Basic Law: Administration of Justice

Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5658/23
Date Decided: 
Monday, January 1, 2024
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset concerned challenges to Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary (the “reasonableness amendment”). In view of the controversy surrounding the amendment and the fundamental constitutional question it raised in regard to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review Basic Laws, the Court took the unprecedented step of sitting en banc. A translation of the official abstract issued by the Court appears here.

 

On January 1, 2024, a majority of the Court (12 of 15 justices) held that the Court held the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws and to intervene in exceptional, extreme cases in which the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority.

 

A majority of the Court (8 of 15 justices) further held that Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary represented an extreme deviation from the Knesset’s constituent authority that left no alternative but to declare the amendment void.

 

A translation of President Hayut's majority opinion is accessible here.

 

 

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Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

 

Abstract

HCJ 5658/23 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset

Date of judgment: 20 Tevet 5784 (Jan. 1, 2024)

Before: President E. Hayut, Deputy President U. Vogelman, Justices I. Amit, N. Sohlberg, D. Barak-Erez, A. Baron (emer.), D. Mintz, Y. Elron, Y. Wilner, O. Grosskopf, A. Stein, G. Canfy-Steinitz, K. Kabub, Y. Kasher, and R. Ronen.

A majority of the Supreme Court (12 of 15 justices) held that the Court held jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws and to intervene in exceptional, extreme cases in which the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority.

A majority of the Court (8 of 15 justices) further held that Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary, which comprehensively eliminated judicial review of the reasonableness of decisions of the government, the prime minister, and government ministers, should be declared void. This, in view of the serious, unprecedented harm to the core character of the State of Israel as a democratic state.

In view of the importance of the issues raised by the petitions against Amendment No. 3, the Court held an en banc hearing on Sept. 9, 2023. The events of October. 7, 2023, unrecognizably transformed Israeli reality, and the country has since been at war with murderous terrorist organizations. But inasmuch as Amendment No. 3 remains in force, and given the final date upon which President (emer.) Hayut and Justice (emer.) Baron could render judgment in accordance with the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, the decision on the petitions was handed down.

The Court majority (per President Justice E. Hayut, Deputy President U. Vogelman, Justice I. Amit, Justice D. Barak-Erez, Justice (emer.) A. Baron, Justice Y. Wilner, Justice O. Groskopf, Justice A. Stein, Justice G. Canfy-Steinitz, Justice K. Kabub, Justice Y. Kasher, and Justice R. Ronen concurring) held that in exceptional, extreme cases, the Supreme Court – sitting as High Court of Justice – holds the authority to void a Basic Law that constitutes a deviation from the constituent authority of the Knesset. In this regard, the Court already held in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset (2021) (the “Nation State” case) that the Knesset, as a constituent authority, is not “all powerful”, and that it does not hold the authority – even by means of a Basic Law – to deny or facially contradict the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Given these limitations, and in order that it be possible to enforce them, a majority of the Court was of the opinion that the Supreme Court’s authority to conduct judicial review over Basic Laws must be recognized. Some of the justices based this conclusion upon Israel’s unusual constitutional structure, which is, inter alia, characterized by a lack of any designated, separate process for adopting constitutional norms; the problematic practice of enacting and amending Basic Laws that testifies to a contempt for the Basic Laws and to their being turned into pawns of the political majority; and upon the role of the Court in protecting the constitutional enterprise. In this regard, some of the justices emphasized Israel’s Declaration of Independence as a basis for the judicial review of Basic Laws, while others grounded that authority in Basic Law: The Judiciary, which grants the High Court of Justice authority to grant relief for the sake of justice and to issue orders to all state authorities.

A majority of the Court (per President  E. Hayut, Deputy President U. Vogelman, Justice I. Amit, Justice D. Barak-Erez, Justice (emer.) A. Baron, Justice O. Groskopf, Justice K. Kabub, and Justice R. Ronen concurring) held that the amendment that was the subject of the petitions – Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary – was an extreme case in which the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority and therefore, there was no alternative but to declare the amendment void. The Court emphasized that the exceptional, sweeping language of the amendment prevented all courts from adjudicating and hearing arguments upon the reasonableness of decisions of the government, the prime minister and government ministers in regard to every decision, including a decision to refrain from exercising authority. The majority was further of the opinion that interpretation of the amendment left no room for doubt that it applies to capricious decisions and to decisions that are unreasonable in the extreme. The result is an unprecedented infringement of two of the core characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state – the separation of powers and the rule of law. In this regard, it was noted that the amendment significantly increases the substantial power already concentrated in the hands of the government and its ministers, while blocking the possibility for an individual to obtain relief in a wide range of situations in which grave harm may be inflicted to his important interests as a result of governmental actions. It was further emphasized that the amendment leads to a situation in which the most significant elements of the executive are effectively exempted them from their duty to act reasonably, it leaves whole areas without effective judicial review, it prevents the protection of such public interests as ethical conduct and administrative regularity, and may lead to a fundamental change of the state’s civil service, severe harm to the independence of the law enforcement authorities, and exploitation of government resources for political gain in the electoral process.

Justice Y. Wilner was of the opinion that the amendment could be upheld by means of narrow construction and therefore, the Court should not consider voiding it. Justices Stein and Canfy-Steinitz were of the opinion that it is possible and would be appropriate to construe the amendment narrowly, and that there is, therefore, no need to intervene inasmuch as it a far cry from those instances in which it might be said that the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority. Accordingly, Justices Wilner, Stein and Canfy-Steinitz were of the opinion that the amendment should be construed such that it would prevent judicial review only on the basis of reasonableness as it has developed since the Court’s decision in HCJ 389/80 Dapei Zahav v. Broadcasting Authority (1980), which focuses upon examining the balance of the various considerations for the governmental decision (“reasonableness balancing”). In accordance with their approach, the amendment, as so construed, would still allow for intervention in the case of capricious decisions in which the Court could have intervened even prior to Dapei Zahav. Justice Kasher refrained from deciding upon the question whether the amendment could be narrowly construed, holding that despite the amendment’s infringement of the separation of powers and the rule of law, it did not rise to the level that would justify the High Court’s intervention in a Basic Law.

Justices Sohlberg and Mintz dissented from the majority view in all that concerned the Court’s jurisdiction in principle to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws, as well as in regard to its authority to decide upon the question itself, noting that there is no legal source that would permit such review. According to their approach, even were one to ignore the problem of the Court’s jurisdiction, the amendment stood far from the narrow limits established by the majority, and they noted that even were it proper to adopt a narrow exception that would allow intervention in Basic Laws in extreme cases of infringement of the basic rights of the individual, the arguments in regard to Amendment No. 3 were not ripe for decision in that the amendment had yet to be interpreted and its boundaries had yet to be set. Therefore, it could not be assumed that its consequences would be as severe as suggested.

 

Following are summaries of the opinions of each of the justices (in the order of their appearance in the judgment):

President (emer.) E. Hayut:

In her opinion, President (emer.) Hayut reiterated the Court’s holding in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset (2021), according to which the Knesset’s power as a constituent authority is not unlimited, and that it is not authorized to enact a Basic Law that denies or directly contradicts the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. According to the President (emer.), this conclusion derives from the “elements of the constitution” developed since the earliest days of the state – the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, the laws enacted by the Knesset, and the case law of the Supreme Court. The President (emer.) further held that given the unique character of Israel’s constitutional regime – the enacting of a constitution “chapter by chapter”, the absence of a rigid process for its enactment and amendment, and the political majority’s control over the exercise of constituent authority – the limitations upon the Knesset’s power cannot be left unenforced and exempt from judicial review through which the Court can intervene in those extreme, exceptional cases in which the Knesset deviates from the bounds of its constituent authority in enacting a Basic Law.

According to the President (emer.), Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary is an extreme case in which the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority. In this regard, it should be emphasized that given the existing Israeli situation, judicial review is the only effective check upon the substantial power concentrated in the government and its ministers. Therefore, the amendment that is the subject of the petitions – which comprehensively denies the Court’s authority to conduct judicial review of the reasonableness of all decisions of the government, the prime minister, and government ministers, and even blocks any possibility of addressing such questions – strikes an extremely severe blow to the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of the rule of law. This extreme harm to two of the quintessential characteristics of the State of Israel as a democratic state (the significance of which the President (emer.) addressed at length in her opinion) can significantly affect the individual and the public in general in an unprecedented way. Therefore, the President (emer.) held that there is no alternative to holding that in enacting Amendment No. 3, the Knesset deviated from its constituent authority and the amendment must be declared void.

Justice Y. Wilner: Justice Y. Wilner concurred with the opinion that the Court holds jurisdiction to review Basic Laws. In her opinion, this is also the case by virtue of sec. 15(c) of Basic Law: The Judiciary, which authorizes the Court to “grant relief for the sake of justice”. She further held that in view of the ambiguity of the term “reasonableness” adopted by the constituent authority in the framework of the amendment, a question arises as to its meaning. Justice Wilner resolved this question by means of an affirming construction according to which the repeal of reasonableness refers only to “reasonableness balancing”, i.e., the sense it was given in Dapei Zahav. In her opinion, this conclusion is required by the firmly established rules of the Court according to which a construction that affirms the law is to be preferred to one that may lead to its voidance. In her opinion, such an affirming construction is linguistically possible, it is grounded in the subjective purpose, and it best realizes the objective purpose. Given the said construction, the amendment does not strike a mortal blow to the democratic identity of the State if Israel. This is so, inter alia, in view of the fact that the amendment does not detract from the duty of the government and its ministers to act lawfully and does not prevent effective judicial review in accordance with the other grounds for such review. And note that while cases may arise in which it will not be possible to grant relief as in the past, nevertheless, while that may be regrettable, we will be concerned with decisions made with authority, following a proper administrative process, in good faith, in the absence of irrelevant considerations, that are proportionate, not arbitrary, non-discriminatory, and not fundamentally unfounded. Justice Wilner further noted that the approaches that, over the years, called for restoring reasonableness to its original meaning were never deemed anti-democratic. She further explained that in examining the constitutionality of the amendment, the Court must take account only of the existing legal situation, and not give heed to arguments concerning future legislative bills. Therefore, Justice Wilner held that the petitions should be dismissed while interpreting the amendment in accordance with an affirming construction.

 

Justice Y. Elron:

Justice Elron was of the opinion that the petitions should be dismissed. He reiterated his principled view that the mandate granted to the High Court of Justice to examine the justification for decisions by the members of the Knesset is limited, and that in the absence of an express norm that limits the authority of the Knesset to enact Basic Laws or that establishes the manner for the exercise of that authority, the continued development of doctrines that grant the Court authority to set the limits for adopting the constitution constitutes a role reversal. Justice Elron further noted his position in regard to the possible existence of a narrow exception in the case of exceptional, extreme cases of harm to fundamental individual rights as a last resort. As for the “cause of reasonableness”, Justice Elron emphasized that if the limitation imposed by Amendment No, 3 meets the test for intervention in a Basic Law, the door that is opened for the Court’s intervention is not narrow at all. In addition to his position in principle, Justice Elron was of the opinion that the petitions could also be dismissed on the grounds that the arguments against Amendment No. 3 were not ripe. He explained that where the Court is of the opinion that it would be proper to consider intervening in the content of a Basic Law, this should be carried out only after examining the law’s application and the definition of its scope as interpreted by the Court. In the instant case, the courts might establish that the import of the amendment is the abolition of the Dapei Zahav rule, and nothing more. If that be the case, then the magnitude of the amendment’s harm to the various democratic principles is far from justifying voiding a provision of a Basic Law. In conclusion, he wrote: “I am firm in my conviction that this is not the time to shake the constitutional foundations of our state. It would be better that we defer the matter to the appropriate time, if and when a decision will be required on the basis of the facts of the case. I fear that at the present time, the harm that will be caused by undermining the foundations of Israeli constitutional law due to the voiding of Amendment No. 3 may be many times greater than the harm in leaving it in place.”

 

Jusitce A. Stein:

Justice A. Stein held that the enactment of laws and of Basic Laws by the Knesset is subject to the boundaries delineated in the Declaration of Independence. This is the case inasmuch as the Proclamation [of the Provisional Council of State] and the Law and Administration Ordinance – which were enacted and promulgated upon the establishment of the state – expressly established that the legislative authority of the Provisional Council of State, which transferred that authority to the Knessets that would succeed it, is grounded in the Declaration of Independence. In addition, Justice Stein held that the amendment to the Basic Law that is the subject of the petitions does not contradict the principles of the Declaration of Independence, inasmuch as it only repeals the Supreme Court’s authority to void government decisions on the basis of unreasonableness as an independent and exclusive cause, while preserving its authority to void government decisions that are found to be facially capricious due to irrelevant considerations, arbitrariness, lack of good faith, and other causes for invalidation. In the opinion of Justice Stein, this narrowing of judicial review returns administrative law to its status prior to the Dapei Zahav case – which recognized unreasonableness of a governmental decision as an independent cause for invalidation – as was expressly stated in the explanatory notes of the amendment’s bill. For this reason, Justice Stein held that the amendment that is the subject of the proceedings does not uproot judicial review and therefore does not breach the requirement of basic justice in the Declaration of Independence. This led Justice Stein to the conclusion that the amendment under review is constitutional.

 

Justice I. Amit:

In his opinion, Justice Amit addressed the Israeli legal system’s lack of checks and balances for restraining the government, which grants it unusual power. This situation leads to the conclusion that what is needed is additional mechanisms for strengthening the democratic regime, whereas the amendment that is the subject of the proceedings moves in the opposite direction. It further empowers the executive branch and harms the fundamental principles of the legal system.

Justice Amit addressed the sweeping language of the law, which appeared to apply to reasonableness in all its forms in the case law, without distinguishing among different types of decisions. He explained that the reasonableness doctrine treats of the day-to-day life of the citizen, and its main power and effect are not in the post-facto examination of an administrative decision in court, but rather ab initio, at the stage of arriving at and framing the decision. In the absence of the reasonableness cause, the duty of reasonableness will wither and die, which may leave the public with no defense, and reshape the civil service. The other tools offered by administrative law cannot fill the gap that would result, and the possibility for examining a decision by means of parliamentary oversight or public pressure cannot provide a real alternative to judicial review.

The amendment to the Basic Law inflicts harm upon the democratic core of the state: the right to access to the courts, the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of distribution of power upon which that rests, and upon fundamental constitutional rights. The amendment also undermines several aspects of the rule of law – placing the government and its ministers above the law; facilitating improper appointments and dismissals, including of the “gatekeepers”; immunity in regard to refraining to exercise administrative power and ignoring professional considerations; a lack of supervision over an interim government; and a fear of elections tampering.

 

Justice G. Canfy-Steinitz:

Justice G. Canfy-Steinitz agreed that the Supreme Court has the authority to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws, but in her view, an examination of the amendment in accordance with its proper interpretation leads to the conclusion that it does not meet the very narrow criteria that would justify voiding a Basic Law.

The issue of the judicial review of Basic Laws raises complex questions that would be better resolved in the public arena. When the Court is required to address this question, Justice Canfy-Steinitz is of the view that the Basic Laws provide a textual foundation for a limitation that the Knesset assumed upon itself, subjecting its constituent power to preserving the character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This limitation is grounded in the existing Basic Laws, including sec. 17A(a)(1) of Basic Law: The Knesset, the purpose of which is to protect the core constitutional identity of the state and prevent a change of the system “from within”. The Court’s authority to review Basic Laws derives from the said limitation in cases where the Knesset deviates from its constitutional limits – but this is as narrow as “the eye of a needle” and should be exercised only in the most rare cases of mortal harm to the core identity of the state.

The amendment was adopted against the background of years of debate on the scope of reasonableness. While the broad, sweeping language of the amendment raises problems, it is a far cry from threatening to undermine the foundations of Israeli democracy. On the interpretive level, the amendment should be narrowly construed, such that it would prevent judicial review on the basis of reasonableness “balancing” but not on the basis of the “narrow” cause of reasonableness. Under this construction, the practical ramifications of the amendment are very limited, inasmuch as recourse to reasonableness balancing can be replaced by other grounds for review in administrative law. The few decisions that cannot be reviewed under the amendment are decisions that by their nature and by the normative position of the legislature – which must be respected – cannot be examined in terms of reasonableness balancing. This would not strike a mortal blow to the rule of law and the principle of the separation of powers.

 

Justice R. Ronen:

Justice Ronen concurred in the opinion of President (emer.) Hayut. She held that the power of the Knesset, as a constituent authority, is limited, such that it cannot enact Basic Laws that significantly infringe the two core characteristics of the State of Israel – its being a Jewish and democratic state. She further held that the Supreme Court holds jurisdiction to conduct judicial review of Basic Laws.

Justice Ronen also held that the possibility of a narrow construction of the amendment must be rejected inasmuch as it has no basis in the language of the amendment, clearly contradicts the subjective purpose of the amendment, and provides the Court no clear operative instruction as to how to examine government and ministerial decisions in the future. This is the case, inter alia, in view of an examination of the legal situation before and after the Dapei Zahav case, and rejecting the assumption according to which an instruction to return to the “pre-Dapei Zahav” situation is significant. It was therefore held that the amendment, properly construed, denies the Court the possibility of examining any claim whatsoever that touches upon reasonableness.

Justice Ronen addressed the standard of review applicable to the amendment and held that since the amendment undermines the judiciary’s ability to review the executive, while materially changing the existing system of balances among the branches, it raises a suspicion concerning Knesset’s inherent conflict of interests. This fear is intensified by the fact that the amendment was adopted without the consent of any of the members of the opposition and its immediate entry into force. That being the case, she held that a somewhat more rigorous standard of review should be applied to the question of whether the harm to democratic characteristics constitutes a deviation from constituent authority.

In view of the interpretation of the amendment and the denial of judicial review in regard to all aspects of reasonableness, Justice Ronen’s conclusion was that the amendment inflicts significant harm to the core values of the democratic system. In this regard, inter alia, the subject of appointments and dismissals of gatekeepers was emphasized. Therefore, in view of the standard of review noted above, Justice Ronen held that the Knesset deviated from its authority in adopting the amendment, and it should be declared void.

 

Justice Y. Kasher:

Justice Kasher concurred with the opinion of the President (emer.) according to which the constituent authority of the Knesset is limited in that it is subject to the definition of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. In addition, the Hight Court of Justice holds the authority to decide that the Knesset has deviated from its constituent authority and order the voiding of a Basic Law. The test for a deviation from the Knesset’s constituent authority was established in the Hasson case – a narrow test expressed in the question whether the amendment denies the core democratic identity of the state or inflicts mortal harm upon the minimal core characteristics of its identity as a Jewish and democratic state.

In the opinion of Justice Kasher, the amendment under review weakens judicial review of the government and its ministers and thereby harms the separation of powers and the rule of law. However, not every shift in the balance point between the judiciary and the executive by means of narrowing judicial review of the executive constitutes a denial of the core democratic identity of the state. In his opinion, the amendment will lead to a certain weakening of judicial review over the executive. However, it is not expected to lead to a situation in which the said review will be ineffective, and thus there is no justification for voiding the amendment.

Justice Kasher concluded in stating that the question that he was called upon to decide is not to what extent he agrees with it and whether, in his view, it were better had it not been enacted, but rather whether the amendment that is the subject of the petitions rises to the level of the extreme circumstances – a mortal blow to the minimal core characteristics of the State of Israel’s identity as a Jewish and democratic state – that alone would justify the Court’s exercise of its very far-reaching authority to declare an amendment to a Basic Law void. Justice Kasher stated that in his opinion, the answer was no, and thus his conclusion.

 

Deputy President U. Vogelman:

The Deputy President held that the constituent authority cannot undermine the Jewish and democratic character of the state, and that the characteristics of the Israeli constitutional enterprise and the actual use of the constituent authority lead to the conclusion that the Court is the institution that holds the authority to decide whether the Knesset has deviated from its constituent authority. The Deputy President held that Israel’s unique situation, in which the control of executive, legislative and constituent powers are all effectively held by the government, as well as the shortcomings of the system for establishing constitutional provisions, have bearing on the threshold for the Court’s intervention.

 As for Amendment No. 3, the Deputy President held that barring any possibility of the Court addressing a claim of unreasonableness in regard to the ministerial level constitutes a mortal blow to the principle of the rule of law and the principle of the separation of powers. This harm is expressed in three spheres: first, for the individual who is harmed by an unreasonable decision and whose access to the Court is barred by the amendment; second, at the ministerial level, regarding  which the amendment removes a significant limitation and erodes the already shaky system of checks and balances of the Israeli legal system; third, regarding the legal system as a whole, by intentionally creating a system in which “there is law but no judge”.

The amendment’s harm in these three spheres is particularly severe because it is comprehensive and absolute: it prevents every court from addressing the cause of reasonableness in regard to decisions at the ministerial level; it extends to every decision at that level; it lacks mechanisms for oversight or other balances; the other causes of action in administrative law cannot provide an effective alternative.

The Deputy President added that a narrow construction of the amendment is not possible in this case. This is so, inter alia, because the suggested interpretive theories have no foothold in the language of the amendment and do not provide a coherent alternative. In any case, he held that even under such interpretation, the severe harm to the rule of law and the separation of powers would remain.

 

Justice D. Mintz:

Justice D. Mintz emphasized that every agency and every judicial instance can act only within the boundaries of the authority granted to it by law. The Court must take care to act strictly within the bounds of its authority, with the same strictness that it applies when the question of authority arises in regard to other authorities. In this regard, jurisdiction to review laws does not rest upon strong foundations, and there is certainly no source of authority that would permit the Court to address the validity of a Basic Law or void it. The development of doctrines that examine the content and substance of Basic Laws ex nihilo undermines fundamental principles of democracy, among them the separation of powers, the legality principle, and the rule of law. Voiding a Basic Law on the basis of a vague doctrine and an undefined formula comprises a heavy price from a democratic perspective, particularly when it involves an issue in regard to which the Court itself has an “institutional conflict of interests”.

From this perspective, there is no need to address the amendment on the merits. In any case, the discussion of its construction is premature inasmuch as its boundaries have yet to be shaped and put into practice. In regard to the position of the majority, Justice Mintz emphasized that a constitutional provision should be interpreted from a “broad perspective” and not “technically”, in a manner that reflects the “fundamental concepts” that it is intended to realize as a constitutional document; it is difficult to establish that the language of the amendment is “sweeping”, unbounded, and leaves “no room for doubt” as to its scope; and there is no flaw in the very fact that it concerns a general concept that requires interpretation. In addition, the amendment does not entirely preclude judicial review of government and ministerial decisions, does not grant them absolute, comprehensive discretion, and does not grant immunity to their decisions. The State of Israel is a strong democracy, and it remains so even after the amendment. The fact that there is a narrow majority among the opinions of the judges for the conclusion that we are concerned with a mortal blow to the principles of democracy also speaks for itself.

 

Justice K. Kabub:

Justice Kabub noted that recognition of the limitations upon the legislature in a democratic state does not necessarily come at the expense of the people’s sovereignty. Someone can protect them if their representatives in the legislature undermine the democratic regime. He explained that the best illustration of such restrictions is the fact that the people did not authorize the Knesset to do whatever it pleases. Thus, the Knesset is not authorized to extend its term beyond four years in the absence of special circumstances, even if all one-hundred-and-twenty members vote in favor of such a law in three readings and call it a Basic Law. Thus, he held that in view of the structure of the Israeli regime, a result according to which there would be no judicial review of Basic Laws constituted through a deviation from authority is unacceptable. However, such review must be undertaken with special care and only in an extreme case.

After surveying the development of reasonableness in Israeli law, Justice Kabub concluded that at root stands the view that the legislature cannot grant the administration authority to make arbitrary and capricious decisions. Over time, the reasonableness doctrine expanded, and the interest-balancing test was devised in the Dapei Zahav case, which has come under criticism primarily because of its ambiguous boundaries. Nevertheless, the proper construction of Amendment No. 3 shows that the Knesset did not merely annul the interest-balancing test, but also comprehensively eliminated judicial review of the reasonableness of the decisions at the ministerial level.

Justice Kabub emphasized that exempting the ministerial level from accountability when it deviates from its authority means that the nation would be governed by people, contrary to the purest description of sovereignty as governance by laws. Therefore, there is no alternative to judicial intervention. However, he explained that attention should be paid to the criticism of the interest-balancing test that has been expressed over the years, which went as far as the Knesset and led to amending a Basic Law, and it would be appropriate to give that expression in the case law.

 

Justice (emer.) A. Baron:

Justice Anat Baron noted that 75 years after that historic moment of the Declaration of Independence, Israeli democracy is under a threat from within – as illustrated by the amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary. The amendment was intended to bring about a fundamental regime change. It frees the government and its ministers from the bonds of judicial review on the grounds of reasonableness and grants the executive the power to rule without effective checks and balances. The import of the amendment is the granting of a comprehensive exemption to the government and its ministers from the duty to act reasonably in their decisions, in a manner that grants the government unprecedented power and the status of a “super” executive-legislative-constituent authority. This strikes a mortal blow to the principle of the separation of powers, the rule of law, and the democratic character of the state.

Justice Baron explained that there is no appropriate alternative to the reasonableness doctrine for maintaining good governance and for protecting individual rights. At the same time, the amendment opens the door to political cronyism in the public administration and undermines the independence of those who hold professional appointments, particularly the “gatekeepers”, inasmuch as their appointment and dismissal would be subject to the grace of the ministers and the government. In Justice Baron’s opinion, the Supreme Court is granted the authority to establish that a constitutional norm is void in extreme cases in which the Knesset deviates from its constituent authority. In the instant case, adopting an affirming construction of the amendment is not possible as it would constitute drafting a new Basic Law, which is neither within the authority nor the role of the Supreme Court. There are those who seek to understate the dimensions of the matter, and make it appear as if the amendment is an inconsequential triviality of minor or marginal importance. But this is an acute moment in which one cannot stand aside, and the amendment must be declared void. In the words of the poet: “Therefore, send not to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee.”

 

Justice O. Grosskopf:

Justice Ofer Grosskopf concurred in the opinion of President (emer.) Hayut that the petitions should be granted, and that the amendment should be voided. In his opinion, the Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, holds jurisdiction to review whether the Knesset has acted in accordance with the limitations under which it operates as a constituent authority by virtue of Basic Law: The Judiciary and by virtue of substantive justifications deriving from the unique character of the Israeli constitutional enterprise. Those limitations are three: Regularity (the requirement that it enact or amend a Basic Law by the required legal procedure); Good faith (the prohibition upon exploiting the constituent authority for foreign purposes); Authority (the limitations upon the power of the sitting Knesset to deviate from the constitutional enterprise designed by its predecessors).

In the area of authority, which is the focus of the proceedings, given the nature of a sitting Knesset to shape the “constitution in the making” (continuation of the constitutional project, and not its creation ab initio), and in view of the primary purpose of the constitution (limiting the power of a transitory majority in the Knesset in its role as constituent authority), the sitting Knesset is subject (in the absence of Basic Law: Legislation) to two restrictions: First, the sitting Knesset is not authorized to undermine the fundamental principles already laid down in the “constitution in the making”, foremost among them the identity of the state as Jewish and democratic (the “constitutional givens”) in manner that would bring down the constitutional structure created by its predecessors; second, the authority of the sitting Knesset to introduce changes that constitute a significant deviation from the “constitutional givens” is contingent upon broad consensus. A transitory majority that the constitution is intended to limit is insufficient.

As for Amendment No. 3 to Basic Law: The Judiciary, Justice Grosskopf accepted the interpretive approach according to which it prevents any judicial review of the reasonableness of a governmental decision. Given that, the amendment constitutes a severe infringement of the “constitution in the making” as designed by the previous Knessets, primarily because it places the government above the law. As a result, the amendment bears severe negative consequences, and above and beyond that, it inflicts mortal harm to the principle of the rule of law, inasmuch as it comprehensively exempts those at the head of the executive branch from judicial review on the basis of reasonableness. Therefore, the amendment should be voided under the first limitation (undermining the “constitution in the making”), and alternatively, under the second limitation (significantly deviating from the “constitutional givens” without broad consensus).

 

Justice D. Barak-Erez:

Justice Barak-Erez was of the opinion that constituent authority is limited in accordance with the fundamental definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. She explained that this limitation is grounded in the Declaration of Independence (which is not a constitution but establishes the limits of the constituent authority). Accordingly, the Court’s jurisdiction to conduct judicial review in cases of deviation from the constituent authority derives from this limitation and cannot be contingent upon the wording of the Basic Laws themselves.

Justice Barak-Erez reiterated her position that the Court will intervene in the content of a Basic Law only in extreme cases of overstepping the bounds, which is the situation in the present case. The amendment to the Basic Law strikes a mortal blow to the foundations of democracy by granting the government broad immunity from effective oversight. In practice,  it leads to harm on three levels: barring the path to judicial relief in regard to decisions that harm individual interests; a lack of effective oversight of interim governments to the point of potentially influencing the transfer of power (for example, by advancing a “popular” policy on the eve of elections); as well as inflicting grave harm to oversight of the regime by those holding office as “gatekeepers” and independent regulators as a result of significantly weakening judicial review over their appointment and dismissal (a subject for which adequate safeguards have not been established in the law). Justice Barak-Erez added that the suggestion of returning to the reasonableness approach of “the good old days” ignores the broad legal and constitutional context and the balances among the branches of government in which judicial review was rooted in the past, in the sense of the adage: “No man ever steps in the same river twice”.

 

Justice N. Sohlberg:

Justice Sohlberg was of the opinion that it would be better to deny the petitions in limine by reason of a lack of jurisdiction.

According to his approach, a holding that there is some limit upon the authority of the constituent authority de facto annuls the fundamental democratic principle of the sovereignty of the people through its elected representatives. Justice Sohlberg added that this is not his view alone. The first seven Presidents of the Court, the eighth President, Aharon Barak at the outset of his judicial tenure, and a significant part of the justices who served on the Court for decades all stated, as it were: “Keep your hands off the state’s Basic Laws.

Justice Sohlberg noted that the Court majority points to various sources of authority, while there is no single source that is acceptable to them all. He was of the opinion that even according to the majority’s approach, one cannot derive from those sources that it is possible to void Basic Laws where the justices themselves are not in agreement, let alone on the basis of one vote.

Justice Sohlberg further noted that the majority opinion represents the opinion of the judiciary. As opposed to that, the constituent authority is of the opinion that not only does the Court lack the authority to void Basic Laws, but also that it lacks jurisdiction to decide the preliminary question: Is it the Court that holds the power to decide whether it has the authority to invalidate Basic Laws? Such a “conflict” between the branches of government is not played out in the legal arena, and it cannot be resolved by legal means.

As for the reasonableness doctrine, Justice Sohlberg was of the opinion that even were we to ignore the question of jurisdiction, then even according to the President (emer.), there is only one question: Does the Basic Law deny “the very existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state?”.  Since that is the question, the answer is near at hand: the Basic Law is a very, very far cry from falling within the compass of that narrow restriction, and more so. In any case, even if there were authority, there would be no grounds for voiding the law.

 

 

A v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CrimA 6659/06
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

Appeals challenging the decisions of the District Court who upheld the legality of the appellants’ arrests under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law 5762-2002 (hereinafter: the Act.) We are concerned with the private case of the appellants, residents of the Gaza Strip, who in 2002-2003 were arrested in an administrative arrest under the security legislation that applies in the strip, when as a result of the end of the military rule there in September 2005, the Chief of the General Staff issued the appellants’ arrest warrants under the Act. The Appeals raise general issues as to the interpretation of the Act and its compliance with humanitarian international law and as to the legality of its arrangements.

 

The Supreme Court (in a decision by President Beinisch and joined by Justices Procaccia and Levi) rejected the appeals and held that:

 

The Act authorizes State authorities to arrest “Unlawful Combatants” – whoever take part in warfare or are part of a force executing warfare activity against the State of Israel, and who do not meet the conditions to be given the status of war prisoners. The objective of the Act is to prevent such persons’ return to combating Israel; it does not apply to innocent civilians and it must be interpreted, as much as possible, according to international law. The Act’s arrest provisions must be examined with the attempt to realize the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty as much as possible. The Act’s arrest authorities severely and extensively infringe an arrested person’s personal liberty, which is justified under the appropriate circumstances to protect the State’s security. However, in light of the extent of the infringement and the extremity of the arrest tool, the infringement upon liberty rights must be interpreted as narrowly as possible, so that it is proportional to achieving only the security purposes. The Act must be interpreted in a manner that complies as much as possible with the international law norms to which Israel is obligated, but according to the changing reality as result of terror.

 

The Act includes a mechanism of administrative arrest that is carried out under a warrant by the Chief of General Staff. Administrative arrest is contingent upon the existence of a cause for arrest that is a result of the arrested person’s individual dangerousness to the security of the State, and its purpose is preventative. The State must demonstrate through sufficient administrative evidence that that arrested person is an “unlawful combatant” insofar that he took significant part, directly or indirectly, in contributing to warfare, or that the arrested person was a member of an organization that carries out warfare activity and then to consider his link and contribution to the organization’s warfare activity, in a broad sense. Only after proving meeting the definition above may the State make use of the presumption in section 7 of the Act whereby releasing the arrested person would harm the security of the State, so long as it is not proven otherwise.

 

The right to personal liberty is a constitutional right. However, it is not absolute and infringing it may be required in order to protect other public essential interests. The Court must consider whether the infringement upon the right to personal liberty is consistent with the conditions of the Limitations Clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, when it should be remembered that the Court does not easily strike down legal provisions. Under the circumstances, the extent of the infringement of the constitutional right to personal liberty is significant and severe. But the purpose of the Act, in light of a reality of daily terrorism is worthy, and therefore the legislature should be granted a relatively wide range of maneuvering in electing the appropriate means to realize the legislative intent. Considering this and additional factors, the Act meets the proportionality tests. Therefore the Act’s infringement upon the constitutional right to personal liberty is not to an extent beyond necessary, so that the Act meets the conditions of the Limitations Clause and there is no constitutional cause to intervene in it.

 

Israel should not have released the appellants, being residents of a liberated occupied territory, when the military rule in the Strip ended because the personal danger they pose continued in light of the ongoing warfare against the State of Israel. As for the individual incarceration warrants lawfully issued against the appellants, then the evidence reveals their tight connection with Hezbollah, their individual dangerousness was proven even without relying on the presumption in section 7 of the Act. There is no place to revoke the incarceration warrants. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

CrimA 6659/06

CrimA 1757/07

CrimA 8228/07

  CrimA 3261/08

 

1 . A

2.  B

v

State of Israel

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals

[5 March 2007]

Before President D. Beinisch and Justices E.E. Levy, A. Procaccia

 

 

Appeals of the decisions of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi) on 16 July 2006, 19 July 2006, 13 February 2007 and 3 September 2007, and the decision of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice D. Rozen) on 20 March 2008.

 

Legislation cited:

Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002

Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, 5739-1979

 

Israel Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        CrimFH 7048/97 A v. Minister of Defence [2000] IsrSC 44(1) 721.

[2]        HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 793.

[3]        HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 241; [2004] IsrLR 505.

[4]        HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[5]         HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785.

[6]        HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

[7]        HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83.

[8]        HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349; [2002-3] IsrLR 173.

[9]        HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2006] IsrSC 60(2) 477; [2005] (2) IsrLR 106. 

[10]      HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior (2006) (not yet reported); [2006] (1) IsrLR 442.

[11]      HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834.

[12]      HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker's Hotline v. Government of Israel [2006] (1) IsrLR 260.

[13]      HCJ 9132/07 Elbassiouni v. Prime Minister (2008) (unreported).

[14]      ADA 8607/04 Fahima v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(3) 258.

[15]      HCJ 554/81 Beransa v. Central Commander [1982] IsrSC 36(4) 247.

[16]      HCJ 11026/05 A v. IDF Commander (2005) (unreported).

[17]       CrimA 3660/03 Abeid v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[18]      HCJ 1853/02 Navi v. Minister of Energy and National Infrastructures (2003) (unreported).

[19]      HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241; [1998-9] IsrLR 635.

[20]      HCJ 4827/05 Man, Nature and Law - Israel Environmental Protection Society v. Minister of the Interior (2005) (unreported).

[21]      CA 7175/98 National Insurance Institute v. Bar Finance Ltd (in liquidation) (2001) (unreported).

[22]      HCJ 5319/97 Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 67; [1997] IsrLR 499.

[23]      CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported); [2005] (2) IsrLR 232.

[24]      CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 529.

[25]      HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 481.

[26]      HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235.

[27]      HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 57.

[28]      HCJ 6893/05 Levy v. Government of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 876.

[29]      HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.

[30]      HCJ 5627/02 Saif v. Government Press Office [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 70; [2004] IsrLR 191.

[31]      EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225;  IsrSJ 8 83.

[32]      CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.

[33]      HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 433.

[34]      AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members' Club v. Haifa Municipality [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 782.

[35]      HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 188.

[36]      CrimApp 8780/06 Sarur v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[37]      HCJ 403/81 Jabar v. Military Commander [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 397.

[38]      HCJ 102/82 Tzemel v. Minister of Defence [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 365.

[39]      ADA 4794/05 Ufan v. Minister of Defence (2005) (unreported).

[40]      ADA 7/94 Ben-Yosef v. State of Israel (1994) (unreported).

[41]      ADA 8788/03 Federman v. Minister of Defence [2004] IsrSC 58(1) 176.

[42]      HCJ 5445/93 Ramla Municipality v. Minister of the Interior [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 397.

[43]        HCJ 2159/97 Ashkelon Coast Regional Council v. Minister of the Interior [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 75.

[44]      HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 801.

[45]      ADA 334/04 Darkua v. Minister of the Interior [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 254.

[46]      HCJ 4400/98 Braham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 337.

[47]      HCJ 11006/04 Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (2004) (unreported).

[48]      CrimApp 3514/97 A v. State of Israel (1997) (unreported).

[49]      HCJ 5994/03 Sadar v. IDF Commander in West Bank (2003) (unreported).

[50]      CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [2006]  (unreported), 2006 (1) IsrLR 320.

[51]      HCJ 3412/93 Sufian v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 843.

[52]      HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiah v. Israel Police [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 209.

[53]         HCJ 2901/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF  Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 19.

[54]    CrimA 1221/06 Iyyad v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

 

 

For the appellants - H. Abou-Shehadeh

For the respondent - Z. Goldner, O.J. Koehler, S. Nitzan, Y. Roitman.

 

JUDGMENT

 

President D. Beinisch:

Before us are appeals against the decisions of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi), in which the internment of the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002 (hereinafter: "the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law" or "the Law") was upheld as lawful. Apart from the particular concerns of the appellants, the appeals raise fundamental questions concerning the interpretation of the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and the extent to which the Law is consistent with international humanitarian law, as well as the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the Law.

The main facts and sequence of events

1.  The first appellant is an inhabitant of the Gaza Strip, born in 1973, who was placed under administrative detention on 1 January 2002 by virtue of the Administrative Detentions (Temporary Provision) (Gaza Strip Region) Order (no. 941), 5748-1988. The detention of the first appellant was extended from time to time by the Military Commander and upheld on judicial review by the Gaza Military Court. The second appellant is also an inhabitant of Gaza, born in 1972, and he was placed under administrative detention on 24 January 2003 pursuant to the aforesaid Order. The detention of the second appellant was also extended from to time and reviewed by the Gaza Military Court.

On 12 September 2005 a statement was issued by the Southern District Commander with regard to the end of military rule in the region of the Gaza Strip. On the same day, in view of the change in circumstances and also the change in the relevant legal position, internment orders were issued against the appellants; these were signed by the Chief of Staff by virtue of his authority under s. 3 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, on which the case before us focuses. On 15 September 2005 the internment orders were brought to the notice of the appellants. At a hearing that took place pursuant to the Law, the appellants indicated that they did not wish to say anything, and on 20 September 2005 the Chief of Staff decided that the internment orders under the aforesaid Law would remain in force.

2.  On 22 September 2005 a judicial review hearing began in the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Justice Z. Caspi) in the appellants' case. On 25 January 2006 the District Court held that there had been no defect in the procedure of issuing internment orders against the appellants, and that all the conditions laid down in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law were satisfied, including the fact that their release would harm state security. The appellants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and on 14 March 2006 their appeal was denied (Justice E. Rubinstein). In the judgment it was held that the material presented to the court evinced the appellants' clear association with the Hezbollah organization, as well as their participation in acts of combat against the citizens of Israel prior to their detention. The court emphasized in this context the personal threat presented by the two appellants and the risk that they would resume their activities if they were released, as could be seen from the material presented to the court.

3.  On 9 March 2006 the periodic judicial review pursuant to s. 5(c) of the Law began in the District Court. In the course of this review, not only were the specific complaints of the appellants against their internment considered, but also fundamental arguments against the constitutionality of the Law, in the framework of an indirect attack on its provisions. On 16 July 2006 the District Court gave its decision with regard to the appellant's specific claims. In this decision it was noted that from the information that was presented to the court it could be seen that the appellants were major activists in the Hezbollah organization who would very likely return to terrorist activities if they were released now, and that their release was likely to harm state security. On 19 July 2006 the District Court gave its decision on the fundamental arguments raised by the appellants concerning the constitutionality of the Law. The District Court rejected the appellants' argument in this regard too, and held that the Law befitted the values of the State of Israel, its purpose was a proper one and its violation of the appellants' rights was proportionate. The court said further that in its opinion the Law was also consistent with the principles of international law. The appeal in CrimA 6659/06 is directed at these two decisions of 16 July 2006 and 19 July 2006.

On 13 February 2007 the District Court gave a decision in a second periodic review of the appellants' detention. In its decision the District Court approved the internment orders, discussed the appellants' importance to the activity of the Hezbollah organization as shown by the testimonies of experts who testified before it and said that their detention achieved a preventative goal of the first order. The appeal in CrimA 1757/07 is directed at this decision.

On 3 September 2007 the District Court gave its decision in the third periodic review of the appellants' internment. In its decision the District Court noted that the experts remained steadfast in their opinion that it was highly probable that the two appellants would resume their terrorist activity if they were released, and as a result the operational abilities of the Hezbollah infrastructure in the Gaza Strip would be enhanced and the risks to the State of Israel and its inhabitants would increase. It also said that the fact that the Hamas organization had taken control of the Gaza Strip increased the aforesaid risks and the difficulty of contending with them. The court emphasized that there was information with regard to each of the appellants concerning their desire to resume terrorist activity if they were released, and that they had maintained their contacts in this area even while they were imprisoned. In such circumstances, the District Court held that the passage of time had not reduced the threat presented by the appellants, who were the most senior persons in the Hezbollah terrorist infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, and that there was no basis for cancelling the internment orders made against them. The appeal in CrimA 8228/07 is directed at this decision.

On 20 March 2008 the District Court gave its decision in the fourth periodic review of the appellants' detention. During the hearing, the court (Justice D. Rozen) said that the evidence against each of the two appellants contained nothing new from recent years. Nevertheless, the court decided to approve their continued internment after it found that each of the two appellants was closely associated with the Hezbollah organization; both of them were intensively active in that organization; the existing evidence regarding them showed that their return to the area was likely to act as an impetus for terrorist attacks, and the long period during which they had been imprisoned had not reduced the danger that they represent. The appeal in CrimA 3261/08 was directed at this decision.

Our judgment therefore relates to all of the aforesaid appeals together.

The arguments of the parties

4.  The appellants' arguments before us, as in the trial court, focused on two issues: first, the appellants raised specific arguments concerning the illegality of the internment orders that were made in their cases, and they sought to challenge the factual findings reached by the District Court with regard to their membership in the Hezbollah organization and their activity in that organization against the security of the State of Israel. Secondly, once again the appellants indirectly raised arguments of principle with regard to the constitutionality of the Law. According to them, the Law in its present format violates the rights to liberty and dignity enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in a manner that does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause in the Basic Law. The appellants also claimed that the Law is inconsistent with the rules of international humanitarian law that it purports to realize. Finally the appellants argued that the end of Israel's military rule in the Gaza Strip prevents it, under the laws of war, from detaining the appellants.

The state's position was that the petitions should be denied. With regard to the specific cases of the appellants, the state argued that the internment orders in their cases were made lawfully and they were in no way improper. With regard to the arguments in the constitutional sphere, the state argued that the law satisfies the tests of the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, since it was intended for a proper purpose and its violation of personal liberty is proportionate. With regard to the rules of international law applicable to the case, the state argued that the Law is fully consistent with the norms set out in international law with regard to the detention of "unlawful combatants".

5.  In order to decide the questions raised by the parties before us, we shall first address the background that led to the enactment of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and its main purpose. With this in mind, we shall consider the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and the conditions that are required to prove the existence of a ground for detention under the law. Thereafter we shall examine the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the law and finally we shall address the specific detention orders made in the appellants' cases.

The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law - background to its enactment and its main purpose

6.  The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law gives the state authorities power to detain "unlawful combatants" as defined in s. 2 of the Law, i.e. persons who participate in hostile acts or who are members of forces that carry out hostile acts against the State of Israel, and who do not fulfil the conditions that confer prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law. As will be explained below, the Law allows the internment of foreign persons who belong to a terrorist organization or who participate in hostile acts against the security of the state, and it was intended to prevent these persons from returning to the cycle of hostilities against Israel.

The original initiative to enact the Law arose following the judgment in CrimFH 7048/97 A v. Minister of Defence [1], in which the Supreme Court held that the state did not have authority to hold Lebanese nationals in detention by virtue of administrative detention orders, if the sole reason for their detention was to hold them as "bargaining chips" in order to obtain the release of captives and missing servicemen. Although the original bill came into being against the background of a desire to permit the holding of prisoners as "bargaining chips", the proposal underwent substantial changes during the legislative process after many deliberations on this matter in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, chaired by MK Dan Meridor. On 4 March 2002, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was passed by the Knesset. Its constitutionality has not been considered by this court until now.

At the outset it should be emphasized that the examination of the historical background to the enactment of the Law and the changes that were made to the original bill, what was said during the Knesset debates, the wording of the Law as formulated at the end of the legislative process, and the effort that was made to ensure that it conformed to the provisions of international humanitarian law evident from the purpose clause of the statute, which we shall address below -  all show that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as it crystallized in the course of the legislative process was not intended to allow hostages to be held as "bargaining chips" for the purpose of obtaining the release of Israeli captives and missing servicemen being held in enemy territory, as alleged by the appellants before us. The plain language of the Law and its legislative history indicate that the Law was intended to prevent a person who endangers the security of the state due to his activity or his membership of a terrorist organization from returning to the cycle of combat. Thus, for example, MK David Magen, who was chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee at the time of the debate in the plenum of the Knesset prior to the second and third readings, said as follows:

'The draft law is very complex and as is known, it gave rise to many disagreements during the Committee's deliberations. The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee held approximately ten sessions at which it discussed the difficult questions raised by this Bill and considered all the possible ramifications of its passing the second and third readings. The Bill before you is the result of considerable efforts to present an act of legislation whose provisions are consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law and which satisfies the constitutional criteria, while being constantly mindful of and insistent upon maintaining a balance between security and human rights...

I wish to emphasize that the Bill also seeks to determine that a person who is an unlawful combatant, as defined in the new Law, will be held by the state as long as he represents a threat to its security. The criterion for interning a person is that he is dangerous. No person should be interned under the proposal as a punishment or, as many tend to think erroneously, as a bargaining chip. No mistake should be made in this regard. Nonetheless, we should ask ourselves whether it is conceivable that the state should release a prisoner who will return to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel?' [emphasis added].

The Law was therefore not intended to allow prisoners to be held as "bargaining chips". The purpose of the Law is to remove from the cycle of hostilities a person who belongs to a terrorist organization or who participates in hostile acts against the State of Israel. The background to this is the harsh reality of murderous terrorism, which has for many years plagued the inhabitants of the state, harmed the innocent and indiscriminately taken the lives of civilians and servicemen, the young and old, men, women and children. In order to realize the aforesaid purpose, the Law applies only to persons who take part in the cycle of hostilities or who belong to a force that carries out hostile acts against the State of Israel, and not to innocent civilians. We shall return to address the security purpose of the Law below.

Interpreting the provisions of the Law

7. As we have said, in their arguments before us the parties addressed in detail the question of the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in the Law. In addition, the parties addressed at length the question of whether the arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are consistent with international law. The parties addressed this question, inter alia, because in s. 1 of the Law, which is the purpose section, the Law states that it is intended to realize its purpose "in a manner that is consistent with the commitments of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian law." As we shall explain below, this declaration is a clear expression of the basic outlook prevailing in our legal system that the existing law should be interpreted in a manner that is as consistent as possible with international law.

In view of the two main focuses of the basic arguments of the parties before us - whether the arrangements prescribed in the Law are constitutional and whether they are consistent with international humanitarian law - we should clarify that both the constitutional scrutiny from the viewpoint of the limitation clause and the question of compliance with international humanitarian law may be affected by the interpretation of the arrangements prescribed in the Law. Before deciding on the aforesaid questions, therefore, we should first consider the interpretation of the principal arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. These arrangements will be interpreted in accordance with the language and purpose of the Law, and on the basis of two interpretive presumptions that exist in our legal system: one, the presumption of constitutionality, and the other, the presumption of interpretive compatibility with the norms of international law - both those that are part of Israeli law and those that Israel has taken upon itself amongst its undertakings in the international arena.

8.  Regarding the presumption of constitutionality: in our legal system the legislature is presumed to be aware of the contents of the Basic Laws and their ramifications for every statute that is enacted subsequently. According to this presumption, the examination of a provision of statute involves an attempt to interpret it so that it is consistent with the protection that the Basic Laws afford to human rights. This realizes the presumption of normative harmony, whereby "we do not assume that a conflict exists between legal norms, and every possible attempt is made to achieve 'uniformity in the law' and harmony between the various norms" (A. Barak, Legal Interpretation - the General Theory of Interpretation (1992), at p. 155). In keeping with the presumption of constitutionality, we must, therefore, examine the meaning and scope of the internment provisions in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law while aspiring to uphold, insofar as possible, the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. It should immediately be said that the internment powers prescribed in the Law significantly and seriously violate the personal liberty of the prisoner. This violation is justified in appropriate circumstances in order to protect state security. However, in view of the magnitude of the violation of personal liberty, and considering the exceptional nature of the means of detention that are prescribed in the Law, an interpretive effort should be made in order to minimize the violation of the right to liberty as much as possible so that it is proportionate to the need to achieve the security purpose and does not go beyond this. Such an interpretation will be compatible with the basic conception prevailing in our legal system, according to which a statute should be upheld by interpretive means and the court should refrain, insofar as possible, from setting it aside on constitutional grounds. In the words of President A. Barak:

'It is better to achieve a reduction in the scope of a statute by interpretive means rather than  having to achieve the same reduction by declaring a part of a statute void because it conflicts with the provisions of a Basic Law.... A reasonable interpretation of a statute is preferable to a decision on the question of its constitutionality' (HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [2], at p. 812; see also HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [3], at p. 276).

9. With respect to the presumption of conformity to international humanitarian law: as we have said, s. 1 of the Law declares explicitly that its purpose is to regulate the internment of unlawful combatants "… in a manner that is consistent with the commitments of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian law." The premise in this context is that an international armed conflict prevails between the State of Israel and the terrorist organizations that operate outside Israel (see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at paras. 18, 21; see also A. Cassese, International Law (second edition, 2005), at p. 420).

The international law that governs an international armed conflict is anchored mainly in the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) (hereinafter: "the Hague Convention") and the regulations appended to it, whose provisions have the status of customary international law (see HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [5], at p. 793; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [6], at p. 827; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 364; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereinafter: "Fourth Geneva Convention"), whose customary provisions constitute a part of the law of the State of Israel and some of which have been considered in the past by this court (Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at page 364; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8]; HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [9], at para. 14); and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977 (hereinafter: "First Protocol"), to which Israel is not a party, but whose customary provisions also constitute a part of the law of the State of Israel (see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at para. 20). In addition, where there is a lacuna in the laws of armed conflict set out above, it is possible to fill it by resorting to international human rights law (see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at para. 18; see also Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Rep. 226, at page 240; Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 ILM 1009 (2004)).

It should be emphasized that no one in this case disputes that an explicit statutory provision enacted by the Knesset overrides the provisions of international law (see in this regard President A. Barak in HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at para. 17). However, according to the presumption of interpretive consistency, an Israeli act of legislation should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent, insofar as possible, with the norms of international law to which the State of Israel is committed (see HCJ 2599/00 Yated, Children with Down Syndrome Parents Society v. Ministry of Education [11], at p. 847; HCJ 4542/02 Kav LaOved Worker's Hotline v. Government of Israel [12], at para. 37). According to this presumption, which as we have said is clearly expressed in the purpose clause of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the arrangements prescribed in the Law should be interpreted in a manner that is as consistent as possible with the international humanitarian law that governs the matter.

Further to the aforesaid it should be noted that when we approach the task of interpreting provisions of the statute in a manner consistent with the accepted norms of international law, we cannot ignore the fact that the provisions of international law that exist today have not been adapted to changing realities and to the phenomenon of terrorism that is changing the face and characteristics of armed conflicts and those who participate in them (see in this regard the remarks of President A. Barak in Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at pp. 381-382). In view of this, we should do our best to interpret the existing laws in a manner that is consistent with the new realities and the principles of international humanitarian law.

10.  Bearing all the above in mind, let us now turn to the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and of the conditions required for proving the existence of cause for internment under the Law. The presumption of constitutionality and the provisions of international law to which the parties referred will be our interpretive tools and they will assist us in interpreting the provisions of the Law and in evaluating the nature and scope of the power of internment it prescribes.

The definition of "unlawful combatant" and the scope of its application

11. S. 2 of the Law defines "unlawful combatant" as follows:

'Definitions

2.  In this law -

"unlawful combatant" - a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel or is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel, where the conditions prescribed in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War with respect to granting prisoner of war status in international humanitarian law, do not apply to him;

This statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" relates to those who take part in hostile acts against the State of Israel or who are members of a force that perpetrates such acts, and who are not prisoners of war under international humanitarian law. In this regard two points should be made: first, from the language of the aforesaid s. 2 it is clear that it is not essential for someone to take part in hostile acts against the State of Israel; his membership in a "force perpetrating hostile acts" - i.e., a terrorist organization - may include that person within the definition of "unlawful combatant". We will discuss the significance of these two alternatives in the definition of "unlawful combatant" below (para. 21 .).

Secondly, as noted above, the purpose clause in the Law refers explicitly to the provisions of international humanitarian law. The definition of "unlawful combatant" in the aforesaid s. 2 also refers to international humanitarian law when it provides that the Law applies to a person who does not enjoy prisoner of war status under the Third Geneva Convention. In general, the rules of international humanitarian law were not intended to apply to the relationship between the state and its citizens (see, for example, the provisions of art. 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, according to which a "protected civilian" is someone who is not a citizen of the state that is holding him in circumstances of an international armed conflict). The explicit reference by the legislature to international humanitarian law, together with the stipulation in the wording of the Law that prisoner of war status does not apply, show that the Law was intended to apply only to foreign parties who belong to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the state. We are not unaware that the draft law of 14 June 2000 contained an express provision stating that the Law would not apply to Israeli inhabitants (and also to inhabitants of the territories), except in certain circumstances that were set out therein (see s. 11 of the Internment of Enemy Forces Personnel Who Are Not Entitled to a Prisoner of War Status Bill, 5760-2000, Bills 5760, no. 2883, at p. 415). This provision was omitted from the final wording of the Law. Nevertheless, in view of the explicit reference in the Law to international humanitarian law and the laws concerning prisoners of war as stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that according to its wording and purpose, the Law was not intended to apply to local parties (citizens and residents of Israel) who endanger state security. For these other legal measures exist that are intended for a security purpose, which we shall address below.

It is therefore possible to sum up and say that an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law is a foreign party who belongs to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the State of Israel. This definition may include residents of a foreign country that maintains a state of hostilities against the State of Israel, who belong to a terrorist organization that acts against the security of the State and who satisfy the other conditions of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant". This definition may also include inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, which today is no longer under belligerent occupation. In this regard it should be noted that since the end of Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip in September 2005, the State of Israel has no permanent physical presence in the Gaza Strip, and it also has no real possibility of carrying out the duties of an occupying power under international law, including the main duty of maintaining public order and security. Any attempt to impose the authority of the State of Israel on the Gaza Strip is likely to involve complex and prolonged military operations. In such circumstances, where the State of Israel has no real ability to control what happens in the Gaza Strip in an effective manner, the Gaza Strip should not be regarded as a territory that is subject to belligerent occupation from the viewpoint of international law, even though the unique situation that prevails there imposes certain obligations on the State of Israel vis-?-vis the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip (for the position that the Gaza Strip is not now subject to a belligerent occupation, see Yuval Shany, "Faraway So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza after Israel's Disengagement," 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2005 (2007) 359; see also the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, where the importance of a physical presence of military forces was emphasized for the existence of a state of occupation: Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (ICJ, 19 December 2005), at para.173; with regard to the existence of certain obligations that the State of Israel has in the prevailing circumstances vis-?-vis the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, see HCJ 9132/07 Elbassiouni v. Prime Minister [13]. In our case, in view of the fact that the Gaza Strip is no longer under the effective control of the State of Israel, we must conclude that the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip constitute foreign parties who may be subject to the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law in view of the nature and purpose of this Law.

With regard to the inhabitants of the territory (Judaea and Samaria) that is under the effective control of the State of Israel, for the reasons that will be stated later (in para. 36 below), I tend to the opinion that insofar as necessary for security reasons, the administrative detention of these inhabitants should be carried out pursuant to the security legislation that applies in the territories and not by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. However, the question of the application of the aforesaid Law to the inhabitants of the territories does not arise in the circumstances of the case before us and it may therefore be left undecided.

Conformity of the definition of "unlawful combatant" to a category recognized by international law

12. The appellants argued that the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law is contrary to the provisions of international humanitarian law, since international law does not recognize the existence of an independent and separate category of "unlawful combatants". According to their argument, there are only two categories in international law - "combatants" and "civilians", who are subject to the provisions and protections enshrined in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions respectively. In their view international law does not have an intermediate category that includes persons who are not protected by either of these conventions.

With regard to the appellants' aforesaid arguments we would point out that the question of the conformity of the term "unlawful combatant" to the categories recognized by international law has already been addressed in our case law in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], in which it was held that the term "unlawful combatants" does not constitute a separate category, but rather, a sub-category of "civilians" recognized by international law. This conclusion is based on the approach of customary international law, according to which the category of "civilians" includes everyone who is not a "combatant". We are therefore dealing with a negative definition. In the words of President A. Barak:

 'The approach of customary international law is that "civilians" are persons who are not "combatants" (see article 50(1) of the First Protocol, and Sabel, supra, at page 432). In the Blaskic case, the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Yugoslavia said that civilians are "persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces" (Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2000), Case IT-95-14-T, at paragraph 180). This definition is of a "negative" character. It derives the concept of "civilians" from it being the opposite of "combatants". Thus it regards unlawful combatants, who as we have seen are not "combatants", as civilians' (ibid., at para. 26 of the opinion of President A. Barak).

In this context, two additional points should be made: first, the determination that "unlawful combatants" belong to the category of "civilians" in international law is consistent with the official interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, according to which in an armed conflict or a state of occupation, every person who finds himself in the hands of the opposing party is entitled to a certain status under international humanitarian law - the status of prisoner of war, which is governed by the Third Geneva Convention, or the status of protected civilian, which is governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention:

'There is no "intermediate status"; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law' (O. Uhler and H. Coursier (eds.), Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War: Commentary (ICRC, Geneva, 1950), commentary to art. 4, at page 51).

(See also S. Borelli, 'Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: International Law and Detentions Abroad in the "War on Terror",' 87(857) IRRC 39 (2005), at pp. 48-49).

Secondly, it should be emphasized that prima facie, the statutory definition of "unlawful combatants" under s. 2 of the Law applies to a broader group of people than the group of "unlawful combatants" discussed in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], in view of the difference in the measures under discussion: the judgment in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] considered the legality of the measure of a military attack intended to cause the death of an "unlawful combatant". According to international law, it is permitted to attack an "unlawful combatant" only during the period of time when he is taking a direct part in the hostilities. By contrast, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law deals with the measure of internment. For the purposes of internment under the Law, it is not necessary for the "unlawful combatant" to participate directly in the hostilities, nor is it essential that the internment take place during the period of time that he is participating in hostile acts; all that is required is that the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law are proved. This statutory definition does not conflict with the provisions of international humanitarian law since, as we shall clarify clear below, the Fourth Geneva Convention also permits the detention of a protected "civilian"' who endangers the security of the detaining state. Thus we see that our reference to the judgment in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] was not intended to indicate that an identical issue was considered in that case. Its purpose was to support the finding that the term "unlawful combatants" in the Law under discussion does not create a separate category of treatment from the viewpoint of international humanitarian law; rather, it constitutes a sub-group of the category of "civilians".

13.   Further to our finding that "unlawful combatants" belong to the category of "civilians" from the viewpoint of international law, it should be noted that this court has held in the past that international humanitarian law does not grant "unlawful combatants" the same degree of protection to which innocent civilians are entitled, and that in this respect there is a difference from the viewpoint of the rules of international law between "civilians" who are not "unlawful combatants" and "civilians" who are "unlawful combatants". (With regard to the difference in the scope of the protection from a military attack upon "civilians" who are not "unlawful combatants" as opposed to "civilians" who are "unlawful combatants", see Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], at paras. 23-26). As we shall explain below, in the present context the significance of this is that someone who is an "unlawful combatant" is subject to the Fourth Geneva Convention, but according to the provisions of the aforesaid Convention it is possible to apply various restrictions to them and inter alia to detain them when they represent a threat to the security of the state.

In concluding these remarks it should be noted that although there are disagreements on principle between the parties before us as to the scope of the international laws that apply to "unlawful combatants", including the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the scope of the rights of which they may be deprived for security reasons under art. 5 of the Convention, we are not required to settle most of these disagreements. This is due to the state's declaration that in its opinion the Law complies with the most stringent requirements of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and because of the assumption that the appellants enjoy all the rights that are enshrined in this Convention (see paras. 334 and 382 of the state's response).

14.  In summary, in view of the purpose clause of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, according to which the Law was intended to regulate the status of "unlawful combatants" in a manner that is consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law, and bearing in mind the finding of this court in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4] that "unlawful combatants" constitute a subcategory of "civilians" under international law, we are able to determine that, contrary to the appellants' claim, the Law does not create a new reference group from the viewpoint of international law; it merely determines special provisions for the detention of "civilians" (according to the meaning of this term in international humanitarian law) who are "unlawful combatants".

The nature of internment of "Unlawful Combatants" under the Law - administrative detention

15. Now that we have determined that the definition of "unlawful combatant" in the Law is not incompatible with division into the categories  of "civilians" as opposed to "combatants"' in international law and in the case law of this court, let us proceed to examine the provisions of the Law that regulate the internment of unlawful combatants. S. 3(a) of the law provides the following:

 

'Internment of Unlawful Combatant

3. (a) Where the Chief of Staff has reasonable cause to believe that a person being held by state authorities is an unlawful combatant and that his release will harm state security, he may issue an order under his hand, directing that such person be interned at a place to be determined (hereinafter: "internment order"); an internment order shall include the grounds for internment, without prejudicing state security requirements.'

S. 7 of the Law adds a probative presumption in this context, which provides as follows:

'Presumption

 7.  For the purposes of this Law, a person who is a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel or who has participated in hostile acts of such a force, either directly or indirectly, shall be deemed to be a person whose release would harm state security as long as the hostile acts of such force against the State of Israel have not yet ceased, unless proved otherwise.'

The appellants argued before us that the internment provisions in the Law create, de facto, a third category of detention, which is neither criminal arrest nor administrative detention, and which has no recognition in Israeli law or international law. We cannot accept this argument. The mechanism provided in the Law is a mechanism of administrative detention in every respect, which is carried out in accordance with an order of the Chief of Staff, who is an officer of the highest security authority. As we shall explain below, we are dealing with an administrative detention whose purpose is to protect state security by removing from the cycle of hostilities anyone who is a member of a terrorist organization or who is participating in the organization's operations against the State of Israel, in view of the threat that he represents to the security of the state and the lives of its inhabitants.

16.  It should be noted that the actual authority provided in the Law for the administrative detention of a "civilian" who is an "unlawful combatant" due to the threat that he represents to the security of the state is not contrary to the provisions of international humanitarian law. Thus art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which lists a variety of rights to which protected civilians are entitled, recognizes the possibility of a party to a dispute adopting "control and security measures" that are justified on security grounds. The wording of the aforesaid art. 27 is as follows:

'... the Parties to the conflict may take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war.'

Regarding the types of control measures that are required for protecting state security, art. 41 of the Convention prohibits the adoption of control measures that are more severe than assigned residence or internment in accordance with the provisions of arts. 42-43 of the Convention. Art. 42 entrenches the rule that a "civilian" should not be interned unless this is "absolutely necessary" for the security of the detaining power. Art. 43 proceeds to obligate the detaining power to approve the detention by means of judicial or administrative review, and to hold periodic reviews of the continuing need for internment at least twice a year. Art. 78 of the Convention concerns the internment of protected civilians who are inhabitants of a territory that is held by an occupying power, and it states that it is possible to invoke various security measures against them for essential security reasons, including assigned residence and internment. Thus we see that the Fourth Geneva Convention allows the internment of protected "civilians" in administrative detention, when this is necessary for reasons concerning the essential security needs of the detaining power.

17.  In concluding these remarks we would point out that the appellants argued before us that the aforesaid provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are not applicable in their particular case. According to them, arts. 41-43 of the Convention concern the detention of protected civilians who are present in the territory of a party to a dispute, whereas the appellants were taken into detention when they were in the Gaza Strip in the period prior to the implementation of the disengagement plan, when the status of the Gaza Strip was that of territory under belligerent occupation.  They argue that art. 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention - relating to administrative detention in occupied territory - is not applicable to their case either, in view of the circumstances that arose after the implementation of the disengagement plan and the departure of IDF forces from the Gaza Strip. In view of this, the appellants argued that no provision of international humanitarian law exists that allows them to be placed in administrative detention, and therefore they argued that their detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is contrary to the provisions of international law.

Our reply to these arguments is that the detention provisions set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention were intended to apply and realize the basic principle contained in the last part of art. 27 of the Convention, which was cited above. As we have said, this article provides that the parties to a dispute may adopt security measures against protected civilians insofar as this is required due to the belligerence. The principle underlying all the detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention is that "civilians" may be detained for security reasons to the extent necessitated by the threat that they represent. According to the aforesaid Convention, the power of detention for security reasons exists, whether we are concerned with the inhabitants of an occupied territory or with foreigners who were apprehended in the territory of one of the states involved in the dispute. In the appellants' case, although Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip has ended, the hostilities between the Hezbollah organization and the State of Israel have not ceased; therefore, detention of the appellants within the territory of the State of Israel for security reasons is not inconsistent with the detention provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The cause of detention under the Law - the requirement of an individual threat to security and the effect of the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant"

18.  One of the first principles of our legal system is that administrative detention is conditional upon the existence of a cause of detention that derives from the individual threat posed by the detainee to the security of the state. This was discussed by President Barak when he said:

'[For cause of detention to exist] the circumstances of the detention must be such that they arouse, with respect to [the prisoner] - to him personally and not to someone else - concern that threatens security, whether because he was apprehended in the combat area when he was actually fighting or carrying out acts of terrorism, or because there is a concern that he is involved in fighting or terrorism' (Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 367).

