International Law

Yassin v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 9060/08
Date Decided: 
Monday, May 7, 2012
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

In HCJ 9060/08 petitions were filed with the High Court against the illegal construction of  structures on a site next to the Beit El settlement. Following a series of hearings the State notified the court of its adoption of  a policy concerning the demolition of illegal building on private land and the arrangement of  construction on State land. As a result of this policy, illegal construction located on private land would be removed.  The Court gave a judgment giving effect to the State's undertaking to ensure the removal of the illegal structures within one year of the filing of said notification.

 

One year later the State filed an application to "renew the hearing of the petition" based on the desire to reconsider the manner of implementing the policy  regarding illegal construction on private land. The State's reasons for the application were: (a) that an action had been filed in the District Court concerning the substantive question of the ownership and hence the legality of the structures and the inappropriateness of ignoring the existence of a pending action which was of clear relevance to the demolition order; (b) that the examination of the structures under adjudication in the petition could not be separated from illegal construction in other locations. The policy relating to priorities in enforcement of the law in the Zone should therefore be reconsidered, keeping in mind planning and property aspects and other political, public and operational aspects. The State therefore requested that the court grant a delay to enable the formulation of an updated policy, during which the structures would not be removed.

The petitioners opposed the request, arguing that the State's failure to fulfill its obligation contained in a judgment constituted contempt of court, that there was no procedural proceeding that enabled the opening of a completed proceeding, and that the State's change of position was politically motivated and was not supported on legal grounds.

 

In his decision of 7 May 2012 President Grunis ruled that there were no grounds for reopening the hearing on the petition. President Grunis ruled that the principle of res judicata does not allow the opening of an already completed proceeding. The principle of res judicata is based on a number of public interests. It enables the delineation of the borders of the legal proceeding, it assists in clarifying the legal position, it prevents the inconveniencing of litigants with the same legal issue and repeat litigation, and it ensures the proper functioning of the judicial system. From a constitutional perspective, the principle of res judicata also reflects the separation of powers between the branches of government in the sense that it signifies the termination of role of the judicial branch in the matter, given that the execution of judgment is a matter for the executive authority.

 

The President further noted that apart from the res judicata issue, the State’s request to open the case also undermined the basic principle of fulfillment of judgments that ensures that the judicial proceeding does not become a meaningless, farcical proceeding, but rather that its results be executed within the time period prescribed by the court. This principle is particularly relevant when the body charged with execution of the judgment is the state. Finally, a change of policy is not grounds for deviating from the principle of res judicata, for otherwise the court would be required to reopen proceedings whenever a change in policy was decided on. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

                                                                                                            HCJ 9060/08

Before:                                         The Honorable President A. Grunis

                                                     The Honorable Justice S. Joubran                           

                                                     The Honorable Justice U. Vogelman          

The Petitioners:

  1. Khaled Abdallah Abd al-Ghani Yassin
  2. Harbi Ibrahim Mustafa Mustafa
  3. Abd al-Rahim Abdallah Abd al-Ghani Dar Yassin

                                                        v.

 

The Respondents:

  1. Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak
  2. IDF Commander in the West Bank
  3. Head of Civil Administration
  4.  Police District Commander for Judea and Samaria,

     Shlomo Katabi

  1. Beit El Local Council
  2. Beit El Yeshiva Center

Applicants to Join:

  1. M.K  Zehava Galon
  2. The Meretz faction
  3. The Ta’al faction
  4. M.K Dr. Ahmad Tibi
  5. Guy Sagiv
  6. David Abudraham
  7. Hana Yifat Abudraham

                                      Application of Respondents 1-4 dated April 27, 2012

Date of Session:                14th of Iyyar, 5772 (May 6, 2012)        

For the Petitioners:               Adv. Michael Sfard; Adv. Shlomi Zacharia; Adv. Avisar Lev

For Respondents 1 – 4:        Adv. Uri Keidar; Adv. Osnat Mandel

For Respondent 5:             Adv. Nethanel Katz

For Respondent 6:                Adv. Yaron Kostliz; Adv. Noa Firer

For Applicants to Join 1- 2: Adv. Omer Shatz

For Applicants to Join 3- 4: Adv. Osama Saadi; Adv. Amar Yaasin.

For Applicants to Join 5-7:  Adv. Ehud Yelink

 

Facts

In HCJ 9060/08 petitions were filed with the High Court against the illegal construction of structures on a site next to the Beit El settlement. Following a series of hearings the State notified the court of its adoption of  a policy concerning the demolition of illegal building on private land and the arrangement of  construction on State land. As a result of this policy, illegal construction located on private land would be removed.  The Court gave a judgment giving effect to the State's undertaking to ensure the removal of the illegal structures within one year of the filing of said notification.

One year later the State filed an application to "renew the hearing of the petition" based on the desire to reconsider the manner of implementing the policy  regarding illegal construction on private land. The State's reasons for the application were: (a) that an action had been filed in the District Court concerning the substantive question of the ownership and hence the legality of the structures and the inappropriateness of ignoring the existence of a pending action which was of clear relevance to the demolition order; (b) that the examination of the structures under adjudication in the petition could not be separated from illegal construction in other locations. The policy relating to priorities in enforcement of the law in the Zone should therefore be reconsidered, keeping in mind planning and property aspects and other political, public and operational aspects. The State therefore requested that the court grant a delay to enable the formulation of an updated policy, during which the structures would not be removed.

The petitioners opposed the request, arguing that the State's failure to fulfill its obligation contained in a judgment constituted contempt of court, that there was no procedural proceeding that enabled the opening of a completed proceeding, and that the State's change of position was politically motivated and was not supported on legal grounds.

Held

In his decision of 7 May 2012 President Grunis ruled that there were no grounds for reopening the hearing on the petition. President Grunis ruled that the principal of res judicata does not allow the opening of an already completed proceeding. The principle of res judicata is based on a number of public interests. It enables the delineation of the borders of the legal proceeding, it assists in clarifying the legal position, it prevents the inconveniencing of litigants with the same legal issue and repeat litigation, and it ensures the proper functioning of the judicial system. From a constitutional perspective, the principle of res judicata also reflects the separation of powers between the branches of government in the sense that it signifies the termination of role of the judicial branch in the matter, given that the execution of judgment is a matter for the executive authority.

The President further noted that apart from the res judicata issue, the State’s request to open the case also undermined the basic principle of fulfillment of judgments that ensures that the judicial proceeding does not become a meaningless, farcical proceeding, but rather that its results be executed within the time period prescribed by the court. This principle is particularly relevant when the body charged with execution of the judgment is the state. Finally, a change of policy is not grounds for deviating from the principle of res judicata, for otherwise the court would be required to reopen proceedings whenever a change in policy was decided on. 

 

 

 

     
 

Israeli Supreme Court Decisions Cited

 

[1]        HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 55 (2) 241.

 

[2]        HCJ 7713/05 Noah – Israel Association of Organizations for the Protection of Animals v. Attorney General (not reported, 22.2.2006).

 

[3]        HCJ 29/52 S.A. Shachupek v. Tel Aviv – Jaffa City Council [1953] IsrSC 7 603.

 

[4]        CA 9085/00  Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Construction Co. Ltd [2003] IsrSC57(5) 462.

 

[5]        HCJ 9669/10 Abd el-Rahman Kassam Abd el-Rahman v. Minister of Defense [2014].

 

[6]        HCJ 7891/07 Peace Now Movement - Sh.A.L. Educational Enterprises v. Minister of Defense [2013].

 

[7]        HCJ 306/85 Kahane v. Knesset Chairman [1985] IsrSC 39 (4) 485.

 

[8]        HCJ 8887/06 Yusuf Musa Abd a-Razeq al-Nabut v. Minister of Defense (not yet reported, 25.3.12)

 

 

Decision

President A. Grunis

1.         Five permanent buildings and five prefabricated structures which were erected adjacent to the Beit El settlement, on a site known as "the Ulpana Hill"  are the focus of this proceeding. In the petition forming the subject of the current proceeding, filed on 29 October 2008, the court was requested to order the execution of demolition orders and stop-work orders issued against these structures. Four hearings were conducted in the presence of the litigants, at the end of which a judgment was given on 21 September 2011.

 In the course of clarifying the petition a long series of notifications was submitted to the court by the litigants as well as responding affidavits of the Respondents, after the issuing of order nisi in the petition (on 15 September 2010). In the responses of Respondents 1 - 4 (hereinafter: – "the State") it was consistently claimed that the land upon which the structures were built or located was privately owned Palestinian land. Accordingly the Civil Administration issued stop-work orders and demolition orders for the structures.  The claims raised by Respondent 6, the Beit El Yeshiva Center concerning the purchase of the land by the settling movement "Amana" were examined by the State and rejected.  The State's argument, as raised in the course of the hearings concerning the petition, is that since the structures were erected on settled land registered in the Tabu books, no validity attaches to the purchase claims for as long as the registration has not been altered. The State further told us that no transaction license had been requested for the alleged purchase, and in the absence of such license, the transaction, to the extent that it occurred, is invalid (notice on behalf of the State on 10 January 2010).

2,         On 1 May 2011 the State filed a response to the order nisi in which it stated that on the 28 February 2011 the Prime Minister had convened a meeting with the participation of senior ministers, the Attorney General and other relevant officials. In this meeting "the foundation was laid for an integrated policy concerning the demolition of illegal building on private land and regarding the arrangement of construction on State land, so that as a rule, illegal construction located on private land was to be removed". In that meeting it was also decide to take measures for the removal of the structures forming the subject of the petition within a year (response on behalf of the State of 1 May 2011, pp. 4 - 5).

3.         Following the notification of the State a judgment was given on the petition, at the end of the hearing conducted on 21 September 2011 (President D. Beinisch, Justices S. Joubran, and U. Vogelman). The judgment anchored the State's notification of 1 May 2011 to the court, and determined the following:

 

                        "We have recorded the State's notification of 1 May 2011 and the notification given to the court today - that pursuant to the decision adopted in a meeting headed by the Prime Minister and additional ministers in the Government, as well as the Attorney General, in accordance with which construction on private land would be removed, as opposed to construction on State land; it was decided that the construction forming the subject of the petition would be removed within one year of the filing of the said notification…. to the extent that the structures are not demolished before then by the possessors thereof.

 

                        In this notification the petition has been exhausted and the proceeding was terminated".

 

Hence, in accordance with the State’s notification to the court, which was incorporated into this judgment, the State was supposed to have demolished the structures by 1 May 2012.

4.         A year passed from the time of the State's notification being given, but the demolition orders were not executed. Instead, on the 27 April 2012, a few days before the termination of the period for the demolition of the structures, the State filed a notification and application to "renew the hearing of the petition". In the application it was written that "The Prime Minister and a ministerial forum wish to reconsider the manner of implementing the policy agreed upon, and as a result thereof, to also reconsider their specific position of which they gave notice to the Honorable Court concerning this petition" (notification of the State of 27 April 2012, p. 2). The State further noted that the structures earmarked for demolition were populated, with about 30 families resident therein and that a claim had been made by an Israeli body that the area on which most of the structures were erected was actually purchased by him in the year 2000, and that an action had been filed on the matter in the District Court (it will be noted that the action was filed on 19 September 2011, i.e. two days before the decision was given in the current proceeding). The State noted that even though the claims concerning the purchase of the land had already been raised in the past and rejected by the competent authorities in the Civil Administration, nonetheless, it argued that it was not possible to ignore the fact that the proceeding in the District Court was pending. The State further argued that the examination of the structures under discussion in the petition could not be separated from other construction in the settlement of Beit El, that most of which had been erected on private land, outside the current boundaries of the seizure order applied in the area. As such, it was claimed that any decision adopted in relation to the structures under discussion in the petition is liable to influence other building in Beit El and in other settlements, which were similarly built on private Palestinian land. In this context the State attorney claimed that in a series of petitions an undertaking had been given to remove structures in Judea and Samaria area or that the State had been obligated to do so in rulings of the Court. It was argued, that this obligation had broad implications and it was therefore "decided to reconsider the priorities in enforcement of the law in the area, which along with the planning and property aspects also had consideration for political, public and operational aspects"(ibid, p.5). In the framework of the renewed consideration preference would still be given to dealing with construction on private land, but the future of each particular structure would not be examined "from a narrow perspective" but rather in its overall context and having consideration for the "context of the events related to the removal" (ibid, p.6). It was further decided to suspend any further act of enforcement in the field until the exhausting of the process of legal clarification underway in relation to the ownership of the land. In order to enable the renewed consideration, the State requested the court to renew the hearing on the petition and to grant a delay of 90 days for the formulation of an updated policy, during which the structures would not be removed. Notably, in the course of the hearing, attorney for the State mentioned a period of 60 days.

5.         The petitioners objected to the State's application.  In their response the petitioners dwelt on the difficulty of reopening an issue which had terminated in a judgment. They claimed that the State's failure to fulfill its undertaking, that had been included in the judgment, constitutes contempt of court. According to the petitioners not only was there no procedural proceeding that enabled the opening of a completed proceeding, also but that the State had not presented any grounds for opening the proceeding. According to the petitioners the change of position was politically motivated and was not supported up by lawful, legal grounds that justifies the opening of the proceeding in which a judgment had been given.

6.         In wake of the State's application to reopen the proceeding, on 6 May 2012 we conducted a hearing in the presence of the litigants in which they reiterated their written pleadings. We examined the pleadings and have found no grounds for acceding to the application to open the proceeding. It is well established that "the point of departure is that once a judgment has been given, the judgment constitutes the final word in the litigation with respect to any additional litigation on the matter forming the subject of the ruling. This is the principle of res judicata. This principle is based on the public interest of the public, as well as that of the parties in the proceeding, that court proceedings should be brought to an end and that justice be done with the individual, without subjecting him to additional proceedings by reason of the same grounds or the same dispute" (HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Justice [1], at p. 244; see also HCJ 7713/05 Noah – Israel Association of Organizations for the Protection of Animals v. Attorney General [2] (hereinafter: "Noah case"). Once a final judgment has been made in a litigation, the parties cannot raise any claims, and certainly not claims that were resolved in the judgment (see: Nina Zaltzman, Res Judicata in Civil Proceedings, 3-12 (1991); (hereinafter: "Zaltzman"). The judgment makes it clear to all those involved that the legal proceeding is completed, and that subject to special exceptions all the relevant parties must act in order to execute the judgment and to give effect to the operative result determined therein.

7.         The principle of res judicata relies on a series of public interests. It enables the demarcation of the legal proceeding; it assists in clarifying the legal situation. It prevents the litigants from being inconvenienced with the same issue and a repeat litigation, and ensures the proper functioning of the judicial system (Zaltzman, pp. 12-15). From a constitutional perspective, the principle of res judicata also reflects the separation of powers in the sense that it signifies the completion of the judicial authority’s handling of the matter brought before it. The execution of the judgment is no longer a matter for the judicial branch but passes to the executive branch, whether by the mechanism of the Execution Office, or the various government ministries, where it concerns a judgment of the High Court of Justice directed against an authority of the central government.

8.         Even though the principal of res judicata has a number of exceptions, their scope is quite limited. Hence, for example, already in 1952 Justice M. Landau ruled in HCJ 29/52 S.A. Shachupek v. Tel Aviv – Jaffa City Council [3] at pp. 604-605:

 

"Nothing comes after the judgment of the High Court of Justice on a matter subject to its authority, and no argument can be heard claiming that a judgment of this court should be vacated because it was mistaken in its interpretation of the law, or in the determination of the facts, or in the procedure for the hearing that it adopted. The possibilities for renewed examination of a judgment of this court are restricted within very narrow borders. In accordance with general principles, a judgment may be vacated when it was granted as the result of an act of deception by one of the parties. This court will also vacate a judgment at the request of a party that was not present during the hearing, if convinced that the party’s absence was not his own fault. "

 

See also in the position of Justice A. Procaccia in CA 9085/00 Shitrit v. Sharvat Brothers Construction Co. Ltd.[4], at p.475 according to which:

 

"The principle of “functus officio“ is intended to ensure the finality of hearings and disputes between the parties, with the goal of achieving certainty, legal security, and preventing the parties from being inconvenienced after the completion of their trial. It is also intended to ensure the orderly functioning of the judicial system and preventing its engagement with repeated disputes over matters already resolved, whereas numerous disputes that have yet to be resolved are waiting in line… against the background of these trends, one can understand the narrow and strict boundaries that are permitted by law for reopening a completed legal decision and giving a later decision in the framework thereof. "

 

9.         Apart from the considerations of the finality of the hearing, and protecting the individual litigant's interest that the matter concerning him will not return to be heard in court, there is also the basic principle of performance of judgments. This basic principle ensures that the legal proceeding will not be a pointless proceeding but rather that its result will actually be executed out, within the time period prescribed by the court. Without this basic component the entire legal proceeding is frustrated, especially when the state is charged with carrying out the judgment (in this context see the judgment of Justice A. Procaccia in the Noah [2] case, para. 17 of judgment).

10.       Examination of the State's claim in its application to reopen the proceedings, in which the ruling was delivered about eight months ago, shows that they contain nothing that justifies deviation from the principle of res judicata. The State’s arguments do not show any exceptional and unique considerations that would warrant an order for the exceptional measure of “renewal of hearing”. The State’s principal claim is that the political echelon wishes to reexamine the manner of implementing the policy declared by the State in the proceeding before us, and in a series of additional proceedings (including HCJ 9669/10 Abd el-Rahman Kassam Abd el-Rahman v. Minister of Defense [5] and HCJ 7891/07 Peace Now Movement v. Sh.A.L. Educational Enterprises v. Minister of Defense [6]). Attorney for the State did not point to even a single legal precedent that supported the State’s application to open the proceeding anew. Nor did the State point to any new circumstances that supported its application. The fact of there being a legal proceeding pending, in which the settlers’ claims are being clarified, was already known before the judgment was given (on 21 September 2011). As such, what reason can there be for  granting the exceptional relief of reopening a legal proceeding that was heard over a number of years, the central facts of which were not disputed by the State, in which order nisi was issued and in which the State’s undertaking to act in a particular matter was recorded?!.

            It is specifically in proceedings before the High Court of Justice that special importance attaches to the fulfillment of the State’s undertakings, and maintenance of the principle of res judicata. Accepting the State’s position, whereby the desire to reexamine policy constitutes grounds for opening a completed proceeding, could lead to grave results. Policy, by definition, is not static. Is it feasible that each and every time that there is a renewed examination of policy that the State will request to reopen proceedings that were concluded in a judgment. Indeed, a change in policy per se is not grounds for deviating from the rule of the res judicata. As noted above, the authority to reopen a completed legal proceeding, assuming it exists, is reserved for exceptional situations and circumstances. No circumstances of this nature were show to exist in the case before us, even if it does raise political, public and social questions of a complex nature.

11.       It bears emphasis that the fact that the judgment in the petition was given in the form of recording of the State's undertaking and that an absolute order wasn’t issued under it, is irrelevant in terms of res judicata and the clear and fundamental obligation to fulfill judgments. Indeed, in cases in which the state gives an undertaking to execute any act or to refrain from its execution, the court occasionally avoids issuing an operative order having consideration for mutual respect between the branches of power. However, once the undertaking is included in a judgment, there is an obligation to fulfill the judgment for all intents and purposes. Conceivably, the fact that no operative order was issued may influence the possibility of filing a proceeding for contempt of court, in the event of the non-performance of the judgment (see regarding the possibility of instituting contempt of court proceedings by reason of non-fulfillment of a declaratory order: HCJ 306/85 Kahane v. Knesset Chairman [7], at p. 485). This was not the question before us, and accordingly we will not address it.

12.       It is for these reasons that we have found no grounds for granting the State's application to reopen the proceeding after judgment was given. Notwithstanding our decision, and in order to enable the State to comply with the undertaking that it gave and which was anchored in the court's judgment, we extend the period determined in the judgment for executing the demolition orders for another 60 days (on the inherent authority vested in the court to extend periods determined in judgments, see HCJ 8887/06 Yusef Mussa abd-a–Rusak al-Nabut v. Minister of Defense [8] para. 11 of the decision of Justice M. Naor). Accordingly, an extension is given until 1 July 2012 for the execution of the demolition orders in accordance with the undertaking given by the State in its written response to the court on 1 May 2011 and in the course of the oral hearing on 21 September 2011.

13.       As an aside it bears mention that after the State's notification concerning its request to reopen the proceeding was filed, a number of applications to join were filed to the court by M.K Zehava Galon and the Meretz faction, by M.K Dr. Ahmad Tibi and the Arab Movement for Renewal - Ta'al, and on behalf of Guy Sagiv, David Abudraham, and Hanna Yifa Abudraham, three of the settlers in the buildings forming the subject of the petition. We have not found any reason for granting the applications to join. The claims of the Knesset Members and their factions have already been presented fully and completely by the petitioners and their joiner would add nothing to the hearing. As for the settlers, no reason was given for their application to join, and nor was any affidavit submitted with it. For that reason alone the application could have been dismissed. All the same, on the merits of the application too, the applicants did not explain why they were only applying to the court at this particular stage, and not during the years in which the petition was conducted, and it would seem that insofar as the arguments in their application were brief, they were presented in the hearing both by the State and by Respondent 5.

 

16.       In view of which the application is rejected, subject to that which was set forth in para. 12 above. The State will bear the Petitioners’ fees for the sum of NIS 15,000.

 

Given today, 15th of Iyyar 5772 (7 May 2012).

 

 

President                                 Justice                                                 Justice

 

 

 

Hess v. Chief of General Staff

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 4146/11
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, July 9, 2013
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

A petition to direct the introduction of a military order prohibiting the use of white phosphorus for any purpose in settled areas and other civilian sites, as well as any use of arms containing white phosphorus in any situation in which there is an alternative weapon that is less dangerous to humans and that is capable of achieving an equal or similar military advantage.

 

HCJ (per Judge Arbel and with the concurrence of Judges Melcer and Danziger) dismissed the petition, subject to guidance regarding the review of the issue the subject of the petition, and held as follows:

 

With regard to the issue’s justiciability, war is subject to laws and the laws are subject to judicial interpretation, within the boundaries of the restraint that the HCJ has imposed on itself especially with regard to quintessential military matters. The choice of weapons used by the Army is not generally a matter for this Court’s consideration. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that in every case in which issues related to the use of weapons arise the Court will refuse to consider the matter. The boundaries of the HCJ’s intervention in matters of this kind are extremely limited to exceptional cases, where there is concern of injury to established legal norms. The HCJ intervenes in petitions even if they have political or military implications, so long as the dominant aspect considered therein is the legal aspect.

 

In order to maintain the balance between the restraint required in the HCJ’s intervention in quintessential military matters and the operational and professional discretion of the Army Command, and the need to protect and safeguard human rights and honor the international law, a multi-stage review is required in petitions of this kind: whether the petitions, ex facie, raise arguments of a legal nature that allow the Court to consider them, without such consideration amounting to intervention in the quintessential professional discretion of the military entities. A negative answer will result in the petition’s summary dismissal. A positive answer will require another prima facie review of the basis for the petition, and if it justifies, ex facie, a more in-depth review of the violation of the military means or military course of action of the law of armed conflict or the basic principles of Israeli law. At this stage, it is also necessary to consider the practical implications of the petition. There is no room for a more in-depth examination by the Court where, based on Army orders, the use of the weapons that are the subject of the petition has ceased. If there are still orders permitting the use, and there is a prima facie basis substantiating any legal injury, the petitioners’ arguments will be considered on their merits, and a determination will be made with regard to the legality of the use of the weapons which are the subject of the petition.

 

This petition raises, prima facie, serious arguments against the use made by the IDF of shells containing white phosphorus, which oblige, ex facie, another in-depth examination. The arguments are of a dominant legal nature. Accordingly, the HCJ proceeded to the second stage of review. However, at this stage the HCJ stopped the judicial review in light of the State’s declarations that it had been decided not to allow at this time the use of shells containing white phosphorus in a built-up area. The exceptions to this order are very limited and leave the prohibition of use effective and very wide, such that it is doubtful whether this matter will realistically arise again. With regard to the concern regarding a change in the Army’s orders, since the State has not declared that the orders are permanent ones, the HCJ ordered the IDF to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth review of the use of white phosphorus in the Army and the possible alternatives for its use, which will serve either to make the orders permanent or to substantiate a position justifying a change in the orders. The HCJ further ordered the State to notify the petitioners’ attorney in the event of a change in the orders, so that he may once again raise his arguments before the HCJ. 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting as a High Court of Justice

 

HCJ 4146/11

 

Before:

Her Honor, Judge E. Arbel

 

His Honor, Judge H. Melcer

 

His Honor, Judge Y. Danziger

 

The Petitioners:

Yoav Hess + 116 other Petitioners

 

 

v.

 

 

The Respondent:

The Chief of General Staff

 

 

 

 

Petition for the grant of an order nisi

 

 

 

Date of session:

Sivan 4, 5773 (May 13, 2013)

 

 

On Behalf of the Petitioners:

Adv. M. Sfard,  Adv. E. Schaeffer

 

 

On Behalf of the Respondent:

Adv. Y. Roitman

 

 

 

Judgment

 

Judge E. Arbel:

1.In the petition before us, the petitioners petition the Court to order the introduction of a military command prohibiting the use of white phosphorus for any purpose in settled areas and other civilian sites, as well as any use of arms containing white phosphorus in any situation in which there is an alternative weapon that is less dangerous to humans and is capable of achieving an equal or similar military advantage.

2.The need for the petition arose, according to the petitioners, following the extensive and unethical use, according to them, of weapons containing white phosphorus by the IDF during Operation Cast Lead (December 2008 – January 2009). According to them, during the operation many bombs containing phosphorus were dropped, and by the nature of things, because the [Gaza] Strip is densely populated with civilians, the result was extensive injury to civilians, some of whom were injured when the bombs were dropped and some much later, when the incendiary effect of the phosphorus was still active. According to them, the use of phosphorus endangered the lives of civilians, humanitarian employees and medical personnel. The petitioners argue that this is a substance which has potential for serious injuries to those who come into contact with it, and that its harmful effect lasts long after it is launched. The use thereof, it is argued, by its nature does not enable distinction between military and civilian targets, and thus even when it is aimed at legitimate targets, it might ultimately injure civilians. The petitioners’ main legal argument is that the use of white phosphorus constitutes a violation of the international law.

3.The respondent argues that the petition is of a type that the Court does not usually consider, as it deals with the weapons to be used by the IDF. The respondent also claims that there is no impediment under the law of armed conflict to using artillery shells containing white phosphorus for camouflage purposes only, including in urban warfare. The respondent emphasized that on the professional orders of the chief artillery officer, the use made of the “white smoke” shell is for camouflage purposes only. The State’s attorney, in the hearing before us, also gave notice that at this time the IDF has decided, even though it is not legally required, not to use shells containing white phosphorus in a built-up area, subject to two limited exceptions. The exceptions were presented to us in camera.

4.I will note that the petitioners motioned for the filing of expert opinions regarding the repercussions of the use of white phosphorus in a built-up area. The respondent objected to the motion and argued, inter alia, that the expertise of the opinion’s authors in the architecture field is not relevant to deciding  the question of the legality, in principle, of arms containing white phosphorus, from the legal and factual aspects. In light of our decision, as detailed below, we see no reason to allow the motion to file the opinion. Nonetheless, if the issue arises again in the future, there might be room to delve into it, and it will then be possible to consider the disagreement between the parties with regard to the relevancy of the expertise of the opinion’ authors to the questions under discussion.

Discussion

5.The first issue that must be addressed concerns the justiciability of the issue before us. While the respondent argues that this issue is not justiciable and is one that the Court does not usually consider, the petitioners claim that nowadays there is no doubt that the war is subject to laws and that the laws are subject to judicial interpretation. On this I must agree with the petitioners, within the boundaries of the restraint that this Court has imposed on itself of course, especially with regard to quintessential military matters. I will explain.

As is known, the choice of weapons used by the Army is not generally a matter for this Court’s consideration. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that in every case in which issues related to the use of these or other weapons arise the Court will refuse to consider the matter. Clearly, where arguments arise regarding the use of weapons in a manner that contradicts the law of armed conflict, the Court will have to “enter the battlefield” and consider the arguments raised before it. The boundaries of this Court’s intervention in matters of this kind are extremely limited, but it is reserved and occurs in exceptional and special cases where there is concern of injury to established legal norms. This Court intervenes at times in petitions even if they have political or military implications, so long as the dominant aspect considered therein is the legal aspect (see HCJ 3261/06, Physicians for Human Rights vs. The Ministry of Defense (January 31, 2011) (hereinafter: “in re Physicians for Human Rights”); HCJ 769/02, The Public Committee against Torture in Israel vs. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 62 (1) 507, paragraph 52 of the judgment of President Barak (2006)), and in the words of President Barak:

            “ ‘Israel is not a desert island. It is part of the international formation’ … the Army’s warfare operations do not take place in a legal vacuum. There are legal norms – some from the customary international law, some from the international law that is anchored in conventions to which Israel is a party, and some from the basic rules of the Israeli law – that determine rules regarding warfare management” (HCJ 4764/04, Doctors for Human Rights vs. The Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza, HCJ 58 (5) 385, 391 (2004)).”

President Beinish has also referred to the matter:

            “We have not said and are still not saying that determining the legality of the IDF’s acts vis-à-vis the residents of the area is not at all subject to judicial review, and on various occasions we have rejected the sweeping argument that these acts are not justiciable. Accordingly, this Court has, on many occasions in the past, been required to consider matters that in certain ways touch upon professional-operational aspects, at times related to acts of warfare, where they gave rise to legal questions concerning the Army’s powers during warfare – in accordance with the law of armed conflict – and the limitations imposed on it by the international humanitarian law” (in re Physicians for Human Rights, paragraph 10).”

6.In order to maintain the balance between the restraint required in this Court’s intervention in quintessential military matters and the operational and professional discretion of the Army Command, and the need to protect and safeguard human rights and honor the international law, we believe that a multi-stage review is required in petitions of this kind. First of all, it is necessary to consider whether the petitions, ex facie, raise arguments of a legal nature that allow the Court to consider them, without such consideration amounting to intervention in the quintessential professional discretion of the military entities. A negative answer will result in the petition’s summary dismissal. A positive answer will require another prima facie review of the basis for the petition, and if it justifies, ex facie, a more in-depth review of the violation of the military means or military course of action of the law of armed conflict or the basic principles of Israeli law. At this stage, it is also necessary to consider the practical implications of the petition. There is no room for a more in-depth examination by the Court where the use of the weapons that are the subject of the petition has been ceased on Army orders. If there are still orders permitting the use, and there is a prima facie basis substantiating any legal injury, there is room for the Court to proceed to the third stage, which involves an in-depth review of the arguments raised, and obtaining extensive answers to these arguments on behalf of the State. At this stage, the Court will examine the legal and factual arguments of the petitioners on their merits, and a determination will be made with regard to the legality of the use of the weapons which are the subject of the petition.

7.The petition before us raises, prima facie, serious arguments against the use made by the IDF of shells containing white phosphorus. From the petition it emerges that this is a substance that might cause serious injuries to human beings, and that there are humanitarian, ethical and legal difficulties in its use in a built-up area, since it is not possible to distinguish between military and civil targets in the course of its use. These arguments, ex facie, oblige another in-depth examination. The arguments raised by the petitioners are of a dominant legal nature. Accordingly, these arguments justify proceeding to the second stage of review required by the Court. However, at this stage we believe that we must stop the judicial review, in light of the State’s declarations regarding the binding orders imposed on the Army with regard to the use of white phosphorus in a built-up area at this time. As aforesaid, the State’s attorney declared that it has been decided not to allow the use of shells containing white phosphorus in a built-up area. Although we were presented with two exceptions to this order, we were persuaded that these exceptions are very limited and leave the prohibition of use effective and very wide, such that it is doubtful whether this matter will realistically arise again. In these circumstances, we believe that there is no room to continue reviewing the matter beyond that. Of course, if the Army’s orders change in the future it will be possible to petition this Court again.

8.It should be emphasized that we have not overlooked the position of the petitioners’ attorney that the orders to limit the use do not resolve the matter. Nonetheless, even the petitioners’ attorney stated that the central difficulties in the current state of affairs are that the respondent has not undertaken that the orders are final, and that the nature of the exceptions are unknown to him. With regard to the nature of the exceptions, as has been noted, they were presented to us with the consent of the petitioners’ attorney “in camera,” and we were persuaded that these exceptions make the use of white phosphorus an extreme exception in the most unique circumstances. With regard to the concern regarding a change in the Army’s orders in such regard, I have two comments. Firstly, since the State has not declared before us that the orders are permanent orders that prohibit the use of the substance, in the current circumstances the IDF should engage in a comprehensive and in-depth review of the use of white phosphorus in the Army, and of its risks and harms, and primarily, it should review the possible alternatives for the use of this substance. Such a review will serve either to make the current orders permanent or to substantiate a position justifying a change in the orders. In any event, it would not be suitable to wait to review the matter in an emergency. Secondly, the State should notify the petitioners’ attorney in the event of a change in the orders, so that he may once again raise his arguments before this Court. 

 

Subject to the aforesaid, the petition is dismissed without an order for costs.

Given today, July 9, 2013.

 

___________________

___________________

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Judge

Judge

Judge

 

 

Ministry of Palestinian Prisoners v. Minister of Defense

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3368/10
Date Decided: 
Sunday, April 6, 2014
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

 

The Petitions request shortening the periods of detention prescribed in the security legislation in the West Bank, including in the Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1651), 5770-2009 (hereinafter: the “Order”), such that they match the periods applicable to Israeli citizens in the West Bank and those of detentions prescribed in Israel.

 

The High Court of Justice (Justice E. Arbel, Justices Amit and Shoham concurring), issued a partial judgment as follows:

 

The High Court of Justice discussed the constitutional human right to liberty and its importance in a democratic system. It further discussed the right to due process before denying one’s liberty. The Court found it warranted that such person be able to respond and make arguments prior to restrictions on such a fundamental right. Additionally, the High Court of Justice discussed the public interests in exposing criminals and preventing crime, as well as thwarting security offenses. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance in the constant tension between security and protecting suspects’ rights that exists in the Israeli reality.

 

On the one hand, a proper legal procedure is an essential element in ensuring the proportionality and constitutionality of a detention for interrogation purposes. In principle, the suspect’s appearance before a judge should not be viewed as an obstacle but rather as a fundamental requirement for an effective and constitutional detention for interrogation purposes. This follows from the customary fundamental approach that judicial review is inherent to the detention process. Therefore it is necessary to adjust interrogation methods to interruptions that allow an effective and fair judicial procedure to take place. On the other hand, the security legislation was created in light of a complex security situation in a territory under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), where special security conditions dictate establishing arrangements that are different than those in the occupying state. This reality has, inter alia, resulted in the detention of Palestinian suspects prior to being brought before a judge, for periods of time that are longer than those of Israeli suspects.

 

During the course of the Petition’s proceedings, the Respondents took a far-reaching approach to shortening the periods of detention such that they would more closely match the detention periods in Israel. Such change would aim to reduce, as much as possible, the infringement of Palestinian detainees’ rights. Considering the distinctions inherent in the different conditions between Israel and the West Bank, and in light of the dramatic changes that were made, whose “on the ground” implementation must be examined over time, the High Court of Justice ruled that in terms of the maximum periods of pre-indictment detention of adults suspected of committing security offenses, and in the scope of offenses that are defined as security offenses, the Petitions were exhausted and therefore are to be dismissed. However, with respect to the periods of detention of minors, the periods of detention of adults suspected of other offenses, and the period of detention until the end of proceedings (of minors and adults, in all classifications of offenses) the High Court of Justice ordered the Respondents to file an update notice.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

HCJ 3368/10

HCJ 4057/10

 

Before:                                                The Honorable Justice E. Arbel                                                                                  The Honorable Justice I. Amit                                                                                    The Honorable Justice U. Shoham

 

The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10:   1.   The Ministry of Palestinian Prisoners

                                                      2.   Adv. Fahmi Shakirat

                                                      3.   Adv. Kamil Sabbagh

                                                      4.   Adv. Kareem Ajwa

 

The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10    The Association for Civil Rights et al.

 

v.

 

The Respondent in HCJ 3368/10: 1.   The Minister of Defense

 

The Respondent in HCJ 3368/10

and in HCJ 4057/10                      2.   GOC Central Command, Commander of IDF Forces in the Region

 

                                                                        Petition to Grant an Order Nisi

 

Date of Session:                                           14th of Sivan, 5773 (May 23, 2013)

 

On behalf of the Petitioners

in HCJ 3368/10:                            Adv. S. Ben Natan

 

On behalf of the Petitioners

in HCJ 4057/10:                            Adv. L. Margalit

 

On behalf of the Respondents:     Adv. A. Helman

 

P A R T I A L   J U D G M E N T

 

Justice E. Arbel:

 

The Petitions before us, the hearings of which were united, address the question why not shorten the periods of detention which are prescribed in the security legislation in the Judea and Samaria region, including in the Order Regarding Security Provisions [Consolidated Version] (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1651), 5770-2009 (hereinafter: the "Security Provisions Order" or the "Order"), which came into effect on May 2, 2010. In the framework of the Petitions, this Court was requested to determine periods of detention which shall be shorter than those determined in the Security Provisions Order, as required under international law and in a manner that corresponds with the periods of detention that are customary in Israel.

 

 

Background

 

  1. Petitioner 1 in HCJ 3368/10 is the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs in the Palestinian Authority, to which, under the security legislation, most of the detainees belong, and which attends to their welfare, their families, their legal representation and which engages lawyers who are members of the Israel and Palestinian Bar Associations. Petitioners 2-4 are lawyers who represent, on behalf of the Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs, suspects who are detainees under the security legislation. The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 are the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, "Yesh Din" – Volunteers for Human Rights and the Public Committee against Torture in Israel.

 

  1. The Petitioners filed their Petitions in light of the legal reality that existed at the time the Petitions were filed, pursuant to which the law applicable to Israeli citizens in the Judea and Samaria region (hereinafter: the "Region"), is different than the law applicable to Palestinians in the Region. In the framework of the Petitions, the said Petitioners requested to shorten the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order such that they will be the equivalent to the periods applicable to Israeli citizens in the Region and will correspond to the periods of detention that are customary in Israel.

 

The Law that was in Effect at the Time the Petitions were Filed

 

  1. The period of the pre-indictment detention and the period of detention until the end of proceedings are grounded in Article C of Chapter C of the Security Provisions Order, which addresses the arrest and release of Palestinian detainees in the Region. Sections 31 and 32 of the Security Provisions Order prescribed the following with respect to detention prior to judicial review:

 

"31.   (a) A soldier may arrest, without an arrest warrant, any person violating the provisions of this order or if there is cause to suspect that he committed an offense under this order.

(b) A person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a) shall be transferred as soon as possible to a police station or place of detention as determined in this order.

(c)   An arrest warrant against a person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a) must be received within a reasonable time; if an arrest warrant is not given within 96 hours from the time of his arrest - he shall be released.

(d) The Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region may authorize any person to order the release of a person arrested in accordance with sub-section (a), provided that no arrest warrant pursuant to the provisions of this article was issued against such detainee.

 

32.     (a)   A police officer who has reasonable grounds to assume that a person violated the provisions of this order or who becomes aware that the investigation material that was gathered against the person who was arrested in accordance with sub-section 31(a) necessitates his continued detention, is authorized to issue a written arrest warrant for a period which shall not exceed eight days from the time of his arrest.

(b)   If an arrest warrant as noted was issued for a period shorter than eight days from the time of his arrest, a police officer may extend it in writing, from time to time, provided that the total periods of detention shall not exceed eight days from the time of his arrest."

 

With respect to the extension of the detention prior to the filing of an indictment, Sections 37 and 38 of the Security Provisions Order prescribe as follows:

 

"37.   A judge is authorized to grant an arrest warrant and to extend the duration of the detention, provided that the arrest warrant or the detention extension shall not be for a period exceeding thirty days at a time and that the total period of detention in accordance with this section shall not exceed ninety days.

 

38.     A Military Court of Appeals judge, may, at the request of the Region's legal counsel, order the extension of the detention of a person who was arrested under Section 37, or his renewed arrest, for a period which shall not exceed three months; if such an arrest warrant is granted for a period of less than three months, a Military Court of Appeals judge may extend it from time to time, provided that the total period of detention in accordance with this section shall not exceed three months."

 

With respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings, Section 44 of the Security Provisions Order provides as follows:

 

"44.   The matter of a defendant who after being indicted was held under detention for the same indictment for a cumulative period that amounted to two years and whose trial in the court of first instance did not end with a verdict, shall be brought before a judge of the Military Court of Appeals.

The judge will hear the defendant's matter and order his release, conditionally or unconditionally, unless the judge believed that the circumstances of the matter, including the severity of the offense attributed to the defendant and his level of dangerousness, the fear of him fleeing justice and the reasons for the prolonging of proceedings, do not justify his release.

(b)   If the judge decides that the circumstances of the matter do not justify the defendant's release, the judge may instruct the defendant's continued detention for a period which shall not exceed six months, and may reorder this from time to time."

 

In accordance with that which is stated above, at the time the Petitions were filed with this Court, a suspect who was arrested under the Security Provisions Order could have been held under detention up to eight days without judicial review, up to 90 days before the filing of an indictment, and with court approval – up to six months. Additionally, a defendant could have, before his trial was completed, been held under open ended detention, subject to periodic extensions every six month, after two years from the commencement of his detention.

 

4.As opposed to the detention periods applicable to Palestinians in the Region, which are listed in the Security Provision Order, Israeli law prescribes detention for citizens of up to 24 hours (which can be extended up to 48 hours) until being brought before judicial review, detention of up to 30 days, which can be extended up to 75 days with the Attorney General's approval, before filing of an indictment, and detention of nine months, which can be periodically extended every three months, until the end of proceedings (Sections 17, 29, 30, 59, 60, 61 and 62 of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers – Arrests) Law, 5756-1996). Additionally, certain exceptions are prescribed in the Israeli law with respect to suspects who are arrested for security offenses and with respect to minors who have been arrested (Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 and the Youth (Adjudication, Punishment and Methods of Treatment) Law 5731-1971).

 

The Claims of the Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10

 

5.The Petitioners claim, through Adv. Smadar Ben Natan, that the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order that applies to the Palestinians in the Region are significantly longer than the standards prescribed for such matters both in international law and in the corresponding periods in Israel. They claim that these periods infringe the right to due process and the protection against arbitrary infringement of liberty which are granted to the residents of the Region, both by virtue of international law and by virtue of the fundamental principles of Israeli law. According to the Petitioners, although at hand are two different regions that are subject to different legal regimes, however both are under the control of the State of Israel.

 

6.The Petitioners further claim that the far-reaching changes that have occurred in Israeli law have hardly been reflected in the military legislation in the Region. They claim that experience shows that the extended periods of detention impact the manner in which arrest and interrogation procedures are conducted, such that they excessively infringe detainees' rights: de facto, the detention of detainees who are arrested in an initial arrest, is not requested to be extended before the lapse of the eight days allowed by the Security Provisions Order; many of them are not interrogated at all during entire days of this detention period and during subsequent detention periods; in many cases, detainees are released after four, five or even eight days without procedures being taken with respect thereto and without a cause of arrest against them being examined by a judge. According to the Petitioners, such an extended period of detention creates fertile ground for inappropriate treatment, for pressure and violence in the interrogation, such as the arrest of a relative without any real cause as a means of pressure.

 

7.The Petitioners add that the proceedings at the Military Courts after the filing of an indictment, are conducted ponderously: Most of the cases end with plea bargains since defendants know that if they chose to conduct a trial, they will stay in detention for a long and unlimited period of time; in the few cases that do go to trial, the periods of time between hearings are extended, the number of judges is small in relation to the volume of the cases, and this reality is created and encouraged by the unlimited detention until the end of proceedings.

 

8.The Petitioners further state that until the implementation of the Disengagement Plan, detainees from the Gaza Strip were subject to the provisions of the Security Provisions Order and that since the Disengagement detainees from the Gaza Strip are brought for detention extensions before the Israeli Courts, subject to Israeli law. According to them, the Israeli law also applies to the population of the settlers. According to the Petitioners, this reality constitutes a violation of equality among people – a legal apartheid. The Petitioners emphasize that not all of the offenses addressed in the Military Courts are security offenses, but the laws of detention apply to all of the detainees.

 

9.According to the Petitioners, the judicial review in the detention proceedings is an integral part of the suspect's right to due process. The very lengthy periods of detention are not justified due to security needs or due to circumstances that are unique to the Region. Therefore, they claim, there is a duty to act in accordance with similar standards in protecting human rights in the procedural criminal proceeding and they request to cancel Sections 31A, 32 and 44 of the Security Provisions Order, to shorten the periods of detention and to determine periods of detention that correspond to those that are customary in Israel.

 

The Claims of the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10

 

10.These Petitioners, through Adv. Lila Margalit, also requested to amend the Security Provisions Order and they raise similar claims against the periods of detention prescribed in the Order. They claim that the periods of detention severely and gravely infringe the fundamental rights of the Palestinian residents of the Region, their right to liberty and their right to be free of arbitrary arrest, as well as their right to due process, dignity and equality, to appropriate means of supervision in order to ensure fair interrogation and in order to prevent torture. These detainees are subject, so they argue, to illegitimate methods of interrogation and to improper treatment on behalf of the interrogation authorities. These infringements derive, according to the Petitioners, both from the fact that their treatment is arbitrarily different than the treatment of Israelis living in the Region and from the duration of the periods of detention which in and of themselves are exaggerated. According to the Petitioners, these infringements are contrary to the provisions of the customary and contractual international law applicable in the Region and to the principles of Israeli public law which apply to Israeli authorities. They argue that these infringements do not serve an appropriate purpose, are not proportionate and are not reasonable. According to the Petitioners' opinion, it is hard to describe a more severe and grave infringement of human rights than the illegitimate situation in which two "categories" of people who are distinguished from each other based on their national origin, are living beside each other. Even regardless of the discrimination allegation, the Petitioners claim that the periods of detention in the Security Provisions Order are contrary to the principles of international law which apply to the Region and to the principles of public law that apply to any action of Israeli authorities. According to them, immediate and frequent judicial review of the detention of a suspect is a necessary condition of its reasonableness and proportionality; an extended detention without judicial review is not proportionate.

 

11.The Petitioners add that the military prosecution's claim that the judicial review of the detention is to be delayed in order to enable the "formulation of a reasonable suspicion", attests that the Order is used for making arbitrary arrests, without there being a reasonable suspicion against the detainee. Therefore, the Petitioners claim that the initial detention period of Palestinian detainees is meant to enable arresting people without there being a reasonable suspicion against them; to protect the interrogation authorities from the court's "intervention", to grant the interrogators "minimal time" to exhaust the interrogation, to avoid the "disturbance" thereof that is involved in presenting the suspect before the judge, and to avoid the logistical difficulties involved in applying immediate judicial review.

 

12.According to the Petitioners, the lack of distinction between minors and adults in the security legislation regarding the periods of detention and the lack of sufficient consideration of the principle of the child's best interest during arrests of minors, result in a disproportionate infringement of children's rights which are grounded in international law and which are recognized by Israeli Law. The basic premises that Palestinian minors are worthy of less protection than Israeli minors also living in the Region, is, in their opinion, illegitimate.

 

13.The Petitioners add that the judicial review of the detention is meant to ensure the justification, from the outset, of the continued denial of a person's liberty and that there is no place to delay it in order to enable the authorities to progress with their interrogation. Additionally, judicial review also has a role in supervising the manner the interrogation is conducted and serves as an important guarantee against the application of illegitimate means of pressure during interrogation and against the use of the detention itself to make the suspect feel completely disconnected from the outside world and subject to the mercy of his interrogators, while his dignity and his right to be silent are being infringed. According to the Petitioners, interrogation that is far from the court's watchful eye, could lead to the use of illegitimate means of interrogation which violate the detainee's dignity and even the integrity of his body, and therefore, in their opinion, constitutes a breach of the State's duty to prevent torture and inhumane treatment of detainees. The lack of judicial supervision is even more severely significant in cases in which the Palestinian detainee is prohibited from meeting with a lawyer, contrary to international law. According to the Petitioners, the concern regarding the use of illegitimate means of interrogation against Palestinians is not a  mere concern, and they refer to reports that were published by human rights organizations in 2007. According to them, purely logistic considerations or administrative difficulties cannot justify the infringement of a human's right to liberty, equality and dignity.

 

The Respondents' Response

 

14.The Respondents' response was presented by Adv. Aner Helman. Even since the letters of response to the Petitioners' approaches, prior to the filing of the Petition, the Respondents stated that the issue of shortening the periods of detention in the Region is being examined in the framework of in-depth staff work that has commenced long ago. It was further written that the security legislation is based on security and public order considerations and this is also true with respect the laws of detention, and that the differences between the law customary in the Region and the law customary in the State of Israel in this context derive from relevant security considerations.

 

15.In the response which was filed on the Respondents' behalf to this Court on January 9, 2010, the Respondents reiterated their claim that it is not for no reason that the periods of detention prescribed in the Security Provisions Order are different than those prescribed in Israeli law. According to the Respondents, the nature of an area that is held under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), even if long-term occupation, necessitates that the special security conditions prevailing therein dictate that different arrangements be prescribed than those customary in the occupying state.

 

16.For example, due to the security situation, the ability to move in the Region is limited, and at times, in light of security conditions which delay or prevent reaching the location, it is not possible to perform interrogations expeditiously, or even at all, in the area; some of the areas of the Region are under Palestinian control and it is not possible or very difficult to reach witnesses and suspects living there; in many cases, suspects who need to be interrogated find shelter in areas that are under Palestinian control making their interrogations and the interrogations of their accomplices who were arrested by the security forces, difficult; in most of the cases, the potential witnesses refuse to cooperate with the security forces, making interrogations difficult; in security interrogations the persons being interrogated acted out of nationalist and ideological motivation, and their interrogation is very difficult. Naturally, there is a minimal period of time that is required until their interrogations will produce initial evidence to support the intelligence information that has been received. At times, a certain interval is required between the time information is received and the time it can be used against the party being interrogated, since using intelligence information very soon after its receipt could "burn" the source of information and at times could even risk his life; in a large share of the security interrogations it is not possible to determine the location and time of the arrest in advance, resulting in the delay of the initial interrogation and it being more difficult; all of the detainees who are suspected of committing severe security offenses are transferred to one of four interrogation facilities which are located in Israel for their interrogation. At times, such transfer, in and of itself, requires not insignificant amounts of time. It is also necessary to exhaust the initial interrogation of the person being interrogated before bringing him before a judge, so as to avoid the possibility of him escaping to the Region; at times it is necessary to arrest many hundreds of people, like for example during the period of the "Defensive Shield" operation in 2002, and it is not possible to prepare to bring all of them before a judge during a short period of time.

 

17.The Respondents argue that these grounds require determining that it is appropriate to allow detaining a suspect for a reasonable period of time that is required in order to formulate initial evidentiary material prior to bringing him before a judge. The Respondents further state that international law does not limit the number of days that a person may be detained without judicial involvement, but rather expresses a principle pursuant to which the decision regarding the detention should be brought to a judge without delay.

 

18.Having said that, the Respondents notified that in recent years staff work has been conducted in the IDF and further on in the Ministry of Justice, by the Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Matters), together with the Deputy Attorney General (Special Assignments) and the Deputy Attorney General (Consultation), which is meant to examine the possibility of shortening the maximum periods of detention in the Region. The Respondents updated that in the framework of the staff work, a decision was reached that, considering the current security situation, at this time, it is possible to significantly shorten the maximum period of detention until bringing a detainee before a judge, however it is not appropriate to make the arrangement which shall be applicable in the Region in this matter the same as the arrangement which is applicable in Israel. The Respondents specified the manner of shortening the periods of detention:

 

19.With respect to offenses that are not security offenses, it was decided that, as a rule, the authority of an initial detention until presentation before a judge shall be for 48 hours; additionally, it will be possible to delay the presentation of the detainee before a judge for an additional 48 hours, as per the decision of an administrative authority, if there is a special cause, such as, for example, urgent acts of interrogation. It was further decided that the arrangement shall be re-examined upon the lapse of two years from the effective date of the amendment of the Order. As for detainees of security offenses, it was decided that the rule that shall be prescribed is that the initial period of detention until presentation before a judge shall be 96 hours at most, with an administrative party being able to extend such period by 48 additional hours, in cases in which the Head of the Interrogation Department at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation in order to bring a detainee before a judge could result in substantially prejudicing the interrogation. It was also decided that in very special circumstances it will be possible for an administrative party to extend the period of detention until being brought before a judge by 48 additional hours, beyond the above said 11(sic.) hours (six days), in cases in which the head of the Interrogation Division at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation in order to bring a detainee before a judge could result in harming the performance of an essential act of interrogation that is meant to prevent harm in human lives. Considering the concern that was raised by security entities regarding the operational implications of these modifications, it was determined that this arrangement would be examined upon the lapse of two years from the date the amendment to the Order became effective.

 

20.It was further decided that the extension of an initial detention by a judge will not exceed 20 days and that it will be possible to re-extend the detention for additional periods which shall not exceed 15 additional days each. The extension of detention prior to the filing of an indictment which exceed 60 days shall be subject to the approval of a senior legal authority in the Region.

 

21.The Respondents added that in the framework of the staff work it was decided to add a provision to the Order pursuant to which if a person was arrested and his interrogation ended he shall be released from detention, however, if the prosecutor declared that they are about to file an indictment against him and the court was convinced that there is prima facie cause to request his detention until the end of proceedings, the judge may extend the detention on this  ground for a period which shall not exceed eight days. It was also decided that at the initial stage the period of detention until the beginning of trial shall be 60 days, and that the possibility of shortening this period to 30 days shall be examined upon the lapse of two years.

 

22.The Respondents further updated that it was decided to amend Section 44 of the Security Provisions Order so that with respect to offenses that are not security offenses, the period stated for holding the first hearing before a judge in the matter of a detainee who is under detention until the end of proceedings shall be one year from the date the indictment was filed. With respect to security offenses, the period currently stated in the Order – two years – shall remain in effect, and this matter shall also be examined upon the lapse of two years from the time the arrangement shall become effective. The Respondents estimated that the required adjustments to the modifications shall last approximately six to nine months and that the Order shall be amended accordingly, immediately thereafter.

 

23.The Respondents requested to dismiss in limine the relief requested in HCJ 4057/10 to make the periods of detention of minors in the Region the same as the periods of detention of minors in Israel, and claimed that the Petitioners did not exhaust the proceedings in this matter. According to them, this matter should not be mixed with the matter of the detention of adults in the Region. According to the Respondents this is a "premature petition" since it was already decided to conduct staff work on this matter as well.

 

Hearing of the Petititons and Update Notice

 

24.On January 12, 2011, a hearing took place in this Court before President D. Beinisch and Justices N. Hendel and I. Amit. At the end of the hearing it was decided that within five months the Respondents would file an update notice together with a draft of the Order which shall be issued in accordance with the principles that were formulated. The Bench of Judges even instructed the Respondents to consider its remarks when drafting the Order, especially with respect to the duration of the period of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge and with respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings after an indictment has been filed.

 

25.On June 1, 2011, the Respondents filed an update notice, and according thereto, in an additional meeting that was held following the court hearing, it was decided to shorten the period until a detainee, who is detained until the end of proceedings for security offense, is brought before a judge, from two years to 18 months. It was further decided that it is vital that the manner of the actual implementation of the arrangement which the staff work decided upon with respect to the maximum period of detention until bringing a suspect before a judge, be examined for a period of approximately two years, before an additional re-examination of the matter. In the framework of this notice, the Respondents added that it is essential, prior to actually shortening the detention periods in the Region, to examine the developments that were scheduled to occur in the Region in September 2011 onwards, in light of the Palestinian Authority's notice that it intends to approach the United Nations General Assembly this month with a request to recognize the "State of Palestine". The Respondents updated that the staff work has not yet been completed and that they expect the Order to be amended during the month of January, 2012.

 

26.Both the Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 and the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 responded to that stated in the update notice. According to them, the shortening of the detention period that the Respondents declared is insignificant and cannot cure the severe defects and infringement of rights that are embodied in the security legislation in the Region. According to the Petitioners, the changes that were made shall not have any practical impact on the arrest procedures of Palestinians who are residents of the Region and will not lead to a significant tightening of the judicial supervision of the periods of detention and to an improvement in the infringement of the right to liberty, of due process and of the presumption of innocence. The Petitioners reiterated their claim that judicial review is an integral part of the arrest process and that there is no justification to delay the judicial review for such an extended period of time. They argued that the initial detention period and the detention until the end of proceedings period constitute an arbitrary infringement of the right to liberty and therefore they insist on their petitions to issue an order nisi in the Petitions and to instruct the Military Commander in the Region to determine periods of detention that correspond with international standards and with those that are customary in Israel. The Petitioners further claimed that there is no reason not to amend the Order due to uncertain future developments.

 

27.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 added that the list of security offenses that is included in the Order spans over dozens of sections and includes offenses such as conducting a procession or an unlicensed meeting, waving a flag without a permit, printing "material which has political significance" without a license from the Military Commander, and the like. The list also includes many "public order" offenses such as throwing objects, disturbing a soldier, breaching curfew or a closed military zone order and the like, thus making the arrangement that relates to offenses that are not security offenses predominantly theoretical. In their opinion, the appropriate criterion for determining the periods of detention is the timeframe applicable to Israelis who also live in the Region. The Petitioners also drew attention to the inconsistencies between the Respondents' notice and the draft of the Order. According to them, the amendment of the Order should not be avoided due to a concern regarding unusual events.

 

Additional Update Notices

 

28.On November 22, 2011, the Respondents filed an additional update notice,  according to which, it was told in meetings that were held at the Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Matters), that the IDF has completed the staff work examining adding the necessary staff positions at the military courts and at the Judea and Samaria Region Prosecution in order to shorten the detention period in the Region and that a decision was even already reached to add the new necessary staff positions, subject to the amendment to the Order becoming effective and to the time required for the procedure of selecting and appointing new judges to the court. It was also clarified that due to a dispute between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public Security regarding the source of the budget, there is still no budgetary solution for the Police and Prison Service's needs for implementing the staff work and that a few additional months shall be required after such a solution is found in order to recruit and train personnel and purchase and receive additional vehicles. On December 22, 2011, the Respondents filed an additional update notice informing that the dispute regarding the budget source was still unresolved, and this is what they informed on January 16, 2012, as well.

 

29.On February 6, 2012, the Respondents filed an additional update notice that the budget dispute regarding financing the detention periods in the Region was resolved. The Respondents further updated that on December 2, 2012 (sic.), the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed the Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 16) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1685) 5772-2012 (hereinafter: the "Amending Order"), which shortened the period of detention in the Region in accordance with the conclusions of the staff work that had been done, and prescribed that its provisions shall become effective gradually, such that the last changes shall become effective on August 1, 2012.

 

The Petitioners' Response

 

30.The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 welcomed the amendments made to the Amending Order. However they claimed that a review of the language of the Amending Order reveals that there are significant differences between the changes declared in the Respondents' response and the actual language of the Amending Order. For example, the Petitioners noted that a security offenses detainee can be held under detention for two periods of 96 hours, i.e. eight days, and only be brought before a judge upon the completion thereof, and the same is true in the case of a non-security offenses detainee. The Petitioners claimed that the shortening of the detention period that was applied is insignificant and does not cure the severe infringement of the detainees' rights under the security legislation in the Region. They claimed that in the case of security offenses, which are the majority of the offenses that are addressed in the Region, the Amending Order does not, in effect, shorten the period of detention before initial judicial review. The Petitioners added that the Amending Order shortens the period of detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses in an insignificant manner from two years to a year and a half, which can be extended indefinitely, and that no change was made with respect to minors and that there is no distinction between a minor and an adult with respect to the detention laws. According to the Petitioners, these changes shall hardly have any practical impact on the procedures of detaining the Region's residents and will not lead to a significant tightening of the judicial supervision of the periods of detention and to an improvement with respect to the infringement of the right to liberty, the right to due process and the presumption of innocence. The Petitioners mentioned with respect to the initial detention period, that judicial review is an integral part of the arrest process and that this is the stage where it is necessary to present the court with only reasonable suspicion which is meant to exist upon the actual arrest. Therefore, in their opinion, there is no justification for delaying the judicial review for such a long period.  Interrogation difficulties should be presented before the judge to justify the extension of the detention, including in security offenses.

 

31.The Petitioners further claimed that the European Court of Human Rights ruled that an initial detention period of four days without judicial review breaches the right to be free of arbitrary detention. Therefore they are of the opinion that a period of detention of four to eight days before judicial review constitutes an arbitrary infringement of the right to liberty in violation of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and is illegal. According to them, a period of detention of a year and a half infringes the defendant's presumption of innocence and constitutes an arbitrary infringement of his right to liberty, since it is based only on prima facie evidence and amounts to an infringement of his right to a fair trial, as it constitutes a negative incentive to conduct trials and examine the charge.

 

32.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/12 also responded to the Respondents' update notice. They also welcomed the Respondents' notice regarding the amendments made to the Amending Order but claimed that they cannot cure the flaw of illegality embedded therein, since even after the amendment, the Palestinian residents of the Region will continue to be subject to exaggerated and discriminating periods of detention which severely infringe their rights. The Petitioners emphasized again that immediate and frequent judicial review of arrest for interrogation purposes is a necessary condition for the reasonableness, proportionality and legality of the detention and that in the absence thereof, it is not possible to prevent arbitrary detention, it is not possible to protect the rights of the suspect and it is not possible to ensure a fair criminal procedure. The Petitioners reiterated their argument that an arrest that is not arbitrary is meant, to begin with, to be based on a reasonable suspicion and that the judicial review constitutes a part of the formulation of the legality thereof. According to them, the special difficulties that characterize the interrogations in the Territories are not at all relevant to examining the legality of the arrest to begin with, and therefore should have no implication on the amount of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge. According to the Petitioners, the Respondents did not provide grounds which could justify the discriminating policy also with respect to the other periods of detention. The Petitioners stated that the Respondents did not refer to minors in their notice and according to them, the list of security offenses is still "all inclusive", and a situation in which an Israeli detainee who lives in the Region and is suspected of a security offense must be brought before a judge within 24 hours while a Palestinian must be brought before a judge only after an a-priori period of four days, cannot be justified.

 

In light of President D. Beinisch's retirement, President A. Grunis appointed me to hear the Petition on March 14, 2012.

 

Additional Hearing of the Petition

 

33.On April 23, 2012, we held an additional hearing of the Petition, in which the Petitioners presented their claims regarding four matters: the time until bringing a detainee before a judge, the detention of minors, the definition of security offenses pursuant to the Order, and the period of the extension of a detention until the end of proceedings. At the beginning of the hearing, the attorney for the Respondents filed the Amending Order with respect to Section 31 of the Order. According to the amendment, a detention prior to being brought before a judge in special circumstances was limited to a period which shall not exceed 96 hours from the time the suspect was arrested, and can, in special circumstances, specified in the Order, be repeatedly extended by two additional days at a time, in accordance with approval by very senior echelons.

 

34.With regard to minors, it was discovered in the hearing that a new Security Provisions Order was meant to come into effect in August, 2012, and the age of minors in the Region was also recently changed to 18 years of age (instead of the previous 16 years). The Respondents requested to monitor the change for one year from the time it became effective, to monitor the wardens' training procedures, and to consider the state of affairs following the lapse of such period. As such, we ruled that the Respondents shall file update notices with respect to the results of the change by no later than December 1, 2012.

 

35.As for the matter of the offenses defined as security offenses, we ruled in a decision at the end of the hearing that the matter was not raised in the Petitions and an order nisi was not requested with respect thereto, other than in the framework of the responses to the Respondents' update notices. Having said that, we found it appropriate that the Respondents consider our remarks, especially the question whether it is appropriate to relate to the security offenses as one assemblage rather than excluding some of them from the definition of security offenses that appear in the Third Addendum of the Security Provisions Order.

 

36.With respect to the detention until the end of proceedings, the Respondents' attorney notified that it was decided to shorten the period of detention to 18 months in security offenses. Since we were of the opinion that this is still a lengthy period and it is appropriate that the matter be re-examined, we instructed that this be addressed in the framework of the update notice that was to be filed. We also ruled that after filing the update notice, the Petitioners would be able to respond thereto, and that we would thereafter decide regarding the further treatment of the Petitions.

 

Additional Update Notice

37.On December 16, 2012, the Respondents filed an additional update notice. First of all, the Respondents informed that the review of the results of the shortening of the periods of detention in the Region indicated that by dedicating effort the Respondents have managed to implement the shortened periods of detention as prescribed in the Amending Order. The Respondents added that following the remarks of this Court in the hearing and the decision it issued at the end of the hearing, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region amended the Security Provisions Order regarding the detention of minors, the definition of the security offenses and the period of extension of detention until the end of proceedings:

 

38.With respect to the detention of minors, the Respondents updated that it was decided to act to amend the security legislation and to prescribe special periods of detention until being brought before a judge and until the end of proceedings, for minors in the Region, which as a rule, shall be shorter than the corresponding periods of detention for adults. In this context, the Respondents informed that on November 28, 2012, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed two new amendments to the Security Provisions Order: Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 25) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1711), 5772-2012 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1711"). The Respondents noted that according to Order no. 1711, as from April 2, 2013, the maximum period of detention of a "youth", as defined in the Security Provisions Order, i.e. a person who is at least 12 years but not yet 14 years old, until being brought before a judge shall be 24 hours from the time of arrest, with a possibility of an additional 24 hours extension due to an urgent act of interrogation. It was decided that this period shall apply to the detention of a "youth" for both security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses. Additionally, the Respondents noted that beginning from such time, the maximum period of detention of a "young adult", as defined in the Security Provisions Order, i.e. a person who is at least 14 years old but not yet 16 years old, until being brought before a judge shall be 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with a possibility of an additional 48 hours extension due to an urgent act of interrogation. It was decided that this maximum period of detention shall apply to the detention of a "young adult" for both security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses. The Respondents further noted that such maximum period of detention applies also to minors over the age of 16 and to adults in the Region who are detained for offenses that are not security offenses.

 

39.According to the Respondents this is a very significant shortening of the maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge for all suspects aged 12-14 and for suspects of security offenses aged 14-16, compared to the periods of detention until being brought before a judge for adult suspects for the said offenses, which were also significantly shortened in the framework of the Amending Order. The Respondents added that the maximum periods of detention until being brought before a judge which apply to adults shall continue to apply with respect to minors over the age of 14 for offenses which are not security offenses, and with respect to minors over the age of 16 for security offenses, as stated in the Amending Order.

 

40.With respect to the period of detention until the end of proceedings for minors in the Region, the Respondents further stated that Order no. 1711 prescribes that the period of detention until the end of proceedings for a minor, i.e. any defendant who is less than 18 years old, shall be only one year. Additionally, the detention of minors until the end of proceedings can be extended by a Military Court of Appeals judge, upon the lapse of a year of detention, for a period which shall not exceed three months, which the judge may re-order. It was noted that such provision applies with respect to minors who are accused of security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses.

 

41.As for the definition of security offenses, the Respondents updated that in the framework of the Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 26) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1712), 5772-2012 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1712"), approximately a third of the security offenses that were previously listed were removed from the Third Addendum of the Security Provisions Order which defines "Security Offenses", and one offense (offense under Section 222 of the Security Provisions Order) was added, and therefore, Order no. 1712 actually resulted in the significant shortening of the maximum periods of detention of those who are suspected and accused of the many offenses that were removed from the Third Addendum. The Respondents noted that there was a significant change even in the matter of adults since approximately a third of the offenses that were previously defined as "security offenses" are no longer defined as such, and therefore the period of detention until the end of proceedings for anyone suspected of committing them shall be 12 months rather than 18 months. The Respondents claim that the implementation of such significant changes in the various periods of detention necessitates granting an opportunity, prior to considering additional changes, to examine the implications thereof on the law enforcement system in the Region and on its ability to function. Therefore, it was decided that at this time it is inappropriate to change the periods of detention until the end of proceedings for adults in the Region. The Respondents were of the opinion that in doing so, a worthy balance was struck between all of the relevant considerations, while granting obvious preference to the rights of minor defendants over those of the adults.

 

The Petitioners' Responses

 

42.The Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 responded to the Update Notice. They welcomed the significant shortening of the period of detention applying to minors aged 12-14 and the additional amendments of which the Respondents informed. However, in their opinion, the Petition has not yet been exhausted since even after the amendments, the periods of detention applicable to Palestinians in the Territories, minors and adults alike, remain exaggerated, discriminating and contrary to the law. According to them, to this day, the Respondents have still not raised any legitimate reason which could justify the continued severe discrimination in this matter between Palestinians and Israelis in the Region. According to the Petitioners, even after the amendments to the Order, it is possible to hold a suspect up to eight days without any judicial review, if he is suspected of an offense which is classified as a security offense, including offenses such as throwing rocks (including towards property) and organizing a protest without a license. Such an extended period of detention also applies to minors who are 16 years old or older. In offenses that are not security offenses, the bringing of a suspect before a judge can be delayed up to 96 hours, even when at hand is a minor who is 14 or 15 years old. The Petitioners mentioned that an arrest is meant to be based, to begin with, on a reasonable suspicion, and that the judicial review constitutes part of the formulation of the legality of the initial detention regardless of the severity of the offense. According to them, the difficulties that characterize the interrogations in the Territories are not relevant to the examination of the legality of the arrest to begin with, and therefore should have no implication on the amount of time until first bringing a detainee before a judge.

 

43.As for minors, the Petitioners claimed that even after the amendment of the Order it will still be possible to hold a minor aged 12 or 13 for an entire day until bringing him before a judge, or for two days if there is a need to perform an urgent act of interrogation, and a minor 14-15 years old can even be held under detention up to 96 hours for ordinary offenses, prior to being brought before a judge. This, as opposed to an Israeli 12 or 13 year old minor from the Region who must be brought before a judge within 12 hours or 24 hours in certain cases. The Petitioners added that even after the amendment, the prohibition against holding Israeli minors who live in the Region under detention until the end of proceedings, is not applied to minors under the age of 14. Additionally, a longer period of detention until the end of proceedings shall continue to apply to minors, a year as opposed to six months, and this period can be extended for longer periods of time, three months, compared to 45 days at a time under Israeli law. The Petitioners complained that the extension of a detention of a Palestinian suspect under the age of 14 or until his release without indictment, was not shortened.

 

44.The Petitioners added that despite the removal of approximately a third of the security offenses from the Third Addendum of the Order, it still includes a wide variety of offenses that do not justify lengthy periods of detention, such as, for example, the throwing of objects, including throwing rocks towards property, organizing protest without a license and the breach of a closed military zone order. According to them, leaving these offenses in the list was meant to serve considerations that are totally irrelevant to the interrogation needs, such as deterrence considerations. At the very least, leaving them in the list does not comply with the proportionality criterion. According to the Petitioners, there is no justification to hold Palestinian detainees who are suspected of security offenses up to 96 hours without judicial review, when according to the Amending Order judicial review can be delayed for up to six or eight days at terms that are much more lenient than those that are required for the detention of Israelis living in the Region and who are suspected of severe security offense. In their opinion, there is also no justification to set a longer period of time for the period of detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses. Determining a period of detention until the end of proceedings that is too long will result, in the Petitioners' opinion, in disproportionate infringement of the defendant's right to liberty and prejudices the fairness of the criminal process, particularly when the extended period is automatically pre-determined and does not require special approval. In their opinion, the expectation of lengthy detention could result in defendants admitting to that which is attributed to them only to avoid an extended stay in jail. According to them, the lack of stringent limits on the length of a trial allows a delay of justice which could even interfere with the discovery of the truth. The Petitioners stated that the matter of the definition of the security offenses did not appear in the Petition because the special periods of detention for security offenses were first prescribed by the Respondents in their response to the Petition. Therefore, the legality and the proportionality of the duration of the periods of detention for security offenses as well as for other offenses, constitute, so they argue, an integral part of the reliefs that were requested in the Petition to begin with.

 

45.The Petitioners reiterated their objections regarding the period of detention until the end of proceedings that applies to adults in security offenses, which was not shortened in the Amending Order, as well as with respect to holding a suspect up to eight days until being brought before a judge if detained in a "combat arrest", as stated in Section 33 of the Security Provisions Order. The Petitioners emphasized their claim that the proper criterion to examine the reasonableness and proportionality of the periods of detention that apply to the Palestinian residents of the Territories is the timeframe that applies to Israelis also living in the Region.

 

46.The Petitioners in HCJ 3368/10 notified that they join that which was stated in the response of the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10. According to them, the differences between the legislation in the Region and the legislation in Israel will remain unfathomable even after the changes that were made to the Order, which in and of themselves are welcome.

 

An Additional Hearing of the Petition

 

47.In a hearing we held on May 23, 2013, the parties reiterated their main arguments: The Petitioners claimed that the amendments made in the Amending Order are not sufficient and that they maintain their petitions. The attorney representing the State requested to separate the matter of the detention of minors from the Petitions being addressed and requested to enable the system to examine the implementation of the amendments to the Order over a reasonable period of time in order to ensure that "things work" and adopt educated decisions. The attorney representing the State stated that upon the lapse of the period, the periods of detention will be re-examined, as the system does not rest on its laurels.

 

48.On October 29, 2013, the Respondents filed an additional update notice. The Respondents informed that on September 30, 2013, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 35) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1727) (hereinafter: "Order no. 1727"), which came into effect on the date of the signing thereof. According to Order no. 1727, the provisions of Article G, Chapter E of the Security Provisions Order, including, the age of minors in the Region, shall from now on be "permanent provisions". The Respondents also updated that since the last hearing of the Petitions, and further to additional staff work, on September 1, 2013, the Commander of the IDF Forces in the Region signed Security Provisions Order (Amendment no. 34) (Judea and Samaria) (no. 1726), 5773-2013 (hereinafter: "Order no. 1726"), which came into effect on October 6, 2013. Order no. 1726 introduced an additional significant shortening of the periods of judicial detention of minors for interrogation purposes, resulting in a Military Court judge being able to order the arrest of a minor for interrogation purposes for a period of 15 days and extend the detention for additional periods which shall not exceed 10 days each, provided that the total periods of consecutive detention with respect to the same event shall not exceed 40 days. A Military Court of Appeals judge may, at the request of the Military Advocate General, extend the detention beyond the first 40 days, for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

49.Additionally, Order no. 1726 prescribed periods of judicial detention for interrogation purposes for adults that are similar to those applicable in Israel, such that a Military Court judge may order the arrest of an adult suspect for interrogation purposes for a period of 20 days and extend the period for additional periods which shall not exceed 15 days each, provided that the total periods of consecutive detention with respect to the same event shall not exceed 75 days. A Military Court of Appeals judge may, at the request of the Military Advocate General, extend the detention beyond the first 75 days, for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

50.According to the Respondents, it is evident that following the coming into force of Order no. 1726, the maximum judicial detention periods of adults for interrogation purposes in the Region are now identical to the periods of detention for interrogation purposes of adults in Israel, mutatis mutandis, except for two matters: one, the maximum period of the first judicial detention order (20 days in the Region compared to 15 in Israel), and two, the requirement to receive the approval of the Attorney General for the request to extend the detention for interrogation purposes beyond 30 days in Israel, compared to the approval of the Military Advocate General, which is only required beyond 75 days in the Region. Considering the previous update notices and this present one, the Respondents are of the opinion that the Petitions have exhausted themselves and should be dismissed.

 

51.On December 30, 2013, the Petitioners in HCJ 4057/10 filed a response to the update notice. According to them, the notice reflects the flawed approach which is guiding the Respondents, who on the one hand prescribed discriminating and exaggerated periods of detention for Palestinians and on the other hand, ostensibly adopted the principle of equality. The Petitioners welcome the Respondents' decision to distinguish between minors and adults with respect to the periods of judicial detention for interrogation purposes and to somewhat shorten the periods applicable to Palestinian minors, however object to the arbitrary determination of longer periods of detention for Palestinian minors as opposed to the periods of detention prescribed for Israeli minors living in the Region and compare them. The Petitioners add that the differences between to the periods of judicial detention for adults are not solely "technical", since while as a rule an Israeli adult suspect in the Region cannot be detained for more than 30 days with respect to the same event, a Palestinian adult suspect can be detained for 75 days and his detention can even be extended without adopting the basic rule pursuant to which upon the lapse of 75 days, "he shall be released from detention, with or without bail". According to the Petitioners, the Respondents have not yet, to this day, provided any legal reasons for the discriminating periods of detention which are imposed upon the Palestinians.

 

Discussion and Ruling

 

52.A person's right to liberty is a constitutional right that is grounded in Section 5 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, where it is prescribed that: "There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, detention, or any other way." The importance and centrality of the right to liberty in a democratic regime also stems from the implications of denying the liberty for the injured person and for the damage that could be caused thereto as a result thereof. The denial of liberty is not expressed only in a person merely being subject to the custody of the State, but also is felt each and every day, during the period when a person is subject to the rules of conduct and discipline that are customary in the place of custody and which also limit his liberty (see HCJ 2605/05 The Law and Business Academic Center v. The Minister of Finance, paragraph 25 of President D. Beinisch's decision (November 19, 2009)). The right to due process prior to a person's liberty being denied derives from the right to liberty, and it is even warranted that he will be given the opportunity to respond and voice his arguments prior to this fundamental right being denied (LCrimA 837/12 The State of Israel v. Gusakov, paragraph 29 (November 20, 2012)). On the other hand, it is in the public interest to expose criminals and prevent crime, and certainly to try and thwart security offenses. Therefore, it is necessary to strike a balance in the constant tension that exists in the Israeli reality, between security and protecting the rights of someone suspected of committing an offense. This tension emerges also in the matter before us – the periods of detention of Palestinians who are residents of the Region.

 

53.As mentioned, the purpose of the laws of detention, including in the Region, is to strike a balance between the public interest of exposing and preventing crime and protecting the rights of the suspect. One must remember that the Region has unique characteristics which derive from the security reality and the essence of the military rule applicable there, from the security needs and from the difficulties of enforcing the law, in light of the absence of Israeli control in part of the area. There is no dispute that constant judicial review of the process of arrest for interrogation purposes is important for the protection of human rights, however the continuity of the interrogation is important for the purpose of realizing the objective of the interrogation: exposing the truth. Exposing the truth quickly and efficiently is especially important when the security of the State and its citizens are at stake.

 

54.The dilemma, therefore, is clear: on the one hand, the conduct of a proper legal procedure is an essential element to secure the proportionality and constitutionality of an arrest for interrogation purposes, and in principle, the appearance of the suspect before a judge should not be regarded as an obstacle, but rather as a fundamental condition for an effective and constitutional arrest for interrogation purposes (CHR 8823/07 Anonymous v. The State of Israel, paragraph 32 (February 11, 2010)). This follows from the customary fundamental approach that judicial involvement is an integral part of the arrest process. It is not "external" judicial review of the arrest, but rather an integral part of the formulation of the arrest itself. This is a constitutional approach that views the judicial involvement in the arrest procedure an essential part of the protection of individual liberties:

 

"The judicial involvement is the barricade against arbitrariness: it is warranted from the principle of the rule of law (see Brogan v. United Kingdom (1988) 11 EHRR 117, 134). It guarantees that the delicate balance between individual liberties and the security of the general public – a balance that lies at the basis of the laws of arrest – shall be preserved (see ADA10/94 Anonymous v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 53(1) 97, 105)." (HCJ 3239/02 Marav v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria, IsrSC 54(2) 349, 368 (2003))."

 

The meaning of this is that it is necessary to adjust the interrogation methods to the need to interrupt them at a certain stage of the interrogation in order to allow an effective and fair judicial procedure to take place. An interrogation that takes place over a period of time, when the person being interrogated is in detention and cannot appear before the court and voice what he has to say, could result in disproportionate infringement of human dignity and liberty.

 

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that the security legislation which is the subject of our discussion was created in light of a complex security situation in a territory that is occupied under belligerent occupation (occupatio bellica), that the special security conditions applicable there dictate the determination of arrangements that are different than those that are customary in the occupying state. This reality has, inter alia, resulted in the detention of Palestinian suspects prior to being brought before a judge, for periods of time that are longer than those of Israeli suspects. In this context, it is important to remember, for example, as the Respondents have clarified, that due to the security situation, the ability to move in the Region is limited and that part of the area is under Palestinian control. The security conditions could, therefore, prevent, or delay, the interrogation parties from reaching the arena, and could make the collection of testimony and evidence more difficult. Additionally, according to the Respondents, potential witnesses do not cooperate with the interrogation parties, either due to their sympathy towards the suspects or due to their hostility towards the State of Israel. According to the Respondents this also creates genuine difficulty in interrogations and greatly delays the ability to formulate initial evidence against the suspect. Furthermore, intelligence material that was received has to be used carefully and often it is necessary to wait before using it so as not to give away the source of the information or god forbid risk his life. Additionally, there is an enhanced concern in the Region of fleeing into areas that are under the Palestinian Authority's control, such that it will not be possible re-arrest such person who was released from detention. In such conditions, the interrogation of the detainees is complicated and complex and at times a longer period of time is necessary to exhaust the interrogation before bringing the detainee before a judge.

 

55.As mentioned, the Petitioners claim that the balance between the need to maintain the security of the general public and the State and the need to protect human rights, dignity and liberty, which is reflected in the Security Provisions Order is not the proper balance even after the amendment thereof, while the Respondents request to examine the implementation of that which is stated in the Amending Order before being able to reach any conclusions on the matter. This is the state of affairs in the case at hand. In any case, it appears that the parties to the Petition share the opinion that judicial review is an essential tool for protecting the legality and propriety of the arrest and share the aspiration to shorten the periods of detention of the Palestinian residents of the Region as much as possible and to apply statutory arrangements thereon which are as similar as possible to those that are customary in Israel, in terms of the degree of protection they provide to the suspect's or defendant's rights. This was also the spirit of what was expressed in this Court, when the matter was presented before it in the past. The Supreme Court expressed its opinion and ruled that:

 

"It is time to apply statutory arrangements in the Military Courts which are similar to those prescribed in the Arrests Law in Israel, in order to protect the rights of defendants; all subject to the unique characteristics of the Region. This is the case with respect to dictating periods of a detention from the time of filing an indictment and until the commencement of the trial (Section 60 of the Arrests Law which does not have a corresponding statutory arrangement in the Region); with respect to limiting the period of the detention between the end of interrogation and the filing of an indictment (Section 17(d) of the Arrests Law, a matter which also does not have a corresponding statutory arrangement in the Region); and with respect to shortening the periods of detention prescribed in the security legislation that applies in the Region, as they are significantly longer than those prescribed in the Arrests Law in Israel" (HCJ 10720/06 Farid v. The Military Court of Appeals (February 11, 2007).

 

56.Indeed, a consequence of this aspiration is the changes that were made to the arrangements of arrests of Palestinian detainees who are residents of the Region. During the course of the Petition, the Respondents took far reaching measures with respect to shortening the said periods of detention, so as to make them more similar to the periods of detention customary in Israel. For the sake of good order and in order to clarify the matter, I shall present the changes that were made to the Security Provisions Order since the Petitions were filed, in the following table:

 

 

 

 

Previous Law

New Law (the Amending Order)

Initial detention until being brought before a judge for offenses that are not security offenses

Eight days

Minors:

12-14 year olds: 24 hours

14-18 year olds: 48 hours

Adults:

48 hours + an option to extend up to 96 hours

Initial  detention until being brought before a judge for security offenses

Eight days

Minors:

12-14 year olds: 24 hours

14-16 year olds: 48 hours

16-18 year olds: 96 hours

Adults:

96 hours + an option to extend up to 8 days

Judicial  detention for interrogation purposes prior to filing an indictment

30 days

  • Can be extended for additional periods which shall not exceed 30 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 90 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 90 days for three additional months.

Minors: 15 days

  • Can be extended for additional periods of up to 10 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 40 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 40 days for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

 

Adults: 20 days

  • Can be extended for periods of up to 15 days each time, provided that the total consecutive periods with respect to the same event shall not exceed 75 days.
  • Can be extended beyond the 75 days for additional periods which shall not exceed 90 days each.

"Bridge Detention" for the purpose of filing an indictment

Unlimited

Eight days

Detention after filing indictment and before the commencement of the trial

Unlimited

60 days

Detention until the end of proceedings in offenses that are not security offenses

Two years

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Minors: A year

  • Extensions of up to three months each.

Adults: A year

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Detention until the end of proceedings in security offenses

Two years

  • Extensions of up to six months each.

Minors: A year

  • Extensions of up to three months each.

Adults: 18 months

  • Extensions of up to six months each.
 

 

 

 

57.The difference between the new law (the Amending Order) and the law existing in Israel can be seen in the table below:

 

 

Initial detention until being brought before a judge

Detention before indictment

Detention until end of proceedings

"Bridge  Detention " for purpose of filing an indictment

In the Region – Offenses that are not security offenses

48-96 hours

20-75 days

A year + extensions of up to six months each.

Eight days

In Israel - Offenses that are not security offenses

24-48 hours

15-30 days

Nine months + extensions of up to three months each.

Five days

In the Region – Security offenses

96 hours – 8 days

20-75 days

18 months + extensions of up to six months each.

Eight days

In Israel – Security offenses

24-96 hours

20-35 days

Nine months + extensions of up to three months each.

Five days

Minors in the Region

12-14 years old

24-48 hours

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in the Region

14-16 years old

48-96 hours

Offenses that are not security offenses:

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in the Region

16-18

Like adults: 48-96-8 days

Offenses that are not security offenses:

15-40 days

Security offenses:

20-75 days

A year

Eight days

Minors in Israel

12-14

12-24 hours

20-40 days

Will not be arrested until the end of proceedings

Five days

Minors in Israel – 14-18

24-48 hours

20-40 days

Six months + extensions of up to 45 days each.

Five days

 

 

58.The tables I have presented above illustrate the significant changes the Respondents made in the matter at hand. For example, the current maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge for offenses that are not security offenses is 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with an option of extension as per the decision of an administrative authority for additional periods which shall not exceed 48 additional hours due to urgent acts of interrogations. In security offenses the maximum period of detention until being brought before a judge is 96 hours from the time of arrest, with an option of extending the detention by 48 additional hours by an administrative party in unusual circumstances, in which the head of the Interrogation Department at the Israel Security Agency was convinced that the interrogation could be substantially prejudiced. In most special circumstances, it is possible to extend the detention by an additional 48 hours (beyond the said six days), when the head of the Interrogation Division at the Israel Security Agency is convinced that interrupting the interrogation could result in harming the performance of an essential interrogation that is meant to save human lives. The Respondents repeatedly emphasized in their arguments that the new arrangement requires preparations and is scheduled to be reexamined again upon the lapse of two years from the time the Order becomes effective, based on the experience that shall accumulate during such period.

 

59.A significant change also occurred with respect to the matter of minors. We shall remind that before the Petitions were filed, there was no distinction at all between minors and adults in all of the periods of detention in the Region. Today, the age of minority in the Region increased from 16 to 18, and special arrangements were prescribed for minors based on a division into a number of age groups. Order no. 1711 provides that the maximum period of detention until bringing a "youth", i.e. a person who is at least 12 years old by not yet 14 year old, before a judge, both for security offenses and for offenses that are not security offenses, shall be 24 hours from the arrest, with a possibility of extending by an additional 24 hours due to urgent acts of interrogation; and that the maximum period of detention until bringing a "young adult", i.e. a person who is at least 14 years old but not yet 16 years old, before a judge, both for security offenses and offenses which are not security offenses, shall be 48 hours from the time of the arrest, with a possibility of extending by an additional 48 hours due to urgent acts of interrogation.

