determine guidelines with regard to publication of the reports in accordance with the principles in section 20 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1968.

G.           The commission shall determine its procedure and its work schedule. The commission’s sessions shall be public or closed to the public as the commission shall decide.

No public proceedings shall take place when this may endanger the security of the state or its foreign relations or when there is any other lawful reason that prohibits this.’

 

2.    On 30 November 2006 an expanded panel of this Court denied by a majority two petitions directed in principle against the Government’s decision to establish a government commission of investigation rather than to order the establishment of a state commission of inquiry in order to examine the conduct of the political and security establishments during the war (HCJ 6728/06 Omets v. Prime Minister [1]). An application to hold a further hearing on the subject of the aforesaid petitions was also denied (HCJFH 10030/06 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister [2]).

The Winograd Commission began to hear testimony on 4 October 2006 and since then has heard dozens of witnesses. All the witnesses were heard in camera. On 29 November 2006 — approximately two months after the Commission began to hear the testimonies — the petitioner, MK Zahava Gal-On, submitted a request to Judge Winograd that the Commission should open its sessions to media coverage and publish the transcripts of the testimonies, with the exception of the parts whose publication would almost certainly cause serious harm to the security of the state. On 30 November 2006 Judge Winograd replied to the petitioner’s request as follows:

‘You are doubtless aware of the fact that most of the subjects in the commission’s deliberations include state secrets. Until now, although the testimonies of the witnesses also included matters that are not classified, the vast majority was classified, and therefore the disclosure of the testimonies to the general public has not been possible.

We are aware of the issue of “the public’s right to know,” and we consider this right in every case against the security of the state and the need to protect its secrets, which in our opinion — and I am convinced that this is your opinion also — should take precedence.

In the government decision that appointed the commission it is stated that the sessions of the commission shall be public or closed to the public, as the commission shall decide. In any case where it is possible, the session will be public…’

It should be noted that on 3 December 2006 — several days after judgment was given denying the petitions against the establishment of the Winograd Commission (Omets v. Prime Minister [1]) — the commission made a statement to the media. This statement said, inter alia, that —

‘The commission will continue its work in an attempt to examine what it had been asked to examine and to provide a quick, thorough and appropriate response to the many issues before it. Naturally most of the testimonies and sessions will be classified. In so far as it will be possible without harming the security of the state, sessions and testimonies will be held in public.’

3.    On 9 January 2007 — more than five weeks after Judge Winograd’s reply — the petitioner filed the petition before us. In the petition, the petitioner requested this Court to order the Winograd Commission (1) to hold its sessions and the hearing of the testimonies before it in public and, (2) to publish the transcripts of its deliberations at the end of each session, except when ‘there is a near certainty of real, serious and grave harm to the security of the state.’ On 17 January 2007 this Court, per Justice Levy, issued an order nisi to the respondent to reply to the petition, and the application for an interim order was denied. Justice Levy added in his decision that —

‘It seems to me that the commission would do well if, until this court decides the petition, it limits itself to hearing testimonies that need to be heard in camera for reasons of state security or that may be privileged by virtue of an order prohibiting publication, in accordance with the principles that have been laid down and explained in case law…’

When the petition was filed, the Winograd Commission was close to completing the stage of hearing the preliminary testimonies before publishing an interim report. After it finishes hearing these testimonies, the Commission intends to present an interim report to the government that will contain an open part that will be published and a privileged part that will not be. Counsel for the state told us that the Commission cannot definitively say the date on which the interim report will be presented but emphasized that we are not speaking of many months, but rather of a relatively early date.

The arguments of the parties

4.    In the petition and also in her pleadings before us, counsel for the petitioner, Advocate D. Holz-Lechner, discussed the centrality of the public’s right to know and  the importance of this principle in the democratic process and in safeguarding basic rights. According to her, the proceedings before the Winograd Commission concerning the conduct of the political and defence establishments during the Second Lebanon War is of great public importance since the matter concerns human lives and public security. She argued that the public is entitled to as much information as possible with regard to the acts, omissions, achievements, and failures that accompanied fighting in which the public suffered injuries and losses on both the battlefront and on the home front. The petitioner further argued that the public’s right to know is only overridden when  there is an almost certain likelihood that a disclosure of the information will cause severe, grave, and serious damage to the security of the state. According to the petitioner, from Judge Winograd’s reply on 30 November 2006 and from the statement to the media published on 3 December 2006, it can be seen that the Commission is of the opinion that the security of the state takes precedence over the public’s right to know.  According to the petitioner in forming this opinion the Commission did not give proper consideration to  the degree of probability that a security risk will occur and did not specifically examinethe extent of the harm involved in publishing the proceedings for each individual testimony. According to her argument, the fact that all the testimonies until now have been heard by the Commission in camera undermines the force of the principle of the publicity of hearings and the public’s right to know, and makes this violation a sweeping, arbitrary, and disproportionate one.

According to the petitioner’s approach, the Commission is not entitled to decide that its proceedings will be held in camera whenever there is any concern relating to state security. Rather,  in each session and with respect to each testimony  the Commission should examine the extent of the harm to state security while also considering the likelihood that such harm will occur. The argument is that a proper implementation of these rules will lead to the conclusion that most of the Commission’s proceedings will be open to the public and that the transcripts of the Commission’s sessions and of the testimonies given before it will be published as close as possible to the date on which they were given. The petitioner further argued that in matters concerning the publicity of the Commission’s proceedings and the publication of the transcripts of its proceedings, the powers of the Commission that were determined in the government decision and the letter of appointment should be interpreted in the spirit of ss. 18 and 20 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law. It was also argued that the anticipated publication of the non-classified parts in the interim report and the final report of the Winograd Commission does not compensate for the disproportionate violation of the public’s right to know, since the report presents a processed version of the information and the conclusions draw from it. By contrast, publication of the testimonies that are heard by the Commission before it presents its report to the government will allow the public to form its own impression, with a maximum degree of transparency, of the way in which the commission came to its conclusions. Publication as aforesaid will also encourage public debate and reveal additional information that was not brought before the Commission and that may be relevant to the matters being examined by it.