The requirement of an individual threat for the purpose of placing a person in administrative detention is an essential part of the protection of the constitutional right to dignity and personal liberty. This court has held in the past that administrative detention is basically a preventative measure; administrative detention was not intended to punish a person for acts that have already been committed or to deter others from committing them; its purpose is to prevent the tangible risk presented by the acts of the prisoner to the security of the state. It is this risk that justifies the use of the unusual measure of administrative detention that violates human liberty (see and cf. Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at pp. 370-372, and the references cited there).

19.  It will be noted that a personal threat to state security posed by the detainee is also a requirement under the principles of international humanitarian law. Thus, for example, in his interpretation of arts. 42 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Pictet emphasizes that the state should resort to the measure of detention only when it has serious and legitimate reasons to believe that the person concerned endangers its security. In his interpretation Pictet discusses membership in organizations whose goal is to harm the security of the state as a ground for deeming a person to be a threat, but he emphasizes the meta-principle that the threat is determined in accordance with the individual activity of that person. In Pictet's words:

'To justify recourse to such measures, the state must have good reason to think that the person concerned, by his activities, knowledge or qualifications, represents a real threat to its present or future security' (J.S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), at pp. 258-259).

20. No one here disputes that the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be interpreted in accordance with the aforesaid principles, whereby administrative detention is conditional upon proving the existence of cause that establishes an individual threat. Indeed, an examination of the provisions of the Law in accordance with the aforesaid principles reveals that the Law does not allow a person to be detained arbitrarily, and that the authority to detain by virtue of the Law is conditional upon the existence of a cause of detention that is based on the individual threat represented by the prisoner: first, the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law requires that it be proven that the prisoner himself took part in or belonged to a force that is carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel, the significance of which we shall address below. Secondly, s. 3(a) of the Law expressly provides that the cause of detention under the Law arises only with regard to someone for whom there is reasonable basis to believe that "his release will harm state security." S. 5(c) of the Law goes on to provide that the District Court will set aside a detention order that was issued pursuant to the Law only when the release of the prisoner "will not harm state security" (or when there are special reasons that justify the release). To this we should add that according to the purpose of the Law, administrative detention is intended to prevent the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities, indicating that he was originally a part of that cycle.

The dispute between the parties before us in this context concerns the level of the individual threat that the state must prove for the purpose of administrative detention under the Law. This dispute arises due to the combination of two main provisions of the Law: one is the provision in s. 2 of the Law, a simple reading of which states that an "unlawful combatant" is not only someone who takes a direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, but also a person who is a "member of a force perpetrating hostile acts." The other is the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law, whereby a person who is a member of a force that perpetrates hostile acts against the State of Israel shall be regarded as someone whose release will harm the security of the state unless the contrary is proved. On the basis of a combination of these two provisions of the Law, the state argued that it is sufficient to prove that a person is a member of a terrorist organization in order to prove his individual danger to the security of the state in such a manner that provides cause for detention under the Law. By contrast, the appellants' approach was that relying upon abstract "membership" in an organization that perpetrates hostile acts against the State of Israel as a basis for administrative detention under the Law renders meaningless the requirement of proving an individual threat, contrary to constitutional principles and international humanitarian law.

21. Resolution of the aforesaid dispute is largely affected by the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law. As we have said, the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" contains two alternatives: the first, "a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel", and the second, a person who is "a member of a force perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel," when the person concerned does not satisfy the conditions granting prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law. These two alternatives should be interpreted with reference to the security purpose of the Law and in accordance with the constitutional principles and international humanitarian law that we discussed above, which require proof of an individual threat as grounds for administrative detention.

With respect to the interpretation of the first alternative concerning "a person who has participated either directly or indirectly in hostile acts against the State of Israel " - according to the legislative purpose and the principles that we have discussed, the obvious conclusion is that in order to intern a person it is not sufficient that he made a remote, negligible or marginal contribution to the hostilities against the State of Israel. In order to prove that a person is an "unlawful combatant", the state must prove that he contributed to the perpetration of hostile acts against the state, either directly or indirectly, in a manner that is likely to indicate his personal dangerousness. Naturally it is not possible to define such a contribution precisely and exhaustively, and the matter must be examined according to the circumstances of each case on its merits.

With respect to the second alternative  - a person who is "a member of a force carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel" - here too an interpretation that is consistent with the purpose of the Law and the constitutional principles and international humanitarian law discussed above is required: on the one hand it is insufficient to simply show some kind of tenuous connection with a terrorist organization in order to include the person within the cycle of hostilities in the broad meaning of this concept. On the other hand, in order to establish cause for the internment of a person who is a member of an active terrorist organization whose self-declared goal is to fight incessantly against the State of Israel, it is not necessary for that person to take a direct or indirect part in the hostilities themselves, and it is possible that his connection and contribution to the organization will be expressed in other ways that suffice to include him in the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense, such that his detention will be justified under the Law.

Thus we see that for the purpose of internment under the Law, the state must furnish administrative proof that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" with the meaning that we discussed, i.e. that the prisoner took a direct or indirect part that involved a contribution to the fighting  - a part that was neither negligible nor marginal in hostile acts against the State of Israel - or that the prisoner belonged to an organization that perpetrates hostile acts, in which case we should consider the prisoner's connection and the nature of his contribution to the cycle of hostilities of the organization in the broad sense of this concept.

It should be noted that proving the conditions of the definition of an "unlawful combatant" in the aforesaid sense naturally includes proof of an individual threat that derives from the type of involvement in the organization. It should also be noted that only after the state has proved that the prisoner fulfils the conditions of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" can it have recourse to the probative presumption set out in s. 7 of the Law, according to which the release of the prisoner will harm state security as long as the contrary has not been proved. It is therefore clear that s. 7 of the Law does not negate the obligation of the state to prove the threat represented by the prisoner, which derives from the type of involvement in the relevant organization, as required in order to prove him to be an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law. In view of this, the inevitable conclusion is that the argument that the Law does not include a requirement of an individual threat goes too far and should be rejected.

Proving someone to be an "unlawful combatant" under the Law - the need for clear and convincing administrative evidence

22.  Above, we discussed the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant". According to the aforesaid interpretation, the state is required to prove that the prisoner took a substantial, direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, or that he belonged to an organization that perpetrates hostile acts:  all this, taking into consideration his connection and the extent of his contribution to the organization's cycle of hostilities. In these circumstances internment of a person may be necessary in order to remove him from the cycle of hostilities that prejudices the security of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. The question that arises here is this: what evidence is required in order to convince the court that the prisoner satisfies the conditions of the definition of an "unlawful combatant" with the aforesaid meaning?

This court has held in the past that since administrative detention is an unusual and extreme measure, and in view of its violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty, clear and convincing evidence is required in order to prove a security threat that establishes a cause for administrative detention (see Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 372, where this was the ruling with regard to the measure of assigned residence; also cf. per Justice A. Procaccia in ADA 8607/04 Fahima v. State of Israel [14], at p. 264; HCJ 554/81 Beransa v. Central Commander [15]). It would appear that the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be interpreted similarly. Bearing in mind the importance of the right to personal liberty and in view of the security purpose of the said Law, the provisions of ss. 2 and 3 of the Law should be interpreted as obligating the state to prove, with clear and convincing administrative evidence, that even if the prisoner did not take a substantial, direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, he belonged to a terrorist organization and made a significant contribution to the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense, such that his administrative detention is justified in order to prevent his return to the aforesaid cycle of hostilities.

The significance of the requirement that there be clear and convincing evidence is that importance should be attached to the quantity and quality of the evidence against the prisoner and the degree to which the relevant intelligence information against him is current; this is necessary both to prove that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" under s. 2 of the Law and also for the purpose of the judicial review of the need to continue the detention, to which we shall return below. Indeed, the purpose of administrative detention is to prevent anticipated future threats to the security of the state; naturally we can learn of these threats from tangible evidence concerning the prisoner's acts in the past (see per President M. Shamgar in Beransa v. Central Commander [15], at pp. 249-250; HCJ 11026/05 A v. IDF Commander [16], at para. 5). Nevertheless, for the purposes of long-term internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, satisfactory administrative evidence is required, and a single piece of evidence about an isolated act carried out in the distant past is insufficient.

23. It follows that for the purposes of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the state is required to provide clear and convincing evidence that even if the prisoner did not take a substantial direct or indirect part in hostile acts against the State of Israel, he belonged to a terrorist organization and contributed to the cycle of hostilities in its broad sense. It should be noted that this requirement is not always easy to prove, for to prove that someone is a member of a terrorist organization is not like proving that someone is a member of a regular army, due to the manner in which terrorist organizations work and how people join their ranks. In Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [4], the court held that unlike lawful combatants, unlawful combatants do not as a rule bear any clear and unambiguous signs that they belong to a terrorist organization (see ibid. [4], at para. 24). Therefore, the task of proving that a person belongs to an organization as aforesaid is not always an easy one. Nevertheless, the state is required to furnish sufficient administrative evidence to prove the nature of the prisoner's connection to the terrorist organization, and the degree or nature of his contribution to the broad cycle of combat or hostile acts carried out by the organization.

It should also be noted that in its pleadings before us, the state contended that the power of internment prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was intended to apply to members of terrorist organizations in a situation of ongoing belligerence in territory that is not subject to the full control of the State of Israel, where in the course of the hostilities a relatively large number of unlawful combatants may fall into the hands of the security forces and it is necessary to prevent them returning to the cycle of hostilities against Israel. The special circumstances that exist in situations of this kind require a different course of action from that which is possible within the territory of the state or in an area subject to belligerent occupation. In any case, it must be assumed that the said reality may pose additional difficulties in assembling evidence as to whether those persons detained by the state on the battle-field belong to a terrorist organization and how great a threat they represent.

The probative presumptions in ss. 7 and 8 of the Law

24. As we have said, s. 7 of the Law establishes a presumption whereby a person who satisfies the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" shall be regarded as someone whose release will harm the security of the state as long as the hostile acts against the State of Israel have not ceased. This is a rebuttable presumption, and the burden of rebutting it rests on the prisoner. We will emphasize what we said above, that the presumption in the said s. 7 is likely to be relevant only after the state has proved that the prisoner satisfies the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant". In such circumstances it is presumed that the release of the prisoner will harm state security as required by s. 3(a) of the Law.

As noted above, one of the appellants' main claims in this court was that the aforesaid presumption obviates the need to prove an individual threat from the prisoner, and that this is inconsistent with constitutional principles and international humanitarian law. The respondent countered this argument but went on to declare before us that as a rule, the state strives to present a broad and detailed evidentiary basis with regard to the threat presented by prisoners, and it has done so to date in relation to all prisoners under the Law, including in the appellants' case. The meaning of this assertion is that in practice, the state refrains from relying on the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law and it proves the individual threat presented by prisoners on an individual basis, without resorting to the said presumption. It should be noted that this practice of the state is consistent with our finding that proving fulfillment of the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law involves proving the individual threat that arises from the type of involvement in an organization as explained above.

In any case, since the state has refrained until now from invoking the presumption in s. 7 of the Law, the questions of the extent to which the said presumption reduces the requirement of proving the individual threat for the purpose of internment under the Law, and whether this is an excessive violation of the constitutional right to liberty and of the principles of international humanitarian law, do not arise. We can therefore leave these questions undecided, for as long as the state produces prima facie evidence of the individual threat presented by the prisoner and does not rely on the presumption under discussion, the question of the effect of the presumption on proving an individual threat remains theoretical. It will be noted that should the state choose to invoke the presumption in s. 7 of the Law in the future rather than proving the threat to the required degree, it will be possible to bring the aforesaid questions before the court, since it will be necessary to resolve them concretely rather than theoretically (see CrimA 3660/03 Abeid v. State of Israel [17]; HCJ 1853/02 Navi v. Minister of Energy and National Infrastructures [18]; HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defence [19], at p. 250 {641}; HCJ 4827/05 Man, Nature and Law - Israel Environmental Protection Society v. Minister of the Interior [20], at para. 10; CA 7175/98 National Insurance Institute v. Bar Finance Ltd (in liquidation) [21]).

25. Regarding the probative presumption in s. 8 of the Law, this section states as follows:

'Determination regarding hostile acts

8. A determination of the Minister of Defence, by a certificate under his hand, that a particular force is perpetrating hostile acts against the State of Israel or that hostile acts of such force against the State of Israel have ceased or have not yet ceased, shall serve as proof in any legal proceedings, unless proved otherwise.

The appellants argued before us that the said probative presumption transfers the burden of proof to the prisoner in respect of a matter which he will never be able to refute, since it is subject to the discretion of the Minister of Defence. The state countered that in all the proceedings pursuant to the Law it has refrained from relying solely on the determination of the Minister of Defence, and it has presented the court and counsel for the prisoners with an updated and detailed opinion concerning the relevant organization to which the prisoner belongs. This was done in the case of the appellants too, who allegedly belong to the Hezbollah organization. In view of this, we are not required to decide on the fundamental questions raised by the appellants regarding the said s. 8.  In any case, it should be stated that in the situation prevailing in our region, in which the organizations that operate against the security of the State of Israel are well known to the military and security services, it should not be assumed that it is difficult to prove the existence and nature of the activity of hostile forces by means of a specific and updated opinion, in order to provide support for the determination of the Minister of Defence, as stated in s. 8 of the Law.

The Constitutional Examination

26.  Up to this point we have dealt with the interpretation of the statutory definition of "unlawful combatant" and the conditions required for proving the existence of a cause for internment under the Law. This interpretation takes into account the language and purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, and it is compatible with the presumption of constitutionality and with the principles of international humanitarian law to which the purpose clause of the Law expressly refers.

Now that we have considered the scope of the Law's application and the nature of the power of internment by virtue thereof, we will proceed to the arguments of the parties concerning the constitutionality of the arrangements prescribed in its framework. These arguments were raised in the District Court and in this court in the course of the hearing on the appellants' internment, in the framework of an indirect attack on the said Law.

Violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty

27.  S. 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides as follows:

'Personal liberty

5.  There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.

There is no dispute between the parties before us that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law violates the constitutional right to personal liberty entrenched in the aforesaid s. 5. This is a significant and serious violation, in that the Law allows the use of the extreme measure of administrative detention, which involves depriving a person of his personal liberty. It should be clarified that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was admittedly intended to apply to a foreign entity belonging to a terrorist organization that operates against the state security (see para. 11 above). In Israel, however, the internment of unlawful combatants is carried out by the government authorities, who are bound in every case to respect the rights anchored in the Basic Law (see ss. 1 and 11 of the Basic Law). Accordingly, the violation inherent in the arrangements of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law should be examined in keeping with the criteria in the Basic Law.

Examining the violation of the constitutional right from the perspective of the limitation clause

28.  No one disputes that the right to personal liberty is a constitutional right with a central role in our legal system, lying at the heart of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state (see Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at para. 20). It has been held in our case law that "personal liberty is a constitutional right of the first degree, and from a practical viewpoint it is also a condition for realizing other basic rights" (Tzemach v. Minister of Defence [16], at p. 251; see also HCJ 5319/97 Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [22], at p. 81 {513}; CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. State of Israel [23], at para. 53; CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [24], at pp. 539-540). Nevertheless, like all protected human rights the right to personal liberty is not absolute, and a violation of the right is sometimes necessary in order to protect essential public interests. The balancing formula in this context appears in the limitation clause in s. 8 of the Basic Law, which states:

'Violation of Rights

8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or according to a law as stated by virtue of explicit authorization therein. '

The question confronting us is whether the violation of the right to personal liberty engendered by the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law complies with the conditions of the limitation clause. The arguments of the parties before us focused on the requirements of proper purpose and proportionality, and these will be the focus of our deliberations as well.

29. At the outset, and before we examine the provisions of the Law from the perspective of the limitation clause, we should mention that the court will not hasten to intervene and set aside a statutory provision enacted by the legislature. The court is bound to uphold the law as a manifestation of the will of the people (HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [25], at pp. 552-553; HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at pp. 263-264; HCJ 3434/96 Hoffnung v. Knesset Speaker [27], at pp. 66-67). Thus the principle of the separation of powers finds expression: the legislative authority determines the measures that should be adopted in order to achieve public goals, whereas the judiciary examines whether these measures violate basic rights in contravention of the conditions set for this purpose in the Basic Law. It is the legislature that determines national policy and formulates it in statute, whereas the court scrutinizes the constitutionality of the legislation to reveal the extent to which it violates constitutional human rights (see per President A. Barak in Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at para. 78). It has therefore been held in the case law of this court that when examining the legislation of the Knesset from the perspective of the limitation clause, the court will act "with judicial restraint, caution and moderation" (Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at p. 263). The court will not refrain from constitutional scrutiny of legislation, but it will act with caution and exercise its constitutional scrutiny in order to protect human rights within the constraints of the limitation clause, while refraining from reformulating the policy that the legislature saw fit to adopt. Thus the delicate balance between majority rule and the principle of the separation of powers on the one hand, and the protection of the basic values of the legal system and human rights on the other, will be preserved.

The requirement of a proper purpose

30. According to the limitation clause, a statute that violates a constitutional right must have a proper purpose. It has been held in our case law that a legislative purpose is proper if it is designed to protect human rights, including by determining a reasonable and fair balance between the rights of individuals with conflicting interests, or if it serves an essential public purpose, an urgent social need or an important social concern whose purpose is to provide an infrastructure for coexistence and a social framework that seeks to protect and promote human rights (see ibid. [26], at p. 264; HCJ 6893/05 Levy v. Government of Israel [28], at pp. 889-890; HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [29], at pp. 52-53, {206}). It has also been held that not every purpose justifies a violation of constitutional basic rights, and that the essence of the violated right and the magnitude of the violation are likely to have ramifications for the purpose that is required to justify the violation.

In our remarks above we explained that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, according to its wording and its legislative history, was intended to prevent persons who threaten the security of the state due to their activity or their membership in terrorist organizations that carry out hostile acts against the State of Israel from returning to the cycle of hostilities (see para. 6 above). This legislative purpose is a proper one. Protecting state security is an urgent and even essential public need in the harsh reality of unremitting, murderous terrorism that harms innocent people indiscriminately. It is difficult to exaggerate the security importance of preventing members of terrorist organizations from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel in a period of relentless terrorist activity that threatens the lives of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. In view of this, the purpose of the Law under discussion may well justify a significant and even serious violation of human rights, including the right to personal liberty. Thus was discussed by President A. Barak when he said that -

'There is no alternative - in a freedom and security seeking democracy - to striking a balance between liberty and dignity on the one hand and security on the other. Human rights should not become a tool for depriving the public and the state of security. A balance - a delicate and difficult balance - is required between the liberty and dignity of the individual and state and public security' (A v. Minister of Defence [1], at p.741).

 (See also Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7], at p. 383; per Justice D. Dorner in HCJ 5627/02 Saif v. Government Press Office [30],  at pp. 76-77, {para.6 at pp. 197-198}; EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [31], at p. 310 {160}).

The purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is therefore a proper one. But this is not enough. Within the framework of constitutional scrutiny, we are required to proceed to examine whether the violation of the right to personal liberty does not exceed what is necessary for realizing the purpose of the Law. We shall now examine this question.

The requirement that the measure violating a human right is not excessive

31. The main issue that arises with respect to the constitutionality of the Law concerns the proportionality of the arrangements it prescribes. As a rule, it is customary to identify three subtests that constitute fundamental criteria for determining the proportionality of a statutory act that violates a constitutional human right: the first is the rational connection test, whereby the legislative measure violating the constitutional right and the purpose that the Law is intended to realize must be compatible; the second is the least harmful measure test, which requires that the legislation violate the constitutional right to the smallest degree possible in order to achieve the purpose of the Law; and the third is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense, according to which the violation of the constitutional right must be commensurate with the social benefit it bestows (see Menahem v. Minister of Transport [26], at p. 279; Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [10], at paras. 65-75; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [6], at pp. 839-840).

It has been held in the case law of this court that the test of proportionality, with its three subtests, is not a precise test since by its very nature it involves assessment and evaluation. The subtests sometimes overlap and each of them allows the legislature a margin of discretion. There may be circumstances in which the choice of an alternative measure that violates the constitutional right slightly less results in a significant reduction in the realization of the purpose or the benefit derived from it; it would not be right therefore to obligate the legislature to adopt the aforesaid measure. Consequently this court has accorded recognition to "constitutional room for maneuver" which is also called the "zone of proportionality". The bounds of the constitutional room for maneuver are determined by the court in each case on its merits and according to its circumstances, bearing in mind the nature of the right that is being violated and the extent of the violation as opposed to the nature and substance of the competing rights or interests. This court will not substitute its own discretion for the criteria chosen by the legislature and will refrain from intervention as long as the measure chosen by the legislature falls within the zone of proportionality. The court will only intervene when the chosen measure significantly departs from the bounds of the constitutional room for maneuver and is clearly disproportionate (see CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [32], at p. 438; HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [33]; AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members' Club v. Haifa Municipality [34], at p. 815; Gaza Coast Regional Council v. Knesset [25], at pp. 550-551).

In the circumstances of the case before us, the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty is significant and even severe in its extent. Nevertheless, as we said above, the legislative purpose of removing "unlawful combatants" from the cycle of hostilities in order to protect state security is essential in view of the reality of murderous terrorism that threatens the lives of the residents and citizens of the State of Israel. In these circumstances, I think that the existence of relatively wide room for legislative maneuver should be recognized, to allow the selection of the suitable measure for realizing the purpose of the Law.

The First Subtest: A Rational Connection Between the Measure and the Purpose

32.  The measure chosen by the legislature in order to realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is administrative detention. As we explained in para. 21 above, for the purpose of internment under the Law the state must provide clear and convincing proof that the prisoner is an "unlawful combatant" within the meaning that we discussed. The state is therefore required to prove the personal threat presented by the prisoner, deriving from his particular form of involvement in the organization. Administrative detention constitutes a suitable means of averting the security threat presented by the prisoner, in that it prevents the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel and thereby serves the purpose of the Law. Therefore the first subtest of proportionality - the rational connection test - is satisfied.

The main question concerning the proportionality of the Law under discussion concerns the second subtest, i.e. the question of whether there exist alternative measures that involve a lesser violation of the constitutional right. In examining this question, we should first consider the appellants' argument that there are more proportionate measures for realizing the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Next we should consider the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law and examine whether they exceed the zone of proportionality. Finally we should examine the Law in its entirety and examine whether the combination of arrangements that were prescribed in the Law fulfils the test of proportionality in the narrow sense, i.e. whether the violation of the right to personal liberty is reasonably commensurate with the public benefit that arises from it in realizing the legislative purpose.

The argument that there are alternative measures to detention under the Law

33.  The appellants' main argument concerning proportionality was that alternative measures to administrative detention exist by virtue of the Law, involving a lesser violation of the right to liberty. In this context, the appellants raised two main arguments: first, it was argued that for the purpose of realizing the legislative purpose it is not necessary to employ the measure of administrative detention, and the appellants ought to be recognized as prisoners of war; alternatively, recourse should be had to the measure of trying the appellants on criminal charges. Secondly, it was argued that even if administrative detention is necessary in the appellants' case, this should be carried out under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, 5739-1979, for according to their argument, the violation that it involves is more proportionate than that of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

The first argument - that the appellants should be declared prisoners of war - must be rejected. In HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [35], which considered the case of Lebanese prisoners, a similar argument to the one raised in the present appellants' case was rejected:

'We agree with the position of Mr Nitzan that the Lebanese prisoners should not be regarded as prisoners of war. It is sufficient that they do not satisfy the provisions of art. 4(2)(d) of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides that one of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to comply with the definition of "prisoners of war" is "that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." The organizations to which the Lebanese prisoners belonged are terrorist organizations, which operate contrary to the laws and customs of war. Thus, for example, these organizations deliberately attack civilians and shoot from the midst of the civilian population, which they use as a shield. All of these are operations that are contrary to international law. Indeed, Israel's consistent position over the years was not to regard the various organizations such as Hezbollah as organizations to which the Third Geneva Convention applies. We have found no reason to intervene in this position' (ibid. [35], at p. 191).

 (See also CrimApp 8780/06 Sarur v. State of Israel [36]; HCJ 403/81 Jabar v. Military Commander [37]; and also HCJ 102/82 Tzemel v. Minister of Defence [38], at pp. 370-371).

Similar to what was said in Arad v. Knesset [35], in the circumstances of the case before us, too, the appellants should not be accorded prisoner of war status, since they do not satisfy the conditions of art. 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, and primarily, the condition concerning the observance of the laws of war.

The appellants' argument that a more proportionate measure would be to try the prisoners on criminal charges should also be rejected, in view of the fact that trying a person on criminal charges is different in essence and purpose from the measure of administrative detention. Putting a person on trial is intended to punish him for acts committed in the past, and it is dependent upon the existence of evidence that can be brought before a court in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Administrative detention, on the other hand, was not intended to punish but to prevent activity that is prohibited by law and endangers the security of the state. The quality of evidence that is required for administrative detention is different from that required for a criminal trial. Moreover, as a rule recourse to the extreme measure of administrative detention is justified in circumstances where other measures, including the conduct of a criminal trial, are impossible, due to the absence of sufficient admissible evidence or the impossibility of revealing privileged sources, or when a criminal trial does not provide a satisfactory solution to averting the threat posed to the security of the state in circumstances in which, after serving his sentence, the person is likely to revert to being a security risk (see, inter alia, ADA 4794/05 Ufan v. Minister of Defence [39]; ADA 7/94 Ben-Yosef v. State of Israel [40]; ADA 8788/03 Federman v. Minister of Defence [41], at pp. 185-189; Fahima v. State of Israel [14], at pp. 263-264). In view of all the above, it cannot be said that a criminal trial constitutes an alternative measure for realizing the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

34.  As we have said, the appellants' alternative claim before us was that even if it is necessary to place them in administrative detention, this should be done pursuant to the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law. According to this argument, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law violates the right to personal liberty to a lesser degree than the provisions of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Thus, for example, it is argued that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law requires an individual threat as a cause for detention, without introducing presumptions that transfer the burden of proof to the prisoner, as provided in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Moreover, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law requires a judicial review to be conducted within forty-eight hours of the time of detention, and a periodic review every three months, whereas the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law allows a prisoner to be brought before a judge as much as fourteen days after the time he is detained, and it requires a periodic review only once every half year; under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law,  the power of detention is conditional upon the existence of a state of emergency in the State of Israel, whereas internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not set such a condition and it is even unlimited in time, apart from the stipulation that the internment will end by the time that the hostilities against the State of Israel have ceased. To this it should be added that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law is effected by an order of the Minister of Defence, whereas internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants is effected by an order of the Chief of Staff, who is authorised to delegate his authority to an officer with the rank of major-general. Taking into consideration all the above, the appellants' argument before us is that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law constitutes a more proportionate alternative than administrative detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

35.  Prima facie the appellants are correct in their argument that in certain respects the arrangements prescribed in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law violate the right to personal liberty to a lesser degree than the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. However, we accept the state's argument in this context that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is intended for a different purpose than that of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law. In view of the different purposes, the two laws contain different arrangements, such that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law does not constitute an alternative measure for achieving the purpose of the Law under discussion in this case. Let us clarify our position.

The Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law applies in a time of emergency and in general, its purpose is to prevent threats to state security arising from internal entities (i.e., citizens and residents of the state). Accordingly, the Law prescribes the power of administrative detention that is usually invoked with regard to isolated individuals who threaten state security and whose detention is intended to last for relatively short periods of time, apart from exceptional cases. On the other hand, as we clarified in para. 11 above, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is intended to apply to foreign entities who operate within the framework of terrorist organizations against the security of the state. The Law was intended to apply at a time of organized and persistent hostile acts against Israel on the part of terrorist organizations. The purpose of the Law is to prevent persons who belong to these organizations or who take part in hostile acts under their banner from returning to the cycle of hostilities, as long as the hostilities against the State of Israel continue. In order to achieve the aforesaid purpose, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law contains arrangements that are different from those in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law (we will discuss the question of the proportionality of these arrangements below). Moreover, according to the state, the power of detention prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was intended to apply to members of terrorist organizations in a persistent state of war in a territory that is not a part of Israel, where a relatively large number of enemy combatants is likely to fall into the hands of the military forces during the fighting. The argument is that these special circumstances justify recourse to measures that are different from those usually employed.

Thus we see that even though the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law prescribe a power of administrative detention whose purpose is to prevent a threat to state security, the specific purposes of the aforesaid laws are different and therefore the one cannot constitute an alternative measure for achieving the purpose of the other. In the words of the trial court: "We are dealing with a horizontal plane on which there are two acts of legislation, one next to the other. Each of the two was intended for a different purpose and therefore, in circumstances such as our case, they are not alternatives to one another" (p. 53 of the decision of the District Court of 19 July 2006). It should be clarified that in appropriate circumstances, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law could well be used to detain foreigners who are not residents or citizens of the State of Israel. Despite this, the premise is that the specific purposes of the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are different, and therefore it cannot be determined in a sweeping manner that detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law constitutes a more appropriate and proportionate alternative to detention under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

36.  In concluding these remarks it will be mentioned that the appellants, who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, were first detained in the years 2002-2003, when the Gaza Strip was subject to belligerent occupation. At that time, the administrative detention of the appellants was carried out under the security legislation that was in force in the Gaza Strip. A change occurred in September 2005, when Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip ended and the territory ceased to be subject to belligerent occupation (see para. 11 above). One of the ancillary consequences of the end of the Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip was the repeal of the security legislation that was in force there. Consequently, the Chief of Staff issued detention orders for the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

In view of the nullification of the security legislation in the Gaza Strip, no question arises in relation to inhabitants of that region as to whether administrative detention by virtue of security legislation may constitute a suitable and more proportionate measure than internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law. Nonetheless, I think it noteworthy that the aforesaid question may arise with regard to inhabitants of the territories that are under the belligerent occupation of the State of Israel (Judaea and Samaria). As emerges from the abovesaid in para. 11, prima facie I tend to the opinion that both under the international humanitarian law that governs the matter (art. 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention) and according to the test of proportionality, administrative detention of inhabitants of Judaea and Samaria should be carried out by virtue of the current security legislation that is in force in the territories, and not by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law in Israel. This issue does not, however, arise in the circumstances of the case before us and therefore I think it right to leave it for future consideration.

Proportionality of the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law

37.  In view of all of the reasons elucidated above, we have reached the conclusion that the measures identified by the appellants in their pleadings cannot constitute alternative measures to administrative detention by virtue of the Law under discussion. The appellants further argued that the specific arrangements prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and more proportionate arrangements that violate personal liberty to a lesser degree could have been set. Let us therefore proceed to examine this argument with regard to the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law.

(1)        Conferring the power of detention on military personnel

38.       S. 3(a) of the Law, cited in para. 15 above, provides that an internment order by virtue of the Law will be issued by the Chief of Staff "under his hand" and will include the grounds for the internment "without prejudicing state security requirement." S. 11 of the Law goes on to provide that "the Chief of Staff may delegate his powers under this Law to any officer of the rank of major-general that he may determine." According to the appellants, conferring the power of detention by virtue of the Law on the Chief of Staff, who may delegate it to an officer of the rank of major-general, is an excessive violation of the prisoners' right to personal liberty. In this context, the appellants emphasized that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law confers the power of administrative detention on the Minister of Defence only.

In the circumstances of the case, we have come to the conclusion that the state is correct in its argument that conferring the power of detention on the Chief of Staff or an officer of the rank of major-general falls within the zone of proportionality and we should not intervene. First, as we said above, the specific purposes of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law are different, and there is therefore a difference in the arrangements prescribed in the two Laws. Since the Law under consideration before us was intended to apply, inter alia, in a situation of combat and prolonged military activity against terrorist organizations in a territory that is not subject to the total control of the State of Israel, there is logic in establishing an arrangement that confers the power of internment on military personnel of the highest rank. Secondly, it should be made clear that the provisions of international law do not preclude the power of detention of the military authority responsible for the security of a territory in which there are protected civilians. This may support the conclusion that conferring the power of detention on the Chief of Staff or an officer of the rank of major-general does not, in itself, violate the right to personal liberty disproportionately.

(2)        The prisoner's right to a hearing after an internment order is issued

39.  Ss. 3(b) and 3(c) of the Law provide as follows:

Internment of unlawful combatant

3.   (a) ...

(b) An internment order may be granted in the absence of the person held by the state authorities.

 (c) An internment order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner at the earliest possible date, and he shall be given an opportunity to put his submissions in respect of the order before an officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be appointed by the Chief of General Staff; the submissions of the prisoner shall be recorded by the officer and shall be brought before the Chief of General Staff; if the Chief of General Staff finds, after reviewing the submissions of the prisoner, that the conditions prescribed in subsection (a) have not been fulfilled, he shall quash the internment order.

According to s. 3(b) above, an internment order may be granted by the Chief of Staff (or a major-general appointed by him) without the prisoner being present. S. 3(c) of the Law goes on to provide that the order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner "at the earliest possible date" and that he shall be given a hearing before an army officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel, in order to allow him to put his submissions; the prisoner's submissions shall be recorded by the officer and brought before the Chief of Staff (or the major-general acting for him). According to the Law, if after reviewing the prisoner's arguments the Chief of Staff (or the major-general) is persuaded that the conditions for detention under the Law are not fulfilled, the internment order shall be quashed.

The appellants' argument in this context was that this arrangement violates the right to personal liberty excessively in view of the fact that the prisoner may put his submissions only after the event, i.e., after the internment order has been issued, and only before an officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel, who will pass the submissions on to the Chief of Staff (or a major-general), in order that they reconsider their position. According to the appellants, it is the person who issues the order - the Chief of Staff or the major-general - who should hear the prisoner's arguments, even before the order is issued. These arguments should be rejected, for several reasons: first, it is established case law that the person who makes the decision does not need to conduct the hearing personally, and that it is also permissible to conduct the hearing before someone who has been appointed for this purpose by the person making the decision, provided that the person making the decision - in our case the Chief of Staff or the major-general acting on his behalf - will have before him all of the arguments and facts that were raised at the hearing (see HCJ 5445/93 Ramla Municipality v. Minister of the Interior [42], at p. 403; HCJ 2159/97 Ashkelon Coast Regional Council v. Minister of the Interior [43], at pp. 81-82). Secondly, from a practical viewpoint, establishing a duty to conduct hearings in advance, in the personal presence of the Chief of Staff or the major-general in times of combat and in circumstances in which there are liable to be many detentions in the combat zone as well, may present  significant logistical problems. Moreover, conducting a hearing in the manner proposed by the appellants is contrary to the purpose of the Law, which is to allow the immediate removal of the "unlawful combatants" from the cycle of hostilities in an effective manner. It should be emphasized that the hearing under s. 3(c) of the Law is a preliminary process whose main purpose is to prevent mistakes of identity. As will be explained below, in addition to the preliminary hearing, the Law requires that a judicial review take place before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date of issue of the internment order, thereby lessening the violation claimed by the appellants. In view of all of the above, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in the Law with respect to the hearing falls outside the zone of proportionality.

 (3)      Judicial review of internmentunder the Law

40.  S. 5 of the Law, entitled "Judicial Review", prescribes the following arrangement in subsecs. (a) - (d):

5.  (a) A prisoner shall be brought before a judge of the District Court no later than fourteen days after the date of granting the internment order; where the judge of the District Court finds that the conditions prescribed in s. 3(a) have not been fulfilled he shall quash the internment order.

(b) Where the prisoner is not brought before the District Court and where the hearing has not commenced before it within fourteen days of the date of granting the internment order, the prisoner shall be released unless there exists another ground for his detention under provisions of any law.

            (c)  Once every six months from the date of issue of an order under s. 3(a) the prisoner shall be brought before a judge of the District Court; where the Court finds that his release will not harm State security or that there are special grounds justifying his release, it shall quash the internment order.

(d) A decision of the District Court under this section is subject to appeal within thirty days to the Supreme Court, a single judge of which shall hear the appeal with; the Supreme Court shall have all the powers vested in the District Court under this Law.

The appellants argued before us that the judicial review process prescribed in s. 5 violates the right to personal liberty excessively, for two main reasons: first, under s. 5(a) of the Law, the prisoner should be brought before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date of his detention. According to the appellants, this is a long period of time that constitutes an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty and of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. In this context the appellants argued that in view of the constitutional status of the right to personal liberty and in accordance with the norms applicable in international law, the legislature should have determined that the prisoner be brought to a judicial review "without delay." Secondly, it was argued that the period of time set in s. 5(c) of the Law for conducting periodic judicial review of the internment - every six months - is too long as well as disproportionate. By way of comparison, the appellants pointed out that the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law prescribes in this regard a period of time that is shorter by half - only three months. In reply, the state argued that in view of the purpose of the Law, the periods of time set in s. 5 are proportionate and they are consistent with the provisions of international law.

41. S. 5 of the Law is based on the premise that judicial review constitutes an integral part of the administrative detention process. In this context it has been held in the past that -

'Judicial intervention in the matter of detention orders is essential. Judicial intervention is a safeguard against arbitrariness; it is required by the principle of the rule of law…. It ensures that the delicate balance between the liberty of the individual and the security of the public - a balance that lies at the heart of the laws of detention - will be maintained' (per President A. Barak in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at page 368).

The main thrust of the dispute regarding the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Law concerns the proportionality of the periods of time specified therein.

With respect to the periods of time between the internment of the prisoner and the initial judicial review of the internment order, it has been held in the case law of this court that in view of the status of the right to personal liberty and in order to prevent mistakes of fact and of discretion whose price is likely to be a person's loss of liberty without just cause, the administrative prisoner should be brought before a judge "as soon as possible" in the circumstances (per President M. Shamgar in HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [44], at pp. 819-820). It should be noted that this case law is consistent with the arrangements prevailing in international law. International law does not specify the number of days during which it is permitted to detain a person without judicial intervention; rather, it lays down a general principle that can be applied in accordance with the circumstances of each case on its merits. According to the aforesaid general principle, the decision on internment should be brought before a judge or another person with judicial authority "promptly" (see art. 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, which is regarded as being of a customary nature; see also the references cited in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at pp. 369-370). A similar principle was established in arts. 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention whereby the judicial (or administrative) review of a detention decision should be made "as soon as possible" (as stated in art. 43 of the Convention) or "with the least possible delay" (as stated in art. 78 of the Convention). Naturally the question as to what is the earliest possible date for bringing a prisoner before a judge depends upon the circumstances of the case.

In the present case, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law provides that the date for conducting the initial judicial review is "no later than fourteen days from the date of granting the internment order." The question that arises in this context is whether the said period of time violates the right to personal liberty excessively. The answer to this question lies in the purpose of the Law and in the special circumstances of the particular internment, as well as in the interpretation of the aforesaid provision of the Law. As we have said, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law applies to foreign entities who belong to terrorist organizations and who are engaged in ongoing hostilities against the State of Israel. As noted, the Law was intended to apply, inter alia, in circumstances in which a state of belligerence exists in territory that is not a part of Israel, in the course of which a relatively large number of enemy combatants may fall into the hands of the military forces. In view of these special circumstances, we do not agree that the maximum period of time of fourteen days for holding an initial judicial review of the detention order departs from the zone of proportionality in such a way as to justify our intervention by shortening the maximum period prescribed in the Law. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the period of time prescribed in the Law is a maximum period and it does not exempt the state from making an effort to conduct a preliminary judicial review of the prisoner's case as soon as possible in view of all the circumstances. In other words, although we find no cause to intervene in the proportionality of the maximum period prescribed in the Law, the power of detention in each specific case should be exercised proportionately, and fourteen whole days should not be allowed to elapse before conducting an initial judicial review where it is possible to conduct a judicial review earlier (cf. ADA 334/04 Darkua v. Minister of the Interior [45], at p. 371, in which it was held that even though under the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, a person taken into custody must be brought before the Custody Review Tribunal no later than fourteen days from the date on which he was taken into custody, the whole of the aforesaid fourteen days should not be used when there is no need to do so).

In concluding these remarks it should be noted that s. 3(c) of the Law, cited above, provides that "An internment order shall be brought to the attention of the prisoner at the earliest possible date, and he shall be given an opportunity to put his submissions in respect of the order before an officer of at least the rank of lieutenant-colonel to be appointed by the Chief of General Staff" [emphasis added - D.B.]. Thus we see that although s. 5(a) of the Law prescribes a maximum period of fourteen days for an initial judicial review, s. 3(c) of the Law imposes an obligation to conduct a hearing for the prisoner before a military officer at the earliest possible time after the order is issued. The aforesaid hearing is certainly not a substitute for a review before a judge of the District Court, which is an independent and objective judicial instance, but the very fact of conducting an early hearing as soon as possible after the issuing of the order may somewhat reduce the concern over an erroneous or ostensibly unjustified detention, which will lead to an excessive violation of the right to liberty.

42.  As stated, the appellants' second argument concerned the frequency of the periodic judicial review of internment under the Law. According to s. 5(c) of the Law, the prisoner must be brought before a District Court judge once every six months from the date of issuing the order; if the court finds that the release of the prisoner will not harm state security or that there are special reasons that justify his release, the court will quash the internment order.

The appellants' argument before us was that a frequency of once every six months is insufficient and it disproportionately violates the right to personal liberty. Regarding this argument, we should point out that the periodic review of the necessity of continuing the administrative detention once every six months is consistent with the requirements of international humanitarian Law. Thus, art. 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides:

'Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.'

It emerges from art. 43 that periodic review of a detention order "at least twice yearly" is consistent with the requirements of international humanitarian law, in a manner that supports the proportionality of the arrangement prescribed in s. 5(c) of the Law. Moreover, whereas art. 43 of the Fourth Geneva Convention considers an administrative review that is carried out by an administrative body to be sufficient, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law provides that it is a District Court judge who must conduct a judicial review of the internment orders under the Law, and his decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court which will hear the appeal with a single judge (s. 5(d) of the Law). In view of all this, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in the Law with regard to the nature and frequency of the judicial review violates the constitutional right to personal liberty excessively.

 (4) Departure from the rules of evidence and reliance upon privileged evidence within the framework of proceedings under the Law

43.  S. 5(e) of the Law provides as follows:

'Judicial review 

  5. ...

(e) It shall be permissible to depart from the laws of evidence in proceedings under this Law, for reasons to be recorded; the court may admit evidence, even in the absence of the prisoner or his legal representative, or not disclose such evidence to the aforesaid if, after having reviewed the evidence or heard the submissions, even in the absence of the prisoner or his legal representative,  it is convinced that disclosure of the evidence to the prisoner or his legal representative is likely to harm state security or public security; this provision shall not derogate from any right not to give evidence under Chapter 3 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971.

The appellants' argument before us was that the arrangement prescribed in the aforesaid s. 5(e) disproportionately violates the right to personal liberty, since it allows the judicial review of an internment order by virtue of the Law to depart from the laws of evidence and it allows evidence to be heard ex parte in the absence of the prisoner and his legal representative and without it being disclosed to them.

With respect to this argument it should be noted that by their very nature, administrative detention proceedings are based on administrative evidence concerning security matters. The nature of administrative detention for security reasons requires recourse to evidence that does not satisfy the admissibility tests of the laws of evidence and that therefore may not be submitted in a regular criminal trial. Obviously the confidentiality of the sources of the information is important, and it is therefore often not possible to disclose all the intelligence material that is used to prove the grounds for detention. Reliance on inadmissible administrative evidence and on privileged material for reasons of state security lies at the heart of administrative detention, for if there were sufficient admissible evidence that could be shown to the prisoner and brought before the court, as a rule the measure of criminal indictment should be chosen (see Federman v. Minister of Defence [41], at p. 185-186). There is no doubt that a proceeding that is held ex parte in order to present privileged evidence to the court has many drawbacks. But the security position in which we find ourselves in view of the persistent hostilities against the security of the State of Israel requires recourse to tools of this kind when granting a detention order under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law or the security legislation in areas under military control.

It should be emphasized that in view of the problems inherent in relying upon administrative evidence for the purpose of detention, over the years the judiciary has developed a tool for control and scrutiny of intelligence material, to the extent possible in a proceeding of the kind that takes place in judicial review of administrative detention. In the framework of these proceedings the judge is required to question the validity and credibility of the administrative evidence that is brought before him and to assess its weight. In this regard the following was held in HCJ 4400/98 Braham v. Justice Colonel Shefi [46], at p. 346, per Justice T. Or:

'The basic right of every human being as such to liberty is not an empty slogan. The protection of this basic value requires that we imbue the process of judicial review of administrative detention with meaningful content. In this framework, I am of the opinion that the professional judge can and should consider not only the question of whether, prima facie, the competent authority was authorized to decide what it decided on the basis of the material that was before it; the judge should also consider the question of the credibility of the material that was submitted as a part of his assessment of the weight of the material. Indeed, that fact that certain "material" is valid administrative evidence does not exempt the judge from examining the degree of its credibility against the background of the other evidence and all the circumstances of the case. In this context, the "administrative evidence" label does not exempt the judge from having to demand and receive explanations from those authorities that are capable of providing them. To say otherwise would mean weakening considerably the process of judicial review, and allowing the deprivation of liberty for prolonged periods on the basis of flimsy and insufficient material. Such an outcome is unacceptable in a legal system that regards human liberty as a basic right.'

It has also been held in our case law that in view of the problems inherent in submitting privileged evidence ex parte, the court that conducts a judicial review of an administrative detention is required to act with caution and great precision when examining the material that is brought before it for its eyes only. In such circumstances, the court has a duty to act with extra caution and to examine the privileged material brought before it from the viewpoint of the prisoner, who has not seen the material and cannot argue against it. In the words of Justice A. Procaccia: "… the court has a special duty to act with great care when examining privileged material and to act as the 'mouth' of the prisoner where he has not seen the material against him and cannot defend himself" (HCJ 11006/04 Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [47], at para. 6; see also CrimApp 3514/97 A v. State of Israel [48]).

Thus we see that in view of the reliance on administrative evidence and the admission of privileged evidence ex parte, the court conducting a judicial review under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is required to act with caution and precision in examining the material brought before it. The scope of the judicial review cannot be defined ab initio and it is subject to the discretion of the judge, who will take into account the circumstances of each case on its merits, such as the quantity, level and quality of the privileged material brought before him for his inspection, as opposed to the activity attributed to the prisoner that gives rise to the allegation that he represents a threat to state security. In a similar context the following was held:

'Information relating to several incidents is not the same as information concerning an isolated incident; information from one source is not the same as information from several sources; and information that is entirely based on the statements of agents and informers only is not the same as information that is also supported or corroborated by documents submitted by the security or intelligence services that derive from employing special measures' (per Justice E. Mazza in HCJ 5994/03 Sadar v. IDF Commander in West Bank [49], at para.  6).

Considering all the aforesaid reasons, the requisite conclusion is that reliance on inadmissible evidence and privileged evidentiary material is an essential part of administrative detention. In view of the fact that the quality and quantity of the administrative evidence that supports the cause of detention is subject to judicial review, and in view of the caution with which the court is required to examine the privileged material brought before it ex parte, it cannot be said that the arrangement prescribed in s. 5(e) of the Law, per se, violates the rights of prisoners disproportionately.

(5)     Prisoner's meeting with his lawyer

44. S. 6 of the Law, which is entitled "Right of prisoner to meet with lawyer"' provides the following:

'6. (a) The internee may meet with a lawyer at the

earliest possible date on which such a meeting may be held without harming state security requirements, but no later than seven days prior to his being brought before a judge of the District Court, in accordance with the provisions of s. 5(a).

(b) The Minister of Justice may, by order, confine the right of representation in the proceedings under this Law to a person authorized to act as defence counsel in the military courts under an unrestricted authorization, pursuant to the provisions of s. 318(c) of the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955.'

The appellants raised two main arguments against the proportionality of the arrangements prescribed in the aforesaid s. 6: first, it was argued that under s. 6(a) of the Law, it is possible to prevent a meeting of a prisoner with his lawyer for a period of up to seven days, during which a hearing is supposed to be conducted for the prisoner under s. 3(c) of the Law. It is argued that conducting a hearing without allowing the prisoner to consult a lawyer first is likely to render the hearing meaningless in a manner that constitutes an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty. Secondly, it was argued that s. 6(b) of the Law, which makes representation dependent upon an unrestricted authorization for the lawyer to act as defence counsel, also violates the rights of the prisoner disproportionately.

Regarding the appellants' first argument: no one disputes that the right of the prisoner to be represented by a lawyer constitutes a major basic right that has been recognized in our legal system since its earliest days (see in this regard CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [50], at para. 14, and the references cited there). According to both the basic principles of Israeli law and the principles of international law, the rule is that a prisoner should be allowed to meet with his lawyer as a part of the right of every human being to personal liberty (see the remarks of President A. Barak in Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at pp. 380-381). Therefore, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that a prisoner should be allowed to meet with his lawyer "at the earliest possible date." It should, however, be recalled that like all human rights, the right to legal counsel, too, is not absolute, and it may be restricted if this is essential for protecting the security of the state (see HCJ 3412/93 Sufian v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [51], at p. 849; HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiah v. Israel Police [52], at pp. 212-213). As such, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that the meeting of the prisoner with his lawyer may be postponed for security reasons, but no more than seven days may elapse before he is brought before a District Court judge pursuant to s. 5(a) of the Law. Since pursuant to the aforementioned s. 5(a) a prisoner must be brought before a District Court judge no later than fourteen days from the date on which the internment order is granted, this means that a meeting between a prisoner and his lawyer may not be prevented for more than seven days from the time the detention order is granted against him.

Bearing in mind the security purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and in view of the fact that the aforesaid Law was intended to apply in prolonged states of hostilities and even in circumstances where the army is fighting in a territory that is not under Israeli control, it cannot be said that a maximum period of seven days during which a meeting of a prisoner with a lawyer may be prevented when security needs so require falls outside the zone of proportionality (see and cf. Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], where it was held that "[a]s long as the hostilities continue, there is no basis for allowing a prisoner to meet with a lawyer," (at p. 381); see also HCJ 2901/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [53]).

In addition to the above, two further points should be made: first, even though the prisoner may be asked to make his submissions in the course of the hearing under s. 3(c) of the Law without having first consulted a lawyer, s. 6(a) of the Law provides that the state should allow the prisoner to meet with his defence counsel "no later than seven days prior to his being brought before a judge of the District Court…." It follows that as a rule, the prisoner is represented in the process of judicial review of the granting of the detention by virtue of the Law. It seems that this could reduce the impact of the violation of the right to consult a lawyer as a part of the right to personal liberty. Secondly, it should be emphasized that the maximum period of seven days does not exempt the state from its obligation to allow the prisoner to meet with his lawyer at the earliest possible opportunity, in circumstances where security needs permit this. Therefore the question of the proportionality of the period during which a meeting between the prisoner and his defence counsel is prevented is a function of the circumstances of each case on its merits. It should be noted that a similar arrangement exists in international law, which determines the period of time during which a meeting with a lawyer may be prevented with regard to all the circumstances of the case, without stipulating maximum times for preventing the meeting (see in this regard, Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8], at p. 381).

45.  The appellants' second argument concerning s. 6(b) of the Law should also be rejected. Making representation dependent upon an unrestricted authorization for the lawyer to act as defence counsel under the provisions of s. 318(c) of the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955, is necessary for security reasons, in view of the security-sensitive nature of administrative detention proceedings. The appellants did not argue that the need for an unrestricted authorization as aforesaid affected the quality of the representation that they received, and in any case they did not point to any real violation of their rights in this regard. Consequently the appellants' arguments against the proportionality of the arrangement prescribed in s. 6 of the Law should be rejected.

 (6)      The length of internment under the Law

46.       From the provisions of ss. 3, 7 and 8 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law it emerges that an internment order under the Law need not include a defined date for the end of the internment. The Law itself does not prescribe a maximum period of time for the internment imposed thereunder, apart from the determination that it should not continue after the hostile acts of the force to which the prisoner belongs against the State of Israel "have ceased" (see ss. 7 and 8 of the Law). According to the appellants, this is an improper internment without any time limit, which disproportionately violates the constitutional right to personal liberty. In reply, the state argues that the length of the internment is not "unlimited", but depends on the duration of the hostilities being carried out against the security of the State of Israel by the force to which the prisoner belongs.

It should be said at the outset that issuing an internment order that does not include a specific time limit for its termination does indeed raise a significant difficulty, especially in the circumstances that we are addressing, where the "hostile acts" of the various terrorist organizations, including the Hezbollah organization which is relevant to the appellants' cases, have continued for many years, and naturally it is impossible to know when they will cease. In this reality, prisoners under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law may remain in detention for prolonged periods of time. Nevertheless, as we shall explain immediately, the purpose of the Law and the special circumstances in which it was intended to apply, lead to the conclusion that the fundamental arrangement that allows detention orders to be issued without a defined date for their termination does not depart from the zone of proportionality, especially in view of the judicial review arrangements prescribed in the Law.

As we have said, the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is to prevent "unlawful combatants" as defined in s. 2 of the Law from returning to the cycle of hostilities, as long as the hostile acts are continuing and threatening the security of the citizens and residents of the State of Israel. On the basis of a similar rationale, the Third Geneva Convention allows prisoners of war to be interned until the hostilities have ceased, in order to prevent them from returning to the cycle of hostilities as long as the fighting continues. Even in the case of civilians who are detained during an armed conflict, the rule under international humanitarian law is that they should be released from detention immediately after the concrete cause for the detention no longer exists and no later than the date of cessation of the hostilities (see J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (vol. 1, 2005), at page 451; also cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), at pages 518-519, where the United States Supreme Court held that the detention of members of forces hostile to the United States and operating against it in Afghanistan until the end of the specific dispute that led to their arrest is consistent with basic and fundamental principles of the laws of war).

The conclusion that emerges in view of the aforesaid is that the fundamental arrangement that allows a internment order to be granted under the Law without a defined termination date, except for the determination that the internment will not continue after the hostile acts against the State of Israel have ended, does not exceed the bounds of the room for constitutional maneuver. It should, however, be emphasized that the question of the proportionality of the duration of internment under the Law should be examined in each case on its merits and according to its specific circumstances. As we have said, the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law prescribes a duty to conduct a periodic judicial review once every six months. The purpose of the judicial review is to examine whether the threat presented by the prisoner to state security justifies the continuation of the internment, or whether the internment order should be cancelled in circumstances where the release of the prisoner will not harm the security of the state or where there are special reasons justifying the release (see s. 5(c) of the Law). When examining the need to extend the internment, the court should take into account inter alia the period of time that has elapsed since the order was issued. The ruling in A v. Minister of Defence [1] concerning detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, per President A. Barak, holds true in our case as well:

'Administrative detention cannot continue indefinitely. The longer the period of detention has lasted, the more significant the reasons that are required to justify a further extension of detention. With the passage of time the measure of administrative detention becomes onerous to such an extent that it ceases to be proportionate' (ibid., at p. 744).

Similarly it was held in A v. IDF Commander [16] with regard to administrative detention by virtue of security legislation in the region of Judea and Samaria that -

'The duration of the detention is a function of the threat. This threat is examined in accordance with the circumstances. It depends upon the level of risk that the evidence attributes to the administrative prisoner. It depends upon the credibility of the evidence itself and how current it is. The longer the duration of the administrative detention, the greater the onus on the military commander to demonstrate the threat presented by the administrative prisoner' (ibid., at para. 7).

Indeed, as opposed to the arrangements prescribed in the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law and in the security legislation, a court acting pursuant to the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not conduct a judicial review of the extension of the internment order, but examines the question of whether there is a justification for cancelling an existing order, for the reasons listed in s. 5(c) of the Law. Nevertheless, even an internment order under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law cannot be sustained indefinitely. The period of time that has elapsed since the order was granted constitutes a relevant and important consideration in the periodic judicial review for determining whether the continuation of the internment is necessary. In the words of Justice A. Procaccia in a similar context:

'The longer the period of the administrative detention, the greater the weight of the prisoner's right to his personal liberty when balanced against considerations of public interest, and therefore the greater the onus placed upon the competent authority to show that it is necessary to continue holding the person concerned in detention. For this purpose, new evidence relating to the prisoner's case may be required, and it is possible that the original evidence that led to his internment in the first place will be insufficient' (Kadri v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria  [47], at para. 6).

In view of all the above, a court that conducts a judicial review of an internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is authorized to confine and shorten the period of internment in view of the nature and weight of the evidence brought before it regarding the security threat presented by the prisoner as an "unlawful combatant" and in view of the time that has passed since the internment order was issued. By means of judicial review it is possible to ensure that the absence of a concrete termination date for the internment order under the Law will not constitute an excessive violation of the right to personal liberty, and that prisoners under the Law will not be interned for a longer period greater than that required by material security considerations.

(7) The possibility of conducting criminal proceedings parallel to an internment proceeding by virtue of the Law

47. S. 9 of the Law, which is entitled "Criminal proceedings", provides the following:

'9. (a) Criminal proceedings may be initiated against an unlawful combatant under the provisions of any law.

(b) The Chief of Staff may make an order for the internment of an unlawful combatant under s. 3, even if criminal proceedings have been initiated against him under the provisions of any law.'

According to the appellants, the aforesaid s. 9 violates the right to personal liberty disproportionately since it makes it possible to detain a person under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law even though criminal proceedings have already been initiated against him, and vice versa. The argument is that by conducting both sets of proceedings it is possible to continue to intern a person even after he has finished serving the sentence imposed on him in the criminal proceeding, in a manner that allegedly amounts to cruel punishment. In reply the state argued that this is a fitting and proportionate arrangement in view of the fact that it is intended to apply in circumstances in which a person will shortly finish serving his criminal sentence and hostilities are still continuing between the organization of which he is a member and the State of Israel; consequently, his release may harm state security.

In relation to these arguments we should reiterate what we said earlier (at para. 33 above), i.e. that initiating a criminal trial against a person is different in its nature and purpose from the measure of administrative detention. In general it is desirable and even preferable to make use of criminal proceedings where this is possible. Recourse to the extreme measure of administrative detention is justified in circumstances where other measures, including the conduct of a criminal trial, are not possible, due to lack of sufficient admissible evidence or because it is impossible to disclose privileged sources. However, the reality of prolonged terrorist operations is complex. There may be cases in which a person is detained under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and only at a later stage evidence is discovered that makes it possible to initiate criminal proceedings. There may be other cases in which a person has been tried and convicted and has served his sentence, but this does not provide a satisfactory solution to preventing the threat that he presents to state security in circumstances in which, after having served the sentence, he may once again become a security threat. Since a criminal trial and administrative detention are proceedings that differ from each other in their character and purpose, they do not rule each other out, even though in my opinion substantial and particularly weighty security considerations are required to justify recourse to both types of proceeding against the same person. In any case, the normative arrangement that allows criminal proceedings to be conducted alongside detention proceedings under the Law does not, in itself, create a disproportionate violation of the right to liberty of the kind that requires our intervention.

Interim summary

48.  Our discussion thus far of the requirement of proportionality has led to the following conclusions: first, the measure chosen by the legislator, i.e. administrative detention that prevents the "unlawful combatant" from returning to the cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel, realizes the legislative purpose and therefore satisfies the requirement of a rational connection between the legislative measure and the purpose that the Law is intended to realize. Secondly, the measures mentioned by the appellants in their arguments before us, i.e. recognizing them as prisoners of war, bringing them to a criminal trial or detaining them under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law, do not realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law and therefore they cannot constitute a suitable alternative measure to internment in accordance with the Law. Thirdly, the specific arrangements prescribed in the Law do not, per se and irrespective of the manner in which they are implemented, violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and they fall within the bounds of the room for constitutional maneuver granted to the legislature. In view of all this, the question that remains to be examined is whether the combination of the arrangements prescribed in the Law satisfies the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. In other words, is the violation of the right to personal liberty reasonably commensurate with the public benefit that arises from it in achieving the legislative purpose? Let us now examine this question.

Proportionality in the narrow sense - A reasonable relationship between  violation of the constitutional right and the public benefit it engenders

49.       The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law was enacted against the background of a harsh security situation. The citizens and residents of the State of Israel have lived under the constant threat of murderous terrorism of which they have been victim for years and which has harmed the innocent indiscriminately. In view of this, we held that the security purpose of the Law - the removal of "unlawful combatants" from the terrorist organizations' cycle of hostilities against the State of Israel - constitutes a proper purpose that is based on a public need of a kind that is capable of justifying a significant violation of the right to personal liberty. For all these reasons, we were of the opinion that the legislature should be accorded relatively wide room for maneuver to allow it to choose the proper measure for realizing the legislative purpose (see para. 31 above).

As we have said, the measure that the legislature chose in order to realize the purpose of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is administrative detention in accordance with the arrangements that are prescribed in the Law. There is no doubt that this is a damaging measure that should be employed as little as possible. However, a look at the combined totality of the above arrangements, in the light of the interpretation that we discussed above, leads to the conclusion that according to constitutional criteria, the violation of the constitutional right is reasonably commensurate with the social benefit that arises from the realization of the legislative purpose. This conclusion is based on the following considerations taken together:

 First, for the reasons that we discussed at the beginning of our deliberations, the scope of application of the Law is relatively limited: the Law does not apply to citizens and residents of the State of Israel but only to foreign parties who endanger the security of the state (see para. 11 above).

Secondly, the interpretation of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in s. 2 of the Law is subject to constitutional principles and international humanitarian law that require proof of an individual threat as a basis for administrative detention. Consequently, for the purpose of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the state must furnish administrative proof that the prisoner directly or indirectly played a material part - one which is neither negligible nor marginal - in hostile acts against the State of Israel; or that the prisoner belonged to an organization that is perpetrating hostile acts, taking into account his connection and the extent of his contribution to the organization's cycle of hostilities in the broad sense of this concept. In our remarks above we said that proving the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" in the said sense includes proof of a personal threat that arises from the form in which the prisoner was involved in the terrorist organization. We also said that the state has declared before us that until now it has taken pains to prove the personal threat of all the prisoners under the Law specifically, and it has refrained from relying on the probative presumptions in ss. 7 and 8 of the Law. In view of this, we saw no reason to decide the question of the constitutionality of those presumptions (see paras. 24 and 25 above).

Thirdly, we held that in view of the fact that administrative detention is an unusual and extreme measure, and in view of its significant violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty, the state is required to prove, by means of clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions of the definition of "unlawful combatant" are fulfilled and that the continuation of the internment is essential. This must be done in both the initial and the periodic judicial reviews. In this context we held that importance should be attached both to the quantity and the quality of the evidence against the prisoner and to the extent that the relevant intelligence information against him is current (see paras. 22 and 23 above).

Fourthly, we attributed substantial weight to the fact that internment orders under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law are subject to preliminary and periodic judicial reviews before a District Court judge, whose decisions may be appealed to the Supreme Court, which will hear the case with a single judge. Within the framework of these proceedings, the judge is required to consider the question of the validity and credibility of the administrative evidence that is brought before him and to assess its weight. In view of the reliance upon administrative evidence and the fact that privileged evidence is admitted ex parte, we held that the judge should act with caution and great precision when examining the material brought before him. We also held that a court that conducts a judicial review of internment under the Law may restrict and shorten the period of internment in view of the nature and weight of the evidence brought before it regarding the security threat presented by the prisoner as an "unlawful combatant", and in view of the time that has elapsed since the internment order was issued. For this reason we said that it is possible, through the process of judicial review, to ensure that the absence of a specific date for the termination of the detention order under the Law does not violate the right to personal liberty excessively, and that prisoners by virtue of the Law will not be interned for a longer period than what is required by substantial security considerations (para. 46 above).

Finally, although the arrangements prescribed in the Law for the purpose of exercising the power of internment are not the only possible ones, we reached the conclusion that the statutory arrangements that we considered do not exceed the bounds of the room for maneuver to an extent that required our intervention. In our remarks above we emphasized that the periods of time prescribed by the Law for conducting a preliminary judicial review after the internment order has been granted, and with respect to preventing a meeting between the prisoner and his lawyer, constitute maximum periods that do not exempt the state from the duty to make an effort to shorten these periods in each case on its merits, insofar as this is possible in view of the security constraints and all the circumstances of the case. We also held that internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law cannot continue indefinitely, and that the question of the proportionality of the duration of the detention must also be examined in each case on its merits according to the particular circumstances.

In view of all of the aforesaid considerations, and in view of the existence of relatively wide room for constitutional maneuver in view of the essential purpose of the Law as explained above, our conclusion is that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law satisfies the third subtest of the requirement of proportionality, i.e., that the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty is reasonably commensurate with the benefit accruing to the public from the said legislation. Our conclusion is based on the fact that according to the interpretation discussed above, the Law does not allow the internment of innocent persons who have no real connection to the cycle of hostilities of the terror organizations, and it establishes mechanisms whose purpose is to ameliorate the violation of the prisoners' rights, including a cause of detention that is based on a threat to state security and the conducting of a hearing and preliminary and periodic judicial reviews of internment under the Law.

Therefore, for all the reasons that we have mentioned above, it is possible to determine that the violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty as a result of the Law, although significant and severe, is not excessive. Our conclusion is therefore that the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause, and there is no constitutional ground for our intervention.

From the General to the Specific

50.  As we said at the outset, the appellants, who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, were originally detained in the years 2002-2003, when the Gaza Strip was subject to belligerent occupation. At that time, the administrative detention of the appellants was carried out pursuant to security legislation that was in force in the Gaza Strip. Following the end of military rule in the Gaza Strip in September 2005 and the nullification of the security legislation in force there, on 20 September 2005 the Chief of Staff issued internment orders for the appellants under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law.

On 22 September 2005 the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court began the initial judicial review of the appellants' case. From then until now the District Court has conducted four periodic judicial reviews of the appellants' continuing internment. The appeal against the decision of the District Court not to order the release of the appellants within the framework of the initial judicial review was denied by this court on 14 March 2006 (Justice E. Rubinstein in CrimA 1221/06 Iyyad v. State of Israel [54]). Before us are the appeals on three additional periodic decisions of the District Court not to rescind the appellants' internment orders.

51.  In their pleadings, the appellants raised two main arguments regarding their particular cases: first, it was argued that according to the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel should have released the appellants when the military rule in the Gaza Strip ended, since they were inhabitants of an occupied territory that was liberated. Secondly, it was argued that even if the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law is constitutional, no cause for internment thereunder has been proved with respect to the appellants. According to this argument, it was not proved that the appellants are members of the Hezbollah organization, nor has it been proved that their release would harm state security.

52.  We cannot accept the appellants' first argument. The end of military rule in the Gaza Strip did not obligate Israel to automatically release all the prisoners it held who are inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, as long as the personal threat posed by the prisoners persisted against the background of the continued hostilities against the State of Israel. This conclusion is clearly implied by the arrangements set out in arts. 132-133 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Art. 132 of the Convention establishes the general principle that the date for the release of prisoners is as soon as the reasons that necessitated their internment no longer exist. The first part of art. 133 of the Convention, which relates to a particular case that is included within the parameters of the aforesaid general principle, goes on to provide that the internment will end as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. Art. 134 of the Convention, which concerns the question of the location at which the prisoners should be released, also relates to the date on which hostilities end as the date on which prisoners should be released from internment. Unfortunately, the hostile acts of the terrorist organizations against the State of Israel have not yet ceased, and they result in physical injuries and mortalities on an almost daily basis. In such circumstances, the laws of armed conflict continue to apply. Consequently it cannot be said that international law requires Israel to release the prisoners that it held when military rule in the Gaza Strip came to an end, when it is possible to prove the continued individual danger posed by the prisoners against the background of the continued hostilities against the security of the state.