 

60.As for the definition of security offenses, the distinction between security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses for the purpose of the periods of detention in the Region was made by the Respondents only after the Petitions before us were filed. Therefore, the Petitioners' objections regarding this matter were not raised in their Petitions, but rather only in the framework of responses to the Respondents' update notices. The dispute regarding which offenses shall be defined as security offenses, is directly and closely linked to the reliefs that were requested in the Petitions, and in fact is a consequence of these reliefs. Indeed, we found it appropriate that the Respondents consider our remarks in the hearing that was held in the Petitions, inter alia, regarding the question whether it is proper to relate to the security offenses as one assemblage rather than excluding some of them from the Order's definitions. Consequently, the Respondents removed a third of the security offenses listed in the list in the Addendum of the Security Provisions Order and this is to be welcomed. If and to the extent the Petitioners still have objections regarding the offenses listed in the Addendum, they are entitled to voice their objections separately and it is inappropriate to further discuss this matter in the framework of the Petitions before us, which already encompass many matters.

 

61.Now, therefore, the staff work that was performed jointly with the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister Office produced a welcome change in the periods of detention listed in the Security Provisions Order. The change is meant to reduce, as must as possible, the infringement of the rights of the Palestinian detainees. There is no doubt that the State came a long way and significantly and even dramatically shortened the periods of detention applicable to the Palestinian residents of the Region. It is worthy to note the many discussions and long meetings that the State held with the IDF and the Ministry of Justice, together with other government ministries, until reaching the results which are expressed in the Amending Order (and in this respect, the Petitioners' achievements are invaluable. Their efforts to shorten the periods of detention of the Palestinian residents of the Region, bore significant fruit and are commendable).

 

62.So, considering the differences that stem from the different conditions between Israel and the Region, and in light of the dramatic changes that were just recently made, the "on site" implementation of which must be examined over a period of time – we are of the opinion that the current detention periods which were prescribed for adults, who are suspected of committing security offenses, in the time period before the filing of an indictment – are reasonable and proportionate, and therefore there is no cause for our involvement in this context at the current time. We shall mention that the Respondents requested to examine how the system adjusts to the changes that were made in the Security Provisions Order over a reasonable period of approximately two years, and it is presumed that upon the lapse of the period and in accordance with the on-site reality, the option of further shortening the mentioned periods of detention shall be reconsidered. We therefore assume that the Respondents' policy shall be re-examined from time to time in accordance with the security situation assessments and that if and to the extent it shall be possible to formulate reliefs these shall be applied in the future by the Respondents accordingly, and the periods of detention prescribed in the Amending Order shall be further shortened. Obviously, the Petitioners have the option of voicing their objections regarding the mentioned periods of detention, also upon the lapse of the "adjustment period".

 

63.Having said that, and without making light of the efforts the Respondents exerted and the important changes they made following the filing of the Petitions, we are not comfortable with three central matters (which partly overlap): Firstly, the periods of time in which Palestinian minors who are residents of the Region can be detained. Indeed significant changes were also made with respect to the population of minors, as specified above, however, in light of the special caution and sensitivity that must be applied towards people who are not yet adults, we are of the opinion that it is necessary to continue to monitor what is being done in their matter. The second matter that is not yet exhausted in the current Petitions is the periods of detention that was prescribed for Palestinians who are suspected or accused of offenses that are not defined as security offenses. The reasons presented in the Respondents' response, in its various stages, did not convince us of the need for such long periods of detention for "ordinary" criminal offenses. This is true also with respect to the third matter of detention until the end of proceedings of both minors and adults, in security offenses and offenses that are not security offenses (including detention after filing an indictment and prior to the commencement of the trial, which is currently 60 days). The circumstances and constraints which the Respondents indicated, by virtue of which more extended periods of detention are required in the Region, relate primarily to the stage of interrogation and collection of evidence and not to the stage of conducting the trial, after the indictment has been filed. In light of these difficulties, we considered issuing an order nisi with respect to the three mentioned matters, however at this stage we decided to leave the Petitions pending and to instruct the Respondents to reconsider how to advance these matters and give notice to such effect in the form of an update notice which is to be filed by September 15, 2014.

 

In summary, in all that relates to the maximum periods of detention for adults suspected of committing security offenses, at the stage before an indictment is filed; and in the scope of the offenses defined as security offenses – the Petitions are denied without an order for expenses (subject to that stated in paragraphs 60 and 62). However, in all that relates to the periods of detention of minors, the periods of detention of adults in offenses that are not security offenses; and the period of detention until the end of proceedings (of minors and adults, in all classifications of offenses) – the Respondents shall, as mentioned, file an update notice by September 15, 2014.

 

Given today, 6th of Nissan, 5774 (April 6, 2014).

 

 

Justice                                     Justice                                                 Justice

A v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CA 8823/07
Date Decided: 
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The appellant was arrested on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization, and had been the subject of: a. a decision by the authority in charge to postpone the appellant’s first meeting with an attorney by three days; and b. a decision, rendered two days after his arrest, to extend his detention by an additional ten days. The Jerusalem District Court rejected the state’s request to have the appeal of the detention extension decision deliberated in the absence of the appellant; and the state successfully appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal against the extension of the detention was thus deliberated in a hearing conducted in the appellant’s absence, in which the appeal was denied. The respondent next requested that the hearing regarding a second extension of the detention be conducted in the appellant’s absence, and in response the appellant argued in the Magistrates Court against the constitutionality of the statutory provision allowing for such a hearing.  The Magistrates Court rejected this argument, and the District Court upheld its decision. An appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

 

As an arrestee suspected of having committed a security offense, the appellant was subject to the possibility of having detention hearings and appeals thereof held in his absence, pursuant to s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006. The constitutionality of this section was attacked indirectly in the appeal originally heard by the Supreme Court, but not considered by the Court because it had not been raised in the earlier stages of litigation. The issue had become moot by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.

 

Held: (Vice President Rivlin) First, the Court could consider the constitutional issue despite its mootness, in light of the importance of the issue and the likelihood of its recurrence in other situations in which it would also become moot by the time its constitutionality could be determined by the Supreme Court. Next, regarding the substance of the appeal, the right to be present at a criminal proceeding (including at the detention hearing stage) is a core part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, as currently established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The right applies at all stages of a proceeding, including detention hearings. Because it is a constitutionally protected right, the denial of the right is permissible only if it meets the four conditions established in the limitations clause of that Basic Law. Here, compliance with the first two conditions (a legislative basis, and conformity with the values of the State of Israel) was not in question. The purpose of the section (the enabling of a continuous and effective interrogation of the suspect, without there being a need for an interruption for the purpose of bringing the suspect to court) is an appropriate one, and the third condition is thus met. The constitutional status of section 5 therefore depends on its compliance with the proportionality condition of the limitations clause, which it fails.

 

Compliance with the proportionality condition has been determined through the use of three sub-tests: a. whether there is a rational relationship between the measure that violates a right and the appropriate purpose it is intended to help achieve (a test which was met here); b. whether the measure involves the least possible violation of the right, in light of the purpose it is intended to achieve; and c. the “narrow sense” proportionality test which requires that the measure be one that creates a violation which is proportionate in terms of the appropriate purpose that is being achieved.

 

The measure here fails the last two sub-tests because of the depth of the violation involved — it is thus neither a measure that causes the least possible violation, nor is it one that represents a proportionate balancing between a violation of a right and the need to achieve a legitimate purpose. The depth of the violation involved is especially marked, given that the measures described in s. 5 of the Temporary Provision can be combined with a measure established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, which establishes the possibility of delaying a meeting between a suspect and his attorney. The suspect can thus be prevented both from appearing in court at a hearing regarding his case, and from meeting with an attorney in order to assist in presenting his case — leading to his utter inability to enjoy due process during the proceedings held in his absence. The section is therefore an impermissible violation of a constitutionally protected right, and the Arrests Law is to be interpreted as if s. 5 had not been enacted.

 

Justice Naor, concurring in part, wrote that while s. 5 was invalid on constitutional grounds, the Knesset should be given a six month period in which to enact a more proportionate arrangement. Justice Naor considered the option of allowing the provision to stand in cases of a near certainty of frustration of the prevention of harm to human life, but ultimately decided that a full invalidation was necessary because there would always be the potential for disproportionate periods of detention. In Justice Naor’s opinion, the decision that a statutory provision is unconstitutional as a result of its “cumulative effect” when combined with another statutory provision is a complex issue that should be left for further discussion. President Beinisch and Justice Rubinstein took a different view regarding the need for deferment and the utility of a new legislative arrangement, both finding that any alternative proportionate legislation would cover such a small number of cases that it would be pointless. Justice Grunis wrote that alternative legislation could be enacted, but that there was no need to defer the declaration of the section’s invalidity for any period of time; to the contrary, an immediate invalidation would provide an incentive for the legislature to act promptly.

 

Appeal allowed.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

CrimApp 8823/07

 

A

 

v.

 

State of Israel

 

The Supreme Court

[4 January 2009]

[24 March 2009]

 

Before President D. Beinisch, Vice President E. Rivlin, and Justices A. Procaccia, E. Levy, E. Grunis, M. Naor, E. Arbel, E. Rubinstein, S. Joubran

 

Appeal of a decision of the Jerusalem District Court dated 18 October 2007 in MApp 10116/07, issued by the Honorable Judge H. Ben Ami

 

Facts: The appellant was arrested on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization, and had been the subject of: a. a decision by the authority in charge to postpone the appellant’s first meeting with an attorney by three days; and b. a decision, rendered two days after his arrest, to extend his detention by an additional ten days. The Jerusalem District Court rejected the state’s request to have the appeal of the detention extension decision deliberated in the absence of the appellant; and the state successfully appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The appeal against the extension of the detention was thus deliberated in a hearing conducted in the appellant’s absence, in which the appeal was denied. The respondent next requested that the hearing regarding a second extension of the detention be conducted in the appellant’s absence, and in response the appellant argued in the Magistrates Court against the constitutionality of the statutory provision allowing for such a hearing.  The Magistrates Court rejected this argument, and the District Court upheld its decision. An appeal to the Supreme Court followed.

As an arrestee suspected of having committed a security offense, the appellant was subject to the possibility of having detention hearings and appeals thereof held in his absence, pursuant to s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006. The constitutionality of this section was attacked indirectly in the appeal originally heard by the Supreme Court, but not considered by the Court because it had not been raised in the earlier stages of litigation. The issue had become moot by the time the case reached the Supreme Court.

Held: (Vice President Rivlin) First, the Court could consider the constitutional issue despite its mootness, in light of the importance of the issue and the likelihood of its recurrence in other situations in which it would also become moot by the time its constitutionality could be determined by the Supreme Court. Next, regarding the substance of the appeal, the right to be present at a criminal proceeding (including at the detention hearing stage) is a core part of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, as currently established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The right applies at all stages of a proceeding, including detention hearings. Because it is a constitutionally protected right, the denial of the right is permissible only if it meets the four conditions established in the limitations clause of that Basic Law. Here, compliance with the first two conditions (a legislative basis, and conformity with the values of the State of Israel) was not in question. The purpose of the section (the enabling of a continuous and effective interrogation of the suspect, without there being a need for an interruption for the purpose of bringing the suspect to court) is an appropriate one, and the third condition is thus met. The constitutional status of section 5 therefore depends on its compliance with the proportionality condition of the limitations clause, which it fails.

Compliance with the proportionality condition has been determined through the use of three sub-tests: a. whether there is a rational relationship between the measure that violates a right and the appropriate purpose it is intended to help achieve (a test which was met here); b. whether the measure involves the least possible violation of the right, in light of the purpose it is intended to achieve; and c. the “narrow sense” proportionality test which requires that the measure be one that creates a violation which is proportionate in terms of the appropriate purpose that is being achieved.

The measure here fails the last two sub-tests because of the depth of the violation involved — it is thus neither a measure that causes the least possible violation, nor is it one that represents a proportionate balancing between a violation of a right and the need to achieve a legitimate purpose. The depth of the violation involved is especially marked, given that the measures described in s. 5 of the Temporary Provision can be combined with a measure established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, which establishes the possibility of delaying a meeting between a suspect and his attorney. The suspect can thus be prevented both from appearing in court at a hearing regarding his case, and from meeting with an attorney in order to assist in presenting his case — leading to his utter inability to enjoy due process during the proceedings held in his absence. The section is therefore an impermissible violation of a constitutionally protected right, and the Arrests Law is to be interpreted as if s. 5 had not been enacted.

Justice Naor, concurring in part, wrote that while s. 5 was invalid on constitutional grounds, the Knesset should be given a six month period in which to enact a more proportionate arrangement. Justice Naor considered the option of allowing the provision to stand in cases of a near certainty of frustration of the prevention of harm to human life, but ultimately decided that a full invalidation was necessary because there would always be the potential for disproportionate periods of detention. In Justice Naor’s opinion, the decision that a statutory provision is unconstitutional as a result of its “cumulative effect” when combined with another statutory provision is a complex issue that should be left for further discussion. President Beinisch and Justice Rubinstein took a different view regarding the need for deferment and the utility of a new legislative arrangement, both finding that any alternative proportionate legislation would cover such a small number of cases that it would be pointless. Justice Grunis wrote that alternative legislation could be enacted, but that there was no need to defer the declaration of the section’s invalidity for any period of time; to the contrary, an immediate invalidation would provide an incentive for the legislature to act promptly.

Appeal allowed.

Legislation cited:

 

Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006, s. 5.

Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], 5742-1982.

(Emergency) Defense Regulations — 1945, Reg. 85.

Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 44, 45.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests), 5756-1996, ss. 35, 38.

Criminal Procedure Regulations (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Deferral of a Security Offense Arrestee’s Meeting With Attorney), 5757-1997.

Military Jurisdiction Law, 5715-1955.

Penal Code, 5737-1977, s. 34K.

Rabbinical Tribunals Regulations, 5733, Reg. 57.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

 

[1]        HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241.

[2]        HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141.

[3]        HCJ 1581/91 Salahat v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 837.

[4]        HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 811.

[5]        CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor (2006) (not yet reported).

[6]        CrimA 152/51 Trifus v. Attorney General [1952] IsrSC 6(1) 17.

[7]        CrimA 353/88 Wilner v. State of Israel [1991] IsrSC 45(2) 444.

[8]        HCJ 7457/95 Barki Petra Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 769.

[9]        CrimA 1741/99 A v. State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 43(4) 750.

[10]     FH 3032/99 Baranes v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 354.

[11]     CrimA 1632/95 Meshulam v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 49(5) 534.

[12]     CrimA 951/80 Kanir v. State of Israel [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 505.

[13]     CrimApp 4586/06 Halido v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[14]     CrimApp 1097/06 Bineib v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[15]     HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1.

[16]     HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[17]     HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiya v. Israel Police [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 209.

[18]     CrimApp 1144/06 Ziyad v. State of Israel (2006) (unreported).

[19]     LCrimA 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist (not yet reported).

[20]     HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817.            

[21]     HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349.

[22]     HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel (2006) (not yet reported).

[23]     HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30.

[24]     HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352.

[25]     HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[26]     CrimApp 8473/07 State of Israel v. A (2007) (unreported).

[27]     HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871.

[28]     HCJ 243/62 Israeli Film Studios v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.

[29]     CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 535.

[30]     HCJ 253/88 Sejadia v. Minister of Defense [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 801.

[31]     HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2004] IsrSC 59(4) 241.

[32]     HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 793.

[33]     CrimA 6659/06 A. v. State of Israel (2008) (unreported).

[34]     HCJ 10203/03 “Hamifkad Haleumi” Ltd. v. Attorney General [2008] (unreported).

[35]     HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister (2006) (unreported).

[36]     HCJ 366/03 Society for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. Minister of Finance (2005) (unreported).

[37]     HCJ 10578/08 Legal Institute of Terrorism Studies v. Government of Israel (2006) (unreported) 

[38]     HCJ 801/00 Bassam Natshe and The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Erez Military Court (2000) (unreported).

[39]     HCJ 320/80 Kawasme v. Minister of Defense [1980]. IsrSC 35(3) 113.

[40]     HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. (2006) (unreported).

[41]     HCJ 951/06 Stein v. Police Commissioner (2006) (unreported).

[42]     HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister (2005) (unreported).

[43]     HCJ 7862/04 Abu Daher v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria Area [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 368.

[44]     HCJ 9441/07 Igbar v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria (2007) (unreported).

[45]     HCJ 1546/06 Gazawi v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria (2006) (unreported).

[46]     CrimApp 10879/05 Al-Abid v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[47]     HCJ 7932/08 Al-Harub v. Commander of the Military Forces in Judea and Samaria (2009) (unreported).

[48]     LCrimA 7284/09 Rosenstein v. State of Israel (2009) (unreported).

[49]     CrimApp 4857/05 Fahima v. State of Israel (2005) (unreported).

[50]     MApp 838/84 Livni v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 729.

[51]     CrimApp 9086/01 Raviv v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 163.

[52]     CrimApp 7200/08 Sa’id v. State of Israel (2008) (unreported).

[53]     CrimApp 5114/97 Salimani v. State of Israel [2001] IsrSC 55(2) 721.

 

U.S. Supreme Court cases cited

[54]     Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[55]     United States v. W.T. Grant Co. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).

[56]     Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).

[57]     United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

[58]     U.S Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership 513 U.S. 18 (1994).

[59]     Kentucky v. Stincer 482 U.S. 730 (1987).

[60]     Snyder v. Massachusetts 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

 

For the appellant — R. Zoabi; D. Halevy.

For the respondent — M. Karshen.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Vice President E. Rivlin

1.    The Jerusalem District Court (Judge H. Ben Ami) denied an appeal of two decisions issued by the Jerusalem Magistrates Court: the first was a decision by Judge R. Winograd, to hold a hearing regarding the extension of the appellant’s detention, rendered in the appellant’s absence; the second was a decision issued by Judge D. Pollock to extend the appellant’s detention by an additional eight days. We first note that the issue arising in the appellant’s own particular case — as is the case with deliberations of all cases of a similar nature within this context — became moot long ago due to the passage of time. But this does not bring the discussion to an end, as will be explained below. The appellant argues that the statutory provisions on which the lower courts based their decisions to deliberate the extension of the detention in the arrestee’s absence — s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 (hereinafter, “the Statute” or “the Temporary Provision”) — is unconstitutional in that it violates the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (hereinafter also: “the Basic Law”). It is this constitutional issue that arose indirectly in the appeal that we face today; because of the nature of the matter, as will be explained below, we have seen fit to hear the case, despite its being a purely theoretical issue with respect to the appellant’s case.

Background and the parties’ arguments

2.    The appellant was arrested on 5 October 2007 on suspicion of membership in an illegal organization (pursuant to Regulation 85(a) of the (Emergency) Defense Regulations — 1945). On 6 October 2007, the authority in charge decided to prevent the appellant’s meeting with an attorney for three days (pursuant to authority established in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) Law, 5756-1996 (hereinafter, “the Arrests Law”) and in the Criminal Procedure Regulations (Powers— Arrests) (Delay of a Security Offense Arrestee’s Meeting With Attorney), 5757-1997)). On 7 October 2007 the Jerusalem Magistrates Court decided to extend the appellant’s detention until 17 October 2007. The appellant appealed this decision and the respondent, on its part, requested that the appeal be heard in his absence, pursuant to s. 5(2) of the Statute. That section is quoted here in full, as follows:

5. Hearing held in the absence of an arrestee suspected of committing a security offense

The provisions of ss. 16(2) and 57 of the Arrests Law, with regard to the presence of an arrestee during deliberations as described in those sections, will apply with regard to the presence of a security offense arrestee during his detention, as stated in s. 4(1), with the following changes:

(1) If the court orders, in the presence of the security offense arrestee, an extension of the detention for a period of less than 20 days, the court may, in the arrestee’s absence, extend his detention for a period that does not exceed the balance of the days remaining until the end of 20 days from the date of the hearing that was held in the security offense arrestee’s presence — if an application for such has been filed with the approval of the supervisor, and if the court has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of a commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life;

(2) The court may order that a hearing concerning an application for a rehearing pursuant to s. 52 of the Arrests Law or of an appeal pursuant to s. 53 of the said statute be held in the arrestee’s absence — if an application for such has been filed with the approval of the supervisor, and if the court has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the investigation;

(3) The provisions of s. 15(c) through (h) of the Arrests Law will apply, mutatis mutandi, to a deliberation about whether to permit the presence of the arrestee in the proceedings described in this section;

(4) A security offense arrestee will be made aware of a court decision reached in a deliberation that was held in his absence as soon as is possible, unless the court orders otherwise at the request of the State’s representative, if the court is persuaded that disclosure to the arrestee is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or the ability to prevent harm to human life;

The District Court rejected the request for the hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence, noting that after reviewing the classified report attached to the application, it was not persuaded that the suspension of the interrogation for the purpose of having the arrestee present at the deliberation of the appeal would likely  cause material harm to the investigation. The state appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (per Justice Fogelman) granted the appeal. The Court reasoned that ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute do violate the suspect’s right to be present at his detention hearing. The Court emphasized that the combination of these provisions with the possibility that the suspect may be prevented from meeting with his attorney, “leads to a situation in which, as a practical matter, the respondent’s ability to present his position at the hearing is very limited”. This, the Court noted, constituted a material violation of the arrestee’s right to be present at the deliberation of his case, to defend himself and to present his position. The Court emphasized the severity of this violation in light of the fact that the deliberation dealt with the restriction of a person’s liberty in the form of his arrest —liberty being a basic right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

3. Despite the constitutional context, the Supreme Court did not discuss the argument that the Statute is unconstitutional, because the arguments concerning that issue were first raised only in the context of the appeal, without a proper background having been presented and without the state having been given an opportunity to relate to the issue. The Court therefore discussed only the matter of implementation, and in this connection noted that in light of the violation of the arrestee’s rights, it was necessary to determine that the violation was no greater than absolutely necessary. The Court further noted that the legislature had made a distinction between s. 5(1), dealing with the extension of detention, and s. 5(2), dealing with the deliberation of an application for a rehearing or an appeal. In the first case, the ability to hold the deliberation in the arrestee’s absence is very limited — in fact, this can only be done in a case in which the court “is persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life”; in contrast, the requirement in s. 5(2) is that the suspension of the interrogation is likely to “cause material harm to the investigation”. The Court also found that, in connection with the implementation of the provisions of the Statute,  consideration must be given to the interest in preserving public welfare and security on the one hand, and on the other, to the need to protect the arrestee’s rights. The court must determine, inter alia, the severity of the harm done to the investigation, the likelihood that such harm will occur, the gravity of the suspicions and the potential danger inherent in the matter under investigation. As Justice Fogelman wrote: “The more severe the suspicions attributed to the arrestee, and the greater the potential danger to public welfare and security that is involved in the matter under investigation, the greater the tendency is towards granting the said request. And the reverse is true as well.”  

Moving from the general to the particular: the Supreme Court, in considering the standard to be applied in the petitioner’s case — i.e., the possibility of “material harm to the investigation” — determined that the evidentiary and intelligence foundation that had been laid before it, which included additional information beyond that which had been presented to the District Court, indicated a high probability that the investigation would be substantively and materially impaired if it was suspended in order to allow the detainee to appear at the hearing  of his appeal. The state’s appeal was therefore allowed, and it was held that the hearing of the appellant’s appeal regarding the extension of his detention could be held in his absence.

4.    On 11 October 2007, the District Court heard the appellant’s appeal regarding the extension of his detention, but without the appellant being present. The appeal was denied. In the meantime, it was also decided that the period during which he could not meet with his attorney would be extended for an additional six days (beginning on 16 October 2007).

In anticipation of the hearing regarding the extension of the appellant’s detention on 17 October 2007, the respondent filed a request to have that hearing held in the appellant’s absence, pursuant to s. 5(1) of the Statute. The appellant, on his part, raised the argument that the statutory provisions on which the respondent relied were unconstitutional and that they should therefore be declared invalid. The Magistrates Court, in its decision dated 17 October 2007, rejected the constitutional argument and held that the Statute satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause of the Basic Law (s. 8 of that Law). The Statute, it was noted, was designed to prevent harm to human life in circumstances in which the suspect is a “ticking bomb” or in which his interrogation could prevent the “explosion of a ticking bomb”. This purpose, it was held, is a proper one. The Magistrates Court added that the violation of the arrestee’s rights caused by s. 5 of the Statute is proportionate — in light of the fact that the first order for the suspect’s detention had been issued in his presence, that the right had only been denied later on (at the point when the court was deciding whether to extend the remand and during the rehearing and appeal), and in light of the high level of proof that the respondent was required to meet in order to establish a ground for applying s. 5(1). Regarding the appellant, the Magistrates Court held that the material that had been presented in his case met the narrow test established in s. 5(1) of the Statute, and that the hearing regarding the request for an extension of the remand could be held in the appellant’s absence. The same day, the Magistrates Court issued another decision, to the effect that the appellant could be detained for an additional eight days (through 24 October 2007).

5.    An appeal was filed with the District Court against all these decisions, and it was denied on 18 October 2007. The District Court also recognized that s. 5 of the Statute violates an arrestee’s basic right — the same as that of an indicted defendant — to be present at his own trial. This violation, the District Court held, has a justifiable purpose, and it is also proportionate: “because, unfortunately, the State of Israel has officially declared a state of emergency and the right to life of the residents of the country hangs in the balance, and it is also beyond doubt that the reasonableness and proportionality requirements have been satisfied.” The District Court also did not see fit to intervene in the specific holdings in the appellant’s case.

An appeal against this decision — the appeal now pending before us— was filed on 21 October 2007. Several general questions were raised in the appeal relating to the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Statute, as were various specific questions regarding the implementation of the section in the appellant’s particular case. Naturally, our case focuses on the constitutional claims. The appellant believes that ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute violate an arrestee’s right to be present at his trial, as well as his rights to due process, dignity and  liberty. This violation, it is argued, is inconsistent with the provisions of the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, particularly when combined with other violations of the rights of a security offender, in particular, of the right to meet with an attorney. The appellant also believes that s. 5 of the Statute conflicts with the State of Israel’s obligations pursuant to international humanitarian law.

When this case was brought to this Court, it was determined that a panel of three judges would deliberate it on the following day. The Court (Justices Arbel, Joubran and Fogelman) noted, in a decision dated 22 October 2007, that the grounds on the basis of which the arrestee was prevented from attending his hearing were no longer valid, and that given this fact, the deliberation of the issue of the appellant’s detention would be returned to the Magistrates Court to be reheard in the presence of the appellant. Nevertheless, the Court held that this Court would deliberate the constitutional matter separately, after the parties had submitted their written positions.    

6.    The respondent, in its written arguments, did not dispute the importance of the right of an arrestee to be present during deliberations regarding his detention. However, the respondent argued that even if the right is a constitutional one — and it raises certain questions regarding that point — its violation within the framework of s. 5 of the Statute is permissible pursuant to the provisions of the limitations clause. The respondent argued that the Statute was enacted in response to the needs of the time, as a means of coping with the security situation prevailing in Israel following, inter alia, the implementation of the disengagement plan and the establishment of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip. The respondent also argues that s. 5 of the Statute does not conflict with the State of Israel’s obligations pursuant to international humanitarian law and that even if  such a conflict existed, it would not be sufficient to justify a nullification of the Statute.

7.    The case was scheduled to be heard before a panel of three justices in the middle of 2008. Even before the date set for the hearing, a number of human rights organizations submitted a petition to this Court seeking to invalidate the Statute in its entirety on constitutional grounds (HCJ 2028/08 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Justice). A decision was made to consolidate the two cases and on 27 July 2008, the Court ruled that the deliberation would proceed before an expanded panel. On 4 January 2009, a deliberation was held before the expanded panel, and oral arguments continued on 24 March 2009. In the course of the deliberation held on that date, a majority of the panel decided to review, ex parte, the classified material that the respondent wished to present. After the review, the parties returned to the courtroom and the Court informed them of the main points of the material that had been presented ex parte. Only then did the petitioners in HCJ 2028/08 state that they were withdrawing their petition in light of the decision to review the material ex parte. The petition was therefore withdrawn and only the appeal before us remained in place. As stated, this appeal raises, indirectly, the question of the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Statute.

Theoretical appeal

8.    The appeal before us was filed by a person — the appellant — who believed that he had been harmed by the implementation of s. 5 of the Statute; the appeal attacked the section’s constitutionality indirectly. The appellant raised various arguments regarding the constitutionality of the section in the earlier stages of litigation as well. The earlier panels responded to these arguments by rejecting the contention that s. 5 is unconstitutional (regarding indirect attacks on statutes in trial courts, see A. Barak “Judicial Review of a Law’s Constitutionality: Centralized or De-Centralized,” 8 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 13 (2005)). When the question reached this Court in the context of the appeal of the first round of litigation, it was still relevant to the appellant’s case. However, as indicated in this Court’s ruling dated 22 October 2007, the grounds for the non-appearance of the appellant in court had lost their force before this Court had the opportunity to decide the constitutional issue. The significance of this is that the constitutional issue became moot with respect to the appellant’s specific case. The Supreme Court therefore returned the appellant’s case to the Magistrates Court to be deliberated there in the appellant’s presence. Nevertheless, the Court decided to retain its focus on the constitutional issue.

9.    It often happens that a discussion of a theoretical issue emerges  in the framework of the process of an appeal to the High Court of Justice. The rule is that the Court does not customarily discuss a theoretical issue and it will  prefer to wait until an appropriate specific case arises before it prescribes a particular rule. However, in certain cases, the Court is nevertheless  required to deal with a petition that is only theoretical in nature. Justice Y. Zamir stressed this point in HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1]:  

‘There have been instances in which the Court was prepared to discuss a theoretical question, of a general nature, even though it was not connected to a specific case. These were mostly cases in which the petition raised an important question and as a practical matter, the Court could not issue a ruling on it, except when it was presented as a general question that was not connected to a specific case. See, for example, HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Chairman of the Knesset [2], at pp. 145-146; HCJ 1581/91 Salahat v. Government of Israel [3], at p. 841; HCJFH 4110/92 Hess v. Minister of Defense [4].’

In that case, the Court discussed the constitutionality of a provision of Military Jurisdiction Law, 5715-1955, which prescribes the period of time during which a soldier may be detained by a military policeman before being brought before a military judge. The Court held that despite the theoretical aspect of the petitions, they should be deliberated in light of the importance of the question related to the basic principles of the rule of law, the frequency with which the question arises, and the “short life-span” of the issue as a practical question; “it arises when a soldier is arrested by a military policeman; it continues to be relevant for only a few days, until the soldier is released or brought before the military court for an extension of his arrest; and then it expires”. The same point is true, in principle and with the necessary changes, with respect to the instant case.

In this case, there has been no petition to the High Court of Justice that attacks the Statute’s constitutionality directly. As stated, the petition submitted by the human rights organizations has been withdrawn. What remains before us, therefore, is an individual appeal that raises the constitutional issue only indirectly. However, it seems to me that for the purpose of the question that we are to decide here, we need make no distinction between the two situations, and in appropriate cases it is proper to discuss a fundamental-constitutional question that has been raised indirectly in a specific case even if it has been rendered moot with respect to the specific appellant. Indeed, if the constitutional question had lost its relevancy with respect to the appellant during the earlier proceedings, the lower courts might not have considered it, and the appropriate way for the appellant — if he had wished to present a fundamental question regarding the Statute’s constitutionality — would have been to petition this Court. I note in this context that in certain respects, the indirect attack is the most appropriate manner in which to test the constitutionality of a statute’s provisions, and an appeal of the type presented here, even if it has become theoretical since the time it was originally brought, is an appropriate manner in which to present a constitutional question to the Supreme Court.

10.  It should be noted that the federal courts in the United States follow a rule (known as the mootness doctrine) according to which a claim must be dismissed when a judicial decision will no longer have any effect on the rights of the parties to the proceeding and the only question remaining before the court is one that is purely hypothetical or academic. The courts have recognized a number of exceptions to this rule. The first applies when there is an expectation that the legal question under discussion will arise again in the future, with regard either to the parties to the specific proceeding or with regard to others, although — because of the question’s temporary character — it will always become a purely theoretical question during the time required for the question to be adjudicated. Thus, for example, in Roe v. Wade [54], which dealt with the right to an abortion, the United States Supreme Court held that although its decision would not impact on the specific appellant’s rights — the appellant having given birth already as the proceedings in the case had continued — it would be inappropriate to deny the appeal on the basis of the mootness doctrine because the problem of potential mootness was inherent to the issue of the constitutionality of a prohibition against abortions, in the sense that legal proceedings would never be relevant with respect to the actual parties for more than the nine months of a pregnancy. A second exception to the doctrine arises when a defendant ceases to engage in a wrongful activity due to the initiation of the legal proceeding, but a need remains to deter the party from returning to such wrongful activity in the future. In such a case, the concern arises with respect to the possibility that the defendant has discontinued the questionable actions as a strategic measure only, in order to lead to the dismissal of the claim brought against it, and will afterward return to its earlier path (see, for example — United States v. W.T. Grant Co. [55]). An additional exception applies when a rejection of the complaint on the basis of the mootness doctrine is likely to expose one of the parties to criminal proceedings or to a civil claim (Edgar v. MITE Corp. [56]).

In some cases, it may still be important, even when a claim has become theoretical at the stage of an appeal, to overturn the trial court’s ruling in order to deny precedential value to that ruling and remove any possible implications for future proceedings between the parties. In the American legal system, this remedy is known as vacatur, and its significance is that it nullifies the lower court’s decision completely. One of the key considerations in determining whether this remedy should be used is whether the claim had become moot due to a voluntary waiver of claimed rights by the appellant at the appellate level (such as in the case of a settlement) or whether it had become moot because of changes in circumstances that are external to the parties or because of an independent move made by the respondent at the appellate level. (See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. [57]; U.S Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership [58]. See also the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision (per President Beinisch) in CrimA 5121/98 Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5]).

11.  In the case before us, there is no need to establish a fixed rule regarding any of these matters. Given the development of the situation in our case, it is of no real consequence whether a distinction is drawn between a direct attack and an indirect one, since the case became theoretical after it was brought before the Supreme Court. And indeed, as stated, the Supreme Court held on 22 July 2007 that the constitutional question, which from the beginning had been raised only indirectly in the context of the specific matter, remained an open question in the case. It is clear that the constitutional question remains a valid issue vis-à-vis all potential parties because a decision regarding the matter will constitute a binding precedent..

We must now deal with the constitutional question on a substantive level.

The temporary provision

12.  The government’s draft law establishing special powers relating to the arrest of security offense suspects, was published toward the end of 2005 (Draft Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Non-Resident Arrestee Suspected of Security Offense — Temporary Provision) 5766-2005, Draft Laws 206). This Draft Law granted powers regarding arrestees who are not residents of Israel and who are suspected of having committed security offenses (according to a list of such offenses set out in s. 1 of the Draft Law). The explanatory material stated that the interrogation of a security offense arrestee, which is conducted for the purpose of bringing the arrestee to trial and thwarting terrorist activity, has special features that justify the grant of special powers to the enforcement authorities.

Among these special features, the explanatory material lists the following — first, regarding an arrestee who prior to his arrest was not a resident of the State of Israel, the investigating authority will have only a limited ability to collect evidence and establish a factual background, as compared to the ability to do so with respect to those who are residents of the State. Second, when the offense involved is a security offense, potential witnesses — when there are any — often do not cooperate for ideological or nationalistic reasons—; this is because of the sympathy such witnesses have for the suspects, or because they are hostile to the State of Israel. The nationalistic or ideological motive — it is further argued — generally means that those being interrogated are themselves uncooperative, and it is therefore necessary to conduct the interrogation for a more extended and uninterrupted period than is usually the case, so that the interrogators can arrive at the truth. Third, some of the interrogations must be held continuously and without interruption, especially at an initial stage, so that the investigating authorities can thwart terrorist attacks before they are carried out.

The explanatory material indicated that the need to grant broader enforcement powers in connection with the interrogation of a security offense arrestee who is not a resident of Israel is also derived from the fact that since the end of the military administration in the Gaza Strip, the investigative authorities can no longer exercise the powers that they previously could pursuant to security legislation enacted by the commander of the IDF forces in the region.

The Draft Law therefore included provisions that expanded the powers of the enforcement authorities beyond the regular powers established in the Arrests Law. Thus, the Draft Law contained provisions that extended the period of time before an arrestee must be brought before a judge, the duration of a detention that can be ordered ex parte, the period of time allowed before an indictment must be brought, and the period of time during which the arrestee may be prevented from meeting with an attorney. The Draft Law also included — as is relevant to this case — a provision that allowed the court to hold a detention hearing without the arrestee being present. Regarding s. 6 of the Draft Law, which is now s. 5 of the Statute, the explanatory material included the following:

‘The right of a person to be present in the court that hears his case is  a very important right under the Israeli legal system, and certainly when the matter involves his detention. It is nevertheless the case that the removal of a security offense arrestee from the interrogation facility for the purpose of bringing him to court can, in certain cases, do serious damage to the interrogation and at times can even lead to the frustration of its purpose. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to balance the protection of the rights of the arrestee against the need to allow the enforcement authorities to carry out their investigative activities continuously, in a manner which leads to the thwarting of terrorist activity or otherwise prevents a danger to human life and the security of the public.’

The law that was eventually enacted is broader than the proposed Draft Law, in the sense that it applies to any person suspected of committing a security offense — whether or not such person is a resident of the state of Israel. In other ways, the law is narrower in scope than the Draft Law — for example, with regard to the type of security offenses to which it applies. The Statute, as currently worded, includes a number of key components. One component deals with the extension of time during which it is permissible to delay the arraignment of a security offense arrestee before a judge — 96 hours instead of the 24 hours or 48 hours provided in the Arrests Law (s. 3). A second component grants the court the power to extend the detention of a security offense arrestee for a period of no more than 20 days, each time — instead of the 15 day period prescribed in the Arrests Law (s. 4(1)). A third component extends the period of time regarding which an application for an additional arrest will not require approval of the Attorney General — up to 35 days, instead of 30 days as established in the Arrests Law (s. 4(2)). The fourth component relates to the matter that arises in the instant case — the holding of detention hearings in the absence of the arrestee (s. 5). The Statute further provides (in s. 6) that the arrestee must be represented by defense counsel at a hearing pursuant to s. 5. The Statute also includes provisions that require reports concerning the implementation of the Statute (s. 8) from the Minister of Justice to the Knesset’s Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice.

13.  The provisions of the Draft Law, which originally applied only to arrestees who were not residents of the state because of the special difficulties involved in interrogating such arrestees and in collecting information about them, were eventually consolidated into a piece of legislation that applied to all security offense suspects. This legislation established various powers that were mainly intended to enable a more continuous interrogation of such suspects, and to minimize “interruptions” and delays in the interrogation process. The legislation narrows the power of the Attorney General and the court to review an arrest in such cases, and limits the arrestee’s ability to object to the arrest. The main objective of these measures is to improve the enforcement authorities’ ability to carry out effective interrogations regarding security offenses, given the special characteristics of such offenses. The main difficulty in these cases arises in connection with the gathering of information and the need to take action in order to thwart acts of terrorism. The Draft Law and the Statute both reflect the fact that those involved in this work wished to establish a balance between these objectives and the rights of the suspects. In the words of the explanatory material:

‘The provisions of the law reflect a consideration of the required balance between the guiding principles of the Israeli legal system regarding suspects’ rights in criminal proceedings — on the one hand — and, on the other hand, he law enforcement authorities’ special need for broader powers with respect to security offense arrestees, because of the danger they pose and the special characteristics of their interrogation.’

14.  Eighteen months before the Temporary Provision was set to expire, the Knesset decided (on 18 December 2007) to extend it for an additional three years, while introducing certain minor changes to the Knesset reporting mechanism. The explanatory material to the Draft Criminal Procedure (Arrestee Suspected of a Security Offense) (Temporary Provision) (Amendment) Law 5765-2005, SH 340, includes the following:

‘During the period in which the law has been in force, it has been found that the provisions established in it were most essential to the law enforcement authorities involved in the investigation and thwarting of terrorist offenses, and that the use of the powers established therein were often helpful in thwarting terrorist attacks, finding offenders, and bringing them to trial. It should be noted that the security forces have used the special provisions established in the law proportionately and cautiously — using them only in cases in which they were needed in order to achieve the said purposes.

It should also be noted that the need for the Statute became even more essential after the Hamas organization came to power in the Gaza Strip.’

The significance of this is that the Temporary Provision will remain in effect until at least 29 October 2010.

The constitutional right to be present at one’s criminal trial and detention proceedings

15.  The appellant argues, correctly, that the Temporary Provision violates fundamental rights that are protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. It is a basic rule of criminal law that no person may be judged other than in his presence. This rule is anchored in the Criminal Procedure Law [Consolidated Version], 5742-1982, which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this law, no person will be criminally tried in his absence”. This rule expresses the right of any defendant to be present at his criminal trial — a presence which is “essential”, as was noted in CrimA 152/51 Trifus v. Attorney General [6], at p. 23. This Court has reiterated the importance of the defendant’s right to be present at his trial. A court’s obligation to respect that right, it has held, “is one of the most basic obligations in terms of maintaining the appearance of justice and regarding the holding of proper proceedings” (CrimA 353/88 Wilner v. State of Israel [7], per Justice Mazza at p. 450). The right of a defendant to be present at his own trial, it was held, ensures that “a defendant will not be tried ‘behind his back’ and that he will be given the opportunity to face the prosecution’s evidence and to put forth his defense” (HCJ 7457/95 Barki Petra Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8], per Justice Dorner at p. 775).

16.  Is the right of a defendant to be present at his trial — which all agree is an important fundamental right — also a constitutional and supra-constitutional right? It is. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to due process as being a protected constitutional right, at least with regard to some of the components thereof. “The Basic Law,” it has been held, “has fortified the defendant’s right to a fair trial. This is done in s. 5 of the Basic Law, which anchors the right of each person to liberty, through the constitutional recognition of human dignity, of which the defendant’s right to a fair trial is a part” (CrimA 1741/99 A v. State of Israel [9], per Justice Turkel at para. 3). Indeed, the right to the core elements of due process is an essential element of the defense of liberty. The right to liberty is a fundamental constitutional right:

‘Personal liberty is a first tier constitutional right, and it is, as a practical matter, a necessary condition for the exercise of all other basic rights. The violation of personal liberty, like a stone thrown into a body of water, creates a ripple effect, widening the circle of violations of additional basic rights: violations of not only the right to freedom of movement, but also of the right to freedom of expression, and of the rights of individual privacy and of property and of additional rights as well. . . . Only a person who is free can fully and properly exercise his basic rights. And personal liberty, more than any other right, is what makes a person free. For that reason, the denial of personal liberty is an especially severe violation’ (Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], per Justice Zamir at para. 17).   

Moreover, the right to due process is closely tied to the right to dignity, since the denial of due process “may also harm the accused’s self-image and give him a feeling of degradation and helplessness, as if he is a plaything in the hands of others, to the extent that there is a violation of his constitutional right to dignity under ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law” Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 67). Thus, “the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, enacted in 1992, recognized the right to due process in the criminal law context as having the status of a protected constitutional right. This recognition is accomplished primarily through s. 5 of the Basic Law, which establishes the right to liberty, and through ss. 2 and 4 of the Basic Law, which establish the right to human dignity. In s. 11, the Basic Law obligates all the branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial — to honor the rights established in the Basic Law” (RT 3032/99 Baranes v. State of Israel [10], at p. 375).

17.  The above discussion demonstrates that the right to those core elements of due process that relate to the protection of liberty and dignity is a protected constitutional right. The defendant’s right to be present at his trial is a core element of the right to due process, and it is therefore a protected constitutional right pursuant to the Basic Law. Justice Dorner has noted the connection between the right to due process and the right to be present at one’s own criminal trial:

‘As a rule, there is an overlap between the right to be present and the public interest in the holding of a fair trial. Indeed, the defendant’s presence upholds the image of justice and ensures an effective defense against incriminating evidence, and thus enables proper clarification of the facts’ (CrimA 1632/95 Meshulam v. State of Israel [11],  at p. 547).

Indeed, the right to criminal due process is a broad right that includes various derivative rights. Among these rights is the right of a defendant to be present at his trial. President Beinisch noted this, as follows:

‘[T]he right to a fair criminal trial is a multifaceted right, which may serve as a basis for deriving many of the procedural rights of the person under interrogation, the suspect and the accused in criminal proceedings. Without exhausting the issue, we should point out that in foreign legal systems that are similar to our own and even in international conventions, the right to a fair criminal trial includes the right of the accused to know why he was arrested and what are the charges against him, the right to be represented by a lawyer, the right to be present at the trial, the right to an open trial by an unbiased and neutral tribunal and the right to defend himself at the trial and to present relevant evidence. The aforesaid right also includes the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and the prohibition of placing the accused in double jeopardy of a conviction for the same act’ (Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 66, emphasis added).

 

The right of a defendant to be present at his trial is an important condition for “ensur[ing] a fair procedure and proper procedural safeguards for the fairness of the criminal trial vis-à-vis the accused” (ibid. [5], at para. 66). This right is not only the right of the individual — it is also an expression of a general public interest in maintaining a criminal justice system that determines a person’s fate only in accordance with due process, in a proceeding in which a defendant is given a full opportunity to present a defense (see CrimApp 2043/05 State of Israel v. Zeevi [12], per Justice Procaccia at para. 12). Indeed, the exercise of a defendant’s right to be present at legal proceedings helps to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of a proceeding whose purpose is to determine the truth. Although it is frequently the case that a criminal proceeding is carried out through agents and representation by attorneys, and the voice of the individual on trial is not heard in the courtroom (or is at least heard only as a whisper) — this does not minimize the importance of the defendant’s presence at his trial, and particularly the importance of the defendant at his criminal trial. A person has an interest in protecting his own position, and desires to be present at the proceeding in which his fate will be determined. If he is prevented from being present, there may be a diminution of justice, because of the possible impact on the defendant’s ability to defend himself. The legal proceeding does not deal with elements that are absent — it deals with elements that are present. Generally, it is appropriate that a defendant should experience, with his own senses, the criminal proceeding. It is fitting that the judge should see, with his or her own eyes, the individual who is on trial. All these are built-in components of the legal process and important conditions for maintaining the defendant’s faith and that of the public in the criminal process. In light of all these factors, it is not surprising that President Barak has directed that the defendant’s right to be present at his own trial is a “constitutional right” (Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8], at p. 780).

18.  It should be noted that the right of every individual to be present at his own criminal trial is also recognized in other legal systems. In the United States it is understood to be an inseparable part of criminal due process (see J. Boeving, “The Right to be Present Before Military Commissions and Federal Courts: Protecting National Security in an Age of Classified Information,” 30 Harv. J.L. & Publ. Pol’y 463 (2007). There, the right is anchored in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, pursuant to both the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and pursuant to s. 43(A)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a defendant must be present at all stages of his trial. Within this normative framework, the right to be present at trial has been analyzed as both part of the ability to hold an effective cross-examination, and, more broadly, as part of due process. The obligation to maintain this right, it has been held, remains in place, for so long as the defendant’s presence can contribute to a just proceeding. The courts have, however, recognized that it may be permissible to hold a hearing when the defendant is not present, if his presence at the proceeding serves no purpose and will do nothing to assist in his own defense (see Kentucky v. Stincer [59]; Snyder v. Massachusetts [60]).

19.  Does a suspect or arrestee also have a constitutional right to be present at his detention hearings, as part of the right to due process? I believe that he does. As a rule, the right to criminal due process applies to all stages of the criminal proceeding — “both at the interrogation and at the trial stage” (CrimA 951/80 Kanir v. State of Israel [12], per Justice Barak at p. 516; Yissacharov v. Chief Military Prosecutor [5], per President Beinisch at para. 66). These words apply especially with regard to a hearing regarding detention, which is “the most difficult form of violation of personal liberty” (Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], per Justice Zamir at para. 17). The detention hearing itself is a proceeding that involves a serious violation of the rights of the suspect or defendant. Effective judicial review is an inseparable part of a detention hearing that complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the need to maintain due process in the context of a detention hearing is a fundamental constitutional right which is necessitated by the need to protect the right to liberty and dignity. The presence of the suspect or defendant at a detention hearing is part of due process; this right to be present at the detention hearing is anchored in ss. 16(2) and 57 of the Arrests Law and also constitutes — in light of the reasons listed above — a constitutional right which is protected by the Basic Law (see also CrimApp 4586/06 Halido v. State of Israel [13], opinion of Justice Hayut; regarding the care to be taken in implementing s. 57 of the Arrests Law, see CrimApp 1097/06 Bineib v. State of Israel [14], opinion of Justice Rubinstein).

20.  The importance and longevity of the principle regarding the arrestee’s physical presence in court is indicated by the doctrine whose name indicates its logic — habeas corpus (“bring the body”). This common law doctrine allows the court to be petitioned to issue an order by which the authorities are directed to bring before the court a person who has been imprisoned by those authorities, so that he can be released if it discovered that the arrest was illegal. This power, which in Israel is conferred on the High Court of Justice, reflects the fundamental perception that the court that is deciding the matter of a person’s liberty will generally be required to see the person and hear his arguments regarding the legality of his detention.

21.  The respondent does not deny that the arrestee’s right to be present at the proceedings for an extension of his detention is an important fundamental right, as defined, and that this right’s importance is derived from reasons that are similar to those that form the basis of the defendant’s right to be present at his own trial. Nevertheless, the respondent argues, the former right is not the same as the latter one — because there is a built-in violation of important rights at the interrogation stage, due to the need to determine the actual truth. Thus, for example, a person’s liberty may be denied initially on the basis of a lower evidentiary standard; the suspect is also not exposed to the main elements of the evidence that is being brought against him. In light of this, the state argues that it is not possible to have an “ideal exercise of the right to due process” at the interrogation stage. It further argues that because at that stage, main elements of the evidence are not disclosed to the suspect, his absence at the detention hearing will not cause any great violation of his rights; this is especially so with respect to a security offense suspect, regarding whom it is often the case that the evidence will be presented to the court ex parte.

I have difficulty accepting this argument. The respondent seems to suggest that it is easier to add another violation, to a situation in which there is already a violation of other rights. But this is not correct. The balance between human rights and other rights and interests is delicate and sensitive. As the respondent correctly notes, the criteria that are applied at the interrogation stage and at the stage of the initial detention are different in certain respects from those that apply at other stages of the criminal proceedings. At these earlier stages, there are also — alongside the possible restriction of the suspect’s or arrestee’s ability to defend himself — various protective mechanisms (for example, the periods of time during which the suspect may be detained during the interrogation stage are shorter, and there is close judicial supervision of the proceedings). However, each additional violation of the suspect’s/arrestee’s rights, particularly when it is expressed by a limitation of the ability to maintain judicial supervision, can undo the balance and undermine the fairness of the process. To the contrary, it is particularly in a proceeding in which there are increased restrictions on the suspect’s/arrestee’s ability to defend himself and to respond to the charges levelled against him that it is necessary to take an especially protective stance against the addition of further difficulties, and against the suspect’s further exclusion from the process. I will return below to the specific argument relating to the existing legal restrictions that apply to security offense suspects, and their implications for the determination of the constitutionality of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision.

In summation, s. 5 of the Temporary Provision violates the right of a security offense suspect to be present at his own detention hearing.

22.  Indeed, the right to due process, including the arrestee’s right to be present at his detention hearing, is not an absolute right. It should be noted that s. 16(2) of the Arrests Law makes it possible for a detention hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence if the arrestee cannot attend the hearing because of the state of his health (see also s. 57 of the Arrests Law, regarding the deliberation of a petition for a rehearing and appeal). The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility that the arrestee himself, may, in certain cases, waive his right to be present at trial (Humphries (Israel) v. State of Israel [8]). In terms of the constitutional aspect, person’s right to be present at the proceedings involved in his own case may be restricted pursuant to a law that complies with the tests established in the limitations clause — s. 8 of the Basic Law. The limitations clause allows for a violation of the right to due process if all the following four conditions are met: the violation is prescribed by a law or pursuant to a law, by virtue of an authorization that is expressly established in the law; the law that creates the violation conforms with the values of the State of Israel; the objective of the law that creates the violation is an appropriate objective; and the violation is not greater than           is necessary. In our case, the main question relates to the last condition — the proportionality condition — and we will therefore focus on that requirement. However, before we reach that point, we must examine and describe the statute’s objective, in light of the close connection between a legislative objective and the means that are designed to be used for achieving that objective.

The objective of the Temporary Provision

23.  The key objective of the Statute, as stated, is to improve the ability of the enforcement authorities to carry out an effective interrogation in connection with security offenses, taking into consideration the special characteristics of these offenses, including the difficulty involved in gathering information and the need to take action to thwart terrorist attacks. This is also the objective of s. 5, the constitutionality of which we are examining in the instant case. As stated, the Draft Law originally focused on arrestees who had not been residents of the State of Israel prior to their arrests, and the reason given for this focus was that  the investigative authorities have a relatively limited ability to gather evidence and information with regard to this class of arrestees. By the time the Temporary Provision was enacted in its final form, the above-mentioned distinction had been removed, and the Statute was written so as to apply to all security offense suspects — regardless of whether or not they are residents of Israel. It has been argued before us that as a practical matter the Statute is used only against Palestinian suspects and that this reflects a violation of the right to equal treatment, but this issue was not sufficiently discussed in the framework of the proceeding here, and in light of the conclusion that we have reached, we see no need to expand on this particular issue.

24.  The main emphasis of the Temporary Provision and of s. 5 in particular, is the need to carry out a quick, continuous and effective interrogation. The respondent explains that the General Security Service’s main and central purposes in carrying out interrogations in connection with security offenses are to discover terrorist organizations and to thwart future terrorist attacks. An interrogation of this type, which looks to the future, must be carried out quickly so as to — among other things — prevent planned terrorist acts in time, or to locate and catch additional terrorists, weapons and explosive materials, all before they can be transferred to a new hiding place. The respondent also informed us, ex parte, of the operational elements, which, according to the respondent, necessitate a proper, continuous and quick interrogation — one that is carried out without delay or interruptions. The respondent also described, primarily in the arguments that were made ex parte, the special methods that characterize this type of interrogation; these methods require time and an uninterrupted interrogation.

Section 5 meets this objective, the respondent explained, as it is often the case that the need to bring a security offense suspect to court will hamper the interrogation of the suspect and may even hinder its purpose completely. The extension of a security offense suspect’s detention in his absence makes it possible, in appropriate cases, to carry out the interrogation continuously and quickly, using special interrogation methods.

25.  In light of these explanations, we can state that s. 5 was enacted in order to achieve an appropriate purpose. Nevertheless, we must note the restrictions to which this appropriate purpose is subject. The instant case deals with the interrogation of those suspected of criminal offenses. The framework in which the suspect’s detention is being sought is a criminal framework. Although this is a special context which presents unique challenges, such uniqueness does not justify an avoidance of the fact that in all these cases the suspect is being questioned regarding his own involvement in security offenses. During the interrogation, a suspect may be asked questions relating to future terrorist activity — but this does not mean that these are “preventative arrests” only, since the interrogation and the detention must rest on grounds relating to the suspect’s involvement in security offenses. With respect to this issue, an arrestee falls within the category of a suspect, and his rights as a criminal suspect must therefore be protected.

 In light of this, and in light of our holding that the Statute does have a proper purpose, we can now turn to the question of its proportionality.

Proportionality

26.   Pursuant to the provisions of the limitation clause, a law that violates the right to due process — and such is the Statute that we are examining here — will be constitutionally valid only if the violation it entails is no greater than is necessary. The question raised here is whether the means chosen by the legislature is proportionate in relation to the Statute’s proper purpose. The case law in Israel, as well as in other legal systems, has examined proportionality on the basis of three sub-tests, which serve to concretize the general standard (see HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation [15]). The three sub-tests are the following: the rational relationship test, referring to the relationship between the means chosen and the violation of the right which is involved and the statute’s purpose; the minimal violation test; and lastly — the proportionate means test, within the narrow meaning thereof (Professor E. Bendor has called this the relativity test). President Barak discussed these tests in HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [16], at p. 385:  

‘The first sub-test is that of a rational correlation or connection. A legislative measure that violates a constitutional human right —in our case, one that violates the right to freedom of employment — is permissible if there is a correlation between it and the achievement of the purpose. A correlative relationship is required between the purpose and the means. The legislative means must lead, in a rational manner, to the achievement of the statutory purpose . . . ; the second sub-test is the test of whether the means involve a minimal infringement. A legislative measure that violates a constitutional human right — in our case, one that violates the right to freedom of employment — is permissible only if the statutory purpose cannot be achieved through some other measure that leads to a lesser violation of the human right . . . the legislative measure can be compared to a ladder, which the legislature climbs in order to achieve the legislative purpose. The legislature must stop on the rung at which the legislative purpose is achieved, and on which the violation of the human right is the least. “The legislature must begin at the ‘rung’ that causes the least infringement and move up the rungs slowly, until it reaches the rung at which the proper purpose is achieved without infringing more than necessary on the human right” . . . “If under the circumstances of the case the moderate measure, the measure that causes the least damage, is not sufficient to achieve the purpose, the authority may prescribe a more severe provision, to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose” . . . . The third sub-test is the proportionate measure test (in the narrow sense thereof). Even if the measure that has been chosen is appropriate (rational) for the achievement of the purpose, and even if there is no more moderate measure, there must be a proper relationship between the benefit achieved from the use of the measure to the scope of the violation of the constitutional human right . . . this test examines the result of the legislation, and the effect it has on the constitutional human right. If the use of the legislative measure causes a severe violation of a human right, and the expected public benefit to be achieved from such violation is minimal, it is possible that the legislation is disproportionate (in the narrow sense)’.

In our case, we have been persuaded by the material presented to us that there is a correlative relationship between the achievement of the Statute’s purposes and the use of the measure that consists of preventing an arrestee from being present at his detention hearing. Section 5 itself provides that the arrest may be extended without the arrestee being present only when the court “has been persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of a commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life” (sub-section (1)); and that the hearing of a petition for a further hearing or for an appeal can be held in the arrestee’s absence only when the court is “persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the investigation” (sub-section (2)). Thus, s. 5 itself creates a connection between the violation of the right and the realization of the objective of carrying out an effective interrogation for the purpose of thwarting the commission of security offenses and preventing harm to human life. Indeed, the interruption of an interrogation for the purpose of having the arrestee appear in court is likely to cause difficulty for the interrogators. As we have been told, it can disrupt the implementation of a particular interrogation method. It can therefore be said that there is a rational relationship between the need to prevent the interruption of an interrogation (for a specific period of time) and the achievement of the objectives of the interrogation.

27.  Nevertheless, we have not been persuaded that the means prescribed in s. 5 will cause only a minimal violation, or that the section presents a proper balance between the violation of the right to due process — in the sense that this right is embodied in the arrestee’s presence at detention hearings — and the achievement of the objectives of the interrogation. Viewed cumulatively the following elements form the basis of our position regarding this matter.

28.  The first element relates to the scope of the violation of the right to due process and of effective judicial supervision. The violation of the right to due process which the operation of s. 5 of the Statute can cause is severe. The arrestee’s presence at his detention proceedings is, as stated, a key element of the realization of his right to due process. When he is absent from the proceeding, a concern arises that his ability to defend himself against the claims that establish the ground for his arrest will be impaired, along with his ability to argue before the court about the terms of his detention and the manner in which the interrogation is being carried out. This absence also denies the court the ability to look the arrestee in the eye and to take note of his condition. The severity of this concern increases greatly when the suspect is detained in connection with a security offense — since, in such cases, the suspect’s ability to defend himself at the detention hearings is restricted by various additional measures that can be used against him.

The provisions of s. 38 of the Arrests Law should be noted in particular. This section provides that an arrestee who is suspected of having committed a security offense may be prevented from meeting with a lawyer when such meeting is likely to disrupt the arrest of other suspects, interfere with the discovery or seizure of evidence, or disrupt an interrogation — or when the prevention of such a meeting is necessary in order to thwart the commission of a crime or in order to preserve human life. “The prevention of a meeting between an arrestee and his attorney” — it has been held — “is a serious violation of the arrestee’s right. This violation is tolerated only when it is essential from a security perspective and necessary in terms of the conduct of a successful interrogation” (HCJ 6302/92 Rumhiya v. Israel Police [16], at p. 13). The combination of the provisions regarding the prevention of a meeting with an attorney with the provisions that are the subject of the constitutional examination here is likely to deny an arrestee any possibility of presenting a position to counter the government’s stand regarding his detention. At the same time, it eliminates the court’s ability to exercise any effective control over the interrogation or the detention for the purpose of interrogation. Justice Fogelman noted this in the judgment rendered in the appellant’s case:

‘A hearing which is not held in the presence of the arrestee is not an ex parte hearing, since the arrestee may, it would seem, argue his case through his counsel. At the same time, in the case before us (and as may be presumed, in other cases in which the powers granted pursuant to the Temporary Provision are exercised), the respondent has been prevented from meeting with his attorney. This combination leads to a situation where, as a practical matter, the respondent’s ability to present his case at the hearing is extremely limited. This is a material violation of the arrestee’s rights. His right to be present at his hearing is violated, as is his right to defend himself and to present his position, and in effect, his right to present his arguments to the court has been materially violated . . . The said violation becomes more serious, since within the framework of the proceeding that is being conducted, it is necessary to restrict the person’s freedom through the use of detention — and as is known, freedom from detention is a basic right which is contained in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.’

In CrimApp 1144/06 Ziyad v. State of Israel [17], at para. H, my colleague Justice Rubinstein wrote as follows: “ . . . It is axiomatic, in any event, that the defense of a party who cannot consult with his attorney is likely to be impaired to a certain degree, and not only temporarily. The suspect is not always aware of his procedural and substantive rights, and an effective legal defense often depends on a combination of the suspect’s factual knowledge and of his lawyer’s legal knowledge.” The provisions of the Statute under discussion here further restrict the arrestee’s ability to conduct a defense in terms of reducing the ability to present to the court the arrestee’s factual knowledge — and this is a restriction that is in addition the violation that results from the prevention of a meeting with an attorney. Thus, both the legal and factual aspects of the defense are weakened.

29.  Indeed, the harm done to a person who cannot protest his detention either through his own presence or through an “intelligent representative presence” is a very severe human rights violation. It is likely to invalidate the legal proceeding and strip it of any content. This is, in effect, an ex parte proceeding. The European Court of Human Rights, in a decision dealing with art. 5(4) of the European Convention of Human Rights, held as follows: “Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.” In that case, an arrestee claimed that she had not been permitted to be present at the proceedings in which the court deliberated regarding objections to her detention — proceedings at which she wished to present arguments with respect to the conditions of her detention. The court ruled as follows:

‘The Court recalls that by virtue of Article 5(4), an arrested or detained person is entitled to bring proceedings for the review by a court of the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the “lawfulness”, in the sense of Article 5(1), of his or her deprivation of liberty… The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure equality of arms between the parties… The possibility for an arrestee to be heard either in person or through some form of representation features among the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty . . . ‘

The Court was aware that the arrestee had been represented by counsel at the proceeding, but that such representation was not a sufficient alternative for her own presence, because of the attorney’s ignorance of facts known only to the arrestee:

 ‘The Court notes at the outset the applicant sought leave to appear before the appeal court in order to plead her release on the grounds intimately linked to her personal situation. She planned, firstly, to describe the appalling conditions of her detention, of which her counsel did not have first-hand knowledge. Only the applicant herself could describe the conditions and answer the judges’ questions, if any. . .

The court therefore held that the refusal to allow the arrestee to appear in court denied her effective control of the legality of her detention, as required pursuant to art. 5(4) of the Convention.

30.  All of the above leads to the conclusion that s. 5 of the Statute can only be examined upon consideration of the overall normative framework dealing with the interrogation and detention of security offense suspects. When the arrestee has not met with an attorney, and the court is unable to direct questions to the arrestee in order to clarify matters that require clarification, the court’s ability to conduct fair and effective review of the matter is substantially restrained. The court, in effect, relies on the position and statements of only one of the parties. This is a harsh result in light of what is necessary for legal proceedings to be proper and in light of the subject under discussion here — the curtailment of a person’s liberty.

Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that according to the law in its current state, it is frequently the case that during detention hearings, courts will be presented with material on an ex parte basis. Needless to say, this fact alone causes some form of a violation of the arrestee’s ability to defend himself. By itself, this is a practice which, although necessary in certain cases, creates difficulty for the arrestee who seeks to conduct a defense and for the court that wishes to rule in accordance with the normal rules that guide us. The courts use various methods to minimize the violation of the arrestee’s rights — such as, inter alia, providing either the arrestee’s lawyer or his counsel with any information that has been presented to the court ex parte and which may be disclosed. It is clear that the ability to minimize the violation of the arrestee’s rights, in terms of allowing the arrestee the opportunity to respond to such information, is weakened when the arrestee is not present and his counsel — as is frequently the case — has not yet met with him.

As noted above, the respondent’s argument that in light of the various restrictions imposed by other laws on the suspect’s ability to defend himself — such as the restricted exposure to the main points of the evidence presented against him — the additional violation caused by his absence from the legal proceeding “is not great”. The reasoning seems to be that an already existing violation of a suspect’s rights and of the propriety of the legal proceeding weakens the argument against a further violation of the suspect’s ability to defend himself, and against a further limitation of the court’s ability to clarify the true facts and information. If the respondent did intend to make that argument, it must be utterly rejected. Even in a proceeding involving the detention of security offense suspects, substantive judicial supervision remains necessary. The arrestee’s presence is especially important in a proceeding such as this one — i.e., the detention hearing — which anyhow involves various restrictions. In any event, when a basic right is violated from a number of perspectives, or gradually, it is certainly possible that the cumulative effect will be that the various violations will cross the threshold of constitutionality, such that the last “marginal violation” will not be permissible.

31.  All of the above indicates that s. 5, especially in combination with other provisions contained in the law, can lead, de facto, to the arrestee being isolated from the legal proceeding being conducted in his case — a proceeding that revolves around a basic impairment of the right to be free of detention. The various provisions relating to the preliminary stages of the interrogation of security offense suspects is likely to mean the loss of any ability to maintain minimally effective control over the protection of an arrestee’s rights in the framework of the detention hearings and interrogation proceedings. In effect, these provisions leave the court, as a reviewing entity, with only a partial view of what it needs to see, and thus impairs an integral and essential aspect of the constitutionality of an investigative detention. As President Barak has stated in another context:

‘The degree of a society’s sensitivity to the need to protect the liberty of the individual is expressed in the scope recognized by the government authority of the judicial review that can be exercised over a decision by the said authority that violates one of a person’s freedoms. Indeed, the protection of the individual’s freedom is too precious to us for it to be left in the hands of the government authorities. I am aware that judicial supervision does not always ensure that human rights will be protected. However, I am persuaded that the absence of judicial supervision will end in the violation of human liberty. When there is no judge, there is no law’ (LCrimA 2060/97 Valinchik v. Tel Aviv District Psychiatrist [18].

The provision contained in s. 5 is therefore likely to cause severe damage to the legal proceeding itself, and to its effectiveness and its fairness. The provision violates the arrestee’s right to due process, which is derived from his right to freedom and dignity. I note that the violation is reduced somewhat by the provision in s. 5 of the Statute that allows the arrestee to be kept from attending his detention hearings only after the first detention hearing has been held in his presence — but the provision does no more than that. The ongoing supervision of the proceedings relating to an investigative detention is important for the protection of human rights — at least as important as the ongoing investigation is for the realization of the goals of the interrogation.

32.  The second element relates to the disruption of the interrogation that s. 5 is intended to prevent. There is no doubt that a continuous interrogation — conducted without any impedance, delay or interruption — is likely to be useful in terms of the realization of its objectives. The expansion of the interrogator’s powers is likely to make it easier to discover the truth. The fast and efficient discovery of the truth is especially important when the security of the state and its citizens is at stake. I note that the power to order the holding of a hearing without the arrestee being present is limited to those situations in which the court is “persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder the ability to prevent harm to human life” (for the continuation of a detention) or when the court “is persuaded that the suspension of the arrestee’s interrogation is likely to cause material harm to the interrogation” (rehearing or appeal). The provision is therefore intended to be used in situations in which, from the perspective of the objectives of the interrogation, it is of great importance to allow the interrogation to be carried out without interruption.

Nevertheless, “a democratic society — one that supports freedom — does not allow interrogators to use any and all methods to disclose the truth . . . sometimes the price of the truth is so high that a democratic society cannot pay it” (HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], per President Barak at para. 22). Thus, an effective interrogation, carried out while the person being questioned is being detained, must be combined with substantive judicial supervision. The conduct of a proper legal proceeding is essential, so as to ensure that the investigative detention is proportionate and constitutional. As a matter of principle, the suspect’s appearance before a judge should not be viewed as an obstacle, but rather as a basic element of an effective and constitutional investigative detention. “The accepted approach is that judicial review is an integral part of the detention process . . . at the basis of this approach lies a constitutional perspective which considers judicial review of detention proceedings essential for the protection of individual liberty” (HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [21]). The significance is that the interrogation methods must be adjusted so that they can be halted in order to allow an effective and fair judicial proceeding to be conducted. An interrogation that takes place over time, while the interrogated party is held in custody and prevented from being brought before a court and to state his case before that court, is likely to reach the level of constituting a violation of human dignity and liberty.

To the extent that the objective is to reduce the harm done to the interrogation due to its interruption for the purpose of holding a judicial proceeding, it is necessary to examine the possibility of minimizing that harm through means that cause a lesser violation of the arrestee’s rights. If it is difficult to interrupt the interrogation in order to bring the arrestee to court, it is also necessary to find ways to reduce this difficulty — ways that are more proportionate than preventing the arrestee’s presence at the hearing. Regarding the proportionality sub-test, we note that the respondent was unable to persuade us that no other methods are available that cause a lesser violation of the arrestee’s rights and which can, at the same time, achieve the objective that the legislation was enacted to achieve; such methods, which involve a lesser violation of a right, would be added to the special methods that are already established in the legislation — those measures that are already available to the authorities conducting the interrogation as well as to the enforcement authorities, pursuant to the existing Arrests Law, and pursuant to the other sections of the Temporary Provision (other than s. 5, which is the subject of discussion here).

33.  An examination of both the degree of the violation of the interrogated party’s fundamental rights — on the one hand — and of the interrogation advantage derived from the provision of s. 5 on the other, leads to the conclusion that this measure is not proportionate. An additional piece of information supports this conclusion — the  frequency with which the measure established in s. 5 is used. The respondents argued that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision is used relatively rarely, and presented data to support this claim. According to them, the data prove that the implementation of s. 5, as a practical matter, is limited to only a few cases each year. However, this argument, which points to the rarity of the need to hold hearings at which the arrestee is not present, only strengthens the constitutional difficulty resulting from the enactment of s. 5. The remarks made by Justice Zamir in the above-mentioned Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1] are pertinent here as well:

‘Even if we had been shown data indicating that only a relatively few soldiers are held in custody until the end of the maximum time period, this is not a sufficient response to the argument that the maximum detention period is longer than necessary . . . The test of the detention period’s proportionality also relates to the maximum period of detention — the period established by law, and not only to the actual period during which a particular person has been detained. If the maximum period causes a violation of personal liberty which is greater than is required, the fact that it violates the liberty of only a few of them makes no difference. The liberty of a single person is as deserving of protection as is the liberty of the entire world’ (ibid, at para. 33).

The same is true in our case.

In light of this, we believe that the Temporary Provision does not satisfy the proportionality test — either from the perspective of the second sub-test (the minimum violation test) or from the perspective of the third test (the relativity test, or as it is also called, the narrow proportionality test).

Conclusion

34.  The Supreme Court has emphasized more than once the need to act with maximum restraint in exercising the power to invalidate laws on the ground that they violate the provisions of the Basic Laws dealing with human rights. “The declaration that a law or a part thereof is invalid is a serious matter. A judge may not do this lightly . . . when he invalidates a piece of primary legislation, the judge frustrates the will of the legislature. This is justified only by the fact that the legislature is subject to constitutional/supra-constitutional provisions that the legislature has itself established . . . At the same time, the courts must exercise significant judicial caution” (HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [16], per President Barak at para. 19). This is how we have acted in this case as well.

 

We have also taken into consideration the special constitutional challenge faced by a democratic state which is fighting against terrorism. A situation involving hostilities in general, and of hostilities in a struggle against terrorism in particular, disturbs the balance between human rights and the security of the state and of the public. Human rights are intended to be basic principles that can withstand such disturbances, but the struggle against terrorism requires — in Israel as in other countries — an adjustment of the implementation of the constitutional criteria for the purpose of dealing with the threat of terrorism. The main principle of Israel’s legal system is to maintain the constitutional requirements even in the face of the terrorist threat. Indeed, “[t]his is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back” (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel [23], per Justice Barak at para. 39). This is the secret of the strength of a democratic regime, which maintains its unyielding support of its fundamental principles and values even when it is engaged in a conflict against a party lacking those same values (see also HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [22]).

35.  In conclusion, and in light of all this, we believe that the provision of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision on which the lower courts relied when deciding the appellant’s case cannot be allowed to stand, because it violates the fundamental constitutional principles established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The significance therefore is that the appellant’s detention hearing should have been held in his presence. From a constitutional perspective, the significance of our holding is that the Arrests Law must from this point forward be interpreted in accordance with its formulation prior to the enactment of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision.

Justice E. E. Levy

 

I concur.

President D. Beinisch

I concur in the opinion of my colleague, Vice President Rivlin, and in his conclusion that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision Law violates, to a greater extent than is necessary, the constitutional right of an arrestee to be present at his detention hearings — which is a core component of the right to due process.

After concurring in this opinion, I received the opinions of my colleagues, Justices Naor and Grunis, who believe that legislation can be used to regulate the issue, which can be a proportionate measure in certain circumstances. Indeed, there may be some exceptional and rare situations in which it may be necessary, in order to prevent an immediate and concrete danger, to refrain from bringing an arrestee before a judge for a detention hearing— but this will be the case only rarely, when the very fact that an interrogation is halted for the purpose of bringing the arrestee to court is likely to lead to immediate harm to human life, and the risk is at the level of great certainty, as in the case of a “ticking bomb”. I myself believe that such rare cases can be resolved through what is at least a partial legal solution that can be found in other existing arrangements. Regarding this matter, I join in the position taken by my colleague Justice Rubenstein in para. 26 of his opinion, in which he expresses doubt that such legislation is worthwhile for the purpose of providing a solution for such rare cases. Indeed, I wonder whether there is any justification for providing a response to these rare cases through a unique piece of legislation such as the Temporary Provision which is the subject of the appeal before us, and whether such legislation will not present a “slippery slope” of constitutional difficulties. These questions are not before us here, and I see no reason to take any position regarding them.    

Justice E. Arbel

 

I agree with the opinion of my colleague, Vice President Rivlin.

Section 5 of the Temporary Provision, as well as the entire Temporary Provision, is the result of the complex security situation that prevails in our region — a situation in which, unfortunately, terrorism has become a permanent fixture. The security forces stand at the frontline of the struggle against terrorism; their task is to deal with the challenges and threats presented by terrorism on a daily basis, and the state provides them with appropriate tools for this purpose. The Temporary Provision is one of those tools, given to the security forces in order to allow them to carry out their function. The purpose of the Temporary Provision is to provide the security forces with the appropriate tools for carrying out their function, based on an understanding that the interrogation of those suspected of having committed security offenses differs from an ordinary police interrogation of a criminal suspect. Indeed, the interrogation of a security offense suspect is unique in that its main purpose is usually to prevent activity that is directed against the security of the state. These are offenses that are generally committed against an ideological background, and this frequently means that the suspects or other relevant individuals who are being interrogated refuse to cooperate with those conducting the interrogation. Furthermore, when the parties being interrogated are not residents of the State of Israel, there is in any event an added difficulty in obtaining additional evidence, questioning relevant witnesses, information-gathering, etc. Each one of these factors alone leads to a situation in which the interrogations of those suspected of committing security offenses are very complex, frequently requiring both time and continuity — and this is even more so when the various factors are combined. Such interrogations are also often carried out under time pressure (see also the Draft Law).

At the same time, as my colleague has explained, even in these circumstances, Israel is required to conduct the struggle for its security and for the security of its citizens in a manner that maintains its character as a democratic and Jewish state. In other words, the battle against terrorism and against all the security threats faced by Israel must be fought within the boundaries outlined in the law (HCJ 3451/02 Almandi v. Minister of Defense [23], at pp. 34-35; HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [24]; HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [25]). The objective does not validate all possible means. Indeed, the explanatory material to the Draft Law, as well as the explanatory material to the Draft Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers — Arrests) (Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) (Amendment), 5768-2007) (Draft Laws 340), pursuant to which the Temporary Provision’s force was extended, indicate that the drafters sought to take into consideration the guiding principles of our system regarding the rights of criminal suspects, while regulating the powers given to the investigative authorities with regard to the investigation of security offenses. Thus, the legislature was also aware that because of Israel’s character as a state that upholds the law, the limitations on permissible government action remain in place — and that special care must be taken regarding the rights of a suspect who is held by the state and is in its custody, whenever a measure is considered which contains within it a violation of a suspect’s rights.

For these reasons, I find it difficult to accept the state’s argument that because a suspect whose liberty has already been restricted in order to serve the public interest of clarifying the truth will already have lost significant rights during the interrogation stage, the temporary loss of his right to be present at a detention hearing will not constitute a significant additional violation. The guideline in this matter should be the opposite: although there are indeed situations in which it is not possible to avoid certain violations of the rights of a security offense suspect — in that the main evidence against him is not disclosed to him and in that he is sometimes prevented from meeting with an attorney for a set period of time etc. — these violations should be viewed as exceptional, as measures that are to be used cautiously and with restraint. We therefore cannot argue that an additional violation of the suspect’s rights is permissible and justified, due to its mildness in light of the other violations that take place in any event.

In conclusion, I also believe that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision lacks proportionality, for the reasons that the Vice President noted. The legislature’s intent, which was to create a reasonable and appropriate balance between the need to create tools that would be suitable for the interrogation of a security offense suspect and our fundamental principles regarding the rights of a suspect and of an arrestee, has not been realized in practice.

Justice M. Naor

 

1.    I agree with my colleague, Vice President Rivlin, that s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision), 5766-2006 (hereinafter: the Statute) impinges upon the right to a fair criminal proceeding — a right which is closely connected to the constitutional right to human dignity  established in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In order to pass the constitutionality test, this infringement  must satisfy the tests set out in the limitations clause. I agree that s. 5 of the Law, as currently formulated, does not satisfy the tests of the limitations clause. Nevertheless, my position is that the declaration that the statute is void should be postponed for six months. This will allow the legislature to determine, if it chooses to do so, narrower and more proportionate limits on the conduct of a detention extension hearing, an appeal or a review in the absence of the arrestee — all in the spirit of my remarks below. In my view, the possibilities for allowing a hearing to take place without the detainee being present must be limited to a narrow range of possibilities, which I will define below. In short, according to my view, in rare cases, the right to due process must retreat for a short time in the face of the need to prevent — at the level of near certainty — harm to human life. As my view is the minority view, I will state my position in brief.

2.    I will first clarify the demarcation of time during which it is permissible, pursuant to the Statute that we are examining here, to hold a hearing without the detainee being present. The first judicial determination regarding the detention of a security offense suspect takes place in the presence of that suspect, and the constitutionality of that first proceeding (hereinafter, “the first detention decision”) has not been challenged by any argument raised before us. The first detention decision may include an order that the suspect be held for up to twenty days (hereinafter: “the maximum period”). Where the court has ordered, in the framework of the first detention decision, a detention period of less than 20 days, section 5 “kicks in” ’and allows a judge to extend the detention up to the maximum period, in a proceeding conducted in the detainee’s absence (hereinafter, “the detention extension decision”). The infringement of the constitutional right therefore occurs within the period in which s. 5 of the Statute grants the court jurisdiction to decide the matter of the extension of the detention, under certain conditions, without the detainee being present; in other words,  the number of days that completes the maximum period of 20 days, and no more. As I have suggested, even this period might be too long, and I will discuss this below.

3.    The rule under the Statute is that a hearing must be held in the presence of the detainee, and the hearing in the absence of the detainee is the exception to that rule. As my colleague the Vice President noted, the purpose of the exception — improving the enforcement agencies’ ability to carry out effective investigations of security offenses — is an appropriate purpose (see paras. 23 and 25 of my colleague’s opinion). The key to its constitutionality is the requirement of proportionality. The state’s argument that the practical implementation of the Statute, is “limited and proportionate” (para. 41 of the written pleadings) is not sufficient. The statute that creates the power that infringes upon a constitutional right must itself be “limited and proportionate”. Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Statute define different “balancing formulas” for the application of the exception, and I will describe them, moving from the most stringent to the most lenient: the frustration of prevention of harm to human life (regarding an extension of detention); the thwarting of a security offense (regarding an extension of detention); or material harm to the interrogation (regarding a review or an appeal). The most stringent test is the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life. It is stringent in comparison with the test involving the prevention of a security offense, given that the definition of a “security offense” in s. 1 of the Statute does not necessarily require proof of a concern regarding harm to human life, and instead refers to a concern regarding harm to the security of the state (see s. 3 of the state’s written pleadings). It is also more stringent in comparison to the test regarding substantial harm to the investigation (see CrimApp 8473/07 State of Israel v. A [26], per Justice Vogelman at para. 5). Regarding the last two balancing formulas, the least stringent ones, I accept the conclusion reached by my colleague the Vice President — that they do not satisfy the proportionality requirement, because they allow for too broad a range of possible  infringements of a constitutional right. Section 5(2) of the Statute should therefore be declared invalid. The possibility of holding a hearing in the detainee’s absence in order to thwart a security offense, as described in  s. 5(1), must also, in my opinion and in the opinion of my colleague the Vice President, be eliminated.

4.    I take a different position, as a matter of principle, regarding the more stringent balancing formula appearing in s. 5(1), which requires that the court be persuaded that the interruption of the interrogation is likely to hinder the prevention of harm to human life. Such a requirement may indeed be proportionate if additional limitations are imposed. One limitation could be achieved by way of interpretation: the expression “likely to” could be interpreted as a test requiring near certainty that the presence of the detainee at the hearing in court will lead to the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life (regarding the near certainty test, see HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister of the Interior [27]; A. Barak, A Judge in a Democratic Society, at pp. 273-274 (2004)). A “near certainty” requirement expresses a formula that “has been established on a broad conceptual basis” (HCJ 243/62 Israeli Film Studios v. Gary [28], per Justice Landau, at 2418G). The case law has accepted near certainty as a balancing formula regarding prior restraint on a right, as opposed to its restriction after the fact (see CrimA 6696/96 Kahane v. State of Israel [29], per President Barak at paras. 10 and 11). The near certainty requirement makes clear that the exception can only be used if there are critical, necessary and “decisive” reasons for its use, in order to prevent the frustration of the prevention of harm to human life (see and compare President Shamgar’s remarks in HCJ 253/88 Sejadia v. Minister of Defense [30], at p. 821, at the B-C margin marks). The typical case in which such reasons are present, but not necessarily the only one, is when there is a “ticking bomb”, when “there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence” (see and compare: Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], at p. 841).

5.    In general, a possible interpretation can be used to conform a statute to the constitutional requirements (see: HCJ 9098/01 Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [31]; HCJ 4562/92 Zandberg v. Broadcasting Authority [32]; CrimA 6559/06 A. v. State of Israel [33], per President Beinisch at paras. 7-8). There is a connection between the interpretative balancing formulas, such as the near certainty test, that were formulated in the case law prior to the “constitutional era”, and the proportionality principle established in the constitutional limitations clause. In my view, the case law balancing formulas can be properly placed, mutatis mutandi, within the framework of the third sub-test of proportionality, which is based on a balancing of values (see HCJ 10203/03 “Hamifkad Haleumi” Ltd v. Attorney General [34], at par. 55 of my opinion). This is the position taken by Professor Barak, as he recently described it (A. Barak, “Principled Constitutional Balancing and Proportionality: the Doctrinal Perspective,” Barak Volume - Studies in the Judicial Work of Aaron Barak 39 (E. Zamir, B. Medina and C. Fassberg, eds., 2009), at pp. 94-96). If the only difficulty I found in s. 5(1) of the Statute regarding the more stringent test was that it does not expressly refer to the near certainty test, that test could be prescribed by way of  interpretation (while eliminating the test relating to the thwarting of  a security offense).

However, in our case, the said interpretation technique is not sufficient to allow the Statute to satisfy the constitutional requirement, even regarding the stringent test. Even if a stringent interpretative criterion were to be adopted regarding s. 5 of the Statute, requiring near certainty that the interruption of the interrogation would frustrate the prevention of harm to human life (while eliminating the other less stringent tests), the section would still be tainted by a constitutional defect that cannot be remedied other than through the legislature’s intervention, should the legislature decide to so intervene: the Statute still grants the power to establish, in the context of a detention extension decision, a duration for the detention which is liable to be disproportionate  — even one that is as long as the maximum period. An extension of detention until completion of the full continuous maximum period, in the absence of the detainee, is liable to infringe upon the constitutional right beyond the extent that is necessary — particularly if the initial detention period  was a short one. I have therefore concluded that there is no choice but to declare the invalidity of s. 5(1), as my colleague has proposed.

6.    The invalidation of a statute is a measure of last resort. The constitutional aspiration is to strike a balance between conflicting values, rather than to decide between them. “A balance must be struck between security needs and the rights of the individual. This balance imposes a heavy burden on those involved in the defense of the state. Not every effective measure is also a legal one. The end does not justify the means . . . This balance imposes a heavy burden on the judges, who must determine, on the basis of existing law, what is permitted and what is prohibited”  (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [22], per President Barak, at para. 63).

Against this background, I considered the possibility of finding the Statute constitutional with respect to the more stringent balancing formula only, as per the interpretation requiring near certainty, in reliance on the assumption that in all cases, a judge deliberating a case in the absence of the arrestee will reach a proportionate result concerning the duration of the detention  (see and compare A. v. State of Israel [33], per President Beinisch at para. 46). However, I concluded, ultimately,  that such an attempt cannot succeed. If, as per my view, s. 5(2) needs to be invalidated in its entirety, there is no point, in any event, in allowing a detention hearing to be held without the detainee being present: an appeal will be submitted immediately, requiring the detainee’s presence by virtue of the general law regarding appeals as established in s. 53 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Enforcement Powers – Arrests), 5756-1996 — and the detainee’s interrogation will be halted for that purpose. Furthermore, the determination of the duration of the maximum period is primarily the job of the legislature, and it should be allowed a reasonable amount of time to establish an arrangement that will satisfy the constitutionality threshold (compare Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1], at p. 284; Marab v. IDF Commander in  Judea and Samaria [18]; Y. Mersel, “Suspension of a Declaration of Invalidity,” 9 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 39 (2006).

7.    I therefore agree with the bottom line expressed in the decision of my colleague the Vice President. I nevertheless believe that we can leave for further discussion the Vice President’s view that in this case the “cumulative effect” of the provisions regarding the denial of attorney-client meetings, together with s. 5 of the Statute, crosses the constitutionality threshold (paras. 28 and 30 of his opinion). I emphasize that in this proceeding the appellant did not attack the constitutionality of s. 35 of the Arrests Law — the section dealing with the prevention of meetings with an attorney (and see also s. 35(g) of the Arrests Law which allows for  hearings to be held in the presence of the detainee and of his attorney, separately). I believe that the bottom line can be reached through a direct analysis of s. 5 of the Statute in and of itself.