In reply, counsel for the state, Advocate A. Helman, argued that the order nisi should be cancelled and that the petition should be denied. In his reply, he said that ‘the respondent accepts that in this case the criteria for the publicity of the respondent’s proceedings are similar, in principle, to those of a state commission of inquiry.’ In the hearing before us, counsel for the state agreed that the general norm that is applicable in this matter is derived from the principle of publicity of proceedings and the public’s right to know. But he argued that this norm is not absolute and should be balanced against competing interests. In this regard, counsel for the state indicated two main reasons why the proceedings of the Winograd Commission have until now been held in camera and the transcripts of its sessions have not been published. The main reason is the public interest of protecting the security of the state. According to this argument —

‘… the commission became aware at the beginning of its work that all the testimonies that are being heard by it also include very classified and sensitive material — to a greater or lesser degree — which is a consequence of the subject being examined by the commission, the identities of the persons and officials who are summoned to testify before it and the matters that the commission is seeking to investigate and on which it wishes to confront the witnesses. In these circumstances, the commission is of the opinion that there is no practical possibility of determining ab initio that a certain testimony will not include classified material, whether in the course of the witness’s statement or in his reply to questions that the witness will be asked during his testimony’ (para. 12 of the state’s reply).

Counsel for the state confirmed in his pleadings that the testimony of witnesses who appear before the commission ‘also includes matters that are not of a classified nature.’ He However, he claimed that there is an inherent difficulty in distinguishing in advance between the parts whose disclosure is permitted and the parts whose disclosure is prohibited, and therefore it is necessary to hear the testimonies in their entirety in camera. For this reason, the Commission has until now not held a session that was open to the public.

With regard to the balancing test between the public’s right to know and the security of the state, counsel for the state argued that where it concerns  the question of the publicity of the Winograd Commission hearings, the strict test of ‘near certainty’ to which counsel for the petitioner referred in her pleadings does not apply. The proper test is one of publicity ‘that may endanger the security of the state’ as stated in the Commission’s letter of appointment. Notwithstanding, it was argued that even if the strict test as claimed by the petitioner does apply in the matter before us, there is an almost certain danger that publication of ‘the vast majority of the testimonies’ will result in serious harm to the security of the state.  This is because of the nature of the matters being investigated by the Commission and the identity of the persons being interrogated by it, and because of the sensitivity inherent in the fact that the Commission is supposed to address in its recommendations the lessons that should be learned for the future. Counsel for the state emphasized in his arguments that the way in which Israel conducted the war and the lessons that should be learned for the future as a result of the manner in which the fighting was carried out, are matters that if disclosed to the public, will very seriously harm the ability of the State of Israel to fight the next war in the best possible manner, and will thus seriously endanger the security of the state.

The second reason for holding the proceedings of the Commission in camera concerns the public interest in having the work of the Winograd Commission carried out efficiently, quickly, and properly, so that the Commission can recommend to the government as soon as possible the lessons and improvements that should be implemented. This issue was raised by counsel for the state, as he put it, ‘beyond what is strictly necessary.’ According to him, the hearing of the testimonies in public will significantly prejudice the ability of the witnesses to testify freely, openly, and frankly before the Commission with regard to the conduct of their superior officers and comrades-at-arms. Moreover, hearing the testimonies in public will significantly harm the proper management of the investigation since the witnesses will be able to prepare themselves for the testimony in a manner that will make it difficult for the Commission to arrive at the truth. Counsel for the state further argued that opening the proceedings to the public would make it necessary to stop the investigation whenever the reply of a witness to a question, or the question itself, concerns a classified matter, and that this would disrupt and prolong the investigations. With regard to the publication of the transcripts of the Commission’s sessions at the end of each day of the proceedings, it was argued that if the Commission needs to consider which parts of the transcript may be published on a daily basis, it would slow down the Commission’s work and impair its efficiency. It was also argued that publication of the transcripts of the testimony before the Commission would require the relevant security personnel to review them, and that these people may be subordinate to some of persons being investigated by the Commission. For these reasons, it was argued that the proper time for making the security examination of the transcripts of the testimonies that the Commission is considering is only after the Commission presents its final report to the government.

In view of all the reasons set out above, counsel for the state argued that we should not intervene in the Commission’s position that, as a rule, its proceedings take place in camera, and that the transcripts of these sessions are not to be at this time According to counsel for the state, this position is reasonable in view of the manner in which two former state commissions of inquiry conducted themselves when they investigated events that occurred during a time of war. These were the Agranat Commission of Inquiry regarding the Yom Kippur War, where all of the proceedings were held in camera in accordance with a government decision, and the Kahn Commission of Inquiry regarding the Beirut Refugee Camps, where most of the sessions were also conducted in camera. According to the state’s approach, the harm to the public’s right to know in this case is proportional in view of the fact that the Commission will make parts of the interim report available to the public, and the fact that the final report will be presented to the government, and in view of the fact that after the final report is presented to the government the Commission will decide whether to publish those parts of the transcripts that do not involve any harm to the security of the state, its foreign relations, or other protected interests. Counsel for the state further stated that publication of parts of testimonies before the Commission’s report is published will not significantly further the public’s right to know since such testimonies alone are likely to present a partial and distorted picture. In view of all this, counsel for the state argued that the Commission’s position is reasonable and the court should not intervene in it.

Deliberation

The principle of the publicity of proceedings and its application to the Winograd Commission

5.    Section 8A of the Government Law, by virtue of which the Winograd Commission was appointed, determines the powers of the government commission of investigation. This section does not address the question of the publicity of the proceedings before such a commission of investigation. Notwithstanding, the issue was expressly addressed in the letter of appointment that the Winograd Commission received from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence in accordance with the government’s decision of 17 September 2006. As I said above, paragraph G of the letter of appointment provides that:

‘The commission’s session shall be public or closed to the public as the commission shall decide. No public proceedings shall take place when this may endanger the security of the state or its foreign relations or when there is any other lawful reason that prohibits this.’

It follows from this that the Government left the question of the publicity of the Winograd Commission’s proceedings to the discretion of the Commission, although it saw fit to emphasize that no public proceedings should take place when doing so might endanger the security of the state or another protected interest.

Defining the character of the Winograd Commission as a body is complex. It is a public authority that was set up by law by the executive branch and it exercises quasi-judicial powers; the Commission’s character as an administrative body and its quasi-judicial powers are characteristics that affect the norms that apply to it. There is no doubt that the discretion given to the Commission on the subject of the publicity of its proceedings is not absolute. None of the parties before us disputes that the Commission as a public authority is liable to exercise its discretion reasonably, after considering all of the relevant factors and giving proper weight to each of them in accordance with the basic principles of our legal system. As we shall clarify later, since the Commission is a body that has been given quasi-judicial powers, the commission should give considerable weight to the principle of the publicity of proceedings when it decides whether to hold the sessions at which it hears evidence in camera. As a public authority it should also give considerable weight to the general norm of the duty of disclosing information in its possession, when there is no legal reason to prevent its disclosure.