53. With regard to the specific internment orders against the appellants by virtue of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, the District Court heard the testimonies of experts on behalf of the security establishment and studied the evidence brought before it. We too studied the material that was brought before us during the hearing of the appeal. The material clearly demonstrates the close links of the appellants to the Hezbollah organization and their role in the organization's ranks, including involvement in hostile acts against Israeli civilian targets.  We are therefore convinced that the individual threat of the appellants to state security has been proved, even without resorting to the probative presumption in s. 7 of the Law (see and cf. per Justice E. Rubinstein in Iyyad v. State of Israel [54], at para. 8(11) of his opinion). In view of the aforesaid, we cannot accept the appellants' contention that the change in the form of their detention - from detention by virtue of an order of the IDF Commander in the Gaza Strip to internment orders under the Law - was done arbitrarily and without any real basis in the evidence. As we have said, the change in the form of detention was necessitated by the end of the military rule in the Gaza Strip, and that is why it was done at that time. The choice of internment under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law as opposed to detention under the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law was made, as we explained above, because of the purpose of the Law under discussion and because it is suited to the circumstances of the appellants' cases.

The appellants further argued that their release does not pose any threat to state security since their family members who were involved in terrorist activities have been arrested or killed by the security forces, so that the terrorist infrastructure that existed before they were detained no longer exists. They also argued that the passage of time since they were arrested reduces the risk that they present. Regarding these arguments it should be said that after inspecting the material submitted to us, we are convinced that the arrest or death of some of the appellants' family members does not per se remove the security threat that the appellants would present were they to be released from detention. We are also convinced that, in the circumstances of the case, the time that has passed since the appellants were first detained has not reduced the threat that they present. In its decision in the third periodic review, the trial court addressed this issue as follows:

'The total period of the detention is not short. But this is countered by the anticipated threat to state security if the prisoners are released. As we have said, a proper balance should be struck between the two. The experts are once again adamant in their opinion that there is a strong likelihood that the two prisoners will resume their terrorist activity if they are released. In such circumstances, the operational abilities of the Hezbollah infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and outside it will be enhanced and the threats to the security of the state and its citizens will increase. The current situation in the Gaza Strip is of great importance to our case. The fact that the Hamas organization has taken control of the Gaza Strip and other recent events increase the risks and, what is more, the difficulty of dealing with them.... It would therefore be a grave and irresponsible act to release these two persons, especially at this time, when their return to terrorism can be anticipated and is liable to increase the activity in this field. I cannot say, therefore, that the passage of time has reduced the threat presented by the two prisoners, who are senior figures in the terrorist infrastructure, despite the differences between them. Neither has the passage of time reduced the threat that they represent to an extent that would allow their release.'

In its decision in the fourth periodic review the trial court also emphasized the great threat presented by the two appellants:

'The privileged evidence brought before me reveals that the return of the two to the field is likely to act as a springboard for serious attacks and acts of terror. In other words, according to the evidence brought before me, the respondents are very dangerous. In my opinion it is not at all possible to order their release. This conclusion does not ignore the long years that the two of them have been held behind prison walls. The long period of time has not reduced the threat that they represent' (at page 6 of the court's decision of 20 March 2008).

In view of all of these reasons, and after having studied the material that was brought before us and having been convinced that there is sufficient evidence to prove the individual security threat represented by the appellants, we have reached the conclusion that the trial court was justified when it refused to cancel the internment orders in their cases. It should be pointed out that the significance of the passage of time naturally increases when we are dealing with administrative detention. At the present time, however, we find no reason to intervene in the decision of the trial court.

In view of the result that we have reached, we are not required to examine the appellants' argument against the additional reason that the trial court included in its decision, relating to the fact that the evidence was strengthened by the silence of the first appellant in the judicial review proceeding that took place in his case, a proceeding that was based, inter alia, on privileged evidence that was not shown to the prisoner and his legal representative. The question of the probative significance of a prisoner's silence in judicial review proceedings under the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law does not require a decision in the circumstances of the case before us and we see no reason to express a position on this matter.

Therefore, for all of the reasons set out above, we have reached the conclusion that the appeals should be denied.

 

Justice E.E. Levy:

I agree with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, the President.

It is in the nature of things that differences may arise between the rules of international humanitarian law - especially written rules - and the language of Israeli security legislation, if only because those conventions that regulate the conduct of players on the international stage were formulated in a very different reality, and their drafters did not know of entities such as the Hezbollah organization and the like.

Therefore, insofar as it is possible to do so by means of legal interpretation, the court will try to narrow these differences in a way that realizes both the principles of international law and the purpose of internal legislation. In this regard I will say that I would have preferred to refrain from arriving at any conclusions, even in passing, regarding the provisions of ss. 7 and 8 of the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002. These provisions are a central part of this Law, as enacted by the Knesset. Insofar as there are differences between them and the provisions of international law, as argued by the appellants and implied by the state's declarations with regard to the manner in which it conducts itself de facto, the legislature ought to take the initiative and address the matter.

Justice A. Procaccia:

I agree with the profound opinion of my colleague, President Beinisch.

Appeals denied as per the judgment of President D. Beinisch.

8 Sivan 5768

11 June 2008

Amir v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 8638/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, April 6, 2006
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

This petition puts to the test the question of the Rabbinical Court's authority to adjudicate a property dispute between a couple after the divorce proceeding between them has been completed, and it focuses on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by one member of the couple. Is the matter within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court or is it within the power of the civil judicial instance; and if the Rabbinical Court does indeed have authority to adjudicate the matter, what is the source of the authority and from where does this authority derive? Is it from the law; is it from the parties' agreement in arbitration or otherwise? And what is the nature of this authority?

 

The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, granted the petition and held (per Her Honor Justice A. Procaccia, with the concurrence of His Honor Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin and His Honor S. Joubran) that –

 

The High Court of Justice's intervention in religious court decisions is limited to extreme cases of ultra vires, infringement of the principles of natural justice, departure from the provisions of law aimed at the religious court or when equitable relief is necessary where the matter is not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal.  The subject matter of the petition justifies this Court's entertaining the matter on grounds of the Rabbinical Court's exceeding the jurisdiction vested in it.

 

The Rabbinical Court is a state judicial instance, which was established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter: "the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law"), and it derives its power and jurisdiction therefrom, and it has only those jurisdictional powers that the state law has given it.

 

The original powers of the Rabbinical Court were set in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they are built of exclusive powers by virtue of the law and powers that are parallel to the civil court and the Rabbinical Court that are vested by virtue of the parties' agreement. The case law has recognized the existence of the judicial instance's inherent ancillary power that derives from the original power of the Rabbinical Court by virtue of the law, and in special circumstances grants it jurisdiction to again hear a matter upon which it has ruled in the past.

 

Is the Rabbinical Court vested with jurisdiction to decide a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement, where such jurisdiction is not in the scope of the statute that empowers the Rabbinical Court or within the ancillary powers that are vested in it? The parties' agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court might take on two guises: one, simple agreement, irrespective of the provisions the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law; the other, agreement intended to empower the Court to deliberate and decide on a dispute as an arbitrator. A court's jurisdiction is vested by law and it has no power to derive it from the parties' agreement except were the law itself has seen fit to recognize such agreement in certain circumstances as the source of jurisdiction. A similar approach is also taken with regard to the judicial instance's power to adjudicate by way of arbitration. Since the state judicial instance merely has the subject matter jurisdiction conferred to it by statute, it is not vested with power to deliberate and adjudicate a matter as an arbitrator by virtue of the parties' agreement, unless it has been expressly given that power by statute. The Rabbinical Court does not have power to hear and decide a matter that is not one of those that is within its exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the statute or within its parallel jurisdiction, even if the parties have given their agreement to its jurisdiction. According to the same way of thinking, the Rabbinical Court has no power to decide a dispute as an arbitrator by virtue of an arbitration agreement between the parties in a matter which by its nature is not within its legal jurisdiction.

 

Is the respondent's answer against the petitioner within the bounds of the Rabbinical Court's subject matter jurisdiction? The respondent's cause of action is the enforcement of a contractual indemnity provision concerning property in the divorce agreement that obtained the force of a judgement of the Rabbinical Court, further to which the parties' divorce was completed. The source of the Rabbinical Court's exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law does not apply because the subject of the claim is a property matter after the dissolution of the parties' marriage and a matter of "marriage and divorce" is not involved. Nor is it a matter "connected with a divorce suit". The respondent's cause of action is a new one, the subject of which is the enforcement of a divorce agreement or an application for the enforcement of a divorce award, based on a divorce agreement. The Rabbinical Court does not have jurisdiction either by virtue of the parties' agreement pursuant to section 9 of the Law, which deals with the Rabbinical Court's parallel jurisdiction that is vested by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. Subject matter jurisdiction under section 9 is limited solely to the matters mentioned in it – matters of "personal status" as defined in the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. In a dispute that does not relate to those matters, even the parties' agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court. The Rabbinical Court therefore has no original jurisdiction to hear the respondent's claim.

 

The Rabbinical Court does not have "ancillary" inherent jurisdiction to try the respondent's claim. In the instant case, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to setting aside a divorce award by reason of a defect in making the divorce agreement, that might have given the Rabbinical Court ancillary jurisdiction to try its revocation, is of no relevance. Similarly, the Rabbinical Court has not acquired ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of a material change in circumstances after making the divorce award that justifies setting aside the divorce agreement and the divorce award since the respondent's claim is for the specific performance and enforcement of the divorce agreement. Again, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction in a matter pending before it until the proceedings conducted before it are concluded will not vest it with jurisdiction. The second respondent finally and unconditionally adjudicated herein and awarded the force of judgement to the divorce agreement. A property dispute that has arisen between the parties after the award of judgement gives rise to a new cause of action and necessitates the institution of new proceedings in accordance with the jurisdictional framework prescribed by law.

 

Nor does the Rabbinical Court have jurisdiction to hear the matter by virtue of the doctrine of "continuing jurisdiction". Continuing jurisdiction is vested where an instance has tried a particular matter in the past and in special circumstances need has arisen to set aside or modify an earlier decision due to a material change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the original decision was based.  The claim seeks to enforce the agreement and has no place in the continuing jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court.

 

The Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to try the new cause arising further to the divorce agreement in order to interpret the agreement. Having completed and exhausted its power to rule on the matter of divorce, it no longer has ancillary power to interpret the divorce agreement or the divorce award. Moreover, in the instant case no question of interpreting the divorce agreement has arisen and a claim for its enforcement has been brought instead.

 

A rabbinical court cannot be empowered to decide a dispute between litigants in arbitration, in a matter that is not within its subject matter jurisdiction according to the statute. In the instant case, it also appears from the divorce agreement that its contents cannot be construed as an arbitration clause, equal to "an arbitration agreement" between the parties. The power of an arbitrator to decide a dispute between parties derives from an arbitration agreement. The condition precedent for arbitration is the existence of an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration. If parties have agreed to refer disputes between them to the decision of some entity but it is not clear that a decision in arbitration is involved, then there is no arbitration agreement.

 

By deciding the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner for the enforcement of a contractual indemnification provision in the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Courts exceeded the power vested in them by law. Consequently, the decisions of the first and second respondents are void.

 

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting As the High Court of Justice                                             HCJ 8638/03

 

Before:

His Honor, Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin

Her Honor, Justice A. Procaccia

His Honor, Justice S. Joubran

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Petitioner:

Sima Amir

 

 

 

 

v.

 

 

 

The Respondents:

1. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

 

2. The Regional Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem

 

 

3. Yoseph Amir

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On Behalf of the Petitioner:

Adv. Michael Korinaldi

 

 

 

 

On Behalf of the Third Respondent:

Adv. Nechama Segal

 

 

 

 

On Behalf Of the Rabbinical Courts System:

Adv. S. Jacoby

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGEMENT

 

Justice A. Procaccia

 

1.         This petition puts to the test the question of the Rabbinical Court's authority to adjudicate a property dispute between a couple after the divorce proceeding between them has been completed, and it focuses on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by one member of the couple. Is the matter within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court or is it within the power of the civil judicial instance; and if the Rabbinical Court does indeed have authority to adjudicate the matter, what is the source of the authority and from where does this authority derive? Is it from the law; is it from the parties' agreement in arbitration or otherwise? And what is the nature of this authority?

 

2.         The petition concerns the petitioner's motion to vacate the decisions of the Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem – the first respondent – of May 4 and June 9, 2003, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal against the judgment of the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem – the second respondent – of May 27, 2002, and its decisions of March 5, 2001 and June 18, 2002.

 

Background and Proceedings

 

3.         The petitioner and the third respondent (hereinafter: “the respondent") were married in 1980 and have three children. Their relationship became unstable and they motioned the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem in 1992 in order to arrange for divorce proceedings. As part of that proceeding, the couple requested the Regional Rabbinical Court to approve a divorce agreement that they had made. In the agreement, the couple agreed on the act of divorce, the custody and support of the children, and various financial and property arrangements, as follows: the three children would be in the custody of the wife until reaching the age of 18 (clause 3); the husband would pay child support in the sum of NIS 1,000 per month for all three of the children until they reach the age of 18; the sum of the child support as set in the agreement would not be increased, and in exchange, the husband would transfer his share of the couple’s apartment to the wife, including his share of the apartment’s contents and the gold objects, ownership of which would all be transferred to the wife (clauses 4(a) and (b)); the husband also undertook to discharge the balance of the mortgage loan each month (clause 6(c)). The agreement also included a condition whereby the wife undertook not to sue the husband in any court for an increase in child support, either directly or indirectly, and if the husband were sued, the wife would compensate him in such a way that he would receive half of the apartment, half of its contents and half of the gold (clauses 4 and 5 the agreement). Taking out a stay of exit order inhibiting the husband's departure from the country would also be deemed a breach of the agreement and lead to the same result (clause 13). In order to secure the wife's obligation in accordance with the agreement, a cautionary note would be registered against the apartment, pursuant whereto one half of the apartment would be transferred into the husband's name if he were sued to increase child support. The relevant provisions of the agreement are as follows:

 

                        "4.       Child Support

 

                                    (e)       For the avoidance of doubt and without prejudice to the generality of the aforegoing, child support under the agreement shall unequivocally cover all the children's needs without exception… until the children reach the age of 18.

 

                                    The mother undertakes not to sue the father in any legal instance for an increase in child support or for the satisfaction of any of the children's needs without exception beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, either directly (herself) or indirectly (through any institution, entity, authority, person and/or in the name of the minor and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest), and if the husband is sued, the wife shall compensate him and he shall receive one half of the apartment, one half of its contents and one half of the gold. The obligation is in perpetuity.

 

                                    …

 

                        5.         Indemnification

 

                                    (a)       The mother undertakes and takes it upon herself not to sue the father in any legal instance whatsoever for an increase in child support or for the satisfaction of any of the children's needs without exception beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, either directly (herself) or indirectly (through any institution, entity, authority, person and/or in the name of the minor and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest).

 

                                    (b)       If, contrary to the abovementioned, the father is sued for an increase in child support and/or satisfaction of any of the children's needs, whether the lawsuit is brought by the mother and/or the mother in the name of the children or by an entity, authority, institution and/or anyone who now and/or in future has an interest, beyond what the father has undertaken in this agreement, then the mother undertakes to transfer one half of the apartment into the father's name and one half of its contents and one half of the gold. The obligation is in perpetuity.

 

                                    (c)       To secure the wife's obligations in this agreement, a cautionary note shall be registered, pursuant whereto one half of the apartment shall be transferred into the husband's name if the husband is sued to increase child support…"

 

            The agreement also includes a provision with regard to the exclusivity of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction in the event of a dispute between them after the divorce, in the following terms:

 

                        "9.       Cancellation of Mutual Claims And/or Complaints

 

                        …

 

                        10.       …

 

                        11.       If after the divorce, differences arise between the couple, they undertake to file the lawsuit solely in the Rabbinical Courts.

 

                        12.       …

 

                        13.       The wife undertakes not to take out a stay of exit order preventing the husband's departure from the country, and taking out such an order shall constitute a breach of this agreement, and the husband shall be entitled to obtain one half of the value of the apartment, of the contents and of the gold.

 

                        …"

 

            The divorce agreement was given the effect of judgement by the Rabbinical Court, and on May 26, 1992 the couple was divorced.

 

4.         About five years later, in June 1997, the couple's children (through the petitioner) filed a child support motion against the respondent in the Jerusalem Family Court (FC 10330/97). The motion was mainly intended to increase the child support upon which the couple had agreed in the Rabbinical Court to NIS 6,700. This was, inter alia, due to the petitioner's claim that the respondent was not paying the mortgage payments as undertaken by him in the divorce agreement. In the answer of defense, the respondent defended the claim on its merits. According to him, he was living off a general disability pension of NIS 1,200 per month, from which he was paying child support. The Family Court (per Judge N. Mimon) held in its judgement that the children's monthly support should be increased to a total of NIS 2,000 for both minor children together, and the sum of NIS 500 for the other child until his enlistment to the IDF; with respect to the minors, it was further held that from the time they reached the age of 18 until they completed their service in the IDF, the child support for them would be reduced by NIS 700, and upon completion of their military service the liability for their support will be terminated; if they do not enlist, the liability for them would be terminated when they reach the age of 18. With regard to the other child, upon his enlistment to the IDF and until his discharge, support of NIS 300 would be payable for him.

 

            On September 20, 1997, about three months after the motion to increase child support was filed in the civil court, the respondent filed a motion in the Regional Rabbinical Court of Jerusalem "for a declaratory judgement and specific performance" of the divorce agreement. In the motion, he pleaded that the petitioner had breached the divorce agreement several times and in several different aspects, as follows:

 

                        "8        (a)       The defendant (the petitioner – AP) filed a motion to increase child support in the name of the minors before this Honorable Court on February 28, 1993 – a motion that was dismissed by the Court

 

                                    (b)       The defendant filed another motion on November 6, 1994 and at the end of that motion the wife again applied for an increase in child support.

 

                                    (c)       The defendant motioned for a stay of exit order that was cancelled on July 21, 1997.

 

                        9.         (a)       The defendant went further, and when she saw that her motions were being dismissed by the Honorable Rabbinical Court, she  filed a motion to increase the child support in the name of the minors in FC 10330/97 in the Jerusalem Family Court.…

 

                                    (b)       As part of the motion in Family Court, the wife applied for a stay of exit order that the Court approved.

 

                                    (c)       Moreover, at about the time she filed the motion, the defendant filed a motion for a stay of exit order on July 22, 1997, after the previous order inhibiting departure from the country had been set aside, and the Chief Execution Officer approved it".

 

            He pleaded that the wife had therefore breached clauses 5 and 13 of the divorce agreement. On the basis thereof, the respondent sued the wife for one half of the apartment and its contents and one half of the gold.

 

5.         After filing his motion to the Regional Rabbinical Court, the respondent traveled abroad for more than two years and abandoned his motion. After returning to Israel, he renewed the motion in the Rabbinical Court. The petitioner pleaded in her defense, that the subject of the motion was " breach of a divorce agreement" and according to the law laid down in HCJ 6103/93 Sima Levy v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, PD 48(4) 591 (hereinafter: "Sima Levy Case") the Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion. As for the merits of the motion, the petitioner argued that the respondent had come to court with unclean hands because he had breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. The Regional Rabbinical Court, in its decision of February 25, 2001, referred the issue of jurisdiction raised by the petitioner to the Rabbinical Courts' then legal counsel on rabbinical jurisdiction, Adv. E. Roth, for his opinion.

 

            During the same month (February 2001) the petitioner filed a lawsuit in the Jerusalem Family Court against the respondent for "declaratory judgement as to the revocation of the indemnity provision in the divorce agreement" (FC 10331/97). This was based, inter alia, on the argument that the respondent breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. The petitioner further requested that the Court declare the revocation of clauses 11 and 13 of the divorce agreement, pleading that they were "contrary to public policy and the law". The respondent argued in his defense that the claim should be summarily dismissed due to the proceedings conducted on the same issues in the Rabbinical Court.

 

            On March 4, 2001, and before the Family Court had awarded its decision on the respondent's motion for the summary dismissal of the petitioner's claim, the opinion of the legal counsel on rabbinical jurisdiction, Adv. Roth, was filed in the Rabbinical Court. In his opinion, with reference to clause 5(b) of the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion after the divorce. Nevertheless, he believed that clause 11 of the divorce agreement could be treated as an arbitration clause in accordance with the Arbitration Law, 5728-1968 (hereinafter: "the Arbitration Law"). By virtue of the rules of arbitration, the Rabbinical Court is empowered to adjudicate the suit as an arbitrator in accordance with the rules and restraints governing an arbitrator. He further added that, in his opinion, it was unnecessary for the couple to sign an arbitration deed, since clause 11 of the divorce agreement constituted an arbitration deed in all respects.

 

            Following the opinion of the legal counsel, Adv. Roth, the Regional Rabbinical Court decided on March 5, 2001 that it was vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit "since in the Court's opinion clause 11 constitutes an arbitration deed".

 

            On May 14, 2002, and before the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement had been awarded in the respondent's suit, the Family Court awarded its decision in the respondent's motion for the summary dismissal of the petitioner's suit. It reviewed the question of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to try the respondent's claim, whether as a court empowered by virtue of statute or as an arbitrator, but it decided to stay the award of its decision on jurisdiction on the ground that:

 

                        "Mutual respect of legal instances requires that after a decision has been awarded by the Rabbinical Court holding that it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit that has been filed with it as an arbitrator, the award of a decision on jurisdiction should be stayed until the proceedings in respect of jurisdiction have been exhausted by the plaintiff, who will perhaps wish to act by applying on appeal to the Great Rabbinical Court or by applying to the High Court of Justice to clarify whether her position with regard to jurisdiction will be allowed, or even by motioning to vacate an arbitral judgment as provided in section 24 of the Arbitration Law…"

 

            On May 27, 2002, the Regional Rabbinical Court awarded its judgement in the respondent's motion. The court was divided in its opinion between the three judges, and the decision was made, in the words of the judgement, in accordance with –

 

                        "the third opinion, which was the decisive one of the three, since there are several doubts regarding the interpretation of the agreement, and there is a doubt as to whether it constitutes a breach according to Halachic authorities and the circumstances. Therefore, the case should be decided according to the law, and if the apartment has already been transferred into the wife's name, it is not possible to take away her ownership of the apartment because of a doubt, and of course the wife is liable to comply with all of the obligations in the divorce agreement.... If the apartment has not yet been transferred, it is not possible to order the plaintiff ... to transfer his share of the apartment into the wife's name ....

If the plaintiff has already signed a power of attorney and delivered it to the wife, it would appear that the wife cannot be precluded from exercising the power of attorney in order to transfer the plaintiff's share of the apartment into the wife's name…. On the other hand, if the husband still needs to sign transfer documents and the like, he should not be made to help transfer the dwelling into the wife's name in any way whatsoever….

With regards to the gold objects that the wife has received, it would also appear that she cannot be made to return them to the husband because they are in her possession and in this way her possession is valid…"

 

            As mentioned above, according to the Rabbinical Court's decision of March 5, 2001 it decided the respondent's suit as an arbitrator, but on June 18, 2002 it awarded another decision that was headed "Clarification", according to which:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Court makes it clear that it was the Rabbinical Court that approved the agreement and that there was an undertaking that all matters involved in the agreement would be tried solely by the Rabbinical Court. Therefore, since both parties undertook in the agreement, and the Rabbinical Court also approved the agreement, the Rabbinical Court consequently has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the matter, and the Rabbinical Court awarded the judgement by virtue of its jurisdiction, and there was no need for the Rabbinical Court to adjudicate the same as arbitrator, and although the Rabbinical Court could also adjudicate the matter as an arbitrator, the Rabbinical Court also had jurisdiction to try the matter as an adjudicating court in accordance with the aforegoing".

 

6.         The petitioner appealed to the Great Rabbinical Court against the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement of May 27, 2002. Her main plea in the appeal was that the Regional Rabbinical Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit, either as a competent court by virtue of the law or as an arbitrator, and its judgement is therefore void. As to the actual merits, she argued that the Regional Rabbinical Court had made an error "of judgement" and "disregarded facts" by not giving proper weight to the fact that it was the respondent who was in breach of the divorce agreement by not making the mortgage payments as he had undertaken in the divorce agreement. Consequently, on that ground too, on the merits of the case, the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement should be vacated. The respondent also appealed to the Great Rabbinical Court against the said judgement.

 

            The Great Rabbinical Court, in its decision of May 4, 2003, dismissed the petitioner's appeal with respect to jurisdiction and held that the interpretation of the divorce agreement indicated that it concerned the couple's agreement for "property in consideration for child support". That interpretation affects the substance of the complaint that the respondent filed to the Rabbinical Court, and it demonstrates that it is a suit to revoke the divorce agreement as opposed to a motion for the enforcement of an indemnity provision. That being the case, the Rabbinical Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion by virtue of its original (primary) authority because "indemnification was not involved, but property and child support and the connection between them, and those matters of property division and child support are certainly matters of personal status that are governed by section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law". The Rabbinical Court was also vested with original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit in view of clause 11 of the divorce agreement, which provides that if differences arise between the petitioner and the respondent after the divorce, the two undertake to file the motion solely to the Rabbinical Courts. The Rabbinical Court mentions that at the hearing, the respondent also pleaded avoidance of the Get and the divorce because according to him the Get had been given by mistake. Consequently, on that ground too, the Rabbinical Court had original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. According to the Rabbinical Court, it also had jurisdiction by virtue of its "continuing" jurisdiction, because the respondent was "applying expressly for the revocation of the property arrangement as a result of a change in circumstances concerning child support". Finally, the Great Rabbinical Court held that the jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's suit was vested in the Regional Rabbinical Court, when "the jurisdiction is the essential jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court, rather than jurisdiction by virtue of the Arbitration Law". The Great Rabbinical Court adjourned the deliberation on the appeal itself to a later date.

 

            On June 9, 2003 the Great Rabbinical Court awarded another decision, this time with regard to the respondent's appeal against the Regional Rabbinical Court's judgement. In its decision, the Great Rabbinical Court ordered the matter to be remitted to the Regional Rabbinical Court for it to try the argument, which had not been tried in the Regional Rabbinical Court, that the petitioner had breached the divorce agreement by suing for increased child support in the Regional Rabbinical Court in 1993.

 

The Petition

 

7.         In her petition before us, the petitioner seeks to set aside the decisions of the Great Rabbinical Court and the Regional Rabbinical Court, according to which the Rabbinical Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's motion, both as original (primary) jurisdiction and by virtue of an arbitration clause.

 

            This Court issued an order nisi in the petition.

 

The Parties' Arguments

 

8.         The petitioner's essential argument in her petition herein is that the Rabbinical Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the property dispute that has arisen between her and the respondent in respect of the divorce agreement that was made between them. According to her, the Rabbinical Courts are not vested with original (primary) jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit. Moreover, they do not have continuing jurisdiction to hear the respondent's suit. The respondent's motion to obtain one half of the property, which was transferred to the wife, is based on the cause of enforcing an indemnity provision in the divorce agreement. This cause is based on a plea of breach, if one occurred, after the divorce agreement was made and the judgement of the Rabbinical Court giving it force and effect was awarded, and after the couple had been duly divorced. A subsequent breach of the divorce agreement in respect of property after the parties' divorce cannot be bound in retrospect with the divorce agreement and the judgment that materialized in the past. From the divorce and onwards, motions that relate to the breach of the divorce agreement are not a part of matters of personal status. The Rabbinical Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate them, and jurisdiction in respect of them is vested in the civil court. Moreover, it was argued that the respondent himself breached the divorce agreement by not paying the mortgage payments as he had undertaken to do in the divorce agreement. His breach of the agreement has civil-financial character, which also demonstrates that his suit after the divorce is subject to the jurisdiction of the civil, rather than religious, court. The petitioner further pleads that clause 11 of the divorce agreement does not amount to an arbitration clause and does not purport to establish an agreement for arbitration. Instead, its wording and contents merely demonstrate its determination, by agreement of the parties, to which court the couple's motions after the divorce should be filed. This agreement, per se, does not vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court. In view of all of this, and based on other grounds too, upon which we shall not focus, the Rabbinical Courts' decisions on jurisdiction are void.

 

9.         The respondent's position in his petition is that the Rabbinical Court is vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the suit he filed to it. In this respect, he relies on the provision of the divorce agreement, according to which the parties expressly agreed to vest the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction to try any future dispute between them concerning the agreement. He pleads that, according to case law, a matter that can be bound from the outset with the divorce suit, such as property matters, and it was agreed in the divorce arrangement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court in respect to them, is also within its jurisdiction after the divorce. He further asserted that the meaning of the cause of the action that he filed was the revocation of a conditional undertaking given under the agreement, as opposed to the enforcement of a contractual indemnification arrangement. That is to say that the respondent entered into a conditional undertaking to transfer property to the petitioner in consideration for the child support being set in a binding amount and not being increased, and for motions not to be brought in this matter. Since that condition had not been fulfilled, the property undertaking that he had given is void. A contractual indemnification provision is not to be treated in the same way as a conditional property undertaking, with regard to which the Rabbinical Court has continuing jurisdiction even after the divorce. Alternatively, it is argued, the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's suit according to the law of arbitration, by virtue of clause 11 of the divorce agreement, which constitutes an arbitration agreement, even if the word "arbitration" is not mentioned in it.

 

Judgment

 

10.       This Court's intervention in the decisions of religious courts is limited to extreme cases of ultra vires, infringement of the principles of natural justice, departure from the provisions of law aimed at the religious court or when equitable relief is necessary where the matter is not within the jurisdiction of another court or tribunal (sections 15(c) and (d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary; HCJ 323/81 Vilozni v. The Great Rabbinical Court, PD 36(2) 733; HCJ 1689/90 E'asi v. The Sharia Court, PD 45(5) 148, 154-155; HCJ 1842/92 Blaugrund v. The Great Rabbinical Court PD 46(3) 423, 438; HCJ 5182/93 Levy v. The Rehovot Regional Court PD 48(3) 1, 6-8).

 

            The subject matter of the petition herein justifies this Court's entertaining the matter on grounds of the Rabbinical Court's exceeding the jurisdiction vested in it for the reasons explained below.

 

The Question

 

11.       The couple signed a divorce agreement containing property and child support arrangements. In the scope of the property arrangements, they agreed to limit and not increase child support. They added a condition according to which if motions to increase child support were filed by the wife, directly or indirectly, or if she took out stay of exit orders, these actions would have certain property consequences. The parties further agreed that if differences arose between the couple after the divorce, they undertook to conduct the claims solely in the Rabbinical Courts. Indeed, after the divorce, disputes did arise between the parties following motions to increase child support that were brought against the husband, and stay of exit orders were taken out. Further thereto, the husband filed a suit in the Rabbinical Court claiming a breach of the divorce agreement by the wife and requesting to receive one half of the property because of that breach. In those circumstances, after the couple's divorce, is the Rabbinical Court vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the husband's property suit, which is based on an alleged breach of the divorce agreement by the wife? Or is the exclusive jurisdiction to deliberate and adjudicate that claim vested in the civil court?

 

            The subsidiary questions that are to be decided can be divided into two:

 

            First is whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the law to adjudicate a property claim based on a breach of the divorce agreement after the divorce has been completed, by virtue of one of the following:

 

            (a)       Original-primary jurisdiction by virtue of statute to hear and adjudicate issues pertaining to the divorce;

 

            (b)       the Court's "ancillary" jurisdiction to adjudicate matters connected with the divorce after its completion, as interpreted and expanded by case law.

 

            The Second is whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to decide a property claim based on the breach of a divorce agreement by virtue of the parties' agreement, and what legal significance is to be given to this agreement.

 

            We shall consider these questions.

 

The Starting Point

 

12.       The starting point underlying the analysis of the Rabbinical Court's scope of jurisdiction is based on several fundamental assumptions:

 

            First, the Rabbinical Court is a state judicial instance, which was established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953 (hereinafter: "the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law"), and it derives its power and jurisdiction therefrom. As such a state judicial instance, the bounds of the Rabbinical Court's powers are defined and fashioned in accordance with the state law.

 

            Second, every state judicial instance, including the religious court, has merely those jurisdictions that the state law has granted it; it is the statute that established it, and it is the one that defined its powers and assigned them to it. In doing so, the statute assumed, as part of the basic concept of democratic government, that in the granting of judicial powers also lay judicial limitations. Anything that has not been granted to the judicial instance is outside and beyond its power, and it must not surpass its acknowledged boundaries and into areas that have not been entrusted to it and go beyond its responsibility. That is the principle of legality that characterises the structure of democratic government, upon which rests the perception of the status of the government authorities, including the courts. It is on the basis of this principle that the realm of jurisdiction that is vested in the state judicial instances, of which the Rabbinical Courts form part, extends.

 

            Third, the definition of the judicial powers of the various different courts, including the Rabbinical Courts, derives from statute, and statute is subject to interpretation by case law. The case law's interpretation of the extent of the powers vested in the judicial instance is intertwined with the provisions of the statute as the primary source of the power vested in the judicial instance, and it is intended to serve its purpose. In reviewing the boundaries of the religious court's power we shall therefore assume that the religious court is vested with the powers that have been granted to it by the statute, as they have been interpreted by case law, and it has only what the law has given it. As the Court stated (per Justice Landau) in HCJ 26/51 Menashe v. The Chairman and Members of the Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem, PD 5 714, 719:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Courts of our country exist in accordance with the general law, which determines their place in the state courts system, and the questions relating to the spheres of their jurisdiction should generally be resolved in accordance with the same principles as govern other courts".

 

            This is what distinguishes Rabbinical Courts from arbitrators, internal tribunals and voluntary tribunals, which are not established by virtue of statute but mainly by virtue of contract or regulations, and the scope of their jurisdiction is determined pursuant thereto. These entities are essentially governed by the principles of the private law that creates them and they are not part of the country's state judicial system.

 

            As Justice Zamir stated in HCJ 3269/95 Yosef Katz v. The Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court, PD 50(4) 590, 602:

 

                        "The Rabbinical Court is established by virtue of statute and its jurisdiction derives from the statute. Its budget comes from the State Treasury and its judges receive salaries like state employees; it sits in judgement beneath the symbol of the State and it writes its judgements on State paper; the orders that it issues speak in the name of the State and are enforced by the State. The Rabbinical Court is not a private entity but a state institution. It is therefore subject to public law and review by the High Court of Justice. Amongst other things, the Rabbinical Court is obliged to respect and observe the fundamental principle that governs every government agency, namely the principle of legality. According to that principle, the Rabbinical Court has nothing other than the power granted to it in accordance with the statute" (emphasis added).

 

            In this respect Justice Cheshin stated in the Sima Levy Case (ibid, p. 616):

 

                        "The legal system takes a grave view of a judicial entity acting beyond the bounds set for it by the law; hence, the case law holds that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction plea stands out and the court will consider it at any stage of the litigation, even where a party first raises it on appeal".

 

            (See also HCJ 816/98 Eminoff v. Eltalaff, PD 52(2) 769, 796-7; HCJ 512/81 The Hebrew University Archaeology Institute v. The Minister of Education, PD 35(4) 533, 543-4; HCJ 30/76, MF 150/76 Siho v. The Karaite Jewish Community Religious Court, PD 31(1) 15, 17-18.)

 

            The state judicial system, and its various different courts, both civil and religious, is built on common norms that govern all its agencies. Thus, for example, it has been held in the past that the fundamental principles that govern civil judges also apply to rabbinical judges. The rabbinical judge, like the civil judge, is part of the judicial authority and in his position he is subject to the same basic rules as obligate any judicial officer:

 

                        "He is not an arbitrator between parties who voluntarily apply to him. He operates by virtue of state law and his authority extends over the whole public with all its diversity, opinions and views. Like a civil judge, a rabbinical judge enjoys independence in matters of judgement. The laws concerning conditions of service, immunity, appointment, discipline and the like that govern the rabbinical judge are very similar to those that govern a civil judge. Like the civil judge, so too the rabbinical judge must, by his action, ensure the public's trust in his judgement. The public is not only the religious public. The rabbinical judge deals with the whole people and he must by his conduct ensure the trust of the whole people, both secular and religious". (Per Justice Barak in HCJ 732/84 MK Tzaban v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, PD 40(4) 141, para. 16.)

 

            In this context, case law has also drawn a clear distinction between a person's fitness as a rabbinical judge of the Israeli Rabbinical Court and his fitness as a community rabbi. On enactment of the Dayanim (rabbinical judges) Law a clear separation was created between judicial and rabbinic functions, and a mix between the two in judicial work is no longer consistent with the concept of state law. In the words of the Minister of Religious Affairs Warhaftig, when he presented the Dayanim Law draft on first reading in the Knesset, as cited in the Tzaban Case:

 

                        "With the establishment of the State of Israel we adopted this course. We distinguished between those functions and separated between rabbis and rabbinical judges" (Knesset Proceedings Session 5457, 1954, p. 2182).

 

 

 

            As Justice Goldberg added on this subject in the Tzaban Case:

 

                        "The main power of the Rabbinate rests in its traditional authority over those who come 'to seek God', whilst the rabbinical judges' authority when sitting in judgement does not depend on the wishes of the litigants but is enforced in the context of the judicial system prescribed for it by the legislature. In this sphere, the rabbinical judges perform the function of 'judging the people', with its varied opinions and views".

 

 

            The religious function of the rabbinical judge as rabbi is not intertwined with the judicial function that he performs as a rabbinical judge and is separate from it. The Rabbinical Court cannot therefore rely on its religious power in order to assume jurisdiction in a matter that exceeds its powers and authorities in accordance with state law (Schiffman, Family Law in Israel, 5755, Vol. I, p. 42).

 

            Against this background there is difficulty with the argument that is sometimes made that the Rabbinical Court might perform a dual function: on the one hand, a state judicial function imposed upon it by virtue of state law, and on the other hand, a religious court in monetary matters by virtue of the parties' agreement. Like any public entity that performs a function in accordance with the law, so the Rabbinical Courts, which operate by virtue of statute must also discharge the responsibility owed by them by virtue of statute and decide the matters entrusted to them. As part of the state judicial system, they possess only the jurisdiction that the statute has placed in their hands. That is the essence of the principle of legality that underlies public administration and the judicial system (Katz Case, ibid, p. 607); hence, even if Jewish law and tradition permit a Rabbinical Court to adjudicate and decide disputes in a certain manner, that does not suffice to authorize it to do so because "the Rabbinical Court, as a state institution, must act within the authority vested in it by state law" (Katz Case, ibid, p. 607). To the same extent, a civil court, which is part of the judicial authority, may not assume an authority or function that does not derive from state law (Tzaban Case, ibid, p. 152).

 

            It is against this background that we shall examine the question of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to decide the respondent's property suit against the petitioner based on a breach of the divorce agreement, and the relief deriving therefrom. A comprehensive analysis of the issue of jurisdiction in a similar context can be found in the judgement of Justice Cheshin in the Sima Levy Case and it will guide and direct us.

 

The Rabbinical Court's Original – Primary Jurisdiction

 

13.       The original primary powers of the Rabbinical Court were set in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they are built on two tiers: exclusive powers by virtue of the statute; and parallel powers of the civil court and the Rabbinical Court that are vested by virtue of the parties' agreement. The exclusive powers comprise matters of marriage and divorce, as well as matters that are duly bound up in the motion for divorce, including wife and child support. Parallel jurisdiction that is vested by agreement relates to matters of personal status in accordance with article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. The relevant provisions are as follows:

 

                        "1.       Jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce

 

                        Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, nationals or residents of the State, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts.

 

                        …

 

                        3.         Jurisdiction in matters incidental to divorce

 

                        Where a suit for divorce between Jews has been filed in a rabbinical court, whether by the wife or by the husband, a rabbinical court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any matter connected with such suit, including support for the wife and for the children of the couple.

 

                        …

 

9.         Jurisdiction by consent

 

In matters of personal status of Jews, as specified in article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council, 1922 to 1947, or in the Succession Ordinance, in which a rabbinical court does not have exclusive jurisdiction under this Law, a rabbinical court shall have jurisdiction after all parties concerned have expressed their consent thereto."

 

The Rabbinical Court's powers – both the exclusive ones (marriage, divorce and matters bound with divorce) and the jurisdiction in accordance with the parties' agreement in matters of personal status – are original-primary powers by virtue of the statute to hear and rule on the matters that fall within the scope of those powers.

 

Power Ancillary to Original Jurisdiction

14.       The Case law has recognized the existence of a judicial instance's inherent ancillary power that derives from the original power of the Rabbinical Court by virtue of the statute and in special circumstances grants it jurisdiction to again hear a matter upon which it has ruled in the past. Such is, for example, the jurisdiction of the civil and religious courts to vacate a judgement awarded by them that is based on an agreement between the parties, in the making of which there has been a defect. Such a material defect might lead to the revocation of the agreement and therefore also to revocation of the judgment that rests upon it, and the instance empowered to decide its revocation is the one that rendered the judgment (HCJ 124/59 Glaubhardt v. The Haifa Regional Rabbinical Court, PD 13 1490; CA 151/87 Artzi Investment Co. v. Rachmani PD 43(3) 489, 498-500). Additional expression of such ancillary jurisdiction occurs when there is a material change in the circumstances of the matter, that has occurred after the award of judgement by consent, which makes its continued performance unjust (Sima Levy Case, ibid, pp. 605-6; CA 442/83 Kam v. Kam PD 38(1) 767, 771; CA 116/82 Livnat v. Tolidano PD 39(2) 729, 732; CA 219/87 Rachmani v. Shemesh Hadar, Building Company Ltd et al. PD 43(3) 489, 498-500). The recognition of this ancillary jurisdiction is intended to bring about a proper balance between the judgment’s finality on the one hand, and the interest not to leave in effect a judgment, the enforcement of which has become extremely unjust due to a change in circumstances. Inherent jurisdiction is also vested in the judicial instance, including the Rabbinical Court, to retain jurisdiction in respect of a matter that is pending before it until the proceedings have been completed. So long as final judgement has not been awarded, jurisdiction continues until the judicial court has completed its work. Once a final, unconditional judgment has been awarded, the work is completed (Sima Levy Case, p. 607; CA 420/54 Ariel v. Leibovitz PD 9 1337; ALA 2919/01 Daniel Oshrovitz v. Yael Lipa (Fried) PD 55(5) 592; J. Zussman, The Civil Procedure (seventh edition, 5755) 550).

One of the expressions of ancillary jurisdiction relates to the existence of the Rabbinical Court's "continuing jurisdiction", the essence of which is that, under certain conditions, where the Rabbinical Court has in the past heard a particular matter, its continuing jurisdiction to hear it again will be recognized. The continuing jurisdiction also derives from the inherent power of the judicial instance. Its basic purpose is to give expression to the duty of mutual respect and the need for harmony between judicial instances where there is parallel jurisdiction between them, and in order to avoid parties running from one judicial instance to another. It has nevertheless already been explained that continuing jurisdiction is not intended to undermine or derogate from the original powers vested in the judicial instances in accordance with statute. Its purpose is essentially "to vest power to vacate or modify an earlier decision due to a change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the first decision was based" (per Justice Cheshin in the Sima Levy Case, ibid, p. 608, 610). Such are matters of child support and custody, which by their nature are subject to material changes of circumstance, and the original judicial instance therefore has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider them when the appropriate conditions arise.

It should be made clear that no inherent power has been recognized for a civil or religious court to exercise its original authority again in order to interpret a judgement awarded by it. Hence, a Rabbinical Court that has granted a divorce does not have inherent jurisdiction to interpret the divorce agreement and the judgement that awarded it force and effect (Sima Levy Case, ibid, pp. 612-13).

These are the characteristics of the original jurisdiction that is vested in the Rabbinical Court in accordance with the statute, alongside its ancillary powers that are sparingly exercised in special circumstances by virtue of its inherent jurisdiction, in order to complete the judicial act and make it a complete and just deed.

We shall now examine the question of whether the Rabbinical Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement, where such jurisdiction is not set in the statute empowering the Rabbinical Courts, and is not within the scope of the ancillary jurisdiction vested in it.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of the Parties' Agreement

15.       The parties' agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court might take on two guises: one, simple agreement to grant the Court jurisdiction in a particular case, regardless of the provisions the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law; second, agreement intended to empower the Court to hear and rule on a dispute as an arbitrator. Can such agreement by the parties vest power in the Court that is not granted to it by the empowering statute or embodied in its ancillary powers?

The Israeli state judicial system and the various different judicial instances, derive their powers from statute. It is the statute that establishes them, it is what delineates the bounds of their activity and it is what defines the sphere of their subject matter and territorial jurisdiction. This is also the case in respect to the civil judicial instances; and so it is with respect to the special judicial systems, including the courts of Israel's different religious communities. These include the Rabbinical Courts in Israel.

By defining the powers of the various different judicial instances in Israel, the statute intended not only to delineate the function and responsibility of the system and its various different arms. It also sought, at the same time, to deny the power of a judicial instance to hear and adjudicate a matter which it was not charged with by the statute and which is not within its inherent jurisdiction. The definition of the judicial instances' powers has a dual dimension, both positive and negative: it constitutes a source of power and responsibility on the one hand, while denying the exercise of authority and power that have not been so conferred; the judicial instance has only what the statute that established it has vested in it, and insofar as it has been made responsible to adjudicate disputes within the scope of the power vested in it, it is under a duty that derives from the statute and the concept of democratic government not to try or adjudicate a matter that is beyond its statutory power.

A preliminary and mandatory condition for the satisfactory activity of any judicial system is a clear and exhaustive definition of the framework of powers and the apportionment of functions that rest with its various different instances. Without an exhaustive and specific definition of powers the systemic structure, built in accordance with the statute, is blurred and the stability of its functioning is not secured. The harmony necessary in the area of operation of the different judicial arms and the relationship between them is impaired; the allocation of professional, administrative and budgetary resources to the different instances is disrupted, and direct harm might occur to the efficacy of the judicial system and the level of judicial performance. The uniqueness of the responsibility owed by the judge, which requires the existence of a clear framework of authority, alongside which is the responsibility and duty to rule, becomes blurry. Thus, recognizing the power of a judicial instance to adjudicate matters, the power and responsibility for which have not been legally transferred to it, might materially disrupt the internal balance required in the structure of the judicial system and severely undermine its standing and performance.

A consequence of the aforegoing is that the power of a judicial instance, as such, be it civil or religious, is acquired by law and it has no power to be derived from the parties' agreement, except where the statute itself has seen fit to recognize such agreement in certain circumstances as a source of the power to adjudicate. Thus, for example, with regard to the effect of the parties' agreement, the law has distinguished between the apportionment of subject matter jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction between judicial instances. It is willing to acknowledge, in certain conditions, the parties' agreement as a valid source for changing the territorial jurisdiction that has been prescribed. Section 5 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 provides that when an agreement between parties as to the place of jurisdiction exists, the lawsuit will be filed to the court in that area of jurisdiction. The relative flexibility regarding territorial jurisdiction, and the willingness to recognize the parties' agreement as the source of such jurisdiction, stems solely from the statute and derives its power from its provisions. That is not the case in respect of subject matter jurisdiction. Generally, the law does not recognize that the parties' agreement has power to depart from the rules of subject matter jurisdiction, as crafted by state legislation.

A similar approach is also taken with regard to the judicial instance's power to adjudicate by way of arbitration. Since the state judicial instance merely has the subject matter jurisdiction conferred to it by statute, it is not vested with power to hear and rule a matter as an arbitrator by virtue of the parties' agreement, unless it has been expressly given that power by statute. In general, a judicial instance is not supposed to adjudicate a matter that is referred to it as arbitrator. However, in certain circumstances, the law has expressly recognized the power of a civil instance to adjudicate a dispute in departure from the ordinary rules of procedure. Thus, for example, in the area of small claims, section 65 of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984 provides that if a lawsuit has been filed in the small claims court, the judge may, with the parties’ consent, try the claim as arbitrator, and the provisions of the Arbitration Law will govern the matter, with certain restrictions; in addition, a court hearing a civil matter has been empowered, with the parties’ consent, to decide a matter before it by way of settlement (section 79A of the Courts Law) or to refer a matter, with the parties' consent, to arbitration or conciliation (sections 79B and 79C of the Courts Law). The said authorities are all vested in the court by virtue of statute. They assume that the subject of the dispute is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court hearing the case and they give it special procedural means that are intended to facilitate and expedite the process of deciding the dispute and bringing about a just result. The various judicial instances have not been generally empowered by law to hear and decide matters that are not included in the scope of their subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement, either as arbitrators or otherwise. Since such authority has not been conferred to them, it is, ipso facto, denied and does not exist.

The Rabbinical Courts are an integral part of the Israeli judicial system. They were established by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they derive their power and authorities from the state statute. They have nothing other than what is vested in them by the statute, and they are subject to the set of powers of the statute in their judicial work, as interpreted over the years by case law. Along those lines, this Court has held in the Katz Case that the Rabbinical Court is not empowered to issue a Letter of Refusal in monetary matters that is intended to compel a party to submit to the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction by ostracizing and disgracing the recalcitrant party; and in HCJ 2222/99 Gabai v The Great Rabbinical Court PD 54(5) 401, the opinion was expressed that the Rabbinical Court lacks legal authority to issue a forced settlement decision, without the parties' consent, thus forcing a judgment on the parties without determining facts on the basis of evidence, if it is unable to decide in accordance with the law.

It emerges from this that the parties' agreement as such cannot, per se, grant jurisdiction to the Rabbinical Court, unless, it has been recognized by the law as a primary source of authority. Thus, the parties' agreement has been recognized as a source of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 9 the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, in matters of personal status of Jews pursuant to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or according to the Succession Ordinance, which are within the parallel jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court and the civil instance. Nevertheless, the Rabbinical Court does not have power to hear and decide a matter that is not of the kind found within its exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the statute or within its parallel jurisdiction, even if the parties have given their consent to its jurisdiction. Such agreement does not derive from a legally recognized source of authority in the law and it cannot, per se, vest jurisdiction in a state judicial instance.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of an Arbitration Agreement

16.       According to the same line of reasoning, the Rabbinical Court has no power and authority to decide a dispute as an arbitrator by virtue of an arbitration agreement between the parties in a matter, which by its nature is not within its legal jurisdiction. The Court has not been vested with jurisdiction by law to decide disputes as an arbitrator and the parties' agreement cannot vest it with such power.

The issue of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction to arbitrate financial and other matters that go beyond the powers granted to it in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law has caused consternation and confusion over the years. It appears that, in reality, the Rabbinical Court assumes the role of arbitrating matters that are beyond the scope of its subject matter jurisdiction (Katz Case, ibid, pp. 606-8; CA 376/62 Bachar v. Bachar, PD 17(2) 881, 882, 885; CA 688/70 Doar v. Hamami, PD 25(2) 396, 399; M. Alon, Jewish Law – History, Sources and Principles, third edition, vol. III, 5748, 1529). Justice Barak considered the inherent difficulty of a state judicial instance's need to adjudicate a dispute by arbitration where it was not empowered to do so by law, saying:

"The first possible argument is that the motion to the Rabbinical Court is like that to an arbitrator and embodied in the Arbitration Law, 5728-1968. That possibility – which has used in practice and can be encored as a year-long custom - raises serious problems in principle. Thus, for example, it can be asked whether it is proper for a judicial entity, whose powers are prescribed by law, to assume additional judicial powers, by being empowered as an arbitrator. Is it conceivable that parties would motion the magistrate’s court to try a pecuniary claim, that is outside its jurisdiction, as an arbitrator? From the state's point of view, is it justifiable to use judicial time and tools (whether of the civil or religious courts) for matters outside the jurisdiction that the law has granted the judicial authorities? Is there no fear that the public be confused as to which decisions the judicial instance has awarded as the government and those that it has awarded as arbitrator?"

(HCJ 3023/90 Jane Doe (a minor) v. The Rehovot Regional Rabbinical Court PD 45(3) 808, 813-14; see also S. Ottolenghi, Arbitration, Law and Procedure (fourth edition, 5765) 167-8; Schiffman, ibid, vol. I, 37.)

In HCJ 2174/24 Kahati v. The Great Rabbinical Court, PD 50(2) 214, this Court (per Justice Dorner) once again referred to the practice, adopted from time to time by the Rabbinical Courts, of deciding disputes as arbitrators in matters that are not within their jurisdiction. It expressed skepticism with respect to the validity of the practice. However, as in the previous case, it again left this question open without making any conclusive ruling, since such a ruling was not necessary in that case (cf. Aminoff, ibid, pp. 792-3).

17.       There is indeed an inherent difficulty in recognizing the Rabbinical Court's power to decide a dispute in a matter on which it has not been given jurisdiction by law (cf. Ottolenghi, Dispute Resolution by Alternative Means, Israeli Law Yearbook, 5752-5753, p. 535, 550-1). In the past, the Mandate government empowered the Rabbinical Courts to act as arbitrators by means of section 10(d) of the Israel Knesset Regulations of 1927, but upon the establishment of the State, the “Israel Knesset”, within its meaning under the Mandate, ceased to exist and it was held that those Regulations no longer had any force or effect (Crim. App. 427/64 Yair v. The State of Israel PD 19(3) 402; HCJ 3269/95, ibid, p. 622-3; Schiffman, ibid, p. 39). It cannot therefore be argued that the said section might serve as the source of the Rabbinical Courts' power as arbitrators. Moreover, upon enactment of the Arbitration Law, it was proposed that an arbitration decision made by a religious court when ruling as an arbitrator would in all respects, except with regard to the appeal, be treated as a judgement of the court sitting in accordance with its jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and that the award would not require confirmation under the Arbitration Law. That proposal was not accepted (Knesset Proceedings 5728, pp. 2966-7).

It is indeed difficult to settle the governing perception that views the judicial system as an arm of government, which derives its power and authority from statute, while acknowledging the possibility that the selfsame system can acquire other subject matter authorities deriving merely from the parties' agreement that do not originate from the empowering law. The Israeli Rabbinical Courts, that are part of the Israeli judicial system, integrate with the said perception and, like the other judicial instances, operate in accordance with the principle of legality of the arms of government (see the dissenting opinion of Justice Tal in the Katz Case, distinguishing between the power of religious courts as a state authority and the power they have, in his opinion, by virtue of Jewish law, which is not connected with state law).

18.       Apart from the essential difficulty inherent in the judicial decision of the Rabbinical Court as an arbitrator, which is not consistent with the principle of legality of the government authorities, other difficulties arise from the said procedural practice. The practice blurs the spheres of the Court's own activity in respect of the procedural basis upon which its decision rests: is it a decision within the scope of the Court's state power that is subject to review by the High Court of Justice in accordance with section 15 of the Basic Law: the Judiciary, or is it an extra-statutory power that is built on a different foundation originating from the parties' agreement and subject to review by a different judicial instance, like the District Court, in accordance with the Arbitration Law (cf. Jane Doe Case, ibid, para. 7)? In more than a few cases the parties might misunderstand the nature of their agreement to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court as they do not always understand the meaning and implications of their consent. Moreover, usually, in the course of such adjudication, strict attention is not paid to enquiring into the existence of an arbitration agreement or the application of the Arbitration Law and the rules pursuant thereto, such, for example, the mechanism for the confirmation and revocation of an arbitral award and the role of the District Court as the competent instance in accordance with the Arbitration Law (Ottolenghi, ibid, p. 168; Dichovski, The Standing of a Rabbinical Court Dealing with Property Law As Arbitrator, The Jewish Law Yearbook 16-17 (5750-5751) 527; MF 268/88 Delrahim v. Delrahim, DCJ 49(3) 428; SC 2329/99 Kfir v. Kfir, PD 55(2) 518, para. 5). An arbitral judgment made by the Rabbinical Court frequently does not undergo confirmation or revocation proceedings in the District Court as required by the Arbitration Law for the purpose of its execution, and the Rabbinical Court has no power to confirm an arbitral judgment (Kahati, ibid, p. 220; HCJ 5289/00 Mograbi v. The Great Rabbinical Court, Takdin Elyon 2000(2) 581; Kfir Case, ibid, para. 5). Furthermore, a situation in which the District Court, by virtue of the Arbitration Law, might oversee the Rabbinical Court's decisions as an arbitrator might harm the proper balance between the instances and aggravate the tension between the civil and religious judicial arms (A. Porat, The Rabbinical Court As Arbitrator, Kiriat Mishpat II (5762) 503, 521-4; Dichovski Case, ibid, p. 529).

The Rabbinical Court, purporting to act as an arbitrator between the parties, still operates under cover, and with the characteristics, of its state role. To that end it makes use of the court's physical and organizational system, which is financed by the state; it adjudicates disputes as an arbitrator in the scope of the court calendar, as part of its ordinary work; the overall services, the organizational and professional arrangement and the government budget are also used by it in that function, which by its nature does not have a state character. The time that it should devote to matters of personal status in its official capacity is partly assigned by it to a different judicial function that is not for the state, despite appearing to carry the state seal in the eyes of the public at large, who finds it difficult to distinguish between the judicial function and the extra-statutory function performed by the Court. This intermingling of functions is inconsistent with the principle of legality and a correct definition of the functions and powers of a state judicial instance (Katz Case, ibid, p. 608; Schiffman, ibid, pp. 37-8).

19.       Mention ought to be made to the approach of Prof. Shochatman in his paper entitled The Rabbinical Courts' Jurisdiction in Matters Other Than Personal Status (Bar Ilan University Yearbook on Humanities and Judaism, vols. 28-29 (5761) p. 437, p. 449 et seq.). As he sees it, the Rabbinical Court might acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters outside its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law by virtue of section 15(d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary, thereby acquiring jurisdiction as an arbitrator. According to that Law, which defines the High Court of Justice's power to review religious courts, the question of a religious court's jurisdiction can only be referred to this instance when it was raised at the first opportunity. The author infers from this that where there is prior agreement between the parties to vest subject matter jurisdiction in the religious court, a party who has so agreed may not later dispute jurisdiction. By virtue of that preclusion the religious court acquires subject matter jurisdiction, and the High Court of Justice is itself precluded from intervening therein. According to this approach, such an agreement vests subject matter jurisdiction and is not limited solely to matters of personal status. It might encompass numerous spheres that are beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the religious court, as defined in the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law.

I cannot agree with this position. The interpretation expressed by Prof. Shochatman assumes that it is possible to recognize the existence of subject matter jurisdiction of an Israel state judicial instance by means of the parties' consent, combined with the doctrine of preclusion and estoppel that prevents someone who has agreed to jurisdiction from later disputing it. That approach is fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of legality that obligates judicial instances, including the religious courts. It is not consistent with the starting point whereby subject matter jurisdiction is vested in a judicial instance by a positive arrangement, and its existence is not to be inferred by an indirect interpretation of provisions of law concerning estoppel and preclusion. The Rabbinical Court's powers are granted to it by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law and they cannot be added to by an indirect interpretation of statutory provisions, the purpose of which is not the vesting of power. Moreover, it has already been held (in Sima Levy Case, ibid, p. 618-19) that the element of preclusion emerging from section 15(d)(4) of the Basic Law: the Judiciary was not intended to vest in the Rabbinical Court subject matter jurisdiction that is not vested in it by virtue of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law. The said preclusion is based on the assumption that the matter being adjudicated by the Rabbinical Court is of the type that are within the parallel jurisdiction of the civil court and Rabbinical Court, and regarding the latter, jurisdiction is conclusively consummated if both parties have agreed to it. In those circumstances, and only in them, a party's prior agreement or silence, or subsequent denial of jurisdiction, might lead to preclusion with respect to a lack of jurisdiction argument in the High Court of Justice - that and nothing more. An interpretation that takes the doctrine of preclusion out of context, and assumes the existence of a potentially unlimited Rabbinical Court subject matter jurisdiction, the final consummation of which is dependent only upon the parties' agreement, is directly opposed to the principle of legality, upon which the concept of democratic government is based. It is inconsistent with the subject matter jurisdictions vested by statute in the arms of government, including the judicial system.

Alternative Decision-Making Systems

20.       The need of various different circles in the religious world to entertain alternative systems for the resolution of disputes is proper and recognized. Indeed, alternative rabbinical judicial systems that are not associated with the state rabbinical judicial system, which decide disputes between litigants in the community, are recognized. They can be granted powers to act as arbitrators by agreement of the parties. The need of different communities for alternative dispute resolution systems specific to them can be met by reference to internal arbitration frameworks that are not part of the state judicial system, within which disputes can be settled by virtue of the parties' agreement. This alternative course to litigation in the state judicial instances can be developed and strengthened in accordance with the different needs and preferences of the communities. This was considered by Justice Zamir in the Katz Case (ibid, p. 606), who stated:

"As is known, there are still observant Jews who prefer to litigate in matters of property according to religious law before a religious court rather than the state court. The state's law does not preclude that, if both parties to the dispute so desire, and it is even willing to give the force of arbitration to such litigation, if the litigants fulfil the provisions of the Arbitration Law. Indeed, in practice, such courts exist in various communities around Israel, not by virtue of state law or as official institutions but as private entities. That is, for example, the case of the rabbinical court of the Edah Chareidis [the Haredi Community] in Jerusalem. However… in these cases we are not dealing with a private entity but a state court, and the law applies to it just as any other of the state's courts. Like any court, in fact, like any government agency, the Rabbinical Court is also subject to the principle of legality, meaning that it has nothing other than what was granted to it by the law… In this respect, the Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem is distinguished from the rabbinical court of the Edah Chareidis in Jerusalem. The Israeli Rabbinical Court, which has jurisdiction in accordance with the Basic Law: the Judiciary, is not like one of the rabbinical courts of the Jewish communities in the Diaspora. Unlike them, it has the power and authority of a government institution. So too, unlike them, it is also subject to the restrictions that apply to any government institution".

Consensual Resolution – Looking to the Future and to the Past

21.       The scope of the Rabbinical Courts' subject matter jurisdiction to decide a dispute by virtue of the parties' agreement outside the framework of the law looks to the past and the future. It calls into question the validity of the Court's rulings based on the parties' agreement outside the scope of the statute, not merely henceforth, looking to the future, but also with respect to the past. The outlook to the future seeks to find a binding definition of the limits of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction and to strictly observe those limits hereafter. However, the outlook to the past calls into question the binding legal validity of the Rabbinical Court's decisions that have been made over the years by virtue of the parties' agreement as aforesaid. That issue is far from simple; there is no need to decide it here, and it will wait until its time comes.

From the General to the Particular

22.       Let us return to the respondent's suit against the petitioner in the Rabbinical Court and examine whether it is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court; the test of jurisdiction depends on the nature of the cause of action, and whether the cause falls within the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical Court.

The Cause of Action – Enforcement of a Contractual Indemnity Clause

23.       The respondent's cause of action in the Rabbinical Court is the enforcement of a contractual clause concerning property, which is contained in the divorce agreement that was made between the couple for the purpose of the divorce proceedings. It provided that if the respondent were sued for an increase in child support and the satisfaction of any of the children's needs or if a stay of exit order was granted at the initiative of the wife, then the petitioner would compensate him, in the language of clause 4(e) of the agreement, with half the property. That provision is also mentioned in clause 5 of the agreement, which is headed "Indemnification", and according to the substance of the provision, and also its location and wording, it is an indemnity clause. The respondent sues for the enforcement of a property condition for his indemnification due to a breach of contract by the wife, and he gave expression thereto by heading his claim as one for "specific performance". That is to say, we have here a property claim for the enforcement of the contractual indemnity clause in a divorce agreement that received the effect of a judgement of the Rabbinical Court and further to which the parties' divorce was completed.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction to Adjudicate a Property Claim for the Breach of a Contractual Indemnity Clause in a Divorce Agreement after the Parties' Divorce

Does the respondent's suit, according to its cause, fall within the scope of one of the sources of the Rabbinical Court's jurisdiction? Because of the great similarity between the instant matter and the case of Sima Levy, we shall draw guidance and direction from that case.

 

 

Original – Primary Jurisdiction

24.       The source of the Rabbinical Court's exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce, as provided in section 1 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, does not apply in the instant case because the subject of the suit is a property matter after the dissolution of the parties' marriage and a matter of "marriage and divorce" is, no longer involved. Nor is it a matter "connected with a divorce suit", including support for the wife and children, within the meaning of section 3 of the Law. After divorce, a property claim in respect of the breach of an indemnity clause is not connected with the divorce suit, which has ended and no longer exists. The respondent's cause of action is a new one, the subject of which is the enforcement of a divorce agreement or an application for the enforcement of a divorce judgment, based on a divorce agreement. The cause is based on the breach of a divorce agreement after the award of the divorce and completion of the couple's divorce, and such a new cause is naturally not to be bound up with the matters that were in the past connected with the divorce suit.

With regard to the property cause of action, which surrounds the breach of an indemnity clause of a divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Court does not have jurisdiction by virtue of the parties' agreement pursuant to section 9 of the Law, which deals with the Rabbinical Court's parallel jurisdiction that is vested by virtue of the parties' agreement in matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. Section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law raises the question of whether jurisdiction can be vested in the Rabbinical Court by consent in a matter included in its parallel jurisdiction after completion of the divorce, or whether its jurisdiction pursuant to that provision is limited solely to matters within its parallel subject matter jurisdiction that arise in connection with, and until, the divorce and its completion, but not afterwards. Whatever the answer to this question, it is in any event clear that the subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 9 is limited solely to the matters mentioned therein, that is, matters of "personal status" as defined in the Palestine Orders in Council and the Succession Ordinance. In a dispute that is not within the bounds of those matters, even the parties' agreement cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court (Schiffman, ibid, vol. I, p. 37; Jane Doe Case, ibid, p. 812). The power of the parties' stipulation is restricted solely to the matters defined by the statute (MF 358/89 Zalotti v. Zalotti PD 43(4) 41, 42; Porat, ibid, p. 510).

Clause 11 of the divorce agreement in this matter looks to the future, and provides that if differences arise between the couple after the divorce, then they undertake to bring their claims solely in the Rabbinical Courts. That agreement is effective only to vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court pursuant to section 9 of the Law in respect of matters of personal status according to article 51 of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance. A property claim for the enforcement of a contractual indemnity clause in a divorce agreement is not a matter of personal status within the meaning of the Palestine Orders in Council or the Succession Ordinance, and thus, the parties' contractual agreement in respect of such a dispute cannot vest jurisdiction in the Rabbinical Court pursuant to section 9 of the Law.

The Rabbinical Court therefore does not have original jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's claim.

"Ancillary" Inherent Jurisdiction

25.       Does the Rabbinical Court have "ancillary" inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondent's claim? The answer is in the negative.

            In the instant case, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction is irrelevant insofar as it relates to the revocation of a divorce award because of a defect in the making of the divorce agreement. It is not a defect of fraud, mistake, deceit, duress or similar that occurred in the making of the agreement and that might have given the Rabbinical Court ancillary jurisdiction to consider its revocation.

