Occupied territories

Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils v. Ministry of Construction

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 727/00
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, December 12, 2001
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: Petition seeking the establishment of egalitarian socio-economic criteria 
for the implementation of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and a similar 
inclusion of Arab settlements, which are ranked under the first and second 
cluster by the Central Office of Statistics, to the inclusion within the project of 
Jewish settlements which fall under that same ranking. 

 

Held: In the majority opinion, written by Justice Beinisch, the petition was 
granted in part as to the requested criteria. The court determined that the 
petition was made partially extraneous given the drafting of new criteria in 
1999, and that the criteria were to be redrafted and the criterion relating to 
‘saturated construction’ and its relative weight among the rest of the criteria was 
to be given explicit expression within the criteria. The petition was denied in 
relation to the immediate inclusion of all the settlements detailed therein. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 727/00

 

1.  Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils in Israel

2.  Balal Ibrahim

3.  Agudat Ha’arba’aim

4.  Il Beit, the Arab Association for the Protection of Human Rights

5.  Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

v.

1.  Ministry of Construction and Housing

2.  Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[December 12th, 2001]

Before President A. Barak, Justices J. Türkel and D. Beinisch

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice for an order nisi and an interlocutory order.

 

Facts: Petition seeking the establishment of egalitarian socio-economic criteria for the implementation of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and a similar inclusion of Arab settlements, which are ranked under the first and second cluster by the Central Office of Statistics, to the inclusion within the project of Jewish settlements which fall under that same ranking.

 

Held: In the majority opinion, written by Justice Beinisch, the petition was granted in part as to the requested criteria.  The court determined that the petition was made partially extraneous given the drafting of new criteria in 1999, and that the criteria were to be redrafted and the criterion relating to ‘saturated construction’ and its relative weight among the rest of the criteria was to be given explicit expression within the criteria.  The petition was denied in relation to the immediate inclusion of all the settlements detailed therein.

 

Israeli cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 2814/97 Chief Supervision Committee for Matters of Arab Education in Israel v. Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, IsrSC 54(3) 233.

[2]      HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs IsrSC 54(2) 164.

[3]      HCJ 59/88 Tzaban v. Minister of Treasury IsrSC 42(4) 705.

[4]      HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Cargo Airlines v. Prime Minister IsrSC 52(4) 193-205.

[5]      HCJ 1438/98 Conservative Movement v. The Minister of Religious Affairs (unreported).

[6]      HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts IsrSC 51(4) 259.

[7]      HCJ 637/89 ‘A Constitution for the State of Israel’ v. Ministry of Finance IsrSC 46(1) 191.

[8]      HCJ 4906/98 ‘Am Hofshi’Association for the Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education and Culture v. Ministry of Construction and Housing IsrSC 54(2) 503.

 

For petitioners – Maruan Dalel

For respondent – Malchiel Blass

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice D. Beinisch

1.    An order nisi was issued by the Court ordering the respondents to explain why egalitarian socio-economic criteria are not to be established for the implementation of the Neighborhood Restoration Project (hereinafter: ‘the project’).  So too, the order directs the respondents to explain why they are not including all the Arab settlements which were ranked in the first and second cluster according to the rankings of the Central Office of Statistics (hereinafter: ‘the COS’) within the project in the same way that all the Jewish settlements which belong to these clusters are included in the project.

Background to the Petition

The background to the petition is the desire of the petitioners – public entities from within the Arab population – to implement educational and welfare programs in the Arab sector, a demand that has already been raised in a prior petition: HCJ 2814/97 Chief Supervision Committee for Matters of Arab Education in Israel v. Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport (hereinafter: ‘HCJ EWS’) [1].  In that petition the question of the implementation of the Division for Educational and Welfare Services (EWS division) programs in Arab educational institutions in Israel was under consideration, and it was determined that funds were to be granted gradually for implementation of the division’s programs in a manner relative to the proportion of the Arab population in the overall population in Israel.  It was clarified in that petition that some of the division’s funds are distributed via a Neighborhood Restoration Project to those settlements and neighborhoods that have been included in the project.  The claim relating to the budget for neighborhood restoration was dismissed for being too general, and because the EWS budget which relates to the Neighborhood Restoration Project constitutes only one component in the many components which result from the inclusion of a settlement within the Neighborhood Restoration Project.  As we noted in that case [1]:

‘Including a settlement or a neighborhood within this project is a necessary condition for the existence of the neighborhood restoration program that the EWS division implements.  However, this inclusion is in the hands of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which operates according to principles determined by the government.  This matter, therefore, warrants a separate inquiry, which will focus on the consideration of the criteria according to which the government enacts the Neighborhood Restoration Project.  Given that the petition before us focuses on the question of discrimination in regard to welfare in educational funds, while the subject of broadening the Neighborhood Restoration Project relates to the extension of a wide net that is not laid out before us in this petition – we have not seen fit to deliberate on it in the framework of the petition before us.’ (p. 239 of the judgment).

Consequently, the petition before us, which deals in its entirety with the Neighborhood Restoration Project in all is various components, both physical and social-educational, was submitted.

The neighborhood restoration project

2.    We have learned of the quality, essence, and scope of the Neighborhood Restoration Project from the affidavit given in support of the State’s response which was signed by the head of the division for social neighborhood restoration and the coordinator of government offices for the project since September, 1982, Ms. Hagit Hovev.  In her affidavit Ms. Hovev surveyed the development of the Neighborhood Restoration Project since its establishment was announced in 1977, when it was established as a national-social project of the State in collaboration with Diaspora Jews via the Jewish Agency.  As is apparent from her affidavit, the project was intended to deal in a comprehensive and multi-faceted manner with social disparity in the State and to deal in particular with points of social hardship and areas of physical wear in city centers and development towns.  The project is the responsibility of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and includes two primary realms: the physical realm and the social realm.  The physical realm of the project includes many components, among them:  expanding residential apartments, renovation of residential buildings and courtyards, completion of the development of public infrastructure, renovation of apartments for the elderly, and encouragement of the purchase of apartments under public lease.  The social realm includes inter alia: programs for the very young, reinforcement of formal studies, programs for youth and at-risk youth and higher education programs.

At first, the project was jointly administered by the government and the Jewish Agency, whereby the Agency served as the mediating entity between the project’s administration and the Jewish communities abroad, and also participated in its financing.  However, since 1990, following the immigration from the CIS, the Agency’s role in the project diminished, and it was passed on to government hands, both in terms of administration and budget.  Implementation of the project is fairly flexible: the project may include both entire settlements, and specific neighborhoods suffering hardship within established cities.  So too, a settlement or neighborhood might be included in only one realm of the project, for example: the physical realm without being included in the other realm of the project.  It is important to note that the project is limited in time, and after its implementation is completed in a particular settlement, the settlement is removed from the project.

The arguments of the parties

3.    The parties are claiming three different remedies, which all surround one central claim, which is a claim of discrimination.  The petitioners present much numerical data which proves, according to them, the difficult situation of the Arab settlements and the discriminatory attitude toward them, in the limited scope of the application of the Neighborhood Restoration Project to them.  Inter alia, they claim that despite the fact that all of the Jewish neighborhoods that are in the first three clusters of the COS ranking are included in the project, only 5 out of 48 of the Arab settlements found in these clusters are included in the project.  Consequently, the petitioners request in their petition that egalitarian criteria be established for implementing the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and they also request that an egalitarian policy be administered between the Arab settlements and the Jewish settlements by including within the framework of the project all the Arab settlements found in clusters 1 and 2 in the  COS ranking.

After the order nisi was granted, the State’s response was received on April 13, 2000.  In its response the State did not disagree with the need for egalitarian treatment of the Arab population, but claimed that the question at the center of the discussion in our matter was the question of ‘the application of the concept of equality’.  According to the State’s claim, the application is particularly complex in the case before us, where it is a matter of a project that has been implemented for over twenty years and when the ramification of the requested remedy is a budget increase of tens of millions of shekels per year, or a detraction from funds given to other settlements which are not party to the petition.  Beyond this generalized claim, the State raised many additional arguments in the framework of the two affidavits that were attached to the petition – the aforementioned affidavit from the Ministry of Construction and Housing and an affidavit on behalf of the Prime Minister’s office.  First, the State admits that at first the project included a relatively small number of Arab settlements as it was a joint project of the State, the Jewish Agency and Jewish communities in the world.  According to its claim, with the lessening of the role of the Jewish agency in the project there has been a marked increase in the number of Arab settlements and neighborhoods included in the project.  According to the claim, as a result of the respondents' policy as to the appropriate criteria for application of the project, and in consideration of the need to complete implementation of the project in the settlements and neighborhoods in which its implementation had already begun, recent years witnessed a gradual change whereby Arab settlements were added to the project and Jewish settlements in which implementation of the project was completed, were taken out.

As to the matter of the criteria for inclusion of additional settlements in the framework of the project, the State argues that in 1999, new criteria were implemented which guide the inter-office team in its recommendations for inclusion of new neighborhoods or settlements within the project.  These criteria were already added to the State’s response in the framework of the discussion in said HCJ EWS, and they were attached again in attachment HH/1 to the affidavit of Ms. Hagit Hovev which is attached to the State’s response, and in attachment P/4 to the petition.  The four criteria that appear on the list are:  multi-dimensional hardship of a large percentage of the neighborhood’s inhabitants (45%).  A lack or low level of physical and social infrastructures (25%), socio-economic strength of the settlement’s population (20%), the presence of new immigrants or particularly weak populations in the neighborhood (10%).  According to the State’s claim, the petitioners arguments according to which it is appropriate to rely exclusively on the COS data to determine the list of settlements included in the project is to be dismissed, as this data does not give a full picture as to the ranking of the settlements included in the project.  Based on the criteria that were established, the COS data makes up only 60 percent of the points to be weighed which are examined for purposes of implementing the project, while the remaining 40 percent are based on data from the various government offices.  Beyond these criteria the State noted, that beginning in 1986 the Ministry of Construction and Housing decided to give preference in the framework of the project to urban areas of hardship, which are characterized by saturated construction, as in these areas the investment can contribute to improvement in the lives of more residents.  The State further claimed that the new criteria are future-looking only, meaning: they will apply only to settlements that will be included in the project from now on.  According to its claim, a change in criteria which will lead to removing settlements in which the work is in progress will cause damage to these settlements and may cause the funds that were already invested to go to waste.  Beyond this, the State noted that due to the ongoing nature of the project and the limited funds at its disposal, it was decided in 2000 not to include new settlements in the project and to concentrate efforts on the 10 neighborhoods which have been included in the project for many years with the goal of completing the work in them.

Another central claim raised by the State, deals with the existence of alternate programs for investing funds in the Arab sector, programs which are better suited, according to the State’s claim, to the needs of the sector, and their purpose, inter alia, is to add funds to the Arab sector in order to close gaps that were created over the years.  According to the State’s claim, the Neighborhood Restoration Project was intended primarily to assist in renewing an area that has deteriorated or to complete physical or social infrastructures that are lacking, while many of the Arab settlements require establishing infrastructure from scratch.  The central program that according to the State will be able to properly address the needs, including the needs for which the Neighbourhood Restoration Project was intended, is a four year plan to develop the Arab sector which was approved by a government decision dated October 22, 2000, and which will include the total sum of 4 billion NIS (including an addition of 2 billion NIS beyond existing development budgets).  According to the State’s claim, the program is meant to include activity of all government offices, inter alia, construction of infrastructures and public buildings, and funds in the areas of education – building classrooms, pedagogical programs and a five year plan for the Bedouin settlements in the north that was begun in 1998 and which will include a total sum of 615 million NIS.  Beyond these broad programs, the State noted in its response two additional programs, smaller in scope, which are operated by the Ministry of Construction and Housing, and their budgets are also directed at the Arab sector – the ‘reinforcement’ program and the program to complete development in old neighborhoods.

The petitioners, for their part, claimed in response that criteria that relate only to new settlements are not sufficient, and that non-inclusion of Arab settlements immediately in the project causes them cumulative damage, the result of which will be a deepening of the social gaps.  So too, the petitioners noted that the criterion relating to ‘saturated construction’ was not mentioned in the framework of the official criteria and that it is a criterion which distinguishes between groups based on an irrelevant basis and leads to a discriminatory result. In regard to the alternate programs the petitioners argue that it is a matter of a claim that is not relevant, since the existence of one assistance program does not offset the right of the Arab sector to benefit from another program.

Consequent to hearing the parties’ arguments and reading their written arguments the case was taken under consideration.  Later, on May 17, 2001, we decided to ask the respondents additional questions relating to the distinction between the physical and the social realms of the project, to the criterion of ‘saturated building’, to an update as to the results of the efforts to concentrate the effort in the year 2000 and to the extent of implementation of the multi-year program to the Arab sector.

In its response of June 21, 2001 the respondent noted that the criteria are indeed general and do not distinguish between the social and the physical realms of the project.  They also noted that the anchor for the criterion as to ‘saturated construction’ which is not mentioned in the general criteria listed above, is found in the guidelines for external renovation of structure that is included in the project, and which is based on the decision of the entities in charge of the project.  As to concentration of the effort in implementation of the project in the year 2000, the respondents noted that the concentration of effort was a success and the project has ended in 10 neighborhoods in the realm of physical restoration, and in 4 neighborhoods in the realm of social restoration.  The State added in its notice that at this stage no additional settlements or neighborhoods will be included in the project, as it is the intention of the Ministry of Construction and Housing to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the project in the upcoming months.  As to this the Stated noted that:

‘At this stage, the inclusion of additional neighborhoods or settlements to the Neighborhood Restoration Project is not on the agenda as it is the intention of the Minister of Construction and Housing and the Director of its office to conduct a comprehensive assessment in the upcoming months of the cumulative contribution of the Neighborhood Restoration Project from its inception, both in the physical and social realm.  In the framework of this assessment it is the intention of the office to assess the suitability of the underlying premises which are at the basis of the project, the geographic units which will be included in it and a formula for its application to the many changes that have taken place in Israel in the social and urban reality, since the project’s inception.  This stance of the Ministry of Construction and Housing relates to all settlements in Israel that are not included in the project, including Arab settlements which need programs in the social realm.’

As to the application of the multi-year plan to the Arab sector, the State noted that staff work has begun in the budget department of the treasury the purpose of which is to produce necessary regulations for the implementation of the project which were to be presented for approval by the Finance Committee by the end of June 2001.  So too, the State’s counsel noted in his response in a general manner what the areas of overlap are between the multi-year plan and the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and which areas in the project supplement the projects in various aspects.  As of the date of this judgment the State has not given notification as to whether these funds were approved and to what extent.

Current allocation of budgets

4.    As said, the respondents admit in their response, that there was historical discrimination in the allocation of funds in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, however, according to their claim this discrimination has greatly decreased with the gradual inclusion of Arab settlements and neighborhoods within the project.  In order to prove this claim, the respondents presented before us the data which relates to the year 2000.  As appears from this data, of the settlements and neighborhoods included in the project, close to 20% are Arab settlements, as is the proportion of the Arab population in Israel.  However, this data does not reflect the full picture, and this is also the State’s position in its affidavits.  Comparison of the budgets as they have been presented by the respondents shows that the proportion of funds that were allocated to the minority sector in the framework of the project stands at 10% only.  The State noted that this budget data does not reflect the true sum that was allocated to the minority sector as additional funds were added in additional restoration programs.  According to the claim, in order to get a full picture of the funds directed to the sector the calculation must include two additional programs: the ‘reinforcement’ program and the program of supplementation of development in the older neighborhoods.  The ‘reinforcement’ program is similar in its characteristics to the physical realms of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and was also intended to deal with physical multi-dimensional hardship, including: external renovation of structures and development of courtyards, renovation of apartments for the elderly and assistance in expansion of apartments.  This program was implemented in a very small number of neighborhoods in the year 2000, and overall in its framework, 7.5 million NIS were allocated, of which 3.8 were allocated to the minority sector.  The program for supplementation of the development of older neighborhoods dealt with the development of the physical infrastructure in minority settlements.  This program is operated within various five-year plans which are designated for the minority sector – a five-year plan for Bedouins in the Negev (which is in preparation phases – although limited funds have already been allocated in its framework), and the multi-year plan for the Arab sector.  In the framework of these programs, the amount of 38.9 million NIS was included in the year 2000 budget of the programs division of the Ministry of Housing, for development of physical infrastructures in minority settlements, as opposed to the sum of 19.75 million NIS which are dedicated to this purpose in Jewish settlements.  According to the State’s claim, if the amounts allocated in the framework of those two programs are included in the overall calculation, it appears that the proportion of funds dedicated to advancing older neighborhoods in the minority sector in Israel reaches up to 24% (about 60 million NIS out of 260 million) – a proportion greater than the portion of the sector in the population.

In order to more accurately assess the claim of the respondents, we must distinguish between the physical side and the social side of the project.  On the physical side, if we also include in the framework of the calculation the two programs parallel to the Neighborhood Restoration Project (both of which relate only to the physical side) then it would appear that the determination is correct that the funds directed at the Arab sector in the year 2000 forms a proportion of 29% of the overall allocation directed at physical restoration in Israel (about 50 million NIS out of 174 million NIS).  This proportion is greater than the portion of the sector in the population, and therefore, on its face, there does not appear to be discrimination, but rather a goal of remedying the disadvantage.

Conversely as to the social realm the funds directed to the Arab sector in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, makes up only 13% of the total budget (12 million NIS out of 90 million) a proportion lesser than the proportion of the sector in the population.  The situation that is created indeed creates a feeling of discrimination which is particularly oppressive given that many of the Arab settlements are at the bottom of the socio-economic ranking.  We also discussed the painful situation of discrimination in funds intended for education in the Arab sector and the need to address this seriously in said HCJ EWS, which dealt, as said, with the implementation of EWS programs in the Arab sector, it was stated there:

‘In the framework of the petition there was no disputing that education in the Arab sector has been disadvantaged over many years and there was no dispute that this needs to be corrected.  From the responses submitted to us on behalf of the State we have been convinced that significant steps have been taken for the allocation of budgetary resources to the Arab sector in order to achieve the goal of equality of resources in said area in accordance with the relative proportion of the Arab population in Israel.’ (p. 240 of the judgment)

The question before us is what is the conclusion to be drawn in the framework of the petition before us as to this matter, both in relation to the petition to establish egalitarian criteria and in relation to the petition for inclusion of Arab settlements within the project.

The principle of equality in allocation of state funds

5.    It appears that it is not necessary to go back and expand on the fact that the value of equality is a basic value in our legal system, and that it stands at the basis of our democratic regime.  In light of its status the value of equality obligates the authority in the implementation of the totality of its powers.  We have noted more than once that the value of equality obligates the authority in allocation of state funds.  Such allocation must be done on an egalitarian basis and according to clear criteria.  As Justice Zamir has said in HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affair [2] at 170:

‘The principle of equality binds every public entity in the State.  First, it binds the State itself.  The principle of equality applies to all the areas in which the State operates.  It applies first and foremost to the allocation of the State’s funds.  The resources of the State, whether in land or money, as well as other resources, belong to all citizens, and all citizens are entitled to benefit from them in accordance with the principle of equality, without discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender or other illegitimate consideration.’

And, at p. 172 as well:

‘Discrimination on the basis of religion or nationality in allocation of state funds, which is even prohibited if it is done indirectly, certainly is a fortiori prohibited when it is done directly.’(See, for example, HCJ 59/88 Tzaban v. Minister of Treasury [3] at 706; HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Cargo Airlines v. Prime Minister [4] at 205.)

These words are true seven-fold when it is a matter of allocation of state funds for the actualization of basic rights such as the right to education, housing, or health.

It is clear that when an authority is directed to act with equality, we are dealing with substantive equality, and not merely formal equality.  At times, in order to achieve substantive equality we must act differently toward different individuals.  Violation of the principle of equality which creates the grounds for our intervention is different treatment of individuals amongst whom there is no difference relevant to the matter at hand (see for example HCJ 1438/98 Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [5] paragraph 20).  In the words of Justice Zamir, discriminatory treatment is different treatment of those who belong to the same ‘equality group’ (see HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [6] 281-283).  From this starting point we are to examine the question of application of the Neighborhood Restoration Project to the Arab sector.

The question of criteria

6.    The first part of the petition deals with the subject of criteria.  As said, according to the petitioners claim, social-economic egalitarian criteria are to be established for application of the project.  As is seen from the State’s response, in 1999, an inter-office commission examined the criteria for the project that were established in the 1980’s, and following this examination new and egalitarian criteria were established which the State has given notice are already in place and will serve from now on as a basis for inclusion of settlements in the framework of the project.  We have already mentioned that the criteria include both multi-dimensional social hardship and multi-dimensional physical hardship.  According to the State’s claim, the new criteria which were established are 60% based on the rankings of the COS, and 40% on additional data from various government offices.  From the State’s response it is further seen that there exists in fact an additional criterion which does not appear explicitly in the list of criteria that were presented to the court, although it influences the inclusion of neighborhoods within the framework of the physical realm of the project – and that is the criterion of granting preference to an urban neighborhood characterized by saturated construction.  In response to additional questions by the Court, it was stated by the State that this criterion is anchored in a procedure for external renovation of structures and the development of courtyards from the year 1998 (which replaced previous procedures from 1986 and 1993), which establishes that renovation of residential buildings is conditioned upon it being a structure that includes at least four residential units.  So too, it was emphasized that there are dozens of criteria and internal guidelines in each of the relevant offices which relate to specific programs operated in the framework of the project.  As is seen from the State’s response, the criteria detailed in P/4, which are, as stated, new, relate only to the inclusion of new settlements in the project, and do not apply to neighborhoods already included in the project, according to arrangements and policy that was determined years ago.

As said, criteria for distribution of budgets from the public pie must be egalitarian in nature, but beyond this, the criteria must also fulfill the other rules which apply to administrative decisions, which means that: they must be based on relevant considerations, a factual basis which reflects the relationship between the purpose for which the financial allocation was intended and the relevant facts, and they must meet tests of reasonableness. (See for example HCJ 1438/98 [5] above).  So too the criteria must be sufficiently concrete to enable their application according to objective measures to the extent possible.  (See HCJ 3792/95 [6] above, at pp. 273-274).

7.    The Neighborhood Restoration Project is in fact characterized by two levels of criteria: the first level, deals with the criteria which serve to determine which neighborhoods or settlements will be included in the project.  The second level, deals with specific and more detailed criteria which relate to the operation of certain programs which are included in the Neighborhood Restoration Project.  These criteria are of course only relevant to neighborhoods or settlements which have overcome the hurdles of the first level's criteria and are included in the project.  In this petition we are dealing with the first level of criteria, meaning: criteria which relate to the inclusion of a neighborhood or settlement within the project.  On its face it appears that the list of criteria brought to us, meets the necessary conditions for allocation of state funds.  It is a matter of criteria which are based on objective sources of information that the government has – COS data and data from various government offices, the criteria are suited to the purpose of the project and they explicitly note the relative weight of each criterion.  Therefore, ostensibly, these criteria are self-evidently egalitarian and reasonable.  However, it is worth noting, that for some reason the inter-office commission chose to draft the criteria in technical and opaque language which appears to be intelligible only to those with specialized knowledge.  It seems that it is appropriate that criteria which apply to the public be drafted in a more detailed, explicit, and clear manner.  Thus, for example, it would be appropriate to detail the content of the phrase ‘multi-dimensional hardship’ and that all the relevant quantitative variables be detailed, whether directly, or by way of reference, such that those dealing with the matter – Jewish and Arab settlements as one – will know what the standards are for allocating the project’s funds and its applicability to them.

The generalized drafting of the criteria on its own, even if it requires clarification, does not point to a flaw which justifies our intervention to nullify them; moreover, in their response to the State’s response the petitioners are not making arguments against the criteria as they were presented.  Therefore, were these criteria the only criteria for inclusion of settlements and neighborhoods in the project, it might be possible to say that the State properly addressed the first part of the petition, making what was requested superfluous.  However, it turns out that it is not so.  From the State’s response it appears that there is an additional criterion which is not included in the list of criteria of the first level – the one that determines the settlements included in the project – and it constitutes a hidden criterion which is able to influence the determination relative to the inclusion of neighborhoods in the project.  It is the criterion of saturated construction, which is anchored – according to the State’s claim – in an internal guideline which relates to the renovation of houses and courtyards – a specific guideline which relates to a specific program which belongs to the physical realm of the project.  Ostensibly, it is therefore a matter of a criterion which by its nature belongs to the second level of criteria – a criterion which relates to a specific program – which filtered through to the first level of criteria, as it was used to determine the neighborhoods which would be included in the project to at the beginning.  Using this criterion which is not counted among the criteria on the list is not proper, both due to its lack of inclusion and because of the lack of clarity as to the weight it is given as to the substance of the determination as to inclusion in the project.

8.    The petitions argue that applying a criterion which conditions implementation of the project on the existence of saturated construction, excludes their settlements from the project overall, as Arab settlements are not urban settlements that were built with saturated construction.  Lacking data as to the quality and scope of influence of this criterion among the other criteria, we cannot determine that this criterion may be an obstacle to inclusion of the Arab settlements in the framework of the project, even though it certainly may impact the scope of the inclusion of Arab settlements, many of which are not saturated construction settlements.  On the other hand, it is not to be said in a sweeping manner that saturated construction removes the Arab sector from the project in light of the existence of distressed neighborhoods in many urban cities in which there is a dense Arab population.  Despite this, the claim is correct that under the circumstances there was a flaw in the application of the criteria of saturated construction as a pre-condition to the implementation of the project.

It should be said first, that when the implementation of the project is dependent, among other things, on the physical condition of neighborhoods and structures, there is nothing wrong in principle with the fact that among other considerations which relate to the physical aspect, consideration which relate to the density of the population and the density of the construction will also be considered.  Giving preference to restorative treatment in areas of distress of high residential density which is characteristic of urban settlements constitutes a relevant and legitimate consideration.  There is also nothing wrong with the rationale that the State raised for giving preference to urban neighborhoods due to the advantage which stems from the effectiveness of the investment in crowded neighborhoods.  However, as has been said more than once in our case law, when we are dealing with equal distribution of resources it is not sufficient that the considerations for allocation are relevant considerations, but there is also significance to the weight of each of the relevant considerations.  In determining standards for budgetary allocation the totality of considerations which relate to the goal for which the financial support was intended, is to be taken into consideration.  Thus for example, the fact that the said criterion is not related at all to the social realm of the project necessitates the conclusion that in the face of the double purpose of the project – physical and social – the criterion which relates to the physical aspect of the project is not to be given determinative weight as to implementation within the social aspect.

Accordingly it can be determined that the saturated construction criterion is not to be used as a threshold criteria until this criterion is included in the list of criteria which determine the conditions for implementing the project and its relative weight, among the other criteria, its scope and concrete reference to the degree of the density of the construction, is clearly defined.  In determining the relative weight of this criterion it is to be taken into account that considerations which relate to the physical aspect of the project are not exhaustive or exclusive and the project also has the purpose of support and encouragement in the social-educational realm in distressed regions.

Therefore, as long as there is not explicit reference in the criteria for the implementation of the project to the criterion of saturated construction, and as long as its relative weight is not determined, this criterion is not to be included as a pre-condition to the implementation of the program.  Subject to the defining of the criterion which relates to saturated construction, as explained above, the establishment of the new criteria is able to address what has been sought under the first part of the petition.

Inclusion of the settlements in the first and second cluster in the project

9.    The State’s notice as to the implementation of criteria for the inclusion of new settlements in the framework of the project does not satisfy the petitioners even if they are not claiming that the criteria that were implemented are flawed.  It is the petitioners’ claim that even if from now on the inclusion of settlements in the project is done on an egalitarian basis, since it is a matter of an ongoing project, the passage of time deepens the schism between the needy settlements in the Arab sector and the settlements that are included in the project already.  They also claim in response to the supplement to the State’s answer, that despite the State’s notice that there is an intention not to include new settlements in the project, the Arab settlements which ranked in the socio-economic scale of the COS as belonging to the first and second clusters should be included in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project.

This petition–to include all the settlements in the first and second cluster of the COS in the Neighborhood Restoration Project – is to be denied in the face of the formulation of the new criteria.  With the establishment of the criteria, the test for including settlements within the framework of the project is in the suitability of the settlement to said criteria, and a determination based exclusively on COS data is not longer sufficient.  However, by the nature of things, in light of the heavy weight of the COS data in the framework of the criteria, and in light of the great hardship which exists in the Arab sector, which no one disputes, it is reasonable to assume that the result of establishing the new criteria will be the inclusion of the settlements under discussion in the petition, or at least most of them, in the project.  Indeed this is the significance of applying egalitarian criteria; including settlements in which the hardship is greater before settlements whose economic-social situation is better.

However, in the face of the existence of the new criteria, the parties dispute remains; it deals with the question:  whether in the present situation as long as the Neighborhood Restoration Project exists as to settlements which were recognized in the framework of the project in the past, it is proper to add the requested Arab settlements immediately, without waiting for their gradual inclusion according to the criteria which were established.  The State argues as to this, that the request to add additional settlements to the project now, is to be denied.  In its reasoning it points to the fact that the budget for neighborhood restoration is limited in scope and since it is an ongoing project, the addition of new settlements may harm those that have already been included in the framework of the program.

10.  We accept that a change in a discriminatory policy and implementation of a new and egalitarian policy, on its own, does not justify harming those who were included in the original program.  (see as to the this: HCJ 637/89 ‘A Constitution for the State of Israel’ v. Ministry of Finance [7] at p. 207; HCJ 4906/98 ‘Am Hofshi’Association for the Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education and Culture v. Ministry of Construction and Housing [8] at p. 523).   The neighborhoods and settlements that were included in the past in the Neighborhood Restoration Project are distressed neighborhoods and there is no dispute that it is not appropriate to stop programs in these neighborhoods and settlements.  The petitioners note that they are not asking for this.  It is to be taken into consideration that it is a matter of ongoing programs whose implementation has already begun and it is proper to enable their completion.  Moreover, the settlements benefitting from these programs have a reliance interest that is also to be recognized for the purpose of granting additional allocation for completion of the project.  Therefore, inclusion of the Arab settlements without consideration of the limited scope of the project in its present formulation, and without consideration of the reliance interest of those benefitting from it, is not a proper solution.

As for the need to remedy the disadvantage caused to the Arab sector in this matter, the State argues that the proper way to address the situation that was created is in implementation of the government decision of October 22, 2000, to implement the multi-year program in the framework of which funds will be allocated in broad scope to development of settlements in the Arab sector and programs whose purpose overlaps with the programs included in the Neighborhood Restoration Project will also be implemented.  These designated programs are meant to be in a scope that is significantly broader than the Neighborhood Restoration Project and encompass both realms of physical infrastructure and social realms.  This response of the State does not properly address what is requested in the petition.  The multi-year plan is indeed meant to address the disadvantage that has been created over the years and to bridge the gaps of the past, but at this time, at the phase in which the multi-year plan is in today, it cannot serve as a substitute for programs operated via the Neighborhood Restoration Project.  This is for two reasons: the first, due to the absence of concrete-budgetary expression for said plans, and the second which is derived from it, that absent budgetary expression, it cannot be established whether the designated program was necessarily designated for development of a program parallel to the one included in the Neighborhood Restoration Project.  If defined programs will be established which will also have budgetary expression and which will have the ability to address the needs which today are addressed in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, it will be possible to determine that any program equal in weight will replace a similar program given within the framework of the project.  However, as long as there is no such concrete expression, the program does not create an exemption of the requirement to apply the said project to the Arab sector.

As we have described, in the situation that was created the core of the problem is in implementing the programs in the social realm and in particular in education programs.  In the petition in HCJ EWS [1] we discussed the need to establish conditions for implementation of the special programs of the Division for Education and Welfare Services in the Ministry of Education – the EWS Division – in an egalitarian manner on the Arab sector.  It was made clear that a certain part of the activity of the division which deals with advancing weak populations in Israel is conditioned on the inclusion of the settlement or neighborhood in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project, and that the part of the Arab settlements in this project was very limited.  With the addition of Arab settlements to the project, over the course of the years, there has been improvement in this matter, however, the proportion of the funds granted in the framework of the Neighborhood Restoration Project in the social realm is still lower than the appropriate relative proportion in accordance with the size of the population and in accordance with its needs, which differs from the allocation of funds in the physical realm which is included in neighborhood restoration.  This is not an appropriate situation.  The State has the duty to grant education to the overall population according to egalitarian criteria, while giving equal opportunity.  When it chose to establish programs for the advancement of education in distressed strata, via the Neighborhood Restoration Project, it must maintain these programs in an egalitarian manner, and even detached from the realm of physical restoration.  As we noted, the Neighborhood Restoration Project enables separation between the physical realm and the social realm.

As said, from the State’s notice we have learned that the future of the project is being re-examined and that this re-examination will take several months.  It is to be assumed that the re-examination is nearing an end; before we point to the appropriate remedy, we will note that the petition is based on the presumption that the Neighborhood Restoration Project continues to exist and this is also the starting point of our discussion.  Accordingly, we accept the State’s claim that consequent to the ongoing character of the project which still necessitates its operation in neighborhoods included within it, and in consideration of the limited budget designated to the project today, it will not be possible include immediately all the distressed Arab neighborhoods.  However, the budgetary portion of the project which relates to social restoration is to be implemented for the appropriate settlements according to the established criteria, within a short time period.  This implementation will be done to a degree that suits the needs and hardship of the Arab sector, and in any event, in a degree that will not be less than its relative proportion in the population.

11.  In conclusion, the necessary conclusion of the above is this:

(A)  As to the first remedy, which deals with establishing egalitarian criteria, the petition was made partially extraneous in the face of the drafting of the requested criteria in 1999.  However, as said above, the criteria are to be redrafted and the criterion relating to ‘saturated construction’ and its relative weight among the rest of the criteria is to be given explicit expression within them.

 (B) The petition to include within the project all the Arab settlements which are included in the first and second clusters according to the socio-economic ranking of the COS is denied.  However, we determine that if it is not decided to end the Neighborhood Restoration Project, the objective of including new settlements in the project, on the assumption that settlements whose hardship is the greatest will be included in accordance with the criteria as they will be amended, is to be continued.  In all that relates to programs which relate to the social-educational realm of the project, they are to be given preference and to be applied to Arab settlements in a proportion which matches their needs and their hardship.  In any event, beginning with the next budget year, care is to be taken that the proportion of the budget that is designated for the Arab sector in the framework of the social-educational realm of the project is not to be less than the relative proportion of the sector in the population.

(C)  The multi-year plan for development in the Arab sector whose importance the government of Israel has recognized, and proclaimed its intention to actualize in a gradual manner, will not detract from the Neighborhood Restoration Project, unless it establishes programs of equal value which can replace the programs operated today in this realm.

The petition is therefore granted in part as to the requested criteria as said in paragraph 11(a), and is denied as to the immediate inclusion of all the settlements detailed in the petition subject to what has been detailed in paragraphs 11(b) and (c).  Under the circumstances there is no order as to expenses.

 

 

President A. Barak

I agree.

 

Justice J. Kedmi

I agree.

 

It was decided as per the opinion of Justice Beinisch.

 

12 December 2001

27 Kislev 5762

 

 

 

Cohen v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 4169/10
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Petitions seeking remedies concerning the release of foreign arrestees who took part in a flotilla from Turkey to the Gaza Strip were rejected. Following the notice of the Attorney General regarding the release of the foreign arrestees, part of these petitions have become unnecessary, whereas regarding the petitions challenging the decision of the Attorney General, it a decision within the discretion of the Attorney General and there is no reason for intervention. The High Court of Justice (in an opinion written by Justice D. Beinisch) rejected the Petitions for the following reasons:

 

Following the decision of the Attorney General, the primary remedies sought as part of these petitions have become unnecessary.

 

As for the Petitions against the Attorney General’s decision to release the foreign arrestees, it is a decision within the range of the Attorney General’s discretion. This Court held in a long line of decisions that the extent of intervention into the discretion of the Attorney General in regards to an investigation or an indictment is limited only to exceptional and unusual cases. Because of the unique nature of the event and the circumstances around it, which – in addition to the criminal aspects – bears political aspects that concern the country’s foreign affairs as well, the Attorney General was permitted to consider such aspects. The developments that occurred in the international arena regarding this affair point to special political sensitivity as to law enforcements treatment of the participants of the flotilla. The Attorney General noted that he consulted all the government bodies relevant to these political aspects and that after considering the fact that nine of the participants were killed and several dozens were injured, he concluded that the political, security and public interests outweigh the interests of criminal law enforcement. The Court found neither in this decision, which was given the above reasons, nor in the considerations that justified it, a reason for intervention. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

 

HCJ 4169/10

HCJ 4193/10

HCJ 4220/10

HCJ 4221/10

HCJ 4240/10

HCJ 4243/10

 

 

Before: The Honorable President D. Beinisch, The Honorable Justice
M. Naor, The Honorable Justice U. Vogelman

 

Petitioners in HCJ 4169/10: Yiftach Cohen; Omer Shatz, Itamar Mann

Respondents in HCJ 4169/10: The Minister of Defense; The Minister of the Interior; The Minister of Public Security

 

Petitioners in HCJ 4193/10: Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel; Public Committee Against Torture in Israel; Physicians for Human Rights

Respondents in HCJ 4193/10: The Minister of Defense; The Military Advocate General; The Israel Prison Service; The Israel Police; The Immigration Authority

 

Petitioners in HCJ 4220/10: Al Jazeera Satellite Network; Othman Al Bukhairi; Abas Naser; Muhammad Fal; Ali Sabri; Andrei Abu Khalil; Jamal Al Shial; Wasima Bin Salah

Respondents in HCJ 4220/10: The Israel Defense Forces; The Minister of Defense; The Minister of Public Security

 

Petitioner in HCJ 4221/10: Yekutiel Ben Yaakov

Respondents in HCJ 4221/10: The Israel Police; The Israel Prison Service; The Government of Israel; The Minister of Defense; The Prime Minister

 

Petitioner in HCJ 4240/10: Shurat Hadin – Israel Law Center

Respondents in HCJ 4240/10: The Attorney General; The Prime Minister; The Minister of Public Security; The Minister of the Interior; The Israel Police

 

Petitioners in HCJ 4243/10: 1. Almagor – Terror Victims Association; Y.S. – Navy commando (res.); D.B. – Navy commando (res.) and bereaved brother; Pniel Krichman; Yekira and Zecharia Komemi; Aviva and Rahamim Komemi; Tzila Rahamim; Moshe Keinan; Briana and Shmuel Hilberg

Respondents in HCJ 4243/10: The Prime Minister; The Minister of the Interior; The Attorney General; The Inspector General of the Israel Police

 

 

Petitions to grant an order nisi

 

Date of hearing:

20 Nisan 5770

(June 2, 2010)

 

For the petitioners in HCJ 4169/10: Itamar Mann; Yiftach Cohen; Omer Shatz

For the petitioners in HCJ 4193/10: Fatima El Ajou

For the petitioners in HCJ 4220/10: Zaki Kamal; Kamal Zaki Kamal

For the petitioner in HCJ 4421/10: Himself

For the petitioner in HCJ 4240/10: Nitsana Darshan Leitner

For the petitioners in HCJ 4243/10: Sharon Avni; Shira Greenberg

For the respondents: The State Attorney Moshe Lador; Osnat Mandel; Dina Zilber; Hila Groni

 

 

Judgment

 

 

President D. Beinisch:

 

 

1.          In view of the control of the Gaza Strip by the Hamas organization, Israel has taken various measures designed to prevent direct access to the Gaza Strip, among them a blockade of the Gaza Strip which, as declared by the State, is designed to prevent the infiltration of weapons and arms to the Hamas organization, which, for years, has carried out acts of shooting and terrorism at Israeli territory for the purpose of harming civilians.

 

2.          In recent weeks, announcements have been publicly made by various organizations, among them organizations that declared themselves to be acting for humanitarian purposes, regarding their intention to arrange a flotilla of ships which, they claimed, were designated to transfer foodstuffs and materials as humanitarian aid to the residents of the Gaza Strip. Israel, for its part, made efforts to prevent the flotilla from reaching the shores of Gaza and breaching the blockade in such manner. The State proposed to the organizers of the flotilla, among others, that the cargo – which was supposed to reach Gaza – be unloaded from the ships and transferred directly to Gaza via Israel. This proposal was rejected.

 

             In the early hours of May 31, a number of ships approached the shores of Israel to implement the flotilla's plan. As decided by the political echelon, the IDF prepared to take measures to prevent the entry of the ships into the Gaza Strip as stated. In the framework of an operation that was designed to stop the ships, soldiers landed on the deck of the ship Mavi Marmara, the largest ship in the flotilla. The soldiers met with a violent and severe response from the flotilla participants on the ship. The soldiers were attacked with knives, clubs and iron rods. Attempts were made to seize the soldiers’ personal weapons and they were violently attacked. One of the soldiers was even thrown off the deck of the ship. The soldiers were forced to respond to defend their lives and, unfortunately, the operation ended with unexpected loss of life - nine people were killed and both soldiers and flotilla participants were injured. The operation concluded with the ships being halted and their passengers removed and detained in Israel.

 

3.          That same morning, when the results of the operation became known, the petition in HCJ 4169/10 was filed with this court (hereinafter: the First Petition), in which four attorneys filed the petition as public petitioners. It should be noted that at the opening of the hearing before us, the petitioners gave notice of the request of attorney A. Feldman, who was among the petitioners, to strike his name from the petition. The petition ascribed grave and illegal acts to the State of Israel and the petitions sought a remedy of habeas corpus to free all the detainees. It is evident in the petition, which was hastily filed, that, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners knew nothing about the actual events, they were quick to cast the gravest aspersions on the actions of the IDF forces, while using inappropriate language. Notwithstanding that stated, because the relief sought was the release of the detainees, the petition was not stricken in limine at that stage, and the State’s response was requested by the following day.

 

             During the course of that day and the following day, a number of additional petitions were filed with court. In HCJ
4193/10, which was filed on behalf of the Adalah organization and other human rights organizations, the petitioners requested information on the detainees and their whereabouts, as well as details on the injured and the dead. This petition was also filed as a public petition. Another petition (HCJ 4220/10) was filed by the Al Jazeera television network and in the name of journalists acting on its behalf who had been arrested on the ship. This petition requested the release of the network personnel who had participated in the flotilla. It should be noted that during the hearing that we held, it transpired that this petition was superfluous since the petitioners had already been released.

 

4.          On June 1, 2010, the government issued a statement that all the foreign flotilla participants would be released and returned to their countries. After this statement was issued, three additional petitions were filed with this court: HCJ 4221/10, which was filed on behalf of Mr. Yekutiel Ben Yaakov; HCJ 4240/10, which was filed by Shurat Hadin – Israel Law Center; and HJC 4243/10 filed by Almagor – Terror Victims Association. In these three petitions, the remedy sought was to bar the release of the foreign flotilla participants, with the main argument being that these were people who had committed an offense, who were required both for investigating the facts and the circumstances surrounding the incident and for a decision about arraignment for trial.

 

             In view of the remedy sought, which related to the question of the release of a large number of detainees, we conducted an urgent hearing and deliberated all the petitions together before the panel at that session, and within two days of the filing of the First Petition.

 

5.          Before the hearing, the State submitted a written response in which it protested the description of the events in the First Petition and pointed out the distortion of the facts therein. In essence, the State addressed the legality of the blockade and referred to an alternative remedy set forth in the relevant provisions of the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, with regard to the foreign participants in the flotilla and the relevant provisions of the law pertaining to the criminal proceedings of investigation and detention with regard to the Israeli suspects who participated in the event. During the day, proximate to the time of hearing the petitions, the State completed its statement and submitted a decision formulated by the attorney general, which stated that on the day of the event, May 31, 2010, the attorney general ordered the opening of an investigation on suspicion of offenses committed on the deck of the ship Mavi Marmara, including the offense of the grave attack on IDF soldiers, disturbing the peace, endangering the lives of soldiers, seizing weapons and so forth. The attorney general further stated that the next day, the ministerial committee on national security matters convened and conducted a long and exhaustive discussion of the security, political, legal and other aspects of the affair. At the end of the discussion, the senior political echelon recommended “to enable the immediate deportation of all the foreigners who had arrived on the flotilla, who were suspected of committing criminal offenses. This is recommended for clear political reasons pertaining to foreign relations and the security of the State of Israel.” In his decision, the attorney general noted that he had discussed the matter with the state attorney and other senior officials at the Ministry of Justice and other government ministries, at the end of which he decided, as stated, to allow the immediate deportation of all the foreigners from Israel.

 

6.          During the hearing before us, State Attorney Moshe Lador, appeared together with senior attorneys. It should be noted that due to the nature of the proceedings which we conducted, we sought not to address the claims pertaining to the legality of the blockade, nor with the factual events during that grave incident, the full details of which had not been presented to us. Claims pertaining to the detention of Israelis suspected of committing offenses while participating in the flotilla were also not adjudicated before us, as they should be argued in individual hearings on the criminal arrest proceedings before the competent courts. The hearing focused on the urgent remedies sought which pertain to holding the foreign detainees. The state attorney stated that all the foreigners who wished to do so could be released from detention and, in effect, those who had not yet left the country were on their way to the airport. The wounded whose medical condition allowed for it, were also removed to their countries of origin. Apparently, two of the wounded remained in the hospital because their condition did not enable them to be flown back to their country. The state attorney further stated that the names of all the wounded had been submitted to the relevant consulates and, with regard to those who came from countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, the details were provided to the Red Cross. It should be noted that the State did not see fit to acquiesce to the request to provide details in this matter to counsel for the Adalah organization, as the details had been provided to the relevant entities. However, the possibility arose that if a specific, substantive application were to be made to obtain details regarding one of the casualties or the wounded, the State would examine the possibility of providing counsel for the Adalah organization with the requested details. It further transpired that the remaining details requested by the Adalah organization regarding the place in which the detainees were being held were resolved. The Adalah organization’s counsel also made claims with regard to the detainees' ability to meet with attorneys. During the hearing it was made clear that there had been no intention to prevent such a meeting, and many detainees had actually already met with attorneys. Due to the need to release hundreds of people quickly, not all the detainees may have had the opportunity to meet with an attorney.

 

             The position of the attorney general to release all the foreign participants meant that the main remedy sought in the First Petition was already granted. In the course of the arguments, in view of the response of the state attorney and the comments of the court, the petitioners retracted the style of the scathing verbal attack that they had employed in the petition.

 

7.          As stated, three of the petitions were filed against the attorney general’s decision to release the foreign detainees. Each one of the petitioners argued before us at length about the importance of keeping the detainees in Israel for the purpose of conducting an exhaustive investigation regarding the grave events that occurred on the ship, and regarding the need to exercise the full rigor of the law or, at least, to investigate details which, they claim, would constitute defense arguments for the IDF soldiers.

 

             We did not find any ground for intervention in the decision of the attorney general. The decision to release the detainees is in the realm of the attorney general’s discretion. In a long series of judgments, this Court has ruled that the scope of intervention in the attorney general’s discretion in decisions pertaining to investigation or prosecution is limited to exceptional and unusual instances. Due to the unusual nature of the event and the circumstances entailed therein which, aside from the criminal aspects, also encompass political aspects pertaining to the State’s foreign relations, the attorney general was entitled to consider these aspects. The developments that have ensued in the international arena indicate that a particular political sensitivity exists in everything pertaining to the handling of the matter by the enforcement entities. The attorney general noted that he consulted with all the relevant government entities and after taking into account the fact that nine flotilla participants were killed and several dozen were wounded, he reached the conclusion that the public, political and security interests outweigh the interests of criminal enforcement. We did not find in this decision, which was reasoned as stated, and in the considerations underlying it, any cause for intervention.

 

             Wherefore, after we were convinced that the main remedies sought in some of the petitions were superfluous, and in the absence of cause to intervene in the decision of the attorney general, we have decided to deny the petitions.

 

             Given this day, 20 Sivan 5770 (June 2, 2010).

 

 

The President          Justice                 Justice

_________________________

This copy is subject to editorial and textual changes 10041690_N04.doc AB

Information Center Tel; 02-65936666, website www.court.gov.il

Center for the Defense of the Individual v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3117/02
Date Decided: 
Sunday, April 14, 2002
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: This petition was submitted during IDF operations against the terrorist 
infrastructure in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. (“Operation Defensive 
Wall.”) Petitioners argued that respondent was not using the special rescue unit 
of the IDF Homefront Command to search for all persons that may be buried 
alive under ruins in the Jenin refugee camp. 

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that both law and morality mandated that the 
rescue unit enter the Jenin refugee camp. As this unit had entered the camp, as 
per respondents reply, the goal of the petition had been fulfilled. 

Voting Justices: 
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 3117/02

Center for the Defence of the Individual, founded by Dr. Lotah Saltzberger

v.

The Minister of Defence

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[April 14, 2002]

Before President Barak., Justices T. Or  and D. Beinisch.

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: This petition was submitted during IDF operations against the terrorist infrastructure in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. (“Operation Defensive Wall.”) Petitioners argued that respondent was not using the special rescue unit of the IDF Homefront Command to search for all persons that may be buried alive under ruins in the Jenin refugee camp.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that both law and morality mandated that the rescue unit enter the Jenin refugee camp. As this unit had entered the camp, as per respondents reply, the goal of the petition had been fulfilled.

 

For the petitioners—Yossi Wolfson

For the respondent—Malchiel Blass, Yuval Rotman

 

JUDGMENT

This petition before us asks why respondent does not, using the special rescue unit of the IDF Homefront Command, search for and rescue all persons buried alive under the ruins of the Jenin refugee camp. The petition was served on Saturday night. The Justice on duty decided that the petition would be heard today, April 14, 2002, in the morning. At the beginning of the hearing, with respondent not having had time to prepare a written response, he informed us that the rescue unit of the Homefront Command had already entered the Jenin refugee camp, together with other forces, to the extent that security restrictions have allowed. The unit will attempt to locate people.

As such, it appears to us that this petition has achieved its objectives.  The entry of the rescue unit is necessitated by both law and morality. The responsibility lies, of course, on the shoulders of the Military Commander on site. He will collect information regarding the possible location of people—information relayed by soldiers and locals, as well as making use of the experience of the unit itself. All this is subject to the judgment of the Military Commander and to the security needs in the field.

In light of the declaration of the State, the petition is rejected.

April 14, 2002

HaMoked v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3278/02
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, October 15, 2002
Decision Type: 
Original
Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Introduction to the full text: 

Beginning in September of 2000, there was an increase in Palestinian terrorist activity against the Jewish community in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and within Israel itself.  Hundreds were killed and wounded.  In reaction, the army initiated military activities.  Hundreds of Palestinians were killed and wounded.  Terrorist activity intensified in the beginning of 2002.  In March of that year there was an increase of Palestinian terrorist activity.  Approximately one hundred and twenty Israeli civilians were killed and hundreds were wounded.  In response to the terrorist activity, the government decided, on 29.03.2002, to carry out a large-scale military operation.  The goal of the operation, Operation Defensive Wall, was to destroy the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure.  During the operation, the Israel Defense Forces [hereinafter the IDF] entered many areas in Judea and Samaria which were under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

HCJ 3278/02                                                                                             

 

1.  HaMoked: The Center for the Defence of the Individual founded by Dr. Lotte Salzberger

2.  Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

3.  The Association for Civil Rights in Israel

4.  B’tselem – The Israeli Information Center of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

5.  Kanon – The Palestinian Organization for the Protection of Human and Environmental Rights

6.  Addameer – Prison Support and Human Rights Association

7.  Alhak – The Law in Service of Human Rights

v.

Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank

 

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[April 25, 2002; July 28, 2002, October 15, 2002]

Before President A. Barak, Justice D. Beinisch and Justice I. Englard

 

For the petitioners—Dan Yakir; Leah Tzemel; Tarek Ibrahim; Yossi Wolfson; Hisham Shabaita

For the respondents—Shai Nitzan

 

 

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

 

Facts

 

1.   Beginning in September of 2000, there was an increase in Palestinian terrorist activity against the Jewish community in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and within Israel itself.  Hundreds were killed and wounded.  In reaction, the army initiated military activities.  Hundreds of Palestinians were killed and wounded.  Terrorist activity intensified in the beginning of 2002.  In March of that year there was an increase of Palestinian terrorist activity.  Approximately one hundred and twenty Israeli civilians were killed and hundreds were wounded.  In response to the terrorist activity, the government decided, on 29.03.2002, to carry out a large-scale military operation.  The goal of the operation, Operation Defensive Wall, was to destroy the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure.  During the operation, the Israel Defense Forces [hereinafter the IDF] entered many areas in Judea and Samaria which were under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

                                     

2.   Within the framework of Operation Defensive wall, the army carried out a wide-ranging operation of detention. The IDF entered Palestinian cities and villages and detained many suspects.  At the height of the activity about 6000 people were detained.  Initially, the detentions were carried out in accordance with the standard criminal detention laws of the area, specifically Security Regulations Order 387 (Judea and Samaria)-1970.  Since 5.04.2002, the detentions have been carried out under the authority of a special order—Detention in Time of Warfare (Temporary Order) (Judea and Samaria) (Number 1500)-2002 [hereinafter Order 1500].  During the first stage of these detentions, the detainees were brought to temporary facilities, which were set up at brigade headquarters. Here the detainees were initially screened, a process whose duration extended between a few hours and two days.  At this point, a substantial number of the detainees were released. During the second stage, those who remained were transferred to a  central detention facility in the area, located at Ofer Camp, for further investigation. Several days after the initiation of Operation Defensive Wall, after the detention facilities at Ofer Camp were prepared, the temporary screening facilities were shut down and the initial screening stage also took place at Ofer Camp.  The petition before us is directed against the detention conditions at both the initial temporary facilities and at Ofer Camp.  In the third stage, some of the detainees were transferred to Kziot Camp.  An additional petition directed against the detention conditions at Kziot, HCJ 5591/02, is pending before this Court, and will be dealt with separately.  A petition regarding the lawfulness of Order 1500 is also pending before this Court. See HCJ 3239/02.  The current petition deals only with the temporary detention conditions at the brigade headquarters during the first stage, and the detentions conditions during the second phase at Ofer Camp.

 

Petitioners’ Arguments

 

3.   The petitioners complain about the detention conditions at both the temporary facilities and at Ofer camp.  Regarding the temporary facilities, the petitioners claim that the detainees were forced to sit on the ground with their heads bent and their hands down, and that their hands were handcuffed in a rough manner, which caused fierce pains and bruise marks.  Furthermore, petitioners claim that the detainees' eyes were covered, that, if they moved or raised their heads, they were exposed to the physical and verbal abuse of the supervising soldiers, that they remained in this difficult position for hours, and that, during this time, they were exposed to the rigors of the weather and were unable to sleep.  Petitioners further assert that detainees were deprived of sustenance, that, though they were permitted to go to the bathroom, permission was not often granted, and that there was no documentation of the possessions that were taken from the detainees, including ID cards, cellular phones and cash. 

 

4.   The petitioners also complain about the inhumane conditions at Ofer Camp.  They claim that the facilities are exceedingly overcrowded.  The detainees were transferred into tents or “shelters," which do not shield the detainees against the rigors of the weather.  The detainees were not supplied with sufficient mattresses, nor were the mattresses that were supplied of reasonable quality.  Furthermore, petitioners assert that the detainees did not receive enough blankets, and that the food that they were provided with was insufficient and of poor quality.  Meals were served in small bowls, without plates or other eating utensils.  They were not provided with clothing.  There were not enough bathroom stalls, nor were they supplied with sufficient toilet paper.  The showers did not have hot water, nor was there sufficient soap.  Furthermore, they assert that, other than painkillers, they received no medical treatment.

 

5.   The petitioners ask that we order the respondent to provide minimal humane detention conditions – which will be reasonable and appropriate – both during the first stage of detention at the temporary facilities and also during the second stage of detention in Ofer Camp.  These conditions must be both suitable and respectable.  The petitioners also ask that we order the respondent to allow representatives of human rights organizations to visit Ofer Camp and observe the conditions of detention provided there.

 

Statement of the State Attorney

 

6.   In the response brief submitted on 24.4.2002, the respondent notes that, at the beginning of Operation Defensive wall, due to the large number of persons being detained, it was impossible to immediately provide all of the detainees with completely suitable detention conditions.  Therefore, for a relatively short period of time, not all of the detainees were provided with completely acceptable detention conditions.  Nevertheless, the army equipped itself very quickly.  Most of the temporary facilities were shut down.  The conditions in Ofer Camp were improved such that all of the detainees are now provided with reasonable detention conditions which meet the standards recognized by both Israeli and international law. 

 

7.   Regarding the conditions in the temporary facilities, respondent notes that the detainees remained there only a short period of time – usually for only a few hours, and no longer than forty-eight.  There, the detainees went through preliminarily interrogation and tentative screening.  Respondent notes that the temporary facilities were not equipped for long-term detentions and the conditions there provided were absolutely minimal.  Nevertheless, respondent noted that to the best of his knowledge, the detainees had been supplied with drinking water, sustenance and medical treatment by doctors on location.  The detainees had access to the bathrooms. Regarding the handcuffs, it was emphasized that the manner of handcuffing the petitioners complain of is prohibited, and that soldiers have no permission to employ such methods.  Respondent asserts that each complaint will be dealt with individually.  Regarding the failure to document the possessions seized from the detainees, it was noted that at the beginning of the period there had apparently been deficiencies in the matter, due to the lack of awareness of those running the facilities.  The situation was quickly remedied, with an order being issued to precisely document of all possessions seized from detainees.  To the best of the respondent’s knowledge, this order has been implemented.  With respect to the complaint that the detainees should be held in a shelter shielded from the weather, the respondent points out that the temporary facilities were intended to hold detainees for very short periods of time.  Some of the detainees were provided with shelter, whether in tents or in permanent buildings.  With regard to the claim that the detainees were subject to the verbal and physical abuse of the soldiers, respondent asserts that such activity is prohibited.  He adds that the detainees can complain about such matters to the commanders in the respective facilities.

 

8.   As to Ofer Camp: respondent asserts that some of the detainees were moved there after an initial screening at the temporary facilities.  When the temporary facilities were shut down, all of the detainees were moved to the Ofer Camp.  Between 29.03.2002 and 22.04.2002, over the course of about three weeks, about 3,000 detainees were brought to the facility.  After being screened and interrogated, about 1,420 of those detained were released, a figure that is correct as of 22.04.2002.  About 240 detainees had been moved to other detention facilities as of that date, such that by 24.04.2002 approximately 1,340 detainees were being held in Ofer Camp.  Ordinarily, Ofer Camp has the capacity to hold about 450 detainees.  The facility is divided into five “detention divisions."  Five tents, designed to hold 100 detainees each, are located in four of these divisions.   Three tents are located in the fifth division, each designed to hold fifty persons. 

 

9.   The number of detainees transferred to Ofer Camp upon its opening greatly exceeded its standard or expanded capacity. In its standard capacity, Ofer is designed to hold 400 persons. In its expanded capacity, it is designed to 700 detainees, such that thirty, instead of twenty, detainees reside in each tent.  A severe situation of overcrowding developed.  In order to resolve this problem, four permanent shelters were quickly erected, using beams which had been found in the facility.  These were to provide temporary shelter for detainees.  These shelters were equipped with wooden beds and chemical bathrooms.  Later, showers were also installed in the shelters.  The shelters were prepared within a number of days.  Thus, the most severe overcrowding problem, which had caused some detainees to remain without shelter for a short period of time, was temporarily resolved.

 

10. Along with the above-mentioned activity, three days after the initiation of Operation Defensive wall, a decision was made to set up seven additional detention divisions in Ofer Camp.  These areas were opened on 24.04.2002.  They are designed to hold about 500 detainees.  The detainees who had been residing in the shelters were moved to these divisions. Two more divisions are scheduled to be opened within the next few days.  Detainees who are currently being held in the other detention divisions will be moved to the new divisions, thus relieving the overcrowding in the other facilities.  The respondent is of the opinion that the facility, after being so expanded, provides reasonable detention conditions.

 

11. The respondent extensively covered the issue of the detention conditions at Ofer Camp.  According to the respondent, as stated, since the completion of the construction activities on 24.04.2002, the issue of overcrowding no longer presents a problem.  There are three bathrooms and three showers located in each of the detention divisions, and the water in the showers may be heated. The detainees are supplied with toilet paper, soap, toothbrushes and shaving brushes.  The detainees sleep on wooden beds with mattresses, which are the same as those used by the IDF.  Initially, the number of blankets available was insufficient.   This problem was solved within a number of days, and each detainee is now supplied with at least three or four blankets.  Regarding the issue of clothing, each detainee was originally supplied with one change of clothes.  However, due to the large number of detainees, many of them soon found themselves lacking extra sets of clothing.  This problem was resolved on 23.04.2002, when a sufficient quantity of clothing arrived at the facility.  As of the time the response was submitted on 24.02.2002, each of the detainees had received at least one, if not two, changes of clothes.  Each of the detainees is provided with a coat.  Regarding the issue of sustenance, during the first few days of the facility’s operation, the food lacked in quantity and variety.  Within a matter of days, a sufficient amount of food was brought into Ofer Camp, and there is no longer a deficiency in the food supply.  The food supplied is now sufficient and varied.  A doctor is always available on location.  As part of his reception into the facility, each detainee undergoes a medical examination. Medical inspections are regularly carried out.  When it becomes necessary, detainees are moved to a hospital.  After arriving at the facility, each detainee receives a postcard and is allowed to communicate the details of his detention, including his location, to his family.  These postcards are transferred to the Palestinian Authority.  Ofer Camp has two tents in which detainees may meet with their attorneys.  Since 14.04.2002, the Red Cross has been allowed to enter the facility, and their representatives have been visiting the site without restriction.  They converse with each of the detainees in the facility.  They meet with the commanding officials and relate their comments about the detention conditions.

 

12. The respondent concluded by objecting to allowing the petitioners’ attorneys to visit Ofer camp.  He claimed that there are no legal grounds for such a request.  As noted, representatives of the Red Cross visit the facility freely, and this ensures that an outside, international body supervises the facility.

 

The First Hearing – April 25, 2002

 

13.             Upon receiving the respondent’s response brief, we held the first hearing in this matter.  The petitioners emphasized that the army should have prepared itself for the large number of persons who were to be detained, and that this oversight was a consequence of the army’s disrespect towards the fundamental rights of the detainees.  The petitioners complained about the sleeping difficulties caused by the wooden beds and thin mattresses.  Three blankets are insufficient.  The food is occasionally served cold. The detainees do not receive hot drinks.  Petitioners reiterated their request that the petitioners' attorneys be allowed to visit Ofer Camp.  The respondent stated that, regardless and independent of this petition, the army has learned the necessary lessons from its initial experiences. The facility is no longer overcrowded and its occupancy is decreasing daily.  The sleeping conditions match the IDF standards.  Each of the detainees receives four or five blankets, and upon request is provided with additional blankets.  The food provided is sufficient and is in accordance with IDF nourishment charts.

 

14. During the oral arguments we asked whether the respondent would allow the petitioners’ attorneys to visit Ofer Camp.  The respondent pointed out that the attorneys do not have visitation rights.  Nevertheless, petitioner agreed to allow a joint visit, with both himself and the petitioners, to the facility.  At the end of the hearing, we decided to postpone this proceeding to a later date.  We noted before us that five representatives of the petitioners would be permitted to visit Ofer Camp, along with the respondent’s attorney.  We ordered that within five days after the visit, the petitioners’ counsel should submit a statement.  The respondent would then be granted five additional days to submit his response.  We decided that the petition would be decided based on the contents of those statements.

 

15. Implementing the decision to allow the visit raised a number of difficulties.  During their visit, petitioners’ counsel requested that they be allowed to converse directly with the detainees.  The respondent asserted that the visit was being allowed ex gratia, and that he had initially indicated that the visitors would not be allowed to converse with the detainees.  He added that one of the petitioners’ representatives, who had requested to meet with the detainees, was charged with disruption of legal proceedings for relaying messages illegally.  The petitioners’ attorneys could learn of the detainees’ complaints from their individual lawyers, who are in constant contact with them.  In light of this response, the petitioners’ attorney refused to proceed with the visit.  They requested that we order the respondent to allow the petitioners’ attorneys to meet with representatives of the detainees during their visit.  We decided to advise the parties, on 8.05.2002, that military personnel in the facility escort the visitors during their visit and decide, in exercise of their discretion, whether to allow the visitors to meet with representatives of the detainees.

 

16. Petitioners’ attorneys visited Ofer Camp on 22.05.2002.  Representatives of the State Attorney, the Judge Advocate-General and the commanders of the camp also attended.  The visit included entrance into a standard detention division where the detainees reside and the detention division where the kitchen is located.  Petitioners’ attorneys were permitted to speak with a number of the detainees’ representatives.  The respondent informed us that, despite the agreement between the parties, the petitioners’ representatives spread out among the tents and began talking to various detainees, disregarding the pleas made by the respondent’s representatives. 

 

17. After the visit we received supplementary statements from both parties.  The petitioners noted that the physical conditions of the camp had been improved since the petition had been submitted.  Nevertheless, the visit – which did not allow detailed or thorough observation of detention conditions – revealed a long list of issues which have yet to be resolved.  According to the petitioners, the following principle problems surfaced: detainees do not receive sufficient medical treatment for their illnesses; the tents are overcrowded; twenty two detainees are held in each tent; other than the sleeping areas, there is no room for the detainees to move around; it is difficult to sleep on the thin five centimeter mattresses of the wooden beds; the heat in the tents is unbearable; the three showers and three bathrooms in each division are insufficient; the maintenance of the stalls is deficient;  the quantity of clothing provided is insufficient;  the detainees are not provided with games or reading materials, save the Koran.  The petitioners' attorney listed other problems in a separate letter to the respondent.

 

18. In his supplementary statement, the respondent complained about the behavior of petitioners’ counsel during their visit in the Camp.  His response also addressed the claims made by the petitioners.  Regarding medical treatment, he noted that there is an infirmary in Ofer Camp, which employs a large staff of five doctors, medics and pharmacists.  The stock of medications is sufficient.  A doctor or medic inspects every detainee as is necessary.  When the medical treatment offered by the facility does not suffice, the detainee is moved to a hospital.  With regard to the crowding in the tents, at the time of the visit 900 detainees were residing at the facility.  At most, each tent held twenty-two detainees.  The area of each tent is sixty square meters.  The wooden beds are lined up along both sides of the tents.  In the center of the tents, there is an empty space 1.4 meters wide for passage.  The number of bathrooms and showers – three per 100 detainees – is absolutely reasonable, considering the fact that access to these six stalls is unlimited throughout the day.  With respect to the claim regarding the absence of books and games, the respondent informed us that the Red Cross provides the detainees with both.