6.    This Court has on many occasions in the past discussed the elevated status and the great importance of the principle of the publicity of proceedings that take place before it. What has been said in case law with regard to the publicity of proceedings is also pertinent with regard to proceedings that are taking place before a body with quasi-judicial powers, such as the Winograd Commission. The premise is that the publicity of the proceedings contributes to improving the quality of the decision that is made at the end of the process. The assumption is that the critical eye of the public may ‘eliminate any possibility that the judicial process may be influenced by bias and prejudice’ (CrimA 152/51 Tripos v. Attorney-General [3], at p. 23). In addition, the publicity of proceedings in a judicial proceeding or a quasi-judicial proceeding contributes to a strengthening of public confidence in public authorities, in general, and in the body that is hearing the matter, in particular. By means of the publicity of the proceedings, justice is not only done but is also seen to be done, and this prevents the impression that the law is administered in secret and according to hidden criteria (see the remarks of Justice Arbel in HCJ 11793/05 Israel News Co. Ltd v. State of Israel [4], at paras. 13-15 of her opinion and all of the references cited there; see also LCrimA 5877/99 Yanos v. State of Israel [5], at pp. 109-112).

The principle of the publicity of proceedings is also based on the public’s right to know and the duty of disclosure that governs a public authority. The public’s right to receive information concerning the manner in which public authorities operate allows them to be subjected to public scrutiny.— a scrutiny that is one of the cornerstones of democracy. This reasoning has found expression in the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998 (hereafter: ‘the Freedom of Information Law’), which gives every citizen and resident a right to receive information from a public authority, subject to the exceptions and reservations listed in the law. To this, we should add that the realization of the public’s right to know by disclosing to the public the manner in which the public authority operates allows the public to determine its agenda and helps individuals in society decide their positions by means of an open discussion of the problems and by a free exchange of opinions on the basis of the information that is published (on the public’s right to know, see AAA 9135/03 Council for Higher Education v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing [6], at paras. 8-9 of the opinion of Justice Hayut; AAA 6013/04 Ministry of Transport v. Israel News Co. Ltd [7], at para. 12 of the opinion of Justice Rivlin).

It has been said in the case law of this Court that the principle of the publicity of proceedings has two aspects: one is that the hearing is held in open court, so that every member of the public is entitled to be present; the other is the permission to publish the content of the proceedings as part of the public’s right to know. It has also been said that today the main importance of the principle of the publicity of proceedings lies in the second aspect which concerns the possibility of publishing the fact that the proceedings are being held and the content of the proceedings, and thereby bring these to the attention of the public as a whole (see Yanos v. State of Israel [5], at p. 112).

7.    The centrality of the principle of the publicity of proceedings in our legal system has received express recognition in legislation and has even been enshrined in a Basic Law. Section 3 of the Basic Law: Judiciary and s. 68(a) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984 (hereafter: the Courts Law) provide the rule that ‘The court shall hear cases publicly.’ This principle has also been determined with regard to commissions of inquiry. Thus s. 18(a) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law provides that ‘A commission of inquiry shall hold public hearings…’.  It should immediately be said that this is not a strict rule, and that the provisions of the aforesaid laws contain exceptions to the principle of the publicity of proceedings, which we shall address later.

As we have said, the Government Law, by virtue of which the Winograd Commission was established, is silent  with regard to the publicity of the proceedings before a government commission of investigation. Prima facie a question may arise as to whether the rule concerning the publicity of proceedings applies to the proceedings of every commission of investigation that is appointed under the Government Law, or whether we should not speak of a strict rule since the matter requires the consideration of each individual commission in accordance with its circumstances. We do not need to decide this question in the circumstances of the case before us because the Winograd Commission is not an ‘ordinary’ government commission of investigation. In Omets v. Prime Minister [1] this court discussed how, in view of the character and scope of the issues that the Winograd Commission was authorized to examine, the government saw fit in the letter of appointment to give the commission additional mandates and powers that are not listed in the Government Law. This was done in order to allow the commission to investigate in depth an issue of national significance and importance, namely the fighting that took place in Lebanon. The commission was given, inter alia given some of the main powers of a state commission of inquiry under ss. 9-11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law — the powers to summon witnesses and to compel them to testify or to produce documents. The Commission is also governed by ss. 14 and 22 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law by virtue of the provisions of s. 8A(c) of the Government Law, with regard to the status of those testimonies. In Omets v. Prime Minister [1] the state also agreed that the Winograd Commission should be subject to a similar arrangement to the one provided in s. 15 of the Commission of Inquiry Law that gives anyone who may be harmed by the Commission’s conclusions the right to state their case.  and in practice the representative of the state declared that the Commission was competent to issue ‘warning letters’ and to make recommendations with regard to specific persons like a state commission of inquiry. In practice, it is possible to interpret the position of the state in Omets v. Prime Minister [1] as that the Winograd Commission is similar in character to a state commission of inquiry, differing only in terms of  the party that appointed it.

Section 18 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, which provides the rule that the proceedings of a state commission of inquiry should be held in public, does not apply directly to the Winograd Commission. But in its pleadings before us, the government agreed that the criteria concerning the publicity of the proceedings of the Winograd Commission are essentially similar to those of a state commission of inquiry, in view of the special character and the scope of powers of commission under discussion (see para. 31 of the respondent’s reply). Indeed, the Winograd Commission is considering issues of paramount public importance and interest. All of these factors affect the weight of the principle that the proceedings should be held in public and that the public has a right to know about the commission’s proceedings. Therefore, it is proper that the general principle concerning the publicity of the proceedings, which is also enshrined in s. 18 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, should govern the Winograd Commission. It would appear that the Commission has indeed taken the aforesaid principle into account. In Judge Winograd’s letter to the petitioner of 30 November 2006, he says that ‘In any case where it is possible, the session will be public.’ The statement to the media on 3 December 2006 also says that ‘In so far as it will be possible without harming the security of the state, sessions and testimonies will be held in public.’ Therefore the premise for the continuation of our deliberations is that, in so far as possible and in the absence of any impediment for reasons of the security of the state, the proceedings of the Winograd Commission should be held in public.