            Similarly, the Rabbinical Court has not acquired ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of a material change in circumstances after granting the divorce judgment that allegedly justifies revoking the divorce agreement and the divorce judgment in order to achieve a just result. On the contrary, the respondent's suit is for the specific performance and enforcement of the divorce agreement, not its revocation. Although, in the Great Rabbinical Court, the respondent pleaded that his suit was to revoke the divorce agreement because, according to him, the Get had been given by mistake (the Great Rabbinical Court's decision of May 4, 2003). These arguments were made as an "embellishment" at a late stage of the trial and do not reflect the real cause of action; the motion to revoke the divorce agreement and the act of divorce is inconsistent with the respondent's claim in his suit to compensate him with half the property (the apartment, the contents and the gold), which is nothing other than a claim for the enforcement of the divorce agreement (cf. CA 105/83 Menashe v. Menashe PD 38(4) 635; Yadin, The Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law 5731-1970, Second Edition, 5739, p. 44).

            Again, the Rabbinical Court's ancillary jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction in a matter pending before it until the proceedings conducted before it are concluded will not vest it with jurisdiction in this case. The Regional Rabbinical Court had granted a final and unconditional judgment and awarded the effect of judgement to the divorce agreement. Indeed, the divorce agreement does contain an indemnification provision, which by its nature looks to the future, but this fact cannot transform a judgement that gave effect to a divorce agreement into a judgment that is not final, leaving the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction that has not yet been exhausted to continue adjudicating with respect to the divorce agreement's future performance in this property matter. A financial-property dispute that has arisen between the parties after the award of judgement gives rise to a new cause of action and necessitates the institution of new proceedings in accordance with the jurisdictional framework prescribed by law (see Sima Levy Case, pp. 607-608; CA 468/85 Dondushanski v. Don PD 40(2) 609; D. Bar Ofir, Execution - Proceedings and Law (Sixth Edition, 2005, pp. 164-5)).

            Nor has the Rabbinical Court acquired jurisdiction to hear this matter by virtue of the doctrine of "continuing jurisdiction". It should be kept in mind, that continuing jurisdiction is vested where an instance has tried a particular matter in the past and, in special circumstances, a need has arisen to vacate or modify an earlier decision due to a material change that has occurred in the circumstances upon which the original decision was based such, for example, in matters of child support and custody. The instant case is fundamentally different. The motion does not seek to modify or revoke the divorce agreement made between the parties. On the contrary, it seeks to enforce the agreement, and such a claim has no place within the continuing jurisdiction vested in the Rabbinical Court. A decision on property matters is a final one and not a matter for continuing jurisdiction, as the Court stated in Sima Levy (Justice Cheshin, ibid, p. 611):

                        "As distinct from decisions concerning the payment of support or child custody – which by their nature are not final and the doctrine of continuing jurisdiction applies to them – a decision on a property matter is in principle a final one" (emphasis added).

            The property aspect of the divorce agreement, including the indemnification clause, and the divorce judgment that gave it effect, are therefore not within the Rabbinical Court's continuing jurisdiction.

            And finally, the Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate the new cause that arose following the divorce agreement in order to interpret the agreement. Firstly, the Rabbinical Court, having completed and exhausted its power to rule on the matter of divorce, no longer has ancillary power to interpret the divorce agreement or the divorce judgment (cf. HCJ 897/78 Yigal v. The National Labour Court, PD 33(2) 6, 7; CA 5403/90 The State of Israel v. RAM Revhiat Ibrahim PD 46(3) 459). Moreover, in the instant case, the question of the agreement’s interpretation hasn’t risen as such, but a claim for its enforcement has been brought instead. Hence, the Rabbinical Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction in this respect either.

            In conclusion: the Rabbinical Court does not have primary original jurisdiction, or ancillary inherent jurisdiction, to adjudicate a property claim for enforcement of a contractual indemnification clause in a divorce agreement that has given the effect of judgement, once the couple's divorce has been completed.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of Consent

26.       As can be recalled, clause 11 of the divorce agreement provides that differences between the couple after the divorce are to be adjudicated solely in the Rabbinical Courts. The couple's agreement as such cannot vest the Rabbinical Court with jurisdiction where there is no legal source for it. The agreement in this case concerns something that is not a matter of personal status according to section 9 of the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law, and it was therefore given for this purpose outside the scope of the law, and is ineffective.

            Indeed,

                        "where the subject of the litigation is not within the jurisdiction of a particular judicial entity, no agreement in the world has power to grant the entity jurisdiction that the statute has not given it; it is the statute that gives and it is the statute that takes away" (Sima Levy, p. 617).

            The Regional Rabbinical Court's decision of June 18, 2002 and the Great Rabbinical Court's decision of May 4, 2003, according to which the Rabbinical Courts have jurisdiction in principle to try the claim by virtue of the law, are inconsistent with its provisions.

The Rabbinical Court's Jurisdiction by Virtue of an Arbitration Arrangement

27.       It was further argued that clause 11 of the divorce agreement is an arbitration provision that vests the Rabbinical Court with power as an arbitrator to adjudicate the respondent's claim of a breach of the agreement's indemnification provision. Although not strictly necessary, we have considered the question in principle of whether a Rabbinical Court can be empowered to decide a dispute between litigants in arbitration, in a matter that is not within its subject matter jurisdiction according to the statute. We have answered that question in the negative and the answer is applicable to the case herein.

            In the instant case, the conclusion that the Rabbinical Court lacks jurisdiction to try the matter as an arbitrator is also reinforced by another reason. Studying the contents of clause 11 of the divorce agreement shows that it cannot be construed as an arbitration clause, equal to an "arbitration agreement" between the parties. It is well known that the power of an arbitrator to decide a dispute between parties derives from an arbitration agreement. Without an arbitration agreement, no arbitration arises. An "arbitration agreement", according to the Arbitration Law, is "a written agreement (between parties) to refer to arbitration a dispute that arises between them in the future, whether an arbitrator is named in the agreement or not" (section 1 of the Arbitration Law). The condition precedent for arbitration is therefore the existence of an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration. If parties have agreed to refer disputes between them to the decision of some entity but it is not clear that a decision in arbitration is involved, then there is no arbitration agreement (ALA 4928/92 Aziz Ezra Haj v. Tel Mond Local Council PD 47(5) 94; Ottolenghi, ibid, pp 9-41).

            In this case, the parties undertook to refer any disputes arising between them after the divorce solely to the Rabbinical Courts. No intention can be inferred from that agreement to refer such disputes to the Rabbinical Court qua arbitrator. In Jane Doe (para. 6 of Justice Barak's opinion), as in the case herein, the couple mistakenly believed that their consent to the Rabbinical Court's adjudicating disputes connected with the divorce agreement could vest it with power to decide as a state judicial instance, rather than as an arbitrator. Indeed, the wording and contents of clause 11 of the divorce agreement do not demonstrate the parties' intention to treat it as an arbitration clause purporting to empower the Rabbinical Court to act as arbitrator. Consequently, even if we assumed that the Rabbinical Court could be empowered to act as an arbitrator in matters in which it has no original or ancillary jurisdiction by virtue of the law, there is still no effective arbitration agreement, as pleaded.

A Note before Closing

28.       The issue of the Rabbinical Court's power to adjudicate by virtue of the parties' agreement, outside the scope of the law, has arisen in earlier contexts in the past, and although different opinions have been expressed in such respect by the courts, no binding decision has been necessary in connection therewith. This absence of a ruling has permitted the continuation of a procedural practice that is inconsistent with the organizational structure of the courts and the division of powers between them in accordance with state law. This custom has enabled a judicial practice that is inconsistent with the principle of the administration's legality and the legality of the judicial system. The time has come to move from the stage of expressing an opinion to the stage of making a ruling, which is necessary to ensure the proper function of the judicial system within the scope of its powers, and thereby to protect the basic foundation that defines the boundaries of its activity based on the principle of legality and the rule of law. This will not harm, in a any way, the need and ability of various social groups to entertain alternative resolution systems outside the state judicial instances, based on the principles of arbitration regulated by law or on the basis of other agreed and recognized rules of procedure. However, at the same time, it is necessary to safeguard, and protect against blurring the boundaries between the state judicial systems and alternative resolution systems that are built on the parties' agreement, in order to protect the proper operation of the different arms of the judicial system and the public's confidence in the way in which its powers are exercised and its judgments.

Conclusion

29.       By deciding the respondent's lawsuit against the petitioner for the enforcement of a contractual indemnification clause in the divorce agreement, the Rabbinical Courts exceeded the power vested in them by law. Consequently, the decisions of the Regional Rabbinical Court and the Great Rabbinical Court in the respondent's claim are void. The result is that the order nisi that has been awarded should be made absolute. The respondent shall bear the petitioner's professional fees in the sum of NIS 12,000.

 

Vice President (Ret.) M. Cheshin

 

            I concur.

 

Justice S. Joubran

            I concur.

Therefore, held as stated in the opinion of Justice Procaccia.

Awarded today, this eighth day of Nissan, 5766 (April 6, 2006).

 

___________________

___________________

___________________

Vice President (Ret.)

Justice

Justice

 

Ministry of Palestinian Prisoners v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3368/10
Date Decided: 
Sunday, April 6, 2014
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

 

The Petitions request shortening the periods of detention prescribed in the security legislation in the West Bank, including in the Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1651), 5770-2009 (hereinafter: the “Order”), such that they match the periods applicable to Israeli citizens in the West Bank and those of detentions prescribed in Israel.

 

The High Court of Justice (Justice E. Arbel, Justices Amit and Shoham concurring), issued a partial judgment as follows:

 

The High Court of Justice discussed the constitutional human right to liberty and its importance in a democratic system. It further discussed the right to due process before denying one’s liberty. The Court found it warranted that such person be able to respond and make arguments prior to restrictions on such a fundamental right. Additionally, the High Court of Justice discussed the public interests in exposing criminals and preventing crime, as well as thwarting security offenses. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance in the constant tension between security and protecting suspects’ rights that exists in the Israeli reality.

 

On the one hand, a proper legal procedure is an essential element in ensuring the proportionality and constitutionality of a detention for interrogation purposes. In principle, the suspect’s appearance before a judge should not be viewed as an obstacle but rather as a fundamental requirement for an effective and constitutional detention for interrogation purposes. This follows from the customary fundamental approach that judicial review is inherent to the detention process. Therefore it is necessary to adjust interrogation methods to interruptions that allow an effective and fair judicial procedure to take place. On the other hand, the security legislation was created in light of a complex security situation in a territory under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), where special security conditions dictate establishing arrangements that are different than those in the occupying state. This reality has, inter alia, resulted in the detention of Palestinian suspects prior to being brought before a judge, for periods of time that are longer than those of Israeli suspects.

 

During the course of the Petition’s proceedings, the Respondents took a far-reaching approach to shortening the periods of detention such that they would more closely match the detention periods in Israel. Such change would aim to reduce, as much as possible, the infringement of Palestinian detainees’ rights. Considering the distinctions inherent in the different conditions between Israel and the West Bank, and in light of the dramatic changes that were made, whose “on the ground” implementation must be examined over time, the High Court of Justice ruled that in terms of the maximum periods of pre-indictment detention of adults suspected of committing security offenses, and in the scope of offenses that are defined as security offenses, the Petitions were exhausted and therefore are to be dismissed. However, with respect to the periods of detention of minors, the periods of detention of adults suspected of other offenses, and the period of detention until the end of proceedings (of minors and adults, in all classifications of offenses) the High Court of Justice ordered the Respondents to file an update notice.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

HCJ 3368/10

HCJ 4057/10

 

Before:                                                The Honorable Justice E. Arbel                                                                                  The Honorable Justice I. Amit                                                                                    The Honorable Justice U. Shoham

 

The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10:   1.   The Ministry of Palestinian Prisoners

                                                      2.   Adv. Fahmi Shakirat

                                                      3.   Adv. Kamil Sabbagh

                                                      4.   Adv. Kareem Ajwa

 

The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10    The Association for Civil Rights et al.

 

v.

 

The Respondent in HCJ 3368/10: 1.   The Minister of Defense

 

The Respondent in HCJ 3368/10

and in HCJ 4057/10                      2.   GOC Central Command, Commander of IDF Forces in the Region

 

                                                                        Petition to Grant an Order Nisi

 

Date of Session:                                           14th of Sivan, 5773 (May 23, 2013)

 

On behalf of the Petitioners

in HCJ 3368/10:                            Adv. S. Ben Natan

 

On behalf of the Petitioners

in HCJ 4057/10:                            Adv. L. Margalit

 

On behalf of the Respondents:     Adv. A. Helman

 

P A R T I A L   J U D G M E N T

 

Justice E. Arbel:

 

The Petitions before us, the hearings of which were united, address the question why not shorten the periods of detention which are prescribed in the security legislation in the Judea and Samaria region, including in the Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1651), 5770-2009 (hereinafter: the "Security Provisions Order" or the "Order"), which came into effect on May 2, 2010. In the framework of the Petitions, this Court was requested to determine periods of detention which shall be shorter than those determined in the Security Provisions Order, as required under international law and in a manner that corresponds with the periods of detention that are customary in Israel.

 

 

Background

 

  1. Petitioner 1 in HCJ 3368/10 is the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, to which, under the security legislation, most of the detainees belong, and which attends to their welfare, their families, their legal representation and which engages lawyers who are members of the Israel and Palestinian Bar Associations. Petitioners 2-4 are lawyers who represent, on behalf of the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs, suspects who are detainees under the security legislation. The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 are the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, "Yesh Din" – Volunteers for Human Rights and the Public Committee against Torture in Israel.

 

  1. The Petitioners filed their Petitions in light of the legal reality that existed at the time the Petitions were filed, pursuant to which the law applicable to Israeli citizens in the Judea and Samaria region (hereinafter: the "Region"), is different than the law applicable to Palestinians in the Region. In the framework of the Petitions, the said Petitioners requested to shorten the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order such that they will be the equivalent to the periods applicable to Israeli citizens in the Region and will correspond to the periods of detention that are customary in Israel.

 

The Law that was in Effect at the Time the Petitions were Filed

 

  1. The period of the pre-indictment detention and the period of detention until the end of proceedings are grounded in Article C of Chapter C of the Security Provisions Order, which addresses the arrest and release of Palestinian detainees in the Region. Sections 31 and 32 of the Security Provisions Order prescribed the following with respect to detention prior to judicial review:

 

"31.   (a) A soldier may arrest, without an arrest warrant, any person violating the provisions of this order or if there is cause to suspect that he committed an offense under this order.

(b) A person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a) shall be transferred as soon as possible to a police station or place of detention as determined in this order.

(c)   An arrest warrant against a person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a) must be received within a reasonable time; if an arrest warrant is not given within 96 hours from the time of his arrest - he shall be released.

(d) The Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region may authorize any person to order the release of a person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a), provided that no arrest warrant pursuant to the provisions of this article was issued against such detainee.

 

32.     (a)   A police officer who has reasonable grounds to assume that a person violated the provisions of this order or who becomes aware that the investigation material that was gathered against the person who was arrested in accordance with sub-section 31(a) necessitates his continued detention, is authorized to issue a written arrest warrant for a period which shall not exceed eight days from the time of his arrest.

(b)   If an arrest warrant as noted was issued for a period shorter than eight days from the time of his arrest, a police officer may extend it in writing, from time to time, provided that the total periods of detention shall not exceed eight days from the time of his arrest."

 

With respect to the extension of the detention prior to the filing of an indictment, Sections 37 and 38 of the Security Provisions Order prescribe as follows:

 

"37.   A judge is authorized to grant an arrest warrant and to extend the duration of the detention, provided that the arrest warrant or the detention extension shall not be for a period exceeding thirty days at a time and that the total period of detention in accordance with this section shall not exceed ninety days.

 

38.     A Military Court of Appeals judge, may, at the request of the Region's legal counsel, order the extension of the detention of a person who was arrested under Section 37, or his renewed arrest, for a period which shall not exceed three months; if such an arrest warrant is granted for a period of less than three months, a Military Court of Appeals judge may extend it from time to time, provided that the total period of detention in accordance with this section shall not exceed three months."

 

With respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings, Section 44 of the Security Provisions Order provides as follows:

 

"44.   The matter of a defendant who after being indicted was held under detention for the same indictment for a cumulative period that amounted to two years and whose trial in the court of first instance did not end with a verdict, shall be brought before a judge of the Military Court of Appeals.

The judge will hear the defendant's matter and order his release, conditionally or unconditionally, unless the judge believed that the circumstances of the matter, including the severity of the offense attributed to the defendant and his level of dangerousness, the fear of him fleeing justice and the reasons for the prolonging of proceedings, do not justify his release.

(b)   If the judge decides that the circumstances of the matter do not justify the defendant's release, the judge may instruct the defendant's continued detention for a period which shall not exceed six months, and may reorder this from time to time."

 

In accordance with that which is stated above, at the time the Petitions were filed with this Court, a suspect who was arrested under the Security Provisions Order could have been held under detention up to eight days without judicial review, up to 90 days before the filing of an indictment, and with court approval – up to six months. Additionally, a defendant could have, before his trial was completed, been held under open ended detention, subject to periodic extensions every six month, after two years from the commencement of his detention.

 

4.As opposed to the detention periods applicable to Palestinians in the Region, which are listed in the Security Provision Order, Israeli law prescribes detention for citizens of up to 24 hours (which can be extended up to 48 hours) until being brought before judicial review, detention of up to 30 days, which can be extended up to 75 days with the Attorney General's approval, before filing of an indictment, and detention of nine months, which can be periodically extended every three months, until the end of proceedings (Sections 17, 29, 30, 59, 60, 61 and 62 of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Arrests) Law, 5756-1996). Additionally, certain exceptions are prescribed in the Israeli law with respect to suspects who are arrested for security offenses and with respect to minors who have been arrested (Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 and the Youth (Adjudication, Punishment and Methods of Treatment) Law 5731-1971).

 

The Claims of the Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10

 

5.The Petitioners claim, through Adv. Smadar Ben Natan, that the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order that applies to the Palestinians in the Region are significantly longer than the standards prescribed for such matters both in international law and in the corresponding periods in Israel. They claim that these periods infringe the right to due process and the protection against arbitrary infringement of liberty which are granted to the residents of the Region, both by virtue of international law and by virtue of the fundamental principles of Israeli law. According to the Petitioners, although at hand are two different regions that are subject to different legal regimes, however both are under the control of the State of Israel.

 

6.The Petitioners further claim that the far-reaching changes that have occurred in Israeli law have hardly been reflected in the military legislation in the Region. They claim that experience shows that the extended periods of detention impact the manner in which arrest and interrogation procedures are conducted, such that they excessively infringe detainees' rights: de facto, the detention of detainees who are arrested in an initial arrest, is not requested to be extended before the lapse of the eight days allowed by the Security Provisions Order; many of them are not interrogated at all during entire days of this detention period and during subsequent detention periods; in many cases, detainees are released after four, five or even eight days without procedures being taken with respect thereto and without a cause of arrest against them being examined by a judge. According to the Petitioners, such an extended period of detention creates fertile ground for inappropriate treatment, for pressure and violence in the interrogation, such as the arrest of a relative without any real cause as a means of pressure.

 

7.The Petitioners add that the proceedings at the Military Courts after the filing of an indictment, are conducted ponderously: Most of the cases end with plea bargains since defendants know that if they chose to conduct a trial, they will stay in detention for a long and unlimited period of time; in the few cases that do go to trial, the periods of time between hearings are extended, the number of judges is small in relation to the volume of the cases, and this reality is created and encouraged by the unlimited detention until the end of proceedings.

 

8.The Petitioners further state that until the implementation of the Disengagement Plan, detainees from the Gaza Strip were subject to the provisions of the Security Provisions Order and that since the Disengagement detainees from the Gaza Strip are brought for detention extensions before the Israeli Courts, subject to Israeli law. According to them, the Israeli law also applies to the population of the settlers. According to the Petitioners, this reality constitutes a violation of equality among people – a legal apartheid. The Petitioners emphasize that not all of the offenses addressed in the Military Courts are security offenses, but the laws of detention apply to all of the detainees.

 

9.According to the Petitioners, the judicial review in the detention proceedings is an integral part of the suspect's right to due process. The very lengthy periods of detention are not justified due to security needs or due to circumstances that are unique to the Region. Therefore, they claim, there is a duty to act in accordance with similar standards in protecting human rights in the procedural criminal proceeding and they request to cancel Sections 31A, 32 and 44 of the Security Provisions Order, to shorten the periods of detention and to determine periods of detention that correspond to those that are customary in Israel.

 

The Claims of the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10

 

10.These Petitioners, through Adv. Lila Margalit, also requested to amend the Security Provisions Order and they raise similar claims against the periods of detention prescribed in the Order. They claim that the periods of detention severely and gravely infringe the fundamental rights of the Palestinian residents of the Region, their right to liberty and their right to be free of arbitrary arrest, as well as their right to due process, dignity and equality, to appropriate means of supervision in order to ensure fair interrogation and in order to prevent torture. These detainees are subject, so they argue, to illegitimate methods of interrogation and to improper treatment on behalf of the interrogation authorities. These infringements derive, according to the Petitioners, both from the fact that their treatment is arbitrarily different than the treatment of Israelis living in the Region and from the duration of the periods of detention which in and of themselves are exaggerated. According to the Petitioners, these infringements are contrary to the provisions of the customary and contractual international law applicable in the Region and to the principles of Israeli public law which apply to Israeli authorities. They argue that these infringements do not serve an appropriate purpose, are not proportionate and are not reasonable. According to the Petitioners' opinion, it is hard to describe a more severe and grave infringement of human rights than the illegitimate situation in which two "categories" of people who are distinguished from each other based on their national origin, are living beside each other. Even regardless of the discrimination allegation, the Petitioners claim that the periods of detention in the Security Provisions Order are contrary to the principles of international law which apply to the Region and to the principles of public law that apply to any action of Israeli authorities. According to them, immediate and frequent judicial review of the detention of a suspect is a necessary condition of its reasonableness and proportionality; an extended detention without judicial review is not proportionate.

 

11.The Petitioners add that the military prosecution's claim that the judicial review of the detention is to be delayed in order to enable the "formulation of a reasonable suspicion", attests that the Order is used for making arbitrary arrests, without there being a reasonable suspicion against the detainee. Therefore, the Petitioners claim that the initial detention period of Palestinian detainees is meant to enable arresting people without there being a reasonable suspicion against them; to protect the interrogation authorities from the court's "intervention", to grant the interrogators "minimal time" to exhaust the interrogation, to avoid the "disturbance" thereof that is involved in presenting the suspect before the judge, and to avoid the logistical difficulties involved in applying immediate judicial review.

 

12.According to the Petitioners, the lack of distinction between minors and adults in the security legislation regarding the periods of detention and the lack of sufficient consideration of the principle of the child's best interest during arrests of minors, result in a disproportionate infringement of children's rights which are grounded in international law and which are recognized by Israeli Law. The basic premises that Palestinian minors are worthy of less protection than Israeli minors also living in the Region, is, in their opinion, illegitimate.

 

13.The Petitioners add that the judicial review of the detention is meant to ensure the justification, from the outset, of the continued denial of a person's liberty and that there is no place to delay it in order to enable the authorities to progress with their interrogation. Additionally, judicial review also has a role in supervising the manner the interrogation is conducted and serves as an important guarantee against the application of illegitimate means of pressure during interrogation and against the use of the detention itself to make the suspect feel completely disconnected from the outside world and subject to the mercy of his interrogators, while his dignity and his right to be silent are being infringed. According to the Petitioners, interrogation that is far from the court's watchful eye, could lead to the use of illegitimate means of interrogation which violate the detainee's dignity and even the integrity of his body, and therefore, in their opinion, constitutes a breach of the State's duty to prevent torture and inhumane treatment of detainees. The lack of judicial supervision is even more severely significant in cases in which the Palestinian detainee is prohibited from meeting with a lawyer, contrary to international law. According to the Petitioners, the concern regarding the use of illegitimate means of interrogation against Palestinians is not a  mere concern, and they refer to reports that were published by human rights organizations in 2007. According to them, purely logistic considerations or administrative difficulties cannot justify the infringement of a human's right to liberty, equality and dignity.

 

The Respondents' Response

 

14.The Respondents' response was presented by Adv. Aner Helman. Even since the letters of response to the Petitioners' approaches, prior to the filing of the Petition, the Respondents stated that the issue of shortening the periods of detention in the Region is being examined in the framework of in-depth staff work that has commenced long ago. It was further written that the security legislation is based on security and public order considerations and this is also true with respect the laws of detention, and that the differences between the law customary in the Region and the law customary in the State of Israel in this context derive from relevant security considerations.

 

15.In the response which was filed on the Respondents' behalf to this Court on January 9, 2010, the Respondents reiterated their claim that it is not for no reason that the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order are different than those prescribed in Israeli law. According to the Respondents, the nature of an area that is held under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), even if long-term occupation, necessitates that the special security conditions prevailing therein dictate that different arrangements be prescribed than those customary in the occupying state.

 

16.For example, due to the security situation, the ability to move in the Region is limited, and at times, in light of security conditions which delay or prevent reaching the location, it is not possible to perform interrogations expeditiously, or even at all, in the area; some of the areas of the Region are under Palestinian control and it is not possible or very difficult to reach witnesses and suspects living there; in many cases, suspects who need to be interrogated find shelter in areas that are under Palestinian control making their interrogations and the interrogations of their accomplices who were arrested by the security forces, difficult; in most of the cases, the potential witnesses refuse to cooperate with the security forces, making interrogations difficult; in security interrogations the persons being interrogated acted out of nationalist and ideological motivation, and their interrogation is very difficult. Naturally, there is a minimal period of time that is required until their interrogations will produce initial evidence to support the intelligence information that has been received. At times, a certain interval is required between the time information is received and the time it can be used against the party being interrogated, since using intelligence information very soon after its receipt could "burn" the source of information and at times could even risk his life; in a large share of the security interrogations it is not possible to determine the location and time of the arrest in advance, resulting in the delay of the initial interrogation and it being more difficult; all of the detainees who are suspected of committing severe security offenses are transferred to one of four interrogation facilities which are located in Israel for their interrogation. At times, such transfer, in and of itself, requires not insignificant amounts of time. It is also necessary to exhaust the initial interrogation of the person being interrogated before bringing him before a judge, so as to avoid the possibility of him escaping to the Region; at times it is necessary to arrest many hundreds of people, like for example during the period of the "Defensive Shield" operation in 2002, and it is not possible to prepare to bring all of them before a judge during a short period of time.

 

17.The Respondents argue that these grounds require determining that it is appropriate to allow detaining a suspect for a reasonable period of time that is required in order to formulate initial evidentiary material prior to bringing him before a judge. The Respondents further state that international law does not limit the number of days that a person may be detained without judicial involvement, but rather expresses a principle pursuant to which the decision regarding the detention should be brought to a judge without delay.

 

18.Having said that, the Respondents notified that in recent years staff work has been conducted in the IDF and further on in the Ministry of Justice, by the Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Matters), together with the Deputy Attorney General (Special Assignments) and the Deputy Attorney General (Consultation), which is meant to examine the possibility of shortening the maximum periods of detention in the Region. The Respondents updated that in the framework of the staff work, a decision was reached that, considering the current security situation, at this time, it is possible to significantly shorten the maximum period of detention until bringing a detainee before a judge, however it is not appropriate to make the arrangement which shall be applicable in the Region in this matter the same as the arrangement which is applicable in Israel. The Respondents specified the manner of shortening the periods of detention:

 

19.With respect to offenses that are not security offenses, it was decided that, as a rule, the authority of an initial detention until presentation before a judge shall be for 48 hours; additionally, it will be possible to delay the presentation of the detainee before a judge for an additional 48 hours, as per the decision of an administrative authority, if there is a special cause, such as, for example, urgent acts of interrogation. It was further decided that the arrangement shall be re-examined upon the lapse of two years from the effective date of the amendment of the Order. As for detainees of security offenses, it was decided that the rule that shall be prescribed is that the initial period of detention until presentation before a judge shall be 96 hours at most, with an administrative party being able to extend such period by 48 additional hours, in cases in which the Head of the Interrogation Department at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation in order to bring a detainee before a judge could result in substantially prejudicing the interrogation. It was also decided that in very special circumstances it will be possible for an administrative party to extend the period of detention until being brought before a judge by 48 additional hours, beyond the above said 11(sic.) hours (six days), in cases in which the head of the Interrogation Division at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation in order to bring a detainee before a judge could result in harming the performance of an essential act of interrogation that is meant to prevent harm in human lives. Considering the concern that was raised by security entities regarding the operational implications of these modifications, it was determined that this arrangement would be examined upon the lapse of two years from the date the amendment to the Order became effective.

 

20.It was further decided that the extension of an initial detention by a judge will not exceed 20 days and that it will be possible to re-extend the detention for additional periods which shall not exceed 15 additional days each. The extension of detention prior to the filing of an indictment which exceed 60 days shall be subject to the approval of a senior legal authority in the Region.

 

21.The Respondents added that in the framework of the staff work it was decided to add a provision to the Order pursuant to which if a person was arrested and his interrogation ended he shall be released from detention, however, if the prosecutor declared that they are about to file an indictment against him and the court was convinced that there is prima facie cause to request his detention until the end of proceedings, the judge may extend the detention on this  ground for a period which shall not exceed eight days. It was also decided that at the initial stage the period of detention until the beginning of trial shall be 60 days, and that the possibility of shortening this period to 30 days shall be examined upon the lapse of two years.

 

22.The Respondents further updated that it was decided to amend Section 44 of the Security Provisions Order so that with respect to offenses that are not security offenses, the period stated for holding the first hearing before a judge in the matter of a detainee who is under detention until the end of proceedings shall be one year from the date the indictment was filed. With respect to security offenses, the period currently stated in the Order – two years – shall remain in effect, and this matter shall also be examined upon the lapse of two years from the time the arrangement shall become effective. The Respondents estimated that the required adjustments to the modifications shall last approximately six to nine months and that the Order shall be amended accordingly, immediately thereafter.

 

23.The Respondents requested to dismiss in limine the relief requested in HCJ 4057/10 to make the periods of detention of minors in the Region the same as the periods of detention of minors in Israel, and claimed that the Petitioners did not exhaust the proceedings in this matter. According to them, this matter should not be mixed with the matter of the detention of adults in the Region. According to the Respondents this is a "premature petition" since it was already decided to conduct staff work on this matter as well.

 

Hearing of the Petititons and Update Notice

 

24.On January 12, 2011, a hearing took place in this Court before President D. Beinisch and Justices N. Hendel and I. Amit. At the end of the hearing it was decided that within five months the Respondents would file an update notice together with a draft of the Order which shall be issued in accordance with the principles that were formulated. The Bench of Judges even instructed the Respondents to consider its remarks when drafting the Order, especially with respect to the duration of the period of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge and with respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings after an indictment has been filed.

 

25.On June 1, 2011, the Respondents filed an update notice, and according thereto, in an additional meeting that was held following the court hearing, it was decided to shorten the period until a detainee, who is detained until the end of proceedings for security offense, is brought before a judge, from two years to 18 months. It was further decided that it is vital that the manner of the actual implementation of the arrangement which the staff work decided upon with respect to the maximum period of detention until bringing a suspect before a judge, be examined for a period of approximately two years, before an additional re-examination of the matter. In the framework of this notice, the Respondents added that it is essential, prior to actually shortening the detention periods in the Region, to examine the developments that were scheduled to occur in the Region in September 2011 onwards, in light of the Palestinian Authority's notice that it intends to approach the United Nations General Assembly this month with a request to recognize the "State of Palestine". The Respondents updated that the staff work has not yet been completed and that they expect the Order to be amended during the month of January, 2012.

 

26.Both the Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 and the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 responded to that stated in the update notice. According to them, the shortening of the detention period that the Respondents declared is insignificant and cannot cure the severe defects and infringement of rights that are embodied in the security legislation in the Region. According to the Petitioners, the changes that were made shall not have any practical impact on the arrest procedures of Palestinians who are residents of the Region and will not lead to a significant tightening of the judicial supervision of the periods of detention and to an improvement in the infringement of the right to liberty, of due process and of the presumption of innocence. The Petitioners reiterated their claim that judicial review is an integral part of the arrest process and that there is no justification to delay the judicial review for such an extended period of time. They argued that the initial detention period and the detention until the end of proceedings period constitute an arbitrary infringement of the right to liberty and therefore they insist on their petitions to issue an order nisi in the Petitions and to instruct the Military Commander in the Region to determine periods of detention that correspond with international standards and with those that are customary in Israel. The Petitioners further claimed that there is no reason not to amend the Order due to uncertain future developments.

 

27.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 added that the list of security offenses that is included in the Order spans over dozens of sections and includes offenses such as conducting a procession or an unlicensed meeting, waving a flag without a permit, printing "material which has political significance" without a license from the Military Commander, and the like. The list also includes many "public order" offenses such as throwing objects, disturbing a soldier, breaching curfew or a closed military zone order and the like, thus making the arrangement that relates to offenses that are not security offenses predominantly theoretical. In their opinion, the appropriate criterion for determining the periods of detention is the timeframe applicable to Israelis who also live in the Region. The Petitioners also drew attention to the inconsistencies between the Respondents' notice and the draft of the Order. According to them, the amendment of the Order should not be avoided due to a concern regarding unusual events.

 

Additional Update Notices

 

28.On November 22, 2011, the Respondents filed an additional update notice,  according to which, it was told in meetings that were held at the Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Matters), that the IDF has completed the staff work examining adding the necessary staff positions at the military courts and at the Judea and Samaria Region Prosecution in order to shorten the detention period in the Region and that a decision was even already reached to add the new necessary staff positions, subject to the amendment to the Order becoming effective and to the time required for the procedure of selecting and appointing new judges to the court. It was also clarified that due to a dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Security regarding the source of the budget, there is still no budgetary solution for the Police and Prison Service's needs for implementing the staff work and that a few additional months shall be required after such a solution is found in order to recruit and train personnel and purchase and receive additional vehicles. On December 22, 2011, the Respondents filed an additional update notice informing that the dispute regarding the budget source was still unresolved, and this is what they informed on January 16, 2012, as well.

 

29.On February 6, 2012, the Respondents filed an additional update notice that the budget dispute regarding financing the detention periods in the Region was resolved. The Respondents further updated that on December 2, 2012 (sic.), the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed the Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 16) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1685) 5772-2012 (hereinafter: the "Amending Order"), which shortened the period of detention in the Region in accordance with the conclusions of the staff work that had been done, and prescribed that its provisions shall become effective gradually, such that the last changes shall become effective on August 1, 2012.

 

The Petitioners' Response

 

30.The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 welcomed the amendments made to the Amending Order. However they claimed that a review of the language of the Amending Order reveals that there are significant differences between the changes declared in the Respondents' response and the actual language of the Amending Order. For example, the Petitioners noted that a security offenses detainee can be held under detention for two periods of 96 hours, i.e. eight days, and only be brought before a judge upon the completion thereof, and the same is true in the case of a non-security offenses detainee. The Petitioners claimed that the shortening of the detention period that was applied is insignificant and does not cure the severe infringement of the detainees' rights under the security legislation in the Region. They claimed that in the case of security offenses, which are the majority of the offenses that are addressed in the Region, the Amending Order does not, in effect, shorten the period of detention before initial judicial review. The Petitioners added that the Amending Order shortens the period of detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses in an insignificant manner from two years to a year and a half, which can be extended indefinitely, and that no change was made with respect to minors and that there is no distinction between a minor and an adult with respect to the detention laws. According to the Petitioners, these changes shall hardly have any practical impact on the procedures of detaining the Region's residents and will not lead to a significant tightening of the judicial supervision of the periods of detention and to an improvement with respect to the infringement of the right to liberty, the right to due process and the presumption of innocence. The Petitioners mentioned with respect to the initial detention period, that judicial review is an integral part of the arrest process and that this is the stage where it is necessary to present the court with only reasonable suspicion which is meant to exist upon the actual arrest. Therefore, in their opinion, there is no justification for delaying the judicial review for such a long period.  Interrogation difficulties should be presented before the judge to justify the extension of the detention, including in security offenses.

 

31.The Petitioners further claimed that the European Court of Human Rights ruled that an initial detention period of four days without judicial review breaches the right to be free of arbitrary detention. Therefore they are of the opinion that a period of detention of four to eight days before judicial review constitutes an arbitrary infringement of the right to liberty in violation of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and is illegal. According to them, a period of detention of a year and a half infringes the defendant's presumption of innocence and constitutes an arbitrary infringement of his right to liberty, since it is based only on prima facie evidence and amounts to an infringement of his right to a fair trial, as it constitutes a negative incentive to conduct trials and examine the charge.

 

32.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/12 also responded to the Respondents' update notice. They also welcomed the Respondents' notice regarding the amendments made to the Amending Order but claimed that they cannot cure the flaw of illegality embedded therein, since even after the amendment, the Palestinian residents of the Region will continue to be subject to exaggerated and discriminating periods of detention which severely infringe their rights. The Petitioners emphasized again that immediate and frequent judicial review of arrest for interrogation purposes is a necessary condition for the reasonableness, proportionality and legality of the detention and that in the absence thereof, it is not possible to prevent arbitrary detention, it is not possible to protect the rights of the suspect and it is not possible to ensure a fair criminal procedure. The Petitioners reiterated their argument that an arrest that is not arbitrary is meant, to begin with, to be based on a reasonable suspicion and that the judicial review constitutes a part of the formulation of the legality thereof. According to them, the special difficulties that characterize the interrogations in the Territories are not at all relevant to examining the legality of the arrest to begin with, and therefore should have no implication on the amount of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge. According to the Petitioners, the Respondents did not provide grounds which could justify the discriminating policy also with respect to the other periods of detention. The Petitioners stated that the Respondents did not refer to minors in their notice and according to them, the list of security offenses is still "all inclusive", and a situation in which an Israeli detainee who lives in the Region and is suspected of a security offense must be brought before a judge within 24 hours while a Palestinian must be brought before a judge only after an a-priori period of four days, cannot be justified.

 

In light of President D. Beinisch's retirement, President A. Grunis appointed me to hear the Petition on March 14, 2012.

 

Additional Hearing of the Petition

 

33.On April 23, 2012, we held an additional hearing of the Petition, in which the Petitioners presented their claims regarding four matters: the time until bringing a detainee before a judge, the detention of minors, the definition of security offenses pursuant to the Order, and the period of the extension of a detention until the end of proceedings. At the beginning of the hearing, the attorney for the Respondents filed the Amending Order with respect to Section 31 of the Order. According to the amendment, a detention prior to being brought before a judge in special circumstances was limited to a period which shall not exceed 96 hours from the time the suspect was arrested, and can, in special circumstances, specified in the Order, be repeatedly extended by two additional days at a time, in accordance with approval by very senior echelons.

 

34.With regard to minors, it was discovered in the hearing that a new Security Provisions Order was meant to come into effect in August, 2012, and the age of minors in the Region was also recently changed to 18 years of age (instead of the previous 16 years). The Respondents requested to monitor the change for one year from the time it became effective, to monitor the wardens' training procedures, and to consider the state of affairs following the lapse of such period. As such, we ruled that the Respondents shall file update notices with respect to the results of the change by no later than December 1, 2012.

 

35.As for the matter of the offenses defined as security offenses, we ruled in a decision at the end of the hearing that the matter was not raised in the Petitions and an order nisi was not requested with respect thereto, other than in the framework of the responses to the Respondents' update notices. Having said that, we found it appropriate that the Respondents consider our remarks, especially the question whether it is appropriate to relate to the security offenses as one assemblage rather than excluding some of them from the definition of security offenses that appear in the Third Addendum of the Security Provisions Order.

 

36.With respect to the detention until the end of proceedings, the Respondents' attorney notified that it was decided to shorten the period of detention to 18 months in security offenses. Since we were of the opinion that this is still a lengthy period and it is appropriate that the matter be re-examined, we instructed that this be addressed in the framework of the update notice that was to be filed. We also ruled that after filing the update notice, the Petitioners would be able to respond thereto, and that we would thereafter decide regarding the further treatment of the Petitions.

 

Additional Update Notice

37.On December 16, 2012, the Respondents filed an additional update notice. First of all, the Respondents informed that the review of the results of the shortening of the periods of detention in the Region indicated that by dedicating effort the Respondents have managed to implement the shortened periods of detention as prescribed in the Amending Order. The Respondents added that following the remarks of this Court in the hearing and the decision it issued at the end of the hearing, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region amended the Security Provisions Order regarding the detention of minors, the definition of the security offenses and the period of extension of detention until the end of proceedings:

 

38.With respect to the detention of minors, the Respondents updated that it was decided to act to amend the security legislation and to prescribe special periods of detention until being brought before a judge and until the end of proceedings, for minors in the Region, which as a rule, shall be shorter than the corresponding periods of detention for adults. In this context, the Respondents informed that on November 28, 2012, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed two new amendments to the Security Provisions Order: Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 25) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1711), 5772-2012 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1711"). The Respondents noted that according to Order no. 1711, as from April 2, 2013, the maximum period of detention of a "youth", as defined in the Security Provisions Order, i.e. a person who is at least 12 years but not yet 14 years old, until being brought before a judge shall be 24 hours from the time of arrest, with a possibility of an additional 24 hours extension due to an urgent act of interrogation. It was decided that this period shall apply to the detention of a "youth" for both security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses. Additionally, the Respondents noted that beginning from such time, the maximum period of detention of a "young adult", as defined in the Security Provisions Order, i.e. a person who is at least 14 years old but not yet 16 years old, until being brought before a judge shall be 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with a possibility of an additional 48 hours extension due to an urgent act of interrogation. It was decided that this maximum period of detention shall apply to the detention of a "young adult" for both security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses. The Respondents further noted that such maximum period of detention applies also to minors over the age of 16 and to adults in the Region who are detained for offenses that are not security offenses.

 

39.According to the Respondents this is a very significant shortening of the maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge for all suspects aged 12-14 and for suspects of security offenses aged 14-16, compared to the periods of detention until being brought before a judge for adult suspects for the said offenses, which were also significantly shortened in the framework of the Amending Order. The Respondents added that the maximum periods of detention until being brought before a judge which apply to adults shall continue to apply with respect to minors over the age of 14 for offenses which are not security offenses, and with respect to minors over the age of 16 for security offenses, as stated in the Amending Order.

 

40.With respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings for minors in the Region, the Respondents further stated that Order no. 1711 prescribes that the period of detention until the end of proceedings for a minor, i.e. any defendant who is less than 18 years old, shall be only one year. Additionally, the detention of minors until the end of proceedings can be extended by a Military Court of Appeals judge, upon the lapse of a year of detention, for a period which shall not exceed three months, which the judge may re-order. It was noted that such provision applies with respect to minors who are accused of security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses.

 

41.As for the definition of security offenses, the Respondents updated that in the framework of the Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 26) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1712), 5772-2012 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1712"), approximately a third of the security offenses that were previously listed were removed from the Third Addendum of the Security Provisions Order which defines "Security Offenses", and one offense (offense under Section 222 of the Security Provisions Order) was added, and therefore, Order no. 1712 actually resulted in the significant shortening of the maximum periods of detention of those who are suspected and accused of the many offenses that were removed from the Third Addendum. The Respondents noted that there was a significant change even in the matter of adults since approximately a third of the offenses that were previously defined as "security offenses" are no longer defined as such, and therefore the period of detention until the end of proceedings for anyone suspected of committing them shall be 12 months rather than 18 months. The Respondents claim that the implementation of such significant changes in the various periods of detention necessitates granting an opportunity, prior to considering additional changes, to examine the implications thereof on the law enforcement system in the Region and on its ability to function. Therefore, it was decided that at this time it is inappropriate to change the periods of detention until the end of proceedings for adults in the Region. The Respondents were of the opinion that in doing so, a worthy balance was struck between all of the relevant considerations, while granting obvious preference to the rights of minor defendants over those of the adults.

 

The Petitioners' Responses

 

42.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 responded to the Update Notice. They welcomed the significant shortening of the period of detention applying to minors aged 12-14 and the additional amendments of which the Respondents informed. However, in their opinion, the Petition has not yet been exhausted since even after the amendments, the periods of detention applicable to Palestinians in the Territories, minors and adults alike, remain exaggerated, discriminating and contrary to the law. According to them, to this day, the Respondents have still not raised any legitimate reason which could justify the continued severe discrimination in this matter between Palestinians and Israelis in the Region. According to the Petitioners, even after the amendments to the Order, it is possible to hold a suspect up to eight days without any judicial review, if he is suspected of an offense which is classified as a security offense, including offenses such as throwing rocks (including towards property) and organizing a protest without a license. Such an extended period of detention also applies to minors who are 16 years old or older. In offenses that are not security offenses, the bringing of a suspect before a judge can be delayed up to 96 hours, even when at hand is a minor who is 14 or 15 years old. The Petitioners mentioned that an arrest is meant to be based, to begin with, on a reasonable suspicion, and that the judicial review constitutes part of the formulation of the legality of the initial detention regardless of the severity of the offense. According to them, the difficulties that characterize the interrogations in the Territories are not relevant to the examination of the legality of the arrest to begin with, and therefore should have no implication on the amount of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge.

 

43.As for minors, the Petitioners claimed that even after the amendment of the Order it will still be possible to hold a minor aged 12 or 13 for an entire day until bringing him before a judge, or for two days if there is a need to perform an urgent act of interrogation, and a minor 14-15 years old can even be held under detention up to 96 hours for ordinary offenses, prior to being brought before a judge. This, as opposed to an Israeli 12 or 13 year old minor from the Region who must be brought before a judge within 12 hours or 24 hours in certain cases. The Petitioners added that even after the amendment, the prohibition against holding Israeli minors who live in the Region under detention until the end of proceedings, is not applied to minors under the age of 14. Additionally, a longer period of detention until the end of proceedings shall continue to apply to minors, a year as opposed to six months, and this period can be extended for longer periods of time, three months, compared to 45 days at a time under Israeli law. The Petitioners complained that the extension of a detention of a Palestinian suspect under the age of 14 or until his release without indictment, was not shortened.

 

44.The Petitioners added that despite the removal of approximately a third of the security offenses from the Third Addendum of the Order, it still includes a wide variety of offenses that do not justify lengthy periods of detention, such as, for example, the throwing of objects, including throwing rocks towards property, organizing protest without a license and the breach of a closed military zone order. According to them, leaving these offenses in the list was meant to serve considerations that are totally irrelevant to the interrogation needs, such as deterrence considerations. At the very least, leaving them in the list does not comply with the proportionality criterion. According to the Petitioners, there is no justification to hold Palestinian detainees who are suspected of security offenses up to 96 hours without judicial review, when according to the Amending Order judicial review can be delayed for up to six or eight days at terms that are much more lenient than those that are required for the detention of Israelis living in the Region and who are suspected of severe security offense. In their opinion, there is also no justification to set a longer period of time for the period of detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses. Determining a period of detention until the end of proceedings that is too long will result, in the Petitioners' opinion, in disproportionate infringement of the defendant's right to liberty and prejudices the fairness of the criminal process, particularly when the extended period is automatically pre-determined and does not require special approval. In their opinion, the expectation of lengthy detention could result in defendants admitting to that which is attributed to them only to avoid an extended stay in jail. According to them, the lack of stringent limits on the length of a trial allows a delay of justice which could even interfere with the discovery of the truth. The Petitioners stated that the matter of the definition of the security offenses did not appear in the Petition because the special periods of detention for security offenses were first prescribed by the Respondents in their response to the Petition. Therefore, the legality and the proportionality of the duration of the periods of detention for security offenses as well as for other offenses, constitute, so they argue, an integral part of the reliefs that were requested in the Petition to begin with.

 

45.The Petitioners reiterated their objections regarding the period of detention until the end of proceedings that applies to adults in security offenses, which was not shortened in the Amending Order, as well as with respect to holding a suspect up to eight days until being brought before a judge if detained in a "combat arrest", as stated in Section 33 of the Security Provisions Order. The Petitioners emphasized their claim that the proper criterion to examine the reasonableness and proportionality of the periods of detention that apply to the Palestinian residents of the Territories is the timeframe that applies to Israelis also living in the Region.

 

46.The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 notified that they join that which was stated in the response of the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10. According to them, the differences between the legislation in the Region and the legislation in Israel will remain unfathomable even after the changes that were made to the Order, which in and of themselves are welcome.

 

An Additional Hearing of the Petition

 

47.In a hearing we held on May 23, 2013, the parties reiterated their main arguments: The Petitioners claimed that the amendments made in the Amending Order are not sufficient and that they maintain their petitions. The attorney representing the State requested to separate the matter of the detention of minors from the Petitions being addressed and requested to enable the system to examine the implementation of the amendments to the Order over a reasonable period of time in order to ensure that "things work" and adopt educated decisions. The attorney representing the State stated that upon the lapse of the period, the periods of detention will be re-examined, as the system does not rest on its laurels.

 

48.On October 29, 2013, the Respondents filed an additional update notice. The Respondents informed that on September 30, 2013, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 35) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1727) (hereinafter: "Order no. 1727"), which came into effect on the date of the signing thereof. According to Order no. 1727, the provisions of Article G, Chapter E of the Security Provisions Order, including, the age of minors in the Region, shall from now on be "permanent provisions". The Respondents also updated that since the last hearing of the Petitions, and further to additional staff work, on September 1, 2013, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 34) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1726), 5773-2013 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1726"), which came into effect on October 6, 2013. Order no. 1726 introduced an additional significant shortening of the periods of judicial detention of minors for interrogation purposes, resulting in a Military Court judge being able to order the arrest of a minor for interrogation purposes for a period of 15 days and extend the detention for additional periods which shall not exceed 10 days each, provided that the total periods of consecutive detention with respect to the same event shall not exceed 40 days. A Military Court of Appeals judge may, at the request of the Military Advocate General, extend the detention beyond the first 40 days, for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

49.Additionally, Order no. 1726 prescribed periods of judicial detention for interrogation purposes for adults that are similar to those applicable in Israel, such that a Military Court judge may order the arrest of an adult suspect for interrogation purposes for a period of 20 days and extend the period for additional periods which shall not exceed 15 days each, provided that the total periods of consecutive detention with respect to the same event shall not exceed 75 days. A Military Court of Appeals judge may, at the request of the Military Advocate General, extend the detention beyond the first 75 days, for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

50.According to the Respondents, it is evident that following the coming into force of Order no. 1726, the maximum judicial detention periods of adults for interrogation purposes in the Region are now identical to the periods of detention for interrogation purposes of adults in Israel, mutatis mutandis, except for two matters: one, the maximum period of the first judicial detention order (20 days in the Region compared to 15 in Israel), and two, the requirement to receive the approval of the Attorney General for the request to extend the detention for interrogation purposes beyond 30 days in Israel, compared to the approval of the Military Advocate General, which is only required beyond 75 days in the Region. Considering the previous update notices and this present one, the Respondents are of the opinion that the Petitions have exhausted themselves and should be dismissed.

 

51.On December 30, 2013, the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 filed a response to the update notice. According to them, the notice reflects the flawed approach which is guiding the Respondents, who on the one hand prescribed discriminating and exaggerated periods of detention for Palestinians and on the other hand, ostensibly adopted the principle of equality. The Petitioners welcome the Respondents' decision to distinguish between minors and adults with respect to the periods of judicial detention for interrogation purposes and to somewhat shorten the periods applicable to Palestinian minors, however object to the arbitrary determination of longer periods of detention for Palestinian minors as opposed to the periods of detention prescribed for Israeli minors living in the Region and compare them. The Petitioners add that the differences between to the periods of judicial detention for adults are not solely "technical", since while as a rule an Israeli adult suspect in the Region cannot be detained for more than 30 days with respect to the same event, a Palestinian adult suspect can be detained for 75 days and his detention can even be extended without adopting the basic rule pursuant to which upon the lapse of 75 days, "he shall be released from detention, with or without bail". According to the Petitioners, the Respondents have not yet, to this day, provided any legal reasons for the discriminating periods of detention which are imposed upon the Palestinians.

 

Discussion and Ruling

 

52.A person's right to liberty is a constitutional right that is grounded in Section 5 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, where it is prescribed that: "There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, detention, or any other way." The importance and centrality of the right to liberty in a democratic regime also stems from the implications of denying the liberty for the injured person and for the damage that could be caused thereto as a result thereof. The denial of liberty is not expressed only in a person merely being subject to the custody of the State, but also is felt each and every day, during the period when a person is subject to the rules of conduct and discipline that are customary in the place of custody and which also limit his liberty (see HCJ 2605/05 The Law and Business Academic Center v. The Minister of Finance, paragraph 25 of President D. Beinisch's decision (November 19, 2009)). The right to due process prior to a person's liberty being denied derives from the right to liberty, and it is even warranted that he will be given the opportunity to respond and voice his arguments prior to this fundamental right being denied (LCrimA 837/12 The State of Israel v. Gusakov, paragraph 29 (November 20, 2012)). On the other hand, it is in the public interest to expose criminals and prevent crime, and certainly to try and thwart security offenses. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance in the constant tension that exists in the Israeli reality, between security and protecting the rights of someone suspected of committing an offense. This tension emerges also in the matter before us – the periods of detention of Palestinians who are residents of the Region.

 

53.As mentioned, the purpose of the laws of detention, including in the Region, is to strike a balance between the public interest of exposing and preventing crime and protecting the rights of the suspect. One must remember that the Region has unique characteristics which derive from the security reality and the essence of the military rule applicable there, from the security needs and from the difficulties of enforcing the law, in light of the absence of Israeli control in part of the area. There is no dispute that constant judicial review of the process of arrest for interrogation purposes is important for the protection of human rights, however the continuity of the interrogation is important for the purpose of realizing the objective of the interrogation: exposing the truth. Exposing the truth quickly and efficiently is especially important when the security of the State and its citizens are at stake.

 

54.The dilemma, therefore, is clear: on the one hand, the conduct of a proper legal procedure is an essential element to secure the proportionality and constitutionality of an arrest for interrogation purposes, and in principle, the appearance of the suspect before a judge should not be regarded as an obstacle, but rather as a fundamental condition for an effective and constitutional arrest for interrogation purposes (CHR 8823/07 Anonymous v. The State of Israel, paragraph 32 (February 11, 2010)). This follows from the customary fundamental approach that judicial involvement is an integral part of the arrest process. It is not "external" judicial review of the arrest, but rather an integral part of the formulation of the arrest itself. This is a constitutional approach that views the judicial involvement in the arrest procedure an essential part of the protection of individual liberties:

 

"The judicial involvement is the barricade against arbitrariness: it is warranted from the principle of the rule of law (see Brogan v. United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117, 134). It guarantees that the delicate balance between individual liberties and the security of the general public – a balance that lies at the basis of the laws of arrest – shall be preserved (see ADA10/94 Anonymous v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 53(1) 97, 105)." (HCJ 3239/02 Marav v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, IsrSC 54(2) 349, 368 (2003))."

 

The meaning of this is that it is necessary to adjust the interrogation methods to the need to interrupt them at a certain stage of the interrogation in order to allow an effective and fair judicial procedure to take place. An interrogation that takes place over a period of time, when the person being interrogated is in detention and cannot appear before the court and voice what he has to say, could result in disproportionate infringement of human dignity and liberty.

 

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that the security legislation which is the subject of our discussion was created in light of a complex security situation in a territory that is occupied under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), that the special security conditions applicable there dictate the determination of arrangements that are different than those that are customary in the occupying state. This reality has, inter alia, resulted in the detention of Palestinian suspects prior to being brought before a judge, for periods of time that are longer than those of Israeli suspects. In this context, it is important to remember, for example, as the Respondents have clarified, that due to the security situation, the ability to move in the Region is limited and that part of the area is under Palestinian control. The security conditions could, therefore, prevent, or delay, the interrogation parties from reaching the arena, and could make the collection of testimony and evidence more difficult. Additionally, according to the Respondents, potential witnesses do not cooperate with the interrogation parties, either due to their sympathy towards the suspects or due to their hostility towards the State of Israel. According to the Respondents this also creates genuine difficulty in interrogations and greatly delays the ability to formulate initial evidence against the suspect. Furthermore, intelligence material that was received has to be used carefully and often it is necessary to wait before using it so as not to give away the source of the information or god forbid risk his life. Additionally, there is an enhanced concern in the Region of fleeing into areas that are under the Palestinian Authority's control, such that it will not be possible re-arrest such person who was released from detention. In such conditions, the interrogation of the detainees is complicated and complex and at times a longer period of time is necessary to exhaust the interrogation before bringing the detainee before a judge.

 

55.As mentioned, the Petitioners claim that the balance between the need to maintain the security of the general public and the State and the need to protect human rights, dignity and liberty, which is reflected in the Security Provisions Order is not the proper balance even after the amendment thereof, while the Respondents request to examine the implementation of that which is stated in the Amending Order before being able to reach any conclusions on the matter. This is the state of affairs in the case at hand. In any case, it appears that the parties to the Petition share the opinion that judicial review is an essential tool for protecting the legality and propriety of the arrest and share the aspiration to shorten the periods of detention of the Palestinian residents of the Region as much as possible and to apply statutory arrangements thereon which are as similar as possible to those that are customary in Israel, in terms of the degree of protection they provide to the suspect's or defendant's rights. This was also the spirit of what was expressed in this Court, when the matter was presented before it in the past. The Supreme Court expressed its opinion and ruled that:

 

"It is time to apply statutory arrangements in the Military Courts which are similar to those prescribed in the Arrests Law in Israel, in order to protect the rights of defendants; all subject to the unique characteristics of the Region. This is the case with respect to dictating periods of a detention from the time of filing an indictment and until the commencement of the trial (Section 60 of the Arrests Law which does not have a corresponding statutory arrangement in the Region); with respect to limiting the period of the detention between the end of interrogation and the filing of an indictment (Section 17(d) of the Arrests Law, a matter which also does not have a corresponding statutory arrangement in the Region); and with respect to shortening the periods of detention prescribed in the security legislation that applies in the Region, as they are significantly longer than those prescribed in the Arrests Law in Israel" (HCJ 10720/06 Farid v. The Military Court of Appeals (February 11, 2007).

 

56.Indeed, a consequence of this aspiration is the changes that were made to the arrangements of arrests of Palestinian detainees who are residents of the Region. During the course of the Petition, the Respondents took far reaching measures with respect to shortening the said periods of detention, so as to make them more similar to the periods of detention customary in Israel. For the sake of good order and in order to clarify the matter, I shall present the changes that were made to the Security Provisions Order since the Petitions were filed, in the following table:

 

 

 

 

Previous Law

New Law (the Amending Order)

Initial detention until being brought before a judge for offenses that are not security offenses

Eight days

Minors:

12-14 year olds: 24 hours

14-18 year olds: 48 hours

Adults:

48 hours + an option to extend up to 96 hours

Initial  detention until being brought before a judge for security offenses

Eight days

Minors:

12-14 year olds: 24 hours

14-16 year olds: 48 hours

16-18 year olds: 96 hours

Adults:

96 hours + an option to extend up to 8 days

Judicial  detention for interrogation purposes prior to filing an indictment

30 days

  • Can be extended for additional periods which shall not exceed 30 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 90 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 90 days for three additional months.

Minors: 15 days

  • Can be extended for additional periods of up to 10 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 40 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 40 days for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

Adults: 20 days

  • Can be extended for periods of up to 15 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 75 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 75 days for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

"Bridge Detention" for the purpose of filing an indictment

Unlimited

Eight days

Detention after filing indictment and before the commencement of the trial

Unlimited

60 days

Detention until the end of proceedings in offenses that are not security offenses

Two years

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Minors: A year

  • Extensions of up to three months each.

Adults: A year

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses

Two years

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Minors: A year

  • Extensions of up to three months each.

Adults: 18 months

  • Extensions of up to six months each.
 

 

 

 

57.The difference between the new law (the Amending Order) and the law existing in Israel can be seen in the table below:

 

 

Initial detention until being brought before a judge

Detention before indictment

Detention until end of proceedings

"Bridge  Detention " for purpose of filing an indictment

In the Region – Offenses that are not security offenses

48-96 hours

20-75 days

A year + extensions of up to six months each.

Eight days

In Israel - Offenses that are not security offenses

24-48 hours

15-30 days

Nine months + extensions of up to three months each.

Five days

In the Region – Security offenses

96 hours – 8 days

20-75 days

18 months + extensions of up to six months each.

Eight days

In Israel – Security offenses

24-96 hours

20-35 days

Nine months + extensions of up to three months each.

Five days

Minors in the Region

12-14 years old

24-48 hours

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in the Region

14-16 years old

48-96 hours

Offenses that are not security offenses:

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in the Region

16-18

Like adults: 48-96-8 days

Offenses that are not security offenses:

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in Israel

12-14

12-24 hours

20-40 days

Will not be arrested until the end of proceedings

Five days

Minors in Israel – 14-18

24-48 hours

20-40 days

Six months + extensions of up to 45 days each.

Five days

 

 

58.The tables I have presented above illustrate the significant changes the Respondents made in the matter at hand. For example, the current maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge for offenses that are not security offenses is 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with an option of extension as per the decision of an administrative authority for additional periods which shall not exceed 48 additional hours due to urgent acts of interrogations. In security offenses the maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge is 96 hours from the time of arrest, with an option of extending the detention by 48 additional hours by an administrative party in unusual circumstances, in which the head of the Interrogation Department at the Israel Security Agency was convinced that the interrogation could be substantially prejudiced. In most special circumstances, it is possible to extend the detention by an additional 48 hours (beyond the said six days), when the head of the Interrogation Division at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation could result in harming the performance of an essential interrogation that is meant to save human lives. The Respondents repeatedly emphasized in their arguments that the new arrangement requires preparations and is scheduled to be reexamined again upon the lapse of two years from the time the Order becomes effective, based on the experience that shall accumulate during such period.

 

59.A significant change also occurred with respect to the matter of minors. We shall remind that before the Petitions were filed, there was no distinction at all between minors and adults in all of the periods of detention in the Region. Today, the age of minority in the Region increased from 16 to 18, and special arrangements were prescribed for minors based on a division into a number of age groups. Order no. 1711 provides that the maximum period of detention until bringing a "youth", i.e. a person who is at least 12 years old by not yet 14 year old, before a judge, both for security offenses and for offenses that are not security offenses, shall be 24 hours from the arrest, with a possibility of extending by an additional 24 hours due to urgent acts of interrogation; and that the maximum period of detention until bringing a "young adult", i.e. a person who is at least 14 years old but not yet 16 years old, before a judge, both for security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses, shall be 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with a possibility of extending by an additional 48 hours due to urgent acts of interrogation.

 

60.As for the definition of security offenses, the distinction between security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses for the purpose of the periods of detention in the Region was made by the Respondents only after the Petitions before us were filed. Therefore, the Petitioners' objections regarding this matter were not raised in their Petitions, but rather only in the framework of responses to the Respondents' update notices. The dispute regarding which offenses shall be defined as security offenses, is directly and closely linked to the reliefs that were requested in the Petitions, and in fact is a consequence of these reliefs. Indeed, we found it appropriate that the Respondents consider our remarks in the hearing that was held in the Petitions, inter alia, regarding the question whether it is proper to relate to the security offenses as one assemblage rather than excluding some of them from the Order's definitions. Consequently, the Respondents removed a third of the security offenses listed in the list in the Addendum of the Security Provisions Order and this is to be welcomed. If and to the extent the Petitioners still have objections regarding the offenses listed in the Addendum, they are entitled to voice their objections separately and it is inappropriate to further discuss this matter in the framework of the Petitions before us, which already encompass many matters.

 

61.Now, therefore, the staff work that was performed jointly with the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister Office produced a welcome change in the periods of detention listed in the Security Provisions Order. The change is meant to reduce, as must as possible, the infringement of the rights of the Palestinian detainees. There is no doubt that the State came a long way and significantly and even dramatically shortened the periods of detention applicable to the Palestinian residents of the Region. It is worthy to note the many discussions and long meetings that the State held with the IDF and the Ministry of Justice, together with other government ministries, until reaching the results which are expressed in the Amending Order (and in this respect, the Petitioners' achievements are invaluable. Their efforts to shorten the periods of detention of the Palestinian residents of the Region, bore significant fruit and are commendable).

 

62.So, considering the differences that stem from the different conditions between Israel and the Region, and in light of the dramatic changes that were just recently made, the "on site" implementation of which must be examined over a period of time – we are of the opinion that the current detention periods which were prescribed for adults, who are suspected of committing security offenses, in the time period before the filing of an indictment – are reasonable and proportionate, and therefore there is no cause for our involvement in this context at the current time. We shall mention that the Respondents requested to examine how the system adjusts to the changes that were made in the Security Provisions Order over a reasonable period of approximately two years, and it is presumed that upon the lapse of the period and in accordance with the on-site reality, the option of further shortening the mentioned periods of detention shall be reconsidered. We therefore assume that the Respondents' policy shall be re-examined from time to time in accordance with the security situation assessments and that if and to the extent it shall be possible to formulate reliefs these shall be applied in the future by the Respondents accordingly, and the periods of detention prescribed in the Amending Order shall be further shortened. Obviously, the Petitioners have the option of voicing their objections regarding the mentioned periods of detention, also upon the lapse of the "adjustment period".

 

63.Having said that, and without making light of the efforts the Respondents exerted and the important changes they made following the filing of the Petitions, we are not comfortable with three central matters (which partly overlap): Firstly, the periods of time in which Palestinian minors who are residents of the Region can be detained. Indeed significant changes were also made with respect to the population of minors, as specified above, however, in light of the special caution and sensitivity that must be applied towards people who are not yet adults, we are of the opinion that it is necessary to continue to monitor what is being done in their matter. The second matter that is not yet exhausted in the current Petitions is the periods of detention that was prescribed for Palestinians who are suspected or accused of offenses that are not defined as security offenses. The reasons presented in the Respondents' response, in its various stages, did not convince us of the need for such long periods of detention for "ordinary" criminal offenses. This is true also with respect to the third matter of detention until the end of proceedings of both minors and adults, in security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses (including detention after filing an indictment and prior to the commencement of the trial, which is currently 60 days). The circumstances and constraints which the Respondents indicated, by virtue of which more extended periods of detention are required in the Region, relate primarily to the stage of interrogation and collection of evidence and not to the stage of conducting the trial, after the indictment has been filed. In light of these difficulties, we considered issuing an order nisi with respect to the three mentioned matters, however at this stage we decided to leave the Petitions pending and to instruct the Respondents to reconsider how to advance these matters and give notice to such effect in the form of an update notice which is to be filed by September 15, 2014.

 

In summary, in all that relates to the maximum periods of detention for adults suspected of committing security offenses, at the stage before an indictment is filed; and in the scope of the offenses defined as security offenses – the Petitions are denied without an order for expenses (subject to that stated in paragraphs 60 and 62). However, in all that relates to the periods of detention of minors, the periods of detention of adults in offenses that are not security offenses; and the period of detention until the end of proceedings (of minors and adults, in all classifications of offenses) – the Respondents shall, as mentioned, file an update notice by September 15, 2014.

 

Given today, 6th of Nissan, 5774 (April 6, 2014).

 

 

Justice                                     Justice                                                 Justice

Barzilai v. Government of Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 428/86
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, August 6, 1986
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

The petitions to the court related to the decision of the President of the State to pardon the Head of the General Security Service (G.S.S.) and three of his assistants in respect of all the offences attributed to them connected with the incident known as "bus no. 300". The pardons were granted by the President under sec. 11 (b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, by which he is empowered "to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof." The principal issue raised in the petitions was whether the President had the power to pardon persons before conviction. The court was also asked to order the competent authorities to investigate the incident referred to.