 

The Second Hearing – July 28, 2002

 

19. Upon receiving statements from both parties we held a second hearing.  The petitioners' attorneys limited their claims to the physical conditions in which the detainees were being held.  They repeated the claims that they had presented in their supplementary statement, while complaining of the overcrowding and heat in the tents, the absence of dining tables which causes the detainees to eat on the floor, the sleeping difficulties, the insufficient quantity of clothing provided and the small number of bathrooms and showers.

 

20. The respondent admitted that, in fact, when the detentions first began, the detainees were not provided with minimal dentition conditions.  Nevertheless, within a matter of days these were improved, such that Ofer Camp now operates reasonably and satisfactorily.  Five hundred and eighty detainees currently reside in the eight detention divisions.  Regarding the congestion in the tents, he pointed out that each currently holds only fourteen detainees.  There is a space of 45 centimeters between each of the beds.  Sustenance is provided according to the IDF nourishment chart.  Detainees who desire are permitted to have their own food brought in by visiting families.  Every detainee is supplied with three sets of clothing.  Some of the detainees prefer not to wear the military garments provided.  They are permitted to wear their own clothing, which is brought to them by their families.  The respondent added that the Red Cross regularly visits the facility, and that each detainee is free to speak with them.  Every detainee is entitled to meet with his attorney who may lodge, in his name, concrete and specific complaints regarding his condition. 

 

The Third Hearing – October 15, 2002

 

21. During the third and final hearing in this matter, the parties repeated their basic positions.  The petitioners' attorney noted the difficult situation that the detainees faced in the first stages of detention.  He claims that even now the detainees’ rights are being violated.  The overcrowding persists; the beds are unsuitable for sleeping; the bathrooms are inappropriate; a number of the faucets are malfunctioning and the facility is not equipped for the winter.  In his response brief the respondent noted that, in the first stages of detention, “there was a big mess."  In time, the conditions have been improved and they now meet legal requirements.  With regard to crowding, it was indicated that the facility is designed to hold 1,100 persons, and it was now holds only 900 detainees.  As such, overcrowding is no longer an issue.  The beds meet IDF standards. The missing faucets were taken by the detainees themselves, and in any case had already been repaired.  The facility is equipped for the winter, and the drainage problem has been solved.

 

The Normative Framework

 

22. The detention conditions in the area are primarily laid down by the Imprisonment Facility Operation (West Bank) Order 29-1967 [hereinafter, the Imprisonment Order].  This order provides directives regarding the conditions of imprisonment in the area.  Most of its provisions, save the following three, have no bearing on the matter at hand.  First, the order specifies that “prisoners shall be provided with appropriate nourishment that will guarantee the preservation of their health," Imprisonment Order, § 4, that “prisoners shall be provided with necessary medical treatment," Imprisonment Order § 5(a), and that “prisoners shall receive a receipt when their family identification and personal ID cards are taken," Imprisonment Order § 7.

 

23. These specific provisions are subject to the general principles of customary international law.  They are also subject to the directives regarding detention conditions set out in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War-1949 [hereinafter, the Fourth Geneva Convention].  As is well-known, Israel considers itself bound by the humanitarian directives of this Convention.  The respondent reiterated this commitment while in his response to the petition before us.  The directives of the Geneva Convention regarding detention conditions are clearly of a humanitarian nature; therefore they should be adhered to.  The question of whether or not the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty applies to detention conditions in the area need not be answered here.  The general principles of administrative law, which apply to Israeli soldiers in the area, are sufficient for this matter. See  HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, IsrSC 37(4) 785.  According to these principles, the army must act, inter alia, reasonably and proportionately, while striking a proper balance between the liberty of the individual and the needs of the public. One may learn about the proper standards of reasonableness and proportionality from the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners.  These standards were adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1955, and were ratified by the United Nations in 1957 and in 1977. See HCJ 221/80 Darvish v. The Prison Service, IsrSC 35(1) 536, 539-40, [hereinafter Darvish]; HCJ 540-546/86 Yosef v. Administrator of the Central Prison in Judea and Samaria, IsrSC 40(1) 567, 573, [hereinafter Yosef]; HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 42(3) 801, 832, [hereinafter Sajadia]. These standards apply to all imprisoned persons, including detainees.  Needless to say, these general standards must always be adjusted to the specific circumstances, with regard to time and place, while ensuring adherence to at least the bare minimum.  Justice Bach has noted:

 

One should not infer from this that all of the directives of the convention regarding the detention conditions of administrative detainees must be followed blindly.  Each and every directive should be examined with regard to its significance, its indispensability, and its adjustment to the special circumstances of the detention facility which is the subject of our proceeding.

 

Sajadia, at 832. Furthermore, we do not deal here with the imprisonment conditions of prisoners held in prisons.  We are dealing with the detention conditions of those being held in detention facilities in the area.  These detainees were detained during warfare in the area.  According to the security forces, the circumstances of the detentions are such that there is fear that the detainees endanger or are liable to endanger the security of the area, the security of IDF forces, or national security. See Order 1500 (the definition of “detainee.") 

 

24. The basic point of departure for our discussion is the balancing point between the liberty of the individual and the security of the public.  On the one hand are the rights of the individual who enjoys the presumption of innocence and desires to live as he wishes.  On the other hand lies society’s need to defend itself against those who rise up against it. Detention laws in general, and, more specifically, detention conditions, reflect this balance.  Here we find the position that detainees should be treated humanely and in recognition of their human dignity.  This is expressed in article 10 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Israel is a member of this covenant.  Article 10 of this covenant is generally recognized as reflecting customary international law. See N. S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law 27 (2nd ed. 1999).  The article states:

 

All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with human dignity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

 

See also the first principle of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1988).  Israel acts according to this principle with regard to all prisoners and detainees. See CApp 7440/97 State of Israel v. Golan, IsrSC 52(1) 1; HCJL.A. 6561/97 The State of Israel v. Mendelson, IsrSC 52(5) 849; HCJL.A. 823/96 Wanunu v. The Prison Service, IsrSC 51(2) 873).  Vice President H. Cohen expressed this principle in Darvish:

 

Any person in Israel, who has been sentenced to imprisonment, or lawfully detained, is entitled to be held under humane and civilized conditions.  It is not significant that this right has yet to be explicitly stated in legislation: this is one of the fundamental human rights, and in a law-abiding democratic state it is so self-evident that it needs not be written or legislated.

 

Darvish, at 538. Indeed, the nature of detention necessitates the denial of liberty. Even so, this does not justify the violation of human dignity.  It is possible to detain persons in a manner which preserves their human dignity, even as national security and public safety are protected. Compare Yosef, at 573. Prisoners should not be crammed like animals into inadequate spaces. Even those suspected of terrorist activity of the worst kind are entitled to conditions of detention which satisfy minimal standards of humane treatment and ensure basic human necessities.  How could we consider ourselves civilized if we did not   guarantee civilized standards to those in our custody?  Such is the duty of the commander of the area under international law, and such is his duty under our administrative law.  Such is the duty of the Israeli government, in accord with its fundamental character: Jewish, democratic and humane. Compare Yosef, at 573.

 

25. In addition to these principles, we must consider the principles and regulations set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention sets out the point of departure for the convention:

 

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.  They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof against and against insults and public curiosity....

 

However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.

 

Alongside this general directive, the Fourth Geneva Convention includes a number of directives which refer to specific conditions of detention.  We shall examine those directives which are relevant to the petition before us, and which reflect the proper balance between the right of detainees and the security needs of the area.  These directives apply to persons in “internment," meaning administrative detention. Apparently, these directives do not apply directly to detentions for the purpose of interrogation, though, indirectly, they do bear heavily on such situations.  Thus, there is no reason not to refer to these directives in regard to the detention conditions before us.  Some of the detainees being held at Ofer Camp, who are in the last stages of their detention, remain there on the authority of an administrative detention order.  The aforementioned directives directly apply to those detainees.  The Geneva Convention specifies that detention conditions must preserve the health and personal hygiene of the detainees, while protecting them from weather conditions.  The detention facility should be properly lit and heated, especially in the late afternoon and until curfew; the sleeping areas should be sufficiently spacious and ventilated; and, in providing bedding, the weather conditions, as well as the age, gender and health conditions of the detainees, should be taken into account.  Detainees should be provided with clean and hygienically maintained bathrooms.  The detainees should receive a sufficient supply of soap and water for laundry and daily bathing; they should be provided with the necessary equipment to this end.  Detainees shall have access to showers, as well as sufficient time for bathing. See Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 85.  Detainees shall receive daily nourishment which is satisfactory in its quantity, quality and variety, such that it preserves their health and prevents the development of illnesses which originate in malnutrition; detainees shall be allowed to prepare their own food; they shall be provided with a sufficient supply of drinking water. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 89.  Detainees shall be provided with sufficient changes of clothing, appropriate for the weather conditions. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 90. An infirmary supervised by doctors shall be located in each detention area; detainees shall have unlimited access to medical authorities. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 91.  Detainees shall undergo medical inspections at least once a month. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 92.  The authorities will encourage learning and educational activities.  They will also encourage the detainees to engage in sports and games.  Sufficient space will be allotted for sporting activities. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 94.  Any items taken from the detainee at the time of his detention shall be returned to him upon his release. Family identification and personal ID cards shall not be seized without providing the detainee with a receipt.  Detainees shall never remain without identification. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 97.  The disciplinary order in the detention facility must conform to the principles of humanity.  The body and spirit of the detainees shall not be harmed. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 100. The minimal standards of treating prisoners, which apply to all forms of detention, do not add significant provisions on the matters relevant to this petition.  It is sufficient to note the following requirements: detainees require minimal space for sleeping, lighting and heating. Fourth Geneva Convention, reg. 10. Each detainee shall have his own bed. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. reg. 19. At least one hour of physical activity shall be allowed. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 21. A doctor from the detention facility shall inspect the conditions of sanitation.

 

From the General to the Specific

 

26. In order to implement these specific principles and rules in this case, we must distinguish between the two stages of detention the detainees went through.  First, we shall deal with the detention in the temporary facilities.  This occurred during the first days of detention.  The detainees were held at brigade headquarters, which was not adequately prepared for so many detainees.  These special circumstances should be taken into account when examining whether the respondent maintained the necessary detention conditions.  In referring to the issue of overcrowding in Sajadia, President Shamgar correctly stated: 

 

The existence of extreme crowding at the beginning of the wave of detentions may be explained by the security need for the simultaneous imprisonment of many people.

 

Sajadia, at 823. Nevertheless, even in such a situation, everything must be done to preserve the minimal standards of detention conditions.  These standards were not observed during the initial stages of detentions at the temporary facilities, and this conduct violated the detention order, the international laws which apply to the area and the fundamental principles of Israeli administrative law.  It will suffice to note several blatant breaches of these standards: detainees’ hands were handcuffed in a rough manner, which resulted in fierce pains and bruise marks; some of the detainees were kept outside for hours, as many as forty-eight, not sheltered from weather conditions and without sufficient access to bathrooms; their possessions were taken from them without being documented.  These conditions of detention can not be justified, nor can other deviations from minimal standards be excused by the need to accommodate so many detainees in such a short period of time. The necessity was known in advance.  It was expected.  Operation Defensive wall was planned in advance.  One of its goals was to arrest as many suspected terrorists as possible.  As such, the need for minimal detention conditions was a natural result of the goals of the operation.  There was no surprise in the matter.  There was the possibility of preparing appropriate divisions with suitable detention conditions.  What was done a number of days after the beginning of the operation should have been done several days before it began.  Indeed, security needs – which must always be taken into account – did not justify the inadequacies in the conditions of detention in the temporary facilities.

 

27. During the second phase, the detainees relocated to Ofer Camp.  During the first days in which the detainees were received in Ofer Camp, some of the minimal requirements regarding detention conditions were not fulfilled.  As we have seen, at the beginning of Operation Defensive Wall, Ofer Camp’s capacity was 450 detainees, with the option of expanding to 700.  In fact, a much larger number of detainees were brought to the facility.  The overcrowding was unbearable.  A substantial number of detainees remained unsheltered, exposed to the rigors of weather conditions.  Not all of the detainees received a sufficient supply of blankets.  These circumstances did not satisfy minimal standards of detention conditions, and had no security justification.

 

28. Shortly after, Ofer Camp's entered a period of routine operation, during which minimal requirements were satisfied.  This was the situation when the respondent first submitted his statement on 24.04.2002, and at the time of the first hearing.  Since then, additional improvements have been made.  The current conditions essentially satisfy the minimal required conditions, and in some cases, the conditions in Ofer Camp even exceed such minimal requirements.  Such a state of affairs is appropriate:  "minimal conditions" guarantee, as their name suggests, only the necessary minimum.  Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state, should aim to more than the minimum, and the respondent acted admirably in ensuring that, regarding certain matters, the conditions exceed minimum requirements.  Even so, two matters still demand improvement.  First, the army should reconsider the issue of supplying tables at which the detainees may eat.  The explanation offered for the absence of such tables – that the detainees will dismantle the tables, and use them in such a way as will disturb security – is unconvincing.  The detainees have not used the wooden beds in this manner, and there is no reason to believe they will do so with tables.  Additionally, concrete tables may be deeply embedded in the ground, thus preventing the detainees from dismantling them.  For those accustomed to eat at tables, the need for such tables is part of their human dignity.  Detainees are not animals and they should not be forced to eat on the ground. See Yoseph, at 575.  It is of course possible that there is not enough space for tables, whether in or around the tents.  This may require the expansion of the detention camp.  The weight and position of this argument has not been explored before us, and we ask that the matter be reconsidered.  Second, the respondent must ensure that books, newspapers and games be provided to the detainees.  Minimal standards demand this, and the matter should not be left to the Red Cross.  It is the respondent’s duty, and fulfilling it does not interfere with security.   Naturally, if the Red Cross has already supplied the detainees with these items, the respondent is no longer obligated to do so.

 

Detention Conditions and Judicial Review

 

29. This Court has always exercised wide-ranging judicial review concerning conditions of imprisonment and detention.  The Court has done so regarding Israeli prisoners and detainees.  It has done so regarding prisoners and detainees from the area.  In all of these cases, the Court thoroughly investigated the arguments, even considering the smallest details of the conditions of detention.  Thus, for example, Darvish dealt entirely with a security prisoner’s right to have a bed in his cell.  When necessary, visits were arranged to the prison, see Yosef, or the detention facility, see Sajadia.  Even so, our judicial review is not a substitute for constant review by the proper authorities in the army itself.  In Sajadia, President Shamgar emphasized this with regard to Kziot Camp, which, like Ofer Camp, holds many detainees from the area:

 

Considering the structure and function of the Court, it cannot perform continual inspection and supervision; however, constant inspection and proper supervision does allows for addressing and examining issues that may arise in a facility which holds such a large number of detainees.  By determining procedures of supervision, it becomes easier to strike the proper balance between providing just and humane conditions, and the need to maintain internal order and discipline and preserve safety and security

 

Sajadia, at 825. A similar problem now lies before us.  During oral arguments, various suggestions were made.  It seems that we are compelled to repeat the recommendation made in Sajadia by President Shamgar, to which all the justices there – both Vice- President M. Elon as well as Justice G. Bach – agreed:

 

As such, we find it appropriate to direct the respondents' attention towards the need to determine efficient manners of inspection and supervision. Our suggestion is that the respondent consider nominating a permanent advisory committee, which will carry out constant inspection and will report and advise the respondent on the matter of the detention conditions in the Kziot detention facility.  The head of the committee can be a senior military judge from the military tribunal units, and the committee may consist of experts from the fields of medicine, psychology, and jailing management.

 

Sajadia, at 825-26. Unfortunately, according to the information we have received, it seems this suggestion has not been put into action.  We ask that this recommendation be brought to the attention of the military's Chief of Staff.  We are confident that he will act to ensure its implementation.

 

30. Even more so: constant supervision and inspection are not substitutes for detainee petitions and judicial review.  These other options are available to detainees in Israel. See Prisons Ordinance [New Version]-1971, § 62A(a). Amending security legislation in order to allow such similar review should be considered.  Of course, such an arrangement would not replace judicial supervision by the High Court of Justice.  It would, however, provide alternative relief, which would justify limiting the judicial review of this Court to those cases where the situation has not been resolved through these other methods.

 

Petition Denied.

 

Justice D. Beinisch

I agree.

 

Justice I. Englard

I agree.

 

Petition Denied.

December 18, 2002

 

Mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya v. IDF Commander in West Bank

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 1748/06
HCJ 1845/06
HCJ 1856/06
Date Decided: 
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioners challenged the construction of a concrete barricade, with a height of 81 centimetres, along a section of road in the south of Mount Hebron in the territory of Judaea and Samaria. The respondents argued that the barricade was required for security purposes. The petitioners argued that it impeded the movement of pedestrians and animals.

 

Held: The concrete barricade was disproportionate, since it was not the least harmful measure that was capable of achieving the security purpose. A metal barricade, which would allow livestock to pass underneath and would make it easier for people to climb over, would achieve the same security purpose, but cause less harm to the local inhabitants.

 

Petition granted.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 1748/06

Mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya

and others

v.

IDF Commander in West Bank

HCJ 1845/06

Khalil Mahmud Younis

and others

v.

1.     IDF Commander in West Bank

2.     Head of Civilian Administration in West Bank, Bethel

HCJ 1856/06

As-Samu Municipality

and others

v.

1.     IDF Commander in West Bank

2.     State of Israel

 

Amicus curiae: Council for Peace and Security

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[14 December 2006]

Before Emeritus President A. Barak, President D. Beinisch
and Vice-President E. Rivlin

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioners challenged the construction of a concrete barricade, with a height of 81 centimetres, along a section of road in the south of Mount Hebron in the territory of Judaea and Samaria. The respondents argued that the barricade was required for security purposes. The petitioners argued that it impeded the movement of pedestrians and animals.

 

Held: The concrete barricade was disproportionate, since it was not the least harmful measure that was capable of achieving the security purpose. A metal barricade, which would allow livestock to pass underneath and would make it easier for people to climb over, would achieve the same security purpose, but cause less harm to the local inhabitants.

 

Petition granted.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

[2]        HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] (2) IsrLR 106.

[3]        HCJ 3680/05 Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

[4]        HCJ 4938/04 Shuqba Village Council v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

[5]        HCJ 1348/05 Shatiyeh v. State of Israel (not yet reported).

[6]        HCJ 1998/06 Bet Aryeh Local Council v. Minister of Defence (not yet reported).

[7]        HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Interior [2006] (1) IsrLR 443.

[8]        HCJ 2942/05 Mansour v. State of Israel (not yet reported).

[9]        HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83.

[10]     HCJ 399/06 Susiya Agricultural Communal Settlement Cooperative Society Ltd v. Government of Israel (not yet reported).

[11]     HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1.

[12]     HCJ 258/79 Amira v. Defence Minister [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 90.

[13]     HCJ 4825/04 Alian v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

[14]     HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Local Council v. Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 481.

 

For the petitioners in HCJ 1748/06 — L. Yehuda.

For the petitioners in HCJ 1845/06 — N. Amar.

For the petitioners in HCJ 1856/06 — G. Nassir.

For the respondents — G. Shirman, D. Tirza.

For the Council for Peace and Security — Col. (res.) S. Arieli, Maj-Gen. (ret.) S. Givoli.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

 

President Emeritus A. Barak

This petition is directed against the construction of a concrete barricade by the IDF forces in the south of Mount Hebron and against orders to requisition land that were made for the purpose of constructing this barricade.

The background to the petition

1.    There are three roads in the south of Mount Hebron in Judaea. Road no. 60 runs from the south-west to the north-east and it passes through the Jewish town of Shima. Road no. 317 is the continuation of road 60, extending east from Shima Junction, and it connects the towns of Susiya, Maon and Carmel. The third road connects road 60 to the town of Tana. The petition concerns three sections of these roads, which jointly create a continuous road that is approximately 41 kilometres long, from the town of Tana in the west to the town of Carmel in the east (hereafter: the roads). North of the roads lie the Palestinian towns of Ad-Dhahiriya, As-Samu and Al-Carmel, and beyond these to the north lies the Palestinian city of Yatta. The Green Line passes to the south of the roads, at a distance of between three and seven kilometres. The route for constructing the separation fence was planned to run close to the Green Line. In the area between the planned separation fence and the roads there are approximately twenty small Palestinian villages in which there live a total of approximately 2,000 inhabitants. This area also contains agricultural land that is cultivated by the local Palestinian inhabitants. The roads are crossed by various paths that connect the Palestinian towns in the north with the Palestinian towns and agricultural land in the south.

2.    On 14 December 2005 the respondents made three requisition orders: order R/185/05, order R/186/05 and order R/187/05 (hereafter — the new requisition orders). According to what is stated in the orders, they were issued ‘in order to establish a defensive barricade in the south of Mount Hebron.’ They requisition land in a strip adjacent to the roads, which has a length of approximately 41 kilometres and a width of several metres. The strip of land passes through the lands of the villages of Ad-Dhahiriya, Yatta, As-Samu, At-Tuwani, Khirbet Zanuta, Khirbet Ar-Rahwa and A-Tuba. The new requisition orders include a strip that is adjacent to the whole length of the roads, with the exception of several sections, whose total length is approximately three kilometres, which according to the military commander are subject to old requisition orders by virtue of which he is in any case authorized to act as aforesaid (order R/82/19 of 17 March 1982, order R/82/31 of 28 June 1982, order R/99/2 of 23 March 1999 and order R/96/4 of 2 April 1996). In total the new requisition orders cover an area of approximately 230 dunams of private land. Objections to the requisition orders that the petitioners filed were rejected by the respondents on 12 February 2006.

3.    The respondents began to construct a concrete barricade in the strip that was requisitioned along the roads, i.e., from Tana to Carmel. The barricade was built on the north side of the roads at a distance of up to three metres from the road itself. It is approximately 41 kilometres long. It is 82 centimetres high and the width of its base is 60 centimetres. There are 13 openings in the barricade that are intended to allow the traffic of vehicles on the paths that cross the roads. Two of these serve a quarry that is situated in the area and the remainder serve the local inhabitants and farmers. During the hearing of the petition, the respondents decided to make eleven additional openings so that there are a total of 24 openings in the barricade. Six of the openings are situated in close proximity to one another along a four-kilometre section of the road south of the town of Tana, and the remainder are at intervals of between one and three kilometres. Most of the openings are located at intervals of approximately two kilometres.

4.    When they filed the petitions, the petitioners requested an interim order that would prevent the performance of the works to construct the concrete barricade until the petition is decided on its merits. We held a hearing of the interim order application on 3 April 2006. The application was denied. We held that in view of the scope of the harm that was anticipated from the works to construct the barricade, which was relatively small, and the fact that the measures were not irreversible, it was not proved that the petitioners’ immediate damage from the performance of the works outweighed the risk involved in delaying the construction of the barricade. After the respondents sealed the opening in the concrete barricade that allowed the traffic of vehicles between the city of Yatta and the village of A-Tuwani and other towns, the petitioners filed an additional application for an interim order. We heard the positions of the parties on this matter at a hearing that took place on 27 July 2006. The respondents explained that the sealing of the opening was carried out as an exceptional and temporary step in consequence of the serious deterioration in the security position, and on account of the redeployment of considerable forces from the territory of Judaea and Samaria to the combat areas in Gaza and Lebanon. In such circumstances, we decided (on 31 July 2006) that there was no basis for granting the application. On 6 September 2006 we held a hearing of the petitions themselves. The hearing was attended by Brigadier (res.) Danny Tirza, who is in charge of the ‘Rainbow’ administration, which deals with the construction of the separation fence, and Colonel (res.) Shaul Arieli from the Council for Peace and Security, which was joined as a party to the hearing, at its request, as amicus curiae. During the hearing the parties agreed to regard the petitions as if an order nisi had been made.

The parties to the petition

5.    The petitioners in HCJ 1748/06 are the mayor of Ad-Dhahiriya, a part of whose land is included in the requisition orders made by the respondents; the head of the village council of A-Tuwani, which is situated south of the concrete barricade; and Palestinian inhabitants who live in the area or who own agricultural land in the area. The seventh petitioner is the Association for Civil Rights. The petitioners in HCJ 1845/06 are the mayor of Yatta and the mayor of the towns around Yatta, which are all near the area where the barricade is being built, and Palestinian inhabitants who live in the area south of the barricade or who live in towns in the area and have land in the area. Petitioner 30 is a non-profit association, Rabbis for Human Rights. The petitioners in HCJ 1856/06 are the municipality, mayor and inhabitants of As-Samu, a town whose agricultural lands are mostly situated in the area south of the concrete barricade. The respondent in the three petitions is the IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria.

The arguments of the parties

6.    The petitioners request that we set aside the decision to build the barricade. They emphasize that the barricade does not merely prevent the passage of motor vehicles but also the passage of livestock, whether these are herds or pack animals. The barricade also prevents the passage of pedestrians, including children, the elderly and the disabled. In view of the character of the local population, travel in the area takes place on foot, on horses or donkeys, or by means of agricultural vehicles such as tractors. The use of these forms of transport has increased as a result of the travel restrictions imposed on the Palestinian population. The result is that the concrete barricade seriously disrupts the petitioners’ mobility. The situation is even more serious on account of the proximity to the separation fence. The concrete barricade encloses an extensive area of land to the north and west, and the separation fence is being built to the south. This creates an enclave that is surrounded on all sides by a barrier. The ability of the inhabitants of the enclave to leave it and the ability of farmers from nearby towns to enter the cultivated areas in the enclave is very restricted and is only possible via the openings that remain in the concrete barricade.

7.    The petitioners point out that the enclave contains approximately twenty villages, which are inhabited by two thousand people. These villages are very small and most of them are not connected to water and electricity. Therefore the inhabitants of the villages are dependent upon Palestinian towns on the other side of the roads for every sphere of life: the supply of water and fuel, health and education services, and a livelihood. According to the petitioners, the construction of the concrete barricade will result in the demographic and economic decline of the villages in the enclave to the point where their long-term existence is endangered. The petitioners attached to their petition a professional opinion of the non-profit association Bimkom — Planners for Planning Rights, which supports this conclusion. According to the petitioners, the concrete barricade bisects kilometres of agricultural land. It encloses within the enclave agricultural land that belongs to the inhabitants of the nearby towns. According to the records in the petitioners’ possession, at least 3,500 families from the towns of Yatta, As-Samu and Ad-Dhahiriya own rights in land in the area of the enclave. It is becoming difficult for these farmers to have access to their land. Sheepherding is impeded because the movement of the flocks has become very restricted. These injuries exacerbate the harm to the property rights of the owners of the private land that has been requisitioned for building the barricade. In most places where openings have been left in the barricade, the paths that connect with the road on either side do not meet at the same point. This means that in order for an inhabitant of the area to pass from one side of the road to the other, he needs to reach the road via a path on one side that leads to an opening, enter the road and travel along it until he reaches another opening which connects with the other side. The problem with this, according to the petitioners, is that in recent years the IDF forces prevent Palestinians from travelling on the roads that are the subject of this petition.

8.    The petitioners claim that the construction of the barricade is not required at all for security reasons and therefore its construction is improper and falls outside the authority of the respondents. The petition was supported by a professional opinion signed by Brigadier (res.) Yehuda Golan-Ashenfeld and four other reserve IDF officers with the rank of colonel or lieutenant-colonel, who all formerly held senior army positions in Judaea and Samaria or the Gaza Strip. The authors of the opinion say that most of the terrain where the barricade was constructed could not in any case be negotiated by vehicles, and the construction of the barricade in fact increased certain threats, such as shooting ambushes, and created security problems. Their conclusion is that not only does the concrete barricade provide no benefit, but it is more of a security liability than an asset. According to the authors of the opinion, the IDF protects hundreds of kilometres of other roads in the territory of Judaea and Samaria without using concrete barricades of the type under discussion in this petition. The petitioners conclude their arguments in this regard by saying that the concrete barricade seriously violates the basic rights of the Palestinian inhabitants without there being any military need that can justify this violation. They therefore claim that this is an act that is ultra vires, or at the very least a disproportionate act that should be set aside.

9.    Finally the petitioners point out that it was originally planned (in a government decision in 2003) to build the separation fence with a route that is close to the route chosen for the concrete barricade. The route of the separation fence was changed (in a government decision in 2005) in order to comply with the principles laid down by this court in HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1]. According to the petitioners, the construction of the concrete barricade along a route that is very similar to the original route of the separation fence is a way of circumventing the requirement of determining a proportionate route for the separation fence. The petitioners express the concern that the barricade constitutes an initial stage on the way to building a barrier like the separation fence, which will be accompanied by the introduction of travel restrictions.

10. According to the respondents, the barricade is intended to protect persons travelling on the roads. These are roads that lead to Israeli towns that are situated on the ‘Palestinian’ side of the security fence in the area, and therefore there is a special defensive need in this area. The respondents pointed out that ‘the security need is based, inter alia, on a series of security incidents that have taken place in the area where the barricade is being constructed (including during 2005), namely stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, shooting at vehicles, etc.’. The concrete barricade restricts the possibilities of entering and exiting the road. It directs vehicles travelling along the road to specific exit openings. These openings will admittedly not be fitted with gates and they will allow free passage, but directing the traffic of vehicles in the area to specific openings will allow the IDF to control the traffic that crosses the road more effectively. The concrete barricade is especially useful in contending with the phenomenon of ‘drive-by shootings,’ because it limits the car’s possibilities of escaping. The respondents claim that the harm to the inhabitants as a result of building the concrete barricade is minimal. The respondents insisted that a barricade that is 82 centimetres high does not create any restriction upon pedestrian traffic. Cars can cross the roads freely at the openings in the barricade. In their statements before us, both in oral argument and in written pleadings, the respondents insisted that there is no general restriction upon the movement of Palestinian cars on the roads themselves. At the last hearing that took place on 6 September 2006 the respondents stated that if the petitioners make specific requests to make additional openings in the concrete barricade, their requests will be considered favourably. On 19 October 2006 the respondents notified the court that they had made a ‘detailed re-examination’ of the route of the concrete barricade and the openings that were made in it. The petitioners’ proposal of making 45 openings in the barricade was examined. The respondents found that the application was not sufficiently detailed and coherent and that it did not ‘represent real needs.’ Notwithstanding, a decision was made to add eleven openings that would be used for the passage of vehicles, pack animals and pedestrians, so that there would be a total of twenty-four openings in the barricade.

11. The experts of the Council for Security and Peace appeared before us and filed a detailed and coherent security opinion. According to them, the concrete barricade does not provide any protection for persons travelling on the roads. On the contrary, it creates security weaknesses. The barricade provides cover for persons wishing to ambush passing cars. It makes it impossible to carry out an immediate pursuit of terrorists when necessary. According to the representatives of the Council for Security and Peace, no incident of ‘shooting from a passing car,’ which according to the respondents is the threat that the concrete barricade is supposed to prevent, ever occurred in the area under consideration in the petition, but only in remote parts of Judaea and Samaria. Instead, other security incidents have taken place in the area under consideration in the petition; these are no less serious, but the concrete barricade is of no use in preventing them. In their opinion the representatives of the Council for Security and Peace point out that the concrete barricade was also built along sections of roads that cannot be used by wheeled vehicles because of topographic conditions, natural obstacles and mounds of earth that are in the area. In view of this, the representatives of the Council for Security and Peace wonder why the concrete barricade was built, why in particular it was built on the roads that are under consideration in the petition, and why no such barricade has been built anywhere else in Judaea and Samaria.

Deliberations

12. According to the laws relating to a belligerent occupation, the military commander is competent to order the construction of a concrete barricade and to requisition land belonging to Palestinian inhabitants for this purpose. This power only exists when the reason that gave rise to the decision is a military or security one. According to art. 52 of the regulations appended to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907, the requisition of the land should be for the ‘needs of the army of occupation.’ According to art. 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, a requisition should be ‘rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.’ The military commander is also competent to requisition land and to build a concrete barricade on it in order to protect the lives and security of Israelis who live in Israeli towns in the territory of Judaea and Samaria, even though the Israelis who live in the territories are not ‘protected persons’ within the meaning of this term in art. 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. This was what we held with regard to the separation fence in HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2], at paras. 18-22; see also HCJ 3680/05 Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3], at paras. 8-10). It is also the position in the petition before us. Indeed, the normative position for deciding the matter before us is identical to the normative position that was determined for considering the petitions concerning the separation fence in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1] and in Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2] (see also HCJ 4938/04 Shuqba Village Council v. Prime Minister [4]; HCJ 1348/05 Shatiyeh v. State of Israel [5]; HCJ 1998/06 Bet Aryeh Local Council v. Minister of Defence [6]). The principles guiding the military commander when constructing the separation fence also apply when he decides to requisition land for other defensive activity, such as the construction of the concrete barricade under discussion in this petition.

13. When he considered the decision whether to construct the barricade, the military commander was required to take several considerations into account. The first consideration is the security or military consideration, which concerns the protection of the security of the state and the security of the army. The second consideration concerns the welfare of the inhabitants who live in the area. The military commander is obliged to protect the human dignity, life and security of every one of them. The third consideration is that the military commander is obliged to protect the human dignity, life and security of Israelis who live in Israeli towns in the territories. These considerations conflict with one another. The military commander should balance the conflicting considerations. Indeed —

‘The laws of belligerent occupation recognize the authority of the military commander to maintain security in the area and thereby to protect the security of his country and its citizens, but it makes the exercising of this authority conditional upon a proper balance between it and the rights, needs, and interests of the local population’ (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1], at p. 833 {290}; see also Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2], at para. 29; Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3], at para. 10).

14. The balance between security needs and the interests of Palestinian inhabitants and Israeli citizens is not simple. The military commander is responsible for striking a balance between them. A main criterion in this balance is ‘proportionality,’ with its three subtests. First, there should be a rational connection between the measure chosen and the purpose that it is supposed to realize. Second, the measure chosen should be the one that is least harmful to the violated rights. The question is whether, of all the various measures that are capable of realizing the security purpose, the least harmful one was chosen.

‘The obligation to choose the least harmful measure does not amount to the obligation to choose the measure that is absolutely the least harmful. The obligation is to choose, of the reasonable options that are available, the least harmful. One must therefore compare the rational possibilities, and choose the possibility that, in the concrete circumstances, is capable of achieving the proper purposes with a minimal violation of human rights’ (HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Interior [7], at para. 68 of my opinion).

Third, the measure chosen should strike a proper balance between the purpose underlying its realization and the violated rights (see Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of Interior [7], at paras. 64-75 of my opinion; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1], at p. 841 {297}; Shatiyeh v. State of Israel [5], at para. 22; HCJ 2942/05 Mansour v. State of Israel [8], at para. 23). When determining the proportional balance, the military commander’s discretion is not absolute. His decision should be one that a reasonable military commander could make (see Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2], at para. 32, and the references cited there). His decision is subject to judicial scrutiny. Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice does not replace the military commander’s discretion with its own discretion. This court exercises judicial scrutiny of the legality of the military commander’s exercise of discretion. In this scrutiny —

‘… we do not appoint ourselves as experts in security matters. We do not replace the security considerations of the military commander with our own security considerations. We do not adopt any position with regard to the manner in which security matters are conducted… Our role is to ensure that boundaries are not crossed and that the conditions that restrict the discretion of the military commander are upheld…’ (HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 375 {109-110}, and see: Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3], at para. 11; Bet Aryeh Local Council v. Minister of Defence [6], at para. 8; Shatiyeh v. State of Israel [5], at para. 22).

The court does not take the place of the responsible military authority. Judicial scrutiny examines whether the actions and decisions of the military commander comply with the law.

From general principles to the specific case

15. In Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3] and HCJ 399/06 Susiya Agricultural Communal Settlement Cooperative Society Ltd v. Government of Israel [10] we denied petitions of Jewish inhabitants of the towns of Tana and Susiya, which are situated in the area under discussion in this petition; they requested, contrary to the position of the army, that the separation fence should pass to the north of their towns so that they would be included on the ‘Israeli’ side. We held that the decisions of the military commander were made after he considered all the relevant factors and struck a proper balance between them. These factors included the protection of the Jewish inhabitants, the protection of the military forces and the protection of the human rights and needs of the protected inhabitants in the territory. Within the framework of the hearings of each of the petitions, the respondents told us that they believed that they could discharge their responsibility to provide the petitioners with security to a sufficient degree even if the town was on the northern side of the fence. The military commander gave details of security measures that would make it possible to provide security for the Jewish towns in the area. The position of the respondents was described in the judgment in Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3] as follows:

‘The military commander is of the opinion that he can discharge his responsibility to provide the inhabitants with security to a sufficient degree even if the town of Tana is left on the northern side of the fence. The town of Tana itself will receive perimeter protection by means of a special security zone, which is a security system that includes a security fence and a series of security measures whose purpose is to prevent any infiltration into the town and to allow advance warning of any attempt to infiltrate the town. The security fence itself will be constructed at a distance of approximately 400 metres from the most outlying houses of the town. A patrol route and lighting will be set up between the security fence and the fence that surrounds the town. The approach route to the town will be protected in the same way in which main traffic arteries are protected in the territories, by means of two long-range observation towers and by means of fences (which are not uninterrupted) along the road, to prevent the throwing of stones and other short-range terrorist measures. Apart from the physical protection measures, rapid response forces will operate in the area at all times’ (Tana Town Committee v. Prime Minister [3], at para. 4; see also Susiya Agricultural Communal Settlement Cooperative Society Ltd v. Government of Israel [10], at para. 5).

Indeed, it should be taken into account that this area contains Jewish towns whose protection requires proper military deployment. The protection of persons travelling on the access routes to these towns also requires proper military deployment. The respondents have the authority to employ military measures in order to guarantee this essential protection. The construction of the concrete barricade is therefore an act that derives from the authority of the military commander.

16. Have the respondents exercised their power proportionately? Does the harm arising from the concrete barricade strike a proper balance between the rights of the petitioners on the one hand and security needs on the other? The respondents insist that the concrete barricade is similar in nature ‘to the safety barricades on Israeli roads,’ such as those that have been constructed along inter-city roads in order to separate the traffic going in different directions. According to them, this implies that the measure is a commonplace one that does not unduly harm the petitioners. We do not accept this argument. The extent of the harm should be examined against the background of the characteristics of the injured population. The principle of proportionality is a concrete test. It is ‘a criterion that balances the authority of the military commander in the occupied area against the needs of the local population’ (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1], at p. 838 {295}). Proportionality focuses therefore on the harm caused by the administrative action to a certain group. The harm depends upon the circumstances. The harm caused by an administrative action varies from person to person and from one population group to another. The harm caused to an urban population by a barricade built along a paved and developed road that is used by motor vehicles cannot be compared to the harm caused by such a barricade to a rural population. The conditions and character of the petitioners’ lives are such that the nature of the harm caused by the barricade to them is serious. Many of the Palestinian inhabitants of the area make use of donkeys and other animals as means of transport, and many of them travel by foot. Many of the inhabitants of the area earn their livelihood from herding sheep. The barricade impedes the passage of pack animals and flocks of sheep and goats. The barricade impedes the passage of pedestrians. Not every person is capable of climbing over a concrete barricade with a height of 82 centimetres. The barricade denies passage to the disabled. The barricade prevents the passage of the elderly and other persons who have limited movement. The barricade makes the passage of women with small children difficult.

17. The concrete barricade causes serious harm. It is more than forty kilometres long. It restricts the movement of more than five thousand inhabitants who live or own agricultural plots to the south. The petitioners filed affidavits of dozens of inhabitants of the villages that are situated in the enclave, which is enclosed by the concrete barricade on one side and the separation fence on the other. The concrete barricade restricts the movement of the inhabitants of these villages in a way that will make it difficult for them to lead normal lives. It seriously impedes access to basic and essential services that are located in nearby urban centres. It makes it difficult for the inhabitants of these villages to earn a livelihood, since they need to reach the nearby urban centres in order to market their crops, and it substantially increases the costs of essential products such as water, food, fuel and animal fodder. Thus the concrete barricade violates property rights, the freedom of movement and the right to education, health, family life and dignity. Indeed, the effect of constructing the concrete barricade, which is more than forty kilometres long, is to isolate a large area and separate it from the other parts of Judaea and Samaria. The lifestyles of the inhabitants will be deeply affected by this isolation. It constitutes a major change for the local inhabitants and imposes a real burden on their ability to continue to live in this area. We are not speaking of self-sufficient towns. These are small villages that depend extensively on their contact with nearby towns. Moreover, the barricade separates the farmers who live north of the road from their crops and grazing land to the south of it. Thus it separates the town of Ad-Dhahiriya from approximately half of its inhabitants’ agricultural land. More than 950 inhabitants of Ad-Dhahiriya own rights in agricultural land in the enclave. The barricade separates the city of as-Samu from 80 per cent of its agricultural land, an area of approximately 22,000 dunams. Admittedly we are not speaking of a complete isolation, since the concrete barricade does have openings, which can be used by the inhabitants to cross the roads. But we are speaking of a significant impediment to the mobility of farmers in the area, especially in view of the extensive use that they make of pack animals and the considerable amount of sheep herding.

18. Does this harm satisfy the first test of proportionality? Is there a rational connection between the measure that was adopted and the purpose that the respondents are seeking to achieve? The petitioners claim that there is no rational connection between the declared security purpose and the construction of the concrete barricade. The representatives of the Council for Security and Peace also claimed before us that constructing the barricade not only makes no contribution to security, but does more harm than good, since it increases the security risks to persons travelling on the roads. By contrast, the professional opinion of the respondents is that restricting the movement of vehicles in the area is important from a security viewpoint and will make it possible to contend with threats presented to those travelling on the roads. We have before us two conflicting viewpoints. When there is a professional dispute between the military commander and other security experts, serious weight should be attached to the professional approach of the military commander in the area. ‘… we must attribute special weight to the military opinion of the party who has the responsibility for security’ (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [1], at p. 844 {302}, and see HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Government of Israel [11], at p. 25; HCJ 258/79 Amira v. Defence Minister [12], at p. 92; HCJ 4825/04 Alian v. Prime Minister [13], at para. 15; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2], at para. 32 of my opinion; HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Local Council v. Knesset [14], at pp. 574-576). Therefore, anyone who asks the court to prefer a professional opinion of another expert to the position of the military commander needs to discharge a heavy burden. The petitioners did not discharge this burden. We have not been persuaded that we should prefer the professional opinion of the members of the Council for Peace and Security or the professional opinion of the security experts representing the petitioners to the position of the military commander. In such circumstances we should base our judgment on the security opinion of the military commander. We therefore accept the respondents’ position with regard to the military solution to the security needs in the area. We rely upon their position that the concrete barricade is an effective means of protecting whoever travels on the roads. The result is therefore that the construction of the concrete barricade satisfies the first subtest of proportionality.

19. Does the harm satisfy the second subtest of proportionality? Have the respondents discharged their duty to choose the least harmful of all possible measures in order to realize the purpose? In their updated statement to the court, the respondents said that following a re-examination that they made, they made additional openings in the concrete barricade to allow the passage of pedestrians and livestock. The petitioners for their part replied to this statement by claiming that the vast majority of these openings do not allow anyone to cross the roads. Some of the openings are situated in impassable areas from a topographical viewpoint; some are not situated in places where the local inhabitants wish to cross the road; others are not even openings, but merely narrow slits that do not allow people and animals to pass through. In their most recent statements, the respondents even undertook that requests to make additional openings in the concrete barricade will be considered favourably. Indeed, this is capable of reducing the degree of harm caused by the barricade. We have taken the most recent statements of the respondents into account, but they are insufficient. The question that is considered by the second subtest of proportionality is whether in comparison to the measure chosen by the respondents — which we are considering in the light of their most recent statements — a less harmful alternative exists. The answer to this is that a less harmful alternative does indeed exist.

20. The alternative measure that is less harmful is a barricade as constructed by the respondents, with one difference: instead of concrete it should be a metal barricade, like the safety barricades that have been constructed at the sides of many roads in Israel and in various parts of the territories. This measure was proposed by the petitioners. It is a less harmful measure. Flocks of sheep will be able to pass under the metal bar of the fence. It will be easier for pedestrians to climb over the fence. The respondents themselves do not deny that a metal barricade is capable of achieving the same security benefit as the concrete barricade, but they argued before us that there is a concern that parts of the barricade will be dismantled by metal thieves. In view of this assessment, the respondents’ position is this measure should not be adopted. Counsel for the respondents did not present any figures with regard to the scope of the phenomenon of the theft of metal in the area under discussion in the petition or in the territories in general. In any case, proportionality demands the construction of a metal barricade and protecting it against theft, rather than a serious injury to the lifestyle of the local inhabitants. It should also be noted that the material before us shows that in addition to the alternative of the metal barricade there are other options. The representatives of the Council for Peace and Security said in their opinion that in order to achieve the respondents’ declared security purpose, it is also possible to construct a lower barricade, which will prevent the passage of wheeled vehicles. A lower barricade is easier for pedestrians and livestock to cross. It is a less harmful measure. Additional options were raised during the petitions, such as the replacement of the barricade with metal posts or stone blocks that can be placed at distances in such a way that they will prevent the passage of cars but allow the free passage of pedestrians and animals. We are not considering the choice of the most suitable option from among these or other options. This matter lies within the respondents’ authority. Our task is to examine whether there is an alternative measure to the one chosen by the respondents — a measure that achieves the same benefit but is less harmful. Such a measure exists. It can realize the security benefit that the barricade seeks to realize, while harming the lifestyle and human rights of the local population to a lesser degree.

21. In view of this finding, the conclusion is that the concrete barricade does not satisfy the requirement of the second subtest of proportionality. Since several rational options were available to the respondents for realizing the same security purpose, they should have chosen the one that is the least harmful to human rights. The respondents did not discharge this duty. In view of our finding with regard to the second condition of proportionality, we do not need to go on to examine whether the third subtest is satisfied.

22. The result is that we are making the order nisi absolute in respect of the construction of the concrete barricade. Within six months the respondents shall dismantle the concrete barricade that they built between the town of Carmel and the town of Tana, along road 60, road 317 and the road leading to the town of Tana. The respondents may construct an alternative barrier that is consistent with this judgment.

The respondents shall be liable for the petitioners’ costs in a sum of NIS 25,000 in each of the petitions.

 

 

President D. Beinisch

I agree.

 

 

Vice-President E. Rivlin

I agree.       

 

 

Petition granted.

23 Kislev 5767.

14 December 2006.

 

Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7957/04
Date Decided: 
Thursday, September 15, 2005
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

 

According to orders by the military commander, a partition fence was erected that sorrounds the town of Alfei Menashe in all directions while leaving a road connecting the town to Israel. Several Palestinian villages are within the area surrounded by the fence. The fence cuts them off from the remaining areas of the West Bank and creates a landlocked cluster of villages on the “Israeli” side of the fence. The Petitioners, residents of the villages, maintain that the fence that surrounds the landlocked area of Alfei Menashe is illegal and must be dismantled. They argue that the military commander is not authorized to order an erection of a fence around the landlocked area. This argument relies, among others, on the advisory opinion of the International Court in the Hague, according to which erecting the fence violates international law. The Petitioners further claimed that the fence – on the path along which it was erected – is disproportional.

 

The Supreme Court held:

 

A.         1.         The legal system that applies in the West Bank is governed by public international law regarding war-based occupation. Under wartime occupation law, the military commander is not authorized to order the erection of a partition fence if the motivation for erecting the partition fence is a political reason of “annexing” lands from the area to the State of Israel and establishing Israel’s state borders. The military commander is authorized to order erection of a partition fence where the reason of erecting the fence is related to security and to the military.

 

            2.         The authority of the military commander to erect a partition fence for security and military reason encompasses, first and foremost, the need to protect the military in an area subject to wartime occupation. This authority also includes protecting the State of Israel itself. Further, the authority includes erecting a fence in order to protect the life and safety of Israeli residents in the area.

 

            3.         When determining the path for the fence, the military commander must balance the security needs and the needs of the local population. This balance will be done, among others, according to the principles of proportionality. Proportionality is based on three sub-test: the first sub-test requires a rational link between the means taken and the desired end; the second sub-test mandates that among the range of means that might accomplish the end, the means selected must be the least restrictive; the third sub-test requires that the harm caused to the individual as a result of the means taken must be at a proper proportion to the benefit it brings.

 

            4.         When examining the decisions and actions of the military commander in an area subject to wartime occupation, a court does not substitute the discretion of the military commander for its own. A court does not examine the wisdom of the decision, but its lawfulness. Still, a court does not refrain from judicial review merely because the military commander operates outside of Israel and because its activity bears political and militaristic consequences. When the decisions of the military commander or its activity infringe upon human rights, they are justiciable.

 

            5.         When an activity may be exercised in several manners, the question examined is whether the action of the military commander is one that a reasonable military commander could have made. When the decision of the military commander relies on military expertise, the court attaches special weight to the military expertise of the area’s commander, who shoulders the responsibility for the security and safety of the area. When the decision of the military commander – which relies on military professionalism – violates human rights, the proportionality of the violation hinges on the acceptable tests for such purposes.

 

B.         The Supreme Court of Israel will attribute the full appropriate weight to the norms of international law, as developed and interpreted by the International Court in the Hague in its opinion. However, the conclusion of the International Court, which relies on a different factual foundation than that which was presented to the Supreme Court, does not constitute a court decision and does not bind the Supreme Court of Israel to find that the entire fence is inconsistent with international law. The Israeli Court will continue to examine each section of the fence’s path, as brought before it and according to the model of adjudication that it follows. It will ask itself, for each part of the fence, whether it embodies a proportional balance between the military-security need and the rights of the local population. When doing so, it will not disregard the overall picture and its determination will always be in regards to each section as a part of the whole.

 

C.         1.         In the case at hand the motivation for erecting the fence is not political. At the foundation of the decision to erect the fence was the security consideration to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into the State of Israel and the Israeli towns in the area. The partition fence is a central security feature in Israel’s war against Palestinian terrorism. The fence is inherently temporary. So is generally the matter of the partition fence, and so, too, is the matter if the path of the fence around the landlocked area of Alfei Menashe. Therefore the decision of the erecting a partition fence in the landlocked area of Alfei Menashe was made within the authority granted to the area’s military commander.

 

            2.         As for proportionality, the partition fence creates a separation between the terrorists and the Israelis (in Israel and in the area,) and in this sense there necessary rational link between the means and the end is met. Therefore the first sub-test of proportionality is satisfied in the case of the landlocked Alfei Menashe.

 

            3.         On the other hand, it cannot be found that the second sub-test of proportionality is met in regard to the path of the fence that creates the landlocked area of Alfei Menashe. The necessary effort was not made, nor explored in depth, to identify an alternative path that would guarantee security and would cause lesser harm to the residents of the villages. Respondents 1-4 must reconsider, within a reasonable period of time, the different alternatives to the fence’s path while exploring security alternatives that would less restrict the lives of residents of the villages in the landlocked area. In this context, excluding the some or all of the villages of the landlocked area from it, and removing them from the “Israeli” side of the fence should be considered. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

H.C.J. 7957/04

 

 

Petitioners:                               1.       Zaharan Yunis Muhammad Mara'abe

  1. Morad Ahmed Muhammad Ahmed
  2. Muhammad Jamil Mas'ud Shuahani
  3. Adnan Abd el Rahman Daud Udah
  4. Abd el Rahim Ismail Daud Udah
  5. Bassem Salah Abd el Rahman Udah
  6. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel

 

v.

 

Respondents:                                      1.         The Prime Minister of Israel

2.The Minister of Defense

3.The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area

4.The Separation Fence Authority

5.The Alfei Menashe Local Council

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

[September 12 2004; March 31 2005; June 21 2005]

 

Before President A. Barak, Vice President M. Cheshin, Justice D. Beinisch, Justice A. Procaccia, Justice E. Levy, Justice A. Grunis, Justice M. Naor, Justice S. Joubran  & Justice E. Hayut

 

Petition for an Order Nisi

For Petitioners:                        Michael Sfard

                                               Dan Yakir

                                               Limor Yehuda

For Respondents no. 1-4:        Anar Helman

                                                Avi Licht

For Respondent 5:                  Baruch Heikin

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

President A. Barak:

 

Alfei Menashe is an Israeli town in the Samaria area. It was established approximately four kilometers beyond the Green Line.  Pursuant the military commander's orders, a separation fence was built, surrounding the town from all sides, and leaving a passage containing a road connecting the town to Israel.  A number of Palestinian villages are included within the fence's perimeter.  The separation fence cuts them off from the remaining parts of the Judea and Samaria area.  An enclave of Palestinian villages on the "Israeli" side of the fence has been created.  Petitioners are residents of the villages.  They contend that the separation fence is not legal.  This contention of theirs is based upon the judgment in The Beit Sourik Case (HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Government of Israel, 58(5) P.D. 807).  The petition also relies upon the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (International Court of Justice, July 9, 2004), 43 IL M 1009 (2004)).  Is the separation fence legal? That is the question before us.

 

A.        The Background and the Petition

 

            1.         Terrorism and the Response to It

 

1.         In September 2000 the second intifada broke out.  A mighty attack of acts of terrorism landed upon Israel, and upon Israelis in the Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip areas (hereinafter – the area).  Most of the terrorist attacks were directed toward civilians.  They struck at men and at women; at elderly and at infant.  Entire families lost their loved ones.  The attacks were designed to take human life.  They were designed to sow fear and panic.  They were meant to obstruct the daily life of the citizens of Israel.  Terrorism has turned into a strategic threat.  Terrorist attacks are committed inside of Israel and in the area.  They occur everywhere, including public transportation, shopping centers and markets, coffee houses, and inside of houses and communities.  The main targets of the attacks are the downtown areas of Israel's cities.  Attacks are also directed at the Israeli communities in the area, and at transportation routes.  Terrorist organizations use a variety of means.  These include suicide attacks ("guided human bombs"), car bombs, explosive charges, throwing of Molotov cocktails and hand grenades, shooting attacks, mortar fire, and rocket fire.  A number of attempts at attacking strategic targets ("mega-terrorism") have failed.  Thus, for example, the intent to topple one of the Azrieli towers in Tel Aviv using a car bomb in the parking lot was frustrated (April 2002).  Another attempt which failed was the attempt to detonate a truck in the gas tank farm at Pi Glilot (May 2003).  Since the onset of these terrorist acts, up until mid July 2005, almost one thousand attacks have been carried out within Israel.  In Judea and Samaria, 9000 attacks have been carried out.  Thousands of attacks have been carried out in the Gaza Strip.  More than one thousand Israelis have lost their lives, approximately 200 of them in the Judea and Samaria area.  Many of the injured have become severely handicapped.  On the Palestinian side as well, the armed conflict has caused many deaths and injuries.  We are flooded with bereavement and pain.

 

2.         Israel took a series of steps to defend the lives of her residents.  Military operations were carried out against terrorist organizations.  These operations were intended to defeat the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and prevent reoccurrence of terrorist acts (see HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 57(2) P.D. 349, hereinafter – Marab; HCJ 3278/02 The Center for Defense of the Individual v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank Area, 57(1) P.D. 385.  These steps did not provide a sufficient answer to the immediate need to halt the severe terrorist attacks.  Innocent people continued to pay with life and limb.  I discussed this in The Beit Sourik Case:

 

"These terrorist acts committed by the Palestinian side have led Israel to take security steps of various levels of severity. Thus, the government, for example, decided upon various military operations, such as operation “Defensive Wall” (March 2002) and operation “Determined Path” (June 2002). The objective of these military actions was to defeat the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and to prevent reoccurrence of terror attacks . . .  These combat operations – which are not regular police operations, rather bear all the characteristics of armed conflict – did not provide a sufficient answer to the immediate need to stop the severe acts of terrorism. The Committee of Ministers on National Security considered a series of steps intended to prevent additional acts of terrorism and to deter potential terrorists from committing such acts . . . Despite all these measures, the terror did not come to an end.  The attacks did not cease. Innocent people paid with both life and limb. This is the background behind the decision to construct the separation fence (Id., at p. 815).

 

Against this background, the idea of erecting a separation fence in the Judea and Samaria area, which would make it difficult for terrorists to strike at Israelis and ease the security forces' struggle against the terrorists, was formulated.

 

3.         The construction of the separation fence was approved by the government on June 23 2002.  At the same time, phase A of the fence was approved.  Its length is 116 km.  It begins in the area of the Salem village, adjacent to the Megiddo junction, and continues to the Trans-Samaria Highway adjacent to the Elkana community.  An additional obstacle in the Jerusalem area (approximately 22 km long) was also approved.  These were intended to prevent terrorist infiltration into the north and center of the country, and into the Jerusalem area.  The government decision stated, inter alia,

 

"(3) In the framework of phase A – to approve construction of security fences and obstacles in the 'seamline area' and in the surroundings of Jerusalem, in order to decrease infiltrations by terrorists from the Judea and Samaria areas for the purpose of attacks in Israel.    

 

(4) The fence, like the other obstacles, is a security means.  Its construction does not reflect a political border, or any other border.

 

(5) . . .

 

(6) The exact and final route of the fence shall be determined by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense . . . the final route shall be presented to the Committee of Ministers on National Security or to the government."

 

After that (December 2002) the construction of phase B of the fence was approved.  That phase began at Salem village, heading east until the Jordan river (approximately 60 km).  This phase also includes an offshoot starting at Mt. Avner (adjacent to the village of Al Mutilla) in the southern Gilboa, heading south toward Thaisar village.  After about one year (on October 1 2003) the government decided to construct phases C and D of the fence.  Phase C includes the fence between Elkana and the Camp Ofer military base, a fence east of the Ben Gurion airport and north of planned highway 45, and a fence protecting Israeli communities in Samaria (including Ariel, Emanuel, Kedumim, Karnei Shomron).  Phase D includes the area from the Etzion Bloc southward to the southern Hebron area.  The government decision stated, inter alia:

 

"(2) The obstacle built pursuant to this decision, like its other segments in the 'seamline area', is a security means for preventing terrorist attacks, and does not reflect a political border, or any other border.

 

(3) Local alterations of the obstacle route or of construction necessary for the overall planning of the route, shall be brought for approval to the Minister of Defense and the Prime Minister.

 

(4) . . .

 

(5) . . .

 

(6) During the detailed planning, all efforts shall be made to minimize, to the extent possible, disturbance liable to be caused to the daily lives of Palestinians as a result of the construction of the obstacle." 

 

The separation fence discussed in the petition before us is part of phase A of fence construction.  The separation fence discussed in The Beit Sourik Case is part of phase C of fence construction.  The length of the entire fence, including all four phases, is approximately 763 km.  According to information relayed to us, approximately 242 km of fence have already been erected, and are in operational use.  28 km of it are built as a wall (11%).  Approximately 157 km are currently being built, 140 km of which are fence and approximately 17 km are wall (12%).  The building of 364 km of the separation fence has not yet been commenced, of which 361 km are fence, and 3 km are wall.

 

4.         The separation fence is an obstacle built of a number of components.  "In its center stands a 'smart' fence. The purpose of the fence is to alert the forces deployed along it of any attempt to cross it. On the fence’s external side lies an anti-vehicle obstacle, composed of a trench or another means, intended to prevent vehicles from breaking through the fence by slamming up against it. There is an additional delaying fence. Adjacent to the fence, a service road is paved. On the internal side of the electronic fence, there are a number of roads: a trace road (a strip of sand smoothed to detect footprints of those who pass the fence), a patrol road, and a road for armored vehicles, as well as an additional fence. The average width of the obstacle, in its optimal form, is 50–70 meters.  Due to various constraints at certain points along the route, a narrower obstacle, which includes only part of the components supporting the electronic fence, will be constructed.  In certain cases the obstacle can reach a width of 100 meters, due to topographical conditions. . . Various means to help prevent infiltration will be erected along the route of the obstacle. The IDF and the border police will patrol the separation fence, and will be called to locations of infiltration, in order to frustrate the infiltration and to pursue those who succeed in crossing the security fence" (The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 818).

 

5.         Parts of the separation fence are erected on private land.  Under such circumstances, there is an administrative process of issuing an order of seizure and payment of compensation for the use of the land.  The seizure order can be appealed to the military commander.  If the appeal is rejected, the landowner is given a seven day period to petition the High Court of Justice.  Since issuance of the orders, more than eighty petitions have been submitted to this Court.  Approximately half were withdrawn in light of compromise between the parties.  The other half are being heard before us.  One of those petitions is the petition before us.

 

6.         Since the decision to construct the fence, a constant and continual process of analysis and improvement has been taking place.  This process was intensified, of course, after the judgment in the Beit Sourik Case (given on June 30 2004).  As a result, some segments of the existing route were altered.  The planning of phases not yet constructed was changed.  When necessary, a government decision was made, ordering an alteration of the route of the fence.  Indeed, on February 20 2005, the government decided to alter the fence route.  The decision stated that it came about "after examining the implications of the High Court of Justice's ruling regarding continued work to construct the fence."  The decision further stated:

 

"(a) The government sees importance in the continued construction of the security fence, as a means whose efficacy - in defending the State of Israel and its residents, and in preventing the negative influence a terrorist attack is liable to have on diplomatic moves - has been proven, while ensuring minimization, to the extent possible, of the affect on the daily lives of the Palestinians, according to the standards outlined in the ruling of the High Court of Justice."

 

This decision included additional segments of fence, whose legal examination had not yet been completed (in the area of Western Samaria, Ma'aleh Edumim, and the Judean Desert).  As a result of the government decision, special teams were established to examine the crossings policy and the permit regime.  According to the data relayed to us, part of the separation fence is inside of Israel or on the Green Line (approximately 150.4 km, which are 19.7% of the route).  The part of the fence which is in the Judea and Samaria area leaves about 432 km2, which are about 7.8% of the area of Judea and Samaria, on the "Israeli" (western) side of the fence.  In this area live 8900 Palestinian residents, who will live under a permit regime; and 19,000 Palestinian residents in the Etzion Bloc area, where such a regime will not apply, and it will be possible to enter and exit freely, subject to security check, with no need to acquire permits or licenses of any kind.  It is worth noting that this figure includes the Gush Etzion region (about 1.2% of the area of Judea and Samaria), the "fingers of Ariel" (about 2.0% of the area of Judea and Samaria) and Ma'aleh Edumim (approximately 1.2% of the area of Judea and Samaria).  The staff work and the legal examination regarding these areas have not yet been completed.  Nor have Jerusalem's municipal territory or no-man's-land been included in these figures, since they are not in Judea and Samaria. 

 

7.         All territory left on the "Israeli" (western) side of the fence in the framework of phase A – that is to say, the area between the fence and the State of Israel (hereinafter – the seamline area) – were declared a closed military area, pursuant to Territory Closure Declaration no. S/2/03 (seamline area) (Judea and Samaria), 5764-2003 (of October 2 2003), issued by the Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area (hereinafter – the declaration).  The seamline area in the phase A area is approximately 87 km2, and about 5600 Palestinians and 21,000 Israeli residents live in it.  The declaration forbade entrance and presence in the seamline area, while determining that the rule does not apply to Israelis or people holding permits from the military commander to enter the seamline area and be present in it. The declaration determined, regarding permanent residents, that people whose permanent residence is in the seamline area will be permitted to enter the seamline area and be present in it, subject to the requirement that they hold a written permit from the military commander testifying to the fact that their permanent place of residence is in the seamline area, and subject to the conditions determined in the permit.  The military commander issued a general permit to enter the seamline area, for holders of foreign passports, holders of permits for work in an Israeli community within the seamline area, and for those who have a valid exit permit from the area into Israel.  After about a half a year (May 27 2004), the declaration was amended (Territory Closure Declaration no. S/2/03 (Seamline Area) (Judea and Samaria) (Amendment no. 1), 5764 – 2004).  According to the amended declaration, the rule forbidding entrance and presence in the seamline area does not apply to permanent residents in the seamline area or those with a work permit from the military commander.  A general permit, for entrance into the seamline area and presence in it for any purpose, was granted to residents of the State of Israel.  Palestinians living in the seamline area were issued a "permanent resident card" testifying that they are permanent residents of the seamline area.  The permits make it possible to live in the seamline area and to move from it into the territories of the area, and back.  Palestinians who are not permanent residents of the seamline area must acquire an entry permit.  Such permits are granted for various reasons, including work, trade, agriculture, and education.

 

            2. The Alfei Menashe Enclave

 

The Alfei Menashe enclave – the topic of the petition before us – is part of phase A of the fence.  The decision regarding it was reached on June 23 2002.  The construction of the fence was finished in August 2003.  The fence circumscribes Alfei Menashe (population approximately 5650) and five Palestinian villages (population approximately 1200): Arab a-Ramadin (population approximately 250); Arab Abu-Farda (population approximately 120); Wadi a-Rasha (population approximately 120); Ma'arat a-Daba (population approximately 250), and Hirbet Ras a-Tira (population approximately 400) (see appendix).  The fence which surrounds the enclave from the north is based, on its western side, upon the fence encircling the city of Qalqiliya (population approximately 38,000) from the south.  This part of the fence passes north of highway 55, which is the enclave's connection to Israel.  The northern part of the fence surrounds Alfei Menashe, Abu-Farda, and Arab a-Ramadin.  The Alfei Menashe enclave is unique for two reasons: First, it is based, in many places, upon the separation fence around the city of Qalqiliya and the villages of Habla and Hirbet Ras Atiyeh; second, the separation fence "brings" over to the "Israeli" (western) side not only Alfei Menashe, but also the five Palestinian villages.

 

9.         There is one crossing and three agricultural gates in the fence surrounding the Alfei Menashe enclave, which connect the enclave to the area.  The central connection between the enclave and the area is via "crossing 109", located on the northern side of the fence, on highway 55.  Crossing 109 is close to the access point to the city of Qalqiliya, in the eastern fence surrounding Qalqiliya called DCO Qalqiliya.  This point is not staffed, except for special cases, and it allows free passage between Qalqiliya and the area.  Crossing 109 allows residents of the enclave to pass by foot and car, subject to security check, to the area and the city of Qalqiliya at all hours of the day.  There are three additional gates in the Alfei Menashe enclave fence, two agricultural, through which one can pass by foot or car.  The three gates are the Ras a-Tira gate (on the western side of the enclave, adjacent to the town of Hirbet Ras Atiyeh); the South Qalqiliya gate, and the Habla gate.  At the time the petition was submitted, the three gates were generally opened three times a day for one hour.  Now, the Ras a-Tira gate opens one hour after sunrise and is closed one hour before sunset.  There is no change in the opening hours of the other gates.  The enclave is connected, with territorial integrity, to Israel (with no checkpoint), and the crossing is made via highway 55, which connects Alfei Menashe to Israel.  The road is mainly used by Israelis traveling to and leaving Alfei Menashe and by Palestinians with permits to enter Israel, or traveling within the boundaries of the enclave.