The principle of the publicity of proceedings versus the security of the state

8.    The principle that proceedings should be held in public, like the basic rights that underlie it, is not absolute. There are cases where it needs to yield to conflicting rights and interests. Under s. 3 of the Basic Law: Judiciary, it is possible to violate the principle that judicial proceedings should be conducted in public only by virtue of an express provision of statute or by means of an order of the court that is made in accordance with statute. Section 68 of the Courts Law and ss. 18, 20 and 23 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law list the exceptions that allow all or some of the proceedings in a certain matter to be held in camera or subject to a prohibition against publication. Inter alia, it is provided that an order may be made to this effect if it is required ‘in order to protect the security of the state.’ It should be stated that even s. 9(a)(1) of the Freedom of Information Law provides that a public authority shall not provide information ‘whose disclosure gives rise to a concern that the security of the state will be harmed…’. As we have said, these provisions of statute do not apply directly to the Winograd Commission. But even the petitioner does not dispute that the exception with regard to protecting the security of the state applies to the Commission’s proceedings, and that in appropriate circumstances it is capable of justifying the holding of sessions in camera and of justifying the prohibition against publication of the content of the matters brought before the commission.

The two values under discussion — state security on the one hand and the publicity of proceedings and the public’s right to know on the other — are basic values in our legal system. ‘Without security the state cannot survive, and the social consensus on which it is built cannot exist. Thus the freedoms of the individual which the state is supposed to uphold will cease to exist. This shows the centrality of the value of security among all the values of the legal system’ (per Justice Barak in HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [8], at p. 629 {92). But without holding proceedings in public and realizing the public’s right to know, the character of our democratic system, which is based on a free exchange of ideas and on public confidence in the state authorities and the propriety of their actions, may be undermined (see para. 6 above). A proper balance, therefore, needs to be struck between the aforesaid two values when they clash ‘head on.’ The balancing formula should realize the value of state security, but at the same time minimize, as much as possible, the violation of the principle of holding proceedings in public and the freedom of information, which are important values in our legal system.

The dispute between the parties before us concerns the proper formula for balancing the values under discussion. According to the petitioner, only when there is a concern that amounts to a near certainty of serious and grave harm to state security are there grounds for violating the principle of the publicity of proceedings by holding the commission’s proceedings in camera. By contrast, counsel for the state argued that the balancing test proposed by counsel for the petitioner is too strict. According to him, the test of ‘near certainty of serious and grave harm to state security’ was determined in the case law of this court in circumstances of a possible conflict between protecting the freedom of speech and safeguarding the security of the state, and that this test does not apply when we are dealing with the publicity of proceedings. The question whether the case law balancing formula between the freedom of speech and state security also applies in the context of a conflict between the publicity of proceedings and state security has not yet been decided in our case law and it has no easy answer. On the one hand, the freedom of speech is one of the reasons underlying the publicity of proceedings and the public’s right to know, as discussed earlier. On the other hand, the freedom of speech is not the only reason for the principle of publicity of proceedings. There are other values that underlie it, and we should consider how these are to be balanced against state security. Moreover, there are circumstances in which holding proceedings in camera serves additional public interests that are not merely matters of state security but also ensure the fairness of judicial proceedings and the possibility that in them we will arrive at the truth. In such circumstances, it is possible that there is a basis for a different fundamental balance than the one indicated by counsel for the petitioner. These questions do not require a decision in the circumstances of this case since counsel for the state was prepared to assume, for the purposes of the proceedings before us, that because of the character of the issues being examined by the Winograd Commission, the fundamental balancing formula argued by counsel for the petitioner does apply.

Whatever the balancing formula may be, there is no doubt that the outcome of the balance between the publicity of proceedings and state security cannot be decided in advance since it depends upon an assessment of the extent of the harm to security and of the likelihood that such harm will occur. Therefore, the result of the proper balancing point is determined by the circumstances and merits of each case. It should be emphasized that in view of the importance of the principle that proceedings should be held in public, a general and sweeping assessment of the danger to the security of the state based on the general nature of the issues under discussion will not suffice. In this context, a concrete and specific examination of the circumstances of the case should be made in order to decide whether there is a justification for departing from the rule that proceedings should be held in public.

From general principles to the specific case — the proceedings of the Winograd Commission

9.    The petition before us was filed after a considerable delay, which influences the application  of the criteria in the circumstances of this case. Originally, the petitioner applied to Judge Winograd with a request to open the proceedings of the Commission to the public and to publish the transcripts of the sessions almost two months after the testimonies began to be heard. The petition to this court was filed more than five weeks after Judge Winograd’s reply was received. These delays have resulted in the vast majority of the testimonies have already been heard by the Commission. At this stage, the hearing of testimonies has ended, that is unless the committee sees fit to allow another round of testimonies before examining recommendations concerning specific individuals.

The relief that the petitioner sought in the petition was of two kinds: first, to order that the proceedings of the Winograd Commission and its hearing of the testimonies to be held in public; and second, to order the publication of the transcripts of the commission’s proceedings at the end of each session. With regard to the first relief, since the petition was filed after the vast majority of the testimonies were heard by the Commission, the question of hearing them in public is no longer relevant. As we have said, it is possible that there remain additional testimonies that will be heard at the next stage of the Commission’s proceedings. From Judge Winograd’s letter to the petitioner of 30 November 2006, it appears that ‘in every case’ the Commission considers the publicity of the proceedings and the public’s right to know, as opposed to  state security and the need to protect its secrets. According to the position presented by the chairman of the Commission in this letter, we assume that the Commission will be mindful of the criteria set out above, and that it will make its decisions concerning the holding of proceedings in camera on an individual basis with regard to each of the testimonies that it may hear.

It should be noted that in his pleadings before us, counsel for the state discussed the inherent difficulty in distinguishing ab initio between parts of testimony that are expected to be heard by the Commission that may be disclosed and parts that must be heard in camera. In this context, I think it right to point out that if there are circumstances in which the vast majority of the testimony may be disclosed, there is no basis for holding the whole testimony in camera. In view of the great importance of the principle of holding proceedings in public, a distinction should be made ab initio between the part that may be disclosed, which should be heard in public, and the classified part, which is the only part that should be heard in camera. The more complex cases — which apparently characterize most of the testimonies being heard by the Commission — are those in which the main testimony is expected to be classified but is interspersed with parts that may be disclosed. In such circumstances, the Commission should make an effort to distinguish ab initio between the various parts, and to hold proceedings in public on the parts of the testimony that may be disclosed. But when the parts that may be disclosed are few and incidental to the classified parts of testimony, the advantage in separating the different parts of the testimony for the purpose of holding proceedings in public may be marginal, and the whole testimony may be heard in camera.