In light of the novelty of my colleague’s approach, I wish to note regarding this matter that the argument concerning the “cumulative effect” of two legislative measures is a consequential argument (see, in the context of a discrimination claim, HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [35]). As a consequential argument it cannot be examined abstractly, and instead it is always applied in the context of a concrete case (see and compare HCJ 366/03 Society for Commitment to Peace and Social Justice v. Minister of Finance [36], per President Barak, at par. 19). The use of the “effect” argument in the context of this case means that a claim is being made that the manner in which the measures are employed, when combined together, amounts to an unnecessarily excessive infringement of a constitutional right. The argument is not made against the very existence of each of these powers, in and of itself and separately. The rule is that the burden of proof in the first stage of a constitutional review is imposed on the party arguing against constitutionality, and it is that party that must prove that a constitutional right has been infringed upon. The rationale at the basis of this requirement is the presumption of constitutionality (A. Barak, “The Burden of Proof and the Infringement of Constitutional Rights,” Trends in the Evidentiary Rules and in the Criminal Procedure Law — Collection of Articles in Honor of Professor Eliahu Harnon 53 (A. Horowitz and M. Kremnitzer, eds., 2009), at p. 71). This is also true with regard to the “effect” argument. Moreover, the acceptance of an “effect” argument” as a ground for invalidating the particular legislative measure that the party making the argument has chosen to attack, would involve, necessarily, a degree of arbitrariness. Such acceptance relies on the preliminary choice made by that party to attack a specific measure and reflects indifference regarding the other measure, even though it is the combination of the two both measures together that provides the basis for the “effect” argument. It is thus possible that the dominant cause of the “effect” — the cause that forms the source of the unconstitutionality — is not even brought before the court for review, and the court is presented with a deficient factual and legal picture. Therefore, in my opinion, the invalidation of a particular legislative measure which has been established through primary legislation, on the basis of an “effect” argument, requires an overall examination of all the legislative measures that give rise to the claimed “effect”. It is clarified that the party making the argument must do so in a reasoned and focused way, and not as a general claim. (The burden of proof requirement mentioned above necessitates this as well.) In my view, we have not been presented here with arguments that justify the acceptance of such an “effect” argument.

And note, even if the appellant had carried the burden of proof described above, I would still be of the opinion that there is no obvious answer to the question of whether the combination of two measures — which are each constitutional on their own — is likely to cause an unconstitutional “effect” on a cumulative basis. The answer to the question depends, inter alia, on the manner in which the measures are actually implemented in practice; on the purpose constituting the basis for each measure; and on the ability to identify the measure which is dominant in  causing the said effect. Thus, for example, when the purposes of the measures are connected, the invalidation of one of the measures is likely to eliminate the justification for the use of the other measure (see and compare HCJ 801/00 Bassam Natshe and The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Erez Military Court [38]). Of course, this examination of the legislative measures will also impact upon the proper constitutional remedy. These issues are complex and require in-depth examination. I prefer to leave them for further review at the appropriate time, having reached the conclusion that the legislative measure prescribed in s. 5 of the Statute, in and of itself, is unconstitutional.

8.    To sum up, if my view is accepted, s. 5(1) and s. 5(2) will be found to be invalid. This leads to the invalidation of the entire s. 5 of the Statute, since s. 5(3) and s. 5(4) do not stand alone. My position is that the legislature should be given six months during which, if it wishes to do so, it may establish a different arrangement that restricts the ability to hold detention extension hearings, reviews and appeals in the absence of the detainee. In my view, such an arrangement may be based on the presence of a danger – at the level of near certainty – that the prevention of harm to human life will be frustrated; the arrangement will relate to a limited period which will meet the criteria for constitutionality. I therefore propose to my colleagues to delay the declaration of the Statute’s invalidation that is contained in our judgment, for a period of six months from the date on which the judgment is rendered.

 

 

Justice S. Joubran

I concur in the decision of my colleague, Vice President E. Rivlin. We cannot ignore the needs of the hour and the need to allow the security forces to use effective means for protecting public welfare and security. However, as my colleague the Vice President notes, the normative framework that we are discussing here is a criminal proceeding. Even in times of emergency, we must not forget the primary principle, that the purpose of a criminal proceeding — the purpose without which there may not be a proceeding — is the punishment of a person for offenses that he has committed and regarding which his guilt has been established. It is often necessary, in the context of such a proceeding, to use secondary measures, the primary example of which would be an arrest and an interrogation, but these are required only for the purpose of realizing the final purpose of the proceeding. The defendant who has been prosecuted is the center of the criminal proceeding, and the questions that are asked of him will all relate to his own acts and liability for that which is attributed to him. Alongside this is the state’s duty to make use of its powers for the purpose of punishing him. It is therefore not for nothing that one of the key requirements, one to be found at the core of the criminal proceeding, is the presence of the defendant in the court where he is being brought to trial. When a defendant is prevented from exercising this right — to be present at the place where he is being judged — his right to human dignity has been severely violated. It would seem that the best description of this situation would be that of Josef K’s experience, and of his extreme despair after having been tried in secret, until his bitter end:

Were there objections that had been forgotten? Of course there were. Logic is no doubt unshakable but it can’t withstand a person who wants to live. Where was the judge he’d never seen? Where was the high court he’d never reached? He raised his hands and spread out all his fingers. But the hands of one man were right at K’s throat while the other thrust the knife into his heart and turned it there twice. With failing sight K. saw how the men drew near his face, leaning cheek-to-cheek to observe the verdict. “Like a dog!” he said; it seemed as though the shame was to outlive him.

[Translator’s note — excerpt from “The Trial, published by Tribeca Books, April 2012, translation copyright by David Wyllie]

Unlike the Kafkaesque legal world, it is unimaginable in the modern liberal world of law that a person would be tried for his actions without being given the opportunity to be present at the time that his guilt is being determined, and this is not disputed in the case before us either.

 

The state’s position on this is incorrect: these matters are just as relevant at the stage of a pre-trial arrest. In contrast to the state’s position, it is when a person is in custody in anticipation of his trial, at a time when the presumption of his innocence remains in full force, that it is especially necessary that he himself be brought before the court in order to refute what has been attributed to him and to seek his freedom. Despite all the significance of an intensive and effective interrogation of security offense arrestees — arrestees whose interrogation can often prevent harm to the lives of innocent people — the purpose of an interrogation in the context of a criminal proceeding is the clarification of those acts that the person being interrogated committed in the past, in anticipation of the person being brought to trial for the commission of such acts. The limitations imposed on the person’s freedom are derived from this purpose — such limitations being a consequence of the acts the person is suspected of having committed. The denial of the rights of these arrestees to come before court and argue against their detention — at a time that the evidence against them is only at the prima facie level and has not yet been formed into the basis for an indictment — constitutes a direct contravention of the most basic principles of criminal law, and we cannot accept it.

I therefore agree with the view that the Temporary Provision must be invalidated, as it does not satisfy the requirements of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

Introduction

1.    I join in the comprehensive opinion of my colleague the Vice President, subject to my following comments. I first wish to express my surprise regarding the petitioners’ decision to withdraw their petition in HCJ 2028/08 because of the hearing held partially in camera (albeit by majority decision), at which the representatives of the defense establishment presented their positions. Section 15 of the Arrests Law does allow for the presentation of confidential information regarding particular individuals on an individual basis, as counsel for the petitioners argued, but I do not believe that this option is unavailable when the case is a “general” and constitutional case being deliberated by the High Court of Justice. Indeed, this is not a routine matter; it is instead a non-routine decision regarding the unconstitutionality of a statutory provision which relies on, inter alia, “the ? hindrance of the prevention of harm to human life” (s. 5(1) and s. 5(4) of the Temporary Provision, with which we are dealing), and requires precise and sophisticated consideration. The court must be presented with the complete picture, particularly when the argument being made involves the proportionality of the legislation. The Knesset sub-committees also view confidential information. As some of my colleagues have noted during the deliberations in this Court, this viewing of confidential information was necessary in order for our decision to be responsible and concrete, rather than abstract.

2.    My colleague the Vice President considered the question of whether the issue should be dealt with as a theoretical one, and I will add, as a further reason for dealing with this case (beyond his reasons, with which I agree) that given the Israeli reality, and especially the reality relating to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian population, it is frequently the case that an immediate decision is required. This immediacy does not allow for an organized and in-depth response to  a particular case, so that the discussion of the principles of the subject must be conducted after the operative matter has come to an end; see the matter of the release of the Palestinian prisoners in the context of negotiations, in HCJ 10578/08 Legal Institute of Terrorism Studies v. Government of Israel [37], decision dated 15 December 2009, and the unreported opinion of Justice Arbel, dated 3 November 2009).

Section 5 and interrogation methods

3.    Regarding the decision itself, it is not a simple one. The subject was discussed at length in the Knesset (as will be partially described below) and the legislature was persuaded by the needs of the security establishment. Our approach here is not based on self-righteousness; we are aware of the burdensome tasks faced by the security establishment in terms of the interrogations that are carried out for the purpose of thwarting acts of terrorism; we do not live in an ivory tower or in a bubble, as we are citizens, whose people and whose country are exposed to security dangers. We believe that the explanatory material accompanying the Draft Law (Draft Laws 206, supra, at p. 1) reflected, per the government, a necessity; we have learned from experience that even if some of the measures that the legislature has made available to the authorities who conduct the security interrogations – such as the prevention of meetings with attorneys (see s. 35 of the Arrests Law) – intrude on the array of rights of those who are subject to such measures, there are good reasons for these measures to be used, reflecting legitimate interrogation needs. As my colleague the Vice President noted, the purpose for the enactment of s. 5 is appropriate, on a prima facie basis. However — and I say this now and I will repeat it below — the measure which is prescribed in s. 5 (i.e., the holding of a hearing in the arrestee’s absence) is rarely used. Its rarity, which none dispute, indicates that the interrogation authorities — and this is a fact to be appreciated — generally do their work by relying on other measures that are available to them. The concern that a judicial decision will prevent the security forces from doing their job well also arose after the decision in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] — that case being one which prohibited the use of a substantial portion of the measures that the parties conducting security investigations had used until that time. This concern eventually dissipated because of the professional wisdom that the authorities displayed following the issuance of that decision (a matter to which I will return). The need for a decision in our case arises from the fact that the State of Israel is a country in which human dignity is a constitutional value — and it is a value which contains within it the right to due process.

4.    I agree with the Vice President that we should not distinguish between the presence of the defendant at his trial and his presence at the detention hearings. As the sage Hillel said: “What is hateful to you, you must not do to your friend” (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 31a). It is true that those who are interrogated under the circumstances under discussion here are generally not our “friends” and they are often in fact our enemies; but we must recall the classic comments of the then Vice President Haim Cohen:

‘What is the difference between the way the state fights and the way its enemies fight — that the state fights while observing the law and the enemies fight while violating it. The moral strength and substantive justice of the fighting engaged in by the authorities is entirely dependent on the observance of the law of the land’ (HCJ 320/80 Kawasme v. Minister of Defense [38], at p. 132).

These remarks are true, a fortiori, with respect to hostilities that are conducted while complying with the Basic Laws and with the constitutional rights — meaning also the right to due process. When we speak of those being detained in connection with security offenses — who are subject, by law, to several unique restrictions (see, as stated, s. 35 and s. 36 of the Arrests Law) — any addition to the existing restrictions must be considered properly in terms of its proportionality, so that the result will not be like that of the mythological beast of burden who was given such a heavy load that any addition to it would cause the beast to collapse.

On security and rights

5.    The decision to be reached in this case is one part of this Court’s effort to deal with security matters, as set against various types of rights of Palestinians and Israelis. As President Barak wrote in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] at p. 895, “[a] democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back” (see also CrimA 6659/06 A v. State of Israel [33], at para. 30; HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [40]; HCJ 951/06 Stein v. Police Commissioner [41]; HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister [42], at para. 29; HCJ 7862/04 Abu Daher v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [43], at paras. 7-8).

6.    More than twelve years ago, I wrote the following:

‘The relationship between human rights issues and the security challenge and security needs will remain on the agenda of Israeli society and of the Israeli courts for many years. Israel is at the height of peace negotiations, but even the most optimistic do not expect that Israel will come to enjoy full peace and security during the foreseeable future. The tension between security and rights will remain, and its key legal expression will be the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; the discussion will continue regarding questions such as when do security concerns prevail over rights, and what is the proper balance between protecting existence and protecting the human essence — a formulation which reaches the core of the dilemma. We will continue to deliberate the question of what is the range between the commandment “take therefore good heed unto yourselves” (Deuteronomy 4, verse 15) in a group sense, and “man was created in the image of God” (Genesis 9, verse 6) and “the honor of human beings is great in that it annuls even a negative commandment of biblical origin” (Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 19b). The court seeks to find the balance between security and rights, such that the word security is not used in vain, but security is also not forgotten’ (E. Rubinstein, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Security Establishment,” 21 Tel Aviv Univ. L. Rev. (Iyyunei Mishpat) 21 (1998), at p. 22; E. Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law (2003), at p. 226).

This matter is especially obvious when we speak of the General Security Service. (See my remarks in my above-mentioned book, at pp. 268, 270-271, originally published in E. Rubinstein, “Security and Law: Trends,” 44 Hapraklit 409 (October 1999); see also E. Rubinstein, “On Security and Human Rights During the Struggle Against Terrorism,” 16D Law and the Military 765 (2003). As N. Alterman wrote, as quoted in Paths of Government and Law, supra, at p. 271, in his poem “Security Needs, Following One of the Searches, 1950” (Seventh Column 1, at p. 3279): “A state is not built with white gloves and the work is not always clean and pure-hearted — this is true! It seems that to some degree, we allow ourselves a small luxury of dirt.” Long before the “age of human rights”, the poet warned us against sliding into the commission of improper acts. And I would bring a “general” parallel from another piece of his poetry, which refers to the concealment of information from the public regarding a security trial (see, as background, M. Finkelstein, “The ‘Seventh Column’ and ‘Purity of Arms’ — Nathan Alterman on Security, Morality and Law” ?20(a) Law and the Military 177 (2009)). The poet wrote the following words (Seventh Column 2, at p. 358):

‘Thus, it is not only that these matters should not be kept confidential, not only that the doors of the courtroom may not be locked . . . the deliberation must go beyond its framework, all must be dealt with under the light of day.’

And the words of the American Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, are often recalled and cited “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . .”.

7.    Indeed, the struggle to arrive at  a balance between security and rights, using a sensitive scale and fine-tuned tools, runs like a shining light through this Court’s case law. Because Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, its approach to the matter of the ethics of the struggle against terror must draw inspiration from Jewish law as well. In HCJ 9441/07 Igbar v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria [44], Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein’s remarks (from “The Patriarch Abraham’s Ethics of War,” Parshat Lech Lecha, 5766, websitehanas of Yeshivat Har Etzion) are cited:

‘We must continue to walk in the path outlined for us by our father Abraham (regarding the way he conducted his war — E.R.) and be sensitive to morality and justice even in the middle of a just war and struggle, which are themselves correct.’

See also J. Ungar, “Fear Not Abraham — on Jewish Military Ethics,” Portion of the Week (A. Hacohen and M. Wigoda, eds.), at p. 30; A. HaCohen, “‘I am for Peace; But When I Speak, They Are For War’: Law and Morality at a Time of War,” Portion of the Week, at p. 260.

8.    In HCJ 1546/06, Gazawi v. Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria [45], the Court, referring to the need for a substantial interrogation of every detainee, held as follows:

‘Within the basic boundaries of human dignity — and the rules relating to this apply to all, even to those who are suspected of having committed the most serious and even despicable and depraved crimes, acts committed by those who are as far from human dignity as east is from west — there is an obligation to interrogate a person shortly after his arrest, while presenting to him the information that can be shown to him, the information which is not classified and which may therefore be disclosed. The purpose of allowing this, beyond the provision of the opportunity to raise arguments concerning mistaken identity, etc., is that a person may not be detained without having been given every opportunity, even if he does not make use of it, to present a version that refutes the justification for his arrest, and to attempt to persuade . . .’

As Professor A. Rosen-Tzvi wrote (Hapraklit, Jubilee Volume -1993, ed. in chief, A. Gabrieli, ed., M. Deutsch), 77, at p. 78:

‘ . . . The reality of security dangers does not negate the law, just as the enormity of crime does not cancel the need to grant basic rights to the person being interrogated, or to a defendant. The law is not silenced by security needs. Security must also adapt itself to law, but at the same time, a particular security situation requires the law to adjust itself within the framework of the proper balancing between law and life’.

See also CrimPet 10879/05 Al-Abid v. State of Israel [46]:

‘The security reality of the state involves real security needs, and the enemies of the state and those who help them or those involved in terrorism . . . often act in a sophisticated manner while presenting new challenges to the security and enforcement authorities . . . the security challenges weigh in on one side, and the need to guard the rights of the defendant, including his constitutional rights, weighs in on the other side; each case requires a careful balancing’.

We are faced, in examining the proportionality of the Temporary Provision in this proceeding, with the duty to act fairly, on the one hand, and the need to find a balance, on the other hand.

Legislative proceedings and parliamentary supervision

9.    It is now necessary to note, in brief, that the Knesset deliberations regarding the legislation that is the subject of this case — deliberations that were held in the plenum and in the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice — involved a great deal of discussion of s. 5 (s. 6 of the Draft Law). The Draft Law was submitted along with a great emphasis on the necessity of continuous interrogations (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 16.3.2006, at p. 2) and the change that had taken place when the military administration of Gaza ended in the summer of 2005. During the Committee’s hearing on 16 March 2006, the Committee’s chairman, MK Michael Eitan, stressed the challenge presented by the need to strike a proper balance (ibid., at p. 3). At the same session Dr. Yuval Shani of the Hebrew University noted (ibid., at p. 14) the difficulty presented by the combination of a hearing held in the defendant’s absence — something which can, by itself, be justified by special security needs — and a situation in which the defendant has been prevented from meeting with an attorney. The representative of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Attorney Lila Margalit, asked whether it was legitimate for a democratic state not to allow a suspect to appear in court because of the need for a continuous interrogation since “judicial supervision has an additional function [beyond the extension of the detention — E.R.], which is the viewing of the suspect. The fact that the suspect is removed from the interrogation unit and physically reaches the court has great significance with respect to his ability to present complaints . . . ” (ibid., at p. 23). Chairman Michael Eitan responded (ibid., at p. 24) that the matter should be the subject of judicial discretion, since the court has the tools to determine when it needs to see the individual. The legal adviser to the General Security Service noted (ibid., at p. 32) that after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the physical disconnection had caused great difficulty with respect to interrogations. The Deputy State Prosecutor, Attorney Shai Nitzan, noted (ibid., at p. 44) that it would be necessary to attempt to persuade a judge, who wishes to be made aware of all, to allow the arrestee not to be present so as not to hamper the interrogation.

10.  The discussion of this subject was not concluded during the sixteenth Knesset’s term, and it was deliberated again by the seventeenth Knesset on 20 June 2006. The deputy legal adviser to the Knesset, Attorney Sigal Kogut, presented (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 20.6.2006, at pp. 2-3) the Draft Law as it was at that time (the proposal had been changed in the meantime), including the framework for the exercise of judicial discretion through which the court would determine whether it was persuaded that the interruption of the interrogation would be likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense, or the ability to prevent injury to human life (ibid., at p. 5). Several Knesset members discussed the question of the arrestee’s presence at a trial, as did Attorney A. Avram, from the Public Committee Against Torture (ibid., at p. 11-12) and the Deputy State Prosecutor, Attorney Nitzan (ibid., at pp. 27-28). Attorney Nitzan agreed (ibid., at p. 28) that s. 5 was problematic, but described the many difficulties involved in conducting a reasonable interrogation if the arrestee is required to be brought every day or two to court — “we therefore sought a solution for the matter . . . that it will be necessary to persuade the court to allow the hearing to be held in the arrestee’s absence. If we wish to enable the conduct of reasonable interrogations, we must provide a tool . . . I ask that you rely on Israel’s judges that if they are being sold a story . . . they will know not to buy it”. At the Committee vote on the section (on 20 June 2006), the Meretz, Chadash and Ra’am-Ta’al factions expressed reservations, seeking to delete s. 5, but these were not accepted. Reservations regarding this subject were expressed in the Knesset plenum (on 27 June 2006), when the Temporary Provision was approved.

11.  During the deliberation preceding the first reading of the matter of the extension of the Temporary Provision (on 12 November 2007), Justice Minister Daniel Friedman stated as follows: “It has become clear that the provisions prescribed in the Temporary Provision have been most essential for the enforcement authorities who are engaged in the investigation of terrorism crimes and in thwarting them.” At the discussion held by the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice (on 3 December 2007), the head of the interrogations department of the General Security Services stated, regarding s. 5, that it had been used on seven occasions through that time. Attorney Avram of the Public Committee Against Torture again noted (Protocol of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice hearing, 3.12.2007, at pp. 8-9) that “the hearing of the two sides is the moral basis for an adjudication . . . we are tying the judge’s hands. The arrestee finds himself in a position of inferiority and remains in a truly inhumane situation. He cannot go to court and state his position, and he cannot tell anyone of the manner in which he is being interrogated, he cannot tell anyone of any mistake that he has found . . . nor can he speak of any other matter . . .” On the other hand, the head of the interrogations department of the General Security Service stated that “without this, it is impossible” (ibid., at p. 123). At a different Committee hearing (on 12 December 2007) the issue of s. 5 arose again (in particular, s. 5(4), dealing with the possibility of concealing from the arrestee the decision in his case if the court is persuaded that “disclosure to the arrestee is likely to prevent the thwarting of the commission of a security offense or hinder an ability to prevent harm to human life”). It was again proposed that s. 5 should be omitted, but the reservation was not accepted. When the extension of the Temporary Provision came up for second and third readings (on 18 December 2007), MK Y. Levy stated, in the name of the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice, that “the Committee  . . . had received a detailed report from the Ministry of Justice and from security forces involved in the matter, and we had the impression that the security forces were using this law in a proportionate manner. The security forces had used these sections only in what appeared to be exceptional cases, which were few in number.”

12.  To complete the picture, it is noted that the semi-annual report to the Committee on the Constitution, Law and Justice regarding the exercise of the powers that had been granted, dated 9 September 2008, stated that s. 5 had been used twice (including the use of more than one sub-section). The Committee’s legal adviser noted that there has been “a substantial decline, primarily in the use of s. 5, which is at the center of the petition.”

13.  We see that the legislative branch considered the issue of s. 5 at length. However, I suspect that the transcripts of the Knesset proceedings indicate that the state’s representatives did not provide any information regarding the way in which the interest in saving human lives that are at risk is truly weakened if the security establishment does not have available to it the ability (even if it is dependent on the court’s approval) to conduct a legal proceeding in the absence of the arrestee, as described in s. 5. The Temporary Provision designed by the legislature is not limited to cases of “ticking bombs” and the protected value which is under discussion here is not limited to human life. The issue thus does not reach the level of near certainty and substantial and immediate concern for human life, and I do not consider here the question of whether, in certain circumstances, the necessity defense established in s. 34K of the Penal Code, 5737-1977 would be available. Thus, when considering the section in terms of the constitutional balancing, it would seem that the scales have tipped, disproportionately, in favour of one side — with harm being done, from the suspect’s perspective, to the significant value which is his right to due process — and this does not, heaven forbid, reflect on the court’s decency or that of the authorities conducting the interrogation and the prosecution. Instead, it relates to the condition of the suspect. We understand the difficulties noted by the security establishment in connection with the need to conduct continuous interrogations, and we cannot say that these are not significant in certain cases, but there are not many such cases, and in any event the duration of the first detention will have been determined by a judge who has examined the interrogation needs in the specific case, in view of the specifics of the party being interrogated. I would emphasize the following: the need to bring the arrestee before a judge is a fundamental principle in any proper legal system and is a part of the judicial genetic code without which there is no due process. Thus, this legislation lacks proportionality, as my colleague the Vice President described. Moreover, we note, simply, the principle of human dignity has shown us that an issue which can be resolved through other measures does not comply with the limitations clause, even if the particular matter has been enacted through legislation, even in only a Temporary Provision — when the constitutional right to due process has been violated.

Dealing with terror and legal limitations

14.  Here I wish to placate the respondents, to a certain degree, by adding that after the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] in 1999 — only a little more than ten years ago — the security establishment was very concerned (to put it mildly). I served, at the time, as the Attorney General, and many discussions were held in various forums regarding the implementation of the decision and the new situation that had been created, and various legislative initiatives were considered that were intended to make it possible “to survive the harsh decree”. And fortunately, the establishment has, over time, found solutions to the difficulties, through various forms of creativity. One year after the decision was issued, the difficult period entitled the “second intifada” began, and the tasks with which the security establishment was charged were very difficult; but it dealt with them, within the limitations established in that decision, with considerable success. The immediate aftermath of the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] was described as follows (Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law, supra, at pp. 273-274):

‘After the decision, the establishment faced a dilemma; on the one hand, the General Security Service believed that the decision had dealt a harsh blow to the effectiveness of its interrogations during a period in which, in any event, in light of the agreements with the Palestinians and the withdrawals that were taking place, its ability to interrogate had become limited; it therefore believed that regulatory legislation was necessary. This position is worthy of examination. Many believed otherwise, and that there was no chance that any effective legislation would comply with the limitations clause. One of the dilemmas that we also face is the matter of the protection of the interrogator who carries out his job honestly, as the decision prohibits the use of the necessity defense as a sword, and allows it to be applied only as an “after the fact” shield. I myself believe that it will be of the utmost importance that there be as broad a consensus as possible for any solution that is found, since I believe that in terms of values, there are none who are more concerned about security than are others, and none who are more concerned with rights than are others.

After the decision was rendered, a committee headed by the Deputy State Prosecutor, Rachel Sucar, and the Deputy Attorney General, Meni Mazuz, discussed the question of whether there was a need for legislation, and if there was, what kind of legislation was needed. The questions are difficult to ask, and they are questions of the “squaring the circle” type . . . . In the end, after all this, the events of Tishrei 5761 (October 2000) occurred, with the ensuing eruption of violence, which significantly sharpened all these questions concerning the relationship between security and rights, as well as other questions.’

In the end, the decision was made not to pursue legislation, and the security establishment found methods and channels of interrogation that fell within the boundaries of the existing law.

15.  We are aware that some of the interrogation methods that are currently used were developed as a consequence of the decision in Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] and that our current decision will necessitate another round of creative thinking. It can be presumed that the security establishment will buckle down following the issuance of this judgment, and will find ways that comply with the law’s requirements to improve the interrogations and to achieve its objectives. We note, nevertheless, that the situation here, and that which followed the 1999 decision, are not at all the same. In Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], this Court disallowed various interrogation methods that had been used for years — but in this case we are dealing with interrogations that had been conducted for years without the additional tools provided in the Temporary Provision. It is true that after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, there were more individuals whose interrogations were subject to Israeli law (and not to the region’s [military administration] law, which had applied in the past), but there is no reason not to apply to them the rules that applied prior to the Temporary Provision.

16.  In this context, I would add, that if the text of s. 5(1) had been such that its application was limited to cases involving the hindrance of the prevention of nearly certain injury to human life in the soon or near future, (which is not the case given the actual text of the section) — meaning that it would cover a “ticking bomb” situation (see also Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [20], at p. 845; Rubinstein, Paths of Government and Law, supra, at pp. 275-277) — it may very well have been able to pass muster from a constitutional perspective. This would be so even if in situations like this, the processes are generally urgent and rushed, with tight schedules that are likely to create problems of a different kind (see also paragraphs 22 through 27 below). However, constitutional judicial review can deal with a specific legislative arrangement, by approving or disapproving it, but such review cannot — either legally or practically — propose a more proportionate arrangement.

17.  We must take the bull by the horns. On a prima facie level, the authority granted in s. 5 is given to the court dealing with the detention, and the court can exercise discretion; the court, carrying out its function as a filter, will consider the circumstances and will ask the right questions before making a decision about whether to be satisfied with a proceeding at which the suspect is represented, but not present. And we must not forget that representation has its own value, and is also a basic right of a constitutional nature. Judicial intervention in such a case is not a simple matter (see, as a comparative parallel situation, HCJ 7932/08 Al-Harub v. Commander of the Military Forces in Judea and Samaria [47]). Nevertheless, I believe that the value of due process for one who is likely to be a serious offender, but who still enjoys a presumption of innocence and against whom no indictment has yet been issued, should tip the scales in the framework of proportionality. This section allows for detention to be extended without the suspect being present even when the interrogation involves a security offense that does not include a near certainty of danger to human life. Furthermore, the judge who determines the length of the first detention period will not necessarily be the one who will waive the need for the presence of the suspect later on, for the maximum of 21 days (which is a long period) — and this is a built-in difficulty. A situation can arise in which a second judge, sitting in the same court, can change the decision reached by his predecessor who had ruled that the court must see the suspect. In substance  — and this is the heart of the matter — it may be that the first judge, at the time that he determines the length of the initial detention, will receive a particular impression regarding the suspect’s situation, but the second judge will not receive this impression when the suspect is absent. I am also aware that this is a Temporary Provision, and that the level of the violation is therefore likely to be less. However, since this a constitutional right, the measure still impairs the concept of proportionality; the degree of harm to a right here is greater than is necessary.

The position of Jewish law regarding the presence of a litigant at his trial

18.  My colleague the Vice President has examined, from the perspectives of Israeli law and of comparative law, the issue of an arrestee’s presence at detention proceedings — both in terms of legislation and case law. I wish to look at the living sources of Jewish law regarding the matter. Although Jewish law does not deal directly with detention hearings, its clear position regarding the presence of a litigant at his trial, either civil or criminal, can be a source of inspiration in our case.

19.  Generally, this is an issue involving equality and fairness, and together with these two values — of justice. Its basis is biblical, coming from the language in Deuteronomy 1, verses 16-17:

‘I further charged your magistrates as follows, “Hear out your fellow man, and decide justly between any man and his fellow or a stranger [‘ger’].” You shall not be partial in judgment, hear out low and high alike. Fear no man, for judgment is God’s’ (emphasis added).

Note that the verse recalls not only the man and his fellow, but also the stranger; and although Rashi [an eleventh century major Biblical and Talmudic commentator – E.R.] explained the term “the ger”, according to the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 7b) as meaning a litigant who “collects much material against him”, the term “stranger” was translated by Onkelos [the Aramaic translator – E.R.] according to its plain meaning [namely, a convert – E.R.], and Rabbi Saadiah Gaon [a tenth century scholar] interpreted the term as meaning a “resident stranger”. And this is relevant to our matter, in which most of the arrestees involved — if not all of them — are Palestinians. Maimonides (the important twelfth century codifier and philosopher) ruled similarly (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 21, 7): “A judge may not hear the words of one of the litigants before his co-litigant arrives, or before the co-litigant was told ‘hear out your fellow man’.” In the same spirit, the Shulkhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat 16, 5) provides that “a judge may not hear the remarks of one litigant other than in the presence of the other litigant, and that litigant too has been cautioned regarding this.”

20.  It should be noted here that in Jewish criminal law, with respect to capital cases (dinei nefashot) (in which the punishment is capital punishment ordered by a court, and I stress this, because the phrase dinei nefashot is currently normally used to refer to criminal law in general) — it is required that the defendant be present. (See Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 79B: “a person’s judgment may not be concluded other than in his presence” — and this applies as well to an animal who is, under certain circumstances, brought to trial — “the animal’s execution is [treated] like its owners”; see also, Babylonian Talmud, Baba Metzia 45A). Maimonides (in Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life, 4, 7) ruled — for example — as follows: “If a murderer who was sentenced to execution becomes intermingled with other people, they are all absolved. Similarly, when a murderer who was not convicted becomes intermingled with other murderers who were sentenced to execution, none should be executed. The rationale is that judgment can be passed on a person only in his presence. All the killers should, however, be imprisoned” (emphasis added — E.R.); see also Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 14, 7 “. . . we complete the judgment of a person only when he is present.” Note that, according to Jewish law, a trial in capital cases is ended on the day of the judgment in the event of an acquittal, and on the day afterwards if there is a conviction (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 4, 1; Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 11, 1). This indicates that even a murderer will actually be exempt from execution if the judge was not able to see him at the time judgment was completed. The Bible states as follows (Numbers 35, 12) “the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the assembly”; and the law is as Maimonides wrote: “How are cases involving capital punishment judged? When the witnesses come to the court and say: ‘We saw this person commit such-and-such a transgression’, the judges ask them: ‘Do you recognize him? Did you give him a warning?’ (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 12, 1), which is based on the language of the Mishnah, Sanhedrin 5, 1, which includes (per Rabbi Yossi) the following language among the questions that are asked of witnesses: “Do you know him? Did you warn him?” It is clear that this involves the presence of the defendant. See also Maimonides, Laws of Murder and the Preservation of Life, 1, 5; Sefer Hachinuch, 409. Indeed, it is not for nothing that in the context of the “capital laws” of our time, s. 126 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Integrated Version), 5742-1982, provides that “[i]n the absence of another provision in this Law, a person may not be judged in a criminal proceeding other than in his presence.”

21.  As Professor E. Shochetman wrote (“‘Hear Out Your Fellow Man’ — Rules of Natural Justice and the Principle of Equality in Arguments Brought by Litigants,” Portion of the Week 36), we are dealing with the principle of equality before the court. As he stated, “the reason for this rule is that in the absence of the opposing party, the litigant who is making his arguments can formulate lies as if they were the truth . . . after the judge has heard the words of this litigant, and has already leaned towards ruling in his favor, it will be difficult for the judge to change so as to rule in favor of the opposing party after he hears the arguments put forth by that party”. I do not say that the government authorities would not tell the court the truth, but I do wish to note the dilemmas involved when only one side is heard. Regulation 57 of the Rabbinical Tribunals Regulations, 5733, provides that “the litigants are to be present throughout the entire trial, even if they have representatives, unless the tribunal decides that their presence is not necessary . . .” Professor Shochetman also noted that the “denial of a litigant’s right to be present at the time that the claims and evidence of the other side are presented is a violation of the right to a fair hearing . . . this is one of the principles of natural justice”. And he concludes by stating that “the commandment of ‘hear out your fellow man’ involves many rules, and the purpose of all of them is ‘and you shall judge with justice’”. He cites Maimonides, as follows (from Laws of the Sanhedrin, 21, 1): 

‘It is a positive commandment for a judge to adjudicate righteously, as it is written: “Judge your fellow people with righteousness.” What is meant by a righteous judgment? It is when the two litigants are made equal with regard to all matters.’

See also Shochetman, Litigation Procedure (1988), at p. 220, citing the responsum of Rabbi Moshe Isserles (the Rama), who lived in Poland during the sixteenth century:

‘Obviously, a matter may not be judged without the defendant’s claims being heard, because the Torah commands “hear out your fellow man”, and although the matter is simple, we can learn it from God’s behavior, because all He does is justice and His ways are pleasant and His directions are of peace; He began with Adam (the first man) by asking him “Who told you that you are naked” and He asked Cain “where is your brother Abel,” so that He could hear his arguments. A fortiori, [the rule applies] to a regular person. And our rabbis learned from the verse “I will go down and see” — that He taught the judges that they should not judge until they hear and understand, and it is learned [from here]. And even if it is clear to the judge that the defendant is guilty, he must in any event hear his claims first.’

This is natural justice in its essence — see also LCrimA 7284/09 Rosenstein v. State of Israel [48], at para. 9; H. Shain, Justice in Jewish Law (2004), at pp. 98-99.

22.  The matter is summed up in Vol. 4 of the Talmudic Encyclopedia, “Litigant” (Column 105): “A litigant may not present his arguments to the judge until the other litigant has arrived, as it is said ‘keep away from lies’ (Exodus 22, verse 7). When a litigant argues in the absence of the other litigant, he is not ashamed of telling a lie. Rabbi Hanina said this, based on the verse ‘hear out your fellow man’ (Deuteronomy 1, verse 16), and this includes the following as well: the word hear means to make it be heard, between the parties, when both are present together” (in accordance with the Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 7b, and Rashi’s commentary there).

23.  We see that Jewish law is very concerned with the rules of natural justice; it is true that the rabbinical judges had not been dealing, over the years, with the struggle against terrorism; but the litigation framework is clear and covers all. This Court cannot support a disproportionate weakening of the rules of natural justice.

Further comments on proportionality

24.  I also note that Professor Aaron Barak has examined the third sub-test as being among those suitable to be used in testing for constitutionality; he termed this test — following Vice President Cheshin  (in Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [40], at para. 109)  — “the test of proportionality in the value sense”  (see A. Barak, “The Test of Proportionality in the Value Sense,” Mishael Cheshin Volume, (2009) A. Barak, Y. Zamir, Y. Marzel (eds.), at pp. 201, 206). He terms this test “the absolute core of proportionality” (ibid., at p. 209), which, according to his view, “brings an aspect of reasonableness into the concept of proportionality” (ibid., at p. 211). Furthermore, in his article “A Principled and Proportionate Constitutional Balancing: A Doctrinal Perspective,” Barak Volume - Studies in the Judicial Work of Aaron Barak, supra, Professor Barak examines balancing — the metaphorical rule which is at the basis of the normative approach (see ibid., at pp. 53, 55), which is the “balancing between the importance that the single principle is given (beyond the proportionate alternative) and the importance of the prevention of harm to a constitutional right resulting from it” (ibid., at p. 63). The concept of the function of the balancing act, in his view, “is not to establish the scope of the right, but rather the justification for its protection or for its violation” (ibid., at p. 98). These comments are particularly apt in our case, and there is no need to expand.

25.  Jewish law also requires that a balancing be carried out. The basic rule, established by Rabbi Judah Hanasi [the President - E.R.] in Ethics of the Fathers 2, 1, provides as follows: “What is the straight path that a person should choose . . . calculate the loss generated by a commandment against its reward and the reward generated by a sin against its loss”. We can see this as being, in brief, a balancing, since here as well we are dealing with a matter that is given over to discretion, where there are more than a few unknown factors; see also Rashi’s commentary to the verse in Proverbs 4, verse 1, which reads as follows:  “Survey the course you take, and all your ways will prosper”; see also Rashi’s commentary to Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 8A, to the phrase beginning “and he who chooses the way. . .”. See also Dr. A. Hacohen, “The Principle of Proportionality in Jewish Law,” Portion of the Week 342, and the examples brought there regarding the need to minimize the harm done to human dignity; Rabbi S. Dichovsky “Proportionality and Coercion Regarding the Granting of a Divorce,” 27 T’humin 300.

Justice Naor’s position

26.  Before concluding, I will address the thorough opinion written by my colleague Justice Naor, which arrived after I had written my remarks. As noted, I also wrote (in paragraph 16 above) that it is very likely that a narrower version of s. 5(a) — dealing only with “ticking bomb” situations — could be found to be constitutional. My colleague also stresses that this type of restriction would involve a situation of a near certainty of harm. Even if such a legislative process is possible, I doubt whether, on a practical level, it would serve much purpose except in rare cases, and the question is whether it would be worthwhile to enact such legislation specifically for those cases.

27.  In any event, even if legislation regarding this matter is considered, it is doubtful whether the factual information that we have been shown here, with respect to the degree to which s. 5 is used as described above, necessitates the delay proposed by my colleague Justice Naor. Furthermore, my colleague discussed, persuasively, the matter of the “cumulative effect”, i.e., the question of why we are invalidating specifically this measure — the absence of the arrestee in court — and not, for example, the process for not allowing a suspect to meet with his attorney. She also discussed the question of whether  the “combination of two measures — which are each constitutional on their own — is likely to cause an unconstitutional ‘effect’ on a cumulative basis” (emphasis in the original); this question is indeed a valid one, although the accumulation of several factors often determine the balancing result in administrative law; but it is possible that the matter can be left as requiring further discussion, in light of the specific constitutional flaw we identified with regard to s. 5.

Conclusion

28.  Based on all of the above, I agree with the opinion of my colleague the Vice President, and I repeat my hope and belief that the security establishment can find appropriate solutions for the difficulty that it has noted, even though it appears that the practical scope of this difficulty is limited.

Justice E. Procaccia

 

I have given much consideration to the question of whether the constitutional difficulty regarding s. 5 of the Temporary Provision should bring about the complete invalidation of its provisions, or whether, in the spirit of the comments of my colleague, Justice Naor, the proper balance between the conflicting values justifies a decision to leave open a narrow possibility of permitting a deliberation in a criminal proceeding in the arrestee’s absence, under circumstances in which the needs of the interrogation involve the prevention of a danger of harm to human life, at the level of near certainty.

The ethical balancing required under the circumstances in this case is difficult and complex. It sets against each other the values of due process in criminal proceedings — which involves, at its core, the presence and involvement of the arrestee — and the needs of a criminal investigation, and in particular the he security aspects involved in the protection of human life which can often present substantial difficulties in terms of bringing the arrestee to the hearing of his case.

The decision to be made regarding these balancing questions is one of the most difficult of the decision-making processes. Nevertheless, it is unavoidable in a country in which there is a constant clash between the struggle for existence on the one hand, and a continuous striving to preserve human rights, on the other — and in which, each day, this conflict sharpens the proportions that must be maintained between protecting life and protecting life values.

The conduct of a fair trial for every person is part of the foundation of a constitutional regime. This is especially the case when the legal proceeding can lead to the restriction of a person’s liberty. The violation of this value of a fair trial touches on the deepest core of the human right to liberty — a right which is ranked highest among all human rights.

A fair trial requires due process. The value of due process in a criminal proceeding is a complex concept, comprised of more than one element. It contains many layers of procedural and substantive rights that are given to a person who is subject of the proceeding, and not all of these are of identical weight and status. Within the rich texture of the procedural rights and super-rights that are involved in a criminal proceeding, which together guarantee at a basic level that the proceeding will be based on due process, the presence and involvement of the arrestee or the defendant at the hearing of his case is one of the most important — if not the most important. The ability to realize these rights stands at the heart of due process. Without these rights, the person being judged is not involved in the determination of his fate; he is unable to make arguments in his defense; and the court is denied the opportunity to receive an impression regarding the conditions under which the person is being held, and of his physical and mental condition. Without these rights, there is a violation of a basic human right, which involves the possibility of a person’s liberty being denied. Without these rights, the judicial process loses an essential tool on its road to discovering the truth, and it loses all ability to examine and to supervise, as it moves towards a correct decision of the matter. The conduct of a criminal proceeding in the absence of the arrestee or of the defendant speaks of judicial proceedings held in the shadows; the horrors of such a phenomenon are an aspect of those dark regimes in which nothing is known of human rights or of judicial due process. The presence of a person at a hearing in his own criminal case is, indeed, one of the main aspects of due process, and without it, an important guarantee of the conduct of a fair trial is removed.

It is undisputed that an improvement of the means given to law enforcement authorities for the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the interrogations they carry out in the area of security offenses is a most important goal — especially when those authorities are dealing with matters involved in the thwarting of possible dangers to human life. Under certain circumstances, the interrogation can become substantially difficult if it must be interrupted in order to bring the interrogated person to court for a hearing. The difficulty is material when the interrogation involves the thwarting of the commission of security offenses, and the prevention of danger to human lives.

The balancing of the right of the arrestee to be present at a hearing in his criminal case, as part of his basic right to criminal due process, on the one hand, and the needs of a security interrogation, given its objectives and its importance — on the other hand — is complex and difficult.

Despite the special complexity involved in the balancing of values that is required in this matter, the violation of the arrestee’s right to due process caused by his absence from the judicial hearing being conducted in his case is so deep and so basic that it cannot be left to stand, even if it creates substantial difficulty for the security forces in conducting their law enforcement activities and their activity involving the security of the state. Justice for the individual — which is dependent on, inter alia, the individual’s presence at his hearing, and on his ability to exercise his right to defend himself properly against the suspicions and accusations brought against him — is one of the signs that identifies a constitutional system of law, and without it the value of due process is dealt a mortal blow. The value of needing to do justice, which cannot be realized in full due to the arrestee’s absence at his hearing, will have, in this context, greater importance than even enforcement and general security considerations — no matter how important and substantive they are. The weight of the value of doing justice and of maintaining criminal due process is so great that it outweighs even the public interest involved in a criminal-security interrogation. Israeli law has expressed this value preference — for protecting the rights of an individual within law enforcement proceedings, as being above considerations related to the public-general security interest — in other contexts as well. Among other matters, the use of harmful interrogation methods even in security cases has been restricted, with the courts giving clear preference to the protection of the rights of the interrogated individual over the security considerations (Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel [20]); the legislature also determined that evidence which is confidential because of security reasons must be disclosed if it is material to the defendant’s defense, even if its disclosure can do harm to a general public interest, including a security interest (ss. 44 and 45 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971; CrimApp. 4857/05 Fahima v. State of Israel [49]; MApp 838/84 Livni v. State of Israel [50], at pp. 737-738; CrimApp 9086/01, Raviv v. State of Israel [51]; CrimApp 7200/08 Sa’id v. State of Israel [52]; CrimApp 5114/97 Salimani v. State of Israel [53], at p. 725.

In the context of the dilemma that arises concerning this issue, the value of doing justice and of maintaining due process in an individual’s case will outweigh even the public interest considerations involved in the use of the most efficient interrogation and enforcement methods, even in extreme situations involving danger to life, when the appearance of the arrestee in court can cause significant difficulty for the activity of the authority carrying out the interrogation. We can hope that these authorities will be able to adjust their operation system intelligently to the framework of rules that are intended to protect the arrestee’s rights in criminal proceedings, in a manner that will best coordinate between the needed protection of human rights in the context of a judicial proceeding and the need to deal with criminal-security interrogation needs, and to maintain the level and efficiency of such interrogations.

I therefore concur in the opinion of my colleague Vice President Rivlin, according to which s. 5 of the Temporary Provision must be completely invalidated, without leaving any margin that would allow for the conduct of a judicial hearing in a criminal proceeding in the arrestee’s absence, subject to the general provisions of the Arrests Law.

Justice A. Grunis

 

1.    I agree with the conclusion of my colleague, Vice President E. Rivlin, to the effect that s. 5 of the Temporary Provision should be invalidated. This is because of the conflict between the section and the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. More specifically, I note that in my view, the provisions of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision are inconsistent with the principle of human liberty as it pertains to freedom from detention, as described in s. 5 of the Basic Law. I do not see any need to state my position regarding the question of whether the section in the Temporary Provision is also in conflict with other provisions of the Basic Law, especially regarding human dignity.

2.    Section 5 of the Temporary Provision effectively suspends the right of a suspect to be present at the detention proceedings being conducted against him. In my view, the suspect’s right to be present in court is derived from the right to liberty, either directly, or pursuant to the right to due process. What makes the case before us unique is that along with the denial of the said right, the law also allows for the possibility that another right will also be denied — the right of a criminal suspect to be in contact with his attorney (s. 35 of the Arrests Law). This right is a critical element of the right of any suspect to be represented by an attorney that he has chosen. In my view, this last right is also derived from the right to personal liberty, and it makes no difference whether the derivation is direct or pursuant to the right to due process.

3.    Theoretically, the authority to deny the two mentioned rights — the right to be present at the detention hearings and to be in contact with an attorney — can be exercised separately, rather than simultaneously. There is certainly the possibility of communication between the suspect and his attorney being prohibited, while the suspect is nevertheless permitted to be present in court. Section 35(g) of the Arrests Law expressly provides that when it has been decided to refuse to allow a suspect to meet with his attorney, the hearing regarding a request for detention or release or regarding an appeal, will be conducted separately for the arrestee and for his attorney “in a manner that prevents contact between them”, unless the court decides otherwise. In such a case, the judge must also serve as a type of go-between for the suspect and his attorney. What is clear is that in such cases the suspect may be present in court and can present his arguments before the judge, even if he is not permitted to communicate with his attorney. It is theoretically possible for a suspect’s right to be present in court to be denied, without his right to meet with his attorney having been suspended ― but this does not occur in reality, for various reasons. It appears that in every instance in which the right to be present in court during a detention hearing has been denied, the suspect’s right to meet with his attorney has also been denied. The significance of this simultaneous denial of the two rights (or, as my colleague Justice Naor calls it, the “cumulative effect”) is clear. In a formal sense, the lawyer may represent the suspect during the detention proceedings, but it is understood that the ability to provide proper representation under such circumstances is extremely difficult. This difficulty is added to the fact that the suspect is himself unable to be present in court. The judge therefore rules on the matter, in such a case, even though he is unable to hear the suspect’s statements. Although it cannot be said that the proceeding becomes an ex parte proceeding, since the suspect’s attorney is present, it does become a proceeding in which that attorney is acting with one hand tied behind his back and the court is provided with only a partial picture (as my colleague the Vice President wrote in para. 31 of his opinion). It should be noted that in the instant case, the two rights were suspended simultaneously. Nevertheless, we have not been provided with information regarding the duration of the period in which there was an overlap between the denial of both rights.

4.    There is no need to explain that under such circumstances, in which the two mentioned rights are both denied, there is a built-in danger that the process will not fulfill the due process requirement. However, even if there has been a violation of a fundamental right to personal liberty, this is not all that is be said of the matter — instead, it is necessary to examine whether the violation satisfies the tests prescribed in the limitations clause in s. 8 of the Basic Law. This examination must, in my view, relate to the period of time in which the mentioned rights are both denied simultaneously. It cannot be that a suspension of a right for a period of forty-eight hours is to be equated with its suspension for a period of twenty days. More concretely, it can be said that the proportionality requirement of the limitations clause requires an investigation of the degree of the possible violation of the right due to the simultaneous suspension of the right to meet with an attorney and the right to be present at detention hearings, arising from the length of time involved.

5.    The maximum period in which it is permissible to deny a meeting between a suspect and his attorney is twenty days (s. 35(d) of the Arrests Law). Regarding the prevention of a suspect’s presence in court, the maximum period is nineteen days (s. 5(1) of the Temporary Provision, which states that the period of detention that a court can order may be for less than twenty days; on the assumption that the day of the hearing is not included, we thus arrive at a maximum period of nineteen days). Thus, there is authority to prevent a suspect from meeting with his attorney, and to prevent his presence at the detention hearings, for a period of eighteen days. In my view, a period of such length does not comply with the proportionality requirements of the limitations clause — either with respect to the least violative measure test or the narrow proportionality test.

6.    Because the defect in the provisions of s. 5 of the Temporary Provision arises from the above-mentioned lack of proportionality (in its broader sense), I do not believe that as a matter of principle, there is any impediment preventing the legislature from adopting a different arrangement regarding the prohibition of the suspect’s presence at the detention hearings. Of course, any new arrangement of this matter must take into consideration the existing arrangement regarding the prevention of the suspect’s meeting with his attorney. In other words, in order for the new arrangement to comply with the proportionality principle of the limitations clause, care must be taken regarding the simultaneous application (or the cumulative effect) of the provisions regarding the prohibition against the suspect’s meeting with an attorney and the ability to conduct hearings in the suspect’s absence. A new and proportionate arrangement may take various forms. We note, inter alia, the possibility of shortening the period of time during which the two restrictions — the denial of the suspect’s ability to appear in court and the prohibition against his meeting with an attorney — would apply simultaneously. In my opinion, it is doubtful that the shortening of the period in which both applied would be sufficient. An additional possibility would be a significant limitation of the grounds that could be used to justify the prohibition of the suspect’s presence at his detention proceedings (see also Justice Naor’s opinion). It is important to find a solution that combines the two possibilities noted here.

7.    I do not agree with the view expressed by my colleague, Justice Naor — to the effect that our holding regarding the invalidity of s. 5 of the Statute should take effect six months from now, in order to allow the legislature time in which to respond. As we have been told, the authority to prohibit a suspect’s presence during detention hearings is exercised only rarely. For any particular suspect being discussed, it makes no difference at all that his case is unusual or even unique. What is important for the particular suspect is that there has been a disproportionate violation of his right to personal liberty. Thus, the rarity of such cases — those involving the use of the said — is not sufficient to qualify a defective arrangement. To the contrary, the fact that there are only few such cases justifies the immediate implementation of the decision to invalidate the arrangement. Furthermore, such immediate implementation will provide an incentive for the parties involved to act quickly and energetically so as to find an alternative arrangement which will be proportionate, and which will pass constitutional muster.

Decided as stated in the opinion of Vice President E. Rivlin, to allow the appeal as described in para. 35 of his opinion, holding that s. 5 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest of a Security Offense Suspect) (Temporary Provision) Law, 5766-2006 is invalid.

27 Shvat, 5770.

11 February 2010.

 

 

Full opinion: 

Yassin v. Ben-David

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5591/02
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, December 18, 2002
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: In the context of IDF operations against the terrorist infrastructure in areas of the Palestinian Authority (“Operation Defensive Wall”), thousands of suspects were detained. Due to overcrowding, some of these petitioners were transferred to the Kziot detention facility in the Negev region. Most of the detainees were detained pursuant to administrative detention orders. This petition concerns the detention conditions of these detainees.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence should be applied to the detainees, as they are being held under administrative detention orders, and have neither been tried nor convicted. The Court further held that the army must ensure that the detainees be treated humanely, and in recognition of their essential human dignity. In determining whether the detainees were being treated humanely, the Court had recourse to domestic Israeli law as well as international law. Concerning the petition at hand, the Court held that, due to inadequate preparation on the part of the army, the initial conditions of detention did not meet minimum standards. In the intervening time, however, the army had improved conditions to the point where they did meet Israeli and international standards.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

HCJ 5591/02

1.            Halel Yassin

2.            Ibrahim Puzi Abrahim Siam

3.            Iad Nebil Aish Alaba’ad

4.            Sha’ar Manjed Yusef Mansuer

5.            Mustafa Ahmed Basharat

6.            Mahmus Shabana—Hebron

7.            Ramzi Mahmud Fiad

8.            Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel

9.            Kanun—The Palestinian Organization for the Protecion of Human and Enviormental Rights

10.          The Center for the Defense of the Individual founded by Dr. Lota Zetzberger

11.          B’tselem—The Israeli Information Center of Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

12.          Addameer—Prison Support and Human Rights Association

13.          Alhak—The Law in Service of Human Rights

14.          Almrah Center—Legal Social Center

15.          Nadi Alasir Alfalstini—West Bank

16.          The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel

17.          Physicians for Human Rights

v.

1.            Yoni Ben-David—Commander of the Kziot Military Camp-Kziot Detention Facility

2.            Binyamin Ben-Eliezer—Minster of Defense

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[December 18, 2002]

Before President A. Barak, Justices D. Beinisch and I. Englard

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: In the context of IDF operations against the terrorist infrastructure in areas of the Palestinian Authority (“Operation Defensive Wall”), thousands of suspects were detained. Due to overcrowding, some of these petitioners were transferred to the Kziot detention facility in the Negev region. Most of the detainees were detained pursuant to administrative detention orders. This petition concerns the detention conditions of these detainees.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence should be applied to the detainees, as they are being held under administrative detention orders, and have neither been tried nor convicted. The Court further held that the army must ensure that the detainees be treated humanely, and in recognition of their essential human dignity. In determining whether the detainees were being treated humanely, the Court had recourse to domestic Israeli law as well as international law. Concerning the petition at hand, the Court held that, due to inadequate preparation on the part of the army, the initial conditions of detention did not meet minimum standards. In the intervening time, however, the army had improved conditions to the point where they did meet Israeli and international standards.

 

Basic Laws cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

Legislation cited:

Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law-1979

Criminal Procedure (Jurisdiction and Enforcement—Detentions) Law-1996, §§ 1(c), 9(a)

 

Regulations cited:

Emergency Powers Regulations (Detention) (Holding Conditions in Administrative Detention)-1981, §§ 5(a), 5(b), 6(a), 6(b), 8(a), 8(c)

Emergency Regulations (Offences Committed in Israeli-Held Areas—Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance)-1967

Criminal Procedure Regulations (Jurisdiction and Enforcement—Detentions) (Holding Conditions in Detention)-1997

 

Treaties Cited:

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War-1949

 

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]          HCJ 3278/02 The Center for the Defense of the Individual founded by Dr. Lota Salzberger v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, IsrSC 57(1) 385

[2]          HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 42(3) 801

[3]          HCJ 2320/98 El-Amla v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, IsrSC 52(3) 246

[4]          HCJ 8259/96 The Association for the Protection of the Rights of Jewish Civilians in Israel v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, IsrSC (unreported decision)

[5]          HCJ 355/79 Catlan v. The Prison Service, IsrSC 34(3) 294

[6]          CA 5942/92 John Doe v. John Doe, IsrSC 35(1) 536

[7]          HCJ 221/80 Darvish v. The Prison Service, IsrSC 50(2) 749

[8]          HCJ 1622/96 Abad Al Rahman Al Ahmed v. The General Defense Service, IsrSC 38(2) 826

[9]          HCJ 337/84 Hokma v. The Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 50(4) 136

[10]        CA 4463/94 Golan v. The Prison Services, IsrSC 52(5) 826

[11]        HCJLA 6561/97 The State of Israel v. Mendelson, IsrSC 52(5) 849

[12]        HCJL.A. 823/96 Vanunu v. The Prison Service, IsrSC 51(2) 873

[13]        HCJ 3114/02 Barake v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 56(3) 11

 

Foreign Books cited:

[14]        J.S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958)

 

Petition denied.

 

For the petitioners—Morad Alsana; Hasan Gabarin; Mahmud Gabarin

For the respondents—Shai Nitzan

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

President A. Barak

This petition concerns the detention conditions of detainees from Judea and Samaria who are being held in administrative detention at the Kziot detention facility.

 

Facts

 

1.            Both Israel and the area have suffered intense terrorist activity.  In Operation Defensive Wall, the government decided to pursue military operations against the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria.  Within the framework of this operation, many suspects have been detained. See HCJ 3278/02 The Center for the Defense of the Individual founded by Dr. Lota Salzberger v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank [1].  The detainees were originally held in temporary facilities which were set up in brigade headquarters.  After an initial screening took place, those who were chosen to remain in detention were moved to the Ofer Camp detention facility in Judea and Samaria.  Due to overcrowding, some of the detainees were moved to the detention facility in Kziot, which is located in the Negev, in the south of Israel.

 

2.            Kziot Camp was opened in the second half of the 1980s.  It primarily held administrative detainees from the area.  The conditions of the detention in the camp were the subject of a comprehensive examination by this Court in HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. The Minister of Defense [2].  The facility was shut down during the second half of the 1990s. In April 2002, once it became clear that Israel would continue holding a substantial number of detainees for security reasons, and that it would be impossible to hold them in Ofer Camp, Kziot Camp was reopened on short notice.  The majority of the detainees are being held at Kziot Camp under administrative arrest warrants which were issued against them in the area.

 

Arguments

 

3.            Petitioners complain about the conditions of the detention in Kziot Camp. Their chief complaint concerns the fact that the detainees are being held in tents.  Petitioners claim that tents do not provide suitable means of detention.  The tents do not shield against the rigors of desert weather, such as heat during the day and cold during the night.  The tents cannot be shut and, as such, sand, mosquitoes, crickets, insects and reptiles enter the tents and disturb the detainees.  The petitioners also complain of overcrowding in the tents. Furthermore, they contend that the food that the detainees are supplied with is insufficient and of low-quality.  The detainees, who are exposed to the intense heat of the Negev, are not supplied with cold water. The detainees do not receive sufficient clothing, and they are unable to launder the little clothing they do receive.  The beds are such that it is difficult for the detainees to sleep properly. The beds are actually wooden beds with mattresses that rise 10 to 15 centimeters above the ground.  As a result, many of the detainees wake up in the middle of the night to find their faces or bodies covered with crickets and insects. Petitioners claim that the amount of soap supplied is insufficient, and that there are not enough showers.  There are no toilet seats in the bathrooms.  The doctor is not easily accessible nor does he speak Arabic.  The petitioners complain that 220 volt electricity does not run through the tents.  Consequently, the detainees are unable to use electrical appliances, especially televisions and fans.  The detainees are not permitted to communicate with their families via telephone.  They are not provided with newspapers and books, nor is there a canteen on location.

 

4.            In respondents’ reply, they claim that the petition was submitted at the end of June 2002. As such, the evidence presented by the petition consists of affidavits submitted by detainees who were held in Kziot Camp in April, and the last of which was submitted at the beginning of May.   Those were the first months of the detention facility's renewed operation, which was reopened on short notice. Between the submission of the petition and the submission of respondents’ reply brief on October 11, 2002, the facility underwent many improvements. Most of petitioners’ claims have been resolved.  In June of 2002, the Attorney-General visited the detention facility, observed the detention conditions and listened to the complaints of the detainees.  During his visit he observed that although the living conditions were not comfortable, especially due to overcrowding and the climate, they were nevertheless reasonable in relation to the reality in Israel.  He added that the conditions did not substantially differ from those provided to the soldiers who carry out detention operations and security functions in the facility, or from the conditions provided to IDF soldiers in general.  While visiting the facility, the Attorney-General investigated various options for improving the detention conditions.  Since then, these suggestions have been implemented.  At the time that respondents submitted their reply the facility held 939 detainees, dispersed throughout four divisions.  Each division was divided into four sub-divisions.  Located within each sub-division were three double “12 tents,” in which 20 detainees were held. 

 

5.            Referring directly to the specific claims made by the petitioners, respondents asserted that the tents are not overcrowded.  Respondents claim that the tents in the facility provide suitable protection against the rigors of the weather.  The quality and quantity of the food provided to the detainees is satisfactory.  In the summer, they are supplied with a large quantity of ice.  The wooden beds and mattresses meet the same standards as those provided to IDF soldiers.  There is no want of clothing in the facility.  A fountain with a large number of faucets may be found in every sub-division.  The detainees are supplied with a sufficient amount of soap.  The level of personal hygiene in the bathrooms and showers is satisfactory.  There is an infirmary operating in the facility which employs three doctors and thirteen medics.  Medical inspections are performed daily in the facility.  When necessary, patients are quickly transferred to the central hospital in the Negev, Soroka Hospital in Beer Sheva.  There is also a dental clinic on location, which employs a dentist.  For security reasons, detainees are not permitted to use telephones to call out of the facility.  The detainees maintain communication with their families via letters.  The Red Cross visits the facility.  The detainees are provided with Hebrew and Arabic newspapers, and they are allowed to use battery-powered radios.  The Red Cross has provided games and a ping-pong table to each sub-division.  There is an operational canteen in the facility.  For security reasons, the sub-divisions are not connected to 220-volt electricity—all tents are illuminated by 24-volt light bulbs.  At night, after the detainees are accounted for, extension chords are utilized in order to allow the detainees to watch television.

 

Arguments of October 15, 2002

 

6.            In oral arguments, petitioners admitted that improvements had been made since the submission of their petition.  Nevertheless, they claim, these improvements are insufficient. Petitioners reiterated their claims against the use of tents and the lack of 220-volt electricity.  They complained of insufficient bathroom stalls and cleaning equipment.  Additionally, they complained that snakes and mice had been found in the area.  Petitioners protested the absence of tables in the facility, which forces the detainees to eat by their beds, which consequently become filthy.  Respondents answered that the old tents had been replaced with new ones.  They asserted that the location is now sprayed for snakes and other animals.  However, regarding the issue of electricity, security considerations prevent any change in the situation.

 

Normative Framework

 

7.            It is appropriate to open this discussion with the normative framework of this case, as was done by Justice Shamgar in Sajadia [2].  This is in response to the possible claim that, since the detainees being held in Kziot Camp are terrorists who have harmed innocent people, we should not consider their detention conditions. This argument is fundamentally incorrect.  Those being detained in the Kziot Camp have not been tried; needless to say, they have not been convicted.  They still enjoy the presumption of innocence.  Justice Shamgar expressed this notion in Sajadia [2]:

 

An administrative detainee has not been convicted, nor is he carrying out a sentence.  He is detained in accordance with a decision made by an administrative-military authority, as an exceptional emergency means due to security reasons …. The aim of the detention is to prevent security hazards, which arise from actions that the detainee is liable to commit, where there is no reasonable possibility of preventing such hazards through standard legal action, such as criminal proceedings, or by taking administrative steps with milder consequences…. The difference between a convicted prisoner and a detainee being held in order to prevent security hazards, is manifest in the status of the administrative detainee and his detention conditions.

 

Sajadia, [2] at 821. In the same spirit Justice Bach noted:

 

With all due respect for security considerations, we must not forget that we are talking about detainees deprived of liberty without their having been convicted of any crime in standard criminal proceedings. We must not be satisfied with a situation in which the detention conditions of these detainees are poorer than the conditions of prisoners who have been sentenced to imprisonment after being convicted.

 

Sajadia, [2] at 831. In a different context, Justice Zamir indicated that:

 

Administrative detention deprives an individual of his liberty in the most severe fashion.  Liberty is denied, not by the court, but rather by an administrative authority; not by a judicial proceeding, but rather by an administrative decision.

 

HCJ 2320/98 El-Amla v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank [3].

 

Not only should we not allow the detention conditions of administrative detainees to fall short of those of convicted prisoners, we should also strive to ensure that the conditions of detainees surpass those provided to prisoners. These detainees continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence. See HCJ 8259/96 The Association for the Protection of the Rights of Jewish Civilians in Israel v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank (unreported case) [4]. This approach was established by the Emergency Powers Regulations (Detention) (Holding Conditions in Administrative Detention)-1981 [hereinafter the Detention Regulations].  The security considerations that led to the detention of these people do not justify holding them under unsatisfactory conditions. 

 

8.            The detainees were lawfully deprived of their liberty.  They were not, however, stripped of their humanity. In an affair that occurred more than twenty years ago, prior to the legislation of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, I remarked:

 

Every person in Israel enjoys the basic right to bodily integrity and the protection of his dignity as a human being…. Convicts and detainees are also entitled to the protection of their bodily integrity and human dignity.  Prison walls do not come between the detainee and his human dignity.

 

HCJ 355/79 Catlan v. The Prison Service [5]. This is especially true after the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, “which does not focus on the proclamation of the existence of fundamental rights, but rather on their essence, their extent and their practical realization.” CA 5942/92 John Doe v. John Doe [6]. (Shamgar, P.) Therefore, the army must ensure that the detainees be treated humanely, and in recognition of their human dignity. See The Center for the Defense of the Individual, [1] at par. 22.  The detention conditions must guarantee civilized and humane life. HCJ 221/80 Darvish v. The Prison Service [7]. Human dignity, which constitutes the foundation of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, together with the values of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, forms the normative lens through which we examine the dentition conditions of detainees.  This framework is not one-sided.  Human liberty is not its sole consideration.  Nor is national security its sole consideration.  The framework attempts to achieve a balance—at times delicate—between the need to guarantee conditions of detention as humane as possible and the need to guarantee national security. 

 

9.            An important legal source with regard to detention conditions is the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law-1979. The Detention Regulations were set out pursuant to the grant of authority contained in this law. These regulations set forth the standards that govern the detention conditions of those who are administratively detained in Israel.  They also apply to whoever is detained in the area pursuant to security legislation.  This is established in regulation 6(b) of the Emergency Regulations (Offences Committed in Israeli-Held Areas—Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance)-1967, which states:

 

Where an arrest warrant or detention order has been issued against any person in the area, pursuant to the proclamation or the order of a commander, such a warrant or order may be executed in Israel in the same manner that arrest warrants and detention orders are executed in Israel; and that person may be transferred, for detention, to the area where the crime was committed.

 

In Sajadia [2] the court held, based on this regulation, that Kziot Camp must heed the Detention Regulations as well. See also HCJ 1622/96 Abad Al Rahman Al Ahmed v. The General Defense Service [8].   Regulation 5(a) of these regulations states that “a detainee in a detention facility shall receive the same meal portion provided to the jailers in that detention location.”  The regulations do not specify that there must be an operative canteen in the facility.  However, they do specify that “in a detention facility which has a canteen, the commanding officer may permit the detainees to purchase goods there.”  The regulations also state that “a detainee is entitled to receive medical treatment and medical equipment, as is demanded by his health condition.” See Regulation 6(b).  Regulation 6(a) specifies that “a detainee shall be examined monthly by a doctor designated by the commander, and at any time where it becomes necessary to do so.” The Detention Regulations also state that “a detainee is entitled … to receive bathing and cleaning materials as necessary,” regulation 8(a), as is he entitled “to receive newspapers and books for reading, as has been decided by the commander” regulation 8(c). 

 

10.            Aside from these regulations, which concern the conditions of administrative detention, comprehensive rules concerning the conditions of “regular” detention may be found in other legislation and regulations.  Section 9(a) of the Criminal Procedure (Jurisdiction and Enforcement—Detentions) Law-1996 states that “a detainee shall be held under suitable conditions, which shall not harm his health or dignity.” Detailed instructions may be found in the Criminal Procedure Regulations (Jurisdiction and Enforcement—Detentions) (Holding Conditions in Detention)-1997. 

We shall now turn to the provisions of international law regarding detention conditions.

 

International Law

 

11.          Israel is not an isolated island. She a member of an international system, which has set out standards concerning conditions of detention.  The most significant of these may be found in article 10(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which states:

 

All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.

 

This rule, which has the force of customary international law, see The Center for the Defense of the Individual, [1] at par. 23, is in harmony with the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which protects the dignity of all persons, including detainees.  Another important source of international law is the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. These principles were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1988.  They establish principles for all forms of detention, including administrative detention. These principles, even if they are not directly binding in internal Israeli law, set forth standards by which any reasonable government authority should act. In this matter we must also refer to article 11(1) of the Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on Human Rights and Fight Against Terrorism, which asserts that:

 

A person deprived of his/her liberty for terrorist activities must in all circumstances be treated with due respect for human dignity.

 

12.          The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War [hereinafter The Fourth Geneva Convention] provides an additional legal source for examination of the detention conditions in Kziot Camp.  This convention sets forth comprehensive arrangements concerning conditions of detention. The validity of the convention with regard to the detention conditions at Kziot is not a subject of dispute before us, as Israel sees itself as bound by the humanitarian provisions of the convention. We have reviewed the details of these provisions in The Center for the Protection of the Individual [1], at par.23.

 

13.          Israeli common law provides an additional legal source concerning this matter.  Our common law includes a long list of judgments concerning the conditions of detention in Israel.  These judgments are founded on the need to strike a proper balance between the liberty of the individual and the security needs of the public. Justice M. Elon explained the guiding principle of this balance:

 

It is an important principle that every civil right to which a person is entitled is preserved even when he is imprisoned or detained. Imprisonment does not deprive anyone of any right, unless such deprivation is an inherent part of detention—such as taking away one’s freedom of movement—or where an explicit statute refers to this matter.

 

HCJ 337/84 Hokma v. The Minister of the Interior, [9] at 832. In the same spirit Justice Matza wrote:

 

It is a firmly established precept that, even between prison walls, a person’s fundamental rights “survive.” Such rights belong to the prisoner (as well as the detainee) even within his prison cell. The only exceptions to this rule are the prisoner’s right to freedom of movement and other limitations which are inherent to depriving him of his personal liberty, or which are based on explicit legal instructions.

 

CA 4463/94 Golan v. The Prison Services, [10] at 152-53. Justice Matza continued, [10] at 155:

 

We do not allow the deprivation of basic human rights, which the prisoners require. These rights consists not only of the prisoner’s right to eat, drink and sleep, but also the right to have these needs supplied in a civilized manner.

 

These decisions and others like them, whether directly or indirectly, provide standards by which we can examine the detention conditions in Kziot. See, e.g., HCJLA 6561/97 The State of Israel v. Mendelson [11]; HCJL.A. 823/96 Vanunu v. The Prison Service [12]. Furthermore, Israeli administrative law applies to the actions of every government authority in Israel. Thus, these principles apply to the actions of respondents, including the establishment and maintenance of detention conditions.  As such, the detention conditions must be reasonable and proportional. See Center for the Defense of the Individual [1]. One may learn about the standards of reasonableness and proportionality from the Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, which were adopted by the United Nations in 1955. See Droish, [7] at 539; Sajadia, [2] at 832.  These standards apply to all forms of imprisonment, including detention.  We reviewed the details of these instructions in Center for the Defense of the Individual, [1] at par.23.

 

From the General to the Specific

 

14.          Soon after the reopening of Kziot Camp, conditions of detention there underwent changes.  This reopening was done hastily and without preparation.  The detention conditions encountered by the first detainees, whose affidavits are attached to this petition, did not meet the necessary minimum standards. There was no justification for this.  Operation Defensive Wall was planned in advance.  Its main goal was “to prevail over the Palestinian terror infrastructure, and to prevent the recurrence of the terror attacks which have plagued Israel.” See HCJ 3114/02 Barake v. The Minister of Defense [13]. It was obvious to all—or at least should have been obvious—that one of the consequences of the operation would be a large number of detainees.  As such, it was necessary to prepare detention facilities in advance, which would satisfy minimum standards.  This was not done.

 

15.          In time, the conditions were improved and the necessary minimum standards were met.  In certain matters, the conditions now exceed minimum standards.  For example, the tents are no longer overcrowded; the quantity and quality of the food supplied is satisfactory.  The detainees are supplied with an adequate quantity of ice.  There are sufficient changes of clothes available.  The conditions of personal hygiene, as well as the general level of sanitation, are both satisfactory.  The medical treatment is satisfactory.  The detainees are provided with newspapers, and they are allowed to use battery-operated radios.  In each section there are ball games and a ping-pong table.  There is an operational canteen on location.  In fact, during oral arguments, respondents dropped many of the claims raised in their petition.  We will therefore focus on a number of issues, which have not been resolved.

 

16.          The first issue relates to the detainees’ being held in tents.  According to petitioners, the environmental conditions in the Negev—with regard to weather conditions, as well as with regard to the sand and insects that easily penetrate the tents—require that the detainees not be held in tents.

 

 In their reply respondents emphasized that the tents provide suitable protection against the rigors of Israeli weather.  They added that thousands of soldiers, including those who supervise the detainees in Kziot, regularly reside in tents for long periods of time. However, it must be noted that, while the conditions of the soldiers are both important and relevant to this petition, they cannot provide a decisive answer. Furthermore, the Detention Regulations do not address this matter. Even so, it has been accepted practice—both in Kziot and in the military prison in Megiddo—that detainees and prisoners reside in tents.

 

17.          Article 85 of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerns living conditions.  It states that the detaining authority must ensure that the detainees:

 

[B]e accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigors of the climate and the effects of war.

 

In Pictet’s explanation of this rule, he asks:

 

Could the term ‘buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regard hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigors of the climate and the effects of war’ be taken to mean camps made up of tents?   This practice is allowed in the case of prisoners of war where the Detaining Powers follow the same procedure for their own troops.  During the Second World War it proved satisfactory in certain climates when some essential improvements had been carried out (cement floors, brick walls, stone paths and access roads).  The same latitude, however could hardly be granted with regard to civilian internees and it seems clear that ‘buildings or quarters’ must be taken to mean structures of a permanent character.

 

See J.S. Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 386 (1958). I doubt that Pictet’s interpretation is correct.  It seems that a better approach would vary according to the time and place.  It depends upon the nature of the tents on the one hand, and the conditions of the location on the other.  Additionally, a significant factor is whether the detention is short-term or long-term, whether it lasts months or even years.  Ultimately, the test is one of reasonableness and proportionality. Thus, we call for this matter to be investigated.

 

18.          The second issue is the height of the beds. Petitioners complain of the height of the beds being 10-15 centimeters.  They claim that, as a result, many of the detainees find their faces covered with insects, which easily enter the tents.  In response, respondents argued that the detainees have makeshift beds, which they independently built from the cots found in the sub-sections of the facility.  Whether or not this answer has resolved the problem is unclear.  We ask that this matter be thoroughly reexamined.  For as long as the detainees remain in tents, the army should do all in its power to provide the detainees with reasonable sleeping conditions.   The fact that detainees built make-shift beds with their own hands points to the existence of a problem. This fact also indicates that making the beds higher does not raise security issues.  In these circumstances, the obligation to resolve this problem rests on respondents. They must address this issue.

 

19.          The third matter which has not been resolved is the absence of toilet seats in the bathrooms.  Respondent's reply does not specifically refer to this matter, save the general statement that the authorities consider the level of personal hygiene satisfactory.  This matter also requires reexamination.

 

20.          The fourth unresolved issue is the absence of tables for eating.  In The Center for the Defense of the Individual [1], respondents argued that this matter raises security issues. Respondents did not repeat this argument here. Instead, they argued that erecting tables would cause overcrowding. We presume that, for those who request it, eating on tables, as opposed to on the floor, is one of the conditions which “guarantee civilized and humane life.” Darvish [7], at 538 (H. Cohen, D.P.) Other than their general argument regarding lack of space, we received no relevant explanation from the respondents.  We ask that this matter be thoroughly examined and satisfactorily resolved.

 

Again in the Matter of Detention Conditions and Judicial Review

 

21.          In this petition we have dealt with the fine details of detention conditions.  Such is our duty, and we do not take it lightly.  Nevertheless, this is not an optimal arrangement, neither from the perspective of the rights of the detainee, nor from a security perspective.  It is necessary that there be an “intermediate body” between the detention authorities and the High Court of Justice.  Such a body must be able to carry out prolonged surveillance and supervision.  The body must be well informed about security requirements and the needs of the detainees and must be able to advise the respondents about all matters regarding detention conditions.  Justice Shamgar emphasized the need for such an arrangement in Sajadia, [2] at 825-26:

 

As such, we find it appropriate to direct the respondents' attention towards the need to determine efficient manners of inspection and supervision. Our suggestion is that the respondents consider nominating a permanent advisory committee, which will carry out constant inspection and will report and advise the respondent on the matter of the detention conditions in the Kziot detention facility.  The head of the committee can be a senior military judge from the military tribunal units, and the committee may consist of experts from the fields of medicine, psychology, and jailing management.

 

We are confident that the respondents will take our suggestions into account, and that the proper steps will be taken in order to realize them.

 

22.          Furthermore, it should be reconsidered whether it is appropriate that the army be responsible for the detention conditions of administrative detainees from the area.  It is our opinion the government should consider placing this responsibility in the hands of the Prison Service.  Such a resolution would allow a number of advantages.  First, the responsibility of tending to detainees and detention conditions will be placed in the hands of a body whose expertise is in this field.  Second, the Prison Service operates in accordance with a intricate system of law.  These laws guarantee that an appropriate balance is struck between security needs and the rights of the detainees.  For example, under these laws, the detainees will have the opportunity to submit “prisoner petitions,” which will ensure judicial review over their detention conditions.  We are well aware of the problems which arise from our suggestion.  We ask that the matter be considered both practically and normatively.  There should be an investigation concerning whether legislative modification would be necessary for the implementation of this suggestion, or whether it would be possible, and perhaps even necessary, to achieve this result in the context of existing law. See section 6 (b) of the Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, and the Gaza Strip—Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) (Extension of Validity)-1977, and section 1(c) of the Criminal Procedure (Jurisdiction and Enforcement—Detention)-1966.

 

Petition Denied.

 

Justice D. Beinisch

 

I agree.

 

Justice Y. Englard

 

I agree.

 

Petition denied, as per the opinion of President A. Barak

December 18, 2002

 

 

 

 

TRANSLATED BY:              Leora Dahan

EDITED BY:                          Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards  elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

Full opinion: 

Tnuva Co-op v. Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Employment

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 891/05
Date Decided: 
Thursday, June 30, 2005
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

The case concerns the question of once it was decided to order a party to pay costs, including attorney’s fees (hereinafter: costs), what is the standard for assessing the amount to be paid: whether “real” costs (that is costs expended by a party in actuality or that the party has committed to expend) or a different standard, such as reasonable expenses or minimal expenses.

 

The Supreme Court held that the Civil Procedure Regulations afford the courts discretion as to whether to order costs, as well as to the matter of their amount. However, there is nothing in the language of the regulations to determine the ordinary standards according to which costs must be ordered and to determine with cost is necessary for conducting litigation.

 

As a general rule, the law applicable in Israel – and in other countries is that the party who lost the judicial proceeding would be order to pay the costs of the party who prevailed. Ordering costs is a unique requirement, somewhat of a hybrid by nature – it is not a clearly tort based requirement and it is not punitive. Rather, it is a statutory requirement that grants the courts discretion. In any event, therefore, the mere requirement to pay costs does not indicate the amount that must be ordered.

 

The general determination as to the responsibility to pay costs is based on balancing several purposes and fundamental principles: ensuring the right to access courts; protecting the individual’s right to property; equality between parties; and managing the resources of the judicial system.

 

As a matter of principle, and as a point of departure, the winning party must be granted the payment of real costs, that is the actual expenditures that party made or had committed to make. However, a judge must exercise objective discretion and examine the amount of costs argued and consider whether these costs are reasonable, proportional, and necessary for the conducting of litigation considering the entirety of the matter’s circumstances.

 

Recognizing ordering “real” costs as the default means that anyone arguing for costs carries the burden of demonstrating their actual amount, for instance by submitting an attorney’s fees agreement, detailing the work that was done on the case, explaining the foundation for the billing of fees and providing evidence of actual payments or invoices for fees. Once the actual costs have been detailed and proven, the burden shifts to the opposing party – who lost the ligitation – to show why the requested amount should not be ordered, considering the costs’ reasonability, necessity and proportionality.

 

Generally, there is no place to distinguish between the state and any other litigant for the purposes of ordering the state to pay costs. It is true that ordering the State to pay costs is tantamount to ordering the public as a whole to pay them, but where the order to pay is justified and its amount is reasonable, the amount should not be reduced merely because it is the State who bears responsibility to pay them. Otherwise, the prevailing party bears the brunt of financing the litigation for the public as a whole. Though there is difficulty in proving actual expenditures made by the State, should it win the litigation and wish to assess its costs, there is no just cause for it not to be granted its reasonable costs considering the entirety of the circumstances in the matter.

 

Under the circumstances, weight should be given to the fact that the procedure ended without a discussion on the merits, a short while after it was submitted; that the Petitioner did not submit the attorney’s fees agreement – which is important for assessing the reasonable attorney’s fees under the circumstances – and that the case itself is not particularly complex, factually or legally, and revolves around the reasonability of the public authority’s action in light of previous proceedings. 

Voting Justices: 
Yigal Mersel
Author
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 891/05 – f

CA 2617/00

 

 

Petitioner in HCJ 891/05:  Tnuva Co-op for Marketing of Agricultural Produce in Israel Ltd.

 

Appellant in CA 2617/00:  Kinneret Quarries (limited partnership)

 

v.

 

Respondents in HCJ 891/05:      1.     The Agency Authorized to Grant Importation

Licenses – The Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment

2.     The Minister of Industry, Trade and Employment

                                3.     The Minister of Finance

                                4.     The Minister of Agriculture and Rural

Development

                                5.     The Israel Dairy Board (formal respondent)

 

Respondents in CA 2617/00:      1.     The Nazareth Illit Local Planning and Building

Committee

2.The District Appeals Committee – Northern District

3.The Galilee Society – The Arab National Society for Health Research & Services

4.Israel Lands Administration – Northern District

 

 

 

The Supreme Court

 

Before Registrar Y. Mersel

 

 

Application for costs

 

For petitioner in HCJ 891/05: Yossi Levi

 

For appellant in CA 2617/00: Yehuda Tunic

 

For Respondents in HCJ 891/05: Avi Licht

 

For Respondents in CA 2617/00 Isaiah Etgar, Itamar Shai

 

 

DECISION

 

1.     A party initiates legal proceedings.  The proceedings are concluded.  The question of costs, including attorneys' fees, arises.  It is determined that one party shall be charged with the other party's costs.  What rate of costs and attorneys' fees shall be awarded?  Is a party entitled to full reimbursement for all his expenses, and the entire amount of attorneys' fees that he paid his attorney ("real costs")? These are the questions that arise in the proceeding before me.

 

The Facts and Proceedings

CA 2617/00

 

2.     In this case, appellant submitted a contempt of court application.  The basis for the application was appellant's claim that respondents are running a quarry on the "Arab el Hayib" site (hereinafter - "the site"), despite the judgment, which determined that the permit for non-conforming use at this site is to be revoked, and that, in any event, no quarry should be run on it.  Respondents filed a response, requesting the rejection of the application.  Appellant then submitted an application to abate its application, as, according to its argument, it became aware that the facts basing its application had changed, and that the activity at the site is no longer operation of a quarry, rather construction of a military base.  Respondents consented to abatement of the application, but respondents no. 1-3 demanded their costs and even requested exemplary costs.  In my decision of February 6 2005 I decided to abate the application regarding contempt of court.  I further decided that petitioner was to be charged with the costs of respondents no. 1-3, as what it discovered in retrospect regarding the use of the site, it could have known in advance, and in any event, it did not explain otherwise, and in any case it should be charged with the costs of respondents no. 1-3 for that application.  Due to the charge for costs, the parties were given an opportunity to make their arguments regarding the rate of costs which should be awarded in this case (my decision of February 6 2005).  Respondents no. 1-3 accordingly submitted a bill including charges for attorneys' fees totaling 32,250 NIS (plus VAT).  They further argued that the circumstances of the case were fitting for an award of "exemplary costs".  Appellant, in its response, argued that its conduct does not justify awarding "exemplary costs".  Regarding the requested amount of costs, it argued that the document submitted is only a bill, not a receipt or an attorneys' fees agreement, and that the date of the bill is after the date of the abatement application, and even after my decision of February 6 2005, and in any case the amount appearing on it should not be awarded.

 

HCJ 891/05

 

3.     In this petition, petitioner attacked respondents' decision not to grant it a license to import milk powder from the US in 2005, which was necessary for petitioner's commercial activity.  It was argued, inter alia, that respondents' decision on the subject was not legal, as it had been determined in previous proceedings (HCJ 8258/03) that petitioner was to be granted sufficient time to initiate legal proceedings if the government should decide upon a policy that would prevent granting a license for importing milk powder, yet such time was not granted, and a new decision on the subject was not made by the government, and in any case – so it was argued – the decision not to grant a license for importing milk powder at that time was not legal, and should be annulled.  In a decision of January 26 2005, respondents' response to the application was requested.  In their response, respondents argued that petitioner had been given a hearing, and that in accordance with it, the intention is to recommend to the government that petitioner – as a monopoly in the milk market – not be allowed to import milk powder.  However, it was clarified in the response, that due to the date that the decision was made on the subject, the policy that had been employed vis-à-vis petitioner would not be changed, and it could import milk powder in 2005 as it always had.  In response to that declaration, petitioner filed an application for abatement of the petition and charging respondents with costs.  The petition was abated (February 23 2005).  Regarding costs, respondents left the decision of that request to the discretion of the Court.  In my decision of March 31 2005, I ordered that the respondents be charged with petitioner's costs, as it had been proven that the change in respondents' policy regarding granting a license to import milk powder had come about as a result of the filing of the petition.  Having no details regarding petitioner's costs, I requested the parties' stances regarding the amount of costs.  In an affidavit by the deputy director of the financial department of petitioner (of April 18 2005), it was argued that the filing of the petition involved direct costs of 103,739 NIS, including attorneys' fees (97,914 NIS); court fees (825 NIS), and auxiliary costs (5000 NIS).  In response, respondents again left the decision regarding the amount of costs to the discretion of the court, while emphasizing that there had been no hearing of the petition on the merits, and that the petition had been satisfied within a short time. 

 

4.     Due to the amounts of costs requested in both cases, and the scope of the disputes between the parties, the hearing of the two cases was unified on June 6 2005.  In the decision it was noted that "in both proceedings before me, a similar question arises: the question of the costs which should be awarded… the question before me is whether it is legal to award amounts of costs totaling the 'real costs' which were actually spent, or the standard for awarding costs – including attorneys' fees – should be different".  The parties supplemented their arguments before me on this matter.

 

The Arguments of the Parties

 

5.     According to the argument of petitioner in HCJ 891/05, as well as respondents no. 1-3 in CA 2617/00, they should be awarded the amount of costs which were actually spent ("real costs").  The basic principle should be that once it has been determined that a party has won the proceedings and the relief he petitioned to receive, the other party must reimburse him for the expenses he bore in order to attain the relief.  According to precedent  – so it was claimed – a party who has won a case shall not come out of the litigation against his rival with a loss, and thus there is a duty to reimburse for the entire amount of attorneys' fees that was paid.  That is the point of departure.  However, the court of course also has discretion and may consider various factors regarding the amount of costs, including the date on which the proceedings came to a close, and the reasonableness of the costs and the attorneys' fees, considering the character of the case.