 

            3.         The Petition

 

10.       The petition was submitted on August 31 2004.  (Original) petitioners are residents of the Ras a-Tira village (petitioners no. 1-3) and the Wadi a-Rasha village (petitioners no. 4-6).  These two villages are located southwest of Alfei Menashe.  Along with them petitioned the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (petitioner no. 7).  At a later phase petitioners' counsel submitted a letter (of March 30 2005) written by the five council heads of the villages in the enclave.  The letter is addressed to the Court.  It expresses support for the petition.  It verifies its content.  At the same time, petitioners' counsel informed us that the village council heads had granted him power of attorney to act in the name of the councils, as petitioners in the petition.

 

11.       Petitioners contend that the separation fence is not legal, and should be dismantled.  They argue that the military commander is not authorized to give orders to construct the separation fence.  That claim is based on the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague (hereinafter also "ICJ").  Petitioners also contend that the separation fence does not satisfy the standards determined in The Beit Sourik Case.  On this issue, petitioners argue that the fence is disproportionate and discriminatory.  Respondents ask that the petition be rejected due to a number of preliminary arguments (laches (delay), the "public" nature of the petition, and the lack of a prior plea to respondents).  On the merits, respondents argue that the military commander is authorized to erect a separation fence, as ruled in The Beit Sourik Case.  The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague makes no difference in this regard, since it was based upon a factual basis different from that established in The Beit Sourik Case.  Respondents also contend that the injury to the Palestinian residents satisfies the standards determined in The Beit Sourik Case.

 

            4.         The Hearing of the Petition

 

12.       The petition was heard soon after being submitted, by President A. Barak, Vice President (emeritus) E. Mazza and Vice President M. Cheshin (on September 12 2004).  The Alfei Menashe local council was joined, at its request, as a respondent in the petition.  Further hearing of the petition was postponed, in order to allow the state to formulate its stance.  We noted that postponement of the petition does not prevent respondents from doing all they can to ease the reality of daily life for petitioners under the existing fence route.  The hearing of the petition continued (on March 31 2005) before President A. Barak, Vice President M. Cheshin and Justice D. Beinisch (who replaced Vice President E. Mazza, who retired).  After that, it was decided (on April 21 2005) that the hearing of the petition would take place together with the hearing of HCJ 1348/05 and HCJ 3290/05 (regarding the separation fence around the city of Ariel), and that the hearing of all three petitions would take place before an expanded panel of nine Justices.  The petition was thus heard before an expanded panel (on June 21 2005).  At the commencement of the hearing, it was stipulated that the court would view the hearing as if an order nisi had been granted.  Petitioners presented arguments regarding the fence's injury to the various areas of life in the villages, and extensively discussed their legal arguments regarding the illegality of the fence.  Respondents expanded upon the authority to build the fence and the steps that had been taken in order to ease the residents' lives.  In addition, Colonel (res.) Dan Tirza (head of the administration dealing with the planning of the obstacle route in the seamline area) appeared before us, and surveyed the fence route and the considerations which the route planners confronted.

 

            5. The Discussion Framework

 

13.       The parties' arguments will be examined in five parts.  In the first part we shall discuss the Supreme Court's caselaw regarding the military commander's authority, according to the law of belligerent occupation, to order the erection of the separation fence.  This caselaw was developed by this Court in scores of judgments it has handed down since the Six Day War.  In the second part we shall discuss the way this law was applied, in concrete implementation, in The Beit Sourik Case.  In the third part, we shall discuss the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague.  In the fourth part we shall discuss the Advisory Opinion's effect upon the standards in The Beit Sourik Case, and its ramifications for the normative outline as determined by this Court, and for the way this outline was implemented in The Beit Sourik CaseFinally, we shall examine whether the separation fence at the Alfei Menashe enclave satisfies the tests of the law.

 

B.        The Normative Outline in the Supreme Court's Caselaw

 

            1.         Belligerent Occupation

 

14.       The Judea and Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation.  The long arm of the state in the area is the military commander.  He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation (see The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 832).  His power is granted him by public international law regarding belligerent occupation.  The legal meaning of this view is twofold: first, Israeli law does not apply in these areas.  They have not been "annexed" to Israel. Second, the legal regime which applies in these areas is determined by public international law regarding belligerent occupation (see HCJ 1661/05 The Gaza Coast Regional Council v. The Knesset et al. (yet unpublished, paragraph 3 of the opinion of the Court; hereinafter – The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case).  In the center of this public international law stand the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter – The Hague Regulations).  These regulations are a reflection of customary international law.  The law of belligerent occupation is also laid out in IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949 (hereinafter – the Fourth Geneva Convention).  The State of Israel has declared that it practices the humanitarian parts of this convention.  In light of that declaration on the part of the government of Israel, we see no need to reexamine the government's position.  We are aware that the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice determined that The Fourth Geneva Convention applies in the Judea and Samaria area, and that its application is not conditional upon the willingness of the State of Israel to uphold its provisions.  As mentioned, seeing as the government of Israel accepts that the humanitarian aspects of The Fourth Geneva Convention apply in the area, we are not of the opinion that we must take a stand on that issue in the petition before us.  In addition to those two sources of international law, there is a third source of law which applies to the State of Israel's belligerent occupation.  That third source is the basic principles of Israeli administrative law, which is law regarding the use of a public official's governing power.  These principles include, inter alia, rules of substantive and procedural fairness, the duty to act reasonably, and rules of proportionality. "Indeed, every Israeli soldier carries in his pack the rules of customary public international law regarding the law of war, and the fundamental rules of Israeli administrative law" (HCJ 393/82 Jami'at Ascan el-Malmun el-Mahdudeh el-Masauliyeh, Communal Society Registered at the Judea and Samaria Area Headquarters v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 37(4) P.D. 785, 810; hereinafter The Jami'at Ascan Case).

 

            2. The Military Commander's Authority to Erect a Security Fence

 

15.       Is the military commander authorized, according to the law of belligerent occupation, to order the construction of a separation fence in the Judea and Samaria area?  In The Beit Sourik Case our answer was that the military commander is not authorized to order the construction of a separation fence, if the reason behind the fence is a political goal of "annexing" territories of the area to the State of Israel and to determine Israel's political border.  The military commander is authorized to order the construction of the separation fence if the reason behind its construction is a security and military one.  Thus we wrote in The Beit Sourik Case:

 

"the military commander is not authorized to order the construction of the separation fence if his reasons are political. The separation fence cannot be motivated by a desire to “annex” territories in the area to the state of Israel. The purpose of the separation fence cannot be to draw a political border. . . . the authority of the military commander is inherently temporary, as belligerent occupation is inherently temporary.  Permanent arrangements are not the affair of the military commander.  True, the belligerent occupation of the area has gone on for many years. This fact affects the scope of the military commander’s authority.         . . . The passage of time, however, cannot expand the authority of the military commander and allow him to take into account considerations beyond the proper administration of the area under belligerent occupation" (Id., at pp. 829-830). 

 

16.       It is sometimes necessary, in order to erect a separation fence, to take possession of land belonging to Palestinian residents.  Is the military commander authorized to do so?  The answer is that if it is necessary for military needs, the military commander is authorized to do so. So we ruled in The Beit Sourik Case:

 

". . . the military commander is authorized – by the international law applicable to an area under belligerent occupation – to take possession of land, if that is necessary for the needs of the army. . . . He must, of course, provide compensation for his use of the land. Of course, . . . the military commander must also consider the needs of the local population. Assuming that this condition is met, there is no doubt that the military commander is authorized to take possession of land in areas under his control. The construction of the separation fence falls within this framework, on the condition that it is necessary from a military standpoint.  To the extent that the fence is a military necessity, infringement of private property rights cannot, in and of itself, negate the authority to build it. . . . Indeed, the obstacle is intended to take the place of combat military operations, by physically blocking terrorist infiltration into Israeli population centers (Id., at p. 832).

 

It is worth noting that construction of the separation fence is unrelated to expropriation or confiscation of land.  The latter are prohibited by regulation 46 of The Hague Regulations (see HCJ 606/78 Iyub v. The Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113, 122; hereinafter – The Iyub case).  Construction of the fence does not involve transfer of ownership of the land upon which it is built.  The construction of the fence is done by way of taking possession.  Taking of possession is temporary.  The seizure order orders its date of termination.  Taking of possession is accompanied by payment of compensation for the damage caused.  Such taking of possession – which is not related in any way to expropriation – is permissible according to the law of belligerent occupation (see regulations 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations, and §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention: see The Iyub case, at p. 129; HCJ 834/78 Salame v. The Minister of Defense, 33(1) P.D. 471, 472; The Iyub case, at p. 122; HCJ 401/88 Abu Rian v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 42(2) P.D. 767, 770; HCJ 290/89 Jora v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, 43(2) P.D. 116, 118; HCJ 24/91 Timraz v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip Area, 45(2) P.D. 325, 333 – hereinafter The Timraz Case; HCJ 1890/03 The Bethlehem Municipality v. The State of Israel – The Ministry of Defense (yet unpublished) – hereinafter The Bethlehem Municipality Case; HJC 10356/02 ­­­­­Hess v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, 58 (3) P.D. 443, 456hereinafter The Hess Case; see also D. Kretzmer "The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law" 99 A.J.I.L. 88, 97 (2005) – hereinafter Kretzmer; N. Keidar "An Examination of the Authority of Military Commander to Requisition Privately Owned Land for the Construction of the Separation Barrier" 38 Isr. L. Rev. 247 (2005) – hereinafter Keidar).  Pursuant to regulation 52 of The Hague Regulations, the taking of possession must be for "needs of the army of occupation".  Pursuant to §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention, the taking of possession must be rendered "absolutely necessary by military operation".  G. Von Glahn discussed the legality of taking possession of land, stating:

 

“Under normal circumstances an occupier may not appropriate or seize on a permanent basis any immovable private property but on the other hand a temporary use of land and buildings for various purposes appears permissible under a plea of military necessity” (G. von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation 186 (1957)).

 

The key question is, of course, whether taking possession of land is rendered "absolutely necessary by military operation" (on this question see Imseis "Critical Reflections on the International Humanitarian Law Aspects of the ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion", 99 A.J.I.L. 102 (2005), and Keidar, at p. 247).  This issue is for the military commander to decide.  J.S. Pictet discussed this point, stating:

 

“[I]t will be for the Occupying Power to judge the importance of such military requirements” (J.S. Pictet, Commentary IV Geneva Convention - Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War  302 (1958); hereinafter - Pictet).

 

Of course, the military commander's discretion is subject to judicial review by this Court (see The Timraz Case, at p. 335).

 

17.       In The Beit Sourik Case and preceding case law, the Supreme Court held that the authority to take possession of land for military needs is anchored not only in regulations 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations and in §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention, but also in regulation 23(g) of The Hague Regulations.  The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague determined that the second part of The Hague Regulations, in which regulation 23(g) is found, applies only during the time that hostilities are occurring, and that therefore it does not apply to the construction of the fence (paragraph 124).  The International Court of Justice added that the third part of The Hague Regulations – which includes regulations 43 and 52 – continues to apply, as it deals with military government (§125).  This approach of the International Court of Justice cannot detract from this Court's approach regarding the military commander's authority to take possession of land for constructing the fence.  This authority is anchored, as mentioned, in regulations 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations and in §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention.  Regarding the principled stance of the International Court of Justice, we note the following two points: first, there is a view – to which Pictet himself adheres – by which the scope of application of regulation 23(g) can be widened, by way of analogy, to cover belligerent occupation as well (see Pictet, at p. 301; G. Schwarzenberger 2 International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals: the Law of Armed Conflict 253, 314 (1968).  Second, the situation in the territory under belligerent occupation is often fluid.  Periods of tranquility and calm transform into dynamic periods of combat.  When combat takes place, it is carried out according to the rules of international law.  "This combat is not being carried out in a normative void.  It is being carried out according to the rules of international law, which determine principles and rules for the waging of combat" (see HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. The Minister of Defense, 56(3) P.D. 30, 34; see also HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh, M.K. v. The Minister of Defense, 56(3) P.D. 11, 16).  In such a situation, in which combat activities are taking place in the area under belligerent occupation, the rules applicable to belligerent occupation, as well as the rules applicable to combat activities, will apply to these activities (see The Marab Case; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. The Commander of IDF forces in the West Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352, and Watkin "Controlling the Use of Force: A Role of Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict" 98 A.J.I.L. 1, 28 (2004)).  Regulation 23(g) of The Hague Regulations will apply in such a situation in territory under belligerent occupation, due to the combat activities taking place in it.  The position of the state, as argued before us, is that the construction of the fence is part of Israel's combat actions.  It is, according to the state's argument, a defensive act of erecting fortifications; it is intended to stop the advance of an offensive of terrorism; it is a defensive act which serves as an alternative to offensive military activity; it is an act absolutely necessary for the for the combat effort.  As mentioned, we have no need to discuss this issue in depth, since the general authority granted the military commander pursuant to regulations 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations and §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention are sufficient, as far as construction of the separation fence goes.  We are thus able to leave that issue for decision at a later opportunity. 

 

18. The rationale behind the military commander's authority to construct a separation fence for security and military reasons includes, first and foremost, the need to protect the army in the territory under belligerent occupation.  It also includes defense of the State of Israel itself (compare §62(2) of The Fourth Geneva Convention, and HCJ 302/72 Hilo v. The Government of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 162, 178; The Iyub Case, at p. 117; HCJ 258/79 Amira v. The Minister of Defense, 34(1) P.D. 90; The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 833; Kretzmer, at p. 101).  Does the military commander's authority to construct a separation fence also include his authority to construct a fence in order to protect the lives and safety of Israelis living in Israeli communities in the Judea and Samaria area?  This question arises in light of the fact that Israelis living in the area are not "protected persons," as per the meaning of that term in §4 of The Fourth Geneva Convention (see The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case (yet unpublished, paragraph 4 of the opinion of the Court)).  Is the military commander authorized to protect the lives and defend the safety of people who are not "protected" under The Fourth Geneva Convention?  In our opinion, the answer is positive.  The reason for this is twofold: first, the military commander's general authority is set out in regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations, which determines:

 

"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

 

The authority of the military commander is, therefore, "to ensure . . . public order and safety".  This authority is not restricted only to situations of actual combat.  It applies as long as the belligerent occupation continues (see The Timraz Case, at p. 336).  This authority is not restricted only to the persons protected under international humanitarian law.  It is a general authority, covering any person present in the territory held under belligerent occupation.  Justice E. Mazza discussed this, stating:

 

"as far as the need to preserve the security of the area and the security of the public in the area is concerned, the military commander's authority applies to all persons present in the boundaries of the area at any given time.  This determination is a necessary deduction from the military commander's known and clear duty to preserve the security of the area and from his responsibility for preservation of the public peace in his area" (HCJ 2612/94 Sha'ar v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 48(3) P.D. 675, 679).

 

In another case I added:

 

"The Israeli settlement in the Gaza Strip is controlled by the law of belligerent occupation.  Israeli law does not apply in this area . . . the lives of the settlers are arranged, mainly, by the security legislation of the military commander.  The military commander's authority 'to ensure public order and safety' is directed towards every person present in the area under belligerent occupation.  It is not restricted to 'protected persons' only . . . this authority of his covers all Israelis present in the area" (HCJ 6339/05 Matar v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (yet unpublished); see also the Hess case, at p. 455).

 

Indeed, the military commander must ensure security.  He must preserve the safety of every person present in the area of belligerent occupation, even if that person does not fall into the category of 'protected persons' (see HCJ 72/86 Zlum v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area, 41(1) P.D. 528, 532, hereinafter – The Zlum Case; HCJ 2717/96 Wafa v. The Minister of Defense, 50(2) P.D. 848, 856; HCJ 4363/02 Zindat v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (unpublished); HCJ 6982/02 Wahidi v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (unpublished); HCJ 4219/02 Gusin v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, 56(4) P.D. 608, 611).

 

19.       Our conclusion is, therefore, that the military commander is authorized to construct a separation fence in the area for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of the Israeli settlers in the area.  It is not relevant whatsoever to this conclusion to examine whether this settlement activity conforms to international law or defies it, as determined in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague.  For this reason, we shall express no position regarding that question.  The authority to construct a security fence for the purpose of defending the lives and safety of Israeli settlers is derived from the need to preserve "public order and safety" (regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations).  It is called for, in light of the human dignity of every human individual.  It is intended to preserve the life of every person created in God's image.  The life of a person who is in the area illegally is not up for the taking.   Even if a person is located in the area illegally, he is not outlawed. This Court took this approach in a number of judgments.  In one case I noted:

 

"The military commander's duty is to protect the security of his soldiers, while being considerate of the safety of the local population.  This population also includes the settlements located in the area.  Their legality is not under discussion before us, and will be determined in the peace treaties which the relevant parties will reach" (HCJ 4364/02 Zindat v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (unpublished), and see also HCJ 6982/02 Wahidi v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip (unpublished)).

 

In another case I stated:

 

"It is contended before us that the objective of the order is to allow movement between two settlements, and that this objective is not a legal one, as the settlements are not legal.  Not security considerations lie at the base of the order, rather political considerations.  This argument holds no water.  The status of the settlements will be determined in the peace treaty.  Until that time, respondent has the duty to defend the population (Arab and Jewish) in the territory under his military control (HCJ 4219/02 Gusin v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, 56(4) P.D. 608, 611; see also The Zlum Case, at p. 532).

 

In a similar vein wrote my colleague, Justice A. Procaccia:

 

"Alongside the area commander's responsibility for safeguarding the safety of the military force under his command, he must ensure the well being, safety and welfare of the residents of the area.  This duty of his applies to all residents, without distinction by identity – Jew, Arab, or foreigner.  The question of the legality of various populations' settlement activity in the area is not the issue put forth for our decision in this case.  From the very fact that they have settled in the area is derived the area commander's duty to preserve their lives and their human rights.  This sits well with the humanitarian aspect of the military force's responsibility in belligerent occupation" (The Hess Case, at p. 460).

 

 

20.       Indeed, the legality of the Israeli settlement activity in the area does not affect the military commander's duty – as the long arm of the State of Israel – to ensure the life, dignity and honor, and liberty of every person present in the area under belligerent occupation (see Y. Shany "Capacities and Inadequacies: a Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases" 38 Isr. L. Rev. 230, 243 (2005)).  Even if the military commander acted in a manner that conflicted the law of belligerent occupation at the time he agreed to the establishment of this or that settlement – and that issue is not before us, and we shall express no opinion on it – that does not release him from his duty according to the law of belligerent occupation itself, to preserve the lives, safety, and dignity of every one of the Israeli settlers.  The ensuring of the safety of Israelis present in the area is cast upon the shoulders of the military commander (compare §3 of The Fourth Geneva Convention).  Professor Kretzmer discussed this:

 

“[A] theory that posits that the fact that civilians are living in an illegal settlement should prevent a party to the conflict from taking any measures to protect them would seem to contradict fundamental notions of international humanitarian law. After all, the measures may be needed to protect civilians (rather than the settlements in which they live) against a serious violation of IHL”   (Kretzmer, at p. 93).

 

It is also to be noted that the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington D.C. between the State of Israel and the PLO on 28 September 1995, provided that the question of the Israeli settlements in the area will be discussed in the negotiations over the final status (see §17(a) and §31(5)).  It was also provided in that agreement that "Israel shall . . . carry the responsibility . . . for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order" (§12(1)).  This arrangement applies to all the Israeli settlements in the area.  This agreement was granted legal status in the area (see Decree Regarding Implementation of the Interim Agreement (Judea and Samaria)(No. 7), 5756-1995)(see The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case, paragraph 10 of the opinion of the Court, as well as Y. Zinger "The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement Regarding Autonomy Arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – Some Legal Aspects", 27 Mishpatim 605 (1997) [Hebrew]).

 

21.       The second reason which justifies our conclusion that the military commander is authorized to order the construction of a separation fence intended to protect the lives and ensure the security of the Israeli settlers in the area is this: the Israelis living in the area are Israeli citizens.  The State of Israel has a duty to defend their lives, safety, and well being.  Indeed, the constitutional rights which our Basic Laws and our common law grant to every person in Israel are also granted to Israelis who are located in territory under belligerent occupation which is under Israeli  control.  We discussed that point in The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case:

 

"In our opinion, the Basic Laws grant rights to every Israeli settler in the area to be evacuated.  This jurisdiction is personal.  It is derived from the State of Israel's control over the area to be evacuated.  It is the fruit of a view by which the state's Basic Laws regarding human rights apply to Israelis found outside the state, who are in an area under its control by way of belligerent occupation" (Id., paragraph 80 of the opinion of the Court).

In sum, Israelis present in the area have the rights to life, dignity and honor, property, privacy, and the rest of the rights which anyone present in Israel enjoys (see The Hess Case, at p. 461).  Converse to this right of theirs stands the state's duty to refrain from impinging upon these rights, and to protect them.  In one case, an Israeli wished to enter the area.  The military commander refused the request, reasoning his refusal by the danger to the Israeli from being present in the place he wished to enter.  The Israeli responded that he will "take the risk" upon himself.  We rejected this approach, stating:

"Israel has the duty to protect her citizens.  She does not satisfy her duty merely since citizens are willing to 'take the risk upon themselves'.  This 'taking of risk' does not add or detract from the issue, as the state remains obligated to the well being of its citizens, and must do everything possible to return them safely to the country" (HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(5) P.D. 385, 406.  See also HCJ 9293/01 Barakeh, M.K. v. The Minister of Defense, 56(2) P.D. 509, 515; The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case (yet unpublished, paragraph 111 of the opinion of the Court)).

Thus it is, generally speaking.  Thus it certainly is, when many of the Israelis living in the area do so with the encouragement and blessing of the government of Israel.

22.       Of course, the scope of the human right of the Israeli living in the area, and the level of protection of the right, are different from the scope of the human right of an Israeli living in Israel and the level of protection of that right.  At the foundation of this differentiation lies the fact that the area is not part of the State of Israel.  Israeli law does not apply in the area.  He who lives in the area lives under the regime of belligerent occupation.  Such a regime is inherently temporary (see HCJ 351/80 The Jerusalem District Electric Company v. The Minister of Energy and Infrastructure, 35(2) P.D. 673, 690; The Jami'at Ascan Case, at p. 802; The Beit Sourik Case, paragraph 27; The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case, paragraph 8 of the opinion of the Court)).  The rights granted to Israelis living in the area came to them from the military commander. They have no more than what he has - Nemo dat quod non habet.  Therefore, in determining the substance of the rights of Israelis living in the area, one must take the character of the area and the powers of the military commander into account.  This Court discussed that point in The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case, as it examined the impingement of the human rights of the Israelis evacuated from the Gaza Strip:

"In determining the substance of the impingement and the rate of compensation, one must take into consideration the fact that the rights impinged upon are the rights of Israelis in territory under belligerent occupation.  The temporariness of the belligerent occupation affects the substance of the right impinged upon, and thus also, automatically, the compensation for the impingement (Id., paragraph 126 of the opinion of the Court).

While discussing the property right of Israelis evacuated from the Gaza Strip, the Court stated:

"This property right is limited in scope . . . most Israelis do not have ownership of the land on which they built their houses and businesses in the territory to be evacuated.  They acquired their rights from the military commander, or from persons acting on his behalf.  Neither the military commander nor those acting on his behalf are owners of the property, and they cannot transfer rights better than those they have.  To the extent that the Israelis built their homes and assets on land which is not private ('state land'), that land is not owned by the military commander.  His authority is defined in regulation 55 of The Hague Regulations. . . . The State of Israel acts . . . as the administrator of the state property and as usufructuary of it . . . " (Id., paragraph 127 of the opinion of the Court).

The scope of this right and the level of protection of it are not put forth for decision before us.  The Israelis whose lives and security the separation fence is intended to protect are not petitioners before us.  Their security, lives, rights of property, movement, and freedom of occupation, as well as the other rights recognized in Israeli law, are taken into consideration in the petition before us in the framework of the military commander's discretion regarding the need for a separation fence, and regarding its route (see The Zlum Case, at p. 532).

23.       Israel's duty to defend its citizens and residents, even if they are in the area, is anchored in internal Israeli law.  The legality of the implementation of this duty is anchored in public international law, as discussed, in the provisions of regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations.  In The Beit Sourik Case, this Court did not anchor the military commander's authority to erect the separation fence upon the law of self defense.  The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague determined that the authority to erect the fence is not to be based upon the law of self defense.  The reason for this is that §51 of the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the natural right of self defense, when one state militarily attacks another state.  Since Israel is not claiming that the source of the attack upon her is a foreign state, there is no application of this provision regarding the erection of the wall (paragraph 138 of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague).  Nor does the right of a state to self defense against international terrorism authorize Israel to employ the law of self defense against terrorism coming from the area, as such terrorism is not international, rather originates in territory controlled by Israel by belligerent occupation.  This approach of the International Court of Justice at the Hague is not indubitable (see R. Higgins Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use It 253 (1994); F. Frank "Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense" 95 A.J.I.L.  839 (2001); J. J. Paust "Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond" 35 Cornell Int'l L.J. 533 (2002); A. C. Arend and R. J. Beck International Law and the Use of Force - Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (2000)).  It stirred criticism both from the dissenting judge, Judge Buergenthal (paragraph 6) and in the separate opinion of Judge Higgins (paragraphs 33 and 34).  Conflicting opinions have been voiced in legal literature.  There are those who support the ICJ's conclusion regarding self defense (see I. Scobbie "Words My Mother Never Taught Me – 'In Defense of the International Court'" 99 A.J.I.L. 76 (2005). There are those who criticize the ICJ’s views on self-defense (see M. Pomerance "The ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction and the Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial" 99 A.J.I.L. 26 (2005); Murphy "Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse, Dixit from the ICJ" 99 I.J.I.L. 62 (2005); Wedgwood "The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self Defence" 99 A.J.I.L. 52 (2005); Gross "Combating Terrorism: Self-Defense, Does it Include Security Barrier – Depends Who You Ask" 38 Corn. Int. L.J. 569 (2005). We find this approach of the International Court of Justice hard to come to terms with.  It is not called for by the language of §51 of the Charter of the United Nations (see the difference between the English and French versions, S. Rosenne 291 General Course on Public International Law 149 (2001)).  It is doubtful whether it fits the needs of democracy in its struggle against terrorism.  From the point of view of a state's right to self defense, what difference does it make if a terrorist attack against it comes from another country or from territory external to it which is under belligerent occupation?  And what shall be the status of international terrorism which penetrates into territory under belligerent occupation, while being launched from that territory by international terrorism's local agents?  As mentioned, we have no need to thoroughly examine this issue, as we have found that regulation 43 of The Hague Regulations authorizes the military commander to take all necessary action to preserve security.  The acts which self defense permits are surely included within such action.  We shall, therefore, leave the examination of self defense for a future opportunity.

            3.         The Military Commander's Considerations in Erecting the Separation Fence and the Balancing Between Them

24.       What are the considerations which the military commander must weigh in determining the route of the fence?  The first consideration recognized by international law is the security-military consideration, by force of which the military commander is permitted to weigh considerations of the security of the state, the security of the army, and the personal security of all present in the area.  Indeed, converse to the human rights of the Israelis stands the military commander's duty and authority to defend them.  The second consideration is, in the context of the petition before us, the good of the local Arab population.  The human dignity of every member of the population, including the local population, must be defended by the military commander.  Indeed, the basic rule is that every member of the local population is entitled to recognition:

"His human dignity, the sanctity of his life, and his status as a free person . . .  one must not take his life or his dignity as a person, and one must defend his dignity as a person . . . the military commander's duty according to the basic rule is twofold: first, he must refrain from acts which hurt the local residents.  That is his 'negative' duty; second, he must take the action necessary to ensure that the local residents will not be hurt.  That is his 'positive' duty" (HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(5) P.D. 385, 394).

The human rights of the local residents include the whole gamut of human rights.  My colleague, Justice A. Procaccia, discussed this point, noting:

"In the framework of his responsibility for the well being of the residents of the area, the commander must also work diligently to provide proper defense to the constitutional human rights of the local residents, subject to the limitations posed by the conditions and factual circumstances on the ground . . . included in these protected constitutional rights are freedom of movement, religion, and worship, and property rights.  The commander of the area must use his authority to preserve the public safety and order in the area, while protecting human rights" (The Hess Case, at p. 461). 

 

25.       Human rights, to which the protected residents in the area are entitled, are not absolute.  As any human rights, they are relative.  They can be restricted (The Limitation of Human Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (de Mestral ed. 1986); Kiss "Permissible Limitations on Rights" The International Bill of Rights (L. Henkin ed. 1981) 290).  Some of the limitations stem from the need to take rights of other people into account.  Some of the limitations stem from the public interest (see The Hess Case, at p. 461; The Bethlehem Municipality Case, paragraphs 14 and 15).  Thus, for example, the freedom of movement is not an absolute freedom.  It can be restricted due to national security needs, public order, or the rights and freedoms of others (see § 12(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966).  The person responsible for the public interest in the area is the military commander.

26.       What is the legal source from which the protected persons in the area derive their rights?  It is unanimously agreed that international humanitarian law is the central source of these rights.  This law is established, inter alia, by The Hague Regulations.  Regulation 46 of The Hague Regulations provides as follows:

"Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated."

   

This humanitarian law is also established in The Fourth Geneva Convention, which protects the rights of "protected persons".  The central provision is established in §27:

"Art. 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity. . . . the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war."

These provisions have been quoted at times in the judgments of the Supreme Court (see HCJ 256/72 The Jerusalem District Electric Company v. The Minister of Defense, 27(1) P.D. 124; HCJ 302/72 Abu Hilu v. The Government of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169; HCJ 574/82 Al Nawari v. The Minister of Defense, 39(3) P.D. 449; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 27(2) 349; HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(3) P.D. 385; The Beit Sourik Case).

27.       Can the rights of the protected residents be anchored in the international conventions on human rights, the central of which is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, to which Israel is party (see E. Benvenisti The International Law of Occupation (1993); Dennis "Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation" 99 A.J.I.L. 119 (2005))?  The International Court of Justice at the Hague determined, in its Advisory Opinion, that these conventions apply in an area under belligerent occupation.  When this question arose in the past in the Supreme Court, it was left open, and the Court was willing, without deciding the matter, to rely upon the international conventions.  In one case, President M. Shamgar relied upon these international sources, stating:

"I enter not, at this point, into the question whether the obligations arising from the various agreements and declarations to be referred to, are legally binding . . . for the concrete purposes before us now, I shall assume that one can view the content of these legal documents as relevant" (HCJ 13/86 Shahin v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area, 41(1) P.D. 197, 210).

 

In another case, my colleague Justice D. Beinisch stated:

 

"We need not decide whether, and to what extent, the international conventions on human rights apply in the Judea and Samaria area . . .  Suffice it to say that in the framework of the military commander's duty to exercise his discretion reasonably, he must also take into account the interests and rights of the local population, including the need to minimize the impingement of its freedom of movement; and that, respondents do not contest" (The Bethlehem Municipality Case (yet unpublished, paragraph 15)).

 

We shall adopt a similar approach.  Indeed, we need not, in the framework of the petition before us, take a position regarding the force of the international conventions on human rights in the area.  Nor shall we examine the interrelationship between international humanitarian law and international law on human rights (on this question see T. Meron Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989); Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Quest for Universality (D. Warner ed. 1997); J. Frowein "The Relationship Between Human Rights Regimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation" 28 Isr. Y. H. R. 1 (1998); D. Schindler "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws" 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 935 (1982)).  However, we shall assume – without deciding the matter – that the international conventions on human rights apply in the area.

 

28.       Indeed, in exercising his authority pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation, the military commander must "ensure the public order and safety."  In this framework, he must consider, on the one hand, considerations of state security, security of the army, and the personal security of all who are present in the areaOn the other hand, he must consider the human rights of the local Arab population.  Indeed, "the law of war usually creates a delicate balance between two magnetic poles.  Military necessity on the one hand, and humanitarian considerations on the other (Y. Dinstein "The Authority to Legislate in the Administered Territories" 2 Iyunei Mishpat 505, 509 (5732-5733) [Hebrew]).  I discussed this point in one case, noting:

 

"The Hague Regulations revolve around two main axes: one – ensuring the legitimate security interests of the occupier in territory held under belligerent occupation; the other – ensuring the needs of the civilian population in the territory held under belligerent occupation" (The Jami'at Ascan Case, at p. 794).

 

My colleague Justice A. Procaccia similarly noted that The Hague Regulations authorize the military commander to provide for two needs:

 

"The first need is military, and the other is a civilian-humanitarian need.  The first concerns itself with providing for the safety of the military force holding the area, and the second – with responsibility for maintaining the well being of the residents.  On the latter subject, the military commander is charged not only with preservation of the order and safety of the residents, but also with defense of their rights, and especially the constitutional human rights granted them.  The concern for human rights stands at the center of the humanitarian considerations which the military commander must weigh" (The Hess Case, at p. 455).

 

29.       These considerations – security needs on the one hand and the needs of the local population on the other – conflict each other.  Thus is usually the case.  Thus certainly is the case regarding the construction of the fence.  What is the military commander to do in this situation?  The answer is that he must create a balance between the conflicting considerations.  Indeed, like in many other areas of law, the solution is not found in "all" or "nothing"; the solution is in locating the proper balance between the clashing considerations.  The solution is not to assign absolute weight to one of the considerations; the solution is to assign relative weights to the various considerations, while balancing between them at the point of decision (see HCJ 953/83 Levy v. The Commander of the Southern District of the Israeli Police, 38(2) P.D. 393).  "In performing his task of preserving order and safety, the commander of the area must ensure, therefore, the critical security interests on the one hand, and protect the interests of the civilian population in the area on the other . . . between these foci of responsibility, a proper balance is needed" (The Hess Case, at p. 456).  Indeed, "The law of belligerent occupation recognizes the military commander's power to preserve the security of the area and to thus defend the safety of his state and its citizens.  However, it makes exercise of this authority conditional upon the proper balance between them and the rights, needs, and interests of the local population" (The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 833).

 

4.         Proportionality

 

30.       How shall this balancing be performed?  The answer is that this balancing raises no problem unique to belligerent occupation.  It is a part of a general problem in law (see A. Barak A Judge in A Democratic Society 262 (2004)[Hebrew]).  The solution to it is universal.  It is found, inter alia, in general principles of law, including reasonableness and good faith.  One of these basic principles which balances between a proper and fitting goal and the means for realizing it is the principle of proportionality (see The Hess Case, at p. 461; The Bethlehem Municipality Case, paragraph 15; The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 836; The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case, paragraph 102 of the opinion of the Court).  This principle draws its strength from international law and from the fundamental principles of Israeli public law.  The principle of proportionality is based on three subtests which fill it with concrete content.  The first subtest calls for a fit between goal and means.  There must be a rational link between the means employed and the goal one is wishing to accomplish.  The second subtest determines that of the gamut of means which can be employed to accomplish the goal, one must employ the least harmful means.  The third subtest demands that the damage caused to the individual by the means employed must be of appropriate proportion to the benefit stemming from it.  Note that "at times there is more than one way to satisfy the proportionality demand.  In such situations, a zone of proportionality (similar to the zone of reasonableness) should be recognized.  Any means which the administrative body chooses from within the zone is proportional" (The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 840).

 

            5.         The Scope of Judicial Review

 

31.       In a long line of judgments, the Supreme Court has determined the standards for the scope of judicial review of decisions and acts of the military commander in territory held under belligerent occupation.  This judicial review is anchored in the status of the military commander as a public official, and in the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice to issue orders to bodies fulfilling public functions by law (§15(3) of Basic Law: The Judiciary).  In determining the scope of judicial review, it was decided on the one hand that the Court does not substitute the discretion of the military commander with its own discretion.  "It is but obvious that the Court does not slip into the shoes of the deciding military official . . . in order to replace the commander's discretion with the discretion of the Court" (Shamgar P. in HCJ 1005/89 Aga v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip Area, 44(1) P.D. 536, 539).  The Court does not examine the wisdom of the decision, rather its legality (see HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. The Commander of IDF Forces in Gaza, 58(5) P.D. 385, 393).  This is appropriate from the point of view of separation of powers.  On the other hand it was determined that the Court does not refrain from judicial review merely because the military commander acts outside of Israel, or because his actions have political and military ramifications.  When the decisions or acts of the military commander impinge upon human rights, they are justiceable.  The door of the Court is open.  The argument that the impingement upon human rights is due to security considerations does not rule out judicial review.  "Security considerations" or "military necessity" are not magic words (see HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, 56(6) P.D. 352, 375; HCJ 619/78 "Al Taliyeh" Weekly v. The Minister of Defense, 33(3) P.D. 505, 512; The Jami'at Ascan Case, at p. 809; HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh, M.K. v. The Minister of Defense, 56(3) P.D. 11, 16).  This is appropriate from the point of view of protection of human rights.

 

32.       It is between these two edges that the normative outline for the scope of judicial review is determined.  This outline examines whether the actions and decisions of the military commander uphold the law in the area.  When the action can be performed in a number of ways, the Court examines whether the act of the military commander is an act that a reasonable military commander could have adopted.  When the decision of the military commander relies upon military knowledge, the Court grants special weight to the military expertise of the commander of the area, upon whom the responsibility for the security of the area is cast (see HCJ 390/79 Duikat v. The Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1, 25; HCJ 258/79 Amira v. The Minister of Defense, 34(1) P.D. 90, 92; The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 844).  When the decision of the military commander – based upon his military expertise – impinges upon human rights, the proportionality of the impingement will be determined according to the customary tests of proportionality.  In one case I discussed this point, noting:

 

"We assume that the military action performed in Rafiah is necessary from a military standpoint.  The question before us is whether the military action withstands the national and international standards which determine the legality of that action.  The mere fact that the action is called for on the military level does not mean that it is lawful on the legal level.  Indeed, we do not substitute the discretion of the military commander, regarding military considerations.  That is his expertise.  We examine their results on the humanitarian law level.  That is our expertise" (The Physicians for Human Rights Case, at p. 393).    

 

 

These standards – by which this Court has acted for a very long time – apply also regarding the scope of judicial review of the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe.  So we said in The Beit Sourik Case:

 

"The military commander is the expert regarding the military quality of the separation fence route.  We are experts regarding its humanitarian aspects.  The military commander determines where, on hill and plain, the separation fence will be erected.  That is his expertise.  We examine whether this route's harm to the local residents is proportional.  That is our expertise (Id., at p. 846).

 

C. The Beit Sourik Case

 

33.       In The Beit Sourik Case, the legality of the construction of the separation fence west of Jerusalem was discussed.  The length of that separation fence was approximately 40 kilometers.  It was part of phase C of the separation fence (upon which the government decided on October 1 2003).  Most of it was built east of the Green Line.  It includes, in its "Israeli" part, a number of Israeli settlements which were built in the Judea and Samaria area, near the Green Line.  The Supreme Court (President A. Barak, Vice President E. Mazza and Justice M. Cheshin) first discussed whether the military commander is authorized to order the construction of the fence, in light of petitioners' argument that a political consideration, and not a military one, lies at the foundation of its construction.  The Court held that the military commander's authority is limited to military-security considerations.  He is not authorized to take political reasons into account.  The Supreme Court examined the data before it and determined that "according to the factual basis before us, the reason for erecting the fence is a security reason" (Id., at p. 830).  On this issue, the Court relied upon government decisions which stressed its character as a security fence; upon affidavits of the commander of the area, in which the military considerations at the heart of the choice of route were detailed; upon the way the government officials went about things, changing (more than once) the route during the hearings, showing openness to suggestions which were raised, and agreeing (more than once) to move the fence route closer to the Green Line.  Summarizing this issue, the Supreme Court stated:

 

"We have no reason to assume that the objective is political rather than security-based. Indeed, petitioners did not carry the burden and did not persuade us that the considerations behind the construction of the separation fence are political rather than security-based. Similarly, petitioners did not carry their burden, and did not persuade us that the considerations of the Commander of the IDF Forces in the area, in choosing the route of the separation fence, are not military considerations, and that he has not acted to fulfill them in good faith, according to his best military understanding" (Id., at p. 831).

 

34.       The second question discussed by the Supreme Court regarded the legality of the orders issued in order to take possession of the land upon which the fence was built.  The various seizure orders were examined on their merits.  The Court found that there had been no defect in the process of issuing the orders or in the process of allowing the submission of appeals.  The Court determined that the military commander is authorized – according to the international law which applies in the area – to take possession of land, needed for military purposes, subject to his duty to pay compensation.  The Court relied upon regulations 23(g) and 52 of The Hague Regulations, and upon §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention.  The Court held that "the obstacle is intended to take the place of combat military operations, by physically blocking terrorist infiltration into Israeli population centers" (Id., at p. 832).

 

35.       The third question discussed by the Court was the legality of the route chosen for the construction of the separation fence.  The Court discussed the need to achieve a balance between the security-military needs and the rights of the protected residents.  Regarding the security-military needs, the Court stated that it assigns special weight to the military opinion of the military commander, with whom the responsibility for security lies.  Regarding the rights of the protected persons, the Court relied upon the humanitarian law set out in The Hague Regulations and The Fourth Geneva Convention.  In the discussion of the appropriate balance, a considerable part of the judgment was devoted to the question of proportionality.  A comparison was made between the intensity of harm to security (without the security fence) and the harm to the local residents (caused by the security fence).  The Court held that the test for proportionality is an objective one. "This is a legal question, the expertise for which belongs to the Court" (Id., at p. 841).  Against this background, the Court examined the five segments of the fence (according to the five seizure orders).  Each fence segment was examined separately, as the separation fence's "proportionality varies according to local conditions" (Id., at p. 846).  Also examined, however, was the compound harm caused to the lives of the local population by all the fence segments together.  Some of the fence segments were found to be proportionate.  Others were found to be disproportionate.  The basis of the determination of lack of proportionality was the third subtest of proportionality.  The question posed by this subtest is whether "the severity of the injury to local inhabitants, by the construction of the separation fence along the route determined by the military commander, stand[s] in reasonable (proper) proportion to the security benefit from the construction of the fence along that route" (Id., at p. 850).  According to that subtest, it was determined, regarding one of the fence segments, that the separation fence "undermines the delicate balance between the duty of the military commander to preserve security and his duty to provide for the needs of the local inhabitants.  This approach is based on the fact that the route which the military commander established for the security fence – which separates the local inhabitants from their agricultural lands – injures the local inhabitants in a severe and acute way, while violating their rights under international humanitarian law" (Id., at p. 850).  One fence segment was held to be disproportionate, since "the farmers' way of life is impinged upon most severely. The regime of licensing and gates, as set out by the military commander, does not solve this problem" (Id., at p. 854).  A third fence segment was found to be disproportionate, as it created "a veritable chokehold, which will severely stifle daily life" (Id., at p. 855).  Regarding all fence segments found to be disproportionate, the Court stated that "[t]he injury caused by the separation fence is not restricted to the lands of the residents and to their access to these lands.  The injury is of far wider a scope. It strikes across the fabric of life of the entire population" (Id., at p. 861).  The result was that those parts of the fence found to be disproportionate were annulled. 

 

36.       After the judgment in The Beit Sourik Case was handed down, the issue went back to the military commander.  He reexamined the route which had been under discussion in that case.  He made alterations to it, which, in his opinion, implement the content of the judgment.  Eight petitions against the legality of the new route are pending.  In seven of them, the Arab residents are petitioning against the new route (HCJ 5683/04 The Beit Sira Village Council et al. v. The Government of Israel; HCJ 426/05 The Bidu Village Council v. The Government of Israel; HCJ 2223/05 Abd el Wahab Kandil et al. v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area; HCJ 3758/04 Agraib v. The Government of Israel; HCJ 8264/05 Hadur et al. v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area; HCJ 8265/05 Saker Ibrahim Abdalla v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area; HCJ 8266/05 Jamal v. The Military Commander).  In one of the petitions, an Israeli settlement petitions against the new route (HCJ 1767/05 The Har Adar Local Council v. The Ministry of Defense).  These petitions are yet pending, as we have been asked to examine – in an expanded panel - the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and its effect upon the normative outline as set out in The Beit Sourik Case.  It is to these questions which we now turn.

 

D. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague

 

            1.         The Request for an Advisory Opinion and the Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice

 

37.       The General Assembly of the United Nations decided (on December 8 2003) to request an Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, regarding the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall (as the separation fence is called in the decision of the General Assembly).  The language of the decision is as follows:

 

“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?” (Resolution ES-10/14).

 

 When it received the request for an Advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice notified all states entitled to appear before the Court that they may relay information to it regarding all aspects of the question presented before it.  In this framework, the Secretary-General of the UN submitted a dossier containing documents likely to throw light upon the question before the ICJ (on January 19 2004).  Written statements were filed to the ICJ by a number of states, including Israel.  The ICJ heard oral arguments.  Israel did not request to make oral arguments.  Two questions stood before the ICJ.  The first question was whether it has jurisdiction to give the requested opinion, and if the answer to that question is positive, are there reasons not to exercise that jurisdiction.  The second question was the question posed to it by the General Assembly, on the merits.  The Advisory Opinion was handed down on July 9 2004.

 

38.       The main factual basis upon which the ICJ based its opinion, comes from the dossier filed with the ICJ by the Secretary-General of the UN.  The dossier contains the resolution of the General Assembly requesting the ICJ's Advisory Opinion, as well as the background of the events that led to its adoption by the General Assembly.  The dossier also contains data likely to throw light upon the question posed to the ICJ.  A central source of the information on the separation fence is the report of the Secretary-General of the UN (of November 24 2003; hereinafter - "The Secretary-General's Report"), prepared prior to the UN General Assembly decision, and a written statement updating his report (of January 19 2004; hereinafter - "the Secretary-General’s written statement").  The Secretary-General's Report opens with a survey of government decisions regarding the "barrier" (as the Secretary-General calls it).  It describes the route of the barrier. 

According to this description, approximately 975 km2 (which are 16.6%) of the West Bank, containing 237,000 Palestinians, will end up between the Green Line and the barrier (220,000 of whom in East Jerusalem). When the entire route of the barrier is completed, an additional 160,000 Palestinians will be in isolated enclaves, with the barrier almost completely encircling communities and tracts of land.  The planned route contains 320,000 Israelis (178,000 in East Jerusalem).  As the report continues, the Secretary-General describes the format of the barrier.  He notes that out of 180 km of the barrier already constructed or being constructed, 8.5 km are concrete walls, which the Israeli army sees as "gunfire protection walls".  They are generally found where Palestinian population centers abut Israel, such as the towns of Qalqiliya and Tulkarm, and parts of Jerusalem. The report further describes the phases of construction of the barrier.  Phase A runs 123 km (from the north end to Elkana).  Much of Phase A construction deviates from the Green Line, and incorporates Israeli settlements. According to UN officials' estimations, approximately 56,000 Palestinians have been put into enclaves - encircled areas that open into the West Bank.  Approximately 5300 Palestinians are in "closed areas" between the barrier and the Green Line.  These people require permits or identity cards.  The enclaves include Qalqiliya (population 41,606) and, to its south, a cluster of three villages with about 7300 residents.  Phase B of the barrier is 45 km long, at the northern part of the Green Line to the Jordan Valley.  It does not incorporate any settlements and does not create Palestinian enclaves.  The Secretary-General 's report also describes the plan for the barrier in Jerusalem.  Further on in the report, the route of the barrier from Elkana to the Ofer Camp military base is described.  It includes two "depth barriers" that together create enclaves encompassing 29,000 acres and 72,000 Palestinians in 24 communities.  The route deviates up to 22 km from the Green Line.  It includes a number of large settlements, including about 52,000 settlers in the "Ariel salient".  The government decision does not explain the nature of the barrier around this area.  Last described is the southern part of the barrier, 115 km long, which cuts several kilometers into the West Bank, to encompass the Gush Etzion settlement bloc and the settlement of Efrat.  An enclave is created with around 17,000 Palestinians.  The construction of the fence in this area has not yet begun.

 

39.       The Secretary-General's report describes the way in which land is requisitioned to build the barrier, including the possibility of petitioning the High Court of Justice.  It is noted that the orders expire on December 31 2005, but that they are renewable.  The report also describes the orders closing the area between the Green Line and the barrier ("Closed Areas"), pursuant to which there is no entrance into the closed area, and no one is allowed to be present in it.  This order will affect 73 km2 and 5300 Palestinians, living in 15 communities.  The order introduces a new system of residency status in the closed area.  Only upon issuance of a permit or ID card by IDF will residents of the closed area be able to remain in it.  Israeli citizens and residents can remain in the closed area and move freely to the closed area, from it, and within it, with no need for a permit.  At the date the report was written, most residents of the closed area had received permits for one month, three months, or six months.  All those that have a permit enter and exit through gates which open for 15 minutes, three times a day.  It is mentioned that if the Palestinian residents are denied regular access to their land, jobs and services, there is a concern that they will leave the area.

 

40.       The final part of the Secretary-General's report examines the humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the barrier.  According to the report, the barrier appears likely to deepen the fragmentation of the West Bank, which began with the closure system imposed after the outbreak of hostilities in September/October 2000.  The barrier dramatically increased the damage to the communities resulting from the closure system.  According to a report of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the barrier has separated 30 localities from their health services, 22 localities from their schools, 8 localities from their primary water sources, and 3 localities from the electricity network.  The report states that the Palestinians living in the enclaves are facing some of the harshest consequences of the barrier’s construction and route. Thus, for example, the city of Qalqiliya is encircled by the barrier, with entrance and exit possible from only one gate.  Thus the town is isolated from almost all its agricultural land. The villages surrounding it are separated from their markets and services.  Thus, for example, at the UN hospital in Qalqiliya, a 40% drop in caseloads has been noted.  The report further notes that completed barrier sections have had a serious impact on agriculture.  Tens of thousands of trees have been uprooted.  Farmers, separated from their land, and often also from their water sources, must cross the barrier via the controlled gates. Recent harvests have perished due to the irregular opening and closing times of the gates.  According to the Secretary-General's report, the barrier has severely restricted movement and access for thousands of urban Palestinians in Jerusalem.  The wall at Abu Dis has already affected the access to jobs and essential social services, notably schools and hospitals.  The north part of the barrier in Jerusalem has damaged long standing commercial and social connections of tens of thousands of people.  This phenomenon will be repeated along much of the route through Jerusalem.  The report states that some Jerusalem identity card holders are outside the barrier, and some of West Bank identity card holders are within the barrier.  This raises concerns about the future status of residency for Palestinians in occupied East Jerusalem under current Israeli laws. The report states that if Israel persists in construction of the barrier, some of its economic and humanitarian impact can be limited if Israel allows regular movement through a series of 41 gates to Palestinians living east of the barrier who need to access their farms, jobs, or services in the closed area.  Such access cannot compensate for incomes lost from the barrier's destruction of property, land, and businesses.  This raises concerns over violations of the rights of the Palestinians to work, health, education, and an adequate standard of living.  At the end of the report appears a short summary of the positions of the government of Israel and of the PLO. 

 

41.       The Secretary-General's report was prepared before the General Assembly resolution.  After that resolution, the Secretary-General added a written statement updating his report (on January 29 2004).  In the Secretary-General's written statement, the Secretary-General repeated some of the data from his first report, and gave an update regarding the developments in the three months which had passed since it was filed.  The statement reported that at the time of its writing, 190 km of the barrier had been completed, and two main crossing terminals had been built.  The Secretary-General's written statement surveys the various segments of the barrier, according to the phase of construction to which they belong.  Phase A, according to the updated data, 150 km long, includes a double barrier around the Baka Sharqiya enclave.  The written statement notes, regarding this enclave, that according to the original route completed in July 2003, the barrier was erected east of the Green Line, such that the enclave included about 6700 Palestinians.  At the end of November 2003, Israel began to build a new barrier along the Green Line, west of the enclave.  Part of the new barrier passes through the town of Nazlat Issa, where a wall 800 m long has been built.  The United Nations has been informed that the east side of the barrier will eventually be pulled down.  The Secretary-General's written statement further states than south of Tulkarm, on the Green Line, a major crossing terminal is being built, modeled after the Karni crossing in the Gaza Strip.  The written statement notes that Israel has removed the permanent checkpoint at the east entrance to Qalqiliya.  In addition, in mid January 2004, construction started on underpasses connecting Qalqiliya to Habla, under the access road to Alfei Menashe.  Regarding phase B, the written statement mentions the completion of barrier segments running along the Green Line or adjacent to it, from the Gilboa Mountains to the Al Mutilla valley.  In January 2004, construction began on an additional segment, in the direction of the Jordanian border.  A third segment is planned to run south and away from the Green Line, toward the Taysir village.  The written statement notes that Israeli officials informed the UN that this segment may not be completed. The written statement further updates regarding construction of the crossing terminal at Jalameh, north of Jenin, which is to serve as the primary point of entry between Israel and the northern West Bank. The written statement further describes phase C of the barrier, including its three sub-phases (phase C1 – from Elkana to the Ofer Camp military base; phase C2 – the Ariel salient; and phase C3 – "the depth barriers").  Construction has begun of 4 km of phase C1, mostly near the Green Line, out of 40 planned kilometers.  The remainder of the planned route deviates from the Green Line, reaching up to 7 km inside the West Bank.  Phase C3 includes two planned "depth barriers", up to 9 km inside the West Bank – one east of the Ben Gurion airport and the other along the planned highway 45.  It was noted that the exact components of the "depth barriers" had not yet been determined, but that if they are constructed, they will create two enclaves containing 72,000 Palestinians living in 24 communities.  The UN was informed that this segment will to be the last to be built.

 

42.       A considerable part of the Secretary-General's written statement is devoted to the barrier in East Jerusalem.  The statement mentions that construction of the barrier in the southeast of the city had begun at the end of November 2003, along the municipal boundary determined by Israel.  The barrier runs 6 km beyond the Green Line, from El Ezaria to Har Homa.  In residential areas, like El Ezaria, the wall is built to a height of 9 m.  This segment cuts El Ezaria off from Jerusalem, and splits the village of Abu Dis into two.  At least 35,000 people will live east of the barrier along this segment, which has no gates.  The entrance into Jerusalem by those with Jerusalem identity cards will be allowed via a checkpoint beneath the eastern slope of the Mount of Olives.  Another concrete wall has been constructed south of Abu Dis.  The Secretary-General's written statement also spoke of a number of roads which are planned or being constructed adjacent to the barrier around Jerusalem, which will result, inter alia, in the separation of Palestinian traffic from Israeli traffic.  The written statement concludes with a description of the obstacle planned in the north of Jerusalem, which will separate the Al-Ram village from Jerusalem.  The UN was informed that changes in the route of highway 45 in this area are being considered.  Finally, the written statement noted that the government of Israel was continuing to erect the barrier along the route approved by the cabinet (on October 1 2003).  Moreover, noted the written statement, additional components, such as crossing terminals, roads, underpasses, and gates were being constructed. 

 

43.       In addition to the two reports of the Secretary-General, the dossier included two reports by special rapporteurs, appointed by the Commission on Human Rights, which were filed prior to the General Assembly decision.  One report (of September 8 2003) discussed the question of human rights violations in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine.  Its author is Mr. John Dugard (hereinafter – "the Dugard report").  The second report (of October 31 2003) discusses "the right to food".  Its author is Jean Ziegler (hereinafter – "the Ziegler report").  We shall briefly discuss each of the two reports. 

 

44.       The Dugard report opens and closes with the finding that the fact must be faced, that what we are presently witnessing in the West Bank is a visible and clear act of territorial annexation under the guise of security.  The report describes the process of building the wall.  It points out that Palestinians between the wall and the Green Line will effectively be cut off from their land and workplaces, schools, health clinics, and other social services.  As a result, many Palestinians are leaving their homes and moving into the Palestinian territory beyond the wall.  There is a real concern of the creation of a new generation of refugees or internally displaced persons.  In the opinion of the rapporteur, the construction of the wall is nothing other than de facto annexation of territory.  The construction of the wall should be seen in the context of the building of settlements and the annexation of East Jerusalem.  Settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank are the principal beneficiaries of the wall, and approximately half of the 400,000 settler population will be incorporated on the Israeli side of the wall.  This data, along with the high cost of the wall, confirm the permanent nature of the wall.  Therefore, beyond the fact that the wall violates Palestinians' freedom of movement, restricts their access to education and health facilities, and results in the unlawful taking of Palestinian property, the wall also violates two of the most fundamental principles of international law: the prohibition on the forcible acquisition of territory, and the right to self determination.  The construction of the wall creates facts on the ground.  Despite the refrain from use of the term, the wall is annexation for all intents and purposes.  Thus the prohibition against forcible acquisition of territory – a prohibition mentioned in many international conventions, including the UN Charter - is violated.  This prohibition applies irrespective of whether the territory is acquired as a result of an act of aggression or in self-defense.  The building of the wall violates the Palestinians' right to self determination.  The realization of the right to self determination requires territorial sovereignty.  The construction of the wall substantially reduces the already small territory within which the Palestinians can exercise their right to self determination.  Israel responded to the Dugard report (on April 2 2004).

 

45.       Ziegler calls the security fence an "apartheid fence".  The building of the wall constitutes a violation of the obligation to respect the Palestinians' right to food, since it cuts the Palestinians off from their agricultural land, water wells, and other means of subsistence.  The report mentions that the fence route deviates considerably from the Green Line, and is a de facto annexation of territory on Israel's part.  The report presents data from the "B'tselem" organization, according to which 72,200 Palestinians in 36 communities will be cut off from their lands.  128,500 people in 19 communities will be put in enclaves and almost completely imprisoned by the winding route of the wall, including 40,000 residents of Qalqiliya.  11,700 people in 13 communities will be trapped in military closed areas between the wall and the Green Line, cut off from the Palestinian areas, but forbidden from entering Israel.  As a result of the construction of the wall, Israel will effectively annex most of the west aquifer system which provides 51% of the West Bank water resources.  As a result of their detachment from means of existence, many residents will be forced to leave their homes.  According to the estimate, between 6000 and 8000 residents have already left the area of Qalqiliya.  The report refers to the government's position that residents will be allowed to appeal the expropriation of lands.  However, the writer notes that all appeals made to the military Appeals Committee at the time of writing have been rejected, although the area expropriated was reduced in some of the cases.  In any case, the report adds, the speed at which the wall is being built (work continues 24 hours a day) makes it difficult to allow for proper judicial process.  The rapporteur concludes with a finding that if the wall continues to be built as planned, it will bite off almost half of the area remaining for the future Palestinian State.  Thus, the possibility of establishing a viable Palestinian state will be eliminated, and the Palestinians right to food will be denied.  Israel responded to the Zeigler report (on November 26 2003).

 

            2.         The ICJ's Jurisdiction and Discretion

 

46.       The International Court of Justice held, in the first part of its opinion, that it has jurisdiction to give the requested opinion, and that that jurisdiction is a discretionary power.  The ICJ further held that it sees no compelling reason for it not to give the opinion.  In this context, the opinion held that the ICJ has sufficient information and evidence to enable it to give the requested opinion.  This information is from the dossier submitted to the ICJ by the UN Secretary-General, written statements submitted to the ICJ by a number of states, Israel's written statement which, although limited to the question of jurisdiction and judicial propriety, included observations on other matters, including Israel's security concerns.  Additional documents issued by Israel on that issue, which are in the public domain, also stood before the ICJ.  This part of the Advisory Opinion was given by a majority of ICJ judges, with Judge Buergenthal dissenting.  According to the opinion of Judge Buergenthal, the ICJ should have exercised its discretion and declined to render the requested Advisory Opinion, since it did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings.  Judge Higgins and Judge Kooijmans noted in separate opinions, that they agree with the ICJ's opinion regarding exercise of jurisdiction with considerable hesitation.  Judge Higgins noted that she gave her vote in favor of the ICJ's finding that the building of the wall violates international law, since the wall undoubtedly has a significant negative impact upon portions of the population of the West Bank, without it being able to be excused on the grounds of military necessity.  On this issue, Israel did not explain to the ICJ why its legitimate security needs can  be met only by the route selected.  Judge Owada noted that the ICJ is lacking material explaining Israel's side of the picture, especially regarding the question why and how the wall, as it is actually planned and implemented, is necessary and appropriate. 

 

 

 

            3.         The Legality of the Fence in International Law

 

47.       The second part of the opinion is devoted to answering the question posed to the ICJ by the General Assembly.  The ICJ briefly described the historic background, beginning with the establishment of the British mandate at the end of the First World War and ending with the political agreements between Israel and the PLO in the 1990's.  The ICJ concluded this analysis with its conclusion that the territories between the Green Line and the eastern boundary of mandatory Palestine were occupied by Israel in 1967, and are held by her pursuant to customary international law, as an occupying power.  Following this introduction, the ICJ proceeded to analysis of the factual basis before it.  It referred, on this issue, to the Secretary-General's report and to his written statement.  At the conclusion of the analysis, the ICJ noted that 975 km2 (which are 16.6%) of the West Bank, containing 237,000 Palestinians, will lie between the Green Line and the wall.  If the full wall should be completed, an additional 160,000 Palestinians would live in almost completely encircled communities, described as enclavcs.  Nearly 320,000 Israeli settlers (178,000 of whom in East Jerusalem) would be living in the area between the Green Line and the wall.  It was further stated that the area between the Green Line and the wall had been declared as a closed area.  Residents of this area may no longer remain in it, nor may non-residents enter it, unless holding a permit or identity card issued by the Israeli authorities. Most residents have received permits for a limited period.  Israelis may remain in, or move freely to, from and within the Closed Area without a permit.  Access into and exit from the closed area are possible through access gates, which are open for short and infrequent periods. 

 

48.       Following the description of the factual basis, the ICJ proceeded to determining the principles of international law relevant to the examination of the legality of the actions taken by Israel.  The ICJ referred to §2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits use or threat of force.  The ICJ also referred to the principle of self determination.  The ICJ further determined that The Hague Regulations have become part of customary international law.  The Fourth Geneva Convention apply as well.  The ICJ further found that the international conventions on human rights also apply to the occupied Palestinian territory.  In this context, the ICJ held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child apply in the area. 

 

49.       Against the background of this normative outline, the ICJ proceeded to examine the question whether the building of the wall is in breach of rules and principles of international law.  The ICJ noted, in this context, the rule prohibiting acquisition of territory by force, the international recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self determination, and its position that the Israeli settlements in areas occupied in 1967 are illegal, as they are contrary to the terms of §49(6) of The Fourth Geneva Convention.  Against this background, the ICJ noted the factual findings presented before it, according to which most Israelis and most of the Israeli settlements are expected, when the wall is completed, to be on its "Israeli" side.  This fact, held the ICJ, raises concern of de facto annexation of the territory on the "Israeli" side of the wall, as well as concern of promoting forced transfer of Palestinians from the seamline area to the "Palestinian" side of the wall.  All these severely impinge upon the Palestinian's right to self determination, a right which Israel must respect.  Judge Higgins, in her separate opinion, criticized the ICJ's finding that the fence impedes upon the Palestinian's right to self determination.  Judge Kooijmans noted, in his separate opinion, that the ICJ would have done well to have left the question of self determination to the political process.

 

50.       At this point, the ICJ proceeded to examine a number of specific provisions of humanitarian law and of human rights law, which appear in international conventions.  In this analysis, the ICJ relied upon the Commission on Human Rights' two rapporteurs' reports.  On this issue, the ICJ held: first, that there is no justification for building the wall in regulation 23(g) of The Hague Regulations, as this regulation is included in the second part of the regulations, which does not apply; second, the building of the fence is contrary to the provisions of regulations 46 and 52 of The Hague Regulations, and of §53 of The Fourth Geneva ConventionThird, the fence restricts the Palestinians' freedom of movement.  That restriction is aggravated by the fact that the gates where passage is permitted are few in number, and their opening hours are restricted and unpredictably applied.  Thus, for example, the city of Qalqiliya, with a population of 40,000, is encircled by the wall, and the residents can enter it or exit from it through one military checkpoint, which is open from 7am until 7pm.  Fourth, the building of the wall damages agricultural produce and many water wells, which are the principle means of subsistence for many Palestinians.  Fifth, the wall makes difficult many Palestinians' access to health, education, water, and electricity services, while effectively annexing most of the western aquifer system in the area.  The wall has caused many businesses to shut down.  Last, as a result of the building of the wall, many Palestinians will likely be forced to move from their present place of residence to another place of residence.  These repercussions, together with the establishment of Israeli settlements in the area, tend toward a change of the area's demographic composition.

 

51.       In light of the ICJ's holdings regarding the breach of international law resulting from the building of the wall, the ICJ examined whether there are legal sources which derogate from the application of that law or qualify its application.  The ICJ held that there are no such sources.  It was held that The Hague Regulations and The Fourth Geneva Convention do not qualify the prohibition of transfer of civilian population into the occupied territory.  Regarding the qualification in The Geneva Convention regarding military necessity, it was determined that this qualification may apply in periods in which there is no active combat, but the ICJ was not persuaded that such necessity exists in this case.  Nor did the ICJ find that any of the recognized qualifications in international human rights conventions apply.  Israel did not qualify her duties pursuant to these conventions in the relevant context, and the exemptions in them do not arise in these circumstances.  Nor was the ICJ persuaded that Israel's actions in building the wall were taken for the purposes of promoting the general welfare (as required by §4 of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).  Judge Kooijmans commented, in his separate opinion, that even if the wall was being built for the military purpose of defending the legitimate rights of the Israeli citizens, it would fail the test of proportionality. 

 

52.       The ICJ summed up this aspect of its opinion by saying:

 

“To sum up, the Court, from the material available to it, is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order. The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments” (paragraph 137 of the opinion).

 

This conclusion was criticized by the dissenting judge, Judge Buergenthal.  He noted that the ICJ's opinion failed to address any facts or evidence specifically rebutting Israel’s claim of military exigencies or requirements of national security. On this subject, the ICJ ignored Israel's position.  The ICJ determined that it was "not convinced" that the route of the wall was chosen for security reasons, without showing why it was not so convinced.  Therefore, according to Judge Buergenthal, the conclusions of the ICJ are not convincing.  Judge Owada also noted in his separate opinion that the ICJ did not have before it the material explaining the Israeli side of the picture regarding the security necessity of the fence.  Judge Owada wrote, that even if such material cannot prevent the conclusion that international humanitarian law has been breached, presentation of such material is important for fairness in the proceedings.