               

1. In regard to the interpretation of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, the court examined the import of the terms "offence" and "offender," and reviewed the legislative background to the enactment of sec. 11(b) above, in particular Article 16 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 and sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949. The court also considered the influence on the interpretation of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law of the Anglo - American Practice in regard to pardon, as well as the place of the Presidential power of pardon in Israel in relation to the powers of other State authorities charged with the administration of criminal justice.

 

Held, per Shamgar P. (Miriam Ben-Porat D.P. concurring):

 

Having regard to the legislative purpose in the light of the above considerations, to the need for a "spacious" interpretation in matters of constitutional content, and to the accepted construction of the pardoning power since enacted in its original form, sec. 11(b) was to be interpreted as empowering the State President to pardon offenders both before and after conviction.

               

Per M. Ben-Porat D.P.:

 

The grant of a pardon involves a conflict between two very important interests: one - equality before the law, which requires that every offender against the law should answer for his conduct; the other - the safeguarding of a vital public interest. The proper balance between the two is the determining factor and the State President was faced with the same predicament when making his pardoning decision.

 

Minority opinion in A. v. The Law Council [2] and the decision in Attorney-General v. Matana [3] followed:

               

Per Barak J., dissenting:

 

Upon a proper interpretation of sec. l l(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, the Israel Legislature cannot be presumed to have favoured Presidential intervention in criminal proceedings before these have run their full course. Under the Israel "constitutional scheme" the Presidential power of pardon must not be construed as a paramount power, or as rivaling the powers of other State authorities, such as the police, the prosecution, the courts. It must be construed as a residual or a "reserve" power to be exercised only after the other authorities concerned have exhausted their own powers, i.e. after conviction of the accused. The pardons granted in the present case therefore are void and of no effect.

               

2. Held by the court (per Shamgar P.):

 

(a) The absence of a real personal interest on the part of any of the petitioners, does not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court will take a liberal view on this aspect and grant access to petitioners where the question that arises is "of a constitutional character" or of "public interest related directly to the advance of the rule of law". This entails no general recognition of the actio popularis, only a general guideline that enables the court to open its doors in suitable cases of a public-constitutional character.

 

(b) In granting the pardons, the State President was acting in a matter "connected with his functions and powers" as provided in sec 13 of the Basic law: The President of the State. Hence he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts in connection therewith, including the Supreme Court's powers of direct review - its authority to demand of the president himself an explanation of his decisions. This immunity relates to the direct challenge of any Presidential act, but there is no obstacle to indirect judicial review of the President's discharge of his functions in proper cases and when the proceedings are directed against some other respondent.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

H.C.J 428/86

H.C.J 429/86

H.C.J 431/86

H.C.J 446/86

H.C.J 448/86

H.C.J 463/86

M.A.A 320/86

 

 

Y. BARZILAI, ADV.

v.

1       GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

2.       ATTORNEY-GENERAL

3-6. A-D                                                                                                                                                                         H.C.J 428/86

 

1.       Y. SARID, M.K.

2.       D. ZUCKER, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF CITIZENS RIGHTS AND PEACE MOVEMENT

3.       CITIZENS RIGHTS AND PEACE MOVEMENT

4.       S. ALONI, M.K.

5.       R. COHEN, M.K.

v.

1.       MINISTER OF JUSTICE

2.       ATTORNEY GENERAL

3.       INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

4.   DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ANDMINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

5-8. A-D.                                                                                                                                                                        H.C.J 429/86

 

1. M. MAROZ, ADV.

2. D. YIFTAH, ADV.

v.

1. MINISTER OF POLICE

2-5.A-D.                                                                                                                                                                         H.C.J 431/86

 

A. ZICHRONI, ADV.

v.

1.       INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

2.       ATTORNEY-GENERAL

3.       MINISTER OF JUSTICE

4.       HEAD OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE (G.S.S.)

5.       ASSISTANT NO. 1 TO HEAD OF G.S.S.

6.       ASSISTANT NO. 2 TO HEAD OF G.S.S.

7.       ASSISTANT NO. 3 TO HEAD OF G.S.S.

8.       DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   H.C.J 446/86

 

1. DR. J.M. EDREY

2. DR. H. BEN-MENAHEM

3. DR. B. BRACHA

4. DR. M. GUR-ARIEH

5. DR. K. MANN

6. DR. A. MAOZ

7. DR. C. PASBERG

8. DR. M. KREMNITZER

9. PROF. D. KRETZMER

10. DR. A. ROZEN-ZVI

11. DR. Y. SHACHAR

12. PROF. M. SCHIFMAN

v.

1. INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

2. MINISTER OF POLICE

3. HEAD AND THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE G.S.S.

                              H.C.J 448/86

 

 

1. M.A. ABU GAM'A

2. S.H. ABU GAM'A

v.

1. GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

2. MINISTER OF POLICE

3. ATTORNEY-GENERAL

                  H.C.J 463/86

 

A. BARAK

v.

1.       Y. SARID

2       .D. ZUCKER, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF CITIZENS RIGHTS AND PEACE MOVEMENT

3.       CITIZENS RIGHTS AND PEACE MOVEMENT

4.       S. ALONI, M.K.

5.       R. COHEN, M.K.

6.       MINISTER OF JUSTICE

7.       ATTORNEY-GENERAL

8.       INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

M.A.A 320/86

 

 

In the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[6 August 1986]

Before: Justice Meir Shamgar, President

                                    Justice Miriam Ben-Porat, Deputy-President

Justice Aharon Barak.

 

         

Constitutional and Administrative Law - Pardon of offenders by President of the State - Presidential power to pardon unconvicted suspects - Basic Law: The President of the State. sec. 11(b) - Interpretation of Statutes -Meaning of the expression "to pardon offenders" - A "spacious interpretation" of constitutional provisions - Attorney-General's power to stay criminal proceedings - Presidential power of pardon and the powers of other State authorities relating to criminal justice -Pardon and Amnesty-High Court of Justice - Locus Standi - Amenability of State President to jurisdiction of the courts - Indirect judicial review of Presidential functions - Rule of Law.

 

          The petitions to the court related to the decision of the President of the State to pardon the Head of the General Security Service (G.S.S.) and three of his assistants in respect of all the offences attributed to them connected with the incident known as "bus no. 300". The pardons were granted by the President under sec. 11 (b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, by which he is empowered "to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof." The principal issue raised in the petitions was whether the President had the power to pardon persons before conviction. The court was also asked to order the competent authorities to investigate the incident referred to.

         

1. In regard to the interpretation of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, the court examined the import of the terms "offence" and "offender," and reviewed the legislative background to the enactment of sec. 11(b) above, in particular Article 16 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 and sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949. The court also considered the influence on the interpretation of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law of the Anglo - American Practice in regard to pardon, as well as the place of the Presidential power of pardon in Israel in relation to the powers of other State authorities charged with the administration of criminal justice.

 

          Held, per Shamgar P. (Miriam Ben-Porat D.P. concurring):

          Having regard to the legislative purpose in the light of the above considerations, to the need for a "spacious" interpretation in matters of constitutional content, and to the accepted construction of the pardoning power since enacted in its original form, sec. 11(b) was to be interpreted as empowering the State President to pardon offenders both before and after conviction.

         

Per M. Ben-Porat D.P.:

          The grant of a pardon involves a conflict between two very important interests: one - equality before the law, which requires that every offender against the law should answer for his conduct; the other - the safeguarding of a vital public interest. The proper balance between the two is the determining factor and the State President was faced with the same predicament when making his pardoning decision.

          Minority opinion in A. v. The Law Council [2] and the decision in Attorney-General v. Matana [3] followed:

         

          Per Barak J., dissenting:

          Upon a proper interpretation of sec. l l(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, the Israel Legislature cannot be presumed to have favoured Presidential intervention in criminal proceedings before these have run their full course. Under the Israel "constitutional scheme" the Presidential power of pardon must not be construed as a paramount power, or as rivaling the powers of other State authorities, such as the police, the prosecution, the courts. It must be construed as a residual or a "reserve" power to be exercised only after the other authorities concerned have exhausted their own powers, i.e. after conviction of the accused. The pardons granted in the present case therefore are void and of no effect.

         

2.       Held by the court (per Shamgar P.):

          (a) The absence of a real personal interest on the part of any of the petitioners, does not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court will take a liberal view on this aspect and grant access to petitioners where the question that arises is "of a constitutional character" or of "public interest related directly to the advance of the rule of law". This entails no general recognition of the actio popularis, only a general guideline that enables the court to open its doors in suitable cases of a public-constitutional character.

          (b) In granting the pardons, the State President was acting in a matter "connected with his functions and powers" as provided in sec 13 of the Basic law: The President of the State. Hence he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts in connection therewith, including the Supreme Court's powers of direct review - its authority to demand of the president himself an explanation of his decisions. This immunity relates to the direct challenge of any Presidential act, but there is no obstacle to indirect judicial review of the President's discharge of his functions in proper cases and when the proceedings are directed against some other respondent.

 

Israel cases referred to:

 

[1] H.C. 73/85, "Kach"Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset 39(3) P.D. 141.

[2] H.C. 177/50, A. v. Chairman and Members of the Law Counci15 P.D. 137.

[3] F.H. 13/60, Attorney-General v. Matana 16(1) P.D. 430; S.J., vol. IV, p.112.

[4] H.C. 249/82, Wakhnin v. Military Appeals Tribuna1 37(2) P.D. 393.

[5] Cr. A. 224/85, Alba Pharmacy Ltd. v. State of Israel 39(4) P.D. 798.

[6] H.C. 156/56, Schor v. Attorney-General 11 P.D. 285; 21 P.E. 227.

[7] H.C. 329/81; M.A. 217/82, 376, 670/83, Nof v. Attorney-General 37(4) P.D. 326.

[8] Cr. A. 117/50, Haddad v. Attorney-General 5 P.D. 1413; I P.E. 318.

[9] H.C. 171/69, Filtzer v. Minister of Finance 24(1) P.D. 113.

[10] H.C. 228/84, unpublished.

[11] H.C. 270/85, unpublished.

[12] H.C. 659/85, Bar Yosef (Yoskovitz) v. Minister of Police 40(1) P.D. 785.

[13] H.C. 297/82, Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37(3) P.D. 29.

[14] H.C. 483/77, Barzilai v. Prime Minister of Israel et al. 31(3) P.D. 671.

[15] H.C. 652/81, Y. Sarid M.K. v. Knesset Chairman Savidor 36(2) P.D. 197.

[16] H.C. 40/70, Becker v. Minister of Defence 24(1) P.D. 238.

[17] H.C. 217/80, Segal v. Minister of the Interior 34(4) P.D. 429.

[18] H.C. 1/81, Shiran v. Broadcast Authority 35(3) P.D. 365.

[19] E.A. 23/84, Neiman et al v. Chairman of the Eleventh Knesset Elections Central Committee 39(2) P.D. 225.

[20] H.C. 186/65, Reiner v. Prime Minister of Israel et al. 19(2) P.D. 485.

[21] M.A. 838/84, Livni et al. v. State of Israe1 38(3) P.D. 729.

[22] H.C. 58/68, Shalit v, Minister of the Interior 23(2) P.D. 477; S.J., Spec. Vol. (1962-1969), 35.

[23] H.C. 390/79, Diukat v. Government of Israe134 (1) P.D. 1.

[24] H.C. 561/75, Ashkenazy v. Minister of Defence 30(3) P.D. 309.

[25] Cr.A. 185/59, Matana v. Attorney-General 14 P.D. 970.

[26] H.C. 742/84, Kahana v. Chairman of the Knesset 39(4) P.D. 85

[27] H.C. 94/62, Gold v. Minister of the Interior 16 P.D. 1846; S.J., vol. IV p. 175.

[28] C.A. 165/82, Kibbutz Hatzor v. Rehovot Tax Assessment Officer 39(2) P.D. 70.

[29] C.A. 481/73, Administrator of Estate Late E. Bergman v. Stossel 29(1) P.D. 505.

[30] H.C. 246,260/81, Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcast Authority 35(4) P.D.1.

[31] H.C. 306/81, Flatto Sharon v. Knesset Committee 35(4) P.D. 118.

[32] H.C. 547/84, "Of Ha-emek" Registered Agricultural Cooperative Society v. Ramat Yishai Local Council 40(1) P.D. 113.

[33] H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister ofFinance 23(1) P.D. 693.

[34] M.A. 67/84, Haddad v. Paz 39(1) P.D. 667.

[35] H.C. 507/81, Abu Hatzeira M.K. et al. v. Attorney-General 35(4) P.D. 561.

[36] C.A. 507/79, Raundnaf (Korn) v. Hakim 36(2) P.D. 757.

[37] H.C. 73,87/53, "Kol Haam"Co. Ltd. et al. v. Minister of the Interior 7 P.D. 871; 13 P.E. 422; S.J., vol. I, p. 90.

[38] C.A. 150/50, Kaufman v. Margines 6 P.D. 1005; 5 P.E. 526.

[39] C.A. 214/81, State of Israel v. Pahima 39(4) P.D. 821.

[40] H.C. 732/84, Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs 40(4) P.D. 141.

 

English cases referred to:

 

[41] Reg. v. Boyes (1861) 9 Cox C.C. 32.

[42] R. v. Foster (1984) 2 All E.R. 678 (C.A.).

[43] McKendrick et al. v. Sinclair (1972) S.L.T. 110 (H.L.).

[44] Jennings v. United States (1982) 3 All E.R. 104 (Q.B.).

[45] Church Wardens & C. of Westham v. Fourth City Mutual Building Society (1892) 28 Q.B. 54.

[46] Thomas v. The Queen (1979) 2 All E.R. 142 (P.C.).

[47] Mistry Amar Singh v. Kulubya (1963) 3 All E.R. 499 (P.C.).

[48] Godden v. Hales (1686) 89 E.R. 1050 (K.B.).

 

American cases referred to:

 

[49] Ex parte Grossman (1925) 267 U.S. 87; 45 S.Ct. 332; 69 Law Ed. 527.

[50] M'Culloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Law Ed. 579; 17 U.S. 316.

[51] Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) 26 A.L.R. 2d. 1378; 343 U.S. 579; 96 Law Ed. 1153.

[52] Ex Parte Garland(1866) 71 U.S. 333.

[53] Burdick v. United States (1915) 236 U.S. 79; 59 Law Ed. 476.

[54] Murphy v. Ford (1975) 390 F. Supp. 1372.

[55] United States v. Wilson (1833) 32 U.S. 149.

[56] Biddle v. Perovich (1927) 274 U.S. 480.

[57] Montgomery v. Cleveland (1923) 32 A.L.R. 1151; 98 So. III.

[58] Schick v. Reed (1974) 419 U.S. 256.

[59] Osborn v. United States Bank (1824) 22 U.S. 738.

[60] New York v. United States (1951) 342 U.S. 882.

[61] Ex Parte Wells (1855) 15 Law Ed. 421; 18 How. 307.

 

          The petitioner in H. C. 428/86 appeared in person; A. Gal- for the petitioners in H.C. 429/86; The petitioners in H.C. 431/86 appeared in person; A. Zichroni and I. Hanin - for the petitioners in H.C. 446/86; M. Soaked - for the petitioners in H.C. 448/86; H Langer- for the petitioners in H.C. 463/86; D. von Wiesel and A. Barak - for the petitioner in M.A. 320/86; Y. Harish, Attorney-General and Y. Ben-Or. Senior Assistant State Attorney and Director of the Criminal Department of the State Attorney's Office - for the respondents; Y. Arnon and D. Weisglas for A-D.

 

SHAMGAR P.

The Matter in Issue

 

1.(a) On 25 June 1986 the State President granted the Head of the General Security Service and three members of that Service a pardon in respect of

all the offences connected with the so-called bus no. 300 incident, and committed from the time of the incident on the night between 12 April and 13 April until the date of this Warrant.

 

The pardon was preceded by certain events which became the subject of debate for a period of several months, both in the Government and among the general public, centering mainly on the proper steps to be taken by the authorities in consequence of the stated offences, which had meanwhile become known collectively as the "bus no. 300 incident".

          The President was apprised of the details of the matter in two conversations with the aforementioned Head of the Service, and the decision to grant the pardon followed formal requests to that end. The pardon was granted before any legal proceedings had been instituted in respect of the matters mentioned in the Warrant of Pardon. On the day the pardon was granted, the President made a public statement in which he explained the reasons for his decision, inter alia as follows:

         

Acting under the power vested in me by law, I have today granted Avraham Shalom, Head of the General Security Service, and three of his assistants, a full pardon in respect of every offence prima facie committed in connection with the "bus number 300 incident". I have so acted with a view to putting a stop to the "devils' dance" raging around the incident and so preventing further grave harm to the General Security Service. In so exercising my power, I have acted upon the recommendation of the Minister of Justice following a cabinet meeting held last night with the participation of the Attorney-General.

   My decision was based on the deep conviction that it was for the good of the public and the State that our security be protected and the General Security Service spared the damage it would suffer from a continuation of the controversy surrounding the incident. This Service is charged with waging the difficult war against terrorism, and the remarkable work of its members saves us tens of casualties every month. Last year alone the Service uncovered some 320 terrorist bands who were responsible for 379 outrages and attempted assaults in all parts of the country. So far this year the Service has exposed the perpetrators of 255 terrorist acts, apprehending among them also those who had committed murder.  I wish to mention another aspect of the war against terrorism, which relates to the security arrangements for the protection of Israel's diplomatic missions and other agencies abroad.  It may be recalled that only recently a murderous assault on an El-Al aircraft was prevented when members of the Service foiled the attempt to smuggle aboard a bomb in a suitcase in London. The public in Israel does not really know what debt we owe to all those anonymous heroes of the General Security Service, and how many lives have been saved thanks to their efforts."

   As President of the State, I feel it my duty to rally to the support of members of the Service; knowing as I do the vitally important and arduous task fulfilled by them, devotedly and in secrecy, daily and hourly. I do so in the hope of preventing moral harm to the intelligence organisation and the security network, and to the war against terror.

   In the special conditions of the State of Israel we cannot allow ourselves any relaxation of effort, nor permit any damage to be caused to the defence establishment and to those loyal men who guard our people.

   The effect of the Attorney-General's unequivocal intimation at the cabinet meeting, that there was no alternative but to open a police investigation into the incident, was to create a situation which requires members of the Service to submit to the investigation without being left any possibility of defending themselves, short of divulging security information of the utmost secrecy. In this situation I saw it as my primary duty to act as I have done in protecting the interests of the public and the security of the State.

         

          (b) Two principal issues have been raised in these petitions. The first concerns the President's power to pardon an offender before his trial and conviction; the second relates to a demand for the holding of an investigation into the events known as the "bus no. 300 incident". Concerning the latter issue, on 15 July 1986 we received the Attorney General's intimation, confirmed by the Inspector General of Police, that the police would investigate the complaints lodged in connection with that incident.

          We accordingly have to deal here with the scope of the presidential power of pardon, and shall refer also to two related matters, namely: the reasons for our decision on 30 June 1986 concerning joinder of the President as a respondent in three of the petitions (H.C. 431/86, H.C. 446/86 and H.C. 463/86); and our ruling on the question of locus standi.

         

2. The President's power of pardon is defined in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State (1964) (hereinafter "the Basic Law"), thus:

 

The President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof.

 

          This legal provision is formulated to deal with two subjects, i.e. the pardoning of offenders and the lightening of penalties. The latter subject is not in issue in the present matter, so what remains to be decided here is whether the power to pardon offenders extends also to someone who has not yet been convicted.

 

The Approach in the Case Law

 

3. (a) For the reasons I shall set out below, it has to be concluded that in the case now before us the State President based the exercise of his power under the above section upon a legal construction in accordance with the accepted approach of this court for the past thirty-five years, which sees the President as empowered to grant a pardon also before conviction. I am not unaware of efforts made over the years by a few distinguished jurists to challenge that interpretative approach. That even they, however, have had to take the view enunciated by this court as the starting point of their analysis, is understandable and clear, for the reason succinctly stated by my learned colleague, Barak J., in "Kach"Faction v. Speaker of the Knesset [1], at p. 152:

 

In a democratic regime, based on the separation of powers, the authority to construe all legislative enactments - from Basic Laws to regulations and orders - is entrusted to the court.... Inherent in every statutory provision, naturally and axiomatically, is a delegation of the interpretative authority to the court. It is true that every state organ - and in the present context also every individual - will seek to interpret the law in order to plan ahead. In the case of certain organs, it is sometimes customary for the interpretative authority to be entrusted to a particular functionary. Thus, for instance, the Executive's interpretative function is entrusted to the Attorney-General, and his construction binds the Executive internally. But where the question of interpretation arises in court, this authority rests with the court and its construction will bind the parties. And where the construction is that of the Supreme Court, it will bind everyone (by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis - sec. 20(b) of the Basic Law: The Judicature). In this regard Shamgar J. remarked as follows:

   "Every governmental authority must on occasion contend with the interpretation of a legislative enactment, for the application of statutory law frequently (in theory invariably) entails the formulation of an attitude as to its substance and content. But the final and decisive interpretative word respecting the law in force at any given time, rests with the court; and in respect to issues raised for deliberation within the legal system, this last word rests with the supreme judicial tribunal" (H.C. 306/81, at p. 141).

   Any other approach would strike at the very heart of the judicial process and completely undermine the doctrine of the separation of powers, and the checks and balances between them. Hence, relations both between the Judiciary and the Executive and between the Judiciary and the Legislature, are governed by the principle that the binding interpretation is that given by the court, no matter what other interpretations may be given.

         

I might add that the reservations expressed about this court's approach have related, as we shall see presently, to the recognition not only of a pardon before conviction, but also a pardon after serving the punishment and in other cases (see Prof. S.Z. Feller, "Rehabilitation", Mishpatim, 113 [1969], 497, 507). In fact, a complete alternative system of pardon has been prepared, and this proposed legislative revision is deserving of deeper study and deliberation than is possible in the framework of this judgment. (See the proposed Bills in the appendix to Prof. Feller's abovementioned article, which also include a proposed rephrasing of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law by replacing the words "to pardon offenders" with an expression connoting remission of punishments.) Such further study of the subject would accordingly be important for shaping the desirable law in the future, if indeed it is sought to depart from the existing arrangement.

 

          (b) I shall now review the pronouncements of this court on the subject of pre-conviction pardoning under the prevailing law. The subject was first mentioned in A. v. The Law Council [2]. The petitioner asked for the restoration of his name to the Roll of Advocates following upon a presidential pardon granted him (after having served his sentence of imprisonment) in respect of the offence for which his name had been removed from the Roll. The petition was dismissed by a majority of the Court, for reasons relating both to the powers of the Law Council and to the Supreme Court's modes of exercising its discretion.

          Justice Agranat was the only member of the court to address the question of the pardoning power. The statutory provision underlying the President's power of pardon at that time (sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949) was phrased, so far as is relevant here, in language identical to that in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. It appears from the judgment of Agranat J. (as he then was) that he saw the power of pardon conferred on the President of the State of Israel as generally parallel to that vested in the King of England or in the President of the United States, whether in underlying perception, in nature and scope, or in the consequences of its exercise. In this connection the learned Judge referred, inter alia, to a statement in Halsbury's Laws (2nd. ed., Hailsham, vol. 6, p. 477) that "Pardon may, in general be granted either before or after conviction." Also referred to was the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex Parte Grossman (1925) [49], where it was held with regard to the Constitutional power to grant pardons for offences, that the Executive could grant a pardon for an offence at any time after its commission. Summing up his opinion on the scope of the power of pardon in Israel, Agranat J. clearly held that the President has the power to pardon offenders either before or after conviction (at p. 751; my italics - M.S.).

          It is true, of course, that the question of the power of pardon before conviction was not part of the ratio on which Justice Agranat founded his decision in that case. Nevertheless, the wider question of principle involving the substance and scope of the pardoning power, the matter of its historical roots and its present day construction, on which the decision of Agranat J. was founded, encompassed also this specific aspect of the exercise of the power before conviction. This aspect arose directly out of and became an integral part of the interpretative method adopted. That is to say, inherent in Justice Agranat's adoption of the view that the President's pardoning power was the same as that of the British King or the American President, was the conclusion that the definition of that power likewise derived from the interpretative process on which the learned Judge had founded his decision, as he himself in fact noted.

          Justice Agranat's abovementioned opinion has come to be recognized as representing the prevailing and commonly accepted interpretation of this court, whether this be due to the fact that no contrary judicial opinion on the matter has been expressed or whether this be attributed to the Further Hearing in the Matana case, a landmark decision in our constitutional law to which I shall presently return.

 

          (c) This subject arose again in the rehearing in Attorney-General v. Matana [3], representing the leading and most comprehensive decision so far on the power of pardon. Once again the substance of the power was analysed, this time in the court's full consciousness that the decision which had occasioned the rehearing amounted to a rejection of the minority opinion of Agranat J. in A. v. The Law Council, insofar as he had found a parallel between the power of the President of Israel and that of the British Monarch. In his judgment in the Further Hearing, Deputy President Agranat (as he then was) reiterated his view expressed in A. v. The Law Council that the President's power of pardon was exercisable also before conviction. He noted that while there was indeed no room for an equation of the President's power of pardon with that of the High Commissioner of Palestine (under Art.l6 of the Order in Council, 1922), he also had no hesitation in reaffirming his approach in A. v. The Law Council as regards the scope of the President's power and its comparison with that of the Executive under the corresponding Anglo-American constitutional law. The power under sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1969 (which for our present purpose is the same as that set forth in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law) was termed by Agranat D.P. an "original" power forming part of a "Constitution in miniature of an independent State." Hence it was not comparable to the pardoning power instituted under the Mandatory legislation, and the model for comparison was the power of the British or the American Head of State.

          In this regard the learned Deputy President added, by way of an interpretative guideline, that in view of its constitutional content the statutory provision concerned did not need a restrictive interpretation ( M'Culloch v. Maryland (1819) [50] at p. 602; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) [51] at 1399, per Frankfurter J.). From the Youngstown case Agranat D.P. cited the statement of Jackson J. that because the American President enjoyed only those powers mentioned in the constitution it "does not mean that the mentioned ones should be narrowed by a niggardly construction."

          In short, it emerges from the Deputy President's judgment that while the relevant provision did indeed relate to a new and independent legislative enactment, for the proper understanding of its substance it was nevertheless permissible to refer also to the corresponding powers that existed in the countries looked upon as the principal models for comparison, and which had nourished and shaped our own legislation.

          Cohn J. (as he then was) - who together with Silberg J. concurred with Agranat D.P. in forming the majority opinion of the court - wrote a separate opinion stressing certain matters which appear to be particularly relevant in relation to the background of the problem now before the court, inter alia holding as follows (at p. 462):

 

Under sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949, the President of the State is empowered to pardon offenders and to reduce punishments. The Presidents of the State have exercised this power from 1949 until the day on which judgment was delivered in Matana v. Attorney-General (23 June 1960), in the manner laid down for them in the judgment of this court (per Agranat J.) in A. v. The Law Council (at p. 745 et seq.). That is to say, both the President of the State and the Minister of Justice, whose countersignature of the President's decision is required by the Law, and also the wide body of citizens who have had need of the President's grace, have always regarded this power of the President as equal and parallel in nature and scope to the power of pardon and reduction of punishments possessed by the Queen of England, and which was possessed by the High Commissioner of Palestine. It has already been said more than once by this court (both during the Mandate and after the establishment of the State) that the court will hesitate very much to reverse a particular practice which has taken root during the years, and if this was said in respect of matters of practice which did not rest upon the authority of judicial precedent, how much more is it applicable to a matter of practice which rests upon a specific decision of the Supreme Court. As for myself, even if I were inclined to agree with the opinion held by my colleagues Berinson J. and Landau J. that the practice followed by the President of the State year after year is based upon too wide an interpretation of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949, even then I would not venture today to change this practice which has received the seal of the Knesset at least by its silence, and more especially since the practice followed by the President of the State adds the "grace" extended by him to its citizens.

   I have no doubt, however, that the said provision in sec. 6 should be given a wide and not a narrow interpretation. But for the principles laid down in A v. The Law Council, which the Deputy President has again adopted in his instructive judgment in this Further Hearing, I would perhaps have gone further and interpreted the said provision even without reference to the powers of the King of England under the common law, which were also given to the High Commissioner of Palestine by virtue of the Order in Council, 1922. For the purposes of the decision in the present case, however, the principles laid down in the judgment referred to are sufficient for me too, and I arrive at the same conclusions as those reached by my colleague, the Deputy President, but without resort to the English and American authorities which he cites in his judgment.

 

          (d) In a dissenting judgment Berinson J. disputed the abovementioned interpretative theses. In essence, however, and notwithstanding the divergence between the minority view (of himself and Landau J.) and the majority view as to the President's power of substituting one sentence for another, even he was expressly of opinion that the President's pardoning power extended also to an act for which the offender had not yet been tried and convicted. In this sense, as Berinson J. expressly pointed out, the President's power was wider than that of the High Commissioner at the time:

 

Moreover the President's power of pardon is in a certain sense wider than that possessed by the High Commissioner. Whereas the High Commissioner was unable to pardon a crime before the offender was tried and convicted unless he turned King's evidence and led to the conviction of his accomplice (the first part of Article 16 of the Order in Council), the President is not bound by this condition and, so it seems to me, may pardon any offender even before he is brought to trial (ibid. p. 469).

 

4. Recently Justice Cohn has had further occasion to express his opinion on the subject ("Symposium on Pardon," hereinafter "Symposium," Mishpatim 15/1 [1984], 14). It was decided law, in his view, that it was never intended by the Israel lawgiver - whether in the Transition Law, 1949,or in the Basic Law - to curtail the scope of the pardoning powers vested in the King of England under the constitutional conventions; it followed that the power to pardon offenders before their conviction availed also in Israel.

 

5. (a) In view of the reference in our decisions to the Anglo-American comparative model, it is fitting that we supplement our above remarks with a brief review of the law of those countries on our present subject. It is consistently asserted in the literature of English constitutional law, that the King is empowered under the common law to grant also a pre-conviction pardon. It is so stated in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England (San Francisco, 1916; vol. II, p. 400). In Halsbury's Laws (4th ed., vol. VIII, 8, par. 949, p. 606) it is stated:

 

          In general, pardon may be granted either before or after conviction.

         

          S.A. De Smith opines that "a pardon may be granted before conviction" (Constitutional and Administrative Law, 5th ed., Street and Brazier, 1985, p. 150, note 121). He holds that this prerogative power, though not exercised today, has not become abrogated by disuse and, like Sleeping Beauty, "it can be revived in propitious circumstances" (p. 143). In other words, in exceptional circumstances which so justify, the King may conceivably have renewed recourse to this power. A like view is expressed by O. Hood Phillips - "A pardon may generally be granted before or after a conviction" ( Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th ed., 1978, p. 378). English decisions and treatises on the subject are replete with statements to the same effect and one need not repeat them all here (see Reg. v. Boyes, [41] ).

         

          (b) In the U.S.A. the pre-conviction pardoning power is clearly enunciated in the classical work on the U. S. Constitution prepared by the Research Service and the Library of Congress: The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation (Washington, 1973), p. 474. In Am. Jur. 59, 2d (Rochester & San Francisco, 1971) par. 25, the presidential power of pre-conviction pardoning is explicitly asserted, and with regard to the separate States it is added:

 

if the constitution does not expressly prohibit the exercise of the power until after conviction, it may be exercised at any time after the commission of an offense before legal proceedings are taken.

 

          That is to say, the customary interpretation is that any State wishing to preclude the grant of a pre-conviction pardon has to make express constitutional provision to that effect, and a power of pardon mentioned without such a reservation means that it may be exercised also before conviction of the offender. See also W.W. Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (New York, 2nd ed. 1929), vol. III, at p. 1491; B. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United State (New York, 1963), vol. II at p. 87; B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law (N.Y. and London, 2nd ed. 1979) at p. 198; L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, 1978) at p. 191.

          In the American precedents the power of pre-conviction pardoning is constantly reiterated. In the celebrated case of Ex Parte Garland (1866) [52], it was held (at p. 380) that the pardoning power

         

….extends to every offence known to the law and may be exercised at any time after its commission either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency or after conviction and judgment.

 

          See also L.B. Boudin, "The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power been Exceeded?" Un. Colo. L. Rev. 48 (1976/77), p. 1.

         

6. In Attorney-General v. Matana [3] the majority agreed with Agranat D.P. as regards the substance of the pardoning power. In the wake of this decision came a legislative development which also throws some light on the attitude of the authorities at the time to the abovementioned legal questions. When the Bill for the Basic Law: The President of the State came before the Knesset, it was decided to vary the text of the provision concerning pardon in a manner clearly enunciating the President's power to commute sentences, this being a matter on which divided opinions had been expressed in the Matana rehearing. However, no attempt at all was made to vary the existing statutory arrangement so far as its interpretation in the rehearing was concerned - both by Agranat D.P. who expressed the majority opinion and by Berinson J. - as empowering the President also to grant pre-conviction pardons. The amendments pertaining to the commutation of sentences clearly stemmed from the wish to eliminate possible doubt resulting from the divergent interpretations on this point in the Matana case. Thus, for instance, Dov Joseph, Minister of Justice at the time, had this to say in support of the proposed amendment:

 

   As to the presidential power to pardon offenders dealt with in sec. 6 of the Transition Law, the matter is now regulated in sec. 12 of the proposed new Law. The change in relation to the existing Law is that the new provision expresses the commutation of punishments to be, along with their reduction, a presidential power of pardon. This is no fundamental change, for even under the existing Law, which mentions the reduction of punishments but not their commutation, the latter was held to fall within the purview of the pardoning power vested in the President. However, since the Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion after much toil, with a minority of the Justices holding otherwise, we thought it desirable to clarify in the proposed new provision that such was the lawgiver's intention from the start (Minutes of the Knesset, 36 (1963/4), 964).

 

          Also of interest in this connection are the comments made in the same debate by Prof. Y. H. Klinghoffer:

         

In a decision of the Supreme Court a year ago, it was decided - as already indicated by the Minister of Justice in his opening remarks - that sec. 6 embodied a power of substitution of a lighter punishment for the one imposed, and in particular to commute a sentence of imprisonment to one of conditional imprisonment" ( ibid., p. 966).

 

          A year later (in 1965) Professor Klinghoffer rested on the same foundation his argument that if difficulties were to arise in consequence of the adoption of a certain proposal raised by him for debate, recourse could be had to the pre-conviction pardoning power in order to solve hard personal problems of punishment for which no other solution was available:

         

Another unconvincing argument advanced is that if a suspect be very ill, it would be an act of cruelty to put him on trial. Unconvincing, because in rare cases of this kind the President of the State would be able to grant a pardon before the trial commenced. The President is empowered to pardon offenders either before or after conviction. That was laid down by Justice Agranat in the case of A. v. The Law Council, H.C. 177/50 ( Minutes of the Knesset, 43(1965), 2319):

 

          Statements made in the course of Knesset debates do not, of course, bind the court when construing the law, let alone the fact that here we are seeking mainly to draw an inference from the non-amendment of the existing statutory arrangement on the subject. We do accept, however, that a particular enactment's legislative history may be a valuable aid in its interpretation (Wakhnin v. Military Appeals Tribunal [4] at p. 424), and we may be so guided here too. An inference may properly be drawn from the fact that at the time when the Knesset debated the implications of the decision in A. v. The Law Council, not a single voice was raised in favour of narrowing the President's power in 'respect of pre-conviction pardoning. Legislatively speaking, it has so far not been seen fit to disturb the wording of the pertinent provision nor, indeed, its manner of interpretation - by Justice Agranat in A. v. The Law Council and by  the Justices of the majority as well as the minority opinion in A. G. v. Matana- as empowering the President to pardon offenders also before conviction. The opportune time for having effected an amendment in curtailment of the pardoning power, should anyone have disapproved of its judicial interpretation, was surely at the stage when the Law was amended anyway to clarify operation of the pardoning power in a different respect, as already mentioned. The fact that the power as it stood was left intact in relation to the matter of our present inquiry, is proof that neither the Legislature nor the Executive saw fit to alter the legal situation that emerged from the expansive interpretation given the pardoning power in A.G. v. Matana.

          Incidentally, though at the time there may have been room for debating whether or not the provisions of the Transition Law, 1949, including sec. 6, were endowed with any permanent constitutional standing, there could certainly have been no doubt as to the constitutional content and standing of the Basic Law: The President of the State. Yet sec. 11(b) thereof repeats verbatim the part of sec. 6 of the Transition Law that is pertinent to our present inquiry, and which the court construed as it did in the Law Council and Matana cases.

         

7. The fact that the Knesset did not vary the court's construction of the power "to pardon offenders" as embracing also pre-conviction pardoning, has contributed to a general recognition of the approach in the two precedents cited as the accepted approach on this subject. Prof. A. Rubinstein, for instance, writes as follows ( The Constitutional Law of  Israel, 3rd ed., at p. 394; in Hebrew):

 

(e) Pardoning of offenders before conviction. The Law does not restrict the President's power to pardon offenders, and he may do so even before they have been convicted. English law is the same as regards the prerogative of pardon of the British Crown. The High Commissioner, however, was delegated only a part of the stated royal power and, in terms of Art.16 of the Order in Council, 1922, was able to pardon offenders only upon their conviction. In this respect the President's power is like that of the British Crown. Even Justice Berinson who interpreted the presidential power narrowly in the Matana case, held that "he has power to pardon any offender also before he is brought to trial."

 

          A more restrictive construction of the expression "to pardon offenders" - even if centering more on the meaning of the term "offenders," which point I shall presently discuss in greater detail - was proposed by Prof. Klinghoffer at a symposium on this subject, though with express acknowledgment that his own view differed from the interpretation given by the Supreme Court (see Prof. Y. Klinghoffer, "Pardon's Constitutional Framework," Lectures at the Symposium "Amnesty in Israel", held in Jerusalem on 13-14 May 1968, Publications of the Hebrew University Institute of Criminology, 2, 5; hereinafter "Lectures on Amnesty"). A similar view was expressed by Prof. S.Z. Feller in his abovementioned article, "Rehabilitation" (at p. 507, note 28). Also present at the symposium was the then incumbent Attorney-General, M. Ben-Zeev, who made these observations:

         

   Prof. Klinghoffer's constitutional analysis of the pardoning power is undoubtedly comprehensive and interesting. I feel it necessary, however, to mention one matter on which I disagree with him - if only to ensure that a different opinion also be heard on this important point. Prof. Klinghoffer interpreted the President's power "to pardon offenders" as applying only to convicted offenders and not to unconvicted suspects, a conclusion felt by him to flow from the very expression here used. Since in our law a person is presumed innocent until convicted he cannot be an "offender" until he is convicted; therefore, in Prof. Klinghoffer's opinion, the President has no power to pardon any person before he has been convicted. In this connection I might mention the case of A. v. The Law Council, cited by Prof. Klinghoffer, in which the wording of the relevant provision in the Transition Law was construed - and from which wording there was no departure, in the instant context, in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State. This identical expression in both the above enactments was interpreted by Justice Agranat, after lengthy analysis in his abovementioned judgment, to mean that the President "has the power to pardon offenders either before or after conviction." This authority accordingly contradicts the approach of Prof. Klinghoffer and I myself, in my capacity as Attorney-General, have relied on this authority in giving my opinion that the President may pardon offenders also before conviction. The term "offender" obviously cannot be understood here to mean someone who has been duly convicted, but rather someone who comes to the President saying: "I have committed an offence and I ask you to pardon me." It is inconceivable that a person should come before the President and say: "I have not in fact committed an offence, but if I have, please grant me a pardon." Such alternative kind of pardon naturally finds no place in our law. But if a person should come and say that he has committed an offence for which he asks to be pardoned, then he is among the offenders whom the President has the power to pardon ( ibid., p. 53).

 

          Another participant in the abovementioned symposium was Dr. Leslie Sebba of the Criminological Institute of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, who made this comment on the legal situation as portrayed there ("Summary of the Lectures at the Symposium 'Amnesty in Israel' " p.x):

         

Finally, there was some doubt as to the proper interpretation of the phrase "to pardon offenders." Did this include persons not yet convicted? In the opinion of the Government, which based its view on judicial opinion, such persons could be regarded as offenders for the purpose of the pardon, for the request for a pardon could in itself be regarded as an admission of the offence .

 

          This leads us to Dr. Sebba's illuminating work, On Pardon and Amnesty: Juridical and Penological Aspects (Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Law of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1975; hereinafter On Pardon and Amnesty), in which the writer examined the scope of the pardoning power in Israel, inter alia making this comment (at pp. 152-153):

         

   Sometimes pardon before conviction or "advance pardon" is treated as an independent form of pardon. This power, which has a legal foundation in both English and American law (but not in France), is generally attributed also to the State President. This view is challenged, however, by Prof. Klinghoffer on the ground that everyone is presumed innocent until duly convicted: "Hence no person is an 'offender' until a final convicting judgment be given against him."

   In our view, the law does indeed enable a pardon to be granted without prior conviction. For certain purposes the Legislature has seen fit to describe an unconvicted suspect as an offender, and the Supreme Court has also held that an unconvicted suspect may be deemed to have a "criminal past" under sec. 2(3) of the Law of Return, 1950 (see H.C. 94/62, Gold v. Min. of Interior, 16 P.D. 1846). Finally, Art. 16 of the Order in Council conferred express power to pardon a person who turned "King's evidence" and whose evidence led to conviction of the principal offender.

         

          The introduction to Article 16 of the Order in Council clearly related to unconvicted suspects who were willing to give evidence for the prosecution. This was envisaged as the main area for application of this provision, which, as in English law for the past centuries, has been the main justification for preserving the power of "advance" or pre-conviction pardon.

         

8. We have so far described the ruling interpretative thesis. Having regard, however, to the arguments advanced during the hearing, it is necessary to examine the reservations and doubts raised as to the President's power to pardon unconvicted offenders under sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. We shall pursue this examination, and the formulation of our interpretative standpoint regarding sec. 11(b), along three principal lines of inquiry: first, the linguistic import of the statutory provisions under consideration; second, the contention as to abrogation of the disputed power following the enactment of other, new powers; and third, the juridical-constitutional substance of the power.

 

The Language of the Section

 

9. Sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law speaks of the power "to pardon offenders." There is no definition of the term "offender" in either the Basic Law or the Penal Law of 1977. As already mentioned, Prof. Klinghoffer founded his narrow interpretation of the presidential power on the perception that the term "offender" applied only to someone duly tried and convicted (see "Lectures on Amnesty",supra; "Symposium," at p. 5). The like opinion was expressed by H. Zadok, former Minister of Justice (ibid., p. 9) and by Prof. S.Z. Feller (ibid., p. 10; and see also "Rehabilitation," at p. 507). Disagreeing with these views, Justice H. Cohn argued that the existence of a pre-conviction pardoning power was also indicated in the language of the Law. He commented that an enactment aimed at expanding civil rights and benefits called for a spacious and liberal interpretation. For purposes of the President's power, an "offender," in his opinion, was anyone who testified to himself as being such “ Symposium," at p. 14).

          I do not think the term "offender" must be understood as referring only to someone who has been tried and convicted. It is accepted in this court that an expression in a particular Law must be interpreted in the light of its legislative context, as was held by my colleague the Deputy President in Alba Pharmacy Ltd. v. State of Israel [5] at p. 802:

         

Expressions and directives in a Law must be interpreted in the light of the purpose it is intended to achieve. Hence it will sometimes happen that the identical expression appearing in different enactments is differently construed, all in accordance with the inherent purpose and intent of the enactment (C.A. 480/79, Treger v. Customs Collector, at p. 306).

 

          According to its plain meaning, the term "offender" relates to someone who has committed an act defined as an offence, and from the word offence or offender itself one can hardly learn that it has no other legislative application than to someone proved, in final criminal proceedings ending in a conviction, to have committed an offence. Fundamental to our perception of criminal justice is the presumption that a person is innocent until duly proven guilty, but this presumption is an incident of the individual's rights and obligations in confrontation with the judicial process, or with any other authority, or individual. It does not necessarily reflect upon all the possible linguistic nuances of a descriptive term employed in a variety of legislative contexts and conjoined to a variety of eventualities in the penal law and related area. Not infrequently one finds mention in enactments of the term "offence" or "offender," when it is intended to refer simply to a criminal act or omission, or to the person to whom such is attributed, even though not yet convicted in criminal proceedings. And this is so even though the circumspection needed when a person's status may be affected in criminal proceedings, would seem to indicate the use of other expressions such as "a person accused of..." or "charged with..." or "alleged to have committed an offence," or like language. The Penal Law of 1977, for example, makes frequent mention of the term "offence" in a variety of contexts. But when it speaks in sec. 4 of bringing an offender to trial, the reference is clearly to someone charged with, and not already convicted of, the offence. (In like vein see also secs. 7, 8 and 10(d) of the Law.) In this connection Dr. L. Sebba refers ( On Pardon and Amnesty, at p. 153) to the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) Ordinance (New Version), sec. 3(3) of which empowers a police officer to arrest a person without warrant if he "has committed in the police officer's presence, or has recently committed" a certain kind of offence; here too one is clearly dealing with someone suspected of committing the offence rather than someone already convicted thereof.

          It is provided in sec. 3 of the Police Ordinance (New Version) that "the Israel Police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of offences, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders." There undoubtedly cannot be any reference here to already convicted offenders. The definition of the term offender in the Interpretation Ordinance (New Version), stresses the element of the sanction but nowhere mentions a finality of legal proceedings. And so one could without difficulty quote many more examples.

          We might, for the purpose of our linguistic inquiry, also examine other provisions of law on matters which may be said to be in pari materia. In this respect the wording of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949 sheds no additional light on the meaning of the term "offender" in the Basic Law. However, besides the individual pardon provided for in the Basic Law, two other Laws were enacted dealing with the subject of general amnesty. The first was the General Amnesty Ordinance of 1949, which in see 2 provided that a person who prior to a specified date "committed an offence... shall not be arrested, detained or prosecuted for it, or if he is already being prosecuted... the proceedings shall be discontinued and he shall not be punished." Clearly the words "...committed an offence" extended the benefit of the amnesty also to offenders who had not yet been tried and convicted. The wording of sec. 2 spoke for itself, and a statement to the same effect was made by the then Minister of Justice, Mr. Y.S. Shapiro, when introducing the Bill for the Amnesty Law of 1967 before the Knesset:

         

This is the second occasion on which a general amnesty is extended by the State directly through the legislature. The first time the general amnesty was granted by the Provisional Council of State in its final session, prior to the convention of the elected assembly - the First Knesset. In the Law passed at the time by the Provisional Council of State, it was laid down that any person who had committed an offence, other than one entailing sentence of death or life imprisonment, should receive a pardon, whether already tried and convicted or not (Minutes of the Knesset, 49, p. 2484).

 

          In sec. 5 of the Amnesty Law of 1967, the second enactment of its kind, mention was again made of a "discontinuance of proceedings" taken in any court for "any offence committed" before a specified date. Thus the amnesty was once more extended in respect of "offences" for which the offender had not yet been tried or the proceedings concerning which had not yet been completed.

          The manner of use of the term "offence" in a Knesset enactment dealing with a general amnesty has implications for the construction of the same term in an analogous Knesset enactment dealing with individual pardons.

          In sum, it may be learned from a linguistic examination of pertinent statutory provisions, that the terms "offence" and "offender" may, according to the subject matter and context, simply import a criminal act or the person accused or suspected of having committed that act, and not necessarily a conviction, or a convicted offender. By analogy, the same term in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law was intended to embrace also a person to whom a criminal act, attempt or omission is attributed, and not only someone already convicted of the same.

          By way of comparison it may be noted that the same term mentioned in the constitution of the U.S.A., in the context of "pardons for offences" (art. II, sec. 2, clause 1), has also not been interpreted as applying solely to criminal conduct which is followed by trial and conviction.

         

 Parallel Statutory Powers

 

10. It was a central argument of the petitioners that the power of pardon before conviction was abrogated by the effects of later, as it were, superseding legislation. This argument assumed diverse forms and I propose to deal with its different aspects. Since, for purposes of our present inquiry, it first found expression in a directive of the Attorney-General included in one of the petitions now before us, I shall start therewith.

 

11. (a) In his capacity as Attorney-General, Prof. Y. Zamir published a directive (no. 21.333) concerning the President's power to pardon offenders before completion of the trial. The learned writer first referred to the opinion of Justice Agranat in the case of A. v. The Law Council, contending that the equation there of the power of the High Commissioner with that of the British Crown was erroneous, as the former was not competent to pardon any person before his conviction. It followed that if the High Commissioner was not so empowered, no power of that nature could possibly have been conferred under sec. 6 of the Transition Law of 1949, when it was enacted.

          The above conclusion as to an equality of pardoning power displayed indeed a certain inaccuracy, for the power delegated to a colonial Governor or to the High Commissioner of a Mandated Territory did not coincide with the prerogative power of the King. But this point was clarified in the Matana case and, I might add, the Attorney-General himself fell victim to an inaccuracy when writing that the High Commissioner had no power to pardon unconvicted offenders. For it was expressly provided in the first part of art. 16 of the Order in Council that the High Commissioner might pardon "any accomplice in such crime or offence who shall give such information and evidence as shall lead to the conviction of the principal offender." This empowerment therefore did not relate specifically to already convicted persons, and further proof is to be found in the continuation of art. 16, where express reference is made to convicted offenders in quite a different context.

         

          (b) The stated directive was further predicated on the premise that the abovementioned statements of Justices Agranat and Berinson (on the instant issue) did not amount to binding precedent. I do not accept this reasoning, since it overlooks the connection between the court's overall decision, as already described above, and the specific conclusion concerning the power of pre-conviction pardoning. The existence of this nexus has not only been acknowledged in extra-judicial commentaries, but was also expressly mentioned by Justices Agranat and Berinson in their respective judgments in the Matana case, both clearly having regarded the power of pardon before conviction as flowing integrally from their underlying legal perception of the wider issue before them. The fact that the learned Justices saw fit to recognise the possibility of pre-conviction pardoning, is evidence that such recognition was a natural corollary of a viewpoint shared by the Judges of the majority as well as the minority opinion in the Matana rehearing. Moreover, the fact that the question of a pardon before conviction was directly addressed in the abovementioned decisions, even though the question was not directly in issue on the facts in either of the two cases concerned, is further evidence of a clear and patent connection seen between the essential pardoning power - as interpreted by the court - and the possibility of a pardon granted before conviction. What I am saying is that one has to examine the judgments of the majority opinion in the Matana rehearing according to their essential legal rationale, rather than merely answer the question whether the judgments dealt directly with the power to pardon before conviction. The ratio of the majority opinion in the Matana rehearing is to be found in the conclusion that the presidential power, although original and autonomous by virtue of an Israel enactment, was nevertheless shaped by and for its legislative purpose according to the Anglo-American model. At the same time the court added its conclusion that the Presidential pardoning power in Israel was equal in scope to that of the King of England, or of the President of the U.S.A. The details of the power, also in the pre-conviction contingency, were but a derivative legal consequence. It was the constitutional analogy with the corresponding Executive powers in the above two countries - whose legal systems, far more than others, have inspired and nourished our own legal and constitutional notions and doctrines - that gave birth to the conclusion that is now the subject of our deliberation.

          A like opinion was expressed by Prof. C. Klein ("Symposium," at p. 17):

         

The source of the pardoning power is the royal prerogative. There is a clear connection between the method of pardon in Israel and the corresponding English method, from which one can learn about the scope of the presidential power of pardon in Israel (a divergence of opinion on this matter is echoed in the Matana case).

 

          The power of pardon is not everywhere the same and, as we shall presently see, a variety of methods are followed in other countries. At the time, however, it was not the constitutions of such other countries that served as the models for shaping our own powers of pardon, so that no conclusion whatever can be drawn from any comparison with them, and their situation cannot now reflect on our own, except as an exercise in the desirable.

          It would also be wrong to conclude from the analysis of principles in the abovementioned precedents that we are, as it were, held captive by our legal heritage and that we lack the vigour to fashion our own constitutional doctrines. Not so! Our essential constitutional form has throughout been autonomously our own, and remains so today. What is at stake is a historical-interpretative question that is concerned with the legal perspectives adopted at the time, with the constitutional result distilled from and founded on the same, and with the tenor of our precedents - representing, for some considerable time now, the accepted legal interpretation.

          Of course, there always remains the possibility that the Legislature may be disposed to replace the existing order with a new arrangement considered more suited to our time. Interesting proposals to this effect have been made, some of them ranging in substance far beyond the limited question of our immediate inquiry. Only in an appropriate manner, however, should we abandon a chosen path of the Knesset and the legislative purpose enshrined in the relevant provisions of the Transition Law and the Basic Law, especially when the powers conferred thereunder are of known scope after lengthy judicial analysis and circumscription. We should take care that any material change contemplated be not impelled by passing events, however stormy their nature, but result from orderly constitutional research and discussion. Any change resolved upon should be effected in a manner showing proper deference to a constitutional norm followed for a comparatively long time, that is to say, it should be done by way of legislative enactment.

 

12. In his directive the Attorney-General founded his conclusions as to the scope of the presidential pardoning power largely upon its comparison with his own power to issue a nolle prosequi:

 

A wider use of the power to order a stay of criminal proceedings has always been made in Israel, and in recent years thousands of requests for such a stay have been lodged annually with the Attorney-General. In practice, therefore, the power to pardon accused persons before completion of their trial needs less to be exercised in Israel than in England....

   A presidential power to intervene in criminal proceedings pending before the court, in a manner permitting termination of such proceedings at any time, is undesirable in principle. The pardoning power of the President bears no comparison with the Attorney-General's power to intervene in criminal proceedings by way of staying the same. The Attorney-General functions from the start as an integral factor in criminal proceedings, for he is empowered by law to prefer the charge on behalf of the State.... The President, on the other hand, is an extraneous factor in criminal proceedings. In this situation, his grant of a pardon in the course of a trial might be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the court....

   Any interpretation that would empower the President to pardon also unconvicted suspects, suffers in addition the practical disadvantage of a concurrence between this power and the power of the Attorney-General to stay the proceedings against such suspects.

         

          In this connection it was contended that even in England the prerogative of pardon before conviction was no longer exercised. Accordingly, it was concluded in the directive that the President was competent to pardon only convicted persons, for the reason that his power to pardon unconvicted suspects had been replaced by the Attorney-General's power to order a stay of criminal proceedings.

         

13. The above argument is complex and involves, as we shall see presently, not only the matter of a nolle prosequi and its effects, but also other legal processes and their ramifications, including problems of interpretation. The full import of the argument is that a whole array of new penal laws enacted over the years have served to abrogate the power of pardon before conviction. It is true that the argument was not presented to us in precisely this form, but this was clearly its substance. It would be helpful, therefore, for us to dissect the argument into its component parts and different legal aspects, and to examine each in turn, namely:

          (a) First, what is the nature of the order staying a criminal prosecution, and what are the points of similarity and difference between this step and the power of pardon before conviction?

          (b) Second, what ground is there for the contention that the power of pardon before conviction is no longer existent in Anglo-American law?

          (c) Third, what other relevant statutory provisions exist on the issue before us, even if not mentioned in the Attorney-General's directive, or in the arguments addressed to us?

          (d) Fourth, can a constitutional directive deriving from statute or from the common law (where it exists) be considered to have been implicitly repealed or abrogated by later legislation dealing with the same subject?

          (e) Fifth, does the emergence, in practice, of a pragmatic legal substitute for an existing constitutional arrangement, implicitly repeal the latter, and is there any difference for this purpose between a constitutional or legal arrangement deriving from express statutory provision, and one which is solely the creation of judicial interpretation?

         

14. (a) As regards the issue of a nolle prosequi, it is provided in sec. 231 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) of 1982, that the Attorney-General may stay the proceedings by reasoned notice to the court at any time after lodging of the information and before judgment; upon such notice the court shall discontinue the proceedings in that trial. The Attorney-General may also delegate to his deputy - either generally or in respect of a particular matter or classes of matters - his power to stay any criminal prosecution except in cases of felony. In a recent Bill for the amendment of the above Law (no. 1703, p. 34) it is further envisaged that the Attorney-General may delegate this power - in charges other than felonies, preferred by a prosecutor who is not an attorney of the State Attorney's Department (e.g. a police prosecutor) - also to the State Attorney or his deputy, to the District Attorney, or to any other attorney of the State Attorney's Department given the power of a District Attorney under see. 242 of the above Law. In the explanatory notes to that Bill, it was stated that the Attorney-General and his deputies were experiencing difficulty in handling the greatly increased number of requests made for a stay, and hence the proposed widening of this delegatory power.

          This proliferation of requests is apparently attributable, inter alia, to the proportion of such requests acceded to, and it is clear from the cited passage in the Attorney-General's directive, that thousands of requests are made annually in what seems latterly to have become a regular and widespread practice. I see no need to express any detailed opinion on the question (which is not in issue here) of the proper use of the power to stay a prosecution, and but for it having become interwoven with the argument now before the court, would have preferred not to deal with it at all. I shall merely state my lack of conviction that the wide use of the staying power, as described in the directive, is in accord with the lawgiver's underlying intentions and the character of the staying procedure. Any misgivings one might have with regard to the implications of a pre-trial exercise of the pardoning power, must also to a large extent accompany this phenomenon of a stay of criminal proceedings before the trial has run its course. We appear to be dealing here, not with the rare and exceptional exercise of a given power, but with a rapidly widening process which entails no public deliberation, no participation of any other authority, and which, by its very nature, allows little opportunity for judicial or any other kind of scrutiny (cf. K.C. Davis, Discretionary Justice, Baton Rouge, 1969, pp. 211-212). And, as already indicated, there are proposals afoot for a further, vertical, diffusion of this power.

 

          (b) Sec. 232 of the same Law provides that, following a stay of proceedings under sec. 231, the Attorney-General may upon written notice to the court renew the proceedings, provided no more than a specified period has elapsed from the time of the stay. Upon such notice, the court renews the proceedings and may commence them again from the start or continue from the stage of their discontinuance. Upon a second stay of the same proceedings, they may not again be revived. This means that the first stay does not finally close the matter, for it does not preclude the revival of the proceedings within a specified period, and only thereafter is finality reached.

         

          (c) The power to order a stay of proceedings is not to be seen as an institution of later legislative vintage than the pardoning power. The Attorney-General's power of stay did not first come into being in the Criminal Procedure Law of 1965, but existed before that under the Mandatory Art.16 of the Order in Council 1922. It continued to exist after the establishment of the State when the pardoning power was later re-enacted, first under sec. 6 of the Transition Law of 1949, and then under sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law of 1964 (see sec. 59 of the Criminal Procedure [Trial upon Information] Ordinance of 1924, and sec. 18 of the Magistrates Courts' Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1939). It follows that the theoretical parallel between the power to pardon and the power to order a stay of proceedings was there from the start - i.e. from the very inception of the pardoning power in its new constitutional guise after the establishment of the State - and that the power to stay a prosecution indeed antedated the Knesset's enactments on the power to pardon offenders.

          This fact alone should suffice to controvert the proposition that the presidential power of pardon was abrogated or curtailed by a later conferment of power on the Attorney-General to order a stay of criminal proceedings. The latter power coexisted with Art. 16 of the Order in Council 1922, and was still operative when the power to pardon offenders was widened in the Transition Law of 1949 and in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. And the construction of the power conferred under these enactments, in Matana and in A. v. The Law Council, did not precede, but followed the creation of the Attorney-General's power of stay.

         

          (d) On the relationship between the two powers, Justice Cohn, for instance, has said:

         

There is no similarity or parallel between the stated presidential power and the power of the Attorney-General to order a stay of proceedings: the one is a prerogative power, the other purely administrative; the one is subject to revocation and change at the Attorney-General's wish, the other is an act of much solemnity and by its very nature of rare and exceptional exercise ("Symposium," at p. 15).

 

          I myself am not inclined to view the Attorney-General's power as being administrative. It relates to a criminal procedure involving the exercise of a quasi-judicial discretion (see Schor v. Attorney-General [6]; Nof v. Attorney-General [7]). The purpose of the staying function was to reserve for the chief prosecution authority the power to halt criminal proceedings, without this entailing the consequences set forth in sec. 93 of the consolidated version of the Criminal Procedure Law (withdrawal of the charge), but retaining the possibility of resuming the proceedings within a given period. However, I do recognize differences between this power and the power of pardon, which I shall summarise presently.

         

          (e) There can be no full parallel between the power of stay and the power of pardon, since the former comes into play only after the suspect has been charged (sec. 231 of the Criminal Procedure Law [Consol. Version]). An immunity from prosecution promised a state witness who has not yet been charged, cannot be founded on the power of stay under see. 231, but only upon an Executive commitment or, if deemed fit, a pardon.

         

          (f) To sum up, the points of difference between the two powers are the following:

          (1) A stay of proceedings is inconclusive until expiry of the statutory prescribed period. A full and unconditional pardon, on the other hand, cannot be withdrawn (see Killinger, Kerper and Cromwell, Probation and Parole in the Criminal Justice System, St. Paul, 1976, p. 318).

          (2) A stay of proceedings under sec. 231 is possible only after the suspect has been charged.

          (3) A pardon (according to the decision in Matana ) acts to remove the stain of guilt utterly (in contrast, for example, to the prevailing approach in Britain, as expressed in R. v. Foster [42] and holding the pardon to wipe out only the consequences of the conviction; and see, in the U.S.A., Ex Parte Garland [52], and cf. Burdock vs. U.S. [53]; see also Killinger, Kerper and Cromwell, Probation and Parole, p. 322). A stay of proceedings is merely a trial procedure which, under the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) of 1982, calls a halt on further activities from the time the stay is ordered, without any retroactive effect.

          (4) As a trial procedure acting to halt the proceedings, the stay of a criminal prosecution is not unique, as appears from sec. 93 of the abovementioned Law concerning withdrawal of a charge by the prosecutor.

          (5) It is necessary for the Attorney-General to give his reasons for issuing a stay of proceedings, whereas no reasons need be given for the issue of an instrument of pardon.

         

15. The comparison made with English law and the contended disuse of the pre-conviction pardoning power, as advanced in the Attorney-General's above directive no. 21.333, seems to show a confusion between the continued existence of a power and the frequency of its exercise. The fact of an abrogation of the royal prerogative to grant a pardon at any time after commission of the offence, is nowhere postulated in English legal writings. One view, stated for example by Hood Phillips (Constitutional and Administrative Law, p. 378) and by R.F.V. Heuston ( Essays in Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., London,l964, at p. 69), takes the form of a mere recital of the power as existing and valid, without any comment or reservation. Another view, advocated by De Smith, holds the prerogative power to be valid but slumbering, and capable of reawakening in special circumstances of need (Constitutional and Administrative.Law, at p. 150, n. 121):

 

It would seem that a pardon may be granted before conviction; but this power is not exercised.

 

Also (at 143):

 

In a Scottish appeal to the House of Lords ( McKendrick v. Sinclair [43] at pp. 116, 117 - M.S.), Lord Simon of Glaisdale said that "a rule of the English common law, once clearly established, does not become extinct merely by disuse"; it may "go into a cataleptic trance", but, like Sleeping Beauty, it can be revived "in propitious circumstances."

 

          It is noteworthy that under the heading "Pardon" it is provided in sec. 9 of the English Criminal Law Act of 1967, that "nothing in this Act shall affect her Majesty's royal prerogative of mercy." As formulated, the section makes no distinction between classes of free pardon. It is at all events clear that the exercise of this prerogative power has greatly diminished in England. Already in 1926 Sir Edward Troup wrote ( The Home Office, 2nd. ed., 1926, p. 57) that the prerogative was not exercised before conviction except in rare cases where the pardon would enable an important witness to testify without incriminating himself in respect of a minor offence. There is reason to believe that since then the power has come to be even less frequently exercised. But, as I have already said, the existence of the power and the measure of its use are two separate matters.

          The question of the continued existence of the prerogative power of pardon, alongside and notwithstanding the power to order a stay of proceedings, is discussed in an article written by A.T.H. Smith in which he states this conclusion ("The Prerogative of Mercy, the Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice," Pub. L. [Autumn 1983], 416-417):

 

   Whether or not the power continues to exist is a matter of some conjecture, but the better view would seem to be that it does. It has certainly not been abrogated by statute, and although it is true that prerogative powers can be lost or modified merely by disuse, as in the case of the royal power to sit as a judge, the criteria for deciding whether or not a power has become "obsolete" are far from clear. As a general principle, the rules of the common law (of which the prerogative is undoubtedly part) do not lapse through desuetude or obsolescence. Even though the power does not at present seem to serve any identifiable constitutional purpose, the prerogative has proved itself to be a remarkably enduring power, and one that can reappear at unexpected moments, and until the advance pardon is expressly abrogated by statute, the possibility that its use will revive at some future time cannot be discounted.

 

          In other words, the accepted view is that the prerogative power, which in England emanates from the common law and not from statute as does the power of pardon in Israel, has not been abrogated by disuse but continues to exist; moreover, neither in theory nor in practice is there anything to prevent its renewed use in special circumstances, and only an express statutory directive can extinguish its efficacy.

          As for the situation in the U.S.A., it will be recalled that the presidential power of pardon was exercised on two recent, well-known occasions. On the first occasion it was exercised in favour of President Nixon (39 Fed. Reg. 32601-02 [1974]). (In this connection see Murphy v. Ford [54] in which the grounds for exercise of the power were discussed; see also Mark P. Zimmett, "The Law of Pardon," Annual Survey of American Law, 1974/5.) On the second occasion, in 1977, the power was exercised by President Carter in favour of evaders of conscription in the Vietnam War, i.e. a form of pardon for a class of persons and a class of offences, bearing the character of a partial "general" amnesty. The pardon was formulated to extend, inter alia, to "all persons who may have committed any offence between August 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973 in violation of the Military Selective Service Act or any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder" (42 Fed. Reg. 4391 [1977]). Bernard Schwarz writes of this pardon of 1977, "the legality [of which] was never questioned" (Constitutional Law, at p. 198). (On this pardon, see also G.S. Buchanan, "The Nature of a Pardon under the U.S. Constitution," Ohio St. L. J. 39 [1978], 36, 61, where the writer comes to the same conclusion.)

          The English system, so far as it is of comparative significance, seems accordingly to invite a conclusion that is the opposite of the one we have been asked to draw. If in England a power stemming from the common law has not lapsed or become obsolete notwithstanding the lack of its use, how much less so in our own case involving a statutory power construed by the Supreme Court (in 1960, in the Matana rehearing) as a valid and existing power in the opinion of all.

          As in England, so with us, the situation is one of a practical non-exercise of the debated power (see e.g. par. 5a of the Attorney-General's directive no. 62.100), rather than its explicit repeal. That is to say, the power itself has been reserved for use in exceptional cases, and its use knowingly restricted. The legal situation in the U.S.A. reflects a similar sparing use of the power of pardon before conviction, but its validity is clearly accepted there.

 

16. Our next assignment is to trace such other legal directives as may have a bearing on the aspect of pardon with which we are now concerned. In this regard Prof. Klinghoffer observed ("Lectures on Amnesty," at p. 7):

 

Showing mercy is not a monopolistic power of the State President. Other authorities too are competent to extend grace and clemency - as does the Attorney-General when issuing a nolle prosequi, or the Minister of Police when authorizing the early release of prisoners, with or without the recommendation of the competent board. The Military Justice Law likewise provides for the functioning of a penalty review board, with power to mitigate or substitute punishments, without derogation from the Presidential power of pardon. Already at the beginning of the lecture it was hinted that the contemporary trend is to permit the courts an increasing measure of mercy along with the doing of justice. Other matters affecting pardon and having constitutional implications, come into play when the quest for a pardon is pursued along the lines of a retrial.