 

6.     Appellant in CA 2617/00 argued, in its response, that the amount of costs requested is absolutely unreasonable.  Costs should be based upon the actual investment of the party.  In any case, its own bona fide conduct should be considered in deciding upon the amount of costs to be awarded.  Respondents in HCJ 891/05 added that attorneys' fees and costs actually spent are a relevant consideration which can be taken into account, but that they are not a central component.  The entirety of the circumstances of the case should be considered, including the character of the suit and its level of complexity; the relief requested and the relation between it and the relief that was granted; the extent of work invested by the party in the proceeding, and the attorneys' fees that the party paid or promised to pay.  It was further argued that the amount of costs that is actually awarded in this Court in similar cases is approximately 10,000 – 15,000 NIS, and that should be seen as a guiding standard, from which there is no justification to deviate in the circumstances of this case.  It was further noted in the response that the State is the trustee of the public, and should not be obligated to pay high costs, especially when it is not customary to charge petitioners who filed baseless petitions with costs.  Last, it was argued that it is difficult to appraise the State's costs if it wins a case, and thus real costs should not be awarded, as that will lead to a lack of balance between the State and other parties.

 

The Disputed Question

 

7.     Indeed, the factual and procedural circumstances in each of the two cases before me are different, but they share one common legal question, which is: when it has been decided to charge a party with legal costs, including attorneys' fees (hereinafter – "costs"), what is the standard according to which the amount of those costs will be decided?  The main dispute centers around the question whether costs should be "real", that is, the costs which were actually paid by the party (or those he promised to pay), or another standard, e.g. reasonable costs, or minimal costs.

 

The Normative Framework

 

8.     In civil proceedings, the awarding of costs – which the registrar of the court, inter alia, has jurisdiction to do (section 99 of the Courts Law [consolidated version], 5744-1984) – is arranged in a number of provisions in the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 (hereinafter – "the regulations").  These provisions apply, in principle, to proceedings in the High Court of Justice as well (see the High Court of Justice Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984, regulation 20(b)).  The general provision on the issue is determined in regulation 511(a) of the regulations, according to which "at the end of the hearing of every proceeding, the Court or the registrar shall decide, regarding the case at hand, whether or not to charge a party for the other party's attorneys' fees and legal costs".  Pursuant to the regulations, an award of costs can be made in two main ways: one is by an express determination of the amount of costs, and the other is by a determination that the party must pay costs, without determining their amount.  Where the amount of costs is expressly determined, regulation 511(b) adds that "if the Court (or registrar) decides to charge a party with costs, the Court (or registrar) may determine the amount of costs according to its (or his) discretion, subject to regulation 512".  Regulation 512, whose title is "Determining the Amount of Costs", determines that:

 

"(a) if the Court (or registrar) determined the amount of costs, it (or he) may award it, both regarding attorneys' fees and regarding legal costs, with one total amount for attorneys' fees and one total amount for legal costs, provided that subject to subsection (b), the amount of attorneys' fees shall not be lower than the minimum rate determined for attorneys' fees in the Israel Bar Rules (Minimum Rates), 5737-1977 (hereinafter – the minimum rate), unless the Court orders payment of a lower rate, for special written reasons.

(b) In giving an order for costs and in determining their amount, the Court or registrar shall consider, inter alia, the value of the relief disputed between the parties, and the value of the relief granted at the end of the trial, and may also consider the way that the parties conducted the hearing.

(c)….".

 

         

9.     As mentioned above, the Court can decide to charge a party for costs without determining their amount.  Such a situation is dealt with by regulation 513, which states that:

 

"If the Court or the registrar awards costs without determining their amount, the amount of costs will be the aggregate of the following, unless the Court or the registrar rules otherwise:

(1) Court fees, expenses for recording the Court protocol, copying it or photocopying it, expenses for serving Court documents pursuant to regulation 475a, stamp tax, witness pay, doctors' and other experts' fees, lodging and travel expenses for those who are in Israel, and any other expense legally listed in the suit file – as determined by the Chief Clerk of the Court according to the material in the file, with no need to file an application and ex partes;

(2) The rest of the costs of the trial as assessed by the registrar, according to a written or oral application, after the parties have been given a chance to make their arguments, if he is of the opinion that said costs were reasonable and necessary in order to conduct the trial".

 

10.   Thus, the regulations grant discretion to the Court on the question whether to award costs, as well as on the question of the amount of costs to be awarded.  However, meticulous reading of the above quoted regulations reveals that, practically, the limits of that discretion are not sufficiently defined.  When a court charges costs whilst determining their amount (regulation 512), although the regulation determines a minimum amount, from which it can also deviate (the minimum attorneys' fees set out in the Israel Bar Rules (Minimum Rate), 5737-1977 (hereinafter: the minimum fee; but see the Israel Bar Rules (Recommended Minimum Rate), 5760-2000)), there is no determination in the language of the regulations of the regular standard according to which it is supposed to award costs.  True, regulation 512(b) determines criteria, on the basis of which the Court can be guided in determining the amount of the costs, including the value of the relief and the conduct of the parties.  However, other than said instruction, it is not clear what the point of departure is regarding the amount of costs to be awarded.  That lack of clarity appears not only in the case that the Court determines the amount of costs expressly.  Indeed, regulation 513(1) sets out a list of types of costs whose amounts appear to be the amount the party paid for them, e.g. court fees, experts' fees, et cetera.  However, regarding the other types of costs – including attorneys' fees – the regulations do not determine their amounts; instead, they determine that a party will be charged with them if the Court is "of the opinion that said costs were reasonable and necessary for conducting the trial".  However, the language of the regulation does not clarify what that reasonableness is, and in what circumstances it will be decided that a certain expense – including attorneys' fees paid by a party – is necessary for conducting the trial.  In order to clarify what needs to be clarified, we must turn to, and examine well, the purposes and the principles at the basis of a decision to charge a party for costs of trial.  We now turn to that examination.

 

Awarding Costs

 

11.   Legal proceedings cost a lot of money.  That cost naturally includes the cost of conducting the proceedings for the court system.  True, in most proceedings the party who initiates the suit pays a Court fee.  But that fee, paid to the state treasury, is but a participation in the cost of the proceedings for the court system (see and compare HCJ 6490/05 Nader Mohammed Ali Sabih v. The Commander of The Army Forces in the West Bank (yet unpublished)).  It does not represent the actual cost of the proceedings.  In that state of affairs, there are countries in which the party who loses the legal proceedings is charged to pay considerable costs to the state, on principle (compare regulation 514 of the regulations).  Thus it is, for example, in Swiss law (see WALTER J. HAPSCHEID, DROIT JUDICIARE PRIVÉ SUISSE (1981) 295) and in German Law (PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STRUNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE (2004) 341).  However, that is not the question before me, and we shall not examine it further.  In the cases before me, the question is of the expenses of the parties, and not of the Court.  Indeed, legal proceedings cost the parties a great deal of money, both in litigation expenses themselves and in the attorneys' fees that they have promised to pay and have paid.  Who must pay for these costs of the parties?

 

12.   Different legal systems have different solutions to that fundamental question.  In most of the systems, the rule is that the party who lost in the legal proceedings is charged with the costs of the party who won.  So it is in Israel (see YOEL SUSSMAN, SEDER HADIN HA'EZRACHI (7th ed., Shlomo Levin ed. 1995) 540-541), and so it is in English law (NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE (2003) 825).  Thus is the law in additional countries such as Italy (MAURO CAPELLETTI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965) 247); in Germany (PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STRUNER, supra, at 341); Sweden (RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN (1965) 367-368, and Bengt Lindell, "Sweden", in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS – CIVIL PROCEDURE (1996) 163); in Canada (BRIAN A. CRANE & HENRY S. BROWN, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA PRACTICE (1996), 83); and in Australia (B. C. CRAINS, AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1992) 486).  However, even though that is the common approach, it is not the only one.  In the United States, subject to a number of exceptions, a different system is common, according to which each party pays for his own expenses, whether he won or lost in the legal proceedings (GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1993) 96).  It seems that this is also the fundamental approach of Jewish law (see Eliav Shohatmen, haChiuv baHotsa'ot baPsikat Batei haDin haRabani'im [Court Expenses in Rabbinical Court Decisions], DINEI YISRAEL 10-11 (5741-5743) 263; see also Eliezer Shenkolewski, Hotsa'ot Mishpat, 12 TECHUMIN (5751) 335.  Indeed, every system has its advantages and disadvantages, and there is no arrangement of the subject that escapes criticism (N. Rickman, The Economics of Cost-Shifting Rules, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (A. A. S. ZUCKERMAN & ROSS CRANSTON eds. 1995) 327).

 

 

 

The Amount of Costs

 

13.   As mentioned above, the law in Israel has long been that, in general, the loser is the party that bears the winner's legal costs (see, e.g. Goldstein supra, at p. 496).  That is the well known rule of "if you lost – you pay the costs" (see CA 26/56 Ta'am haChayim Ltd. v. Asri, 11 PD (1) 550, 553).  We shall take a close look at that rule – which is uncontroversial in the case before me – and analyze its character.  That examination will reveal that in fact, the principle according to which the party who lost the proceedings must pay the winner's costs, in and of itself, is not necessarily a determination regarding the amount of those costs.  It is therefore not clear whether the charge is of costs that were actually paid, of reasonable costs, of minimal costs, or maybe punitive costs.  The question therefore presents itself again: when a party is charged with the other party's costs, what should the amount of the costs be?

 

14.   One possible way of solving this question is on the basis of characterization of the legal basis of awarding costs, and as a derivative of it, the question of the amount (compare AAA 10219/01 Mis'viv l'Agam Ltd. v. The Municipality of Ramat Gan, 57 PD (2) 97, 100).  Thus, for example, the charge for legal costs can be viewed as a tort obligation (ex delicto), or a "quasi-tort" obligation.  Barak, P. discussed this idea, stating that "the right to costs is granted to the winner by force of tort law.  When a person carries out a legal proceeding against another person, and it ultimately turns out that a reasonable person would not have carried out such a proceeding, he commits a tort against him.  At times the elements of the tort of oppression will be fulfilled (section 60 of the Torts Ordinance [new version]); at times the elements of the tort of negligence will be fulfilled (sections 35 & 36 of the Torts Ordinance [new version])" (see BAA 663/90 A. v. The District Committee of the Israel Bar, 47 PD (3) 397, 403; CA 243/83 The Municipality of Jerusalem v. Gordon, 39 PD (1) 113).  The awarding of legal costs by courts is understood as a "procedural 'shortcut', intended to make possible efficient realization of the substantive right to compensation" (see BAA 663/90 supra, at p. 403). If the charge for costs is essentially a tort obligation, its amount should make the entitled party whole (see DINEI HANEZIKIN – TORAT HANEZIKIN HAKLALIT (GAD TADESCHI, ed. 1976) 25).  The amount of costs that a court should award, then, subject to the duty to mitigate damage, is that of the real costs; in other words, expenses that were actually paid by the winning party.  However, this approach is not devoid of problems.  The main difficulty in it is the fact that in most cases, it cannot be determined that the proceeding was a baseless proceeding pursued maliciously that constitutes the tort of oppression, or that there was fault in pursuing it, to the point of negligence.  The loss of the legal suit does not, in and of itself, mean that the suit was misguided and unjustified from the very beginning (see Zvi Zylbertal, Hotsa'ot leTovat haMedina [Costs Awarded to the State], 15 MISHPATIM (5746), 389, 393).  Assigning liability ex post whilst assigning blame ex ante is problematic (Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. (1959) 401).  In most cases it cannot be determined that by the very litigation of the proceeding the party acted unreasonably or unfairly (Shalev Ginossar, Abuse of Process, 17 ISR. L. REV. (1982) 401, 424); Shalev Genosar, Mitrad la'Yariv [Nuisance between Litigants], 2 MISHPATIM (1970) 221), and charging him to pay the costs of the other party on that basis raises difficulty (see Stephen Goldstein, The Influence of Constitutional Principles on Civil Procedure in Israel, 17 ISR. L. REV. (1982) 467, 497).  As has been shown, considerable difficulty arises from the attempt to deduce the amount of costs from the tort character of that obligation.

 

15.   The attempt to base awarding of costs on a punitive basis also runs into difficulty.  Awarding costs is not punishment of a party who has lost for dragging his adversary to court.  The amount of costs awarded in any case is not punitive, and should not be higher than the expenses that were actually paid out.  It was for good reason that the Supreme Court accordingly ruled that "awarding of costs is not intended to punish the party who lost his suit" (see CA 161/77 Haifa Assessing Officer v. Paz Oil Company Ltd., 31 PD (3) 505, 513) and that the Court has no jurisdiction to award punitive costs (CA(L) 551/83 Berger v. Ventura, 36 PD (1) 266, 270-271).  Indeed, the obligation to pay costs is a unique obligation.  It was rightly said that the jurisdiction to obligate a party to pay costs – an obligation ex lege in the regulations – is a "hybrid" obligation (see Ginossar supra, at p. 425; Zylbertal supra, at p. 394).  It is not a tort obligation par excellence, and it is not a punitive obligation.  It is an obligation by force of the law, which leaves discretion to the Court.  In any case, the amount to be awarded cannot be deduced from the very fact of the obligation to pay costs.

 

The Purpose of a Party's Obligation to Pay his Adversary's Legal Costs

 

16.   Indeed, the answer to the question what, in principle, is the amount of costs which the loser of the proceeding must pay, is to be derived from the purpose of the obligation to pay costs.  The principled decision regarding the obligation to pay legal costs is based upon a number of trends and basic principles which are to be balanced: one principle is ensuring the right to access to justice.  It is no longer controversial that said access is a basic right of the individual (CA 733/95 Arpal Aluminium Ltd. v. Klil Industries Ltd., 51 PD (3) 557; Yoram Rabin, Zchuyot Chevratiyot me'haSphera haDiunit, ZCHUYOT KALKALIOT, CHEVRATIOT U'TARBUTIOT BAYISRAEL [ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL] (YORAM RABIN & YUVAL SHANY eds. 2004) 765.  It also entails the entire public's interest in the rule of law and the enforcement of the law.  The question whether a party can afford the price of the proceedings, as well as the question whether he must pay the costs of the adversary party, thus has implications upon the right of access to the courts, and the ability to realize that right.  Over-deterrence of parties should be avoided (compare ANDREWS supra, at p. 827).  The second principle is the protection of the individual's property rights.  Obliging a party to pay for legal costs, whether his own, if he won the proceeding, or the expenses of the adversary party, if he lost the proceeding, can be considered an impingement upon the property of an individual.  Every rule regarding awarding of costs inherently includes objectives regarding protection of property rights.  The third principle is equality between the parties.  In light of the considerable cost of legal proceedings, every arrangement of awarding costs has a different affect upon parties with different financial ability.  Thus, for example, ordering a party to pay the costs of the other party is more meaningful for someone with little resources than for a person with money.  However, a rule according to which each party pays his own costs also acts differently upon parties with different financial ability.  The question arises, whether a given costs arrangement impinges upon the right to equality, or realizes it (see, e.g., Chen Barir, Bituach Hotsa'ot Mishpat [Legal Expense Insurance], 15 MISHPATIM (1985) 105, 131; HAZARD & TARUFFO supra, at pp. 209-210).  Last, arrangements for awarding legal costs are related to management of the resources of the judicative system, as it can be argued that the policy employed by the courts regarding awarding costs affects the number of proceedings heard in the courts, the essence of those proceedings, or the way they are litigated by the parties.  It can prevent baseless suits and cumbersome litigation tactics (compare ANDREWS supra, at p. 826, and Dirter Leiopold, Limiting Costs for Better Access to Justice –The German Experience, REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (A. A. S. ZUCKERMAN & ROSS CRANSTON eds. 1995) 265). 

 

Full ("Real") Costs or Partial Costs

 

17.   Different balancing points between the various rights and interests I have discussed can lead to different approaches regarding the question what amount of costs should the losing party be obligated to pay.  As a matter of principle, it seems that there are two main approaches on the issue: one approach is the "real" costs approach.  According to that approach, a party who litigated a legal proceeding and lost it, must pay the costs that the adversary party actually paid, regardless of their amount.  He must pay the costs of litigating the entire proceeding, including the attorneys' fees of the winning party, be their amount as it may.  That approach is, prima facie, based upon a sentiment of justice, according to which it is unjust if a person who won a legal proceeding loses money (see Zylbertal supra, at p. 394).  That approach involves deterring parties in certain cases from litigating baseless proceedings and from wasting precious judicial time.  It assumes a proper constitutional relationship between the property right of the party who won the proceeding (see further SHLOMO LEVIN, TORAT HAPROTSEDURA HAEZRACHIT – MEVO V'IKRONOT YESOD [THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE – INTRODUCTION AND BASIC PRINCIPLES] (1999) 26-27).  Its objective is preventing a situation in which enforcement of a right whilst preserving the rule of law is not worth the cost (compare Lindell supra, at p. 163).  However, this approach has disadvantages of its own.  There is concern that awarding full costs will create unjustified inequality toward parties who do not have sufficient financial capability, as well as of over-deterrence of such parties, who will fear being obliged to pay the full costs of their richer adversaries – costs which will, naturally, be even higher than theirs.  Furthermore, there is concern that ultimately, awarding "real" costs will unnecessarily make the cost of legal proceedings more expensive, and in the words of Landau J., "this crawling inflation intended, prima facie, to benefit the winning party, will ultimately take its revenge against the entire public, by great increase in the expense of proceedings in the courts (see CA 621/68 Guttman and Sons, Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hillel, 23 PD (1) 305, 308).  Against this background, great criticism has even been made of the arrangement in English law, in which there is jurisdiction to award actual costs, which are actually indemnity costs, and a custom of doing so (see ANDREWS, supra, from p. 831).  According to the criticism, the cost of legal proceedings, and the legal costs awarded in this way, are too high, and a reform in this field should be advanced, whilst placing a limit upon the amounts of costs awarded (see Lord Woolf's report, ACCESS TO JUSTICE – FINAL REPORT (1996) 78; see also A. A. S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolf's Access to Justice: Plus ça change…", 59 MODERN L. REV (1996) 773).

 

18.   The other approach regarding the amount of costs is that even though the party who lost the case must pay the costs of the party who won, that does not lead to awarding the full costs that were actually paid, rather, as a matter of principle, a lower amount should be awarded.  Lying at the basis of this approach is the idea that over-deterrence of parties should be prevented, while preserving the equality between them (compare CA 647/79 Iwon v. The Assessing Officer, 35 PD (4) 645).  It assigns great weight to the right of access to justice.  That approach also prevents unnecessary enrichment of the winning party – or his attorney – on the basis of awarding of excessive costs which are unnecessary (see CA 541/63 Reches v. Hertsberg, 18 PD (1) 120, 128).  It prevents seeing the judicial process as a "gamble".  At the same time, this approach also raises significant difficulties, as there is a certain extent of injustice when a party wins the case but does not win all of his costs.  That is an impingement upon his property right.  The rule of law, and law enforcement, are liable to suffer damage.  Awarding partial costs constitutes an incentive to litigate, and can encourage baseless proceedings, or improper conduct of the litigation.  It even involves a dimension of uncertainty, as the party cannot expect the amount of costs he will receive if he wins the case, and thus cannot plan his conduct in a sufficiently informed fashion. 

 

The Proper Amount of Legal Costs

 

19.   What, therefore, is the proper approach on this issue?  My answer to the question is: in principle, and as a point of departure, real costs are to be awarded to the party who won the case; in other words, the expenses that he actually paid or obligated himself to pay.  However, that is but a point of departure.  It is not the endpoint, as the Court must examine the amount of costs alleged, and verify that they are reasonable, proportionate and necessary costs for litigating the case, considering the entirety of the circumstances of the case.  The attorneys' fees and costs which were actually paid are thus relevant data in the framework of awarding costs, however, they are not exclusive data (compare CA 9535/04 The "Bialik 10" Faction v. The "Yesh Atid LaBialik" Faction (yet unpublished).  Costs are not a prize or bonus for the winning side, rather, a reimbursement of necessary and appropriate costs of the proceeding (compare CRAINS supra, at p. 488).  Thus, not necessarily every expense actually paid must be reimbursed, if it was not necessary for conducting the litigation and it is based completely upon the party's  overcautious conduct (compare Rechberger supra, at p. 71).  The costs must be proportionate to the proceeding itself and its essence, as that prevents putting excessive cost upon the loser, and encourages appropriate conducting of litigation on the part of winners (compare Lownds v. Home Office, [2002] 1 W. L. R. 2450, Woolf, J.).  Awarding costs and attorneys' fees is thus based upon employment of objective discretion in every case, each according to its circumstances.

 

20.   This approach, according to which real costs are to be awarded, subject to their being reasonable, necessary and proportionate, is based upon a number of reasons: first, in my opinion, such a rule reflects an appropriate synthesis of both aforementioned approaches, and it can realize the advantages of both of them, whilst minimizing their disadvantages.  The point of departure, according to which the costs that will be awarded will be real costs, advances justice toward the party who won the proceeding, and protects his property, as well as advancing, to a certain extent, efficient conduct of worthy cases in the courts.  On the other hand, subjecting that point of departure to the requirements of reasonableness, necessity and proportionality, considering the entirety of circumstances of the case, is intended to prevent a situation in which the costs awarded are too high, causing over-deterrence of parties, creating inequality, needlessly making legal proceedings more expensive, and impinging upon access to justice.  Second, although the language of the regulations does not determine the amount of damages to be awarded, in both regulation 512 and regulation 513 there are elements of the idea that it is not necessary for the amount of costs awarded to always be the full amount.  Thus, regulation 512(a) refers the adjudicator to the minimum rate for attorneys' fees in the Israel Bar Rules; regulation 513(2) determines that the amount of costs to be awarded shall be the amount that was actually paid if the registrar "is of the opinion that said costs were reasonable and necessary in order to conduct the trial".

 

21.   Third, it appears that, practically, the caselaw of this Court for years supports such a rule.  In the aforementioned CA 541/63, Berenson J. stated that "lacking a special reason to justify not awarding costs or awarding reduced costs for a party that won the case, it is appropriate to award payment of his full costs, so that he does not suffer a loss" (ibid, at p. 127).  This approach was repeated in additional judgments (see CA 208/66 Bank HaPoalim Ltd. v. Estate of Kali, 20 PD (4) 169, 170; CA 600/67 Haifa Assessing Officer v. Berger, 22 PD (2) 490, 491; CA 300/77 Rosner v. Binyanei T. L. M. Construction Company Ltd., 32 PD (3) 682, 689; CA 3769/97 Dahan (incapacitated) v. Dani, 53 PD (5) 581, 598).  At the same time, this basic principle was subjected to the standard of reasonableness:  first, on the basis of the assumption that the minimum rate of the Israel Bar constitutes a standard for the reasonableness of costs (see CA 309/59 Chevrat Mifalei Mayim Ltd. v. Fishov, 14 PD (2) 1121, 1140-1142; CA 600/67 supra, at p. 491; CA 403/78 Chevrat Mivnei Ta'asiya Ltd. v. Orenstein, 33 PD (1) 105, 108), but doubts were later expressed regarding the minimum fee as an appropriate standard for examining the reasonableness of the costs (CA 309/59 supra, at p. 1138; compare CA 77/85 The Electric Company – Jerusalem District Ltd. v. The Electric Company of Israel, 39 PD (2) 592; Yehuda Savir, Schar Tirchat Orech Din va'Yitsiot baBeit haMishpat – Gisha Chadasha, 28 HAPRAKLIT (1972) 477).  It has been said that "it is a minimum limit, and it seems that years ago it became meaningless in practical life" (see CA 9535/04, supra).  Note, finally, that the minimum rate's status today is but a recommendation, and the force of the reference in regulation 512(a) regarding this matter has in any case been weakened (see section 81 of the Israel Bar Law, 5721-1961 as amended in 5753; the Israel Bar Rules (Recommended Minimum Rate), 5760-2000).  The conclusion stemming from this caselaw, and from the weakening of the minimum fee, is that the point of departure in costs caselaw should be the expenses that were actually paid by the party – so that he does not suffer a loss (compare The Supreme Court President's Instruction of February 6, 1998, 51 PD (1) 1).  S. Levin J. discussed that, stating:

 

"There is no doubt that in the past, in certain cases, it became customary to award parties only a small part of the fees they paid their attorneys, and thus the party who won his case suffered a loss.  It is my opinion that the time has come to break free from that custom, and to award parties who have won their cases the appropriate amount, considering all the circumstances, even if in certain cases it is higher than the minimum rate (see CA 611/89 Drucker Zacharia Contracting Company v. Nachmias, 46 PD (2) 60, 68; CA 27/81 Module Mechanical Engineering Company Ltd. v. Imco Industries Ltd., 37 PD (1) 211, 213)."

 

The costs to be awarded are thus usually "real" costs.  However, these costs must be reasonable.  That reasonableness is no longer necessarily the same as the minimum rate in the Israel Bar Rules.

 

22.   The fourth reason for the conclusion I have reached is the fact that this standard is the common one regarding the amount of costs in many legal systems in which the rule is that the loser pays the winners' costs.  In them as well it has been determined that the point of departure is that the amount of costs to be awarded is the total of expenses actually paid, subject to their being reasonable, necessary and proportionate in the circumstances of the case (see PETER HURST, CIVIL COSTS (2d ed. 1995) 51-52).  So it is in Sweden (see GINSBURG & BRUZELIUS, supra, at p. 369); in Denmark (see Peter Fogh & Frants Dalgaard-Knudsen, "Denmark", INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE (CAMPBELL & CAMPBELL eds. 1995) 75, 115); in Australia (see CRAINS supra, at p. 488); in Austria (Walter Rechberger, "Austria", INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS – CIVIL PROCEDURE (1996) 70); and in South Africa (Roshana Kelbrick, "South Africa", INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS – CIVIL PROCEDURE (1996) 98).  Even English law, which is strict in its approach toward real costs, acknowledges a type of costs that, although they are real in character, must at the same time be reasonable and proportional ("standard costs" – see ANDREWS, supra, at p. 830).  Indeed, comparative law as well supports this conclusion.  Indeed, the appropriate rule is that the legal costs awarded be those that were actually spent, conditional upon their being reasonable, necessary and proportional, according to the circumstances of the case.

 

What are Reasonable, Necessary and Proportional Costs?

 

23.   There are different approaches regarding the determination whether an amount of costs in a given case is reasonable, necessary and proportional.  One way is to expressly determine in statute what reasonable amounts of attorneys' fees and expenses are, whereas if a party chooses to spend beyond that determined amount, he is responsible for it, and will not be awarded reimbursement for the extra amounts, even if he wins the case.  That, for example, is the approach in Germany, in which maximum amounts of costs are determined in law (MURRAY & STURNER, supra, at pp. 346-347).  However, that is not the way chosen by the Israeli regulations.  Israeli law takes a second approach, according to which the adjudicator has discretion to examine when the real costs are not reasonable, necessary or proportional in the proceedings, and to lower them accordingly.  What are the principles that guide this discretion?

 

24.   Attempts to lay out hard and fast rules will not succeed, due to the great scope of imaginable cases and circumstances, as well as those which, as reality teaches us, the future yet holds.  Nonetheless, in the language of the regulations, in the caselaw of the courts, and in comparative law (see, e.g. 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND (4th ed.) pp. 21-22), one can find guidelines and considerations that may be taken into account, among the other considerations, in the framework of the objective examination of reasonableness of the real costs of a winning party: first, the minimum rate is not usually used as a standard for determining costs.  It is the bottom limit.  It is however clear that when the costs actually spent are within the amounts determined in the minimum rates, there is usually no difficulty determining that such costs are reasonable.  Second, the conduct of the parties to the proceedings, including the way they conduct the proceedings (see regulation 512(b) of the regulations; SUSSMAN supra, at p. 541; Zylbertal supra, at p. 392).  "The way a party acts is an important component in determining attorneys' fees and costs" (CA 9535/04 supra).  In principle, the losing party does not therefore have to bear extra costs which the winning party spent due to negligence in conducting the proceedings, or overcautious conduct which is not needed in order to attain justice or protection of his rights (compare Kelbrick, supra, at p. 98).  Third, the requested relief or the size of the disputed amount (see regulation 512(b) of the regulations; SUSSMAN supra, at p. 541); there must be a proportional relationship between the requested relief – and the relief granted – and the attorneys' fees and costs (see CA 77/85 supra; CA 9535/04 supra; and HURST supra, at p. 52).  Fourth, the complexity of the case and the time invested in preparing it can be considered (see CA 762/76 Katz v. The Menachem Amir Co. Ltd., 32 PD (2) 500, 502).  It was justly said that attorneys' fees are for the effort expended, and are not compensation (see CA 309/59 supra, at p. 1140).  It follows naturally that the question whether the handling of the case required special skill and expertise can be important.  Last is the importance of the case for the parties.  To the extent that the case's objective importance to the party is supreme, or even critical, it is natural that he will wish to expend more resources in the litigation, and such expenditure will be more reasonable.  The examination is therefore one of the "retrospective interest" of the parties to the proceedings (see Habscheid supra, at p. 296).  Furthermore, in the framework of the importance of the case, additional aspects related to the importance of the issue raised in the case and the public interest in it can be examined (compare CA 9535/04 supra).  Indeed, the list of considerations is not a numerus clausus.  Each case must be examined according to its circumstances.

 

25.   Before returning to the circumstances of the cases before me, and the applications for costs in them, two comments should be added: the first regards the burdens of proof when dealing with costs.  Indeed, the caselaw recognition of "real" costs as a point of departure means that the party claiming the costs is the one who must prove their actual amounts.  Thus, for example, by submitting the attorneys' fees agreement (see Supreme Court President's Instruction of February 6 1998, supra); detailing the work invested in the case; the basis for charging attorneys' fees, and evidence of actual payment or charging of such a payment.  If the actual expenses have been proven and detailed, the burden is transferred to the other party – who lost the case – to show why the requested amount should not be awarded, considering the reasonableness of the expenses, their necessity and their proportionality.  However, parties and their attorneys routinely apply for award of costs without detailing the requested expenses (and attorneys' fees).  In such a situation, the applicant for costs should be seen as leaving the decision regarding costs to the discretion of the court, which will determine the reasonable, necessary and proportional amount of costs in light of the circumstances of the case before it.  The other comment regards the status of the State as a party in the framework of applications to award costs and attorneys' fees.  Indeed, as a matter of principle, and if there is no other justification to decide otherwise, the State should be seen as no different than any other party regarding charging the State with costs.  True, charging the State with costs is like charging the entire public with them, but when the charge is justified on the merits and reasonable in its amount, the amount of costs should not be lowered simply since the State is the party bearing them, as otherwise, the winning party bears the cost of conducting the proceeding for the entire public.  Furthermore, there is indeed difficulty in proving actual expenses paid by the State, if it wins the proceedings and requests assessment of its costs.  However, in this context, there is no prima facie reason not to use the standard used in those cases in which a party does not prove its actual expenses, which is a standard of the reasonableness of the expenses considering the circumstances at hand.  When the State wins – as a party – in a proceeding, there is no justification for it not being awarded its reasonable costs, considering the entirety of the circumstances of the case.

 

Implementation in the Cases Before the Court

 

HCJ 891/05

 

26.   Petitioner in this proceeding argues that the expenses it actually paid total 103,739 NIS.  Evidence to prove these costs was submitted, including detail of the billed hours and attorneys' fees, and receipts for expenses paid.  Respondents in this petition do not dispute the amount of expenses actually paid.  That is, therefore, the point of departure.  Examination of the rest of the circumstances of the case reveals that although the attorneys' fees are higher than those determined in the minimum rate, that does not, as aforementioned, indicate unreasonableness.  The value of the relief petitioner petitioned for was considerable, and it regarded a necessary component of petitioner's business activity, as well as the import quota for the entire 2005 year.  According to the petition, "importation of milk powder is an integrative part of the regular production scheme of the milk business in Israel . . . every delay in allocating import quotas is liable to cause severe breakdowns in supply of milk products to the local market, especially in the summer months, in which milk production decreases".  It was argued before me that the value of the import license totals "tens of millions of NIS".  Against this background, it is clear that petitioner chose to conduct a legal proceeding on the issue, and needed appropriate legal counsel.  It is also clear that there is a reasonable proportion between the value of the disputed issue and the attorneys' fees paid.  The petition itself is 25 pages long, and includes extensive description of the prior proceedings and the relevant legal framework.  There is no claim, or basis to claim, that petitioner was negligent in its conduct, or took legal steps and paid large unnecessary expenses.  However, the fact that the entire proceeding ended without a hearing on the merits, a short time after its filing in this Court, is to be granted weight.  It is further noted that petitioner did not attach its attorneys' fees contract, and it is thus impossible to know the basis of the hourly fees of the attorney and the legal clerk who worked on the case.  Those figures are important in assessing the reasonable attorneys' fees in the circumstances of the case.  Last, despite the importance of the issue, it seems that the case itself is not particularly complex – factually or legally – and revolves around the legality of the public agency's conduct in light of prior proceedings.  In that state of affairs, my conclusion is that respondents should be charged with costs the amount of which is reasonable in the circumstances of the case (5,825 NIS) and attorneys' fees paid by petitioner totaling 60,000 NIS.  Indeed, the amount of costs may be higher than the amount of costs awarded at times in various proceedings before this Court.  However, the test for that is not arithmetical, rather substantive.  As awarding of costs is based, in light of the aforementioned, upon examination of actual expenses in each specific case and their reasonableness, the amount of expenses, in and of itself, cannot be compared to anything but the amount in cases that are similar.  As in this case actual expenses were claimed and proven at the amount stated above, the award of costs should be based upon that proven amount.

 

 

CA 2617/00

 

27.   Respondents no. 1-3 in this proceeding submitted, as evidence, a "bill".  There is no detail before me of the work done in its framework.  No attorneys' fees agreement was attached.  The basis for the charge is not clear.  Furthermore, there is no evidence of actual payment of the requested amount.  In such a situation, it is difficult to adopt the amount argued by respondents no. 1-3 as actual expenses.  Against that background, it appears that reasonable and proportional attorneys' fees for filing the response to the proceeding initiated by appellant totals 10,000 NIS, and that is the amount appellant shall be obliged to pay respondents no. 1-3 in this proceeding.  I further add that despite the arguments of respondents no. 1-3 regarding appellant's conduct, I do not award an amount higher than that stated above.  Even though appellant is charged with costs, that does not lead, in and of itself, to an award of high costs – "exemplary costs". 

 

28.   The result is that respondents no. 1-4 in HCJ 891/05 shall pay petitioner's costs totaling 5,825 NIS and attorneys' fees totaling 60,000 NIS.  Appellant in CA 2617/00 shall pay the attorneys' fees of respondents no. 1-3 totalling 10,000 NIS.

 

Given today, 23 Sivan 5765 (June 30 2005).

 

Yigal Mersel, Judge

 

Registrar

 

Rosenstein v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CrimA 4596/05
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

 

The United States filed a petition for the extradition of the Appellant, Ze’ev Rosenstein, for the purposes of prosecuting him for conspiracy to smuggle a dangerous drug to the United States and its distribution there. Following the Petition, the Attorney General submitted a motion to the District Court for a declaratory relief that he is extraditable. The District Court granted the motion and declared the Appellant extraditable. This led to the appeal here. The Appellant claims, among others, criminal justice estoppel,[1] which requires the suspension of the extradition process and that his extradition to the United States is unconstitutional since he is a citizen and resident of Israel and because the offense of which he was accused was committed in its entirety in Israel.

 

The Supreme Court held:

 

A.        1.         Whether the doctrine of criminal justice estoppel stands alone in the extradition process or whether it is encompassed in the “internal” defenses of extradition law, an extradition petition that reveals a real concern for compromising principles of justice and legal fairness or for the right to due process may be refused for such reasons. Where extradition procedures have already commenced, they may be suspended.

            2.         In this case the claim of criminal justice estoppel must be rejected. We cannot accept the Appellant’s arguments as to discrimination compared to other defendants and as to a flaw in the Prosecutions divergence from previous policy.

 

B.        In light of the independent and active role the Extradition Act grants the judicial authority, courts reviewing extraditions must consider the range of factors relevant to the petition. The factors include: the nature of the act at the basis of the extradition petition, including the proper enforcement policy regarding it; the strength of the connection between the act and the legal systems of the requesting country and the requested country; the requirements, in the relevant case, of extradition laws, including those in agreement-based international law; the ability to ensure the subject of the extradition request a due process and fair trial in the requesting country; the public interest in extradition and the proper balance between extradition and one’s constitutional right not to be extradited; considerations as to the status of Israel, its sovereignty and international relations, including considerations of reciprocity.

 

C.        The Appellant’s matter meets the procedural and substantive requirements of the Extradition Act. The relevant act meets the “dual criminality” rule and has yet to pass the period of limitations, the Appellant is not exposed to double jeopardy and the offence of which he is accused carries a penalty of more than a year’s incarceration; the context of the extradition is not political or security based, and the extradition is not discriminatory against the Appellant; the evidence presented is sufficient for extradition; the United States has committed to return the Appellant to Israel for the purposes of serving his sentence should he be committed, and the extradition is contingent upon this commitment.

 

D.        1.         The acts of which the Appellant is accused create both American and Israeli jurisdiction. The offenses for which the United States wishes to prosecute him allow, by their nature and under the principles of the law there, to expand the application of this country’s laws to acts committed outside of its borders. Israeli law views the issue of extra-territorial application in this case the same way American law does. This approach is clearly expressed in the extradition treaty between the two countries as well. Additionally, both countries have a territorial link to the relevant acts: the conspiracy was completed in Israel (a narrow territorial link) and its impact materialized in the United States (broad territorial link). At the same time the acts are connected to the Israeli system by virtue of the Appellant’s Israeli citizenship and residence, and to the United States by virtue of the fact that the harmed party is the American public and the essential interests of this country. Both countries, put together, have an interest in bringing to justice those who are suspected of committing drug offenses.

            2.         The primary purpose of extradition is in the principle of allowing the “natural judge” of the defendant to consider the case. To the extent that this concerns criminal law, the “natural” legal system is that which has the most links to the relevant allegations. This approach is termed at times the approach of the “majority of links” or the approach of offense’s “center of gravity”, and it best reflects the connection between the offense and the legal system which ought to apply to it. Therefore, to the extent that one’s act, regardless of the physical location of where it is committed, is particularly linked to the legal system of the requesting country, then the purposes of extradition law leads to the conclusion that such person much be extradited to such country. Identifying the center of gravity of the offense is merely a rule of preference which reveals which of the legal systems’ link has priority in regard to the offense. This is not a determinative rule, and its outcome joins the other factors taken into account in the decision.

            3.         Under the circumstances of the case at hand, we must determine that the conspiratorial act and its outcomes, as one, are linked primarily to the United States and that the case’s center of gravity is in this country. The geographical location where, as argued, the Appellant acted has no real importance. Therefore the American system takes priority under the “preference rule”. This is the “natural system” for adjudicating the Appellant’s guilt. The harms it suffered from the criminal activity must be attributed significant weight. Its clear interest in realizing its sovereignty must be given preference, which is realized through the prosecution – within its borders – of those responsible for such harms. The pragmatic expression of this is in granting the extradition petition.

 

E.         The Appellant’s argument that the extradition would violate his due process rights should be rejected. The issue of fairness must be considered in the context of the foreign criminal law in its entirety and in light of the overall system of constitutional balances it holds. The American legal process follows principles of fairness in all of the substantive and procedural rights that flow from it. This is sufficient to ensure that the Appellant would not be exposed to a process that is not fair.

 

F.         The Appellant’s extradition is consistent with the public interest. It realizes the purposes at the foundation of extradition. It is not done out of coercion or pressure, but based on the positions of the Israeli prosecution and courts. It is but a clear reflection of Israel’s sovereignty, and insofar that it is build on a foundation of reciprocity in the relationship with the United States, it is expected to strengthen the principle of sovereignty when Israel submits a similar request to the American legal authorities.

 

G.        All four conditions of the Limitations Clause in section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are met in the matter of the Appellant’s extradition.

 

H.        Therefore the District Court’s declaration of the Appellant as extraditable to the United States is lawful. This is a result of recognizing the natural prerogative given under the circumstances to the United States to protect itself from those threatening it from the outside. It is required by the desirable cooperation between the two countries. It is required by the interest of the Israel public, and such is the proper balance between it and the Appellant’s rights. The Appeal must be rejected.

 

[1] Editor’s note - We use this term to refer to the Israeli doctrine of “Hagana min HaTzedek,” literally translated as “protection from justice.” It does not have a genuine parallel in American law but is closest in spirit to doctrines such as abuse of process, outrageous conduct, double jeopardy, and entrapment by estoppel. The doctrine was first adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court in CrimApp 2910/94 Yefet v. State of Israel, IsrSC 50 (2) 221, where the Court ruled in favor of the appellant's claim of "Hagana min HaTzedek" based on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the inherent power of the court to quash a charge that is contrary to justice and fairness.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

CrimA 4596/05

 

Ze'ev Rosenstein

 

v.

 

The State of Israel

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals

Before Vice President M. Cheshin, Justice E.E. Levy, Justice E. Rubinstein

 

Appeal of the decision of the Jerusalem District Court on 19 April 2005 in CrimApp 4023/05, given by the Honorable Judge Y. Tsaban

 

For Appellant: Devorah Chen; Ariel Bendor; Shlomo Nissim; Benny Nahari

For Respondent: Gal Levertov; Yitzhak Bloom; Yuval Sasson (State Attorney's Office)

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice E.E. Levy

 

            An Israeli citizen is wanted in the United States, for the crime of conspiracy to import a dangerous drug and to distribute it within its borders. The prosecution authorities there wish to put him on trial.  The State of Israel, in which he is present and in which the conspiracy was made, is being asked, on the basis of the extradition treaty between the two states, to extradite him.  Israeli penal law allows putting him on trial here.  Is it legal to extradite him?  That is the question which stands before us in this appeal.

 

Factual Background

 

1.         On December the 27th, 2004 the United States Government relayed a request to the Government of the state of Israel, for the extradition of appellant Ze'ev Rosenstein to the US.  The request included a detailed account of appellant's alleged crime, which – according to the prosecution authorities in the US – conspired in Israel to import a dangerous drug into the US and to distribute it there.

 

            The extradition request was supported by evidence which seems to be the fruit of a considerable investigative effort.  The request is detailed and comprehensive.  The picture which arises from it – prima facie, one must emphasize – is grim.  It contains suspicions of a worldwide criminal conspiracy, whose consummation was made possible by activating agents, and agents' agents, from afar.  The conspiracy, which allegedly brought forth its evil fruit for a long time, led to the penetration of about one and a half million pills of the drug known as methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, known also as "ecstasy").  Appellant is suspected, in addition to his general involvement in the conspiracy, of personally funding the purchase of approximately one third of the pills.  There is no need to expand upon the severity of the charges, the wide scope of the alleged acts and, especially, the damage to society and health which they involve.  American society, which was the main target of the activity, suffered the lion's share of the damage, and would have had to suffer results even more severe, had the plan been carried out fully.

 

2.         The essence of the allegations in the extradition request is as follows: in 1996 or 1997, appellant first met a person by the name of Baruch Dadush (hereinafter: Dadush), and they became friends. Two years later, the allegedly began to participate together in criminal activity.  One day in 1999, the two met in the Tel Aviv "Hilton" hotel with a man by the name of Zvi Fogel (hereinafter: Fogel).  Appellant apparently suggested that Dadush and Fogel deal drugs, and even informed Fogel that Dadush would be his representative in any future drug deals.  After this meeting, Dadush began trafficking in drugs for appellant, including the deals at the center of this case.

 

3.         The extradition request claims that appellant was involved in three drug deals of wide scope.  The first took place in 1999, when 135,000 MDMA pills were bought in Holland and brought to their destination via Germany, hidden in motor vehicles.  According to the American prosecution authorities, appellant funded the purchase of 32,000 of these pills.  After selling the drugs in the US, Fogel transferred part of the profits to Dadush, $90,000 of which Dadush gave appellant, keeping the same amount for himself (clause 15a of affidavit of Benjamin G. Greenberg, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, hereinafter: the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; and clauses 2-7 of Dadush's affidavit, which is attached to the extradition request).    

 

            In the same year an additional drug deal was allegedly carried out.  That deal led to the distribution of 305,000 pills of the drug in the US, 50,000 of which appellant purchased for a total of $50,000, which he paid Fogel via Dadush. This time the drug was transported while hidden in copper scrap and computer parts.  Dadush intended to travel to the US, accompanied by his brother Alain, in order to coordinate the distribution of the drug, but he was refused entry and returned to Israel.  As for Alain, he entered the US, and followed Dadush's instructions in order to distribute the pills in New York City.  When the job was finished, the profits were transferred to Fogel in Israel.  The latter transferred the relevant part of the profits to Dadush, out of which appellant's share was paid to him (clause 15b of the Assistant US Attorney Affidavit;  clauses 8-9 of the Dadush affidavit; and clauses 2-5 of the affidavit of Alain, which was attached to the extradition request).

 

According to the prosecution authorities, an additional shipment of drugs was arranged in 2001.  In one deal during that year, appellant invested an amount of $125,000.  For unclear reasons, the shipment of the drug to the US was delayed.  Dadush asked Fogel about this, and relayed the answers to appellant.  As the delay continued, appellant lost his patience, and in a meeting of the three which was arranged at his request, he pressured Fogel and demanded his profits.  A few days later, it became clear that the problem had been solved (clause 15c of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clauses 11-12 of the Dadush affidavit).  In a second deal, appellant's share was 250,000 drug pills, for which he paid between $150,000 – 200,000 (clause 13 of the Dadush affidavit).  Dadush made travel arrangements to the United States for two people: Israel Ashkenazi (hereinafter: Ashkenazi) and David Roash (hereinafter: Roash).  They rented an apartment in Manhattan, in which they stored the drugs, but the group experienced difficulties in locating buyers. At this point an additional person entered the picture – Shemtov Michtavi (hereinafter: Michtavi), an acquaintance of appellant, who met in the United States with a man named Mordechai Cohen (hereinafter: Cohen), and told him that appellant, whom he called "the strongest man in Israel", for whom he works, needs help in distributing a large quantity of ecstasy pills in the United States.  Cohen lent a hand (clauses 15d-15e of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clauses 13-16 of the Dadush affidavit).  He contacted his friend, Patricio Vives, who was in Colombia at the time, and asked his help in locating buyers.  The effort was successful, and two buyers were found for the drugs.  Appellant relayed their contact information to Dadush, and instructed him regarding the scope of the deals and the amounts of money he expected to receive.  Dadush then instructed Roash and Ashkenazi, according to the instructions he had received from appellant (clauses 16-17 of the Dadush affidavit).  After the first sale, Cohen spoke on the telephone with appellant, who promised him that he "is behind" the deal.  Appellant also gave Cohen his phone number, and told him to call him directly in case anything goes wrong (clause 15f of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clauses 2-7 of Cohen's affidavit, which was also attached to the extradition request).          

 

            After the successful completion of the deal, Vives contacted Cohen and told him about his friend in Miami, by the name of Juan Carlos, who was also interested in buying drugs from the outfit. What they did not know, was that Carlos was an informant of the Miami police and of the Drug Enforcement Agency (hereinafter: DEA), and his activity was part of an intensive American effort to expose the affair and to arrest those involved in it (clause 7 of the affidavit of Robert Dick, DEA Mission Team Officer (hereinafter: Dick). Cohen called appellant directly, and informed him of the offer he had received.  After a discussion, it was decided that the offer would be accepted, and that the deal would go down in New York.  Carlos informed Cohen that he or one of his people would come to the city, and gave him the phone number of a man named George – also an undercover police informant, who played the role of the buyer's agent.  Cohen updated appellant regularly regarding the progress of the deal (clauses 15j-15h of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clauses 8-11 of the Cohen affidavit; clauses 19-20 of the Dadush affidavit; clauses 8-12 of the Dick affidavit). On July 16 2001, Roash gave George a sample of the pills.  Investigators followed him to the apartment building in Manhattan, and searched the apartment. There, they found 700,000 ecstasy pills (total weight 182.8 kg) and $187,000 in cash. Roash and Ashkenazi were immediately arrested for conspiracy and possession of a controlled substance.  On the day of the arrest, Dadush tried to make contact with them, in order to find out whether the deal had been successfully completed.  When his call was not answered, he informed appellant accordingly, and the latter called Cohen and instructed him to find out what had happened (clauses 15i-15m of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clause 12 of the Cohen affidavit; clause 21 of the Dadush affidavit; clauses 14-16 of the Dick affidavit; clauses 2-4 of the affidavit of Luis Alvarez, New York police detective, which was attached to the extradition request).

 

            After it became clear that Roash and Ashkenazi had been arrested, Dadush met with appellant and told him that they need to raise money for their legal representation.  Appellant allegedly called Cohen, and told him he suspects that the buyers and their agents were undercover agents (clause 15n of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit; clause 13 of the Cohen affidavit).  During an additional meeting in the Tel Aviv "Hilton", between appellant, Dadush, and Alain, Dadush confirmed to appellant, that the buyer had turned out to be an undercover agent. Appellant was very angry, and in a telephone conversation with Cohen, who was in Spain at the time, told him that he (appellant) had "lost a lot of money" and that "someone would be responsible" (clause 23 of the Dadush affidavit).

 

The Trials of the Syndicate Members

 

4.         The exposure of the syndicate was made possible by great and extended covert and overt investigation efforts on the part of American law enforcement agencies.  On the basis of the evidence gathered during the investigation, most of the people involved in the affair were tried in American courts.  Roash and Ashkenazi were tried and convicted. Michtavi was extradited to the United States from Bulgaria, and was tried and convicted in September 2004.  Cohen was extradited to the US from Spain, and was convicted in a plea bargain; Vives, a Colombian citizen, was also tried in the United States (clause 15e of the Assistant US Attorney affidavit). 

 

            The Dadush brothers, however – Baruch and Alain – were tried in Israel.  They were convicted in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court, but while their appeal was pending in the Supreme Court, they were asked to be state's witnesses in the United States.  Having agreed, the two were released from prison and extradited to the US.  In permitting their release, Beinisch J. ruled:

 

"There is no doubt that the agreement has been made for a purpose which is in the public interest, to the highest degree.  If respondents fulfill all the conditions which they took upon themselves, there is a chance that an important step in will be made the international struggle against serious crime and drug trafficking, a struggle in which the State of Israel is a partner: [CrimApp 10149/04 The State of Israel v. John Doe, unpublished decision of November 10 2004].

 

            I might add, incidentally, that Zvi Fogel was tried in Israel, and also convicted, but not in the affair discussed in this case, rather as a result of his involvement in another drug case (see CrimA 7463/03 Fogel et al. v. The State of Israel, unpublished decision of February 19, 2004).

 

Regarding Appellant

 

5.         Appellant was arrested in Israel on November 8 2004.  On December 17 2004, a Grand Jury in the Southern District of Florida decided to indict him on charges of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, an offense pursuant to 21 USC § 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(c) and 846, and conspiracy to import a controlled substance into the United States, an offense pursuant to sections 952(a), 960(b)(3) and 963 of that law.  The maximum penalty prescribed for these offenses in American law is twenty years imprisonment.  This penalty "ceiling" becomes a penalty "floor", when the use of the controlled substance caused death or serious bodily injury.  In that case, the American court must hand down a sentence of at least twenty years imprisonment.

 

            As a result of the indictment, a warrant for the arrest of appellant was issued in the United States on December 20 2004.  On December 28 2004, the US Department of Justice made a request to the Office of the State Attorney of Israel, for the extradition of appellant to the US law enforcement agencies.  As a result of the request, and pursuant to The Extradition Law, 1954 (hereinafter: The Extradition Law), the Attorney General, per instructions of Acting Justice Minister T. Livni, petitioned the Jerusalem District Court on January 5 2005 for a declaration that appellant is extraditable.  The District Court allowed the petition and issued the requested declaration.

 

The Decision of the District Court

 

6.         The District Court (the Honorable Judge Y. Tsaban) thoroughly examined each of appellant's arguments against his extradition.  It first discussed the arguments regarding violation of the rules of natural justice, the inadequacy of the evidence, and the lack of due process, as appellant was not interrogated and was given no opportunity to present his version, and was not allowed to inspect all of the investigation file upon which the extradition request was based.  These arguments were rejected, since even if a version completely negating the prosecution's version were presented, and even if additional investigation material would be added to the pool of evidence, that would not undermine the value of the prima facie evidence against appellant.  In any case, the court ruled, the extradition court does not examine the truth of the indictment, rather only whether there is prima facie evidence, and as mentioned, sufficient such evidence was found.

 

The District Court then progressed to the main argument, which is that extradition of appellant to the United States is unconstitutional.  This argument was also rejected.  The District Court first ruled that despite the fact that appellant allegedly committed the crimes in Israel, the target of these crimes was the United States.  Therefore, ruled the court, Israel and the United States have concurrent jurisdiction to try appellant.  In examining the entirety of the considerations in deciding between concurrent jurisdictions, the District Court ruled that strict rules are not to be formulated, and that the decision should be subject to the concrete circumstances of the case.  The court emphasized that in crimes involving a prominent international dimension, including drug offenses, the center of gravity of the offense should not be identified as the physical place in which it was committed, since that place is likely to be random and unimportant.  Instead, weight should be given to the place in which the offense was consummated.  The court further stressed that in such offenses, the territorial principle should be given little weight, and the interests regarding the reciprocity of extradition between states, and the need for international cooperation to rout organized crime, should be preferred.  The court concluded that appellant's extradition raises no concern of violation of public policy or due process, and does not impair his ability to defend himself against the charges against him.

 

            On this basis, as previously mentioned, the District Court allowed the petition and declared appellant extraditable.  It is against that decision that the appeal before us is directed.  Appellant wished, in addition, to raise his arguments in a petition he submitted to the High Court of Justice (HCJ 5832/05), but in light of our comments that the issues arising in both proceedings are similar, he agreed to the abatement of the petition, and we ruled accordingly.

 

 

The Arguments in the Appeal

 

7.         Appellant asks this Court to change the decision of the District Court.  He asks us to see the Attorney General's petition for his extradition as a unique case, which is the first of its kind, since, as he sees it, in circumstances where the extradited person is an Israeli citizen and resident, and the alleged offense was committed entirely in Israel, extradition to another country deviates from the balance required by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and by fundamental principles of penal law.

 

            Appellant's first argument is that since the disagreement between the parties is limited to the question of his involvement in the alleged drug deals, as opposed to the question whether the deals took place, the evidence is centered in Israel and not in the United States.  Appellant stated that if the trial takes place in Israel, he is willing to waive cross examination of US law enforcement personnel, and he will not object to the presentation of any of the evidence which is to be presented before the US court.  He also refers to the state's witness agreements signed with Baruch and Alain Dadush, in which they promised to give testimony in Israel if necessary.  Therefore, he contends, no great importance should be given to the fact that the prosecution witnesses are in the United States.  However, in the very same breath, appellant complains that the extradition of the Dadush brothers prevents him from cross examining them, should he be tried in Israel. How this contradiction is to be solved, he does not explain.

 

            Appellant further argues that the dominant link of the offenses with which he is charged is to Israel, and not to the United States.  According to his approach, since these offenses – conspiracy to import a controlled substance and conspiracy to distribute it – do not contain a consequential element, they should be seen as offenses whose elements were all fulfilled in Israel.  Considering, further, that the offender is an Israeli citizen and resident, who is not a fugitive from justice in another country and who can be tried in Israel, appellant claims that extradition serves no worthy purpose, and is not proportional.  Appellant further contends that the target of the conspiracy to import and distribute controlled substances, and the personal link of the victims of the crime, cannot outweigh the principle of territorial jurisdiction, which is to be given decisive weight.  And in any event, in circumstances in which concurrent jurisdiction arises, as in this case, the jurisdiction of the state of the suspect's citizenship – which is Israel – should be preferred. 

 

            Appellant's third argument is that his extradition will violate his procedural and substantive rights as a defendant in a criminal case.  He will not have the benefit of being judged in his natural environment, and language difficulty and the difference between the Israeli and American legal systems will compromise his defense and his rights to due process.  The argument refers mainly to the jury system, which is a different decision making system than the one in Israeli law, but refers also to the scope of the right to inspect the evidence, which is more restricted in the United States; to the admissibility of hearsay in American law in certain circumstances; and to the lack there, as opposed to in Israel, of the requirement that states' witnesses' testimony be corroborated by independent evidence.

 

            Appellant brushes away the contention that his non-extradition will make Israel out to be a state of refuge for criminals.  Indeed, he did not even flee to Israel and did not commit any of his alleged acts outside the borders of the state.  He contends that the real purpose of the decision to extradite him is the prosecution's wish to remove evidentiary difficulties, which make trying him in Israel difficult, from their path. 

 

            Last, appellant claims outrageous conduct, which requires suspension of the extradition proceedings.  He contends that the prosecution's policy on drug offenses has long been to conduct trials in Israel, even if the act was committed outside of Israel.  Appellant specifically mentions the trials in Israel – at least in the beginning – of the Dadush brothers.  The argument is, in essence, that the decision regarding appellant is discriminatory, and for this reason as well, must therefore be annulled.

 

The Attorney General's Response

 

8.         The Attorney General supports the decision of the District Court.  He asks that we see appellant as a person who, in this case, de jure and de facto, acted as the head of a crime syndicate.  As such, appellant needed not take part in the activity in the target state, rather could instruct his people from afar. There is, therefore, no real importance in the geographical location from which appellant acted. 

 

            Respondent further contends that an interpretation capable of realizing the purpose of the extradition law must give considerable weight to the interest of advancing cooperation between states in the fight against organized crime, and specifically against the distribution of dangerous drugs, and that such cooperation requires the extradition of appellant. Such an interpretation also stems from the international obligations which Israel has taken upon herself in agreements she has entered.

 

            Were we to follow appellant's line of argument, contends respondent, we would find ourselves allowing all those acting from within one country against the security of another, to escape justice, or, at least, to choose the law they find more comfortable.  Appellant, it is claimed, has no "right" to commit a crime against one state and at the same time, to be judged according to the laws of another state.  For this reason, his plea of outrageous conduct is also to be rejected.  Respondent emphasizes, on this point, that the term "escaping" should not be constructed narrowly, and it should be recognized that it is not merely "physical escape, as in moving one's residence from one country to another", rather it is "any act intended to or making it possible to distance a person from the law enforcement agencies and justice in the country which wishes to put him on trial and has been harmed by the crime."  Any other interpretation would lead to a normative situation in which The Extradition Law would apply only to those members of conspiracies or of crime syndicates who are found at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy – couriers, distributors, manufacturers, and sellers – and not to the leaders.  Respondent argues that such a conclusion is at odds with the purpose of The Extradition Law and with the vital interest of routing transnational crime. 

 

Respondent also rejects appellant's arguments regarding a lack of link between his alleged acts and the American law.  It is claimed that the United States' reasons for prosecuting appellant are clear and obvious: appellant intended to strike at the rule of law in the United States, at the social values which its law is intended to advance, and at the security and well being of its citizens.  Therefore, there is no basis to the argument that appellant's link to the requesting state is a "technical-formal" one; rather the link should be seen as a substantive one, which makes application of US law to this case appropriate.

 

            Respondent emphasizes that the proper constitutional balance between appellant's rights and the public interest is to be found in his conviction in the United States – that, if he is convicted – and his return to Israel to serve his sentence, which the United States has expressly agreed to.

 

            Last, the Attorney General argues that the "procedural arrangements" suggested by appellant to reduce the scope of the argument should be rejected, as they are at odds with the law and even mistaken on their merits.  He also asks that we reject appellant's argument regarding the expected blow to his substantive and procedural rights in the United States, inter alia in light of guarantees which can ensure due process there.

 

Discussion

 

Outrageous Conduct

 

9.         I shall begin the discussion with those arguments which are not at the heart of the issue, and can be decided prior to delving into the depths of it.  The first is the claim of outrageous conduct.  In its most common sense, the outrageous conduct doctrine allows the court to annul an indictment, when it is not possible to ensure the accused a fair trial, or when putting him on trial strikes at the principles of justice (CrimA 2910/94 Yefet v. The State of Israel, 50 (2) PD 221, 370; HCJ 1563/96 Katz v. The Attorney General, 55 (1) PD 529, 543; HCJ 5319/97 Kogen v. The Military Advocate General, 51 (5) PD 67, 94; BAA 2531/01 Chermon v. The Tel Aviv – Jaffa District Committee of the Israel Bar, 58 (4) PD 55, 77; and CrimA 4855/02 The State of Israel v. Borovitz et al (yet unpublished decision of March 31 2005).

 

            The central justification for using that authority is the desire to ensure that law enforcement agencies behave properly, as required by their status as governmental bodies.  It is intended to serve as a check on unbridled enforcement activity which is blind to all other interests and denies the rights of the accused and values of the rule of law.  This is an unusual power, as are the circumstances that would justify its use.  It integrates a complex interweaving of competing values: advancing the public interest in putting criminals on trial, beside recognition of the role of the rights of the accused; the desire to find the truth, but not at any price; protection of public security, beside the duty to uproot abuse of governmental power.  A court examining whether the accused is to benefit from a ruling of outrageous conduct in a particular case must take this delicate and complex balance, which we recently discussed in Borovitz, into account. 

 

            The court must "identify the faults which occurred in the proceedings regarding the accused, and measure their intensity, irrespective of the question of his guilt or innocence" (id., at paragraph 21).  It must examine whether conducting the criminal proceedings – despite the faults which occurred in them – violates one's sense of justice and fairness. The lens through which the court examines the justification for employing the outrageous conduct doctrine in a particular case is wider than it was in the past, due to the Borovitz case, and is no longer restricted to the narrow reasoning of the Yefet rule. That is to say, it is no longer restricted to "insufferable behavior on the part of the authorities", which "shocks the conscience" (id., at p. 370).  Instead, a purposive-substantive examination of the entirety of the circumstances is performed (the Borovitz case, id.).

 

10.       It is possible to make an argument of outrageous conduct against extradition proceedings as well, due to its justifications and the substantive proximity between an extradition proceeding and a "regular" criminal proceeding (see S. Z. Feller Extradition Law (Jerusalem, 1980) 24 [Hebrew]; CrimA 6914/04 Feinberg v. The Attorney General (yet unpublished decision of March 7 2003, paragraph 39).  It seems, however, that its proper place is in the "internal" examination which extradition law requires us to perform, and which I will later discuss.  I refer both to the proper balance between the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, which includes the right to not be extradited as a basic right (Article 5 of the basic law), and the provisions of The Extradition Law itself; and also to the requirement – which is also in The Extradition Law – that the extradition not violate public policy. "The fundamental principles, deeply held views, and sublime interests," (in the words of my colleague Cheshin J. in CrimA 2521/03 Sirkis v. The State of Israel, 57 (6) PD 337, 346), which are wrapped up in this vague concept (German –"ventilbegriff"; Italian – "concetto volvola"), include the principles of justice and legal fairness, as well as the right to a fair trial. And indeed, these are the very same values which are protected by the outrageous conduct doctrine. 

 

            Whether one says that the outrageous conduct defense stands on its own in extradition proceedings, or that it is a subset of the "internal" defenses in extradition law, the conclusion is the same: an extradition request which raises real concern of violation of the principles of justice and legal fairness, or of the right to a fair trial, is likely to be refused, merely for that reason.  In a situation where extradition proceedings have already commenced, they can be suspended (compare the words of my colleague, Cheshin J., in Feinberg, Supra, at paragraph 17).

 

11.       However, I can hardly understand what appellant's case has to do with all that.  As mentioned, his petition to gain the outrageous conduct defense rests on two claims: one is that the extradition discriminates between him and other accused persons, including those in this very case; the second is that prosecution authorities deviated from the law when they decided to bring state's witnesses Baruch and Alain Dadush to the United States, and later used that excuse to justify the necessity of appellant's extradition to the US, contending that the evidentiary center of gravity of the case is there.  I find both claims unfounded.  The claim regarding the fault in prosecution authorities' deviation from their long term policy is doomed to failure.  The Public Prosecutor – as any other administrative agency – is permitted to change its policy, or instructions which it adopted, as long as there are appropriate reasons for such a change.  No person has a vested right that a certain policy will remain standing, even under circumstances justifying its change. Moreover, the rule is that the implementation of a policy – especially an implementation involving the use of discretion – is a specific implementation, which takes into account the specific circumstances of each case:

 

"There is nothing preventing an agency, to which the legislature has assigned the performance of a role involving discretion, from coming to the conclusion that the custom, manner, or considerations in the policy of performing the role need to be changed, and there is no fault in such a conclusion, when such a change is required by past experience, change of circumstances, or other factors which relate to or have implications upon the same subject.  It is however clear, that alteration of policy must be guided by a consideration of realizing the law and its spirit; therefore, when dealing with the use of discretion regarding individual persons of different circumstances and traits, one must not form a uniform and inflexible policy, when the very objective of the law is that the discretion actually be used toward the certain person with consideration of his special circumstances" (HCJ 92/83 Nagar v. The Workers Compensation Insurance Authority, 39 (1) PD 341, 353; emphasis added).

 

            The reasons noted by the state, in its response to the question why the discretion in the case of appellant was used as it was, are acceptable, and I found no reason to doubt them.  They take into account appellant's alleged central role in the leadership of the conspirators; the fact that the results of the crime appeared overseas; the central purpose of the Extradition Law, which requires international cooperation in the war on organized crime and especially on drug trafficking; and the amendment of the year 1999 of The Extradition Law (which we shall yet discuss), which expands the arc of cases in which a person can be extradited.  More importantly, indictments submitted in Israel against other persons suspected of smuggling drugs to other countries have differences, vis a vis appellant's indictment, which are sufficient to justify employing a different policy against him.      

 

12.       The argument regarding discrimination between appellant and the other accused persons in this case is also to be rejected. It is uncontroversial that selective enforcement based on irrelevant considerations is forbidden:

 

". . . selective enforcement is enforcement which violates equality, in the following way: it differentiates, for the purpose of enforcement, between similar persons or similar situations, in order to achieve an unlawful goal, or on the basis of an irrelevant consideration, or out of pure arbitrariness. . . such enforcement sharply violates the principle of equality before the law in its basic sense.  It is destructive to the rule of law; it is an outrage to justice; it endangers the legal system. The authority to make a criminal indictment is an important and severe one.  It can determine a person's fate.  So too is the authority to enforce the law in other ways, such as the authority to arrest a person or the authority to confiscate property.  It must be used in a relevant, equal, and reasonable fashion" (HCJ 6396/96 Zakin v. The Mayor of Be'er Sheva, 53 (3) PD 289, 305).

 

There may also be cases in which partial enforcement will be found to be unlawful and to justify a defense of outrageous conduct, even if it is not founded upon unlawful considerations, rather is faulty from another standpoint (Borovitz, at paragraph 26).  However, the relief for which appellant petitions – suspension of the proceedings due to outrageous conduct – requires a factual basis (see also CrimApp 4934/98 Kahane v. The State of Israel, unpublished decision of October 27 1998, at paragraph 5).  Such a factual basis was not provided by appellant.  Inter alia, he did not prove that anything but relevant reasons served as the basis of the decision in his case.  We have not been convinced that the decision is discriminatory.  It was not even contended that a request to extradite any of the other accused persons was submitted (including the Dadush brothers, before the decision to try them in Israel was made).

 

13.       Regarding extradition of Baruch and Alain Dadush to the United States: it is uncontroversial that the agreement reached with them was unusual.  I am willing to assume that "benefits", in the words of appellant's counsel, were given to the Dadush brothers in the framework of the extradition, in exchange for their agreement to be state's witnesses against appellant.  However, study of the documents presented before us leaves no room for doubt that the extradition of the two was not intended to determine the issue of the location of appellant's trial.  It was part of a complex process, in which the two agreed to testify against appellant if they would be accepted into the US "witness protection program", whose basic foundation – maybe even more than in other countries – is raising the chances of safeguarding their lives and guaranteeing their security.  The making of the agreement with them was, therefore, a legitimate act on the part of the prosecution, in its efforts to ensure that justice will be served regarding all found guilty in the case.                        

 

            Moreover, appellant cannot hold the rope from both ends.  His argument, on the one hand, that the extradition of the Dadush brothers to the United States grants him the defense of outrageous conduct due to its blow to his defense if he is tried in Israel, cannot be heard together with his argument, on the other hand, that the fact that the two promised to return to Israel if their testimony is needed here, reinforces the conclusion that the evidentiary center of gravity is in Israel, and therefore that he is not to be extradited.  The claim regarding outrageous conduct, and all the arguments in it, are therefore rejected.

 

The Procedural Arrangements Suggested by Appellant

 

14.       Appellant's offer to "reduce the scope of disagreement" through his obligation to waive the testimony of witnesses, cannot be accepted.  Even considering the adversary character of our legal system, such an offer violates the procedural process, and worse still – the ability to properly discover the truth - in a way that cannot be accepted.  Respondent correctly noted that such an arrangement does not take into account the court's discretion to call witnesses. Just recently, dealing with a similar issue, this Court ruled:

 

"Experience shows that prosecution in Israel of crimes committed in foreign countries involves so many difficulties – inter alia, difficulties in locating witnesses and obligating them to testify – that they can only be solved with great difficulty.  Appellant's offer to solve these difficulties – e.g. by way of changing the regular rules of procedure and evidence – are so difficult to implement and so distort the process, that they are not feasible, de facto" (Feinberg, Supra, at paragraph 23).

 

The logic of this reasoning applies to the same extent in our case, and requires that we also reject appellant's offer.  Having removed this issue from our path, we can turn to the examination of the issues at the heart of the appeal.

 

The Normative Framework – Israeli Extradition Law

 

15.       Israeli extradition law is made of three strata.  The first is the constitutional right not to be extradited, which is anchored in Article 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.  That right can be restricted under conditions set out in the basic law, which we shall later discuss.  The second is The Extradition Law, which, together with the regulations issued pursuant to it – the Extradition Regulations (Procedure and Evidence Rules in Petitions), 1970 – sets out the arrangement in a detailed fashion.  Finally, international conventions which arrange Israel's extradition relations with foreign entities, and especially with foreign countries, are conditional to the existence of extradition relations, and are what casts extradition law's substantial content.

 

            The Extradition Law defines a list of conditions, which only if cumulatively satisfied allow a person's extradition.  These are related to the normative "atmosphere" of the extradition request, to the identity of the wanted person, to the essence of the charges against him, and to the identity of the extradition requestor.  The law contains a list of both procedural and substantive blocks, any one of which will prevent the extradition of a person, including the prescription of the wanted person's alleged offense, the fact that he was tried for that crime in Israel beforehand or served even a part of his sentence here (prevention of double jeopardy), or his pardon for the crime in the requesting state. The law further determines that only a person indicted for a crime which is not minor can be extradited, that is to say "a crime which, had it been committed in Israel, would lead to one year's imprisonment or a more severe punishment" (article 2(a) of the law).  It is forbidden to extradite for reasons irrelevant to the fight against crime, including an international relations or security motivation, or to discriminate on the basis of race or religion; and extradition which violates public policy or a vital interest of Israel is not to be permitted (article 2b).

 

            In its current wording – the Extradition Law has been amended a number of times in recent years, to the point that my colleague Cheshin J. compared it to "a price tag on supermarket products during a time of inflation" (CrimA 7569/00 Yegudayev v. The State of Israel, 56 (4) PD 529, 542) – the law grants special protection to a person who was an Israeli citizen and resident at the time the crime was committed.  Such a person can only be extradited for trial, as opposed to extradition for sentencing or serving a sentence.  Allowing an extradition request is conditional upon the requesting state's promise that, to the extent that he is convicted and sentenced to prison, the extradited person will be returned to serve his sentence in Israel (article 1a(a)(2)).  It is here that extradition law comes in contact with the provisions of the Serving of Prison Sentences in the State of the Prisoner's Citizenship Law, 1996, article 10(a1) of which provides that a court in Israel, subject to the existence of a similar provision in a treaty between the two states, is permitted to shorten a sentence handed down outside the country, and to set it at the maximum period of incarceration determined in Israeli penal law for the crime for which the sentence was given.

 

            A necessary component of the recognition of a person as extraditable is the existence of prima facie evidence of his guilt.  Article 9(a) of the law provides that it must be shown that "the wanted person was convicted for an extraditable offense in the requesting state, or that there is evidence which would be sufficient to try him for such a crime in Israel".  This Court has repeatedly ruled that the decision in an extradition request is not a decision of the extradition candidate's innocence or guilt.  The evidence is not to be examined on its merits in order to determine its weight; nor is the extent to which each piece of evidence fits with others to be examined.  All that is examined is "whether the indictment has any support in the evidence" (CrimA 308/75 Pesachovitz v. The State of Israel, 31 (2) PD 449, 460; see also CrimA 318/79 Engel et al. v. The State of Israel, 34 (3) PD 98, 105).       

 

            A fundamental condition for extradition is the existence of an extradition treaty between Israel and the requesting state, whether it is a treaty exclusively on extradition or a general treaty containing provisions regarding extradition (article 2a(a)(1) of the law).  Without an extradition treaty between the State of Israel and the requesting state, there is no basis for the existence of extradition relations between them.  From the standpoint of the internal law, each state has the sovereign prerogative – subject to the foundations of its law – to formulate the character of extradition proceedings in the treaty, to determine its conditions, to decide which crimes are extraditable, which people's extradition can be requested, et cetera.  From the time it is signed, the extradition treaty becomes an inseparable part of our law, assuming that the former does not contradict any of the latter's fundamental principles.  So ruled my colleague, Cheshin V.P.:

 

"The Extradition Law grants internal legal force to the extradition treaty, and turns it – as the law provides – into an organ in the body of Israeli law.  The law refers us directly to the treaty, and this reference grants legal force to Israel's relations with the [state which is party to] the treaty (Feinberg, at paragraph 26).

 

Israel has extradition treaties with a considerable number of states, and on December 10 1962 the extradition treaty with the United States was signed (13 Treaty Series 505, 795).  The treaty has been employed a number of times in extraditing suspects from Israel to the United States, and vice versa

 

16.       Extradition proceedings open with an extradition request by the requesting state, through diplomatic channels, to the Minister of Justice (article 3(b) of The Extradition Law).  In practice, the request is relayed directly to the Department of International Affairs in the State Attorney's Office (article B(1) of "Procedure for Handling Extradition Requests" Directives of the Attorney General 4.6000 (October 1 1973)).  There it is examined, in light of the question whether it can fulfill all the requirements pursuant to The Extradition Law and the relevant treaty (article B(3) of said directive).  To the extent that it is found that all those requirements are met, the Minister of Justice is asked to use his authority pursuant to The Extradition Law, and   instruct the Attorney General to submit a petition to the Jerusalem District Court, in order to examine whether the candidate for extradition is extraditable (article 3(b) of The Extradition Law; articles 3(6) & (7) of the directive).  The law provides that the District Court shall declare a person extraditable if it is proven before it that the extradition request fulfills the requirements pursuant to the law (article 9(a) of the law).  The District Court's decision can be appealed before this Court (article 13 of the law).

 

            When the decision to declare a person extraditable becomes final, "all the normative conditions for the extradition of the requested person have been fulfilled, and the executive branch is permitted to hand him over to the requesting state" (Feller Extradition Law, 442).  However, that is not the end of the proceedings.  The declaration is valid for 60 days (article 19 of the law), unless there are special circumstances justifying its extension by the District Court (article 20).  During this period, the Minister of the Justice is authorized to determine, inter alia on the basis of "extra-normative considerations which the judiciary is unauthorized to consider" (Extradition Law, at p. 445), that despite all the above, the extradition is not to be carried out (article 18 of the law).

 

            A study of the relevant provisions shows, therefore, that during all stages along the chain of extradition request handling, the authorized officials – the Attorney General, by himself and via the State Attorney, the Minister of Justice, and the Jerusalem District Court – are required to use discretion.  Each official in the chain, and each stage of the decision, involves its own unique type of discretion. 

 

17.       Regarding the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice – their decisions are administrative decisions, and the rules applicable to any decision of any statutory agency apply to them. The decision must be the product of consideration of all the relevant factors.  It must fulfill the rules of natural justice, and be made in good faith.  It must be reasonable, and well founded from an evidentiary perspective (HCJ 852/86 Aloni, M.K. et al. v. The Minister of Justice, 41 (2) PD 1, 50).  It must take into account the purpose of extradition law (HCJ 3261/93 Manning v. The Minister of Justice, 47 (3) PD 282, 285).

 

18.       The "administrative" considerations have considerable weight.  The District Court, although not sitting as an "administrative" instance, is authorized to take them into account if it finds them relevant. This Court as well, sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals, will address those considerations to the extent that they arise.  However, those are not exclusive considerations.  The issue is not restricted to the question of the judicial intervention in the decisions of the executive branch.  The administrative aspect is only one of the faces of the extradition issue.  Therefore, I am not willing to accept the argument of the state, that we can suffice ourselves with the tests determined in the caselaw of The High Court of Justice for the intervention – the limited intervention - in the discretion of the Public Prosecutor (see, inter alia, HCJ 223/88 Sheftel v. The Attorney General, 43 (4) PD 356, 368; HCJ 935/89 Ganor v. The Attorney General, 44 (2) PD 485; and HCJ 806/90 Hanegbi v. The Attorney General, 44 (4) PD 797).  My view is that, in light of the independent and active role which The Extradition Law set aside for the judiciary, the extradition courts must themselves consider all the considerations relevant to extradition. 

 

            And what are those considerations?  Although it seems to me that the list is not exhaustive, the following are among them: the essence of the act for which extradition is requested, including the appropriate enforcement policy regarding it; the extent of the link between the act and the legal systems of the requesting state and the requested state; the fulfillment, in the specific case, of the requirements of extradition law, including those in the conventional law; the possibility of ensuring the extradition candidate a fair legal process in the requesting state; the public interest in the extradition issue and the proper balance between it and a person's constitutional right not to be extradited; and considerations regarding Israel's status, sovereignty, and international relations, including considerations of reciprocity.  I shall thus turn to examination of the case before us in light of these considerations, not necessarily in the order I just mentioned them. 

 

The Application of Penal Law

 

19.       One of the elements of penal law, in addition to the element of the act and the application of the law on the axis of time, is the geographical application of the law.  I refer both to the application of the local substantive law and to the courts' jurisdiction.  In criminal law, the jurisdiction is always a function of the application of the law.  It is difficult to accept the possibility that a court in one legal system would apply the substantive penal law of another system to the case before it (see CrimA 135/70 The State of Israel v. Azaiza 24 (1) PD 417, 419; CrimA 7230/96 John Doe v. The State of Israel, 51 (3) PD 513, 521; and S. Z. Feller "'Criminal Jurisdiction: Limits and Restrictions' – What and Where They Are" B Iyunei Mishpat 582, 586 (1972) [Hebrew]; M. Karayanni The Influence of the Choice of Law Process on International Jurisdiction (Jerusalem, 2002) 168 [Hebrew]).

 

            It is but simple that the legal system cannot be applied, and does not intend to be applied, to any act done on Earth.  It is thus accepted that a link must be found between the legal system and the act being examined, as a condition for its application.  This link – "the connecting link" or "the normative bridge", in the words of my colleague Cheshin J. in John Doe – is what, as a necessary condition, grants the legal system the power to cast liability pursuant to its penal law.

 

It is a fundamental rule that any legal system, via its governmental institutions, has the prerogative to choose, for itself, the links which are to bring about its application, and thus to determine the scope of its application.  In most systems, if not in all, a dominant status is assigned to territorial link which, in its common form, applies the penal law of the system to every crime committed in the geographic area in which the system applies. "The territorial link is accepted today in most legal systems in the world as the basis of the application of the laws of the state and of the penal norms regarding locus delicti" – CrimApp 1178/97 Kahane v. The State of Israel, 51 (3) PD 266, 269 (Barak, P.).  See also the words of my colleague Cheshin J. in John Doe, Supra, at p. 521.

 

20.       A principle no less fundamental determines that a legal system can also expand its application to acts committed outside of its territory.  It stems from the view of the Common Law, by which the legislature (originally – the Parliament of England) may legislate any law it pleases, without being limited due the possible repercussions of the law upon what will take place outside of the state's territory.  Agranat J. discussed this in HCJ 279/51 Amsterdam et al. v. The Minister of Finance et al., 6 (2) PD 945, 965, referring to the work of British scholars Coke ("the power and jurisdiction of parliament is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds") and Blackstone ("that what the Parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo"). That approach was also anchored in the well known case of the International Court of Justice in S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10, where the connection between the principle of state sovereignty and the authority to expand application of its laws was recognized, to the extent that the state is not restricted by norms prohibiting such expansion.        

 

            It was upon this foundation that the approach, by which the legislature may draw the borders of the law as it pleases, including expanding it beyond the boundaries of the state, without it being restricted by foreign law or even the international law, came to be accepted in Israeli law (see article 9(a) of The Penal Code, and Feller "Penal Jurisdiction", id., at p. 582).  In Amsterdam, Agranat  J. ruled that "in the absence of a constitution containing provisions to the contrary, the principle regarding the legislature's unlimited legislative authority applies also in Israel" (id., at p. 966).  This ruling appeared in additional cases (HCJ 100/57 Weiss et al. v. The Inspector General of the Israeli Police, 12 (1) PD 179, 184 (Landau J.) and Azaiza, Supra, at p. 419 (Sussman J.). It was ruled that the court also may interpret legislation in a way expanding its application beyond state territory (CrimA 123/83 K.P.A. Steel v. The State of Israel, 38 (1) PD 813, 820; CA 800/89 Biton v. Karsal et al., 46 (2) PD 651, 655; CA 1432/03 Yinon Food Products Manufacture and Marketing Ltd. V. Kara'an et al., yet unpublished decision of September 1st 2004, at paragraph 5). The condition is that the law must express, through its purpose, a possibility of such expansion.

 

21.       So it is in our law, as in the laws of the United States.  It is law in the United States, both in civil and criminal cases (see United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd., 109 F. 3d (1st Cir. 1997), that the law is likely to apply even outside of the state's territory, if such an intent is implied by the purpose of the acts issued by Congress (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  Although best if such an expansion sits well with the rules of international law, Congress is not limited in its determination by any foreign law (Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Alcoa"); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963); Federal Trade Commission v. Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F. 2d. 1300, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Yousef, 327 F. 3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003)).  Expansion of application, in essence, sits well with the US Constitution (United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F. 2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1991)).

 

            An intention of extraterritorial application can be expressly provided by the statute, but it can also be implied from the "nature" of the statute (United States v. MacAllister, 160 F. 3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998).  There are offenses for which, by their very nature, criminal liability does not stem from the place they were committed, rather draws from the need to protect important American interests.  The Supreme Court of the United States discussed that, through Taft J., in U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98:

 

"[some] criminal statutes are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated. . . . Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense" (emphasis added).

We shall yet return to Bowman, as acts of conspiracy to import controlled substances to the United States and distribute them are counted, par excellence, among the crimes of the type to which it refers (United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F. 2d 289, 290 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wright-Barker 784 F. 2d 161, 167 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. Vasquez-Velasco 15 F. 3d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1994))

 

Application-Expanding Links

 

22.       The legal system having chosen to apply itself beyond the territory of the state, the geographic element falls, and a gap is created between the system and the act to which it indents to apply itself.  A need then arises to replace it with an alternative link, capable of reconnecting the act to the legal system.  "The relation is selective, according to the link between the crime and the state which replaces the territorial link" (S. Z. Feller 1 Foundations of Penal Law (1974) 240 [Hebrew]).  Barak J. also discussed this:

 

"When a statutory provision expands the statute's 'jurisdiction' beyond state territory, the general territorial element disappears as an element that determines the scope of local application of the penal norm.  In the place of this general territorial element usually comes another normative requirement, which connects the crime committed outside the territory of the state with the state . . . Instead of the general territorial principle, which usually serves as a substantive element of the offense, comes a new substantive element, which determines the boundaries of the penal norm's extraterritorial application" (CrimA 163/82 David v. The State of Israel, 37 (1) PD 622, 630).

 

American caselaw similarly ruled that –

 

"…the territorial concept of jurisdiction is neither exclusive nor a full and accurate characterization of the powers of state to exercise jurisdiction beyond the confines of their geographical boundaries" (United States v. King, Supra, at p. 851),

 

and therefore -

". . . the Congress may pick and choose whatever recognized principle of international jurisdiction is necessary to accomplish the purpose sought by the legislation" United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (1960)).

 

            Despite our having said that expansion is not subject, in principle, to the rules of international law, there are four main accepted application-expanding links recognized by it: a protective link, relating to acts done outside the country which harmed, or were intended to harm, the vital interests of that country or the functioning of its institutions; a passive personal link, between the legal system and the victim of the crime; an active personal link (or national link), between the legal system and the perpetrator of the crime; and a universal link, which covers especially severe crimes, whose prevention is in the interest of all of humanity, such as crimes against international law, war crimes, and piracy.

 

           This categorization, based on the 1935 work of Harvard scholars ("Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime" 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935)), is accepted today in many legal systems (see Y. Dinstein "Criminal Jurisdiction: Boundaries and Limitations" A Iyunei Mishpat (1971) 303; In Israeli caselawDavid, Supra, at p. 628; John Doe, Supra, at p. 521; In American caselawRocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 547 (9th Cir. 1961); Rivard v. United States 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. King, Supra, at p. 851; United States v. Yousef, Supra, at p. 91).

 

           The differentiation between the types of links is not always clear, and the attempt to draw a line between them is likely to be artificial.  An interest is likely to be protected by more than one link (see, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F. 2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Yousef, Supra, at p. 97; Feller Foundations of Penal Law, pp. 241, 246).  What is important, is that all the links are used together to improve the fight against crime, especially transnational crime.  There is "complementary relationship between the different types of local application of the penal norm, in order to advance a common objective of serving the war on crime" (id., at p. 247).

 

           The four extraterritorial links I have discussed relate to one of the elements constituting the crime, which is not the geographic element. In Israeli law, these links are found in articles 13-16 of The Penal Code, 1977, which, with certain restrictions, apply Israeli criminal law to crimes committed anywhere, against Israeli citizens or residents or by them, on crimes committed against Jews outside of Israel, on crimes against the interests of the state and on crimes against humanity.

 

23.      However, significant expansion of the law's application to extraterritorial acts is found within the territorial link itself.  Penal law today grants dual meaning to that link.  Beside the common meaning, relating to acts committed inside state territory ("narrow" or "subjective territorial link"), the law recognizes an additional meaning, regarding the place where the effect of the crime was felt, or intended to be felt ("wide"; "objective" – that is, the object of the crime; or "derivative territorial link").  Concisely: the narrow territorial link relates to the place where the physical facts of the act took place, whereas the expansion regards its geographical purpose.  Both territorial principles – the narrow and the wide – were anchored long ago in Israeli law. Article 7 of The Penal Code, whose title is "The Offenses According to their Location", provides:

 

(a) "Internal offenses" –

 

(1) an offense committed entirely or partly within the territory of Israel;

 

(2) an act of preparation to commit an offense, an attempt, an attempt to solicit another, or conspiracy to commit an offense, which were committed outside of Israel, if the offense, entirely or partly, was intended to be committed inside of Israeli territory (emphasis added).

 

           Article 7(a)(2) has virtually not been discussed at all in our caselaw.  In CrimApp 9022/96 Sheet v. The State of Israel 50 (5) PD 597, 599, Strasberg-Cohen J. ruled that an act of solicitation to import a drugs into Israel, which was committed entirely in Lebanon by a Lebanese citizen, is an "internal offense". As is well known, a statutory arrangement is also interpreted in light of the rationale behind it and the circumstances at the time it was passed.  Article 7(a) was added to The Penal Code in amendment 39 in the year 1984, and the term "internal offense" was coined by scholars Feller and Kremnitzer, who worded the amendment draft.  In his book, Feller wrote: "The Israeli legislature tended to refer to crimes committed outside the borders of the state, as 'external offenses', as the object of extraterritorial application of the state's criminal law. We shall accordingly add the opposite expression, 'internal offense', as the object of the territorial application of this law" (Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 236; emphasis added).