 

53.       The ICJ proceeded to examine the argument that justification for the building of the wall is to be found in Israel's right to self defence, as provided in §51 of the Charter of the United Nations.  It was determined that §51 recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attacks by other states. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign state.  Even the Security Council's resolutions (no. 1368 and 1373 of 2001), which recognized certain aspects of war against terrorism as included in §51 of the charter, do not justify the construction of the wall, since Israel is arguing that the attack against it originates in territory in which it exercises control, and not in territory beyond its control, as was the case in those resolutions.  The ICJ found that §51 of the charter has no relevance in the case.  This approach of the ICJ spurred the criticism of a number of judges.  Dissenting Judge Buergenthal did not accept the ICJ's position that only when a state is attacked by another state, is it entitled to exercise its right to self defence.  In his opinion, the terrorist attacks upon Israel from the territory under belligerent occupation grant Israel the right to self defence.  Judge Higgins as well, in her separate opinion, distanced herself from the ICJ's position regarding self defence.  In her opinion, there is nothing in the text of §51 of the Charter of the United Nations which stipulates that self-defence is available only when an armed attack is made by a State. Judge Higgins also failed to understand the ICJ’s view that an occupying power loses the right to defend its own civilian citizens at home if the attacks emanate from the occupied territory – a territory which it has found not to have been annexed and is certainly ‘other than’ Israel. However, she did not vote against the ICJ's opinion on this issue, both since she was unconvinced that non-forcible measures (such as the building of a wall) fall within self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, and since the building of the fence, even if it can be seen as an act of self-defence, would need to be justified as necessary and proportional. Those justifications, according to Judge Higgins, have not been explained. Judge Kooijmans noted in his separate opinion, in this context, that a state has the right to defend itself against international terrorism.  He opined that Israel does not have this right, since the terrorism against her originates in territory held by her.

 

54.       Finally, the possibility of basing the building of the wall upon customary international law regarding "state of necessity" was rejected.  The ICJ stated that this doctrine allows such acts only if they are the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for that construction. The construction of the wall on its present route does not meet this condition.  The ICJ writes:

 

"The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population.  It has the right, and indeed the duty, to respond in order to protect the life of its citizens.  The measures taken are bound nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law" (paragraph 141).

 

In this context, Judge Higgins noted, in her separate opinion, that the ICJ should have said that defense of civilians is not only the duty of the occupying state, but is also the duty of those seeking to liberate themselves from occupation (paragraph 19).

 

55.       At the conclusion of its opinion, the ICJ detailed the normative results stemming from it.  The ICJ held that the construction of the wall is contrary to international law. The ICJ further held that Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law, and to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall. Israel must dismantle all that she built, and repeal or render ineffective forthwith all acts relating thereto. According to the Advisory Opinion, Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall. It was further determined, on the international plane, that all States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall.  Judge Kooijmans voted against this final conclusion regarding the duty of the states.

 

E.        The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague and The Beit Sourik Case

 

            1.         The Legal Status of the Advisory Opinion

 

56.       The opinion of the ICJ – as its title testifies, and in contrast to a judgment by the same court – is an Advisory Opinion.  It does not bind the party who requested it.  As the ICJ itself noted in its opinion (paragraph 31), it does not bind the states.  It is not res judicata (see S. Rosenne The Perplexities of Modern International Law 122 (2002)).  However, the opinion of the International Court of Justice is an interpretation of international law, performed by the highest judicial body in international law (S. Rosenne 3 The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996 1754 (3rd ed. 1997)).  The ICJ's interpretation of international law should be given its full appropriate weight.

 

            2.         The Difference Between the Conclusions of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ and of The Beit Sourik Case

 

57.       The basic normative foundation upon which the ICJ and the Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case based their decisions was a common one (see Watson "The 'Wall' Decisions in Legal and Political Context" 99 A.J.I.L. 6 (2005); hereinafter – Watson).  The ICJ held that Israel holds the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) pursuant to the law of belligerent occupation.  That is also the legal view at the base of The Beit Sourik Case.  The ICJ held that an occupier state is not permitted to annex the occupied territory.  That was also the position of the Court in The Beit Sourik Case.  The ICJ held that in an occupied territory, the occupier state must act according to The Hague Regulations and The Fourth Geneva Convention.  That too was the assumption of the Court in The Beit Sourik Case, although the question of the force of The Fourth Geneva Convention was not decided, in light of the State's declaration that it shall act in accordance with the humanitarian part of that convention.  The ICJ determined that in addition to the humanitarian law, the conventions on human rights apply in the occupied territory.  This question did not arise in The Beit Sourik Case.  For the purposes of our judgment in this case, we assume that these conventions indeed apply.  The ICJ held that the legality of the "wall" (the "fence" in our nomenclature) shall be determined, inter alia, by regulations 46 and 52 of The Hague Regulations and §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention.  This was also the position of the Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case.  The ICJ held that as a result of the building of the "wall", a number of rights of the Palestinian residents were impeded.  The Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case also held that a number of human rights of the Palestinian residents had been impeded by the building of the fence.  Finally, the ICJ held that the harm to the Palestinian residents would not violate international law if the harm was caused as a result of military necessity, national security requirements, or public order.  That was also the approach of the Court in The Beit Sourik Case.

 

58.       Despite this common normative foundation, the two courts reached different conclusions.  The ICJ held that the building of the wall, and the regime accompanying it, are contrary to international law (paragraph 142).  In contrast, the Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case held that it is not to be sweepingly said that any route of the fence is a breach of international law.  According to the approach of the Supreme Court, each segment of the route should be examined to clarify whether it impinges upon the rights of the Palestinian residents, and whether the impingement is proportional.  It was according to this approach, that the fence segments discussed in The Beit Sourik Case were examined.  Regarding some segments of the fence, it was held that their construction does not violate international law.  Regarding other segments of the fence, it was held that their construction does violate international law.  Against the background of this difference, two questions arise: The first, what is the basis of this difference, and how can it be explained?  The second, how does the explanation of the difference between the conclusions of the two courts affect the approach of the Supreme Court of Israel regarding the question of the legality of the separation fence according to international law generally, and the question of the legality of the separation fence in the Alfei Menashe enclave, specifically?  We shall discuss each of these two questions separately.

 

            3.         The Basis of the Difference Between the Conclusions of Each of the Two Courts

 

59.       The basis of the main difference between the legal conclusions of the International Court of Justice at the Hague and the judgment in The Beit Sourik Case can be found in the ICJ's concluding passage.  We discussed this passage (see paragraph 52, supra).  In light of its importance, we shall quote it again:

 

"To sum up, the Court, from the material available to it, is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives.  The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order.  The construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights instruments" (paragraph 137).

 

From this passage – as well as the rest of the opinion – it appears that, based on the data before the ICJ, it was not persuaded that the route of the wall – which severely impedes the rights of the Palestinian residents – is necessary for achieving the security objectives which Israel contended.  In contrast, the Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case ruled that there is a military necessity to erect the fence.  However, it ruled that some discussed segments of the fence route violate the Palestinian residents' rights disproportionately.  What is the basis of this difference between the two judgments?

 

60.       The answer to that question is that the main difference between the legal conclusions stems from the difference in the factual basis laid before the court.  This difference was affected, in turn, by the way the proceedings are conducted and by the legal problem before the court.  We shall discuss this difference.

 

            4.         The Difference in the Factual Basis

 

61.       The main difference between the two judgments stems primarily from the difference in the factual basis upon which each court made its decision.  Once again, the simple truth is proven: the facts lie at the foundation of the law, and the law arises from the facts (ex facto jus oritur).  The ICJ drew the factual basis for its opinion from the Secretary-General's report, his written statement, the Dugard report, and the Zeigler report.  The Supreme Court drew the facts from the data brought before it by the Palestinian petitioners on the one hand, and the State on the other.  In addition, The Supreme Court received an expert opinion by military experts who requested the opportunity to present their position as amici curie.  Despite the fact that the data which each court received regarded the same wall/fence, the difference between each set of data is deep and great.  This difference is what ultimately led to the contrary legal conclusions.  In what is this difference manifested?   

 

62.       The first difference, and the most important one, regards the security-military necessity to erect the fence.  This necessity was presented expansively before the court in The Beit Sourik Case.  The State laid out before the Court the full data regarding the terrorism which has plagued Israel since September 2000; regarding the character of this terrorism, which spares no means, including "human bombs" which explode in buses, in shopping centers, and in markets; regarding the thousands killed and injured; regarding the various military action taken in order to defeat the terrorism ("Defensive Wall" in March 2002; "Determined Path" in June 2002), which did not provide a sufficient solution to it; regarding the additional plans which were suggested, yet rejected due to legal reasons (see, e.g., The Ajuri Case) or were of no avail.  Against this background came the decision to construct of the fence.  From the evidence presented before the Court, the conclusion arose that the decision to erect the fence was not the fruit of a political decision to annex occupied territory to Israel.  The decision to erect the fence arose out of security-military considerations, and out of security-military necessity, as a necessary means to defend the state, its citizens, and its army against terrorist activity.  Against this background, we wrote, in The Beit Sourik Case:

 

"We examined petitioners’ arguments.  We have come to the conclusion, based upon the facts before us, that the reason the fence is being erected is a security reason. As we have seen in the government decisions concerning the construction of the fence, the government has emphasized, numerous times, that 'the fence, like the additional obstacles, is a security measure.  Its construction does not reflect a political border, or any other border' (decision of June 23, 2002).  'The obstacle that will be erected pursuant to this decision, like other segments of the obstacle in the 'Seamline Area,' is a security measure for the prevention of terrorist attacks and does not mark a political border or any other border” (decision of October 1, 2003)" (p. 830).

 

Later in our judgment, we dealt with the affidavit submitted to us by the military commander:

 

"In his affidavit he stated that 'the objective of the security fence is to allow effective confrontation of the array of threats stemming from Palestinian terrorism.  Specifically, the fence is intended to prevent the unchecked passage of residents of the area into Israel and their infiltration into certain Israeli communities located in the area. The choice of the topographic route was derived from the security consideration' (affidavit of April 15 2004, sections 22-23). The commander of the area detailed his considerations behind the choice of the route. He noted the necessity that the fence pass through territory that topographically controls its surroundings; that it pass through a route as flat as possible, which will allow surveillance of it; and that a 'security zone' be established which will delay infiltration into Israel. These are security considerations par excellence. In an additional affidavit which was submitted to us, Major General Kaplinsky testified that 'it is not a permanent fence, but rather a fence erected temporarily, for security needs' (affidavit of April 19 2004, section 4).  We have no reason to give this testimony less than its full weight, and we have no basis for not believing in the sincerity of the military commander's testimony" (p. 830).

 

We concluded our discussion on this question, stating:

 

"We devoted seven sessions to the hearing of the petition.  We intently listened to the explanations of officers and workers who handled the details of the fence.  During our hearing of the petition, the route of the fence was altered in a number of locations. Respondents showed openness to various suggestions which were made. Thus, for example, adjacent to the town of Har Adar, they agreed to move the fence passing north of the town to the security zone closer to the town, and distance it from the lands of the adjacent village of El Kabiba.  We have no reason to assume that the objective is political rather than security-based. Indeed, petitioners did not carry the burden and did not persuade us that the considerations behind the construction of the separation fence are  political rather than security-based. Similarly, petitioners did not carry their burden, and did not persuade us that the considerations of the Commander of the IDF Forces in the area, in determining the route of the separation fence, are not military considerations, and that he has not acted to fulfill them in good faith, according to his best military understanding" (p. 831).

 

63.       The security-military necessity is mentioned only most minimally in the sources upon which the ICJ based its opinion.  Only one line is devoted to it in the Secretary-General's report, stating that the decision to erect the fence was made due to a new rise in Palestinian terrorism in the Spring of 2002.  In his written statement, the security-military consideration is not mentioned at all.  In the Dugard report and the Zeigler report there are no data on this issue at all.  In Israel's written statement to the ICJ regarding jurisdiction and discretion, data regarding the terrorism and its repercussions were presented, but these did not find their way to the opinion itself.  This minimal factual basis is manifest, of course, in the opinion itself.  It contains no real mention of the security-military aspect.  In one of the paragraphs, the opinion notes that Israel argues that the objective of the wall is to allow an effective struggle against the terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank (paragraph 116).  That's it.  In another paragraph, the ICJ discusses the force of §53 of The Fourth Geneva Convention, according to which it is prohibited for an occupier state to harm local property, "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations".  Regarding that, the ICJ stated:

 

“[O]n the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the destructions carried out contrary to the prohibition in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention were rendered absolutely necessary by military operations” (paragraph 135).

 

Further on, the ICJ discussed human rights according to the international conventions.  It notes that the conventions allow restriction of human rights.  In this context, the ICJ mentioned the freedom of movement (§12 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).  It noted that pursuant to §12(3) of that convention, it is permissible to restrict the freedom of movement, if the restriction is necessary for the defense of national security or public order (ordre public). The ICJ ruled out these restrictions' application to the wall, since:

 

 “On the basis of the information available to it, the Court finds that these conditions are not met in the present instance” (paragraph 136).

 

The ICJ concluded its position, holding:

 

“[T]he Court, from the material available to it, is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security objectives” (paragraph 137).

 

Finally, the ICJ discussed the necessity defense.  The ICJ analyzed the elements of this defense, noting:

 

“In the light of the material before it, the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interest of Israel against the peril which it has invoked as justification for the construction” (paragraph 140).

 

64.       This minimal factual basis regarding Israel's security-military necessity to erect the fence did not go unnoticed by the judges of the ICJ.  The dissenting judge, Judge Buergenthal, noted in his opinion:

 

“I am compelled to vote against the Court’s finding on the merits because the Court did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings” (paragraph 1).

 

Judge Buergenthal mentioned the possibility that, on the basis of all the facts, the conclusion would be that the building of the wall violates international law; however, in his opinion,

 

“[To] reach that conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole without having before it or seeking to ascertain all relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of self defence, military necessity and security needs, given the repeated deadly terrorist attacks in and upon Israel proper coming from the Occupied Palestinian Territory to which Israel has been and continues to be subject, cannot be justified as a matter of law. The nature of these cross-Green Line attacks and their impact on Israel and its population are never really seriously examined by the Court, and the dossier provided the Court by the United Nations on which the Court to a large extent bases its findings basely touches on that subject” (paragraph 3).

 

In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans stated his opinion that:

 

“[T]he present Opinion could have reflected in a more satisfactory way the interests at stake for all those living in the region. The rather oblique reference to terrorist acts which can be found at several places in the Opinion, are in my view not sufficient for this purpose” (paragraph 13).

 

A similar attitude can be found in the separate opinion of Judge Owada.  He notes that the ICJ had ample material before it regarding the humanitarian and socioeconomic effect of the building of the wall.  In contrast,

 

“What seems to be wanting, however, is the material explaining the Israeli side of the picture, especially in the context of why and how the construction of the wall as it is actually planned and implemented is necessary and appropriate” (paragraph 22).

 

Judge Owada quotes the statement in the Advisory Opinion that, on the basis of the material before the ICJ, it is not convinced that the fence route is necessary for achieving the security objectives (pargraph 137 of the Advisory Opinion), and adds:

 

“It seems clear to me that here the Court is in effect admitting the fact that elaborate material on this point from the Israeli side is not available, rather than engaging in a rebuttal of the arguments of Israel on the basis of the material that might have been made available by Israel on this point” (paragraph 23).

 

65.       We need not determine, nor have we a sufficient factual basis to determine, who is to blame for this severe oversight.  Is it the dossier of documents submitted to the ICJ?  Is it the oversight of the State of Israel itself, or was it the ICJ's unwillingness to use the data submitted to it by Israel and other data in the public domain?  Or maybe it is the method of examination, which focused on the fence as a totality, without examining its various segments (see paragraph 70, infra)?  Whatever the reason may be, the reality is that the ICJ based its opinion on a factual basis regarding impingement of Palestinian residents' rights, without the factual basis regarding the security-military justification for this impingement.  In contrast, in The Beit Sourik Case, an expansive factual basis was laid before the court, both regarding the impingement upon the local residents' human rights and regarding the security-military needs.  This comprehensive factual basis made it possible for the Court to decide that certain parts of the separation fence violate the rules of international law, and that other parts of the fence do not violate those rules.  Thus, we have the first explanation for the difference between the conclusions of the ICJ and the conclusions of this Court in The Beit Sourik Case.

 

66.       The other difference between the two judgments regarding the factual basis regards the scope of the impingement of the local residents' rights.  This impingement stood at the foundation of both judgments.  However, the factual basis was different.  In The Beit Sourik Case, the petitioners brought various data regarding the scope of the impingement of their rights due to the construction of the fence on their lands.  The State brought its own data.  The Court examined the different positions.  It examined each part of the route before it, separately.  On the basis of the totality of the evidence before it, the scope of the impingement of the local residents' rights was established.  This impingement was by no means a light one.  Thus wrote the Court:

 

"Having completed the examination of the proportionality of each order separately, it is appropriate that we lift our gaze and look out over the proportionality of the entire route of the part of the separation fence which is the subject of all of the orders. The length of the part of the separation fence to which the orders before us apply is approximately forty kilometers. It impinges upon the lives of 35,000 local residents. Four thousand dunams of their lands are taken up by the fence route itself, and thousands of olive trees growing along the route itself are uprooted.  The fence cuts off the eight villages in which the local inhabitants live from more than 30,000 dunams of their lands. The great majority of these lands are cultivated, and they include tens of thousands of olive trees, fruit trees, and other agricultural crops. The licensing regime which the military commander wishes to establish cannot prevent or substantially decrease the extent of the severe injury to the local farmers.  Access to the lands depends upon the possibility of crossing the gates, which are very distant from each other and not always open. Security checks, which are likely to prevent the passage of vehicles and which will naturally cause long lines and many hours of waiting, will be performed at the gates. These do not go hand in hand with a farmer’s ability to work his land. There will surely be places where the security fence must cut the local residents off from their lands. In these places, passage which will reduce the injury to the farmers to the extent possible should be ensured" (p. 860).

 

Later in the judgment the Court held:

 

"The damage caused by the separation fence is not restricted to the lands of the residents and to their access to these lands.  The damage is of a wider scope. It strikes across the fabric of life of the entire population. In many locations, the separation fence passes right by their homes. In certain places (like Beit Sourik), the separation fence surrounds the village from the west, the south and the east.  The fence directly affects the ties between the local residents and the urban centers (Bir Nabbala and Ramallah). These ties are difficult even without the separation fence. This difficulty is multiplied sevenfold by the construction of the fence" (p. 861).

 

Against this background - and balancing with the security-military needs – it was decided which fence segments illegally violate the rights of the local population according to international law, and which fence segments are legal.

 

67.       The ICJ based its factual findings regarding impingement upon the local residents' rights, upon the Secretary-General's report and his supplemental documents, and upon the Dugard report and the Zeigler report (see paragraph 133 of the opinion).  In their arguments before us, State's counsel noted that the information relayed to the ICJ in these reports is far from precise.  We shall discuss some of these arguments of the State:

 

(a)        The ICJ quotes data relayed by a special committee, according to which 100,000 dunams of agricultural land were seized for construction of the first phase of the obstacle.  The State contends that this figure is most exaggerated.  According to its figures, the area seized for the construction of phase A of the fence is 8300 dunams, 7000 of which is private land.

 

(b)        the reports upon which the ICJ relied describe a cutoff between the residents of the seamline area and the other parts of the West Bank.  According to figures presented to us, that is not precise, as a regime of permits allows entry and exit from the seamline area.

 

(c)        The opinion quotes the Zeigler report, according to which Israel is annexing most of the western aquifer system, which supplies 51% of the water consumption of the territories, by erecting the obstacle.  The State claims that this is completely baseless.  It was mentioned before us that in the framework of the interim agreement between Israel and the PLO, detailed arrangements regarding the water issue were stipulated.  The construction of the fence does not affect the implementation of the water agreements determined in the agreement.

 

(d)       A number of paragraphs in the opinion discussed the city of Qalqiliya.  The ICJ quotes the Dugard report, according to which the city is sealed off from all sides.  Residents are allowed to exit and enter through one military gate which is open from 7am to 7pm.  This conclusion contradicts the Secretary-General's written statement, according to which there is no checkpoint at the entrance to the city.  The State adds that two open access roads now lead to the city of Qalqiliya.  Part of the obstacle east of the city was dismantled.  Parts of the Dugard report and the Zeigler report, according to which 6000 to 8000 residents left the city of Qalqiliya and 600 stores were closed in that city, were mentioned in the opinion.  The State contends that since April 2004, approximately 90% of the stores which closed have been reopened.  Regarding residents' leaving, in the State's opinion, it is very difficult to reach a clear cut conclusion on this issue.  The ICJ's opinion held, on the basis of the Secretary-General's report, that as a result of the building of the wall, a 40% drop in caseload at the UN hospital in Qalqiliya had been recorded.  From a graph submitted to us by the State it appears that the number of hospitalization days in 2004 is higher than that of 2002.  The conclusion is that it cannot be said that the separation fence brought to a decrease in the number of hospitalized patients.  The graph also shows that in 2003 there was a considerable rise in the number of beds in hospitals.  In addition, a new private hospital was opened in Qalqiliya in 2003, and the Palestinian Authority also opened a hospital in 2002.  In the opinion of the State, it is reasonable to assume that the opening of the new hospitals affected the caseload of the UN hospital in Qalqiliya.

 

68.       The difference between the factual bases upon which the courts relied is of decisive significance.  According to international law, the legality of the wall/fence route depends upon an appropriate balancing between security needs on the one hand and the impingement upon the rights of the local residents on the other.  We have a scale before us: on one side rests the impingement upon the rights of the local residents, and on the other side rest the security and military considerations.  Delicate and sensitive balancing between the two sides of the scale, taking into account the need to ensure the proportionality of the security measures' impingement upon the local residents' rights, and taking into account the margin of appreciation given the state, brings about the appropriate solution.  In The Beit Sourik Case, data were laid before the Court on both sides of the scale.  In certain parts of the route discussed before the court, the considerations regarding the impingement upon human rights prevailed.  At other parts of the route, the security-military needs prevailed.  Not so was the opinion of the ICJ.  As a result of the factual basis presented to the ICJ, full weight was placed on the rights-infringement side; no weight was given to the security-military needs, and therefore the questions of the proportionality of the impingement or of the margin of appreciation were not discussed at all.  The result was the ICJ's conclusion that Israel is violating international law.  The different factual bases led to different legal conclusions.  This stands out especially in the case of those parts of the ICJ's opinion dealing with Qalqiliya.  On one side of the scale, the ICJ placed the severe impingement of the rights of Palestinians in Qalqiliya.  Even if we remove the imprecision of these figures, the remainder is sufficient to indicate a severe impingement of their rights.  On the other side of the scale, the ICJ did not place – due to the factual basis laid before it – any data regarding the security and military considerations.  It was not mentioned that Qalqiliya lies two kilometers from the Israeli city of Kfar Saba; that Qalqiliya served as a passage point to Israel for suicide bomber terrorists, primarily in the years 2002-2003, for the purpose of committing terrorist attacks inside of Israel; that the Trans-Israel highway (highway 6), whose users must be protected, passes right by the city; that the majority of the fence route on the western side of the city runs on the Green Line, and part of it even within Israel; that since the fence around Qalqiliya was built – including the wall on the western side which borders upon highway 6 – terrorist infiltrations in that area have ceased.

 

69.       The difference in the factual bases was affected by the difference between the proceedings which took place in the ICJ and the proceedings in The Beit Sourik Case (see Weston, at p. 24).  In the proceedings before the ICJ, the injured parties did not participate. Israel was not party to the proceedings.  There was no adversarial process, whose purpose is to establish the factual basis through a choice between contradictory factual figures.  The ICJ accepted the figures in the Secretary-General's report, and in the reports of the special rapporteurs, as objective factual figures.  The burden was not cast upon the parties to the proceedings, nor was it examined.  In contrast, the parties to the proceedings in The Beit Sourik Case stood before the Court.  An adversarial process took place.  The burden of establishing the factual basis before the court was cast upon the parties.  The parties' factual figures were examined and made to confront each other, as the factual basis which would determine the decision was established.  The proceedings themselves lacked strict formalities, and allowed the parties to make suggestions for alternative routes, which were examined by the other party, and the fence route was altered during the hearings themselves.  All these aspects had an effect on the legal conclusions reached by the ICJ and the Supreme Court of Israel in The Beit Sourik Case (see Y. Shany "Capacities and Inadequacies: a Look at the Two Separation Barrier Cases" 38 Isr. L. Rev. 230 (2005)).

 

70.       We would especially like to point out an important difference in the scope of examination.  Before the ICJ, the entire route of the fence was up for examination.  The factual basis which was laid before the ICJ (the Secretary-General's report and written statement, the reports of the special rapporteurs) did not analyze the different segments of the fence in a detailed fashion, except for a few examples, such as the fence around Qalqiliya.  The material submitted to the ICJ contains no specific mention of the injury to local population at each segment of the route.  We have already seen that this material contains no discussion of the security and military considerations behind the selection of the route, or of the process of rejecting various alternatives to it.  These circumstances cast an unbearable task upon the ICJ.  Thus, for example, expansive parts of the fence (approximately 153 km of the 763 km of the entire fence, which are approximately 20%) are adjacent to the Green Line (that is, less than 500 m away).  An additional 135 km – which are 17.7% of the route – are within a distance of between 500 m and 2000 m from the Green Line.  Between these parts of the route and the Green Line (the "seamline area") there are no Palestinian communities, nor is there agricultural land.  Nor are there Israeli communities in this area.  The only reason for establishing the route beyond the Green Line is a professional reason related to topography, the ability to control the immediate surroundings, and other similar military reasons.  Upon which rules of international law can it be said that such a route violates international law?  Other parts of the fence are close to the Green Line.  They separate Palestinian farmers and their lands, but the cultivated lands are most minimal.  Gates were built into the fence, which allow passage, when necessary, to the cultivated lands.  Can it be determined that this arrangement contradicts international law prima facie, without examining, in a detailed fashion, the injury to the farmers on the one hand, and the military necessity on the other?  Should the monetary compensation offered in each case, and the option of allocation of alternate land (as ruled in The Beit Sourik Case (Id., at p 860)) not be considered?  There are, of course, other segments of the fence, whose location lands a severe blow upon the local residents.  Each of these requires an exacting examination of the essence of the injury, of the various suggestions for reducing it, and of the security and military considerations.  None of this was done by the ICJ, and it could not have been done with the factual basis before the ICJ.   

 

71.       Of course, prima facie, the ICJ could have determined, that on the basis of the examination of the totality of the fence, it had reached the conclusion that the motivation behind its construction is political and not security-based, and that the intention of the government of Israel in erecting the fence was its desire to annex parts of the West Bank which lay on the "Israeli" side of the fences.  The ICJ did not, however, do so; nor was a factual basis placed before it, which would have enabled it to do so.  The ICJ came extremely close to such an approach, stating:

 

“Whilst the Court notes the assurance given by Israel that the construction of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a temporary nature . . . it nevertheless cannot remain indifferent to certain fears expressed to it that the route of the wall will prejudge the future frontier between Israel and Palestine, and the fear that Israel may integrate the settlements and their means of access. The Court considers that the construction of the wall and its associated regime create a ‘fait accompli’ on the ground that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de facto annexation” (paragraph. 121).

 

However, this statement – which expressed grave concerns – is not a positive finding that the fence is political, and that its objective is annexation.

 

72.       The method of the Supreme Court of Israel was different.  The Beit Sourik Case dealt with five segments of the separation fence, approximately forty kilometers long.  Other segments of the fence have been discussed by the Supreme Court in other petitions, which were examined by various panels of Supreme Court justices.  Since the construction of the separation fence, about 90 petitions have been submitted to the Supreme Court.  The hearing of 44 petitions has been completed.  In most of them the parties succeeded, after negotiations, and usually after amendments were made to the route as requested by the Palestinian petitioners, to reach a compromise, so that no legal decision on the merits was needed.  Approximately 43 petitions are still pending before the Court.  In most the arguments have been completed, and they are waiting for our decision regarding the effect of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ upon the ruling of the Supreme Court of Israel.  They examine the legality of the route of the fence.  These petitions can be divided into three main types: the first type of petition is a petition by farmers for the impingement upon their rights caused by the fact that the separation fence separates them from their lands.  The Beit Sourik Case itself belongs to this type.  The second type is a petition regarding the large blocs of settlements, which in some instances create enclaves of communities which are cut off from their urban infrastructure, or impede Arab farmers' access to their lands.  The petition before us belongs to this type.  The third type includes petitions regarding the fence route around Jerusalem.

 

            5.         The Effect of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague upon the Rulings in The Beit Sourik Case

 

73.       Our point of departure was that the basic normative foundation upon which the ICJ and the Supreme Court based their judgments is a common one.  Despite that, the two courts reached different conclusions.  The ICJ held, in its opinion, that the route of the wall contradicts international law, as a majority of it passes through the West Bank.  The Supreme Court in The Beit Sourik Case ruled in its judgment that a sweeping answer to the question of the legality of the fence according to international law should not be given, and that each segment of the fence route should be examined separately.  Against this background, it was decided in The Beit Sourik Case, that part of the route discussed in that petition sits well with international law and that part of it violates international law.  We asked ourselves: what is the explanation for this difference?  We answered that question by saying that the difference stems from the factual basis that was laid before the ICJ, which was different from that which was laid before the Court in The Beit Sourik Case.  We also noted that the difference in the model of proceedings also contributed to the different results.  Against this background, we must answer the following question: what is the effect the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the future approach of the Supreme Court on the question of the legality of the separation fence according to international law, as determined in The Beit Sourik Case?

 

74.       Our answer is as follows:  the Supreme Court of Israel shall give the full appropriate weight to the norms of international law, as developed and interpreted by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion.  However, the ICJ's conclusion, based upon a factual basis different than the one before us, is not res judicata, and does not obligate the Supreme Court of Israel to rule that each and every segment of the fence violates international law.  The Israeli Court shall continue to examine each of the segments of the fence, as they are brought for its decision and according to its customary model of proceedings; it shall ask itself, regarding each and every segment, whether it represents a proportional balance between the security-military need and the rights of the local population.  If its answer regarding a particular segment of the fence is positive, it shall hold that that segment is legal.  If its answer is negative, it shall hold that that segment is not legal.  In doing so, the Court shall not ignore the entire picture; its decision will always regard each segment as a part of a whole.  Against the background of this normative approach – which is the approach set out in The Beit Sourik Case – we shall now turn to examining the legality of the separation fence in the Alfei Menashe enclave.

 

F.         The Separation Fence at the Alfei Menashe Enclave

 

            1.         The Enclave

 

75.       The Alfei Menashe enclave is an 11,000 dunam area (see the appendix to this judgment).  It includes Alfei Menashe (population 5650) and five Palestinian villages (Arab a-Ramadin (population approximately 180); Arab Abu Farde (population approximately 80); Wadi a-Rasha (population approximately 180); Ma'arat a-Dara (population approximately 250) and Hirbet Ras a-Tira (population approximately 400); total population of the five villages is approximately 1200).  The enclave is located on the "Israeli" side of the separation fence.  It is part of the seamline area.  The enclave and Israel are territorially contiguous, meeting at highway 55.  Exit from the enclave into the area, by car and foot, is through one crossing ("crossing 109") to Qalqiliya.  This crossing is open at all hours of the day.  The separation fence also includes three gates (the Ras a-Tira gate; the South Qalqiliya gate; and the Habla gate).  At first, we shall discuss petitioners' arguments and the state's response in detail.  Then, we shall examine the arguments and the answers to them according to the standards determined in The Beit Sourik Case.

 

            2.         Petitioners' Arguments

 

76.       Petitioners expand upon the severe damage to the fabric of life of the residents of the five Palestinian villages within the enclave.  These are small villages which are unable to provide necessary services such as employment, medical care, education, and community services by themselves.  Thus, for example, the schools attended by enclave residents are located in Palestinian communities outside the enclave, with the exception of the elementary school of Ras a-Tira and a-Daba.  The fence cuts the residents of the villages off from the Palestinian communities which provide them necessary services.  The fence traps the residents of the villages inside of an enclave cut off from the Palestinian population in the West Bank.  The residents of the villages are unable to enter a Palestinian community outside the enclave without passing through the gates in the fence or a checkpoint (crossing 109).  Residents who wish to travel from the villages of the enclave to the adjacent towns of Habla and Ras Atiyeh are forced to pass long and wearying roads, which require travel by car, just to get to a place which in the past was reachable by foot.  Petitioners note that the availability of cars for enclave residents, especially for women, is most minimal.

 

77.       According to petitioners, the enclave has caused mortal injury to all areas of life – freedom of movement; employment and commerce; health; education; family, community, and social ties; religious services; and more.  Almost all of the Palestinian residents of the enclave have lost their sources of income since the construction of the fence.  The fence cuts the residents of the villages off from pastures, hothouses, and agricultural lands.  The regime of permits has turned the enclave into a place that non residents do not enter.  The residents of the enclave are thus denied the possibility of holding social events in their villages.  As for the future, the fence has destined the five villages to economic, social, and cultural destruction. 

 

78.       Soon after the petition was filed, petitioners submitted an expert opinion on the subject of planning, prepared by the nonprofit society known as "Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights," which works to strengthen the ties between civil and human rights and the Israeli planning system.  The expert opinion was prepared by four architects and urban planners.  They reached the conclusion that the current route of the fence critically injures the Palestinian population living in the Alfei Menashe enclave.  Prior to the construction of the fence, the Palestinian villages in the enclave relied upon the array of villages and cities in the Qalqiliya district and in the West Bank.  The fence route chopped the area into three enclaves (the Qalqiliya enclave, the Habla and Hirbet Ras Atiyeh enclave and the Alfei Menashe enclave which includes the five Palestinian villages), and caused immediate damage to the system of spatial interrelations which existed prior to construction of the fence.  The fence was constructed without any spatial planning logic.  The fence cuts off main roads and access roads, crosses through built areas, chops up contiguous cultivated agricultural lands, and separates villages from their agricultural lands.  As a result of the construction of the fence, two villages have even been cut off from the wells which provide them and their agricultural lands with water.  The fence and associated permit system make access to regional civil services very difficult, and damage economic potential and existing social structure.

 

79.       According to the expert opinion, the fence has a substantial effect on the Palestinian villages' continued functioning in all areas of life.  As far as economy and employment are concerned, hundreds of dunams of the villages and thousands of dunams of the cultivated agricultural lands, mostly olive groves, were expropriated for the construction of the fence.  The fence cut off farmers' access to markets in Habla and Qalqiliya.  It also decreased access to all sources of employment in the West Bank.  In the area of employment there is, therefore, a substantial rise in unemployment, and a trend of finding undesirable jobs requiring no skills in Alfei Menashe.  In the area of education, the fence makes students' access to schools in Habla and Ras Atiyeh very difficult, and within a year a substantial rise in dropout level was noted in the education system.  In the area of health, only partial and irregular health services are now provided in the villages.  The fence cut the villages off from health and medical services, and access of emergency vehicles from the Habla area has been cut off.  In terms of family and social ties as well, the fence's damage has been severe.  The permit regime cuts enclave residents off from their relatives and friends, from ceremonies and family events, and threatens to disenfranchise them of their status and connections in Palestinian society.  As time goes on, this is likely to lead to abandonment of the villages and the cessation of the present communities' existence.       

 

80.       Petitioners' legal argument is that the construction of the fence surrounding the Alfei Menashe enclave, built completely in the area, violates the principles of public international law and is illegal.  Petitioners' position is based upon two main pillars: ultra vires and lack of proportionality.  First it is contended that respondents have no authority to erect the fence around the enclave, both due to the lack of security necessity and due to the creation of de facto annexation of the enclave territory to the State of Israel.  The arguments on this issue rely, inter alia, upon the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ.  Petitioners further argue that the enclave was not created for military or national security reasons, and not even for the security needs of Alfei Menashe residents.  The construction of the fence around the enclave was intended to put Alfei Menashe west of the fence, and make it territorially contiguous to the State of Israel.  It is an act whose entire purpose is to move the effective border of the state, and it is not legal according to the laws of belligerent occupation.  According to petitioners, the decision to erect the fence on the present route was made under pressure from the residents of Alfei Menashe and of the residents of the Matan community, who requested that a road alternative to highway 55 not be built near it.  According to the original plan, highway 55 was to be left east of the fence, and thus security officials decided to pave a new road to connect Alfei Menashe with Israel via the Matan community.  However, in light of Matan residents' opposition to the new road, the fence route was altered so that highway 55 would be included in the enclave.  Petitioners contend that the fence does not serve a military need.  Military necessity does not include defense of settlement residents.  Petitioners argue that leaving the Palestinian villages west of the fence does not fit the military need, as presented by army officials.  The fence creates a long term change, whose meaning is practical annexation of the lands in the enclave to an area in absolute control of the State of Israel.  Cutting the ties between the residents living in the enclave and those living beyond it creates a new geopolitical entity.

 

81.       Petitioners' second argument is that the enclave – according to the route upon which it was created – is disproportionate.  The enclave creates a wide scale impingement upon the basic rights of protected civilians.  It seriously impinges upon property rights, freedom of movement, and rights to make a living, to education, to health, to food, to dignity and honor, and to equality.  International law, like Israeli law, includes the condition that impingement of rights be proportionate.  Petitioners add that international human rights law also applies to the petition, and that the prohibitions upon violation of petitioners' basic rights flow from it as well.  Petitioners contend that the fence route around the enclave causes damage which is disproportionate, both due to the fact that it is unnecessary for achieving its declared objective, and due to the lack of any serious interest which would justify it.  It is contended that the fence route around the enclave does not satisfy any of the three subtests of proportionality.  The first subtest (fit between the injury and the objective) is not satisfied, since there is no rational connection between construction of the fence and an Israeli security goal.  The second subtest (the least harmful means) is not satisfied, as it is possible to realize the legitimate objective of defending the residents of Israel by pushing the fence back to the Green Line.  Petitioners claim that a fence along the Green Line would serve the security objectives better, since it would be much shorter, straight and not winding, and would leave a considerable Palestinian population east of the fence.  The third subtest (proportionality in the strict sense) is not satisfied, since the impingement upon petitioners' rights is not proportional to the danger which it is intended to confront.  The injury to the residents of the villages is all-encompassing; moving the fence to the Green Line, on the other hand, will not bring about any decrease in security. 

 

82.       Petitioners' third argument is directed against the legal regime put into force in the enclave, which requires non Israeli residents to hold permits.  Petitioners contend that the legal regime in the seamline area is a discriminatory regime based upon nationality, and is therefore to be annulled.  The enclave regime creates legal classes according to ethnicity, and only obfuscates itself with security claims.  The very existence of the permit regime is a shameful and illegal legal situation, of formalized discrimination on the basis of ethnic-national background.

 

83.       The remedy requested by petitioners is that the separation fence be dismantled and moved to the Green Line.  To the extent that Alfei Menashe needs a separation fence, such a fence can be built around that community, on the basis of the existing fence around it.  In any case – so argue petitioners – there is no justification for including the enclave villages inside of it.

 

            3. The State's Response

 

84.       In its first response to the petition (of September 9 2004), respondents announced that as a result of the judgment in The Beit Sourik Case, staff work is being done in order to examine the patterns of life in the seamline area.   They announced that there is a most reasonable possibility that there will be alterations to the arrangements in the seamline area.  Improvements in the arrangements will decrease the injury to the residents and affect the balancing point between the rights of the residents and the security needs.  Respondents requested that the proceedings in the petition be stayed, in order to allow them to formulate their position.  In these circumstances, it was contended that the petition, as a petition demanding the dismantling of the fence, is prima facie an early petition, and that it is appropriate to wait for the formulation of final decisions.  However, respondents emphasized that the decisive need for the existence of a fence in this area leads to the conclusion that, in any case, no order to dismantle the fence in the Alfei Menashe area should be issued.

 

85.       In a supplementary statement by respondents (of December 5 2004), they raised a number of preliminary arguments for rejecting the petition.  The first argument claimed that the petition suffered from severe laches (delay).  According to respondents, petitioners' request to dismantle the fence a year and a half after its construction was completed, when its dismantling will cause severe damage to respondents, suffers from most serious laches.  Petitioners had many opportunities to voice their claims against the route.  They were served the land seizure orders at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, and they had the opportunity to submit appeals.  Regarding the objective element of the law of laches, dismantling the fence will cause most severe security damage, as well as severe economic damage.  On the other hand, the injury to petitioners is not as severe, as it can be moderated and minimized to a large extent by various improvements which are being made, and will yet be made, by respondents.  The second preliminary argument raised by respondents regards the petition's character as a "public petition," at a time when there are specific potential petitioners who refrained from petitioning.  Petitioners are residents of two of the five villages in the enclave.  From the petition itself it appears that residents of the other three villages refused to join the petitioners.  The specific petitioners, as well as the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (petitioner no. 7) are not authorized to speak in the name of all of the enclave residents.  Third, it is argued that the petition should be preliminarily rejected due to a lack of prior plea directly to respondents.  Although the Association for Civil Rights in Israel wrote to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense prior to the petition, requesting that they order alteration of the fence route at the segment under discussion, these pleas were most compact, and most of the arguments in the petition weren't mentioned in them at all.

 

86.       On the merits, respondents argue that there is no justification for altering the Alfei Menashe route.  The fence indeed changed the reality of life for the residents of the villages left on the Israeli side of the fence.  This stems from the decisive security need to defend the citizens of Israel against terrorist attacks.  The injury to the residents of the villages is proportionate, considering the decisive security need to leave the fence where it is.  Respondents noted that just prior to construction of the fence, the military commander's civil administration collected data regarding the enclave residents and their way of life, and that on the basis of the collected data, they issued permits to the residents of the enclave which enable them to live in the enclave and move to the area from it, and back.  Today, there are approximately 1200 permits in force, held by the residents of the enclave.  Respondents informed us that the permits are soon to be replaced with permanent identity cards for seamline area residents, which will be valid as long as the declaration is in force.  Approximately 1065 entrance permits have also been issued, for workers of international organizations, infrastructure workers, traders, educators, medical services, and similar purposes.  The Commander of IDF Forces in the area recently decided that the various permits will be replaced by a uniform permit, valid for a two year period (the current permits are valid for a period up to three months).  The permits allow entry into the enclave through four gates.

 

87.  In their response, respondents discussed a list of infrastructure and logistic improvements intended to relieve the situation of the residents of the villages to the extent possible.  First, crossing 109, located at the north end of the enclave near the eastern entrance to Qalqiliya, is open constantly, all day long.  Permanently on site is a representative of the coordination and liaison administration, whose role is to handle problems which may arise.  Second, the eastern entrance to Qalqiliya (DCO Qalqiliya) is open to free movement, and at present, no checkpoint operates there (except in the case of a security alert).  Thus, those wishing to enter or exit Qalqiliya are spared the prolonged wait at the city entrance.  Exit from the enclave through passage 109 and through the entrance into Qalqiliya are thus free.  Third, close to the time the petition was submitted, an underpass connecting Habla to Qalqiliya was opened under highway 55.  Fourth, The Commander of IDF Forces decided to keep the agricultural fence at Ras a-Tira, which connects the enclave to Habla and Ras Atiyeh, open longer, so that the gate will be open to travel by foot and car during most hours of the day.  For that purpose, a specialized military force will be allocated, which will also ensure more precise opening hours of the two additional agricultural gates.  Fifth, respondents are running transportation, funded by the civil authority, of all pupils living in the enclave who go to school beyond it.  Sixth, a permanent staff of doctors, equipped with entrance permits, visits the enclave villages through crossing 109, according to a regular schedule.  In the case that urgent medical care is needed, it is possible to travel to Qalqiliya and other areas through crossing 109, which is open at all hours of the day.  Seventh, the coordination and liaison administration, in coordination with an international organization by the name of ANERA, commenced a project to connect the villages of Ras a-Tira and Hirbet a-Daba to the water system.  The rest of the villages also enjoy regular supply of water.  Eighth, approval has been given, in principle, for a plan to improve the access road from the villages to crossing 109 and for a plan to improve the road which goes along highway 55, in order to make it passable and safe for wagons.       

 

88.       Respondents further noted in their response that most of the enclave residents' agricultural lands are inside the enclave itself, and that the fence does not have any effect on residents' access to them.  Farmers whose lands are located in the Habla and Ras Atiyeh area are able to reach their lands through the agricultural fences.  Moreover, a large part of enclave residents make their living in the community of Alfei Menashe.  The possibility of working in Alfei Menashe has not only not been decreased by the construction of the fence; it has been improved.

 

89.       In respondents' supplementary response (of June 19 2005), respondents presented their general position regarding the construction of the security fence on lands in the area, including such construction for the purpose of protecting the Israeli communities in the area.  Respondents also presented their position regarding the effect of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague (of July 9 2004) upon the petition before us.  Regarding the state's position on the implications of the Advisory Opinion on the issue of the fence, respondents referred to their position in HCJ 4815/04 and HCJ 4938/04 (discussing the separation fence at the village of Shukba and the village of Budrus).  We discussed this position in the part of our present judgment which was devoted to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

 

90.       The state's position is that the construction of the fence is a security act par excellence.  It is intended to provide a temporary solution to the terrorism offensive, both in Israel and in the area.  It is intended to provide a solution to existing and future threats of terrorism, until it will be possible to reach a stable and reliable political arrangement.  Respondents clarify that the contacts underway between Israel and the new Palestinian Authority leadership do not remove the need for construction and completion of the obstacle.  According to respondents, the present route of the obstacle is temporary.  The seizure orders, issued for the purpose of obstacle construction within the area, are restricted to a definite period of a few years.  The obstacle is not a permanent one.  It is intended to protect the residents of Israeli communities in the area as well.  The obstacle itself provides defense not only to the community itself, but also to the access roads to it and to its surroundings.  However, the selected route is not the ideal route from a security standpoint.  That is the case, due to the duty to protect the conflicting interests of the Palestinian residents, who are harmed by the construction of the obstacle due to seizure of lands, harm to agriculture, restrictions of movement, and impediment of daily life.  Respondents recognize this harm, and are working to minimize it to the extent possible, both at the time of construction of the obstacle and by protecting the residents' fabric of life after its construction.

 

91.       Respondents claim that the military commander is authorized to defend the Israeli communities in the area both pursuant to international law and pursuant to internal Israeli administrative and constitutional law.  Israel's right – which is also her duty – to defend her citizens, is the fundamental legal source which grants it the right and the duty to defend its citizens living in the area.  Respondents are of the opinion that the construction of the obstacle satisfies the restrictions in the law of belligerent occupation.  The military commander is required, pursuant to rules of international law, to protect all present in the area held under belligerent occupation, and that includes Israeli citizens living in the area or traveling on the roads in the area.  The duty of the military commander to protect those present in the occupied territory is not limited to those defined as "protected" in The Fourth Geneva Convention.  This duty is not conditional upon the legal status of the Israeli communities in the area in terms of international law, which will be decided in the permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  Respondents note that the political agreements between Israelis and Palestinians also leave the authority to protect the Israeli citizens in the area in the hands of the State of Israel, until the issue is arranged in the permanent status agreement.  The internal security legislation in the area also reflects Israel's responsibility for the security of the Israelis in the area.  On this point, respondents refer to §6 of the Interim Agreement Implementation Proclamation (Judea and Samaria)(No. 7).  An additional source of the duty to protect the Israelis in the area is the Israeli administrative law and the Basic Laws of the State of Israel.  The state claims that the military commander is obligated to protect the basic rights of Israeli citizens (both those pursuant to the Basic Laws and those stemming from "common law").  Exercise of the authority must be proportionate.  The military commander is therefore authorized to protect Israeli citizens in the area, and even to impinge upon other rights for that purpose, as long as the impingement is a proportional one which stems exclusively from the security purpose.        

 

 

            4.         Petitioners' Response to Respondents' Response

 

92.       Petitioners informed us, in their response, that the planned alterations to the enclave do not provide a real solution to the hardships which enclave residents confront.  Most of the changes are cosmetic, and a few of them are of low significance.  The most significant change is the decision to lengthen the opening ours of the Ras a-Tira gate, but at the time the response was submitted, it had not yet been implemented.  Petitioners ask us to reject all of the preliminary arguments raised by respondents.  They argue that there is no justification for rejecting the petition as a "public petition".  Among petitioners are private people, and the damage described in the petition is caused to them personally, in addition to the similar damage caused to their neighbors.  Regarding lack of prior direct plea, petitioners state that petitioner no. 7's letters (of March 10 2004 and July 19 2004) contained the main arguments against the route, and these pleas are to be seen as worthy ones.  Petitioners also ask that we reject the argument regarding laches.  There was no subjective delay, as the petitioners' awareness of the damage came about only after daily life in the enclave had entered a regular pattern.  Regarding objective delay, the only damage in this case is economic damage, and it is lesser in severity and weight than the violations of basic rights and of the rule of law.

 

            5.         The Alfei Menashe Local Council's Response

 

93.       The Alfei Menashe Local Council was joined as a respondent to the petition, at its own request.  It argues that the fence does not harm the Palestinian residents, and certainly not in the way described by petitioners.  Regarding the security aspect, the fence should be left in its present place, where it is able to provide security for the residents of Alfei Menashe and harms the Palestinian residents only minimally.  The Local Council wished to present a different picture regarding the reality of life for the Palestinian residents in the enclave, especially that of the residents of the a-Ramadin tribe.  It was claimed that Alfei Menashe is an honorable source of employment for many of the residents of the villages.  Employment problems, to the extent that they exist, are not the result of the fence or its location.  It was further claimed that the issue of movement from the village of Habla and the city of Qalqiliya, and that of medical services, are not a problem for the members of the a-Ramadin tribe.

           

            6. The Outline of the Discussion of the Legality of the Alfei Menashe Enclave

 

94.       We shall commence our discussion of the legality of the Alfei Menashe enclave with an examination of the state's preliminary arguments.  Then, we shall proceed to examine the question whether the construction of the separation fence around the enclave was intra vires.  This discussion will examine the reasons behind the construction of the fence generally, and the route determined for it at Alfei Menashe, specifically.  After examining the question of authority, we shall proceed to examine the scope of the damage to the local residents.  Against this background we shall examine whether this damage is proportional.  We shall conclude our discussion with an examination of the appropriate remedies as a result of the legal analysis.

 

            7.         The Preliminary Arguments

 

95.       In its response, the state raised three preliminary arguments.  The first is a claim of laches (delay) in petitioning the Supreme Court.  The state argues that construction of the separation fence in the Alfei Menashe enclave was concluded approximately a year and a half prior to the filing of the petition.  Petitioners could have attacked the land seizure orders which were served to them at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003.  At the same time, surveys along the planned route were held for the residents, and they were given the opportunity to appeal the route.  Even after that – previous to or during fence construction work – it was possible to petition this Court.  In petitioners' response to the state's response, petitioners state that their awareness of the damage came about only after daily life in the enclave entered its regular pattern.  In any case, due to the severe affront to the rule of law, the laches claim should not be accepted.  In our opinion, petitioners are right.  We accept their claim that they could not assess the scope of the impingement upon their rights before life in the Alfei Menashe enclave entered a regular pattern.  Only when the permit regime had been formulated; only when the opening and closing hours of the gates had been set; only when the cutoff from health, education, and commerce institutions in Qalqiliya and in Habla began to take their toll – only then was it possible to know what the scope of the damage was.  In fact, even at the time the petition was filed, the pattern of life in the enclave had not yet reached its final format.  Respondents themselves announced that there is a most reasonable possibility that there will be alterations to the arrangements in the seamline area, and in that context they even claimed that "the petition is early".  In this state of affairs, the fact that petitioners waited for the formulation of the regular pattern of life in the seamline area does not provide a basis for a claim of laches.

 

96.       Respondents' second preliminary argument regards petitioners' standing, as it arises from the petition itself.  Petitioners no. 1-3 are residents of Ras a-Tira, and petitioners no. 4-6 are residents of Wadi a-Rasha.  Petitioner no. 7 is the Association for Civil Rights in Israel.  The state argues that the petition shows that the three other villages (Hirbet a-Daba, Arab a-Ramadin, and Arab Abu Farda) refused, for undisclosed reasons, to join as petitioners in the petition.  Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that petitioners represent all of the residents of the two villages.  They certainly do not represent the other three villages.  The petition regarding the latter villages is a public petition.  The state contends that such a petition should not be allowed, as individual potential petitioners exist, yet refrain, for undisclosed reasons, from petitioning the Court.  We have no need to examine this argument, seeing as petitioners' counsel noted before us in oral argument that he possesses a letter (of March 30 2005) written by the five council heads of the enclave villages.  In this letter, they authorize counsel to act on their behalves in the petition before us.  Thus this issue was solved.  We can therefore leave the open the question whether it was impossible to suffice ourselves with the petitioners before us, for further hearing of the petition.

 

97.       The third preliminary argument is that petitioners did not make a direct plea to respondents before their petition to the Court.  This argument is rejected.  As it appears from the material before us, petitioner no. 7 (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel) wrote (on March 10 2004 and July 19 2004) to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.  In these pleas, that petitioner raised the main points of its opposition to the fence route at the Alfei Menashe enclave, emphasizing the severe injury to the residents of the villages (in the first letter) and the disproportionate level of injury (in the second letter, written after The Beit Sourik Case).  This is sufficient to satisfy the direct plea requirement.

 

            8. The Authority to Erect the Separation Fence in General, and at the Alfei Menashe Enclave, Specifically

 

98.       The military commander is authorized to order the construction of the separation fence in the Judea and Samaria area, if the reason behind it is a security-military one.  He is not authorized to order the construction of the fence, if the reason behind it is a political one (see The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 828).  In The Beit Sourik Case we examined - using the legal tools at our disposal - the motivation behind the government decision.  We reached the conclusion, on the basis of the data before us, that the motivation behind construction of the fence is not political.  That is our conclusion in the petition before us as well.  Here as well, we have been persuaded that the decision to erect the fence was made in light of the reality of severe terrorism which has plagued Israel since September 2000.  Justice D. Beinisch discussed this in a case dealing with the northeast segment of the fence, in the area surrounding the territory discussed in this petition:

 

"The decision to erect the separation fence was made on April 14 2002 by the Council of Ministers on National Security, in order 'to improve and reinforce the operational assessments and capabilities in the framework of confronting terrorism, and in order to frustrate, obstruct, and prevent infiltration of terrorism from Judea and Samaria into Israel'.  This decision was approved after a government debate on June 23 2002, in which the decision was made to erect a 116 kilometer long obstacle, particularly in sensitive areas through which terrorists – sowing destruction and blood – often passed in order to commit terrorist attacks. The final route of the obstacle was selected by security and military officials, in cooperation with relevant professionals, and was approved by the Committee of Ministers on National Security on August 14 2002.

 

The seamline area is intended to block passage of suicide bombers and other terrorists into the State of Israel.  According to the view of the security and military officials responsible for this subject, the creation of a seamline area is a central component of the fight against terrorism originating in the Judea and Samaria area.  To the extent that the obstacle will not create a hermetic seal against terrorist infiltration, the purpose of the obstacle is to delay the infiltration into Israel for a period of time which might allow security forces to reach the point of infiltration, and thus create a geographic security area which will allow the combat forces to pursue the terrorists before they enter the state.

 

There is no doubt that the creation of a seamline area injures the Palestinian residents in that area.  Agricultural land is being and will be seized for construction of the obstacle, which is liable to harm residents' ability to utilize their lands; their access to the land is also liable to be impeded.  Such harm is a necessity of the hour, and it is a result of the combat situation in the area which has continued for more than two years – a situation which has cost many human lives" (HCJ 8172/02 Abtasam Muhammad Ibrahim v. The Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank (unpublished)).

 

99.       We asked state's counsel why the separation fence cannot be built on the Green Line.  We understood from the state's response, that security and military considerations prevented that possibility.  Their response was based upon three considerations:  first, the Green Line "passes under a mountain ridge located east of the line.  The line is crossed by many east-west riverbeds.  In many of its segments, there is thick vegetation.  This topography does not allow attainment of the obstacle's goals by a route which passes only within Israel.  Erecting the obstacle exactly on the border line of the Judea and Samaria area does not allow for defense of the soldiers patrolling it, who in many cases would be in disadvantaged topographic positions.  Nor does such a route allow surveillance of the Judea and Samaria area, and would leave IDF forces in a situation of operational disadvantage, in comparison with terrorists waiting on the other side of the obstacle" (paragraph 64 of the state's response of February 23 2005); second, "at many segments, Israeli communities and other important locations inside of Israeli territory are in close proximity to the boundary of the Judea and Samaria area.  For example, the communities of Kochav Yair, Tzur Yigal, Matan, Maccabim, Mevasseret Tzion, the neighborhood of Ramot in Jerusalem, et cetera.  Laying the route inside of Israel would require constructing the obstacle on the fences of these communities and locations with no alert zone to allow security forces to arrive prior to infiltration.  Such an alert zone is necessary to allow hitting terrorists liable to cross the obstacle, before they commit their attack.  Such a route would allow sabotage of locations by way of gunfire from beyond the obstacle (Id., id.); third, the separation fence is intended to protect Israelis living in Judea and Samaria as well.  The fence is also intended to protect other important locations, such as roads and high voltage lines.

 

100.     On the basis of all the material at our disposal, we have reached the conclusion that the reason behind the decision to erect the fence is a security consideration, of preventing terrorist infiltration into the State of Israel and into the Israeli communities in the area.  The separation fence is a central security component in Israel's fight against Palestinian terrorism.  The fence is inherently temporary.  The seizure orders issued in order to erect the fence are limited to a definite period of a few years.  So it also appears from the government decisions, whose reliability we have no basis for doubting, including the decision of February 20 2005, which brought about a change in the separation fence route as a result of the judgment in The Beit Sourik Case.  This change was especially apparent in phases C and D of the separation fence, which had not yet been constructed, or was in stages of construction.  So it also appeared from the affidavits submitted to us and from the rest of the material at our disposal.  Thus, for example, according to the figures of the General Security Service, in the (approximately) 34 months between the outbreak of the armed conflict and until the completion of the first part of the separation fence, the terrorist infrastructure committed 73 mass murder attacks in the Samaria area, in which 293 Israelis were killed, and 1950 injured.  Since the completion of the separation fence – that is, the year between August 2003 and August 2004 – the terrorist infrastructure succeeded in committing five mass murder attacks, in which 28 Israelis were killed and 81 injured.  Comparison between the year prior to commencement of work on the separation fence (September 2001 – July 2002) and the year after construction of the fence (August 2003 – 2004) indicates an 84% drop in the number of killed and a 92% drop in the number of wounded.  The respondents brought to our attention an example of the security efficacy of the separation fence.  The Islamic Jihad organization wished to detonate a suicide bomber from the Jenin area at a school in Yokneam or Afula.  The suicide bomber and his guide left Jenin in the early morning, and intended to reach Wadi Ara, and from there, Afula or Yokneam.  In the pre-separation fence era the terrorists' job was easy.  The seamline area was wide open, and one could easily reach Wadi Ara.  This route is now sealed.  Therefore, the terrorist had to travel to Wadi Ara through a much longer route, through an area where the separation fence had not yet been constructed, a detour which lengthened the route from 27 km to 105 km.  The long detour allowed the security forces to gather intelligence, arrange the forces and locate the two terrorists en route.  After they were caught, the explosive belt was located, and the attack was avoided.  This is only one of various examples brought to our attention.  They all indicate the security importance of the fence and the security benefit which results from its construction. 

 

101.     Such is the case regarding the separation fence generally.  Such is also the case regarding the separation fence route around the Alfei Menashe enclave.  The decision regarding that segment of the fence was made by the government on June 23 2002.  It is a part of phase A of the separation fence.  It appears, from the interrogation of various terrorists from Samaria – so we were informed by respondents' affidavit (paragraph 14) – that the separation fence in this area indeed provides a significant obstacle which affects the ability of the terrorist infrastructure in Samaria to penetrate terrorists into Israel.  It also appears from the interrogations that, due to the existence of the obstacle, terrorist organizations are forced to seek alternative ways of slipping terrorists into Israel, through areas in which the obstacle has not yet been built, such as the Judea area.  We examined the separation fence at the Alfei Menashe area.  We received detailed explanations regarding the route of the fence.  We have reached the conclusion that the considerations behind the determined route are security considerations.  It is not a political consideration which lies behind the fence route at the Alfei Menashe enclave, rather the need to protect the well being and security of the Israelis (those in Israel and those living in Alfei Menashe, as well as those wishing to travel from Alfei Menashe to Israel and those wishing to travel from Israel to Alfei Menashe).  Our conclusion, therefore, is that the decision to erect the separation fence at the Alfei Menashe enclave was made within the authority granted to the military commander.  We shall now proceed to examination of the question whether the authority granted to the military commander to erect the security fence has been exercised proportionately.  We shall deal first with the fabric of life in the Alfei Menashe enclave.  Then we shall examine whether the injury to the local residents' lives is proportionate.

 

 

            9.         The Scope of the Injury to the Local Residents

 

102.     Respondents accept that "the security fence erected in the Alfei Menashe area altered the reality of life for the residents of the villages west of the fence" (paragraph 44 of the supplementary statement of December 5 2004).  There is disagreement between petitioners and respondents regarding the scope of this injury.  We shall discuss a number of central components of the fabric of life, including education, health, employment, movement, and social ties.

 

103.     Petitioners claim that most of the children in the enclave villages attend the elementary, middle, and high schools located in Habla and Ras a-Atiyeh, that is to say, on the other side of the separation fence.  Prior to construction of the fence, the children were driven to school by their parents.  Some of the children (from the villages adjacent to Habla) even walked to school by foot.  Now, in order to reach school, they must pass through the gates in the fence.  Respondents informed us, regarding this issue, that the civil administration funds regular transportation of all the pupils from the enclave villages to school and back.  Of course, parents cannot reach their children during school hours, and the children cannot return to their villages on their own.

 

104.     There are no hospitals or clinics in the enclave villages.  Medical services were previously provided in Qalqiliya and Habla.  There is a government hospital in Shchem (Nablus).  Petitioners argued before us that prior to construction of the fence, doctors from Qalqiliya or Habla would visit the villages, and village residents would travel to them to Qalqiliya or Habla, within a few minutes.  After the construction of the separation fence, one must prearrange a visit with a doctor, who must pass through one of the fences, during fence opening hours.  There is no solution in the case of an urgent medical situation.  Entrance by ambulances from Qalqiliya or Habla requires coordination which takes many hours.  In their response, respondents state that permits have been issued to a permanent staff of doctors, who visit the enclave villages according to a regular schedule.  Ambulances enter on a basis of need, through coordination with a coordination officer available 24 hours a day. 

 

105.     Petitioners claim that the construction of the separation fence had a severe effect upon the employment status of the residents of the enclave villages.  About ten percent of the lands of the village of Ras a-Tira are on the other side of the fence.  Eight dunams of hothouses belonging to residents of the village of Wadi a-Rasha are located on the other side of the separation fence.  The residents of the village of Arab a-Ramadin make their living primarily from growing sheep.  The fence separates the village and its pasture grounds.  The residents of the village of a-Daba make their living from agriculture (production of olive oil, and vegetable and other seasonal crop growing).  The fence separates the village from its agricultural lands.  The residents of the village of Abu-Farda made their living from cattle and goat commerce.  After construction of the fence, the village was cut off from the pasture grounds and the customers, who are unable to reach it.  The residents of the village had no choice but to sell the cattle.  Some residents of the villages worked as Palestinian Authority officials in Qalqiliya.  Due to the separation fence, they have difficulty reaching their place of work.  Many of the workers who worked in agriculture lost their jobs, due to their inability to reach their jobs at the times necessary for agriculture.  They have found jobs as workers in Alfei Menashe.  In their response, respondents mention that the residents of the villages are able to get to the cities and villages of the West Bank through the crossing and gates in the separation fence.  Farmers can pass through the agricultural gates at Habla and Ras a-Tira.  Respondents add that most of the agricultural lands of enclave residents are located within the enclave itself.  A significant part of the families living in the villages of the enclave make their living from work in the Alfei Menashe community.

 

106.     Petitioners claim that the separation fence severely damages the ties between the enclave villages and Qalqiliya and Habla.  Prior to the construction of the fence, it was possible to reach Qalqiliya within a few minutes.  After construction of the fence, and resulting from the need to pass through the gates, the journey takes many hours.  Moreover, a permit to pass through the gates by car is granted only to a car owner who is a resident of the enclave.  Relatives and friends are not allowed to receive a permit.  Most residents of the villages have no car of their own, and as a result – and due to fact that one can not be assisted by the car of a relative or friend – most residents of the villages are bound to their villages.  This also causes damage – regarding the village of Arab a-Ramadin – to religious services.  There is no mosque in that village.  The residents of the village used to pray in the mosque in Habla, which was walking distance from the village.  The fence now separates the village from the mosque.  Considering the fact that there are only five cars in the village, residents of the village have no practical possibility of attending prayer on Fridays and holidays.  In addition, the fence separates the residents of the villages from their relatives and friends.  It is difficult to invite guests to various ceremonies (like weddings and funerals), as entry requires a permit, which is not given at all, or given only a long time after the request date. 

 

107.     Petitioners argue that the separation fence has brought financial and social destruction to the Arab residents of the Alfei Menashe enclave.  It has created a cutoff between the residents and their agricultural lands and all the services necessary for normal life.  Petitioners contend that "due to the construction of the fence, the lives of hundreds of people have turned into miserable lives, sentenced to a economic, social, and cultural withering" (paragraph 4 of the petition).  Petitioners claim that the residents' freedom of movement, and rights to family life, health, education, equality, subsistence, and human dignity and respect have been impinged upon.  These impingements are not proportionate, and legally, they are destined to be annulled.

 

108.     Respondents recognize that the separation fence impinges upon the rights of the Arab residents of the Alfei Menashe enclave.  However, respondents' position is that the general regime in practice in the seamline area, and the new arrangements regarding crossings and gates, have generally turned the injury to the Palestinians, and specifically to the residents of the villages in the enclave, into proportionate ones.  On this subject, we were informed that in July 2004 the declaration was amended, so that permanent residents of the seamline areas were issued a "permanent resident card".  The holder of such a card needs not hold a permit in order to enter into the seamline area or to stay in it.  In order to preserve the fabric of life in the seamline area, checkpoints, allowing passage from one part of the separation fence to the other, have been established.  The checkpoints are manned every day of the year, all day long.  In addition, the agricultural fences have been opened, allowing farmers to pass from their place of residence to their fields.  The gates are open three times a day, for regular, published periods of time.  When these times are insufficient, they can be extended.  The gates are open for a longer time during periods of intensive agricultural cultivation, like during the olive picking season.