 

          As already indicated, the statutory creation of an alternative legal framework for some of the processes for which the pardoning power is now used - in its various forms, mainly after conviction but also before - was proposed by Prof. Feller in his abovementioned article, "Rehabilitation." His proposal included a draft Rehabilitation Law, a supplemented and expanded rehearing facility, and an express narrowing of the provisions of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law so as to encompass only respite or remission of punishments not yet served (as distinct from a pardon in respect of the conviction). Prof. Feller proposed a synthesis between new legislation and amendments to existing enactments, aimed at supplementing the existing arrangements on matters such as a stay of proceedings, review of punishment, mitigation of punishment and retrial.

          Some years ago the trend embodied in the above proposals gained momentum with the enactment of the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law of 1981, which provides, inter alia, for the automatic deletion from the register in certain cases of a person's previous convictions, for restricting the availability of information concerning the same, and like directives. In other words, we witness here the completion of part of the legislative program designed to establish new legal machinery that will give expression to and aid in the practical attainment of an equality of rehabilitative opportunity and rights.

          In sum, we see in existence today a number of statutory provisions to reach many of the same results as are attained through exercise of the power of pardon. Some of these provisions precede the Knesset's enactment of the existing power of pardon and its judicial construction, for instance those concerning the prosecution's discretion as to charging a suspect, or the power to stay criminal proceedings. Other such provisions have sprung up contemporaneously and in coexistence with the statutory directives concerning pardon, such as the provisions relating to retrial and review of punishment, while more recently provision was made, as already mentioned, for expunging a person's criminal record. Thus some of the new provisions apply in the pre-conviction stage of the trial, while others - and these form the bulk - are applicable in the post-conviction stage, i.e. the stage where most of the decisions affecting exercise of the pardoning power are in practice made today.

 

17. We must now give attention to the fourth of our questions posed above, namely, the nature of the reciprocal tie between existing legislation and new legislation on the same subject or, more specifically: does the emergence of a new statutory arrangement alongside and overlapping an existing provision entail any abrogation of the latter?

          The prevailing Anglo-American interpretative approach is to start on the premise that the lawgiver intends no tacit repeal of earlier enactments, particularly not when the enactments are all of modern date (see F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation j London, 1984, p. 433, with reference to the decision in Jennings v. United States [44]; the same view is taken by R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation, London, 1976, 3). Incidentally, according to Cross. English law also does not recognize the possibility of abrogation of a law through desuetude, so that a statute will not cease to be valid merely on account of obsolescence. Generally speaking, express legislative direction is required for such invalidation.

          It is interesting that a similar approach was advocated by Prof. Klinghoffer, speaking at the time in a Knesset debate (Minutes of the Knesset, 43 (1965), 2319):

         

It is not the function of the prosecution to determine whether certain provisions of the penal enactments have become a dead letter. As long as they remain inscribed in the statute book they must be observed, and if their further observance be undesirable, it is up to the lawgiver - and not the prosecution - to repeal them.

 

          English law does not regard the mere concurrent existence of earlier and later legislative enactments on the same subject as warranting the inference of an implied repeal. This consequence flows only from contradiction between two enactments (see E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed., Toronto, 1983, p. 226; also W.F. Craies, On Statute Law, 7th ed., London, 1911, p. 366). Cross succinctly states the situation thus ( Statutory Interpretation, p. 13):

         

The test of whether there has been a repeal by implication by subsequent legislation is this: are the provisions of a later Act so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the provisions of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together.

 

          In support the writer quotes the decision in Westham Church Wardens v. Fourth City Mutual Building Society (1892) [45], adding, "The fact that two provisions overlap is therefore not enough."

         

18. (a) The question of a repeal by implication was deliberated by this court in Haddad v. Attorney-General [8], which involved the relationship between different penal enactments prescribini different measures of punishment for one and the same offence. In a majority decision it was held, inter alia, as follows (at p. 1421):

 

If the contradictions and inconsistencies between the two Laws cannot be aligned and reconciled with each other, the conclusion cannot be avoided that the earlier enactment has been implicitly repealed by the new one. In keeping with that rule, it has been laid down that even though the new Law deals with an offence that is also dealt with in the earlier Law, both Laws may continue to exist together if the new Law is found to have a different purpose and for that reason prescribes a substantially different penalty for the offence concerned; in such event, the offender may be charged under either Law. If, however, the penalty varies in degree only, that is to say, the one enactment prescribes a heavier or a lighter penalty than does the other, the earlier enactment will be deemed repealed by the subsequent one (see Maxwell, pp. 193-194; also Henderson v. Sherborne [1837].

 

          Reliance upon the interpretative rule concerning repeal by implication, was founded in the above case on the doctrine that an accused person is entitled to be held to account under the less stringent of two penal directives applicable to him. Therefore, the directive of earlier date, which differs from the later one only in the heavier punishment it prescribes for the same criminal act, will be deemed repealed by implication. This interpretative rule operates only in respect of punitive criminal directives which are laid down in two separate enactments, each dealing with the identical act, omission or attempt. In other words, the contradiction finds expression, in the situation described above, in the different measure of punishment prescribed. That situation has little bearing on the problem now before us, and certainly the above rule of interpretation has no application to the situation described in the Attorney-General's directive, namely, a concurrence of the power of staying criminal proceedings and that of pardoning offenders. There is neither a contradiction nor an identity between the two.

         

          (b) The question of the rule to apply when the same power is extended in two overlapping Laws arose directly before this court in Filtzer v. Minister of Finance [9]. The issue was the effect on certain powers conferred under the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance of 1943, of other powers to achieve the same objective conferred subsequently under the Rehabilitation Zones (Reconstruction and Evacuation) Law of 1965.

    For our present purpose, the above case is directly in point, since there too it was contended that the existence of parallel powers of different legislative vintage (in our own case the presidential pardoning power and the Attorney-General's power of stay) implied an abrogation of the earlier power. More specifically, it was argued in Filtzer that the Finance Minister's power of land expropriation under the Land Ordinance had been abrogated by the subsequent conferment of a parallel power on the rehabilitation authority constituted underthe later statute. Landau J. (as he then was) rejected the contention as to an invalidation of the power under the Ordinance of 1943, holding that even if the same purpose could be achieved under two different Laws, that did not preclude application of the earlier Law, though its provisions were less favourable to the citizen than those of the later Law. He noted that the two enactments were of equal status, and the Law of 1965 did not serve to deprive the Minister of his powers under the Ordinance of 1943, merely because the rehabilitation authority could achieve the same objective under the Law of 1965. Yet this conclusion had been said by the petitioners to be self-evident, in reply to which the learned Justice said (at pp. 119, 120):

 

The gist of the petitioner's argument is that the Law had effected a pro tanto repeal by implication of the earlier Ordinance in respect of all the eventualities covered in the Law of later date. Were it not for such an implicit repeal, it would anyhow be impossible to attribute to the Minister of Finance an abuse of his power under the Ordinance, when the exercise of such power is competent under the Ordinance as it stands. In H.C. 5/48 there arose a similar question in relation to the application of regulation 48 of the Defence Regulations of 1939. It was argued that this regulation had been implicitly repealed by regulation 114 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945. This argument was rejected, the learned President (Smoira), quoting the following passage from Maxwell:

Repeal by implication is not favoured. A sufficient Act ought not to be held repealed by implication without some strong reason. It is a reasonable presumption that the Legislator did not intend to keep really contradictory enactments on the Statute book, or, on the other hand, to effect so important a measure as the repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so. Such an interpretation, therefore, is not to be adopted unless it be inevitable. Any reasonable construction which offers an escape from it is more likely to be in consonance with the real intention.

The reason for such extra caution in declaring a statute implicitly repealed, is clear: to act otherwise is to introduce an undesirable element of uncertainty into the interpretation of laws which derive their validity directly from the will of the Legislature.

 

          Landau J. referred also to the Haddad case [8], mentioning that ground for holding an earlier enactment to be implicitly repealed by later overlapping legislation, existed in the area of penal statutes, with specific reference to differences in the mode of trial or the punishment prescribed in the later legislation. Landau J. then quoted this passage from the judgment of Smoira P. in the above criminal appeal (at p. 1426):

         

Great importance attaches, in my opinion, to the principle of such an implied repeal specifically in the area of the penal law. One finds the theory as to a possible coexistence between two penal Laws dealing with the same offence, to be accompanied by the routine statement that the public prosecution may choose as it sees fit to prosecute either under the more stringent or the more lenient law. However, this statement has no foundation other than its   routine recital, and in my view violates the fundamental penal law rule: nulla poena sine lege. A plurality of penal statutes from among which the public prosecution has a right of selection, is tantamount to a situation of having no defined and certain law.

 

          The abovementioned statements are particularly instructive in the context of our present inquiry, as they show the court frowning in that case on the development of a situation in which the citizen who has committed an offence is dependent upon the prosecution's discretionary choice of the penal provision under which he be charged, whether the more onerous or the more lenient provision. "The penal law can affect the citizen' s freedom and reputation" Landau J. pointed out, adding that there was no like reservation with regard to other legislation in the public field.

          These views expressed by Smoira P. and Landau J. have a bearing on the contention that the Attorney-General's power of stay operates as an implied pro tanto repeal or curtailment of the presidential pardoning power. At stake is the repeal or abrogation of a recognized constitutional power, the power of pardon of such scope and substance in our law as fundamentally perceived and construed in the decisions of our courts. Any interpretation that seeks to narrow the hitherto understood scope of this power, would normally require to be unequivocally established, for, as already indicated, the tendency is to give constitutional powers a wide interpretation. It is all the more difficult, therefore, to adopt the perspective that a power entrusted to the prosecution, at the exercise of its sole discretion, should oust a constitutionally endowed presidential power. It would seem difficult enough to accept the proposition advanced even if we were talking about a power of the prosecution that was new, rather than one already in existence when the pardoning power was enacted. I must reiterate what I have already stressed, that the question here is the existence of the power and not the manner of its exercise.

          Our inquiry accordingly leads to the conclusion that the rule as to an implied repeal of a statutory provision by later overlapping legislation, is not applicable in the matter now before us. This is so not only for the reasons stated in the Filtzer case [9], but because the question of an implied repeal by later legislation actually fails to arise at all in our present matter, inasmuch as the Attorney-General's power of stay antedated the modern enunciation of the presidential pardoning power.

         

19. The fifth question we posed was whether the pragmatic development of defined processes in our current legal reality can curtail the operational scope of an existing constitutional arrangement which is essentially the product of statutory interpretation. This question entails here the notion of a pro tanto repeal of the concurrent part of an earlier enactment, a notion which was explained by Justice Landau in the Filtzer case to have no application in circumstances of the kind now before us. The answer to the question is negative.

          In the first place, the answer to the question would normally depend upon the substantive nature of the processes at work, as weighed against the degree to which the constitutional arrangement evolved from statutory interpretation, and upon which the stated processes would impinge, has taken root. If this arrangement is the outcome of a wide, basic constitutional perspective, its efficacy will not be diminished by processes which are not contradictory thereto.

          Second, we are dealing here with a contention that is in fact predicated upon a change in the rate and frequency of exercise of the power of stay. This change, so the argument runs, should be seen as justification for viewing the presidential power of pardon as having been curtailed. That is tantamount to saying that the Attorney-General, by the number of nolle prosequi's he issues, determines whether or not the presidential power continues to exist. I do not believe that this proposition finds any existing legal foundation. Jurisprudence does not yet recognise a biological process by which, within a complex of existing interrelated statutory provisions, a kind of law of natural selection functions as a mechanism for the abrogation of Laws for which there is abated need because they have, as it were, fallen into disuse.

          Third, there will be scant inclination in a democratic regime espousing the rule of law and individual rights, to adopt an interpretation that suffers the whittling down, and even negation, of a power destined mainly to serve the individual, and it matters little that there exist other parallel institutions exercising like powers.

         

20. We might conveniently summarise our above reasoning as follows:

          (1) It is our accepted view that a legislative overlapping or even duplication does not in itself abrogate an existing enactment or power.

          (2) The validity of a statutory directive is not annulled by the fact of its disuse or rare use.

          (3) An implied repeal of statute law may result either from directives which are contradictory in content or, in the penal field, from the prescription of a lighter punishment in a later enactment. The presence of such contradictory directives was not argued in the matter before us, nor have we perceived it to exist. That the existence of two concurrent competent authorities does not in itself amount to a contradiction is clear from the ruling in Filtzer [9].

          (4) The mere fact of an overlapping between the power of stay and the power of pardon before conviction, does not invoke the rule of interpretation that would negate one of the two arrangements. The one is a procedural power, whereas the other is among the powers vested in the person who functions as the formal Head of State. The latter powers were fundamentally, by their very nature, intended to produce similar consequences to those resulting - to one extent or another, whether by legal design or in practice - from the acts of other governmental authorities. The two powers are of different juridical substance and the one does not negate the other.

          (5) The crucial question is whether the power of pardon before conviction was ever actually created. Once it transpires that this court has recognised the existence of such a constitutional power, and regarded it as an element of the wider presidential pardoning power, the same can no longer be amenable to an inadvertent or implied repeal. It is proper that the repeal of a constitutional power be effected only after due consideration and in a patent and advertent manner, as befits the subject of the repeal. Moreover, the rule of law is fortified when we show respect for our constitutional directives, inter alia, in the way we set about their amendment or repeal.

 

21. Were we to hold that the very enactment of new legislation can curtail the scope of an existing statute, or even implicitly repeal an express constitutional provision, then surely even the presidential power to pardon after conviction should be overtaken by the same consequence. A retrial, or the different punishment review boards, or the operation of the abovementioned Law concerning the rehabilitation of offenders, all serve purposes which overlap, partly at least, those of a pardon after conviction. As already indicated, this situation lately assumed added significance with the enactment by the Knesset of the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law of 1981, incorporating the ideas of Professors Klinghoffer and Feller.

          The argument as to legislative duplication and overlapping mechanisms, can hardly be confined to comparison of a stay of proceedings with the power of pardon before conviction (and substitution of the one for the other), but should properly embrace all the pertinent parallel mechanisms in the field of the constitutional as well as the penal law. An interesting illustration of the possible co-existence of parallel powers in the post-conviction stage, is provided by the Privy Council decision in Thomas v. The Queen [46], where the power of pardon of the New Zealand Governor-General was not considered invalid in relation to the class of cases in which the law permitted a retrial.

          There is no logical basis for a mode of interpretation that would differentiate, for the purpose of determining the scope of validity of the pardoning power, between the various new statutory provisions and their effects, and single out precisely those pertaining to the pre-trial stage. The power of pardon has been interpreted in our law in relation not only to the post-conviction stage, but also the pre-trial as well as the trial stages, and the fact of a gradual evolution of overlapping and parallel mechanisms provides no justification for a selective kind of interpretation.

          In fact we have here no implied repeal, nor any other phenomenon of an extinction without trace. When dealing with a constitutional directive such as sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, we cannot sanction the elimination of any part thereof except by an explicit statutory provision which, after all, is the product of methodical study and preparation and is founded upon tried and tested legal concepts rather than chance eventualities. It is important that objectives of constitutional import be attained in a seemly manner.

          In recapitulation, it seems clear that an enacted constitutional power is not repealed except upon express statutory directive, and that the statutory conferment on the prosecution of a power which is similar in content to that exercised by the President, does not act as an implied repeal of the constitutionally bestowed presidential power. It follows that the presidential power as construed in the cases of A. v. The Law Council and Matana, continues to exist and remain valid so long as not repealed by the Knesset.

          I would not disparage the view that the power of pardon needs to be reconsidered in a manner leading perhaps to revisory legislation. Any deliberation towards this end should, in the nature of things, encompass also a solution of the problem that arises, not infrequently, from the contradiction between the judicial decision and the pardon that follows it. The search for a proper balance and separation between the different Executive organs, and the coordination of their separate activities, does not come to an abrupt halt at the chance limits set by the legal dispute in a particular matter.

 

Juridical Substance of the Pardoning Power

 

22. Our next matter for inquiry, as I have already indicated in paragraph 8 of this judgment, is the juridical substance of the pardoning power.

          The power of pardon has ancient roots, and has for thousands of years been so interwoven with the ruler's status, as to induce an opinion that it finds no place in a democracy (see e.g. Blackstone's Commentaries, p. 397). The view that pardon was a feature of autocratic rule also found expression at the time of the French Revolution, when the power was abolished for the first time and left without trace for some years. Beccaria (On Crime and Punishment, New York 1963, pp. 58-59) saw an unbridgeable gap between his own penological perspectives and the power of pardon. Yet the power has survived in an overwhelming majority of world legal systems, although in a rich variety of forms so far as concerns its scope and the authority in whom it is vested (see Dr. L. Sebba, "The Pardoning Power - A World Survey," J. Crim. L. and Criminology 68 [1977], 83). The prevailing constitutional perspective is that the pardoning power now reposes in the people who, by the force of legislation, confer it in turn on a defined authority ( Am. Jur., supra, at p. 10).

          As to the variety of constitutional arrangements, I might briefly mention that sometimes the power of pardon vests in the Head of State, i.e. the President or the King; sometimes it entails the functioning of an advisory board representing all or some of the connected governmental authorities, or consultation with the court or a special judicial tribunal, or a judge (see J. Monteil, La grace en droit francais moderne, Paris, 1959, p. 22). In other countries the actual power is wielded by the legislature as such (for instance, in Switzerland and Uruguay), or by the judiciary. Sometimes the power is vested in the Council of State (for instance, in a number of Eastern European countries and in South Korea), or in the Presidium or a council specially constituted for this purpose. In Sweden the power rests with the Government and in the U.S.S.R. with the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

          These examples illustrate, without exhausting, the range of pardoning powers, which vary also in their prescribed procedures, such as the manner of lodging the request, of consultation with judicial bodies or other agencies, and of arrival at the decision. In Australia, for instance, an inquiry is conducted in all cases by a Justice of the Peace appointed by the Governor-General or by a Judge of the Supreme Court.

          In some countries the power of clemency is confined to the reduction of punishment alone (as in France, but there one finds also the special power of la grace amnistiante, which enables the grant of a full pardon to certain classes of persons; see Monteil, La grace, at p. 207). Pardon before conviction is possible in numerous countries, inter alia, the U.S.A., Britain, New Zealand, Singapore, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Iceland, Czechoslovakia, Lichtenstein, and the State of Queensland in Australia (see Dr. L. Sebba, On Pardon and Amnesty, at p. 291). In many other countries, however, there is pardon after conviction only (for instance in India, where the restriction is statutorily prescribed). The legal consequences of a pardon also vary greatly from country to country.

          In some countries the actual decision may be directly or indirectly challenged in the courts, whereas elsewhere, for instance in France, the decision offers no ground for recourse to the courts, whether as to the legality of the decision or as to its substance within the national framework. F. Luchaire and G. Conac phrase the situation thus: tant au niveau de leur legalité qu'au plan de la responsibilité de l'Etat (La constitution de la republique francaise, Paris, 1979, p. 351). The writers rely in this connection on a resolution of the Conseil d'Etat (30.6.1892; Gugel, Dalloz Periodique, 1894, III p. 61; 28.3.1947, Gombert, Sirey, 1947, III p. 89).

          Sometimes pardon is granted for political offences alone (for instance in Colombia), and at other times these are specifically excluded as a type of offence for which a pardon may be granted.

          Our purpose in sketching the abovementioned varieties and possibilities of pardon, is to illustrate the lack of any uniform model and the fact that virtually every legal system has fashioned its own peculiar perspective on the subject, in harmony with its other governmental institutions. For comparative purposes, it is of no moment that in the U.S.A. the President, in whom the power of pardon is vested, serves to head the executive, whereas in Israel the President fulfills the function of a titular and formal Head of State - much like the arrangement in England, adopted also in many of the European democracies after World War I. There is no uniform tie between the nature and general status of the executive office filled by the holder of the pardoning power, and the power itself, since it is sometimes vested in authorities other than the President or King. When this court made reference in Matana and in A. v. The Law Council to the constitutional situation in Britain or the U.S.A., it did so, not in order to link the Israel arrangement to one or another foreign complex of powers, but to indicate the source and substance of the viewpoints we ourselves adopted. These the court found reflected in what was taken at the time to be the prototype for our own constitutional mould when our initial autonomous directives to this end came to be enacted. Once domestically fashioned, the powers became independent of any influence other than our own perspectives and concepts. Processes in other countries may be of instructive and comparative interest, but cannot deflect us from what is customary and accepted here until such time as we ourselves decide to change the approach, and do so in the appointed manner, having regard to the character of the subject and the substance of the power concerned. For this reason, too, there is little logic in seeking guidance from other systems structured upon essentially different perspectives. If, for instance, French law decrees that grace, in the case of an individual, shall relate only to the punishment and not to the conviction (except in the case of grace amnistiante ), there is little we can learn from it as regards the possibility of pardon before conviction. The French method of grace, incidentally, seems to differ also from our own method of remission of punishment, for instance in relation to a mandatory death sentence. (On the reservations of former French President Giscard d'Estaing in this connection, see Luchaire et Conac, La constitution, at p. 348.) The opposite applies in Belgium, where remission Of a mandatory minimal punishment is possible (see Dr. Sebba's article "The Pardoning Power," at p. 86). In short, the lack of a power of pardon before conviction in France or Germany, for instance, has no bearing on the present situation in our law since the models in those countries played no part in the shaping of our constitutional framework of pardon. Furthermore, for a proper evaluation of standards, we should put the emphasis on the substance of the pardoning power, and not on the functionary who exercises it, or the manner of its exercise. In our law it has been held that the President is invested with the widest form of the power of pardon (as regards offences) and clemency (as regards punishment), being empowered to obliterate even the stain of the offence and not only its consequences. That is our existing legal situation and it is in the light of this conclusion that we have to draw further inferences as to specific aspects of the power. The fact that proposals have been made to change the legal situation - and I certainly am not opposed to the discussion of these ideas, and even the adoption of some of them - does in no way affect the substance of the existing law.

 

23. It accordingly transpires that in the present case the decision to pardon came within the formal scope of the State President's power. In this regard it should be noted that the lawgiver has made provision for the preliminary ascertainment of this court's views on matters of pardon. Thus sec. 32 (a) of the Courts Law (Consolidated Version) of 1984, provides that upon a request for a pardon or reduction of sentence lodged with the President, any question which arises and in the opinion of the Minister of Justice deserves to be dealt with by the Supreme Court, but which provides no ground for retrial under sec. 31 of the Law, may be referred by the Minister to that Court.

 

Exercise of the Power

 

24. Having concluded that the President has a valid power to pardon before conviction, we might now inquire as to the occasion for its exercise. In fact the power has so far remained virtually unused, such a pardon having been granted until now in only a small number of exceptional cases, some of which were brought to our notice in the course of our deliberations here. It is only right that the power be used sparingly, for only the most exceptional circumstances of paramount public interest or personal plight - for which no other reasonable solution can be envisioned - will justify such anticipatory intervention in the normal course of the trial proceedings. It would be wrong, therefore, to attempt to classify in advance the proper cases for the exercise of this power.

          The decision to pardon was held by Justice Marshall of America to be generally motivated as an act of grace ( United States v. Wilson [55], at pp. 160-161), but the prevailing American approach is to rest the decision on considerations of the public welfare (see: Biddle v. Perovich [56] at p. 486; and see also C.C. Joyner, "Rethinking the President's Power of Executive Pardon," Federal Probation 43 (1979) 16).

          As the general starting point for examining an exercise of the pardoning power, I am disposed to accept the approach enunciated in Montgomery v. Cleveland [57] at p. 1157:

         

While a pardon is a matter of grace, it is nevertheless the grace of the State, and not the personal favor of the Governor. It is granted out of consideration of public policy, for the benefit of the public as well as of the individual, and is to be exercised as the act of the sovereign state, not of the individual caprice of the occupant of the executive office as an individual. He is supposed to act in accordance with sound principles and upon proper facts presented to him.

 

          Normally, a pardon is not a natural further progression in the course of judicial proceedings, but should properly come into play only in exceptional circumstances which involve a material change in the situation after completion of the trial proceedings, and warrant an alteration of the judicial decision. All the more rarely and exceptionally, therefore, should the power of pardon be exercised before conviction, this being a reserve or residual constitutional power left with the President - something in the nature of a "safety valve."

          A theoretical example of circumstances warranting the grant of a pre-conviction pardon, was outlined by Prof. Klinghoffer in his abovementioned statement before the Knesset, the relevant passage from which I shall repeat below for the sake of convenience:

         

Another unconvincing argument advanced is that if a suspect be very ill, it would be an act of cruelty to put him on trial. Unconvincing, because in rare cases of this kind the President of the State would be able to grant a pardon before the trial commenced. The President is empowered to pardon offenders either before or after conviction. That was laid down by Justice Agranat in the case of A. v. The Law Council, H.C. 177/50.

 

          As a further example one might mention that reasons of state, involving arrangements with hostile elements, have been recognized in the past as legitimate grounds for the early release of prisoners from custody, even before completion of the trial and, implicitly at least, as warranting also the grant of a pardon (cf. H.C. 228/84 [10]; H.C. 270/85 [11] and Bar-Yosef v. Min. of Police [12]). Of course, even in the stated circumstances every case would still require to be examined independently and the situation would vary from one concrete set of circumstances to another.

         

25. Just as it would be inconsistent with the purpose of pardon for it to become converted into a kind of instance of appeal from judicial proceedings, so too pardon before conviction ought not to become a mode of appeal against the decisions (to prosecute) of the public prosecution. This slumbering, residual kind of power has been preserved for sole use in the exceptional situation of a risk of serious harm which the holder of the power may legitimately take into account, which is incapable of being warded off by other means, and thus warrants relaxation of the essential restraint on the exercise of the power.

          In concluding my remarks on the instant point, I should like to recall, and endorse with such changes as may be necessary, the recommendation made by Dr. L. Sebba (On Pardon and Amnesty). He proposes that even upon adoption and completion of the comprehensive legislative program proposed by him for the creation of machinery to deal effectively with all matters and foreseeable problems connected with or likely to result from punishment under the criminal law, there should still be left with the President a reserve or residual power, as he put it, to deal with exceptional cases (at p. 267):

         

However, even if all the proposed solutions be accepted, we do not recommend the complete abolition of this power. Even if the parole arrangement be instituted, even though it embody regulation of the penalty of life imprisonment, and even upon the abolition or qualification of prescribed minimal punishments, there will always remain special cases in which the offender will not find salvation unless the President be empowered to come to his aid. It is true that the flexibility contributed by the pardoning power to the process of meting out the punishment, has largely become redundant in view of the increased freedom allowed the courts over the years in this regard. It is also customary nowadays to enable the Executive to intervene in the more advanced stages of implementation of the punishment, so as to maintain flexibility in these stages as well. But in the end it is still necessary to leave an opening for intervention on the part of some additional authority, in the event that the other two authorities be unable to effect the desired solution. The proper authority for this purpose is indeed the State President, who ranks in status above the other two authorities, and especially since there is sometimes involved a departure from the policy laid down by the third authority, i.e. the Legislature. In these residual cases there remains room, therefore, for entrusting the President with a power that will function as a kind of "safety valve" in the event the customary processes provide no solution.

 

          And now, arising out of the hearing of the instant petitions, there are some additional observations I have to make.

         

The State and the Rule of Law

 

26. (a) The rule of law is not an artificial creation. It is to be observed in a concrete day-to-day manner in the maintenance of binding normative arrangements and their actual application to one and all, in the upholding of the basic freedoms, in the insistence upon equality and the creation of an atmosphere of trust and security. The rule of law, the public welfare and the approach of the State to problems are not opposing conceptions but complement and sustain each other.

          The court is specially charged with the practical realisation of these expectations, but all of the State organs are committed to the attainment of the stated objectives. One cannot conceive of a sound administration without maintenance of the rule of law, for it is a bulwark against anarchy and ensures the State order. This order is essential for the preservation of political and social frameworks and the safeguarding of human rights, none of which can flourish in an atmosphere of lawlessness. National security also leaned on the rule of law, both in protecting internal policy measures, and in aiding the creation of means to combat hostile elements. There can be no organized activity of any body of persons, or any discipline, without norms based on binding legal provisions.

         

          (b) Sound government requires that the authority concerned be in full possession of the relevant facts before acting. It is not necessary that the information be known to all, and the confinement thereof to a few persons is sometimes not only desirable but also legally imperative. Yet the need for the responsible authority fully to acquaint itself with the facts increases as the subject takes on greater importance. It must be remembered that the "leaking" of classified information does not happen by itself, but by its deliberate or accidental disclosure by some person involved.

         

          (c) Sound government is founded upon the faculty of sound decision making, which there can never be without prior knowledge of the relevant particulars, no matter the subject of the decision. The matter was discussed by this court in Berger v. Minister of the Interior [13], in the context of the Minister's duties with regard to the introduction of summer-time or "daylight saving." In background importance the subject, of course, did not match that which is now under deliberation, but the principle enunciated there is equally applicable elsewhere. In the above case the court formulated rules affecting the manner of ministerial decision making, reiterating the obvious proposition that this should result from and be structured upon knowledge of the factual situation.

          Sound administrative procedures will ensure diverse facilities for obtaining information, maintaining constant supervision and overseeing the implementation of directives. The process of gathering information or holding an investigation, when necessary, may also assume different forms. Here one golden rule has to be observed, valid for purposes of administration as well as inquiry, namely: the sooner a matter calling for investigation is examined, the better from all points of view. A particular authority may perhaps confine information departmentally, or otherwise restrict its dissemination and ensure that no harm result from the disclosure or obtaining of information. But there are no circumstances that allow an administrative authority to refrain totally from investigating a matter which may bear upon its capacity, and that of its subordinates, to function properly, and to decide issues within the scope of its immediate responsibility, or perhaps affecting its responsibility to the public at large. There is a world of difference between a decision to hold a controlled and protected investigation, and a decision not to conduct one at all. The latter option would be like trying to cross a busy road with one's eyes shut.

 

          (d) There are different ways to conduct a confined or departmental inquiry or investigation into any subject - including recourse to whatever legal proceedings be considered necessary - without prejudicing the national security. Such problems have been dealt with before, and I shall say no more on the subject on the assumption that the processes mentioned by the Attorney-General in his intimation of 15 July 1986, have been set in motion.

 

The President as a Respondent

 

27. On 30 June 1986 we ruled to delete the President's name as a respondent in petitions H.C. 431/86 and H.C. 446/86, and ruled likewise on 20 July 1986 in petition H.C. 463/86. Our reason for so doing is set forth in the Basic Law: The President of the State, sec. 13(a) of which reads as follows:

 

The President of the State shall not be amenable to any court or tribunal, and shall be immune from any legal act, in respect of anything connected with his functions or powers.

 

When he granted the instant pardon, the President was acting in a matter "connected with his functions and powers," so that he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts in connection therewith, including this court's powers of direct review - its authority to demand of the President himself an explanation of his decisions. This immunity relates to the direct challenge of any presidential act, but there is no obstacle to indirect judicial review of the President's discharge of his functions - in proper cases and when the proceedings are directed against some other respondent, as happened, for instance, in the case of Bar-Yosef v. Minister of Police [12].

 

28 (a) The question of the legality of the pardon granted is of wide range, embracing as it does both the power itself and the manner of its discretionary exercise. As regards the power itself, we have dealt extensively with the matter and sought to provide the correct answer above. With regard to the exercise of the presidential discretion, this court has had occasion to comment as follows, in connection with a ministerial recommendation for a pardon referred to the President:

 

Even if the President was misadvised, or even if he himself erred in the exercise of his discretion, the legal validity of his decision remains unaffected thereby and this court does not sit in appeal from the President's decision" (Barzilai v. The Prime Minister [14] at p. 672).

 

          The matter calls for a measure of clarification and qualification. It is accepted that in exercising judicial review, the court does not assume the role of the functionary whose conduct is under challenge (even if indirect) but examines whether the functionary acted as one in his position should have done ( Nof v. Attorney-General [77] at p. 334). The court does not seek to project and substitute its own decision but intervenes only when convinced that no reasonable authority in a similar situation could have arrived at that same conclusion. The degree of reasonableness required depends upon the status of the authority and the nature of its powers. That is to say, in exercising its jurisdiction the court will also have regard to the identity of the constitutional authority whose conduct is under review. The norms for the judicial review of discretionary power will in any event incorporate reference to the functional character and nature of the authority concerned (cf. Sarid v. Knesset Chairman [15] at pp. 203-4).

 

          (b) The petitioners' criticism of the President's exercise of his discretion extended also to the paucity of the information made available to him prior to his decision, as well as the haste, so it was further contended, with which the different pardons were deliberated and granted, and like contentions. I find none of them to provide any ground for intervention by this court. First, as regards the facts, there is no reason to dispute the declaration before us that the President was fully informed and had also met twice with one of the persons later granted a pardon. The fact that he did not meet with the other three applicants can hardly be regarded as an impropriety, as in fact the President normally deals only with written requests for a pardon and it is exceptional for him to meet with the applicant (see E. Abramovitz and D. Paget, "Executive Clemency in Capital Cases," N.Y.U.L. Rev. 39 [1964], 136, 137; and see Dr. Sebba, On Pardon and Amnesty, at p. 194). Once it is established that there was evidence before the President of the commission of offences as set forth in the pardon applications referred to him, whether verbal or in writing, and also that the applicants admitted having committed the criminal acts for which they asked to be pardoned, then clearly the President had before him sufficient particulars upon which to decide, thus leaving no ground for the court's intervention.

         

29. A further argument concerning the presidential pardoning power, focused on the distinction between amnesty and individual pardon, was addressed to us by Adv. Michal Shaked, learned counsel for the petitioners in matter H.C. 448/86. She contended that the circumstances of the grant of the pardons indicate them to have been in the nature of an amnesty, whereas the President enjoyed no such power, but the power to grant individual pardons alone. In support of her contention counsel quoted the following statement (extract from The Attorney-General's Survey of Release Procedures, Department of Justice, Washington, 1939 vol. III):

 

In an attempt to classify the institution of amnesty, we may state that it belongs to the upper concept of pardon. It is a plurality of pardoning acts, and its main feature is that the amnesty determines the conditions and the extent of the pardon by groups of persons or groups of crimes or by certain general attitudes of the individuals concerned. There is a pronounced predilection to lay stress on the motive. Even the exceptions and limitations in an amnesty are generally given by groups, regardless of the merits of the single case.

 

          It indeed appears from the decision in Matana [3] (at p. 445) that the President enjoys the power of individual pardon only (as is the case in England). But that exactly was the power exercised by the President in the instant case. It is true that he issued four different warrants of pardon, but each of them related solely to the individual named in that warrant and to the offence therein stated. The warrants did not define the right to the pardon according to a class of persons, or offences, or qualifying conditions. The fact that a number of pardons are granted simultaneously to several individuals involved in the same act or incident, does not serve to convert each separate warrant, or all of them together, into an amnesty (see Dr. Sebba, On Pardon and Amnesty, at p. 61).

         

Locus Standi

 

30. At the commencement of the hearing learned counsel for the respondents asked for dismissal of the petitions in limine, on the ground that the petitioners had no legal standing to contest the validity of the pardons granted. It was argued that these were in the nature of an individual act of the President and of concern to the recipients of the pardon alone. It was contended that the petitioners could not point to any real and direct personal interest in the invalidation of the pardons, as these operated solely for the benefit of the individuals pardoned (certain of the respondents in these proceedings), so that the petitioners, far from seeking any relief for themselves, were motivated merely to deprive others of a benefit (see Becker v. Minister of Defence [16], at p. 147).

          The absence of a real personal interest, even if this be true of the petitioners in the present case, does not, however, justify the immediate dismissal of the petition. This court has already held that it would take a liberal view on this aspect and grant access to petitioners where the question that arose was "of a constitutional character" ( Segal v. Minister of the Interior [17] pp. 429, 433), or "of public interest related directly to the advance of the rule of law" ( Shiran v. Broadcast Authority, [18] at 374; see also Dr. Zeev Segal's illuminating book, Standing Before The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice, Papyrus Publishing, 1986). Needless to say, there is no general recognition here of the actio popularis, a "public petition" to the court, only a general guideline that enables the court to open its doors in suitable cases of a public-constitutional character.

          Guided by the above rule I find the petitions now before us, which centre on the scope of the presidential pardoning power under the Basic Law: The President of the State, to disclose sufficient petitioner interest for recognition of their standing.

         

The Approach of Justice Barak

 

31. I have meanwhile had the opportunity of reading the interesting opinion of my learned colleague Barak J., and I am prompted to make several further observations in elucidation of our divergent approaches.

 

          (a) I naturally take no issue with the fundamental doctrine that we must decide according to our best knowledge and understanding of the law, regardless of the surrounding influences of the time and the subject concerned. That standpoint has always been customary with this court, and nothing new has happened in this generation to change the court's perspective.

         

          (b) A perusal of Justice Barak's opinion may lead one to think that our present subject has no acknowledged legal starting point founded in precedent, and that one is being referred (in Matana and in A. v. The Law Council) to nothing more, as it were, than some forgotten obiter dictum raised here from oblivion for the first time and elevated - without legal justification - to the standing of a recognized legal thesis. One might further gain the impression that even Justices Agranat and Berinson intended no differently in the above precedents. I must reject this approach because it does not accord, with all due respect, with the factual situation. The legal proposition that the President is endowed with the power of pardon before conviction, was clearly demonstrated first in the case of A. v. The Law Council and later, even more emphatically, in the Matana majority decision. Incidentally, even Landau J., at the end of his dissenting opinion in Matana. noted his complete agreement with the opinion of Berinson J. (at p. 461), whose remarks on the presidential power to pardon before conviction have already been quoted in full above.

          In brief, the ruling in Matana has become known and accepted as faithfully reflecting, for some decades now, the prevailing law on the subject. Confirmation thereof is to be found in the written commentaries and in all academic discussion of the subject. This situation has been so clear to all as to have prompted the two distinguished jurists who advanced a different perspective on the subject (Professors Klinghoffer and Feller), to acknowledge that their view was not in accord with the approach of the Supreme Court - which they interpreted substantially as I have understood and set it out above. One of them, moreover, relied on the very existence of the pre-conviction pardoning power for a proposed solution to other legal problems discussed by him at the time (see Prof. Klinghoffer's abovementioned remarks in the Knesset - Minutes of the Knesset, 43, p. 2319). It will be recalled that one of these jurists (Prof. Klinghoffer) based his approach upon a construction of the language of the pardoning directive, while the other (Prof. Feller) argued on the basis of the working of a complex of new (overlapping) statutory enactments, but I gather from the remarks of Justice Barak that his own viewpoint is founded on neither of the above two perspectives.

          There is no escaping the fact that Justices Agranat, Berinson and Cohn (to whose clear statements on the subject Justice Barak has not referred) all unequivocally expressed their opinion on the power of pardon before conviction within the general framework of pardon. That opinion has held sway until now. It was on the strength of an identical opinion that a past Minister of Justice, P. Rosen, acting upon the Attorney-General's advice, referred recommendations to the President for certain pre-conviction pardons which were subsequently granted. Our task here is not to search for the desirable constitutional framework, but rather to ascertain the existing legal situation concerning pardon in Israel, just as it was in fact enunciated by this court many years ago, without so far having undergone any change.

 

          (c) The constitutional development towards the existing situation was clearly traced in the Matana decision, from which one can gather the court's reasons for construing as it did the scope of the pardoning power under sec. 6 of the Transition Law and sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State. It is not possible to ascertain the meaning of an expression in a Law by seeking to unravel the true wishes of Knesset committee members from the surviving summaries of their statements in minutes of proceedings never published. In my recognition, the answer lies in an understanding of the legislative purpose. This is to be derived from the "spacious" interpretation to be given to constitutional provisions; from the construction of expressions according to their manifest purpose; and from factors such as legal background and development, constitutional analogy, the characteristics of our legal system and our own constitutional notions as given expression, inter alia, in the very determination of the presidential office, its object and functions. All these were dealt with in the Matana case and I shall not cover the same ground again.

          Justice Barak has sought to point out a divergence between the interpretative approach in Matana, and my own approach. Little substantiation of this has been provided, however. There is no substantial difference between the "historical-interpretative approach" said to have been adopted by me here, and the so-called legal-constitutional approach ascribed to Justice Agranat, and the difference in title is but a semantic one. Substantively speaking, the two approaches are alike: that followed on the one hand by Justices Agranat, Berinson and Cohn and - on the question of pardon before conviction - also adopted without reservation by Justices Silberg and Landau, and on the other hand, my own approach here. My learned colleague has commented thus:

         

Justice Agranat accordingly did not construe the Transition Law on the basis that its legislative purpose "was fashioned in the Anglo-American mould, which served as its prototype."

 

          In support of this connection he quotes the following observation of Agranat J.:

         

The result is that the ground of the absence of any similarity or comparison between the status of the President of our country and that of the British thrown (or of the President of the United States) is erroneous.

 

          This observation speaks for itself and, with all due respect, refutes my learned colleague's contention in indicating the opposite conclusion.

         

          (d) The legal situation in France, Germany and Italy was not fully portrayed in the Matana case, and I should like to clarify some additional facets. As far as I am aware, pardon before conviction is known in Italy too, but the pardon only comes into operation if the suspect is later convicted. This arrangement does not preclude putting the suspect on trial, and allows for an acquittal on the merits without recourse to the pardon. Briefly, in Italy and in Germany there has evolved the duality of a judicial pardon side by side with an extra-judicial one justizgebundener Gnadenakt and justizfreier Gnadenakt, see Mario Duni, Il Perdono Giudiziale, Milan, 1957; Richard Drews, Das Deutsche Gnadenrecht, Cologne, 1971; Klaus Huser, Begnadigung und Amnestie als Kriminalpolitisches Instrument, Hamburg, 1973).

 

          Judicial pardon or clemency, I believe, should be seen as a convincing reason for gradual curtailment of the Executive pardon. This process, which is also discussed by Prof. Feller within the wider framework of his proposed legislative program, has acted to shift the focal centre of the pardoning decision from the King, or President, to the judicial tribunal or special statutory bodies created to deal directly with the review of conviction and punishment (retrial, release and parole boards, and the like). The comparison of our system with those applied on the Continent is therefore questionable and premature in the existing state of affairs.

         

          (e) As to the pre-conviction pardoning power in England, concerning which too Barak J. has expressed reservations, I need only reiterate that there is not a single English constitutional text that fails to mention the continued legal validity of this power, though it be reserved for use in exceptional cases. Even the post-conviction pardoning power would seem to be somewhat less frequently exercised in England nowadays.

          I must also contest Justice Barak's endeavour to distinguish the American constitutional situation from our own on the basis of the President's status there as Head of the Executive. In fact, the power of pardon was originally conferred on the U.S.A. President as part of the legal continuity adopted there, with the concomitant imitation of the English model of the King's prerogative power (see the majority decision in Schick v. Reed [58], per Burger C.J.). The view that the U.S.A. President holds the pardoning power in his capacity as Executive Head, runs counter to authority:

         

Our government is established upon the principle that all governmental power is inherent in the people. Hence, crime is an offense against the people, prosecuted in the name of the people, and the people alone can bestow mercy by pardon. As subsequently is noted, the people may confer the pardoning power upon any officer or board that they see fit ( Am. Jur., at p. 10).

 

          The import of the passage is that the U.S.A. President holds his power as representative of the people and it is not his executive capacity, designation or status that determine its scope.

          In our own constitutional framework the President stands outside the political arena, and this neutrality should allay at least one of the apprehensions expressed by my learned colleague. Moreover, the conferment and exercise of all power can and should properly be subjected to supervision and review, as was indeed noted by Justice Agranat in Matana (at p. 461):

         

   Nor have I overlooked the fact that to endow the power in question with its "full" content may lead to its excessive use, which in turn involves the danger that the authority of the law in the eyes of the public will be weakened. My reply to this point, however, is that every instrument of pardon by the President requires the countersignature of the Prime Minister or one other Minister (sec. 7 of the Transition Law, 1949). This means that even if the decision to pardon or to reduce a sentence must be the personal decision of the President, it is also conditional upon the recommendation of the Minister concerned. This Minister will ordinarily be the Minister of Justice who has the means of conducting a precise investigation into the circumstances of the case before submitting his recommendation to the President. It is clear that this recommendation, and therefore the decision to pardon as well, are subject to review by the Knesset and it is this possibility which must be regarded as the guarantee laid down by law against the danger referred to.

 

And Justice Cohn had this to say on that same point (at p. 465):

I have no fear whatsoever of any supposed impairment of the courts power to judge and to punish by the extent that the President of the State is empowered to change or set aside the results of their judicial acts. I could see some slight ground for fear and some small degree of impropriety if the power in question were possessed by the government or one of its organs, or even by the Knesset, for that would perhaps involve some confusion of the boundaries between the judicial on the one hand and the executive or legislative authorities on the other. The President of the State, however, stands above all these three authorities. He embodies in his person the State itself.

 

          So far as I am concerned, the existing Israel form of the pardoning power is not a sine qua non for the maintenance of orderly constitutional government. The variety of arrangements made on this subject in different countries is indicative of more than one solution to a universal problem. Our own arrangement is hardly, therefore, to be seen as the sole possibility. The central feature of the pardoning power wielded is a personal, selective decision which is dependent, inter alia, on the recommendation and countersignature of an authority of a political character, i.e. the Minister. My own inclination is to prefer some new legislative arrangement that will introduce appropriate statutory mechanisms free to function, as regards judicially decided matters, without recourse to the decisions of political organs. At the same time, however, one has to reject the view that the full pardoning power presently prevailing is inconsistent with the rule of law. It should be remembered that we are dealing here with legally valid constitutional arrangements of the kind found today in countries of recognised democratic character, and to say that the existence of an effective rule of law is negated by reason of a pardoning power of full scope, where it exists, is an extreme proposition lacking any real foundation.

          I must also refer to the contention that the very overlapping of the presidential power with like administrative powers is inconsistent with the maintenance of good government. I have already pointed out that there is no complete parallel between the two kinds of power. Pardon in all its existing forms represents an institution which by its very nature and working contradicts the rulings of other authorities, just as it does whether it is extended before or after conviction. Such overlapping is therefore an inherent feature of the entire pardoning process and in this respect its exercise before conviction is not exceptional.

          It is only right that the abandonment of the existing arrangement in favor of newly devised systems should be preceded by a comprehensive study of the subject - of the kind undertaken by Prof. Feller - and be followed by orderly legislation embracing all aspects of pardon and clemency. But until the fundamental constitutional perspective underlying our recognition of the pardoning power be revised in the appointed way, there is no room for the abrogation - in a sporadic manner, by the method of interpretation - of one of the facets of that power which has been recognised for many years now, and is rooted in the fundamental judicial understanding of the pardoning institution in our legal system. The ad hoc erosion of an existing legal arrangement in answer to the needs of the hour, weakens rather than strengthens the rule of law. This was the kind of situation I had in mind when I remarked thus in Neiman v. Central Knesset Elections Committee [19] (at 260):

         

When constitutional matters are under review, their import and implications have to be considered in the long term, and proper weight has to be given to their influences on the political and social frameworks within which they operate. If these be subjugated to the needs of the hour and we adopt a casuistic approach in matters of constitutional content, we shall miss the mark and deal less than justly with the subject.

 

          (f) It is, in sum, an inescapable conclusion that the Matana precedent adopts a wide and embracing interpretation of the presidential pardoning power. It was explicitly decided there by Justices Agranat, Berinson and Cohn that it also encompassed pardon before conviction. Though the product of autonomous Israeli legislation, the power cannot be divorced from its repeated comparison and equation, in the Matana case, with the parallel power held in the Anglo-American legal system by the King or President, as the case may be. This equation had a direct bearing on the reach of the constitutional power unfolded in the above precedent. Much as I try, I find no evidence in the Matana decision to support the suggestion of Barak J., that at that time the origin and substance of the power in England and in the U.S.A. had not been properly understood. I also find no evidence that this court had overlooked, as it were, differences of constitutional structure between those countries and Israel or, for that matter, the prosecution's own powers and independence in Israel, or the clash of the presidential power with other overlapping, frequently exercised powers - both before and after conviction. This suggestion is in entire disaccord with the long-accepted Matana ruling.

The constitutional situation is, therefore, that enunciated in Matana, by which precedent we have to be guided - as regards the scope of the pardoning power until the lawgiver sees fit to intervene. We have to contend with the legal and factual circumstances as we find them unfolded before us, rather than with hypothetical or desirable situations, and without circumventing or bypassing the decisions of this court and their consequences. It is our judicial task, in the present context, to give a principled, normative decision, structured upon existing legal foundations. In the pursuit of this objective we should do well to apply Chief Justice Marshall's well-known dictum in Osborn v. United States Bank [59] (at p. 866):

 

Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect .... to the will of the legislature.

 

The Investigation

 

32. We understand from the State's reply, as intimated by the Attorney-General, that the police will conduct an investigation into the events forming the subject of these petitions. This leaves no room, in my opinion, for intervention by this court in connection with the holding of an investigation.

          Following the Attorney-General's intimation, the petitioners in file H.C. 431/86 gave notice of withdrawal of their petition, and the petitioner in file H. C. 428/86 advised that he was confining his petition to the sole issue of the legality of the pardons granted.

          As to the petition in file M.A. 320/86, I see no reason to question the decision on the investigation as intimated by the Attorney-General, the nature of which I find acceptable in principle.

         

33. I would accordingly dismiss the petitions and discharge the order nisi.

 

MIRIAM BEN-PORAT D.P.

 

1. The divergence of opinion between my learned colleagues, President Shamgar and Barak J., persuaded me to await their written judgments before giving my own decision on the important question under consideration here, namely: is the President of Israel empowered to grant a pardon to a person before trial and conviction? I find my learned colleagues to have unfolded in their judgments a wide and colourful tableau of concepts, precedents and scholarly comment, which have aided me greatly in formulating my own opinion. Their painstaking and comprehensive analyses leave me free to concentrate mainly and briefly on my reasons for concurring in the judgment of the learned President - more particularly, my reasons for agreeing that the pardons granted by the President are legal and valid and, primarily, my reason for holding that the stated presidential power of pardon before conviction effectively exists.

 

2. In see. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, it is provided that the President

   shall have power to pardon offences (and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof).

 

          I have put the latter part of the directive in parentheses since the first part is the focus of our deliberation here, although I shall of course deal with the whole in substantiation of my viewpoint. As already clarified by my learned colleagues, the power "to pardon offenders" was previously vested in the President under sec. 6 of the Transition Law of 1949, and remained so vested until the repeal of this provision by sec. 26(a) of the above Basic Law. A comparison of the language of the two sections shows only a slight difference in wording, of no material significance. We may accordingly treat anything stated or decided on the basis of sec. 6 of the Transition Law as equally applicable to sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, with which we are now concerned. For the better understanding of my exposition below, it should be recalled that until the enactment of the Transition Law, the President's power was anchored (pursuant to sec. 14 of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948), in Article 16 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922, which provided as follows:

         

When any crime or offence has been committed within Palestine, or for which the offender may be tried therein, the High Commissioner may, as he shall see occasion, grant a pardon to any accomplice in such crime or offence who shall give such information and evidence as shall lead to the conviction of the principal offender or of any such offenders if more than one; and further may grant to any offender convicted of any crime or offence in any court.... a pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions, or any remission of the sentence.

 

          I have stressed, in the above passage, the word "offender" and the phrase "a pardon.... subject to lawful conditions," for purposes which I shall presently elucidate. At this stage, however, I merely wish to summarize the President's power at that time (from the transfer to him of the High Commissioner's powers under the above Ordinance) as embracing a pre-conviction pardon granted an accomplice who was willing to give information leading to the conviction of the principal offender or any such offenders, as well as a pardon granted any convicted offender. The pardoning power, as already indicated, was formulated differently in the Transition Law, and this version was later repeated without material change in the Basic Law.

         

3. Our search for the proper interpretation of the statutory provision in issue here, hardly breaks new ground. Justice Barak is aware of this fact, but attaches little weight to the precedents cited, for two reasons. In the first place, he holds the statements made in these precedents to have been obiter, and secondly, he considers certain passages therein actually to support his own view. Thus he mentions, for instance, that Justice Agranat saw the power conferred under sec. 6 of the Transition Law as an "original" one, and therefore offering no basis for analogy with the corresponding power in English law. Justice Barak also attaches no significance to the practice that has evolved out of those precedents.

 

          I accept Justice Agranat's determination, in the Matana case [3] (at p. 443), that the language of sec. 6 of the Transition Law- and likewise of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law - was not comparable with that of Art.16 of the Order in Council, since the Transition Law provision represented an "original" Israel power of constitutional content, in contrast to the class of powers delegated by the English King to colonial Governors. The latter were much narrower than the King's own powers, and required a restrictive interpretation.

          However, I disagree with Barak J., that in the Matana case Agranat D.P. (as he then was) did not view the presidential power of individual pardon under the Transition Law (as opposed to a general amnesty), as being basically the same as that of the English King or the American President. In other words, Justice Agranat's remarks on the original nature of the power set forth in sec. 6 of the Transition Law, and on the universality of the pardoning concept, were only intended, I believe, to explain why the non-repetition in sec. 6 of the Transition Law of certain parts of Art.16 of the Order in Council, could properly be ignored in construing that section. For the purposes of the issue in Matana, Agranat D. P. was not prepared to regard the non-repetition in sec. 6 of the Transition Law, of the words "pardon.... subject to lawful conditions" (appearing in Art.16 of the Order in Council and stressed by me in the above citation), as being in derogation or restriction of the presidential power. On the contrary, his opinion was that the general language used in sec. 6 was characteristic of a constitutional directive and called for a wide interpretation, and he saw the Anglo-American legal sources as prompting the proper interpretation of our own statutory provisions (see the Matana case [3], at pp. 453, 454). It was his opinion (which became the majority opinion of the court) that notwithstanding the absence of an express empowerment of the President to grant a pardon subject to conditions, the general wording ("the power to pardon offenders") sufficed, by virtue of the wide interpretation, to invest the President with this power as well (i.e. to pardon conditionally).

          Any remaining doubt as to Justice Agranat's recognition (in Matana) of the link between Israel and England as regards the power of individual pardon, is surely dispelled upon reading his judgment in the earlier case of A. v. The Law Council [2]. While the learned Justice erred there with regard to the power of colonial Governors (i.e. the High Commissioner of Palestine), an error he subsequently corrected, his basic standpoint has nevertheless prevailed. This standpoint he expressed in the following terms, and in other statements to the same effect in his judgment:

         

   I am of the opinion that the power of pardon of the President of Israel is the same, generally speaking, as the power of pardon of the King in England, in its nature and in respect of the consequences which flow from its exercise" (ibid., p. 750).

         

          Agranat J. (as he then was) was indeed alone in considering the full arguments of counsel as to why the name of A., the petitioner, was to be restored to the Roll of Advocates following upon the full pardon granted him (after he had served his full sentence). Yet the related comments of Agranat J. were not mere obiter dicta - and as is known, these too can carry considerable weight - but were made in the deliberation, on its merits, of what he considered to be the real question underlying the dispute in that case:

 

The real dispute being waged today between the petitioner and the community, has its origin in the former's argument that the pardon gave him an absolute right to the restoration of his name to the Roll of Advocates....  It is clear that this court alone is competent to adjudicate upon this dispute between the petitioner and the public.... The fact that the petitioner, for the reason of having misconceived the powers of the Law Council, turned to that body for the enforcement of his right, does not negate the possibility that the petitioner's abovementioned argument may be finally disposed of in the present proceedings.... If we find the petitioner's argument to be well founded, and declare him entitled to renew practice as an Advocate, such a declaration will bind everyone, and the petitioner should experience no difficulty in having his name restored to the Roll. If, on the other hand, we decide that the pardon does not bring about the desired result, that ruling will equally resolve this dispute between the citizen and the public. One way or the other, I believe it is required of us to decide this whole question.... which is what I now proceed to do (my italics-M.B.P.).

 

          It seems to me that Justice Agranat's attitude reflected his clear perception that the power of pardon in Israel required to be widely interpreted, as in England and America, as embracing also the pardon of an offender before his conviction. This attitude is to be gathered from his judgments, in A. v. The Law Council and in Matana. It so transpires from his citation and adoption of a statement in Halsbury's Laws of England that "pardon may, in general, be granted either before or after conviction," and especially from his own conclusion (in A. v. the Law Council [2], at p. 751):

         

from which I learn that the President has the power to pardon offenders both before and after conviction, either unconditionally, or with qualifications.

 

          Justice Agranat gave practical implementation to his above perception by interpreting the consequences of the pardon in issue there in accordance with the customary approach in England and in the U.S.A. (ibid., p. 751).

          A perusal of the two precedents reveals that none of the other Justices dissented from the interpretation according to which the President of Israel was competent to pardon offenders also before conviction; indeed, most of the Justices explicitly took the same view. Thus the difference of opinion between Berinson J. and Agranat J. in Matana, as to the comparison of sec. 6 of the Transition Law with Art.16 of the Order in Council (with Berinson J. refusing to recognize a presidential power to grant a pardon subject to conditions, owing to the absence in sec. 6 of such express provision), did not prevent Berinson J. from holding (perhaps on account of the first part of Art. 16) that the presidential power of pardon was exercisable also before conviction ( ibid., at p. 469):

         

the President's power of pardon is in a certain sense wider than that possessed by the High Commissioner. Whereas the High Commissioner was unable to pardon a crime before the offender was tried and convicted unless he turned King's evidence and led to the conviction of his accomplice (the first part of Article 16 of the Order in Council), the President is not bound by this condition and, so it seems to me, may pardon any offender even before he is brought to trial.

 

          Landau J., at the end of his opinion in Matana, expressed his "complete agreement" with the judgment of Berinson J., from which it follows that he agreed also with the content of the above passage, or at least had no reservations about it.

          Justice Cohn fully supported Justice Agranat's interpretative approach, and emphasized his view that the Presidential power was to be widely construed.

          The general opinion, therefore, was that there was in Israel an existing, valid presidential power of pre-conviction pardoning. There was, however, a divergence of opinion in Matana on the question of equating the power of the President of Israel with that of the British Monarch.

          It may be noted that Justice Agranat's approach has been followed in practice ever since the decision in A. v. The Law Council. This fact is confirmed in the judgment of Cohn J. in Matana (at p. 461):

         

Under sec: 6 of the Transition Law, 1949, the President of the State is empowered to pardon offenders and to reduce punishments. The Presidents of the State have exercised this power from 1949 until the day on which judgment was delivered in Matana v. Attorney-General (June 23, 1960, in the manner laid down for them in the judgment of this court (per Agranat J) in A. v. The Law Council, at 745 et seq.). That is to say, both the President of the State and the Minister of Justice, whose countersignature of the President's decision is required by the Law, and also the wide body of citizens who have had need of the President's grace, have always regarded this power of the President as equal and parallel in nature and scope to the power of pardon and reduction of punishments possessed by the Queen of England.

 

          This practice (with which few were as familiar as Justice Cohn, who had held office as Attorney-General for a lengthy period) had been followed for some ten years when the decision was given in Matana, and in this context the learned Justice went on to comment as follows (at p. 462):

         

It has already been said more than once by this court (both during the Mandate and after the establishment of the State) that the court will hesitate very much to reverse a particular practice which has taken root during the years, and if this was said in respect of matters of practice which did not rest upon the authority of judicial precedent, how much more is it applicable to a matter of practice which rests upon a specific decision of the Supreme Court. As for myself, even if I were inclined to agree with the opinion held by my colleagues Berinson J. and Landau J. that the practice followed by the President of the State year after year is based upon too wide an interpretation of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949 [and it will be recalled that the opinions differed there on the question of a pardon subject to conditions, and not as regards a pardon before conviction - M.B.P.], even then I would no venture today to change this practice which has received the seal of the Knesset at least by its silence (my italics - M.B.P.).

 

          We are, therefore, talking about a practice that has now been followed for some decades. Initially the practice was founded on the single opinion of Agranat J, that is, on the ratio of his decision in A. v. The Law Council, and later also on the Matana decision.

          That even distinguished jurists treated the decision in A. v. The Law Council as laying down a rule to be accepted, may be gathered from the following extract from a statement made by Prof. Y. H. Klinghoffer in a Knesset debate on 29 June 1965 ( Minutes of the Knesset, 43, p. 2319):

         

Another unconvincing argument sometimes advanced is that if a suspect be very ill, it would be an act of cruelty to put him on trial. Unconvincing, because in rare cases of this kind the President of the State would be able to grant a pardon before the trial commenced. The President is empowered to pardon offenders either before or after conviction. That was laid down by Justice Agranat in the case of A. v. The Law Council (my italics-M.B.P.).

 

          The above remarks were made with reference to the question whether it were better to render it obligatory for the prosecution to charge a suspect and put him on trial when the evidence so warranted, or to leave the decision to the discretion of the prosecution. Prof. Klinghoffer clearly favoured the former option, reasoning thus:

         

In expressing my reservations I would recommend we abandon this method in favour of one that obliges the prosecution to put a person on trial when it is in a position to substantiate the charge upon sufficient evidence. When a particular act or omission is defined by statute as a criminal offence, the matter should properly be submitted for judicial determination, and it is not the concern of the prosecution, which is a part of the Executive authority, to relieve the suspect of responsibility for his act or omission by not putting him on trial, and precluding the competent court from judging him according to law. To entrust the prosecution with the option to decide on its own whether or not there be any public interest in holding a particular trial, and accordingly whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against the suspect, is to invite dangers of a political nature. This arrangement would amount to a conferment of power to pardon someone in advance, and convert the prosecution into a kind of pardoning institution, something that is not in keeping with its essential function (my italics - M.B.P.).

 

          We accordingly see that Prof. Klinghoffer drew a clear distinction between an unqualified discretion given the prosecution whether or not to charge a suspect - according to its perception of the public interest in the matter - and the exercise of the pardoning power. The distinguished jurist saw such an option as holding out certain dangers, and undesirably conferring a power of advance pardon, whereas he accepted as a matter of fact the presidential power to grant a pardon, in rare cases, even "before the trial commenced."

In the end the Knesset took the middle path, but I shall come back to this aspect later.

         

4.       Two conclusions may be drawn from what I have said so far:

          (a) As regards the scope of the presidential power to pardon offenders before conviction, we are not without guidance, for the existing judicial pronouncements on the subject to the effect that the President does possess such power, cannot be said to be purely obiter;

          (b) We are confronted with a practice that has taken root in Israel ever since the decision in A. v. the Law Council, that is to say, for some decades now.

          There can be no doubt as to the importance of these two considerations in the determination of our attitude.

          (c) Also carrying weight, purely as an interpretative indicator for me (and not as a source of legislation), is the fact of the lawgiver's silence on the instant point when the content of sec. 6 of the Transition Law was reenacted in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. This silence was maintained despite the clear trend of the precedents and the practice evolved and based thereon, and it stands out against the express addition in the Basic Law of a presidential power to "commute" sentences, the lack of which had been established in the precedent cited, together with the court's unanimous opinion that the President was empowered to pardon also before conviction. This silence and its implications are fully elucidated in the judgment of Shamgar P.

         

5. It is true, however, that a later legislative development sometimes does dictate a change in interpretative approach. Attitudes also change with the passage of time, and these changes come to be reflected in the decisions of the courts - in the manner of new wine poured into an old flask - if weighty reasons be found for departing from an existing rule, deeply rooted though it may be. If, for instance, the customary interpretation be found necessarily to misconceive the purpose of the provision concerned, or that it has not even the slightest foundation in the language of the provision, or that its implementation in the exigencies of new reality poses a real threat to the maintenance of good government, then I should be inclined to construe the pardoning power restrictively as being confined to the post-conviction stage alone.

          I have come to the conclusion, however, that there are no weighty reasons for disturbing the existing precedents and practice. My reasons for so concluding are the following:

          (a) The wide interpretation given the term "offender" finds ample justification in the language of the statutory provision in question. My colleague, Barak J., acknowledges that, linguistically speaking, the term "offender" could embrace also a suspect who has yet to be tried and convicted; hence, in his opinion, the wording of the provision alone does not advance our inquiry one way or the other. Yet the learned Justice suggests at the same time that only someone who has already been convicted is an offender, as appears, for instance, from the following passage in his judgment (par. 25):

         

   Even an admission by the applicant for a pardon that he committed an offence, is of no consequence, for he is presumed innocent until convicted by the court.

 

          I must confess that I find the emphasis given to circumscription of the term "offender" in the context of our instant inquiry, somewhat perplexing. It is common cause that the main (some hold, the only) purpose of a full pardon, is to make amends for a serious miscarriage of justice which has resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. If that be the main (or sole) purpose, then the recipient of the pardon is no "offender" at all, but the victim of an error. If we adopt the arguments of the petitioners, and of certain jurists, that only the court is competent to stamp a person as an "offender" for the purposes of pardon, we shall find that it is precisely that kind of error which the President is unable to repair - a situation that is contrary to all logic. Of what avail is it for the court to find, upon hearing evidence and argument, that the accused indeed committed the crime - and thus branding him an "offender" - if the essence, and main purpose, of a pardon be to proclaim that he is not such? This reasoning alone would warrant the conclusion that an "offender" includes someone to whom the commission of an offence is attributed.

          It is pertinent, moreover, to recall that Art. 16 of the Order in Council empowered the High Commissioner to pardon an offender (an accomplice) before conviction, if he was prepared to give information and evidence concerning the principal offender or any such offender. We must bear in mind the proximity in time between the repeal of the said Article 16 and the enactment of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, a proximity which provides further indication that the term "offender," as already pointed out in the judgment of Shamgar P., was intended to refer to someone to whom the commission of an offence "is attributed." The learned President cited many convincing examples of the lawgiver's use of the term "offender," in a variety of contexts, from which too one may learn that this term does not necessarily mean someone who has already been convicted. In other Laws the term may indeed import otherwise, depending upon the legislative context and intent, but the abovementioned examples all relate to the same or closely the same kind of material as our present matter (for instance, general amnesty), and convincingly show that the term "offender" should not be understood only as someone who has been tried and convicted. In addition to the above illustrations, among many other possible ones, I might also mention sec. 6 of the Secret Monitoring Law of 1979, which provides a framework for secret monitoring, inter alia, if necessary "to prevent offences or detect offenders." It is clear from the context that the Law envisages the monitoring and exposure of the conversations of a person involved in a criminal act (whether not yet committed, in the process of commission or after its commission) and all, of course, in the stage preliminary to the trial and, certainly, before conviction of the suspect.

          In essence, my learned colleagues and I all agree that linguistically speaking sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law suffices, as it stands, to encompass also the power of pardon before conviction. The requisite interpretative nexus for this purpose is there, and the statutory provision cannot be said to lack a linguistic foundation for such a construction.

 

          (b) We must now, after disposal of the linguistic aspect, deal with the main criterion, namely, the legislative purpose of the pardoning directive.