 

           Professor Feller further wrote:

 

"One can imagine territorial application of the state's penal law, even when no element of the elements of the offense actually took place in the territory of the state.  I refer to a consequential offense [an offense of the type which includes a consequence as an element], whose conduct took place outside the territory of the state, and whose consequence, which the offenders intended to take place within this territory, they did not have time to cause or did not succeed in causing. . . . an additional step [is] territorial application, derivative of course, of the state's criminal law upon the attempt to commit an offense which requires only conduct, not consequence, which was committed outside the borders of the state, whose completion was supposed to take place within it, or an attempt, done outside the borders of the state, to solicit a person to commit an offense within its territory.  Those are examples of derivative territorial application of the state's criminal law even on acts of preparation . . . and the final step: a criminal conspiracy made outside the territory of the state, whose objective is the committing of an offense inside its territory, is also likely to result in the derivative territorial application of the state's penal law" (Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 259; emphases added).

 

           In the explanatory notes of the amendment 39 bill, Feller and Kremnitzer discussed the rationale for assigning penal responsibility on the basis of the territorial link, saying "these characteristics of territorial application stem from the main purpose of penal law, which is protection of order inside the sovereign territory of the state" (S. Z. Feller & M. Kremnitzer "The Bill for a Preliminary Part and a General Part for the New Penal Code and Concise Explanatory Notes" 14 Mishpatim (1994) 127, 201 [Hebrew]).

 

           Indeed, the roots of the approach which recognizes the territorial link are planted deep in the fundamental attitudes of penal law and jurisprudence, regarding the role of social incorporation, and in its modern form – of the state, as a means of protecting the security and welfare of the public which finds shelter in it. The modern garb of this principle is the concept of "state sovereignty", in whose name the sovereign is given authority over the goings on in its geographic territory. This is the "power inherent in sovereignty" referred to by the Supreme Court of the United States in Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). In implementing this purpose, the state is authorized to determine a system of norms regarding the permitted and the forbidden in the territory under its control, and to enforce them.  This system of norms covers both acts which took place inside the borders of the state, and also acts intended to undermine public order in its territory. 

 

           All this shows that Israeli law after amendment 39 recognized the objective territorial link, not only for consequential offenses, but also in offenses requiring only conduct, and not only for substantive offenses, but also for the offense of conspiracy and other acts of preparation. All these fulfill the requirements of the expanded link, to the extent that they caused, or were intended to cause, an effect within the borders of the territory.

 

24.      American law has adopted a similar approach since the beginning of the twentieth century. The guiding rule was laid down by Holmes J. in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911):

 

"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power."

 

Although this statement referred, at the time it was written, to the application of one US state's law to acts which occurred inside the borders of another US state, in later cases the Strassheim rule was also implemented upon acts committed outside the United States (see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1927); Rocha v. United States, Supra, at p. 548; Marin v. United States, 352 F. 2d 174, 178 (5th Cir.-OLD 1965)).  The American Assistant-Secretary of State (and later, Judge) J.B. Moore discussed this, in his essay on the Cutting case (in which an American was put on trial in Mexico in 1887 for an essay he published in a Texan newspaper against a Mexican).  Referring to the necessity of such an approach in an era in which developing methods of action make the committing of international offenses easier, Moore said:  

 

"The principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done, is recognized in the criminal jurisprudence of all countries. And the methods which modern invention has furnished for the performance of criminal acts in that manner has made this principle one of constantly growing importance and of increasing frequency of application" ("Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case" 2 Moore's International Law Digest 244; emphasis added).

 

            In later decisions, United States courts began to use express language in referring to objective territoriality (see United States v. Cotten, 471 F. 2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. King, Supra, at p. 850; Chua Han Mow v. United States, Supra, at p. 1311; United States v. MacAllister, Supra, at p. 1308).  In Rivard, Judge Dyer ruled:

 

"There are, however, two views as to the scope of the territorial principle. Under the subjective view, jurisdiction extends over all persons in the state and there violating its laws. Under the objective view, jurisdiction extends over all acts which take effect within the sovereign even though the author is elsewhere" (id., at p. 886).

 

25.     Since the 1980's, an additional loosening of the territorial element has been noted, first in the legal literature (see Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 (1981), and C. L. Blakesley "United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime" 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1109, 1112), and later in the caselaw. In the background stood, inter alia, offenses of conspiracy to import and distribute drugs (which are also the subject of the appeal before us). These conspiracy offenses – controlled by particular statutory provisions in the Controlled Substance Act (21 USC § 963, 21 USC 846), as opposed to the general conspiracy offenses in American Law (18 USC § 371) – do not require, as a condition for criminal liability, that the conspiracy was accompanied by an additional act necessary for its consummation. It is sufficient to prove that the conspiracy offense involved a planned effect inside the United States (see United States v. Bermudez, 526 F. 2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Thomas, 567 F. 2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. – OLD 1978); United States v. Littrell, 574 F. 2d 828, 832 (5th Cir.-OLD 1978); United States v. Marable, 578 F. 2d 151, 153 (5th Cir.-OLD 1978); United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F. 2d 906, 919 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bey, 736 F. 2d 891, 894 (3rd Cir. 1984).

 

            That, however, created a problem regarding conspiracies made outside of the state.  According to Strassheim, liability in such a case was conditional upon the existence of an act performed within the borders of the United States (see also United States v. Winter, 509 F. 2d 975, 982 (5th Cir.-OLD 1975). This disharmony was solved by United States courts by a revision in Justice Holmes' rule.  It was held that for those offenses which do not require, by their very definition, the existence of an act toward realization of the desired consequence, the law will apply whether the act led, de facto, or was merely intended to lead, to a consequence in the United States.  And so it was held:

 

"It seems somewhat anomalous, however, that Congress intended these statutes to apply extraterritorially, but that jurisdiction attaches only after an act occurred within the sovereign boundaries. Thus, even though the statutes were designed to prevent one type of wrong ab initio, under the traditional approach, the courts were without power to act. This dichotomy directly contravenes the purpose of the enabling legislation.

. . .

As a result, it is now settled in this Circuit that when the statute itself does not require proof of an overt act, jurisdiction attaches upon a mere showing of intended territorial effects. The fact that appellants intended the conspiracy to be consummated within the territorial boundaries satisfies jurisdictional requisites" (United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.-OLD 1980); emphasis added).

 

See also United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir.-OLD 1980); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (D. Fla. 1990) ;United States v. Wright-Barker, Supra, at p.168; United States v. Yousef, Supra, at p. 91; and compare United States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d 862, 886 (5th Cir.-OLD 1979).  For an exhaustive treatment of the subject see also the judgment of United States v. Best, 172 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660 (D.V.I. 2001).

 

            Last, it should be mentioned that the courts in the United States have not seen a justification to make a differentiation between a criminal, acting by himself outside the country to commit criminal acts on the territory of the United States, and a person who instructs, from his place of residence outside the country, agents who are "his long arm" within it (see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,  Supra, at p. 444).

 

26.       In sum: The Israeli legal system and the American legal system both apply their penal law to a person who acted outside the country, even merely by conspiring to commit a crime within the country, whether his plan was consummated or not, and whether he acted alone, or via another person. They do so on the basis of the territorial link, with no need to turn to other application expanding links. These legal systems do so by somewhat loosening the inflexible rules of application, in order to ensure preservation of public order in the geographic territory which they control.  In the background lies the understanding, that such loosening is made necessary by the need to fight crime, especially crime spread over a number of states.

 

Expansion of Application and the Right to Due Process

 

27.       That last conclusion raises the question of the link between the expansion of the state's law and the right to due process.  Does application of the principles of a legal system outside its usual radius of application, while trapping a person in its net who usually would not be caught in it, violate that right?  That question arose in US law in a number of cases, and I shall quote a few passages on the way they dealt with it there, as we can adopt some of them into our own law.

 

            American law prohibits the expansion of application when that would violate the basic rights of a person, including the right to due process provided in the Fifth Amendment to the American Constitution.  So ruled an American court:

 

"As long as Congress has indicated its intent to reach such conduct, a United States court is bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment" (United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983); emphasis added).

 

          The links which expand application of the state's law are the principled basis of the constitutionality of that expansion. They create the "sufficient nexus" between the criminal act and the state, required by American case law in order for the application of the law outside the territory to meet the requirement of due process:

 

"in order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" (United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990); emphasis added).

 

            American courts have discussed the meaning and definition of the term "sufficient nexus" in a number of cases, dealing mainly with wide scale drug smuggling.  Examination of them does not reveal full uniformity.  In one of the cases the court ruled that the basis of this requirement is the principle of state sovereignty and a person's expectation that he will not be exposed to foreign law. The expansion is justified, therefore, only when a link exists between the criminal activity and the United States, to the extent which justifies protection of American interests (United States v. Caicedo, 47 F. 3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995).  In contrast to that relatively wide definition, which apparently allows application of American law to a very wide gamut of acts taking place outside its territory, another court ruled that proof of a "sufficient nexus" requires showing that the criminal activity had, or was supposed to have, repercussions inside the borders of the United States (United States v. Kahn, 35 F. 3d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F. 3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

28.       Between the wide definition and the narrow one lies the requirement of a "sufficient nexus" based on the criminal's "voluntary assumption of risk". At its foundation lies the assumption that a person whose evil acts had an effect in a foreign country has exposed himself to trial according to its laws, and can no longer claim that trying him there is unfair.  An American Court of Appeals wrote in the same vein, discussing the appeals of foreign citizens who had been convicted of involvement in the explosion at the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, and of conspiring to crash an American passenger airplane in the Philippines:

 

"Applying… [the sufficient nexus] standard, it seems clear that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendants was entirely consistent with due process. . . . Given the substantial intended effect of their attack on the United States and its citizens, it cannot be argued seriously that the defendants' conduct was so unrelated to American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. As a consequence, we conclude that prosecuting the defendants in the United States did not violate the Due Process Clause" (United States v. Yousef, Supra, at p. 112).

 

American caselaw further shows (see Caicedo and Klimavicius-Viloria), that even in cases involving a conspiracy to commit a crime inside of the United States, where no act to consummate the crime occurred on American soil, it is possible to try the conspirators in an American court without it being considered a violation of their right to due process. To complete the picture, we note that there was not unanimous agreement about that. It was contended that over-expanded application of the law to acts which occurred outside of the territory of the state is liable to become a potential tool for the aggressive advance of American foreign policy. A restriction of the "sufficient nexus" rule was thus suggested, by which, when the locus of the consequence of the crime is unexpected, or the accused has no control or prior knowledge of his coconspirators' acts in the state requesting extradition, application of the law of the state will be considered unfair (C. Norchi & L. Brilmayer "Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process" 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1223, 1260). 

 

29.       So far we have discussed the theoretical aspect, but, first and foremost, the issue has practical ramifications. The question which arises is whether the expansion of application of the law of the state makes it more difficult for the accused to properly manage their defense, whether it denies them access to evidence and to witnesses outside the country, whether it makes it more difficult for them to bear the cost of arranging their defense, et cetera.  This issue arose for examination in Yousef.  The American Court of Appeal's ruling was unequivocal: a general claim is insufficient.  A person claiming damage to the fairness of the process must point out a specific impediment.  In that case, the argument of violation of due process was rejected, as it was found that access to all relevant evidence had been preserved, that the state itself had provided part of the material, that the American court had funded the defense's efforts to collect material in the country of origin, and that the accused himself had not used all the tools at his disposal for collecting evidence (id., starting at p. 112).

 

Transnational Offenses – Dealing with a new Criminal Reality

 

30.       All we have said so far is especially relevant for crimes which, inherently, are not restricted to the borders of a single state.  Such are, for example, international terror, crimes of human trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, and computer and internet crimes, which usually involve extraterritorial characteristics par excellence.  Also listed among them are acts of conspiracy in one state to commit crimes in another state.  The elements of these acts are likely to be spread over the territory of a number of states, as are their repercussions.  Take, for example, a plan to distribute a dangerous drug, formed by conspirators located in all four corners of the earth, involving purchasing the drug in one country, transferring it to another, and selling it in a third country, whereas the money financing the purchase also crosses continents, as do the proceeds from the sale of the drugs.

 

            Transnational crime has, from the criminal point of view, considerable advantages.  The financial potential in these crimes is great.  They provide the local criminal with a much wider field of action than the one at his disposal when he limits his actions to the territory of a single state.  That allows him to direct his criminal activity to the place which yields the highest profits.  He attains the ability to act from afar, via agents, with minimal exposure to personal danger.  He attains power to choose the law which will apply to him in case he is caught.  International crime even often brings about the establishment of a worldwide criminal infrastructure, which is likely to be used, in addition to its original purpose, as a convenient field for developing new and various channels of crime. 

 

            Transnational crime has existed since the dawn of history.  However, the phenomenon grew stronger with the development of means of communication and commerce between states.  The more the world became a "global village", the criminal craft, which needs convenient means of communication, transportation, and shipping, became easier.  Today, it is easy for a person to sit, say, in a hotel by the beach in Tel-Aviv, and to plan acts whose repercussions will be felt thousands of miles away from there. That situation brought about a considerable increase in the dimensions of international crime, and in the scope and severity of the acts, which are spread over the width and breadth of the globe.  My colleague, Cheshin J., discussed this, regarding drug crime in Israel:

 

"There is no doubt about it: Israel has jumped up a league in the trafficking of dangerous drugs.  In the past, small time drug dealers, mid-size drug dealers, and even big time drug dealers would come before this Court.  However, in recent years we are witness to a phenomenon which our forefathers did not know.  We now speak of Israelis involved in international drug trafficking, and in amounts which the ancients didn't even imagine" (CrimApp 3179/03 The State of Israel v. Fogel, unpublished decision of April 7 2003).   

 

            This criminal reality requires legal systems all over the globe to enhance their fight against crime.  The methods of the past, which were even proved efficient, are no longer sufficient.  A need has arisen for new statutes, which confront phenomena which were not previously known. A renewed examination of the rules of application in the internal law is needed, in order to confront acts taking place outside of the state's territory.  It is now necessary to make new interpretations of existing law, which will fit their updated objectives.  There is now a greater importance to international cooperation in the fight against crime, and no state should treat its fellow's request for assistance stingily.  Thus, extradition of criminals has become a most important means in the fight against crime.  Bach J. discussed this point:

 

"There is a prevalent interest in granting assistance to the prosecution and legal authorities of other countries, in bringing those suspected of committing serious offenses to justice. At a time when the world of crime is becoming more organized and sophisticated, and when means of modern communication have made distances and borders almost insignificant, the conclusion is that international cooperation on the part of the legal institutions of different countries is vital, if we want to successfully confront serious criminal phenomena.  Extradition of fugitive criminals is one of the means by which this cooperation is expressed" (CrimA 74/85 Goldstein et al. v. The State of Israel, 39 (3) PD 281, 285).

 

Crime in the Framework of a Criminal Organization

 

31.       And just as the dimensions of crime have grown more intense, so has the organizational infrastructure which carries them out developed.  Worldwide criminal networks, more or less established, have become a necessary means for such crime.  This is no longer ad hoc cooperation for the joint perpetration of a single crime, rather the creation of a crime syndicate, working in a systematic way, again and again, via criminals spread over different places all over the world, who take part in the criminal activity, each one according to his mission.  Conducting the operation above them is the leadership of the organization, which takes part in outlining and funding the activity, and, usually, its members are the main beneficiaries of the activity (see M. Amir "Organized Crime" 4 Plilim 189 (1994) [Hebrew]. Technology aids the organization leadership in controlling the execution of the acts "by remote control" from where it sits, with no need to travel to the target country, like an octopus sending its tentacles – those are the network members – overseas. 

 

            Criminal networks grow slowly out of sporadic criminal activity, and the more they continue working together, the greater the chances that they will adopt behavior patterns of a crime organization.  The term "crime organization" does not refer merely to the high level of development of criminal networks, which is unfortunately well known from mafia stories in different countries in the world.  Usually, the system is less organized, yet fulfills a number of characteristics which set it apart from such "regular" criminal activity.  This was expressed in article 1 of The Fight against Crime Organizations Law, 2003, which defines a "crime syndicate" as follows:

 

"A group of people, incorporated or unincorporated, which acts according to an organized, systematic, and ongoing plan to commit offenses which, pursuant to Israeli law, are felonies or crimes listed in the first schedule, excepting felonies listed in the second schedule; for these purposes, it makes no difference –

 

(1) whether the organization members know the identity of the other members or not;

 

(2) whether the makeup of the organization is constant or varies;

 

(3) whether the offenses mentioned above are committed or intended to be committed in Israel or outside of Israel, as long as they constitute offenses both according to Israeli law and according to the law of the place where they were committed, or, whether according to Israeli law, the Israeli penal law is applicable to them even though they are not offenses according to the law of that place;"

 

            The concern about all the various levels of organized crime should not be taken lightly (see, e.g. CrimApp 8793/04 The State of Israel v. Kakun, yet unpublished decision of October 20 2004, at paragraph 7 (Procaccia J.), and CrimApp 8331/05 Gabbai v. The State of Israel, yet unpublished decision of September 7 2005, at paragraph 6 (Chayut, J.). Considerable effort – both on the national and international level – is invested in the struggle against criminal networks spread all around the world.  Against this background, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 came into being, and on its heels the said Israeli Fight against Crime Organizations Law was passed, whose purpose is to make dealing with this new danger more efficient.  The statute sees activity in the framework of a crime network, in and of itself, as a criminal offense leading to a severe punishment which varies, according to the nature of the activity, between 10 and 20 years imprisonment (article 2 of the law).  Thus, in addition to the criminal liability pursuant to any other law, which takes on a dimension of additional severity when an offense was committed in the framework of a crime organization (article 3 of the law).  Article 1(3) of the law, quoted above, once again anchors the principles of application of Israeli penal law, including the expansion of that application in the appropriate situations, even to acts committed outside the territory of Israel. 

 

Drug Offenses

 

32.       As I have already noted, offenses of international distribution of and trafficking in dangerous drugs are listed among the most prominent transnational offenses.  The unique characteristics of these offences led to wide recognition of the need to intensify the war against them and to employ special means in doing so. It has been determined, a number of times, that it will not be possible to rout the plague "if states restrict themselves merely to punishment of offenses which take place within their borders.  The commerce in drugs is a phenomenon which all must fight together, and separately" (CrimA 401 Elkayel v. The State of Israel 38 (1) PD 354, 357 (Shamgar P.).  Türkel J. also discussed this point:

 

"Crime is rising and crossing borders.  It is becoming transnational.  Especially in the drug business, in which great quantities of drugs are transferred from one state to another, and it is impossible to fight this phenomenon except through international cooperation" (CrimA 10946/03 Issa v. The State of Israel, yet unpublished decision of June 23 2005, at paragraph 8).

 

See also Y. Zilbershatz "Dangerous Drugs: International Law and Israeli Law" 13 Mechkarei Mishpat 461 (1997) [Hebrew] and CA 9796/03 Shemtov et al. v. The State of Israel, yet unpublished decision of February 21 2005, at paragraph 24.

 

            Not only is Israeli law forced to deal with Israel being turned into a central target for drugs originating abroad; it also must deal with the growing involvement of Israelis in drug offenses all over the world.  A particularly grim expression of this is found in the report of the American Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) of February 2004, according to which:

 

"The majority of the MDMA produced in other countries is trafficked to the United States by Israeli and Russian organized crime syndicates that have forged relationships with Western European drug traffickers and gained control over most of the European market".

 

Against this background, a provision was added to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1973, expanding its application even beyond the geographic area of Israel.  I refer to article 38 of the ordinance, which provides that Israeli law will apply, by force of the active personal link (national link), upon drug offenses committed anywhere by an Israeli citizen or resident (article 38(a)); Israeli law will further apply, by force of the severity of the offenses (universal link), upon the main drug offenses, which will be seen – even if committed outside of Israel and by a person who is in no way Israeli – as if they were committed in Israel (article 38(b)).  On this matter, see and compare CrimA 4002/01 Korakin v. The State of Israel, 56 (4) 250, 256; CrimA 7303/02 Hekesh v. The Attorney General, 67 (6) PD 481, 502; and CrimA 4479/03 Oyko v. The State of Israel, yet unpublished decision of March 10 2004.  The deviation from the "narrow" principle of territorial application stems from the recognition that the drug epidemic is no longer an internal Israeli phenomenon, and that its elimination justifies a loosening of the boundaries of application of national penal law (see also Alkayel, Supra, at p. 357, and John Doe, Supra, at p. 532).

 

            Drug trafficking offenses are also among those recognized in The Israeli Penal Code as offences against international law, in light of the convention prohibiting drug dealing, to which Israel has been party since June 18 2002: The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) (49 Treaty series 1388, at p. 1). The Penal Code prior to amendment 39 expressly listed drug offenses along with "crimes against humanity" (article 4 of the code. Regarding the relationship between The Penal Code and The Dangerous Drugs Ordinance in this context, see John Doe, Supra, at p. 536). Inclusion of the trafficking offense in this grouping of offenses, then as now, also testifies to drug offenses' great severity in the eyes of the law, and to the awareness of the need for international cooperation in legal confrontation of them.

 

            One of the practical applications of the principles we have outlined above is the power to order the extradition of drug offenders from the State of Israel and to it, to the extent circumstances justify it and the law allows it.  Bach J. discussed this, in dealing with an Israeli crime network which attempted to smuggle a great quantity of drugs into the United States:

 

"Organized crime gangs become more sophisticated every year; using telexes, faxes, and other means of communication, distances and borders are losing their meaning and importance.  Therefore, there is a need for an awareness of the danger that a lack of cooperation [between states] is liable to bring about the failure and frustration of the preventative action and of the war against international crime.  One way such cooperation can be expressed is through reciprocal extradition of criminals (CrimApp 3547/93 Zalmonovitch v. The State of Israel, unpublished decision of July 15 1993, at paragraph 5).

 

            And indeed, the recognition of the severity of these offenses led to their inclusion in the list of extraditable offenses in the conventions to which Israel is party.  The bilateral treaty between Israel and the United States provides, in article 2(31), that "offenses against the laws relating to dangerous drugs" are extraditable offenses.

 

            33.       Examination of American law reveals a similar picture.  It should be mentioned at the outset, that it is not by chance that many conspirators direct their acts especially toward the borders of the United States. That country is a preferred target for drugs smuggled in from the outside. This is a drug "market" which, it turns out, is large, and in which the profits are huge. The demand for the "ecstasy" drug there, as we have seen in various cases which have come before this Court, is high.

 

            Drug crimes, like the conspiracies to commit them, are clearly listed in American law as acts which allow the application of the law on acts done outside US territory, according to United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) referred to above.  These are acts in which, for the purposes of the application of the law, the decisive element is not the place they are committed, rather the place where their effect is intended to be felt. American caselaw has repeatedly emphasized that.  Abovementioned United States v. Wright-Barker discussed the case of conspirators who conspired, outside the borders of the United States, to import controlled substances and distribute them within that country.  The Court of Appeals ruled that the American law has clear application upon these offenses, as United States law –

 

"...undoubtedly intended to prohibit conspiracies to import controlled substances into the United States, and intentions to distribute such contraband there, as part of its continuing effort to contain the evils caused on American soil by foreign as well as domestic suppliers of illegal narcotics" (Id, at p. 167).

 

In another case, the court ruled that restricting the application of the law only upon acts committed inside the United States would to a considerable extent undermine the ability to fight drug crime and the effectiveness of that fight (United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, Supra, at p. 839; see also Brulay v. United States, 383 F. 2d 345, 349 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Perez-Herrera, Supra, at p. 290; United States v. MacAllister, Supra, at p. 1307).

 

            I might add, that this Court only recently handed down a judgment, in HCJ 3315/04 Shitrit et al. v. The Jerusalem District Court et al., yet unpublished judgment of September 15 2005, in which it ruled that in American Law, conspiracy to possess a controlled substance is not to be seen as "a regular conspiracy offense", in the words of my colleague Cheshin J., rather as an offense which digs its foundations deep in the field of drug offenses:

 

"The offense of conspiracy draws its essence, usually, from the offense which is the objective of the conspiracy and from the value protected in that offense, even more so regarding the offense pursuant to article 846 [of American federal law] – an offense which is a drug offense par excellence . . . the center of gravity of the offense is to be found in the 'drugs' part of it, and not in the 'conspiracy' part of it" (id., at paragraphs 28-29).

 

            Thus, Israeli law, like American law, has recognized the need to invest considerable efforts in routing the drug epidemic.  Positioned at the center of the legal activity is the ability to expand the application of the internal law of any state outside its territory, alongside the persistence in international cooperation.  In the framework of these activities, a central role is set aside for the ability to extradite criminals from one country to another, to the extent that is called for by the law and the circumstances.

 

 

 

 

Conspiracy Offenses

 

34.       Offenses of conspiracy were created out of the recognition that it is better, in the war against crime, to frustrate criminal plots before they are consummated (compare with Issa, at paragraph 2 (Barak P.)).  An American court discussed this in the Wright-Barker case -

 

"The purpose of these provisions is to halt smugglers before they introduce their dangerous wares into and distribute them in this country" (Id., at p. 168).

 

The very preventative purpose in this idea is actually liable to make it more difficult to enforce the criminal prohibition.  Many times there is likely to be a gap between the formulation of a criminal plan and the taking of action to carry it out.  It is possible that the prior planning will remain an agreement "on paper", and no act to consummate it will take place.  Alternately, it is possible that acts to consummate the conspiracy will take place far away from the place it was first formulated.  Indeed, many times the efforts to conspire, as well as the formulation of a completed and final criminal plan, happen in places totally different than the one where the plan's evil fruit will appear.  The conspirators can make their plans without ever setting foot on the target soil.  They are liable to enjoy the protection of the borders between various states and legal systems, at the same time that their plans were intended to undermine those very borders.  The result is that the conspirators are liable to take advantage of the geographical gap in order to immunize themselves against exposure to the legal system of a certain state, despite the fact that they chose that very state as the field for their criminal plot.  It is difficult to accept a situation in which, just by choosing to conspire in a certain state and not in another, the conspirators will be safe from the legal system of the state in which the conspiracy is intended to be carried out.

 

            The law offers two solutions to this problem, which dovetail together. The first is seeing the conspiracy as an offense that stands on its own, independent – in terms of the fulfillment of its elements – of the acts it is intended to bring about.  In Israeli law, this is expressed in article 499 of The Penal Code, which recognizes a conspiracy to commit a felony or misdemeanor as an independent offense.  That is also the case regarding the other particular offenses which The Penal Code defines for a person who conspired to commit the main offense (articles 92, 121, 133, 440, and 500 of the code).  This is the case, regardless of the question whether these acts of conspiracy led, de facto, to the offense for which the conspiracy was plotted (see Issa, at paragraph 3 (Barak P.).  A similar idea is found in American law, by which the offense of conspiracy, listed in the set of independent, inchoate crimes, stands on its own, even if it did not lead to the carrying out of the planned offense (see United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Williams v. United States, 179 F. 2d 644, 649 (5th Cir-OLD 1950); United States v. Carlton, 475 F. 2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.-OLD 1973).  And as I have already mentioned, in such conspiracy offenses regarding dangerous drugs, there is not even any requirement that any action to carry out the conspiracy be taken.  In that context, the extradition treaty between Israel and the United States recognizes conspiracy as a cause for extradition, beside the extraditable offenses listed in article 2 of the treaty.

 

            The second solution – upon which I expanded above – is recognition of the ability to try conspirators in the country in which the consequences of the conspiracy were to take place, on the basis of the objective territorial link.  In Israeli law, this is anchored in the definition of conspiracy made abroad, whose purpose is carrying out the act in Israel, as an "internal offense", in article 7(a)(2) of The Penal Code.

 

35.       I wrote above, that the basis of objective territorial application is the state's ability to protect its sovereignty, even against external acts intended to strike within it.  In conspiracy offenses, this idea becomes clearer against the background of the correlative character of the offenses (see Issa, at paragraph 3 (Barak P.)).  These offenses, despite their being separate and independent offenses – a principle resting, as mentioned, upon the purpose of stopping the evil before it occurs – have a strong link to the offenses planned to be committed through them.  The conspiracy is merely "a material meeting between two or more people, with the same intent to commit a prohibited act, and turning it into a common plan, while making a pact to carry it out" (S. Z. Feller "Criminal Liability with no Act, on What Basis?" 29 HaPraklit 19, 22 (1974-1975) [Hebrew]; emphasis added).  The goal of the conspiracy – the offense which has been agreed to be carried out – is what grants the prior agreement its criminal character.  It is what motivates the actions of the conspirators.  Elsewhere, Professor Feller added:

 

"At the stage of the creation of the conspiracy, the aspiration of each of the conspirators is to attain the agreement of the others to act in the future to advance the unlawful mission for which the conspiracy is created.  If the pact with said content is indeed made between them, then this actus reus – the making of the conspiracy – joins the accompanying mens rea, and the offense is complete, as it has been outlined at that point by the conspirators.

. . .

The offense of conspiracy is correlative, in that it does not arise unless the object of the conspiracy is to carry out another offense, felony or misdemeanor.  The correlativity of the conspiracy is expressed through its link to another offense, as a goal to be achieved (S. Z. Feller "Criminal Conspiracy versus Complicity" 7 Mishpatim 232, 240 (1967) [Hebrew]; see also M. Kremnitzer "On the Essence of Criminal Conspiracy and the Relation between it and Solicitation" 14 Mishpatim 231, 236 (1984) [Hebrew]).

 

            Thus, from the substantive point of view, the differentiation between the agreement by the conspirators to commit an offense – that is, between the conduct of making contact itself – and the circumstance regarding the content of that conspiracy, is an artificial one.  These two parts of one entire conduct – the plan and its execution – affect each other, inter alia regarding the question which law shall apply to each of the two. 

 

            In CrimA 84/88 The State of Israel v. Aberjil, 44 (2) PD 133, a person conspired in Israel to deal in dangerous drugs outside of her borders, and the conspiracy was carried out.  The state wished to try the accused in Israel for the acts which he had committed.  There was no doubt that he could be tried for the offense of conspiracy, as the elements of that offense were completed within the borders of Israel.  The disagreement was restricted to the question whether the State of Israel was authorized to try him, by force of territorial link, for the offense which was the object of the conspiracy – trafficking in dangerous drugs, which had taken place entirely outside the borders of the state.  So ruled this Court, through Bach J.:

 

"Every conspirator should be seen as a person who solicits and entices the other conspirators to commit the planned offenses . . . the result is that one can see respondent, regarding the conspiracy in Israel,  as a person who solicited  . . . to commit the offense of export of the drug . . . a person can be tried in Israel for an offense committed abroad by another person, after the latter was solicited to commit it by the accused in Israel, since the act of solicitation should be seen as "part of the complete offense" . . . a result, by which  a person who solicited a person in Israel to commit an offense abroad can be tried in Israel, but there is no parallel jurisdiction [to try] the member of the criminal conspiracy [for the main offense resulting from the conspiracy], is completely unacceptable" (id., at p. 143; emphasis added).

 

American law has expressed a similar stance:

 

"The smuggling of heroin into the United States was the object of the conspiracy. It is inconceivable that the Court could have jurisdiction over a defendant to try him for a conspiracy formed outside the United States, whose object was to smuggle heroin into the United States, but not have jurisdiction to try him for the smuggling itself, which was the very object and fruition of the conspiracy" (Rivard v. United States, Supra, at p. 887).

 

            Indeed, due to the special link between the offense of conspiracy and the main offense, one can see each of the conspirators as a person who "solicited" his fellow conspirators, as well as the people who committed the offense de facto, to carry out the conspiracy.  Thus, each of the conspirators is likely to be considered to have motivated his fellows to carry out the main offense, even if he did not commit any of its elements.  As the main offense was committed in a certain country, the laws of that country apply not only upon those who committed it, but also upon the conspirators.

 

            The conclusion is that, for the purposes of the application of the law, there is no longer any basis for the differentiation between the conspiracy and the offense for which it was made.  From the moment the conspirators plan to "export" their actions beyond the territory in which the conspiracy was made, its link is no longer to be restricted to the place where their plot was made; rather, that place is now to be seen as transferring itself over to the territory where the main offense was to be carried out, which is also the place where the conspirators intended to make their profit.  Logic plainly demands that when the conspirators have decided to commit the main offense in a certain country, they shall be seen as having voluntarily exposed themselves to the law of that country, independent of the question where the conspiracy was made, or whether it was, in the end, brought to fruition.

 

A Linkage to More than One Legal System

 

36.       From the discussion thus far, the conclusion that it is indeed possible for one offense to have a link to a number of legal systems is beginning to arise and take form.  In the words of Professor Dinstein:

 

"It appears, from the very [existence of the principle granting] a state criminal jurisdiction according to links to the offense or the offender et cetera, that competing criminal jurisdiction between two or more states, over one person, is possible.  Competing jurisdiction exits when, for example, a citizen of country A commits an offense in country B: the latter may employ its jurisdiction by force of the territorial principle, whereas country A may employ jurisdiction by force of the allegiance principle.

. . .

Occasionally the competition between jurisdictions becomes a clash between them, as each state (having legal jurisdiction) wishes to employ it despite the existence of a competing jurisdiction" (Dinstein, at p. 312).

 

The following question naturally arises: which system shall prevail, and on what basis shall the competition be decided?  Only in unusual cases does international law provide norms for deciding between competing jurisdictions.  Such is the case, for example, for offenses carried out on the high seas (see articles 6, 8, 9 & 19 of the Convention on the High Seas (1958)). However, in most cases, conventional international law is expressed in bilateral or multilateral extradition treaties.  These usually provide that it is forbidden to expose a person to double jeopardy.  That prevents the possibility that both legal systems, one after the other, might act to try the accused.  Thus, once the law of one system is applied to the offense, the law of the other can no longer do so.  The fundamental principle of international law instructs each state: aut dedere aut judicare – either extradition or prosecution.  International law is uninterested in the result of the "competition" between legal systems which have a link to a certain offense.  It has but one objective: that the accused stand trial, and it makes no difference if that happens in the requesting state or, alternately, in the state receiving the request.

 

            The rationale at the basis of this rule is liable to be frustrated, when there are no extradition relations between the states, or when there is a concern, for any reason, that even if there are such relations, the choice is not a true choice, as the person's trial in the state receiving the extradition request will be but a farce.  In such a case, the competition between legal systems might be solved practically in a number of ways: attaining custody of the accused without extradition (which is extremely controversial in international law); bringing the competition before an international tribune (as was done in the Lotus affair); or other forms of intervention of the international community (as happened in the affair regarding the downing of the Pan-Am airplane over Lockerbie in 1988).  But in none of these solution alternatives does international law offer a rule of decision, to decide which of the involved legal systems is to prevail. 

 

            International law even refrains from adopting a hierarchy between the application links it recognizes, even though that, it would seem, would assist in deciding the competition.  International law so refrains, out of concern that the determination of a strict hierarchy would lead to unjust or arbitrary results, whereas a more flexible rule, involving discretion, would be unfeasible without a neutral and objective party authorized to employ it (M. Plachta "The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare" 12 European Journal of International Law (2001) 125, 130).

 

            The conclusion is that, lacking an obligatory external norm, the competition can be solved only on the basis of the internal law of the states, or, more precisely, by the rules – including the extradition law – of the state requested to extradite the accused.  I shall therefore now discuss the foundations of Israeli extradition law. 

 

Extradition Law – A Substantive Examination

 

The Right not to be Extradited

 

37.       Article 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, titled Personal Freedom, states:

 

"A person's freedom is not to be taken or restricted by imprisonment, detainment, extradition, or any other way."

 

The right not to be extradited is, therefore, a constitutional right in Israeli law, and the caselaw has so ruled in the past (CrimA 6182/98 Sheinbein v. The Attorney General, 53 (1) PD 625, 658; Hekesh, Supra, at p. 495; HCJ 3992/04 Maimon-Cohen v. The Foreign Minister et al., 59 (1) PD 49, 56; and Issa, at paragraph 7).  All governmental authorities – including the Judicial branch – are commanded to protect it (Article 11 of the basic law).

 

            This right has two faces.  First, it draws its strength from the right to freedom in its simple sense.  Just as putting a person in detention or imprisoning him impinges upon his freedom, so does his extradition to another country, especially assuming that there he will be exposed to a similar risk.  The second face of the right is the harm a person is exposed to as a result of his disconnection from his familiar environment, and his exposure to the risks of a foreign legal system, including its substantive law, its evidence and procedural law, and the sentencing policy it employs. In this sense, an individual's "personal freedom" also includes his freedom to choose his environment and the system of norms, including legal norms, to which he is subjected.  Barak P. explained that in Sheinbein:

 

". . . it would not be just to try a person in a country of whose laws he is unaware, with whose culture he is unfamiliar, and whose language he does not speak.  It is not good to detach a person from his country, his family, his witnesses, and his people . . ." (id., at p. 637).

 

            However, as any right, the right not to be extradited is not absolute.  Against it stand contrasting interests, on the basis of which the law is likely, in certain cases, to allow impingement upon it (see Hekesh, Supra, at p. 495).  The constitutional apparatus which arranges the issue is our well known "limitations clause" – Article 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom – with its four cumulative conditions.  Pursuant to those conditions, in order for the impingement to be legal, it must be shown that it is enacted in a statute or by force of one, that its purpose is worthy, that it sits well with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and a democratic state, and that it is proportional. 

 

            The question is, therefore, what is the quality and content of the public interest which stands opposite the right not to be extradited, and what is its weight when put on the scales against that right?  The public interest for extradition or against it is formed out of a fusion of the various interests – those in favor and those against.  These are found in the interpretation of the statute dedicated to the issue of extradition – The Extradition Law; in the provisions of the relevant extradition treaty; and in additional sources.

 

The Public Interest as Seen through the Extradition Law and the Treaties

 

38.       In Goldstein, Bach J. discussed the need to interpret the terms in The Extradition Law "liberally" (id., at p. 284).  In Engel, Barak J. expressed a similar approach, ruling that "the clear tendency of the courts [is] to grant the extradition treaties a liberal interpretation (id., at p. 103).  Barak P. repeated this stance, in his dissenting opinion in Sheinbein, stating that "The Extradition Law (and the extradition treaties) is interpreted liberally" (id., at p. 640).  In contrast, Or J. ruled, in the opinion of the Court, that it is not possible "to determine, as a sweeping rule, that the law set out in The Extradition Law is to be interpreted 'liberally'" (id., at p. 660).

 

            In my opinion, the question is not the extent of liberality in the interpretation of the law.  Extradition law, like any other law, is interpreted according to its purpose, while balancing between the values embodied in it (see Aloni, M.K., Supra, at p. 42; CrimA 600/88 Davis v. The Attorney General, 43 (2) PD 645, 647; HCJ 3806/93 Manning et al. v. The Minister of Justice, 47 (3) PD 420, 425; and CrimFH 8612/00 Berger v. The Attorney General, 55 (5) PD 439, 449).  This purpose or more precisely, these purposes, are the key to understanding the public interest in the extradition question in each particular case.

 

            Before discussing all of the purposes, I will further comment that extradition law is not made in a vacuum.  They are woven into the general tapestry of the laws of Israel.  The ways they are interpreted is affected by the fundamental principles of law in general, and by the purposes of statutes adjacent to the extradition issue (see Manning, Supra, at p. 285 (Barak J.).

 

Cooperation in the Fight against Crime

 

39.       The first and central purpose of extradition law is the creation of an effective instrument for international cooperation in the fight against crime, particularly transnational crime.  Barak P. discussed this in Sheinbein:

 

"This purpose is the creation of a legal instrument for international cooperation in the war on crime . . . a tool for assisting the legal authorities of the requesting state, as a part of the international community's fight against crime" (id., at p. 639).

 

In Hekesh, Mazza J. added:

 

"At the head of the interests standing against the right not to be extradited is the interest of the State of Israel – which is a common interest to all civilized countries – in the existence of a common international fight to rout crime.  The signing of extradition treaties expresses the joint interest of the signing states to create a legal and practical infrastructure which will allow cooperation between them.

. . .

The need for cooperation between states has only grown stronger as the years have gone by.  The increase in criminal activity which crosses national borders, the establishment of sophisticated crime frameworks, based on cooperation between criminals in different countries, and the common phenomenon of citizens who move to other countries, and then, after having committed crimes there, return to the state of their citizenship, all require increasing cooperation between all civilized states" (id., at p. 495). 

 

Bach J. also wrote:

 

"At a time when crime is getting more sophisticated every year, when distances and borders have become almost unimportant, and when telecommunication between criminals has also become easy, efficient, and immediate, the success of the authorities fighting crime, be it international terror, drug trafficking, or severe financial offenses, will be in danger of frustration if efficient cooperation between law enforcement authorities in different countries is not ensured.  The arrest of crime suspects in every country, and their extradition to the requesting country, are part of the means to realize that cooperation (CrimApp 4655/95 Livkind v. The Attorney General, 49 (3) PD 640, 646).

 

The need for international cooperation is the result of the changing times.  In the past, the dominant approach drew exclusively from the principle of state sovereignty.  The state was thought of as the only body permitted to enforce the law upon acts which took place on territory under its control.  No external body was allowed to intervene in the way it did so, needless to mention doing so instead of it.  However, "such an understanding of the issue has long since ceased to be a part of the legal consciousness of the enlightened world" (S. Z. Feller Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 240).  Professor Feller adds:

 

"The period in which we are living is characterized by the fast and easy movement of people in the free world from one state to another.  A person's presence all over the world, as a temporary resident, a tourist, or just a traveler, is a routine thing.  Moreover, a person is liable to create danger and strike at vital interests of the state while being beyond national borders – even by taking advantage of the fact that he is beyond them.  The ease and speed of travel in the world, and the possibility of undermining public order and vital interests of the state even from a distance, grant foreign criminal activity importance which does not fall from that of domestic criminal activity.  This is a dangerous phenomenon for the state, which requires response and ammunition on the penal plane" (id.).

 

            The attitude today is that the penal law no longer looks solely upon what is done inside the country.  It has an important role in the constant interrelations which each legal system maintains with its fellows.  The legal system does not act in a vacuum.  It has some level of responsibility toward other systems.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Canada wrote in Libman v. Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 214: "In a shrinking world, we are all our brother's keepers".  Such responsibility has apparently not yet been internalized by customary international law, but it is reflected in the conventional law between the states, and should also simultaneously serve among the internal principles which guide each state in interpreting its laws.  Not only is it inappropriate for a state, as a society in the community of civilized nations, to seclude itself within the narrow boundaries of its sovereignty; such behavior is likely to lead to severe consequences from the standpoint of its internal interests as well.

 

Preventing Flight from Justice

 

40.       One of the central objectives of international legal cooperation is preventing criminals, who committed a crime in one country and fled to another which has no link to the crime or cannot bring them to justice for other reasons, from avoiding justice.  Adiel J. discussed this in Maimon-Cohen, Supra, at p. 58:

 

"The process of extradition, being a component of criminal law enforcement, is intended to establish international cooperation which will allow the state requesting extradition to apply its criminal law in light of all the purposes at its foundation, and ensure that fugitive criminals will not frustrate the goals of criminal law by fleeing to the territory of other states".

 

Wise & Bassiouni also discussed this in their book:

 

"Extradition is a means for making sure that the purposes which are thought to be served by having a system of criminal law are not frustrated by the ability of putative wrongdoers to slip out of the country and obtain asylum abroad. It helps to ensure that criminals do not escape the punishment they deserve, that the preventive, educative, or expressive uses of the criminal law are not diluted by the recurrent spectacle of offenders managing to avoid trial by fleeing to a foreign sanctuary. It serves to close one kind of potential bolt hole" (M.C. Bassiouni, E.M. Wise Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Dordrecht,1995) 26).

 

            It should be emphasized that flight from justice is a complex concept.  It should not be viewed through a narrow lens.  It embodies not only the question of the state's jurisdiction, but also the ability to convict a person who has committed a crime and punish him as he should be punished (R. v. Godfrey [1922] All E.R. Rep. 266).  I need not conduct here an exhaustive characterization of the concept of flight from justice.  It will suffice to say that when the evidence which can be collected in the state being asked to extradite is weak since most of the evidence is abroad, or when there are real difficulties in bringing witnesses, that may help a person flee – de facto – from justice, even if he is tried in that country.  These words of Barak P. in Sheinbein exemplify this:

 

" . . . Our evidence law, which, in general, does not allow hearsay, and is based upon the right to cross examination, makes trial in Israel of an accused person most [difficult], when all the evidence in his case is outside of Israel.  It is not by chance that the Common Law countries – to which the State of Israel is close, regarding criminal proceedings – do not prosecute their citizens who committed crimes outside their territory, rather, extradite them.  Their evidence law requires such a result" (id., at p. 640; see also Feinberg, Supra, at paragraph 23).

 

41.       If the State of Israel were to grant, in one way or another, asylum to criminals, who cling to her legal system as if they were "grasping the horns of the altar" (1 Kings 2: 28) – in the words of M.K. C. Porat in a debate before the Knesset on the amendment of 1999 (Knesset Transcript, 1999 20, 4212), it would lead to severe consequences. First, that would harm the international war effort against crime.  Second, that might endanger security and public order in Israel: "the state will cause severe damage to itself, if it allows international criminals to safe harbor here" (Pesachovitz, Supra, at p. 456 (Landau J.)). Third, that would cause damage to Israel's image in the eyes of the nations of the world, as Israel would be seen as not doing enough to fight crime (see Pesachovitz, id., and Sheinbein, Supra, at p. 641).  The words of Mazza J. are appropriate here, by way of analogy:

 

"Needless to say, when a state refrains from extraditing its citizens – and when circumstances require it, refrains from prosecuting them – it raises suspicion that it is an uncivilized state which gives cover – heaven forbid – to criminals.  Thus, not only is its image in the eyes of other states damaged, but also – no less worrisome – its image in its own eyes" (Hekesh, Supra, at p. 498).

 

            An additional negative result is likely to be the loss of motivation by the requesting state's law enforcement agencies, to the extent that its efforts wove the tapestry of evidence for which extradition is requested.  It is clear that the requesting state's expectation, after having invested resources to collect evidence against a person, is that this person will be brought to justice. A deep gap between this expectation and the consequence of refraining to extradite him is liable to dampen the requesting state's willingness to act in the field of detection and investigation of criminals in the future, in light of the chance that they will be rescued from the vise of the law only because of the unwillingness to extradite them.  This is likely to damage both the requesting state and the requested state, as well as their common fight against crime, and in the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, 1494:

 

". . . what initiative would law enforcement agencies in one country have to investigate a crime that could not be successfully prosecuted?"

 

A Person is to be Tried by his "Natural" Legal System

 

42.       A main purpose of the legal institution of extradition is related to the principle by which it is best to allow the "natural judge" of the accused to decide his case.  Extradition law is not indifferent to the special interest of a legal system with a tight link to the crime – as opposed to any other system – in prosecuting its perpetrators.  That is the type of link about which Barak P. said, in Sheinbein, that "by the force of such a link, the judges of Israel can be seen as a persons "natural judges" (id., at p. 641).

 

            What is that link, which grants a certain legal system its character as the "natural" system which is to prevail among all legal systems that have a link to the crime?  The answer to that question requires returning to the issue of the competition between systems, and to the question of "conflict of applications", which, as I mentioned above, is an issue for the internal law of the requested state to decide.  Many times, the requested state is willing to waive the application of its law.  This is the source of the Israeli prosecution authorities' authority to petition the District Court for a declaration that a person is extraditable.  However, the question arises again in full force, since this waiver has been put up for the examination of judicial review – which requires reconsideration of the prosecution authorities' position; and all the more so, since the requesting state has not waived the opportunity to apply its own law.

 

43.       This is an issue, some of whose characteristics are reminiscent of the issue of conflict of law (and see A. Levontine Conflict of Law – A Bill (1987) A).  The legal realm of conflict of laws is usually categorized as part of private international law, and it is usually mentioned in the context of civil issues.  In conflict of law, a choice must be made between different legal systems, which would apply themselves upon the same case by force of a number of links.  This choice must be made in light of rules of choice of law, set out in the law of the forum hearing the issue.  Each legal field has its own unique rule of choice of law.  Thus, for example, Israeli law provides that the law applying to a tort which has links to more than one legal system will usually be the law in the place it was committed (lex locus delicti) (Yinon, at paragraph 9); the law applicable in inheritance is the law of the testator's residence at the time of his death (articles 137-140 of The Inheritance Law, 1965), et cetera.  The engine powering the rules of choice of law is the preference of one link over another and, accordingly – the preference of one legal system over its competitor.

 

            The situation is different when dealing with a criminal issue, as in the case before us (see also Levontine, Conflict of Laws, C).  First, as I mentioned at the beginning, in criminal law the substantive law is not separated from jurisdiction, and both are bound together.  The choice between competing systems is therefore not a "choice of law", rather a "choice of application" of the law and of jurisdiction together.  And it seems easier for a legal system to "waive" only one of those two components, than to waive both.  Second, and more importantly, criminal law has unique characteristics: one is that penal law is bound to the question of state sovereignty, and thus belongs to the "nucleus" of issues, upon which the legal system especially wishes to apply its values.  The second aspect is that in the criminal process, the accused is exposed, more than the parties to a civil case, to the risks that his stance will be rejected and the stance of the opposite side will be accepted.  Finally, extradition law, which is adjacent to criminal law, does not deal only with the question of the relationship between the links.  It tries to look at the issue with a broad view, while considering many various considerations, of which the relationship between the application links is only one.

 

            Therefore, in the penal field there should be no talking of a "rule of decision", rather a "rule of preference".  Such a rule is a station along the way.  It is not a final station.  As I noted, a judicial forum asked to decide a question of extradition, needs more than a rule of decision.  Thus, for example, when it is found that, according to the rule of preference which has been adopted – be its content as it may – that the foreign law is to be applied, the court will still have to examine whether the foreign state will give the accused a fair trial, and, alternately, whether the law of this state is likely to "rescue" the accused, to the extent that justice will not be done.  It may be that in the end, the legal system chosen will not be the one determined by the rule of preference, rather the one which fulfills most of the other rationales which the legal system wishes to consider.

 

            I have discussed these rationales, and I will further discuss them.  At this point, I shall try to locate the rule of preference in our extradition law, and in our search for that rule, we must return to the basics of criminal law.

 

44.       "The criminal norm is legislated, first and foremost, in order to ensure the proper functioning of society within its political boundaries, including all the values upon which its existence and development depend, according to the views of the political force leading it. Thus, the offense's territorial link to the state is of the highest degree" (S. Z. Feller Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 245). Feller recognizes the hierarchy between the different application links.  In his words:

 

"These links have a value-based hierarchy between them, according to the state interest embodied in each of them.  Indeed, the state's interest requiring the application of its penal law upon every offense committed in the territory of the state is not the same as the interest in applying its law in an undiscerning fashion upon offenses committed outside of the territory of the state.  Regarding extraterritorial offenses, the interest in applying the law of the state due to an offense which endangers its security, is not the same as the interest in punishing any crime whatsoever committed by a citizen of the state . . . " ("Criminal Jurisdiction", at p. 594; emphasis in original).

 

            The territorial link is thus the link of highest "rank", and its application is central.  The other links are listed after it in the hierarchical order, and each one has residual application in relation to the one before it (see Feller Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 246).  About the meaning of the hierarchy of links, Professor Feller adds:

 

"The same value-based hierarchy is also manifest in the characterization of various types of application as main on the one hand, or subsidiary on the other hand, in terms of conflict of laws; that is to say, between the law of the state and the foreign law" (id.; emphasis added).

 

            In The Penal Cod, the hierarchy of links is partially manifested after amendment 39. Thus, article 14(b) of the Code, which establishes application of criminal law by force of the passive personal link, provides that Israeli law shall retreat when the offense was committed in the territory of a foreign state, and is not an offense according to that state's law, or its law restricts criminal liability for it, or when the foreign legal system has already exhausted its power – by force of the territorial link – to prosecute the accused, and he was acquitted, or convicted and served his punishment.  Article 15(b) and 16 apply a similar hierarchy between the active personal link or the universal link according to Israeli law, and the link of the foreign law. 

 

            However, as Professor Feller himself notes, the hierarchy relates only to conflict of laws, and – would I add – does not have anything to do with the choice between legal systems competing about application.  Its meaning is that where the laws of a foreign state provide that an offense committed in its territory is not an offense, the Israeli law can no longer apply itself to that act by force of links which are inherently inferior to the foreign state's territorial link.  That is also the case where the foreign country has exhausted justice in the case of the accused.  In fact, the implementation of the hierarchy does not lead to decision in a competition between legal systems, rather makes competition unnecessary in the first place.  However, where such competition actually exists, for instance when all the conditions in abovementioned article 14(b) are met, or when the involved legal systems fail to properly integrate the hierarchy of links in their internal law (and see Foundations of Penal Law, at p. 247), the question of decision returns.

 

            An alternative solution is likely to be found in a priori granting of higher status to the link of a certain kind, so that it will always prevail.  In the past it was thought, for example, that the nationality of a person makes that nation-state the most proper forum for his prosecution.  That was the intention of my colleague Cheshin J., when he wrote that-

 

"Walking back into the depths of history will show us that the source of the laws preventing extradition of citizens was, inter alia, the spring of nations (printemps des peuples) in the 19th century. . . . a citizen is a son of his country – if you will, a son of his fatherland – and it is thus worthy that before judges in his country – before them and not before judges of another country – he shall stand trial, as they are his 'natural' judges" (Yegudayev, Supra, at p. 558).

 

            This anachronistic approach is no longer in force.  Its voice, wrote Barak P. in Sheinbein, "seems like a voice from a distant and strange past" (id., at p. 641).  And Cheshin J. added:

 

"the reasons given in the past for preventing the extradition of citizens to other countries – the injustice of trying a person in a country with whose law he is not familiar and whose culture is foreign to his, the state's duty to protect its citizens from the foreign system of law, the lack of trust in the fairness of the foreign legal system toward people who are not its citizens – have lost their force in a world which has become a 'global village' . . . " (Yegudayev, Supra, at p. 544).

 

45.       The approach which has taken the highest status is the one which claims that the preferred link is the territorial link, and therefore that it is preferable to prosecute a person in the place where the crime was committed.  There is logic to this result.  A person who chose to commit a crime in a certain place can certainly be seen as a person who voluntarily subjected himself to the legal system in that place.  Professor Feller also discussed this:

 

"By committing a criminal offense, the offender accepts, in advance, the jurisdiction of the state in whose territory he committed the offense" (Extradition Law, at p. 3).

 

Barak P. was also of the opinion that the "'natural judge' of the accused is the judge of the country in which he committed the crime" (Sheinbein, Supra, at p. 637).  And in Hekesh, Mazza J. wrote:

 

"Justice demands that a person who chose to commit an offense in a country of which he is not a citizen or permanent resident stand trial before the authorized court in the country in which he committed the offense, according to its laws and system" (id., at p. 499).

 

And Adiel J. added:

 

"The committing of the offense violates, first and foremost, the sovereignty and order of the state in whose territory the offense was committed.  It is logical, therefore, that the state's interest be focused, first and foremost, on what takes place within its borders, and only after that on acts committed in other countries which have no direct effect on the goings on in its territory" (Maimon-Cohen, Supra, at p. 64).

 

46.       But what shall the law be when the offense is committed in a number of different places? The rule relating to locus delicti gives no solution in such circumstances.  Moreover, even if a case came before us, in which the competition is between two states who do not wish to prosecute on the basis of the territorial link, even then the "locus delicti rule" would not be relevant.  Moreover, and this is what is important in our case: how shall the competition be decided when the offense is conspiracy in one country to commit an offense in another country? Indeed, according to the view I expressed, both states are to be seen has having territorial application, and in such a case the "locus delicti rule" is useless.

 

            I am therefore of the opinion that as far as criminal law is concerned, a person's "natural" legal system is the system to which the alleged crime has the most links.  This approach, sometimes called the "majority of links" or "center of gravity" approach, is the one which best expresses the relationship between the criminal conduct and the legal system which should apply.  It offers an efficient rule of preference, able to assist – along with the other considerations which the court must consider – in solving most cases of competition.

 

            Such an approach is also implemented in civil law.  It is the approach accepted in Israeli law for examining the convenience of the judicial forum (See CApp 4716/93 The Arab Insurance Company, Nablus v. Zariqat, 48 (3) PD 265, 269; and CApp 851/99 Van Doosselaere et al. v. Depypere et al., 57 (1) PD 800, 813).  However, it has also been criticized. It has been claimed that such an approach is liable to impinge upon legal certainty, and even be used as a manipulative mechanism in the hands of the court (see Karayanni, at p. 53; and Yinon, Supra, at p. 375). However, these contentions are unfounded when dealing with criminal law. Indeed, as I noted, the principle of legal certainty is one of the foundations of penal law. But its meaning is merely that a person shall not be exposed to criminal liability if he is unable to know about the criminal prohibition and its nature (CrimA 534/78 Kovillio v. The State of Israel, 34 PD (2) 281, 287).  The principle of certainty also relates to the right of the accused to due process and to have the charges against him be clarified on the basis of fair and clear rules of evidence.  However, the principle does not include a criminal's certainty that he will be able to evade justice if only he is wise enough to commit his unlawful acts in a place, or in a manner, which will prevent bringing him to justice.  Nor does it include the certainty that he can produce his profits in a certain place, but not be exposed to the jeopardy of the legal system of that place. Nor does it include a person's certainty that he will be able to claim that he is not familiar with the law in the place in which he chose to commit the offense (see, on this issue, the verdict of an American court in Washington D.C. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 902 (D.D.C. 1988)).

 

            The "center of gravity" approach, as a rule of preference in extradition law, was also adopted by the courts in Canada, first in the words of a Queen's Bench judge in the District of Manitoba, Judge Hanssen, in United States v. Swystun [1987] 50 Man. R. (2d) 129.  In that case, the court listed the considerations to be taken into account in the question whether to extradite to the United States a Canadian citizen suspected of conspiracy to distribute drugs in the latter country. The accused had allegedly performed all his acts exclusively in Canada. Among the considerations listed by the court as relevant were: the place where the effect of the conspiracy was intended to be felt; which of the competing legal systems has a stronger interest to prosecute the accused; which country's law enforcement agencies discovered the crime; which place is the evidentiary center of gravity, et cetera.  At the end of its examination, the court ruled:

 

". . . it is apparent from an examination of the factors listed above that although a fugitive may not have personally performed any act in the foreign jurisdiction in furtherance of the crime with which he is charged, that jurisdiction, for a variety of reasons may still be the most effective place for him to be prosecuted" (Id., at p. 134; emphasis added).

   

            This approach was examined soon after, in two similar cases in which the extradition of two Canadian citizens to the Unites States was requested, for the crime of conspiracy to commit drug crimes there.  Their conspiring and their acts to advance the plot did not go beyond Canada's borders, and the acts committed in the United States were done solely by their agents. The prosecution's evidence was mostly in the United States.  The discovery of the conspiracy would not have been possible without the efforts of United States law enforcement.  Pursuant to the law, it was possible to try the suspects either in Canada or in the United States.  The trial court ordered their extradition.  The appellate court overturned the decision and ruled that the extradition violates their constitutional right not to forcedly leave the country, beyond the extent necessary. After that, the Supreme Court heard the case.  In its decision, given by La Forest J., by a majority of five against two – see United States v. Cotroni [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 – the Supreme Court of Canada adopted Swystun, ruling:

 

"It is often better that a crime be prosecuted where its harmful impact is felt and where the witnesses and the persons most interested in bringing the criminal to justice reside and . . . where the . . . evidence [is] located" (Id, at p. 1488).

 

It was thus decided that in light of the entirety of the considerations, extradition to the United States is constitutional (compare also Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 405).

 

            Support for the "center of gravity" principle as the appropriate rule of preference for questions of conflict of application might also be found, by way of analogy, in article 403 of the American Restatement (Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relation Law (1986)).  That article, which deals with both civil and criminal cases, provides a rule of choice of application, when two states see it as reasonable to apply their laws to one act, but the legal systems contradict each other.  The foundation of this rule is the need to prevent a situation in which a person is subject to two contradictory legal rules which cannot be reconciled.  In such a situation, states the Restatement, each of the competing states must examine – on the basis of the all the relevant variables – which state has the clearly greater interest.  A state which finds that the other state has a clearly greater interest must waive the application of its own law.  It appears to me, that one can adopt that rule even for situations in which the legal rules do not contradict each other but the question is: which of the states, with similar laws, shall apply its law to the case, when they cannot both do so jointly?

 

            Last, we can make an analogy from a similar situation of competition, which arises when two states concurrently request the extradition of a person from a third state.  The solution in such a case is often provided in the particular provisions of the extradition treaty.  Article 17 of the European Convention on Extradition, Paris 13.XII. 1957, for example, whose title is "conflicting request", provides:

 

"If extradition is requested concurrently by more than one State, either for the same offence or for different offences, the requested Party shall make its decision having regard to all the circumstances and especially the relative seriousness and place of commission of the offences, the respective dates of the requests, the nationality of the person claimed and the possibility of subsequent extradition to another State" (Emphasis added).

 

In other words, the state asked to extradite has the right to decide the competition according to its discretion, in the framework of which it is to consider all of the relevant circumstances (in other words – all of the links).  A similar rule of decision according to all of the circumstances is provided in article 14 of the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Israel. On that subject, Professor Feller wrote "I haven't even a shadow of a doubt that the flexible approach taken by the European Convention and by the other treaties which take it, is preferable to any inflexible approach, whatever test it may have chosen "(Extradition Law, at p. 405). With that I can only agree.

 

In conclusion, to the extent that a person's act, regardless of the physical place in which it was committed, is especially linked to the legal system of the requesting state, the particular purpose of extradition law, which is the subject of our present discussion, determines that it is appropriate to extradite him to that state.  I will, however, re-emphasize what I have said: location of the offense's center of gravity is merely a rule of preference, which discovers which of the legal systems has a preferential link to the offense.  It is not a rule of decision, and its results merely join the rest of the parameters examined regarding the extradition question, which together form the fabric of considerations in the decision.

 

 

Manifestation in the Conventional Law

 

47.       As previously mentioned, states may form their extradition interrelations in a treaty, constrict their scope or expand them, and stipulate various conditions in them.  Study of extradition treaties to which Israel is party reveals that many of them include requirements, regarding the offense which is the cause of the request, relating to the physical place in which the elements of that offense came about. 

 

            Such is article 1 of the Agreement for the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the State of Israel (Treaty Series 360, vol. 11, 65), which requires, as a condition for extradition, that the offense took place in the requesting state.  In the original language:

 

"The Contracting Parties agree to extradite to each other, in the circumstances stated in the present Agreement, those persons who, being accused or convicted of any of the offences enumerated in Article 3 and committed within the territory of the one Party, or on the high seas on board a vessel registered in the territory of that Party, shall be found within the territory of the other party".

 

            It seems that this provision is an artifact from the "narrow" territorial view, which was, until recently, the fundamental view in English law.  For many years, the dominant approach in Britain was that only when the gist of the offense took place on British soil does local criminal law apply, even if the offenses are inherently transnational.  The foundation of this view, which in Britain is called the "last act rule", or the "terminatory theory", is Reg. v. Ellis [1899] 1 Q.B. 230, which was reinforced in Reg. v. Harden [1963] 1 Q.B. 8.  The rule greatly constricted the willingness to apply English law to acts performed outside of the country, and assumed, as a fundamental axiom, that the state's interest ends where its physical borders lie.

 

            In light of the gap between the results of this approach and the reality of the changing world, it was criticized in caselaw and in the legal literature (see Judge Rose's speech in R v. Smith [1996] 2 BCLC 109; and L. Hall "Territorial Jurisdiction and the Criminal Law" 1972 Crim L. Rev. 276; L. Collins Fraudulent Conduct 1989, at p. 258.  Professor Feller also criticized the approach:

 

"According to this approach, the 'location of the offense' has such a restricted role that it creates an ad hoc concept of 'criminality for the purposes of extradition' – as opposed to the regular and true criminality – which stems from the offense's link to the state, even if it is extraterritorial.  Indeed, this approach was once employed in order to determine regular criminality, since each state's isolation and isolationism were reflected, inter alia, by the fact that only conduct that took place in its territory was worthy of interest and reaction . . . [but it is] an artifact from the days when the application of the criminal law was exclusively territorial, and has therefore become obsolete" (Extradition Law, at p. 187; emphasis added).

 

Professor Feller gives an example:

 

"if, for example, a robbery or attack against an 'El Al' agency should take place in some country, and the criminals flee to England, the extradition treaty with Great Britain will lead to the rejection of any request to extradite them to Israel, since only the state in which the offense was committed has the right to take the criminals into its custody" (id.).

 

            It has become clear, though, in recent years, that English law wishes to distance itself from that constricted approach.  First, regarding some types of offenses, primary legislation has adopted an expanded approach regarding application (see Criminal Justice Act 1993, which took effect in 1999).  Second – and this is the main thing – English caselaw has recently recognized the possibility of adopting an expansive approach, regardless of the type of offense at hand.  I refer to the judgment of the Court of Appeals of March 2004, R v. Smith (No. 4) [2004] EWCA Crim 631.  In that case, Lord Woolf recognized a Common Law rule of application, which does not draw exclusively from the place where the "heart" of the offense took place, rather also relates, inter alia, to the place where its consequences appeared.

 

            In any event, regarding offenses of conspiracy, British law had already taken an approach different from the "last act rule".  British law had adopted the principle, parallel to the objective territorial link, by which the law is chosen according to the place where the effect of the conspiracy took place (see Reg. v. Doot [1973] A. C. 807, 816, 818; Liangsiriprasert v. Government of the United States of America [1990] 2 All ER 866; Reg. v. Sansom [1991] 2 Q.B. 130.

 

48.       The extradition treaty between the State of Israel and France (Treaty Series 308, vol. 10, 379) contains a "territorial restriction" of another sort.  Article 7(1) of the convention excludes from the states' extradition relations cases in which the offense took place within the borders of the state asked to extradite.  At the foundation of this provision is the view that when the offense was committed in the territory of the state asked to extradite, the application of that state's law – which is territorial application – has a dominant status.

 

49.       On the other side of the divide are the treaties in which, out of a desire to intensify international cooperation, extradition relations have been expanded to include situations in which the entire offense was committed outside the territory of the requesting state.  Such is the extradition treaty between Israel and the United States.  Article I of the extradition treaties between these two countries provides:

 

"Each contracting Party agrees, under the conditions and circumstances established by the present Convention, reciprocally to deliver up person found in its territory who have been charged with or convicted of any of the offenses mentioned in Article II of the present Convention committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, or outside thereof under the conditions specified in Article III of the present Convention."

 

Article III of the treaty provides:

 

"When the offense has been committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting Party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws of the requested Party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar circumstances.

…."

 

            Thus Israel and the United States intended to expand the list of situations in which criminals can be extradited from one country to the other, to include cases in which the extradition offense was committed outside of the borders of the requesting state, if the requesting state's penal law would apply to the act if the roles between the states were reversed. 

 

            If one remembers the discussion of the rules outlining the application of penal law according to the American system, the roots of the difference between the Israeli-US treaty and the other mentioned treaties becomes clear.  The idea at the heart of US-Israeli extradition relations is that the application of a state's criminal law can and should be expanded beyond the requesting state's geographic borders, in those cases in which there is a clear link between it and the offense. 

 

Reciprocity in Extradition Relations

 

50.       The extradition issue is umbilically tied to the idea of reciprocity, according to which, when state A agrees, under certain circumstances, to extradite a person to state B which wishes to prosecute him, the chances increase that state B will also agree to similarly extradite when the roles are reversed, even though it has no duty by law to do so (Pesachovitz, Supra, at p. 452).  The interest of the state being asked to extradite is that when the time comes, it will not be denied the opportunity to apply its penal law upon offenses which it is obligated by common sense and a sense of justice to prosecute; and to implement its law and fundamental principles, including its interest that fugitives from its law will be returned to it in order to face justice.  Wise & Bassiouni discussed this: 

 

"Each state has an interest in getting back fugitives from its own law who flee to a foreign country. But to secure their return on a regular basis, a state is likely to have to agree to extradite in its own turn. This is the main motive for concluding extradition treaties" (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare, 37).

 

            The principle of reciprocity is very important.  It is an important component of a state's ability to plan ahead.  It contains a synergetic element, which empowers states working together against crime.  It ensures that such joint activity will continue; and it is a fundamental element in the ability to maintain bilateral relations.  In the words of Mazza J.:

 

"…Extradition treaties are based on reciprocity.  A state which refrains from extraditing its citizens cannot expect that its requests to extradite criminals who violated its laws and fled will be met with willingness" (Hekesh, Supra, at p. 498).

 

And these were the instructive words of my colleague, Cheshin J.:

 

"One side will not do for the other – not in the long term, at least – unless the other also does the same . . . always, or – almost always, will the 'something' rule hang over us: something for something.  So it was in interrelationships between individuals before law existed, and so it is now beyond the law's scope, and since humans society is made up of individuals, so it was – and is – after the creation of law.  And knowing that the state is run by humans, so it also is in the interrelationships between states" (Yegudayev, Supra, at p. 565).

 

Professor A. Shapira added, on the same subject:

 

"States, being aware of their interdependence, cannot allow themselves the luxury of isolationism within the four walls of their unique interest.  The needs of the modern international community require reciprocal consideration of national interests.  Every state may have a real interest in advancing its own policies and principles of justice, as they are embodied in its laws.  Systematic ignoring of foreign states' legitimate interests undermines the foundations of a comprehensive world order" (A. Shapira "The Nature of Conflict of Law Rules" 10 Iyunei Mishpat (5744) 275, 286)[Hebrew]).

 

51.       This talk of the reciprocity principle is not merely lip service.  It is concretely manifest in Israel's extradition relations with various countries. Especially noteworthy are those cases in which the State of Israel requested – and was granted – the extradition to Israel of persons suspected of committing crimes outside of her borders, which had an effect within her territory.  Thus, in 1995, Israel asked the United States to extradite the head of the "political wing" of "Hamas", Mousa Abu Marzook, to Israel.  In the petition request it was contended that as a high ranking member of a terrorist organization, Abu Marzook was responsible for terrorist attacks committed in Israel.  It was not contended that any of his alleged acts were committed in Israel, or that he physically participated in committing terrorist attacks in Israeli territory.  All of Abu Marzook's alleged acts were committed by him outside of the borders of the State of Israel, from where he was at the time, in the United States. On May 7 1996, the District Court for the Southern District of New York declared that Abu Marzook is "extraditable" to Israel, and it was only an internal Israeli reason that prevented the extradition in the end.

 

            In October 2004, Israel asked Russia to extradite Shote Shmallshvilli, who allegedly served as a key figure in a crime syndicate which trafficked in women for prostitution.  According to the allegations in the extradition request, Shmallshvilli was responsible for the "purchase" of women in Russia and their "sale" to Israeli pimps.  The offenses of which he was suspected were all committed outside of Israel, and the lion's share of them within Russia.  It was alleged that in Russia he held women, dealt with their sale to Israelis, and also arranged their transportation to Israel, through Egypt.  Russia granted Israel's request, and Shmallshvilli was extradited.

 

            Only recently, Israel asked the United Kingdom to extradite to Israel a person allegedly involved in the affair known as "the Trojan horse" – a case of industrial espionage by hacking into Israeli companies' computers.  An intensive Israeli Police investigation led to suspicion that an Israeli couple living in London was involved in the development and distribution – all exclusively within British borders, without any act whatsoever by them or on their behalf being committed in Israel – of a computer program used to penetrate computers.  On August 28 2005, the Magistrates' Court of the Southern District of London decided, on the basis of the fact that the couple had allegedly committed "conspiracy to defraud", to extradite them to Israel.

 

            It is but obvious that just as the State of Israel expects that the extradition requests which it directs to foreign countries will not fall on deaf ears, it is best, out of recognition of her vital interests, that she treat other states' requests similarly.

 

Preserving Public Policy

 

52.       At the beginning of this opinion, I discussed the "vague principle" in The Extradition Law, pursuant to which a person is not to be extradited, if, under the circumstances, it would violate "public policy" (article 2b(a)(8) of the law).  The decided case law is that this "public policy" is merely "external public policy".  When the extradition - that is to say, the allowing of the foreign law's application – involves a violation of the fundamental values of the local legal system, such extradition is no longer worthy, as it violates public policy.  That is the law regarding "external" public policy, as opposed to "internal" public policy - which merely means that the local law was likely to provide a different solution to the issue than that set out in the foreign law - which is not sufficient, in and of itself, to prevent extradition (CA 1137/93 Ashkar v. Haims 48 (3) PD 641, 651; Yegudayev, Supra, at p. 585; Sirkis, Supra, at p. 346; HCJ 3439/04 Bezeq v. The Attorney General, previously unpublished decision of December 29 2004, at paragraph 15; Feinberg, Supra, at paragraph 16).

 

            It is possible to fit many of the interests found in The Extradition Law, which are related to this case, under the wing of public policy; and I would like to discuss two of them: one is the duty to ensure that the person whose extradition is requested will not suffer injustice in the requesting country, and that his trial will not be a miscarriage of justice.  The second relates to the connection between extradition and the sovereignty of the country being asked to extradite.

 

Extradition and the Right to Due Process

 

53.       The right of a person accused of a criminal offense to due process is a constitutional basic right.  It stems from the right of the individual to freedom and dignity.  Dorner J. discussed this point:

 

"Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom . . . granted the status of constitutional basic right to a person's right to criminal due process, especially pursuant to Article 5 of the basic law, which determines the right to freedom, and pursuant to Articles 2 & 4, which determine the right to human dignity" (Criminal Retrial 3032/99 Baranes v. The State of Israel, 56 (3) PD 354, 375).

 

            The right to due process is a multifaceted right.  A number of different principles are employed in order to safeguard it. Ensuring that these principles are employed "is a precaution of the highest importance for doing substantive justice and for preserving the rights of suspects, accused persons, and witnesses, in criminal proceedings (HCJ 6319/95 Chachmi v. Levi, 51 (3) PD 750, 755).  Their role is to balance the unequal power relations between the accused and the prosecution, which usually enjoys an advantageous procedural status and additional advantages, and to ensure that the accused is given a full opportunity to make a case for his innocence, and to act in order to prove it.  Against this background, the rationale behind rights and guarantees such as the presumption of innocence, the right to inspect the prosecution's evidence, the right to remain silent and the right to not incriminate oneself, the right to counsel, the right to cross examination and the right to present evidence, et cetera, becomes clear.  Some of these rights are expressly anchored in statutes (see, e.g., articles 15, 74 & 126 of The Criminal Procedure Law [consolidated version] 5742 – 1982; and articles 32 & 34 of The Criminal Procedure Law [Enforcement Authority – Detention], 5756-1996).  The opinion that these rights are now principles which are "on the books" has even been sounded (CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. The State of Israel, 49 (3) PD 355, 375; HCJ 1437/02 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Minister of Public Security, 58 (2) PD 746, 764; A. Barak "The Constitutionalization of the Legal System as a result of the Basic Laws and its Implications for (Substantive and Procedural) Criminal Law" 13 Mechkarei Mishpat 21 (5756) [Hebrew].

54.       The right to due process covers extradition law as well. Its manifestations, as seen in The Extradition Law, are many: the principle preventing "double jeopardy"; the prohibition of extradition on a political basis or discriminatory extradition; the requirement that prima facie evidence be shown; the return of Israelis convicted abroad to Israel, to serve their sentences; and the prohibition of extradition to a country where the extradited person may face the death penalty, unless he could be so punished in Israel as well.  These principles are also anchored in extradition treaties, including the treaty between the United States and Israel (see articles 5 & 6 of the treaty).

            The principle regarding due process does not contradict the other purposes of The Extradition Law.  It fits in with them.  It can ease the concern about exposing the accused to a legal system to which he is unaccustomed.  It serves as a counterweight against the prosecution principle of nationality.  The following words of S. Weiss, M.K., in the debate on the first call of the 5759 amendment, are fitting:

"The principle according to which Israel is a member of the family of civilized and democratic nations is a good principle; these laws reflect the tradition and law of Israel, and complement them.  We shall extradite criminals to political and legal cultures in which they will get a fair trial.  Reciprocally, they will extradite criminals to Israel; and here humaneness and the fact that we are members of the international human community come before the national principle, since we assume that justice against crime will be done in both places: just trial, and just procedure (Knesset Transcript, 5758 25, 7086).

55.       Legal systems may use different means to achieve the same objective.  Such is also the case regarding the right to due process.  This right is recognized in most democratic countries, but its realization may involve different means.  One state may ensure it using certain procedural rights and guarantees, and another state's laws may adopt other rights and guarantees.  Against this background, it is clear that the argument that differences between legal systems violates, in and of itself, the right to due process and therefore justifies refraining from extradition, cannot be accepted.  Legal systems which are absolutely procedurally and substantively identical have yet to be found, even among countries with a common legal tradition.

            However, it may be possible that gaps between one legal system and another, regarding the quality of guarantees employed in order to ensure due process, will be so fundamental and irreconcilable, that one must inevitably conclude that the legal system in the requesting country cannot be seen as allowing due process.  Just as the difference, in and of itself, does not justify a sweeping conclusion regarding non-extradition, it can also not be relied on in order to prevent subjecting the extradition to judicial review (and compare Maimon-Cohen, Supra, at p. 66).

56.       What kind of difference between legal systems, then, would justify the conclusion that a person is not to be exposed to the law and legal system of the requesting state?  Answering this question requires two separate stages of examination.  At the first stage, the court must examine the alleged due process violation which characterizes the law of the requesting state, in light of the fundamental principles and basic views used in Israeli law in order to identify due process and the rights and guarantees without which, according to our view, its existence is impossible.  At the second stage, one examines how the alleged violation fits into the requesting state's legal system's set of criminal law balances.  A claim that a certain right or guarantee is not realized, or realized in a faulty fashion, is not sufficient to support a conclusion regarding non-existence of due process; one must prove that in the entirety of rights and guaranties which the foreign system provides to a person defending himself against criminal charges, there are no elements capable of "setting off" the alleged violation and of ensuring that in the when all has been taken into account, the right to due process has been preserved.  Adiel J. discussed this, addressing the argument that the right to due process is violated since a foreign legal system does not allow inspection of the prosecution's evidence:

"With no comprehensive familiarity of criminal procedure in the [foreign] legal system, we are not willing to determine, merely on the basis of the material before us, that the legal system in its entirety will not allow petitioner a fair trial.  In order to reach such a conclusion, we must examine the entire system, including its principles and rules, in order to see how it balances between the rights of the accused and guarantees his ability to prove his innocence, and the powers and advantages granted to the prosecution.  An examination of one sole institution of a legal system does not allow us to reach such a far reaching conclusion" (Maimon-Cohen, Supra, at p. 68; emphasis added).

Extradition and the Sovereignty Question

57.       A state's decision not to apply its law to an event, despite its ability to do so, and to extradite those involved in it, is liable to be understood as discharge of sovereignty and as an expression of a lack of confidence in the local legal system and in its ability to handle the case with its own tools.  Such a thing surely violates the public policy of that state, which requires that the legal system not be deterred from applying its own fundamental views and from dealing with crimes in its own way.

            However, as I have already noted, public policy in extradition law is "external" public policy.  Not every decision not to apply local law is to be seen as a waiver of sovereignty.  Au contraire: to the extent that the decision to extradite a person is an expression of the purposes I discussed above, the decision not only sits well with the fundamentals of the legal system; it advances them.  The very waiver of application of the law in certain circumstances reinforces the principle of state sovereignty.  The power to withdraw the law, where it is justified to do so, flows directly from this principle.  Indeed, it is done out of free will, and with no external coercion.  Landau J. discussed this:

". . . reciprocity in extradition is not – or is not yet – a duty cast upon states by international law, rather it is a policy issue, dependent upon the state's desire, and this desire can be legally expressed in the provisions of a bilateral convention, or in a multilateral convention it joined" (Pesachovitz, Supra, at p. 452; emphasis added).

Professor Feller adds:

"There is no rule in international law which obligates states to extradite criminals in their sovereign territory to other states.  There is no duty to extradite when the state has not expressed a willingness to do so . . . the conclusion is that one cannot really speak of 'the right to extradition', nor of 'the right to extradite', pursuant to international law.  No state is entitled to demand of its fellow, pursuant to this law, that the latter extradite a criminal which the former is interested in receiving, as international law has not formulated – has not yet formulated, at least – any such general duty of states to extradite criminals at the request of another state . . . as a result of this, each state is sovereign to decide, without any restriction or unstipulated limitation, if it will extradite criminals at all, and if it will do so – on what basis . . . the state is further sovereign to decide on a case by case basis, according to its discretion . . . as such, extradition is an act of sovereignty par excellence, toward other states as well (Extradition Law, at p. 22; emphasis in original).

 Moreover, on the basis of the principle of reciprocity discussed above, respect of state sovereignty will also be ensured in the future, when it requests extradition.  So ruled Landau J. in Pesachovitz:

"From the very start, the principle of reciprocity was not created for the accused or convicted citizen, rather for the state, as the holder of rights and duties in international law, whether we see this principle as recognition of states' sovereignty, or whether we see it – as do most current international law scholars – as a tool for making the war against international crime more efficient" (id., at p. 455; emphasis added).

            One of the purposes of The Extradition Law is, therefore, to grant the state the possibility, on the basis of its sovereign power, to waive the application of its law, when it sees justification to do so.

Special Protection for Israeli Citizens and Residents

58.       I noted previously, that the extradition of a person who was an Israeli citizen and resident at the time he allegedly committed his offense, is today dependent upon the obligation of the requesting state, that to the extent that he is convicted and sentenced to prison, he will return to Israel to serve his sentence here (article 1a(a)(2) of The Extradition Law).  It is clear, therefore, that The Extradition Law intends to grant special protection to a person whose extradition is requested and who maintains an active personal link to the State of Israel.

            One can learn of the essence of this protection, and of its scope, from the transformations which The Extradition Law underwent in recent years.  The protection was added to the law in the year 1978, however was originally of much larger scope.  Article 1a of the law, in its wording at that time, states: "an Israeli citizen is not to be extradited, except for a crime which he committed before he became an Israeli citizen".  The rationale on which that qualification to extradition was based was the concern that Israeli citizens would be abandoned to confront unjust trial in foreign countries, especially in light of their race and national identity.  M. Begin, M.K., who stood at the head of those proposing the qualification, explained this:

"One cannot ignore the fact that the Jewish people is unique in history.  And one must not forget what happened to the Jewish people, especially in the last generation . . . we cannot forget that this sick phenomenon, which devours every last bit of good in people and their culture, whose artificial name is anti-Semitism and whose meaning is hatred of Jews, has not passed from the world . . . we must be very careful that we do not cause injustice even to a person who has committed a crime" (Knesset Transcript, 1977 16, 1452). 

This normative situation, which stood for more than two decades until the amendment in the year 1999, created serious problems. The main problem was that Israel became a refuge for criminals who for various reasons could not be prosecuted here, and who, after attaining Israeli citizenship, were no longer extraditable.  The provision also led to Israel's breach of extradition treaties to which she was party, including the treaty with the United States, in which it was expressly provided that nationality is not a cause for non-extradition (article 4 of the treaty).  These problems appeared in their sharpest form in Sheinbein, the case of an American youth with Israeli citizenship, who was suspected to have committed murder and conspiracy to commit murder and fled to Israel.  Formally speaking, he could have been tried here, but that was practically difficult, or even impossible.  The decision in that case, handed down in February 25 1999, in which this Court ruled that Sheinbein is not to be extradited to the United States, reinforced the recognition of the need to amend The Extradition Law.

            The law was indeed amended soon after (amendment no. 6, April 19 1999).  The protection for Israeli citizens was greatly restricted: the amendment provided that it was no longer forbidden to extradite, rather that a person who was an Israeli citizen and resident at the time the extradition request was relayed, and was convicted abroad after extradition, will return to Israel to serve his sentence. The process was completed in the year 2001, when the law was once again amended, providing, according to its wording, which is the current wording, that the protection is given only to a person who fulfilled the requirement of citizenship and residency at the time the offense was committed.

59.       The new wording of the law expressed a substantial change of attitude.  The law distanced itself from the "citizenship approach", which, as I mentioned, is no longer appropriate.  Instead of recognition of Israeli criminals' interest not to stand trial abroad, as "Jews pursued to the very neck" (in the words of M.K. Begin during the debate on the amendment of 1978 (Knesset Transcript, id.)), the amended law emphasized the prevention of "the cynical use which certain Israelis make of the special status of citizenship" – in the words of Justice Minister T. Hanegbi in presenting the 1999 amendment to the Knesset (Knesset Transcript, 1998 25, 7084).  The change reflected Israeli extradition law's distancing itself from "the citizenship qualification", which was rooted in the law of the Continent (see Sheinbein, Supra, at p. 641 (Barak P.)), and moving toward the approach dominant in Common Law countries, according to which the nationality link has but a weak status, secondary in comparison to the need for effective enforcement (see also the explanatory notes to the amendment of 1999 – The Extradition Law (Amendment no. 6)(Qualification for Extraditing a Citizen) Bill, 1998, Proposed Bills 2707).

            The balancing point, at which the law bases its decision between the need to cooperate in fighting international crime and protecting the interests of the extradition candidate, has changed.  The law no longer focuses on the trial stage, nor on the moment of conviction.  Regarding those, and despite the difficulty involved in it for the accused, the law grants a higher status to international cooperation, that is – to extradition.  The interest of the accused – an Israeli citizen and resident – comes to bear only at the stage when the criminal proceedings have come to a close: the punishment stage.  B. Elon, M.K. touched precisely upon this differentiation between easing the burden of serving a sentence in a foreign country, and the question of the place where the trial will take place, that is – extradition, in the debate on the second and third calls of the amendment in the year 1999:

"As Israelis who have respect for our citizenship – non-Jews as well – and as Jews who are sensitive to the issue of being in a foreign prison, we are sensitive to the issue of where the sentence is served.  On the other hand, regarding the trial, we cannot allow ourselves to be a refuge state for organized bands of criminals, even if they are Israeli bands" (Knesset Transcript, 1999 20, 4214).

The Normative Balance

60.       Now that we have considered the essence of the public interest in the extradition issue, it should be put to a balancing test against a person's constitutional right not to be extradited.  This balance is always a result of weighing the particular circumstances of each case.  Shamgar P. discussed this:

"The guiding principle is that extradition is carried out according to the principles formulated in the law, and that the duty to fulfill the statutory purpose of extradition law retreats only in unusual circumstances, when there is a substantial violation of a fundamental principle which tips the scales decisively to the other direction.  Each case is of course examined in light of the entirety of its circumstances" (Aloni M.K., Supra, at p. 48).

            The first part of the constitutional examination requires finding the relationship between the act of extradition and the public interest.  To the extent that they are at odds with each other, there is no longer a need to continue, since an extradition act which does not serve the interest of society is baseless anyway.  However, if it is found that the extradition serves the public interest, the way opens to the second stage of the examination, in which the act of extradition is stood in front of the constitutional mirror. As noted, at this point we use the tools of examination in the "limitations clause". To the extent that the act of extradition fulfills the requirements set out in that clause, it can be approved despite its impingement upon a basic right.  If, on the other hand, it is found that the extradition does not fulfill the requirements of the "limitations clause", there is no choice but to reject it, or, at least, to change it so that it will fit those requirements.  This is the "vertical" balancing, used in the constitutional examination of acts which stem from the public interest (see HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Vilk et al, 48 (2) PD 456, 473 (Barak P.); and HCJ 1514/01 Gur Arieh v. The Second Television Authority, 55 (4) PD 267, 284 (Dorner J.).

Having discussed the law, we shall proceed to the facts of this case.

From General Principles to Specific Implementation

61.       Is appellant's extradition, under the circumstances before us, and in light of the normative framework laid out above, legal? My answer to that question is in the affirmative.  Before explaining my reasoning, I emphasize that the evidence which serves as the basis for the case before us is merely prima facie evidence.  The decision is limited, of course, to the issue of extradition alone, and makes no factual finding whatsoever regarding appellant's guilt or innocence, which will be clarified separately.