 

109.     In the separation fence at the Alfei Menashe enclave there are one crossing and three gates.  The crossing ("crossing 109") is open at all hours of the night and day, every day of the year.  Enclave residents can pass through it, after a security check, by foot or by car, to Qalqiliya and all other parts of Judea and Samaria, whether for employment purposes or for any other reason.  From Qalqiliya, it is possible to continue on to Judea and Samaria with no additional checkpoint.  It should also be mentioned that a new underpass connecting Qalqiliya to Habla has been opened.  It passes under highway 55, which leads to Alfei Menashe.  Movement through this underpass is unrestricted.  In addition to the underpass, there are three gates in the enclave: the Ras a-Tira gate, the Habla gate, and the South Qalqiliya gate.  The Ras a-Tira gate connects the enclave to Habla and to Ras a-Atiyeh.  It was decided that it would be open from one hour after sunrise until one hour before sunset.  Both other gates are open three times a day for one hour.  The farmers can reach their lands through these gates.

 

            10.       The Proportionality of the Injury to the Local Residents

 

110.     Is the injury to the residents of the enclave villages proportionate?  According to the caselaw of this Court – and in the footsteps of comparative law – proportionality is tested according to three subtests.  The first subtest holds that the injury is proportionate only if there is a rational connection between the desired objective and the means being used to achieve that objective.  The second subtest determines that the injury is proportionate only if there is no other less injurious means which can achieve the desired objective.  The third subtest holds that the injury is proportionate only if the impingement upon human rights is of appropriate proportion to the benefit reaped from it.  We applied this standard in The Beit Sourik Case.  Is it satisfied in the case before us?

 

111.     Petitioners contend that the first subtest (rational connection) is not satisfied in the Alfei Menashe enclave.  That is since the current route "annexes, de facto, the residents of the five villages that found themselves in the enclave, into Israel; and instead of creating the that 'separation' (which is, to our understanding, the essence of the fence's security doctrine), it creates a reality in which hundreds of Palestinians find themselves west of the fence, without any checkpoint or gate between them and the cities of Israel.  Therefore, it is difficult to see how the impingement upon the rights of the residents of the villages promotes the security of the State of Israel, of the IDF, or even of Alfei Menashe, none of which are separated from the residents of the villages; au contraire" (paragraphs 140-141 of the petition).  We cannot accept this argument.  The separation fence creates a separation between terrorists and Israelis (in Israel and in the area), and from that standpoint, the required rational connection exists between the objective and the means for its attainment.

 

112.     Is the second subtest (the least injurious means) satisfied?  Is it possible to ensure the security of Israelis through a different fence route, whose impingement upon the rights of the local residents would be a lesser one?  Petitioners answer this question in the affirmative.  According to their argument, it is possible to protect the Israelis through a fence constructed on the Green Line. We cannot accept this argument. In their arguments before us, respondents correctly noted that construction of the separation fence on the Green Line would leave Alfei Menashe on the eastern side of the fence.  It would be left vulnerable to terrorist attacks from Qalqiliya, Habla, and the remaining cities and villages of Samaria.  Movement from it to Israel and back would be vulnerable to acts of terrorism.  Indeed, any route of the fence must take into account the need to provide security for the 5650 Israeli residents of Alfei Menashe.

 

113.     Against this background arises the question whether the security objective behind the security fence could not be attained by changing the fence route such that the new route would encircle Alfei Menashe, but would leave the five villages of the enclave outside of the fence.  Such a route would create a natural link between the villages of the enclave and Qalqiliya and Habla.  It would create a link to the array of civil services which were provided to the residents prior to the construction of the fence.  Most of the injuries to the residents of the villages would be avoided.  Indeed, the lives of the residents under to the present route are difficult.  The enclave creates a chokehold around the villages.  It seriously damages the entire fabric of life.  The alteration to the route, which will remove the villages from the enclave, will reduce the injury to the local residents to a large extent.  If it is not possible to remove all five villages from the enclave, is it possible for most of them to be removed from it?  Indeed, based upon the factual basis as presented to us, the existing route of the fence seems strange.  We shall begin with the southwest part of the enclave.  We are by no means persuaded that there is a decisive security-military reason for setting the fence route where it presently is.  Why is it not possible to change the route in a way that the three villages in this part (Wadi a-Rasha, Ma'arat a-Daba, and Hirbet Ras a-Tira), or most of them, remain outside of the fenced enclave?  There is a planning scheme, which has been filed, for the development of Alfei Menashe in the direction of the southwestern part of the enclave.  But as Mr. Tirza, who presented the enclave map to us, stated before us, that is not a consideration which should be taken into account.  We shall now turn to the northern and northwestern part of the enclave.  Why should the villages of Arab a-Ramadin and Arab Abu-Farde not remain outside of the fence?  A main consideration in this issue might be the need to defend highway 55, which connects Alfei Menashe to Israel.  On this issue, Mr. Tirza noted that the location of highway 55 raises security problems.  Israelis have been shot on it from the direction of Qalqiliya.  We learned from the material before us, that according to the original plan, the segment of highway 55 which connects Alfei Menashe to Israel was to be cancelled.  Instead, a new road was supposed to be paved, which would connect Alfei Menashe to Israel, southwest of the enclave, adjacent to the Matan community inside the Green Line.  Petitioners argue – an argument which is supported by the material they submitted to us – that this plan was not approved due to the opposition of the Matan community, who thought that it would harm its quality of life.  Mr. Tirza noted before us that the road connecting Alfei Menashe to Israel (highway 55) should be viewed as a temporary road.  In this state of affairs, we were by no means convinced that it is necessary, for security-military reasons, to preserve the northwest route of the enclave.  If this route will indeed be altered, it will have an additional implication, in that it will be possible to cancel the two gates separating Qalqiliya and Habla, and reconnect them into a large urban bloc, as it was in the past, and not make due only with the new underpass which connects them.

 

114.     Thus, we have by no means been convinced that the second subtest of proportionality has been satisfied by the fence route creating the Alfei Menashe enclave.  It seems to us that the required effort has not been made, and the details of an alternative route have not been examined, in order to ensure security with a lesser injury to the residents of the villages.  Respondents must reconsider the existing route.  They must examine the possibility of removing the villages of the enclave – some or all of them – from the "Israeli" side of the fence.  Of course, this alteration cannot be done in one day, as it requires the dismantling of the existing fence (in the northern part, the northwestern part and the southwestern part) and the building of a new fence, while canceling highway 55 which connects Alfei Menashe to Israel and buiding a new road southwest of Alfei Menashe.  Respondents must examine, therefore, the preparation of timetables and various sub-phases, which can ensure the changes to the route within a reasonable period.

 

115.     Has the third condition of the proportionality test (narrow proportionality) been satisfied?  In order to answer this question, we must determine whether the existing route of the separation fence at the Alfei Menashe enclave has an alternative route which provides Israelis (in Israel and Alfei Menashe) the required level of security.  If such an alternative route exists, we must examine the intensity of injury to the fabric of life of the village residents.  Thus, for example, if it is possible, according to the security considerations, to reduce the route of the fence so that the enclave will contain only Alfei Menashe, then there is no doubt that the additional security provided by the existing route (compared to the alternate route) does not measure up to the additional injury which the existing route (compared to the alternate route) causes to the local residents (for "relative" implementation of narrow proportionality: see The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 840).

 

116.     And what will be the case if examination of the alternative route leads to the conclusion that the only route which provides the minimum required security is the existing route?  Without it, there is no security for the Israelis.  With it, there a severe injury to the fabric of life of the residents of the villages.  What will the case be in such a situation ("absolute" implementation of narrow proportionality: see The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 840)?  That is the most difficult of the questions.  We were not confronted with it in The Beit Sourik Case, since we found that there was an alternative which provides security to Israelis.  How shall we solve this difficulty in the case before us?  It seems to us that the time has not yet come to confront this difficulty, and the time may never come.  We hope that the examination of the second of the proportionality subtests will allow the alteration of the fence route, in the spirit of our comments, so that a new route can be found, whose injury to the lives of the local residents will be much lesser than that caused by the current route.  We can therefore leave the examination of the satisfaction of the third subtest open, while focusing the examination at this time upon the second condition, that is, examination  of the possibility of reducing the area of the enclave.

 

            Therefore, we turn the order nisi into an order absolute in the following way:  respondents no. 1-4 must, within a reasonable period, reconsider the various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while examining security alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the enclave to a lesser extent.  In this context, the alternative by which the enclave will contain only Alfei Menashe and a connecting road to Israel, while moving the existing road connecting Alfei Menashe to Israel to another location in the south of the enclave, should be examined.

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch:

 

I concur in the judgment of my colleague President A. Barak.

 

 

Justice A. Procaccia:

 

I concur in the judgment of my colleague, President A. Barak.

 

 

Justice E. Levy

 

I concur in the result of the judgment of my colleague, the President.

 

 

Justice A. Grunis:

 

I agree that the petition is to be allowed, as proposed by my colleague, President A. Barak.

 

 

Justice M. Naor:

 

I concur in the judgment of my colleague President A. Barak.

 

 

Justice S. Jubran:

 

I concur in the judgment of my colleague President A. Barak.

 

 

Justice E. Chayut:

 

I concur in the judgment of my colleague President A. Barak.

 

 

Vice President M. Cheshin:

 

I read the comprehensive opinion of my colleague President Barak, impressive in scope and depth, and I agree with his legal decision, and with the way he traveled the paths of the facts and the law until he reached the conclusions he did.  Usually I would not add anything to my colleague's words – as we all know that often, he who adds, actually detracts – however, I found the decision of the International Court of Justice at the Hague to be so objectionable, that I said to myself that I should take pen to paper and add a few words of my own.

 

2.         International law has undergone many welcome revolutionary changes in recent decades.  I remember that 50 years ago – when I was a young student at the Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem – the subject of Public International Law (as opposed to Private International Law) was a negligible and peripheral subject (even though it was taught as a required course).  Public International Law was not seen by us – we the students – as worthy of the title "law", and the institutions of the international community, including the International Court of Justice, received the same treatment.  The years passed, and public international law got stronger and began to stand on its own two feet as a legal system worthy of the title "law".  That is the case, at least, as far as certain areas or certain states on the face of the globe are concerned. It is fortunate that public international law has developed in that way, although the road is long before it will turn into a legal system of full standing; as a legal system whose norms can be enforced against those who violate them. In the same context, we should know and remember that the International Court of Justice at the Hague, even when asked to write an Advisory Opinion, is still a court.  Indeed, when the ICJ sits in judgment as the giver of an advisory opinion, the proceedings before it are not regular adversary proceedings, and its decision does not have immediate operative force – as opposed to the decision of a regular court. However, the way in which the ICJ writes its opinion is the way of a court; the proceedings of the ICJ are, in principle, like the proceedings of a court; and the judges sitting in judgment don the robes of a judge in the way familiar to us from regular courts.  Take these procedural distinguishing marks away from the ICJ, and you have taken away its spirit as a court.  For we have no lack of political forums.

 

3.         I read the majority opinion of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and, unfortunately, I could not discover those distinguishing marks which turn a document into a legal opinion or a judgment of a court.  Generally, and without going into piecemeal detail, there are two main parts to the judgment of a court, and likewise, to an opinion of the ICJ: one part lays a basis of facts which were properly proven before the tribunal, and upon this basis is built the other part - the legal part.  Thus is also the case with the opinion of the ICJ before us, one part of which is the factual part, and the other part – which builds itself on the first part – is the legal part.  Regarding the legal part of the opinion of the ICJ, I shall not add to what my colleague the President wrote.  We have seen that there are no essential disagreements between us and the ICJ on the subject of law, and that is fortunate.  However, if that is the case regarding the legal part, regarding the factual part – the part which is the basis upon which the judgment is built – I should like to disagree with the ICJ.

 

4.         As we saw in my colleague's survey, the factual basis upon which the ICJ built its opinion is a ramshackle one.  Some will say that the judgment has no worthy factual basis whatsoever.  The ICJ reached findings of fact on the basis of general statements of opinion; its findings are general and unexplained; and it seems that it is not right to base a judgment, whether regarding an issue of little or great importance and value, upon findings such as those upon which the ICJ based its judgment.  The generality and lack of explanation which characterize the factual aspect of the opinion are not among the distinguishing marks worthy of appearing in a legal opinion or a judgment.  Moreover, generality and lack of explanation infuse the opinion with an emotional element, which is heaped on to an extent unworthy of a legal opinion.  I might add that in this way, the opinion was colored by a political hue, which legal decision does best to distance itself from, to the extent possible.  And if all that is not enough, there is the ICJ's almost complete ignoring of the horrible terrorism and security problems which have plagued Israel - a silence that the reader cannot help noticing – a foreign and strange silence.  I can only agree with Judge Buergenthal, and partly with Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans, and Judge Owada, that the factual basis upon which the judgment was built is inadequate to the point that it is inappropriate to pass judgment upon it, even by way of opinion.  As Judge Buergenthal wrote (paragraph 1 of his opinion):

 

". . . I am compelled to vote against the Court's findings on the merits because the court did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings; it should therefore have declined to hear the case . . ."

 

Thus also further on in his opinion (see paragraph 64 of the President's judgment).  I am sorry, but the decision of the ICJ cannot light my path.  Its light is too dim for me to guide myself by it to law, truth, and justice in the way a judge does, as I learned from those who preceded me and from my father's  household.

 

 

Decided according to the judgment of President A. Barak.

 

Given today, September 15 2005.

 

 

             

 

Association for Civil Rights v. Central District Commander

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 358/88
Date Decided: 
Sunday, July 30, 1989
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945 authorizes a Military Commander to order the forfeiture and destruction or sealing of any house from which gun fire has issued or explosive or incendiary material was thrown unlawfully, and of any house in an area or village residents of which violated the Emergency Regulations involving violence or intimidation. These regulations, including the said Regulation 119, were promulgated by the British Mandate during the period of its rule in Palestine.

           

Regulation 119 continues to be in force in Israel by virtue of section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance enacted by Israel upon its establishment in 1948, which provide in essence that the law that was in force on the eve of the establishment of the State shall continue to be in force until abolished or amended by a law enacted by the Israeli Knesset. The Regulation also continues to be in force in Jordan by virtue of similar legislation there. Therefore, it is part of the local law that was in force in Judea and Samaria when those areas were occupied by the Israel Defense Forces during the Six Day War in 1967, and under international law it continues to be the law in force in the occupied territories. No substantive change has been made in the law in Gaza since the Mandate and Regulation 119 continues in force there as well.

           

This Petition concerns the procedures applicable when a Military Commander issues an order to demolish a house pursuant to Regulation 119, more particularly, whether the owner or occupants of a house affected by such an order should have the right to a brief delay in its implementation, during which time they can present their objections thereto before the Commander who issued the order, consult with legal counsel and, if they wish, raise their claims by petition before the High Court of Justice. The Court issued an order directing the Respondents to show cause why they should not allow the Petitioners the rights claimed.

           

The Petitioners argued that the right to present one's claims is a fundamental right of natural justice that has legal force even if it is not set forth expressly in the Regulations at issue. This right is especially important in the case of the Regulation at hand, since the destruction of the property is irreversible. Destruction of the property is a severe sanction, whose very severity requires that an opportunity be allowed to present one's claims before the Regional Military Commander and, if need be, before the Court.

           

The Respondents asserted that, in practice, it is generally possible for a party affected by such an order to present his claims before the Military Commander who issued the order and that implementation of the order will ordinarily be postponed to enable the affected party to petition the High Court of Justice, if he wishes to do so. But, they contended, there are occasional instances of "severe and exceptional cases" in which it is essential that the powers granted by Regulation 119 be enforced promptly after the event because of which the order was issued, in order to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Such cases consist of incidents involving lethal injury or grievous wounding and the throwing of incendiary bottles. The Respondents objected to a broad ruling that would require a delay in implementing the order in all cases, such as was sought by the Petitioners.

           

The Court accepted the Petition and issued a rule absolute in the Petitioner's favor to the effect that -

           

1. Except for matters involving ongoing military-operational needs, such as, for example, the need to clear away an obstacle or overcome resistance that prevents taking prompt military action in response to an attack on military forces or on civilians, an order issued under Regulation l19 should include a notice that the person affected by the order may select an advocate and present his claims before the Military Commander, within a fixed time period set forth therein, before the order is implemented, and that he will be given an additional fixed period to apply to the High Court of Justice;

 

2. The State may apply to the Court, in an appropriate case, and request that the hearing of the matter be given preference;

 

3. In urgent situations, the premises can be sealed on the spot before the appeal or hearing takes place. The sealing of the premises, as distinguished from their destruction, is not irreversible.

 

In reaching its decision, the Court noted, inter alia, that international law does not recognize any right to present one's claims under a regime of military law, as the Petitioners seek in this case. However, Israeli military authorities who function in the occupied territories do so under a dual and cumulative standard. In addition to their duty to abide by the Laws of War, as Israeli officials in the Area, they must also act in accordance with the norms of Israeli administrative law. As such, an Israeli official does not fulfil his duty merely by satisfying the norms of international law, but he must also act in accordance with the rules of Israeli administrative law that define what constitutes a fair and ordely administration. The right to be heard is not a part of the Laws of War, but an Israeli authority will not fulfil its duty if it does not respect that right.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 358/88

           

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel and others

v.

The Central District Commander and Another

 

 

 

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[July 30, 1989]

Before  Shamgar P., Elon D.P., and Wallenstein, J.

 

 

Editor's Synopsis -

            Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945 authorizes a Military Commander to order the forfeiture and destruction or sealing of any house from which gun fire has issued or explosive or incendiary material was thrown unlawfully, and of any house in an area or village residents of which violated the Emergency Regulations involving violence or intimidation. These regulations, including the said Regulation 119, were promulgated by the British Mandate during the period of its rule in Palestine.

           

            Regulation 119 continues to be in force in Israel by virtue of section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance enacted by Israel upon its establishment in 1948, which provide in essence that the law that was in force on the eve of the establishment of the State shall continue to be in force until abolished or amended by a law enacted by the Israeli Knesset. The Regulation also continues to be in force in Jordan by virtue of similar legislation there. Therefore, it is part of the local law that was in force in Judea and Samaria when those areas were occupied by the Israel Defense Forces during the Six Day War in 1967, and under international law it continues to be the law in force in the occupied territories. No substantive change has been made in the law in Gaza since the Mandate and Regulation 119 continues in force there as well.

           

            This Petition concerns the procedures applicable when a Military Commander issues an order to demolish a house pursuant to Regulation 119, more particularly, whether the owner or occupants of a house affected by such an order should have the right to a brief delay in its implementation, during which time they can present their objections thereto before the Commander who issued the order, consult with legal counsel and, if they wish, raise their claims by petition before the High Court of Justice. The Court issued an order directing the Respondents to show cause why they should not allow the Petitioners the rights claimed.

           

            The Petitioners argued that the right to present one's claims is a fundamental right of natural justice that has legal force even if it is not set forth expressly in the Regulations at issue. This right is especially important in the case of the Regulation at hand, since the destruction of the property is irreversible. Destruction of the property is a severe sanction, whose very severity requires that an opportunity be allowed to present one's claims before the Regional Military Commander and, if need be, before the Court.

           

            The Respondents asserted that, in practice, it is generally possible for a party affected by such an order to present his claims before the Military Commander who issued the order and that implementation of the order will ordinarily be postponed to enable the affected party to petition the High Court of Justice, if he wishes to do so. But, they contended, there are occasional instances of "severe and exceptional cases" in which it is essential that the powers granted by Regulation 119 be enforced promptly after the event because of which the order was issued, in order to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Such cases consist of incidents involving lethal injury or grievous wounding and the throwing of incendiary bottles. The Respondents objected to a broad ruling that would require a delay in implementing the order in all cases, such as was sought by the Petitioners.

           

            The Court accepted the Petition and issued a rule absolute in the Petitioner's favor to the effect that -

           

1.  Except for matters involving ongoing military-operational needs, such as, for example, the need to clear away an obstacle or overcome resistance that prevents taking prompt military action in response to an attack on military forces or on civilians, an order issued under Regulation l19 should include a notice that the person affected by the order may select an advocate and present his claims before the Military Commander, within a fixed time period set forth therein, before the order is implemented, and that he will be given an additional fixed period to apply to the High Court of Justice;

 

2.     The State may apply to the Court, in an appropriate case, and request that the hearing of the matter be given preference;

 

3.     In urgent situations, the premises can be sealed on the spot before the appeal or hearing takes place. The sealing of the premises, as distinguished from their destruction, is not irreversible.

 

            In reaching its decision, the Court noted, inter alia, that international law does not recognize any right to present one's claims under a regime of military law, as the Petitioners seek in this case. However, Israeli military authorities who function in the occupied territories do so under a dual and cumulative standard. In addition to their duty to abide by the Laws of War, as Israeli officials in the Area, they must also act in accordance with the norms of Israeli administrative law. As such, an Israeli official does not fulfil his duty merely by satisfying the norms of international law, but he must also act in accordance with the rules of Israeli administrative law that define what constitutes a fair and ordely administration. The right to be heard is not a part of the Laws of War, but an Israeli authority will not fulfil its duty if it does not respect that right.

 

Israel Supreme Court Cases Cited:

 

[1] H.C. 897/86 jabar v. The Central District Commander, 41(2) P.D. 522.

[2] H.C. 513, 514/85 Nizal v. The Commander of the I.D.F. Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region, 39(3) P.D. 345.

[3] H.C. 434/79 Schoweel v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, 34(1) P.D. 464.

[4] H.C. 22/81 Chamad v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, 35(3) P.D. 223.

[5] H.C. 274/82 Chamamra v. The Minister of Defence, 31(2) P.D. 755.

[6] H.C. 69, 493/81 Abu Aita v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, 37(2) P.D. 197.

[7] H.C. 619/78 "Al Tliyah" Weekly v. The Minister of Defence, 33(3) P.D. 505.

[8] H.C. 331/71 Almakdesah v. The Minister of Defence, 26(1) P.D. 574.

[9] H.C. 361/82 Chamri v. The Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, 36(3) P.D. 439.

 

American Cases Cited:

 

[10] Hirabayashi v. United States 320 U.S. 81 (1954).

[11] Korematsu v. United States 319 U.S. 432 (1944).

[12] Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasings Co. 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

            SHAMGAR P.: 1. This petition concerns the introduction of fixed and general appellate procedures to apply in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, following the issuance of an order pursuant to Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, with regard to the demolition or sealing of a building or part thereof.

 

            Based on the petition, this Court issued an order nisi, instructing the Respondents to appear and explain:

           

            "A. Why they should not permit a resident of a house, as to which an order of demolition or sealing will be issued pursuant to Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, to present his claims before the competent authority prior to the implementation of the order.

 

B. Why they should not allow such resident a delay of 48 hours from the denial of consent to his application, or of a longer period of time as may be determined by this Court, to submit a petition to this Court, if he should so desire, prior to the implementation of the order.

 

C. Why they should not permit such a resident to establish immediate contact with a lawyer, if he should so desire.

 

D. Why they should not notify such a resident that he has these rights."

 

            2. The aforementioned Regulation 119 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations was promulgated by the High Commissioner in the year 1945, during the time of British rule over all the territories which today include the State of Israel and the areas occupied by her. This is the text of the regulation:

           

            "FORFEITURE AND DEMOLITION OF PROPERTY, ETC.

           

119. (1) A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the Government of Israel of any house, structure, or land from which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise discharged, or of any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street, the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence against these Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court offence; and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything growing on the land. Where any house, structure or land has been forfeited by order of a Military Commander as above, the Defence Minister may at any time by order remit the forfeiture in whole or in part and thereupon, to the extent of such remission, the ownership of the house, structure or land and all interests or easements in or over the house, structure or land shall revest in the persons who would have been entitled to the same if the order of forfeiture had not been made and all charges on the house, structure or land shall revive for the benefit of the persons who would have been entitled thereto if the order of forfeiture had not been made.

 

(2) Members of the Government Forces or of the Police Force, acting under the authority of the Military Commander may seize and occupy, without compensation, any property in any such area, town, village, quarter or street as is referred to in subregulation (l), after eviction without compensation, of the previous occupiers, if any." (Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The Regulation continues to be in force in Israel by virtue of the provisions regarding the continuity of the law, as stated in paragraph 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948.

           

            It continues to apply in Judea and Samaria by virtue of similar provisions regarding the continuity of the local law, which were enacted by the Jordanian government.

           

            In H.C. 897/86 [1], we stated in this regard, at pp. 525-526:

           

"... Regulation l19 is part of the law which was in force in Judea and Samaria just before the establishment there of I.D.F. rule.... The local law remained in force, with exceptions not related to the matter before us, in accordance with the principles of public international law, as set forth also in the Law and Administration Proclamation (Judea and Samaria) (No. 2), 5727-1967 of the Regional Commander of I.D.F. Forces (see Regulation 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Hence, the authority granted by the said Regulation ll9 is local law that exists and applies in the area of Judea and Samaria, that was not abolished during the previous regime or the Military Rule, and no legal reasons have been brought before us, on the basis of which it should be deemed abolished now."

 

            With regard to the continuing force of the above-mentioned Defence (Emergency) Regulations in Judea and Samaria, see also H.C. 513, 514/85 [2], at p. 650; as to the validity of Regulation 119, see also, inter alia, H.C. 434/79 [3], at p. 466; H.C. 22/81 [4], at p. 224; H.C. 274/82 [5], at p. 756.

           

            No substantive change in the local law has occurred in the Gaza Strip since the period of the Mandate, so no claim has ever been raised against the continuing validity of the above-noted Defence (Emergency) Regulations in general, and of Regulation 119 in particular, there.

           

            3. The Petitioners claim that the owners of the building or those who reside in it, as to which an order pursuant to Regulation  119 is about to be implemented, should be permitted to present objections to the Regional Commander who issued the order. Thereby, the right to present one's claim will be given expression prior to implementation of the order, so that one who is affected by the matter can try to persuade the Regional Commander that the order should not be issued in the circumstances. As requested by the Petition before us, if the Regional Commander declines to rescind his decision, there should be an additional delay in implementing the order for 48 hours or more, as will be determined, so as to permit application to the High Court of Justice prior to implementation of the order. Thus the right to present one's claim will find its expression before the property of those affected in the matter is damaged. According to the Petitioners, the right to present one's claim is a right rooted in Israeli law, available to every person in judicial, quasi-judicial and even administrative proceedings. They assert:

 

"The principle accepted in Israel is that when legislation grants a government authority the power to take a decision that injures a citizen, the principles of natural justice apply without the need that they be enacted expressly. These principles do not apply only when there exists an explicit and clear legislative provision that negates their applicability. Legislative silence should not be interpreted as a negative regulation, when it comes to the applicability of principles of natural justice, and its express recognition in the one case does not imply its rejection in others."

 

            In the Petitioners' opinion, the emergency situation does not abolish the existence of the right as stated, and the power applied pursuant to emergency regulations - including both those who source is Mandatory legislation as well as those whose basis is paragraph 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance - does not limit the described right. In their words:

           

"The essence of Regulation 119, which grants power to inflict extreme and severe punishment, does not suggest the negation of principles of natural justice. On the contrary. The more extreme the authority, and the more severe the injury to the citizen's rights, the more it is necessary to adhere strictly to the procedural protections given to the person who is likely to be hurt, including his right to have his claim heard."

 

            They further contend that the negation or postponement of the right to present their claim can be justified only to prevent serious danger or the complete frustration of government action. An example of circumstances of the first type is the hospitalization of a person against his will if he is liable to hurt himself or another, or the destruction of a dangerous article. Also, a security operation, such as the destruction of a building for immediate-operational reasons to prevent it from being used as a hiding place for terrorists, can justify a departure from the right to present one's claim. An example of the second array of circumstances is the issuance of an order barring departure from the country or the seizure of an item which may be removed beyond control; even then, two cumulative conditions must be satisfied, that the action taken is reversible (a bar against leaving the country can be cancelled), and that the right to be heard will be granted immediately after the action is taken.

 

            The sanction pursuant to Regulation 119 is severe, and the demolition is irreversible. The claim is that the Respondents' opposition to permitting a delay in enforcement of the order for the purpose of presenting their objection is intended primarily, according to the Petitioners, to prevent application to the High Court of Justice, because in this forum, the question whether the issuance of the order was weighed pursuant to standards formulated in this Court will be put to test, including whether there is an adequate factual basis for the exercise of the authority. Without hearing the claim by the owner of the building, there is no opportunity for suitable weighing and examination of the facts by the competent authority:

           

"When an order is issued immediately after a horrible terrorist episode or a serious incident (such as the Baita Incident), the Military Commander is liable to reach his decision as a result of his and the public's emotional reaction, and sometimes even before the facts of the incident are thoroughly clarified. The Commander must act from logical and relevant considerations. He must not operate - and the public must not fear that he operates - out of anger, haste or a public atmosphere that demands revenge. A reasonable pause and listening to the affected party are the best assurances for making a reasoned decision".

 

            According to the Petitioners, there is no proof that speed of action helps bring about deterrence, and, even if the matter were so, it would not justify making an exception to the principles of natural justice.

           

            4. The Respondents claim that, in reality, it is generally possible for the affected party, against whose property an order of demolition or sealing has been issued pursuant to Regulation 119, to present objections to the Regional Commander even though Regulation 119 in particular and the local law in general do not contain provisions allowing objections or appeal before a judicial authority. In other words, according to the Respondents' answer, it is the practice today, in many cases, to delay the implementation of an order if the affected party wishes to petition to the High Court of Justice concerning the issuance of the order after rejection of his application to the Regional Commander.

 

            As stated in the Respondents' answer, the Regional Commander's work practices contain directives to provide the affected party an opportunity to set forth his claims during the time period necessary for gathering the facts and reaching a decision, except in serious and exceptional cases, subject to such limitations as will ensure that this will not frustrate the primary goal, which is to exercise the authority without particular delays so as to fulfil the Military Commander's obligations and rights to protect public law and order in the area.

           

            These matters, according to the Respondents, are a consequence of the policy that seeks to apply the general principles of law, as far as possible, even in times of emergency and in conditions of emergency; but this is to be done in such a way as to preserve the required balance between the principles mentioned and safeguarding security needs and the public order in the area, as changing conditions require from time to time.

           

            The Respondents further explained in their Response the background for their opposition to the Petitioners' request that a delay be allowed in every case to raise an objection and apply to a court before the excercise of the said authority based on Regulation 119; and thus it is said, inter alia, in the words of the Response:

           

          "Regulation 119, by its very nature, grants the Military Commander the authority to apply the sanctions specified therein at varying levels of severity, beginning with forfeiture, partial or complete sealing, and ending with forfeiture and demolition of the structure.

           

          The more severe the implemented sanction, the greater is the corresponding deterrent effect.

 

Alongside the severity of the sanction and its level, it is of the greatest importance that it be implemented quickly and immediately after the criminal act, because of which it was taken in the first place.

 

An immediate response in executing the sanction is of the greatest importance, particularly in serious and exceptional events, in which demolition of the building urgently and immediately - as distinguished from sealing it - will have the greatest deterrent effect.

 

I wish to reassert once again that the defence establishment is cognizant of the extreme seriousness of the destruction of a house without providing a prior right to assert claims, but this sanction will be applied only in serious and exceptional cases, that result in a lethal injury or grievous wounding, and against those who throw incendiary bottles and are caught within a short and reasonable time thereafter."

 

            In a notice from the State Attorney, detail is given of the lines of action approved by the Minister of Defence, pursuant to which the Respondents will operate from now on. The statement reads:

           

"(A) Except in severe and exceptional cases, notice is to be given to the residents of the house concerning the possibility to present their contentions before the Military Commander, before the excercise of the authority under Regulation 119 of the Defence Regulations. Afterwards, if they should so desire, they are to be given additional time to submit their contentions to the honorable Court, before the implementation of the order.

 

(B) 'Severe and exceptional cases' will be deemed particularly serious events that result in lethal injury or grievous wounding.

 

(C) Also, the residents of the house will not be given the opportunity to raise their claims prior to implementation of the order, in situations requiring, in the Military Commander's opinion, a quick deterrent response, shortly and within a reasonable period of time after the event.

 

Such situations occur today in cases of the throwing of incendiary bottles.

 

(D) Residents of the building are not to be prevented from contacting a lawyer, if they so desire."

 

            In the course of the hearing, the Court raised a proposal, according to which, if there is an intention to seize the house, it would be possible to seize the house and seal it before hearing the residents' claim, but the act of demolishing the house would not be taken until after the right to present the claims has been allowed, pursuant to the usual time periods. The Petitioner's learned counsel, Advocate Shoffman, agreed to the said proposal.

           

            The Minister of Defence's response to the Court's said proposal was presented in a notice from the State Attorney's Office, which stated:

           

"After the Minister of Defence consulted with various security officials, including the Respondents, and after he considered the Court's proposal and examined it, and giving consideration to the current circumstances and situation, the Minister of Defence cannot accept the honorable Court's proposal, at this time".

 

            Nevertheless, the Respondents once again confirmed that they will adhere to the arrangement whose salient points were quoted above.

           

            We will now examine the litigants' claims.

           

            5. According to the Law and Administration Proclamation (Judea and Samaria) (No. 2), 5727-1967, the law which was in force in the Gaza Strip and the Judea and Samaria area on the 27th of Iyar 5727 - June 6, 1967, or the 28th of Iyar 5727 - June 7, 1967, respectively, will continue and remain in force, insofar as there is nothing therein that contradicts the above-mentioned Proclamation or any Proclamation or Order which will be issued by the Commander of I.D.F. forces in the area, and subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of I.D.F. rule in the area. The Proclamation expresses public international law principles, as they are also set forth, inter alia, in Regulation 43 to the Supplement to the 1907 Hague Regulations regarding the Law and Customs of War On Land (hereinafter - the Hague Regulations) and in Article 64 to the Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilians in Time of War, 1949 (hereinafter - the Fourth Geneva Convention).

 

            When applying principles of public international law, the Regional Commander operates according to guidelines that are derived from the basic conceptions of administrative law practiced in Israel. We said in H.C. 69, 493/81 [6], at pp. 231-232:

           

"...[T]he Court reviews the legality and validity of the action in accordance with the principles of Israeli administrative law, to ascertain whether the official who carries out functions of the Military Government, acts lawfully and according to the norms binding on an Israeli public servant. More particularly, this does not mean that Israeli administrative law applies to the Region and its inhabitants or that the legality of an act in the Administered Territory will be examined according to Israeli law only. The above dictum means that the legality and validity of actions of the Military Government and its authorities, as arms of the Israeli Executive, will be tested by additional criteria. True, the rules of Israeli law have not been applied to the Area, but an Israeli official in the Area brings with him to his functions the duty to act in accordance with those additional standards that are demanded by reason of his being an Israeli authority, wherever he may be. In this regard he bears an additional and cumulative duty, because the duty to conduct himself according to the norms of Israeli administrative law does not release him from the duty to abide by the Laws of War. Therefore, he cannot rely on norms of the Israeli administrative law to refrain from fulfilling a duty or honoring a prohibition that applies to him as is customary under the Laws of War. But, from this Court's perspective, an official does not generally fulfil his duty by merely doing what the norms of international law require of him, since more is demanded of him as an Israeli authority, namely, that he act in the Military Government Area in accordance with the rules that define fair and orderly administration. For example, the Laws of War do not contain any firmly established rule - or even a developing rule - about the right to be heard, but an Israeli authority will not discharge its duty, when its acts are judicially reviewed by this Court, if it does not respect this right in those cases in which the norms of our own administrative law require that it be granted. All this is obviously subject to specific legislation prescribing special regulations in any particular matter. It was to this that the following remarks describing the two-level Israeli conception were directed:

 

'From the normative point of view the rule of law in the territories found its expression in the adoption of two main principles of action:

 

(1) the prevention of the development of a legal vacuum by the de facto observance of customary international law and the humanitarian rules included in the Hague Rules and the Fourth Convention and furthermore;

 

(2) the supplementation of the above-mentioned rules and provisions by the basic principles of natural justice as derived from the system of law existing in Israel, reflecting similar principles developed in western democracies.

 

(M. Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of Israeli Military Government, supra at 48-49)'"

 

In H.C. 619/78 [7], at pp. 511-512, it was indicated that -

 

"From the facts and the claims which are before us, it appears that the Israeli Military Government did not exercise its above-stated authority, granted it under international law, to the fullest extent and severity, but rather sought to limit itself, as much as possible, to those means which are absolutely essential for the preservation of public safety and peace, while giving expression, in practice and in theory, to the tendency to go beyond the rule of law in the formal sense of this phrase and adopt our conception of the rule of law in its substantive meaning ..." (Emphasis added - M.S.).

 

            In other words, the Israeli regime took a more moderate approach, in various areas, than that permitted according to the principles of international law. Thus, for example, the more extreme approach with regard to its consequences for individual rights, as expressed for example in the circumstances described in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) [1O] and Korematsu v. United States (1944) [11], was not taken.

           

            The above noted H.C. 619/78 [7], added, at p. 512:

           

          "The Respondents' exercise of authority will be tested by the same standards that this Court applies when it reviews the actions or omissions of any other arm of the executive, taking into consideration of course the Respondents' obligations as they are defined from the nature of their functions, as described above."

 

This means, in defining the obligations of Military Commanders, and when the Court reviews government actions, the Court is guided by the rules of administrative law, which always include, of course, reference to the scope, the character and the substance of the powers and the duties of the public servant whose actions are being examined by the Court.

                                                                                                

A derivative question arises at this point, namely, how do the rules of administrative law integrate themselves within the operation of local law. Do the above statements mean that the provisions of the local law, too, are altered automatically, being subordinated to the rules of Israeli administrative law? Such a sweeping answer must be rejected because, for example, we cannot hold that every local provision of law that grants authority to act to any government authority, incorporates by itself, without supplementary defense legislation, the relevant norm of Israeli administrative law. This approach is not in accord with the principles of public international law, that the local law may only be amended explicitly, on the basis of security legislation within the bounds created by international law (see Regulation 43 to the Hague Regulations and Article 64 to the Fourth Geneva Convention cited above, and see also H.C. 331/71 [8], and H.C. 493, 69/81 [6], referred to above.

 

To summarize this point: the topic under consideration must be dealt with at all times according to the context, nature and implications of the local law. The primary guideline in a case such as this is that a change in the local law provisions can only derive from legislative directive, which in the area of Military Government finds its sole expression in the security legislation (see, for example, Order Concerning the Cancellation of the Boycott Laws Against Israel (Judea and Samaria) (No. 71), 5727-1967, and Order Concerning Local Courts (Death Penalty) (Judea and Samaria) (No. 268), 5728-1968).

                                                                                                

And yet, it is also necessary to examine each subject according to the substance of the directive or the guideline which it is sought to engraft as an additional layer on the existing local law. Therefore, if the Regional Commander establishes for himself internal rules of action, by virtue of which he abstains from excercising a certain power in its fullest severity, and establishes for himself a more liberal rule of action that does not harm individual rights, the matter may be expressed in internal working procedures alone, even without legislation.

                                                                                                

6. The Regional Commander bears responsibility for the public security and order in the area which he commands. In the framework of his obligations he must also protect the safety of the I.D.F. forces and public administration officials and maintain lines of transportation (see Article 64 to the Fourth Geneva Convention, noted above). He must ensure, as necessary, the appropriate and effective operation of the penal laws and prevent crime and anarchy. A resident of the territory who commits an act of violence against the armed forces commits a crime and it is expected that he will be brought to judgment according to the law and that every possible sanction within the local law or according to the security legislation will be taken against him (see also Sir H. Lauterpacht, The Law of War on Land, Part III of the Manual of Military Law (London, 1958) 35-36.

  The prevention of acts of violence is a condition for the establishment of public safety and order. There is no security without enforcement of the law, and law enforcement will not be successful and will not be effective if it does not also have a deterrent influence. The range of steps taken to enforce the law is in all cases related to the seriousness of the offense, to its frequency and to the nature of the offense committed. If, for example, there is a proliferation of murders of people because of their contacts with the Military Government, or if attacks are made which are intended to bum people or property so as to sow terror and fear, stricter and more frequent enforcement of the law is required. These things are true in every location, and the Military Government territory is not exceptional in this regard; to the contrary, the establishment of order and security and its preservation in practice are, according to public international law, among the central tasks of the Military Government.

                                                                                                

Regulation 119 cited above is among the lawful sanctions applicable according to the local law, and the excercise of its powers is given, of course, to the discretion of the military authority that commands the territory and whose tasks were defined above.

                                                                                                

This discretion is subject to judicial review, just as that of all other administrative authorities, and we have already referred to our statement on this matter in H.C. 619/78 [7] supra (see also H.C. 274/82 [5] supra). Judicial oversight examines whether the discretion was excercised lawfully. And in this connection, attention is also paid to the question whether the decision was properly considered and examined and, inter alia, whether the enforcement of the regulation and the level of its enforcement are commensurate with the seriousness of the act for which it is sought to be applied, pursuant to the examination according to these standards.

                                                                                                

Thus it was said, for example, in H.C. 361/82 [9], at p. 444, that:

           

"The Military Commander's judgment, that the circumstances of the matter before him demand forceful action, which can be a deterrent, and protect thereby security and order, is a consideration that, in the circumstances of the matter before us, falls within the framework of the lawful considerations that the Military Commander is permitted to weigh."

 

            7. The Respondents do not dispute that there are circumstances - and until now these were apparently the majority of instances - in which, even in their opinion, there is no reason not to permit the making of objections (within a fixed time) before the person who issues the order, and also to allow the possibility of postponing its implementation for an additional fixed time (48 hours were mentioned), during which it will be possible to present a petition to this Court requesting the exercise of judicial review over the administrative decision. It is unnecessary to add that it is possible that an interlocutory order will be given, as a result of the application to the Court, and additional time will pass until the actual decision will be given.

           

            However, it is argued, there are situations whose circumstances require on the spot action, and in which it is not possible to delay the implementation of the action until the said periods have passed.

           

            Demolition of a building is, everyone agrees, a harsh and severe means of punishment, and its deterrent power does not diminish its described nature. One of its central characteristics is that it is irreversible, that is, it cannot be corrected after the act; a hearing after implementation of the order is always very limited from the point of view of its practical meaning. According to our legal conceptions, it is, therefore, important that the interested party be able to present his objections before the Commander prior to the destruction, to apprise him of facts and considerations of which perhaps he was unaware.

           

            This Court considers that the existence of fair hearing rules in a matter involving a person, is expressed, inter alia, in that one who anticipates severe harm to his person or property shall be given advance notice and be granted an opportunity to raise his objections in the matter. This rule applies also when the law permits an act on the scene, such as immediate forfeiture of property (which is permitted in certain circumstances, for example according to the United States decisions, even when the property owner was not involved in committing the offense because of which the property is forfeited. See: Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasings Co. (1974) [12]).

           

            8. Certainly there are military-operational circumstances, in which the conditions of time and place or the nature of the circumstances are inconsistent with judicial review; for example, when a military unit is engaged in an operational action, in which it must clear away an obstacle or overcome resistance or respond on the spot to an attack on army forces or on civilians which occurred at the time, or similar circumstances, in which the authorized military authority sees an operational need for immediate action. By the very nature of the matter, in circumstances such as these there is no place for delay in the military action, whose performance is required on the spot.

 

            9. In my opinion, ways should be found to maintain the right to present one's claim before implementation of a decision which is not among the types of situations dealt with in paragraph 8.

           

            This Court, when sitting as the High Court of Justice, has not closed its gates to complaints and appeals of She inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza since the establishment of military rule in June 1967, and has dealt with them according to the same standard we apply to anyone who presents his matters before us. There is no legal or other justification, particulary in a matter whose consequences are irreversible after the act, for us to raise the threshhold and refuse to listen to claims against the acts of the administration.

           

            The legitimate and proper balance between the need to act in a quick and effective manner and the grant of opportunity to present one's objection to the Commander or by petition to this Court must and can find its expression in the right of preference, which the court can grant in urgent situations, as it has done, more than once, in varied and different situations, if such a request comes to it from an interested party.

           

            In other words, the military practice can allow a fixed delay for application to a lawyer, to the Regional Commander or to this Court, in that order, and upon request the Court may, according to its discretion, grant priority for clarification of matters such as this.

           

            Furthermore, if on-the-spot action is required, it is sufficient to take action which is reversible, such as eviction and sealing, and to delay the matter of demolition until after the judicial decision.

           

            In other words, I see room to distinguish between sealing and demolition. The first may be done on the spot, if circumstances require this. Before taking action of the second type (demolition), time is to be given to assert one's claims by way of objection or of petition, as the case may be.

 

            In summation:

           

            (A) I think that, except for matters involving military-operational needs as set forth in paragraph 8, it would be appropriate that an order issued under Regulation 119 should include a notice to the effect that the person to whom the order is directed may select a lawyer and address the Military Commander before implementation of the order, within a fixed time period set forth therein, and that, if he so desires, he will be given additional time after that, also fixed, to apply to this Court before the order will be implemented.

           

            (B) Of course, the State may apply to this Court, in an appropriate case, and request that the hearing in a petition of this type be granted a right of preference.

           

            (C) In urgent situations, the premises can be sealed on the spot, as distinguished from demolition, which is, as stated, irreversible, before the appeal or hearing of the Petition takes place. In the case of an on-the-spot sealing, as stated, notice is to be given to the affected party, clarifying that the right of objection or submitting a petition remains available.

           

            This is the absolute order I propose in this situation.

           

            ELON D.P.: I concur.

           

            WALLENSTEIN J.: I concur.

           

            Decided as stated in the President's decision.

           

            Judgment given today, the 27th of Tammuz 5749 (July 30, 1989).

Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5973/92
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 28, 1993
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Following a number of brutal acts of kidnapping and murder committed by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist organisations is December, 1992, it was decided by the Government of Israel to empower the military commanders of Judea and Samaria and of the Gaza Strip to issue orders for the temporary deportation of the leaders of these two terrorist organisations who had taken part in organising and supporting acts of terror, for a period not exceeding two years. The two commanders thereupon issued (general) temporary provisions under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (from the time of the British Mandate but still in force in the territories) allowing for individual temporary deportation orders to be carried out immediately after being issued. An appeal committee was also set up, which would, however, hear appeals only after the deportation had already taken place. Altogether, 400 persons were deported to Lebanon under the deportation orders.

           

The defence authorities (the respondents) submitted that the deportation orders were lawfully carried out even though the deportees were not given an opportunity to bring an appeal and have it heard prior to deportation, since pressing emergency conditions required the deportation to be carried out without any delay. Moreover, they argued, prior hearing could be dispensed with, since the general deportation orders made express legislative provision in that respect. Alternatively, case law of the High Court recognises emergency situations where even an inherent right like the right to hearing will not be enforced.

 

The petitioners argued that the deportation orders were void, both because the general order itself was void ab initio, in particular owing to lack of sufficient legal basis for denying deportees a prior right of hearing, and also owing to defects in the individual orders. Moreover, they submitted that the deportation was contrary to international law since the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to Protection of Civilians in Wartime prohibits deportation in general and mass deportation in particular. It was also contrary to Israeli administrative law which grants the right to a hearing prior to deportation.

           

An additional argument of the petitioners was that an appeal committee was not set up prior to the deportation, and that was an additional reason for invalidating the orders. The argument was rejected outright by the Court, since a committee was indeed in existence prior to the deportation (under regulations l l l and 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

           

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held as follows:

           

I.      The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 including Regulation l l 2 dealing with deportation is in force in Judea and Samaria, and in Gaza. Its continued force was derived first from Jordanian law and subsequently from legislation enacted by the Israeli military administration.

 

2.     According to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, there must be sufficient evidence to support the deportation in each individual case. This requirement has been fulfilled.

 

3.     Regulation 112(8) of the above Regulations provides that the advisory committee set up to hear appeals against administrative detention also has jurisdiction to examine deportation orders if so requested by a deportee. That Regulation does not, however, specify whether the appeal is to be heard before or after the deportation is carried out. A reasonable interpretation would be that the right of appeal under Regulation 112(8) should be exercised prior to deportation. However, denial of a right to a prior hearing does not necessarily lead to invalidation of the deportation orders. The correct remedy would be to allow a hearing to take place after the deportation under the same conditions as would have prevailed if it had taken place prior to the deportation.

 

4.     The High Court of Justice will examine the legality of any act of the military government in accordance with the principles of Israeli administrative law. Those principles require grant of the right of hearing, and as far as possible the hearing, so as to be fair and effective, should be held in the presence of the person concerned (in this case, the deportee). Allowing such person to appear in person, and not just by his representative, may have prevented cases of mistaken identity or other errors of which there were a number in the present matter.

 

5.     In exceptional circumstances, the rule allowing for the right to a prior hearing can be departed from, where security needs justify such departure. However, in the present case, it is not necessary to consider whether such exceptional circumstances exist, since the rule laid down in earlier case law applies here, whereby even where there has been no prior hearing, a hearing should be held subsequent to deportation, and this should afford the deportee the opportunity to put forward his case in detail; in any event, lack of a prior hearing does not invalidate the individual deportation orders.

 

6.     The general temporary provision orders where invalid insofar as they sought in general to replace existing principles of natural justice which require a prior hearing to take place before carrying out deportation orders, without relating to specific exceptional cases.

 

7.         The Court concluded as follows:

a)     Lack of prior hearing did not invalidate the individual deportation orders. The Court ordered the right of hearing to be granted following the deportation.

b)     The "provisional" (general) deportations order was invalid, for reasons stated, but this did not invalidate the individual orders.

c)     Submissions regarding invalidity of individual deportation orders were to be considered by the advisory committee within the scope of the (subsequent) appeals.

Voting Justices: 
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

            H.C.J 5973/92                        H.C.A. 5990/92

            H.C.J 5974/92                        H.C.A. 6043/92

            H.C.J 5975/92                        H.C.A. 6047/92

            H.C.J 5976/92                        H.C.A. 6064/92

            H.C.J 6023/92                        H.C.A. 6077/92

            H.C.J 6114/92                        H.C.A. 6089/92

            H.C.J 6170/92                        H.C.A. 6097/92

            H.C.J 6263/92                        H.C.A. 6129/92

            H.C.J 6289/92                        H.C.A. 6167/92

H.C.J 29/93                                H.C.A. 6213/92

H.C.J 32/93                                H.C.A. 6245/92

                                                                                                            H.C.J 97/93                            H.C.A. 6247/92

H.C.J 107/93                              H.C.A.  217/93

            H.C.A.  248/93

            H.C.A.  249/93

            H.C.A.  266/93

            H.C.A.  278/93

            H.C.A.  285/93

            H.C.A.  454/93

 

 

    (H.C. 5973/92)

Association for Civil Rights in Israel

v.

Minister of Defence and others

 

(H.C. 5974/92)

Taher Sheritah & Others

v.

Commander of the IDF

 

(H.C. 5975/92)

Centre for the Protection of the Individual & Others

v.

Commander of the IDF in the West Bank & Others

 

(H.C. 5976/92)

Leah Tsemel & Others

v

Commander of the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza

 

 (H.C. 6023/92)

Abed El Wahab Darawashe, M.K.

v

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence & the Other

 

(H.C. 6114/92)

Ahmad Muhammed Nimer Husein and Another

v.

Commander of the IDF in the Gaza Strip

 

(H.C. 6170/92)

S. Porath

v.

Government of Israel

 

(H.C. 6263/92)

Naftali Gur Arie

v.

Government of Israel and others

 

(H.C. 6298/92)

Darawish Nasser and another

v.

The Commander of the Central Command and another.

 

(H.C. 29/93)

Ibrahim Said Abu Salem and others

v.

Minister of Defence

 

(H.C. 32/93)

Na'ama Husein Elabori

v.

Minister of Defence and another

 

(H.C. 97/93)

Majhad Hamed Kadir & Others

v.

Minister of Defence and another

 

(H.C. 107/93)

Fares Mahmud Abu Muamar

v.

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and another

 

 

 

In The Supreme Court Sitting as a High Court of Justice

[28 January 1993]

Shamgar P., Elon D.P., Barak, Netanyahu, Goldberg, Or and Mazza JJ.

 

Editor's Summary

 

            Following a number of brutal acts of kidnapping and murder committed by the Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorist organisations is December, 1992, it was decided by the Government of Israel to empower the military commanders of Judea and Samaria and of the Gaza Strip to issue orders for the temporary deportation of the leaders of these two terrorist organisations who had taken part in organising and supporting acts of terror, for a period not exceeding two years. The two commanders thereupon issued (general) temporary provisions under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 (from the time of the British Mandate but still in force in the territories) allowing for individual temporary deportation orders to be carried out immediately after being issued. An appeal committee was also set up, which would, however, hear appeals only after the deportation had already taken place. Altogether, 400 persons were deported to Lebanon under the deportation orders.

           

            The defence authorities (the respondents) submitted that the deportation orders were lawfully carried out even though the deportees were not given an opportunity to bring an appeal and have it heard prior to deportation, since pressing emergency conditions required the deportation to be carried out without any delay. Moreover, they argued, prior hearing could be dispensed with, since the general deportation orders made express legislative provision in that respect. Alternatively, case law of the High Court recognises emergency situations where even an inherent right like the right to hearing will not be enforced.

 

            The petitioners argued that the deportation orders were void, both because the general order itself was void ab initio, in particular owing to lack of sufficient legal basis for denying deportees a prior right of hearing, and also owing to defects in the individual orders. Moreover, they submitted that the deportation was contrary to international law since the 4th Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to Protection of Civilians in Wartime prohibits deportation in general and mass deportation in particular. It was also contrary to Israeli administrative law which grants the right to a hearing prior to deportation.

           

            An additional argument of the petitioners was that an appeal committee was not set up prior to the deportation, and that was an additional reason for invalidating the orders. The argument was rejected outright by the Court, since a committee was indeed in existence prior to the deportation (under regulations l l l and 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

           

            The Supreme Court held as follows:

           

I.      The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 including Regulation l l 2 dealing with deportation is in force in Judea and Samaria, and in Gaza. Its continued force was derived first from Jordanian law and subsequently from legislation enacted by the Israeli military administration.

 

2.     According to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, there must be sufficient evidence to support the deportation in each individual case. This requirement has been fulfilled.

 

3.     Regulation 112(8) of the above Regulations provides that the advisory committee set up to hear appeals against administrative detention also has jurisdiction to examine deportation orders if so requested by a deportee. That Regulation does not, however, specify whether the appeal is to be heard before or after the deportation is carried out. A reasonable interpretation would be that the right of appeal under Regulation 112(8) should be exercised prior to deportation. However, denial of a right to a prior hearing does not necessarily lead to invalidation of the deportation orders. The correct remedy would be to allow a hearing to take place after the deportation under the same conditions as would have prevailed if it had taken place prior to the deportation.

 

4.     The High Court of Justice will examine the legality of any act of the military government in accordance with the principles of Israeli administrative law. Those principles require grant of the right of hearing, and as far as possible the hearing, so as to be fair and effective, should be held in the presence of the person concerned (in this case, the deportee). Allowing such person to appear in person, and not just by his representative, may have prevented cases of mistaken identity or other errors of which there were a number in the present matter.

 

5.     In exceptional circumstances, the rule allowing for the right to a prior hearing can be departed from, where security needs justify such departure. However, in the present case, it is not necessary to consider whether such exceptional circumstances exist, since the rule laid down in earlier case law applies here, whereby even where there has been no prior hearing, a hearing should be held subsequent to deportation, and this should afford the deportee the opportunity to put forward his case in detail; in any event, lack of a prior hearing does not invalidate the individual deportation orders.

 

6.     The general temporary provision orders where invalid insofar as they sought in general to replace existing principles of natural justice which require a prior hearing to take place before carrying out deportation orders, without relating to specific exceptional cases.

 

7.         The Court concluded as follows:

a)     Lack of prior hearing did not invalidate the individual deportation orders. The Court ordered the right of hearing to be granted following the deportation.

b)     The "provisional" (general) deportations order was invalid, for reasons stated, but this did not invalidate the individual orders.

c)     Submissions regarding invalidity of individual deportation orders were to be considered by the advisory committee within the scope of the (subsequent) appeals.

 

 

Israel Supreme Court Cases Cited:

 

[1]       H.C. 513, 514/85 Nazal v. Commander of IDF in Judea and Samaria, 39(3) P.D. 145.

[2]   Elections Appeal 1/65 Yarador v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee, 19(3) P.D. 365.

[3]       H.C. 680/88 Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 42(4) P.D. 617.

[4]   H.C. 1361, 1378/91 Maslam v. Commander of IDF Gaza Strip; Abu Judian v. Minister of Defence, 45(3) P.D. 444.

[5J       H.C. 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence, 35(3) P.D. 113.

[6]       H.C. 672/88 Lavdi v. Commander of IDF West Bank, 43(2) P.D. 227.

[7]       H.C. 7/48 Karabutli v. Minister of Defence 2 P.D. 5.

[8]       H.C. 25/52 Al Galil v. Minister of interior 6 P.D. 110.

[9]       H.C. 240/51 Al Rahman v. Minister of interior 6 P.D. 364.

[10]     H.C. 174/52 Abu Dahud v. Governor of Acre Jail, 6 P.D. 897.

[11]     8/52 Badar v. Minister of interior, 7 P.D. 366.

[12]     H.C. 3/58 Berman v. Minister of lnterior, 12 P.D. 1493.

[13]     H.C. 290/65 Altagar v. Mayor of Ramat Gan, 20(1) P.D. 29.

[14]     H.C. 654/78 Gingold v. National Labour Court, 35(2) P.D. 649.

[15] Cr. A. 768/ 80 Shapira and Co. Netanya Contractors Ltd v. State of Israel, 36(1) P.D. 337.

[16] H.C. 4112/90 Israel Association for Civil Rights v. Commander of Southern Command, 44(4) P.D. 529.

[17] Misc. App. H.C. 497/88 (H.C. 765/88) Shachshir v. IDF Commander West Bank, 43(1) P.D. 529.

[18] H.C. 69/81 Abu Ita v. Commander of Judea and Samaria Region; Kanzil v. Customs Commissioner Gaza Region Command, 37(2) P.D. 192.

[19] H.C. 358/88 Israel Association for Civil Rights v. Commander of Central Command, 43(2) P.D. 529.

[20] H.C. 531/79 "Likud" Faction in Petach Tikva Municipality v. Petach Tikvah Municipal Council, 34(2) P.D. 566.

[21]     H.C. 549/75 Noah Films Ltd v. Films Censorship Board, 30(1) P.D. 757.

 

 

English Case Cited:

[22]     R. v. Secretary of State for Home Dept. ex parte Hosen Ball [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766.

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[A]      Genesis Ch. 3, vv. 1-2, Ch. 4, vv. 9-10, Ch. 18, v. 21.

[B]       Deuteronomy Ch. l, v. 16.

[C]       Response of Harama (Rabbi Moshe Isserles) 108.

 

On Behalf of the Petitioner in H.C. 5973/92:

Adv. J. Shoffman; Adv. D. Brixman

On Behalf of the Petitioners in H.C. 5974/92; 5975/92;

and Respondents No. 5

Adv. A. Feldman; Adv. E. Rosenthal; Adv. L. Tsemel

in 14C 6263/92

On Behalf of the Petitioners in H.C. 6023/92; 107/93:

Adv. E. Dekoar

On Behalf of the Petitoner in H.C. 6114/92:

Adv. E. Riadh

On Behalf of the Petitioner in H.C. 6298/92, 32, 97/93:

Adv. D. Nassar

On Behalf of the Petitioners in 29/93:

Adv. G. Bolos

On Behalf of Respondents 34 in H.C. 6263/92:

U. Slonim

On Behalf of the Respondents:

Adv. J. Harish, The Attorney-General

Adv. N. Arad, Director of the High Court of Justice Department

The State Athority's Office

In the Supreme Court Sitting as High Court of Justice

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Introduction

 

            1. (a) These petitions and the applications accompanying them relate to the deportation to Lebanon on 17th December 1992 of 415 residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, in respect of whom, according to governmental authorities, information has been assembled to the effect that they are active in the Hamas or Islamic Jihad organisations.

           

            According to Respondents' reply, only those whose activities reached, or exceeded, the level of responsibility for local administration (including training, operations and incitement) have been deported, and not those who were engaged merely in disturbing the peace, distributing leaflets or writing slogans.

 

            (b) Relatives of the late Nissim Toledano and Iris Azoulai, who were victims of the above organisations, and the Victims of Terror Association joined the proceedings as respondents, requesting that the steps taken by the State remain in Force. The family of the missing soldier Yehuda Katz also joined the proceedings as petitioner and applied for the Government to declare its willingness to include an exchange of Israeli missing in Lebanon for the persons expelled. Adv. Shai Porath also joined the petitions, claiming that the Government was not competent to refuse on 25th December 1992, the request of the International Red Cross to transfer aid and supplies to the deportees at the place they are staying in Lebanon.

           

            We would explain our position in respect of these additional petitions at the outset:

           

            (1) Insofar as relates to the petitions of the Toledano and Azoulay families and the Association of Victims of Terror Association, their positions are the same as that of the State, and therefore everything stated by us in this context below will also apply to those petitions.

           

            (2) As the Attorney-General has declared before us, the application of the Katz family is being considered by the Government and we did not consider that at this stage we can go beyond that.

           

            (3) We were dubious as regards the legal basis of Adv. Porath's petition; however, it has meanwhile become apparent that the question of medical aid for the deportees is in any event amongst those matters which the Government is at present taking up with the International Red Cross, and at this stage, therefore, considera­tion of the said additional petition has become superfluous.

           

            2. Our statements will be divided into the following sections:

           

            (a) Factual background, including a description of the Hamas organisation and the Islamic Jihad organisation.

           

            (b) The expulsion orders which were made and the legal basis for the expulsion orders according to the Respondents.

           

            (c) The Petitioners' arguments.

           

            (d) Conclusion on the legality of the expulsion.

 

The Hamas and the Islamic Jihad

 

            3. (a) On 13th December 1992 the Hamas carried out a brutal kidnapping and murder of the late Nissim Toledano. The same week, the said organisation caused another five deaths, the climax of acts of murder which had preceded them. Acts of kidnapping and murder expressed the central and dominant objective of the said organisation, and of the Islamic Jihad organisation and its factions, to bring about the liquidation of the State of Israel through Jihad (a holy war). Those organisations have in recent years been responsible for the murder or wounding, by stabbing, axes, strangulation or shooting, of civilians and soldiers who have fallen in the path of the perpetrators; amongst the victims are a 15 year old girl and old people of 70 years and more. These organisations have also murdered many tens of Arab residents of the occupied territories who, according to them, were suspected of having contact with Israeli entities or of disloyalty to the personal norms of conduct which bound them according to the said organisations' philosophy.

           

            (b) According to an expert's opinion which has been submitted to us, based to a great extent on the manifest publications of these organisations, i.e. statements quoted from them, the Hamas is a secret organisation which combines the most extreme Islamic fundamentalism with absolute opposition to any arrangement with Israel or recognition of it and preaches the destruction of the State of Israel ("Israel will arise and exist until Islam wipes it out, just as it wiped out its predecessors" - quoted from the Hamas Covenant).

           

            The object of the organisation is the reinstatement of an Islamic state in the whole area of Palestine "from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River" ("the Hamas believes that the Land of Palestine in a Muslim trust until the end of time. Neither it nor any part of it can be surrendered... This is the principle of the Islamic Sharia (Islamic law) and holds good as regards any country conquered by force by the Muslims" - quoted from the third chapter of the Hamas Covenant dated 18th August 1988). Holy War (Jihad), in the form of armed struggle, including murder, is the sole and immediate means to achieve the said goal; any accomodation with an Israeli entity amounts to surrender of the principles of the Islamic religion.

 

            In its propaganda the organisation relies on local religious personalities who add religious decisions and interpretations as a conceptual foundation and as religious legitimation for acts of terror. Its adherents include members of the free professions who guide the organisation's activites and arrange for the supply of resources necessary for its activities. The organisation is aided by front organisations which serve as sources for mobilising manpower and for camouflaging covert action (transfer of funds, etc.).

           

            The acts of murder and terror are in a constant process of escalation, and for taitous kidnapping for the purpose of murder, as already mentioned, is outstanding feature of the organisation's activities.

           

            The main objectives of the organisation emerge from its proclamations. In Proclamation 91 of 5th October 1992 it was said, inter alia:

           

"Hamas calls upon the masses of our Arab and Islamic people to clarify their position: rejection of the device of autonomy and rejection of the normalisation of relations with the Zionist enemy. Hamas demands that the leadership of the PLO and of all Arab countries concerned in the negotiations with the Zionist enemy withdraw from the negotiations and stand alongside the Palestinian people in its Jihad against subjugation.

 

            Hamas congratulates the brave Halal As Eladin Elkassem Brigade for their success in attacks in Gaza and Jerusalem against soldiers of the Zionist occupier and calls for more heroic attacks".

 

            In Proclamation 93 of 5th December 1992, the following passage appears:

 

"Only iron will rout iron and only the strong will overcome the weak, a firm decision is a firm decision and Jihad is Jihad until Allah proclaims victory.

 

Your movement, the Hamas, renews its promise to continue the Jihad, despite the surrender of the docile or the violence of the occupiers and calls as follows:

 

(a) On the foreign level:

Hamas stresses its demand that the Arab countries participating in the negotiating process, withdraw from it and not respond to the demands of the Zionist enemy to halt the economic boycott and normalise relations with it".

 

            The Proclamation of 14th December 1992, following the kidnapping and murder of the Late Nissim Toledano, included the following:

           

"We emphasise that the Jihad and the death of the martyrs which Hamas has adopted as a method and strategy is the only means for the liberation of Palestine, and it is this alone which will bring about the collapse of our enemy and shatter his arrogance. We have promised Allah to continue our jihad, to escalate it, develop it and constantly surprise the enemy by our sacred military activites. We call upon our brethren in all the Palestinian (Islamic and national) factions to escalate the activities of the Jihad and concentrate all our people's potential in the front which is fighting the enemy and to turn our pillaged land into a volcano which will destroy the conquering invaders by fire.

 

The capture of the officer is in the context of the state of war between Palestine, our people and our brigades and the Zionist enemy, and it was not the first act, as our people is well aware - and will not be the last - with the help of the Almighty". (Emphasis in the original)

 

            Expression of the spiritual image of the Hamas activists can also be seen from the congratulatory statements about the murder at the end of December of the Lage Haim Nahmani, which were made by the chief spokesman of the deportees, Dr. Elaziz Rantisi, on 4th January 1993.