          Justice Barak holds in his judgment that a construction according to which the President of the State may pardon someone before his trial and conviction, is inconsistent with the purpose of the pardoning directive. He states that in order to choose between the possible linguistic options we must turn to the legislative purpose, and he holds the true objects of the pertinent statutory provision to be those enunciated by Justice Agranat in A. v. The Law Council and in Matana, and none other, namely:

         

The primary purpose... is to redress the wrong done to a person who was convicted while innocent, and the second purpose - the value of which should also not be underestimated - is to reduce the sentence of the offender in circumstances which justify this. It is clear that the exercise of such a power by one of the highest State authorities is essential for the effectiveness of any governmental regime, since in no country whatever has there yet been created a system of justice capable of perfect and unerring operation, and of dispensing justice in every case without fail ( A. v. The Law Council, at p.751).

Justice Barak then goes on to make this comment:

This reasoning naturally only holds true in relation to a convicted offender. It is not at all applicable to someone who has yet to be convicted. How, then, is this reasoning of Justice Agranat to be reconciled with his view that the President has power to pardon before conviction? Such power would necessitate a different rationalisation, of the kind that is not to be found either in A. v. The Law Council or in Matana (my italics - M.B.P.).

 

          This seems a cogent argument in support of the conclusion that, measured by the test of legislative purpose, the presidential power is restricted in its exercise to a pardon after conviction only. It is not so, however. Thus, for instance, in A. v. the Law Council Justice Agranat mentioned additional objects of a pardon, remarking inter alia as follows (at p. 755):

Third, I have not overlooked the possibility that a pardon may also be granted for reasons which do not stem, necessarily, from the innocence of the convicted person.

 

          These remarks link up with what Justice Agranat said later in the Matana decision (at p. 451):

         

It is quite easy to think of a case in which the need to use this system would arise when the public interest alone, and not that of the prisoner, requires his release from custody. It may, for example, be proper to liberate a prisoner who is a national of an enemy state on condition that he leave Israel territory immediately and permanently, in order to facilitate an international arrangement which will ensure, in return for such a pardon, the immediate release of a "Zionist prisoner" in custody in that state.

 

          The above example happens to relate to a convicted prisoner, yet this underlying purpose is not to reverse an injustice but to prefer the public interest, to which the rule of equality before the law must bow. That is to say, we have here a conflict between two very important interests: one - equality before the law, which requires that every offender against the law should answer for his conduct; the other - the safeguarding of a vital public interest. The proper balance between the two is the determining factor. The President of the State was in the same predicament in relation to the matters raised in the petitions before us. Thus he declared his conclusion that despite finding merit in the opposing viewpoint, he was satisfied at the time that vital security interests of the State were at stake and also that it was necessary to put an end to the "devils' dance," as he described it, and therefore he decided to accede to the requests for a pardon.

          The primary purpose of a pardon, at least until the retrial procedure was instituted, has indeed been to correct an injustice resulting from an error in judicial proceedings. But that has not been the only purpose of a full pardon. Thus, as already mentioned, it was possible under Article 16 of the Order in Council to pardon an accomplice (before trial) in order to induce him to give information and evidence against the principal offender or any such offenders. The purpose of such a pardon was not to reward its recipient, but to achieve an object considered by the pardoning authority more important than trying the person pardoned. (A similar approach is also to be discerned in civil law - see Mistry Amar Singh v. Kulubya [47], where the plaintiffs claim, though tainted with illegality, was sustained in order that the purpose of the law should not be defeated.) For the attainment of the same purpose a pardon or clemency may conceivably also be granted to a convicted offender, by way of a reduction of sentence, if the latter, only at that late stage, is prepared to disclose important information against other offenders who committed serious crimes.

          Furthermore, such rationalisation - that the public interest sometimes prevails over the interest of bringing the offender to trial or of having the trial run its full course - is to the best of my understanding, contrary to the opinion of Barak J., also to be found in the cases of A. v. The Law Council, and Matana. I base this conclusion in the first instance on the abovementioned remark of Agranat J. in A. v. The Law Council (at p. 755), that a pardon may also be granted for reasons "which do not stem, necessarily, from the innocence of the convicted person," and also on his following statement in the same case (at p. 747) :

         

lts main purpose - and I do not overlook its other purposes - was and remains to declare before all that the person tried and convicted, and now receiving a pardon, is free of guilt and that his offence has been wiped out (my italics-M.B.P.).

 

          Thus, we seem to find in the two abovementioned precedents precisely such "different rationalisation," according to which a full pardon may also be granted to someone other than a wrongly convicted person who is serving his sentence. This pardoning consideration, provided it is applied correctly and carefully in the proper cases, operates with the same validity and force both before and after the conviction of the offender. In fact, even Justice Barak countenances the possibility that it may be better, in rare cases, to pardon a person before conviction rather than to stay the proceedings against him - for instance when the person is suffering from a malignant disease - save that my learned colleague does not consider such exceptional cases to warrant a wide interpretation of the statutory directive. By the same token I would hold it desirable, in a rare case, for a person to be pardoned before trial and conviction for the sake of protecting a vital public interest. The Attorney-General is indeed the competent party to decide whether a person shall stand trial or not, to which end he may, even must, weigh considerations of a social or security nature. Like Justice Barak, I too find support for my view in the report of the Agranat Commission on the Powers of the Attorney-General (1962), where it was stated, inter alia, that

 

In certain circumstances a matter of security, political or public interest may dictate that no criminal charge be preferred (p. 6).

 

          The Commission dealt also with the Attorney-General's need to consult with the political authorities when making his decision, reporting thus (p. 13):

         

The stated duty to consult arises particularly when criminal proceedings are being instituted in relation to a matter of security, political or public interest. In such event it is always incumbent on the Attorney-General to consider whether the act of instituting criminal proceedings (or halting the same) is not more likely to prejudice the interests of the State than refraining from taking such action. This the Attorney-General will only be able to do after having sought information and guidance from those who carry the primary responsibility for safeguarding the State from the security, political and public aspects - that is to say, from those who, so we must presume, are more experienced and knowledgeable in those fields than we are. As already indicated, he will generally need to refer to the Minister of Justice for the required direction and advice; but sometimes, that is in cases which give rise to questions of "high policy," there will be no alternative but to obtain guidance from the Government as a body (my italics - M.B.P.).

 

          I shall come back to these statements later. First, however, I wish to consider the situation that arises when pursuant to sec. 59 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) of 1982, a police investigation has to be opened upon a complaint of the commission of a felony, and it transpires that the very conduct of the investigation (including the taking of statements from witnesses) may seriously impair the security of the State. Who will then be empowered to decide whether the investigation shall be completed or discontinued?

          Mr. Harish, the Attorney-General, has submitted that he lacks the authority to order that a police investigation be discontinued (or not opened after the police learn of the commission of a felony). It is arguable, perhaps, that the police, being an arm of the Attorney-General for criminal investigation purposes ( Reiner v. Prime Minister of Israel [20], pp. 485, 486), is obliged to act as directed by him, thus rendering the Attorney-General competent to order discontinuance of the investigation. The matter, however, is far from clear. For instance, there is the express directive in sec. 60 of the above Law, that upon completion of the investigation of a felony, the police shall transmit the material to the District Attorney; the police, however, may refrain from investigating lesser offences, though only for the reasons set forth in sec. 59 of that Law. A measure of support for this separation of powers is even to be found in the following passage from the judgment of Justice Barak (in paragraph 25, though his remarks were intended for a different purpose):

 

This conclusion as to a "separation of powers", between the presidential pardon and the powers of other State authorities, is reinforced when regard is had to Israel's general constitutional framework. The other State authorities (the police, the prosecution and the courts) have the means to establish the facts. The police has its investigating facilities and seeks to reach an assessment of the factual situation. The prosecution, to whom the police must transmit the material, will handle and process the same until delivery of the judgment. The courts possess the institutional and normative facilities for elucidating the question of innocence or guilt.

 

          That is to say, each authority has its own field of responsibility. The police, upon receiving a complaint or otherwise learning of the commission of a felony, is obliged to conduct an investigation, and upon its completion to transmit the evidence to the appointed authority, the prosecution, which only then comes into the picture. It is even doubtful whether the police may halt its investigation in cases of felony, even where the police considers the Attorney-General to have good reasons for wishing to do so. On a plain reading of the conclusion to sec. 59 of above Law, the police has such a discretion (on the grounds of there being no public interest involved) only in relation to misdemeanours, and not felonies. And most important, even the Attorney-General's power to intervene in the investigation by directing that it be discontinued is, as already mentioned, a matter of doubt. Thus, there is the express provision (sec. 61 of the Law) that the Attorney-General may direct the police to continue investigating if, after receiving the material, he "considers it necessary for a decision as to prosecution or for the efficient conduct of the trial." This provision would seem to be superfluous if the Attorney-General is indeed competent to decree at will the completion or halting of police investigations.

          On the assumption that the police is legally obliged to complete its investigation of a felony, and then to refer the material to the District Attorney, the grant of a pardon would indeed be the only way of halting an investigation if it endangered a vital public interest such as the security of the State. The abovementioned view of the Agranat Commission that the security, political or public interests of the State may in certain circumstances require that no criminal charge be preferred, holds good also as regards the halting of an investigation for similar reasons. It is quite likely that in this situation (in contrast with the stage when the police refer the material of the investigation to the District Attorney) a presidential pardon will be the only way of halting the process.

         

          Again, even assuming the Attorney-General to have power to halt a police investigation, a difference of opinion may yet arise, in a particular case, between the Attorney-General and the State authorities with whom, as the Agranat Commission required, he must consult. While it has to be presumed, according to the Commission, that the security authorities are more experienced and better informed than the Attorney-General, and though they bear primary responsibility for safeguarding the security and other vital interests of the State, the latter nevertheless has to make his own decision on matters within his sphere of responsibility. In this situation, with each party insisting upon its own viewpoint, how will the conflict be resolved? It seems to me that the situation bears comparison with the conflict that arises between the need to withhold privileged evidence and the right of the accused to defend himself against a criminal charge. It is a hallowed principle of penal law, embedded in the structure of a democratic regime, that the accused shall be given every opportunity to avail himself of any evidence in the hands of the prosecution. Yet this right has been qualified in the Evidence Ordinance (New Version) of 1971, sec. 44(a) whereof provides:

         

A person is not bound to give, and the court shall not admit, evidence regarding which the Prime Minister or the Minister of Defence --- has expressed the opinion that its giving is likely to impair the security of the State --- unless a Judge of the Supreme Court on the petition of a party who desires the disclosure of the evidence finds that the necessity to disclose it for the purpose of doing justice outweighs the interest in its non-disclosure.

 

          If a Supreme Court Justice (not involved in a particular criminal case) should come to the conclusion that the need to disclose certain evidence, in the interests of justice, has to defer to the State interest in keeping such evidence privileged, he will uphold the latter even if the accused's ability to defend himself is affected thereby. If, on the other hand, it is decided that the evidence should be disclosed in the interests of justice, there would still be the possibility that the security authorities, taking a different view as to the measure of harm that may result, would prefer not to disclose the evidence, even if this should lead to the accused's acquittal. The acquittal may represent a more valuable prize to the accused than even a pardon, since he may be guilty and undeserving thereof; yet, in the view of the authorities concerned, the one interest (equality before the law) will have to yield to the other (safeguarding the security or existence of the State).

          The above situation was deliberated in the case of Livni v. State of Israel [21], where Justice Barak commented as follows (at p. 736):

         

Once the court has decided that the evidence should be disclosed, the prosecution is faced with the dilemma of deciding whether or not to continue with the criminal proceedings. If the trial continues, the prosecution will have to disclose the evidence; if the prosecution believes that disclosure of the evidence will endanger the security of the State, it may have to stay the proceedings and sometimes even cause the accused to be acquitted. Thus, whereas initially the conflict was between the need to disclose the evidence in the interest of doing justice, and the need to keep it privileged in the interest of State security, we now find - upon the decision of the court - that the conflict is between the need to proceed with the trial by way of disclosure of the evidence, and the need to keep the evidence privileged by way of the discontinuance of the trial. The former conflict is resolved by the Judge in adoption of the procedure prescribed in sec. 44(a) of the Evidence Ordinance; the latter conflict is resolved by the prosecution within the framework of its general discretion in the conduct and stay of criminal prosecutions.

 

Equally in point are these remarks of Barak J. in continuation (at p. 735):

 

On the other hand, there is the consideration that it is sometimes in the public interest to keep the material of the investigation privileged, if its disclosure may prejudice the security of the State. It is an important public interest to protect the security of the State against all harmful subversive acts, which are mostly the product of underground planning and organisation. The struggle against such harm calls for the gathering of intelligence information without its sources becoming known.... This war is being waged by the security services, whose struggle would be gravely prejudiced by the uncovering or identification and public exposure of these sources (Miscellaneous Applications 52/82)............................................ This consideration asserts itself in every country, but does so with particular sharpness in the State of Israel, whose security has been threatened ever since its establishment. We are a "democracy on the defensive"... which has to fight for its survival, not only in large-scale wars but also in the day-to-day campaigns thrust upon it by its enemies. We must not close our eyes to this bitter reality.

 

          It cannot be overlooked that those who discharge a clear security function find it especially difficult to act always within the law. The measure of departure may vary from country to country, but it exists as a fact, also in democratic regimes whose fidelity to civil rights is beyond question. In this regard Prof. B. Akzin has commented as follows ( Elements of International Politics, Akademon, 1984, in Hebrew, p. 332):

         

It should be added that while the police strives (or, at least, should strive) to act within the frame of the existing law, the intelligence and espionage services, including counter-espionage, are less punctilious about observing the law, and it sometimes happens that they knowingly and seriously violate it. Even in times of peace, let alone in times of war, they engage in acts of violence and sabotage, both in foreign countries and in their own. This reality leads to situations of embarrassment for countries which adhere to the rule of law, and places them in the dilemma of the comparative priority between the principle of legality and intelligence interests. That is no easy dilemma. If we compare the practice of some established democracies in this regard, we shall find that in the United States, for instance, the scope of intelligence operations is often (though not invariably) curtailed by the need to keep within the law, whereas in Britain and France the principle of legality does not restrict intelligence operations to the same extent (my italics - M. B. P.).

 

          Naturally, the smaller the deviation from the legal norm, the easier it would be to reach the optimal degree of harmony between the law and the protection of the State's security. But we, as judges who "dwell among our people," should not harbour any illusions, as the events of the instant case well illustrate. There simply are cases in which those who are at the helm of the State, and bear responsibility for its survival and security, regard certain deviations from the law for the sake of protecting the security of the State, as an unavoidable necessity.

         

          Barak J. has correctly pointed out in the Livni case [21] that when the two interests of a fair trial and the security of the State are competing for primacy, the conflict must be resolved. Both interests are of concern to the public, and the resolution of the conflict takes different forms in different countries, the form sometimes changing within the same country. He added that

 

this struggle between the conflicting interests is particularly sharp in Israel, since on the one hand we are insistent upon fairness in criminal proceedings and maintaining public confidence in them.... while on the other hand we are subject to considerable security risks, which have beset us for a long period (ibid., p. 735).

 

          It is true that when the issue of privileged information arises in the course of a trial, the conflict between the two interests is resolved by a Supreme Court Justice (who is not hearing that particular case). But even when he rules that the evidence must be disclosed, that is not the end of the matter, for such disclosure may be avoided by a discontinuance of the trial, leading even to the acquittal of the accused.

          By analogy it seems to me that a decision by the Attorney-General to refer a complaint to the police - despite the objections of the Executive authorities (in our present context, the inner Cabinet) that so to do would harm security interests - is also not necessarily final. There would be nothing improper in the Attorney-General's attitude that an investigation should be conducted notwithstanding the advice given him to the contrary, but equally there is no ground for questioning a resolution of the dilemma by way of its referral to the President as the Head of State - the symbol of the people whom he represents. I do not hold that the only course open to the Executive in the above circumstances, is for the Government to dismiss the Attorney-General, for his attitude is a legitimate one, and he may properly adhere thereto. Nor, by the same token, is any injury done to the standing of a Supreme Court Judge who has ruled that the evidence in question should be disclosed. The same may also be said of the authorities entrusted with the security and survival of the State, and who bear primary responsibility for this onerous task. In the present case it may be presumed of the President that he properly considered all aspects of the dilemma, and so it indeed appears from his public statement quoted in the judgment of Shamgar P. He mentioned his understanding of the opposing viewpoint, but was convinced that the interests of security should prevail. My respected colleagues and I all agree that if a presidential power to pardon before conviction exists, the considerations weighed by the President at the time of granting the pardons are valid.

 

          At the same time, however, it is necessary to stress the gravity of the offences disclosed before us, the nature and quality of which should alert us to the need for a thorough review of the security establishment, with a view to the determination of just norms and directives as far as this is possible.

         

          Justice Barak concedes the possibility of a valid presidential power of pardon before conviction, for exercise on rare occasions alone, but holds this to be undesirable as likely to increase in frequency and become the norm. He is accordingly deterred from building constitutional norms on what he regards as hope alone. With all due respect, I find no adequate basis for this apprehension. On the contrary, it was shown to us that the pre-conviction power of pardon has been exercised most rarely during the past thirty-five years, since the decision in A. v. the Law Council. That is no small guarantee that this will continue in the future as well, as indeed it should. Moreover, already in the Matana case, the fear of an excessive exercise of this power was allayed by Agranat D. P., in these terms (at p. 454):

         

Nor have I overlooked the fact that to endow the power in question with its "full" content may lead to its excessive use, which in turn involves the danger that the authority of the law in the eyes of the public will be weakened. My reply to this point, however, is that every instrument of pardon by the President requires the countersignature of the Prime Minister or one other Minister (sec. 7 of the Transition Law, 1949) [now sec. 12 of the Basic Law: The President of the State - M.B.P.]. This means that even if the decision to pardon or to reduce a sentence must be the personal decision of the President, it is also conditional upon the recommendation of the Minister concerned. This Minister will ordinarily be the Minister of Justice who has the means of conducting a precise investigation into the circumstances of the case before submitting his recommendation to the President. It is clear that this recommendation, and therefore the decision to pardon as well, are subject to review by the Knesset and it is this possibility which must be regarded as the guarantee laid down by law against the danger referred to.

 

          There is therefore someone who is answerable to the Knesset (the Prime Minister or some other Minister) and this safeguard is now fortified by the possibility of challenging the pardoning decision indirectly. Another important factor is the special status of the President as representing the people and standing above political or public controversy. The State President presumably weighs all necessary considerations before deciding to exercise his power to grant a full pardon, whether before or after conviction. This is a power which has to be most rarely exercised. The pre-conviction pardon was not designed for the purpose of redressing an injustice done to the person pardoned, for the fact of his guilt is taken for granted and he is assumed to have committed the offence attributed to him (by the police or the prosecution). What has to be weighed, therefore, is the seriousness of the offence against some other interest - humanitarian, security, and the like. In other words, the pre-conviction pardon always entails a conflict between the interest of equality before the law and some other, vital, extraneous interest. This fact acts greatly to restrict the range of cases in which the exercise of this power will be justified.

 

          A constitutional directive gives expression to the will of the people, to its "credo." If under a directive of this kind the power to pardon offenders has been conferred on the President, the latter must be seen as the proper authority for the discharge of this difficult task (with the countersignature of the Minister concerned, who is also answerable to the Knesset, and subject further to indirect judicial review of the President's decision). In those cases where the offender benefits from a pardon, though not for the reason of his innocence of the charge but for the protection of a higher interest - whether before or after conviction - the principle of equality before the law will well be breached, but this will happen also when, for example, an acquittal results from the ruling of a Supreme Court Judge that privileged information be disclosed, in the circumstances outlined above.

          My abovementioned remarks as to the President being the ideal authority to grant a pardon, find support in the following statement of an American authority quoted in the judgment of Shamgar P.:

         

...Crime is an offense against the people, prosecuted in the name of the people, and the people alone can bestow mercy by pardon... the people may confer the pardoning power upon any officer or board that they see fit ( Am. Jur., at p. 10).

 

          Like Justice Shamgar, I believe that the decisive factor is not the rank of the State President within the Executive hierarchy, but the fact that he symbolises the State and represents the people in holding and exercising the power of pardon .

          An undesirable exercise of the pardoning power must be avoided at all times, whether it takes the form of an uncontrolled or unjustifiable remission of sentence, or the grant of a full pardon after conviction. A reduction of punishment granted one offender but not another in comparable circumstances (so we assume), amounts naturally to a discrimination between equals. An ill-timed pardon, or one granted on grounds already deliberated by a judicial tribunal, is tantamount to an intervention in the domain of the judicial authority. It has to be borne in mind that the facilities available to the court - rules of procedure and evidence for the greater part determined by legislative means and partly by judicial means - offer the most effective may of establishing the truth and ensuring a fair trial. The reversal by non-judicial means of a judicial decision, particularly in an age when a retrial is possible, is a process the retention of which may well be questioned. But that is a matter for the lawgiver. What concerns us here is that the grant of a pardon for reasons other than the correction of an injustice, and involving a conflict between the principle of equality before the law and some other vital interest, invokes a power which should rarely be exercised, and only after much careful consideration.

 

          (c) From the aspect of the separation of powers, the President must be seen as holding a power termed "residuary" (by Justice Barak) or "reserve" (by Justice Agranat in the cases of A. v. the Law Council and Matana ). It is right that the power remain of such a nature, and that the President refrain from exercising it as long as some other authority is still competent to act in the desired direction.  In his judgment (par. 25), Justice Barak cites the example of a pardon granted after conviction but before sentence is passed. I hold, unlike my learned colleague, that in this case the power itself is there, but its exercise (the grant of a full pardon alone is possible at this stage) would entail a gross interference with the judicial function and a possible lowering of its prestige. The same applies when a pardon is granted where the possibility of a retrial exists. Like the President, Justice Shamgar, I would not discount the need for a change in the existing constitutional arrangement on the subject, perhaps along the lines proposed by legal scholars such as Professor Feller.

 

          (d) Justice Barak states that a pardon is given without publicity, whereas a stay of criminal proceedings is manifest and publicly known. I believe this picture should be put into its proper perspective.

          (1) The Attorney-General's decision to stay proceedings must be reasoned, and conveyed to the complainant (pursuant to sec. 63 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Consolidated Version). Information concerning the decision must not, however, be disseminated among the general public, but may only be furnished to certain specified authorities consistently with the provisions of the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law, 1981 (see sec. 11(a) thereof). It may be noted that these authorities are mostly public organs (the Attorney-General, the police, the General Security Service, and others).

          (2) As regards a pardon, the initiative is usually taken by the Ministry of Justice and the warrant requires to be countersigned by the Prime Minister or another Minister, normally the Minister of Justice. In case of complaint originally lodged with the police, it is clear that the fact of the pardon will also be brought to its notice, if it has to discontinue the investigation. Such discontinuance would also obligate the police to notify the complainant accordingly (sec. 63 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, Consolidated Version). There may be some difference in the measure of disclosure occasioned in each of the two cases, but the gap should not be exaggerated.

         

6. With reference to the petitioners' prayer concerning investigation of the complaint lodged with the police, I concur in the opinion of my learned colleagues that at this stage the court should rest content with the Attorney-General's intimation that the whole incident will be fully investigated. The petition, therefore, should be dismissed in this regard.

          It has occurred to me that this result - dismissal of the prayer regarding the investigation - might have the effect of converting an indirect challenge of the pardons into a direct one, which would not be permissible under the existing law.  I have not, however, delved too deeply into the question and, having regard to the attitude of my colleagues, have likewise preferred to deal with the question of the inherent validity of the pardons.

 

7. Having affirmatively answered the question as to the President's power to grant the pardons here deliberated, I must now deal with the second question confronting us, namely: were the requirements for the grant of such pardons satisfied?

          I should state that I have found the Warrants of Pardon to provide only a general description and not to be sufficiently particularised, though less so in relation to the Head of the General Security Service. In the latter case it is recorded that the pardon was to extend to all the offences "connected with the incident called 'bus no. 300' and occurring on the night between 12 April and 13 April 1984, whether committed on the day of the incident or subsequently in connection therewith until the date of this Warrant." In the remaining Warrants it was stated that the pardon extended to all the offences "connected with the so called 'bus no. 300 incident,' and committed from the time of the incident on the night between 12 April and 13 April until the date of this Warrant." On its own this would be an inadequate particularisation, but with the declarations we have of the pardoned persons, together with the contents of the pardon applications as well as the subsequent Warrants, we now have sufficient particulars to identify the offences concerned. I need hardly add that the pardon extends solely to those offences and none other.

          As to the State President's grounds for granting the pardons, we ruled earlier (on 1 July 1986) that there was no need for any declaration to be lodged concerning his reasons for deciding as he did.

          From the material before us it may be learned that the negotiations with the President were commenced some considerable time before the pardons were granted, and only the final, formal stage was completed in haste, on account of the pressure arising from the surrounding circumstances. It has been declared that all the particulars relating to the incident were explained to the President, and I have no reason to doubt the truth thereof.

         

8. In conclusion, I must emphasise that I, like my respected colleagues, have endeavoured to deal with the central issue - the President's power of pardon before conviction - in isolation from the stormy public controversy aroused by this unfortunate incident. Such detachment is enjoined by our judicial task, which we must fulfil to the best of our understanding. We are obliged to adopt an attitude, even with regard to matters of public controversy and even though part of the public may not approve of that attitude. What is conclusive is the court's decision, as distinct from its views (by way of analogy, see Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [22], at p. 520, per Witkon J.).

 

9. For the reasons given above I concur in the judgment of the respected President, Justice Shamgar, and in his conclusion.

 

BARAK J .

 

          I am of the opinion that the pardon granted by the State President to the Head of the General Security Service and three of his assistants is null and void, for lack of a presidential power so to act. It would follow that, as intimated by the Attorney-General, the investigation is to continue.

         

A. Our Judicial Function

 

1. After carefully perusing the judgment of my respected colleague, President Shamgar, I find myself agreeing with some of his opinions and not with others. The whole issue is important, lying as it does at the heart of our constitutional life. Interwoven with the immediate problem of the presidential power of pardon and the manner of its exercise, are questions of the rule of law and its supremacy. All these we shall examine from the legal standpoint. The issue has provoked a stormy public reaction, but we have not allowed that to influence our decision. We function in accordance with constitutional criteria and fundamental legal principles which reflect the "credo" of our national life. It is not passing moods that guide our approach, but fundamental national perceptions as to our existence in a democratic state. This guideline was succinctly stated by Shamgar P. , in Neiman v. Chairman of  1lth Knesset Elections Central Committee [19], in these terms (at p. 259):

 

Judicial decisions in constitutional matters, even in difficult cases, should properly be founded and shaped according to principles rather than considerations of policy structured according to what is viewed as desirable and responsive to the need of the hour or the feeling of the majority.

 

          We are aware of the public controversy that is raging around this matter, and in the dynamics of political life our judgment here may well come to be used as a lever in the struggle between the opposing political forces. That we regret, but we have to fulfil "our function and our duty as Judges," as was pointed out by Landau D.P. in Duikat v. Government of Israel [23], at p.4:

         

It is still much to be feared that the court may come to be seen as having abandoned its proper place and descended into the arena of public discussion, and that its decision will be enthusiastically welcomed by a section of the public while another section loudly and utterly rejects it. In this sense I see myself - as one whose duty it is to decide in accordance with law any matter brought before the court according to law - constrained to proceed undeterred in the discharge of my task. Even so, I know full well that the wider public will look not to the legal reasoning but to the final conclusion alone, with the attendant risk of damage to the rightful standing of the court as an institution beyond the divisions of public controversy. But what shall we do, if that be our function and our duty as Judges.

 

          We are an arm of government, whose task it is to review the functioning of the other authorities, so as to ensure the government's adherence to the rule of law. These arms of government are of high status, but the law stands above them all. We should be failing in our judicial duty, were we not to pass under review, within the framework of petitions properly lodged, the activities of other State authorities in the circumstances disclosed in the petitions before us. I propose first to examine some of the questions on which I share the opinion of Shamgar P., and then to deal with the State President's power to grant a pardon before conviction. Following that, I shall endeavour to clarify my reasons for dissenting from the judgment of my learned colleague, Shamgar P., and shall conclude with some general remarks pertaining to the functioning of the State authorities in the present case. I regret the length of this judgment, but I did not have enough time to write a shorter one.

         

B. Locus Standi

 

2. Like Shamgar P., I hold the petitioners to have due standing to approach the court in the present matter. I do so for various reasons. In the first place, a number of persons lodged complaints with the police relating to offences committed in the "bus no. 300 incident." Under sec. 58 of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Consolidated Version), it is open to "any person" to lodge a complaint with the police, and the complainant must be informed of a decision not to investigate the same (sec. 63). He may then lodge an objection with the Attorney-General, whose decision is subject to judicial review and the complainant certainly would have standing in such a petition (Ashkenazy v. Minister of Defence [24], at 371). It is true that not all of the petitioners lodged complaints, but their standing before the court may be recognized on a second ground, which I shall now state.

          When there arises before the Supreme Court a legal problem of constitutional import, the court will take a liberal view in matters of legal standing:

 

in such cases it is desirable to grant access to the court, without examining too carefully the interest at stake, provided this is in furtherance of the rule of law ( Segal v. Minister of the Interior [17], at p. 443).

 

          The rule of law would be so served in the present case, having regard to the allegation that the Head of the General Security Service, and a number of his assistants, committed very serious offences involving loss of life and interference with the processes of investigation and the administration of justice. According to the material before us, these allegations - raised by the Attorney-General, Prof. Zamir - were not being investigated, though such investigation was said to be called for. The petitions accordingly involve basic questions of the rule of law, of equality before the law and of the susbservience of the principal centres of power in the State to the law as it stands. In these circumstances it is fitting that the petitioners be recognized as having sufficient standing to approach the court as they have done.

 

C. The Petition Concerning the Investigation

 

3. Some of the petitioners have concerned themselves with instigating a police investigation into the "incident." In a written communication received by us from the Attorney-General (on 15 July 1986), it was intimated as follows:

 

The attitude of the Attorney-General, communicated here with the confirmation of the Inspector General of Police (the remaining respondents have no standing whatever as regards the investigation), is that the police will investigate the said complaints pursuant to its duty under sec. 59 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) 1982.

 

          In his oral argument before us, the Attorney-General repeated his above intimation in these terms:

         

There will be a police investigation. The investigation will be conducted without qualification or reservation, until its conclusion, and will encompass all levels from top to bottom, including the political hierarchy. It is not intended to leave any matter uninvestigated, nor to exclude any person from the investigation.

 

          The Attorney-General further emphasized that the investigation had already commenced, and in that situation, he argued, there was no room for confirmation of the order nisi - as prayed for by some of the petitioners - but the petitions, so far as they related to the investigation, should be dismissed. I agree with Shamgar P. that the Attorney-General's view should be sustained.

         

D. The State President as a Respondent

 

4. A number of petitioners joined the State President as a respondent. We ordered that his name as a respondent be deleted. As was pointed out by Shamgar P., this ruling was dictated by sec. 13(a) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, under which "the President of the State shall not be amenable to any court or tribunal... in respect of anything connected with his functions or powers." The President's act of pardon although, in my opinion, ultra vires, was nevertheless "connected with" his functions or powers, so that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain any direct challenge against his conduct. In the criminal appeal in Matana v. Attorney-General [25], Berinson J. noted (at p. 979) that when the President purported to act within the scope of his functions and powers, he would, if he exceeded these, be subject, like everyone else, to the laws of the State, and "amenable to the jurisdiction and authority of the courts." It seems to me, however, that even when the President exceeds his powers, but does so in a matter connected with his functions and powers, in good faith and in furtherance of what he considers to be the discharge of his duties - this court will have no jurisdiction over him. This limitation falls away where it is not sought to render the President answerable directly, but only to challenge indirectly the legal competence of a presidential act. The question arose in Bar Yosef v. Minister of Police [12], where the Supreme Court held as follows:

 

We accept that the State President has a discretion in the exercise of his power under sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State, and that this discretion - as distinct from the President himself - is, in proper circumstances, subject to indirect judicial review.

 

          This perspective emerged from the approach of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned criminal appeal in Matana v. Attorney-General [25], where Berinson J. commented thus (at p. 786):

         

If indeed the President lacked authority to act as he did, there would be no need in the present case to disqualify the act itself. It would suffice for us to refrain from granting it validity and from aiding in its implementation, so far as this depends on us.

 

Elsewhere in the judgment, he added:

 

this does not mean that the legality of his official conduct and acts which may be prejudicial to the individual, cannot be indirectly reviewed without the President himself appearing as a party.

 

          In the Attorney-General's original reply to the petitions (dated 30 June 1986), he noted that "once a pardon has been granted to all the members of the General Security Service who are mentioned as suspected of having committed the offences attributed to them, there is no longer any ground for investigating this complaint." This approach is challenged by the petitioners, and incidental to this main line of attack (against the Attorney-General), they are also challenging the President's pardoning decision. That they are entitled to do.

          Such indirect judicial review is essential, for in its absence the power becomes unlimited in practice. Unlimited powers wielded by government authorities are alien to a democratic regime. Absolute powers, as Justice Douglas has rightly pointed out, are "the beginning of the end of liberty" (see New York v. United States [60], at p. 884, which statement was cited by this court in Kahana v. Speaker of the Knesset [26], at p. 92). The same is true of the pardoning power, which is not publicly exercised, the exercise of which need not be reasoned and which is little known to the public (see M. Gottesman, "Arbitrariness & Sympathy: The Criteria for Granting a Pardon," Mishpatim 1 [1968], 211; R. Gabison, "Arbitrariness & Sympathy: A Further Note," ibid., p. 218; D. Friedman, "Amnesty: Disclosure of Reasons," Hapraklit 25/1 [1969], 118; M. Ben-Ze'ev, "Matters of Amnesty," Hapraklit 25/2 [1970], 368). Such a power, if not subject to judicial review - even if only indirect - poses, upon its improper exercise, danger of the kind most destructive to all orderly government. Bentham has clearly outlined this danger:

 

From pardon-power unrestricted, comes impunity to delinquency in all shapes; from inpunity to delinquency in all shapes, impunity to maleficence in all shapes; from impunity to. maleficence in all shapes, dissolution of Government; from dissolution of Government, dissolution of political society ( The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. Bowring, New York, 1962, vol. 1, p. 530).

 

          These are strong words, perhaps too strong, but they speak eloquently of the need for judicial review. Since the lawgiver left no opening for challenging directly the President's exercise of this power, it is well that we do what is next best, and exercise indirect judicial review.

         

E. The Pardoning Power

 

(1) The Matter in Issue

 

5. I now come to the central issue in the petitions before us. This issue has a twofold aspect: first, does the State President have the power to pardon someone before he has been convicted? second, assuming this power to exist, were the conditions for the grant of a pardon to an unconvicted suspect satisfied in the instant case? I am of the opinion that the State President lacks the power to pardon before conviction, and it is therefore unnecessary for me to deal with the latter question concerning the propriety of the President's exercise of his pardoning power.

          As regards the first aspect, i.e. the existence of a presidential power of pre-conviction pardoning, the question is by no means an easy one, and has been the subject of keen controversy. In the circumstances, the proper path to have followed seems to be that appointed by the lawgiver, in see. 32(a) of the Consolidated Version of the Courts Law of 1984, namely:

         

Where a petition for a pardon or for the reduction of a penalty has been submitted to the President of the State, and a question arises which in the opinion of the Minister of Justice deserves to be dealt with by the Supreme Court, but which cannot provide a ground for a retrial under section 9, the Minister of Justice may refer such question to the Supreme Court.

 

          The circumstances were pressing, however, and the opportunity was missed. We have no option, therefore, but to examine the validity of the power within the framework of a petition to the High Court of Justice.

         

          (2) "To Pardon Offenders"

         

6.       In principle, the starting point for our inquiry is sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law: The President of the State (the "Basic Law"), which reads:

 

The President shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof.

 

          To ascertain the meaning of the expression "to pardon offenders," we must, as with any other act of interpretation, start with a linguistic inquiry. I believe the question whether the terms "to pardon" and "offenders" in themselves provide an answer to our inquiry, must be answered in the negative. In Israel legislation the term for pardon* does not have one single meaning only. Thus besides its use in sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, it is also used in Knesset enactments to designate amnesty (thus the General Amnesty Ordinance of 1949, the Amnesty Law of 1967). There is no disputing that the two kinds of pardon differ from each other. The presidential pardon is an individual act, whereas the Knesset amnesty is a general, all-embracing act. The two pardons differ also in their consequences. Despite these differences between the two forms of pardon, the lawgiver has used the same term to describe both. In fact, the term haninah has not acquired any scientific precision or conceptual clarity in Israel, and the term on its own does not enable us to define its meaning. The reasons for this uncertainty - which is not unique to Israel - are hinted at by Dr. Sebba, in these terms (On Pardon and Amnesty, at p. 140):

         

The lack of clarity on this matter stems from a number of factors, but mainly from a confusion in the choice of terminology, historical changes in the development of these institutions, and a lack of definition of the functions of pardon in its different forms - both as regards their objectives and their legal consequences.

 

          It is quite clear that the term "to pardon" in the Basic Law, relates only to individual pardon. On the other hand, the "pardon" mentioned in sec. 149(9) of the Consolidated Version of the Criminal Procedure Law of 1982, would seem to embrace both individual pardon and general amnesty, but apparently refers mainly to the latter since diffferent situations of individual pardon (in the context of preliminary pleas in a criminal trial) are already covered in sec. 149(5) of the Law, which mentions "a former acquittal or former conviction."

          The term "pardon" (haninah) seems, therefore, to have no uniform meaning in Israel law. We have not yet evolved for ourselves an operative jurisprudence the reflective processes of which would generate "jurisprudential" expressions such as "pardon," having a recognized meaning for the entire legal community. Other countries - among them France, Italy and Germany - are more fortunate in this respect, since their own terms for the concept of a pardon granted by the authority at the head of and symbolizing the State (grace, grazia, Begnadigungsrecht), are all self-understood as relating to (individual) pardon after conviction. We have yet to reach such unanimity in Israel, and here, as already indicated, the term haninah encompasses both pardon and amnesty. As regards the question whether an individual pardon - with which alone sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law deals - has any reference to an unconvicted suspect, our own operative jurisprudence offers no answers. That leaves us no alternative but recourse to judicial interpretation, from which there shall evolve, in the course of time, the kind of operative jurisprudence that is responsive to the existing conceptual need.

 

          (3) "Offenders"

 

7. We have next to examine whether the term "offender" throws any light on our inquiry. Can an unconvicted suspect be deemed an "offender"? This question was discussed by Prof. Klinghoffer, who wrote as follows" ("Lectures on Amnesty," at p. 5):

 

The Law mentions the power to "pardon offenders." Now it is a cardinal rule in the constitutional law of Israel that a person suspected or accused of a criminal offence is presumed innocent until duly and finally convicted. That means no person is an "offender" until a final convicting judgment has been given against him.

 

The same approach was adopted by the then Attorney-General, M. Ben Ze'ev, when the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset was considering the proposed Basic Law: The President of the State. He said:

 

The designated meaning of the word [offender], in my opinion, is someone who has been convicted in a court of law. For if not so, we shall come into conflict with the cardinal rule in our system that a person is presumed innnocent until duly convicted according to law, and anyone might come to the President and say: "I am under suspicion, grant me a pardon" (quoted in the opinion of the Attorney-General, Prof. Zamir, dated 15 June 1985 and appearing in directive no. 21.333 of the Attorney-General's Directives).

 

          I naturally accept that every convicted person is an offender, but it does not follow that someone who has not yet been convicted cannot for the purpose of some particular enactment likewise be deemed an offender (cf. Gold v. Minister of the Interior [27]). Thus, for example, when sec. 3 of the Police Ordinance (New Version) speaks of the employment of the police in "the apprehension and prosecution of offenders...," it is clear from the context that the term "offenders" specifically excludes convicted persons; someone who has already been convicted of a particular offence may not be "apprehended" by the police or "prosecuted" for that same offence. Yet a convicted person is certainly an "offender" for purposes of the Basic Law. In fact, the lawgiver has made a far from precise use of the term, and has not always distinguished clearly between persons suspected, accused, or convicted of a criminal offence - having sometimes included all three possibilities within the purview of this term.

         

8. The term "offenders" raises further questions about its meaning. It will be found amenable to more than one meaning in the context of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. Besides certainly embracing someone who has been duly tried and convicted, in a final judgment (as distinct from the meaning of the same term in the new version of the Police Ordinance), does it also include someone who has been convicted in a judgment that is not yet final? And what is the situation of a person who has not been convicted but in respect of whom the court has held "the charge proved" and issued a probation order under sec. 1 of the Probation Ordinance (New Version) 1969? And in particular, what is the situation of  someone who has not yet been charged at all, or who has been charged but whose trial has not yet reached completion? "Offender" is therefore a vague term, ambiguous and open to different interpretations in different contexts.

 

(4) The Legislative Purpose

 

9. It is now clear that a linguistic examination of the term "offender" does not suffice to dispose of our interpretative problem - as indeed it rarely should be expected to do (Kibbutz Hatzor v. Rehovot Assessment Officer [28], at p. 74). Among the different possible meanings we should select that which ensures attainment of the legislative purpose - "the Law is an instrument for the achievement of a legislative purpose, and therefore needs to be construed according to its inherent purpose" (per. Sussman J. in Estate Late E. Bergman v. Stossel [29], at p. 516). This purpose can be ascertained, first and foremost, from the intention of the lawgiver. The legislative history of an enactment is a source from which one may ascertain the legislative purpose.

 

(5) The Intention o1the Legislature

 

10. In order to ascertain the intention of the Legislature when investing the State President with the power "to pardon offenders," we must return to the Transition Law. It represented the first Israel Law to deal with the presidential powers. In sec. 6 of the Transition Law the Presidential office had been established, inter alia, with the "power to pardon offenders." The objects of this directive were elucidated by Agranat D.P. (as he then was) in the rehearing in Attorney-General v. Matana [3] (at p. 441). He pointed out that as the basis for its debates at the time, the Constitution Committee of the Provisional Council of State relied on the draft constitution of Dr. L. Kohn and a memorandum submitted by E. Vitta. I have carefully considered all this material, from which it clearly transpires that it was not the pardoning powers of the English Monarch, nor those of the American President, the High Commissioner for Palestine, or the Head of any other State, that were envisioned by the draftsmen of the Transition Law as the model for the powers of our own President. Dr. Kohn did not elaborate on the presidential pardoning power, beyond a bold statement (in sec. 59 of his proposal) that the President be reserved the right to grant a pardon. Vitta changed the wording slightly, proposing that the presidential functions include the grant of pardon and the reduction of punishments. Commenting upon Dr. Kohn's proposal, Vitta opined that the presidential power be restricted to individual cases, with a power of general or even partial amnesty entrusted to the Legislature alone, for implementation by way of a formal statute. In a comprehensive debate on the President's proposed status conducted by the abovementioned Constitution Committee, the presidential powers in France, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland were mentioned, slight reference was made to the King of England, while the American President was only hinted at. With regard to the power of pardon, there is recorded only Z. Warhaftig's opinion that the directive be phrased to empower the President "to pardon and reduce punishments" (Proceedings of the Constitution Committee of the Provisional Council of State, Debate on the Executive Authority). The proposal was adopted. In introducing the Bill for the Transition Law, 1949, before the Knesset, Y. Idelson made only a brief statement, and the subsequent debate on the presidential powers was also short. Neither the English King nor the High Commissioner was mentioned in the context of pardon, while the office of the American President was mentioned only as differing from our own form of presidential office. Our survey accordingly leads to a twofold conclusion: first, we lack full information concerning the extent of the pardoning power which the Knesset sought to confer on the President at that time; second, it is clear that the Knesset did not consider imitating any particular model of the power, and certainly not the power of the English King, the High Commissioner or the American President.

 

11. The provisions of sec. 6 of the Transition Law were repealed with the enactment of the Basic Law. We have no access to the debates of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, which are closed, but I am prepared to accept the following account thereof given by the Attorney-General, Prof. Zamir, who apparently had the opportunity to peruse the minutes of the relevant proceedings (see his abovementioned opinion):

 

The Legislature's intention may also be gathered from the preparatory stages of the Law. The question before us was not discussed when the Knesset plenum debated the Bill for the Basic Law: The President of the State, but it did arise in a discussion of the Bill at a meeting of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee (on 5 February, 1964). It appears from the discussion that all the speakers considered the President empowered to grant a pardon to convicted offenders only. The then Attorney-General, Mr. M. Ben Ze'ev, said at that meeting: "The designated meaning of the word [offender], in my opinion, is someone who has been convicted in a court of law. For if not so, we shall come into conflict with the cardinal rule in our system that a person is presumed innocent until duly convicted according to law, and anyone might come to the President and say: 'I am under suspicion, grant me a pardon.' " And Knesset Member, H. Zadok, remarked at the end of the discussion on this point: "It seems to me we have no difference of opinion on the substance of the matter. We intend to empower the President to pardon persons who have been criminally tried and convicted."

 

          This is further evidence that it was not the pardoning powers of the English Monarch, the High Commissioner, or the American President that served as a basis for the above Committee's discussions. On the contrary, the subjective thought of those who dealt with the question was -"We intend to empower the President to pardon persons who have been criminally tried and convicted".

         

12. Speaking for myself, I would not attribute too much weight to the factor of the legislator's intention in the instant case. The legislative history of the Transition Law offers us scant details and hardly advances our inquiry. As for the Basic Law, we know the opinions of members of the Knesset Committee who dealt with the Bill, but not what the Knesset itself thought. Actually, as faithful interpreters of the law, it is our task to act by way of "analysis of the law and not psychoanalysis of the lawgiver" (Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcast Authority [30], at p. 17). We must not seek to establish a Knesset Member's attitude towards a particular problem confronting us from the legislative history of an enactment. The solution of such problems is our responsibility, and ours alone (FIatto Sharon v. Knesset Committee [31], at p. 41;"Kach"Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset [1], at p. 141). Elsewhere, I have had occasion to comment thus:

 

The Judge does not seek a concrete answer to the practical problem he has to decide in the history of a legislative enactment. The court is not interested in the specific pictures and concrete likenesses contemplated by the Legislature. In the legislative history of an enactment we seek its purpose; we seek the interests and objectives from which, after compromise and balance between them, there was distilled the policy underlying the norm which is being construed. What we seek is the fundamental perception rather than the individual application - the abstraction, the principle, the policy and purpose. We are interested in the Legislature's concept as to the purpose of the Law, and not in its conception as to the resolution of the specific dispute before the court ("Of Ha-Emek"v. Ramat Yishai Local Council [32], at pp. 143-144) .

 

          We must accordingly continue our search for the legislative purpose behind the statutory provision concerned.

         

(6) The Legislative Purpose: a "Spacious View"

 

13. The proper path to follow was indicated by Agranat D.P. (as he then was) in the Matana rehearing [3]. Referring to the Transition Law, which was then in force, Justice Agranat observed (at p. 444):

 

The "omission" in which my learned colleague found the expression of the desire of the Israel Legislature to cut down the provisions of Art. 16 of the Order in Council and therefore to restrict the President's power of pardon, is in no sense proof of any such intention. It is more correct to say, as was said by Smoira P. in another context... that the Israel Legislature "neither copied nor omitted, but built its law as an independent structure."

 

          The Transition Law was indeed an independent Israel Law, as is the Basic Law which followed it, and the presidential powers conferred thereunder are autonomous and original. The Israel legislator, far from "copying or omitting" anything, fashioned by its own means the constitutional framework for our national life, producing an "independent structure" which must also, therefore, be construed in the same way.

         

14. We are in fact dealing with an independent Israel Law of constitutional content. This element is of basic importance in the construction of the Law, as was pointed out by Agranat D.P. ([3], p. 442) with reference to the statement of Justice Frankfurter (in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer [51]), that when a matter touched a document which laid down the framework of the government of the State, the court was to take a "spacious view of the powers herein prescribed." I myself followed this approach in the Neiman case [19], where I made these observations (at p. 306):

 

Basic provisions must be construed according to a "spacious view"- to use an expression of Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, quoted by Agranat D.P. in the Matana case - and upon the understanding that we are dealing with a directive which determines the national pattern of life. A basic constitutional directive is not to be construed in the same way as an ordinary legislative provision. It was Chief Justice Marshall of America who, in the early stages of the shaping of the American constitutional perspective, stated that in interpreting the Constitution it had to be remembered that it was no ordinary document -"it is a constitution we are expounding" (M'Culloch v. Maryland). We are concerned here with a human endeavour which has to adapt itself to the changing realities of life. If we have said of an ordinary Law that it is not a fortress to be conquered with the aid of a dictionary, but a frame for a living legislative idea (Cr. A. 881, 787/79, at p. 427), how much more should we be so guided when engaging in the interpretation of directives of a constitutional nature.

 

          Constitutional enactments must indeed be interpreted with the structure of the whole system in mind. A Law is "a creature living within its environment" (per Sussman J. in Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [22], at p. 513), and the "environment" of a constitutional Law is, inter alia, the other constitutional enactments which determine the essential character of the regime. Every constitutional enactment is but a building block in the overall structure, which is erected upon given foundations of government and law. Hence, when construing a constitutional enactment, it is the judge-interpreter's function to bring the same "into harmony with the foundations of the existing constitutional regime in the State" (Justice M. Landau, "Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice," Mishpatim 1 (1969), 292). That expresses the real importance of Justice Agranat's perception that a "spacious view" must be taken of a constitutional enactment.

         

15. To take such a "spacious view" when construing the presidential power "to pardon offenders," means to view the presidential powers as part of the general distribution of powers among the State authorities. The presidential power of pardon must be seen as a component in the complex of governmental powers comprising the "constitutional scheme," as was stated by Justice Holmes in Biddle v. Perovich E56] (at p. 486):

 

A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the constitutional scheme.

 

The pardoning power forms part of the fabric of our democratic life: it flows from the regime's republican system of power allocation. This aspect was elucidated in the American case of Schick v. Reed [58], where it was held per Marshall J., at p. 276):

 

The references to English statutes and cases are no more than dictum: as the Court itself admonishes, "the power [of pardon] flows from the Constitution alone"... .Accordingly, the primary resource for analyzing the scope of Art. II is our own republic system of government.

 

16.     What conclusions are to be derived from the above mode of interpretation, according to which the presidential pardoning power must be "spaciously" viewed against the background of our own constitutional structure? Two main conclusions seem to be warranted. First, for the purpose of construing the President's pardoning power, we cannot be guided by the powers of pardon conferred on officeholders in other countries whose status, in the devolution of powers in their respective countries, differs materially from that of our own President. We may, however, by the same token, learn about his pardoning power by comparing it with such powers conferred on like officeholders in other countries of similar constitutional structure. The second conclusion is that whatever the scope of similar powers in other countries, we must in the final analysis construe the State President's own power against the domestic constitutional background, and in the end we can gain but limited interpretative guidance from the situation in other countries.

 

(7) The Legislative Purpose: Guidance from England?

 

17. Let us examine the power of pardon of the English Monarch. This power had its origin in the seventh century during the reign of the Anglo-Saxon kings (see L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law, London, 1948, vol. 1, pp. 107-137). These kings had the power of life and death:

 

the power to take life included the power to save it... and the pardon power was identical in scope with the power to punish (Boudin, "The Presidential Pardons", at p. 9).

 

          This basic standpoint prevailed for a long period of time. Thus in 1686, an English court held that the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns, that the laws were the Kings' laws and that the King had the power "to dispense with any of laws of the Government as he saw necessity for it" (Godden v. Hales [48], at p. 1051). A number of attempts to curtail the royal power of pardon were made over the years, but in essence it remained as wide as before. Its ideological foundation was the notion that the King was the "fountain of justice." He was the defender of the public and dispenser of justice; he established courts and executed the law, he prosecuted offenders and granted pardons. As Blackstone has commented (Book 1, at pp. 268-269):

         

          As the public, which is the invisible body, has delegated all its power and rights, with regard to the execution of the laws, to one visible magistrate, all affronts to that power, and breaches of those rights, are immediately offences against him, to whom they are so delegated by the public. He is therefore the proper person to prosecute for all public offences and breaches of the peace, being the person injured in the eye of the law... and hence also arises another branch of the prerogative, that of pardoning offences; for it is reasonable that he only who is injured should have the power of forgiving... of prosecutions and pardons.

 

          With the conversion of the English Crown to a constitutional monarchy, the power of pardon itself underwent no real change, although a change did assert itself as regards the exercise of the power. Thus the royal power of general pardon was recognized, but never came to be exercised in practice. The royal power to pardon before conviction has likewise remained recognized, but has not been exercised since the middle of the nineteenth century. At that time this possibility was limited to an immunity from prosecution given to someone who turned "King's evidence."

          Nowadays, however, with the development of police powers as well as the Attorney-General's power to stay criminal proceedings, and with the establishment of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the power of pardon is no longer exercised even in the above exceptional circumstances. An English authority has described the situation thus (see J.L. Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest, London, 1984, at p. 414):

         

During the nineteenth century it was common practice to grant a pardon to an accomplice who was to turn Queen's evidence, but this resort to the machinery of pardons, prior to the registering of a conviction, has long since become obsolete. Where the reluctance of a witness to testify on behalf of the Crown did not stem from his being an accomplice but arose on the ground that he would incriminate himself, it was also known for the Crown to prepare a free pardon in advance, ready to be produced by prosecuting counsel. The last occasion when a free pardon was granted to a witness in these circumstances was in 1891. There is now a general understanding among British constitutional law authorities that the practice of conferring a pardon upon a principal offender before conviction has fallen into disuse.

 

          The English King's historical power of pardon is rooted in the royal prerogative, with the King perceived as the source of justice. That perception provides no guidance so far as concerns the President of Israel, as was pointed out by Berinson J. in Matana v. Attorney-General [25] (at pp. 976-977):

         

I cannot say that the Israel Legislature in conferring the power of pardon upon the President of the State in the Hebrew language, intended to include therein the full content which the concept of pardon has acquired over the ages in English law, pardon which is wholly in the hands of the Crown without reserve or limit by virtue of the ancient royal prerogative. There is no point of comparison between the status of the President in our country and that of the Crown in England. The President is a creature of statute and his powers are defined by law. Like everyone else in this country, he enjoys no rights or privileges which are not accorded to him by the laws of the State and every official act of his which exceeds the limits of the law is null and void.

 

          Unlike the English Monarch, the President of Israel is not "the fountain of justice," he does not execute the law or prosecute public offences. Accordingly, as regards the presidential power "to pardon offenders," no interpretative guidance is to be derived from the pardoning power enjoyed in principle by the English Monarch. But we could certainly be guided as to the scope of the presidential pardoning power by the practice followed by the English Monarch today. And as we have seen, this practice does not extend to a pardon before conviction, since

such practice is out of harmony with modern views as to the propriety of granting dispensation before the normal process of the criminal law has run its course (Edwards, The Attorney-General, p. 475).

 

(8)     The Legislative Purpose: Guidance from the U.S.A.?

 

18.     In the American case of Schick v. Reed [58] Justice Burger relates that when the American Constitution was under preparation, a short discussion took place on the scope of the pardoning power to be entrusted to the President. The view that it be confined to exercise after conviction only, was rejected for the reason that this would preclude the possibility of using accomplices as prosecution witnesses in conformity with the English practice at the time. The American courts have since then interpreted the President's pardoning power as being similar to that of the English Monarch. This power embraces not only individual pardon but also general amnesty, and results from the perception that the President of the U.S.A. is charged with the execution of the laws:

 

A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws (United States v. Wilson [55], at p. 160, per Marshall C.J.).

 

          The customary view, which is based on dicta in a number of old cases, is that the existing pardoning power extends also to the grant of a pardon before conviction. There seem to be several reasons, however, why even the American model cannot guide us with regard to the presidential power of pardon in Israel. First, in the U.S.A. the President heads the Executive authority. Like the English King in the past, so the American President today is responsible for execution of the law, so that there is a certain logic in entrusting him with a power not to execute the law in certain cases by way of granting a pardon. That is not the situation of the President of Israel, who holds no powers so far as execution of the law is concerned. Second, the U.S. President is empowered to grant a general amnesty, also to unconvicted suspects. There is a certain logic in the contention that the authority competent to grant an amnesty to unconvicted suspects should also be competent to grant an individual pardon before conviction (see P.B. Kurland, Watergate and The Constitution, Chicago, 1978, p. 145). This argument doesn't hold good in Israel, where the President is not empowered to grant an amnesty, and from this viewpoint there is no logical basis for empowering him to grant a pardon before conviction. A third reason for distinguishing the American situation from our own is that the framers of the American Constitution were mindful of the English experience, which they themselves had shared in the colonial period. This was pointed out by Judge Wayne in Ex Parte Wells (1856) [61]:

 

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, American statesmen were conversant with the laws of England, and familiar with the prerogatives exercised by the Crown. Hence, when the words "to grant pardons" were used in the Constitution, they convey to the mind the authority as exercised by the English Crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. At that time both Englishmen and Americans attached the same meaning to the word "pardon."

 

          A different situation has existed in Israel. As we have seen, the draftsmen of the Transition Law did not seek to emulate the experience of the English monarchy, and those who legislated the Basic Law into existence did not consider the presidential pardoning power to be exercisable before conviction.

         

19. The result is that we cannot be guided by the Anglo-American experience when seeking to construe the scope of the President of Israel's power "to pardon offenders." This does not mean that the constitutional situation in England and the U.S.A. cannot ever provide any interpretative guidance for us. On the contrary: our own interpretative processes, ever since the establishment of the State, have drawn extensively on the Anglo-American constitutional experience, and the outlook in these countries on many subjects, among them human rights, have often inspired our own approach. Yet such nourishment has to be controlled, and the inspiration can only flow from a comparison between institutions, processes and perspectives which have a common basis. Thus we too can learn from the American recognition of the fundamental human rights, since both our countries have democratic regimes committed to the rule of law and the separation of powers. That, however, does not apply to the power of pardon, which in England and the U.S.A. is based on an approach that differs entirely from our own.

 

          (9) The Legislative Purpose: Proper Guidance

         

20. The absolute French monarchy also wielded a wide power of pardon, both before and after conviction, individual as well as general. Like powers were enjoyed by other absolute monarchies in Europe. A drastic change came with the French Revolution, when the existing form of pardon was abolished in France and replaced by a more restricted form. Since then it has been customary in most of the Continental countries for a limited power of pardon - not exercisable before conviction - to be conferred on the titular, and not executive Head of State, that is to say, the person holding the powers which symbolise the State. This is the situation in modern France (see e.g. sec. 35 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, and see also Monteil, La grace); in Italy (see art. 87 of the new Constitution, and see also Manzini, Trattato Di Dirrito Penale Italiano, 1981, p. 510; Bortolloti, "Il principio Constituzionale Della Clemenza," Rivista Trim. Di Dir. Civ. [1978], 1681): in Germany (see sec. 60(2) of the new Constitution) and in many other countries (including Holland and the Phillipines). It is interesting to discern the same trend in the new democracies which became a part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Thus the King of England and the Governor-General of Canada cannot grant a pardon in that country except after conviction (see. 683 of the Criminal Code of 1970). The same holds true in Australia, except in the context of persons who turn Queen's evidence. Section 72 of the Indian Constitution empowers the President to grant a pardon after conviction only (see Balkrishna, "Presidential Power of Pardon," J. of Indian Law Institute 13 [1971], 103). It might also be noted that in a number of countries (among them France, Italy and Germany) the pardoning power is constitutionally defined in general terms, while their equivalents of the expression "to pardon offenders" have been construed, in judicial decisions and by commentators, as relating solely to pardon after conviction.

 

21. I may now conveniently summarize my observations on the interpretative guidance to be derived from a review of the pardoning methods in other countries. I have sought to show that in countries where the law of pardon is not laden with historical memories from the era of the absolute monarchy or coloured by other similar influences of a bygone era, and at the head of which stands a King or President who symbolises the State, this authority holds a restricted power of pardon. The most important restriction is the limitation of the power to the stage after conviction. This conclusion does not, however, put an end to our interpretative search, for we have seen that constitutional directives require a "spacious view" in their construction. In our present context, that means we have to construe the pardoning power in the light of the general governmental structure in Israel. This I now proceed to do.

 

(10) The Legislative Purpose: General Governmental Structure

 

22. During the era of absolute rule, when the power of pardon was wielded by the sovereign himself, there would have been little point in examining the division of authority among the different governmental organs. The ruler held supreme authority, and was therefore entitled to grant a pardon (individual or general) when so disposed, before or after conviction or the conduct of an investigation. It is different in a democratic constitutional regime. The sovereignty there lies with the people, the ruler is no longer omnipotent, and the rule itself is divided among the different authorities. Each has to function within its own sphere, though in general synchronization with the others and subject to mutual checks and balances. It is not in keeping with the democratic character of the regime that any authority, be it the President himself, should hold a paramount power which enables it to change a decision of any of the other authorities which have acted within their responsibility in the framework of criminal proceedings. Such a power may be fitting for an absolute ruler who wishes to show grace to his subjects, but is alien to a holder of high office who wants to serve his subjects. This contrast is well-illustrated in the American precedents. At first it was held by the Supreme Court that a pardon granted by the President, like one granted by the English King, was an act of grace (see U.S. v. Wilson [55], at p. 160) per Marshall C.J.):

 

A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws....It is the private, though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court.

 

          This approach, however, fell into disfavour (see Buchanan, "The Nature of a Pardon under the U. S. Constitution,") and was later expressly rejected in Biddle v. Perovich [56], where Justice Holmes observed as follows (at p. 486):

 

We will not go into history, but we will say a word about the principles of pardons in the law of the United States. A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the constitutional scheme.

 

          The power of pardon of the President of Israel is, indeed, a part of the constitutional scheme, within which it has to find its rightful place.

         

23. What then are the implications for the pardoning power of the need for its coordination with the other State organs and authorities? In the first place, it seems to me that the President's power of pardon must not be construed as placing him in paramount authority over all the other authorities involved in the administration of criminal justice. The pursuit of criminal justice involves different authorities in different stages, from the commission of the offence until the delivery of a final judgment: the police, the prosecution, the courts, and the prison services (for holding suspects in custody). It would be contradictory to this constitutional arrangement to enable the President to intervene in the normal process by exercising his power of pardon concurrently with the powers exercised by the other State authorities. Only an unworthy constitutional arrangement would permit the President a power to halt a police investigation or the prosecution of a criminal charge, or to intervene at any stage in the course of the adjudicatory process. Such a situation was decried by Landau J. in the Matana rehearing in these terms ([3] at p. 461):

 

I am unable to see any purpose which can justify such confusion in methods of punishment and the division of powers between the authorities of the State.

 

          The proper interpretative approach indeed requires us to focus attention on the division of powers between the different State authorities, the ramifications of which are to be gathered from the "constitutional scheme" underlying our legislation. The proper construction of the pardoning power against this background is that it should be exercised by the President only after the other authorities have discharged their own functions. If in that situation there be need for a pardon, the President will be empowered to grant it. This was the fundamental philosophical approach to the question of pardon in the U.S.A., as was pointed out by Hamilton (Federalist, no. 74):

 

The Criminal Act of every country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exception in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.

 

          The same idea was expressed by American Chief Justice Taft, in Ex Parte Grossman [49] (at pp. 120-121):

         

Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law. The administration of justice by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances which may properly mitigate guilt. To afford a remedy, it has always been thought essential in popular governments, as well as in monarchies, to vest in some other authority than the courts power to ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judgments. It is a check entrusted to the Executive for special cases.

 

          That was also the approach of Justice Agranat in A. v. the Law Council [2], where he commented thus (at p. 751):

         

Here - as in England - the primary purpose... is to redress the wrong done to a person who was convicted while innocent, and the second purpose - the value of which should also not be underestimated -is to reduce the sentence of the offender in circumstances which justify this. It is clear that the exercise of such a power by one of the highest State authorities is essential for the effectiveness of any governmental regime, since in no country whatever has there yet been created a system of justice capable of perfect and unerring operation, and of dispensing justice in every case without fail. I need hardly state that not all the material which may throw light on the matter before the court is invariably produced at the trial, and even the judges, who are but human, may err from time to time. It is essential, therefore, that there be available such a reserve power in order to prevent the harmful consequences of an injustice, and also to enable the reduction of a person's punishment - even when properly convicted - should the circumstances so dictate or warrant .

 

          It accordingly transpires that the power of (individual) pardon is exercisable only upon conviction of the offender in a final judgment. Only then will the different State organs have exhausted their own powers, and only then can there arise the need to correct an injustice. Until that stage, the fate of the suspect is to be determined by the appointed authorities in the ordinary course of the administration of criminal justice. A presidential invasion of the province of any of these authorities is an inconceivable possibility in a democratic-constitutional country.

         

 24. The perception that the presidential power of pardon must not be construed as being in rivalry with the powers of the other State authorities, underlies the interpretative conclusion that the power does not extend to the grant of a general amnesty. The expression "to pardon offenders" - according to its plain meaning, as I have already explained - would seem to embrace also the grant of a general amnesty, since it too effects a pardon for offenders. Yet there is no disputing the view that the President lacks the power to grant a general amnesty, as was in fact held by Agranat D.P. in the Matana rehearing (at p. 455):

 

It must be understood that when the First Knesset conferred the power of pardon upon the President, its intention was that he should not be empowered to declare a general amnesty, the result of which would be to pardon all offenders, for the intention was to reserve the power of general amnesty to the legislative authority itself.

 

          I believe the rational explanation for the President's lack of the power of amnesty to be the perception that amnesty is a legislative act which is properly the function of the Knesset rather than that of the President. The latter must exercise no powers that impinge on those of the legislative authority or, by analogy, on those of other authorities. The powers of the police to conduct investigations, and of the Attorney-General to prosecute offenders, including their respective powers to discontinue the investigation, or the prosecution, must not be subject to encroachment by the President through exercise of his pardoning power. Neither, indeed, should this power be construed as warranting presidential intervention in the authority of the court to acquit or convict and impose whatever punishment it sees fit. It has to be recognized that the grant of a pardon in the course of the investigation of an offence, or a trial, is an intervention in the exercise of these executive powers just as unwarranted as an intervention by the President in the Knesset's exercise of its legislative powers. The undesirability of construing the pardoning power in a manner permitting such presidential intervention, was stressed by the Attorney-General, Prof. Zamir, in his abovementioned directive, in these terms:

         

A Presidential power to intervene in criminal proceedings pending before the court, in a manner permitting termination of such proceedings at any time, is undesirable in principle. The pardoning power of the President bears no comparison with the Attorney-General's power to intervene in criminal proceedings by way of staying the same. The Attorney-General functions from the start as an integral factor in criminal court proceedings, for he is empowered by law to prefer the charge on behalf of the State. This power naturally entails also the power to withdraw the charge as well as to stay the criminal proceedings at any stage before final judgment, such decision being founded on a close involvement in and familiarity with the proceedings. The President, on the other hand, is an extraneous factor in criminal proceedings. In this situation, his grant of a pardon in the course of the trial might be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into the domain of the court.

 

Such an unwarranted intervention would occur if, for instance, the court were to convict the accused and he be pardoned by the President before sentence.

 

 25. This conclusion as to a "separation of powers" between the presidential pardon and the powers of other State authorities, is reinforced when regard is had to Israel's general constitutional framework. The other State authorities (the police, the prosecution and the courts) have the means to establish the facts. The police has its investigating facilities and seeks to reach an assessment of the factual situation. The prosecution, to whom the police must transmit the material, will handle and process it until judgment. The courts possess the institutional and normative facilities for elucidating the question of innocence or guilt. That, however, is not the situation of the President, who has no facilities for ascertaining the truth and testing the facts. It is therefore only natural that in matters of pardon the President be guided by the court's rulings. If it finds the accused not guilty, that is the end of the matter; if it convicts the accused and sentences him, that will be the President's starting point. Before conviction of the accused the President has no factual basis whatever for weighing the justifiability of a pardon. Even an admission by the applicant for a pardon that he committed an offence is of no consequence, for he is presumed innocent until convicted by the court.