Counsel for the state went on to point out that the Winograd Commission is not prepared to allow persons who testify before it to make a ‘statement to the media’ at the beginning of their testimony in a hearing which then continues in camera. Two reasons are given for this position. First, the person testifying before the Commission has the possibility of giving interviews to the media and to say whatever they wish to say. Second, allowing the possibility of such ‘statements’ conflicts with the desire to conduct the proceedings of the Commission professionally and efficiently and to complete its work as quickly as possible. We see no reason to intervene in the Commission’s reasoning in this matter. We assume that the Commission will be mindful of the rule concerning the publicity of the proceedings and will allow the hearing of testimonies — or at least parts of them — in public, in circumstances where there is no legal impediment according to the criteria set out above.

It should be noted that in support of his arguments counsel for the state sought to rely on the manner in which state commissions of inquiry operated in the past when considering similar issues to those being considered by the Winograd Commission, including when the proceedings before them were alleged to be classified. In this respect, it should be stated that in the case of the Agranat Commission a blanket order prohibiting any publicity regarding its proceedings was imposed by a government decision that was originally made in accordance with s. 23 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law.  By contrast, in the case before us the Winograd Commission was given complete discretion. With regard to the proceedings of the Kahn Commission, these were mostly classified, but proceedings that were open to the public, at the commission’s discretion, also took place. Indeed, the manner in which the commissions operated in the past shows that an investigation of military operations that involves making recommendations naturally does not allow full disclosure of the evidence before the commission for reasons of state security. But no conclusion should be drawn from the examples in the past that the Commission is exempt from the application of the principle that proceedings should be held in public, and, as we have said, the Commission is obliged to hold proceedings in public if there is no impediment to this on grounds of state security.

10. The second relief that is sought in the petition concerns the publication of the transcripts of the Commission’s hearings. In his written pleadings, and also before us, counsel for the state confirmed that the testimonies that were heard by the Winograd Commission include parts that are not classified and that may be published under the law. The essence of the dispute between the parties concerned two matters. First, he parties disagree with regard to the scope of the material that may be disclosed to the public: whereas counsel for the petitioner is of the opinion that there is no reason why most of the material heard before the commission should not be published, the state argues that most of the testimonies may not be published. Prima facie the state’s position appears reasonable. The nature of the subjects being considered by the Winograd Commission, the identity of the persons appearing before it, and the sensitivity of the information being considered by it may lead in most cases to the existence of an almost certain danger of harm to the security of the state if the information that is revealed in the Commission’s hearings is published. Notwithstanding, this does not exempt the Commission from the need to examine the transcripts in detail in order to publish those parts that may be disclosed under the law. In this regard, a general assessment made at the outset is insufficient; it is necessary to make a detailed examination. As we have said, an examination should be made for each testimony to see whether there is a justification for prohibiting publication of what was said in it. In this context, there may be a difference between an examination made before the event and an examination made after the event.  With regard to testimony before it has been heard by the Commission, there is in many cases an inherent difficulty in distinguishing between the parts that may be disclosed and the parts that are classified.  When the examination is made after the event — after the testimony is given — distinguishing between the aforesaid parts may be done more easily.

The main disagreement between the parties concerns the date of publication of the parts of the Winograd Commission transcripts that may be disclosed. Section 8A of the Government Law and the letter appointing the Winograd Commission do not address this issue, apart from the statement in paragraph H of the letter of appointment, which says: ‘When its work is completed, the commission shall deposit all the transcripts of its proceedings and all the material that was brought before it in the state archives.’ It should be noted that paragraph F of the letter of appointment, which discusses the publication of the commission’s reports, refers to ‘the principles in section 20 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law.’ Section 20(c) of the aforesaid law provides that ‘The commission may, if it sees fit to do so, publish the transcript of its proceedings, or any other material relating to its work, in whole or in part.’ From this we see that the Commission was given discretion with regard to the question of the publication of the transcripts of hearings that took place before it and also with regard to their date of publication. As we clarified above, the Commission should exercise its discretion reasonably and give proper weight to all of the relevant factors.

In the hearing before us, counsel for the petitioner requested that the transcripts should be published as soon as possible after they are made. Counsel for the state, however, argued that in the Commission’s opinion the proper time for making a security examination of the testimony transcripts is only after the Commission presents its final report to the government. Two reasons were given for this. First, it was argued that if the Commission is compelled now to examine the parts of the transcript proceedings that may be publishe that this would hold up the Commission’s work and undermine its efficiency. Second, it was argued that publication of the transcripts at this time would require the matter being referred to security personnel who may be subordinate to some of the persons being investigated.

We should say immediately that the aforesaid reasons raised by counsel for the state are not convincing. In our remarks above, we discussed the great importance of holding proceedings in public and of the public’s right to know. We said that the flow of information is a condition without which people cannot form their opinions and that it is an essential condition for upholding democracy. ‘Only in this was can he [the citizen] adopt for himself as independent an opinion as possible on those questions that are at the top of the social and political agenda, which must ultimately be decided by him, by virtue of his right to elect the organs of the state’ (per Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 Israel Film Studios Ltd v. Geri [9], at p. 2415 {217}). ‘The democratic system of government is nourished by — and also depends upon — a free flow of information to and from the public with regard to the main issues that affect society and the individual’ (per Justice Shamgar in HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [10], at p. 378). This is certainly applicable in this case given the national importance and great public interest raised by the issues being considered by the Winograd Commission. Moreover, our case law holds that the duty of an authority to make available to the public the information in its possession, when there is nothing in the law that prevents this, allows public scrutiny and that this principle derives from the status of the authority as a trustee that holds the information in trust for and on behalf of the public as a whole (see the remarks of Justice Rivlin in Ministry of Transport v. Israel News Co. Ltd [7], at paras. 11-13 of his opinion; see also the remarks of Justice Hayut in Council for Higher Education v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing [6], at paras. 8-9 of her opinion and the references cited there). In view of all this, if the transcripts of the Winograd Commission hearings contain parts with regard to which there is no legal impediment that prevents their disclosure to the public, it is not reasonable to delay the publication of the material until the final report is presented. It may be assumed that it is possible to find reliable and experienced persons who will be made available to the Commission for the purpose of carrying out the security check required in order to identify the material that may be disclosed.