           

            (c) The Islamic jihad movement, with all its factions, is no different in its character and objects. It emerges from the statements of its leaders and its publications that this movement views the "Zionist Jewish entity" embodied in the State of Israel as a prime enemy and advocates immediate action to liquidate it, this movement too has given expression to its ambitions in dozens of acts of murder and terror.

           

The Deportation Orders

 

            4. (a) Against the background of increasing Hamas activity in the first weeks of December 1992, the Government, on 16th December 1992, decided as follows:

           

"456. Security matters

 

In the Ministerial Committee for National Security Matters, authority is given to make emergency regula­tions for the issue of immediate deportation orders for the expulsion of persons inciting acts of terror and it is decided (by a majority, one abstention) as follows:

 

            (a) In view of the existence of a state of emergency and in order to safeguard public security - to instruct the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to order and empower the military commanders of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to issue orders in accordance with vital, immediate security needs relating to the temporary deportation, without prior notice, for the purpose of deporting inciters, of those of the residents of the territory who are, by their action, endangering human life or inciting such action, for such period as determined by the military commanders, but not exceeding two years.

 

            (b) Any person departed as aforesaid may, within 60 days, appeal against his deportation to a special committee through a member of this family or his advocate in accordance with rules to be laid down in the orders".

           

            Following the said decision, the Commander of Central Command, who is also Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, and the Commander of Southern Command, who is also Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, published provisional orders relating to the Temporary Deportation (Temporary Provision) (Judea and Samaria Region) (No. 138l) Order, 1992 and the Temporary Deportation (Temporary Pro­duction) (Gaza' Strip Region) (No. 1986), 1992. The wording of the order in respect of Judea and Samaria is set out below:

           

"The Israel Defence Forces

           

Order for Temporary Deportation (Temporary Provision)

 

By virtue of my power as Commander of the IDF Forces, having been satisfied due to the special circumstances presently existing in the territory, that decisive security reasons so require, I hereby order, as a temporary provision, as follows:

 

Definitions

 

1. In this Order -

 

'regulations' means the Defence (Emergency) Regula­tions, 1945;

 

 'temporary deportation order' means an order pursuant to Regulation 112(1) of the Regulations, the force of which is limited to a period not exceeding two years.

 

Implementation of temporary deportation order

 

2. A temporary deportation order may be carried out immediately after it is issued.

 

Appeals committee

 

3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Regulation 112(8) of the Regulations, appeal committees shall be established for the purpose of this Order whose members shall be appointed by me or by person empowered by me.

 

(b) A legally qualified judge of a military court shall serve as chairman of an appeal committee.

 

(c) An appeal committee shall have power to hear an appeal brought before it and may approve the temporary deportation order, revoke it or reduce the period specified therein.

 

Appeals

 

4. (a) An appeal against a temporary deportation order may only be made to the appeal committee within 60 days of the temporary deportation order being issued.

 

(b) The deliberations of the appeal committee shall be conducted in camera.

 

(c) Where the temporary deportation order has been carried out, the appeal committee shall consider the appeal in the absence of the deportee.

 

(d) The deportee shall be entitled to be represented before the appeal committee by an advocate or a relative.

 

5. (a) This Order shall commence on the date of its signature.

 

(b) This Order shall remain in force until other provision

is made by me.

 

6. This Order shall be referred to as the Temporary Deportation (Temporary Provision) (Judea and Samaria Region) Order (No. 138 l), 1992.

16th December 1992.

 

Danny Yatom, Brigadier

Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria"

 

 

            The wording of the order in respect of the Gaza Strip is similar, with some insignificant modifications, to the order published for Judea and Samaria.

           

            (b) The said order relating to temporary expulsion is based on the provision of Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which were made by the British Mandatory Government and are still part of domestic law in the said territories.

           

            The relevant provisions of Regulation 112 as aforesaid provide as follows:

           

"Deportation

           

112. (l) The Commander of the Israel Defense Forces in the territory shall be empowered to make an order under his hand hereinafter referred to in these Regulations as a deportation order) for the deportation of any person from the occupied territory. Any person in respect of whom a deportation order is made shall remain outside the occupied territory so long as the order is in force.

 

(8) Any advisory committee appointed under the provision of sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 111, if so requested by any person in respect of whom a deportation order is made under these Regulations, is empowered to deliberate and make recommendations to the commander of the territory in connection with the deportation order".

 

            There has been no dispute before us that the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, including the said Regulation 112, are part of the domestic law in force in each of the said occupied territories (as regards Judea and Samaria, see also the summary of the legislative history in H.C. 513/85 [l] Nazal v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, (hereafter - the Nazal case) [l]. In the Gaza Strip, the British Mandatory law still applies in full, so that Regulation 112 is included therein.

           

            (c) From the above quotation, it emerges that the temporary deportation order referred to the special circumstances which had arisen and to the decisive security reasons, and it provided the following main arrangements:

           

            (1) The force of the temporary deportation is for two years at the most.

           

            (2) The temporary deportation order under Regulation 112 of the said Regulations can be carried out on the spot, namely immediately after its issue.

           

            (3) The right to a hearing would only be available after the deportation is carried out, i.e., it would be possible to submit an appeal for up to 60 days from the date of issue of the order. The 60 day limitation was revoked in an amendment of 13th January 1993.

           

            (4) The appeal committee for the purposes of such an appeal would have power to make a binding decision, not merely a recommendation.

           

            (5) The appeal would be heard in the absence of the deportee, who could be represented by an advocate or relative.

           

            (d) Following on the orders, the commanders actually exercised the power vested in them, as follows:

           

            In Judea and Samaria, 284 deportation orders were issued, of which 39 were for a period of 18 months and the rest for a period of 24 months. In the Gaza Strip, 202 orders were issued, of which 100 were for a period of 18 months and the rest for a period of 24 months. Of the said total number, 78 were subsequently with­drawn, but orders were added, to the effect that altogether 415 persons were expelled.

           

            On 16th December 1992 the deportation began. It was temporarily stayed following on the first petitions, by interim orders of this court, which were set aside on 17th December 1992 together with the issue of the orders nisi.

           

            (e) The criterion applied by the military authority which decided to carry out the deportation was an individual one; namely, the selection was personal, based on the information regarding each of the candidates for deportation. As stated in the State's written reply submitted to us:

           

"49. Those involved are individuals, some of whom took part in the organisation and support of acts of violence or in the guidance, incitement or preaching of such acts. The others assisted the activites of the said organisations in the sphere of ecomomic or organisational infrastructure, the mobilisation of personnel, the raising and distribution of funds and also in the wording of proclamations and organising their circulation. "

 

            (f) after the deportation, it transpired that the deportees included, in error, six people against whom an order had not been made, another person in respect of whom of identity an error had been made and nine persons under legal process or persons against whom court proceedings were being conducted, whom it was not intended to expel without first exhausting the legal proceedings already being taken.

 

            The Government announced its willingness to return the said persons, and 14 of them who agreed thereto have already been returned.

           

The Respondents' Position

 

5. The position of the Respondents is that a deportation order may be duly carried out pursuant to the emergency provisions without allowing an opportunity to submit an appeal prior thereto, pursuant to Regulation 112(8) quoted above, because -

 

            (a) in practical terms there is a necessity, namely there are pressing emergency conditions which required deportation; and

           

            (b) in legal terms, in such circumstances, the prior hearing of an appeal could be dispensed with, because the orders of the commanders laid down an express legislative provision on this issue permitting expulsion without prior hearing; in the alternative, the law of the State of Israel, as expressed in the precedents of this Court, also recognises exceptions which, in extreme security circumstances, permit departure from the observance of an inherent right, including that of a hearing. In this context the Respondents referred inter alia to the judgment of President Agranat and of Judge Sussman in E.A. 1/65 (Yarador v. Chairman of the Sixth Knesset Central Elections Committee, [2] and to the judgment in H.C. 680/88 (Schnitzer v. The Chief Military Censor, [3], at 630, opposite the letter B).

           

The Petitioners' Arguments

 

            6. (a) The central argument of the Petitioners is that the deportation orders are void for a dual reason, both because the empowering order (namely the Temporary Provisions Order) is void ab initio and because of various defects which occurred in the course of issuing the individual orders.

           

            With regard to the first reason, the Petitioners referred in particular to alleyed absence, of a sufficient legal basis for denying the deportee the right of prior hearing, so as to allow him to raise his objections to the deportation, before it takes place, before a committee operating under Regulation 112(8) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, and if he so desires thereafter also before the High Court of Justice (according to the limits delineated in that respect by this Court in H.C. 1361/1378/91 Mesalem v. The Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza Strip, Abu Judian v. Minister of Defence [4] at 453, opposite the letter F).

 

            (b) The act of deportation is contrary to both public international law and to Israeli administrative law, jointly and severally:

           

            (1) Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relate to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War prohibits expulsion generally and mass expulsion in particular.

           

            (2) Israeli law grants the right to a hearing before deportation (H.C. 320/90, Kawasme v. Minister of Defence, H.C. 672/88, (hereafter, the Kawasme case) [5], Lavadi v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, [6] at 235,. and H.C.A. 454/88, quoted therein). This right, which is laid down in Israeli law, should not be denied by security legislation in occupied territory.

           

            (c) Following H.C. 7/48 (EI Karbutli v. Minister of Defence, (hereafter, the Karbutli case) [1] it was pleaded by the Petitioners that the deportation orders are void on a further ground, namely that the committees under the Temporary Provisions Order were only set up after the deportation, i.e. they did not exist before the deportation was carried out.

           

            We should point out already at this stage that we cannot accept this last argument. As we shall specify below, the right to apply for a hearing (or appeal) is based on the provisions of Regulation 112 as aforesaid. Sub-regulation (8) thereof, which the Petitioners continue to view as the determining provision as to the appeal, refers to the committees set up under Regulation 111(4), which have been in existence time, including the date that the order was carried out.

 

The Legal Conclusions

 

            7. The following are the matters requiring examination.

           

            (a) The validity of Regulation 112 of the said Regulations as part of domestic law.

           

            (b) When may Regulation 112 be implemented.

           

            (c) The right of hearing pursuant to that regulation.

           

            (d) The exceptions to the right of hearing and the validity of the temporary provisions.

           

            (e) The validity of the deportation orders.

           

            (f) The implementation of the right of hearing.

           

            8. Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which deals with deportation, is a legal provision of law valid in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, since it is part of the law applicable in the region ("the laws in force in the country", in the words of Regulation 43 in the Aurex to the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare). The continued force of the Regulation, which was made during the British Mandate, originally derived from the provisions of Jordanian law, and since the entry of the IDF Forces it has a similar derived from the Law and Administration Proclamation (No. 2), 1967 and Proclamation of the same year related to the Gaza Strip (see also H.C. 1361-1378/91, [4], at p. 455). The implementation of Regulation 112 as domestic law is, since the entry of the IDF Forces, with the power and authority of the regional commander.

 

            The orders which were made in the present case were based on specific information in respect of each deportee, namely on individual considerations which, according to the Respondents, indicated the existence of a basis in respect of each single one of the deportees. This means that there was no collective order but a set of personal orders, each of which exists independently, and meets the requirements of Regulation 108 of the said Regulations, which is discussed below.

 

            9. The arguments addressed to us did not justify a departure from the legal conclusion that the discretion standing behind the implementation of Regulation 112 was based on considerations contained in Regulation 108 of the said Defence Regulations (as stated therein, "if it is necessary or effectual to grant the order for the security of the public, the defence of the State of Israel, the maintenance of public order or the suppression of uprising, rebellion or riots"), provided that the individual data relating to a deportee, as presented to the Commander of the IDF Forces before making the order, give foundation for such an act. The evidence relating to each deportee should be clear, unequivocal and persuasive, see the Nazal case [1], at 655).

           

            10. (a) Regulation 112(8) lays down as aforesaid that a consultative committee, appointed under Regulation 111(4) for the purposes of hearing appeals against an administrative detention order, is empowered to examine and make recommendations in connection with a deportation order if so requested by a person in respect of whom such an order has been made.

           

            The said Regulation does not specify whether the hearing of the appeal should be held before or after the deportation is carried out. The British Mandatory authorities which made the Regula­tions believed, as emerges from the way in which the Regulation was implemented, that there is no duty to hear an appeal before the deportation order is carried out, and the then consultative committee heard appeals (when too, in the absence of the deportee) only after the deportation order had been carried out. The committee under Regulation 112(8) was the same committee which acted under Regulation 111(4) and, just as it heard appeals after detention rather than before it, so it also heard appeals against deportation after, rather than before, its implementation.

           

            As can be learnt and inferred from the case law of the early years of the State, then too it was not the practice to grant the right of hearing, in the event of an appeal, prior to eassying out a deportation order (this is for example implied from H.C. 25/52, Jalil v. The Minister of the Interior, [8]; H.C. 240/51, Ta Alrahman v. Minister of the Interior, [9]; H.C. 174/52, Abu-Dahud v. Superintendent of Acre Prison, [10]; H.C. 8/52, Badar v. Minister of the Interior, [11].

 

            However, the developments which have occurred in consti­tutional and administrative law in recent decades have conferred on the right of hearing as a rule - including the right to appeal to the consultative committee under Regulation 112(8) which takes place in advance - the status of an established rule, and an essential means for the prior examination of the justification for the Commander to make a deportation order. The courts have viewed the prior hearing in the field of administrative law as one of the rules of natural justice (H.C. 3/58, Berman v. Minister of the Interior, [12] at 1503; H.C. 290/65, Eliaar v. Mayor of Ramat Gan, [13] at 33; H.C. 654/78, Gingold v. National Labour Tribunal, [14] at 654; Cr. A. 768/80, Schapira v. State of Israel, [15] at 363); and as regards the right of prior hearing, it was stated in H.C. 4112/90, Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander of the Southern Command, [16] at 638, that -

           

"The source and foundation [of the right of hearing] is in Jewish tradition, and the sages of Israel ancient saw it the ancient right of humanity" (Genesis, Chapter 3, Verses 11-12; Chapter 4, Verses 9-10 [a] 18, 21; Deuteronomy, Chapter 1, Verse [B] 16); and further on [16] on page 638 it is stated:

 

            As regards the present case, it was stated in H.C.A. 497/88 (H.C. 265/88) (Shakshir v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, [17] at 537

           

"In Aware of the grave and far-reaching determent occasioned to the person concerned by reason of an order expelling him from is place of residence, the legislature has laid down a special procedure, which is not known in criminal law, through Regulations 111(4) and 112(8) of the Defence Regulations, according to which a consultative committee, headed by a lawyer, was established, amongst its powers being to examine all the information existing against the deportee 18 including all evidence, whether unrestigated privileged, in the posession of the Defense authorities. This committee gives the deportee an opportunity to submit to it his evidence and arguments and it must also allow him to call other witnesses on his behalf, if those witnesses might affect the result of the hearing. After examining the evidence and hearing the arguments of the parties or their attorneys, the consultative committee makes its recommendation to the Military Commander as regards the outcome of the relevant order... if the Commander decides, after receiving t he opinion of the consultative committee, not to cancel the deportation order and to insist upon its imple­mentation, it is open to the deportee submit a petition to the High Court of Justice".

 

            (c) The legal interpretation according to which Regulation 112(8) grants a right of appeal before implementation of the deportation was considered at length in the Kawasme case [5].

           

            The Kawasme case [5] involved the deportation of the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Imam of the El Ibrahimi Mosque, Rajahb El-Tamimi, following the murder in Hebron of six Jews who, on 2nd May 1980, were returning from prayers at the Cave of Machpela. Immediately upon the deportation order being made by Brigadier-General Benjamin Ben Eliezer, the three were taken from their homes, supposedly for the purpose of talks with the regional commander. They were then told that they were going to meet the Minister of Defence and instead they were flown by helicopter to the Lebanese border and there expelled over the border. Their spouses petitioned this Court against the validity of the deportation order.

           

            An order nisi was issued pursuant to which the authorities were required to show cause "why the deportation orders should not be set aside... since they (the deportees) had not been given a fair opportunity to state their objections to the deportation orders for consideration by the committee mentioned in Regulation 112(8)... and were not allowed to appear before that committee before the expulsions were implemented.

           

            In the Kawasme case the State Attorney explained in his arguments that those responsible for the deportation knew that the law prescribed with regard to Regulation 112(8), although they had decided, without consultation with legal authorities, to implement the deportation forthwith without service of an order or notice of its contents, because "a situation had arisen which obliged the immediate deportation of the said three leaders in order to prevent a dangerous escalation in the security situation in the region". The State representation also stated in court, after deportation had been carried out, that it would be willing to hold a hearing before an appeal committee.

           

            President Landau held that, according to the rules of natural justice and in view of the wording of Regulation 112(8), the reasonable meaning of the Regulation was that there is a duty to grant an opportunity of applying to the committee immediately after the deportation order is made and before it is carried out. After the deportation has been carried out a new situation arises, when the deportee is already over the border and he is thereby deprived of his ability to object to the order and put his case to the committee.

           

            This was also how the Regulation was understood - as emerged from the Minister of Defence's reply - in another case, being that of the deportation order in respect of Bassam Shaka, the mayor of Nablus. In the words of President Landau, "even if it had been most desirable in the eyes of the respondents, for pressing reasons of security, that the deportation be implemented without any delay, that did not justify their disregard... of the necessity to observe the law" (ibid., p. 119).

           

            Nevertheless, President Landau did not see fit to set aside the deportation order. The consultative committee was already in existence at the time of the deportation and it was therefore not appropriate to conclude that the order was void on the ground that this Court applied in the case of Karbulti (ibid., H.C. 7/48), in which a detention order was revoked because a committee under Regulation 111(4) did not exist at the time the detention was carried out.

           

            In President Landau's opinion, the main point is that denial of the right to apply to the committee prior to deportation require does not retroactive revocation of the order, but the correct remedy for the wrong is reinstatement, namely placing the petitioners in the situation in which they would have been had they not been deprived of the right to apply to the committee. In view of the evidence of open incitement against the State by the Imam El Tamimi, the court did not find it appropriate to extend relief to that deportee, whereas in respect of the other two (Kawasme and Milchem), a majority of the judges (the President and Judge Yitzhak Kahan) decided, as President Landau said, after much soul-searching, that a recommendation should be made to allow those two to appear before the committee after the event. Judge Yitzhak Kahan, as mentioned, agreed with the result which President Landau reached, but added that although Regulation 112(8) does not contain express provision that an appeal to the committee should be allowed before deportation, in his opinion the rule is that generally a person should be allowed to appeal to the consultative committee before the order is implemented. This rule is not founded on statute, but on principles laid down by the courts which oblige every authority to act fairly. Denial of the right to apply to the committee is similar to denying a person's right to a fair hearing. However, according to him, there could be emergency situations in which the right of hearing must bow to a contrary vital interest, which should be given priority. We shall discuss this below.

           

            Judge Haim Cohen, dissenting, believed that the order should be made absolute, since the expulsion orders should be viewed as void in view of the manner in which the deportation had been dealt with.

           

            The court, therefore, by a majority, decided to discharge the order nisi, namely to dismiss the petition, making the following recommendation:

 

 "...that if the committee (namely the consultative committee appointed under Regulation 111(4) of the 945 Regulations) finds that the content of the first and second petitioners' application to it, if made, is prima facie relevant and that it contains a clear position on the part of the petitioners whereby they intend to observe the laws of the military administration in their activities as public personalities and it also contains unequivocal reference to the statements of incitement published in their name in the media - then in the next stage the petitioners should be allowed to appear personally before the committee to allow it to gain an impression of their oral explanations, in the manner which should have been adopted initially" (ibid., pp.124- 125).

 

            The two deported mayors indeed applied to the committee through the Red Cross in affidavits which met the requirements. Following this, they were returned for the hearing via Allenby Bridge and were arrested on the spot. The consultative committee held its hearing by the Bridge. Petitioners' counsel appeared before it and their arguments were heard, and information was submitted on behalf of the Army about their activities. The committee heard the appeal and dismissed it, and the deportation order was upheld. The petitioners applied to this Court with a new petition which too was dismissed. The deportation order was then carried out once again.

           

            11. (a) In the present case, the Respondents have sought to modify the legal infrastructure by enacting the orders regarding the temporary provisions which expressly permit immediate expulsion, and allowing the possibility of applying to the consultative committee after the deportation.

           

            (b) We have explained in the past on more than one occasion that this Court will review the legality of an act of the military administration and the validity thereof in accordance with the principles of Israeli administrative law, in order to decide whether the norms binding an Israeli public officer have been observed (HC 69,493/81,) Abu Ita, v. Judea and Samaria Regional Commander, Kanzil v. Customs Commissioner, Gaza Region Command [18], at 231.

           

            It was stated there:

 

"So far as this Court is concerned, the officer is not generally regarded as having fulfilled his duty if he has performed that which is necessitated by the norms of international law, since more is required of him, as an Israeli authority, and he should also act in the sphere of military administration in accordance with the rules which delineate fair and proper administrative procedures. For example, the laws of war do not disclose any principle, whether established or at least formu­lated, according to which there is a duty to observe the right of hearing, but an Israeli authority will not fulfil its duty... if it does not respect that duty in circum­stances where the right should be granted in accordance with our norms of administrative law".

 

            Israeli administrative law requires as aforesaid, the grant of a right of hearing, and we have already stated that the more serious and irrevocable the results of the Government decision, the more essential is it that the person affected be allowed to state his objections and give his answer to the allegations against him so as to try to refute them (see H.C. 358/ 88, Association for Civil Rights v. Commander of the Central Command, [19] at 540).

           

            (c) Moreover, hearing arguments from an intermediary rather than from the person concerned is inherently deficient in value and practicality. Statements made by counsel lose some of their force when the person making the statements on behalf of another cannot first meet with the person concerned in order to obtain from him information, guidance and instructions, and continue consulting with him routinely in respect of the factual allegations raised against him which are the basis of the hearing, and in respect of which his reply is sought, as he alone knows his exact case Personal appearance, before the committee of the person in respect of whom the deportation order is made, is the foundation and essence the right to a hearing.

           

            The cases of mistaken identity, and of selection of deportees which have been discovered in the matter before us after the event, have of course made more acute the conclusion as regards the importance of giving an opportunity to put forward a regiments directly before the committee. There is a possibility - if only theoretical - that there are other cases in which it could become apparent that there was a mistake in - or non-justification for - the deportation, if the person concerned appeared before the committee and stated his case.

 

            12. (a) The Respondents have put forward the argument that, according to the principles of administrative law, there are circumstances in which vital interests of state security prevail over the duty to hold a prior hearing, before carrying out the deportation order. In other words, in balancing these competing values, namely the right of hearing versus security needs and when the security circumstances are of special weight, the right to hearing should not be exercised in advance of carrying out the deportation but only subsequently, and the need to exercise the power immediately then constitutes an incontestable constraint. The State's argument was as follows:

           

"31. Moreover, the opinion of the security authorities was, and still is, that any attempt to carry out the deportation of hundreds of people according to the previous pattern (rather than by way of immediate expulsion), whilst the deportees were still in the territories, was likely to give rise to a very services wave of incitement and violence, aimed inter alia at creating pressure (both domestic and international) on the State of Israel to rescuid the intention to expel them.

 

32. In this context, it could also be appraised, on the basis of past experience, that such a wave of incitement was also likely to spread beying the Palestinian street into the detention centres and prisons in Israel, in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip".

 

            In order to lay the foundation for his argument of the existence, at times of a right to depart from the major principle of granting the right of prior hearing, the Attorney-General referred inter alia to H.C. 531/79 (The Likud Faction in Petach Tikva Municipality v. The Petach Tikva Municipal Council, [20] at 576), where it is stated:

 

"Principles of necessity or temporary constraints set aside the application of the rules of natural justice".

 

            Cr.A. 768/80 [15] was also mentioned, where it was held, an p. 365-366 of the report:

           

"There are cases where an administrative authority makes a decision without hearing the interested party and at the decision can be a valid one. This will happen when the interest which the decision protects in a specific case is of greater weight in the context of interests as a whole than the interest of the right to a hearing. Granted the importance of the principle of the right to a hearing, it should not be forgotten that it is only one of the generality of interests which have to be balanced and respected".

 

            In delineating the bounds of the said exception to the existence of the rule as to a hearing in purely operational matters, in the realm of security, it was said in H.C. 358/88 [19], at 546-561:

           

"There are indeed operational military circumstances in which judicial review is inconsistent with the place or time or with the nature of the circumstances; for example, when a military unit carries out an operation in the scope of which it must remove an obstacle or overcome opposition or respond on the spot to an attack on military forces or on civilians, and the operation is taking place at the time, or like circum­stances in which the competent military authority sees an operational need for immediate action. By the very nature of the matter, in such circumstances there is no room to delay the military operation which must be carried out on the spot".

 

In H.C. 4112/90 [16], (at p. 640): we went on to say on this issue

           

"Such circumstances existed in the case before us, where the Military Commander for a lengthy period tried many different measures until it became apparent to him that none of them could prevent an act of murder because of the narrow and winding streets of the location which did not allow the life of the victim to be safeguarded. This grave and uncontrollable situation in which human life is at risk obliges action on the spot to safeguard human life and immediately prevent the recurrence of such cases, as the Military Commander directed in the order. Among a right of argument in such circumstances, before implementing the order, involving a delay in taking action for the period necessary to hold the hearing in this Court, as described and requested in the petition, constitutes a substantial risk to human life and a real concern as to the frustration of the possibility of taking necessary action, as detailed in paragraph 7 of our judgment. In this example the supreme value of preserving human life takes priority over the value of a right to a hearing. This balance between these two values is the supreme value in our legal system".

 

            (b) The existence of the exception was also considered by Judge Yitzhak Kahan in his separate opinion in the Kawasme case [5]. He referred to the statement of Judge Witkon in H.C. 549/75 Noah Film Company v. Cinema Film Review Board, [21], at 760), according to which:

           

"There are of course situations in which the need to cancel a license or permit granted in error or without due consideration is so great and urgent that even if the rule of audi alteram partem was not complied with the court should hesitate to invalidate the decision for cancellation.

 

            Justice Yitzhak Kahan further stated:

 

"In the work of the learned author, H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, (Oxford, 4th ed., 1977, p. 451), the following was stated in this regard:

 

'Sometimes urgent action may have to be taken on ground of public health or safety, for example to seize and destroy bad meat exposed for sale or to order the removal to hospital of a person with an infectious disease. In such cases the normal presumption that a hearing must be given is rebutted by the circumstances of the case. So it is also, for obvious reasons, where the police have to act with urgency, e.g. in making arrests'.

           

            An example of a case in which - for reasons of safeguarding public security - the court in England justified infringing the rules of natural justice, can be found in the judgment in R. v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Honsenbal, (1977) [22]. In that case a deportation order was issued against an American journalist who had resided in England for a substantial period of time, and the Home Secretary refused to disclose all the details of the material in consequence of which the deportation order was made. In the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the petition was dismissed and the Court did not order the Minister to disclose details of the reasons for deportation. I am not sure that we would have adjudicated as the English Court of Appeal did in that case, but this instance does show that even in peaceful England, which does not face the danger of war, the court is willing to prefer a public interest of national security to the principles of natural justice. One may certainly do so when a state of emergency is involved which obliges immediate action. As the learned author J.F. Garner states in Administrative Law (London, 5th ed., 144 ( 1979):

 

'The full panoply of natural justice does not have to be observed in a case where this would be contrary to national security'.

           

            In the United States too it has been held on more than one occasion that the right to a hearing must give way in certain cases in states of emergency, when immediate action by the authority is necessary in order to safeguard important public interests. See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law (Boston - Toronto, 1976), The learned author states there inter alia the following at pages 210-211.

           

'In the emergency case, the emergency itself is complete justification for summary action. The right to be heard must give way to the need for immediate protection of the public.

 

The typical emergency case involves danger to public health or safety. But the emergency exception is not limited to health or safety cases."

 

            (c) In the Kawasme case [5] President Landau observed that if Regulation 112(8) could not be implemented in accordance with the said existing interpretation, thereof, the respondents in that case could have proposed revocation or modification of the Regulation by legislation (ibid., p. 120, opposite the letter E); so too according to Judge H. Cohen (ibid., p. 127, opposite the letter D). Obviously, those observations with regard to the possibility of legislation relate to circumstances in which it is sought to set aside the right of hearing for the purposes of defined exceptional cases, rather than legislation which revokes the right altogether.

           

            Justice Y. Kahan, on the other hand, believed that "the same source that imposes a prohibition may also revoke it", i.e., whoever initiated the right to a hearing as one to be observed ab initio, is also the one who can - by way of precedent rather than legislation - determine in what circumstances exceptions to the rule can be recognised.

           

            (d) The Respondents sought this time to refer in advance to the legislative option, and made the orders which are, as they are eatified, enactea "temporary provisions" permitting temporary deportation immediately after the issue of the order, the right of appeal being ancuitable only after the order is carried out. In our view the temporary provisions in the present case neither add nor subtract anything, whichever way one looks at it. If there is an exception to the right of a prior hearing, action can be taken in accordance with that exception and there is no need for a temporary provision; and if there is no exception to the right of hearing, the temporary provision is in any event invalid. As regards the question whether exceptions exist to the rules relating to the right to a hearing in deportation proceedings, as we have already stated, case law is to the effect that such exceptions do exist, and they are the result of the balance between the needs of security and the right to a hearing.

 

            We have not seen fit here to take a view on the question of whether an exception to the right of hearing existed in the circumstances herein, since we accept - according to the rule in the Kawasme case [5] (per Justice Landau and Y. Kahan) - that if there was no prior hearing, a subsequent hearing should be held, serving the object of giving an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case in detail, and the absence of a prior hearing does not per se invalidate the individual deportation orders.

           

            13. Is amending legislation in the present form valid, or, in other words, can the security legislation of a military commander determine that there was no legal duty to observe the right to a hearing before the deportation order was implemented?

           

            In view of the contents of paragraph 12 above, the question of the validity of the Temporary Provisions Order becomes devoid of practical legal meaning: the power to find that there is an exception in a specific concrete case, in which exigencies demand immediate action before granting the right to a hearing, is in any event inherent in the authority to exercise the power in respect whereof the right to a hearing is sought.

           

            However, so as to complete the picture, we shall also answer the question of the validity of general legislation, such as the Temporary Provision:

           

            If the Order purported to determine a new normative arrangement, without connection to or dependence on special concrete circumstances, the existence whereof must be examined in advance in any event, then it would be ultra vires the powers vested in the Military Commander. Security legislation cannot bring about the modification of general established norms of administrative law, which our legal system views as the fundamentals of natural justice. If the Temporary Provision sought to determine, as a rule, that henceforth any expulsion order can be implemented for a limited period without granting the right to a prior hearing, then does not grant legality to the said new arrangement. Only concrete exceptional circumstances can create a different balance between the conflicting rights and values, and such circumstances were not detailed in the wording of the Temporary Provisions. The Order laid down a general arrangement which will remain in force for so long as the Temporary Provision is in force. In other words, the Order laid down a limitation as regards the duration of the deportation, although it prescribed nothing in connection with defining the exceptional concrete circumstances in which the right of hearing can be restricted. It thereby sweepingly and in an overall way abrogated the right of hearing, and such power is not vested in the Military Commander.

 

            To conclude this point, since the Temporary Provisions sought to convert a valid general norm into another, without restriction or delineation for defined exceptional cases, the Temporary Provisions Order cannot be regarded as valid.

 

            As already explained, that is of no significance as regards the power to make deportation orders. The expulsion orders were expressly made on the basis of the provisions of Regulation 112(1) and in reliance on the powers vested pursuant thereto. The said Order relating to the Temporary Provisions did not create the power to make a deportation order but referred to Regulation 112. For the purpose of the case herein, it merely sought to determine arrangements with regard to the right of hearing; that and nothing more. We have found that the temporary provision is of no avail. The power to refrain from granting the right to a prior hearing is ancillary to the provisions of Regulation 112 in accordance with the explanation in paragraph 12 above, without the need for specific empowering legislation.

           

            We are therefore inherently brought back to the provisions of Regulation 112 in all its parts, including sub-regulation 112(8) thereof. This means that the power to make a deportation order exists and the hearing, by way of an appeal against the deportation order - which will take place after the order is carried out - should be conducted in accordance with Regulation 112(8), as interpreted by case law of this Court.

           

            14. The Petitioners have argued before us that the individual deportation orders are void by reason of defects in obtaining them, apart from the lack of a right of hearing. The Respondents have disputed this.

           

            We believe that in the present case the place for such arguments is before the consultative committee, to which the deportee may address his appeal. So long as the consultative committee has not otherwise decided, each individual order remains in force.

           

            15. The Respondents must now make practical arrangements for implementery the right of appearance before a consultative committee operating under Regulation 112(8) of the said Regula­tions in respect of anyone who so requests; that is to say, that if a written application is made by a deportee through the International Red Cross or otherwise, according to which the committee is asked to hear his appeal, then the applicant should be allowed to appear personally before the committee to enable it to obtain an impression of his oral explanations and to examine his case and the justification for performing the expulsion order in respect of him. Pending the appearance before the committee, he should also be allowed a personal meeting with counsel who asks to represent the deportee before the committee.

           

            The committee may hold its hearings at any place where the IDF can guarantee that they can properly take place.

           

            For the purpose of all the aforegoing, the Respondents must make practical arrangements, details of which should be decided by the authorities charged therewith. The commencement of such arrangements was described in the States' notice submitted to us on 25th January 1993, although they should be supplemented along the lines stated here.

           

            We have also taken note of the Attorney-General's notice of 25th January 1993, according to which further consideration of the security information concerning every deportee who files an appeal will be given within a reasonable time at the initiative of the Respondents.

           

            16. We shall conclude by referring to what was said by Judge Olshan (as he then was) in the Karbutli case [7], at p. 15:

           

"Whilst it is correct that the security of the State which necessitates a person's detention is no less important than the need to safeguard the citizen's right, where both objectives can be achieved together, neither one nor the other should be ignored".

 

            17. In conclusion, we have unanimously reached the following conclusions:

           

            (1) We find that as regards the personal expulsion orders, the absence of the right of prior hearing does not invalidate them. We order that the right of hearing should now be given as detailed above.

           

            (2) The order as to temporary deportation is void for the reason detailed in paragraphs 12(d) and 13 above. This conclusion does not invalidate the individual deportation orders.

           

            (3) The arguments against validity of the personal deportation orders, issued by virtue of Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 should, as aforesaid, be submitted to the consultative committee.

           

            Subject as aforesaid, we dismiss the petitions and discharge the orders nisi.

           

Given this 6th day of Shevat 5753 (28th January 1993).

Almandi v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3451/02
Date Decided: 
Thursday, May 2, 2002
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: This petition was submitted during IDF operations against the terrorist infrastructure in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. (“Operation Defensive Wall.”) It concerns the situation in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, in which armed Palestinians had fortified themselves. In the church compound there were also unarmed Palestinians civilians, as well as clergymen. The clergymen, who were not in the same part of the compound as the Palestinians, received food, though the Palestinians did not. Petitioners requested that food be allowed into the compound. They asserted that preventing food from entering the compound was a violation of international law. Respondents reply that they are not preventing the civilians from exiting the compound—indeed, they are encouraging them to do so—and assuring them that no harm shall befall them. In response, petitioners asserted that the armed Palestinians were preventing the civilians from exiting the compound, and that they only way to ensure that food reached the civilians was to allow food into the compound for all inside.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that Israel, finding itself in the middle of difficult battle against a furious wave of terrorism, is exercising its right of self defense under the Charter of the United Nations. This combat is being carried out according to the rules of international law, which provide principles and rules for combat activity. The Court found that, regarding the treatment of the armed Palestinians, the State had not violated international law. The problem was with the unarmed civilians inside the Church compound, those that were not connected to terror. The Court held that, in view of the reality in the compound, in which there was a well providing a certain amount of water, and food, even if it was only basic, and in view of the willingness of the respondents to provide extra food to the civilians even if they do not leave the compound, the respondents had fulfilled their obligation under international law.

 

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 3451/02

1.  Mohammed Almandi

2.  MK Ahmed Tibi

3.  MK Mohammed Barakeh

v.

1.  The Minister of Defense, Mr. Benjamin Ben-Eliezer

2.  The Chief Of Staff

3.  The Commander of the Central Command of the Israeli Defense Forces

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[April 25, 2002]

Before President A. Barak, Justices D. Beinisch, I. Englard

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: This petition was submitted during IDF operations against the terrorist infrastructure in the areas of the Palestinian Authority. (“Operation Defensive Wall.”) It concerns the situation in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, in which armed Palestinians had fortified themselves. In the church compound there were also unarmed Palestinians civilians, as well as clergymen. The clergymen, who were not in the same part of the compound as the Palestinians, received food, though the Palestinians did not. Petitioners requested that food be allowed into the compound. They asserted that preventing food from entering the compound was a violation of international law. Respondents reply that they are not preventing the civilians from exiting the compound—indeed, they are encouraging them to do so—and assuring them that no harm shall befall them. In response, petitioners asserted that the armed Palestinians were preventing the civilians from exiting the compound, and that they only way to ensure that food reached the civilians was to allow food into the compound for all inside.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that Israel, finding itself in the middle of difficult battle against a furious wave of terrorism, is exercising its right of self defense under the Charter of the United Nations. This combat is being carried out according to the rules of international law, which provide principles and rules for combat activity. The Court found that, regarding the treatment of the armed Palestinians, the State had not violated international law. The problem was with the unarmed civilians inside the Church compound, those that were not connected to terror. The Court held that, in view of the reality in the compound, in which there was a well providing a certain amount of water, and food, even if it was only basic, and in view of the willingness of the respondents to provide extra food to the civilians even if they do not leave the compound, the respondents had fulfilled their obligation under international law.

 

Treaties Cited:

The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12, 1949

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 3436/02 La Custodia Internazionale di Terra Santa v. Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[2]HCJ 168/91 Marcus v. The Minister of Defense IsrSC 45 (1) 467

[3]HCJ 3114/02 Barake  v. The Minister of Defense IsrSC 56(3) 11

[4]HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. The Minister of Defense IsrSC 35 (3) 113

 

Israeli Books Cited:

[5]Y. Dinstein, The Laws of War (1983)

 

For the petitioners—Saadi Usama

For the respondent—Yochi Jensin

 

 

Judgment

President A. Barak

 

1. On March 29, 2002, the government decided to carry out a military operation—“Operation Defensive Wall”—against the Palestinian terror infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. The goal of the operation was to prevent the recurrence of the terror attacks which have plagued Israel. In the context of this operation, IDF forces entered Bethlehem on April 14, 2002. As IDF forces entered Bethlehem, approximately thirty to forty wanted Palestinians terrorists list broke into the Church of the Nativity, shooting as they entered. According to information in the hands of the security services, these men are responsible for the murder of Israeli civilians. Scores of armed Palestinian security services personnel also burst into the church compound. In addition, a number of civilians, unarmed and unconnected to the others, also entered the church.  In total, approximately two hundred Palestinians entered the compound. The armed Palestinians positioned themselves in the Basilica of the church.

 

2. The IDF surrounded the church compound. Several times, the IDF requested of all Palestinians, especially of the ill requiring medical care, to exit the compound. The message was conveyed to those in the compound that those who were not involved in terror activity, and who were not wanted by Israel, could leave the compound and go free. Those who were wanted—and these constituted a minority of the armed persons in the compound—were given the options of either standing trial in Israel or leaving Israel and the areas of the Palestinian Authority.

 

3. Many of those who entered the compound of the Church of the Nativity have since left. Those who left the compound included the wounded and the ill. These were examined by a medical team which had been set up adjacent to the church compound, and were evacuated to hospitals when necessary. Two bodies of armed persons were taken out for burial.  In addition, a number of civilians, including nine youths, took advantage of the opportunity they were given and left the compound. 

 

4. Initially, there were approximately forty eight clergymen in the Church of the Nativity. They congregated outside the basilica, in several compounds. The IDF, of course, allowed all clergymen the opportunity to leave the compound. Seventeen of them left the church. Water and food is being inserted into the compound for the clergymen, as per their needs. See HCJ 3436/02 La Custodia Internazionale di Terra Santa v. Government of Israel (unreported decision) [1]. 

 

5.  Currently, negotiations toward a resolution of the situation are being conducted between the Palestinians in the compound and the State of Israel.  The negotiations are being conducted by special teams that were established for that purpose.  During these negotiations, the La Custodia [1] petition was filed. That petition contained demands to provide food, water, medicine, and other necessary items to the clergy in the church, to connect the compound to electricity and water and bring a doctor into the compound, and to allow two bodies in the compound to be removed. The petition was filed by the owner and possessor of the compound. 

 

As arguments in the petition were being heard, negotiations were also being conducted on these same issues. As such, the La Custodiai [1] petition was rejected. There, Justice Strasberg-Cohen stated that “at the moment, the sides are in contact for the purpose of arriving at an arrangement. In the middle of a military operation, the Court should not interfere in such developments. In addition, as clarified by respondents, the IDF is doing all that is necessary to care for the clergy in a sensitive and humane manner.” Regarding the substantive issue, this Court noted that the clergymen were already receiving all assistance that they had requested.  We have already noted that seventeen priests, out of the forty eight in the compound, left of their own volition. Water and food are being brought in as necessary. Medication was brought in to the compound, according to prescriptions relayed by the clergymen to the IDF.

 

6.  The petition before us was filed by the Governor of Bethlehem (petitioner 1), who is inside the compound, and by two Israeli Members of Knesset (petitioners 2 and 3). They request that medical teams and representatives of the Red Cross be allowed to enter the compound, in order to provide food and medicine. In addition, they request that medical teams and representatives of the Red Cross be allowed to collect the bodies in the compound, and to provide medical care to the ill. They also request that ill persons requiring medical care be allowed to leave the compound. As noted, the solution to the problem of collection and burial of bodies has already been found. The problem of the ill that required medical treatment has also been solved. The only remaining problem is the issue of water and food for those in the compound. Even this problem has been solved, as far as the clergymen are concerned. As such, the problem reduces to the question of the Palestinians in the basilica.

 

7.  Respondents has notified us that the IDF has disconnected most of the compound from water and electricity. However, to the best of the army’s knowledge, there is a well in the compound, from which water is being pumped.  In addition, in certain areas of the compound, electricity is being provided by a generator. Furthermore, Palestinians who left the compound reported that there are bags of rice and beans inside. It is clear, however, that there is a shortage of food, and the petition here concerns that shortage. 

 

8.  Petitioners, during oral arguments of April 24, 2002, argued that the fact that Palestinians in the compound are being deprived of food is a severe breach of international law. Respondents reply that the petition is not justiciable. They assert that there is no justification for judicial intervention when the parties are in the middle of negotiations. Substantively, respondents argue that they are acting according to international law.

 

9.  Israel finds itself in the middle of difficult battle against a furious wave of terrorism. Israel is exercising its right of self defense. See The Charter of the United Nations, art. 51. This combat is not taking place in a normative void. It is being carried out according to the rules of international law, which provide principles and rules for combat activity.  The saying, “when the cannons roar, the muses are silent,” is incorrect.  Cicero’s aphorism that laws are silent during war does not reflect modern reality. I dealt with this idea in HCJ 168/91 Marcus v. The Minister of Defense [2], at 470-71, noting:

 

When the cannons roar, the muses are silent. But even under the roar of the cannons, the Military Commander must uphold the law. The strength of society in withstanding its enemies is based on its recognition that it is fighting for values that are worth defending. The rule of law is one of those values

 

In HCJ 3114/02 Barake, v. The Minister of Defense [3], decided only a few days ago, during the height of combat activities in “Operation Defensive Wall,” we stated

 

Even in a time of combat, the laws of war must be followed.  Even in a time of combat, all must be done in order to protect the civilian population. 

 

The foundation of this approach is not only the pragmatic consequence of a political and normative reality. Its roots lie much deeper. It is an expression of the difference between a democratic state fighting for its life and the aggression of terrorists rising up against it.  The state fights in the name of the law and in the name of upholding the law. The terrorists fight against the law and exploit its violation. The war against terror is also the law’s war against those who rise up against it. See HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. The Minister of Defense [4], at 132.  Moreover, the State of Israel is founded on Jewish and democratic values. We established a state that upholds the law—it fulfills its national goals, long the vision of its generations, while upholding human rights and ensuring human dignity. Between these—the vision and the law— there lies only harmony, not conflict.

 

10.  Indeed, the State argues that it is acting according to the rules of international law. These are humanitarian laws, which Israel honors. Respondent asserts that “the means used by the IDF towards the Palestinians in the Church of the Nativity are not forbidden by international law. These means are proportionate—we have refrained from the use of military force in order to enter the compound, and allow armed Palestinians to leave the compound at any time that they wish to do so and, if they do so without their weapons, they will not be hurt, but rather arrested.” See para. 32 of respondents’ brief. On this issue we were referred to Articles 17 and 23 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter - the Fourth Geneva Convention].

 

11. We examined the arguments of the parties regarding international law. We are convinced that as far as the armed Palestinians are concerned, there is no breach of these rules. The majority of our attention was directed towards the Palestinian civilians in the compound.  These civilians are not armed, they are not government authorities, and there is no charge that they are connected with terrorism.  How can their rights be ensured? Respondents’ answer is that they are not preventing Palestinian civilians from exiting the compound, and are encouraging them to exit, while promising them that no harm shall befall them. Petitioners respond that, according to their information—information from Israeli sources, they claim—the armed Palestinians are preventing these civilians from exiting the compound, and the only way to ensure the provision of food to the civilians is by providing enough food for all who are in the compound.  To this the State replies that there is enough food inside the compound now and that, in any case, there is no possibility to ensure that additional food brought into the compound will be consumed by the civilians only, and that, clearly, additional food will also be consumed by the armed persons.

 

This situation troubled us. On April 30, 2002, we held a special session in order to be updated on this issue. We asked how it can be ensured that extra food—beyond the essentials—be provided to the civilians who remain in the compound.  We asked whether respondents would be willing to allow civilians to leave the compound, receive extra food, and return to the compound.  We received a positive answer.  Like the clergy, who exit the church to tend to religious matters and then return, so unarmed civilians will be allowed to leave the compound, receive extra food according to their needs outside of the compound, and then return to the church. It appears to us that, in view of the reality in the compound, in which there is a well providing a certain amount of water, and food, even if it is only basic, and in view of the willingness of the respondents to provide extra food to the civilians even if they do not leave the compound, the respondents have fulfilled their obligation under international law. See Article 23(a) of the Fourth Geneva Convention; see also A. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield 62 (1996); Y. Dinstein, The Law of War 140 (1983).

 

12.  Like many others, we hope that the events in the compound of the Church of the Nativity will come to an end quickly.  It is difficult to describe the gravity of the taking of a holy place by armed Palestinians, the desecration of its sanctity and the holding of civilians hostage. Negotiations between the two sides are taking place in order to find a solution to the difficult situation which has been created.  A solution to the problem must be found in the framework of these negotiations. Clearly, just as “this Court will take no position regarding the manner in which combat is being conducted,” see HCJ 3114/02 [3], we will not conduct the negotiations, and will not guide them. Responsibility for this issue rests on the shoulders of the executive branch and those acting on its behalf.

 

The petition is rejected.

 

Justice D. Beinisch

 

I agree.

 

Justice I. Englard

 

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, President A. Barak, and with his reasons. I would only like to add a few comments regarding the causes of this intolerable situation of the desecration of a Christian holy place—and not just any holy place, but one of the most ancient and significant holy places to the Christian communities.  Who is responsible for the fact that thugs burst in, by force, to the ancient basilica and did “things that ought not to be done?” Cf. Genesis 34:7. Who had the obligation to protect this holy place and prevent its invasion by armed men?  Who is responsible for the breach of the international law, which requires the protection of religious and cultural treasures from combat activities, and forbids their use for the purposes of war? See the provisions regarding holy places and cultural treasures in Geneva Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977; and Geneva Protocol II, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1977.  Does this responsibility not rest on the shoulders of the Palestinian Authority which obligated itself to protect the holy places in areas under its control?  Did the Palestinian Authority take substantial steps to prevent this desecration, and did it make an effort to end it immediately?  We all deserve answers to these questions!

 

Decided according to the opinion of President  Barak. 

May 2, 2002

Al-Aziz v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 785/87
Date Decided: 
Sunday, April 10, 1988
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The military commanders of the various occupied territories, acting  pursuant to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, ordered the deportation of the Petitioners from the territories, on the ground that they are involved in hostile activities against the State of Israel, such as to endanger the security of the state and the public peace. The Petitioners contend that the deportation orders violate Article 49 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1949. Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the court denied the petitions, holding:

           

1.  Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention must be interpreted against the background of the outrages perpetrated by the Nazis against civilian populations during World War II, the recurrence of which it was intended to prevent. Article 49 protects civilian populations from arbitrary conduct of the occupying power and from inhuman treatment. It does not apply to the deportation of individuals, under law, for legitimate reasons, such as protection of the public peace. A literal interpretation of the Convention so as to forbid deportation of protected individuals absolutely and in all circumstances, would yield unreasonable results. For example, an illegal infiltrator could not be expelled after he has completed service of his sentence for the infiltration. Nor could the authorities extradite a wanted person to another country in order to stand trial for crimes charged.

 

2.  Israeli law distinguishes between international customary law and international conventional law. International treaties that create new rights create such rights and obligations between states, but do not confer them upon individuals. Such treaties do not become part of the country's municipal law in the absence of legislation to such effect by the Knesset. On the other hand, the customary international law is part of the country's municipal law. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is part of the international conventional law, not the customary law, and, therefore, is not part of Israeli municipal law.

 

3.     The evidence supports the Respondents' findings that the Petitioners are engaged in hostile activities against the security of the state and the public peace.

 

Justice Bach joined in the court's decision, dissenting, however, from that portion of the opinion which interpreted Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention so as to limit its application to the arbitrary deportation of protected persons for inhuman ends. Agreeing that the Convention was prepared against the background of the Nazi horrors perpetrated against civilian populations, he thought, nonetheless, that the broad language of Article 49 creates an absolute prohibition against expelling a protected person from occupied territory. He agreed, however, that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention is not reflective of international customary law but is rather part of international conventional law and, therefore, it is not part of Israeli municipal law.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 785/87

HCJ 845/87

HCJ 27/88

           

ABD AL NASSER AL AZIZ ABD AL AZIZ ABD AL

    AFFO ET AL                                                                                               

v.

COMMANDER OF I.D.F. FORCES IN THE WEST BANK

H.C. 785/87

 

ABD AL AZIZ ABD ALRACHMAN UDE RAFIA  ET AL                        

v.

COMMANDER OF I.D.F. FORCES IN THE GAZA STRIP

H.C. 845/87

 

J'MAL SHAATI HINDI                                             

v.

COMMANDER OF I.D.F. FORCES IN THE JUDEA AND

   SAMARIA REGION

H.C. 27/88

 

 

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[April 10, 1988]

Before Shamgar P., Ben-Porat D.P., S. Levin J., Bach J. and Goldberg, J.

 

 

 

Editor's synopsis -

            The military commanders of the various occupied territories, acting  pursuant to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, ordered the deportation of the Petitioners from the territories, on the ground that they are involved in hostile activities against the State of Israel, such as to endanger the security of the state and the public peace. The Petitioners contend that the deportation orders violate Article 49 of the Fourth Hague Convention of 1949. Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the court denied the petitions, holding:

           

1.  Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention must be interpreted against the background of the outrages perpetrated by the Nazis against civilian populations during World War II, the recurrence of which it was intended to prevent. Article 49 protects civilian populations from arbitrary conduct of the occupying power and from inhuman treatment. It does not apply to the deportation of individuals, under law, for legitimate reasons, such as protection of the public peace. A literal interpretation of the Convention so as to forbid deportation of protected individuals absolutely and in all circumstances, would yield unreasonable results. For example, an illegal infiltrator could not be expelled after he has completed service of his sentence for the infiltration. Nor could the authorities extradite a wanted person to another country in order to stand trial for crimes charged.

 

2.  Israeli law distinguishes between international customary law and international conventional law. International treaties that create new rights create such rights and obligations between states, but do not confer them upon individuals. Such treaties do not become part of the country's municipal law in the absence of legislation to such effect by the Knesset. On the other hand, the customary international law is part of the country's municipal law. Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is part of the international conventional law, not the customary law, and, therefore, is not part of Israeli municipal law.

 

3.     The evidence supports the Respondents' findings that the Petitioners are engaged in hostile activities against the security of the state and the public peace.

 

            Justice Bach joined in the court's decision, dissenting, however, from that portion of the opinion which interpreted Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention so as to limit its application to the arbitrary deportation of protected persons for inhuman ends. Agreeing that the Convention was prepared against the background of the Nazi horrors perpetrated against civilian populations, he thought, nonetheless, that the broad language of Article 49 creates an absolute prohibition against expelling a protected person from occupied territory. He agreed, however, that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention is not reflective of international customary law but is rather part of international conventional law and, therefore, it is not part of Israeli municipal law.

           

           

Israel cases referred to:

[1] H.C. 606,610/78, Ayub  et al. v. Minister of Defence  33P.D.(2)113.

[2] H.C. 97/79, Abu  Awad  v. Military Commander of the Judea  and Samaria Region 33P.D.(3)309.

[3] H.C. 698/80, Kawasma  v. Minister of Defence  35P.D.(1)617.

[4] H.C. 629/89, Mustafa  v. Military Commander of the Judea  and Samaria Region 37P.D.(1)158.

[5] H.C. 513,514/85, M.A.256/85, Nazal v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria  Region 39P.D.(3)645.

[6] C. A. 31/63, Feldberg  v. Director for the Purposes of the Land Appreciation Tax Law, 17P.D.1231.

[7] H.C. 442/71, Lansky  v. Minister of interior  26P.D.(2)337.

[8] Cr. A. 94/65, Turjeman  v. Attorney General 19P.D.(3)57.

[9] C. A. 165/82, Kibbutz Hatzor  v. Rehovot  Assessment Officer 39P.D. (2)70.

[10] C.A. 282/73, Haifa  Assessment Officer  v. Arison  25P.D.(1)789.

[11] H.C. 47/83, Tour Aviv (Israel) Ltd. v. Chairman of the Restrictive Trade Practices Control Board 39P.D. (1)169.

[12] Cr. A. 174/54, Stampfer  v. Attorney-General 10P.D.5.

[13] Cr. A. 336/51, Eichmann  v. Attorney-General 16P.D.2033.

[14] C.A. 25,145,148/55, Custodian of Absentee Property v. Samara 10P.D.1825.

[15] Cr. A. 131/67, Kamiar v. State of Israel  22(P.D.)(2)85.

[16] H.C. 69,493/81, Abu Aita et al. v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region et al. 37P.D.(2)197; S.J. vol. VII, p. 1.

[17] H.C. 393/82, J'mait Askan ... Cooperative Society Registered with the Judea and Samaria Region Command Headquarters v. Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria  Region 37P.D. (4)785.

[18] H.C. 390/79, Diukat  v. State of lsrael  34P.D.1.

[19] Motion 41/49, "Shimson" Ltd. v. Attorney  General 4P.D.143.

[20] C.A. 65/67, Kurz  v. Kirschen  21P.D.(2)20.

[21] H.C. 103/67, "American-European Bet-El Mission" v. Minister of Welfare 21P.D.(2)325.

[22] H.C. 102,150,593,690/82, 271/83, Tzemel v. Minister of Defence 37P.D.(3)365.

[23] H.C. 574/82, El Nawar  v. Minister of Defence  39P.D.(3)449.

[24] C.A. 303/75, State of Israel  v. Raphael 29P.D.(2)601.

[25] H.C. 609/82, Fantomb Overseas (1981) Ltd. v. Investments Center 38P.D.(1)757.

[26] C.A. 586,626/82, Insurance Corporation of ireland Ltd. v. State of Israel - Ministry of Communications; El-AI lsrael Airlines Ltd. v. Insurance Corporation of Ireland 41P.D. (2)309.

 

American case referred to:

[27] Ex  parte Quirin 317 U.S.1(1942).

 

English cases referred to:

[28] Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison. Ex parte Soblen  [1963]2Q.B.243(C.A.).

[29] Porter v. Freudenberg  [1915]1K.B.857(C.A.).

[30] West Rand Central Gold Mining Company v. Rex. [1905]2K.B.391.

[31] The Cristina  [1938]1 All E.R.719(H.L.).

[32] Chung  Chi  Cheung  v. The King [1939]A.C.160(P.C.).

 

International cases referred to:

[33] Re  Rizo and Others [1952]Int'l. L.R.478.

[34] I.M.T. Judgment [1946] Cmd.6964.

 

L. Tzemel  for Petitioner no. 1, H.C. 785/87;

D. Kretzmer  for Petitioner no. 2, H.C. 785,845/87;

D. Nasser for Petitioner no. 1, H.C. 845/87;

G. Bulus  for Petitioner in H.C. 27/88;

D. Beinish, Deputy State Attorney, and N. Arad, Director of High Court Department, State Attorney's Office, for Respondents.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

          SHAMGAR P.: 1. These three petitions, which we have heard together, concern deportation orders under Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, which were issued with respect to each of the Petitioners by the Commander of I.D.F. Forces in his region (with respect to the Petitioners in H.C. 785/87 and H.C. 27/88, the Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region; with respect to the Petitioner in H.C. 845/87, the Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Gaza Strip).

 

            The Association for Civil Rights in Israel joined the petitions in H.C. 785/87 and 845/87.

           

            This court has issued an interim order staying the execution of the deportation orders.

           

            The parties have agreed to argue these petitions as if an order nisi had been given in respect of each of them.

            On 13 March 1988 we decided to dismiss the petitions and to set aside the orders issued in consequence thereof. The following are the reasons for the judgment.

           

            2. In these petitions general legal arguments were raised concerning the legality of a deportation order under public international law and under the law applying in the above-mentioned territories. Also, objections were raised regarding the substantive justification for issuing a deportation order in each of the cases upon which these petitions are based.

           

            As for the order in which these submissions will be discussed, we shall first examine the general contentions which essentially negate the existence of a legal basis for the issue of a deportation order against a resident of the above-mentioned territories. For if the conclusion is that under the relevant law the issue of a deportation order is forbidden, then obviously there will be no need to examine whether a substantive justification exists for the issue of the specific order, through the application of this question to the factual data pertaining to each of the Petitioners. Therefore, we will now turn to the general contentions which are common to the three petitions.

           

            3.(a) The Petitioners raised, as a central reason for their petitions, the argument that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereinafter: the Fourth Geneva Convention) forbids the deportation of any of the Petitioners from Judea, Samaria or the Gaza Strip, as the case may be. According to the argument, an absolute prohibition exists, with regard to a resident of one of the territories occupied by the I.D.F., against the application of Article 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 or of any other legal provision (if such exists) whose subject is deportation. This is due to the provisions of the above-mentioned international convention which, according to the contention, should be seen as a rule of public international law, binding upon the State of Israel and the Military Government bodies acting on its behalf and granting those injured the right of access to this court.

           

            The legal premise underlying this argument has been raised time and again before this court and has been discussed either directly or partially and indirectly in a number of cases - see principally: H.C. 606,610/78 [1], 121; H.C. 97/79 [2], 309; H.C. 698/80 [3] H.C. 629/82 [4], at 161; H.C.513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5]. In order to complete the legal picture, see also Professor Y. Dinstein's article "The Rafiah Salient Judgment" 3 (1973) Iyunei  Mishpat , 934.

           

            This court's statement in H.C. 513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5] mentioned above is apposite to the present matter, allowing for slight changes deriving from the material itself. It is said at pp. 649-650:

           

As a sort of general introduction to an analysis of the Petitioners' arguments, it should be noted that the first argument mentioned above has been raised already - with slight variation - in a hearing before this court in H.C. 698/80 at p. 623 and was rejected. The repeated raising of this and other arguments regarding the legal validity of Regulation 112 and the force and nature of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention stems from the premise - founded in error - that this court has not already decided the issue whether it is possible to implement Regulation 112 in the Judea and Samaria Region, and that this court has not yet expressed itself on both the reasons based on the internal legislation of the Region and the those resting on rules of public international law. As was said, the proposition of the Petitioners 'learned counsel, that these issues have not been resolved, is founded in error. This court has dealt with the above legal questions at length both in H.C. 97/79, and in H.C. 698/80 mentioned above, which completed the examination of a series of contentions that had not been raised or discussed in H.C. 97/79. The decision in H.C. 698/80 was in fact rendered by the majority opinions of Landau P. and Kahan J. as against the dissenting opinion of Cohn D.P. But this of course does not detract from its validity, nor does it nullify the status of the judgment as a substantive decision on the arguments. We shall follow in its path as long as no weighty material reasons are presented to us justifying a change in the law. That is the difficulty. The decisive majority of the submissions heard by us were nothing more than a quasi-repetition of what has already been argued before this court on the previous occasions mentioned above and which has already been dealt with explicitly and in detail. If we have listened patiently to a repetition of these long arguments, it is mainly because more than five years have passed since the authority to deport was last exercised, and we thought it proper to examine carefully whether in the meantime there has not been any legal development bearing on our case or any renewed argument affecting the matter before us, which would have, no doubt, far-reaching personal consequences for the Petitioners. To summarize, in the judgments of this court in H. C. 97/79 and H.C. 698/80 a clear position was taken on the validity of Regulation 112 in Judea and Samaria after the end of the Mandate, based on the later Jordanian legislation. All aspects of the issue were discussed and decided there.

 

            (b) As was stated, the Petitioners' submission rests first and foremost on the provisions of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The court's attitude thereto was fully detailed in H.C. 97/79 [2] and in H.C. 698/80 [3], and has been already mentioned in H.C. 513,514/85 [5], the opinions expressed therein are acceptable to me on the issue before us and I see no reason to add to what has already been said by this court. As may be recalled, the statements of Landau P. in H.C. 698/80 [3] complement those of Sussman J. in H.C. 97/79 [2], so far as they concern certain legal aspects of the provisions of the 1952 Jordanian constitution, whereas the decision in H.C. 513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5] touches on additional alternate objections, which were raised regarding the above-mentioned legal question.

           

            Since there have been no developments of any possible bearing on the assessment of the legal situation, as expressed in various ways in the above-mentioned judgments, I would see no need to go back and deal with the varied reasons for the interpretation of Article 49 above, which have already been presented in the previously cited decisions, to which I subscribe. Nonetheless, I have read the remarks of my esteemed colleague, Bach J., and as he does not tend to follow the legal paths that were paved in H.C. 97/79 and H.C. 698/80, and as I disagree with his approach to this issue, I will present the gist of my view on this subject.

           

            Afterwards I will also deal with the new argument raised by the Petitioners' learned counsel regarding the assimilation into our law of some of the rules of conventional international law.

           

                        (c) My comments will relate to the following areas:

           

(1) The accepted approach to interpretation under internal Israeli law;

 

(2) Principles of interpretation applicable to international conventions;

 

(3) Interpretation of the above-mentioned Article 49.

 

            (d) The accepted interpretation in our law. We accept that the interpretive rules applied in a given legal system are peculiar to that system and are not necessarily identical with those applied in another legal system. In the words of Justice Barak in Judicial Discretion (Papyrus, 1987), at pp. 339-340:

           

Every legal system has its doctrine of interpretation. The interpretive approach of English law (based in great measure on the language of the law, and where importance is attached to the purpose of the legislation, it can be discovered mainly from the language of the law), differs from that in American law (based on the purpose of the law, which may be learned also from sources outside the law itself)....Rules of interpretation are legal rules which are based on logic, but not solely on logic. Thus for instance, the answer to the question whether the purpose of the law is to be sought only through the language of the law, is not an answer which can be given based solely on logic.... Deciding from amongst the different possibilities is not a matter of logic, but of legal policy. At times this decision is made by the legislator himself, who determines the rules of interpretation that are to be followed. Generally legislators do not operate in this manner and entrust the formation of rules of interpretation to the judiciary.

 

            The author also refers in this regard to W. Friedman, "Legal Philosophy and Judicial Lawmaking", 61 Colum.  L. Rev. (1961) 821.

           

            The method of interpretation which our courts have applied for quite some time is that which attributes to the wording of the law the meaning which realizes its purpose; this is the interpretative method based on the legislative purpose which has recently received a thorough and penetrating examination in Justice Barak's book cited above.

           

            The formation of rules of interpretation is not effected in a vacuum; rather it is adapted, as stated, to the system of law in which and from which these rules stem. The application of the said rules, in any concrete case in which the court is asked to give content to an enactment warranting interpretation, is carried out, as is accepted here, by applying judicial discretion. Applying judicial discretion is necessary, mainly, where clarification of the wording of an enactment open to interpretation is required in the context of a decision regarding the weight to be given the words of the text, in determining the definition and scope of the legislative purpose. Justice Barak writes about this in his book (supra at pp. 341-342) :

           

            Any doctrine of interpretation must assume as its starting point the doctrine of linguistics ... however, and as we have seen, language is generally not unambiguous. It has multiple meanings, is unclear and consists of "open tissue". At times, words are given an accepted and regular meaning, an almost primary meaning. But for the most part words also have a special and exceptional meaning, a secondary meaning as it were. The doctrine of interpretation must set standards by which one meaning is chosen over another. From the standpoint of language, one meaning does not have preference over another. Any meaning which is possible in a semantic sense is also permissible semantically. It would be a mistake to base a doctrine of legal interpretation on dictates, as it were, of linguistics.

 

            These conclusions are drawn from this court's consistent approach, which has been expressed in a series of judgments, of which those cited below are but a few.

           

            Thus Cohn J. said in C.A. 31/63 [6], at 1235:

           

            ...the correct interpretation of a given provision in the law stems not only - though primarily - from the language of the provision, but also from the purpose of the law, from the flaw which it comes to correct, and from the circumstances surrounding it.

(Emphasis added - M.S.) See also the comments of Agranat P: on the same subject in H.C. 442/71[7], at p. 349:

 

Each Law has its purpose, in the light of which the given phrase should be interpreted.

 

            In other words, the same word can have different meanings in different laws. *

           

            Sussman J. (as his title then was) stated in Cr.A. 94/65 [8], at p. 80:

           

We have learned that the meanings of words are many, and they change from law to law and from issue to issue. We do not begin with the axiom that every word or text has but one fixed definition; rather when we deal with interpretation we address the question: What is the meaning of a given term in a law in the context in which it appears? Since we have thus phrased the question, it naturally follows that the judge interprets the words with the purpose of the legislation as his guiding light and only in this way can he faithfully serve the legislator. In a similar vein Judge Learned Hand said in Borella  v. Borden Co. (1944):

 

We can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose, and with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time.