Appellant's case fulfills the procedural and substantive requirements listed in The Extradition Law.  The act he is accused of fulfills the "double criminality" rule and has not yet reached prescription; appellant is not exposed to double jeopardy, and the offense with which he is charged carries a penalty of more than one year's imprisonment.  The background to the extradition is not political or security related, and, as I have shown, appellant is not being discriminated against by it.  I have been persuaded that the prima facie evidence presented in the extradition request and in the response of the Attorney General are sufficient for the purposes of extradition.  The United States has agreed that if the appellant is convicted, he will be returned to Israel to serve his sentence, and the extradition is subject to that obligation.

            Regarding the question of application, appellant's alleged acts lead to application of the law of both Israel and the United States. The offenses for which the United States wishes to prosecute him, by their nature and according to the principles of law there, allow expansion of the application of that country's law even upon acts which were committed outside of its territory.  This is not the United States' attitude alone.  Were the situation opposite – a conspiracy plotted in the United States to import drugs into Israel – the basic attitude of Israeli law also supports the law's expansion beyond national territory.  Israeli law therefore sees the question of extraterritorial application in this case eye to eye with American law.  As stated above, this attitude is also clearly expressed in the extradition treaty between the two countries.

            Both countries have a territorial link to the alleged acts: Israel, due to the fact that the elements of the alleged conspiracy occurred here (narrow territorial link), and the United States, on the basis of the fact that the conspiracy's effect was felt there (wide territorial link).  Simultaneously, the acts are linked to the Israeli legal system due to the fact that the appellant is an Israeli citizen and resident, and to the American legal system due to the fact that the victims are the American public and the vital interests of that country.  Both countries have an interest in bringing a person suspected of drug offenses to justice.  Seeing as it is clear that the two states cannot both apply their laws to appellant (article 2b(4) of The Extradition Law; article 6(1) of the extradition treaty), the question arises, which of their applications is preferable.  True, appellant is Israeli.  The conspiracy was made in Israel.  However, as I have explained, conspiracy, in essence, requires a wide gaze, which views not only the place where the plot was made, but also the chain of acts which stemmed from its implementation.  The main thing, in my opinion, is that the place where the conspiracy was meant to be consummated, and indeed was consummated, is the United States.  Its would-be victims are Americans.  Public order in the United States is the main victim of this conspiracy.  The United States is the main bearer of the social and financial burden involved in confronting it.  American law enforcement initiated the comprehensive, transnational investigation and policing steps which led to its discovery.

            The conclusion which arises and crystallizes from the entirety of these circumstances is that the conspiracy and its fruits, as a unit, are linked mainly to the United States, and it is uncontroversial that the center of gravity of the affair is in that country.  The geographical location from which appellant allegedly acted – the place upon which he now wishes to rely – lacks real importance.  The conspiracy could have been made anywhere in the world.  The fact that it was made inside the borders of Israel's territory is, in the circumstances of the case before us, an almost neutral fact, which carries but technical-formal meaning.  At most, it was intended to benefit the conspirators, who refrained from exposing themselves physically to the danger of their acts on American soil. The American legal system has therefore attained a dominant status, by force of the "rule of preference" which we discussed.  This is the "natural system" for clarifying the charges against appellant.  Decisive weight should be given to the damage suffered by the United States as a result of the criminal activity.  Preference should be given to the United States' clear interest in employing its sovereignty, an interest which is realized by its prosecution of those responsible for that damage within its borders.  The concrete expression of this is the granting of the extradition request.

            This conclusion becomes even clearer in light of the essence of appellant's alleged crimes.  The offenses in which he allegedly took part are especially serious.  The charges in this case involve distribution of a very large amount of drugs, in a constant and repeated manner, which was halted only when it was discovered.  As the criminal outfit persisted in its activity and gained experience, it began to recall, more and more, an organized cartel, and its members became specialized in their roles.  The acts have an international dimension par excellence.  They illustrate the necessity of international cooperation in the fight against crime.  In this case, the only sufficient meaning of that cooperation is generosity toward the request of the United States.

62.       One must not deny the hardship which extradition is liable to cause appellant.  He is not accustomed to the law of the United States, its language is foreign to him, and some of his potential witnesses are in Israel. However, this hardship is to be viewed as inherent in many extradition cases.  Had the target of the acts not been the United States, the argument that such hardship can tip the scales against extradition might not have fallen on deaf ears.  However, the suspicion is that appellant wished to reap his reward there, and thus he exposed himself to the danger that the laws of the United States would apply to him.  In this state of affairs, not even a doubt should be left standing, regarding a criminal suspect's ability to choose the law he finds most comfortable.

Moreover, in weighing the evidentiary difficulty faced by appellant against the opposite difficulty which non-extradition will cause the prosecution, extradition, in the circumstances described, prevails.  That conclusion is necessitated by the rationale of not allowing a person to escape justice, even if he is only a suspect, since, indeed, the evidentiary center of gravity of this affair is in the United States.  The central witnesses are in the United States; not only appellant's alleged coconspirators, but also American law enforcement personnel.  Bringing them to Israel to testify, including cross-examination, even if not impossible, involves great difficulties.  It is not at all clear that it will be possible to guarantee their security here.  It seems, therefore, that the prosecution stands before difficulty greater than the damage which will be caused to appellant due to the fact that he will have to bring his witnesses from afar.

            We have discussed the realization of the public interest in extraditing appellant, and shall now proceed to the alleged damage to this interest, should the extradition be carried out.  In appellant's first argument, according to which extradition violates his right to due process, I found no basis. First, it is worth emphasizing that which is in any event well known: that the American legal process fulfills the principle of fairness, including the scope of substantive and procedural rights which stem from that principle.  That principle is expressly anchored in the Constitution of the United States of America (in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments), and it is also reflected in the caselaw of the United States.

            Second, even if I assume, as per appellant's counsel's argument, that there indeed are differences between the criminal procedure and evidence law of the United States and that of Israel, I am not of the opinion that this difference is so substantive and deep that it negates the fair character of the legal process which takes place there.  It is inherent to extradition that it involves a foreign legal system, with legal rules which are unique to it.  It is doubtful that any example could be found where the law of the requesting state and the requested state are absolutely identical.  Differences between criminal procedure and evidence rules are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to support a determination that the right to due process has been violated.

            As I emphasized above, the question of fairness is to be examined against the background of the foreign criminal law in its entirety, while considering the comprehensive system of constitutional balances in it.  Examination of the legal system of the United States shows, inter alia, that the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, that he has the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate himself, that he has the right to counsel, that he has the right to bring evidence of his own and to examine those who testify against him, by way of cross examination, and that, as mentioned, he enjoys the general constitutional right of due process.  All this is sufficient to ensure that appellant will not be exposed to a process which is unfair.

63.       Appellant's argument is also to be rejected, to the extent that it bases itself upon the alleged limited scope of the right to inspect evidence.  True, the accused has a basic right to inspect the evidence used against him. That is "the center beam of the right to a fair trial" (CrimApp 3152/05 Ben Yaish v. The State of Israel, yet unpublished decision of May 10 2005 (Arbel J.).  However, it is not sufficient to make an unsubstantiated claim that "the scope of the duty of discovery of evidence in the United States is restricted compared to that duty in Israel".  One must show how that restricted scope is liable to hurt the defense of the accused.  That was not done by appellant, whose extradition request, as well as other proceedings which took place, displayed before him in great detail the list of witnesses and the evidence against him, including affidavits, a state's witness agreement, transcripts of phone conversations which are evidence in the case, and the protocol of witness Roash's testimony in a trial in the United States.  What evidence was held from him? That, appellant does not explain.  

64.       Finally, even said difficulty in bringing defense witnesses does not provide a basis for the argument regarding violation of due process.  This issue was addressed before the lower court.  Pursuant to its decision, appellant's counsel clarified with United States Attorney General personnel what options appellant has, according to American law, to bring these witnesses to the trial.  In the answer, which was put before us in respondent's argument summary, it was explained that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States grants the accused the right to obligate others to testify in his trial.  So it is, naturally, regarding witnesses within the borders of the United States, but it was emphasized that to the extent that the direct testimony of defense witnesses is not possible, he can take their testimony via a letter rogatory or via closed circuit television.  That answer satisfied the lower court, and it is also satisfactory to my mind.  There is no reason that the right to access to evidence and the effective ability to bring witnesses - which is an inseparable part of the right of the accused to due process in the United States, and which the courts there are obligated to safeguard – will be denied to appellant, of all people.

65.       The conclusion is similar regarding appellant's arguments about Israel's waiver of her sovereignty, which his extradition involves.  As stated above, non-application of local law does not, in all circumstances, mean waiver of sovereignty.  In the circumstances before us, extradition of appellant sits well with the public interest.  It is a manifestation of purposes of extradition.  It is done not under coercion, or as surrender to pressure, rather on the basis of the position of the prosecution officials and the courts of Israel.  It is nothing other than a clear expression of Israel's sovereignty, and to the extent that it fulfills the element of reciprocity in relations with the United States, it is to be expected that it will even reinforce the principle of sovereignty, when Israel relays a similar request to law enforcement personnel in the United States in the future.

66.       All that has been said thus far forms the public interest in the extradition.  This interest also succeeds in passing the constitutional test.  My view is that all four cumulative conditions of Article 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom are fulfilled in the extradition of appellant.  Of those four, I see fit to expand on the latter two – the worthy purpose, and the extent which does not surpass the necessary extent.  It is clear, first of all, that after having been found to fulfill all the rationales in The Extradition Law, and to have been decided upon within the framework of the discretion of the prosecution without irrelevant considerations, the extradition fulfills the requirement of worthy purpose.  The existence of prima facie evidence against appellant, at the level necessary for the District Court to declare him extraditable, also contributes to this conclusion.

67.       Regarding proportionality: first, it cannot be claimed that appellant's extradition to the United States has nothing to do with the purposes of The Extradition Law.  There is no doubt that there is a fit between those purposes and the means chosen to realize them.  The requirement of rational connection is therefore fulfilled.  The second subtest – the proportion between the benefit from the extradition and its "price" – also supports the extradition.  The extradition of suspects like appellant to foreign countries indeed has a "price tag".  It impinges, as I have noted, upon Israel's legal system's ability to apply its principles, even when it could otherwise do so.  It impinges – absolutely – upon the fundamental right of an Israeli to be judged in his own country.  It is liable to become a precedent for Israeli law enforcement to distance itself from its duty to enforce the law.  However, the benefit from the extradition, which is done for a worthy purpose and fulfills the principles behind our extradition law, is tens of times greater than this damage.  It is a substantial contribution to the international fight against crime.  It advances the ability of the State of Israel to bring suspects who acted against her in foreign countries to justice, in Israel.  It contributes to Israel's legal relations with foreign countries.  Accordingly, the price of non-extradition, when extradition was called for, is also high, and in this regard it is sufficient to glance back at the atmosphere at the time of Sheinbein.

Moreover, the damage involved in the extradition is balanced, to some extent, by the statutory provisions regarding the return of the convicted extradited person to serve his sentence in Israel, and regarding the local legal system's ability to intervene in the sentence he is given.  And there is no more fitting a place than this to comment, that it is by no means necessarily the case that appellant's trial in the United States will expose him to conviction and sentencing which are more severe than those customary in Israel.  Indeed, as I have mentioned, a judgment upon the very same offense with which appellant is charged was recently given in the United States. I refer to Shitrit, which dealt with Israelis who were convicted in the United States of an offense of conspiracy to posses a controlled substance with intent to distribute it – an offense pursuant to article 841(a)(1), together with article 846, of the previously referred to American Law.  The Court ruled that the Israeli "parallel" to this offense is not the offense of conspiracy to commit a felony, whose sanction is more minor (article 499 of The Penal Code), rather the offense of making a drug deal of another kind – an offense pursuant to article 13 of The Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, whose maximum punishment is 20 years imprisonment (see paragraph 37 of that judgment).  This, it seems, speaks for itself.

68.       Last, one must employ the least damaging means test.  This test requires that out of all the means capable of achieving the desired objective, the means whose impingement upon a basic right is most minor is the one chosen.  Indeed, as we are dealing with extradition, it is not relevant to speak of a "ladder" or "stairway", where each higher rung or stair intensifies the infringement upon the right (CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. et al. v. Migdal et al., 49 (4) PD 221, 468 and HCJ 1715/97 The Israel Investment Managers' Bureau v. The Minister of Finance, 51 (4) PD 367, 389).  Indeed, there is no such thing as partial extradition.  Moreover, it seems that one cannot even speak of extradition which is restricted by conditions which lessen the intensity of the impingement.  Such conditions were taken into consideration during the stage of formulating the public interest according to The Extradition Law, and without their existence, extradition would never reach the stage of constitutional examination.  It is therefore difficult to think of a means to achieve the purposes I discussed, whose impingement is lesser than that embodied in the act of extradition pursuant to law.  Non-extradition is not, of course, listed among these means, since, as clarified, it does not achieve these purposes.  The conclusion is, therefore, that in the case before us, the decision to extradite, which fulfills all the other parameters which we examined above, does not impinge upon the constitutional right to an extent greater than the necessary extent.

69.       In sum, my conclusion is that the lower court lawfully declared appellant extraditable to the United States.  That conclusion is called for, by the recognition of the United States' natural prerogative, in the circumstances of this case, to defend itself against those who rise up against it from beyond.  It is also necessary for the worthy cooperation between the two countries.  Thus requires the public interest in Israel, as does the proper balance between it and appellant's rights.  So Israel asked the United States to act in the past. So shall we act in the case of appellant.

            I therefore propose to my colleagues that we reject the appeal.

 

Vice President M. Cheshin

            I concur in the judgment of my colleague, Justice Levy.

            It is common knowledge that inflexible and formal tests which characterized legal systems of old have begun to turn, today, into substantive and flexible tests, which adapt themselves to the circumstances of each and every case, or, at least, to the circumstances of different types of cases.  It is through the spectacles of that quiet development, which is a reflection of societal life in our world – no more inflexible etiquette, no more people mummified in top-hat-vest-tuxedo et cetera – that we must examine the issue of appellant's extradition to the United States.  A comprehensive and all-encompassing glance leaves not the slightest of doubts in my mind, that the United States has the moral right to judge appellant.  The United States is the country which was hurt by the evil acts which were committed – those very acts which originated in appellant's alleged conspiracy -  and how just and right it is, that it should be the United States which judges him and sentences him (should he be convicted).  As for Israel, her place and status in the whole picture of the indictment are but marginal ones.

            Moreover, most of the people who committed the evil acts in the United States were judged by the United States, and the United States sentenced them to various punishments.  So it was with Roash and with Ashkenazi, and so it was with Michtavi, with Cohen, and with Vives.  It is uncontroversial that it was proper for all of these people to be judged in the United States – and indeed they were judged, and their sentences were given them – and whatever makes appellant different from all of them, is beyond me.  Indeed, appellant was not physically in the United States.  He was in Israel.  Yet from his place of residence he pulled the strings, and motivated the others to do his bidding.  I of course agree that the others were not like marionettes, which the puppeteer – and he alone – moves at his will, right and left, up and down.  And yet, according to the evidence which supports the extradition request, it was appellant who controlled – at least partially – the deals which went through; his people in the United States were his representatives and his agents; and the appropriate conclusion is that appellant's physical absence from the United States was but a marginal and minor event, at least for the purposes of the extradition issue.  Appellant "was" in the United States, and acted in the United States, through others who were his long arm.  From the substantive perspective, and for the purposes of jurisdiction and the application of the United States' legal system upon appellant's acts, appellant's status was no different – not morally, and not legally – from the status of the others; his status was no different – and it is not right that it should be any different.

 

 

 

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

1.         I concur in the comprehensive opinion of my colleague Justice Levy, as well as in the comments of my colleague the Vice President.  In my opinion, the foundation of the balance between the considerations in this case - which was not simple from the legal point of view at first glance, and there was good reason for appellant's counsel to so extensively and skillfully argue, leaving no argument unargued - is the component of values and morals. Were the scales balanced from the formal legal standpoint – and they are not, as Justice Levy discussed – that component would undoubtedly be the one to tip them.  According to the prima facie evidence, it was the residents of the United States which appellant intended to harm; he apparently thought that in the land of unlimited opportunities, the opportunities for crime are also unlimited.  The fact that he was in Israel does not cancel the fact that his net was spread over the United States as well.  The law allows him to be tried here, yet also allows trying him in the United States, and the question is fundamentally one of discretion.  It seems that morals and values all point in the direction of prosecuting appellant in the place at which he aimed his arrows.  It would not be proportional, under the circumstances, if appellant's agents were to be prosecuted in the US, but he himself, who, prima facie, was the "mind" behind them, was to be prosecuted here.  Indeed, these days are not like ancient days, and in a number of areas in our lives, with technological advance which our forefathers didn't even imagine, things will not continue to be as they were.  However, the "global village" is not only a technological term regarding the expansion of communications and travel possibilities, which no one doubts; it is also a term of values, even if its pendulum has not yet found its resting point, and even if it has areas which are unclear, lest we say distorted, in the international criminal legal system as well.  An example (which is not the only one) is the attempts to employ "universal jurisdiction" in unjustified circumstances; but this is not the place to expand on that subject.  In any event, our case falls clearly into the category in which the law is interpreted according to what is worthy, which is, in this case, also what is efficient. Indeed, globalization includes questions of terrorism on the one hand, and those of economics on the other, and beside those – environmental and many other issues; and the law occasionally lags behind new technology, and has to catch up, substantively and morally.  See, regarding law and technology, S. Lavi (ed.) Technology of Justice, Law, Science, and Society; and the various issues that are discussed there. 

 

2.         (A)       I must deal, first, with the issue of reciprocity: long ago, when The Extradition Law was amended in the framework of the Law Amending External Offenses Law, 5738-1978, a substantial and embarrassing gap, which remained for more than two decades, was created between Israel's obligations in its extradition Treaty with the US in 1962 (effective since 1963) and the provisions of The Extradition Law.  According to the Treaty, Israel has a duty to extradite her citizens, pursuant to the conditions stipulated in the Treaty: see article 1 of the treaty: "Each contracting Party agrees… reciprocally to deliver up persons found in its territory who have been charged with or convicted of . . . offenses . . . committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the other . . ."; and article 4 provides that "[a] requested Party shall not decline to extradite a person sought because such person is a national of the requested Party."  However, the law as amended in the year 5738-1978 provides (in article 1a, titled "Qualification of Extradition of Citizens") that "an Israeli citizen shall not be extradited, except for an offense he committed before he became an Israeli citizen".  Indeed, this provision came with necessary complementary provisions: article 4a of the Penal Law (External Offenses) Law (consolidated version) 5733-1973 provided that "the courts of Israel have jurisdiction to judge, according to Israeli law, an Israeli citizen or resident who committed an act abroad which, were it committed in Israel, would be an offense in the schedule of The Extradition Law, 5714-1954", subject to certain conditions. And, indeed, in the explanatory notes to the Amendment to External Offenses Law Bill, 5737-1977 (Proposed Bills 5737, 258), it is written that in a minority of extradition treaties in the world (approximately 5%) there are no qualifications to extraditing citizens of the requested state, whereas all the rest have such qualifications.  Thus it was proposed, on the one hand, to prevent extradition of citizens, yet on the other hand, to add to the jurisdiction of Israeli courts, so that they could judge citizens for offenses committed outside of the country, "in order to prevent the state from turning into a city of refuge for criminals".  There is no denying that behind the amendment stood an historic-ideal position, associated especially throughout the years with the name of then Prime Minister Menachem Begin, may he rest in peace, relating to the history of the Jewish people and the persecutions it suffered.  However, the amendment did not sufficiently take into account, and in any event did not anticipate, the reality of criminal life; that stood out especially in extradition relations with the US, where quite a few Israelis live for long periods.  Not only was Israel in breach of the Extradition Treaty with the US from the legal standpoint; the solution which was provided – prosecution in Israel – was practical only in part of the cases in which enforcement was necessary.  Indeed, de jure, it was possible for a person who had committed offenses in the US and fled here, to be tried in Israel.  But in practice, the great expenses of doing so, and the numerous difficulties, including the inability to force witnesses to testify, did not allow such prosecution in every case, de facto.  Naturally, in the situation which was created, Israeli citizens, including those who had emigrated from Israel long ago, could commit offenses in the United States, and escape justice by fleeing to Israel soon after committing the offense.  Israel did not want that, and needless to say, the US, who had continued to extradite pursuant to its obligations in the Treaty, didn't either; reciprocity, the necessary and vital foundation of extradition relations discussed by Justice Levy, was not preserved.  For example, in 1981 Israel and then US Secretary of State Alexander Haig discussed the extradition of the terrorist Ziyad Abu Ayin,  who committed murder in Tiberias, and despite pressure on the part of various elements in the Arab world, he was indeed extradited (it appears that he was later released in one of the prisoner release "deals").

 

            (B)       Attempts to repair the lack of reciprocity were made for almost two decades, since the beginning of the 1980's.  I had the opportunity to accompany these attempts; the great difficulty in repairing the situation, the need for which was understood by all, involved a moral question regarding extradition of Israeli citizens, which was the legacy of the amendment of 5738 (1978). The Sheinbein affair (CrimA 6182/98 Sheinbein v. The Attorney General, 53 (1) PD 625) was one of the severe manifestations of this issue, as the "regular" anomaly of prosecuting people in Israeli courts for offenses which had no Israeli link in and of themselves, and the said difficulties in presenting evidence, were joined by Sheinbein's extremely weak link to Israel, which was akin to mountains hanging only by a string.  As he was accused of a murder which was brutal from every standpoint, there was tremendous complaint from Washington, in whose Maryland suburbs the murder was committed (the hypothetical opposite, which could not have actually happened, as the US continued to extradite citizens after the 5738 (1978) amendment despite the lack of reciprocity, would arouse rage here as well); as a result of Sheinbein's flight to Israel, a certain high ranking member of Congress even sounded words of warning regarding aid to Israel, and it was necessary to explain that in Israel, like in the US, no extradition could take place without orderly judicial proceedings. The affair ended when in the year 5758 (1998), The Extradition Law (Amendment no. 6)(Qualification of Extradition of a Citizen)  Bill was submitted, proposing to allow extradition of a citizen who committed an extraditable offense abroad at the time he was an Israeli citizen and resident, if the requesting state promises to return him to Israel to serve his sentence, should he be sentenced to prison.  The explanatory notes (Proposed Bills 5758, 330) described the difficulties mentioned above: the legal and practical difficulty in bringing witnesses, including the financial question, as well as the changes in the world, the great volume of international travel, and international crime. The submitting of the bill was accelerated in no small part by Sheinbein, even if it didn't apply to that case, and regarding Sheinbein himself, this Court ruled, in a majority opinion, that Sheinbein was not to be extradited, due to his Israeli citizenship, despite the questions regarding his links to Israel.  A petition for a Further Hearing was rejected (CrimFH 1210/99, S. Levin V.P.).  Note that according to the bill, the decisive date for determining the suspect's status as an Israeli citizen and resident is the date that the offense was committed.

 

            (C)       The amendment to the law (Amendment no. 6 to The Extradition Law, in 5759-1999) which was actually passed was different than the original amendment bill regarding the decisive date for the citizenship and residency conditions, which was set at the date on which the extradition request was made.  It was presented as an achievement for Israel which "shall not turn into a state of refuge, neither for organized crime nor for unorganized crime" (Chanan Porat M.K., Chairman of the Constitution, Statutes and Law Committee of the Knesset, session of 3 Iyar 5759 (19 April 1999)).   Yet again difficulties resurfaced, as it was possible for a person who is not a citizen and resident to flee to Israel after committing the offense, and then become naturalized and claim residency.  Thus The Extradition Law (Amendment no. 8) Bill 5761-2001 was submitted, proposing to move the determinative date to the time the offense was committed, instead of the time the request was made.  It was explained that according to the previous wording, a person who is not an Israeli citizen can "flee to Israel after committing the offense, attain Israeli citizenship, and even claim Israeli residency, if time – even a short time – has passed from the day he came to Israel to the time the extradition request is made" (Proposed Bills 5761, 154), and, indeed, in amendment no. 7 to The Extradition Law (5761-2001), in which additional substantial amendments to the law were made, it was provided that the determinative date is the date the offense was committed.

 

            (D) The result, in any event, is that today it is possible to extradite a person who was an Israeli citizen and resident at the time the offense was committed, for prosecution in the requesting state, and if sentenced to imprisonment he is returned to Israel to serve his sentence.  I described that at length, as the amendments to the law in 5759 (1999) and 5761 (2001), and the provision that the sentence is served in Israel, greatly blunted a substantial number of the rationales behind the moral difficulty which the legislature confronted in the 5738 (1978) amendment and afterward.  The return of the extradited person to serve his sentence in Israel (if he is convicted), leads to the result that he will spend his period of incarceration in his national and lingual environment, close to his family.

 

3.         (A)       I shall briefly discuss appellant's arguments, which were discussed at length by my colleague.  Those arguments certainly are not to be taken lightly, in light of the precedents regarding extradition: appellant's counsel discussed the "classic" approach, found in many extradition cases, by which it is best that a person be prosecuted in the place where the offense was committed, which is the "natural place" for him to be tried, as well as in the place familiar with his culture and language.  However, that statement does not fully confront the situations in which a person commits an offense in a country which is not his own.  Indeed, in Sheinbein, Barak P. – albeit in a dissenting opinion – opined that despite the reason given for the citizenship qualification (such as in the law from 5738 (1978) - that a person's natural judges are those in his own country and not a in country of whose laws he is unaware – the "natural judge" is actually the judge of the country in which he committed the offense (p. 639).  However, as we see, the very fact that it is possible to decide either way regarding the "naturalness" of the judge speaks for itself.  In this case, we expand the definition of "committing of the offense", saying that in the modern world, the place where the offense was directed can be considered the place it was committed.

 

The other side of the coin – or, the small consolation to appellant – is that he will be returned to serve his sentence in Israel if he is convicted in the United States and sentenced to prison.

 

(B)       I shall emphasize my point: according to the wide view proposed by my colleague, which includes that "wide territorial link" which seems acceptable also to me, it is worthy to define the locus delicti in the global village through the lens of the target of the offense; the place toward which it was directed; and the place of residence of the victims; and see articles 13-14 of The Penal Code, 5737-1977.  Indeed, there's no denying that this is a change in thinking and a certain deviation from the practice up until now, but we have arrived at this point due to international developments.  It is but elementary that the Attorney General and, of course, the courts, are presumed to always consider the character of the requesting state; and in this case we are dealing with the United States, a country with a legal system about which there is no concern in general, that it will not conduct a fair trial, or that appellant's rights will not be preserved.  Thus, even though there is no denying that US law is not exactly Israeli law; however, even if there is a basis to appellant's claims regarding the difference between evidence law and procedure – and I shall not rule on the question – they do not reach the level which would establish a concern for a fair trial or of violation of appellant's rights.  The calculated balances point in the direction of my colleague's judgment.   

 

            (C)       Appellant's learned counsel emphasized his constitutional rights, pursuant to Article 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, which provides that "A person's freedom is not to be taken or restricted by imprisonment, detention, extradition, or any other way".  However, the basic answer to that is found in Article 8 of the basic law, and The Extradition Law is indeed a statute, with the worthy purpose of enforcement and international cooperation, and in any event, in the situation resulting from the amendments to that law, it fits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.  Regarding the values of the State of Israel, I shall not refrain from saying that in my opinion, they also include the human dignity of the potential victims – for our purposes, victims of drug trafficking.  The modern approach to criminal enforcement includes the rights of crime victims (The Rights of People Harmed by Offenses Law, 5761-2001), and those rights should be affixed upon our consciousness.  In sum, appellant's rights are given weight within the framework of The Extradition Law and in the caselaw, and as my colleague Justice Levy has shown, his rights according to the basic law are not violated by this extradition decision.

 

4.         (A)       Appellant's counsel contended that, from the point of view of Jewish Law, prosecution of a person suspected of offenses is vital, but prosecution in Israel is preferable.  On the other side, state's counsel contended that according to Jewish Law, extradition is appropriate.  Both sides supported their arguments with the same caselaw: HCJ 852/86 Aloni M.K. v. The Minister of Justice, 41 (2) PD 1, 76-98, in the opinion of Elon, V.P.; Sheinbein, in the opinion of Justice Ilan, at pp. 668-669; and in the opinion of Judge Drori in his decision in this case, in the motion for detention till completion of proceedings (CrimApp (Jerusalem) 4024/05).  Elon, V.P. concluded that Jewish Law rules out a persons flight from justice, and requires putting him on trial before an authorized court, and therefore it is appropriate to extradite, especially considering that it is an act under the supervision of a sovereign Jewish state; he expressed his principled stance that the provisions of The Extradition Law (as they were at that time) are valid also according to Jewish Law; see also the summary of his opinion in his article "Extradition Law in Jewish Law" 8 Techumin 263 (5747)[Hebrew].  Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli criticized it ("Extraditing a Criminal to Foreign Jurisdiction", id., at p. 287), opining, first, that the prohibition against going to foreign courts remains in effect; second, that extradition is permissible when Israel herself has no possibility of trying the suspect; and that incarceration abroad, beyond detaching a person from his family, distances him from the Jewish experience, from holy days and festivals, and from all that is Jewish . . . and indeed, that is spiritual death" (pp. 292-293).  In sum, according to Rabbi Yisraeli "it is prohibited to deliver up any Jew to the courts of the gentiles, and it is a duty to give him a just trial in the State of Israel (see also Rabbi D. Bleich "Extradition of a Criminal to a Gentile People", id., at p. 297).  See also Justice Elon's responses to his critics, id. At p. 304, among which he said that "in the issue under discussion, there is an additional relevant consideration.  In my opinion, it is to be taken into account also from the purely halachic standpoint[1]: that a sovereign state, especially in the circumstances of Israel, fighting for her existence and well being, needs extradition treaties with other countries, so that the latter will extradite terrorists and murderers who have fled to their jurisdictions.  Thus, for example, the State of Israel demanded the extradition of the terrorist Abu Ayin from the United States, for committing acts of terrorism in Tiberias . . . such extradition is important and vital to the State of Israel, and it increases her security and her ability to wage war on terrorists; yet such extradition cannot take place without an obligation on the part of Israel to extradite criminals who are wanted by The United States.  This consideration, of enhancing the security of The State of Israel, is an halachic consideration par excellence."  Note that all the participants in that debate were writing regarding the situation prior to the amendments to The Extradition Law in 5759 and 5761.

 

Various opinions have been voiced, and all are important and all are clear.  Indeed, without the claim to be deciding halacha[2], it seems to me that the approach expressed by (then) Justice Elon in Aloni also fits, in the contexts relevant to this case, what former Great Rabbinical Court Judge Eliezer Waldenberg wrote in his responsa, Tzitz Eliezer 18, b, regarding extradition involving death: "and I should also add this, that in the case that prosecution is being requested only for incarceration, and not for death, and even if there is some doubt about it, that has nothing to do with 'deliver up one of you to us' [the case of a besieging enemy who demanded that one of the besieged be delivered up, otherwise he would kill them all – E.R.] et cetera . . . and it is permitted to deliver him up for the good of all . . . and especially when the accusation is a true one."  See also, regarding the approach of the Jerusalem Regional Rabbinical Court, Rabbi E. Batzri "The Good of the Individual versus the Good of the Public" 9 Techumin 63 (5748)[Hebrew], and his conclusion that the concern of aginut [wives who cannot remarry, as divorce is infeasible] (as was the claim in Aloni) trumps an extradition order.  See also S. Rabinowitz "'And You Walked His Paths', on Mercy in Law", 89 Parashat HaShavua (A. HaCohen & M. Vigoda eds.).  In sum, there is no denying that Jewish Law's position is complex, and that the preference in interpretation is to limit extradition when there is another option.  However, even according to the position of those opposed to extradition, a large part of the difficulties, like those raised by Rabbi Yisraeli, have been substantially softened by the amendment to the law by which the sentence is served in Israel.  Joining that is the issue of reciprocity, which is also recognized by Jewish Law, as Justice Elon and Judge Drori noted.

 

(B) And regarding reciprocity, it is worthwhile to remember that law inherently involves moral norms, and that sometimes morals rise to the level of legal obligations.  See C. Pizam Charity as a Legal Norm, Charity Child Support in Jewish and Israeli Law 1 (5736).  Law is thought of as one of the traits of G-d, in addition to benevolence and truth (R. Yerucham Levovitch, Mashgiach (spiritual teacher) of the Mir Yeshiva in the 1920's and 1930's, Da'at Chochma u'Musar A 239).  As for relations with people who are not Jewish, the Darkhei Shalom (paths of peace) bylaw, based also upon a moral approach, obligates the People of Israel with various duties toward non-Jews (supporting their poor, visiting their sick, burying their dead, comforting their bereaved; see Tosefta Gitin 3 13; Bavli Gitin 61, 1: "the gentile poor are supported along with the poor of Israel, and the gentile sick are visited along with the sick of Israel, and the gentile dead are buried with the dead of Israel, as those are the paths of peace [darkhei shalom]."  See also Rambam Matnot Ani'im 7, 50, Evel 14, 12; Shulchan Aruch Yore De'ah 345, 9; 367, 1. Thus, in order to prevent discrimination and to avoid enmity and fighting; on this point, note Rabbi Moshe Feinstein's responsa (Igrot Moshe, Orach Chaim 4, 79) in which he discussed the permission that a Jewish doctor has to desecrate the Sabbath to heal non-Jews in order to prevent enmity, saying that the danger of that enmity is greater – in his words – "due the immediate publication of news by newspapers regarding news all over the world," and that therefore such desecration should be permitted.  See also Rabbi Dr. A. Hilevitz "Clarifying the Issue of 'Mipnei Darkhei Shalom' Regarding Gentiles" 100 Sinai 328, 331, 355, and the sources referred to therein, and in his words, "when gentiles see that the People of Israel take care of these issues for those Jews who are in need, but that they are discriminated against, the gentiles will be full of enmity toward the People of Israel . . . enmity should be avoided not out of fear, rather in order to establish an order of peace in the world" (at p. 355), and below ". . . in order not to cause enmity and fighting between any son of Noah and a Jew, that too is tikkun olam [repairing the world]" (at p. 357).  In this context, the "paths of peace" with the United States are reciprocity, and that reinforces the conclusion which has been reached.

 

5.         As mentioned, I enjoin my opinion to that of my colleagues.  

 

 

Appeal Denied.

 

November 30 2005

 

 

 

 


[1] The standpoint of Jewish Law.

[2] A ruling in Jewish Law.

Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5100/94
HCJ 4054/95
HCJ 6536/95
HCJ 5188/96
HCJ 7563/97
HCJ 7628/97
HCJ 1043/99
Date Decided: 
Monday, September 6, 1999
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: In its investigations, the General Security Service makes use of methods that include subjecting suspects to moderate physical pressure. The means are employed under the authority of directives. These directives allow for the use of moderate physical pressure if such pressure is immediately necessary to save human life. Petitioners challenge the legality of these methods.

 

Held: The Court held that the GSS did not have the authority employ certain methods challenged by the petitioners. The Court also held that the “necessity defense,” found in the Israeli Penal Law, could serve to ex ante allow GSS investigators to employ such interrogation practices. The Court's decision did not negate the possibility that the “necessity defense” would be available post factum to GSS investigators—either in the choice made by the Attorney-General in deciding whether to prosecute, or according to the discretion of the court if criminal charges are brought were brought against them.

 



Petition denied.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

This document is a draft, and is subject to further revision.

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards metargem@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

HCJ 5100/94

HCJ 4054/95

HCJ 6536/95

HCJ 5188/96

HCJ 7563/97

HCJ 7628/97

HCJ 1043/99

 

HCJ 5100/94

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel

v.

1. The State of Israel

2. The General Security Service

 

HCJ 4054/95

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel

v.

1. The Prime Minister of Israel

2. The Minister of Justice

3. The Minister of Police

4. The Minister of the Environment

5. The Head of the General Security Service

 

 

 

 

HCJ 6536/95

Hat’m Abu Zayda

v.

The General Security Service

 

HCJ 5188/96

1. Wa’al Al Kaaqua

2. Ibrahim Abd’allah Ganimat

3. Center for the Defense of the Individual

v.

1. The General Security Service

2. The Prison Commander—Jerusalem

 

HCJ 7563/97

1. Abd Al Rahman Ismail Ganimat

2. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel

v.

1. The Minister of Defense

2. The General Security Service

 

HCJ 7628/97

1. Fouad Awad Quran

2. Public Committee against Torture in Israel

v.

1. The Minister of Defense

2. The General Security Service

 

HCJ 1043/99

Issa Ali Batat

v.

The General Security Service

 

 

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[May 5, 1998, January 13 1999, May 26, 1999]

Before President A. Barak, Deputy President S. Levin, Justices T. Or,  E. Mazza,  M. Cheshin, Y. Kedmi, I. Zamir, T. Strasberg-Cohen, D. Dorner

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: In its investigations, the General Security Service makes use of methods that include subjecting suspects to moderate physical pressure. The means are employed under the authority of directives. These directives allow for the use of moderate physical pressure if such pressure is immediately necessary to save human life. Petitioners challenge the legality of these methods.

 

Held: The Court held that the GSS did not have the authority employ certain methods challenged by the petitioners. The Court also held that the “necessity defense,” found in the Israeli Penal Law, could serve to ex ante allow GSS investigators to employ such interrogation practices. The Court's decision did not negate the possibility that the “necessity defense” would be available post factum to GSS investigators—either in the choice made by the Attorney-General in deciding whether to prosecute, or according to the discretion of the court if criminal charges are brought were brought against them.

 

 

Petition denied.

 

Counsel for the petitioner in HCJ 5100/94—Avigdor Feldman; Ronit Robinson

Counsel for the petitioner in HCJ 4054/95—Dan Yakir

Counsel for the petitioners in HCJ 6536/95 HCJ 5188/96 and HCJ 1043/99—Andre Rosenthal

Counsel for petitioner Number Three in HCJ 5188/96—Eliyahu Abram

Counsel for petitioners in HCJ 7563/97 and HCJ 7628/97—Leah Tzemel; Allegra Pachko

Counsel for respondents—Shai Nitzan; Yehuda Scheffer

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

President A. Barak

 

The General Security Service [hereinafter the “GSS”] investigates individuals suspected of committing crimes against Israel’s security. Authorization for these interrogations is granted by directives that regulate interrogation methods. These directives authorize investigators to apply physical means against those undergoing interrogation, including shaking the suspect and placing him in the “Shabach” position. These methods are permitted since they are seen as immediately necessary to save human lives. Are these interrogation practices legal? These are the issues before us.

 

Background

 

1. Ever since it was established, the State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle for its security—indeed, its very existence. Terrorist organizations have set Israel’s annihilation as their goal. Terrorist acts and the general disruption of order are their means of choice.  In employing such methods, these groups do not distinguish between civilian and military targets. They carry out terrorist attacks in which scores are murdered in public areas—in areas of public transportation, city squares and centers, theaters and coffee shops. They do not distinguish between men, women and children. They act out of cruelty and without mercy. (For an in depth description of this phenomenon see the Report of the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Interrogation Practices of the GSS with Respect to Hostile Terrorist Activities headed by Justice (ret.) M. Landau, 1987 [hereinafter the Report of the Commission of Inquiry]. See 1 The Landau Book 269, 276 (1995).

 

The facts before this Court reveal that 121 people died in terrorist attacks between January 1, 1996 and May 14, 1998. Seven hundred and seven people were injured. A large number of those killed and injured were victims of harrowing suicide bombings in the heart of Israel’s cities. Many attacks—including suicide bombings, attempts to detonate car bombs, kidnappings of citizens and soldiers, attempts to highjack buses, murders, and the placing of explosives—were prevented due to daily measures taken by authorities responsible for fighting terrorist activities. The GSS is the main body responsible for fighting terrorism.

 

In order to fulfill this function, the GSS also investigates those suspected of hostile terrorist activities. The purpose of these interrogations includes the gathering of information regarding terrorists in order to prevent them from carrying out terrorist attacks. In the context of these interrogations, GSS investigators also make use of physical means.

 

The Petitions

 

2. These petitions are concerned with the interrogation methods of the GSS. They outline several of these methods in detail. Two of the petitions are of a public nature. One of these (HCJ 5100/94) is brought by the Public Committee against Torture in Israel. It submits that GSS investigators are not authorized to investigate those suspected of hostile terrorist activities. Moreover, they claim that the GSS is not entitled to employ those methods approved by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, such as “the application of non-violent psychological pressure” and of “a moderate degree of physical pressure.” The second petition (4054/95) is brought by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel. It argues that the GSS should be ordered to cease shaking suspects during interrogations.

 

The five remaining petitions involve individual petitioners. They each petitioned the Court to hold that the methods used against them by the GSS are illegal.

 

3. Petitioners in HCJ 5188/96 (Wa’al Al Kaaqua and Ibrahim Abd’alla Ganimat) were arrested at the beginning of June 1996. They were interrogated by GSS investigators. They appealed to this Court on July 21, 1996 through the Center for the Defense of the Individual, founded by Dr. Lota Saltzberger. They petitioned the Court for an order nisi prohibiting the use of physical force against them during their interrogation. The Court granted the order. The two petitioners were released from custody prior to the hearing. As per their request, we have elected to continue hearing their case, in light of the importance of the issues they raise.

 

4. Petitioner in HCJ 6536/96 (Hat’m Abu Zayda), was arrested  on September 21, 1995 and  interrogated by GSS investigators. He turned to this Court on October 22, 1995 via the Center for the Defense of the Individual, founded by Dr. Lota Saltzberger. He complained of the interrogation methods allegedly used against him, including sleep deprivation, shaking, beatings, and use of the “Shabach” position. We immediately ordered the petition be heard. The Court was then informed that petitioner’s interrogation had ended. Petitioner was subsequently convicted of activities in the military branch of the Hamas terrorist organization. He was sentenced to 74 months in prison. The court held that petitioner both recruited for Hamas and also helped construct its terrorist infrastructure. The purpose of this infrastructure was to carry out the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers as well as execute other terrorist attacks against Israeli security forces. During oral arguments, it was asserted that the information provided by petitioner during his interrogation led to the thwarting of a plan to carry out serious terrorist attacks, including the kidnapping of soldiers.

 

5. The petitioner in HCJ 7563/97 (Abd al Rahman Ismail Ganimat) was arrested on November 13, 1997 and interrogated by the GSS. He appealed to this Court on December 24, 1997 via the Public Committee against Torture in Israel. He claimed to have been tortured by his investigators, through use of the “Shabach” position,” excessively tight handcuffs, and sleep deprivation. His interrogation revealed that he was involved in numerous terrorist activities, which resulted in the deaths of many Israeli citizens. He was instrumental in the kidnapping and murder of Sharon Edry, an IDF soldier. Additionally, he was involved in the bombing of Cafe “Appropo” in Tel Aviv, in which three women were murdered and thirty people were injured. He was charged with all these crimes and convicted at trial. He was sentenced to five consecutive life sentences plus an additional twenty years in prison.

 

Subsequent to the dismantling and interrogation of the terrorist cell to which petitioner belonged, a powerful explosive device, identical to the one detonated at Cafe “Appropo” in Tel Aviv, was found in Tzurif, petitioner’s village. Uncovering this explosive device thwarted an attack like the one at Cafe “Appropo.” According to GSS investigators, the petitioner possessed additional crucial information which he revealed only as a result of the interrogation. Revealing this information immediately was essential to safeguarding national and regional security and preventing danger to human life.

 

6. The petitioner in HCJ 7628/97 (Fouad Awad Quran) was arrested on December 10, 1997 and interrogated. He turned to this Court on December 25, 1997 via the Public Committee against Torture in Israel. Petitioners claimed that he was being deprived of sleep and was being seated in the “Shabach” position. The Court issued an order nisi and held oral arguments immediately. During the hearing, the state informed the Court that “at this stage of the interrogation, the GSS is not employing the alleged methods.” For this reason, no interim order was granted.

 

7. The petitioner in HCJ1043/99 (Issa Ali Batat) was arrested February 2, 1999, and interrogated by GSS investigators. The petition, brought via the Public Committee against Torture in Israel, argues that physical force was used against petitioner during the course of the interrogation. The Court issued an order nisi. During oral arguments, it came to the Court’s attention that the petitioner’s interrogation had ended and that he was being detained pending trial. The indictment alleges his involvement in hostile activities, the purpose of which was to harm the security and public safety of the “area” (Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip).

 

Physical Means

 

8. The GSS did not describe the physical means employed by GSS investigators. The State Attorney was prepared to present this information in camera. Petitioners opposed this proposal. As such, the information before the Court was provided by the petitioners and was not examined in each individual petition. This having been said, the state did not deny the use of these interrogation methods, and even offered justifications for these methods. This provided the Court with a picture of the interrogation practices of the GSS.

 

The decision to utilize physical means in a particular instance is based on internal regulations, which requires obtaining permission from the higher ranks of the GSS. The regulations themselves were approved by a special Ministerial Committee on GSS interrogations. Among other guidelines, the committee set forth directives regarding the rank required of an officer who was to authorize such interrogation practices.  These directives were not examined by this Court. Different interrogation methods are employed in each situation, depending what is necessary in that situation and the likelihood of obtaining authorization. The GSS does not resort to every interrogation method at its disposal in each case.

 

Shaking

 

9. A number of petitioners (HCJ 5100/94; HCJ 4054/95; HCJ 6536/95) claimed that they were subject to shaking. Among the investigation methods outlined in the GSS interrogation regulations, shaking is considered the harshest. The method is defined as the forceful and repeated shaking of the suspect’s upper torso, in a manner which causes the neck and head to swing rapidly.  According to an expert opinion submitted in HCJ 5584/95 and HCJ 5100/95, the shaking method is likely to cause serious brain damage, harm the spinal cord, cause the suspect to lose consciousness, vomit and urinate uncontrollably and suffer serious headaches.

 

The state entered several opposing expert opinions into evidence. It admits the use of this method by the GSS. It contends, however, that shaking does not present an inherent danger to the life of the suspect, that the risk to life as a result of shaking is rare, that there is no evidence that shaking causes fatal damage, and that medical literature has not, to date, reported a case in which a person died as a direct result of having been shaken. In any event, they argue, doctors are present at all interrogation areas, and the possibility of medical injury is always investigated.

 

All agree that, in one particular case, (HCJ 4054/95) the suspect expired after being shaken. According to the state, that case was a rare exception.  Death was caused by an extremely rare complication which resulted in pulmonary edema. In addition, the state argues that the shaking method is only resorted to in very specific cases, and only as a last resort. The directives define the appropriate circumstances for its use, and the rank responsible for authorizing its use. The investigators were instructed that, in every case where they consider the use of shaking, they must examine the severity of the danger that the interrogation is intending to prevent, consider the urgency of uncovering the information presumably possessed by the suspect in question, and seek an alternative means of preventing the danger. Finally, the directives state that, in cases where this method is to be used, the investigator must first provide an evaluation of the suspect’s health and ensure that no harm comes to him. According to the respondent, shaking is indispensable to fighting and winning the war on terrorism. It is not possible to prohibit its use without seriously harming the ability of the GSS to effectively thwart deadly terrorist attacks. Its use in the past has lead to the prevention of murderous attacks.

 

Waiting in the “Shabach” Position

 

10. This interrogation method arose in several petitions (HCJ 6536/95, HCJ 5188/96, HCJ 7628/97). As per petitioners’ submission, a suspect investigated under the “Shabach” position has his hands tied behind his back. He is seated on a small and low chair, whose seat is tilted forward, towards the ground. One hand is tied behind the suspect, and placed inside the gap between the chair’s seat and back support. His second hand is tied behind the chair, against its back support. The suspect’s head is covered by a sack that falls down to his shoulders. Loud music is played in the room. According to the briefs submitted, suspects are detained in this position for a long period of time, awaiting interrogation.

 

Petitioners claim that prolonged sitting in this position causes serious muscle pain in the arms, the neck and headaches. The state did not deny the use of this method. It submits that both crucial security considerations and the safety of the investigators require the tying of the suspect’s hands as he is being interrogated. The head covering is intended to prevent contact with other suspects. Loud music is played for the same reason.

 

The "Frog Crouch"

 

11. This interrogation method appeared in one of the petitions (HCJ 5188/96). According to the petition, the suspect was interrogated in a “frog crouch” position. This refers to consecutive, periodical crouches on the tips of one’s toes, each lasting for five minute intervals. The state did not deny the use of this method, and the Court issued an order nisi in the petition. Prior to hearing the petition, however, this interrogation practice ceased.

  

Excessively Tight Handcuffs 

 

12. In a number of petitions (HCJ 5188/96; HCJ 7563/97), several petitioners complained of excessively tight hand or leg cuffs. They contended that this practice results in serious injuries to the suspect’s hands, arms and feet, due to the length of the interrogations. The petitioners contend that particularly small cuffs were used. The state, for its part, denies the use of unusually small cuffs, arguing that those used were of standard issue and were properly applied. Even so, the state is prepared to admit that prolonged hand or foot cuffing is likely to cause injuries to the suspect’s hands and feet. The state contends, however, that injuries of this nature are inherent to any lengthy interrogation.      

 

Sleep Deprivation

 

13. In a number of petitions (HCJ 6536/96; HCJ 7563/97; HCJ 7628/97) petitioners complained of being deprived of sleep as a result of being tied in the “Shabach” position, while subject to the playing of loud music, or of being subjected to intense non-stop interrogations without sufficient rest breaks. They claim that the purpose of depriving them of sleep is to cause them to break from exhaustion.  While the state agrees that suspects are at times deprived of regular sleep hours, it argues that this does not constitute an interrogation method aimed at causing exhaustion, but rather results from the long amount of time necessary for conducting the interrogation.

 

Petitioners’ Arguments

 

14. Before us are a number of petitions. Different petitioners raise different arguments. All the petitions raise two essential arguments. First, they submit that the GSS is never authorized to conduct interrogations. Second, they argue that the physical means employed by GSS investigators not only infringe the human dignity of the suspect undergoing interrogation, but also constitute criminal offences. These methods, argue the petitioners, are in violation of international law as they constitute “torture.” As such, GSS investigators are not authorized to conduct these interrogations. Furthermore, the “necessity defense” is not relevant to the circumstances in question. In any event, the doctrine of "necessity" at most constitutes an exceptional post factum defense, exclusively confined to criminal proceedings against investigators. It cannot, however, provide GSS investigators with the authorization to conduct interrogations. GSS investigators are not authorized to employ any physical means, absent unequivocal authorization from the legislature which conforms to the constitutional requirements of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. There is no purpose in engaging in a bureaucratic set up of the regulations and authority, as suggested by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, since doing so would merely regulate the torture of human beings.

 

We asked petitioners whether the “ticking bomb” rationale was sufficiently persuasive to justify the use of physical means. This rationale would apply in a situation where a bomb is known to have been placed in a public area and will cause human tragedy if its location is not revealed. This question elicited different responses from the petitioners. There are those convinced that physical means are not to be used under any circumstances; the prohibition on such methods, to their mind, is absolute, whatever the consequences may be. On the other hand, there are others who argue that, even if it is acceptable to employ physical means in the exceptional circumstances of the “ticking bomb,” these methods are used even in absence of “ticking bomb” conditions. The very fact that the use of such means is illegal in most cases warrants banning their use altogether, even if doing so would include those rare cases in which physical coercion may have been justified. Whatever their individual views, all petitioners unanimously highlight the distinction between the post factum possibility of escaping criminal liability and the advance granting of permission to use physical means for interrogation purposes.

 

The State’s Arguments

 

15. According to the state, GSS investigators are authorized to interrogate those suspected of committing crimes against the security of Israel. This authority comes from the government’s general and residual powers, as per article 40 of the Basic Law: the Government. Similarly, the authority to investigate is bestowed upon every individual investigator under article 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Statute [Testimony]. With respect to the physical means employed by the GSS, the state argues that these methods do not violate international law. Indeed, it is submitted that these methods cannot be described as “torture,” as “cruel and inhuman treatment,” or as “degrading treatment,” which are all strictly prohibited under international law.  The state further contends that the practices of the GSS do not cause pain and suffering.

 

Moreover, the state argues that these means are legal under domestic Israeli law. This is due to the “necessity defense” of article 34(11) of the Penal Law-1977. In the specific cases where the “necessity defense” would apply, GSS investigators are entitled to use “moderate physical pressure” as a last resort in order to prevent real injury to human life and well-being.  Such “moderate physical pressure” may include shaking. Resort to such means is legal, and does not constitute a criminal offence. In any case, if a specific method is not deemed to be a criminal offence, there is no reason not to employ it, even for interrogation purposes. According to the state, there is no reason to prohibit a particular act if, in specific circumstances, it does not constitute a crime. This is particularly true with respect to GSS investigators who, according to the state, are responsible for the protection of lives and public safety.  In support of their position, the state notes that the use of physical means by GSS investigators is most unusual and is only employed as a last resort in very extreme cases. Moreover, even in such cases, these methods are subject to strict scrutiny and supervision, as per the conditions and restrictions in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry. This having been said, when such exceptional conditions are present, these interrogation methods are fundamental to saving human lives and safeguarding Israel’s security.

 

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry

 

16. The authority of the GSS to employ particular interrogation methods was examined by the Commission of Inquiry. The Commission, appointed by the government under the Commission of Inquiry Statute-1968, considered the legal status of the GSS. Following a prolonged deliberation, the Commission concluded that the GSS is authorized to investigate those suspected of hostile terrorist acts, even in absence of an express statute, in light of the powers granted to it by other legislation as well as by the government’s residual powers, outlined in the Basic Law: the Government. See The Basic Law: The Government, § 40.  In addition, the power to investigate suspects, granted to investigators by the Minister of Justice, as per article 2(1) of the Statute of Criminal Procedure [Testimony], also endows the GSS with the authority to investigate.  Another part of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry deals with “defenses available to the investigator.” With regard to this matter, the Commission concluded that, in cases where the saving of human lives requires obtaining certain information, the investigator is entitled to apply both psychological pressure and “a moderate degree of physical pressure.” As such, an investigator who, in the face of such danger, applies a degree of physical pressure, which does not constitute abuse or torture of the suspect, but is proportionate to the danger to human life can, in the face of criminal liability, avail himself of the “necessity defense.” The Commission was convinced that its conclusions were not in conflict with international law, but were rather consistent with both the rule of law and the need to effectively protect the security of Israel and its citizens.

 

The commission approved the use of “moderate degree of physical pressure.” Such "moderate physical pressure" could be applied under stringent conditions. Directives to this effect were set out in the second, secret part of the report, and subject to the supervision of bodies both internal and external to the GSS. The commission’s recommendations were approved by the government.

 

The Petitions

 

17. A number of petitions dealing with the application of physical force by the GSS for interrogation purposes have made their way to this Court over the years. See, e.g., HCJ 7964/95 Billbissi v. The GSS (unreported decision); HCJ 8049/96 Hamdan v. The GSS (unreported decision); HCJ 3123/94 Atun v. The Head of the GSS (unreported decision); HCJ 3029/95 Arquan v. The GSS (unreported decision); HCJ 5578/95 Hajazi v. The GSS (unreported decision). Immediate oral arguments were ordered in each of these cases.  In most of the cases, the state declared that the GSS did not employ physical means. As a result, petitioners requested to withdraw their petitions. The Court accepted these motions and informed petitioners of their right to set forth a complaint if physical means were used against them See HCJ 3029/95. In only a minority of complaints did the state did not issue such a notice. In other instances, an interim order was issued. At times, we noted that we "did not receive any information regarding the interrogation methods which the respondent [generally the GSS] seeks to employ and we did not take any position with respect to these methods." See HCJ 8049/96 Hamdan v. The GSS (unreported decision). In HCJ 336/96; HCJ 7954/95 Billbissi v. The GSS (unreported decision), the Court noted that, “[T]he annulment of the interim order does not in any way constitute permission to employ methods that do not conform to the law and binding directives.”

 

As such, the Court has not decided whether the GSS is permitted to employ physical means for interrogation under the defense of “necessity.” Until now, it was not possible for the Court to hear the sort of arguments that would provide a complete normative picture, in all its complexity. At this time, in contrast, a number of petitions have properly laid out complete arguments. For this we thank them.

 

Some of the petitions are rather general or theoretical while others are quite specific. Even so, we have decided to deal with all of them, since we seek to clarify the state of the law in this most complicated question. To this end, we shall begin by addressing the first issue—are GSS investigators authorized to conduct interrogations? We shall then proceed to examine whether a general power to investigate could potentially sanction the use of physical means—including mental suffering—the likes of which the GSS employs. Finally, we shall examine circumstances where such methods are immediately necessary to rescue human lives and shall decide whether such circumstances justify granting GSS investigators the authority to employ physical interrogation methods. 

 

The Authority to Interrogate

 

18. The term “interrogation” takes on various meanings in different contexts. For the purposes of these petitions, we refer to the asking of questions which seek to elicit a truthful answer, subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. See the Criminal Procedure Statute (Testimony), § 2. Generally, the investigation of a suspect is conducted at the suspect’s place of detention.  Any interrogation inevitably infringes the suspect’s freedom—including his human dignity and privacy—even if physical means are not used. In a country adhering to the rule of law, therefore, interrogations are not permitted in absence of clear statutory authorization, whether such authorization is through primary or secondary legislation. This essential principle is expressed in the Criminal Procedure Statute (Powers of Enforcement, Detention)-1996, §1(a):

 

Detentions and arrests shall be conducted only by law or by virtue of express statutory authorization.

 

Hence, the statute and regulations must adhere to the requirements of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The same principle applies to interrogations. Thus, an administrative body, seeking to interrogate an individual—an interrogation being defined as an exercise seeking to elicit truthful answers, as opposed to the mere asking of questions as in the context of an ordinary conversation—must point to an explicit statutory provision. This is required by the rule of law, both formally and substantively. Moreover, this is required by the principle of administrative legality. “If an authority cannot point to a statute from which it derives its authority to engage in certain acts, that act is ultra vires and illegal.” See I. Zamir, The Administrative Authority (1996) at 50. See also 1 B. Bracha, Administrative Law 25 (1987).

 

19. Is there a statute that authorizes GSS investigators to carry out interrogations?  There is no specific provision that deals with the investigatory authority of GSS agents. “The status of the Service, its function and powers, are not outlined in any statute addressing this matter.” See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, at 302. This having been said, the GSS constitutes an integral part of the executive branch. The fact that the GSS forms part of the executive branch is not, in itself, sufficient to invest it with the authority to interrogate. It is true that, under the Basic Law: The Government, § 40, the government does possess residual or prerogative powers:

 

The Government is authorized to perform, in the name of the state, all actions which are not in the jurisdiction of another authority. In performing such actions, the Government is subject to all applicable laws.

 

We cannot, however, interpret this provision as granting the authority to investigate. As noted, the power to investigate infringes a person’s individual liberty. The residual powers of the government authorize it to act whenever there is an “administrative vacuum.” See HCJ 2918/93 The City of Kiryat Gatt v. The State of Israel. There is no so-called “administrative vacuum” this case, as the field is entirely occupied by the principle of individual freedom. Infringing this principle requires specific directives, as President Shamgar insisted in HCJ 5128/94 Federman v. The Minister of Police:

 

There are means which do not fall within the scope of government powers.  Employing them, absent statutory authorization, runs contrary to our most basic normative understanding.  Thus, basic rights forms part of our positive law, whether they have been spelled out in a Basic Law or whether this has yet to be done. Thus, for example, the government is not endowed with the capacity to shut down a newspaper on the basis of an administrative decision, absent explicit statutory authorization, irrespective of whether a Basic Law expressly protects freedom of expression. An act of this sort would undoubtedly run contrary to our basic understanding regarding human liberty and the democratic nature of our regime, which provides that liberty may only be infringed upon by virtue of explicit statutory authorization.... Freedom of expression, a basic right, forms an integral part of our positive law. It binds the executive and does not allow it to stray from the prohibition respecting guaranteed human liberty, absent statutory authorization.

 

In a similar vein, Professor Zamir has noted:

 

In areas where the government may act under section 40 of the Basic Law: The Government, its actions must conform to the law. Clearly, this precludes the government from acting contrary to statutes. Moreover, it prevents the government from infringing basic rights.  This, of course, is true regarding the rights explicitly protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This is also the case for human rights not specifically enumerated in those Basic Laws. For instance, section 40 cannot authorize the government to limit the freedom of expression…. Section 40 only grants general executive powers that cannot serve to directly infringe human rights, unless there is explicit or implicit statutory authorization for doing so. This same conclusion can also be drawn from the fact that a grant of administrative authority cannot be interpreted as granting the power to infringe human rights, unless such powers are explicitly granted by statute.

 

 See 1. I. Zamir, The Administrative Authority 337 (1996).

 

The same is true in this case. There are to be no infringements on an individual's liberty against interrogation absent statutory provisions which successfully pass constitutional muster. The government’s general administrative powers do not fulfill these requirements. Indeed, when the legislature sought to endow the GSS with the power to infringe individual liberties, it anchored these powers in specific legislation. Thus, for instance, statutes provide that the head of a security service, under special circumstances, is authorized to allow the secret monitoring of telephone conversations. See the Secret Interception of Communication Statute-1979, § 5; Compare the Protection of Privacy Statute-1981, § 19(3)(4). Is there a special statutory instruction endowing GSS investigators with interrogating powers?              

 

20. A specific statutory provision authorizing GSS investigators to conduct interrogations does not exist. While it is true that directives, some with ministerial approval, were promulgated in the wake of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, these do not satisfy the requirement that a grant of authority flow directly from statute or from explicit statutory authorization. These directives merely constitute internal regulations. Addressing such directives, in HCJ 2581/91 Salhat v. The State of Israel , Justice Levin opined:

 

Clearly, these directives are not to be understood as being tantamount to a “statute,” as defined in article 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity. They are to be struck down if they are found not to conform to it

 

From where, then, do the GSS investigators derive their interrogation powers? The answer is found in article 2(1) of the Criminal Procedure Statute [Testimony] which provides:

 

A police officer, of or above the rank of inspector, or any other officer or class of officers generally or specially authorized in writing by the Chief Secretary to the Government, to hold enquiries into the commission of offences, may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of any offence in respect whereof such officer or police or other authorized officer as aforesaid is enquiring, and may reduce into writing any statement by a person so examined.

 

It is by virtue of the above provision that the Minister of Justice authorized GSS investigators to conduct interrogations regarding the commission of hostile terrorist activities. It has been brought to the Court’s attention that, in the authorizing decree, the Minister of Justice took care to list the names of those GSS investigators who were authorized to conduct secret interrogations with respect to crimes committed under the Penal Law-1977, the Prevention of Terrorism Statute-1948, the (Emergency) Defense Regulations-1945, the Prevention of  Infiltration Statute (Crimes and Judging)-1954, and crimes which are to be investigated as per the Emergency Defense Regulations (Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip-Judging in Crimes and Judicial Assistance-1967). It appears to us—and we have heard no arguments to the contrary—that the question of the authority of the GSS to conduct interrogations can be resolved. By virtue of this authorization, GSS investigators are, in the eyes of the law, like police officers. We shall not now, however, express our opinion as to whether this arrangement, as opposed to the explicit statutory regulation of GSS officers, is an ideal arrangement.

 
The Means Employed for Interrogation Purposes

 

21. As we have seen, GSS investigators are endowed with the authority to conduct interrogations. What is the scope of these powers and do they include the use of physical means in the course of the interrogation? Can use be made of the physical means presently employed by GSS investigators—such as shaking, the “Shabach” position, and sleep deprivation—by virtue of the investigating powers given the GSS investigators? Let us note that the state did not argue before us that all the means employed by GSS investigators are permissible by virtue of the “law of interrogation.” Thus, for instance, the state did not make the argument that shaking is permitted simply because it is an “ordinary” method of investigation in Israel. Even so, it was argued that some of the physical means employed by the GSS investigators are permitted by the “law of interrogation” itself. For instance, this is the case with respect to some of the physical means applied in the context of waiting in the “Shabach” position—the placing of the head covering to prevent communication between the suspects, the playing of loud music to prevent the passing of information between suspects, the tying of the suspect’s hands to a chair for the investigators’ protection, and the deprivation of sleep, as necessary from the needs of the interrogation. Does the “law of interrogation” sanction the use of these physical means?

 

22. An interrogation, by its very nature, places the suspect in a difficult position. “The criminal’s interrogation,” wrote Justice Vitkon over twenty years ago, “is not a negotiation process between two open and honest merchants, conducting their affairs in mutual trust.” Cr. A 216/74 Cohen v The State of Israel, at 352. An interrogation is a “competition of minds,” in which the investigator attempts to penetrate the suspect’s mind and elicit the information that the investigator seeks to obtain. Quite accurately, it was noted that:

 

Any interrogation, be it the fairest and most reasonable of all, inevitably places the suspect in embarrassing situations, burdens him, penetrates the deepest crevices of his soul, while creating serious emotional pressure.

 

See Y. Kedmi, On Evidence 25 (1991)

 

Indeed, the authority to conduct interrogations, like any administrative power, is designed for a specific purpose, and must be exercised in conformity with the basic principles of the democratic regime. In setting out the rules of interrogation, two values clash.  On the one hand, lies the desire to uncover the truth, in accord with the public interest in exposing crime and preventing it. On the other hand is the need to protect the dignity and liberty of the individual being interrogated. This having been said, these values are not absolute. A democratic, freedom-loving society does not accept that investigators may use any means for the purpose of uncovering the truth. “The interrogation practices of the police in a given regime,” noted Justice Landau, “are indicative of a regime’s very character” Cr. A. 264/65 Artzi v. The Government’s Legal Advisor. At times, the price of truth is so high that a democratic society is not prepared to pay. See A. Barak, On Law, Judging and Truth, 27 Mishpatim 11, 13 (1997).  To the same extent, however, a democratic society, desirous of liberty, seeks to fight crime and, to that end, is prepared to accept that an interrogation may infringe the human dignity and liberty of a suspect—provided that it is done for a proper purpose and that the harm does not exceed that which is necessary. Concerning the collision of values, with respect to the use of evidence obtained in a violent police interrogation, Justice H. Cohen opined in Cr. A. 183/78 Abu Midjim v. The State of Israel, at 546:

 

On the one hand, it is our duty to ensure that human dignity be protected; that it not be harmed at the hands of those who abuse it, and that we do all that we can to restrain police investigators from prohibited and criminal means. On the other hand, it is also our duty to fight the growing crime rate which destroys the good in our country, and to prevent the disruption of public peace by violent criminals.

 

Our concern, therefore, lies in the clash of values and the balancing of conflicting values. The balancing process results in the rules for a "reasonable interrogation." See Bein, The Police Investigation—Is There Room for Codification of the ‘Laws of the Hunt’, 12 Iyunei Mishpat 129 (1987). These rules are based, on the one hand, on preserving the “human image” of the suspect, see Cr. A. 115/82 Mouadi v. The State of Israel, at 222-24, and on preserving the “purity of arms” used during the interrogation. Cr. A. 183/78, supra. On the other hand, these rules take into consideration the need to fight crime in general, and terrorist attacks in particular. These rules reflect “a degree of reasonableness, straight thinking, and fairness.” See Kedmi, supra, at 25. The rules pertaining to investigations are important to a democratic state. They reflect its character. An illegal investigation harms the suspect’s human dignity. It equally harms society’s fabric.

 

23. It is not necessary for us to engage in an in-depth inquiry into the “law of interrogation” for the purposes of the petitions before us. These laws vary, depending on the context. For instance, the law of interrogation is different in the context of an investigator’s potential criminal liability, and in the context of admitting evidence obtained by questionable means. Here we deal with the “law of interrogation” as a power of an administrative authority. See Bein supra. The “law of interrogation” by its very nature, is intrinsically linked to the circumstances of each case. This having been said, a number of general principles are nonetheless worth noting.

 

First, a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture, free of cruel, inhuman treatment, and free of any degrading conduct whatsoever.  There is a prohibition on the use of “brutal or inhuman means” in the course of an investigation. F.H. 3081/91 Kozli v. The State of Israel, at 446. Human dignity also includes the dignity of the suspect being interrogated. Compare HCJ 355/59 Catlan v. Prison Security Services, at 298 and C.A.4463/94 Golan v. Prison Security Services. This conclusion is in accord with international treaties, to which Israel is a signatory, which prohibit the use of torture, “cruel, inhuman treatment” and “degrading treatment.” See M. Evans & R. Morgan, Preventing Torture 61 (1998); N.S. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law 63 (1987). These prohibitions are “absolute.” There are no exceptions to them and there is no room for balancing. Indeed, violence directed at a suspect’s body or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice. The use of violence during investigations can lead to the investigator being held criminally liable. See, e.g., the Penal Law: § 277. Cr. A. 64/86 Ashash v. The State of Israel (unreported decision).

 

Second, a reasonable investigation is likely to cause discomfort. It may result in insufficient sleep. The conditions under which it is conducted risk being unpleasant. Of course, it is possible to conduct an effective investigation without resorting to violence. Within the confines of the law, it is permitted to resort to various sophisticated techniques. Such techniques—accepted in the most progressive of societies—can be effective in achieving their goals. In the end result, the legality of an investigation is deduced from the propriety of its purpose and from its methods. Thus, for instance, sleep deprivation for a prolonged period, or sleep deprivation at night when this is not necessary to the investigation time-wise, may be deemed disproportionate.

 

From the General to the Particular

 

24. We shall now turn from the general to the particular. Clearly, shaking is a prohibited investigation method. It harms the suspect’s body. It violates his dignity. It is a violent method which can not form part of a legal investigation. It surpasses that which is necessary. Even the state did not argue that shaking is an “ordinary” investigatory method which every investigator, whether in the GSS or the police, is permitted to employ. The argument before us was that the justification for shaking is found in the “necessity defense.” That argument shall be dealt with below. In any event, there is no doubt that shaking is not to be resorted to in cases outside the bounds of “necessity” or as part of an “ordinary” investigation.

 

25. It was argued before the Court that one of the employed investigation methods consists of compelling the suspect to crouch on the tips of his toes for periods of five minutes. The state did not deny this practice. This is a prohibited investigation method. It does not serve any purpose inherent to an investigation. It is degrading and infringes an individual’s human dignity.

 

26. The “Shabach” method is composed of several components: the cuffing of the suspect, seating him on a low chair, covering his head with a sack, and playing loud music in the area.  Does the general power to investigate authorize any of the above acts? Our point of departure is that there are actions which are inherent to the investigatory power. Compare C.A. 4463/94, supra. Therefore, we accept that the suspect’s cuffing, for the purpose of preserving the investigators’ safety, is included in the general power to investigate. Compare HCJ 8124/96 Mubarak v. The GSS (unreported decision). Provided the suspect is cuffed for this purpose, it is within the investigator’s authority to cuff him. The state’s position is that the suspects are indeed cuffed with the intention of ensuring the investigators’ safety or to prevent the suspect from fleeing from legal custody. Even petitioners agree that it is permissible to cuff a suspect in such circumstances and that cuffing constitutes an integral part of an interrogation. The cuffing associated with the “Shabach” position, however, is unlike routine cuffing. The suspect is cuffed with his hands tied behind his back. One hand is placed inside the gap between the chair’s seat and back support, while the other is tied behind him, against the chair’s back support. This is a distorted and unnatural position. The investigators’ safety does not require it. Similarly, there is no justification for handcuffing the suspect’s hands with especially small handcuffs, if this is in fact the practice. The use of these methods is prohibited. As has been noted, “cuffing that causes pain is prohibited.” Mubarak supra. Moreover, there are other ways of preventing the suspect from fleeing which do not involve causing pain and suffering.

 

27. The same applies to seating the suspect in question in the “Shabach” position. We accept that seating a man is inherent to the investigation. This is not the case, however, when the chair upon which he is seated is a very low one, tilted forward facing the ground, and when he is seated in this position for long hours. This sort of seating is not authorized by the general power to interrogate. Even if we suppose that the seating of the suspect on a chair lower than that of his investigator can potentially serve a legitimate investigation objective—for instance, to establish the “rules of the game” in the contest of wills between the parties, or to emphasize the investigator’s superiority over the suspect—there is no inherent investigative need to seat the suspect on a chair so low and tilted forward towards the ground, in a manner that causes him real pain and suffering.  Clearly, the general power to conduct interrogations does not authorize seating a suspect on a tilted chair, in a manner that applies pressure and causes pain to his back, all the more so when his hands are tied behind the chair, in the manner described. All these methods do not fall within the sphere of a “fair” interrogation. They are not reasonable. They infringe the suspect’s dignity, his bodily integrity and his basic rights in an excessive manner. They are not to be deemed as included within the general power to conduct interrogations.

 

28. We accept that there are interrogation related concerns regarding preventing contact between the suspect under interrogation and other suspects, and perhaps even between the suspect and the interrogator. These concerns require means to prevent the said contact. The need to prevent contact may, for instance, flow from the need to safeguard the investigators’ security, or the security of the suspects and witnesses. It can also be part of the “mind game” which pits the information possessed by the suspect, against that found in the hands of his investigators. For this purpose, the power to interrogate—in principle and according to the circumstances of each particular case—may include the need to prevent eye contact with a given person or place. In the case at bar, this was the explanation provided by the state for covering the suspect’s head with a sack, while he is seated in the “Shabach” position.  From what was stated in the declarations before us, the suspect’s head is covered with a sack throughout his “wait” in the “Shabach” position.  It was argued that the head covering causes the suspect to suffocate. The sack is large, reaching the shoulders of the suspect. All these methods are not inherent to an interrogation. They are not necessary to prevent eye contact between the suspect being interrogated and other suspects.  Indeed, even if such contact is prevented, what is the purpose of causing the suspect to suffocate?  Employing this method is not related to the purpose of preventing the said contact and is consequently forbidden. Moreover, the statements clearly reveal that the suspect’s head remains covered for several hours, throughout his wait. For these purposes, less harmful means must be employed, such as letting the suspect wait in a detention cell. Doing so will eliminate any need to cover the suspect’s eyes. In the alternative, the suspect’s eyes may be covered in a manner that does not cause him physical suffering. For it appears that, at present, the suspect’s head covering—which covers his entire head, rather than eyes alone—for a prolonged period of time, with no essential link to the goal of preventing contact between the suspects under investigation, is not part of a fair interrogation. It harms the suspect and his dignity. It degrades him. It causes him to lose his sense of time and place. It suffocates him. All these things are not included in the general authority to investigate. In the cases before us, the State declared that it will make an effort to find a “ventilated” sack. This is not sufficient. The covering of the head in the circumstances described, as distinguished from the covering of the eyes, is outside the scope of authority and is prohibited. 

 

29. Cutting off the suspect from his surroundings can also include preventing him from listening to what is going on around him. We are prepared to assume that the authority to investigate an individual may include preventing him from hearing other suspects under investigation or voices and sounds that, if heard by the suspect, risk impeding the interrogation’s success. At the same time, however, we must examine whether the means employed to accomplish this fall within the scope of a fair and reasonable interrogation. In the case at bar, the detainee is placed in the “Shabach” position while very loud music is played. Do these methods fall within the scope or the general authority to conduct interrogations? Here too, the answer is in the negative. Being exposed to very loud music for a long period of time causes the suspect suffering. Furthermore, the entire time, the suspect is tied in an uncomfortable position with his head covered. This is prohibited. It does not fall within the scope of the authority to conduct a fair and effective interrogation. In the circumstances of the cases before us, the playing of loud music is a prohibited.    

  

30. To the above, we must add that the "Shabach" position employs all the above methods simultaneously. This combination gives rise to pain and suffering. This is a harmful method, particularly when it is employed for a prolonged period of time. For these reasons, this method is not authorized by the powers of interrogation. It is an unacceptable method. "The duty to safeguard the detainee's dignity includes his right not to be degraded and not to be submitted to sub-human conditions in the course of his detention, of the sort likely to harm his health and potentially his dignity." Cr. A. 7223/95 The State of Israel v. Rotenstein.

 

A similar—though not identical—combination of interrogation methods were discussed in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 3 (1976). In that case, the Court examined five interrogation methods used by England to investigate detainees suspected of terrorist activities in Northern Ireland. The methods included protracted standing against a wall on the tip of one's toes, covering of the suspect's head throughout the detention (except during the actual interrogation), exposing the suspect to very loud noise for a prolonged period of time, and deprivation of sleep, food and drink. The Court held that these methods did not constitute "torture." However, since they subjected the suspect to "inhuman and degrading" treatment, they were nonetheless prohibited.

 

31. The interrogation of a person is likely to be lengthy, due to the suspect's failure to cooperate, the complexity of the information sought, or in light of the need to obtain information urgently and immediately. See, e.g., Mubarak supra; HCJ 5318/95 Hajazi v. GSS (unreported decision). Indeed, a person undergoing interrogation cannot sleep like one who is not being interrogated. The suspect, subject to the investigators' questions for a prolonged period of time, is at times exhausted. This is often the inevitable result of an interrogation.  This is part of the "discomfort" inherent to an interrogation. This being the case, depriving the suspect of sleep is, in our opinion, included in the general authority of the investigator. Compare HCJ 3429/94 Shbana v. GSS (unreported decision). Justice Shamgar noted as such in Cr. A. 485/76 Ben Loulou v. The State of Israel (unreported decision):

 

The interrogation of crimes and, in particular, murder or other serious crimes, cannot be accomplished within an ordinary work day...The investigation of crime is essentially a game of mental resistance...For this reason, the interrogation is often carried out at frequent intervals. This, as noted, causes the investigation to drag on ...and requires diligent insistence on its momentum and consecutiveness.

 

The above described situation is different from one in which sleep deprivation shifts from being a "side effect" of the interrogation to an end in itself. If the suspect is intentionally deprived of sleep for a prolonged period of time, for the purpose of tiring him out or "breaking" him, it is not part of the scope of a fair and reasonable investigation. Such means harm the rights and dignity of the suspect in a manner beyond what is necessary.

 

32. All these limitations on an interrogation, which flow from the requirement that an interrogation be fair and reasonable, is the law with respect to a regular police interrogation. The power to interrogate granted to the GSS investigator is the same power the law bestows upon the ordinary police investigator. The restrictions upon the police investigations are equally applicable to GSS investigations. There is no statute that grants GSS investigators special interrogating powers that are different or more significant than those granted the police investigator. From this we conclude that a GSS investigator, whose duty it is to conduct the interrogation according to the law, is subject to the same restrictions applicable to police interrogators.

  

Physical Means and the "Necessity" Defense

 

33. We have arrived at the conclusion that GSS personnel who have received permission to conduct interrogations, as per the Criminal Procedure Statute [Testimony], are authorized to do so. This authority—like that of the police investigator—does not include most of the physical means of interrogation in the petition before us. Can the authority to employ these methods be anchored in a legal source beyond the authority to conduct an interrogation? This question was answered by the state in the affirmative. As noted, our law does not contain an explicit authorization permitting the GSS to employ physical means. An authorization of this nature can, however, in the state’s opinion, be obtained in specific cases by virtue of the criminal law defense of “necessity,” as provided in section 34(1) of the Penal Law. The statute provides:

 

A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, in response to particular circumstances during a specific time, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm.

 

The state’s position is that by virtue of this defense against criminal liability, GSS investigators are authorized to apply physical means—such as shaking—in the appropriate circumstances and in the absence of other alternatives, in order to prevent serious harm to human life or limb. The state maintains that an act committed under conditions of “necessity” does not constitute a crime. Instead, the state sees such acts as worth committing in order to prevent serious harm to human life or limb. These are actions that society has an interest in encouraging, which should be seen as proper under the circumstances. In this, society is choosing the lesser evil. Not only is it legitimately permitted to engage in fighting terrorism, it is our moral duty to employ the means necessary for this purpose. This duty is particularly incumbent on the state authorities—and, for our purposes, on the GSS investigators—who carry the burden of safeguarding the public peace. As this is the case, there is no obstacle preventing the investigators’ superiors from instructing and guiding them as to when the conditions of the “necessity” defense are fulfilled. This, the state contends, implies the legality of the use of physical means in GSS interrogations.

 

In the course of their argument, the state presented the “ticking bomb” argument. A given suspect is arrested by the GSS. He holds information regarding the location of a bomb that was set and will imminently explode. There is no way to diffuse the bomb without this information. If the information is obtained, the bomb may be neutralized. If the bomb is not neutralized, scores will be killed and injured. Is a GSS investigator authorized to employ physical means in order to obtain this information? The state answers in the affirmative. The use of physical means should not constitute a criminal offence, and their use should be sanctioned, according to the state, by the “necessity” defense.

 

34. We are prepared to assume, although this matter is open to debate, that the “necessity defense” is available to all, including an investigator, during an interrogation, acting in the capacity of the state. See A. Dershowitz, Is it Necessary to Apply ‘Physical Pressure’ to Terrorists—And to Lie About It?, 23 Israel L. Rev. 193 (1989); K. Bernsmann, Private Self-Defense and Necessity in German Penal Law and in the Penal Law Proposal— Some Remarks, 30 Israel L. Rev. 171, 208-10 (1998). Likewise, we are prepared to accept—although this matter is equally contentious—that the “necessity defense” can arise in instances of “ticking bombs,” and that the phrase "immediate need" in the statute refers to the imminent nature of the act rather than that of the danger. Hence, the imminence criteria is satisfied even if the bomb is set to explode in a few days, or even in a few weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialize and there is no alternative means of preventing it. See M. Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report—Was the Security Service Subordinated to the Law or the Law to the Needs of the Security Service?, 23 Israel L. Rev. 216, 244-47 (1989). In other words, there exists a concrete level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence. See M. Kremnitzer & R. Segev, The Petition of Force in the Course of GSS Interrogations- A Lesser Evil?, 4 Mishpat U’Memshal 667, 707 (1989); See also S.Z. Feller, Not Actual “Necessity” but Possible “Justification”; Not “Moderate Pressure”, but Either “Unlimited” or “None at All”, 23 Israel L. Rev. 201, 207 (1989).

 

Consequently we are prepared to presume, as was held by the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, that if a GSS investigator—who applied physical interrogation methods for the purpose of saving human life—is criminally indicted, the “necessity defense” is likely to be open to him in the appropriate circumstances. See Cr. A. 532/91 Anonymous v. The State of Israel (unreported decision). A long list of arguments, from the fields of ethics and political science, may be raised in support of and against the use of the “necessity defense.” See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra, at 696; M.S. Moor, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 Israel L. Rev. 280 (1989); L. Shelf, The Lesser Evil and the Lesser Good—On the Landau Commission’s Report, Terrorism and Torture, 1 Plilim 185 (1989); W.L. & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 305 (1973); D. Stetman, The Question of Absolute Morality Regarding the Prohibition on Torture, 4 Mishpat U’ Mimshal 161, 175 (1997); A. Zuckerman, Coersion and the Judicial Ascertainment of  Truth, 23 Israel L. Rev. 357 (1989). This matter, however, has already been decided under Israeli law. Israeli penal law recognizes the “necessity defense.”                               

 

 35. Indeed, we are prepared to accept that, in the appropriate circumstances, GSS investigators may avail themselves of the “necessity defense” if criminally indicted. This, however, is not the issue before this Court. We are not dealing with the criminal liability of a GSS investigator who employed physical interrogation methods under circumstances of “necessity.” Nor are we addressing the issue of the admissibility or probative value of evidence obtained as a result of a GSS investigator’s application of physical means against a suspect. We are dealing with a different question. The question before us is whether it is possible, ex ante, to establish permanent directives setting out the physical interrogation means that may be used under conditions of “necessity.” Moreover, we must decide whether the “necessity defense” can constitute a basis for the authority of a GSS investigator to investigate, in the performance of his duty.  According to the state, it is possible to imply from the “necessity defense”—available post factum to an investigator indicted of a criminal offence—the ex ante legal authorization to allow the investigator to use physical interrogation methods. Is this position correct?

 

36. In the Court’s opinion, the authority to establish directives respecting the use of physical means during the course of a GSS interrogation cannot be implied from the “necessity defense.” The “necessity defense” does not constitute a source of authority, which would allow GSS investigators to make use physical means during the course of interrogations.  The reasoning underlying our position is anchored in the nature of the “necessity defense.” The defense deals with cases involving an individual reacting to a given set of facts. It is an improvised reaction to an unpredictable event. See Feller, supra at 209. Thus, the very nature of the defense does not allow it to serve as the source of authorization. Authorization of administrative authority is based on establishing general, forward looking criteria, as noted by Professor Enker:

 

Necessity is an after-the-fact judgment based on a narrow set of considerations in which we are concerned with the immediate consequences, not far-reaching and long-range consequences, on the basis of a clearly established order of priorities of both means and ultimate values...The defense of necessity does not define a code of primary normative behavior. Necessity is certainly not a basis for establishing a broad detailed code of behavior such as how one should go about conducting intelligence interrogations in security matters, when one may or may not use force, how much force may be used and the like. 

 

See A. Enker, The Use of Physical Force in Interrogations and the Necessity Defense, in Israel and International Human Rights Law: The Issue of Torture 61, 62 (1995). In a similar vein, Kremnitzer and Segev note:

 

The basic rationale underlying the necessity defense is the impossibility of establishing accurate rules of behavior in advance, appropriate in concrete emergency situations, whose circumstances are varied and unexpected. From this it follows, that the necessity defense is not well suited for the regulation of a general situation, the circumstances of which are known and may repeat themselves. In such cases, there is no reason for not setting out the rules of behavior in advance, in order that their content be determined in a thought out and well-planned manner, which would allow them to apply in a uniform manner to all.

 

The “necessity defense” has the effect of allowing one who acts under the circumstances of “necessity” to escape criminal liability. The “necessity defense” does not possess any additional normative value. It can not authorize the use of physical means to allow investigators to execute their duties in circumstances of necessity. The very fact that a particular act does not constitute a criminal act—due to the “necessity defense”—does not in itself authorize the act and the concomitant infringement of human rights. The rule of law, both as a formal and as a substantive principle, requires that an infringement of human rights be prescribed by statute. The lifting of criminal responsibility does not imply authorization to infringe a human right. It shall be noted that the Commission of Inquiry did not conclude that the “necessity defense” is the source of authority for employing physical means by GSS investigators during the course of their interrogations. All that the Commission of Inquiry determined was that, if an investigator finds himself in a situation of “necessity,” forcing him to choose the “lesser evil”—harming the suspect for the purpose of saving human lives—the “necessity defense” shall be available to him. Indeed, the Commission of Inquiry noted that, “the law itself must ensure a proper framework governing the actions of the security service with respect to the interrogation of hostile terrorist activities and the related problems particular to it.” Id. at 328.

 

37. In other words, general directives governing the use of physical means during interrogations must be rooted in an authorization prescribed by law and not in defenses to criminal liability. The principle of “necessity” cannot serve as a basis of authority. See Kremnitzer, supra at 236. If the state wishes to enable GSS investigators to utilize physical means in interrogations, it must enact legislation for this purpose. This authorization would also free the investigator applying the physical means from criminal liability. This release would not flow from the “necessity defense,” but rather from the “justification” defense. This defense is provided for in section 34(13) of the Penal Law, which states:

 

A person shall not bear criminal liability for an act committed in one of the following cases:

(1) He was obliged or authorized by law to commit it.

 

This "justification" defense to criminal liability is rooted in an area outside the criminal law. This “external” law serves as a defense to criminal liability. This defense does not rest upon “necessity,” which is “internal” to the Penal Law itself. Thus, for instance, where the question of when an officer is authorized to apply deadly force in the course of detention arises, the answer is found in the laws of detention, which is external to the Penal Law. If a man is killed as a result of this application of force, the “justification” defense will likely come into play. See Cr. A. 486/88, Ankonina v. The Chief Army Prosecutor. The “necessity” defense cannot constitute the basis for rules regarding an interrogation. It cannot constitute a source of authority on which the individual investigator can rely on for the purpose of applying physical means in an investigation. The power to enact rules and to act according to them requires legislative authorization. In such legislation, the legislature, if it so desires, may express its views on the social, ethical and political problems of authorizing the use of physical means in an interrogation. Naturally, such considerations did not come before the legislature when the “necessity” defense was enacted. See Kremnitzer, supra, at 239-40.  The “necessity” defense is not the appropriate place for laying out these considerations. See Enker, supra, at 72.