The argument of counsel for the state that publication of the material before the final report is presented will disclose to the public partial and distorted information is likewise rejected. If the transcripts contain material that may be disclosed under the law, the information should be published, and we should not say that it is better for the public that the publication should be postponed to such a remote date. In this regard we emphasize that if and when the Commission decides in the future to summon witnesses under caution, the relevant information will in any case be disclosed to them. At this stage, the ‘judicial’ aspect of the Commission’s work takes precedence over the ‘investigative’ aspect. In such circumstances, there is no concern that the publication of parts of the transcripts before the Commission’s final report is presented will disrupt testimonies or seriously undermine the proper work procedures of the Commission. We, therefore, assume that the Winograd Commission will exercise its discretion in accordance with what we have said above, and in accordance with its professed position in the letter of the Chairman of the Commission and its statement to the media, and that the Commission will take steps to publish the parts of the transcripts whose disclosure is permitted within a reasonable time, before the final report is presented to the government.

11. In summary, since the petition was filed after the vast majority of the testimonies had already been heard by the Commission, the question of the hearing of those testimonies in public is no longer relevant. It is possible that there are more testimonies that will be heard at a later stage of the commission’s deliberations. The pleadings of counsel for the state show that the Commission does not dispute that the rule that proceedings should be held in public applies to it. The Commission can be presumed to be conducting  itself in accordance with the criteria set out above and to examine the question whether all or parts of the testimonies may be given in public. With regard to the publication of the transcripts of the Commission’s hearings, the Commission will take into account the principles discussed above, and it is presumed that it will take steps to publish the parts of the transcripts that may be disclosed within a reasonable time and before the final report is presented to the government.

In view of all of the aforesaid and subject to what is stated in para. 11, the order nisi should be cancelled.

 

 

 

Vice-President E. Rivlin

I agree.

 

Justice A. Procaccia

I agree with the opinion of my colleague President D. Beinisch. If I see a need to add some remarks, it is in order to support, strengthen and emphasize what I think needs to be emphasized and highlighted.

1.    According to the constitutional outlook that prevails in the Israeli legal system the principle that proceedings should be held in public has a supreme status. The publicity of proceedings is a part of the duty of disclosure that lies at the heart of democracy. The aim of disclosure is to guarantee a free flow of information on subjects of public importance that affect the individual and society as a whole. A free flow of information, opinions and outlooks is an essential condition for a healthy democracy. Only in this way is it possible to ensure, on the one hand, the ability of the individual to influence the government’s actions by means of data and information that are required for this, and only in this way is the public given a means of scrutiny whereby he may examine the propriety of the actions of government bodies (HCJ 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [11], at p. 364 {219-220}). A free flow of information on matters that concern the public is one aspect of the value of freedom of speech that lies at the heart of a free society, which includes not only the right to express oneself and make oneself heard and seen, but also the right to know, hear and see (HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [12], at p. 433; HCJ 651/03 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for Sixteenth Knesset [13], at pp. 71-72). Alongside the freedom to express oneself and utter opinions, beliefs and ideas there is the right of the public to know about the complex actions of the government and the activity of public authorities; this is the other facet of freedom of speech, without which we cannot have a proper constitutional system that protects human rights and ensures the propriety of the activities of the government. The exposure and disclosure of information that is important to the public are prerequisites for the existence of public scrutiny and examination, whereas concealing and covering up such information screens and obscures deviations from public norms and makes it difficult to expose them and to recommend corrections where they are needed. The principle that proceedings should be held in public derives its force from the public’s right to know about the actions of the government and its agencies; holding discussions and judicial proceedings in the public eye also guarantees the fairness of the investigation and the quality, standard and seriousness of the decision made at the end of the proceeding. Openness increases public confidence in government authorities and the bodies who examine and scrutinize their actions. The principle that proceedings are held in public achieved statutory constitutional status in s. 3 of the Basic Law: The Judiciary  (see CA 2800/97 Lipson v. Gahal [14], at p. 718; HCJ 6005/93 Eliash v. Israel Bar Association [15], at p. 161; CrimApp 5153/04 A v. Yediot Aharonot Ltd [16], at p. 938; LCA 3614/97 Avi-Isaac v. Israel News Co. Ltd [17], at pp. 45-47; and recently CrimA 11793/05 Israel News Co. Ltd v. State of Israel [18], at paras. 13-16 (per Justice E. Arbel)). The principle that proceedings should be held in public is a basis element of judicial activity in the Israeli courts. It is an established principle in the Administrative Courts that try disputes in which a public authority is involved (s. 25 of the Administrative Courts Law, 5752-1992). The principle that proceedings should be held in public also applies as a basic principle of the legal system to quasi-judicial bodies. The principle of administrative disclosure and publicity also applies in general to the activity of government authorities that have an executive function, even though the principle of disclosure in the executive and administrative spheres may take a different form to the one that is found in the judicial or quasi-judicial sphere; ‘Indeed, administrative publicity is a basic principle in a democracy. It allows the public not only to plan its course of action, but also to develop a dialogue with the administration, which includes the scrutiny of its actions’ (I. Zamir, Administrative Power (1996), at p. 924). Indeed —

‘Proper government acts in the light of day, in the open, and thus it exposes itself to constant scrutiny and therefore also to the correction of corrupt courses of action’ (LCrimA 1127/93 State of Israel v. Klein [19], at p. 516 (per Justice M. Cheshin)).

An expression of the outlook of administrative publicity and the duty of disclosure that governs public authorities can be found in the Freedom of Information Law, 5758-1998, which gives every Israeli citizen or resident a right to receive information from a public authority in accordance with the provisions of the law (s. 1). Even before the Freedom of Information Law there existed a principle that documents of public authorities are available to anyone who has an interest in the matter. A refusal to disclose them imposed on the public authority a burden of explaining and justifying its refusal (CA 6926/93 Israel Dockyards Ltd v. Israel Electric Co. Ltd [20], at p. 796). The principle of disclosure was extended in the past, before the enactment of the law, to administrative bodies such as internal professional audit bodies; even though their deliberations are usually not open to the public, their conclusions are likely to be subject to disclosure (LCA 1412/94 Hadassah Medical Organization v. Gilad [21]).