(Emphasis added M.S.)

 

            In other words, language does not govern the purpose, rather it serves it. The law is an instrument for realizing legal policy, and therefore interpretation needs to aim toward emancipating the wording from its semantic bonds, were these to distance it from the legislative purpose which the words are intended to realize. Thus, for example, the legislative purpose may be reflected in the description of the legal situation which existed on the eve of the legislation being introduced (C.A. 165/82 [9], at 74).

           

            The following remarks of Asher J. in C.A. 282/73 [10] at p. 793 express the same approach; he says:

           

The same word, which in every-day language, is defined in the this nuance is even apt to change from law to law, and from matter to matter within the same law. Therefore it is not sufficient as counsel for the appellant claims, to rely upon a clarification of the "regular" meaning of an expression; rather, the definition must be determined from a variety of factors, including the context in which the legislator used the expression, and the purpose behind the enactment being defined.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The approach which attaches central importance, both to the legal substance of the issue as tested by the lancet of the interpreter, and to the purpose which the legal provision aims to serve, is not satisfied with the apparently clear and simple meaning of the language of the law. Barak J. commented on this in words appropriate to our subject in H.C. 47/83 [11]. He states at p. 176:

           

Every law, including that whose language is "clear", requires interpretation. The law is "clear" only after the interpretation has clarified it. It is not clear without interpretation. Words by themselves are not "clear". In fact there is no less clear a statement than that words are "clear".

 

            In a nutshell, what has been said until now may be summarized thus: We have referred to the guidelines used in establishing the relation between the literal meaning of the written word and the correct legal interpretation, as far as this applies to our legal system. Interpretation in this sector seeks, as was said, to pave the way to a revelation of the legislative purpose. Setting the purpose in this form is directed to the sources which one may turn to in order to ascertain the purpose. It is customary in this matter to examine more than the text and, inter alia , also the legislative history; the legal and substantive context, and the meanings stemming from the structure of the legislation (see ibid., at 175).

 

            (e) Interpretation in Public International Law. Now the second question arises, i.e. what are the rules of interpretation relevant to our matter that are used in public international law?

           

            Israel has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties, which came into force in 1980 for those who joined it (hereinafter: the Vienna Convention). As an aside, what is said in Article 4 of the above Convention regarding non-retroactivity, in any case fundamentally limits the provisions relative to the question before us. Nonetheless, there is value, even if only for the sake of comparison, in an examination of the provisions of the Convention regarding interpretation.

           

            On the issue of interpretation, Articles 31 and 32 of the said Convention state :

           

31. General rule of interpretation

           

1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

 

2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes :

 

(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;

 

(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

 

32. Supplementary means of interpretation

 

Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:

 

(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or

           

(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

 

            It seems that from the first part of Article 31(1) one could conclude that the Convention sought to support that school of interpretation which emphasizes the text, as opposed to the alternative school of interpretation, no less accepted, which focuses on the intentions of the draftsmen of the Convention (see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1979) 624). Yet, the second part of Article 31(1) and Article 32 form the bridge to the other theories of interpretation, also familiar to us from the earlier examination of our municipal law. That is, the provisions of the Convention leave ample space to enable examination of the purpose which led to its making. It is even possible to reflect upon the preparatory work describing the background to the making of the Convention, as material which can complement the plain understanding of the text, its purpose and scope of application.

           

            The accepted view is, as was stated, that one of the contributions of the Vienna Convention in this context was expressed in the creation of a closeness and link between the two alternative theories of interpretation. In any event, an examination of the legislative purpose - which is one of the applicable methods of interpretation, unrelated to treaties - is among the recognized principles of interpretation. In the words of J. G. Starke (An Introduction to International Law (London, 8th ed., 1977) at p. 510):

           

The related rules concerning the intention of the parties proceed from the capital principle that it is to the intention of the parties at the time the instrument was concluded, and in particular the meaning attached by them to words and phrases at the time, that primary regard must be paid. Hence, it is legitimate to consider what was the 'purpose' or 'plan' of the parties in negotiating the treaty.

 

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

See also: Re Rizzo and Others (1952) [33] at p. 481.

 

            Starke stresses the issue of the intention of the parties to the treaty at the time of its conclusion and refers in particular to the meaning of words and phrases, as intended at the time of the treaty's conclusion.

           

            The Vienna Convention did not purport to list comprehensively and describe all rules of interpretation, which, at times, suggest, in the words of Brownlie (supra, at 624), different and varying solutions which are, as he describes them, "general, question-begging and contradictory".

           

            Starke explains that in order to set out a method of interpretation (supra, at 511):

           

treaties should, it is held, be given an interpretation in which the reasonable meaning of words and phrases is preferred, and in which a consistent meaning is given to different portions of the instrument. In accordance with the principle of consistency, treaties should be interpreted in the light of existing international law. Also applying both reasonableness and consistency, since it is to be assumed that states entering into a treaty are as a rule unwilling to limit their sovereignty save in the most express terms, ambiguous provisions should be given a meaning which is the least restrictive upon a party's sovereignty, or which casts the least onerous obligations...

(Emphasis added - M. S.)

 

            The aim, according to Starke, is to interpret restrictively any provision in a treaty which limits the authority of the states.

           

            Furthermore, it is perfectly clear that any treatment of the subjects of international law, which earn such multifaceted and even contradictory interpretations, cannot be accomplished with the same exacting standards for which we strive in municipal law.

           

            The caveat, by which one is to distinguish between the interpretive approach used in municipal law and that practised in public international law, was presented in an especially detailed and instructive way in the research of Professor Mustafa Kamil Yasseen on interpretation of treaties found in volume 151 of the writings of the Academie De Droit International (M. K. Yasseen, "L'Interpretation des Traites d'apres La Convention de Vienne Sur Le Droit des Traites", 151 Recueil Des Cours,  (1976) 1, 10). He writes:

           

7. La methode d'interpretation peu ne pas etre la meme, elle peut varier selon une serie de considerations; elle est commandee surtout par la conception qu'on a de l'interpretation, la nature de l'instrument a interpreter et les caracteristique de l'ordre juridique dont il s'agit.

 

          8. Aussi, en ce concerne les traites la methode d'interpretation doit viser a exercer une fonction declarative et non creatrice, elle doit prendre en consideration que le traite est une acte de volonte qu'il n'est pas un acte unilateral, que les parties au traites sont des Etats souverains qu'il ne s'agit ni d'une contrat entre individus, ni d'une, loi de droit interne. Enfin cette methode doit tenir compte des caracteristiques de l'ordre juridique international, ou, le formalisme n'est pas de rigueur, ou les Etats jouissent d'une grande liberte, ou ils sont aussi bien les auteurs, que les destinaires des traites, ou le choix des moyens pacifiques des reglements des differends depend en principe de la volonte des Etats. Il ne serait donc pas etonnant que la methode d'interpretation du traite differe de celle de la loi et de celle du contrat.

 

          And freely translated: The method of interpretation cannot be uniform and identical and it may change in accordance with a series of factors. It is fundamentally dictated by the approach of the interpreter to interpretive methodology, by the substance of the instrument being interpreted, and by the characteristics of the particular field of law (i. e. public international law- M. S.) with which one is dealing. This and more, as far as treaties are concerned, a method of interpretation must see itself as a declarative act and not as a formative one (i.e. not judicial legislation - M.S.). The method must take into account that the treaty is an act stemming from the free will of the treaty-makers, and that it is not a one-sided act; that the parties to the treaty are sovereign states, and that it is not a contract between individuals, nor the internal law of the state. Lastly this method must keep in mind the characteristics of the international legal order, a field in which formalism does not have the upper hand, a field in which states enjoy a great deal of freedom of action, a field in which states are not only parties to a treaty, but also the ones to whom the treaty is directed (i.e. the states must be its executors - M.S.), and a field in which the preference for peaceful means to settle disputes depends upon the free will of states. Therefore, it is not surprising that the method of interpreting a treaty is different from that applicable to a law or a contract.

         

          Professor Yasseen's approach is not unique; in the essays of scholars in the field of international law, one can find more than one instance of a tendency to stress the cognitive image of the rules of public international law, and mixing the desirable with the actual is not uncommon. Yet it is also possible to find a sober and realistic viewpoint, such as that of Professor Yasseen, running through the legal literature. In this context O'Connell states in International Law (London, vol.1, 1965) XII:

         

The legal practitioner who is unaware of the theoretical structure of the subject is likely to be misled into supposing that the rules of international law are more concrete and more absolute than they really are.

           

            As a footnote to these remarks, one can cite an obvious example of the diverse and non-uniform application of those rules of international law that should theoretically apply in an identical manner in identical situations: The victorious Allies in World War II, at the time justifiably viewed the Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter: the Hague Regulations) as binding customary international law (see IMT Judgement (Nuremberg,1946) Cmd. 6964 at 65). At the same time they saw themselves free of the obligation to act in accordance with those same Regulations following the occupation of Germany. They based themselves on the Debellatio (subjugation) claim (see G. Schwarzenberger, International Law (London, vol. 2,1968) 167, 467; L. Oppenheim, International Law (London, 7th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, vol. 2, 1952) 603). I see of course no reason to take a stand here regarding these approaches to the application of the Hague Regulations. I mentioned the interpretation which adapts itself to changing circumstances only as a supplement to the above-mentioned theories of Starke. To broaden the picture on the diverse application of these norms, I will add that the German jurists tended not to accept the above legal interpretation of the Allies on the effect of the subjugation in 1945 on the application of the Hague Regulations. Yet it has become evident that during the Allies' military rule of the Rhineland (1920-30), it was the German jurists of that generation who in their essays held that the Hague Regulations were not applicable to the Allied military rule of the said territory (see Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law (London, 1944) 188,189).

           

(f) The treatment of the questions of interpretation in our internal law and in public international law may be summarized by mentioning the conclusion, that not for naught has the subject before us been examined in H.C. 97/79 [2] in the light also of its legislative purpose. This approach was necessitated by the method of interpretation customary in our legal system and by the doctrines of interpretation customary in public international law. As was already mentioned, the two systems do not maintain the exclusiveness of the literal method of interpretation, nor even a preference for it. Moreover, when for the purpose of the issue before us we adopt the interpretive approach as expressed in the specific area of law here discussed, namely public international law, we should recall Professor Yasseen's interpretive guidelines and the remarks of Starke mentioned above, from which emerges, inter alia, a stand rejecting the constriction of state authority and rejecting formalism, or an approach which ignores the special qualities of the field of law that we are discussing.

 

            We shall now proceed to the application of the rules of interpretation to the issue before us.

           

            (g) Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. What is the dispute regarding the interpretation of the above-mentioned Article 49.

           

            The relevant portions of the Article state:

           

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

 

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand....

 

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

 

            In H.C. 97/79 [2] cited above, Sussman P. comments (at pp. 316-317) regarding the argument that the application of Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations is contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:

           

Neither have I found any substance in the argument that the exercise of the above-mentioned Regulation 112 contradicts Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It is intended, as Dr. Pictet in his commentary on the Convention (p.10) writes, to protect civilians from arbitrary action by the occupying army, and its purpose is to prevent acts such as the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in World War II, during which millions of civilians were deported from their homes for various reasons, generally to Germany to serve the enemy in forced labour, along with Jews and others who were deported to concentration camps for torture and extermination.

 

It is clear that the above-mentioned Convention does not detract from the obligation of the Occupying Power to preserve public order in the occupied territory, an obligation imposed by Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention, nor does it detract from its right to employ the necessary means to ensure its own security; see Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims,  at p. 115...

 

It has nothing whatsoever in common with the deportations for forced labour, torture and extermination that were carried out in World War II. Moreover, the intention of the Respondent is to place the Petitioner outside the country and not to transfer him to the country, to remove him because of the danger that he poses to public welfare and not to draw him nearer for the purpose of exploiting his manpower and deriving benefit from him for the State of Israel.

 

Landau P. again referred to this subject in H.C. 698/80 [3] mentioned above (at pp. 626-628). The following are the relevant passages:

In H.C. 97/79 at p. 316, Sussman P. explained the background to the enactment of Article 49: to prohibit the acts of arbitrary deportation, based on the experience of the atrocities in the mass deportation of Jews to labour camps and death camps during the Holocaust of European Jewry. It goes without saying that there is no similarity between these atrocities and the deportation of people who endanger security in an occupied territory. Article 49 does not detract from the obligation of an Occupying Power to preserve public order in the occupied territory, as required by Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention, nor does it detract from its right to take necessary measures to preserve its own security (ibid., at 316).

 

With the dismissal of the submission founded on Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in H.C. 97/79 , the Petitioners herein were not granted an order nisi on those grounds during the first stage in their matter in H.C. 320/80. This time Ms. Langer has more forcefully repeated that same argument. In her opinion, the court in H.C. 97/79 ignored the difference between the first and second paragraphs of said Article 49: Whereas the prohibition against evacuating civilian populations generally carried out by displacement within the occupied territory is permitted for purposes of the population's security or for imperative military reasons, as is stated in the second paragraph of the Article, the prohibition against deportation beyond the border is absolute, "regardless of their motive" as is stated in the latter part of the Article. The book The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Commentary (Geneva, ed. by J.S. Pictet, vol. IV, 1958) 279 is cited. Regarding the prohibition against deportations, it states:

 

The prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2.

 

Further, in the commentaries on Article 78 which deal with assigned residence and internment of persons endangering public security, it states (ibid., at 368):

 

As we are dealing with occupied territory, the protected persons concerned will benefit by the provisions of Article 49 and cannot be deported; they can therefore only be interned, or placed in assigned residence, within the frontiers of the occupied country itself.

 

It has been argued before us that one must distinguish between the reason for the prohibitions in Article 49 of the Convention, which was, as was said, founded in the memory of those atrocities, and between that which stems from the unambiguous wording of the prohibition in the first paragraph of the Article, which applies, according to its language, not only to mass deportation, but also to deportation of individuals. As opposed to this, one can say that the deportation of individuals was also carried out occasionally under the Hitler regime for the realization of the same policy which led to mass deportation, and therefore none of the provisions of Article 49 are in any way applicable to the deportation of persons who endanger public welfare - as this court has ruled in H.C. 97/79. In the words of J. Stone in his lecture entitled "No Peace No Law in the Middle East" (Sydney, 1969), at p. 17:

 

...It seems reasonable to limit the sweeping literal words of Article 49 to situations at least remotely similar to those contemplated by the draftsman, namely the Nazi World War II practices of large-scale transfers of populations, whether by mass transfer or transfer of many individuals, to more hostile or dangerous environments, for torture, extermination or slave labour.

 

But whatever the correct interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 49 of the Convention may be, the Convention, as Article 49 in its entirety, does not in any case form a part of customary international law. Therefore, the deportation orders which were issued do not violate internal Israeli law, nor the law of the Judea and Samaria Region, under which this court adjudicates... Ms. Langer recalled to us a passage from G. Schwarzenberger's book, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London, vol. II, 1968) 165-166, which was cited in the above-mentioned H.C. 606,610/78, at p. 121. The learned writer expresses the belief that the prohibition against the deportation of residents of an occupied territory is but "an attempt to clarify existing rules of international customary law". I assume that here too, the reference is to arbitrary deportations of population, akin to the Hitler regime. If the author was also referring to deportation of individuals in order to preserve the security of the occupied territory, then that is the opinion of an individual author, stated in vague terms with no substantiation whatsoever.

           

            After a detailed analysis of the Petitioners' arguments, Landau P. decided, as quoted above, to accept the more far reaching argument of the State regarding the applicability to our legal system of Article 49, which falls within the realm of conventional law, and therefore saw no need for additional comments on the content of the Article.

           

            At the time no basis was given for the argument that Article 49 expresses a customary rule of international law; and given the material presented to us, the armed conflicts that have occurred since 1949 (India-Pakistan, Cyprus and others) have not brought about legal decisions that would shed a different light on the issue. In any case if there are any, they were not brought to our attention by the parties. We will return to the commentary of Dr. J. Pictet on the reason for the inclusion of Article 49 in the Convention; but regarding his interpretation of the scope of the applicability of the Article, I will already note that it has not been explained why we are to prefer the remarks of Dr. Pictet over, for example, those of Prof. J. Stone.

           

            The background which the draftsmen of the Convention had in mind is clearly reflected in the deliberations of the Geneva Conference. The relevance of the background is twofold: It describes the flaw which the Convention seeks to rectify (H. Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties" 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. (1949) 48, 53 and compare with C.A. 31/63 [6] above); and the purpose that the draftsmen had in mind (O'Connell, supra, at 271; Cr. A. 94/65 [8] cited above and the remarks of Learned Hand J. as there quoted, at 80). It even sheds light on the legal situation for which they strove (C.A. 165/82 [9]). This is also the reason that compelled Landau P. in H.C. 513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5] cited above, to turn to the question of whether the prohibition against deportation is within the realm of law rooted in custom or a conventional innovation.

           

            (h) What were the considerations guiding the draftsmen of the Convention? An examination of Actes de la Conference Diplomatique de Geneve de 1949 (Berne, tome 2) 648, 649, 743, 744, 810, 811, shows unequivocally that in using the term "deportations", the participants in the deliberations referred to deportations such as those carried out during World War II. Thus it is stated for example at p. 810:

           

Bien qu'on se soit prononce a l'unanimite pour condamner les deportations comme  celles  qui  eurent  lieu pendant la derniere guerre, la phrase qui se trouve au debut de l'article 45 [In the draft the current Article 49 bore the number 45 - M.S.] a suscite quelques difficultes, car il etait peu aise de concilier les idees exprimees dans des termes divers, en francais, en anglais et en russe. Finalement, le Comite a decide d'adopter un texte qui interdit les transferts individuels ou collectifs obligatoires ainsi que les deportations de personnes protegees, d'un territoire occupe dans un autre pays, mais qui autorise les transferts volontaires.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The Convention draftsmen referred to deportations such as those that took place during the last war and in the framework of the deliberations sought a text that would reflect the ideas that were expressed in different ways and in different languages.

           

            So did Pictet in his article "Convention de Geneve - Protection de Civil" 76 Recuiel des Cours (1950) 1, 96. He pointed to the accomplishments of the Convention in contrast with the situation that prevailed before it, cited the futile attempts of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1921 to prohibit the execution of hostages and deportations, and described the suffering of the civilian population during World War II:

           

Des centaines de milliers d'entre eux ser virent exposes aux deportations aux prises d'otages, a l'internment dans les camp de concentration, au pires services et a la mort.

 

            In translation: Hundreds of thousands of them were exposed to deportations, to the taking of hostages, to internment in concentration camps, to the most severe brutality and to death.

           

            Article 49, which prohibited deportations was connected therefore with such provisions. As Pictet describes at pp. 109-110:

           

Quand an songe aux millions de personnes transferees de force au cours de dernier conflit et a leurs souffrances physique et morales on ne peut que saluer avec reconnaissance un texte mettant fin a ces pratique inhumaines.

 

            In his words: When one thinks about the millions of people who were forcibly transferred from place to place during the last conflict [i.e. World War II - M.S.], and about their suffering, both physical and moral, one cannot but thankfully bless the text [of the Convention - M.S.] which put an end to these inhuman practices.

 

                      Here then deportations, concentration camps and the taking of hostages were linked together and the word "deportations" was used in the context described above.

         

          Incidentally, parallel to this, Article 34 of the Convention prohibits the taking of hostages, something which Pictet calls "an innovation in international law" ("constitue une innovation dans le droit internationale").

         

          One is not speaking in this regard, not even by inference, about the removal from the territory of a terrorist, infiltrator or enemy agent, but rather about the protection of the entire civilian population as such from deportation, since the civilian population has more and more frequently become a direct victim of war, despite its civilian character and despite its lack of involvement in active fighting.

         

          M. H. Coursier ("Droit Humanitaire: Protection des Personnes Civiles en Temps", 99 Recueil Des Cours (1960) 397, 399) cited the mass attacks against civilians in the context of the situation preceding the development of humanitarian law, when unless expressly prohibited, everything was permitted. He mentions in this context the words of Grotius, according to which:

         

Le massacre des femmes et des enfants est compris dans le droit de la guerre.

         

          (Translation as found in Pradier-Fodere, III ch. 419.) Namely: The massacre of women and children was permissible under the laws of war at the time.

         

          He saw the Convention as a necessity stemming from the numerical increase in civilian victims. In World War I half a million civilians were killed as opposed to nine million soldiers. In World War II a kind of numerical parity was created as 24 million civilians and 26 million soldiers were killed. Coursier mentions the deportations in the context of forced labour, but makes no reference to the broad interpretation which would also apply the deportation prohibition to terrorists or enemy agents, whose deportation is necessary to protect the civilian population, for which the military authority is responsible.

         

          That is also the case in B.M. Jankovici's book "Public International Law" (New York, 1984) 375, 376. In discussing the prohibition against deportation, he refers to the millions of people who were tortured and killed in the concentration camps.

         

          Also F. F. Spangenberg in "Die Zwangsarbeit der Bevolkerung Kriegsbesetzter Gebiete und das Volkerrecht" (Kiel, 1961) (Forced Labour of the Population in an Occupied Territory and The Law of Nations) describes the forced transfers and deportations in the war in connection with Article 49 and points out that -

         

Die "Deportation" als solche ist somit erstmalig absolut verboten.

 

            The reference is to the manner and form of deportation in World War II, about which he writes in his book.

           

            This is also the meaning of the text found in Schlochauer, Worterbuch des  Volkerrechts, De Gruyter (vol. 3, 1962) 560; see the entry entitled "Vertreibung" (Deportation).

           

            R.I. Miller, The Law of War (Lexington) 88, creates the like link between the various tribulations that mankind underwent in World War II, which he details, and the prohibition in Article 49:

           

In World War II at least 5 million persons were deported from occupied territories to Germany as part of the Nazi program of slave labor, persecution and death. Although HR-1907 does not prohibit deportation per se, its articles with respect to the safety and order of the inhabitants and requisitioning of supplies and services lead to the conclusion that forcible deportation is beyond the legitimate activities of an occupying power. The International Military Tribunal and Nuremberg and the Military Tribunals under Control Council Order no. 10, pursuant to their charters that defined "deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose" to be war crimes, held the Nazi deportations to be unlawful.... Nevertheless, forcible deportation alone was held in the Krupp Trial to be a violation of customary law, as well as deportation for an illegal purpose (for example, forced labour in the territory of the occupying power) and deportation that disregards recognized standards of decency and humanity.

 

Accordingly, GC-949 provides that "individual or mass forcible transfers" and deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power, or any other country, are prohibited regardless of motive. The total or partial evacuation of a given area is permitted if the security of the population or imperative military reasons demand.

 

(The emphasis pointing to the causal link is added - M.S.)

 

            On the developing trend in the laws of war to protect the civilian population as such and to try to distinguish effectively between it and the fighters, see also Prof. F. Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare (Leiden, 1973), 28.

           

            W. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War (New York, 1981) presents the subject in a similar context, that is, in connection with the harm caused to a civilian population by transferring it from its location and in connection with the exception regarding evacuation of civilians on security grounds or for imperative military reasons:

 

The last specific prohibition of the positive international law jus in bello to be considered, is that against forced displacement of civilians. With respect to international conflict, Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention flatly prohibits massed forcible transfers or deportations of protected persons to the territory of the occupying power or to any other country, "regardless of their motive". Article 49 then provides that "the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand".Conditions for such a transfer are to be limited to what is unavoidable.

 

            It was also pointed out that the 1949 Geneva Convention was in this respect an improvement on and an extension of the agreement on the protection of civilians signed in Berne on 25 April 1918 between Germany and France, which also included provisions on deportation and forced labour (See Coursier, supra,  at 397).

           

            I would add that joining the subject of "evacuation", as it appears in the second paragraph of Article 49, to the subject of "deportations", where the matter of "evacuation" is given as an exception to the "deportation" prohibition and both are linked by the conjunction "nevertheless", also affects the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 49. In other words, tying the evacuation of a civilian population or portions thereof, which is permissible under certain circumstances, with deportation of the population, which is prohibited, teaches us also about the substance of the subject in the first paragraph. That is, inter alia, an example of an interpretation "based on the context", to which the Vienna Convention refers.

           

            The placing of the subjects of the mass evacuation of a civilian population as such and the prohibition against deportation, side by side, is also discussed in the works of P. la Pradelle, La Conference Diplomatique Et Les Nouvelles  Conventions de Geneve Du 12 Aout 1949 (Paris, 1951) 66-67, 185 and E. Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality (Helsinki, 1984). See also J.A.C. Gutteridge, "The Geneva Conventions of 1949", 26 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. (1949) 294, 323 n. 3.

           

            The conclusion from everything said above, is that the purpose which the draftsmen of the Convention had in mind was the protection of the civilian population, which had become a principal victim of modern-day wars, and the adoption of rules which would ensure that civilians would not serve as a target for arbitrary acts and inhuman exploitation. What concerned the draftsmen of the Convention were the mass deportations for purposes of extermination, mass population transfers for political or ethnic reasons or for forced labour. This concern is the "legislative purpose" and this is the material context.

 

            It is reasonable to conclude that the reference to mass and individual deportations in the text of the Article was inserted in reaction also to the Nazi methods of operation used in World War II, in which mass transfers were conducted, sometimes on the basis of common ethnic identity, or by rounding up people in Ghettos, in streets or houses, at times on the basis of individual summonses through lists of names. Summons by name was done for the purpose of sending a person to death, to internment in a concentration camp, or for recruitment for slave labour in the factories of the occupier or in agriculture. Moreover, it seems that the summons to slave labour was always on an individual basis.

 

            (i) The gist of the Petitioners' argument is that the first paragraph prohibits any transfer of a person from the territory against his will.

           

            The implications of this thesis are that Article 49 does not refer only to deportations, evacuations and transfers of civilian populations, as they were commonly defined in the period of the last war, but also to the removal of any person from the territory under any circumstances, whether after a legitimate judicial proceeding (e.g. an extradition request), or after proving that the residence was unlawful and without permission (see, for instance, Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison Ex parte Soblen (1963)[28], which uses the term deportation, and also Starke, supra, at 386), or for any other legal reason, based upon the internal law of the occupied territory.

 

            According to the said argument, from the commencement of military rule over the territory there is a total freeze on the removal of persons, and whosoever is found in a territory under military rule cannot be removed for any reason whatsoever, as long as the military rule continues. In this matter there would be no difference between one dwelling lawfully or unlawfully in the territory, since Article 49 extends its protection to anyone termed a "protected person", and this expression embraces, according to Article 4 of the Convention, all persons found in the territory, whether or not they are citizens or permanent residents thereof and even if they are there illegally as infiltrators (including armed infiltrators), as also follows from Pictet's remarks (The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Commentary, (Geneva, ed. by J.S. Pictet, vol. 4, 1958) 47).

 

            The Petitioners' submission rests essentially on one portion of the first paragraph of the Article, i.e. on the words "...transfers ... deportations ... regardless of their motive". That is, according to this thesis, the reason or legal basis for the deportation is no longer relevant. Although the Petitioners would agree that the background to the wording of Article 49 is that described above, the Article must now be interpreted according to them in its literal and simple meaning, thus including any forced removal from the territory.

 

            (j) I do not accept the thesis described for a number of reasons:

           

            It is appropriate to present the implications of this argument in all its aspects. In this respect we should again detail what is liable to happen, according to the said argument, and what is the proper application of Article 49 in the personal sense and in the material sense.

           

            Ratione personae is appropriate in reference to the term "protected person", while ratione materiae relates to the following two foundations: "deportation" and "regardless of their motive".

           

            From the personal aspect, Article 49 refers-as was already mentioned, and as is universally accepted - to all those falling under the category of protected persons. This term is defined in Article 4 of the Convention, which in the relevant passage states:

           

Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

 

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The definition employs a negative test, i.e. for our purposes, anyone who is not an Israeli national and is found in a territory occupied by our forces, is "ipso facto a protected person. This includes an infiltrator, spy and anyone who entered the territory in any illegal manner. This interpretation is presented by Pictet in Commentary, supra,  at 47, who in reference to this matter states:

           

The Article refers both to people who were in the territory before the outbreak of war (or the beginning of the occupation) and to those who go or are taken there as a result of circumstances: travellers, tourists, people who have been shipwrecked and even, it may be, spies or saboteurs.

 

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The acceptance of the argument that the prohibition in Article 49 applies, whatever the motive for its personal application, means that if someone arrives in the territory for a visit of a limited period, or as a result of being shipwrecked on the Gaza coast, or even as an infiltrator for the purpose of spying or sabotage (and even if he is not a resident or national of the territory, for that is not a requirement of Article 4), it is prohibited to deport him so long as the territory is under military rule. In other words, the literal, simple and all-inclusive definition of Article 49, when read together with Article 4, leads to the conclusion that the legality of a person's presence in the territory is not relevant, for his physical presence in the territory is sufficient to provide him with absolute immunity from deportation. According to this view, it is prohibited to deport an armed infiltrator who has served his sentence.

 

            In order to demonstrate the implications of the Petitioners' thesis, let us presume a set of theoretical circumstances: In Ex  parte  Quirin  [27], the U.S. Supreme Court heard the appeals of six Germans, former residents of the United States, who landed on the American coast during World War II in order to carry out acts of sabotage and spying. They were all sentenced to death in 1942.

 

            The event took place in the territory of the United States; but had a similar incident occurred in an occupied territory (e.g. one of the islands held by the United States following World War II as occupied territory) after 1949, and it was decided not to execute the terrorists but to deport them back, whether in the framework of an exchange or in some other way, this would constitute, as it were, a serious violation of the Fourth Convention (Article 147). It is superfluous to add that the return of a deportee to his country of origin is not always done in accordance with his wishes, and the post-World War II examples of this abound. There is no need to go as far as the United States in order to bring examples of infiltration for sabotage purposes, and that example was intended only to illustrate the point. In any event from the thesis offered by the Petitioners, it would follow that an infiltrator for sabotage purposes could not be deported before or after serving his sentence. The same would be true, according to this approach, of a person who came for a visit over the open bridges, yet stayed beyond the expiration of his permit. The literal and simple interpretation leads to an illogical conclusion.

 

            (k) From here we shall proceed to the essence of the concept "deportation", used in the Article. It is my opinion that, in accordance with the applicable rules of interpretation, one should not view the content of Article 49 as anything but a reference to such arbitrary deportations of groups of nationals as were carried out during World War II for purposes of subjugation, extermination and for similarly cruel reasons.

 

            If, on the other hand, one accepts the proposed interpretation of the Petitioners, according to which deportation means any physical removal from the territory, then the above would apply, for instance, to deportation for the purposes of extradition of the protected person, for this too requires removing a person from the territory. Laws, judicial decisions and legal literature use, in the context of extradition, the term deportation to refer to the stage of carrying out the extradition or the rendition. A murderer who escaped to the occupied territory would have a safe haven, which would preclude his transfer to the authorized jurisdiction. As we have already shown, in light of what is said in Article 4 of the Convention, no relevance is attached to the nationality or domicile of a protected person, and the mere presence in an occupied territory of one who is not a national of the occupying state is enough to qualify him as a protected person. (The subject of the applicability of conventions in a territory under military rule is discussed, inter alia, in T. Meron's illustrative article, "Applicability of Multilateral Conventions to Occupied Territories" in Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel 1967-1980 (Jerusalem, vol. 1 ed. M. Shamgar, 1982) at 217, 218 no. 8. The idea that a broad definition of Article 49 could prevent extradition is discussed in New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts by M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch, W. A. Solf (Hague, 1982) 693, in an examination of the Geneva Protocols of 1977.)

 

            (l) Regarding the issue before us, the Petitioners have directed our attention to the remarks of Pictet in Commentary, supra, at 368, who adopts the literal interpretation, according to which all deportations are prohibited no matter what the reason. One should see this interpretive view, which would apply Article 49 to as broad a group of circumstances as possible, in its context and within its limits. The desire for a literal and simple meaning, which may find expression in scholarly opinions in professional literature, does not bind the courts. Not only are there other and contradictory viewpoints (see in this matter the remarks of Stone, which were quoted in Landau P.'s judgment in H.C. 698/80 [3]), but, more essentially, the court deals with the law as it exists and clarifies the meaning of a law or of a treaty, as the case may be, by adopting accepted rules of interpretation (see in this respect Lauterpacht, supra, at 80).

           

            Were we to adopt the rules of interpretation used in our law*, we could not accept the thesis proposed by the Petitioners. The Court would consider the flaw which the Convention was intended to correct (C.A. 31/63 [6] cited above); would examine the material context and the structure of Article 49, which in its other provisions refers clearly and openly to evacuations and transfers of population (Cr.A. 94/65 [8], C.A. 282/73 [10], and H.C. 47/83 [11]), would attempt to lift the veil from over the legislative purpose in order to adopt it as a standard of interpretation (C.A. 165/82 [9] cited above); and would be wary of and refrain from the adoption of a literal interpretation which is, so to speak, simple but in law and in fact so simplistic that it leads the language of the law or the Convention, as appropriate, to a range of applicability that confounds reason (Barak, in his above book, at p. 349), e.g. the absolute prohibition against the deportation of an infiltrator or spy, since deportations are prohibited, as it were, "regardless of their motive".

 

          Essentially, even reference to the rules of interpretation of international conventions does not help the Petitioners' argument: For even the Vienna Convention does not submit to the literal interpretation, but rather sees the words of the convention "in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" (Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention). The Convention permits us to examine the preparatory work and shies away from an interpretation whose outcome is "manifestly absurd or unreasonable", and this description would apply at once to a prohibition against the deportation of an infiltrator (Lauterpacht, Brit. Y. B. Int'l L., supra, at 89).

         

          Here it is appropriate to add that one may not adopt a broad interpretation conditionally, that is, an interpretation which invokes the broad application selectively on the basis of the results, and chooses between an outcome which is acceptable to the claimant and one which is not. Whoever accepts the literal and simple interpretation, according to which the term deportation includes any removal from the territory, and who sees the words "regardless of their motive" as a catch-all, forgoes thereby the possibility of selection, as this would lead to a contradiction; one who adopts an interpretation that precludes discretion based on differentiating the motives, cannot then at his convenience accept only part of the prohibition and reject the rest.

         

          Thus, one cannot remove the sting by saying that the language of Article 49 prohibits deportation, under Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, and which also based on the implementation of a valid municipal law, but allows, on the other hand, the deportation of infiltrators, spies and various enemy agents, or the extradition of criminals.

         

          (m) Arising out of this answer to the Petitioners' contention, is the opposite question, namely, what then is the alternate interpretation of the words "regardless of their motive"?

         

          If we interpret the term "deportation" as referring to the mass and arbitrary deportations whore descriptions are familiar to us, then the words referring to the motive do not change the essence; the reference to some possible motive simply serves to preclude the raising of arguments and excuses linking the mass deportations to, as it were, legitimate motives. In other words, whatever the motive, the basic essence of the prohibited act (deportation), to which the words of Article 49 are directed, does not change. The opposite is true: there is ground for the claim that the reference to "some motive" is also among the lessons of World War II.

         

          The words "regardless of their motive" were intended to encompass all deportations of populations and mass evacuations for the purposes of labour, medical experiments or extermination, which were founded during the war on a variety of arguments and motives, including some which were but trickery and deceit (such as relocation, necessary work, evacuation for security purposes etc...). Furthermore, the draftsmen of the Convention took into account the existing right of the military government to utilize manpower during wartime (see Regulation 52 of the 1907 Hague Regulations which deals with compulsory services, and Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which even today permits the subjection of protected persons to forced labor), but sought to clarify that mass deportation, as it had been carried out, is prohibited even when the motive is seemingly legitimate, except in the event of evacuation in accordance with the qualifications set out in the second paragraph of Article 49.

 

            It would be correct to read these words in the light of the remarks of Starke supra, at 510, according to whom one must refer to the "intention of the parties" and to the "meaning attached by them to words at the time". In the light of these principles, one can attribute to the words a reasonable interpretation that accords with the other parts of the Article. It would not be superfluous to quote Starke again (at p. 511):

           

Treaties should, it is held, be given an interpretation in which the reasonable meaning of words and phrases is preferred, and in which a consistent meaning is given to different portions of the instrument. In accordance with the principle of consistency, treaties should be interpreted in the light of existing international law. Also applying both reasonableness and consistency, since it is to be assumed that states entering into a treaty are as a rule unwilling to limit their sovereignty save in the most express terms, ambiguous provisions should be given a meaning which is the least restrictive upon a party's sovereignty, or which casts the least onerous obligations...

 

            Moreover, even the above-mentioned guiding remarks of Professor Yasseen on the subject of interpretation, are incompatible with a literal, plain and expansive interpretation of the relevant paragraph.

           

            To summarize, this court was competent to choose the interpretation resting upon the principles explained above, over the literal interpretation urged by the Petitioners. This court has done so in H.C. 97/79 [2], and I see no grounds for altering that conclusion, as its approach is acceptable to me. I also see no reasonable cause to deviate from the conclusion that served this court in H.C. 698/80 [3], and which treated the matter as conventional law.

           

            Further on, I will address the supplementary argument raised by the Petitioners on this last issue.

 

                      4.(a) This court has indicated in its judgments that the above-mentioned Article 49 is within the realm of conventional international law. In consequence of this determination, the Petitioners have now raised a new thesis which holds that this court's approach, which also forms the basis for the decisions in H.C. 97/ 79 [2] and H.C. 698/80 [3] is founded in error. This approach holds that the rules of conventional international law (as opposed to customary international law) do not automatically become part of Israeli law, unless they first undergo a legal adoption process by way of primary legislation.

         

          This argument of the Petitioners does not directly relate to the interpretation of Article 49; but it does seek to attack that part of the reasoning in our previous decisions in which this court indicated that it saw no reason to delve into the question of the substantive interpretation of the above-mentioned Article 49, since the Article only reflects conventional international law, and as such, has not been assimilated into our country's law.

         

          (b) The Petitioners submit that not only does customary international law automatically become part of the municipal law (barring any contrary legislation), but that there are also parts of conventional international law which are automatically incorporated, without the need for adoption by way of legislation as a substantive part of Israeli municipal law. These are those parts of conventional international law which are within the realm of "law-making treaties". In this argument the Petitioners based themselves on the statements of Lord McNair in two of his works (A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, 1961) 89; A.D. McNair and A.D. Watts, The Legal Effects of War (Cambridge, 4th ed., 1966) 371); on a judgment of the Court of Appeals in the matter of Porter v. Freudenberg [29]; on statements in B. Rubin's article, "The Incorporation of International Treaties into the Country's Law by the Courts", 13 Mishpatim  (1983-4) 210 and on Professor A. Rubinstein's article, "The Changing Status of the Territories...", 11 Iyunei Mishpat (1985-86) 439, 446 [see English version in 8 TeI-Aviv University Studies in Law (1988), 59]. They have also referred to portions of two articles which they believe lend support to the above-mentioned thesis: Professor H. Lauterpacht, "Is International Law A Part of the Law of England?" 25 Transactions of the Grotius Society (1939) 51; Professor F.A. Mann, "The Enforcement of Treaties By English Courts", 44 Transactions of the Grotius  Society (1958-59) 29.

         

5. (a) My conclusions, in answer to these arguments, have a threefold thrust:

 

(1) The suggested thesis does not accord with the accepted legal approach in Israel.

(2) One discerns no reasonable ground for changing or deviating from the existing legal situation, which in the light of the existing constitutional structure, is also the desired legal situation.

(3) The legal situation in England, to which the Petitioners sought to refer us (whether, in the Petitioners' words, as a binding prototype or for purposes of comparison and persuasion), is not unequivocal, and does not necessarily coincide - certainly not in everyone's opinion - with the view that the Petitioners suggested we adopt. There is much literature pointing to a lack of clarity on this subject. Even in the above two articles (those of Professor Lauterpacht and Professor Mann), the scholars' dispute on the subject is presented.

 

Let us examine the subject in the above order.

 

(b) The legal situation in Israel. Israeli law on the relationship between international law and internal law - that is in order to decide whether a given provision of public international law has become part of Israeli law - distinguishes between conventional law and customary law (Prof. Y. Dinstein, International Law and The State (Schocken and Tel-Aviv University, 1971) 143). Prof. Dinstein refers in this matter mainly to Cr.A. 174/54 [12]; Cr.A. 336/61 [13]; C.A. 25,145,148/55 [14], Cr.A. 131/67 [15].

           

            The view that reflects the accepted opinion in this court's decisions on the subject, was also presented in H.C. 69,493/81 [16], at p. 233 ff.; in the remarks of Barak J. in H.C. 393/82 [17], 793 and in the remarks of Witkon J. in H.C.390/ 79 [18], 29. See also: M. Shamgar, "Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Government - The Initial Stage", Military Government in the Territories Administered By Israel 1967-1980, supra, at 13, 47, 64, 69 and the above-mentioned article of Professor Dinstein, at 937, the last paragraph.

           

            According to the consistent judgments of this court, customary international law is part of the law of the land, subject to any contradictory provision in Israeli legislation.

           

            In Cr.A. 174/54 [12], mentioned above, Cheshin J. with whom Witkon J. concurred, spoke about "the customs of international law [i.e. customary international law -M.S.], as part of the law of the land" (ibid., p 17). In Cr.A. 336/61 [13] - following Motion no. 41/49 [19] at 145-6, and the English cases in the matters of West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. Rex [30], at 406-7, and The Cristina  [31] - the application of rules of international law accepted by the international community was recognized, and the rules were proved to be thus accepted. As Professor Dinstein has written in his above-mentioned book (at p. 146) regarding the meaning of what was said in that judgment:

           

The ruling is that rules of (customary) international law are automatically assimilated into Israeli law and become a part thereof; however, in cases of a frontal collision between such rules and the statutory law, the statutory law takes precedence.

 

            Lord Alverstone expressed the same idea in the West Rand case mentioned above when he said that in order to be considered a part of English law, a rule of international law must:

           

...be proved by satisfactory evidence, which must shew either that the particular proposition put forward has been recognised or acted upon by our own country, or that it is of such a nature, and has been so widely and generally accepted, that it can hardly be supposed that any civilized State would repudiate it.

 

            That is, in fact, a standard similar to the one adopted in the definition appearing in Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court, which deals with international custom.

           

            In the Cristina case mentioned above, Lord MacMillan demanded - as a condition for the adoption of a rule of international law-that it should have-

           

            the hall-marks of general assent and reciprocity.

            These too are accepted indicators of customary international law.

           

            (c) The status of conventional international law vis-a-vis our law is examined in C.A. 25,145,148/55 [14], where, Berenson J. states at p. 1829:

           

The Rhodes agreement is a treaty between the State of Israel and another state. Whatever the validity of such an agreement may be in terms of international law, it does not constitute a law to which our courts will have recourse or to which they will ascribe validity. The rights that it confers and the duties that it imposes are rights and duties of the states that entered into the agreement and its implementation is solely in their hands through the special means of implementing international treaties. This type of treaty is not in any way subject to the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, unless and to the extent that it, or the rights and duties deriving from it, have been refined in the melting pot of the state's legislation and have been shaped into binding law. In this sort of case, the court does not, in actual fact, require the agreement as such, but rather the Law which affixes its imprint on the agreement and breathes into it legal life in terms of our municipal law. From this it also follows that where the Law and the agreement are incompatible, even though it is clear that the Law is intended to activate and implement the agreement, the courts will prefer the Law, which alone binds them, and by which alone a judgment can be given. Furthermore, even when it is stipulated in an interstate or international agreement that defined rights are to be conferred upon certain people, the obligation under the agreement remains in the realm of an international obligation of the state and no more. The persons concerned do not acquire for themselves any actual right based on the agreement and cannot enforce this kind of a right in court, either as direct beneficiaries of the agreement or in any other way.

 

And further at p. 1831:

 

On the face of it, it seems that in the United States the practice is otherwise (and in other countries with a similar constitutional framework), but in fact that is not so. In the United States Constitution there is an express provision which bestows the status of "supreme law of the land" upon any treaty lawfully concluded in the name of the United States. For this reason federal and state courts uphold treaties and even give them precedence over other laws of the country, where those laws do not accord with the treaties. That is a direct result of the above-mentioned constitutional situation. In essence then, U.S. courts also act according to those same universal principles noted above. They also execute treaties benefiting individuals, where rights are granted to them that are realizable in court, but only in accordance with a provision of their own law; however,: because of the existence of that general provision in the U. S. Constitution, there is no need for a special provision for each individual treaty. See Edye  v. Robertson, (1884), 112 U.S. 580; 5 S.Ct. 247, 254.

 

            The clear meaning of these remarks is that the adoption of international treaties - in order to incorporate them as part of internal law and in order to render them enforceable through the national tribunals - is conditional upon a prior act of the legislator. As we shall see, international treaties may constitute a statement of the valid customary law - but then their content will be binding by virtue of the said customary status of the rule stated therein and not by virtue of its inclusion in the treaty. We shall return to this subject later in the discussion.

           

            Based on what was said in C.A. 25,145,148/55 [14], Prof. Dinstein remarks in his book, op. cit., p. 147:

...The rules of conventional international law are not automatically incorporated into Israeli law, rather there is a need for special and explicit complementary legislation in order for them to become part of Israeli law.

 

In Cr. A. 131/67 [15] Cohn J. reiterates (at p. 97) that-

...No international treaty has legislative force so long as such status has not been granted in an explicit Law of the Knesset....

 

            (d) From the remarks of Cohn J. in C.A. 65/67 [20] (see also H.C. 103/67 [21]), one might surmise that there are rules of conventional international law which are expressed in law-making treaties and which automatically become part of municipal law without the requirement of any prior legislation. Such a conclusion is founded in error. We accept the relevant classification between declarative and constitutive treaties, and one must be exact and distinguish between them. To hold the fact that an international conference or the United Nations General Assembly approves the wording of a proposed treaty and invites states to join it, is proof of the treaty's declarative nature, is less than accurate. This is clarified by Prof. N. Feinberg in "Declarative Treaties and Constitutive Treaties in International Law", 24 Hapraklit (5728 - 1967/8) 433, 435:

           

This thesis [according to which a general norm of international law is created in the above-mentioned way - M.S.], is very far-reaching, as it sees the work of codification in the area of international law, conducted today in the framework of the United Nations, to be declarative codification. It is possible that Justice Cohn was influenced here by the British approach to codification...however, this is not valid in international law, in which there is a basic distinction between a declarative treaty that transfers existing norms from the realm of customary law to that of conventional law, and a constitutive treaty that creates entirely new norms that are indeed founded in the conduct of states, yet the latter remains for the time being in the nature of a usage or practice, not yet having crystallized into a customary norm.

 

And, at p. 437:

 

Every "accepted rule of international law" or, in other words, "every general norm of international law", is rooted in international custom.

 

            Accordingly, Professor Dinstein summarizes his examination of C.A. 65/67 [20] by stating (op. cit. at p. 148):

           

In anything concerning declarative law-making treaties, the rules of international law will be automatically incorporated into the internal law, not because it is stated in the treaty, but in spite of it being stated in the treaty. They will be automatically incorporated, since the treaty reflects only existing customary international law... Even if the Supreme Court erred in the specific application of the above general principle [the reference is to C.A. 65/67 [20] - M.S.], that does not detract from or flaw the principle itself.

 

            To summarize, according to the law applying in Israel, an international treaty does not become part of Israeli law unless -

           

            (1) its provisions are adopted by way of legislation and to the extent that they are so adopted; or,

           

            (2) the provisions of the treaty are but a repetition or declaration of existing customary international law, namely, the codification of existing custom.

           

            This is the way in which Israel has approached the provisions of international treaties which are indicative of "law-making treaties" - as in the enactment of the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, 5710-1950, which was passed pursuant to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the Air Navigation (Security in Civil Aviation) Law, 5737-1977, which was passed pursuant to the 1970 Hague Conventions against the seizure of aircrafts and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation; the Sale (International Sale of Goods) Law, 5731-1971, enacted pursuant to the 1964 Hague Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods; and the Immunity and Rights (International Organisations and Special Missions) Law, 57431983, regarding which I would refer to the explanatory notes in the International Organisations (Status) Bill, 5740-1980 (enacted as the International Organisations (Status) Law, 5740-1980 and subsequently replaced by the above-mentioned Law of 1983). I mention these laws merely as oft-cited examples of lawmaking treaties (see for instance Starke, supra,  at VII, 2).

           

            (e) When applying our above remarks to the issue before us, we must remember that Article 49 has been categorized in our judgments as conventional law which does not express customary-international law. Thus it was held by Landau P. in H.C.698/80 [3] that (p. 627)-

           

...Article 49(1) of the Geneva Convention (which) is for now regarded only as a provision of conventional international law, upon which the individual cannot found his petition in a court adjudicating according to the positive law of the forum country.

 

As regards Article 49 not reflecting customary law, Landau P. adds at p. 629:

 

In fact the occupation forces in the Rhineland in Germany, after World War I, used the sanction of deportation from the occupied territory against officials who broke the laws of the occupation authorities or who endangered the maintainance, security or needs of the occupying army: Fraenkel, Military Occupation and the Rule of Law, Oxford University Press, 1944. Under this policy the French deported during the armistice following that war 76 officials and the Belgians - 12, and during the dispute over the Ruhr (1923) no less than 41,808 German officials were deported (ibid., at 130-131). In the face of these facts, it is clear that the prohibition against the deportation of civilians did not constitute a part of the rules of customary international law accepted by civilized states, as if the Geneva Convention simply gave expression to a pre-existing law.

 

            According to Fraenkel, to whom Landau P. refers above, the deportee had no right of appeal whatsoever, neither before a committee nor before a court.

           

            6. (a) I have read the interesting articles, cited above, of Rubin and of Prof. Rubinstein at p. 446, to which we were referred by the Petitioner, but I have not been convinced that we should deviate from the existing and accepted law, as expressed in the rulings of this court, on the methods of incorporating various rules of public international law into our legal system. Moreover, the existing law adequately reflects not only the prevailing, but also the desired situation, in terms of the power of the state to shape its law through its own independent legal tools. Adoption of the viewpoint suggested in the Petitioners' arguments, according to which there is no need for Knesset legislation to assimilate into our law a rule of conventional public international law which finds expression in an international treaty joined by Israel, and which is not in the nature of codification of an existing customary rule, would, in fact, grant the government legislative power, since according to our constitutional structure, the government concludes and ratifies international treaties without any approval from the Knesset. In light of such outcome of the suggested thesis, a twofold doubt arises as to whether the described interpretive innovation is indeed desirable from the viewpoint of sound administration and the rule of law.

           

            For that reason Prof. Feinberg, in his above-mentioned article (at p. 442 n. 77), links the change in the status of law-making treaties to a corresponding change in the ratification methods. This is what he says:

           

In fact, there is no chance of an arrangement under which the courts in Israel would be empowered to apply self-executing international treaties without the need for an act of adoption or inclusion, as long as there is no solution to another question, which is inseparably linked, and that is the question of the status of the Knesset regarding the entire subject of international treaty ratification. For in any such arrangement, if at the same time the power of ratification were to remain under the sole authority of the executive, the result would be a delegation of a quasi-legislative power to the executive and a blow to the principle of separation of powers. And perhaps, there is room to assume that in this field too, the tradition that has developed until now will end and the Knesset will be given the special place that the legislature is entitled to claim for itself in a proper democratic government.

 

Prof. Dinstein writes on this aspect in his book cited above (at p. 147):

 

The power to make treaties in Israel - as in England - is given to the executive authority ... and were there to be automatic incorporation of conventional international law into the existing law in Israel, it could confuse the complicated matter of separation of powers. The existing situation allows the Knesset (the legislative authority) to check the government (the executive authority) and to prevent a mixing of authorities.

 

            (b) To summarize this point: the system suggested by the Petitioners would grant the executive the power to infuse binding legal provisions into our legal system, without recourse to the legislator. This can even be learned from what was written in the above-mentioned article of Prof. Lauterpacht (in 25 Transactions of the Grotius Society, supra, at 51). The Petitioners, basing themselves on his remarks, tried to convince us of the existence, as it were, of an accepted English thesis, uniform and clear, by which law-making treaties automatically become part of the law of Britain. Prof. Lauterpacht states in the above article at p. 74:

           

If a treaty ratified and internationally valid is without force within the State unless supplemented by legislative action, then, it is asserted, International Law embodied in that treaty is not part of the law of the land. This is entirely true. The rule is obviously in the nature of an exception to the principle of incorporation. But the reasons for it lie not in any subtle intention of English Courts to take away with one hand what they grant with the other, but only and exclusively in the exigencies of British constitutional law and the division of powers within the State. It is a rule of British constitutional law that the conclusion and ratification of treaties are a prerogative of the executive. In other countries, such as the United States, the concurrence of the Legislature, or of a part thereof, is necessary for the valid ratification of a treaty. This is not the case in Great Britain. A treaty becomes binding for this country as soon as it has been finally ratified by the Crown. This being so, it might be possible for the Crown to impose burdens upon the subject, and to legislate for him, indirectly, without the concurrence of Parliament, by means of concluding a treaty (X). The existing rule which requires in such cases an enabling Act of Parliament removes that possibility.

 

And in footnote (x):

 

(X) The case of State of Missouri v. Holland, United States Game Warden, decided in 1920 by the Supreme Court of the United States, is an interesting example of a government arming itself, by means of a treaty, with powers which it did not apparently otherwise possess. In 1915 the Congress of the United States passed an Act concerning the protection of migratory birds. That act was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it interfered with the rights reserved to the member states. Thereupon the United States concluded a treaty with Great Britain for the protection of migratory birds. The Supreme Court held that a statute providing for the enforcement of that treaty was constitutional: 252 U. S. 416; Annual Digest, 1919-1922, Case No. 1. The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Att.  Gen.  for Canada v. Att.  Gen.  for Ontario and Others, 53 T.L.R. 325, is also of interest in this connection. The question was, essentially, how far can Canada enact labour legislation, in pursuance of international labour conventions, in matters reserved by the constitution to the provinces?

 

            (c) Another reason for the objection to the automatic adoption of a treaty which does not reflect customary international law, lies in the substantive and basic difference between international law and municipal law, a matter which more than once has eluded the scrutiny of jurists interpreting rules of international law. Moreover, dependence on the automatic application of law-making treaties would subordinate Israeli law to provisions which had not been adapted to the conditions of the country, its interests, and its residents. In this context one must consider the fact that among the treaties presented in the professional literature by those jurists adhering to this thesis, and brought as leading examples of law-making treaties having immediate application, are treaties adopted by the United Nations and the International Labour Organization. While wanting to refrain from generalizations, the idea that the majority in these international bodies could automatically impose upon us provisions of binding law, which would be in force unless expressly annulled by the Knesset, is not attractive.

 

                      Also the attainment of clarity in determining the substance and limits of the law will necessarily be obstructed if we adopt the suggested approach. It is generally agreed that an a-priori classification of the treaties is necessary in order to distinguish between those which apply automatically and those which require enabling legislation. Rules of differentiation and distinction are not defined clearly and simply. If we return , for example, to the remarks of Prof. Lauterpacht, he determines that the said division is "not clearly defined" (ibid., at 75), and that is one of the reasons that the subject is marked by vagueness, dissention and a lack of new and clear distinctions. In any event, the inclusion of an uncertain and unclearly defined element in our legal system does not seem desirable.

         

          (d) The problematic nature of the issue, partially presented above, did not elude the English courts, and a striking, even blunt expression thereof is found in the remarks of Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King [32], when he said (at 167-168):

         

It must be always remembered that, so far, at any rate, as the Courts of this country are concerned, international law has no validity save in so far as its principles are accepted and adopted by our own domestic law. There is no external power that imposes its rules on our own code of substantive law or procedure.

 

          Professor Lauterpacht called this approach of the courts in his country "judicial hesitancy" and sought to criticize it; however, we are not engaged here in an academic examination of the relative merits and faults of the different legal approaches, but only with the search for specific answers required for our issue, namely :

         

(1) Is there a basis for the argument raised before us that England today is governed by a different legal approach than that to which Israeli courts have turned and referred in developing our legal outlook; and -

 

(2) Is there indeed room today for a change, by way of legal interpretation, in the legal principles that we apply.

 

          What we have said above will suffice to answer these questions in the negative.

         

          7.(a) The third question which we posed above, at the outset of our discussion of the Petitioners' stated argument, concerns the legal situation in England. This subject has been largely covered above, and therefore we will deal with it here only in a nutshell.

         

          The two articles - that of Professor Lauterpacht and that of Professor Mann - do not point to the existence of a uniform and accepted thesis regarding the automatic adoption of law-making treaties. The main substance and purpose of these articles is the learned writers' confrontation with the various views, which give expression to the approach that contradicts the one suggested to us.

 

            The lack of a uniform approach, as evidenced in Professor Lauterpacht's article, has already been referred to above. Professor Manns's point of departure, as presented in his article above, is expressed in the following remarks (at pp. 3031):

           

It is a commonplace that a treaty as such cannot be a source of English law or, in other words, impose duties or confer rights on anyone except the Crown in its international relations. Were this not so the Crown would have the power of legislation. Consequently, in order to become binding upon subjects a treaty must be incorporated into the law of England by parliamentary legislation [Emphasis added - M.S.] What is sometimes loosely referred to as "ratification" will not be sufficient. Parliament may approve the conclusion of a treaty and it may even pass legislation connected with a treaty, but a treaty cannot become part of English law otherwise than by the strictly legislative process. Thus the various treaties which are known as "Documents relating to the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany: were ratified and approved by Parliament after they were signed at Bonn in May 1952 and Paris in October 1954, yet they do not form part of English law except in so far as the German Conventions Act, 1955 adopts certain of their provisions. The legal position is sumarised by a dictum of Lord Atkin which must today be regarded as locus classicus:

 

Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligation, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.

 

And at p. 45:

 

Internationally a treaty to which the Crown is a party binds the Crown even if there has been no ratification of any kind. This is elementary and probably not denied, though sometimes concealed by loose formulations. Thus, when it is said of a treaty to which the United Kingdom is a party that in order to be binding it requires legislation, what is referred to is only the binding character of the treaty in municipal law.

 

                 And at p. 45:

 

… A treaty to which the legislature has failed to attribute the force of law cannot be given that very same force by the judiciary. This point is so fundamental that it necessarily imposes severe limitations upon the ambit within which treaty obligations may constitute a head of public policy. The mere fact that a particular decision would be inconsistent with the terms of a treaty concluded by the Crown and, therefore, would involve a breach of this country's treaty obligations cannot lead to a decision in the opposite sense.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            We see no basis for drawing the conclusion that a defined and accepted thesis has been developed which establishes the automatic adoption of law-making treaties under English common law.

           

            The reference to the question of the application of the laws of war in the domestic English law also does not breach the existing reservations outlined above, but there are those who see the authority of the Crown to conduct war, to exercise powers to this end and to conclude treaties (for instance, armistice agreements) as part of the common law. Says Prof. Mann (ibid., at p. 37):

           

It would seem to follow that, if and in so far as the prerogative rights of the Crown in war-time prevail, the Crown can, by treaty no less than by proclamation, alter the common law, for to that extent it is in pursuance of the existing domestic law that the Crown alters it.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            In discussing the above-mentioned Porter case [29], he seeks to discern by way of conjecture what thesis underlay the approach of the judges who weighed there the matter of the application of Regulation 23(h) of the Hague Regulations, 1907, in the English courts. He remarks at p. 38:

           

The explanation can only be found in the view that, in the absence of any relevant restriction by Parliament of the Crown's prerogative in war-time, the Crown could by treaty alter the common law.

 

And in note 28 he adds:

 

Lord McNair, British Year Book of International Law 1928, 63 sqq. and Law of Treaties, p. 337, seems to think that the Hague regulations constitute a treaty affecting belligerent rights and therefore bind the subject. Similarly, Wade & Phillips, Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1950) assert the binding character of treaties affecting belligerent rights, because waging war comes under the prerogative. There is probably not much difference between these formulations and the statement of the rule suggested in the text. However, the conception of belligerent rights originates from public international law and is not germane to English constitutional law. The latter regards treaties as binding only if and in so far as the prerogative of the Crown prevails. If it does not prevail even treaties affecting belligerent rights cannot bind the subject.

(Emphasis added - M. S.)

 

Similarly see McNair and Watts, supra,  at 371.

 

            I do not believe that conjecture regarding the specific English constitutional situation should serve as a basis for converting the clear and well-defined Israeli legal situation to the system suggested by the Petitioners.

           

            (b) In England a law was passed in order to implement the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (The Geneva Conventions Act, 1957). On the face of it, this would appear to support the thesis that in England as well legislation is necessary in order to implement the Geneva Conventions in internal law. In Rubin's above-mentioned article, it was pointed out in relation thereto, that the purpose of the legislation was limited to the application of the rules of the war crimes convention and no more. Even this interpretation, according to which legislation is necessary only for creating provisions to enable legal proceedings in the national courts, does not necessarily support the thesis proposed to us. Moreover, the fact that the Act incorporated only provisions which are applicable in the kingdom does not mean that the rest of the provisions, dealing with the conduct of armed forces in an occupied territory, have instantly become rights enforceable in an English court. There is a question, for example, of the point of time when the stated system of rights and duties consolidates according to the proposed legal thesis, whether immediately upon ratification of the treaty at the international level, or perhaps at a later stage? And if the second possibility is preferred, the question remains - what is this later stage? As already hinted, a derivative question is why parliamentary legislation is necessary with regard to part of the treaty, in order to bind the courts, and whether in terms of such legally binding status, there is a a difference between the part that was legislated and the part that was not included in the legislation. These are interesting questions worthy of examination, but as far as we are aware, there is no uniform view on the subject in Britain either.

           

            I do not see, therefore, a need to enter into a discussion of the question, although interesting per se, whether there is a basis for adopting the conclusion reached by Lord McNair regarding the meaning, for purposes of the issue before us, of the above-mentioned judgment of the English appeals court in the Porter case [29], according to which the English courts were basically prepared to apply the provisions of the Hague Regulations even without changes in internal English law (McNair, supra,  at 89, McNair and Watts, supra,  at 371).

           

            In the portion of the Porter judgment ([29] at 878), that is in my opinion central to our issue, the argument raised before this court is presented (the question of the application of Regulation 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations as part of the common law), and the conclusion is that there is no need to resolve the question, since Regulation 23 (h) of the Hague Regulations in no way sought to change the law applying within England itself.

           

            It remains an open question, it seems, whether the court was prepared to change the interpretation of the existing municipal law on the issue of locus standi  before an English court, without any internal legislation and based solely on the Hague Regulations. From the following remarks in Porter (129] at 878), McNair, supra, concluded that the court was prepared to view the Hague Regulations as part of the common law:

           

It is impossible to suppose that this means (as it must do if the effect of the paragraph (h) [the reference is to rule 23(h) of the Hague Regulations - M.S.] is to abrogate the law existing hitherto in England and to give an alien enemy the position of a persona standi in judicio in English Courts of Law) that the War Office of Great Britain shall in the present war for this purpose issue instructions to Sir John French, commanding our land forces in the field, forbidding him to "declare" that the rights of alien enemies - Germans, Austrians, or Turks - to institute legal proceedings in the High Court of Justice in London are suspended or inadmissible. And yet this absurdity seems necessarily to follow from the scheme of the Convention as applied to paragraph (h) if the interpretation of this paragraph is that which is contended for by those who find in it an abrogation of our law, which hitherto has not given to an alien enemy the position of a persona standi in judicio.

 

Our view is that article 23(h), read with the governing article 1 of the Convention, has a very different and very important effect, and that the paragraph, if so understood, is quite properly placed as it is placed in a group of prohibitions relating to the conduct of an army and its commander in the field.

 

            With all due respect to the learned writer, I would have refrained from expressing so certain an opinion based solely upon the remarks cited above.

           

            (c) As already indicated, the views on interpretation are not uniform. Thus, for instance, O'Connell states (op. cit., at p. 24):

           

It is sometimes suggested that there is a type of treaty which is properly legislative, in the sense that it lays down the law where none existed before, tout d'un  coup [emphasis in original - M. S.] It is important that this proposition be carefully examined. True, one may cite innumerable conventions, mostly multilateral, which are now taken as international and not contractual law. One may cite the Slave Trade Conventions, the Declaration of Paris, 1856, between the combatants in the Crimean War which put an end to privateering, and most notably, of course, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva Conventions. But the point is whether nonsignatory and non-accessionary States were automatically bound by the provisions of these conventions as soon as they became operative, or whether they became bound by the rules they contain at a subsequent date when it was accepted that these rules had become part of international custom. The latter is the correct interpretation, and it is clear, then, that it is custom embodying the treaty, and not the treaty itself, which creates law as distinct from contractual rules.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The learned writer refers in his above remarks to the extent a legal obligation is binding upon states which did not sign the convention; by way of contrast, countries, which are signatories to the treaty, are obligated to adhere to their said obligations in relations inter se; however, in the system of relations between the individual and government, one can lean in court only upon rules of customary public international law. This approach formed the basis for Witkon J.'s remarks in H.C. 390/79 [18], when he said (at p. 29):

           

One must view the Geneva Convention as part of conventional international law; and therefore - according to the view accepted in common law countries and by us - an injured party cannot petition the court of a state against which he has grievances to claim his rights. This right of petition is given solely to the states that are parties to such a convention, and even this litigation cannot take place in a state's court, but only in an international forum.

 

            (d) Mr. Rubin questions in his above-mentioned article, whether grounds exist to assume that the Hague Regulations were considered at the time of signing of the Convention as merely an international obligation undertaken by the signatory state to the Regulations, and that only subsequently did they turn into binding customary international law and as such a part of the internal law. The answer to this question emerges, in my view, from the following statement in the judgment of the International Tribunal in Nuremberg (I. M. T. Judgment, supra,  at 65):

           

The rules of land warfare expressed in the convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at the time of their adoption. But the convention (Hague convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land) expressly stated that it was an attempt "to revise the general laws and customs of war" which it thus recognised to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down in the convention were recognised by all civilised nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war...

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            In other words, there has been development as regards the status of the Hague rules as customary law in the period that has elapsed since the signing of the Convention in 1907.

           

            (e) To sum up the discussion regarding the third question posed above - a change in the English approach - even if shown to have occurred - need not influence the adoption of an identical approach by us. For as has already been mentioned, the context and constitutional structure in Israel is different, and there is no justification in Israel's present constitutional dispensation for abandoning an approach that has crystallized in Israel since the establishment of the state. Moreover, there is no ground for concluding that the argument regarding the existence of a uniform and monolithic legal approach in England has been thoroughly substantiated.