 

Granting GSS investigators the authority to apply physical force during the interrogation of suspects suspected of involvement in hostile terrorist activities, thereby harming the suspect's dignity and liberty, raises basic questions of law and society, of ethics and policy, and of the rule of law and security. These questions and the corresponding answers must be determined by the legislative branch. This is required by the principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law, under our understanding of democracy. See HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense.

 

38. We conclude, therefore, that, according to the existing state of the law, neither the government nor the heads of the security services have the authority to establish directives regarding the use of physical means during the interrogation of suspects suspected of hostile terrorist activities, beyond the general rules which can be inferred from the very concept of an interrogation itself. Similarly, the individual GSS investigator—like any police officer—does not possess the authority to employ physical means that infringe a suspect’s liberty during the interrogation, unless these means are inherent to the very essence of an interrogation and are both fair and reasonable.

 

An investigator who employs these methods exceeds his authority. His responsibility shall be fixed according to law. His potential criminal liability shall be examined in the context of the “necessity defense.” Provided the conditions of the defense are met by the circumstances of the case, the investigator may find refuge under its wings. Just as the existence of the “necessity defense” does not bestow authority, the lack of authority does not negate the applicability of the necessity defense or of other defenses from criminal liability. The Attorney-General can establish guidelines regarding circumstances in which investigators shall not stand trial, if they claim to have acted from “necessity.” A statutory provision is necessary to authorize the use of physical means during the course of an interrogation, beyond what is permitted by the ordinary “law of investigation,” and in order to provide the individual GSS investigator with the authority to employ these methods. The “necessity defense” cannot serve as a basis for such authority.

 

A Final Word

 

39. This decision opened with a description of the difficult reality in which Israel finds herself. We conclude this judgment by revisiting that harsh reality. We are aware that this decision does make it easier to deal with that reality. This is the destiny of a democracy—it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open before it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of an individual constitute important components in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its difficulties.

 

This having been said, there are those who argue that Israel’s security problems are too numerous, and require the authorization of physical means.  Whether it is appropriate for Israel, in light of its security difficulties, to sanction physical means is an issue that must be decided by the legislative branch, which represents the people. We do not take any stand on this matter at this time. It is there that various considerations must be weighed. The debate must occur there. It is there that the required legislation may be passed, provided, of course, that the law “befit[s] the values of the State of Israel, is enacted for a proper purpose, and [infringes the suspect's liberty] to an extent no greater than required." See article 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.            

 

40. Deciding these petitions weighed heavily on this Court. True, from the legal perspective, the road before us is smooth. We are, however, part of Israeli society. Its problems are known to us and we live its history. We are not isolated in an ivory tower. We live the life of this country. We are aware of the harsh reality of terrorism in which we are, at times, immersed. The possibility that this decision will hamper the ability to properly deal with terrorists and terrorism disturbs us. We are, however, judges. We must decide according to the law. This is the standard that we set for ourselves. When we sit to judge, we ourselves are judged. Therefore, in deciding the law, we must act according to our purest conscience. We recall the words of Deputy President Landau, in HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. The State of Israel, at 4:

 

We possess proper sources upon which to construct our judgments and have no need—and, indeed, are forbidden—to allow our personal views as citizens to influence our decisions. Still, I fear that the Court will appear to have abandoned its proper role and to have descended into the whirlwind of public debate; that its decision will be acclaimed by certain segments of the public, while others will reject it absolutely. It is in this sense that I see myself as obligated to rule in accordance with the law on any matter properly brought before the Court. I am forced to rule in accordance with the law, in complete awareness that the public at large will not be interested in the legal reasoning behind our decision, but rather in the final result. Conceivably, the stature of the Court as an institution that stands above the arguments that divide the public will be damaged.  But what can we do, for this is our role and our obligation as judges?

The Commission of Inquiry pointed to the “difficult dilemma between the imperative to safeguard the very existence of the State of Israel and the lives of its citizens, and between the need to preserve its character—a country subject to the rule of law and basic moral values.” Report of the Commission, at 326. The commission rejected an approach that would consign our fight against terrorism to the twilight shadows of the law. The commission also rejected the “ways of the hypocrites, who remind us of their adherence to the rule of law, even as they remain willfully blind to reality.” Id. at 327. Instead, the Commission chose to follow “the way of truth and the rule of law.” Id. at 328. In so doing, the Commission of Inquiry outlined the dilemma faced by Israel in a manner open to examination to all of Israeli society.

 

Consequently, it is decided that the order nisi be made absolute. The GSS does not have the authority to “shake” a man, hold him in the “Shabach” position (which includes the combination of various methods, as mentioned in paragraph 30), force him into a “frog crouch” position

 

and deprive him of sleep in a manner other than that which is inherently required by the interrogation. Likewise, we declare that the “necessity defense,” found in the Penal Law, cannot serve as a basis of authority for interrogation practices, or for directives to GSS investigators, allowing them to employ interrogation practices of this kind. Our decision does not negate the possibility that the “necessity defense” will be available to GSS investigators—either in the choice made by the Attorney-General in deciding whether to prosecute, or according to the discretion of the court if criminal charges are brought.

 

Deputy President S. Levin

 

I agree.

 

Justice T. Or

 

I agree.

 

Justice E. Mazza

 

I agree.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

 

I agree.

 

Justice I. Zamir

 

I agree.

 

Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen

 

I agree.

 

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

 

I agree.

 

Justice Y. Kedmi

           

I accept the conclusion reached by my colleague, the President, that the use of exceptional interrogation methods, according to the directives of the Ministerial Committee, "has not been authorized, and is illegal." I am also of the opinion that the time has come for this issue to be regulated by explicit, clear, and unambiguous legislation.

 

Even so, it is difficult for me to accept that, due to the absence of explicit legislation, the state should be helpless in those rare emergencies defined as "ticking bombs," and that the state would not be authorized to order the use of exceptional interrogation methods in such circumstances. As far as I am concerned, authority does exist under such circumstances, a result of the basic obligation of the state—like all countries of the world—to defend its existence, its well-being, and to safeguard the lives of its citizens. It is clear that, in those circumstances, the state—as well as its agents—will have the natural right of "self-defense," in the broad meaning of the term, against terrorist organizations that seek to take its life and the lives of its citizens.

 

Against this background, and in order to prevent a situation where the state stands helpless while the "bomb ticks" before our eyes, I suggest that this judgment be suspended for one year. During that year, the GSS will be allowed to employ exceptional interrogative methods in those rare cases of "ticking bombs," on the condition that explicit authorization is granted by the Attorney-General.

         

Such a suspension would not limit our present ruling that the use of exceptional interrogation methods—those that rely on directives of the Ministerial Committee—are illegal. The suspension of the judgment would not constitute authorization to continue acting according to those directives, and the authorization of the Attorney-General would not legalize the performance of an illegal action. This suspension would only affect the employment of exceptional interrogation methods under the emergency circumstances of a "ticking bomb."

         

During such a suspension period, the Knesset would be given an opportunity to consider the issue of exceptional interrogation methods in security investigations, both in general and in times of emergency. The GSS would be given the opportunity to cope with emergency situations until the Knesset considers the issue. Meanwhile, the GSS would also have an opportunity to adapt, after a long period during which the directives of the Ministerial Committee have governed.

           

I therefore join the judgment of the President, subject to my proposal to suspend the judgment for a period of one year.

 

Decided according to the opinion of the President.

September 6, 1999

Public Committee Against Torture v. Government

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 769/02
Date Decided: 
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: In the armed conflict between the State of Israel and the terrorist organizations operating in the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip the government of the State of Israel decided to adopt a policy of ‘targeted killings’ against terrorists. The petitioners asked the court to declare that this policy was illegal under international law and to order the respondents to desist from using the policy.

 

Held: Customary international law distinguishes between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians.’ There is insufficient information for saying that a third category of ‘unlawful combatants’ has been recognized at this time by customary international law. Since terrorists do not satisfy the requirements of the definition of ‘combatants’ in international law, because inter alia they do not observe the laws and customs of war, they must be classified as civilians. Under article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions, civilians may not in principle be targeted by armed forces. However, art. 51(3) of the First Protocol states that ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ Therefore terrorists may be targeted by armed forces if ‘they take a direct part in hostilities.’ The targeting of terrorists by armed forces must satisfy the requirements of art. 51(3); the terrorists must ‘take a direct part in hostilities’ and the targeting of terrorists may be carried out ‘for such time’ as they do so. The principle of proportionality in carrying out these attacks should also be observed.

 

It cannot therefore be said that ‘targeted killings’ are prohibited by customary international law in every case, just as it cannot be said that they are permitted by customary international law in every case. Each case should be examined prospectively by the military authorities and retrospectively in an independent investigation, and the findings should be based on the merits of the specific case. These findings will be subject to the scrutiny of the court.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

HCJ 769/02

1.         Public Committee against Torture in Israel

2.         LAW — Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment

v.

1.         Government of Israel

2.         Prime Minister of Israel

3.         Minister of Defence

4.         Israel Defence Forces

5.         Chief of General Staff

6.         Shurat HaDin — Israel Law Centre and 24 others

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[14 December 2006]

Before President Emeritus A. Barak, President D. Beinisch
and Vice-President E. Rivlin

 

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: In the armed conflict between the State of Israel and the terrorist organizations operating in the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip the government of the State of Israel decided to adopt a policy of ‘targeted killings’ against terrorists. The petitioners asked the court to declare that this policy was illegal under international law and to order the respondents to desist from using the policy.

 

Held: Customary international law distinguishes between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians.’ There is insufficient information for saying that a third category of ‘unlawful combatants’ has been recognized at this time by customary international law. Since terrorists do not satisfy the requirements of the definition of ‘combatants’ in international law, because inter alia they do not observe the laws and customs of war, they must be classified as civilians. Under article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions, civilians may not in principle be targeted by armed forces. However, art. 51(3) of the First Protocol states that ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ Therefore terrorists may be targeted by armed forces if ‘they take a direct part in hostilities.’ The targeting of terrorists by armed forces must satisfy the requirements of art. 51(3); the terrorists must ‘take a direct part in hostilities’ and the targeting of terrorists may be carried out ‘for such time’ as they do so. The principle of proportionality in carrying out these attacks should also be observed.

It cannot therefore be said that ‘targeted killings’ are prohibited by customary international law in every case, just as it cannot be said that they are permitted by customary international law in every case. Each case should be examined prospectively by the military authorities and retrospectively in an independent investigation, and the findings should be based on the merits of the specific case. These findings will be subject to the scrutiny of the court.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 8.

Basic Law: the Army, s. 1.

Basic Law: the Government, s. 40(b).

Government and Justice Arrangements Ordinance, 5748-1948, s. 18.

Internment of Unlawful Combatants, 5762-2002, s. 2.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, s. 34M(1).

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 1.

[2]        HCJ 9255/00 Al-Saka v. State of Israel (unreported).

[3]        HCJ 2461/01 Canaan v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (unreported).

[4]        HCJ 9293/01 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 509.

[5]        HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11; [2002-3] IsrLR 39.

[6]        HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30; [2002-3] IsrLR 47.

[7]        HCJ 8172/02 Ibrahim v. IDF Commander in West Bank (unreported).

[8]        HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] (2) IsrLR 106.

[9]        HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83.

[10]     HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 385; [2004] IsrLR 200.

[11]     HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785.

[12]     CrimA 174/54 Stampeper v. Attorney-General [1956] IsrSC 10 5.

[13]     CrimA 336/61 Eichman v. Attorney-General [1963] IsrSC 17(3) 2033.

[14]     LCA 7092/94 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 625; [1997] IsrLR 403.

[15]     HCJ 785/87 Afu v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 4.

[16]     HCJ 69/81 Abu Ita v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 197.

[17]     HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

[18]     HCJ 698/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [1981] IsrSC 35(1) 617.

[19]     HCJ 3278/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 385; [2002-3] IsrLR 123.

[20]     HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 443; [2004] IsrLR 53.

[21]     HCJ 72/86 Zaloom v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 528.

[22]     HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 403.

[23]     HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349; [2002-3] IsrLR 173.

[24]     HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 736; [2005] (1) IsrLR 98.

[25]     HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [2005] (2) IsrLR 206.

[26]     HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 188.

[27]     HCJ 9593/04 Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2006] (2) IsrLR 56.

[28]     HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Local Council v. Knesset [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 481.

[29]     HCJ 2847/03 Alauna v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria (unreported).

[30]     HCJ 9252/00 El-Saka v. State of Israel (unreported).

[31]     HCJ 4219/02 Gussin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2002] IsrSC 56(4) 608.

[32]     HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [2006] (1) IsrLR 443.

[33]     HCJ 8276/05 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence [2006] (2) IsrLR 352.

[34]     HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441; IsrSJ 10 1.

[35]     HCJ 9070/00 Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law and Justice Committee [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 800.

[36]     HCJ 9056/00 Kleiner v. Knesset Speaker [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 703.

[37]     HCJ 652/81 Sarid v. Knesset Speaker [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 197; IsrSJ 8 52.

[38]     HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141.

[39]     HCJ 742/84 Kahane v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(4) 85.

[40]     HCJ 606/78 Awib v. Minister of Defence [1979] IsrSC 33(2) 113.

[41]     HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 1.

[42]     HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 210; [1992-4] IsrLR 158.

[43]     HCJ 2117/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 53(3) 26.

[44]     HCJ 5488/04 Al-Ram Local Council v. Government of Israel (not yet reported).

[45]     HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 801.

[46]     HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 118.

[47]     HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry, Ministry of Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.

[48]     HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 728.

[49]     HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255.

[50]     HCJ 1005/89 Agga v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 536.

[51]     HCJ 258/79 Amira v. Minister of Defence [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 90.

[52]     HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 1.

[53]     HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235.

[54]     HCJ 168/91 Morcus v. Minister of Defence [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 467.

[55]     HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 113.

[56]     HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[57]     HCJFH 2161/96 Sharif v. Home Front Commander [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 485.

[58]     HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817; [1998-9] IsrLR 567.

[59]     HCJFH 10739 Minister of Defence v. Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (not yet reported).

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

[60]     SFC 1158/02 (TA) State of Israel v. Barghouti (not yet reported).

 

Israeli Military Tribunal cases cited:

[61]     Military Prosecutor v. Kassem, 42 International Law Reports 470 (1971).

 

American cases cited:

[62]     Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).

[63]     Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

[64]     Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).

 

Canadian cases cited:

[65]     Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248.

 

English cases cited:

[66]     Mohamed Ali v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 1 A.C. 430 (PC).

 

European Court of Human Rights cases cited:

[67]     Banković v. Belgium, 41 ILM 517 (2002).

[68]     Ergi v. Turkey, 32 E.H.R.R. 388 (2001).

[69]     McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 E.H.R.R. 97 (1995).

[70]     McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 E.H.R.R. 553 (2001).

 

Inter-American Court of Human Rights cases cited:

[71]     Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (series C, no. 4) (1988); 28 ILM 291 (1989).

 

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda cases cited:

[72]     Prosecutor v. Akayesu, case no. ICTR-96-4-T (1998).

 

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia cases cited:

[73]     Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY case no. IT-94-1.

[74]     Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ICTY case IT-95-14-T (2000).

[75]     Prosecutor v. Strugar, ICTY case IT-01-42 (2005)

[76]     Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, ICTY case no. IT-95-16 (2000).

 

For the petitioners — A. Feldman, M. Sfard.

For respondents 1-5 — S. Nitzan.

For the sixth respondents — N. Darshan-Leitner, S. Lubrani.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

President Emeritus A. Barak

The Government of Israel has adopted a policy of preventative attacks that cause the death of terrorists in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. It brings about the death of those terrorists who plan, dispatch or carry out terror attacks in Israel and in the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, against both civilians and soldiers. Sometimes these attacks also harm innocent civilians. Does the state thereby act unlawfully? This is the question that is before us.

(1) Factual background

1.    In September 2000 the second Intifadeh broke out. A fierce barrage of terrorism was directed against the State of Israel and against Israelis wherever they were. The barrage of terror does not distinguish between combatants and civilians, or between women, men and children. The terror attacks are taking place both in the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and in the State of Israel. They target civilian centres, shopping centres and marketplaces, cafés and restaurants. In the last five years thousands of acts of terrorism have been committed against Israel. In the course of these, more than one thousand Israelis have been killed. Thousands of Israeli civilians have been injured. Thousands of Palestinians have also been killed and injured during this period.

2.    In its war against terrorism, the State of Israel has adopted various measures. As a part of the defence activity that is intended to deal with terrorist attacks, the state employs what it calls ‘the targeted killing policy.’ By means of this policy, the security forces operate in order to kill operatives in terrorist organizations who are involved in the planning, dispatching or commission of terror attacks against Israel. During the second Intifadeh, preventative attacks have been carried out throughout Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. According to figures provided by the petitioners, from the time when these operations began until the end of 2005 almost three hundred operatives in terrorist organizations were killed in these attacks. More than thirty targeted killing attempts failed. Approximately one hundred and fifty civilians who were near the location of the targets of these killings were killed in these operations. Hundreds of others were injured. The targeted killings policy is the focus of this petition.

(2) The petitioners’ arguments

3.    The petitioners’ position is that the targeted killings policy is clearly illegal, contrary to international law, Israeli law and basic principles of human morality. It violates the human rights both of the targets of the attacks and of innocent bystanders who happen to be in the area of the attack, as these rights are recognized in Israeli and international law.

4.    The petitioners’ position is that the legal framework that governs the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations is not the laws of war but the laws that concern the enforcement of law and order in an occupied territory. The petitioners’ position in this regard underwent changes in the course of the petition, of which some were the result of changes that occurred in the respondents’ position. Originally it was argued that the laws of war mainly concern international conflicts, whereas the armed struggle between Israel and the Palestinians does not fall into the category of an international conflict. Therefore it is not the laws of war that apply to this dispute but the laws of policing and law enforcement. In their closing statement (of 1 September 2004) the petitioners agreed with the position that in our case we are dealing with an international conflict, but even in this framework there is no place for military operations that are governed by the laws of war. This is because Israel’s right to carry out military operations of self-defence under article 51 of the United Nations Charter of 1945 does not apply to the dispute under discussion. The right of self-defence is given to a state in response to an armed attack of another state. The territories are subject to a belligerent occupation of the State of Israel, and therefore article 51 does not apply at all to our case. Just as the state is unable to claim self-defence against its own population, so too it cannot claim self-defence against inhabitants who are subject to the occupation of its army. Against an occupied civilian population there is no right of self-defence but only a right to enforce the law in accordance with the laws of belligerent occupation. Therefore our case is subject to the laws of policing and law enforcement within the framework of the laws of occupation, and not the laws of war. In this framework, there is no place for killing suspects without due process, and without arrest and trial. The targeted killings violate the basic right to life and this violation has no defence or justification. The prohibition of arbitrary killing that is not required for self-defence is enshrined in the customary norms of international law. A prohibition of this kind derives also from the duties of the occupying power in an occupied territory vis-à-vis the occupied population, which constitutes a protected population under the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, and also according to the two additional protocols to the convention that were signed in 1977. All these laws reflect norms of customary international law and they bind Israel. According to the petitioners, the practice of states that fight terrorism indicates unequivocally an international custom according to which members of terrorist organizations are treated as criminals, and the criminal law, sometimes with the addition of special emergency powers, is what governs the methods of combating terrorism. The petitioner state as examples for this purpose the British struggle against the Irish terrorist organizations, the Spanish struggle against the Basque terrorist organizations, the German struggle against the terrorist organizations, the Italian struggle against the Red Brigades organization and the Turkish struggle against the Kurdish terrorist organizations.

5.    In the alternative, the petitioners claim that the targeted killing policy violates the rules of international law even if we apply the laws of war to the armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. These laws recognize only two statuses of persons — combatants and civilians. Combatants are legitimate targets for attack, but they also enjoy the rights that are granted in international law to combatants, including immunity against indictment and the right to a status of prisoners of war. Citizens enjoy protections and rights that are granted in international law to civilians in times of war. Inter alia, they are not a legitimate target for attacks. The status of civilians and the protection afforded to them are enshrined in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This is a basic principle of customary international law. The petitioners’ position is that this classification of combatants and civilians is an exhaustive classification. There is no intermediate status and there is no third category of ‘unlawful combatants.’ Every person who is not a combatant and every person with regard to whom there is a doubt as to whether he is a combatant automatically has the status of a civilian and is entitled to the rights and protections given to civilians in times of war. Even a civilian who collaborates in combat activities is not an ‘unlawful combatant,’ but only a criminal civilian, and therefore he retains his status as a civilian. The petitioners therefore reject the state’s position that the terrorist organizations’ operatives should be regarded as unlawful combatants. The petitioners discuss how the state itself refuses to give these operatives the rights and the defences given in international law to combatants, such as the right to a status of a prisoner of war. The result is that the state wishes to treat them according to the worse of both worlds: as combatants, to justify killing them, and as civilians, for the purpose of arresting them and bringing them to trial. This result is unacceptable. The operatives of the terrorist organizations, even if they take part in combat activities, are not thereby excluded from the application of the rules of international law. The petitioners’ position is therefore that the operatives of the terrorist organizations should be regarded as having the status of civilians.

6.    The petitioners state that a civilian who takes part in combat may lose some of the protections given to civilians in times of war. But this is only when he takes a direct part in the combat activities, and only as long as this direct participation lasts. These two conditions are provided in article 51(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions (hereafter — the First Protocol). This article, with all of its conditions, reflects, according to the petitioners, a customary rule of international law. These conditions were adopted in international case law, and they are mentioned in additional international documents, as well as in the army manuals of most Western countries. In order to preserve the clear distinction between combatants and civilians, these conditions are given a narrow and precise interpretation. According to this interpretation, a civilian will lose his immunity against attack only when he actually takes a direct part in hostilities, and only during the time when this direct participation is continuing. Thus, for example, from the moment that the civilian returns home, and even if he intends to take part once again in hostilities at a later date, he is not a legitimate target for attack, although he can be arrested and brought to trial for his participation in the combat activities. The petitioners insist that the targeted killing policy, as it is implemented in practice and as the respondents expressly state, goes beyond these narrow limits. It targets civilians even when they are not participating directly in combat or hostile acts. The targeted killings are carried out in circumstances that do not satisfy the immediate and essential conditions which alone justify an attack on civilians. Therefore we are dealing with an illegal policy that constitutes a prohibited attack on civilian targets.

7.    The petitioners attached an expert opinion from Prof. Cassese, an expert in international law, who was the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. In his opinion Prof. Cassese discusses the fundamental distinction in international law between civilians and combatants, which is enshrined, inter alia, in the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which are appended to the fourth Hague Convention of 1907. Someone who does not fall within the definition of combatant is automatically a civilian. There is no third category of ‘unlawful combatants.’ Therefore persons who participate in various hostile acts without satisfying the definition of combatants have the status of civilians and are entitled to the protections granted to them by the laws of war. A civilian who participates in hostilities loses these protections and may become a legitimate target for an attack. But this is only if he is taking a direct part in hostilities, and only if the attack against him is carried out during the period of time when he is actually taking a direct part in the hostilities. This rule is enshrined in article 51(3) of the First Protocol, but it reflects a rule of customary international law. Prof. Cassese’s position is that the expressions ‘direct part’ and ‘period of time’ should be interpreted strictly and narrowly. A civilian who takes part in hostilities loses the protections given to civilians only during the period of time when he actually takes part directly in hostilities, such as when he is shooting or laying a mine. Even a citizen who is making preparations to carry out hostile activity may be considered someone who is taking a direct part in hostile acts, provided that he is openly carrying a weapon. When he puts down his weapon, or when he is not carrying out hostilities he ceases to be a legitimate target for an attack. Therefore someone who only provides assistance in planning a hostile act, or someone who trains or sends others to carry out hostilities is not a legitimate target for an attack. Indirect assistance of this kind to hostile activities may expose the citizen to arrest and trial, but it does not make him a legitimate target for an attack.

8.    The petitioners’ position is that the targeted killing policy, as it is implemented in practice, also violates the requirements of proportionality that constitute a part of both Israeli law and customary international law. The principle of proportionality is a central principle of the laws of war. It prohibits attacking even legitimate targets if the attack is expected to result in an excessively serious attack on the lives of innocent persons relative to the military advantage of the operation. This principle is enshrined in article 51(5)(B) of the First Protocol, which is a customary rule of war. The targeted killing policy does not satisfy this condition. Its perpetrators are aware that it may, sometimes almost certainly, result in death and injury to innocents. And this is indeed what happens time after time. Because of the modus operandi adopted within the framework of this policy, many of the preventative killing attempts end in the death and injury of innocent civilians. Thus, for example, on 22 July 2002 a bomb weighing 1,000 kg was dropped on the home of Salah Shehada, a wanted person, in a dense residential area in the city of Gaza. The bomb and the shockwave caused the death of the wanted person, his wife, his daughter and also twelve additional persons who lived nearby. Dozens of people were injured. This case, as well as other cases, illustrates damage caused by the targeted killing policy, which does not distinguish between terrorists and innocents. The petitioners’ position is, therefore, that the targeted killing policy does not satisfy the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. Moreover, according to the petitioners the policy also does not satisfy the second test of proportionality, which concerns the least harmful measure. According to the petitioners, the respondents make use of the targeted killing measure on a frequent basis, including when there are also other measures available for apprehending the persons suspected of terrorist activity. The petitioners point to the fact that during the second Intifadeh the security forces have made hundreds of arrests in those parts of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip that are under the exclusive control of the Palestinian Authority. These figures show that the security forces have the operational ability to arrest suspects even in areas under the exclusive control of the Palestinian Authority and to bring them to arrest and interrogation facilities. In these circumstances, there is no justification for making use of targeted killings. Finally, the petitioners discuss how the targeted killings policy is not immune from serious mistakes. The targets of the killings are not given an opportunity to protest their innocence. The targeted killing policy works in a secret world where the public eye does not see the evidence on which basis the targets are chosen for the killings. There is no judicial review before or after the targeted killing operations. At least in one case there is a concern that a mistake of identity was made and a man who had a similar name to a wanted person and lived in the same village was killed.

(3) The respondents’ reply

9.    In their preliminary reply to the petition, the respondents stated that a petition that is identical to the petition before us, both in substance and with regard to the arguments that were raised in it, was considered and denied by the Supreme Court (HCJ 5872/01 Barakeh v. Prime Minister [1], judgment of 29 January 2002). In this judgment it was held that ‘the choice of the method of combat that the respondents employ in order to prevent murderous terrorist attacks before they are committed is not one of the subjects in which this court will see fit to intervene.’ The respondents’ position is that this approach is a proper one. This petition, like its predecessor, seeks to bring the court into the battle zone in order to consider matters that are of a purely operational character, which are not justiciable. For these reasons the petition should be denied in limine. Notwithstanding, the respondents did not reiterate this argument in the supplementary pleadings that they filed.

10. On the merits, the respondents discuss the security background that led to the targeted killing policy. Since the end of September 2000, combat activities against Israel have been occurring in the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. As a result of these, more than one thousand Israeli citizens were killed in the years 2000-2005. Thousands more were injured. The security forces carried out various operations in order to contend with the combat activities and terrorism. In view of the armed conflict, these operations are subject to the laws of war, or the laws of armed conflicts that constitute a part of international law. The respondents’ position is that the court should reject the argument that Israel may only defend itself against terrorism by using law enforcement measures. There is no longer any dispute that a state may respond with military force to a terrorist attack against it, by virtue of its right to self-defence that is provided in article 51 of the United Nations charter, which allows a state to protect itself against an ‘armed attack.’ Even if there is a dispute among scholars with regard to the question of what is an ‘armed attack,’ there cannot be any doubt that the terrorist barrage against Israel satisfies the definition of an armed attack. Therefore Israel may use military force against the terrorist organizations. The respondents point to the fact that other countries have stopped regarding terrorist operations merely as criminal offences and have begun to make use of military measures against terrorist operations that are directed against them. This is especially the case when the terrorist acts are on a large scale and continue for a long period. The respondents’ position is that the question whether the laws of belligerent occupation apply to all the territories is not relevant to the question before us, since the question whether the targeted killing policy is legal will be determined in accordance with the laws of war, which apply both to an occupied territory and to an unoccupied territory, provided that an armed conflict is taking place there.

11. The respondents’ position is that the laws of war govern not only war in the classical sense, but also other armed disputes and conflicts. International law does not include an unambiguous definition of the concept of ‘armed conflict.’ But there is no doubt today that an armed conflict may take place between a state and groups or organizations that are not states, inter alia because of the military abilities and weapons in the possession of such organizations and their willingness to use them. The current dispute between Israel and the terrorist organizations is an armed conflict in which Israel is entitled to respond with military measures. This has also been upheld by the Supreme Court in a host of cases. With regard to the classification of the conflict, originally the respondents argued that it is an international conflict that is subject to the ordinary rules of war. In the closing reply (of 26 January 2004) the respondents said that the question of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is a complex question, and it has diverse aspects. In any case, there is no need to decide this for the purpose of the petition, since according to each of the categories the laws of armed conflict will apply to the state’s actions. These laws permit an attack on someone who is a party to the armed dispute and takes an active part in it, whether it is an international armed conflict or it is an armed conflict that is not international, and even if we are dealing with a new category of armed conflict that has developed in the last decade in international law, which concerns armed conflicts between states and terror organizations. According to each one of these categories, someone who is a party to the armed conflict and takes an active part in it is a combatant, and he may be attacked. The respondents’ position is that the terrorist organizations’ operatives are a party to the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations, within which framework they take an active part in the combat. Therefore they are legitimate targets for an attack as long as the armed conflict continues. Notwithstanding, they are not entitled to the rights of combatants under the Third Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations since they do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population, and because they do not observe the laws of war. In view of this complex reality, the respondents’ position is that a third category of persons should be recognized, namely the category of unlawful combatants. Persons who fall into this category are combatants, and therefore they constitute a legitimate target for an attack. Notwithstanding, they are not entitled to all the rights given to lawful combatants, since they do not themselves observe the requirements of the laws of war. The respondents’ position is that the terror organizations’ operatives in the territories fall into the category of ‘unlawful combatants.’ The status of the terrorists who participate actively in the armed conflict is not the status of civilians. They are a party to the armed conflict, and therefore it is permitted to attack them. They do not observe the laws of war, and therefore they do not enjoy the rights and protections given to lawful combatants, who observe the requirements of the laws of war. The respondents’ position is therefore that according to each of the alternatives, ‘the state is permitted to kill someone who is fighting against it, in accordance with the basic principles of the laws of war that govern every armed conflict’ (para. 68 of the respondents’ reply of 26 January 2004).

12. Alternatively, the respondents’ position is that the targeted killing policy is lawful even if the court does not accept the argument that the terrorist organizations’ operatives are combatants that are a party to the armed conflict, and even if the court regards them as persons who have a civilian status. This is because the laws of armed conflict permit an attack on civilians who are taking a direct part in the combat activities. Indeed, as a rule the laws of war give civilians immunity from attacks. But a ‘civilian’ who takes a direct part in the hostilities loses his immunity and may be the target of an attack. This also means that it is permitted to attack civilians in order to frustrate intentions to carry out future or planned hostile activity. Any person who takes a direct part in the commission, planning or dispatching of hostilities that are intended against civilian or military targets is a legitimate target for attack. This exception reflects a customary rule of international law. The respondents’ position is that the condition of simultaneity provided in article 51(3) of the First Protocol, according to which a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities may only be attacked at the time when he is taking part in the hostilities, does not bind Israel since it does not reflect a rule of customary international law. In this regard the respondents state that Israel, like other countries, was not a party to the First Protocol. Therefore it is permitted to attack civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities even when they are not carrying them out. There is nothing that prevents attacking terrorists at any time and place, as long as they have not laid down their weapons and left the cycle of combat. Finally, the respondents’ position is that even if we regard art. 51(3) of the First Protocol, with all of its conditions, as a customary rule, the targeted killings policy satisfies its provisions. This is because they should be interpreted more broadly than the interpretation proposed by the petitioners. Thus the expression ‘hostilities’ should be interpreted to include acts such as the planning of terrorist attacks, the dispatching of terrorists and being in command of terrorist cells. There is no basis for Prof. Cassese’s position that ‘hostilities’ should include the use of weapons or the carrying of weapons. The expression ‘taking a direct part’ should also be given a broad interpretation, so that anyone who plans, commits or sends another person to carry out a terrorist attack will be regarded as someone who takes a direct part in hostilities. Finally, the condition of simultaneity should also be interpreted broadly so that it will be possible to attack a terrorist at any time that he is systematically involved in acts of terror. The respondents’ position is that the very restrictive interpretation of art. 51(3) that is proposed by the petitioners is unreasonable and outrageous. The petitioners’ position and the opinion submitted on their behalf imply that terrorists have immunity from attack for as long as they are planning terrorist attacks and this immunity is removed for a short time only, when the attack is actually being carried out. After the attack has been carried out, the immunity returns to protect the terrorists, even if it is known and clear that they are going home in order to plan and carry out the next attack. This interpretation allows someone who takes an active part in hostilities ‘to change hats’ as he wishes between a combatant’s hat and a civilian’s hat. This result is unthinkable. It is also inconsistent with the purpose of the exception, which is intended to allow the state to take action against civilians who take an active part in the struggle against it. The respondents’ conclusion is that the targeted killings policy satisfies the laws of war even if we regard the terrorists as civilians, and even if we regard the conditions set out in art. 51(3) of the First Protocol as customary rules.

13. The respondents’ position is that the targeted killings policy, as it is carried out in practice, satisfies the requirement of proportionality. The requirement of proportionality does not lead to the conclusion that it is prohibited to carry out military operations that may harm civilians. This requirement means that the harm to civilians should be proportionate to the security benefit that is likely to arise from the military operation. Moreover, the proportionality of the operation should be examined against the background of the uncertainty that inherently accompanies any combat activity, especially in view of the circumstances of the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations. The State of Israel satisfies the requirements of proportionality. Targeted killing operations are only carried out as an exceptional step, when there is no alternative to this activity. Its purpose is the saving of lives. It is considered at the highest levels of command. In every case an attempt is made to limit as much as possible the collateral damage that may be caused to civilians as a result of the targeted killing operation. In cases where the security establishment is of the opinion that there are other alternatives to the operation, these alternatives are implemented in so far as possible. Targeted killing missions have been postponed or cancelled on more than one occasion when it transpired that there was no possibility of carrying them out without endangering innocent persons disproportionately.

(4) The petition and the hearing thereof

14. The petition was filed on 24 January 2002, and after preliminary replies were filed it was set down for a hearing before a panel of three justices. After the first hearing on 18 April 2002 before Justices A. Barak, D. Dorner and I. Englard, the parties were asked to file supplementary statements that addressed a series of questions that were posed by the court. After the responses were filed, another hearing of the petition was held on 8 July 2003 before a panel of Justices A. Barak, T. Or and E. Mazza). During this, we considered the petitioners’ application for an interim order. The application was denied. At the request of the parties, additional time was given for the filing of supplementary statements. At the request of the petitioners, an additional hearing of the petition was held on 16 February 2005 before a panel of Justices A. Barak, M. Cheshin and D. Beinisch). During this the respondents submitted the prime minister’s statement at the Sharm El-Sheik conference according to which the State of Israel was suspending the use of the targeted killings policy. In view of this statement, we decided to defer the hearing of the petition to another date, in so far as this would be required. In the month of July 2005 the state began to employ the targeted killings policy once again. In view of this, at the request of the parties an additional hearing of the petition was held on 11 December 2005, before a panel of Justices A. Barak, M. Cheshin and D. Beinisch. At the end of this, we held that judgment would be given after further supplementary statements were filed by the parties. Pursuant to the decision of President D. Beinisch on 22 November 2006, Vice-President E. Rivlin replaced Vice-President M. Cheshin who had retired.

15. After the petition was filed, two applications were filed to join it. First on 22 July 2003 an application was filed by counsel for the petitioners on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers to join the petition and to file written pleadings as amicus curiae. The respondents opposed the application. Subsequently an application was filed on 23 February 2004 on behalf of Shurat HaDin — Israel Law Centre and 24 additional applicants to join them as respondents in the petition. The petitioners opposed the application. We are deciding to grant the two applications and to join the applicants as parties to the petition. The pleadings on behalf of the amicus curiae support the main arguments of the petitioners. They also argue that the killing of religious and political leaders is contrary to international law and is not legitimate, whether in times of war or in times of peace. In addition, no use should be made of the targeted killings policy against anyone who is involved in terrorist activities except in cases where there is an immediate danger to human lives, and even then only in the absence of any other means of averting the danger. The pleadings of Shurat HaDin support the main arguments of the respondents. They also argue that the targeted killings are permitted, and even necessary, according to the principle of Jewish law ‘If someone comes to kill you, kill him first!’ (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot 58a) and according to the law of ‘Someone who is pursuing his fellow-man to kill him…’ (Mishnah, Sanhedrin 8, 7).

(5) The general normative framework

A.    An international armed conflict

16. The fundamental premise is that, since the Intifadeh began, a continuous state of armed conflict has existed between Israel and the various terrorist organizations that operate from Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (hereafter — the territories). The court has discussed the existence of this conflict in a host of judgments (see HCJ 9255/00 Al-Saka v. State of Israel [2]; HCJ 2461/01 Canaan v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [3]; HCJ 9293/01 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [4]; HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [5]; HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. Minister of Defence [6]; HCJ 8172/02 Ibrahim v. IDF Commander in West Bank [7]; HCJ 7957/04 Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8]). In one case I said:

‘Since the end of September 2000, fierce fighting has been taking place in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. This is not police activity. It is an armed struggle’ (HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 358 {87}).

This approach is consistent with the definition of an armed conflict in international literature (see O. Ben-Naftali and Y. Shani, International Law Between War and Peace (2006), at p. 142; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (fourth edition, 2005), at p. 201; H. Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law (2005), at p. 219). It clearly reflects what has been occurring and is still occurring in the ‘territories.’ The situation was described in the supplementary closing arguments of the State Attorney’s Office (of 26 January 2004) as follows:

‘For more than three years the State of Israel has faced an unceasing, continuous and murderous barrage of attacks, which are directed against Israelis wherever they are, without any distinction between soldiers and civilians or between men, women and children. Within the framework of the current terror barrage, more than 900 Israelis have been killed from September 2000 until the present, and thousands of other Israelis have been injured. Thousands of Palestinians have also been killed and injured during this period. By way of comparison we should point out that the number of Israeli victims relative to the population of the State of Israel is several times greater than the percentage of victims who were killed in the United States in the events of September 11 relative to the population of the United States. As is well known, and as we have already pointed out, the events of September 11 were defined by the countries of the world and international organizations without any hesitation as an “armed attack” that justifies the use of force in reply.

The terror attacks are taking place both in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (hereafter — the territories) and in the State of Israel itself. They are directed both against civilians, civilian population centres, shopping centres and marketplaces, and also against IDF forces and bases and facilities of the security forces. In these attacks the terrorist organizations employ measures that are of a purely military character, and what all of these measures have in common is their lethalness and callousness. These measures include shooting attacks, suicide attacks, the firing of mortars, the firing of rockets, the use of car bombs, etc.’ (at p. 30).

17. This armed conflict (or dispute) does not take place in a normative vacuum. It is subject to normative arrangements as to what is permitted and what is prohibited. I discussed this in one case where I said:

‘“Israel is not an island. It is a member of an international community...”. The military operations of the army are not conducted in a legal vacuum. There are legal norms — some from customary international law, some from international law enshrined in treaties to which Israel is a party, and some from the basic principles of Israeli law — which provide rules as to how military operations should be conducted’ (HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [10], at p. 391 {205-206}).

What are the normative arrangements that apply in the case of an armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations that operate in the territories?

18. The normative arrangements that apply to the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations in the territories are complex. They focus mainly on the rules of international law concerning an international armed conflict (or dispute). The international character of an armed conflict between a state that is occupying a territory in a belligerent occupation and guerrillas and terrorists that come from that territory — including the armed dispute between Israel and the terrorist organizations in the territories — was discussed by Prof. Cassese, who said:

‘An armed conflict which takes place between an Occupying Power and rebel or insurgent groups — whether or not they are terrorist in character — in an occupied territory, amounts to an international armed conflict’ (A. Cassese, International Law (second edition, 2005), at p. 420).

These laws include the laws of belligerent occupation. But they are not limited to them alone. These laws apply to every case of an armed conflict of an international character — i.e., one that crosses the borders of the state — whether the place where the armed conflict is occurring is subject to a belligerent occupation or not. These laws constitute a part of the laws of the conduct of war (ius in bello). From the humanitarian viewpoint, they are a part of international humanitarian law. This humanitarian law is a special law (lex specialis) that applies in an armed conflict. Where this law has a lacuna, it can be filled by means of international human rights law (see the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ Rep. 226, at p. 240; the advisory opinion of the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) 43 ILM 1009; Banković v. Belgium [67]; see also Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law,’ 94 Am. J. Intl. L. 239 (2000)). In addition to the provisions of international law governing an armed conflict, the basic principles of Israeli public law are likely to apply. These basic principles are carried by every Israeli soldier in his backpack and they go with him wherever he goes (see HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 810; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 365 {96}; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 14 of the judgment).

19. Significant parts of international law that deal with an armed conflict are of a customary nature. These customary laws are a part of Israeli law, ‘by virtue of the fact that the State of Israel is sovereign and independent’ (per Justice S.Z. Cheshin in CrimA 174/54 Stampeper v. Attorney-General [12], at p. 15; see also CrimA 336/61 Eichman v. Attorney-General [13]; LCA 7092/94 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson [14], at p. 639 {416}, and the cases cited there; see also R. Lapidot, ‘The Place of Public International Law in Israeli Law,’ 19 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 809 (1990); R. Sabel, International Law (2003), at p. 29). This was well expressed by President Shamgar, who said:

‘According to the consistent case law of this court, customary international law is a part of Israeli law, subject to Israeli legislation containing a contrary provision’ (HCJ 785/87 Afu v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [15], at p. 35).

International law that is enshrined in international conventions (whether Israel is a party to them or not) and which does not involve the adoption of customary international law is not a part of the internal law of the State of Israel (see HCJ 69/81 Abu Ita v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [16], at p. 234, and Y. Zilbershatz, ‘Incorporating International Law in Israeli Law — The Law As It Is and As It Should Be,’ 24 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 317 (1994)). In the petitions before us, no question arises with regard to any conflicting Israeli legislation. Public law in Israel recognizes the Israel Defence Forces as ‘the army of the state’ (s. 1 of the Basic Law: the Army). The army is authorized ‘to do all the lawful actions that are required for the defence of the state and in order to achieve its national security goals’ (s. 18 of the Government and Justice Arrangements Ordinance, 5748-1948). The Basic Law: the Government recognizes the constitutionality of ‘military operations that are required for the purpose of protecting the state and public security’ (s. 40(b)). Naturally, these operations also include an armed conflict with terrorist organizations outside the borders of the state. We should also mention the defence against criminal liability provided in s. 34M(1) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977, according to which a person will not be liable under the criminal law for an act that ‘he was obliged or competent to do according to law.’ When the soldiers of the Israel Defence Forces operate in accordance with the laws of armed conflict, they are acting ‘according to law,’ and they have the defence of justification. By contrast, if they act contrary to the laws of armed conflict, they are likely to be liable, inter alia under the criminal law, for their actions. Indeed, the question before us should be considered within the framework of customary international law concerning an armed conflict. This is also the source for all the other laws that may be relevant under our internal law. Conventional international law that has no customary force is not a part of our internal law.

20. International law concerning the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations is enshrined in several legal sources (see Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2004), at p. 5). The main source is the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907 (hereafter — the Hague Convention). The provisions of this convention, to which Israel is a party, have a status of customary international law (see Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 793; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 827 {283}; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 364 {95-96}). In addition to this there is the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereafter — the Fourth Geneva Convention). Israel is a party to this convention. It was not adopted in Israeli legislation. Notwithstanding, its customary provisions are a part of the law of the State of Israel (see the opinion of Justice H.H. Cohn in HCJ 698/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [18], at p. 638). It is well known that the position of the Government of Israel is that in principle the laws of belligerent occupation in the Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply with regard to the territories. Notwithstanding, Israel observes the humanitarian provisions of this convention (see Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [18]; Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 194; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 364 {95-96}; HCJ 3278/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [19], at p. 396 {136}; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 827 {283}; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 14 of the judgment). For the purposes of the petition before us this is sufficient. In addition, the laws concerning an international armed conflict are enshrined in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977 (‘the First Protocol’). Israel is not a party to this protocol, and it has not been adopted in Israeli legislation. Of course, the customary provisions of the First Protocol are a part of Israeli law.

21. Our premise is that the law that governs the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations in the territories is the international law that relates to an armed conflict or dispute. This is how this court has regarded the character of the dispute in the past, and this is how we are also continuing to regard it in the petition before us. According to this approach, the fact that the terrorist organizations and its members do not act on behalf of a state does not make the struggle merely an internal matter of the state (see Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 420). Indeed, in today’s reality a terrorist organization may have a considerable military capacity, sometimes exceeding even the capacity of states. Dealing with these dangers cannot be limited merely to the internal affairs of a state and its criminal law. Contending with the risk of terror constitutes a part of international law that concerns armed conflicts of an international nature. Additional possibilities have been raised in legal literature (see Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, supra, at p. 218; E. Gross, Democracy’s Struggle Against Terrorism: Legal and Moral Aspects (2004), at p. 585; O. Ben-Naftali and K. Michaeli, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ 36 Cornell Intl. L. J. 233 (2003); D. Jinks, ‘September 11 and the Law of War,’ 28 Yale J. I. L. 1 (2003)). According to the approach of Prof. Kretzmer, this armed dispute should be classified as a dispute that is not merely an internal-national dispute, nor should it be classified as being of an international character, but it has a mixed character, in which both international human rights law and international humanitarian law apply (see D. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 171 (2000)); counsel for the state raised these possibilities before us and indicated the problems that they raise, without adopting any position with regard to them. As we have seen, the premise on which the Supreme Court has relied for years — and which also was always the premise of counsel for the state before the Supreme Court — is that the armed dispute is of an international character. In this judgment we are continuing with this approach. It should be noted that even those who think that the armed dispute between Israel and the terrorist organizations is not of an international character hold that it is subject to international humanitarian law or international human rights law (see Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 194; Ben Naftali and Shani, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 142, and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld [62]; Prosecutor v. Tadić [73], at para. 127; on non-international armed conflicts see: Y. Dinstein, C. Garraway, M. Schmitt, The Manual On Non-International Armed Conflict: With Commentary (2006)).

22. International law concerning armed conflicts is based on a delicate balance between two conflicting considerations (see Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 794; Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [19], at p. 396 {136}; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 833 {290}). One concerns the humanitarian considerations that relate to anyone who is harmed as a result of the armed conflict. These considerations are based on human rights and dignity. The other concerns military considerations, which lie at the heart of the armed conflict. These considerations are based on military necessity and success (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 16). The balance between these considerations is the basis for the international law of armed conflicts. This was discussed by Prof. Greenwood, who said:

‘International humanitarian law in armed conflicts is a compromise between military and humanitarian requirements. Its rules comply with both military necessity and the dictates of humanity’ (Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 32 (1995)).

In Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11] I said:

‘The Hague Regulations revolve around two main focal points: one is ensuring the legitimate security interests of the occupier of a territory that is subject to a belligerent occupation; the other is ensuring the needs of the civilian population in the territory that is subject to a belligerent occupation’ (ibid. [11], at p. 794).

In another case Justice A. Procaccia said that the Hague Convention authorizes the military commander to ensure two needs:

‘The first need is a military need and the second is a civilian-humanitarian need. The first focuses on concern for the security of the military force that is occupying the area, and the second concerns the responsibility for preserving the welfare of the inhabitants. Within the latter sphere, the area commander is responsible not only for maintaining order and ensuring the security of the inhabitants but also for protecting their rights, especially their constitutional human rights. The concern for human rights lies at the heart of the humanitarian considerations that the area commander must consider’ (HCJ 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [20], at p. 455 {65}).

In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17] I added that:

‘The laws of belligerent occupation recognize the authority of the military commander to maintain security in the area and thereby to protect the security of his country and its citizens, but it makes the exercising of this authority conditional upon a proper balance between it and the rights, needs, and interests of the local population’ (ibid. [17], at p. 833 {290}).

Indeed —

‘Indeed, like in many other areas of the law, the solution is not one of “all or nothing.” The solution lies in finding the proper balance between the conflicting considerations. The solution is not to be found in giving absolute weight to one of the considerations; the solution lies in giving relative weight to the different considerations by balancing them in relation to the matter requiring a decision’ (Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 29 of the judgment).

The result of this balance is that human rights are protected by the laws of armed conflict, but not to their full extent. The same is true with regard to military necessity. It may be realized, but not to its full extent. This balance reflects the relativity of human rights and the limitations of military necessity. The proper balance is not fixed. ‘In certain cases the emphasis is on military necessity whereas in other cases the emphasis is on the needs of the local population’ (Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 794). What, then, are the factors that affect the proper balance?

23. A main factor that affects the proper balance is the identity of the person who is harmed or the target that is harmed in the armed conflict. This is the basic principle of distinction (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 82; Ben-Naftali and Shani, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 151). Customary international law with regard to armed conflicts discusses a fundamental distinction between combatants and military targets, on the one hand, and non-combatants, i.e., civilians, and civilian targets on the other (see the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra, at p. 257; art. 48 of the First Protocol). According to the basic principle of distinction, the proper balance between the military needs of the state as opposed to combatants and military targets of the other party is different from the proper balance between the military needs of the state as opposed to civilians and civilian targets of the other party. As a rule, combatants and military targets are legitimate targets for a military attack. Their lives and bodies are subject to the risks of combat. It is permitted to kill and injure them. Notwithstanding, not every combat activity is permitted against them, nor is every military course of action permitted. Thus, for example, it is permitted to shoot them and kill combatants. But there is a prohibition against the treacherous killing of combatants or harming them in a manner that amounts to perfidy (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 198). Similarly the use of certain weapons is prohibited. A consideration of all this does not arise in the petition before us. Moreover, there are comprehensive laws that concern the status of prisoners of war. Thus, for example, prisoners of war may not be brought to a criminal trial because of their actual participation in the fighting, and they should be treated ‘humanely’ (art. 13 of the Third Geneva Convention). It is of course permitted to bring them to trial for war crimes that they committed during the hostilities. In contrast to the combatants and military targets there are the civilians and civilian targets. They may not be subjected to a military attack that is directed at them. Their lives and bodies are protected against the risks of combat, provided that they do not themselves take a direct part in the combat. This customary principle was formulated as follows:

‘Rule 1: The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

Rule 6: Civilians are protected against attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Rule 7: The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects’ (J. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (vol. 1, 2005), at pp. 3, 19, 25).

This approach, which protects the lives, bodies and property of civilians who do not take a direct part in an armed conflict, runs like a golden thread through the case law of the Supreme Court (see Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 794; HCJ 72/86 Zaloom v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [21], at p. 532; Almadani v. Minister of Defence [6], at p. 35 {53}; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 365 {97}; Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [19], at p. 396 {136}; HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp [22], at p. 412; HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [23], at p. 364 {191}; Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [20], at p. 456 {65}; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at paras. 24-29 of the judgment; HCJ 1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel [24], at para. 15; HCJ 3799/02 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [25], at para. 23 of my opinion; I discussed this in Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [10], which considered combat activity during the armed conflict in Rafah:

‘The basic injunction of international humanitarian law applicable in times of combat is that the local inhabitants are “… entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof…” (art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; see also art. 46 of the Hague Convention)… What underlies this basic provision is the recognition of the value of man, the sanctity of his life and the fact that he is entitled to liberty… His life or his dignity as a human being may not be harmed, and his dignity as a human being must be protected. This basic duty is not absolute. It is subject to “… such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war” (last part of art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). These measures may not harm the essence of the rights… They must be proportionate’ (ibid. [10], at p. 393 {208-209}).

Later in that case I said that:

‘The duty of the military commander, according to this basic rule, is twofold. First, he must refrain from operations that attack the local inhabitants. This duty is his “negative” obligation. Second, he must carry out acts required to ensure that the local inhabitants are not harmed. This is his “positive” obligation… Both these obligations — the dividing line between which is a fine one —should be implemented reasonably and proportionately in accordance with the needs of the time and place’ (ibid. [10], at p. 394 {209}).

Are terrorist organizations and their members combatants for the purpose of their rights in the armed conflict? Are they civilians who take part directly in the armed conflict? Or are they perhaps neither combatants nor civilians? What, then, is the status of these terrorists?

B.    Combatants

24. Who are combatants? This category naturally includes the armed forces. It also includes persons who satisfy the following conditions (art. 1 of the Regulations appended to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907):

‘The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:

To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

To carry arms openly; and

To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

…’

This wording is repeated in art. 13 of the First and Second Geneva Conventions, and art. 4 of the Third Geneva Convention (cf. also art. 43 of the First Protocol). These conditions, together with additional conditions that are derived from the relevant conventions, have been examined in legal literature (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 39). We do not need to consider all of these, because the terrorist organizations from the territories and their individual members do not satisfy the conditions of combatants (see Gross, Democracy’s Struggle Against Terrorism: Legal and Moral Aspects, at p. 75). It is sufficient it we point out that they do not have a fixed recognizable mark that makes it possible to distinguish them from afar and they do not conduct their activities in accordance with the laws and customs of war. In one case I said:

‘The Lebanese detainees should not be regarded as prisoners of war. It is sufficient that they do not satisfy the provisions of art. 41(2)(d) of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides that one of the conditions that must be satisfied in order to fulfil the definition of “prisoner of war” is “that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” The organizations to which the detainees belonged are terrorist organizations that operate contrary to the laws and customs of war. Thus, for example, these organizations deliberately attack civilians and shoot from amongst a civilian population, which they use as a shield. All of these are acts that are contrary to international law. Indeed, Israel’s consistent position over the years has been to refuse to regard the various organizations, such as Hezbollah, as organizations to which the Third Geneva Convention applies. We have found no reason to intervene in this position’ (HCJ 2967/00 Arad v. Knesset [26], at p. 191; see also SFC 1158/02 (TA) State of Israel v. Barghouti [60], at para. 35); Military Prosecutor v. Kassem [61]).

25. The terrorists and their organizations, against which the State of Israel is conducting an armed conflict of an international character, are not included in the category of combatants. They do not belong to the armed forces nor are they included among the units that are given a status similar to that of combatants by customary international law. Indeed, the terrorists and the organizations that send them are unlawful combatants. They do not enjoy the status of prisoners of war. It is permitted to bring them to trial for their participation in the hostilities, to try them and sentence them. This was discussed by Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme Court, who said:

‘By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful population of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatant are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful’ (Ex Parte Quirin [63], at p. 30; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld [64]).

The Internment of Unlawful Combatants, 5762-2002, authorizes the chief of staff to issue an order for the administrative detention of an ‘unlawful combatant.’ This concept is defined in s. 2 of the law as —

‘A person who took part in hostilities against the State of Israel, whether directly or indirectly, or who is a member of a force carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel, and who does not satisfy the conditions granting a prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law, as set out in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.’

It need not be said that unlawful combatants are not outside the law. They are not outlaws. They too were created by God in His image; even their human dignity should be respected; they too enjoy and are entitled to the protection of customary international law, no matter how minimal this may be (see G.L. Neuman, ‘Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force,’ 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 283 (2003); G. Nolte, ‘Preventive Use of Force And Preventive Killings: Moves Into a Different Legal Order,’ 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 111 (2004), at p. 119). This is certainly the case when they are interned or when they are brought to trial (see art. 75 of the First Protocol, which reflects customary international law, and K. Dörmann, ‘The Legal Situation of “Unlawful / Unprivileged Combatants”,’ 85 IRRC 45 (2003), at p. 70). Does it follow from this that within the framework of Israel’s war against the terrorist organizations, Israel is not entitled to target them nor is it entitled to kill them even if they are planning, ordering or committing terrorist attacks? Were we to regard them as (lawful) combatants, the answer of course would be that Israel would be entitled to target them. Just as it is permitted to target a soldier of an enemy state, so too it would be permitted to target them. At the same time, they would enjoy the status of prisoners of war and the other protections given to lawful combatants. But, as we have seen, the terrorists operating against Israel are not combatants according to the definition of this expression in international law; they are not entitled to a status of prisoners of war; it is permitted to bring them to trial for their membership of terrorist organizations and for their actions against the army. Do they have the status of civilians? We will now turn to examine this question.

C.    Civilians

26. Customary international law relating to armed conflicts protects ‘civilians’ from attacks against them as a result of the hostilities. This was discussed by the International Court of Justice in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra, where it said:

‘States must never make civilians the object of attack’ (p. 257).

This customary principle was given expression in art. 51(2) of the First Protocol, according to which:

‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.’

This also gives rise to the duty to do everything to minimize the collateral damage to the civilian population when carrying out attacks on ‘combatants’ (see E. Benvenisti, ‘Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty To Spare Enemy Civilians,’ 39 Isr. L. Rev. 81 (2006)). This protection that is given to ‘civilians’ gives rise to the question of who is a ‘civilian’ for the purpose of this rule. The approach of customary international law is that ‘civilians’ are persons who are not ‘combatants’ (see art. 50(1) of the First Protocol and Sabel, International Law, supra, at p. 432). In Prosecutor v. Blaškić [74] the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia said that civilians are:

‘Persons who are not, or no longer, members of the armed forces’ (Prosecutor v. Blaškić [74], at para. 180).

This definition is of a ‘negative’ character. It determines the concept of ‘civilians’ as the opposite of ‘combatants.’ Thus it regards unlawful combatants — who, as we have seen, are not ‘combatants’ — as civilians. Does this mean that the unlawful combatants are entitled to the same protection to which civilians who are not unlawful combatants are entitled? The answer is no. Customary international law relating to armed conflicts provides that a civilian who takes a direct part in the hostilities does not at the same time enjoy the protection given to a civilian who is not taking a direct part in those acts (see art. 51(3) of the First Protocol). Thus we see that the unlawful combatant is not a combatant but a ‘civilian.’ Notwithstanding, he is a civilian who is not protected against being targeted as long as he is taking a direct part in the hostilities. Indeed, the fact that a person is an ‘unlawful combatant’ is not merely a matter for national-internal criminal law. It is a matter for international law relating to international armed conflicts (see Jinks, ‘September 11 and the Law of War,’ supra). An expression of this is that civilians who are unlawful combatants are a legitimate target for attack, and therefore they do not enjoy the rights of civilians who are not unlawful combatants, provided that they are at that time taking a direct part in the hostilities. As we have seen, they also do not enjoy the rights given to combatants. Thus, for example, the laws relating to prisoners of war do not apply to them.

D.    Is there a third category of unlawful combatants?

27. In its written and oral pleadings before us, the state requested that we recognize the existence of a third category of persons, namely the category of unlawful combatants. These are people who play an active and continuing part in an armed conflict, and therefore their status is the same as that of combatants in the sense that they constitute a legitimate target for attack and they are not entitled to the protections given to civilians. Notwithstanding, they are not entitled to all the rights and protections given to combatants, since they do not distinguish themselves from civilians and they do not observe the laws of war. Thus, for example, they are not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. The state’s position is that the terrorists who participate in the armed conflict between Israel and the terrorist organizations fall into this category of unlawful combatants.

28. The literature on this subject is extensive (see R.R Baxter, ‘So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,’ 28 Brit. Y. B. Int’l. L. 323 (1951); K. Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and Struggle Over Legitimacy, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, ‘Occasional Paper’ (Winter 2005, no. 2); J. Callen, ‘Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions,’ 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 1025 (2004); M.H. Hoffman, ‘Terrorists Are Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction With Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law,’ 34 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 227 (2002); S. Zachary, ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 38 Isr. L. Rev. 378 (2005); Nolte, ‘Preventive Use of Force and Preventive Killings: Moves Into a Different Legal Order,’ supra; Dörmann, ‘The Legal Situation of “Unlawful / Unprivileged Combatants”,’ supra). We will not adopt a position on the question whether this third category should be recognized. The question before us is not a question of what the law should be but of what the law is. In our opinion, in so far as the law as it actually stands is concerned, we do not have before us sufficient information that allows us to recognize the existence of this third category on the basis of the existing position of international law, whether conventional or customary (see Cassese, International Law, supra, at pp. 408, 470). It is hard for us to see how it is possible to recognize a third category within the framework of interpreting the Hague and Geneva Conventions. We do not think that we have been presented with sufficient information that allows us to say that this third category has been recognized, as of the present, in customary international law. Notwithstanding, a new reality sometimes requires a new interpretation. Rules that were developed against the background of a reality that has changed should be given a dynamic interpretation that will adapt them, within the framework of the accepted rules of interpretation, to the new reality (see Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 800; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 381 {116}). In this interpretive spirit we shall now address the rules of customary international law that consider the status of civilians who are also unlawful combatants.

(6) The status of civilians who are unlawful combatants

A.    The basic principle: civilians who take a direct part in hostilities are not protected at that time

29. Civilians enjoy comprehensive protection of their lives, bodies, liberty and property. ‘… the safety of the lives of the civilian population is a central value in the humanitarian laws…’ (Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [25], at para. 23 of my opinion). ‘…the right to life and physical integrity is the most basic right that lies at the heart of the humanitarian laws that are intended to protect the local population…’ (per Justice D. Beinisch in HCJ 9593/04 Morar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [27], at para. 14 of her opinion). As opposed to combatants, who may be targeted because they are combatants, civilians may not be targeted precisely because they are civilians. A provision in this vein is stipulated in art. 51(2) of the First Protocol, which constitutes customary international law:

‘The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack…’.

In a similar vein, art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides, in its definition of war crimes, that if an order is given intentionally to direct attacks against civilians, it is a war crime. This crime is applicable to those civilians who are ‘not taking a direct part in hostilities.’ Similarly civilians may not be attacked indiscriminately, i.e., an attack that, inter alia, is not directed at a specific military target (see art. 51(4) of the First Protocol, which constitutes customary international law: see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 37). This protection is given to all civilians, except for those civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities. Indeed, the protection against attack is not granted to unlawful combatants, who take a direct part in the hostilities. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘Indeed, the military operations are directed against terrorists and persons carrying out hostile acts of terror. They are not directed against the local inhabitants’ (Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [10], at p. 394 {209}).

What is the source of this basic principle, according to which the protection of international humanitarian law is removed from someone who is currently taking a direct part in hostilities, and what is the scope of its application?

B.    The source of the basic principle and its customary status

30. The basic principle is that civilians who take a direct part in hostilities are not protected at that time from being targeted. This principle is expressed in art. 51(3) of the First Protocol, which provides:

‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’

It is well known that Israel is not a party to the First Protocol. Therefore it has not been adopted in Israeli legislation. Does this basic principle reflect customary international law? The position of the Red Cross is that this is indeed a principle of customary international law (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 20. We accept this position. It is consistent with the provisions of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, to which Israeli is a party and which everyone agrees reflect customary international law, according to which protection is given to —

‘Persons taking no active part in the hostilities…’

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has held that article 51 of the First Protocol constitutes customary international law (Prosecutor v. Strugar [75], at para. 220). The military manuals of many countries, including Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Italy, Canada, Germany, the United States (the air force) and New Zealand have copied this provision exactly or adopted its principles whereby civilians should not be targeted unless they are taking a (direct) part in the hostilities. Legal literature regards this provision as an expression of customary international law (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 11; Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 192; Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 269; Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 416; M. Roscini, ‘Targeting and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment,’ 54 Int’l and Comp. L. Q. 411 (2005), at p. 418; V-J. Proulx, ‘If the Hat Fits Wear It, If the Turban Fits Run for Your Life: Reflection on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killings of Suspected Terrorists,’ 56 Hastings L.J. 801 (2005), at p. 879; G.H. Aldrich, ‘The Laws of War on Land,’ 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 42 (2000), at p. 53). Counsel for the respondents pointed out to us that in the opinion of the State of Israel, not all of the provisions of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol reflect customary international law. According to the state’s position, ‘all that customary international law provides is that it is prohibited to target civilians in general and also that it is permitted to target a civilian “who is taking a direct part in hostilities.” There is no restriction on the period of time when such an attack is permitted’ (supplementary closing arguments of the State Attorney’s Office of 26 January 2004, at p. 79). It follows that according to the state’s position the non-customary part of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol is that part that provides that civilians do not enjoy protection against being targeted ‘for such time’ as they are taking a direct part in the hostilities. As we have said, our position is that all the parts of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol reflect customary international law. What, then, is the scope of this provision? We shall now turn to this question.

C.    The nature of the basic principle

31. The basic principle is therefore this: a civilian — namely someone who does not fall within the definition of combatants — should refrain from participating directly in hostilities (see Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, at p. 210). A civilian who breaches this rule and who carried out hostilities does not lose his status as a civilian, but as long as he is taking a direct part in hostilities he does not at that time enjoy the protection given to a civilian. He is subject to the risks of an attack just like a combatant, but without enjoying the rights of a combatant, such as those given to him as a prisoner of war. Admittedly, his status is that of a civilian and he does not lose this status when he participates directly in carrying out hostilities. But he is a civilian who is carrying out the function of a combatant. As long as he is acting to realize this function, he is subject to the risks that this function entails and ceases to enjoy the protection given to a civilian against being attacked (see K. Watkin, ‘Controlling The Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,’ 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (2004)). This was discussed by H-P. Gasser in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, where he said:

‘What are the consequences if civilians do engage in combat? … Such persons do not lose their legal status as civilians… However, for factual reasons they may not be able to claim the protection guaranteed to civilians, since anyone performing hostile acts may also be opposed, but in the case of civilians, only for so long as they take part directly in hostilities’ (at p. 211, para. 501).

In a similar vein, the manual of the Red Cross states:

‘Civilians are not permitted to take direct part in hostilities and are immune from attack. If they take a direct part in hostilities they forfeit this immunity’ (Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces, at para. 610, p. 34 (1999)).

This is the law with regard to the unlawful combatant. As long as he retains his status as a civilian — i.e., he does not become a part of the military forces — but he carries out combat activities, he ceases to enjoy the protection given to the civilian, and he is subject to the risks of being attacked like a combatant without enjoying the rights of the combatant as a prisoner of war. Indeed, guerrillas and terrorists who carry out hostilities are not entitled to the protection given to civilians. Admittedly, terrorists who carry out hostilities do not cease to be civilians, but by their actions they have deprived themselves of the benefit of being civilians that grants them protection from military attack. They also do not enjoy the rights of combatants, such as the status of prisoners of war.

32. We have seen that the basic principle is that the civilian population and individual civilians are protected against the dangers of military activity and are not a target for an attack. This protection is given to civilians ‘unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ (art. 51(3) of the First Protocol). This provision is made up of three main parts. The first part concerns the requirement that the civilians take part in hostilities; the second part concerns the requirement that the civilians take a ‘direct’ part in the hostilities; the third part concerns the provision that civilians are not protected against being attacked ‘for such time’ as they are taking a direct part in the hostilities. Let us discuss each of these parts separately.

D.    First part: ‘take a… part in hostilities’

33. Civilians lose the protection of customary international law concerning hostilities of an international character if they ‘take a… part in hostilities.’ What is the meaning of this provision? The accepted view is that ‘hostilities’ are all those acts that by their nature and purpose are intended to cause harm to armed forces. The Commentary on the Additional Protocols that was published in 1987 by the Red Cross states:

‘Hostile acts should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the armed forces’ (Y. Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols (1987), at p. 618).

A similar approach was adopted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which is cited with approval by Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 22). It would appear that to this definition we should add those acts that by their nature and purpose are intended to cause harm to civilians. According to the accepted definition, a civilian takes part in hostilities when he uses weapons within the framework of the armed conflict, when he collects intelligence for this purpose or when he prepares himself for the hostilities. With regard to taking part in the hostilities, there is no requirement that the civilian actually uses the weapons that he has, nor is it a requirement that he carries weapons on him (openly or concealed). It is possible to take a part in hostilities without using weapons at all. This was discussed by the Commentary on the Additional Protocols as follows:

‘It seems that the word “hostilities” covers not only the time that the civilian actually makes use of a weapon, but also, for example, the time that he is carrying it, as well as situations in which he undertakes hostile acts without using a weapon’ (at pp. 618-619).

As we have seen, this approach is not limited solely to ‘hostilities’ against the armed forces of a state. It applies also to hostilities against the civilian population of the state (see Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 192).

E.    Second part: ‘take a direct part’

34. Civilians lose their protection against the attack of armed forces that is given to them under customary international law relating to international armed conflicts ((as adopted in art. 51(3) of the First Protocol) if ‘they take a direct part in hostilities.’ The provision therefore distinguishes between civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities (who lose the protection from attack) and civilians who take an indirect part in the hostilities (who continue to enjoy protection from attack). What is this distinction? A similar provision appears in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which adopts the expression ‘active part in hostilities.’ A judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda held that these two expressions have the same content (see Prosecutor v. Akayesu [691]). What is this content? It would appear that it is accepted in international literature that there is no agreed definition of the word ‘direct’ in the context before us (see Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, Report Prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (2003); Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2004)). Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 23) rightly said:

‘It is fair to conclude… that a clear and uniform definition of direct participation in hostilities has not been developed in state practice.’

In such circumstances, and in the absence of a complete and agreed customary criterion, there is no alternative to judging each case on its own merits, while limiting the scope of the dispute (cf. Prosecutor v. Tadić [73]). In this regard we should mention the following remarks in the Commentary of the Red Cross:

‘Undoubtedly there is room here for some margin of judgment: to restrict this concept to combat and active military operations would be too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too broad, as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war effort to some extent, albeit indirectly’ (ibid., at p. 516).

Indeed, a civilian who bears arms (openly or concealed) and is on his way to the place where he will use them against the armed forces, or who is at the place of shooting itself, or who is on his way back from the place of shooting is a civilian who is taking a ‘direct part’ in the hostilities (see Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 17). By contrast, a civilian who supports the hostilities against the armed forces in a general manner does not take a direct part in the hostilities (see Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, supra, at p. 230). Similarly, a civilian who sells food or medicines to unlawful combatants also is taking a merely indirect part in the hostilities. This was discussed in the third report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:

‘Civilians whose activities merely support the adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities cannot on these grounds alone be considered combatants. This is because indirect participation, such as selling goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the armed parties, does not involve acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party’ (IACHR, Third Report on Human Rights in Columbia, at paras. 53, 56 (1999)).

What is the law with regard to the area between these two extremes? On the one hand, the desire to protect innocent civilians leads in difficult cases to give a narrow interpretation to the expression ‘taking a direct part in hostilities.’ Prof. Cassese states:

‘The rationale behind the prohibition against targeting a civilian who does not take a direct part in hostilities, despite his possible (previous or future) involvement in fighting, is linked to the need to avoid killing innocent civilians’ (Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 421; emphasis in the original).

On the other hand, it is possible to say that the desire to protect combatants and the desire to protect innocent citizens leads in difficult cases to giving a broad interpretation of the ‘direct’ character of the hostilities, since thereby civilians are encouraged to distance themselves from the hostilities as much as possible. As Prof. Schmitt says:

‘Gray areas should be interpreted liberally, i.e., in favor of finding direct participation. One of the seminal purposes of the law is to make possible a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. Suggesting that civilians retain their immunity even when they are intricately involved in a conflict is to engender disrespect for the law by combatants endangered by their activities. Moreover, a liberal approach creates an incentive for civilians to remain as distant from the conflict as possible — in doing so they can better avoid being charged with participation in the conflict and are less liable to being directly targeted’ (M.N. Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ in H. Fischerr (ed.), Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection: Festshrift Fur Dieter Fleck, 505 (2004), at p. 509).

35. Against the background of these considerations, the following cases should be included within the scope of taking a ‘direct part’ in hostilities: someone who collects information about the armed forces, whether in the spheres in which the hostilities are being carried out (see W. Hays Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War,’ 32 A. F. L. Rev. 1, 116 (1990)) or whether outside these spheres (see Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 511); someone who leads unlawful combatants to or from the place where the hostilities are being carried out; someone who operates weapons being used by unlawful combatants or who supervises their operation or provides service for them, whatever the distance from the battlefield may be. All of these are carrying out a function of combatants. The function determines the directness of the taking part in the hostilities (see Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 17; Roscini, ‘Targeting and Contemporary Aerial Bombardment,’ supra). By contrast, someone who sells an unlawful combatant food products or medicines does not take a direct part, but merely an indirect one, in the hostilities. The same is true of someone who helps unlawful combatants with a general strategic analysis and grants them general logistic support, including financial support. The same is true of someone who disseminates propaganda that supports those unlawful combatants. If these persons are harmed, the state may not be liable for this if they fall within the scope of collateral or incidental damage. This was discussed by Gasser:

‘Civilians who directly carry out a hostile act against the adversary may be resisted by force. A civilian who kills or takes prisoners, destroys military equipment, or gathers information in the area of operations may be made the object of attack. The same applies to civilians who operate a weapons system, supervise such operation, or service such equipment. The transmission of information concerning targets directly intended for the use of a weapon is also considered as taking part in hostilities. Furthermore, the logistics of military operations are among the activities prohibited to civilians… not only direct and personal involvement but also preparation for a military operation and intention to take part therein may suspend the immunity of a civilian. All these activities, however, must be proved to be directly related to hostilities or, in other words to represent a direct threat to the enemy… However, the term should not be understood too broadly. Not every activity carried out within a state at war is a hostile act. Employment in the armaments industry for example, does not mean that civilian workers are necessarily participating in hostilities… Since, on the other hand, factories of this industry usually constitute lawful military objectives that may be attacked, the normal rules governing the assessment of possible collateral damage to civilians must be observed’ (Gasser, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra, at p. 232, paras. 517, 518).

In international literature there is a disagreement with regard to the following case: what is the law that applies to a civilian who drives a vehicle conveying ammunition? (see Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War,’ supra, at p. 134; Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 507; A.P.V. Rogers, Law on The Battlefield (1996), at p. 8; L.L. Turner and L.G. Norton, ‘Civilians At The Tip of the Spear,’ 51 Air Force L. Rev. 1 (2001); J.R. Heaton, ‘Civilians at War: Re-Examining The Status of Civilians Accompanying The Armed Forces,’ 57 Air Force L. Rev. 171 (2005)). Some authorities hold that he is taking a direct part in the hostilities (and therefore he may be attacked), while others hold that he is not taking a direct part in the hostilities (and therefore he may not be attacked). The two opinions hold that the ammunition in the vehicle may be attacked. The disagreement is whether the civilian driver may be attacked. Those who believe he is taking a direct part in the hostilities hold that he may be attacked. Those who believe that he is not taking a direct part in the hostilities hold that he may not be attacked, but if he is harmed it is a case of collateral damage caused to a civilian who is in the vicinity of a military objective that may be attacked. In our opinion, if the civilian driver is taking the ammunition to the place where it will be used to carry out hostilities, he should be regarded as taking a direct part in the hostilities (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 27; Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 509; Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, at p. 7; A.P.V. Rogers and P. Malherbe, Model Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (ICRC, 1999), at p. 29).

36. What is the law with regard to civilians who act as a human shield for terrorists who are taking a direct part in the hostilities? Certainly if they are acting in this way because they were compelled to do so, these innocent civilians should not be regarded as taking a direct part in the hostilities. They are themselves the victims of terrorism. But if they are acting in this way voluntarily because of their support for a terrorist organization, they should be regarded as persons who are taking a direct part in the hostilities (see Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 521, and M.N. Schmitt, ‘Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees,’ 5 Ch. J. Int’l Law 511 (2004), at p. 541).

37. We have seen that a civilian who attacks armed forces is taking a ‘direct part’ in the hostilities. What is the law regarding the persons who recruit him to take a direct part in the hostilities and the persons who send him to carry out hostilities? Is there a difference between his direct commanders and those who are more senior to them? Is it only the last terrorist in the chain of command who is responsible for taking a ‘direct’ part in the hostilities or is the whole chain of command responsible? In our opinion, the ‘direct’ character of taking part in the hostilities should not be limited only to someone who carries out the physical attack. Someone who sends him to carry out the attack also takes a ‘direct’ part. The same is true of someone who decides upon the actual attack, or who plans it. It cannot be said that all of these only take an indirect part in the hostilities. Their participation is direct (and active) (see Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 529).

F.     Third part: ‘for such time’

38. Article 51(3) of the First Protocol provides that civilians enjoy protection against the dangers arising from military operations and may not be a target for attacks unless ‘and for such time’ as they take a direct part in hostilities. The provisions of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol introduce a requirement of time. A civilian who takes part in hostilities loses the protection from being attacked ‘for such time’ as he is taking a part in those hostilities. When this time has passed, the protection afforded to the civilian is restored. In the respondents’ opinion, this part of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol does not reflect customary international law, and the State of Israel is not obliged to act accordingly. We cannot accept this approach. As we have seen, all of the parts of art. 51(3) of the First Protocol reflect customary international law, including the requirement concerning time. The key question concerns the interpretation of this provisions and its scope of application.

39. Just as there is no consensus in international literature with regard to the scope of the expression ‘take a direct part in hostilities,’ there is also no consensus with regard to the scope of the expression ‘for such time.’ Indeed, these two concepts are closely related. But they are not identical. In the absence of a consensus as to the interpretation of the expression ‘for such time,’ there is no alternative to taking each case as it comes. Once again it is helpful to consider the extreme cases. At one extreme, a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities on a single occasion or sporadically, and thereafter severs his connection with this activity, is a civilian who, when he severs his connection with the activity, is entitled to protection from an attack. He should not be attacked because of the hostilities that he carried out in the past. At the other extreme, a civilian who joins a terrorist organization that becomes his home, and within the framework of his position in that organization he carries out a series of hostilities, with short interruptions between them for resting, loses his immunity against being attacked ‘for such time’ as he is carrying out the series of operations. Indeed, for such a civilian the rest between hostilities is nothing more than preparation for the next hostile act (see D. Statman, ‘Targeted Killing,’ 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 179 (2004), at p. 195).

40. These examples indicate the dilemma presented by the requirement of ‘for such time.’ On the one hand, a civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities on a single occasion or sporadically, but has severed his connection with them (whether entirely or for a lengthy period), should not be attacked. On the other hand, we must avoid a phenomenon of the revolving door, whereby every terrorist may invoke sanctuary or claim refuge while he is resting and making preparations, so that he has protection from being attacked (see Schmitt, ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 536; Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 12; Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 193; Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 29; Parks, ‘Air War and the Law of War,’ supra, at p. 118). In the considerable distance between these two extremes lie the ‘grey’ areas, where customary international law has not yet been formulated. There is no alternative, therefore, to examining each case on its merits. In this regard the following four issues should be addressed: first, reliable information is required before the civilian is classified as falling into one of the cases that we have discussed. Innocent civilians should not be harmed (see Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 421). Properly verified information should exist with regard to the identity and activity of the civilian who is claimed to be taking a direct part in the hostilities (see Ergi v. Turkey [68]. Cassese rightly says that:

‘… if a belligerent were allowed to fire at enemy civilians simply suspected of somehow planning or conspiring to plan military attacks, or of having planned or directed hostile actions, the basic foundations of international humanitarian law would be seriously undermined. The basic distinction between civilians and combatants would be called into question and the whole body of law relating to armed conflict would eventually be eroded’ (Cassese, International Law, at p. 421).

The burden of proof of the armed forces in this matter is a heavy one (see Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 203; Gross, Democracy’s Struggle against Terrorism: Legal and Moral Aspects, at p. 606). In case of doubt, a careful examination is required before an attack is carried out. This was discussed by Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck:

‘… when there is a situation of doubt, a careful assessment has to be made under the conditions and restraints governing a particular situation as to whether there are sufficient indications to warrant an attack. One cannot automatically attack anyone who might appear dubious’ (Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 24).

Second, a civilian should not be attacked at a time that he is taking a direct part in hostilities if it is possible to act against him by means of a less harmful measure. In our internal law this rule is derived from the principle of proportionality. Indeed, of the possible military measures one should choose the measure whose violation of the victim’s human rights is the least. Therefore, if it is possible to arrest, interrogate and prosecute a terrorist who is taking a direct part in hostilities, these steps should be followed (see Mohamed Ali v. Public Prosecutor [66]). A trial is preferable to the use of force. A country governed by the rule of law resorts to the use of trials rather than the use of force. This question arose in McCann v. United Kingdom [69]. In that case, three terrorists from Northern Ireland who belonged to the I.R.A. were shot to death. They were shot in the streets of Gibraltar, where they were attacked by British agents. The European Court of Human Rights held that the United Kingdom unlawfully violated the victims’ right to life (art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights). The court held:

‘… the use of lethal force would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether deliberately or through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the deprivation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk’ (ibid. [69], at p. 148, para. 235).

Arrest, interrogation and trial are not measures that can always be adopted. Sometimes this possibility simply does not exist; sometimes it involves so great a risk to the lives of soldiers that there is no requirement to adopt it (see A. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways (2005), at p. 230). But it is a possibility that should always be considered. It is likely to be practical especially in conditions of a belligerent occupation where the army controls the territory where the operation is being carried out, and arrest, interrogation and trial are possibilities that can sometimes be carried out (see art. 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Naturally, in a specific case this possibility may not exist. Sometimes it may cause greater harm to the lives of innocent civilians in the vicinity. In such a case, it should not be adopted. Third, after carrying out an attack on a civilian who is suspected of taking a direct part at that time in hostilities, a thorough investigation should be made (retrospectively) to ascertain that the identity of the target was correct and to verify the circumstances of the attack on him. This investigation should be an independent one (see Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,’ supra, at p. 23; Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, supra, at p. 310; Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 419; C. Warbrick, ‘The Principle of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Responses of States to Terrorism,’ (2002) E. H. R. L. R. 287, at p. 292; McCann v. United Kingdom [69], at pp. 161, 163; McKerr v. United Kingdom [70], at p. 559). In appropriate cases there will be grounds for considering the payment of compensation for harming an innocent civilian (see Cassese, International Law, supra, at pp. 419, 423; art. 3 of the Hague Regulations; art. 91 of the First Protocol). Finally, if the attack is not only on the civilian who is taking a direct part in the hostilities but also on innocent civilians who are in the vicinity, the harm to them is collateral damage. This harm should satisfy the test of proportionality. Let us now turn to examine this question.

(7) Proportionality

A.    The principle of proportionality and its application in customary international law

41. The principle of proportionality is a general principle in the law. It is a part of our legal approach to human rights (see s. 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; see also A. Barak, A Judge in a Democracy (2004), at p. 346). It is an important element in customary international law (see R. Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and How We Use It (1994), at p. 219; J. Delbruck, ‘Proportionality,’ in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1997), at p. 1144). It is an integral part of the law of self-defence. It is a major element in the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflicts (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 119; Gasser, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra, at p. 220; Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 418; Ben-Naftali and Shani, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 154; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 60; J.G. Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law,’ 87 Am. J. Int’l L. 391 (1993); J.S. Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (1985), at p. 62; W.J. Fenrick, ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare,’ 98 Mil. L. Rev. 91 (1982); T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary International Law (1989), at p. 74). It has a central role in the law of belligerent occupations (see Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [20], at p. 461 {71}; Bethlehem Municipality v. State of Israel [24]; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 836 {309-310}; HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Local Council v. Knesset [28], at para. 102 of the majority opinion; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 30 of my opinion; see also Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 119; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 60). In a whole host of cases the Supreme Court has examined the authority of the military commander in the territories according to the criterion of proportionality. It has done so, inter alia, with regard to assigning residence (Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9]); surrounding towns and erecting road blocks on access routes to and from them for the purposes of fighting terrorism (see HCJ 2847/03 Alauna v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [29]); damage to the property of protected inhabitants as a result of army operations (see HCJ 9252/00 El-Saka v. State of Israel [30]); upholding the rights to pray at holy sites and have access to them (Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [20]); demolishing houses for operational needs (HCJ 4219/02 Gussin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [31]); imposing a blockade (Almadani v. Minister of Defence [6]); building the security fence (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17]; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8]).

B.    Proportionality in an international armed conflict

42. The principle of proportionality plays a major role in the international law of armed conflicts (cf. arts. 51(5)(b) and 57 of the First Protocol; see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 46; Ben-Naftali and Shani, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 154). These laws are of a customary nature (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, ibid., at p. 53; Duffy, The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law, supra, at p. 235; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić [76]). The principle of proportionality arises when the military activity is directed against combatants and military targets, or against civilians for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities, and in the course of this civilians are also harmed. The rule is that the harm to innocent civilians that is caused as collateral loss in the course of the combat activities should be proportionate (see Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 119). Civilians are likely to be harmed because of their presence inside a military target, such as civilians who work in a military base; civilians are likely to be hurt when they live, work or pass close to military targets; sometimes because of an error civilians are harmed even if they are not close to military targets; sometimes civilians are used, by means of coercion, as a ‘human shield’ against an attack on a military target, and they are hurt as a result. In all of these situations and others similar to them, the rule is that the harm to innocent civilians should, inter alia, satisfy the principle of proportionality.

43. The principle of proportionality applies in every case where civilians who are not taking a direct part in hostilities at the time are harmed. This was discussed by Justice Higgins in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra:

‘The principle of proportionality, even if finding no specific mention, is reflected in many provisions of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Thus even a legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from the attack’ (at p. 587).

An expression of this customary principle can be found in the First Protocol, according to which indiscriminate attacks are prohibited (art. 51(4). The First Protocol goes on to provide (in art. 51(5)):

‘5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as indiscriminate:

(a) …

(b) An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.’

44. The requirement of proportionality in the law of armed conflicts focuses mainly on what in our constitutional law is called proportionality ‘in the narrow sense,’ i.e., the requirement that there is a proper proportionate correlation between the military objective and the civilian harm. Notwithstanding, the law of armed conflicts includes additional elements, which are also an integral part of the theoretical principle of proportionality in its broad sense. It would be proper to consider the possibility of concentrating all of these laws into one body of material, by formulating a comprehensive doctrine of proportionality, as has been done in the internal law of many countries. We cannot examine this matter within the framework of the petition before us. We will concentrate on the aspect of proportionality that is agreed by everyone to be relevant to our case.

Due proportion between the advantage and the damage

45. The test of proportionality stipulates that an attack on innocent civilians is not permitted if the collateral damage to them is not commensurate with the military advantage (in protecting combatants and civilians). In other words, the attack is proportionate if the advantage arising from achieving the proper military objective is commensurate with the damage caused by it to innocent civilians. This is an ethical test. It is based on a balance between conflicting values and interests (see Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 850 {309-310}; HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [32], at para. 74 of my opinion). It is accepted in the national law of many countries. In Israel it constitutes a main normative test for examining government activity in general and army activity in particular. In one case I said:

‘This subtest is in essence a vehicle for the constitutional outlook that the end does not justify the means. It is an expression of the idea that there is an ethical barrier that democracy cannot pass, even if the purpose that we wish to realize is a proper one’ (HCJ 8276/05 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence [33], at para. 30 of my opinion); see also R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002), at p. 66).

As we have seen, this requirement of proportionality is found in customary international law concerning the protection of civilians (see Cassese, International Law, supra, at p. 418; Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?’ supra, at p. 200; Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, ‘ “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law”: A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings,’ supra, at p. 278; Gardam, ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law,’ supra; art. 51(4)(c) of the First Protocol, which constitutes customary law). When the damage to innocent civilians is disproportionate to the advantage of the attacking army, the attack is disproportionate and prohibited.