2.    The principle of disclosure and publicity is not absolute. Like every constitutional norm, the degree of protection afforded to it is not unlimited. Thus there may be restrictions upon the realization of the norm and the scope of the ability to realize it. The scope of protection given to the constitutional norm is limited by the principles that determine the proper balance between it and important conflicting interests to which the law gives a special status. The principle of the publicity of proceedings, as a part of the value of the freedom of speech, is subject to restrictions in the spirit of the limitations clause in s. 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [22]; EA 92/03 Mofaz v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset [23]). The principles of the limitations clause demand that in order for a violation of a constitutional norm to be recognized as legitimate, it should originate in a statute that befits the values of the state, it should be intended for a proper purpose and it should satisfy the requirement of proportionality.

3.    Case law has held that where there is a clash between the principle of publicity and conflicting interests, ‘the principle of the publicity of proceedings retains a preferential status of a supreme right’ (Lipson v. Gahal [14], at p. 719). A clear and unambiguous provision of statute is required in order to restrict or qualify the publicity of proceedings rule (Eliash v. Israel Bar Association [15], at pp. 168-169, 170; CA 5185/93 Attorney-General v. Marom [24], at p. 342; Lipson v. Gahal [14], at p. 719). Even when there is such a provision of statute, it should be interpreted in accordance with the principles of the limitations clause, and especially in accordance with the principle of proportionality therein. This means that the principle of publicity will prevail unless the restriction of publicity satisfies the limitations tests, and especially that it should be of an extent no greater than what is required,  (CrimA 353/88 Vilner v. State of Israel [25], at pp. 450, 451; Lipson v. Gahal [14], at p. 719; Avi-Isaac v. Israel News Co. Ltd [17], at p. 66). The restrictions upon the publicity of proceedings are always interpreted narrowly (LA 176/86 A v. B [26], at p. 499; CrimApp 2794/00 Aloni v. State of Israel [27], at p. 369).

Publicity and disclosure are therefore the rule. Privilege and secrecy are the exception. Since the exception constitutes a restriction upon a constitutional norm, its application in a manner that violates the norm is conditional upon preconditions that mainly concern a proper purpose and proportionality.

4.    In various contexts legislation contains restrictions upon the publicity of proceedings. These qualifications include the protection of the security and foreign affairs of the state (s. 68(d)(1) and (2) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984; s. 25(b)(1) of the Administrative Courts Law, 5752-1992).

5.    A state commission of enquiry that acts by virtue of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1968, is required to hold its proceedings in public and to publish its report (ss. 18(a) and 20(a) of the law). Alongside the publicity of proceedings principle and the duty of disclosure that govern the commission, the law lists exceptions to the publicity and disclosure rule, which include matters of state security. But according to the principles of the legal system, since the principle of publicity is the rule and secrecy is the exception, the commission of inquiry is required to make its proceedings open to the public and to publish the details of its activities unless, for weighty reasons that satisfy the constitutional requirement of proportionality, one of the exceptions listed in the law should be applied. The principle of publicity in a state commission of inquiry is particularly important, because a state commission of inquiry is charged with inquiring into a matter ‘of essential public importance’ that requires investigation (s. 1 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law). Such a commission is usually established where there is a crucial public need to investigate a matter of particular importance that is subject to disagreement, which not infrequently gives rise to deep public emotion and distress. The purpose of a commission of inquiry is to restore public confidence in the government and the persons running it. Re-establishing public confidence in society — which is one of the main purposes of a state commission — depends upon there being openness, disclosure and publicity in the proceedings of the commission to the greatest extent possible. Openness helps the public trust the fairness of the proceedings of the commission and accept its conclusions out of a belief in the integrity of its criteria and the objectivity of its motives. Publicity in the work of a commission of inquiry removes any concern of political bias or favouritism in the commission’s work and leads to greater public confidence in its activity (A. Klagsbald, State Commissions of Inquiry (2001), at pp. 23, 213; A. Rubinstein and B. Medina, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (vol.2, ‘Government Authorities and Citizenship,’ 2005), at pp. 1028, 1040-1041).

6.    Naturally commissions of inquiry are sometimes appointed to examine particularly sensitive security matters t or special matters of state, and these require secrecy. In circumstances such as these, when we are speaking of an essential public need of great significance that satisfies the proper purpose and the requirement of proportionality, a commission of inquiry is authorized to decide to apply the exception to the rule of publicity and to restrict opening the proceedings of the commission to the public and disclosing the information and the material submitted to it and the transcripts prepared by it where necessary and to the required degree.

7.    It is important to emphasize that even where there may be an exception to the publicity of the proceedings of a commission of inquiry, whether for security or other reasons, the balance between applying the principle of publicity and the need for resorting to the exception thereto should be made very carefully, and its implementation is required with regard to each element and each stage of the commission’s proceedings: the guiding principle is publicity, disclosure and exposure, and the exception is confidentiality and secrecy, which will apply only where it is necessary — where it is a ‘necessary evil.’ A sweeping preliminary decision that all the proceedings of the commission will be secret and that all the material that arises in its sessions will be classified seriously undermines the principle of publicity and is inconsistent with the requirements of the law. The commission should therefore examine, in so far as it can before the event, every testimony and every procedural stage that takes place before it on an independent basis, in order to decide whether it may be disclosed to the public or whether there is no alternative to making it privileged. Only in this way will the principle of publicity be properly realized, while upholding the proper balance between it and other essential public interests (Klagsbald, State Commissions of Inquiry, supra, at p. 215).

8.    The commission of investigation under s. 8A of the Government Law, 5761-2001, namely the Winograd Commission, was appointed to investigate the events of the war in the north with regard to a very broad range of issues, as can be seen from government decision no. 525. The letter of appointment that defines its powers authorized it to examine the conduct of the political echelon with regard to the war from political, military and civilian perspectives; it also requested an examination of the preparations  of the defence establishment, including questions of readiness for war, preparation of intelligence, conduct of the war, activation  of forces, etc.. The commission was given interrogation powers under ss. 9 to 11 and 27(b) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, which concern powers to interrogate witnesses. These powers were given to the commission by virtue of s. 8A(a) of the Government Law. In view of the breadth and depth required when examining the subject of the war, the government supplemented what was lacking in the powers of the commission of investigation under s. 8A of the Government Law by giving the commission additional powers and authority, which it set out in the letter of appointment; thus, for example, it ordered the publication of the commission’s reports (para. F of the letter of appointment), it authorized persons to collect material (para. J of the letter of appointment) and following an opinion of the attorney-general it adopted the mechanism of sending warnings under s. 15 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, which constitutes a condition for making personal recommendations. This opinion was given against a background of the similarity between a state commission of inquiry and a commission of investigation, and according to the state —

‘As a rule, in the absence of a special reason to deviate from this, a similar arrangement to the one set out in section 15 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law should be adopted in this case, with the  scope of the right to state one’s case in each specific instance being determined by the commission, according to the circumstances of the case’ (para. 49 of the state’s reply in HCJ 6728/06 Omets v. Prime Minister [1].