           

            8. Often raised, peripherally to the discussion of the legal problems regarding the applicability of conventions, is the matter of the status of a customary rule of public international law in our internal law. The question of the nature and identification of a customary rule was discussed in detail in H.C. 69,493/81 [16] at pp. 238-242, and I therefore will not reiterate it here. However, it is worth taking note and repeating certain words of caution, which were included in the above-mentioned judgment:

           

            15. In his above cited work, the The Law of Armed Conflict (vol. 2, at 3) Prof. G. Schwarzenberger gives two necessary warning signs that must be taken into account by anyone inquiring into the existence of a binding rule under the Laws of War: One points to the tendency of creating the impression of greater certainty of the existence of binding legal rules that can be attained in the area of the Laws of War in which belligerents seek to retain for themselves, as is natural - although it may not seem so to others - the maximum freedom of action. The second warning concerns the obstacle set up by the unwarranted praise heaped on a given usage with which it is sought to dress up a particular interest with a universal rule that is inappropriate. The viewpoints of parties or sectors of states, parties interested in the upholding of a rule, do not reflect the existing law, but rather only to a description of the legal situation they desire.

 

The practical conclusion that is to be reached at this stage, is that a careful, detailed and all-inclusive examination is required, giving proper weight to various opinions on a specific subject, to determine whether we are referring to a view acceptable to the overwhelming majority, or to only one of various possible viewpoints.

 

            9. In H.C. 27/88 the Petitioner again raised the argument that Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations is not in force in Judea and Samaria.

           

            This legal argument too has already been discussed and rejected in H. C. 513, 514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5] and earlier in the above-mentioned H.C. 97/79 [2]. As stated, I see no reason to add to what has already been said in the matter.

           

            10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in H.C. 845/87 raised, toward the close of the hearing, a new contention, which was not mentioned in the petition and in the arguments voiced before us in the course of the hearing. In his opinion, the Military Commander no longer has any authority to direct the deportation of the Petitioner under Regulation 112 of the above-mentioned Regulations, since with the signing of the Peace Treaty with Egypt, the Military Government terminated and the Respondent no longer possesses the legal authority to issue such an order. Petitioner's counsel did not take the trouble, I regret, to base his contention on a reasoned legal argument. Thus, he did not explain which provisions of the Peace Treaty would lead us to the above conclusion, or what rules of law sustain them.

           

            I find the above-mentioned contention unacceptable and the reason is both short and simple. The Treaty of Peace between Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt was accompanied by an additional agreement between the states that concluded it namely A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David. According to this agreement, it was determined, inter alia, that further developments would ensue in the deployment of the Military Government at a certain stage, which need not be spelled out here, in the implementation of the said agreement. What emerges from this agreement is that as long as the said stage has not arrived, the Military Government continues to function. There is no indication that the powers which signed the Peace Treaty had decided upon the abolition of the Military Government either at that time or at a subsequent stage prior to this time.

 

            This court has already ruled that as long as the military force exercises control over the territory, the laws of war will apply to it (H.C. 102,150,593,690/82; 271/83, Tzemel  and Others v. Minister of Defence,  [22] at 373):

           

The application of the provisions of the laws of war regarding the powers and obligations of a military force that has taken effective control of an area lying beyond the jurisdiction of its country's applicable law, can also be the result of belligerent action which provides the military force with control over a state against which it is not waging a war.

 

The court further stated at p. 374:

 

...even where the territory is seized from a country with whom a state of belligerency exists (an armistice agreement does not terminate a state of belligerency) at the time the military forces enter and seize effective control. If an agreement was subsequently signed, such as an agreement terminating the state of belligerency, the transfer of the territory, the powers, or both, to the previous authority is disposed of in accordance with the terms of the said agreement. However, as long as the military force exercises control in the territory, the powers granted it and the limitations imposed upon it by virtue of the laws of war, remain in effect. This, of course, is entirely subject to the arrangement agreed upon by the duly authorized political bodies.

 

See also H.C. 574/82 [23].

 

            For our purposes it similarly emerges that, irrespective of the fact that a peace treaty has been signed, so long as the Military Government has not left the Gaza Strip and the relevant parties have not agreed otherwise, the Respondent continues to hold the territory by force of belligerent occupation and is subject to the laws of customary international law that apply in war-time.

           

            11. Let us now turn to the specific submissions of each of the Petitioners:

           

            12. H.C. 785/87: (a) The Petitioner Abd al Nasser Abd al Aziz Abd al Affo,  born in 1956, is a resident of the town of Jenin.

           

            The deportation order was issued by Maj.-Gen. A. Mitzna, Commander of I.D.F. Forces in Judea and Samaria on 3 September 1987, while the Petitioner was serving a prison sentence that was to terminate on 20 September 1987. The full text of the order reads as follows:

           

By virtue of my authority under Regulation 112 (1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, and my authority under any law or security legislation, and whereas I believe the matter is necessary to ensure the security of the Region, public welfare and public order, I hereby order that:

 

Abd  al Nasser  Abd  al Affo  Muhamad  Abd  al  Aziz , I. D. no. 94808545, born in 1956, from the town of Jenin, be deported from the Region.

 

Abd al Nasser Abd al Afro Muhamad Abd al Aziz is a senior operative in the "National Front" organization, who has been sentenced three times in the past to prison terms for his terrorist activity. He is about to finish a third prison term of five years and three months. During his stay in prison, he assiduously continues his hostile activity in order to further the purposes of the organization.

 

            (b) After the deportation order was served, the Petitioner applied to the Advisory Committee which operates under Regulation 112 (8) of the above-mentioned Regulations (in a number of documents and previous petitions, this body is called an "Advisory Board"). The Committee was composed of the President of the Military Courts in Judea and Samaria, as chairman, and two additional officers holding the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The Committee heard the Petitioner and his learned counsel and also the Respondent's counsel in the course of four sessions, during which it was also furnished with the information on which Maj.-Gen. Mitzna relied in reaching his decision. Part of this information was unclassified, and part was classified for security reasons and therefore not brought to the attention of the Petitioner. The Respondent was also presented with a long list of written questions by learned counsel for the Petitioner, which the Respondent answered, as the Committee noted in its decision, subject to the security limitations. These questions and answers were also brought before the Committee. The detailed and reasoned decision of the Committee given on 28 October 1987, stated, inter alia:

 

According to the statement of the Respondent's counsel, the activity of the Applicant began in 1972 when he was studying in high school. He was involved in the theft of a mimeograph machine which was used for duplicating posters. In the years 1975-76, he took part in inciting students to demonstrate in Jenin. In December 1976 he was detained for questioning and in the course of it he admitted to organizing demonstrations and incitements. He was sentenced to three years in prison, of which seven months were actual confinement. In February 1979 he was again arrested and he admitted recruiting people for the Popular Front organization. He was tried in Case Sh. 7033/79 and was sentenced to three years in prison, of which nine months were actual confinement. In April 1980 he took part in elections at Najah University as a representative of the Popular Front. In June 1980 he incited youths to engage in a demonstration, in the course of which stones and bottles were thrown at I.D.F. soldiers and a Palestinian flag was flown. In November 1980 he took part in a student strike against the activities of the Military Government in Ramallah. In November 1980 he participated actively in disturbances, in the course of which road blocks were erected and stones were hurled at I.D.F. soldiers. He acted similarly a month later. Since then and on various additional occasions up until July 1982, as detailed in the unclassified material, the Applicant was reported to have been active in recruiting students for Najah University from among the supporters of the National Front organization (1980). He incited a strike to halt studies and delivered speeches on behalf of the Popular Front. He was an organizer of demonstrations and strikes. At a number of these disturbances, road blocks were erected and rocks were hurled at I.D.F. forces and once at an Israeli bus. In one of the gatherings held in honour of Fatah Day (January 1982), the applicant spoke of revolution and of the unification of all the organizations.

 

In July 1982 the Applicant was arrested and in the course of his interrogation admitted that he was recruited to the Popular Front. In the charge sheet against the Applicant in August 1982, it was stated that beginning in February or March 1981, the Applicant renewed his active membership in the terrorist organization called the "National Front". It was also stated that the Applicant was appointed to head the political wing of that organization at Najah University in Nablus. Further, it was stated in that same indictment that at the end of 1981, the Applicant recruited two additional members to the organization. The Applicant admitted what was attributed to him in the indictment. He was convicted and sentenced to three years of actual confinement. Additionally, his suspended sentence of two years and three months was activated to be served consecutively. Thus, the Applicant was to serve a sentence of five years and three months actual imprisonment. This is the penalty which the Applicant is about to complete serving in the coming days.

 

In its sentence, which was submitted to the Advisory Board and marked Exhibit 1, the court noted as follows:

 

Barely a year and a half has elapsed since the accused was released from prison, and the accused has again engaged in crime and committed the violations which are the subject of this case. This court has decided on more than one occasion to exercise severity in the cases of recidivist offenders who did not learn the proper lessons from the sentences imposed on them in the past, did not fulfil the conditions of the suspended sentences and returned to their errant ways. More rare is the case of an accused who has already been sentenced twice in the past for security offences, yet is ready to carry on and to continue his association with a hostile organization, compounding his transgression by recruiting others.

 

As may be recalled, it has been contended by counsel for the Respondent that even in prison he continued his activities to further the goals of the organization. Because the classified material is highly sensitive, it cannot be made public, save for the fact that in February 1985 - from deciphering a note which a prisoner attempted to smuggle out during a family visit - a report concerning the activity of the security prisoners in the prison was uncovered. The Applicant apparently signed the report ... The Applicant began serving as a leader of the Popular Front in Jenin. He attained this status when he arrived in prison and retains it to this day. Furthermore, since the 80's, the Applicant has been among of the leaders of the Popular Front organization in the Judea and Samaria Region.

 

            (c) The Petitioner contended that although he did participate in demonstrations, he never took part in violent activities or instigated others to carry them out. He also denied any illicit activity while in prison.

           

            (d) The classified material that was presented to the Committee attested, in its opinion, to the senior status of the Petitioner in the above-mentioned organization and to his modes of operation both inside prison and those conducted from prison and directed outside. Counsel for the Respondent noted before the Committee that before the issue of the order, a less severe measure, such as administrative detention, was considered. However, this alternative was rejected. For in view of the intensive activity of the Petitioner while in prison, this alternative was shown to be totally ineffective in his case.

 

            Regarding the nature and quality of the evidence presented, the Committee noted the following:

           

The reliability of the material was examined by us, as was the method of gathering the material and the weight assigned it. Similarly, we examined the work methods of the Intelligence Service until the information was consolidated. On the basis of our examination and on the basis of clarifications which we received from representatives of the General Security Service, we have no hesitation in determining that this information is reliable, substantiated and well-supported by evidence that conforms to the requirements for the production of evidence in administrative proceedings such as these, as it is clear, unequivocal and convincing.

 

            After the Committee addressed itself in detail to the contentions of counsel for the Petitioner regarding the exercise of authority under Regulations 108 and 112 of the Regulations and the way in which the Committee operated, the Committee summed up its opinion in these terms:

           

We have before us an Applicant [i.e. the Petitioner - M.S.] whose is involved in activity of such nature that, along with his role, seniority and status in the Popular Front organization, transform him into a person whose presence and continued activity pose a tangible danger to the security of the Region. The Applicant has not learned any lessons from the past. Placing him on trial three times has been to no avail. For even while in prison he continued his work to further the purposes of the organization. The material presented to us indicates the Applicant's intention to continue his activities in order to secure his standing and advancement in terms of his level of seniority.

 

We have been persuaded that the Applicant is intimately involved in Popular Front circles. He is a part of the organization and has influence within it. Similarly, we are convinced that we are not dealing with a onetime activity that was perpetrated by the Applicant, but with protracted activity that has taken place over a number of years. As mentioned, the Applicant was termed a leader of the Popular Front in the prison, and, since the beginning of 1980, he is a member of the leadership of the Popular Front in the Judea and Samaria Region.

 

After seriously considering the arguments of the parties, we have been persuaded that the considerations of the Regional Commander and the grounds for the issuance of the order were pertinent and within the purview of his authority as defined in Regulation 108 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 and were intended to ensure public welfare, the security of the Region and the maintenance of public order within it.

 

Therefore, we have reached the conclusion that a material security justification exists for adopting this measure of deportation against the Applicant.

 

            The Committee also recommended that the Regional Commander again review the statements of the Petitioner and his counsel before the Committee. In those statements the Petitioner consented to submit to a protracted sentence or to forced transfer to another place of residence and promised not engage in any illicit activity, provided the deportation would not be carried out.

           

            (e) When the Respondent decided on 1 November 1987, in consultation with advisers on legal and security matters, to continue the deportation procedures, the Petitioner, on 6 November 1987, turned to this court.

           

            (f) The Petitioner raised in his petition a number of general legal points, which I have addressed above. He additionally contested the weight of the evidence produced against him and especially its true significance. In his opinion, he had engaged purely in legitimate and open activity, and one should not ascribe to him actions whose seriousness would justify so grave a measure as was decided upon on this occasion.

           

            (g) The State's response, as presented to us and as put forward in a statement by the State Attorney's Office, can essentially be summed up by the following arguments:

           

The terrorist organizations, including the Popular Front of which the Applicant is a member, are striving to build up an infrastructure in the Judea and Samaria Region that is intended to undermine security and the control that I.D.F. forces exercise in the Region, and their ultimate goal is to take control of the entire Region and even beyond.

 

The Respondent, as Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Region, is dutybound to act to the best of his ability to frustrate this process and ensure security and public order, and this indeed is one of the central purposes of Regulations 108 and 112(1).

 

The Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Judea and Samaria Region is convinced that the deportation of the Petitioner from the Region will enable the Commander of I.D.F. Forces in the Region to fulfil the obligation upon him by virtue of his position and will result in the cessation of the Petitioner's hostile activity in the Region.

 

The opinion of the Respondent is that less severe measures, such as issuing an administrative detention order or placing the Petitioner on trial, are not appropriate for the Petitioner under the circumstances.

 

For even during the course of his last prison sentence that extended, as stated, for over five years, the Petitioner transformed his very stay in the prison into a broad vista for hostile activity.

 

Administrative detention, by its very nature, is intended either to frustrate a concrete evil that could be created by a certain person's activity or to prevent a relatively short term phenomenon. By contrast, the harm in which the Petitioner is involved is continuous, since he occupies a senior position in the terrorist organization.

 

In view of his continuous hostile activity, the Petitioner constitutes a protracted danger, which can be feasibly frustrated solely by means of deportation.

 

            (h) With the consent of learned counsel for the Petitioner, this court was apprised in the absence of the Petitioner and his counsel, of those items of evidence that were classified, pursuant to a certificate issued by the Minister of Defence, in accordance with Section 44 of the Evidence Law (New Version), 5731-1971. As mandated under section 44 and on the basis of the above-mentioned consent of the Petitioner, we heard explanations from learned counsel for the State and from representatives of the Security Service. We examined the possibility of disclosing additional elements of the classified material to the Petitioner and we announced our negative conclusion in our decision of 15 February 1988.

           

            (i) As a direct outcome of studying both the unclassified and the classified material, the Court has formulated its opinion that it cannot find any justification for intervening in the factual and pertinent conclusions that the Respondent drew and that the Advisory Committee drew subsequently with regard to the character, scope and purposes of the activities of the Petitioner and the degree of danger that they posed for security. We were persuaded that the Respondent had clear, unequivocal and persuasive evidence, and even the classified evidence, as stated, was brought to our attention. The consistent activity of the Petitioner for and on behalf of the terrorist organization emerges from this evidence.

           

            The court's clear conclusion is that the Respondent could have arrived at the conclusion which he reached.

           

            13. H.C. 845/87:

            (a) Abd al Aziz Abd Alrachman Ude Rafia, born in 1950, is a resident of Gaza.

           

            On 15 November 1987 a deportation order was issued against him, reasoned as follows:

           

This order is issued since the above serves as a spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip, which supports a violent Islamic revolution on the Iranian model, armed struggle and the liberation of Palestine through Jihad.  In the framework of his sermons in the mosques, he calls for action against the Israeli rule by military struggle.

 

            Immediately upon the issue of this order, the Petitioner was arrested and jailed in Gaza. The Petitioner applied to the Advisory Committee, which functions under Regulation 112(8) of the above-mentioned Regulations, and the hearing before the Committee took place on 19 November 1987.

           

            (b) The Petitioner was represented before the Advisory Committee by five attorneys.

           

            Counsel for the Respondent described the hostile activity of the Petitioner in the past, including his conviction for membership in an illegal organization and incitement, and regarding his activity following his release from prison, counsel stated, inter alia,  as follows:

           

The Appellant was released from prison on 30 July 1985. Despite the sentence that he had served and the suspended sentence pending against him, he persisted in similar activity; that is, since June 1985, numerous complaints have been filed against him, which are detailed in the order. The unclassified facts are as follows: In May 1986, at the Friday prayer marking the opening of Ramadan in al Kasam Mosque, the Appellant delivered a sermon of a nationalist character, in the course of which he accused the authorities of fanning local disputes, of stirring up emotions and of planting spies whom one had to identify and act against. Moreover, he warned that the authorities intended to perpetrate in the Region what they had done in Lebanon. The Appellant delivered his statement in his capacity as Immam of the mosque. In June 1986 the Appellant actively participated, together with other religious people from the Region, in the disturbances that took place on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The disturbances occurred on 3 June 1986, during a Moslem religious festival, and this was a real incident in the course of which a number of investigation files were opened. The Appellant was not investigated at this stage. Information received in July 1986 revealed that the Appellant was found consorting with those responsible for the Islamic Jihad in Gaza. An additional item of information in this vein is from October 1986, according to which three people were appointed to direct the activity of the Islamic Jihad in Judea and Samaria. They were in turn subordinate to the Appellant and his brother Salman. As this is related to the Islamic Jihad  organization, I will present material further on.

 There are three items of information from November 1986 dealing with the investigation of three members of the Islamic Jihad, who were accused of the sabotage incident against the Givati soldiers in Jerusalem. The three gave evidence separately. One of them visited the Appellant in Gaza before the incident, without indicating a connection between the Appellant and the incident. The other two said the same. An item from February 1987 reports that in a religious instruction that the Appellant transmitted over the mosque loudspeaker, he noted, among other things, that there are parents who view their children who throw stones as hooligans, but in the Appellant's opinion, a stone is like a bullet and the children are not hooligans.

 An item from March 1987 deals with a sermon delivered by the Appellant in a mosque on 6 February 1987 in which he spoke of the Jordanian five-year plan. He rejected the plan with the comment that the Palestinians had no need for financing, nor for strengthening the Israeli conquest and rule; rather they had a need for liberty and for expelling the occupation.

 In a religious instruction given on 10 February 1987, he expressed support for Iran and came out strongly against Iraq and Israel.

 In a sermon on 27 February 1987, the Appellant called upon the believers to continue the struggle, because this was an opportunity to arouse believing residents to struggle.

 The Appellant spurned the requests that were directed to him to cease these disturbances. In the investigation of a suspect from Rafiah in January 1987, the person interrogated divulged that he was recruited for the Islamic Revolutionary Movement by Fathi Brij Jacki, who was a prisoner sentenced for membership in the Islamic Jihad. That same suspect divulged that Fathi stipulated to him that should he be arrested, the Appellant would replace him, and the suspect would have to coordinate with the Appellant the attendance of youths at the Friday sermons.

 On 5 June 1987 in the Bet Lahiya mosque, the Appellant delivered an address to mark 20 years since the Six Day War. He incited to Jihad, called for the liberation of Jerusalem and urged his followers to continue the struggle and not surrender even if they be injured.

 On 9 October 1987, in the course of the Friday afternoon prayer in his Gaza mosque, he devoted the sermon to the four terrorists who were killed in clashes with the security forces and, inter alia,  stated the following:

 

The worshippers should take the four slain terrorists as an example and engage in struggle as they did. The individual must overcome his private interests and act against the authorities for the sake of the general Islamic interests. The worshippers ought to adopt the path of armed struggle even if it might cost them their lives.

 

In the course of the sermon, proclamations were disseminated among the worshippers that included the portraits of the slain terrorists and a message similar to the one just mentioned. I would like to present two proclamations that were disseminated on that occasion, together with a translation. There is a problem at this stage in presenting the translation. I wish to waive the presentation of the translation at this stage.

The proclamations will be designated as Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3. The investigation report of October 1987 states that on 1 October 1987 in the afternoon sermon in his Gaza mosque, the Appellant remarked that Islam is the religion that calls for Jihad. Those present must go forth and struggle as God wills. Those present must unite in order to expel the foreign conqueror. At the end of October 1987, the Appellant took part in a memorial ceremony for two attorneys who were murdered in Gaza a few months ago. The two were identified as supporters of the Islamic Jihad. In the ceremony the Appellant delivered a speech, in which he stated, inter alia, that blood must be requited by blood. The report of November 1987 on the interrogation of M.F. of Jelazun, in the Ramallah area reveals that he indicated that he and the members of his cell were members of the Islamic Jihad and that they had visited the Appellant in Gaza, who knew of his activities in the Islamic Jihad.

In a sermon at his mosque on 6 November 1987, the Appellant called upon God to pour down fire on the enemies, for He always sides against the tyrants.

 From some of the items of information that I have detailed and will detail later, it cannot be said that the preachings of the Appellant were addressed solely to the Israeli authorities. But preachings which call for violent activity and civil disorder in the context of religious extremism, including actions against persons suspected of heresy to Islam, as well as against stores which carry abominable movies or against weddings where western music is played - these activities also severely harm the security of the Region, because there was resort to fire arms and casualties were caused .

 At this stage I would like to present two documents. The first is the expert opinion of a General Security Service officer regarding the Islamic Jihad.  It is identical to what has been presented in the past in the trials of members of the Islamic Jihad and is in the possession of the defence attorneys - marked as Exhibit 4.

 In addition, I would like to present a personal profile and impression of the Appellant that was prepared by the Advisor on Arab Affairs of the Region's civil administration, on the basis of the material in his possession, as well as a meeting he held with the Appellant. As stated, this document is a precis of the Appellant's personality and activities.

 

            In addition, counsel for the Respondent also brought before the Committee classified material containing detailed information on the Petitioner's activity that endangered security. This information was presented subsequently to this court, with the consent of counsel for the Petitioner (in the absence of the Petitioner or his counsel), and with respect to which we rendered our decision of 15 February 1988.

           

            The Committee noted in its reasoned and detailed decision, inter alia, as follows:

           

The Applicant is mentioned as responsible for the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and perhaps beyond that area. He is depicted as a guide of that organization and as an influential figure among the residents of the area in general, and among those who belong to that organization in particular. They look to him constantly and often wait by his doorway to hear his word. He acquired this status through his activities as a lecturer at the university and as a preacher in the mosque, where he delivered extremist religious and nationalist addresses laden with incitement and hatred against Israeli rule. These more than once called for violent struggle, including encouragement of civil disorder and even extreme acts of violence, such as murder. There is no doubt, therefore, that the Applicant constitutes an actual danger to the security of the Region and its inhabitants and to the maintenance of public order; further, that the deportation order was given, within the framework of considerations enumerated in Regulation 108 of the Regulations... The question remains whether in the Applicant's case, the most severe measure, namely deportation, is called for.

 

In view of the Applicant's "history" and personality, we are convinced that the answer to this question is affirmative. The Applicant was subject in the past to various restrictions because of his activity, was even tried and has served a prison sentence. However, despite all this, he did not mend his ways and continued precisely along the path upon which he had embarked previously. In the course of time, he even extended his influence and acquired a greater following of believers.

 

The Applicant has impressed us as a man of strong character, who totally believes in the righteousness of his ways and, therefore, there is no chance that in the foreseeable future he will desist from his dangerous activity. We do not believe that any restrictions imposed upon him will suffice to prevent the continuation of his negative influence on the residents of the Region.

 

Even his incarceration (e.g. by way of administrative detention), will not counter his influence. There is ground to fear that precisely in such a place will he be even more accessible to the extremists among his followers, and that his stay in prison will have a most dangerous and negative influence on what takes place both within the prison and outside it.

 

The most efficient and suitable measure in this case is, therefore, to deport the Applicant outside the Region and the country.

 

Even if he be free to go about in a foreign land, with no one to constrain him, his harmful influence on the Region would be immeasurably smaller and less perceptible and immediate than would be the case, were he to walk about in our midst.

 

            (c) When the Committee rejected the application of the Petitioner and recommended on 25 November 1987 that the deportation order be upheld, the Petitioner turned to this court.

           

            His biography was described in his petition in these terms:

           

3.a. The Petitioner bears I.D. card no. 92118635, was born in 1950, and is a permanent resident of Gaza. He is married and the father of 5 minor children.

 

b. In 1970 the Petitioner traveled to Cairo with the consent of the Israeli military authorities to pursue academic studies. In 1975 he completed his studies for a master's degree on the subject of the Islamic Sharia.

 

c. Between the years 1976-1981, the Petitioner served as a teacher in the Emirate of Shajah in the Persian Gulf.

 

d. During the course of his study and work outside the Region, the Petitioner would intermittently visit his family in the Gaza Strip.

 

e. In 1981 the Petitioner returned permanently to Gaza, his place of domicile. He was hired as a lecturer on Islamic Sharia at the Islamic University of Gaza and served in the post of Immam  at one of the mosques of Gaza. In the framework of this position, he delivered sermons during the Friday prayers at the mosque.

 

f. In September 1983, a six month supervision order was issued against the Petitioner. It was extended for another six months (up to September 1984). Under these orders the Petitioner was prohibited. inter alia,  from entering the Islamic University where he worked.

 

g. The Petitioner appealed against the orders. His first appeal, however, was struck out due to his non-appearance. The second appeal was heard in June 1984 and dismissed.

 

h. In October 1984 the Petitioner was put on trial before the Military Court in Gaza, on charges of membership in an illegal organization (Regulation 85 (1) (a) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations) and of incitement (Section 7 of the Order Prohibiting Acts of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda).

 

i. The Petitioner was convicted on the second offence - incitement and membership activity, and was sentenced to 11 months of actual imprisonment, from the date of arrest, and to an additional suspended sentence. He was released from prison in July 1985.

 

j. Following his release he returned to work at the Islamic University and to his post as Immam.

 

            (d) As stated, all the evidentiary material, including the classified material, was presented to us.

           

            Respondent no. 1, O/C Southern Command, noted in the affidavit that he submitted to us:

           

The decision to deport the Petitioner from the Region was taken after all parties responsible for the security of the Region, its welfare and proper administration, including military and security personnel at the highest military, security and political echelons, consulted and seriously examined the need for deportation. All were convinced that the status, position and activity of the Petitioner in the Islamic Jihad movement dictate today the adoption of this grave and extreme measure of deportation.

 

The copious evidentiary material accumulated by the security authorities was presented to the above-named parties and to me, and it sufficed to persuade me unequivocally that the Petitioner serves as the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip, a movement which supports a violent revolution on the Iranian model and an armed struggle and the liberation of Palestine through Jihad. In the framework of his sermons in the mosques, the Petitioner calls for action against the Israeli rule by means of military struggle.

 

            The facts as presented to us clearly and persuasively attest to the consistent and hostile activity of the Petitioner, and they directly refute the contentions and denials of the Petitioner. The sole possible conclusion is that this material was, as the court requires, clear, unambiguous and convincing.

           

            We find no basis for the contentions as to lack of good faith or arbitrariness, and can discern from the proceedings up to now that, with respect to the question here deliberated, the authorities acted cautiously, upon thorough examination and with discretion.

           

            I therefore see no grounds for intervention by this court in the decision of Respondent no. 1.

           

            14. (a) H.C. 27/88:

           

            (a) The Petitioner, J'mal Shaati Hindi , is a resident of Jenin and is studying at Al Najah University. On 1 December 87 a deportation order was issued against him reasoned as follows:

           

J'mal Shaati Yunis Hindi is a senior operative in the Al Fatah  organization and the focus of his hostile activity is in the city of Nablus in general and at Al Najah University in particular. He was sentenced to four years of actual imprisonment for his terrorist activity and was subject to a restriction order for a year and a half and to a nine month period of administrative detention. During that entire time he continued intensively to act in furtherance of the organization, both inside and outside prison.

 

            He applied to the Advisory Committee and this body heard the submissions of counsel for the Petitioner and of course for the Respondent, who produced the evidence that assisted the Regional Commander in making his decision. A portion of the evidence was submitted by the security authorities in the absence of the Petitioner or his counsel.

           

            The disclosed facts against the Petitioner, as subsequently summarized in the decision of the Advisory Committee, were as follows:

           

The hostile activities of the applicant began in 1976. In that year, the applicant was among a group of youths who incited students in Jenin to demonstrate, and the windows of the school were shattered. The applicant was among those who organized demonstrations in the Jenin refugee camp.

 

In July 1976 doctrinal material regarding the Al Fatah  organization was found in the applicant's home.

 

In August 1976 the applicant was arrested and interrogated. He admitted that about a year earlier he had been recruited to the Al Fatah organization. He received a code name and recruited additional activists. Together with members ... (not clear) he trained in laying sabotage charges and even prepared an explosive charge himself. The applicant also knew of the location of a box of bullets, kept by one of his companions. During that same period he participated actively in organizing demonstrations, erecting road blocks, throwing rocks and setting fire to tires.

 

On the basis of the investigation material and the admission of the accused, he was tried, convicted and sentenced to four years of actual imprisonment.

 

 In July 1980 the applicant completed his sentence and was released from prison. A few of months after his release, in April 1981, the applicant took an active part in organizing "Palestine Week" at Najah University, sponsored by Al Fatah.

 

In a demonstration that took place in November 1981, at Najah University, the applicant was one of the leading activists. In the course of the demonstration, stone road blocks were erected and rocks were hurled at a military force that arrived on the scene. A similar demonstration in which the applicant was active took place that same month.

 

During the months of March and June 1982, the applicant was again involved in disturbances in which he played an active role. In this period the applicant was arrested twice. From the interrogation of an Al Fatah activist in October 1982, it emerged that the applicant headed the volunteer youth committee of the Fatah in the Jenin refugee camp. In January 1983 a celebration marking the anniversary of the establishment of the Fatah was held at Najah University. Four thousand people participated in that celebration. The applicant was among those active in organizing the celebration. In January 1983 the applicant again took part in throwing stones at I.D.F. forces.

 

On 19 April 1983 a special supervision order was issued against the applicant for a period of six months. In May 1983 he was again involved in disturbances. The original supervision order was extended for another six months, commencing 19 October 1983; and on 19 April 1984 it was extended for yet another six months.

 

In August 1984 the applicant was a member of Lijnat A'Shabiba in the Jenin refugee camp. In August 1985 an administrative detention order was issued against the applicant for six months, but following his appeal, the period of administrative detention was shortened to three months. With his release from administrative detention, a celebration was held in his honour in May 1986, in the course of which songs were sung in support of Al Fatah. In July 1986 the applicant was among the senior operatives of the A'Shabiba  movement at Najah University.

 

On 8 January 1987, the applicant spoke to an Al Fatah Day event at Bir Zeit University, and extended greetings to mark the day. On 12 June 1987 the applicant was placed under administrative detention for a period of six months.

 

            In July 1987, a day before the student council elections, the applicant presented the Shabiba candidates to the students of Najah University and called for continued nationalism and struggle, including armed struggle. Toward the end of November 1987, the applicant was again arrested for his involvement in disturbances at the Jenin refugee camp.

 

According to the material, the applicant's name came up in the interrogation of a member of a youth committee in Jenin, as one of those responsible for Shabiba activities in the Jenin refugee camp.

 

            The above was a precis of the unclassified material presented by counsel for the Respondent. In addition to this material, a large collection of classified material was brought before the Advisory Committee.

           

            The Petitioner denied all involvement in a terrorist organization and attributed the issueance of the order to a desire to hamper him in expressing his political views. The Advisory Committee had this to say in its decision of 27 December 1987:

           

The statement of the applicant is totally belied by what we have found in the copious material, both classified and unclassified, that was presented to us. As opposed to the sweeping and blanket denial of the applicant, we found in the body of the material details concerning his activity and standing in the AI Fatah  organization. In closed hearings, clarifications were received regarding the method in which the material was gathered and the reliability of the sources. We were persuaded that the sources of the information are numerous and that most of the the important items of information were received from diverse sources and corroborated. We were persuaded that the evidence presented to us meets the requirements set in the case law, being clear, unequivocal and persuasive (H.C. 513,514/85, Nazzal  and Others v. Commander of I.D.F.  Forces in the Judea  and Samaria  Region, 39 (3) P.D. 645). In examining the material, we took into consideration the fact that it is difficult for the applicant to defend himself against material that is not brought to his attention and, therefore, we exercised special caution.

 

The import of our above determination is that the applicant's course of conduct is totally at odds with the description he presented to us and upon which his counsel relied. We are dealing with a person holding a senior position in the AI Fatah organization and with connections in the organization. His modus operandi is sophisticated. He refrains from appointments to official positions to avoid exposure, but is fully involved in what is going on. His main activity is to take an active part in organizing demonstrations and violent disturbances, in some of which rocks were thrown at military forces and road blocks were set up. The applicant is a person of standing, power, influence and ability to instigate and bring about relatively large scale disturbances in those centres where he is active and known.

 

As emerges from the material, the applicant's activity continued over a period of years. He was imprisoned for four years for terrorist activity; he was subject to special supervision orders and was placed under administrative detention, but he did not cease his hostile activities. He continued them intensively and on one occasion when he participated in a disturbance he suffered injury from a bullet fired at his leg.

 

The applicant's activity has continued up until recently and from a perusal of the material one can gauge not only his sense of determination to act and to engage others in violent ways in order to further the goals of the organization in whose framework he functions, but one can also discern in him a person who has decided to make such activity his life's goal. We have been persuaded that he is likely to pose a tangible and lasting danger, due not solely to his growing stature, but also to the range and type of his activity, which reflects a method for realizing the armed struggle that the applicant propounds.

 

In light of the aforesaid, there is no basis for the contentions of the applicant and his counsel that the order was issued purely for a political view expressed. The applicant's activity and its inherent danger to the security of the Region, was the basis for the issue of this order. There is no need to dwell on the danger that could result from this type of activity in which the applicant is engaged. Violent demonstrations and disturbances gravely effect the Region's security and the maintenance of public order. and prevent securement of the public welfare.

 

We have no doubt that material and decisive security considerations prompted the issuance of the order against the applicant.

 

            After the Committee recommended upholding the deportation order, the Petitioner turned, on 12 January 1988, to this court.

           

            (b) The material upon which we must base our decision is that which was presented openly before the Petitioner and the Advisory Committee, because in this case we were not requested to examine the evidence for which a certificate of privilege was issued in accordance with Section 44 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971.

           

            The Petitioner did not submit an appeal in the regular manner prescribed in the latter part of Section 44 of the above-mentioned Ordinance, as distinguished from the method of review by the bench that is hearing the matter, a method that depends upon the agreement of the parties. The legal significance of the matter is that the Petitioner cannot today contest the justification for classifying the evidence (as opposed to challenging the justification for the deportation order). What implication does this have? The legislature authorized the Minister of Defence to attest by a signed certificate that the presentation of certain evidence could harm state security. The legislature also left the affected party an opening to try and persuade a judicial authority that the need for disclosing the evidence in order to do justice takes precedence over the need for withholding it, i.e. that the classification of the evidence is unjustified. Once a party has refrained from requesting disclosure of the evidence in the prescribed manner so that it could be decided statutorily by the competent judicial authority - that is, having abandoned the avenue of appeal established in the Evidence Ordinance (New Version) - his claim, that preference be given to considerations supporting disclosure of the evidence over considerations supporting the maintenance of secrecy, cannot in any case be argued before us.

           

(c) In his petition, the Petitioner repeatedly claims that there is nothing in the arguments or the evidence to justify the adoption of such a severe and far reaching measure as deportation.

 

            He has contested the legality of issuing a deportation order, a matter that we have discussed above, and has disputed the existence of a justification for issuing it in his specific case. The Respondent's reply submitted to us quotes the above-mentioned statement of the Committee, namely:

           

The applicant's course of conduct is totally at odds with the description he presented to us and upon which his counsel relied. We are dealing with a person occupying a senior position in the Al Fetch organization and with connections in the organization. His modus operandi is sophisticated. He refrains from appointments to official positions to avoid exposure, but is fully involved in what is going on. His main activity is to take an active part in organizing demonstrations and violent disturbances, in some of which rocks were thrown at military forces and road blocks were set up. The applicant is a person of standing, power, influence and ability to instigate and bring about relatively large scale disturbances in those centres where he is active and known.

 

            (d) The Petitioner complained about the legal procedure, in the framework of which classified evidence was presented to the Advisory Committee in his absence and in the absence of his counsel. On this issue the court has stated in the above-mentioned H.C. 513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5] at p. 658:

           

The Petitioners complained that they were not privy to the secret material that was presented to the Advisory Board, but as this court has already explained in a similar case in A.D.A. 1/80, this is the sole reasonable arrangement that strikes a balance between the two interests, which are: on the one hand maintaining review of the considerations and decisions of the Military Commander; and on the other hand preventing damage to state security through disclosure of secret sources of information. It indeed does not provide an opportunity to respond to every factual contention and the Advisory Board (or a court under given circumstances) must take this fact into consideration when it examines the weight or the measure of additional corroboration of the information. However, the legislature found no more reasonable and efficient way to guard against the disclosure of secret information in circumstances where this is vital in order to prevent grave damage to security; and it may be said in passing that this method is mentioned not only in Section 44 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, but also in the less known provision in section 128 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977, by which one can similarly limit the full disclosure of information.

 

            This time too the Committee examined, what the maximal information was that it could place at the disposal of the Petitioner without damaging vital security interests, and one has no cause for complaint against the Committee. We have nothing to add in the matter, because we have not examined the secret material and do not know its details.

           

            As regards the examination of the material, I am aware that in the absence of a request to this effect by the Petitioner, we have not had an opportunity to peruse the classified material. From the standpoint of the Petitioner, this cannot avail him in the case at hand. The unclassified material attests to consistent and prolonged hostile activity on the part of the Petitioner. In the absence of any supporting data, we can find no basis for the Petitioner's contention that the Respondent's action is based on arbitrariness or lack of good faith, or that the classified material does not support the Respondent's approach. No reason or grounds exist to preclude our concluding from the known constellation of circumstances that the Respondent found in the classified evidence substantial support for the approach he adopted, a view also held by the Committee which did examine the material. The absence of an initiative on the part of the Petitioner to submit the secret information for review in the manner established by the legislature for this purpose, or to request that the court do so, can only lend support to the thesis presented by the Respondent.

 

            (e) Having studied the material in the Respondent's reply and in his arguments before us, and having considered the submissions of the parties, we have concluded that there are no grounds for the intervention of this court in the discretion of the Respondent. The manner in which the Respondent acted for the purposes of exercising his authority under Regulation 112 in the specific case before us was proper, and the matter was examined in a thorough and exhaustive manner by the Advisory Committee.

           

            The considerations of the Advisory Committee, whose reasoned decision was before us, and the considerations of the Respondent as they emerge from the reply submitted to us, and as buttressed by and consistent with the unclassified material presented to us, do not point to the existence of any grounds upon which this Court could exercise its authority under section 15(d)(1) and (2) of Basic Law: The Judicature.

           

            Finally, a general comment. Having regard to the substance and scope of the material which substantiated the Respondents' decisions regarding each of the Petitioners, we see no reason to deal with the Petitioners' theoretical argument as to what likelihood of danger is generally required in order to found a decision under the above-mentioned Regulation 112.

           

            15. During the hearing before the Advisory Committee in the case of the Petitioner in H.C. 785/87, as well as before us, the question arose as to whether a person against whom a deportation order is issued and who appeals to the Advisory Committee is allowed to call witnesses to testify on his behalf before the Committee.

           

            In one of the sittings of the Advisory Committee, a categorical view was expressed that no such right exists. I find this opinion unacceptable.

           

            In its functioning, the Advisory Committee hears arguments just like any advisory committee that examines a question within the purview of its authority, and upon which it must express an opinion and provide its recommendation. Customarily, the Committee also hears the prospective deportee, if he so desires. The hearing before the Advisory Committee is not in the nature of a judicial proceeding in which evidence is presented in the manner acceptable in a court of law; and whoever represents the statutory authority, to which the Committee presents its recommendations, does not have to prove his contentions in the same manner that evidence is adduced before a judicial body. However, in a case where the Petitioner raises a detailed and reasoned argument in apparent good faith, contending that a particular witness can provide the Committee with relevant information that has a direct bearing on the case and which can shed light on the question posed before the Committee, it would be proper for the Committee to decide to hear the witness.

 

            In retrospect, it does not appear that the witness, whom it was sought to summon in this case could have refuted the evidentiary material, whose substance and quality were described above, and therefore no miscarriage of justice requiring remedy was caused at that point.

           

            16. The Petitioners raised the argument that a deportation order must specify the duration of the stay outside the Region imposed by the order.

           

            There is nothing in the text of Regulation 112 to support the above argument. The Regulation authorizes the Military Commander to direct, by way of a signed order, the deportation of person. Incidentally, the text of Regulation 122 (7), as promulgated during the period of the Mandate, even relieved the person issuing the order from the obligation of noting the name of the deportee. Obviously, today the authority is not exercised in such fashion.

           

            There is no provision in the Regulation as to the period of time for which the order is in effect. All that is stated in the original version is:

           

A person in respect of whom a Deportation Order has been made shall remain out of Palestine so long as the order remains in force.

 

            This signifies that the prohibition on return to the Region remains in force so long as the deportation order has not been rescinded by whoever issued it. It is my opinion that the Regulation would admit the possibility of raising anew the question of the duration of the order, either by applying to the person who issued the order or by a renewed application to the Advisory Committee. Regulation 112(8) empowers the Advisory Committee appointed for the purposes of Regulation 111(4), to consider the applications of a person against whom a deportation order was issued.

           

            The task of the Advisory Committee was defined in Regulation 111(4) as follows:

           

The functions of any such committee shall be to consider, and make recommendations to the Military Commander with respect to, any objections against any order under this regulation which are duly made to the committee by the person to whom the order relates.

 

            Regulation 112(8) provides that the Committee shall consider the application of a person against whom a deportation order was issued, and make its recommendation in this regard. There is nothing in the aforesaid text to indicate a onetime examination. One should interpret this Regulation in accordance with the language used, in a manner that will permit a person against whom a deportation order was issued, and which is still in force, to renew an application for reconsideration of his case.

           

            This approach finds support in the tendency reflected in the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with a different though essentially related subject to that before us. It also coincides with the directive in section 16 of the Interpretation Order (Judea and Samaria Region) (No. 130), 57271967, which states:

           

Exercise of Power or Fulfilment  of obligations.

16. Where a power is vested in or by virtue of a security enactment, or a duty imposed therein or thereunder, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be fulfilled, repeatedly, from time to time as the circumstance may require, provided no other intention is implied.

 

            Therefore, repeated applications may be made to the Advisory Committee, even after the implementation of a deportation order and so long as the order is in force.

           

            17. In summary, we have not found any abuse of authority, deviation from authority, lack of good faith, arbitrariness, unlawful discrimination or similar shortcomings or irregularities that would invalidate the Respondent's acts. In light of all of the facts presented to us, there is no room to doubt the veracity of the Respondents' submissions and their reliability, and one cannot negate the legal and substantive basis for their decisions.

           

            Accordingly, I would dismiss the petitions and set aside the orders issued pursuant to them.

           

            LEVIN J.: I concur.

           

            GOLDBERG J.: I concur.

           

            BEN-PORAT D.P.: I concur in the instructive opinion of my esteemed colleague, Shamgar P. I would only add that in his judgment he mentioned and reviewed that interpretive approach which holds that one should interpret a treaty in a liberal and broad fashion, paying due attention to the intention of the treaty's draftsmen and to the purpose underlying its conclusion. For this purpose, a passage was quoted from Starke, op cit. at p. 511:

           

...Treaties should be interpreted in the light of existing international law.

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.).

 

            A similar rule of interpretation is accepted by us in relation to legislative enactments, namely: two laws that deal "in pari materia" with the same subject and have the same purpose should be interpreted in a uniform manner, so as to create a suitable interpretive harmony between their provisions. See: C.A. 303/ 75 [24] at 605; H.C. 609/82 [25] at 766. I believe that one can apply this also to the present issue: Regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations, which is found in the section on "Military Authority Over the Territory of a Hostile State", reads as follows:

           

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

           

            The provisions of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention should be read (inter alia) in the light of the directive in Regulation 43 of the above-mentioned Hague Regulations, so that the strict prohibition against the deportation of civilians, according to a simple reading of the text, should be qualified by the duty imposed under Regulation 43.

           

            Let me clarify my position. One can deport individual residents of those territories to locations outside them, so long as their continued residence may harm public security and order in the occupied territories, and on condition that in the given circumstances no other option than deportation exists in order to protect the population of the territories. I would further add that one should read Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the light of what is stated in Regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations, since the Hague Regulations bind Israel as part of customary international law, whereas the Geneva Convention has only conventional force. It is, therefore, understandable that greater weight should be accorded to the duty of ensuring security and public order in the occupied territories as set forth in Regulation 43.

           

            In the petitions before us an affidavit was submitted by the Respondents, explaining that all other remedies including administrative detention had been exhausted, that it had become evident that none of these could respond to the security problem relating to the Petitioners, and that the sole solution was to deport them outside the occupied territories.

           

            As stated, this is but an addendum to the exhaustive and persuasive considerations advanced by my esteemed colleague, Shamgar P.

 

                      BACH J.: 1. I concur in the final conclusion reached by my esteemed colleague, the President, in these petitions; however, on one point of principle I must dissent from his opinion.

         

          This point is the proper interpretation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (hereinafter "The Convention"). Counsel for the Petitioners requested that we re-examine this question and consider again an argument advanced on a number of occasions in the past - that the deportation of persons permanently residing in the territories occupied by the I.D.F., outside the boundaries of those territories and into the territory of another state, is indeed in contravention of the provisions of Article 49 of the Convention.

         

          2. In a reasoned decision given by Sussman P. in H.C. 97/79[2], it was established, explicitly, that the deportation of a person from the territories of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip to one of the neighboring Arab states out of concern for state security, is within the purview of the Military Commander's authority under Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations and outside the framework of actions to which Article 49 of the Convention applies.

         

          In subsequent petitions, when this point was again raised on behalf of the Petitioners, the court was content to refer to the judgment in the above-mentioned H.C. 97/79[2], expressing its concurrence in the ruling given in that case (e.g. see the judgment in H.C. 513,514/85 and M.A. 256/85 [5], at 650-659) which is extensively quoted in the opinion of my esteemed colleague, the President. However, there have been instances when the court decided to reserve judgment on this point. Thus in H.C. 698/80 [3], Landau P. reviewed the various arguments on this question and decided not to adopt a position regarding them when he stated (at p. 627):

         

...and I will refrain from deciding upon the legality of the deportation orders under Article 49(1) of the Geneva Convention, which for the time being must be regarded as a provision of conventional international law alone, upon which an individual cannot found his petition in a court adjudicating according to the positive law of the forum country.

         

          (I will return to this last argument below.) My opinion, therefore, does not contradict the conclusions of Landau P. in H.C. 698/80 [3] and I am constrained to dissent only from the opinion expressed on this point in H.C. 97/79 [2]. It should be recalled that in that same judgment in H.C. 698/80 [3], a minority opinion was delivered by Cohn J. who held that it was proper to make the order nisi absolute, and regard the deportation order as void.

         

          3. Before I clarify my stand on this matter, and in order to make it easier to follow my arguments later, it would be useful to cite now the text of the relevant part of the aforesaid Article 49 as well as the reasoning of Sussman P. in H.C. 97/ 79 [2], which the Petitioners requested us to reject.

 

            The first two passages of Article 49 provide:

           

Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.

 

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given territory if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

 

            "Protected persons", in the sense of the Convention (according to the definition in Article 4 of the Convention) are

           

those who at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.

 

            The following reasoning underlies the view of Sussman P., in H.C. 97/79 [2] at pp. 316-317, that the deportation of people who endanger the security of the Region, under Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, lies beyond the scope of the above-mentioned Article 49:

           

Neither have I found any substance in the argument that the exercise of the above-mentioned Regulation 112 contradicts Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It is intended, as Dr. Pictet in his commentary on the Convention (p.10) writes, to protect civilians from arbitrary action by the occupying army, and its purpose is to prevent acts such as the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in World War II, during which millions of civilians were deported from their homes for various reasons, generally to Germany to serve the enemy in forced labour, along with Jews and others who were deported to concentration camps for torture and extermination.

 

It is clear that the above-mentioned Convention does not detract from the obligation of the Occupying Power to preserve public order in the occupied territory, an obligation imposed by Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention, nor does it detract from its right to employ the necessary means to ensure its own security; see Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, at p. 115.

The High Commissioner, or whoever succeeded him, was not empowered to use the above-mentioned Regulation 112 as he saw fit, since Regulation 108 directs that -

 

An order shall not be made by the High Commissioner or by a Military Commander under this Part in respect of any person unless the High Commissioner or the Military Commander, as the case may be, is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to make the order for securing the public safety, the defence of Palestine (Land of Israel), the maintenance of public order or the suppression of mutiny, rebellion or riot.

 

This direction tells us that the powers entrusted to the authorities by virtue of the state of emergency, were granted for one sole purpose, the maintenance of public order and security. Even according to Dr. Pictet, ibid, at p. 159, this is a legitimate goal. It has nothing whatsoever in common with the deportations for forced labour, torture and extermination carried out in World War II. Moreover, the intention of the Respondent is to expel the Petitioner from the country and not to transfer him here, to remove him because of the danger he poses to the public welfare and not to draw him near so as to exploit his labour and derive benefit from him for the State of Israel.

 

            4. Professor Kretzmer, representing the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, submitted a comprehensive and exhaustive argument on this point on behalf of the Petitioners, without ignoring the inherent difficulty of moving the court to deviate from precedents established by it in the past and affirmed in subsequent hearings. He stresses, however, that we are dealing with a conspicuous error in interpretation which is incumbent upon us to correct, and that in contradistinction to previous compositions of the court, when dealing with this matter in the past, we are sitting now in an enlarged bench of five judges, and this fact as well can facilitate our adopting a decision to deviate from the aforesaid rule.

           

            5. After examining the question in all its aspects, I am inclined to accept the position of the Petitioners on this matter, and my reasons are these:

           

            a) The language of Article 49 is unequivocal and clear. The juxtaposition of the words individual or mass forcible transfers as well as deportations with the phrase regardless of their motive, [emphasis added - G.B.] admits, in my opinion, no room to doubt that the Article applies not only to mass deportations but to the deportation of individuals as well, and that the prohibition was intended to be total, sweeping and unconditional - "regardless of their motive".

           

            b) I accept the approach which also found expression in the judgment of Sussman P. in H.C. 97/79 [2], namely that the Convention was framed in the wake of the Hitler rule in Germany, and in face of the crimes perpetrated against the civilian population by the Nazis during World War II. Likewise, I would subscribe to the opinion that one may consider the historical facts accompanying the making of a convention and its purpose, in seeking the proper interpretation of its provisions. Also the Vienna Convention, upon which Professor Kretzmer relied in this context, is compatible with this possibility, since it provides in Article 31:

           

A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

           

            On this issue I do not dissent at all from the opinion of the esteemed President and most of the authorities cited by him are acceptable to me as well. However, I find no contradiction between this "historical approach" and a broad interpretation of the Article in question.

           

            The crimes committed by the German army in occupied territories emphasized the need for a convention that would protect the civilian population and served as "trigger" for its framing. But this fact does not in any way refute the thesis that when framing that convention, the draftsmen decided to formulate it in broad forms, in a manner that would, inter alia, totally prevent the deportation of residents from those territories either to the occupying state or to another country.

           

            The language of the Article, seen in its own context and in light of the treaty in its entirety, does not admit, in my opinion, the construction that it is intended to prevent only acts such as those committed by the Nazis for racial, ethnic or nationalistic reasons.

           

            We must not deviate, by way of interpretation, from the clear and simple meaning of the words of an enactment when the language of the provision is unequivocal and when the literal meaning does not contradict the legislative purpose or lead to an illogical and absurd result.

           

            (c) The second portion of Article 49 supports the above interpretation. Here the Convention allows the evacuation of a population within the territory, i.e. from one place to another in the occupied area, if necessary for the security of the population or imperative for military purposes. It teaches us that the draftsmen of the Convention were aware of the need to safeguard security interests, and for this purpose even allowed the evacuation of populations within the occupied territories. The fact that this qualification was not included in the first portion, i.e. the deportation of residents beyond the borders for security reasons was not permitted, is significant.

           

            (d) Other provisions of the Convention also illustrate an awareness by the draftsmen of the security needs of the occupying state, and indirectly support the stated broad interpretation of Article 49.

           

Thus Article 78 opens:

 

If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment.

 

            I accept Professor Kretzmer's contention that Articles 78 and 49 should be read together, to infer from them as follows: where a person poses a security risk, one may at most restrict his freedom of movement within the territory and detain him, but one cannot deport him to another country. This idea is also expressed by Pictet in Commentary, supra, at p. 368. In discussing Article 78 of the Convention, he states:

           

It will suffice to mention here that as we are dealing with occupied territory, the protected persons concerned will benefit by the provisions of Article 49 and cannot be deported; they can therefore only be interned, or placed in assigned residence, within the frontiers of the occupied country itself.

 

            A similar conclusion emerges from an examination of Articles 35 and 48 of the Convention. The first part of Article 35, which deals with the fate of aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, reads:

           

All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so, unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the State.

 

            Article 48 of the Convention has a like provision concerning protected persons in the occupied territory, as follows:

           

Protected persons who are not nationals of the Power whose territory is occupied, may avail themselves of the right to leave the territory subject to the provisions of Article 35...

 

            Again one sees an alertness to the need for permitting measures to protect the interests of the occupying state. To further such an interest, one can prevent the departure of persons from the occupied territories. The absence of a similar provision permitting deportation of a person from the territory, for similar purposes, is conspicuous, especially considering that Articles 48 and 49 are contiguous to each other.

           

            Article 5 of the Convention, which deals specifically with spies and saboteurs, leads to the same conclusion. Its second paragraph reads:

           

Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Convention.

 

            The rights of communication accorded to protected persons under the Convention include the right to communicate with their families (see Article 25 of the Convention), the right to communicate with the Red Cross and other organizations (see Article 30 of the Convention), and the right to maintain free contact with an attorney (Article 72 of the Convention).

           

            We see that under the Convention, the rights of spies and saboteurs can be denied in various ways, if the matter is deemed necessary for security reasons. Yet despite the alertness of the Convention's draftsmen to the security needs of the occupying power, there is no provision qualifying the sweeping prohibition in Article 49, and there is no allusion to the right to deport such persons to another state .

           

            The above-mentioned Articles of the Geneva Convention supplement the provisions of Regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations, which obligates the occupying power to ensure public order and public welfare in the occupied territories, in the sense that they indicate the measures which may be adopted in order to fulfil this obligation. In any event, nothing in Regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations is incompatible with the simple and broad interpretation suggested for Article 49.

           

            (e) A clear direction is discernible in the Convention. The freedom of movement of a "protected person" can be limited, and he can even be arrested without trial, if it is necessary in order to protect public security or another vital interest of the occupying state; this is in addition to the possibility of placing him on trial, punishing him and even condemning him to death. But the "protected person" cannot be deported; for the moment deportation to another country is carried out, the occupying state has no further control over him, and he therefore ceases to be a "protected person".

 

            (f) Most scholars subscribe to the opinion that the above broad interpretation of Article 49 of the Convention is indeed the required interpretation. Thus at p. 279 of the above-mentioned Commentary on the Convention, Pictet says the following regarding the first part of Article 49:

           

The prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions, apart from these stipulated in paragraph 2.

 

            This opinion has been expressed in Israel on a number of occasions and in a consistent fashion by the learned scholar, Professor Dinstein. In his article, "Settlements and Deportations in the Occupied Territories" (Iyunei Mishpat , 7 (1979-1980), 188), Professor Dinstein levels piercing criticism at the judgment in the above cited H.C. 97/79 [2], and relying on the text of Article 49 of the Convention, he writes, inter alia,  as follows (at p. 193):

           

No one would dispute that this paragraph was formulated on the basis of the bitter experiences of World War II. However, it is equally quite clear that the text of the paragraph is formulated as a total prohibition that admits no exception. A qualification that is based on military order and the security of the civilian population does appear in Article 49. However, these matters are not included in the first paragraph (which deals with deportation and exile outside the occupied territory), but rather in the second paragraph (which deals with a temporary evacuation that can and even must be performed within the occupied territory).

 

            Likewise, the question of the authority to deport and evacuate in occupied territories is discussed in Professor Dinstein's book "The Laws of War" (Schocken and Tel-Aviv University, 1983). At p. 225 of the book, Professor Dinstein mentions the Articles of the Convention (such as Article 35), which permit restricting the freedom of movement of residents of the occupied territories for the purposes of protecting certain interests of the occupying power, and he adds:

           

The position is different when the departure - or more precisely, the removal - from the occupied territory is done by force. Article 49 of the Convention distinguishes between deportation and evacuation. Deportation is the forcible transfer of civilians - on an individual or collective basis - from the occupied territory to the territory of the occupying state or to another state (whether it is occupied or not). Deportation is prohibited unconditionally and without consideration of motives.

           

            See also Professor Dinstein's "The International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights", 8 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1978), 104, 123.

           

            This interpretation of Article 49 of the Convention has won nearly universal acceptance and I accept it as well.

           

            6. My esteemed colleague, the President, attempts to demonstrate through a number of examples, that the simple, literal interpretation of Article 49 will lead to intolerable results. With all due respect, I do not believe that any of these aforesaid examples can lead to such a conclusion.

           

            The learned President mentions the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin [27], which deals with German agents who infiltrated into the United States on an espionage mission, for which they were sentenced to death. It is clear that the case as such is not in point here, because it did not involve an occupied territory, only the territory of the United States itself, and the question of deportation did not arise there. The President is aware of this, nevertheless he expresses the following thought:

           

The event took place inside the territory of the United States; but had a similar incident occurred in an occupied territory after 1949, and it was decided not to execute the terrorists but to deport them back, whether in the framework of an exchange or in some other way, this would constitute, as it were, a serious violation of the Fourth Convention.

 

            It is difficult to see how such a hypothetical possibility can avail the arguments of my esteemed colleague. Let us in fact assume that those people spying against the United States were apprehended after 1949 in territory occupied by Americans. If we further assume that these people could expect a death sentence, then we may suppose that they would have willingly consented to be transferred to another country in order to save their lives. Nothing in the Convention prevents the willing transfer of protected persons to another country. Only forcible deportations are prohibited. But if we were to imagine that for one reason or another, these German residents would not have agreed to leave the territory, then in truth the authorities of the United States could not deport them against their will to another country (if it were determined that they were "protected persons"), without violating the Convention. If for example, a spy with communist ideological sympathies were caught in the American occupation zone in Germany, it would be permissible to arrest and punish him in every possible legal manner, but it would not be possible, according to the Geneva Convention, to deport him forcibly, not even to East Germany, the Soviet Union, or some other communist country. To the best of my knowledge, no such attempt was ever made. In any case, I do not find anything unreasonable or absurd in such an outcome.

 

            My esteemed colleague, the President, also relies on the argument that, in light of the sweeping formulation of Article 4 of the Convention which includes a definition of the term "protected persons" under the Convention, a literal interpretation of Article 49 would lead to the conclusion that one could not even deport terrorists who illegally infiltrate into the territory during the occupation; similarly that it would not be possible to extradite criminals from the territories to other states in accordance with extradition treaties.

           

            The question regarding infiltrators could arise because of a certain difficulty in the interpretation of Article 4 of the Convention, which is not free of ambiguity. Thus when that same Article 4 states that "Persons protected by the Convention are those who find themselves in case of a conflict or occupation in the hands of a Party to the conflict or an Occupying Power..." (emphasis added - G.B.) then there is perhaps room to argue that the reference is to people who due to an armed conflict or belligerence between states, have fallen into a situation where against their will they find themselves in the hands of one of the parties to the conflict or in the hands of the occupying power; whereas people who subsequently penetrate into that territory with malicious intent are not included in that definition. If and when this problem arises in an actual case, there will be a need to resolve it through an appropriate interpretation of Article 4 of the Convention, but this does not suffice, in my opinion, to raise doubts concerning the interpretation of Article 49. In the matter before us, the aforesaid difficulty is in any case nonexistent, since the Petitioners are, by all opinions, permanent residents of the territories controlled by the I.D.F.; and if the Convention under discussion applies to those territories, then the Petitioners are undoubtedly included in the definition of "protected persons".

 

            The same applies to the problem of extraditing criminals. The question as to the feasibility of an extradition treaty between states, when it concerns people who are located in territories occupied by countries which are parties to the treaty, is thorny and complicated in itself; and whatever may be the answer to this question, one can not draw inferences from this regarding the interpretation of Article 49. In any case, should it be established that it is indeed possible to extradite persons who are residents of occupied territories on the basis of the Extradition Law, 5714-1954 and the treaties that were signed in accordance with it, then regarding the possibility of actually extraditing the persons concerned, I would arrive at the same ultimate conclusion as I do regarding the Petitioners against whom the deportation orders were issued under Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, as will be detailed below.

 

            7. Despite everything I have said above, I concur in the opinion of my esteemed colleague, the President, that these petitions should be dismissed. I do indeed see a need to dissent from the rule established in H.C. 97/79 [2] regarding the interpretation of Article 49 of the Convention. On the other hand, I do not see any ground for deviating from the rule established and upheld in an appreciable number of judgments, that Article 49 of the Convention is solely a provision of conventional international law as distinguished from a provision of customary international law. Such a provision does not constitute binding law and cannot serve as a basis for petitions to the courts by individuals.

           

            This opinion, which was clarified in H.C. 606,610/78 [1] (at pp. 120 and 127) by Witkon J. and by Landau D.P. (his title then) and upheld as we have seen above by, among others, Landau P. in H.C. 698/80 [3], is deeply rooted in the judgments of this court.

           

            I would also mention the judgment of Barak J. in H.C. 393/82 [17], in which (at p. 793) the declarative and hence binding nature of the Hague Regulations is explained. The judgment goes on to state:

           

The same is not true of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, which even if applied to Israel's belligerent occupation in Judea and Samaria - this question is subject to bitter controversy and we will not express any position on it... - is essentially a constitutive convention which does not adopt existing international customs but creates new norms, whose application in Israel requires a legislative act...

 

            Only recently we re-examined the rule that a conventional international agreement has no binding force on the national level so long as it has not been adopted by the local legislator, and we upheld the existing rule on the subject [see C.A. 580,626/82 [26] at 314.

           

            I would agree in this regard with the judgment of Landau P. in H.C. 698/80 [3], in which he expresses the opinion (at p. 646) that if the Convention is to be interpreted in such a manner as to prohibit the deportation of individuals in order to preserve security in occupied territory, then this provision does not constitute a part of customary international law but at most an addition to conventional international rules.

           

            Landau P. made reference in this context to the work of G. Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory (Minneapolis, 1957), which states, at p. 20:

           

The 1949 Convention has resulted in most valuable additions to the conventional law of military occupation, such as treatment of civilians, deportation...

(Emphasis added - G.B.)

 

            On this point I agree with the reasoning of my esteemed colleague, the President, in his judgment on the present petitions.

           

            8. I would further add that I see no grounds for our intervention in the decisions of the Respondents in this matter for the sake of justice. Indeed my opinion is, as stated, that formally the deportation of the Petitioners is included within the framework of acts to which Article 49 of the Convention applies. However, I also believe that the prevention of such acts of deportation was not the primary and dominant purpose of those who drafted the Convention.

           

            I have not ignored the fact that representatives of the state have declared on a number of occasions before this court, that it is the intention of the Government to honour as policy the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.

           

            Landau P. expressed the opinion in H.C. 698/80 [3] (at p. 627-8), that

           

the decision of the State of Israel to honour in practice the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention (see the article of M. Shamgar, "The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories", 1 Israel Yearbook On Human Rights (1971) 262) is a political decision which does not pertain to the legal sphere with which this court is concerned.

 

            I believe however, with all due respect, that this determination is too sweeping. We have here a policy declaration that as a general rule obligates the Government, and cases may arise where in the framework of rules of administrative law we will instruct the Government to honour its obligation.

           

            However, each case will be examined here in accordance with its circumstances, and in contrast with the interpretation of laws and conventions which at times require strict adherence to the meaning of words and terms, the court enjoys a flexible and broad discretion when it examines a Government policy declaration in terms of its content and spirit.

           

            It should not be overlooked that the Fourth Geneva Convention, with which we are dealing, includes a variety of provisions, the major portion of which are surely humanitarian in substance. But some are of public and administrative content and the Convention also contains provisions which can only partially be considered of a humanitarian nature. Article 49 of the Convention is indeed primarily of a humanitarian nature, but it seems that this aspect cannot predominate when it seeks, by virtue of its sweeping formulation, to prevent the deportation of individuals whose removal was decided upon because of their systematic incitement of other residents to acts of violence and because they constitute a grave danger to public welfare.

 

            In Shamgar's article - "The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories", 1 lsrael Yearbook On Human Rights (1971), it is stated (at 262-3):

           

Humanitarian law concerns itself essentially with human beings in distress and victims of war...

           

            This definition does not fit the deportation of members of terrorist organizations to one of the neighboring countries.

           

            In any case, when we are dealing with people in respect of whom the elements of Regulations 108 and 112 in the Defence (Emergency) Regulations are satisfied, that is to say, where it has been demonstrated that their deportation is necessary for protecting public welfare and security in the Region, I would not suggest that we exercise our authority in the sphere of administrative law to order the Respondents to refrain from carrying out the deportation of the Petitioners, solely because the state has declared that in general it intends to honour the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.

           

            It should be noted and further emphasized in this context, that even counsel for the Petitioners have not argued before us that the orders nisi should be made absolute because of the aforesaid declaration by the state, should their submission, that the content of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention expresses customary international law, be rejected.

           

            There is, therefore, no room for our intervention, not even from the standpoint of the general considerations outlined above.

           

            9. In light of what I have said, and as I also agree with those portions of the President's opinion which deal with the factual aspects of the petitions, I concur in the conclusion reached by my esteemed colleague in his judgment on the fate of these petitions.

           

            Judgment given on April 10, 1988.

 

* See also the remarks of Justice Holmes in Towne  v. Eisner , 245 U.S. 418 (1918).

* That is, they are not to be applied unless they express general principles of law recognized by civilized states: O'Connell, supra, at 276.

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