 

26. My approach to the construction of the presidential power of pardon is also dictated by the reality of Israel's own constitutional structure. The President is the "Head of State," and not the head of the executive authority. He is a kind of additional authority to those four already existing (the legislative, executive,  judicial and supervisory authorities). In the Israel constitutional context, the President is perceived as symbolizing the State. He is not party to the power struggles in the country, and stands above the day-to-day political strife. It is unreasonable to assume that a President so constituted should be endowed by the lawgiver with a power of intervention in the daily functioning of the remaining governmental authorities. That would be like descending into the "arena," and not fitting for the President. Here, indeed, is a material difference between the President of Israel and the American President. The latter heads the Executive and has to do battle every day. That is why his power of pardon may be construed as extending also to a general amnesty as well as a pardon before conviction of the offender.

 

27. Moreover, the exercise of power must be subject to judicial review, without which arbitrariness will result, for without the judge there is no law. Hence our  constitutional perspective that the activities of each of the governmental authorities are subject to judicial review, consistently with the scope of the powers of that authority. This court has held even the functioning of the Knesset to be subject to limited judicial review (see Bergman v. Minister of Finance [33]; Sarid v. Knesset Chairman [15]; "Kach" Faction v. Knesset Chairman [1]; Kahana v. Knesset Chairman [26]). However, it was seen fit in the Basic Law, see. 13(a), to free the discharge of the presidential function from direct judicial review. There does remain the possibility of indirect review of his decisions, but only in a restricted way. For example, if he pardons a particular person, but refuses to pardon someone else in a similar position, the latter person would have no remedy. It is inconceivable that that same Legislature which freed the presidential functions from judicial review, should have granted him pardoning powers in place of those of other authorities amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts. We should, on the contrary, construe the presidential pardoning power as a residual, or a "reserve" power - as Justice Agranat called it - for use when the powers of the other authorities have reached the limits of their exercise.

 

28. I have so far assumed that our own "constitutional scheme" requires the pardoning power to be construed as not competing with the powers of other authorities. Hence my conclusion that the President lacks the power to pardon before conviction. It might be argued that the desired result could be achieved by recognizing the President's power to pardon before conviction in the expectation that he would make only a limited use of that power, as is the case in England. There the law has left the constitutional monarch with the pardoning power of the absolute monarch, but ensured that he does not in practice exercise that power except as consistent with the democratic character of the regime. This alternative, attractive as it may seem, is unacceptable to me for a number of reasons .

          In the first place, constitutional norms cannot be built on hopes. Basic principles of government are not shaped on the assumption that all will proceed as planned. Quite the contrary. The entire constitutional edifice is testimony to the realization that checks and balances must be provided to prevent, or cope with, situations that are likely to go wrong. If under our "constitutional scheme" the presidential powers must not rival those of other authorities, it would be most undesirable to rest the attainment of this objective on the expectation of presidential restraint, and his refraining from the exercise of his available powers. What if the presidential conduct doesn't come up to expectations? And - should we pursue this approach - why not say that the President has a general power of pardon and amnesty? The fact is that we are dealing here with a matter of constitutional import, impinging as such on our lives within the national framework. When it comes to the shaping of basic principles of government, we have to adopt a clear stand one way or the other. The matter should not be left for resolution on a casuistic basis of distinction between case and case, exceptional or otherwise, that would leave everything exposed to the vagaries of the passing political rivalries. We have been so instructed by my respected colleague, President Shamgar, in Neiman v. Central Knesset Elections Committee [19], where he held as follows (at p. 260):

         

When constitutional matters are under review, their import and implications must be considered in the long term, and proper weight given to their influences on the political and social frameworks within which they operate. If these be subjugated to the needs of the hour and we adopt a casuistic approach in matters of constitutional content, particularly concerning the freedom and rights of the individual, we shall miss the mark and deal less than justly with the subject.

 

          Were we to resolve the problem by a casuistic determination that the State President has the power, in principle, to pardon before conviction, with everyone left hoping that he will only rarely exercise that power, we should be guilty of doing exactly as admonished not to do.

          Secondly, the very existence of a power, albeit slumbering, invariably arouses expectations of its use. The President would be subject to constant individual and public pressure to exercise his power of pardon before conviction, and thrust himself into the centre of public controversy whether he accede to or refuse the request for a pardon. It is precisely the need to regard the President as the symbol of the State and isolate him from political rivalries, that demands a clear and unequivocal determination as to the scope of his pardoning power, and its negation before conviction of the offender in a final judgment.

          Thirdly, the indirect - in Israel the only possible - judicial review of the President's discharge of his functions, would be ineffective if he intervened in the activities of the other authorities, for if he acted within his lawful powers, there would be little opportunity for intervention by the court. If we are bent upon a "separation of powers," it is necessary that we keep the powers duly separated.

         

29. It is accordingly my conclusion that our constitutional framework precludes a construction of the presidential pardoning power as being concurrent with the powers of other State authorities. It demands, in fact, that the power only be exercised after the other authorities have exhausted their own powers. It might be asked whether this approach is not unduly rigid, and whether it may not result in injustice in certain, perhaps exceptional, cases. Can it be said that the other authorities will weigh the same considerations as does the President, and that in a rare case the presidential pardon will not offer the most effective remedy if granted before conviction? These questions are important and must be answered.

          Our starting point is that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the different State authorities are sufficiently equipped to deal with the problems with which the power of pre-conviction pardoning is likely to be confronted. True, the mechanisms are not the same, nor is the legal consequence identical, but the main problems are solved. If someone's personal plight (for example, a malignant disease) indicates that he should not be interrogated or prosecuted, a presidential pardon is not the only satisfactory solution. The police and the prosecution may take the suspect's personal circumstances into account and, for example, the Attorney-General may stay the proceedings for lack of public interest in the continuation of the trial on grounds of personal considerations affecting the applicant. Legally speaking, pardon is of course a "stronger" remedy than a stay of proceedings, yet the latter "milder" remedy suffices to solve the problem of the incurably ill suspect, or other problematic cases, by achieving the generally desired effect: The Attorney-General may likewise take into account general social considerations (embracing also matters of security and foreign policy). It was pointed out in the report of the Agranat Jurists' Commission on the Powers of the Attorney-General (1962) that in certain circumstances a situation involving a security, political or public interest may demand that no criminal charge be preferred. In this connection the Commission reported as follows on the Attorney-General's need to consult with the political authorities (at p. 13):

 

The stated duty to consult arises particularly when criminal proceedings are being instituted in relation to a matter of security, political or public interest. In such event it is always incumbent on the Attorney-General to consider whether the act of instituting criminal proceedings (or halting the same) is not more likely to prejudice the interests of the State than refraining from taking such action. This the Attorney-General will only be able to do after having sought information and guidance from those who carry the primary responsibility for safeguarding the State from the security, political and public aspects - that is to say, from those who, so we must presume, are more experienced and knowledgeable in those fields than we are. As already indicated, he will generally need to refer to the Minister of Justice for the required direction and advice; but sometimes, that is in cases which give rise to questions of "high policy," there will be no alternative but to obtain guidance from the Government as a body.

 

          It will be found that most of the problematical cases for which a pre-conviction pardon is sought, can and should properly be handled through the existing mechanisms, which have been structured in advance to deal with that very kind of case. Every person is presumed innocent until convicted, and a suspect's legal status cannot change except upon conviction by the court. The particular problems, for the suspect himself and for the general public, can normally be satisfactorily handled through the authorities charged with the administration of criminal justice. The former situation of the comparatively poor facilities available for the "extinction" of the offender's criminal past, has now been significantly improved with the enactment of the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law of 1981, according to which a presidential pardon - and clearly only a pardon after conviction is envisioned there - is an extinction of the conviction for all intents and purposes (sec. 16(c).

         

30. I am ready to acknowledge the possibility of very exceptional circumstances in which the power of pardon before conviction would offer the most practical and effective means of dealing with the problem. Even that, however, would not be a decisive consideration, for the reason that the "spacious view" we have to take when construing a provision of constitutional content, which is the case here, otherwise dictates. We must take into account not only the individual's plight, but also the interests of the general public, and the possibility of the abuse of the power. We must also remember the dynamics of a progression in which the rarest exceptions become less rare, and then become the general rule. The Attorney-General's power to stay proceedings offers an illustration of such a progression. We accordingly have to strike a balance between the different interests - between the hypothetical special exception and the need for the determination of clear and sharply defined limits for the exercise of executive powers at the highest level. Since there is no ideal solution, we can only strive at one that promises the least evil by balancing between the clashing interests. In so doing, in these circumstances, there is no need to give any priority to anomalies and exceptions. The best way to deal with the special cases is through the powers of the authorities who deal regularly with the situations concerned, and not through the conferment of exceptional powers on the State President. That has been the experience of many countries with political regimes resembling our own. Thus the Heads of State in France, Italy, Germany, India, Australia, Canada and in numerous other countries, do not enjoy a power of pardon before conviction. This lack has not, so far as I am aware, led to injustice grave enough in exceptional cases to prompt any move towards amendment of the existing law of pardon. The modern trend seems rather to indicate the contrary, and countries which were formerly subject to the English King's power of pardon have acted to restrict exercise of the pardoning power in their own countries to the post-conviction stage. Edwards, for example, states the situation in these terms (The Attorney-General, at 474):

 

A review of the independence constitutions within the Commonwealth, negotiated with the United Kingdom Government prior to the transfer of sovereignty, provides substantial support for a pre-conviction limitation of the pardoning power.

 

          And the trend in our own country has been towards refinement of the functioning and facilities of the existing authorities, as witness the provisions of the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law of 1981. Even the most anomalous and exceptional circumstances should not, therefore, be allowed to controvert our fundamental constitutional doctrines.

         

31. Before concluding this part of my opinion, I wish to refer to a problem connected with the President's post-conviction pardoning power. Does the pardoning power avail, after conviction, in situations where other State authorities have their own powers to deal with the problem? For instance, can a presidential pardon be granted someone whose case is under examination in a retrial, or be granted for reasons of "permanent ill-health" when this question is under examination by the Minister of Police in the framework of his powers under sec. 49(d) of the Penal Law of 1977? These questions do not arise in the matter now before us, and must await elucidation at the opportune time. However, I may point out that the situations described raise a question different from that occupying us in the present petitions. Our concern so far has been whether the term "offender" includes also an unconvicted suspect, the term itself being "open" and amenable to different possibilities, so that we are assigned the task of selection in accordance with the legislative purpose. In the above problematical situations (such as retrial) the accused, who has already been convicted, is by any linguistic test an "offender" and the question is whether such a person can be said to fall outside the ambit of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law. These situations raise interpretative questions of the greatest complexity. Hence, it may happen that the legislative policy, though its trend be clear, will not be given to implementation in respect of a certain class of "offender" concerning whom the language of the law is insufficiently flexible. The answer, whatever it may be, cannot however affect the construction of the term "offender" in those cases where the language of the Law is flexible enough to serve the legislative policy. It would be unreasonable to hold that since the Legislature failed to attain its objective in some of the possible cases, it then becomes desirable to construe its directives generally in a manner thwarting achievement of the legislative purpose. I believe we should take the opposite interpretative approach. As faithful interpreters, we are committed to attainment of the legislative purpose as far as possible, bearing in mind always that while the interpretation is not bound to the words used, the words do limit the interpretation and so restrict our interpretative freedom. We may implement a legislative purpose within the bounds of a maximum-minimum semantic gradation, but we may not implement a legislative purpose which has no foundation at all in the language of the statute. The point was elucidated by this court in Haddad v. Paz [34], in the following terms (at p. 670):

 

The legislative purpose constitutes an interpretative aid when it serves as a guide in choosing between different, linguistically permissible, interpretations. It is essential, therefore, that the interpretative option which would implement the legislative purpose, find a receptacle in the language of the Law. There has to be a verbal connection, even a minimal one, between the language and the purpose of a Law. It is necessary to find an Archimedean hold for the legislative purpose in the language of the Law. The interpreter may not implement a purpose that finds no linguistic anchorage in the Law.

 

          We have dealt with the legislative purpose. Linguistically speaking it may be achieved in relation to an unconvicted person. He is not in the category of an "offender." It is doubtful whether this purpose is attainable in relation to a convicted person whose case is under retrial, or under examination by the Minister of Police in the context of his powers in situations of permanent ill-health. These are difficult questions awaiting clarification at the proper time.

         

32. It may possibly be contended that such linguistic "rigidity" is indicative of a basic misconception as to the legislative purpose. It should perhaps be said that because the President has a power of pardon where there is a retrial, he has the like power where no trial has been held at all. My answer to this legitimate question is that the available evidence - factual (the views of the Knesset members concerned) and legal ("the constitutional scheme") - does not support such a conclusion.

 

(11) Interim Summary

 

33. The empowerment of the President "to pardon offenders" is couched in "open", equivocal language, offering in itself no answer to the question whether the power of individual pardon is exercisable also before conviction, or the term "offender" includes also an unconvicted suspect. For the purpose of choosing between the possible linguistic options, we must have recourse to the legislative purpose. That purpose was not the equation of the State President's pardoning power with that of the English King, or of the President of the U.S.A., so we cannot be guided by those models. The Basic Law: The President of the State, is indeed an original Israel Law - the Israel Legislature "neither copied nor omitted, but built its law as an independent structure." It must accordingly be construed against the background of our own national experience, with interpretative guidance sought from the countries which have a similar constitutional arrangement. In discharging the interpretative function we must take a "spacious view," having regard to our "constitutional scheme." Against this background, my own approach is not to presume that the lawgiver sought to confer on the State President - who does not head the executive authority but symbolizes the State, and whose functioning is not subject to direct judicial review - executive powers concurrent with those of other State authorities (the police, the prosecution, the courts). The lawgiver cannot be presumed to have favoured presidential intervention in criminal proceedings before these have run their full course. Therefore, I interpret the expression "to pardon offenders" as extending only to persons against whom a final convicting judgment has been given. This approach finds support in the scholarly treatises of two of Israel's most distinguished jurists, Professors Feller and Klinghoffer, in the criminal law and constitutional law fields respectively. In the view of both scholars, each from the angle of his own specialized field, the presidential power of individual pardon extends only to duly convicted persons (see Prof. Feller's article, "Rehabilitation," p. 5). The same approach was also adopted by Landau J. in the Matana rehearing, where he held as follows (at p. 461):

 

My main ground in opposing the wide interpretation proposed by the Deputy President is that matters of punishment in criminal cases fall within the jurisdiction of the courts. It is clear that side by side with this jurisdiction the special power of pardon is required in order to correct any serious error of the court which cannot otherwise be corrected, and as an act of grace after the offender has served part of his sentence.

 

          The matters of correcting "any serious error of the court," and "an act of grace after the offender has served part of his sentence," have relevance after conviction only. I am conscious of the fact that Deputy President Agranat (as he then was) and Justice Berinson, two of Israel's most distinguished Judges, expressed a different opinion. I shall seek to explain how this occurred when I examine the approach of my respected colleague, President Shamgar, which I now proceed to do.

         

F. The Approach of Shamgar P.

 

(1) The Gist of his Approach

 

34. I shall seek to set out the main points in the judgment of Shamgar P. on which our approaches diverge. My colleague's starting point seems to be that the Anglo-American model was envisaged by the Israel Legislature as the prototype for the presidential pardoning power in Israel at the time when sec. 6 of the Transition Law was enacted. Further, that it was also so held in the case of A. v. the Law Council and in the Matana rehearing. This "historical-interpretative" approach would dictate the conclusion that the presidential pardoning power in Israel is the same as that of the English King or the American President - and different from other models which may be disregarded - and that it embraces also the grant of a pardon before conviction. In the opinion of Shamgar P., this same situation was envisaged by the Israel Legislature when it later enacted the Basic Law: The President of the State. Hence, so far as pertaining to the issue now before the court, the text of the pardoning provision in the Transition Law was re-enacted without change in the form in which it had been interpreted in the precedents - an indication that no need was seen to change the then existing legal situation. Accordingly, it could not be contended that parallel powers held by other authorities (such as the Attorney-General's power to stay criminal proceedings) might affect the presidential pardoning power, without it first being proved that the existence of such parallel or overlapping powers have implicitly repealed the presidential power. In the opinion of Shamgar P., no such implied repeal could be established in the present matter since the existence of the parallel powers created no conflict. The State President was accordingly competent to grant a pre-conviction pardon and, in the view of Shamgar P., this conclusion was also consistent with the interpretative perspective that constitutional powers must be given an expansive interpretation.

 

35. Shamgar P. also made reference to other matters in his important judgment, but I believe I have sufficiently stated the essence of his approach. With all due respect, 1 am unable to agree with that approach. Lack of time prevents me from elaborating upon many of the points on which 1 am in disagreement with my respected colleague, and I shall confine my remarks to certain matters which seem to me important for the resolution of the problem before us.

 

(2) The Anglo-American "Mould and Prototype"

 

36. As I have already indicated, Justice Shamgar took as the starting point for his construction of the presidential pardoning power, the view that it was structured according to the powers of pardon of the English Monarch and the U.S. President. I have sought to show that this view is not in accord with the facts. It was not the latter powers that the lawgiver had in mind when the power of pardon was enacted under the Transition Law. I have examined the relevant legislative history, without finding any hint of factual support for this theory. The powers of pardon of the English Monarch did not serve as the "prototype" for the pardoning power of the President of Israel. Even Justice Agranat did not find as a fact, in A. v. the Law Council [2], that in enacting sec. 6 of the Transition Law the Israel Legislature had in mind the English Monarch's pardoning power as a matter historically established. Justice Agranat's approach was legal and not historical and he assumed, as a matter of law, that the pardoning power of the President of Israel was the same as that of the High Commissioner in the Mandatory period, which in turn he assumed was the same as that of the English Monarch. On this basis he drew the logical conclusion that the pardoning power of the State President was the same as that of the English Monarch, the learned Justice holding as follows (at pp. 750-751):

 

I am of the opinion that the power of pardon of the President of Israel is the same, generally speaking, as the power of pardon of the King of England, in its nature and in respect of the consequences which flow from its exercise. Before the enactment of the Transition Law of 1949, the High Commissioner was empowered under Art. 16 of the Palestine Order in Council (inter alia) to "grant to any offender convicted of any crime... within Palestine... a pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions, or any remission of the sentence passed on such offender.... " The power of pardon held by the High Commissioner was accordingly the same as the power of pardon held by the King of England.... If the provisions of sec. 6 of the Transition Law of 1949 were enacted in place of Art. 16 of the Order of the King-in-Council, as I believe happened, then the power of pardon held by the President must be deemed the same as the power formerly possessed by the High Commissioner, and later by the Provisional Government. That is to say, this power is parallel, in its nature and in the consequences which flow from its exercise, to the power of pardon exercised by the King of England.

 

          It is generally accepted today that the above parallel drawn by Justice Agranat in A. v. the Law Council contained two errors, as was indeed pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Landau J. in the Matana rehearing. In the first place, it is clear that the State President's pardoning power is not the same as was the power possessed by the High Commissioner. If these were the same, the question now before us might never have arisen, since except with regard to offenders who turned "King's evidence," the High Commissioner had no power of pre-conviction pardoning. This error was later acknowledged and corrected by Justice Agranat in the Matana rehearing, in the following terms ([3] at pp. 443-444) :

         

resort to a system of comparison between the language of Art. 16 of the Order in Council and that of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, 1949, in order to ascertain the intention of the Israel Legislature in the latter section which it enacted - resort to this mode of interpretation is out of place... The language of Art. 16 of the Order in Council need not prevent the giving of a wide interpretation to the President's power of pardon.

 

          The second error was Justice Agranat's perception of the High Commissioner's pardoning power as equal to that of the King of England. This aspect too was later dealt with by him in the Matana rehearing, where he pointed out that the High Commissioner held a delegated power which was not the full power of the English King:

         

   the power of pardon granted to the High Commissioner under Art. 16 of the Order in Council... is none other than the power delegated to him by the King from that accorded to the latter by virtue of the prerogative... In view of the rule of construction mentioned above which demands a restricted interpretation of the "delegated" powers of one who has the status of the governor of a British colony, it was imperative to define clearly and precisely the power which was delegated in this respect to the High Commissioner, and it is to this that the detailed and exact language of art. 16 must be attributed. The truth of the matter is that the power of pardon of the King of England was never delegated, in its entire scope, to the High Commissioner. This is proved by the fact that whereas we learn from the passage from Halsbury's Laws quoted above that the King is empowered to grant a pardon also " before conviction," it is provided by Art.16 of the Order in Council that the High Commissioner may only exercise this power in respect of "any offender convicted" (ibid., pp. 439-440).

 

          There accordingly appears to be neither a factual nor any legal basis for the "historical-interpretative" premise that at the root of the State President's pardoning power lay the power of pardon of the English Monarch. Nor, I need hardly add, is there any factual-legal basis for attributing such a role to the pardoning power of the U.S. President.

         

37. I shall now proceed to analyse the judgment of Agranat D.P. in the Matana rehearing. I have endeavoured above to show that he did not found his decision on any "historical-legal" basis of an Anglo-American "prototype" of the pardoning power. The starting point of his approach was the perception of the Transition Law of 1949 as an original Israel enactment. Agranat D.P. relied in this regard on a dictum of Smoira P., that the Israel Legislature "neither copied nor omitted, but built its law as an independent structure", and went on to add as follows ([3] at p. 444):

 

I have so far tried to show that the language of Art. 16 of the Order in Council need not prevent the giving of a wide interpretation to the President's power of pardon and that the formulation of this power in sec. 6 of the Transition law "suffers" such a construction. Is there any positive justification for this and how far should the line be stretched? To answer this question we must first consider the nature of the various powers of pardon.

 

The approach of Agranat D. P. is accordingly to be seen as interpretative rather than historical. Reading the text of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, he examines whether the language "suffers" the construction concerned, and among the possibilities "suffered", chooses the meaning for which there is "positive justification" but taking care not to "stretch the line" too far. He takes into account the fact that he is dealing with a constitutional provision which, he holds, need not be given a restrictive interpretation but calls for the taking of a "spacious view" (ibid. p. 442). It was against this background that Agranat D.P. examined the substance of the pardoning power. Making a thorough examination of the pardoning powers held by the King of England and the American President, he was confronted by the judgment of Berinson J. in the criminal appeal in Matana v. Attorney-General [3], where the latter dwelt on the difference between the English King and the President of Israel. Countering this argument, Agranat D.P. held as follows:

 

My reply to these words of dissent is twofold. Firstly even if the fact that the local provision is drafted in the Hebrew language must not be lightly disregarded, it would also not be right to give it undue weight. Not only do the expressions "pardon" and "reduction of punishments" have a universal meaning, but the power of pardon, in its scope under the common law, is the power which passed to the Provisional Government by virtue of sec. 14 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, and was known to local jurists at the time when that provision was framed.

 

   Secondly, the importance of the lesson from American precedent arises from the fact that although it was the clear aim of the draftsmen of the Constitution of the United States (and it was this very object which they wished to achieve) to ensure - by means of the provision imposing upon the President the duty of supervising the faithful implementation of all the laws of the State - that no trace should remain of those prerogative powers which served the King as a means of relaxing the bonds of various laws and statutes, nevertheless they left the power of pardon within the realm of criminal law just as it was, and introduced a specific provision conferring such power upon the President of the State.

         

          And in reply to the contention that the status of the President of Israel, as "symbolizing" the State, differed from that of the American President as "conducting its affairs," Agranat D.P. had this to say (ibid., pp. 453-454):

         

The reply to this argument is that also in France, where at least until 1958 the status of the President was basically similar to that of the President of Israel, it was found necessary to confer upon the President of the Republic the right to grant pardons.... The result is that the ground of the absence of any similarity or comparison between the status of the President of our country and that of the British Crown (or of the President of the United States) is erroneous.

 

          Justice Agranat accordingly did not construe the Transition Law on the basis that its legislative purpose "was fashioned in the Anglo-American mould, which served as its prototype." His approach was to take a pervasive constitutional perspective, to take a "spacious view" in construing the relevant statutory provision. In ascertaining for himself the meaning of "pardon," he availed himself of the English experience as well as the American, the French and the German. He did not distinguish between the legal situations in the different countries, and he was apparently unaware of the fact that in France the term grace mentioned by him, was not interpreted in the same way as the term "pardon" in the U.S. Constitution. He sought to uncover the essence of the matter, seeing the term "pardon" as harbouring a concept of "universal significance." I wish to adopt that same approach in the matter now before us.

 

.38. It cannot be overlooked that in his judgment in the Matana rehearing, Agranat D.P. also held, specifically, that the State President has the power to pardon before conviction, and so did Berinson J. As for the import of this determination, I believe it is generally recognized as carrying the weight of an obiter dictum. That would entail a twofold consequence. First, from the viewpoint of our legal system, the abovementioned conclusion constitutes no authoritative declaration that Israel law empowers the President to pardon suspects also before their conviction. Hence a District Court Judge, for instance, would still be free to hold that the presidential power of pardon avails after conviction only. For the same formal reason M. Ben-Ze'ev, a former Attorney-General, felt himself free to declare before the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee - after the decisions in A. v. The Law Council and in the Matana rehearing - that the presidential pardoning power was exercisable after conviction alone. For this reason too legal scholars have expressed the same opinion. In so doing they were not merely reflecting the desirable state of affairs, but what seemed to them to be the existing legal situation. It is true that "the final form in which the Law is shaped, is the form given it by the Judge" (Justice Sussman, "The Courts and the Legislating Authority," Mishpatim 3 [1971], 213). Also, "Once the Supreme Court has construed a legislative enactment as it did, in a dispute before it, this construction becomes part of that enactment" (Justice S. Agranat, "The Contribution of the Judiciary to the Legislative Endeavour," Iyunei Mishpat 10 (1984), 244). But these statements are true only with regard to the ratio decidendi, and do not apply to obiter dicta. The rational explanation for this is that in his passing remarks the judge does not sense the same responsibility as he does when setting forth the reasons for his decision. Knowing that his remarks in passing have no binding force, he may feel greater freedom in expressing them. It seems to me that our instant matter well illustrates the point. Thus Berinson J.'s statement concerning the presidential power to pardon before conviction does not, I believe, accord with his general line of thinking. Seeking to restrict, he in fact widened the interpretation. His own perspective provided little explanation for that result. As for Justice Agranat, he referred not only to Anglo-American law but also to Continental law, without, however, carefully examining the latter. He was therefore unaware of the fact that the Continental countries generally did not recognize the possibility of individual pardon without prior conviction. He would certainly have made a thorough study of the matter had he considered it central to his decision. Moreover, in substantiating the need for the pardoning power, Justice Agranat set forth the following two reasons alone (in A. v. The Law Council and in the Matana rehearing):

 

   The primary purpose... is to redress the wrong done to a person who was convicted while innocent, and the second purpose - the value of which should also not be underestimated -is to reduce the sentence of the offender in circumstances which justify this. It is clear that the exercise of such a power by one of the highest State authorities is essential for the effectiveness of any governmental regime, since in no country whatever has there yet been created a system of justice capable of perfect and unerring operation, and of dispensing justice in every case without fail (A. v. the Law Council [12], at p. 751).

 

          This reasoning naturally only holds true in relation to a convicted offender. It is not at all applicable to someone who has yet to be convicted. How, then, is this reasoning of Justice Agranat to be reconciled with his view that the President has power to pardon before conviction? Such power would necessitate a different rationalization, of the kind that is not to be found either in A. v. The Law Council or in Matana.

          The second implication (of holding a judicial statement to be obiter) is that much significance may nevertheless attach to obiter dicta. If these flow directly from a coherent basic perception, they are capable of heralding accurately the reasons for a decision in the future. As a result these dicta create public expectations which are frequently acted upon. The resulting practice may in turn contribute in the course of time to the adoption of a construction that is in keeping with the original dictum, the expectations thus fulfilling themselves. All of this, of course, will fail to be decisive if a later court holds the dictum to be wrong. But it will all be of great importance if the later court should hesitate between two possible constructions. It is true that as between truth and stability, we should prefer truth, yet sometimes when truth and truth vie with each other - stability is to be preferred (see Of Ha-Emek Cooperative Society v. Ramat Yishai Local Council [32]). These considerations do not apply in the case before us for several reasons. First, because the dicta of Justices Agranat and Berinson were not a necessary concomitant of their basic perspective, and with regard to Justice Agranat I have sought to show that he did not perceive the Anglo-American method of pardon as the "prototype" for our own, but that his underlying approach was to give the expression "pardon" its universal meaning. By such universal standards, the dictum that the State President has the power to pardon before conviction certainly cannot be said to have any compelling foundation. A second reason for not following this dictum is that no constitutional practice actually evolved in its wake. In fact, the contrary appears to be the case, for, by internal directive, requests for a pardon have generally not been acceded to before conviction. In argument before us only a very small number of cases of pardon before conviction could be cited. It seems that the dictum created no expectations which could influence our interpretation.

          It accordingly transpires that the question of the presidential power to pardon before conviction has remained essentially unanswered, and we are now called upon to resolve it for the first time. So far the question has been the subject of passing judicial statements, legal articles and jurists' opinions. It is now the time for this court to have its say.

         

39. My colleague, President Shamgar, relying on the statements of Agranat D.P. in the Matana rehearing, holds that constitutional provisions should be given an expansive interpretation. This is an important determination, since Shamgar P. seeks to give the presidential power of pardon a wide construction. I have two comments in this regard.

 

          First, Justice Agranat's starting point (in the Matana rehearing) was that constitutional directives did not necessarily require a restrictive interpretation, but called for a "spacious view" to be taken. I agree with that approach and it also forms the basis of my own judgment here. In my opinion, however, it does not follow that every directive of constitutional content should be expansively construed. That is unfeasible, since constitutional directives deal in the nature of things with the reciprocal relations between the State authorities, and the occasional expansive construction of a particular authority's powers necessarily entails a narrowing of those of some other authority. Furthermore, an expansive interpretation of a governmental power may often entail a narrowing of basic rights, which too is an inconceivable result. In fact, the question whether the construction should be expansive or restrictive does not determine the mode of interpretation, but is itself the interpretative outcome. Thus Justice Agranat himself held that the presidential power of pardon did not extend to a general amnesty, this conclusion being the result of a narrow construction of the pardoning power. The constitutional proposition, in my opinion, is that constitutional directives must be construed in a manner fitting their preferred standing, and in consonance with their capacity to determine the national pattern of life. A basic provision is not intended to perpetuate an existing situation, but to give direction to human experience. Its construction accordingly calls for a pervasive perception, and not a technical approach.

          My second comment is that if called upon to choose between an expansive and a restrictive construction of the presidential pardoning power, I should prefer the latter for several reasons: in the first place, in order to avoid the kind of unwelcome rivalry between the different authorities that I have already described; secondly - and this is the main consideration here - because pardon creates an inequality between "offenders," and a statutory provision relating to pardon must accordingly be given a narrow interpretation. The matter was discussed by Landau J. in Bergman v. Minister of Finance [33], in the following terms (at p. 698):

         

It is accordingly proper, especially in borderline cases, that where a statutory provision is open to two constructions, we should prefer the construction which upholds the equality of all before the law and does not set it at naught.

 

          This principle has been reiterated by the court on a number of occasions (see Abu Hatzeira v. Attorney-General [35]; Raundanaf (Korn) v. Hakim [36]).

         

40. Before concluding my remarks on the instant problem, I should state that President Shamgar's basic standpoint that Knesset Members contemplated a particular model of the pardoning power when our own version was enacted, raises many questions in my own mind. Supposing it were to be established that the English or the American model indeed served as the "prototype" for the wording of sec. 6 of the Transition Law, would that require us to construe the provision in accordance with the American tradition? I believe not. A Law, as I have already mentioned, is a creature living within its awn "environment," and the environment of an Israel statute differs from that of an English or American statute, even if they be similarly worded. "The law of a people must be studied in the light of its national way of life" per Agranat J. in "Kol Haam" Ltd. v. Minister of the Interior [37] at p. 884). The judicial discretion in the interpretation of a statute, so Justice Landau has guided us, must be exercised "in order to bring it into harmony with the constitutional regime in existence in the State" (see his abovementioned article in Mishpatim, 1[1969], at p. 306). All does not depend, therefore, on the model or prototype contemplated by the lawgiver when the pardoning provision was enacted and, important though this may be, it is not decisive. We must interpret the law in consonance with our national way of life, and this may change with the passage of time. If so, the interpretation of a Law will undergo a corresponding change. "If times have changed," Justice Sussman wrote, "the Law suffers a sufficiently flexible construction to enable its adaptation to the changes" (see his abovementioned article in Mishpatim 3 [1971], at p. 215). In this regard Agranat J. has commented thus (Kaufman v. Margines [38], at p. 1034):

 

When the Judge is confronted by a factual situation stemming from new conditions of life rather than those which called forth the existing ruling, it will be the Judge's task to re-examine the logical premise on which the ruling formulated against a different background was based, with a view to adaptation of the same to the new conditions.

 

          This adaptative need applies not only when the facts change, but also when the legal context or "environment" changes. The enactment of new Laws creates a new legal context, and these have the capacity to influence the construction of an earlier statute. It is to be observed that the question is not one of a repeal, expressed or implied, of an earlier Law, but of the effect of the very existence of the new and different Laws on the interpretation of the earlier Law. The point was discussed in State of Israel v Pahima [39], where it was held as follows (at p. 828) :

         

Sometimes a Law, upon its enactment, presents a number of interpretative options, but with the passage of time arid the enactment of additional Laws on the same subject, some of these options fall away, while others take their place. Apposite here is Justice Sussman's statement that "a term in an enactment is a creature living within its environment" (H.C. 58/58, at 513). This environment includes, besides other directives in that enactment, other statutory enactments which throw light on the interpretation of the Law concerned. It must be observed that here the additional enactments bring about no "legislative" change in the Law, only an "interpretative" change. The new enactments have created a new "environment," which by its very existence influences the manner of interpretation of the Law.

 

          Hence the "prototype" contemplated by the lawgiver when the State was established, for all its importance, cannot in itself determine the contemporary interpretation of the Law. A Law is a dynamic creation, adaptable to changing exigencies. This quality was thus elucidated by Justice Agranat in his abovementioned article (Iyunei Mishpat 10 [1984], at p. 239):

         

   Experience teaches that words have a dynamic life of their own. That is to say, with the changes wrought by time in the conditions of life and the concomitant changes in the different social outlooks, words gradually "shed" their original meaning and "assume" a new significance, or come to harbour additional shades of meaning. This factor may well - though it need not always - bring about a construction of the Law the result of which, although falling within the purview of the Law's general purpose, is not the interpretation contemplated by the lawgiver.

 

          It follows that new legislation (such as, for instance, the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law) enacted after the passing of sec. 6 of the Transition Law and sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, is able to affect the mode of interpretation of the latter provisions.

         

(3) The Legislative Authority and its "Acquiescence"

 

41. The expression "to pardon offenders" was repeated in the Basic Law without change, just as it stood in the Transition Law. From this Shamgar P. infers that the Knesset adopted for itself the construction of the majority as well as the minority opinion of the court, on the question of the pre-conviction pardoning power, in the Matana rehearing. This approach is neither factually nor legally acceptable to me.

 

42. Factually, the above thesis seems in conflict with the views held by members of the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee when they discussed sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law prior to its enactment. It appears from the views they expressed, as cited by me above (see par. 11), that they considered the presidential pardoning power to be exercisable after conviction alone. They so understood the words "to pardon offenders," and that was the result they desired. I need only repeat the following statement made by Knesset Member H. Zadok towards the end of the Knesset Committee's discussion of the matter:

 

It seems to me we have no difference of opinion on the substance of the matter. We intend to empower the President to pardon persons who have been criminally tried and convicted.

 

Against this background, I do not see how it can be said that the Knesset "rested content" with the pre-conviction pardoning situation as interpreted by the court in the Matana rehearing. The Knesset focused its attention on the problems which inspired the ratio decidendi, and clarified the matter by way of a subsequent amendment to the wording of the Law on the troublesome point then in issue. The Knesset did not address itself at all to the obiter dictum on the matter of pardon before conviction.

 

43. Legally speaking I am equally unable to accept the aforementioned thesis of Shamgar P. My own approach is that the Knesset legislates only when it actually enacts, and not when it refrains from so doing (see A. Shapira, "The Silence of the Legislature: A Canon of Statutory Construction?," Hapraklit, 21, 293; G. Tedeschi, "Recent Trends in the Theory of 'Stare Decisis'," Hapraklit, 22, 320). The proposition was succinctly stated by Berinson J. as follows (in the Matana rehearing [3], at p. 470):

 

When have we found that the Legislature is able by silence or inaction to put its seal on a particular course of action of one of the State authorities?

         

          Accordingly, the Knesset's mere repetition in the Basic Law of the wording used in the Transition Law, cannot be said to have put the seal of a binding norm on the above dicta in the Matana rehearing.

         

(4) Implied Repeal

 

44. My colleague, President Shamgar; has devoted a considerable part of his judgment to the question of a repeal by implication. In my perception, however, this question fails to arise at all. It is not my view that the powers conferred on the different State authorities (the police, the prosecution, the courts) have repealed by implication the presidential power to pardon before conviction. To have thought so, would necessarily have entailed a recognition of the presidential pardoning power also before conviction. In fact, my approach is that the presidential power of pardon does not avail at all before conviction, so that no question of an implied repeal arises here. In my view, the various Laws dealing with the powers of the different authorities form part of the legal context or "environment," within the framework of which the pardoning power must be construed. These Laws have not implicitly repealed the provisions of sec. 11(b) of the Basic Law, but they do constitute a factor in the interpretation of the Basic Law (see State of Israel v. Pahima [39], at p. 828).

 

G. On the Rule of Law

 

45. Before concluding my judgment, I might observe that the petitions before us harbour in the background formal, as well as substantive, questions of the rule of law. In its formal sense the rule of law requires that all persons and bodies in the State - individuals, associations and governmental agencies - act in accordance with the law, and that any act in conflict with the law must be confronted by society's organized sanction. In this sense the rule of law has a twofold meaning: lawful rule and supremacy of the law. This embodies a formal principle, since it is not the content of the law that concerns us here, only the need for it. In this sense the rule of law is unconnected with the nature of the regime, but only with the principle of public order. As far as the executive authority is concerned, the rule of law concerns itself with the legality of the administration. The Executive is subject to the law, and its agencies have no rights, powers or immunities, unless conferred by law. It follows that a State functionary as such holds no greater rights, powers or immunities than does any other person in the State, and is therefore equally answerable for his actions. In this connection I may quote the well-known words of A.V. Dicey:

 

With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable, or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen (The Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., p. 193).

 

          Consequently, if the Attorney-General be of the opinion that the available material provides prima facie justification for the opening of an investigation concerning very serious offences allegedly committed by members of the executive authority, the rule of law will require that the matter be examined and investigated. That is how we should treat anyone else, and State officials should be treated no differently. Security considerations dictate no contrary result, for there is no security without law, and the rule of law is a component of national security. Security needs dictate that the proper investigative machinery be found, or else the General Security Service will be unable to fulfill its task. The strength of the Service lies in the public confidence it enjoys, in the trust placed in it by the court. If security interests become the paramount consideration, the public as well as the court will lose their trust in the Security Service and in the legality of its operations. Without trust, the State authorities cannot function. That is the case with the public trust in the courts (see Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [40]), and so it is with the public trust in the other governmental organs .

         

46. The rule of law carries, in addition to its formal attributes, also a substantive significance, namely: rule of the appropriate law, law which displays a balance between individual and the public needs. The primary implication thereof is the equality principle, equality in the application of the law and its use. The rule of law is negated where there is discrimination between equals. The matter was discussed by this court in Neiman v. Knesset Central Elections Committee [19], where Shamgar P. made these observations (at pp. 261-262):

 

The rule of law finds its main expression in the fact that it is not the rule of persons - according to their own unfettered decisions, considerations and desires - but is founded upon stable normative directives which are equal for all and bind everyone in equal measure. The manner of definition of a right and even its recital in the Law do not in themselves constitute an effective safeguard, for these do not secure full realization of the right. Rights are practically realized when they are respected by applying them equally in practice, without unjust discrimination. The value and potency of a Law which confers rights lie in the facts that the rights thus conferred do not remain in the realm of an abstract idea, however lofty in spirit and trend, that also the letter of the Law comes down to what is concrete and available, that it is applied according to standards of an equality among equals, from which there be no deviation for improper reasons.

 

The subjection of one person to an investigation, but not another who is in an equal situation, is an impairment of the rule of law, just as it is to grant one person a pardon but not another in equal circumstances, or to afford one person every opportunity of defending himself and stating his version of events whilst withholding the same benefits from someone else with an equal claim thereto.

 

47. Historians tells us that Chief Justice Coke, when he was unable to dissuade King James I from asserting authority in the judicial sphere, addressed these memorable words to the King:

 

          Quod rex non debet sub homine, sed sub deo et lege (the King is subject not to men, but to God and the law).

         

          So be it.

         

          The petitions concerning the investigation dismissed by unanimous opinion; the petitions concerning the pardons dismissed by majority opinion. The orders discharged.

         

Judgment given on 6 August 1986.

 

* In Hebrew - haninah, חנינה-Translator's note

 

Adam v. Knesset (summary)

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7146/12
Date Decided: 
Monday, September 16, 2013
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

In a judgment given on 16 September 2013, an extended panel of nine Justices of the Supreme Court of Israel decided the question of the constitutionality of the arrangement enacted by the Knesset in 2012, in amendment no. 3 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Adjudication), 5714-1954, which allows holding infiltrators in custody for a period of three years.

 

All nine Justices of the panel held, unanimously, that the arrangement is unconstitutional because it disproportionately limits the constitutional right to liberty determined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

Regarding the scope of constitutional relief the court held, by a majority of President A. Grunis, Deputy President M. Naor and Justices E. Arbel, S. Joubran, E. Hayut, Y. Danziger, U Vogelman and I. Amit, that all the arrangements determined in the various provisions of section 30a of the Prevention of Infiltration Law must be annulled.  Justice N. Hendel dissented, holding that only the provisions of section 30a(c) of the Prevention of Infiltration Law should be annulled.  The Court further held that at the time of the annulment of the law, the provisions of the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952 will enter effect, such that the custody and deportation orders issued will be seen as if they were given pursuant to it.  It was additionally held that the process of individual examination and release of all being held in custody must commence immediately.  The process of examination of all those in custody was limited to a period of 90 days from the day of the judgment.

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Full text of the opinion: 

The Supreme Court

HCJ 7146/12 Adam v. the Knesset

Regarding the Constitutionality of Amendment no. 3 to the Prevention of Infiltration Law

 

Summary of the Judgment

 

          In a judgment given on 16 September 2013, an extended panel of nine Justices of the Supreme Court of Israel decided the question of the constitutionality of the arrangement enacted by the Knesset in 2012, in amendment no. 3 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Adjudication), 5714-1954, which allows holding infiltrators in custody for a period of three years.

 

All nine Justices of the panel held, unanimously, that the arrangement is unconstitutional because it disproportionately limits the constitutional right to liberty determined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

Regarding the scope of constitutional relief the court held, by a majority of President A. Grunis, Deputy President M. Naor and Justices E. Arbel, S. Joubran, E. Hayut, Y. Danziger, U Vogelman and I. Amit, that all the arrangements determined in the various provisions of section 30a of the Prevention of Infiltration Law must be annulled.  Justice N. Hendel dissented, holding that only the provisions of section 30a(c) of the Prevention of Infiltration Law should be annulled.  The Court further held that at the time of the annulment of the law, the provisions of the Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952 will enter effect, such that the custody and deportation orders issued will be seen as if they were given pursuant to it.  It was additionally held that the process of individual examination and release of all being held in custody must commence immediately.  The process of examination of all those in custody was limited to a period of 90 days from the day of the judgment.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice E. Arbel

 

          Justice E. Arbel, who wrote the central opinion in the case, surveyed the phenomenon of infiltration into Israel in recent years, noting that there are approximately 55,000 infiltrators present in Israel.  Justice Arbel discussed that most of the infiltrators originate from the countries of Eritrea and Sudan, and discussed the difficulties that people from those countries experience.  She also clarified that regarding citizens of Eritrea, the State of Israel today applies the international principle of non-refoulement, meaning that the state will not send a person to a place where his life or liberty are in danger.  Sending people back to the Republic of Sudan is not possible due to the lack of diplomatic ties with Israel.  That means that the state is confronted with a significant phenomenon of tens of thousands of infiltrators into its territory, who at this stage cannot be deported from its territory, for practical or normative reasons.

 

          Justice Arbel further discussed the implications of the infiltration phenomenon for society in Israel.  Regarding crime committed by infiltrators, she noted that there is disagreement regarding the factual situation, whereas there are studies that show that the level of crime committed by infiltrators is lower than that in society in general.  She however emphasized that the distressful feeling of the residents of South Tel Aviv that the level of security in their neighborhoods has decreased considerably, should not be underestimated.  Also mentioned were implications for the Israeli labor market, as well as budgetary implications.  Justice Arbel noted that as of the end of 2010, the infiltrators constituted only 20% of the non-Israelis working in Israel without a permit, such that the difficulties on that issue stem only partially from the infiltration phenomenon.  In conclusion, Justice Arbel noted that the picture is complex and contain hues of grey, in contrast to the black and white with which the parties wish to color it.

 

          Justice Arbel further discussed the normative situation on the eve of the amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, the background behind its legislation, and the amendment's provisions.  She noted that the amendment began to be implemented in June 2012, and that at the time of the case approximately 2,000 infiltrators were in custody pursuant to it.

 

          In the framework of the constitutional examination of the amendment, Justice Arbel determined that it limits the right to liberty enshrined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.  She discussed the importance of this right, which is one of the basic rights of the individual and is based upon the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state.

 

          At the next stage, Justice Arbel examined whether the limitation of the right to liberty withstands the conditions of the limitations clause in the basic law.  It was held that the limitation is made by a statute, and that the point of departure should be that the amendment befits the values of the State of Israel.

 

          As for the condition regarding a proper purpose, Justice Arbel discussed the two purposes of the amendment.  One purpose is preventing infiltrators from settling in Israel, and the state's need to deal with the implications of the phenomenon.  It was held that this purpose does not raise difficulty.  The second purpose, as presented by the state, is to curb the infiltration phenomenon.  Justice Arbel clarified that the meaning of this purpose is actually deterrence.  In other words, the very placing of infiltrators in custody deters potential infiltrators from coming to Israel.  Justice Arbel emphasized that this purpose creates difficulties that are not negligible. A person is taken into custody not because he personally presents any danger; but rather in order to deter others.  He is treated not as an end, but rather as a means.  That treatment is undoubtedly an additional limitation of his dignity as a person.  Justice Arbel discussed the caselaw of the Supreme Court, and the standpoint of international law, which reinforce the doubt whether this purpose is a proper one.  However, Justice Arbel was willing to assume that the purpose is proper, noting that in an extreme situation in which this purpose becomes most necessary for the state and the preservation of its most basic interests, it may be possible to justify such a purpose.

 

          Justice Arbel then progressed to the proportionality test.  Regarding the first subtest, it was held that theoretically, there is a rational nexus between taking infiltrators into custody and preventing their settling in Israel and the negative implications stemming from their presence in the cities of Israel.  However, the way the amendment is actually implied should be considered.  According to the data, there are 55,000 infiltrators in Israel.  Of them, only 1,750 are in custody, whereas, at the time of the case, that was the maximum volume that could be held.  That means that there is great doubt whether that purpose is actually fulfilled.

 

The picture regarding the rational nexus between the deterrence purpose and the taking of infiltrators into custody is not clear.  The difficulty stems, inter alia, from the disagreement whether the infiltrators are mere labor immigrants, or refugees fleeing from atrocities in their countries.  Nor does the numerical data, which indicate a drastic reduction in the number of infiltrators reaching Israel since the middle of 2012, lead to a clear conclusion.  The main difficulty stems from the fact that taking infiltrators into custody was carried out simultaneously with the completion of the border fence between Israel and Egypt.  The simultaneity of these processes creates a lack of clarity regarding the contribution of each factor to the decrease in the number of infiltrators.  Justice Arbel thus assumed that this proportionality subtest is satisfied.

 

          Justice Arbel held that the second subtest, regarding choosing the least harmful means, is not satisfied.  To the extent that the purpose of the amendment is deterrence, there are considerable chances that the border fence between Israel and Egypt will be sufficient.  As for the purpose regarding settling in Israel and the negative implications of the infiltration phenomenon, a variety of alternate means that will fulfill that purpose in a less harmful way can be formulated.  Thus, for example, duties to report can be created; area of residence can be limited; infiltrators can be required to stay at a facility at night; some of the foreign workers can be replaced by infiltrators; enforcement against human smugglers can be intensifies; the local authorities can be reimbursed for their expenses in handling the infiltrators; police monitoring can be intensified in areas with high concentrations of infiltrators; labor laws can be more strictly enforced; and more.  Such means can be employed alongside means of monitoring and punishment, as well as actions taken in order to allow the deportation of infiltrators from Israel.  Justice Arbel also surveyed the way other countries in the world confront similar phenomena via various means, without denying liberty for a long period of time.

 

          In obiter dictum, Justice Arbel also examined the third subtest of proportionality, regarding the existence of a reasonable ratio between the limitation of the constitutional right and the benefit stemming from the limitation.  It was held that this subtest is also not satisfied.  Imprisoning the infiltrators and denying their liberty for a long period of three years is a critical and disproportionate blow to their rights, their bodies and their souls.  The limitation is a most severe one, of high and great intensity.  It is uncontroversial that most of the infiltrators arrive from countries in which their living conditions are most difficult, and where the human rights situation is very bad.  This fact should also be taken into account when measuring the intensity of the limitation.

 

          On the benefit side of the scales, it was held that in light of the severe limitation of the right to liberty, the state must be prepared to take on the economic burden involved in confronting the infiltrators.  Regarding the implications for the local population: they continue to deal with the difficulties now, as most of the infiltrators in Israel are not in custody.  Considering that there are many alternative means that the state can employ, and considering the border fence with Egypt and the possibility of improving its efficiency, it cannot be said that the benefit attained by taking infiltrators into custody is greater than the severe limitation of their rights.

 

          Justice Arbel emphasized that an unbearable situation might occur, in which infiltrators continue to swarm into the State of Israel despite all the other means employed, putting the state in danger of severe harm to its vital interests.  In such a situation it will be possible to say that the benefit is not less than the damage, and Israeli society cannot endanger itself for the people of other countries.  However, in her opinion we are very far from that dark forecast.

 

          Justice Arbel noted, in conclusion, that the result of this judgment will not be easy for the Israeli public, and will be particularly difficult for the residents of South Tel Aviv, whereas the distress reflected in their cry sounds heartfelt, and evokes empathy and understanding regarding the need to assist them in the situation in which they find themselves.  She further added: "I want to believe that the state will be able to find the way to deal with the situation that has arisen through means it has at its disposal and to ease their distress.  Woven like a thread in this opinion is the attempt to clarify and persuade that it is not correct to choose a solution that, prima facie, seems simple – a long period of custody – as it is a most harmful means toward any person, certainly most harmful to infiltrators held in custody for a long period.  I reiterate that one of the most important basic rights of a person, which is at the tip of the pyramid of rights, is the right to liberty.  Since ancient times, people always have fought for freedom.  Limitation of the right to liberty is one of the most severe limitations that one can think of.  Denying the freedom of the infiltrators by imprisoning them for a long period is a critical and disproportionate limitation of their rights, their bodies and their souls.  We should not solve one injustice by creating another injustice.  We cannot deny fundamental basic rights and at the same time coarsely limit human dignity and liberty in the framework of a solution to a problem that requires a fitting comprehensive political solution.  I have noted in the past in another context that 'the needs of one group, important as they may be, cannot be satisfied by limiting the needs and rights of another group in the population" (FH 10007/09 Gluten v. The National Labor Court, par. 29 of my judgment (18 March 2013)).  We must not forget our basic principles that flow from the declaration of independence, and our moral duty toward every person, as a person, as they are etched on the basic pattern of the state as a Jewish and democratic state."

 

          The relief granted in the petition is annulment of section 30a(c)(3) of the Prevention of Infiltration Law, that determines the taking into custody of infiltrators for a period up to three years.  No separation can be made between the parts of the amendment when its central provision is void.  The conclusion is therefore that in actuality, all of section 30a will be annulled, and the existing arrangement in the Entry into Israel law will take its place.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice U. Vogelman

 

In his judgment, Justice U. Vogelman concurred in the conclusion of Justice Arbel that the custody arrangement determined in amendment no. 3 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law is unconstitutional, and that it must be annulled.  Justice Vogelman held that the amendment was in fact intended to deal with immigrants that the State of Israel does not deport to their countries of origin at the present time: citizens of Eritrea and citizens of North Sudan.  The factual picture regarding this group is complex.  Although the economic motivations of these immigrants should not be ignored, their claims of international protection, against the backdrop of information regarding their states of origin as well as policy employed regarding them de facto by the State of Israel and the countries of the world, cannot be aloofly brushed aside. In the framework of the constitutional examination, Justice Vogelman concurred in Justice Arbel's determination that the amendment severely limits the infiltrators' right to personal liberty.  Similar to Justice Arbel, Justice Vogelman did not wish to rule on the question whether the purpose behind the amendment is a "proper purpose", although that question raises difficulty, because in any case the provisions do not withstand the proportionality tests, as they were outlined in caselaw.

 

          It was held that the critical limitation of the right of those held in custody to personal liberty does not have a proportional relationship to the alleged benefit of the amendment.   In addition, the arrangement set out deviates from the accepted principles in immigration law in Israel and the world regarding denying the liberty of persons who are in the country illegally.  It was further noted that there are other alternatives (including those employed in the rest of the world) for dealing with a phenomenon of infiltration, which can fulfill the purposes of the amendment – albeit not fully – while limiting the right to personal liberty to a considerably lesser extent.  Justice Vogelman wondered whether the state can rely upon the negative implications of the infiltration phenomenon of recent years as a justification for employing harmful means, without making any attempt to confront those implications through alternative means that are less harmful.  On the plane of relief, Justice Vogelman opined that there is no choice but to annul the possibility of employing the custody arrangements determined in section 30a of the law entirely, as according to his line of reasoning, annulment of only section 30a(c)(3) of the law would not lead to the desired result.  Due to the critical limitation of the infiltrators' right to personal freedom, the declaration of voidness of the amendment provision should not be delayed.  As a result of the declaration of voidness, the cases of all of the infiltrators upon which the amendment was employed shall be examined according to the arrangement set out in the Entry into Israel Law.  The authorities must examine the cases of those who are in custody immediately, and those who can be released – should be released immediately.  The period of ninety days determined for examining the causes for release set out in the Entry into Israel Law and their caveats is the maximum period for examining the cases of all of those in custody, due to their large number.  As noted, a person whose examination has been completed and regarding whom there is no cause to prevent release – shall be released without delay. 

 

The end of the judgment states: "the challenge which the State of Israel must confront and has had to confront in light of the unarranged immigration of tens of thousands of people from Africa into its borders is a difficult one.  In my judgment, I have laid an extensive framework regarding the societal, economic and other difficulties it entails.  No one disputes that the state cannot stand by and do nothing, and that it must confront this complex phenomenon.  That is not only a discretionary power granted to the state; it is a duty imposed upon it, toward its citizens and residents.  There are no magical solutions.  At the center of our discussion is the issue of the constitutionality of the means chosen to do so.  In a democratic society, not all means are legitimate.  That is also the case regarding the arrangement which has been put forth for our constitutional examination.  As difficult as the mission that the State of Israel is required to confront against its will may be, we must remember that those who have already passed through our gates are now among us.  They are entitled to the right to liberty and the right to dignity granted in the basic law to any person, as a person.  Limitation of these rights is possible only for a proper purpose and to an extent that is not excessive.  The means chosen by the state does not withstand that standard, and does not successfully pass constitutional review.  The arrangement determined in the amendment, the annulment of which we declare here, limits the right to personal liberty, which is a basic right of every person as a person, in a critical and disproportionate way, deviating from the principles accepted in Israel and in the rest of the civilized world.  Thus, the custody arrangement set out in the amendment must be annulled".

 

 

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Deputy President M. Naor

 

Deputy President M. Naor concurred in the opinions of Justices Arbel and Vogelman, noting that at the time of legislation of the amendment to the law under discussion in the petition, a well rooted principle already existed in the caselaw of the Supreme Court according to which a person cannot be held in detention if he cannot be deported within a certain time.  The means of detention for a long period is not a proportionate one.

 

          The Deputy President further noted that there is no doubt that the state has the right to hold the "keys to the house" and determine who enters its gates.  Due to its geopolitical situation, the State of Israel found itself dealing with a very large number of infiltrators, well beyond its size in relation to other democratic states.  The infiltrators are guests for a time, although that time is becoming longer.  The infiltrators are not entitled to make aliya [the right of Jews to return to Israel and receive citizenship].  The state is allowed to find legal ways to deport them; ways that befit the caselaw of the Supreme Court of Israel and accepted international law.

 

          The Deputy President further wrote: "the State faces a reality – forced upon it against its will – which it must confront.  That confrontation poses difficulties that entail challenges.  Those challenges require creative solutions.  This could be the state's finest hour, if, in a reality forced upon it, it is wise enough to find humane solutions, solutions that comport not only with international law, but also with the Jewish worldview.  At the same time, this could also be the finest hour of human rights organizations and supporters of human rights.  My colleague Justice Arbel referred (in par. 66 of her opinion) to possible cooperation between the agencies of the state and human rights organizations.  I wish to concur in that.  Human rights organizations can show that beyond the (justified) activity to annul the statutory provision, they also have great ability for constructive activity: to enlist volunteers, to guide and train infiltrators, and to assist them while they are here".

 

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice I. Amit

 

          Justice I. Amit concurred in the opinions of Justices Arbel and Vogelman, according to which the statutory arrangement under discussion contradicts Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and must therefore be annulled.

 

          Justice Amit determined that regarding those requesting asylum who have already entered the gates of the country, the state must treat them with open hearts and compassion regarding work, welfare, health and education, particularly in light of the march of tribulations they suffered on their way to Israel.

 

          Justice Amit emphasized that the content of his opinion relates to the situation today, in which the number of infiltrators stands at approximately one percent of the population of Israel, as a fait accompli. At the same time, Justice Amit commented that one wonders about the numerical "red line" of what the state can bear without concern for a real limitation of its sovereignty, its character, its national identity, its cultural-societal character, the makeup of its population and the entirety of its unique characteristics, and without concern for its stability and of "breaking its neck" in terms of crowding, welfare and economy, internal security and public order.  Against that backdrop, Justice Amit noted that when balancing between various basic rights or between basic rights and the vital interests of the state, we must be aware of the data, the assessments and the forecasts, as there are situations in which "quantity makes quality".

 

          In any case, Justice Amit clarified that this is not the situation today, but assuming other situations and data, the result might change on the legal plane as well.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice S. Joubran

 

          Justice S. Joubran is of the opinion that at the stage of examination of the constitutionality of the purpose of the amendment to the law (in our case, curbing the phenomenon of infiltration), the Court must refrain, to the extent possible, from constitutional examination of the means to achieve it (in our case, detention of the infiltrators).  In his opinion, the role of the proper purpose test is to provide an answer to the question whether the purpose of the statute provides sufficient justification for the limitation of the constitutional right.

 

          The state's position was that the infiltrators' very awareness of the legal tools for confronting labor immigration influences their decision whether to immigrate into its borders.  Justice Joubran was of the opinion that it is conceivable that the normative situation in a given country is a consideration that influences the decision of labor immigrants whether to "infiltrate" into it.  In his opinion, there is no principled reason preventing means that constitute a "normative block" against labor immigrants.  He is of the opinion that the desire of a country to formulate legislation that does not encourage labor immigration is not illegitimate; it does not deviate from its prerogative to determine who passes through its gates; it comports with its sovereignty, subject, of course, to the limitations clause, and its commitments pursuant to international law.  This question becomes more complex regarding persons who are entitled to refugee status.  In the current circumstances he is of the opinion that there is no need to decide that question.

 

          The amendment to the statute allows holding infiltrators in custody for three years until their deportation; however, de facto their deportation is not possible, and they are destined to remain in custody. In the opinion of Justice Joubran, that situation limits the infiltrators' right to liberty, which cannot at this time be tolerated.  Therefore, he concurs that the amendment must be annulled.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice Y. Danziger

 

          Justice Y. Danziger was also of the opinion that the arrangement determined in the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Adjudication)(Amendment no. 3 and Temporary Provision), 5772-2012 is unconstitutional and must be annulled.

 

          Justice Danziger wished to add that even if it can be assumed that there is an economic element to the choice of thousands of citizens of Sudan and Eritrea to come to the State of Israel, they cannot be categorized as mere illegal labor immigrants.  It must be assumed that in some of the cases, they are refugees entitled to political asylum.  However, the State of Israel chose not to examine individual asylum applications submitted by some of the Sudanese and Eritrean citizens, but at the same time refrained from deporting them back to their countries, either due to the "temporary non-deportation" policy, or due to other constraints.

 

          The challenge the state is required to confront when dealing with unorganized immigration of a large scope intensifies due to the distress of the residents of the neighborhoods of South Tel Aviv, in which many of the immigrants live.  The cry of the residents of the neighborhoods echo in our hearts, and their pain is our pain.  However, the solution to that distress is not to be found in holding thousands of people – men, women and children – in custody in prison facilities for an indefinite period of time, without them being accused – needless to say put on trial – for anything, when there is no foreseeable possibility of deporting them.  That is an extreme limitation of their basic right to liberty.  The state has the duty to confront this complex problem in ways that comport with constitutional norms accepted in Israel and in the countries of the civilized world.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice E. Hayut

 

          Justice E. Hayut concurred in the judgment of Justice Arbel, and in the judgment of Justice Vogelman.  She further commented that the State of Israel remains the only western democracy in the world with no organized immigration policy, and that ad hoc solutions are no substitute for such needed policy.  According to Justice Hayut, the legislature responded to the need for a fitting and comprehensive normative arrangement with a very specific act that is problematic and extreme, by adding amendment no. 3 to the Prevention of Infiltration Law.  That amendment has two faults.  First, it contains no solution for the complex problems created as a result of the arrival of tens of thousands of infiltrators into Israel who have concentrated themselves in large groups in big cities and various communities.  Imprisoning the infiltrators who have just arrived, and whose number is relatively small, is in this context a completely ineffective means.  Second, she determined that the provisions of the amendment to the statute and the detention arrangement set out in it substantially enlarge and intensify limitation of the constitutional right to liberty of those illegally in the country, and a limitation of such an intensity exceeds the extent necessary in order to complete the process of their deportation.  Justice Hayut further emphasized that the conclusion regarding the voidness of the statute does not mean that the legal situation prior to its legislation was satisfactory.  The opposite is the case.  The immigration policy issue cries out for a comprehensive legislative arrangement and long term thinking that might provide a proper solution for the many challenges it poses for Israeli society.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of Justice N. Hendel

 

          The position of Justice N. Hendel is that the reality that led to amendment of the statute cannot be ignored: a flood of tens of thousands of illegal infiltrators, which mainly harmed the weaker socio-economic strata of society.  That is the ground upon which the amendment to the statute grew, and that should not be forgotten.  Of course, one cannot ignore the duty –   which also stems from Jewish law – to act compassionately toward any person, as a person, "for the sake of paths of peace".  However, alongside that duty there is also an additional duty in Jewish law: "the poor of your city come before the poor of another city".  Balancing between both sides of the coin – on the public plane – is delicate, dependent upon the circumstances of reality, and is for the most part the domain of the legislature and the elected government.

 

          When an infiltrator enters the country while clearly violating the law, the authorities may hold him in custody.  However, a distinction must be made between the very act of holding him in custody, which is, in and of itself, necessary, and the length of the period of custody.  That is the heart of the matter of this petition: does the maximum period of three years' custody withstand constitutional examination.  The Court has the duty to examine the issue with strict constitutional review (strict scrutiny), which is familiar to us from American law.  The significance of that is mainly that the issue must be examined not only at the time of the legislation of the statute, but also at the present time.

 

          From data relayed by the state it appears that there has been a drastic reduction in the number of infiltrators: from thousands of infiltrators per month, to tens or even a single digit number of infiltrators per month.  That decrease "shouts" for itself.  There can be no comparison between a situation in which 10 infiltrators enter the country each month and a situation in which 10,000 infiltrators enter the country each month.  In addition one must consider the fact that the section under discussion is defined as a temporary provision, which ex definitio responds to a certain reality – a reality which no longer exists.  In the new circumstances which have been created, and until a change occurs in them, a more proportional means is sufficient: a maximum period of custody that does not reach, or even approach, 3 years.  Comparative law that shows various solutions for the period of custody was presented.  That does not obligate or limit Israel, but it may be of assistance to the Israeli legislature.

 

          Thus, section 30a(c)(3) must be annulled.  Along with it, the entirety of section 30a(c) must be annulled, as its provisions are derived from the maximum period of 3 years.  That annulment is sufficient, and there is no need to annul the entire temporary provision as proposed by the majority in this case.  There are two reasons for this.  First, the other parts of the statute contain positive components, such as the causes for release, which are not subject to conditions regarding time.  Second, that requires the legislature to concentrate upon the main issue – determining a different maximum period for custody, and will allow it to complete the job without deviating from the 90 day deadline which has been determined.  Unnecessary pressure, which might not result in any benefit, should not be put on the legislature.  The time remaining until the expiration of the temporary provision – 15 months – will grant the legislature time to think and to study the implementation of the temporary provision on the ground, and thus determine a proper alternative.

 

The Essence of the Opinion of President A. Grunis

 

President A. Grunis concurred in the opinions of Justice Arbel and Justice Vogelman, according to which the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Offenses and Adjudication)(Amendment no. 3 and Temporary Provision), 5772-2012 (hereinafter – the "Law") contradicts Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and thus must be annulled.  President Grunis based his opinion upon reasons that are different, to a certain extent, from those raised by Justice Arbel.  According to his line of reasoning, the law is faulty not because it does not withstand the second subtest of proportionality, but rather because it does not withstand the third subtest, known as "proportionality stricto sensu".  In other words, it must be annulled because it does not maintain a reasonable relationship between the period of custody and the advantages stemming from the law.  According to his opinion, in the current reality, the arrangement in the law, which allows holding the infiltrators in custody for a period of three years, is constitutionally repugnant, particularly in light of the fact that it is not at this time possible to deport most of those in custody, who are citizens of Eritrea and Sudan. 

 

          Nonetheless, the President emphasized that the voidness of the statute is proper at this time, that is, in the existing circumstances.  In his opinion, a substantial negative change in the circumstances, e.g. a significant rise in the number of infiltrators crossing into Israel's borders, would justify renewed judicial examination of the issue, should the Knesset again enact a similar statute.  Moreover, according to his approach, even in the existing circumstances there is nothing preventing legislation of a new statute that allows holding the infiltrators in custody for a period of time significantly shorter than three years.        

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