With regard to the aspect of the publicity of proceedings, the letter of appointment determined that ‘The commission’s sessions shall be public or closed to the public as the commission shall decide.’ It was also determined that ‘No public proceedings will take place when this may endanger the security of the state or its foreign relations or when there is any other lawful reason that prohibits this.’

9.    In the wording of the letter of appointment, the government therefore regarded the commission of investigation as a body of a similar nature to a state commission of inquiry, and it acted to make the powers and authority of the commission of investigation as similar as possible to those given to a commission of inquiry acting in accordance with the Commissions of Inquiry Law. This purpose of equating the two types of commission is not surprising in view of the fact that the commission of investigation for examining the war in the north was set up to examine a matter ‘of essential public importance’ that requires clarification, in the sense that this expression is used in s. 1 of the Commissions of Inquiry Law, and it is only natural that the government sought to equip such a commission with the powers given to a commission of inquiry in order to enable it to carry out the complex task with which it was charged. The similarity between the powers of the Winograd Commission and the powers of a commission of inquiry is what was used by the state as its main justification in reply to the argument raised against it in Omets v. Prime Minister [1], according to which the government erred when it appointed a commission of investigation to examine the war in the north, when it had the power to appoint a commission of inquiry, with the characteristics and powers given to it in the law.

10. The close similarity between the Winograd Commission and a state commission of inquiry from the viewpoint of the character and scope of the matters requiring examination and their public significance and from the viewpoint of the scope of investigative powers given to it leads to the conclusion that even though the publicity of proceedings provision in the Commissions of Inquiry Law does not apply directly to the Winograd Commission, the publicity of proceedings principle applies to its proceedings to a similar degree as it applies to a state commission of inquiry. This is the necessary conclusion from the general application of the principle of publicity to quasi-judicial bodies as one of the basic principles of the legal system, and in view of the subject of the investigation and its broad public significance, together with the broad scope of the powers given to the commission of investigation and its status as a quasi-judicial body. The nature of the matters being considered by the commission of inquiry and their broad public scope, as well as the need to ensure public confidence in the way in which the commission conducts its investigations and reached its decisions, make it necessary to apply the rule of publicity, with its exceptions, to its proceedings in the usual manner that this is done with regard to a state commission of inquiry. Any other result would be inconsistent with the basic principles of the legal system and might even frustrate the main purpose for which the commission was set up — restoring public confidence in the army, the defence establishment and the government. Once the rule of publicity applies to the commission of investigation, the exceptions to the rule will also apply, in the same vein as those set out in the Commissions of Inquiry Law.

11. I should also point out that the application of the principle of publicity to the commission of investigation does not conflict, in my opinion, with the wording of paragraph G of the letter of appointment, according to which:

‘The commission’s sessions shall be public or closed to the public as the commission shall decide. No public proceedings shall take place when this may endanger the security of the state or its foreign relations or when there is any other lawful reason that prohibits this.’

Against the background of the principle of publicity which is one of the foundations of the legal system, it is possible to interpret what is stated in the letter of appointment as giving the commission of investigation discretion as to when to depart from the principle of publicity in its proceedings and to order them to held in camera, but this discretion is supposed to be exercised subject to the accepted principles of the legal system. There is no inherent contradiction between the wording of the letter of appointment in this regard and general principles, and the aforesaid provision should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with basic concepts as aforesaid.

12. The conclusion that arises from the aforesaid is that the Winograd Commission is subject to the principle of publicity, with its exceptions, and everything that derives from them, in the same way as the principle applies to a state commission of inquiry. In a commission of investigation publicity is therefore the rule; state security, or any other recognized reason for secrecy that reflects a weighty public interest is the exception. The principle of publicity has broad application. The exception only applies when circumstances require, it is for a proper purpose and it is not excessive.

13. The practical application of these principles leads to the conclusion that the Winograd Commission has a duty to allow the content of its proceedings and the material presented to it to be disclosed to the maximum degree possible without harming the security purpose or any other national interest of the highest importance. Only a real concern of harm to a public interest of special importance will justify a departure from publicity and the duty of disclosure and will allow proceedings in camera or a prohibition against publishing material and reports that were brought before the commission or will be issued by it.

14. Investigating matters concerning the War may naturally make it necessary to make some or even most of the proceedings and the material before the commission privileged for security reasons. But the commission has a duty to examine the need for making its proceedings classified for each testimony and for each hearing that is going to take place before it. The commission is not supposed to decide in advance that its proceedings will be subject to a blanket prohibition against disclosure. When determining the framework of the prohibition against disclosure, it should act on the basis of a premise of disclosure and publicity, and regard a prohibition against holding proceedings in public or disclosing information as an exception that should be applied narrowly and sparingly, and only in cases where it is necessary.

15. As the President of the court explained in her opinion, upholding the principle of publicity in the proceedings of the commission will realize the principle of the freedom of information and disclosure in the proceedings of the commission within the framework of the permitted limits. Applying the aforesaid principle will expose the proceedings of the commission to important public scrutiny and will ensure public confidence in its proceedings, as well as its decisions and conclusions. This is consistent with the nature of the subject that the commission was asked to examine as a matter of paramount public importance. It is also consistent with the broad scope of the powers given to the commission, which makes it very similar in this respect to a state commission of inquiry.

16. Since the state agreed, in principle, with the aforesaid analysis, I agree with the president’s conclusion that it is not required to make the order absolute in the current circumstances, since it can be presumed that the commission of investigation will act in accordance with the principles set out in this judgment, and that it will exercise its discretion in accordance with the criteria set out herein, which are based on the fundamental principles of our legal system.

 

 

Petition denied.

18 Shevat 5767.

6 February 2007.

 

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