46. Proportionality in this sense is not required with regard to an attack on a combatant or a civilian who is at that time taking a direct part in the hostilities. Indeed, a civilian who is taking part in hostilities endangers his life and he may, like a combatant, constitute a target for an attack that causes death. This is a permitted killing. By contrast, proportionality is required in any case where an innocent civilian is hurt. Therefore the requirements of proportionality in the narrow sense should be satisfied in a case where the attack on a terrorist causes collateral damage to innocent civilians in the vicinity. The rule of proportionality applies to the attack on these innocent civilians (see art. 51(5)b) of the First Protocol). The rule is that combatants or terrorists may not be attacked if the expected damage to innocent civilians in their vicinity is excessive in relation to the military benefit of attacking them (see Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra, at p. 49). Making this balance is difficult. Here too we need to proceed on a case by case basis, while limiting the area of the dispute. Take an ordinary case of a combatant or terrorist sniper who is shooting at soldiers or civilians from the balcony of his home. Shooting at him will be proportionate even if as a result an innocent civilian who lives next to him or who passes innocently next to his home is hurt. This is not the case if the house is bombed from the air and dozens of residents and passers-by are hurt (cf. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, at p. 123; Gross, Democracy’s Struggle Against Terrorism: Legal and Moral Aspects, at p. 621). The difficult cases are those that lie in the area between the extreme examples. Here a careful examination of each case is required; the military advantage should be concrete and direct (see art. 57(2)(a)(iii) of the First Protocol). Indeed, in international law just as in internal law, the end does not justify the means. The power of the state is not unlimited. Not all the means are permitted. This was discussed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which said:

‘… regardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the perpetrators of certain crimes, the power of the state is not unlimited, nor may the state resort to any means to attain its ends’ (Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras [71], at para. 154).

Notwithstanding, when there are hostilities, there are losses. A balance should be struck between the duty of the state to protect the lives of its soldiers and civilians and its duty to protect the lives of innocent civilians who are harmed when targeting terrorists. This balance is a difficult one, because it concerns human life. It gives rise to moral and ethical problems (see A. Kasher and A. Yadlin, ‘Assassination and Preventive Killing,’ 25 SAIS Rev. 41 (2005)). But despite the difficulty, the balance must be struck.

8.    Justiciability

47. A large part of the initial reply of the State Attorney’s Office (of 20 March 2002) was devoted to a preliminary argument. According to this, ‘the combat activities of the IDF that are carried out within the framework of the combat activities taking place in the territories, which are of a purely operational character, are not justiciable — or at least are not institutionally justiciable — and this honourable court will not consider them’ (para. 26, p. 7; emphasis in the original). In explaining this position, counsel for the respondents emphasized that in his opinion ‘the predominant character of the matter is not legal and judicial restraint requires the court neither to enter the battlefield nor to consider the purely operational activities taking place on the battlefield’ (ibid, at para. 36, p. 11; emphasis in the original). Counsel for the respondents emphasized that:

‘It is obvious that the fact that a matter is “not justiciable” does not mean that no supervision or control is exercised on the part of the executive authority itself… The army authorities have been instructed by the attorney-general and the Chief Military Attorney to act in this area, as in others, solely in accordance with the provisions of international law that apply to the laws of war, and this instruction is observed by them’ (ibid., para. 40, p. 13).

48. It is well known that we distinguish between a claim of no normative justiciability and a claim of no institutional justiciability (see HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defence [34]). A claim of no normative justiciability proposes that there are no legal criteria for deciding a dispute that is before the court. A claim of no institutional justiciability proposes that it is not fitting that a dispute should be decided according to the law by the court. The claim of no normative justiciability has no legal basis, either in general or in the case before us. A claim of no normative justiciability has no legal basis in general because there is always a legal norm according to which a dispute may be decided, and the existence of a legal norm gives rise to the existence of legal criteria for it. Sometimes it is easy to recognize the norm and the criteria inherent in it and at other times it is difficult to do so. But ultimately a legal norm will always be found and legal criteria will always exist. This norm may be a general one, such as the norm that a person may do anything except what he has been prohibited from doing, and the government may do only what it has been permitted to do. Sometimes the norm is far more limited. Such is the position in our case. There are legal norms that address the question before us, and from these it is possible to derive criteria that determine what is permitted and what is prohibited. There is therefore no basis to the claim of a lack of normative justiciability.

49. The second type of non-justiciability concerns a lack of institutional justiciability. This non-justiciability concerns the question —

‘… whether the law and the court are the proper framework for deciding a dispute. The question is not whether it is possible to decide a dispute according to the law and in the court. The answer to this question is yes. The question is whether it is desirable to decide a dispute — which is normatively justiciable — according to legal criteria in the court’ (Ressler v. Minister of Defence [34], at p. 489 {73}).

This type of non-justiciability is recognized in our legal system. Thus, for example, it has been held that as a rule questions of the day-to-day running of the affairs of the Knesset are not institutionally justiciable (see HCJ 9070/00 Livnat v. Chairman of Constitution, Law and Justice Committee [35], at p. 812; HCJ 9056/00 Kleiner v. Knesset Speaker [36], at p. 708). Only if it is alleged that a breach of the rules concerning the internal proceedings undermines the fabric of parliamentary life and the foundations of the structure of our constitutional system will there be a basis for considering the claim in the court (see HCJ 652/81 Sarid v. Knesset Speaker [37]; HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [38]; HCJ 742/84 Kahane v. Knesset Speaker [39]).

50. The scope of the doctrine of institutional non-justiciability in Israel is not extensive. There is no consensus with regard to its limits. My personal opinion is that it should only be recognized within very narrow limits (see Barak, A Judge in a Democracy, at p.275). Whatever the position is, the doctrine has no application in the petition before us, for four reasons: first, in the case law of the Supreme Court there is a clear policy that the doctrine of institutional non-justiciability does not apply where recognizing it would prevent an examination of a violation of human rights. This was discussed by Justice A. Witkon in HCJ 606/78 Awib v. Minister of Defence [40]. That case considered the legality of a settlement in the territories. It was argued by the state that the question of the legality of a settlement in the territories was non-justiciable. In rejecting this argument, Justice A. Witkon said:

‘I was not impressed by this argument at all… It is clear that in matters of foreign policy, like in several other matters, the decision is made by political authorities and not by the judiciary. But on the assumption… that a person’s property has been harmed or taken away from him unlawfully, it is difficult to believe that the court will refuse to hear that person because his right may be the subject of political negotiations’ (Awib v. Minister of Defence [40], at p. 124).

In HCJ 390/79 Dawikat v. Government of Israel [41] the question of the legality of a settlement in the territories was considered once again. Vice-President M. Landau said:

‘A military government that wishes to violate the property rights of the individual should show a legal basis for doing so, and it cannot avoid judicial scrutiny of its actions by claiming non-justiciability’ (Dawikat v. Government of Israel [41], at p. 15).

In Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8] the court considered the legality of the separation fence in accordance with the rules of customary international law. With regard to the justiciability of this question I said:

‘… the court is not prevented from exercising judicial scrutiny merely because the military commander acts outside Israel, and his actions have political and military ramifications. When the decisions or actions of the military commander violate human rights, they are justiciable. The doors of the court are open. The argument that the violation of human rights was the result of security considerations does not prevent the exercising of judicial scrutiny. ‘Security considerations’ and ‘military necessity’ are not magic words… This is required by the protection of human rights’ (ibid. [8], at para. 31 {p. 140}).

The petition before us seeks to determine what is permitted and what prohibited in military operations that may violate the most basic of human rights, the right to life. The doctrine of institutional non-justiciability cannot prevent an examination of this question.

51. Second, justices who think that there is a place for the doctrine of institutional non-justiciability point out that the test is one of the predominant nature of the question in dispute. When this is political or military, there are grounds for refusing to hear the case. By contrast, when the nature of the question is predominantly legal, the doctrine of institutional non-justiciability does not apply (see HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Government of Israel [42], at p. 218 {166}). The questions in dispute in the petition before us are not questions of policy. Nor are they military questions. The question is not whether or not to adopt a policy of a preventative attack that causes the death of terrorists and sometimes also of innocent civilians in the vicinity. The question is a legal one, which can be seen from an analysis of our judgment; the question concerns the legal classification of the military dispute taking place between Israel and the terrorists who come from the territories; the question concerns the existence or non-existence of customary international law on the matter addressed by the petition; the question concerns the determination of the scope of application of this customary law, in so far as it is reflected in the provisions of art. 51(d) of the First Protocol; the question concerns the rules of proportionality that apply in this matter. The answer to all of these questions is predominantly a legal one.

52. Indeed, in a whole host of judgments the Supreme Court has considered the rights of the inhabitants of the territories. Thousands of judgments have been given by the Supreme Court, which, in the absence of any other competent judicial instance, has addressed these issues. These issues have concerned the powers of the army during combat and the restrictions imposed on it under international humanitarian law. Thus, for example, we have considered the rights of the local population to food, medicines and other needs of the population during the combat activities (Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [10]); we have considered the rights of the local population when terrorists are arrested (Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. IDF Central Commander [25]); when transporting the injured (HCJ 2117/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [43]; when besieging a church (Almadani v. Minister of Defence [6]); during arrest and interrogation (Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [19]; Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp [22]; Marab v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [23]). More than one hundred petitions have examined the rights of the local inhabitants under international humanitarian law as a result of the construction of the separation fence (see Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17]; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8]; HCJ 5488/04 Al-Ram Local Council v. Government of Israel [44]). In all of these the predominant character of the question in dispute was legal. Admittedly, the legal answer is likely to have political and military ramifications. But they did not determine the nature of the question. It is not the results that arise from the judgment that determine its nature, but the questions that are considered by it and the way in which they are answered. These questions have in the past been, and they remain today, predominantly of a legal nature.

53. Third, the types of question that were considered by us are considered by international courts. The international law that concerns the duties of armed forces to civilians during an armed conflict has been considered, for example, by the International Criminal Tribunals for war crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (see paras. 26, 30 and 34 above). These courts have examined the legal aspects of the conduct of armed forces. Why cannot an Israeli court examine these matters too? Why should these questions, which are justiciable in international courts, not be justiciable in national courts?

54. Finally, the laws concerning the preventative operations of armed forces that cause the death of terrorists and innocent civilians in their vicinity require a retrospective investigation of the conduct of the armed forces (see para. 40 above). Customary international law provides that this investigation should be of an independent character. In order to enhance its objective nature and ensure the maximum possible objectivity, this investigation should be subject to judicial scrutiny. This judicial scrutiny is not a substitute for the ongoing scrutiny of army authorities, which exercise their scrutiny prospectively. ‘Because of the court’s structure and the scope of its functions, it cannot operate by way of ongoing scrutiny and supervision’ (per President M. Shamgar in HCJ 253/88 Sajadia v. Minister of Defence [45], at p. 825). Moreover, this judicial scrutiny is not a substitute for an objective retrospective investigation after an event in which, it is alleged, innocent civilians who did not take a direct part in the hostilities were harmed. When a retrospective investigation has been made, judicial scrutiny of the decisions of the objective committee of investigation should be possible in appropriate cases. This will ensure that they function properly.

(9) The scope of judicial scrutiny

55. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, exercises judicial scrutiny of the legality of the discretion of military commanders in the territories. This court has done this since the Six Day War. The premise that has guided the court was that the military commanders and officers who are subject to its authority are civil servants who carry out public duties according to the law (Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [11], at p. 809). This scrutiny ensures the legality of the discretion exercised by the military commander.

56. The scope of judicial review on a decision of a military commander to carry out a preventative attack that causes the death of terrorists in the territories, and sometimes the death of innocent civilians, varies according to the nature of the concrete question that is under discussion. At one end of the spectrum lies the question, which we are considering in the petition before us, concerning the content of the international law of armed conflicts. This is simply a question of determining the applicable law. According to our legal approach, this question lies within the purview of the judiciary. ‘The final and decisive decision as to the interpretation of a statute, according to its validity at any given time, rests with the court’ (per President M. Shamgar in HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee [46], at p. 141). The task of interpreting the law rests with the court. This is the case with regard to the Basic Laws, statutes and regulations. This is the case with regard to Israeli common law. It is certainly also the case with regard to customary international law that applies in Israel. The court is not permitted to shirk this authority. The question that the court should ask itself is not whether the executive understood the law in a reasonable manner. The question that the court should ask itself is whether the executive understood the law correctly (HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry, Ministry of Interior [47], at p. 762). It is the court that has expertise in interpreting the law (see HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [48], at p. 743; HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [49], at p. 305). It follows that the judicial scrutiny of the content of customary international law with regard to the question before us is comprehensive and complete. The court asks itself what the international law is and whether the military commander’s approach is consistent with that law.

57. At the other end of the spectrum of possibilities lies the professional-military decision to carry out a preventative operation which causes the death of terrorists in the territories. This is a decision that falls within the authority of the executive branch. It has the professional security expertise in this sphere. The court will ask itself whether a reasonable military commander would have made the decision that was actually made. The question is whether the decision of the military commander falls within the margin of reasonable activity of a military commander. If the answer is yes, the court will not replace the security discretion of the military commander with the security discretion of the court (see HCJ 1005/89 Agga v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [50], at p. 539; Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], at p. 375 {109}). In Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], which concerned the route of the security fence, we said:

‘We, the justices of the Supreme Court, are not experts in military matters. We shall not examine whether the military outlook of the military commander corresponds with ours, in so far as we have a military outlook concerning the military character of the route. This is how we act with regard to all questions of expertise, and this is how we act with regard to military matters as well. All we can determine is whether a reasonable military commander could have determined a route as the military commander determined it’ (ibid. [17], at p. 843 {300}).

It follows that judicial scrutiny with regard to military measures that should be taken is an ordinary scrutiny of reasonableness. It is true that ‘military considerations’ and ‘state security’ are not magic words that prevent judicial scrutiny. But the question is not what I would have decided in the given circumstances, but whether the decision that the military commander made is a decision that a reasonable military commander was entitled to make. In this regard special weight should be given to the military opinion of the person who has the responsibility for security (see HCJ 258/79 Amira v. Minister of Defence [51]; Dawikat v. Government of Israel [41], at p. 25; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 844 {300}; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 32 of the judgment).

58. Between these two ends of the spectrum there are cases that lie in the middle ground. Each of these requires a careful examination of the character of the decision. In so far as it involves a legal perspective, it will approach one end of the spectrum. In so far as it involves a professional military perspective, it will approach the other end of the spectrum of possibilities. Take the question whether a decision to carry out a preventative attack that causes the death of terrorists falls within the framework of the conditions determined by customary international law in this regard (as stated in art. 51(3) of the First Protocol). What is the scope of the judicial scrutiny of a decision of the military commander that these conditions are satisfied in a specific case? Our answer is that the question whether the conditions provided in customary international law for carrying out a military operation are satisfied is a legal question, with regard to which the court has the expertise. I discussed this in Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [10]:

‘Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to carry out military operations. The issue addressed by judicial review is the legality of the military operations. Therefore we presume that the military operations carried out in Rafah are necessary from a military viewpoint. The question before us is whether these military operations satisfy the national and international criteria that determine the legality of these operations. The fact that operations are necessary from a military viewpoint does not mean that they are lawful from a legal viewpoint. Indeed, we do not replace the discretion of the military commander in so far as military considerations are concerned. That is his expertise. We examine their consequences from the viewpoint of humanitarian law. That is our expertise’ (ibid. [10], at p. 393 {207-208}).

A similar approach exists with regard to proportionality. The decision on a question whether the benefit that accrues from the preventative attack is commensurate with the collateral damage caused to innocent civilians who are harmed by it is a legal question, with regard to which it is the judiciary that have the expertise. I discussed this in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17] with regard to the proportionality of the harm that the security fence causes to the local inhabitants’ quality of life:

‘The military commander is the expert on the military aspect of the route of the separation fence. We are experts on its humanitarian aspects. The military commander determines whether the separation fence will pass over the hills or in the plain. That is his expertise. We examine whether the harm caused by this route to the local inhabitants is proportional. That is our expertise’ (ibid. [17], at p. 846 {304}; Marabeh v. Prime Minister of Israel [8], at para. 32 of the judgment).

Proportionality is not a precise criterion. Sometimes there are several ways of satisfying its requirements. A margin of proportionality is created. The court is the guardian of its limits. The decision within the limits of the margin of proportionality rests with the executive branch. This is its margin of appreciation (see HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [52], at p. 12; HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [53], at p. 280; Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [32], at para. 78 of my opinion).

59. Judicial scrutiny of military decisions to carry out a preventative attack that causes the death of terrorists and innocent civilians is by its very nature of limited scope. There are two reasons for this: first, judicial scrutiny cannot be exercised prospectively. Once we have determined in this judgment of ours what the provisions of customary international law that apply in the matter before us are, we naturally cannot examine its realization prospectively. The judicial scrutiny in this matter naturally occurs retrospectively. Second, the main investigation should be made by the investigatory committee which according to international law should carry out an objective investigation that is made retrospectively. The scrutiny of this court can naturally be directed only against the decisions of that committee, according to the accepted criteria in this regard.

(10) From general principles to the specific case

60. The order nisi that was issued at the request of the petitioners is this:

‘To order respondents 1-3 to come and explain why the “targeted killing” policy should not be cancelled and why they should not refrain from giving orders to respondents 4-5 to carry out this policy, and also to order respondents 4-5 to come and explain why they should not refrain from carrying out operations of killing wanted persons in accordance with the aforesaid policy.’

A consideration of the ‘targeted killing’ — or, as we call it, a preventative attack that causes the death of terrorists, and sometimes also of innocent civilians — shows that the question of the legality of the preventative attack under customary international law is a complex one (for an analysis of the Israeli policy, see Y. Shany, ‘Israeli Counter-Terrorism Measures: Are They “Kosher” under International Law,’ in M.N. Schmitt and G. Beruto (eds.), Terrorism and International Law: Challenges and Responses 96 (2002); M. Gross, ‘Fighting by Other Means in the Mideast: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Assassination Policy,’ 51 Political Studies 360 (2003); S.R. David, ‘Debate: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,’ 17 Ethics and International Affairs 111 (2003); Y. Stein, ‘Response to Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing: By Any Name Illegal and Immoral,’ 17 Ethics and International Affairs 127 (2003); A. Guiora, ‘Symposium: Terrorism on Trial: Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense,’ 36 Case Western Res. J. Int’l L. 319; L. Bilsky, ‘Suicidal Terror, Radical Evil, and the Distortion of Politics and Law,’ 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 131 (2004)). What emerges is not that a preventative attack is always permitted or that it is always prohibited. The approach of customary international law as it applies to armed conflicts of an international character is that civilians are protected against being attacked by the armed forces. But this protection does not exist with regard to those civilians ‘for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities’ (art. 51(3) of the First Protocol). Targeting these civilians, even if it results in death, is permitted, provided that there is no less harmful measure and provided that innocent civilians in the vicinity are not harmed. The harm inflicted upon them should be proportionate. This proportionality is determined in accordance with an ethical test which seeks to strike a balance between the military advantage and the harm to civilians. It follows that we cannot determine that a preventative attack is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is always illegal. Everything depends upon the question whether the criteria of customary international law relating to international armed conflicts permit a specific preventative attack or not.

Conclusion

61. The State of Israel is fighting against ruthless terrorism that is inflicted on it from the territories. The means available to it are limited. The state determined that an essential measure from a military perspective is the preventative attack upon terrorists in the territories that causes their death. This sometimes causes innocent civilians to be injured or killed. This use of this preventative attack, notwithstanding its military importance, should be done within the law. The maxim ‘When the cannons speak, the Muses are silent’ is well known. A similar idea was expressed by Cicero, who said: silent enim leges inter arma (laws are silent in times of war). These statements are regrettable. They do not reflect the law either as it is or as it should be (see Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re) [65], at p. 260). It is precisely when the cannons speak that we need laws (see HCJ 168/91 Morcus v. Minister of Defence [54], at p. 470). Every struggle of the state — whether against terrorism or against any other enemy — is carried out in accordance with rules and laws. There always exists a law that the state is liable to follow. Black holes do not exist (see J. Steyn, Democracy through Law: Selected Speeches and Judgments (2004), at p. 195). In our case, the law is determined by customary international law relating to armed conflicts of an international character. Indeed, the struggle of the state against terrorism is not waged ‘outside’ the law. It is waged ‘within’ the law and with tools that the law makes available to a democracy.

62. The war of the state against terrorism is a war of the state against its enemies. It is also the war of the law against those who attack it (see HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. Minister of Defence [55], at p. 132). In one case that considered the laws of war in an armed conflict, I said:

‘This fighting is not carried out in a normative vacuum. It is carried out according to the rules of international law, which set out the principles and rules for waging war. The statement that “when the cannons speak, the Muses are silent” is incorrect. Cicero’s aphorism that at a time of war the laws are silent does not reflect modern reality… The reason underlying this approach is not merely pragmatic, the result of the political and normative reality. The reason underlying this approach is much deeper. It is an expression of the difference between a democratic state that is fighting for its survival and the fighting of terrorists who want to destroy it. The State is fighting for and on behalf of the law. The terrorists are fighting against and in defiance of the law. The war against terror is a war of the law against those who seek to destroy it… But it is more than this: the State of Israel is a state whose values are Jewish and democratic. We have established here a state that respects law, that achieves its national goals and the vision of generations, and that does so while recognizing and realizing human rights in general and human dignity in particular; between these two there is harmony and agreement, not conflict and alienation’ (Almadani v. Minister of Defence [6], at pp. 34-35 {52-53}; see also Morcus v. Minister of Defence [54], at p. 470; HCJ 1730/96 Sabiah v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [56], at p. 369).

Indeed, in the struggle of the state against international terrorism, it is obliged to act in accordance with the rules of international law (see M. Kirby, ‘Australian Law – After September 11, 2001,’ 21 Austl. Bar. Rev. 253 (2001)). These rules are based on a balance. They are not a question of all or nothing. I discussed this in Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [9], where I said:

‘In this balance, human rights cannot receive complete protection, as if there were no terror, and state security cannot receive complete protection, as if there were no human rights. A delicate and sensitive balance is required. This is the price of democracy. It is expensive, but worthwhile. It strengthens the State. It provides a reason for its struggle’ (HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [6], at p. 383 {120}).

Indeed, the struggle against terrorism has turned our democracy into a ‘defensive democracy’ or a ‘militant democracy’ (see A. Sajo, Militant Democracy (2004)). But this struggle must not be allowed to deprive our system of government of its democratic character.

63. The question is not whether it is permitted to defend oneself against terrorism. Certainly it is permitted to do so, and sometimes it is also a duty to do so. The question is the manner in which one responds. In this regard, a balance should be struck between security needs and the rights of the individual. This balance imposes a heavy burden on those involved in the defence of the state. Not every effective measure is also a legal one. The end does not justify the means. The armed forces need to train themselves to act in accordance with the rules of law. This balance imposes a heavy burden on the justices, who need to determine, on the basis of existing law, what is permitted and what is prohibited. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘The decision has been placed at our door, and we must accept it. We have a duty to preserve the legality of government even in hard cases. Even when the cannons speak and the Muses are silent, the law exists and operates, and it determines what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is legal and what is illegal. And where there is law, there is also a court that determines what is permitted and what is prohibited, what is legal and what is illegal. Some of the public will rejoice at our decision; the rest of it will criticize it. It is possible that neither the former nor the latter will read out reasoning. But we shall do our duty’ (HCJFH 2161/96 Sharif v. Home Front Commander [57], at p. 491).

Indeed, the decision in the petition before us is not simple:

‘We are members of Israeli society. Although we sometimes find ourselves in an ivory tower, that tower is in the heart of Jerusalem, which has on more than one occasion suffered from ruthless terror. We are aware of the killing and destruction that the terror against the state and its citizens brings in its wake. Like every other Israeli, we too recognize the need to protect the State and its citizens against the serious harm of terror. We are aware that, in the short term, this judgment of ours will not make the state’s struggle against those that attack it any easier. But we are judges. When we sit in judgment, we ourselves are being judged. We act to the best of our conscience and understanding. As to the struggle of the State against the terror that besets it, we are convinced that, in the final analysis, its struggle in accordance with the law and its provisions strengthens its power and its spirit. There is no security without law. Upholding the requirements of the law is an element of national security (Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [17], at p. 861 {323}).

64. In one case we considered the question whether the state was entitled to order its interrogators to adopt special interrogation measures that involved the use of force against terrorists in a situation of a ‘ticking bomb.’ Our answer to this question was no. I described in my opinion the difficult security reality that Israel faced, and I added:

‘We are aware that this decision does not make it easier to deal with that reality. This is the destiny of a democracy — it does not see all means as acceptable, and the ways of its enemies are not always open to it. A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back. Even so, democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and the liberty of the individual constitute important components in its understanding of security. In the final analysis, they strengthen its spirit and this strength allows it to overcome its adversities’ (HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel [58], at p. 845 {605}).

Let us pray that this is so!

It has therefore been decided that it cannot be determined ab initio that every targeted killing is prohibited under customary international law, just as it cannot be determined ab initio that every targeted killing is permitted under customary international law. The laws relating to targeted killings are determined in customary international law, and the legality of each individual attack needs to be decided in accordance with them.

 

 

Vice-President E. Rivlin

1.    I agree with the important and comprehensive opinion of my colleague President A. Barak.

The increase in terrorism in recent years — an increase both in scope and intensity — has raised difficult questions concerning the manner in which a democratic state should and may fight against the persons who rise up against it and its citizens to destroy them. Indeed, it is not disputed that a state may and should fight terrorism. It is also not disputed that not all means are permitted. It is difficult to map out the correct way of how to fight terrorism and defend oneself against it. The ordinary means whereby a state protects itself and its citizens are not necessarily effective against terrorist organizations and their members. Even policing and enforcement methods that characterize the fight against ‘conventional’ criminal activity are unsuited to the needs of fighting terrorism (see also D. Statman, ‘Targeted Killing,’ 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 179 (2004)). For these reasons, the State of Israel (like other states) has over the years employed and continues to employ various operations in order to deal with terrorism. This court, on various occasions, is called upon to consider the question of the delicate balances involved in making use of these courses of action.

The petition before us concerns the ‘targeted killing’ policy. In this policy, the State of Israel attacks persons that it identifies as being involved in the planning and execution of terror attacks. The goal, on the one hand, is to protect the civilians and armed forces of the State of Israel, and on the other hand, to prevent an attack upon, or to minimize collateral damage to, the Palestinian civilian population. My colleague President A. Barak is of the opinion that the question before us should be examined in light of the rules of international law relating to an armed conflict (or dispute) of an international character. I agree with this position (see also J. N. Kendall, ‘Israeli Counter-Terrorism: “Targeted Killings” under International Law,’ 80 N.C.L. Rev. 1069 (2002)). An armed dispute has existed for many years between Israel and the various terrorist organizations operating in the territories. This dispute, as my colleague the president says, does not exist in a normative vacuum. Two normative sets of laws apply. In the words of my colleague the president: ‘In addition to the provisions of international law governing an armed conflict, the basic principles of Israeli public law are likely to apply. These basic principles are carried by every Israeli soldier in his backpack and they go with him wherever he goes.’ Indeed, two normative systems require consideration in our case: one is the rules of international law, and the other is the legal rules and moral principles of the State of Israel, including the basic value of human dignity.

2.    In his consideration of the normative system incorporated in the rules of international law, my colleague the president addresses the question of the correct classification of terrorist organizations and their members: should they be regarded as combatants or civilians, or perhaps as a separate group of unlawful combatants? My colleague’s conclusion is that, in so far as the law currently stands, ‘we do not have before us sufficient information that allows us to recognize the existence of this third category’ of unlawful combatants, and since such combatants do not satisfy the conditions for being included in the category of ‘combatants,’ they should be classified as civilians. He clarifies that this classification does not, within the framework of international law, grant protection to civilians who are taking a direct part in hostilities; these persons are therefore not protected against attack, when they are taking a direct part in terrorist operations.

The issue of the correct classification of terrorist organizations and their members gives rise to difficult questions. Customary international humanitarian law requires the parties to the dispute to distinguish between civilians and combatants, between military objectives and civilian objectives, and to refrain from causing excessive damage to enemy civilians. The question is whether reality has not created, de facto, an additional group that is subject to a special law. Indeed, the scope of the danger presented by the terrorist organizations to the State of Israel and the safety of its citizens, the unsuitability of the measures usually employed against civilian lawbreakers and the threat arising from terrorist activity all give rise to a feeling of discomfort when we try to adapt the traditional category of ‘civilians’ to those persons who are taking a direct part in acts of terrorism. The latter are not ‘combatants’ according to the definition of international law. The manner in which the term ‘combatants’ has been defined in the relevant conventions resulted precisely from a desire to deny ‘unlawful combatants’ certain protections that are given to ‘lawful combatants’ (especially protections concerning the status of prisoners of war and not being brought to trial). They are ‘unprivileged belligerents’ (see K. Watkin, Warriors without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and Struggle Over Legitimacy, Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, ‘Occasional Paper’ (Winter 2005, no. 2); R.R. Baxter, ‘So Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,’ 28 British Year Book of International Law 342 (1951)). But it is precisely the characteristics of terrorist organizations and their members that exclude them from the category of ‘combatants’ — the absence of recognizable emblems and the refusal to observe the laws and customs of war — that create a difficulty, in so far as this exclusion gives a better status, even if only in certain matters, to someone who chooses to become an ‘unlawful’ combatant, who acts contrary to the rules of international law and the rules of morality and humanitarianism.

The classification of members of terrorist organizations under the category of ‘civilian’ is not, therefore, self-evident. Dinstein wrote in this context that:

‘… a person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful combatant. He is an unlawful combatant in the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy. Nor does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status: Article 5 (first Paragraph) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War specifically permits derogation from the rights of such a person (the derogation being less extensive in occupied territories, pursuant to the second Paragraph of Article 5)’ (Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge, 2004) at pp. 29-30).

It has also been said that: ‘… If it is not fitting to regard terrorists as combatants, and in consequence of this to give them the protections given to combatants, they should certainly not be regarded as civilians who are not combatants and be given far greater rights’ (E. Gross, Democracy’s Struggle Against Terrorism: Legal and Moral Aspects (2004), at p. 76; see also Y. Dinstein, ‘Unlawful Combatancy,’ 32 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 249 (2002); Baxter, ‘So Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,’ supra). Those who believe that a third category of lawbreakers exists emphasize that this includes those persons who seek to obscure the dividing line between civilians and combatants: J.C. Yoo and J.C. Ho, ‘The New York University–University of Virginia Conference on Exploring the Limits of International Law: The Status of Terrorists,’ 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 217 (2003). The difficulty may become even greater if we take into account that those persons who do not satisfy the requirements either of lawful combatants or of innocent civilians are not homogeneous. They include groups that are not necessarily identical to one another from the viewpoint of their willingness to accept the basic legal and humanitarian norms. In particular, we should distinguish in this context between unlawful combatants who fight against armed forces and those who deliberately operate against civilians.

It would therefore appear that international law needs to be brought into line with the age in which we live. In view of the facts that were submitted before us, my colleague the president proposes that we adapt the law by interpreting the existing law, which in his opinion recognizes two categories — combatants and civilians (see also S. Zachary, ‘Between the Geneva Conventions: Where Does the Unlawful Combatant Belong?’ 38 Israel L. Rev. 379 (2005)). As we have said, there may be other approaches. I see no need to expand upon them, since in view of the rules of interpretation proposed by my colleague the president, the fundamental difficulty loses much of its urgency.

The interpretation that my colleague President A. Barak proposes de facto creates an additional category, and rightly so. It is possible to derive this from the category of combatants (‘unlawful combatants’), and it is possible to derive this from the category of civilians. My colleague the president follows the latter path. If we follow him, we will derive from this category the group of civilians who are international lawbreakers, whom I would call ‘uncivilized civilians.’ But whichever path we follow, there is no difference in the result, since the interpretation that my colleague the president proposes to give the provisions of international law adapts the rules to the new reality. I agree with this interpretation. It is a dynamic interpretation that rises above the limitations of a literal reading of the laws of war.

3.    Against the background of the differences between ‘lawful’ combatants and ‘international lawbreaking’ combatants, it is possible to draw an analogy between the combat methods that are permitted in a struggle between two armed forces and the ‘targeted killing’ of terrorists (see also Statman, ‘Targeted Killing,’ supra). The approach underlying the ‘targeted killing’ policy is that only persons who are actually involved in terrorist activity should be targeted. Indeed, in a conventional war the combatants are identifiable and distinguishable from the civilian population. It is permitted to target these combatants (subject to the limitations of international law). Civilians may not be targeted. Similarly, within the framework of the struggle against terrorism, it is permitted to target international lawbreaking combatants, but harming civilians should be avoided in so far as possible. The difficulty arises of course from the fact that the unlawful combatants by definition do not act in accordance with the laws of war, which means, inter alia, that they very often operate from a concealed position among the civilian population, which is contrary to the express provisions of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions. They do this in order to obtain an advantage that arises from the fact that the opposing forces wish to respect the rules of international law (see J. Callen, ‘Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions,’ 44 Va. J. Int’l L. 1025 (2004)).

But even under the difficult conditions of fighting against terrorism, the distinction between lawbreaking combatants and civilians should be maintained. This, for our purposes, is the significance of the word ‘targeted’ in the expression ‘targeted killings.’ The significance is the requirement of proportionality that my colleague the president discusses at length.

4.    In so far as the implementation of the requirement of proportionality is concerned, the proper premise emphasizes the rights of innocent civilians. The State of Israel has the duty to respect the lives of the civilians on the other side. It is liable to protect its own civilians while respecting the lives of the civilians who are not under its effective control. When we consider the rights of innocent civilians, we will find it easier to recognize the importance of the restrictions placed upon the manner in which the armed conflict is conducted. The duty to respect the civilians on the other side is clearly stated in the rules of international law (see E. Benvenisti, ‘Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians,’ 39 Israel L. Rev. 81 (2006), at p. 96).

This duty is also a part of the other normative system that governs the armed conflict: it is a part of the moral code of the state and the supreme principle of preserving human dignity. I discussed this with regard to the issue of the use of the ‘prior warning’ procedure (also known as the ‘neighbour’ procedure):

‘… In one matter the lines are clear and sharp — the respect for human dignity as such. An army occupying a territory under a belligerent occupation has the duty of protecting the life of the local inhabitant. It also has the duty of protecting his dignity. Making such an inhabitant, who is caught in a battle zone, choose whether or not to agree to the army’s request to convey a warning to a wanted person places him in an impossible situation. The choice itself is immoral. It violates human dignity’ (HCJFH 10739 Minister of Defence v. Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel [59]).

The two normative systems that govern armed conflicts are as one in regarding the principle of human dignity as central. This principle nourishes the interpretation of international law, just as it nourishes the interpretation of Israeli internal public law. It expresses a general value that gives rise to various specific duties (on the importance of this principle in international law and its significance with regard to the treatment of civilians, see Benvenisti, ‘Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians,’ supra; it should be noted that Benvenisti identifies two principles that are relevant to the implementation of the principle of respecting human dignity in the context under discussion: the principle of individualism, which states that every person is responsible solely for his own actions, and the principle of universalism, according to which all individuals are entitled to the same rights, irrespective of the group to which they belong. This principle is not expressly recognized in the law of armed conflicts. But this does not negate the duty relating to enemy civilians. The scope of the duty varies but not the existence of the duty itself (ibid., at p. 88)).

5.    The principle of proportionality, which is a general principle that is enshrined in various provisions of international law, seeks to realize this duty. This principle does not allow disproportionate collateral damage to innocent civilians. Thus it demands that the benefit that arises from realizing the proper military objective should be commensurate with the damage caused to innocent civilians. It demands that the collateral damage should not be excessive in the circumstances of the case. There are some who regard the weighing of the benefit against the damage as a concretization of the requirement to refrain from harming civilians excessively. Although the connection between the two is clear, it would appear that there may be collateral damage to the civilian population that is so serious that even a military objective of real benefit will not justify causing it. After all, we are speaking of ethical requirements. ‘This is an ethical test,’ my colleague the president says. ‘It is based on a balance between conflicting values and interests.’ This ethical outlook is accepted in customary international law with regard to the protection of civilians (art. 51 of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions). It is also accepted in the national legal systems of many countries. This test, as President Barak said in one case, ‘seeks in essence to realize the constitutional outlook that the end does not justify the means. It is an expression of the concept that there is an ethical barrier that democracy cannot pass, even if the purpose that is being sought is a proper one (Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence [33]).

The duty to respect the lives of innocent civilians is therefore the premise. It gives rise to the requirement that the collateral damage to civilians should not be excessive and should be proportionate to the benefit arising from the military operation. This ethical outlook logically imposes restrictions on attacks against the lawbreaking combatants themselves. The restrictions may relate to the type of weapon that is used during the targeted killing. The restrictions may also result in choosing a method that reduces the danger to the lives of innocent civilians. The restrictions may relate to the degree of care that should be taken in identifying the target for the killing. These are all restrictions that seek in essence to realize the duty to respect the lives of innocent civilians, and they will be interpreted accordingly.

The premise is therefore the rights of innocent civilians. It is the premise, but it is not the only premise. It does not detract from the human dignity of the lawbreaking combatants themselves. Admittedly, international law does not grant lawbreaking combatants equal rights to those given to lawful combatants or, conversely, to innocent civilians. But human dignity is a supreme principle that applies to every person, even in times of war and conflict. It is not conditional upon reciprocity. One of the consequences of this, which is not disputed by the state, is that whenever it is possible to arrest a terrorist who is taking a direct part in hostilities and bring him to trial, the state will do so. This is a possibility that should always be considered. But as my colleague the president says, sometimes this possibility may be completely impractical or may endanger soldiers excessively.

6.    The principle of proportionality is easy to state, but hard to implement. When we consider it prospectively, under time constraints and on the basis of limited sources of information, the decision may be a difficult and complex one. Frequently it is necessary to consider values and principles that cannot be easily balanced. Each of the competing considerations is based upon relative variables. None of them can be considered as standing on its own. Proportionate military needs include humanitarian elements. Humanitarian considerations take into account existential military needs. As my colleague the president says, the court determines the law that governs the decision of the military commander. The professional military decision is the responsibility of the executive branch, and the court will ask itself if a reasonable military commander could have made the decision that was actually made, in view of the normative principles that apply to the case (cf. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was submitted to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in June 2000).

7.    In conclusion, like my colleague the president, I too am of the opinion that it cannot be decided ab initio that a targeted killing operation is always illegal, just as it cannot be decided ab initio that it is legal and permitted in all circumstances. Such an operation — in order to be legal — must satisfy the rules of law, including the requirement of proportionality as explained above, from an outlook that places the main emphasis on the right of the State of Israel to protect itself and the lives of its civilians, but at the same time regards the principle of human dignity as a fundamental value.

I therefore agree with the opinion of my colleague President A. Barak.

 

 

President D. Beinisch

I agree with the judgment of President (Emeritus) Barak and would like to emphasize several aspects of the difficult subject that has been brought before us.

In the petition before us the petitioners requested us to order the respondents to cancel the ‘targeted killing’ policy and to refrain from carrying out any operations within the framework of that policy. This is therefore a petition for a general and broad relief that relies on the petitioners’ claim that Israel’s policy in this regard is ‘manifestly illegal.’ Among the other arguments from the field of international law and Israeli internal law, the petitioners also based their claims on specific examples from the past, which they believe show the illegality of the aforesaid policy. These specific examples indicate the problems and the risks involved in the ‘targeted killing’ policy, but they cannot decide the legal question of the legality of the policy in general.

For the reasons set out in the opinion of my colleague President Barak, I agree with the conclusion that the question before us is governed by the laws applying to international armed conflicts, and that the petitioners’ sweeping position is not mandated by the rules of international humanitarian law. The conclusion reached by President Barak, with which I agree, is that it cannot be said that the aforesaid policy is always prohibited, just as it cannot be said that it is permitted in all circumstances at the discretion of the military commander. The legal question before us is complex and cannot be addressed in the broad and all-embracing manner as argued by the petitioners.

This court has held many times in the past that even combat operations are governed by the norms enshrined in both international law and internal law, and that military activity does not take place in a normative vacuum. The legal difficulties that we are required to confront derive first and foremost from the fact that international law has not yet developed the laws of war in a manner that will make them suitable for war against terrorist organizations as opposed to a regular army. Therefore, we are required make use of interpretive tools in order to adapt existing humanitarian law to the needs of the cruel reality with which the State of Israel is contending. It should be noted that the spread of the scourge of terrorism in recent years is a concern of legal scholars in many countries and experts in international law, who seek to establish the norms of what is permitted and prohibited with regard to terrorists who do not comply with any law. Against this normative reality, I too agree that within the framework of existing law, terrorists and their organizations should not be classified as ‘combatants’ but as ‘civilians.’ In view of this, they are subject to art. 51(3) of the First Additional Protocol to the 1977 Geneva Conventions — an arrangement that is a part of customary international law — according to which:

‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’

In his opinion President Barak discussed at length the interpretation of the main elements of the aforesaid art. 51(3), in view of the need to define the expression ‘civilians’ that ‘take a direct part in hostilities’ and to clarify the meaning of ‘for such time.’ As can be seen from the interpretation given in the president’s opinion, the power of the state to carry out ‘targeted killing’ operations is subject to restrictions and reservations. From these reservations we see that not every involvement in terrorist activity will constitute taking ‘a direct part in hostilities’ under art. 51(3) and that we are speaking of activity relating to actual hostilities — activity which, although is not limited merely to the physical attack, does not include activity of indirect assistance (see para. 35 of the president’s opinion). I agree that the dilemmas that arise in view of the interpretation of the elements of the aforesaid art. 51(3) require a specific examination on a case by case basis. It should be remembered that the purpose of the ‘targeted killing’ is to prevent harm to human life as a part of the duty of the state to protect its armed forces and civilians. Since art. 51(3) is an exception to the duty to refrain from harming the lives of innocent civilians, great caution should be exercised when considering, in the appropriate circumstances, the possibility of endangering the lives of civilians. When exercising this caution, an examination should be made of the level of information required in order to classify a ‘civilian’ as someone who is taking a direct part in the hostilities. This information should be reliable, substantial and convincing with regard to the risk presented by the terrorist to human life — a risk that includes persistent activity that is not limited to sporadic activity or a single concrete act. I would add that in appropriate circumstances information concerning the activity of the terrorist in the past may be used to examine the risk that he presents in the future. I would also add that when assessing the risk, the likelihood of the hostile activity that endangers human life should be considered. In this regard, a remote suspicion is insufficient; there should be a significant probability that such a risk exists. I agree of course with the finding that a thorough and independent (retrospective) investigation should be made with regard to the correctness of the identification and the circumstances of the attack. To all of the above I would add two points: first, no use should be made of ‘targeted killings’ when it is possible to arrest a terrorist who is taking a direct part in hostilities without any real risk to the lives of the armed forces. Second, the principle of proportionality as accepted in customary international law, according to which disproportionate collateral damage to innocent civilians should be avoided, should be observed. When the harm to innocent civilians is not proportionate to the benefit of the military operation (the test of ‘proportionality in the narrow sense’), the ‘targeted killing’ will be disproportionate. This matter was also discussed in depth by my colleague Vice-President Rivlin, and I agree with him too. Ultimately, when a ‘targeted killing’ operation is carried out in accordance with the reservations that have been discussed and within the framework of the law relating to international armed conflicts in customary humanitarian law as we have interpreted it, we are not speaking of taking human life in an arbitrary manner, but of an action that is intended to save human life.

Therefore I too am of the opinion that in Israel’s difficult war against terror that besets it, we cannot say in a sweeping manner that the use of the measure of ‘targeted killings’ as one of the strategies in the war against terrorism is prohibited, and thereby prevent the state from using a strategy which, in the opinion of those responsible for security, is essential for the protection of the lives of Israeli inhabitants. Notwithstanding, in view of the extreme nature of the ‘targeted killing’ strategy, it should only be used subject to the restrictions and reservations outlined in our judgment and in accordance with the circumstances and merits of each individual case.

 

 

Petition denied.

23 Kislev 5767.

14 December 2006.

 

Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 4764/04
Date Decided: 
Sunday, May 30, 2004
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petition was filed during combat operations against the terror infrastructure in the area of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The petitioners sought various kinds of relief from the court. The issues raised by the petitioners were the supply of water, food, electricity and medical supplies, the evacuation of the wounded, the burial of the dead, an investigation into an incident in which a crowd was allegedly shelled, and a request that doctors should be allowed into the Gaza Strip in order to assess the medical needs in the area. The petition was heard within a very compressed timeframe, while the combat operations were taking place.

 

Held: Most of the issues were resolved in the course of the few days during which the petition was heard. Therefore there was no need for the court to grant any relief in these matters by the time it gave judgment. Notwithstanding, the court held that the military commander was liable to make preparations in advance of any military action, so that foreseeable problems could be resolved more quickly and efficiently.

 

With regard to the alleged shelling of a crowd, an investigation was taking place, and the court held that the petitioners must wait for the results of the investigation before turning to the court.

 

With regard to the request that doctors should be allowed into the Gaza Strip, the court upheld the respondent’s position that Israeli doctors could not be allowed into the Gaza Strip because of the very real danger they would be harmed or taken hostage. Any doctors who were not Israeli citizens could enter the Gaza Strip and assess the medical needs in the area.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 4764/04

1.         Physicians for Human Rights

2.         Association for Civil Rights in Israel

3.         Centre for Defence of the Individual

4.  Betzelem — Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

v.

IDF Commander in Gaza

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[30 May 2004]

Before President A. Barak and Justices J. Türkel, D. Beinisch

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: The petition was filed during combat operations against the terror infrastructure in the area of Rafah in the Gaza Strip. The petitioners sought various kinds of relief from the court. The issues raised by the petitioners were the supply of water, food, electricity and medical supplies, the evacuation of the wounded, the burial of the dead, an investigation into an incident in which a crowd was allegedly shelled, and a request that doctors should be allowed into the Gaza Strip in order to assess the medical needs in the area. The petition was heard within a very compressed timeframe, while the combat operations were taking place.

 

Held: Most of the issues were resolved in the course of the few days during which the petition was heard. Therefore there was no need for the court to grant any relief in these matters by the time it gave judgment. Notwithstanding, the court held that the military commander was liable to make preparations in advance of any military action, so that foreseeable problems could be resolved more quickly and efficiently.

With regard to the alleged shelling of a crowd, an investigation was taking place, and the court held that the petitioners must wait for the results of the investigation before turning to the court.

With regard to the request that doctors should be allowed into the Gaza Strip, the court upheld the respondent’s position that Israeli doctors could not be allowed into the Gaza Strip because of the very real danger they would be harmed or taken hostage. Any doctors who were not Israeli citizens could enter the Gaza Strip and assess the medical needs in the area.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 1.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 4573/04 Albesioni v. IDF Commander (unreported).

[2]        HCJ 4585/04 Shakfahat v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip (unreported).

[3]        HCJ 4694/04 Abu Atra v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip (unreported).

[4]        HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 403.

[5]        HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30; [2002-3] IsrLR 47.

[6]        HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11; [2002‑3] IsrLR 39.

[7]        HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817; [1998‑9] IsrLR 567.

[8]        HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 785.

[9]        HCJ 358/88 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Central Commander [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 529; IsrSJ 9 1.

[10]     HCJ 3278/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 385; [2002‑3] IsrLR 123.

[11]     HCJ 2936/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 3; [2002-3] IsrLR 35.

[12]     HCJ 2117/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 53(3) 26.

[13]     HCJ 3436/02 Custodia Internazionale di Terra Santa v. Government of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 22.

[14]     CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464.

[15]     HCJFH 3299/93 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 195.

[16]     CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon LeZion Jewish Burial Society [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600; [1998-9] IsrLR 259.

[17]     HCJ 66/81 Inspector-General of Police v. Ramla Magistrates Court Judge Mr Baizer [1984] IsrSC 38(4) 337.

[18]     HCJ 3117/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 17.

[19]     CA 5604/94 Hemed v. State of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(2) 498.

[20]     HCJ 9293/01 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 509.

[21]     HCJ 3022/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 39.

 

For the petitioners — F. Alaju.

For the respondents — A. Helman, Senior Deputy to the State Attorney; Y. Roitman, Assistant to the State Attorney.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

President A. Barak

Is the State of Israel complying with various humanitarian obligations to which it is subject under international humanitarian law, during the military operations taking place in Rafah? This is the question before us.

Background

1.    Since 18 May 2004, active combat has been taking place in the area of Rafah in the Gaza Strip (see HCJ 4573/04 Albesioni v. IDF Commander [1]; HCJ 4585/04 Shakfahat v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [2]; HCJ 4694/04 Abu Atra v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [3]). According to the respondent’s statement, the combat activities are on a large scale. They are intended to damage the terror infrastructure in that area. The main goal is to locate tunnels that are used for smuggling weapons from the Egyptian part of Rafah to the Palestinian part. The fighting also has the aim of arresting persons wanted for acts of terror and locating weapons in the Rafah area. The activity taking place there includes battles with armed opponents. Many explosive charges have been directed against the IDF forces, and various weapons are being fired at them.

2.    The city of Rafah is divided into several neighbourhoods. Most of the military operations were in the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan. The IDF also entered the Brazil neighbourhood. During the night between the filing of the petition (20 May 2004) and the hearing the next morning (21 May 2004), the IDF left these two neighbourhoods, but the neighbourhoods are surrounded and controlled by the army.

3.    Before the fighting — in the light of experience from similar operations carried out in the past — the army took three steps that were intended to facilitate the solution of humanitarian problems. First, a ‘humanitarian centre’ was set up. This centre maintains contact with parties outside the area of operations. Thus, for example, various human rights organizations contact it. An attempt is made, on the spot, to resolve concrete problems arising in the course of the fighting. Second, a District Coordination Office (‘DCO’) was established. This DCO is in constant communication, with regard to humanitarian matters arising as a result of the fighting, with personnel from the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the Palestinian Red Crescent and the International Red Cross. The person in charge of the DCO in the southern part of the Gaza Strip is in direct contact with personnel from the Palestinian Ministry of Health and with local hospitals. It is his job to find a solution to problems arising as a result of the fighting. The person in charge of the DCO in the area of the Gaza Strip is Colonel Y. Mordechai. Third, every battalion involved in the fighting has an officer from the DCO. His job is to deal with humanitarian issues arising from the fighting, such as the evacuation of the Palestinian dead and wounded.

The petition

4.    The petitioners are four human rights organizations. They point to various instances of harm suffered by the local population in Rafah — which we will discuss below — as a result of the army’s military operations. They are petitioning that the army should allow medical teams and ambulances to reach the wounded in Rafah in order to evacuate them; that the evacuation should take place without prior coordination with the humanitarian centre; that the transport of medical equipment between Rafah and the hospitals outside it should be allowed; that medical teams or civilians involved in the evacuation of the dead or wounded should not be harmed or threatened; that the electricity and water supply to the neighbourhood of A-Sultan should be renewed and the supply of food and medicines for the residents of the neighbourhood should be allowed; that a team of physicians on behalf of the Physicians for Human Rights Organization (the first petitioner) should be allowed to enter hospitals in the Gaza Strip in order to assess the medical needs there. Finally, the petitioners ask that an incident (on 19 May 2004) in which a crowd of civilians was shelled and several residents were killed should be investigated. They also ask that an order should be made prohibiting the shooting or shelling of a crowd of civilians even if they contain armed persons who do not pose an immediate danger to life.

The respondent’s response

5.    The respondent asks us to deny the petition. It emphasizes that extensive military operations are continuing in the area. Battles are taking place against armed combatants. In this situation, great caution is required when the court exercises judicial review of the activities of the security forces. The activity lies on the border of the sphere of institutional justiciability. On the merits, the respondent claims that Rafah was a main channel for bringing weapons into the Gaza Strip, mainly by means of tunnels dug between the Egyptian part of Rafah and the Palestinian part. These smuggled weapons are used to attack the army and Israeli settlements both in the Gaza Strip and outside it. The purpose of the fighting is to damage the Palestinian terror infrastructure in this area; to locate tunnels being used for smuggling weapons; to arrest Palestinians wanted for acts of terror; to locate weapons in the Rafah area. Within the framework of the IDF’s operations in the area of Rafah, battles took place with armed combatants. Many explosive charges were used against the IDF forces. They were fired upon with various weapons, and intensive fighting took place between the IDF and the armed combatants. In their written and oral arguments, counsel for the respondent emphasized that within the framework of the fighting, the IDF has made considerable efforts to take into account the needs of the local population and to minimize in so far as possible any damage to the civilian population, and contact and coordination personnel were appointed in advance for this purpose. Notwithstanding, the position in the area is complex, since the terrorists are making use of the homes of Palestinians for firing on the IDF. They operate from within the Palestinian population, and as a result they make it difficult for the IDF to deal with these problems. Nonetheless, the army is fulfilling its obligation to the civilian population and is doing everything into order to minimize the damage to it. In this respect, the respondent responded — as we will see below — to each of the petitioners’ claims. The respondent emphasizes that difficulties are caused by the fact that the terrorists are operating from among the Palestinian population and they sometimes use it as a human shield. The respondent also points out that the description of the position in the petition is based on Palestinian sources, and it includes gross exaggerations, whose sole purpose is to paint the humanitarian picture in far worse a light than the actual reality.

The proceeding before us

6.    The petition was filed in the Supreme Court on Thursday, 20 May 2004. It was set down for a hearing before us the next morning, 21 May 2004. Prior to this hearing, we asked for and received a written response from the respondent. At the oral hearing, in addition to the representatives of the parties, the head of the District Coordination Office for the Gaza Strip, Colonel Y. Mordechai, and the Chief Military Attorney, were present at the hearing. Colonel Mordechai informed us orally about various matters that arose before us. Sometimes he asked for a little time to find out what was happening in the area of Rafah, while he contacted his men in the area of Rafah who gave him details, and he passed them on to us. At the end of the arguments, we suggested that a certain arrangement — which we will discuss below — should be considered with regard to the burial of the dead (see para. 25 below). In this respect we received a notice containing an update from the State Attorney on Sunday, 23 May 2004. On 24 May 2004, we asked for the petitioner’s response. Before this was received, we received on the same day (24 May 2004) an additional response from the respondent. The petitioners’ response was also received on the dame day, and it related both to the problem of burying the dead and to the issue of restoring electricity in Rafah. The respondent’s response to the petitioners’ notice was received on 27 May 2004, after the IDF left Rafah on 24 May 2004 and after the area was returned to the civilian and security control of the Palestinian Authority.

Judicial Review

7.    ‘Israel is not an island. It is a member of an international community...’ (HCJ 5591/02 Yassin v. Commander of Ketziot Military Camp [4], at p. 412). The military operations of the army are not conducted in a legal vacuum. There are legal norms — some from customary international law, some from international law enshrined in treaties to which Israel is a party, and some from the basic principles of Israeli law — which provide rules as to how military operations should be conducted. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘Israel finds itself in a difficult war against rampant terror. It is acting on the basis of its right to self-defence (see art. 51 of the United Nations Charter). This fighting is not carried out in a normative vacuum. It is carried out according to the rules of international law, which set out the principles and rules for waging war. The statement that “when the cannons speak, the Muses are silent” is incorrect. Cicero’s aphorism that at a time of war the laws are silent does not reflect modern reality…

The reason underlying this approach is not merely pragmatic, the result of the political and normative reality. The reason underlying this approach is much deeper. It is an expression of the difference between a democratic state that is fighting for its survival and the fighting of terrorists who want to destroy it. The State is fighting for and on behalf of the law. The terrorists are fighting against and in defiance of the law. The war against terror is a war of the law against those who seek to destroy it (see HCJ 320/80 Kawasma v. The Minister of Defence, at 132). But it is more than this: the State of Israel is a state whose values are Jewish and democratic. We have established here a state that respects law, that achieves its national goals and the vision of generations, and that does so while recognizing and realizing human rights in general and human dignity in particular; between these two there is harmony and agreement, not conflict and alienation’ (HCJ 3451/02 Almadani v. Minister of Defence [5], at pp. 34-35 {52-53}).

Indeed, all the military operations of every army are subject to the rules of international law governing these operations. I discussed this in one case where I said: ‘Even in a time of combat, the laws of war must be upheld. Even in a time of combat, everything must be done in order to protect the civilian population…’ (HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [6], at p. 16 {46}).

8.    The judicial review of the Supreme Court is normally exercised ex post facto. The act which is the subject of the complaint has already been committed. Occasionally, a significant period of time elapses between the event and its review in the Supreme Court, which examines the legal consequences after the event. This is not the case here. We were not asked by the petitioners to examine the legal significance of military operations that have already been carried out and completed. The purpose of the petition is to direct the immediate conduct of the army. Our judicial review is prospective. It is exercised while the military activity is continuing. This imposes obvious constraints on the court. Admittedly, the mere fact that the hearing is prospective is not unprecedented in the Supreme Court. Thus, for example, in HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [7], we examined the legality of a guideline that allowed physical pressure to be exerted against persons under interrogation. The purpose of our review in that case was not to examine interrogations that took place in the past; the purpose was to consider interrogations that were taking place at that time. Nonetheless, the case before us is special in that the judicial review is taking place before the military operations have ended, and while IDF soldiers are facing the dangers inherent in the combat. In this regard, it should be emphasized once again that:

‘Certainly this court will not adopt any position regarding the manner in which the combat is being conducted. As long as soldiers’ lives are in danger, the decisions will be made by the commanders. In the case before us, no claim was brought before us that the arrangement that we reached endangers our soldiers’ (HCJ 3114/02 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [6], at p. 16 {46}).

            This is the case here: the humanitarian concerns have been resolved without endangering the lives of soldiers or the military operations. Subject to this restriction, this case is no different from other cases where this court examines the legality of military operations.

9.    Judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to carry out military operations. The issue addressed by judicial review is the legality of the military operations. Therefore we presume that the military operations carried out in Rafah are necessary from a military viewpoint. The question before us is whether these military operations satisfy the national and international criteria that determine the legality of these operations. The fact that operations are necessary from a military viewpoint does not mean that they are lawful from a legal viewpoint. Indeed, we do not replace the discretion of the military commander in so far as military considerations are concerned. That is his expertise. We examine their consequences from the viewpoint of humanitarian law. That is our expertise.

The normative framework

10. The military operations of the IDF in Rafah, in so far as the local inhabitants are concerned, are governed by the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907 (hereafter — the Hague Convention) and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (hereafter — the Fourth Geneva Convention). In addition to this, there are the general principles of administrative law, which accompany every Israeli soldier (see HCJ 393/82 Jamait Askan Almalmoun Altaounia Almahdouda Almasaoulia Cooperative Society v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [8]; HCJ 358/88 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Central Commander [9], at p. 536 {12}). According to these general principles of Israeli administrative law, the army must act in the occupied area, inter alia, with (substantive and procedural) fairness, reasonableness and proportionality, with a proper balance between individual liberty and the public interest (see HCJ 3278/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [10], at p. 396 {136}).

11. The basic injunction of international humanitarian law applicable in times of combat is that the local inhabitants are ‘… entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof…’ (art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; see also art. 46 of the Hague Convention). This general normative-humanitarian framework was formulated by Gasser, in the following language:

‘Civilians who do not take part in hostilities shall be respected and protected. They are entitled to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions, and their manners and customs. Their property is also protected’ (H.P. Gasser, ‘Protection of the Civilian Population,’ The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (D. Fleck ed., 1995), at p. 211).

            What underlies this basic provision is the recognition of the value of man, the sanctity of his life and the fact that he is entitled to liberty (cf. s. 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; see also J.S. Pictet (ed.), Commentary: Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), at p. 199). His life or his dignity as a human being may not be harmed, and his dignity as a human being must be protected. This basic duty is not absolute. It is subject to ‘… such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the war’ (last part of art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). These measures may not harm the essence of the rights (see Pictet, op. cit., at p. 207). They must be proportionate (Gasser, op. cit., at p. 220). Indeed, the military operations are directed against terrorists and hostile acts of terror. They are not directed against the local inhabitants (Gasser, op. cit., at p. 212). When these, as sometimes happens, enter a combat zone — and especially when terrorists turn the local inhabitants into ‘human shields’ — everything must be done in order to protect the lives and dignity of the local inhabitants. The duty of the military commander, according to this basic rule, is twofold. First, he must refrain from operations that attack the local inhabitants. This duty is his ‘negative’ obligation. Second, he must carry out acts required to ensure that the local inhabitants are not harmed. This is his ‘positive’ obligation (Gasser, op. cit., at p. 212). Both these obligations — the dividing line between which is a fine one —should be implemented reasonably and proportionately in accordance with the needs of the time and place.

12. In addition to the basic injunction regarding the human dignity of the local inhabitants during military operations, international humanitarian law establishes several secondary obligations. These are not a full expression of the general principle. They are merely a specific expression of it. Of these secondary obligations, we shall mention two that are relevant to the petition before us:

1.  The supply of food and medicines: ‘…the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate’ (art. 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; see Pictet, op. cit., at p. 300). In this context, humanitarian organizations and the Red Cross should be allowed to supply food and medicines (art. 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Free passage of these consignments should be permitted (ibid., and see also art. 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Of course, the consignments may be searched in order to ascertain that they are intended for humanitarian purposes (art. 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

2.  Medical services: The proper operation of medical establishments in the area under belligerent occupation should be ensured (art. 56 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). Persons engaged in searching for the wounded shall be protected. They shall be recognizable by means of an identity card certifying their status (art. 20 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). The Red Cross and the Red Crescent shall continue their activities in accordance with the principles of the Red Cross (art. 63 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

From the general to the specific

13. In their written petition and in their oral arguments, counsel for the petitioners presented a list of specific matters with regard to which the respondent is violating international humanitarian law. We asked for and received a written and oral response to each of these matters from counsel for the respondent. We also received updated explanations orally from Colonel Y. Mordechai. Let us now discuss each of these matters.

Water

14. Counsel for the petitioners argued before us that the entrance of tanks into the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan has destroyed the water infrastructure and as a result the supply of water to the whole of Rafah has been disrupted. Before the date of the oral arguments before us, one of the wells was repaired, and therefore there is a severe water shortage in the area. Water tankers are not coming to the houses, and therefore there is a problem with the water supply. The petitioners ask that we order the respondent to renew the water supply to the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan. In his oral response, Colonel Y. Mordechai said that the water wells in the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan were indeed damaged. As a result of this, there is a shortage of water in the southern part of the Gaza Strip. According to his report, as of the date when matters were presented before us, four out of five water wells had been repaired. The delay in the repairs was caused because the Palestinian repair team did not want to enter the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, for fear of being injured. Later, on the initiative of Col. Mordechai, the Red Cross came in an international vehicle and most of the wells were repaired. In areas where there is still no running water (like in the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan), the army allows water to be brought in tankers. As of now, there are five water tankers in the neighbourhood, to which the inhabitants have access without difficulty. While he was explaining this to us, Col. Mordechai was told — and he told us — that six additional water tankers had entered the neighbourhood. We were also told that all the wells are now functioning. Diesel fuel has been brought into the neighbourhood to enable the operation of generators which allow water to be pumped from the wells. As a result of this, there is now running water in all the neighbourhoods of Rafah. In a notice that we received from counsel for the petitioners (on 24 May 2004), we were told that an enquiry directed to the Mayor of Rafah revealed that the water infrastructure in Rafah has not yet been repaired. According to him, the IDF’s tanks and bulldozers caused major damage to the water infrastructure. Water pipes have been cracked, and sewage has flooded the roads and polluted the drinking water. Many homes still have no water.

15. It is the duty of the military commander to ensure the supply of water in the area subject to military activities. This duty is not merely the (negative) duty to prevent damage to water sources and to prevent a disruption of the water supply. The duty is also the (positive) duty to supply water if there is a shortage. Everything should be done in order to protect water sources and to repair them with due speed. Water tankers should be provided if the normal water supply is not functioning properly. Lessons will certainly have been learned in this regard for the future.

Electricity

16. The petitioners claim that the neighbourhoods in Rafah are without electricity. An attempt to connect the Tel A-Sultan neighbourhood to the electricity network failed, and the whole city is without electricity. They ask that we order the respondent to restore the supply of electricity. In his oral response, Col. Mordechai said that electricity in the southern part of the Gaza Strip comes from Israel. During the military operations, the electricity infrastructure was damaged. The army — in coordination with the Rafah municipality — is working on repairing the damage. This takes time, as sometimes the workers have difficulty finding the source of the problem. In addition, the fighting taking place in the area makes it difficult to repair the electricity network properly. At the moment, there is electricity in the vast majority of Rafah, and everything will be done in order to complete the repairs so that electricity is restored for the whole area. Against this background, it seems to us that there is no need for any further action on our part. In a statement providing an update (on 24 May 2004), which was filed by the petitioners, we were told that many houses in Rafah still do not have electricity. Equipment that does not exist in the Gaza Strip is required in order to repair the network, and this must be imported from Israel. The closure of Karni crossing prevents the entry of the equipment and materials that are needed for repairing the electricity network. After the IDF forces left the area of Rafah and after military operations ceased, we received a statement from the respondent (on 27 May 2004). We were told that the area of Rafah was now under the civilian and security control of the Palestinian Authority, and not of the IDF forces. On the substantive question we were told that there is nothing to prevent the transfer of the equipment required for the repair of the electricity infrastructure through Karni crossing, provided that arrangements are made with the appropriate authorities in the IDF.

Medical equipment and medicines

17. Counsel for the petitioners said that there is a severe shortage of medicines, medical equipment and blood units in the A-Najar hospital, which, although it is located outside the area of combat, serves the area which is controlled by the IDF. Notice of this was given by the hospital to Professor Donchin, a member of the first petitioner (Physicians for Human Rights). The first petitioner prepared a vehicle containing medicines, bandages, and blood units. The vehicle is waiting by Erez Crossing, and it is not being allowed to enter the Gaza Strip. The petitioners request that we order the respondent to allow the supply of medicines to the inhabitants in the Tel A-Sultan neighbourhood. They also request that we order the respondent to allow the passage of vehicles carrying medical equipment between Rafah and the hospitals outside it, in Khan Younis and Gaza City. In his written response, Col. Mordechai said that the entry of medicines and medical equipment to the Rafah area is being allowed on a regular basis. There is nothing preventing the transfer of medical equipment from one area to another. The international border crossing at Rafah, which was closed during the fighting, was opened for this very purpose, in order to allow trucks carrying medical equipment from Egypt to enter the Gaza Strip area. In his oral response Col. Mordechai added that the entrance to the combat zone is through Karni Crossing. Any medical equipment that is brought to that gate will be transferred immediately to its destination, provided that it is not accompanied by Israeli civilians, because of the fear that they may be taken hostage. With regard to the position regarding medicines in the hospital, Col. Mordechai said that he spoke, on his own initiative, with the hospital director. At first, he was told of the shortage of blood units and basic medical equipment. After a short time, he was told that blood units had been received and that there was no longer a shortage. The shortage of first aid equipment continues. That same evening a truck from Egypt carrying medical equipment from Tunisia entered the Gaza Strip. In addition, four Red Cross trucks containing medicines entered via Karni Crossing. Col. Mordechai remains in direct contact with the Red Cross regarding this issue. Every request for the supply of medicines is accepted and carried out. During the fighting, oxygen tanks were permitted to be taken out of Gaza. These were filled in Israel and returned to the hospital. In her response, counsel for the petitioners said that contact had just been made between the first petitioner and the Red Cross, and that the vehicle prepared by it and the equipment in it would be taken to their destination. Counsel for the respondents also told us that he had just been told that four trucks carrying medical equipment had passed through Karni Crossing.

18. It is the obligation of the military commander to ensure that there is sufficient medical equipment in the war zone. This is certainly his obligation to his own soldiers. But his obligation extends also to the civilian population under his control. Within the framework of the preparations for a military operation, this issue — which is always to be expected — must be taken into account. In this regard, both the local medical system and the ability of the local hospitals to give reasonable medical care during the fighting must be considered in advance. Medical equipment must be prepared in advance in case of a shortage; the entry of medical equipment from various sources must be allowed in order to alleviate the distress; contact must be maintained, in so far as possible, with the local medical services. The obligation is that of the military commander, and the receipt of assistance from external sources does not release him from that obligation (cf. art. 60 of the Fourth Geneva Convention). However, such external assistance may lead to the de facto fulfilment of the obligation. It seems to us that this issue has now been resolved and we do not think that there is a basis for any additional relief from the court.

Food

19. According to the claim of counsel for the petitioners, when the military activity began, the army imposed a full curfew and sealed off some neighbourhoods in Rafah. These are lifted and imposed intermittently, depending upon the area where combat is taking place at any given time. In the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, continuous combat has been taking place since the morning of 18 May 2004. Because of the curfew, the residents of the neighbourhood have been cut off from the outside world for three days. They suffer from a shortage of water (see para. 14 supra), medicine (see para. 17 supra), and food. In four neighbourhoods of Rafah, there is no milk nor any basic food products. Contact with other neighbourhoods — which would solve the problem — is prevented by the army. Moreover, no food is being brought in from outside the area. The petitioners request that we order the respondent to allow the supply of food to the residents of the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan. In his response, Col. Mordechai said that the usual procedure is that, when a curfew is imposed, a restocking of food should be allowed within 72 hours from the beginning of the curfew. In the case before us, the army allowed food trucks prepared by the Red Cross to be brought into the area within 48 hours. Food stations were designated in various parts of the neighbourhoods, and food was distributed to the residents. In this regard, the IDF is in contact with the mayor of Rafah and with the ministries of the Palestinian Authority. During the day, additional food trucks will be allowed to enter. Every request from an outside source to supply food will be approved and allowed. The same applies to milk. In Col. Mordechai’s opinion, there is currently no shortage of food. He emphasized in this regard that, even before the operation, UNRWA was allowed to fill its storage facilities with food.

20. On the normative level, the rule is that the military commander who is holding an area under belligerent occupation must provide the food requirements of the local inhabitants under his control. Carrying out this obligation in practice is naturally dependent on the conditions of the fighting. However, it is prohibited for the fighting to result in the starvation of local inhabitants under the control of the army (see Almadani v. Minister of Defence [5], at p. 36 {53-54}). On the practical level, it seems to us that the food problem has been resolved, but we should repeat that, like the problem of medicines, the question of food for the civilian population must be part of the advance planning for a military operation. The full responsibility for this issue lies with the IDF. The IDF may, of course, be assisted by international organizations, such as the Red Cross and UNRWA, but the actions of these do not discharge it, since it has effective control of the area, of its basic obligation to the civilian population under its control (cf. art. 60 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

Evacuation of the wounded

21. The petitioners claim that, when the military operation began, the road from Rafah to Khan Younis was blocked in both directions. Ambulances that evacuated the wounded from Rafah to Khan Younis on that morning did not succeed in returning to Rafah. Therefore, wounded persons remained in the A-Najar hospital. That hospital is not equipped, nor is it sufficiently advanced, to treat the dozens of wounded coming to it. Because of the blocking of the road, the lives of many wounded are in danger. Moreover, when the army allows the evacuation of the wounded from A-Najar hospital in Rafah to hospitals outside Rafah, it allows the evacuation only on the condition that the name and identity number of the wounded person and the licence number of the ambulance which is supposed to evacuate him are provided. While the demand for giving the licence number of the ambulance can be satisfied, albeit with difficulty, the demand that the name and identity number of the wounded person are provided is an impossible demand. The reason for this is that many of the wounded are not conscious and their identity is not known. Because of this demand, ambulances are unable to come to evacuate wounded persons whose identities are not known. Moreover, the entry of additional ambulances into the A-Sultan neighbourhood is prevented because of digging that the IDF is carrying out in the area. In one case, shots were even fired on an ambulance of the ‘Red Crescent.’ The petitioners request that we order the IDF to refrain from harming or threatening the medical teams or civilians involved in the evacuation of the wounded or the dead. They also request that medical teams and Palestinian ambulances are allowed to reach the wounded in Rafah in order to evacuate them to hospitals. Finally, they request that we order the respondent to allow the transfer of the wounded in ambulances from the hospital in Rafah to other hospitals in the Gaza Strip without any need for prior arrangement, including giving details of the identity of the wounded.

22. In his written response, Col. Y. Mordechai said that the IDF allows the entry of ambulances and medical teams into Rafah in order to evacuate the dead and wounded. This is coordinated with Red Cross and Red Crescent officials, the Palestinian Civilian Liaison office, various UNRWA officials, various Palestinian officials, and Israeli human rights organizations that have contacted the humanitarian centre. As a rule, IDF forces do not prevent the entrance of ambulances into the Rafah area or the passage of ambulances from the Rafah area to the Khan Younis area. With regard to the demand for the licence plate number of the ambulances and the identity of the wounded, Col. Mordechai said, in his written response, that these demands are based on a desire to ensure that it is indeed wounded persons that are being transferred by Palestinian medical teams, and that it is indeed an ambulance and not vehicles that are being used for another purpose. Experience has shown that Palestinian terrorists have used even ambulances for terrorist activities, including the transport of armed Palestinians and the smuggling of weapons from one area to another. In his oral response, Col. Y. Mordechai added that a DCO officer is attached to each battalion. One of his main duties is to ensure the evacuation of the wounded in coordination with the ambulance team. During the operation, more than eighty ambulances passed from the northern part of the Gaza Strip to Rafah. The IDF allows the passage of every ambulance, provided that it is coordinated with the army. The search of the ambulance — in case it contains prohibited military equipment that is being transported from one place to another — is completed within minutes. With regard to the evacuation of the wounded, this is not made conditional on providing the names and identity numbers. Even someone whose name and identity is unknown is evacuated, but if it is possible to obtain the name and identity number, the information is requested and received. Without regard to the evacuation of the wounded to somewhere outside Rafah, Col. Mordechai says that more than 40 ambulances have left Rafah, heading north. Every ambulance requesting to leave is permitted to do so. All that is required is coordination with regard to the route. With regard to the shooting on an ambulance, it was stressed before us that the shooting was unintentional. There are clear orders that shooting at ambulances is prohibited. ‘Ambulances are out of bounds’ — so Col. Mordechai told us. Col. Mordechai informed us that dozens of ambulances have passed without being harmed. It is to be regretted if even a single exception occurred. Wireless contact exists between ambulance drivers and officers of the DCO, by which proper coordination between the forces moving in the field and ambulances is maintained. When the passage of an ambulance is prevented by earth on the road, everything is done — after coordination — so that a tractor is brought to that place to remove the earth.

23. There is no dispute regarding the normative framework. The army must do everything possible, subject to the state of the fighting, to allow the evacuation of local inhabitants that were wounded in the fighting. In this respect, it was held by this court, per Justice Dorner, more than two years ago:

‘… our combat forces are required to abide by the rules of humanitarian law regarding the treatment of the wounded, the sick and dead bodies. The abuse committed by medical teams, hospitals and ambulances has made it necessary for the IDF to act in order to prevent such activities, but it does not, in itself, justify a sweeping violation of humanitarian rules. Indeed, this is the declared position of the State. This position is required not only by international law, on which the petitioners are relying, but also by the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (HCJ 2936/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [11], at pp. 4-5 {37}).

            In another case, Justice Dorner said:

‘… The rules of international law provide protection for medical facilities and personnel against attack by the combat forces… it is forbidden, in any circumstances, to attack mobile or stationary medical facilities of the medical service, i.e., hospitals, medical storage facilities, evacuation points for the sick and wounded, ambulances, and so forth…

However, the medical team is entitled to full protection only when it is involved exclusively in missions for the search, collection, transport and treatment of the sick and wounded, etc.…

… The protection of medical establishments shall cease if they are being used “for purposes other than their humanitarian functions, for carrying out acts that harm the enemy,” on condition that “advance warning was given, stipulating, in all appropriate cases, a fair deadline and the warning was not heeded” ’ (HCJ 2117/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [12], at pp. 28-29).

It appears to us that the passage of ambulances to and from Rafah took place properly. This was made possible, inter alia, by the contact between the IDF — through the officers of the DCO — and the ambulance drivers. This contact is proper, and it worked properly. Also the movement of ambulances to and from the area was unrestricted. The demand of the IDF regarding the licence plate numbers of ambulances is reasonable. It is correct not to make the transfer of the wounded conditional upon giving their names and identity numbers, but we see nothing wrong in the attempt to receive this information when it is available, provided that obtaining this information is not made a condition for transporting them outside the combat area and does not cause an unreasonable delay in the transport. The single case of shooting on an ambulance was an exception. We are persuaded that in this respect the orders prohibiting such activity are clear and unequivocal. It seems to us, therefore, that in this regard the petition has been satisfied.

Burying the dead

24. Counsel for the petitioners said that the A-Najar Hospital in Rafah has 37 bodies of inhabitants who were killed in the course of the IDF’s operations. Because of the restrictions imposed by the army, it is impossible to bury them. In his response before us, Col. Mordechai said that, in so far as the army is concerned, there is nothing to prevent the dead being buried in the cemeteries. These are located, to the best of his knowledge, outside the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan and therefore the funerals can be carried out today. In her response, counsel for the petitioners said that the funerals had not taken place because the army is surrounding the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, and it is not possible for the relatives of the dead to participate in the funerals. Col. Mordechai admitted this to be true.

25. This response did not satisfy us. We said that a solution to this problem must be found quickly. Thus, for example, we asked why all or some of the relatives are not being allowed to participate in the funerals. Col. Mordechai promised us an answer to this question. In an updated statement we received on 23 May 2004, after the pleadings were concluded, we were notified by counsel for the respondent, on behalf of Col. Mordechai, that the respondent decided (on 21 May 2004) to allow several family members of each of the dead to leave the Tel A-Sultan neighbourhood in order to hold the funerals. The proposal was rejected by the Palestinian authorities. That statement also said that on that same day (21 May 2004) the respondent was prepared to allow, as a good will gesture, two vehicles from each family to leave the area of Tel A-Sultan in order to participate in their relatives’ funerals. This proposal was also rejected by the Palestinians. On Saturday (22 May 2004) the respondent was prepared to allow, as a good will gesture and in response to a request by the Red Cross, the family members of each of the dead to leave the neighbourhood in order to take part in the funeral ceremonies, without any limit on the number, provided that the funerals should not be conducted at the same time, but one after the other. The Palestinians rejected this proposal as well. On Sunday (23 May 2004) the respondent announced that he was prepared, as a good will gesture and in coordination with the Palestinian Authority, to allow several buses to leave the neighbourhood in order to allow family members to take part in their relatives’ funerals. To the best of the respondent’s knowledge, the Palestinians began organizing the buses needed to transport the family members from the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan for the funerals. A further statement from the respondent (on 24 May 2004) told us that the attempt (on 23 May 2004) to transport family members from the neighbourhood on organized buses for the funerals was unsuccessful because of  the opposition of the Palestinians. The respondent added that on that day (24 May 2004), after IDF troops left the Tel A-Sultan neighbourhood, 22 funerals took place, and there was nothing to prevent the participation of family members living in the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, as traffic between the neighbourhood and the area where the funerals took place was not held up by the IDF.

26. In their response (which was received on 24 May 2004), counsel for the petitioners said that, after making enquiries with the mayor of Rafah, it became clear that the residents in Rafah did indeed refuse the IDF’s proposals, which significantly limited the participation of the families in the funerals of their relatives. The residents preferred holding the funerals after the siege on the neighbourhoods was lifted, in order to ensure that the prayer for the dead would be recited and that a mourners’ tent would be erected for receiving condolences, as Islamic law mandates. We were further told that the mayor of Rafah announced that, in view of the end of the curfew on the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, the inhabitants of Rafah are organizing a mass funeral for the 23 dead in Rafah. The funeral will take place in the afternoon and is expected to continue until the late afternoon because of the large number of the dead.

27. The problem of burying the dead has been resolved. Nevertheless, there are lessons to learn from the incident. The premise is that the basic principle enshrined in art. 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, according to which the dignity of the local inhabitants must be protected, applies not only to the local inhabitants who are alive, but also to the dead (cf. art. 130 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; see Pictet, Commentary: Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, at p. 506; see also HCJ 3436/02 Custodia Internazionale di Terra Santa v. Government of Israel [13], at p. 25). Human dignity is the dignity of the living and the dignity of the dead (with regard to Israeli law, see: CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [14]; HCJFH 3299/93 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [15]; CA 6024/97 Shavit v. Rishon LeZion Jewish Burial Society [16]). ‘… The protection of the dead and their dignity is like the protection of the living and their dignity…’ (per Justice J. Türkel in HCJ 66/81 Inspector-General of Police v. Ramla Magistrates Court Judge Mr Baizer [17], at p. 353). It is the duty of the military commander to locate the bodies of the dead (see HCJ 3117/02 Centre for Defence of the Individual v. Minister of Defence [18], at p. 18). After bodies are found, he is obliged to ensure a dignified burial is held. In Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [6], which considered the duty of the military commander with regard to the bodies of persons killed in military operations, we said:

‘The basic premise is that, in the circumstances of the case, the responsibility for locating, identifying, evacuating and burying the dead rests with the respondents. This is their obligation under international law. The respondents accept this position, and they act accordingly…

… The location, identification and burial of the dead are very important humanitarian acts. They derive from respect for the dead — respect for all dead. They are fundamental to our being a state whose values are Jewish and democratic. The respondents declared that they are acting in accordance with this approach, and their approach seems correct to us…

… in the humanitarian sphere, it is usually possible to reach an understanding and an arrangement. Respect for the dead is important to us all, for man was created in the image of God. All the parties wish to finish the procedure of locating, identifying and burying the dead as soon as possible. The respondents are prepared to allow the participation of the Red Cross and, during the identification stage after the evacuation, also local authorities (subject to the specific decision of the military commander). In locating the bodies, everyone agrees that burials should be carried out with respect, in accordance with religious custom and as quickly as possible’ (ibid., at pp. 15-16 {43-45}).

            The army tried to act in accordance with these principles in the case before us. The dead were identified and transferred to A-Najar Hospital. During all these stages, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent were involved. The problem that arose in the case before us is the problem of burial. The respondent was naturally prepared to bury the dead, but he thought that when he transferred the bodies to A- Najar Hospital he had discharged his duty. This was not the case. The duty of the respondent is to ensure a dignified burial for the bodies. In this regard, he must speak with the local authorities, to the extent that they are functioning, and find dignified ways to carry out this duty. As is clear from the information presented to us, the main difficulty that presented itself was with regard to the participation of the relatives of the dead. This matter was within the control of the respondent, whose forces controlled all the entrances to the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan, and it was naturally conditional upon the security considerations. Prima facie it would appear that the proposals which he made in the end could have been made at an earlier stage. The changing position of the respondent, as it appears from the response of the State Attorney’s Office, implies that the matter was not originally taken into account, and the solutions that were proposed were improvisations made up on the spur of the moment. This should not happen. Preparations for dealing with this matter should have been made in advance. A clear procedure should be adopted with regard to the various steps that should be followed in this matter. Naturally, if in the final analysis the bodies are in a hospital and their relatives refuse to bury them, they should not be forced to do so. Nonetheless, everything should be done in order to reach an agreement on this matter.

Shelling on a procession    

28. The petitioners claim that on Wednesday, 19 May 2004, thousands of Palestinians from Rafah participated in a quiet and non-violent procession. They marched in the direction of the neighbourhood of Tel A-Sultan. None of the participants were armed or masked. The marchers included men and women, children and the elderly. Many of the marchers carried food and water, which they intended to bring to the residents of Tel A-Sultan, which had at that time been completely cut off from all outside contact for three days. While they were marching, three or four tank shells and two helicopter missiles were fired at them. According to reports from the participants in the procession, shots were fired also from the direction of the Tel Al-Zuareb observation post, which is an observation post manned by the IDF. The shooting at the crowd resulted in the deaths of eight civilians. About half the dead were minors. The petitioners request that we order an investigation by the Military Police Investigations Department. They also request that we order the respondent to issue an unequivocal order absolutely forbidding the shooting or shelling of civilian gatherings, even if there are armed men among them, if they do not pose an immediate danger to life.

29. Counsel for the respondent told us that an initial investigation was conducted immediately. It found that because of a mishap, a shell was fired at an abandoned building, and eight Palestinians were killed by shrapnel. One of these was an armed activist of the Islamic Jihad. The other seven victims were completely innocent. In this regard it was emphasized that there are considerable amounts of weapons in Rafah, including armour-piercing weapons. It was also emphasized that, in the past, terrorists have made many attempted to use civilians to attack the IDF. It was also feared that the protesters would climb onto the armoured vehicles with soldiers inside them. The procession took place in the middle of a war zone. There were armed elements among the marchers. In an initial attempt to speak with the marchers, an attempt was made to stop the procession. The attempt failed. Afterwards, deterrents were used. These also failed and the procession continued on its way. In these circumstances, it was then decided to fire a hollow shell at an abandoned building. As stated, the full investigation has not yet been completed. When it is completed, all the material will be passed on to the Chief Military Attorney, who will make a decision on the matter. The respondent further said in his written response that the rules for opening fire in effect in the IDF, including with regard to dealing with civilian gatherings, were formulated on the basis of the ethical and legal outlook of preventing harm to the innocent, in so far as possible. Nevertheless, he reiterated that this was a situation of active warfare and danger to our forces in an area densely populated with civilians, where those persons fighting against the army do not separate themselves from the civilian population, but hide within it. They deliberately use the population as a human shield, contrary to the basic rules of war, which amounts to a war crime.

30. The investigation of this tragic event has not yet been completed. All the material will be sent to the Chief Military Attorney. In these circumstances, there is no basis, at this stage, for any action on our part. The petitioners must wait for the results of the investigation and the decision of the Chief Military Attorney. It may be assumed that lessons will be learned, and if there is a need for changing the rules that are given to the army, that will be done. At this stage, in the absence of a factual basis, we can only repeat the obvious, that the army must employ all possible caution in order to avoid harming the civilian population, including one that is protesting against it. The necessary precautions are naturally a function of the circumstances, including the dangers facing civilians on the one hand and the army on the other (cf. CA 5604/94 Hemed v. State of Israel [19]).

The requested remedies

31. The petitioners set out in their petition a list of seven reliefs that they requested from us (see para. 4 supra). We have discussed six of the seven reliefs, with regard to the specific issues that the petitioners raised (see paras. 14 (water), 15 (electricity), 16 (medical equipment and medicines), 18 (food), 20 (evacuating the wounded), 27 (investigating the shooting that hit the procession)). This leaves the final relief. This is the petitioners’ request that we order respondent to allow the entry of a delegation of three doctors on behalf of the first petitioner (Physicians for Human Rights) into hospitals in the Gaza Strip, in order to assess the medical needs there, for the purpose of bringing in teams of the appropriate medical personnel and medical equipment.

32. In his written response, Col. Y. Mordechai said that any delegation of doctors from the first petitioner or any other authorized body may enter the area and visit the hospitals. The sole condition that the respondent made is that there are no Israelis among the visiting doctors. This is because of the fear that they may be harmed or taken hostage, an occurrence that will very seriously complicate the security situation. In this context, he said that there is already a team from the International Red Cross in the area, and that the head of the International Red Cross in Israel is in direct contact with the IDF. Within the framework of oral arguments, counsel for the respondent added that there is nothing to prevent a visit by doctors who are not Israelis but who work in Israeli hospitals. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent doctors from hospitals in Judea and Samaria, or hospitals in the Gaza Strip, from visiting and examining the situation. These proposals did not satisfy the petitioners, who insisted that Israeli doctors should be allowed to enter hospitals in the Gaza Strip.

33. We found nothing wrong with the respondent’s position in this matter. We are persuaded that the consideration underlying the respondent’s position is solely the security factor, and that he has no other non-security reason. Indeed, concerns for the welfare of Israelis who enter the Gaza Strip in general, and the war zone in particular, are very real. Even during periods when there was no military activity taking place the respondent acted in accordance with a similar consideration, and his reasoning was found to be lawful by the court. This was the case regarding the entry of Knesset members into the Gaza Strip (see HCJ 9293/01 Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [20]). This was also the case with regard to doctors from the first petitioner entering the Gaza Strip (see HCJ 3022/02 Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [21]). Israel has a duty to protect its citizens. It does not discharge this duty merely because some citizens are prepared to ‘take the risk on themselves.’ This ‘taking the risk’ is of no significance, because the state remains responsible for the safety of its citizens, and it must do everything in order to return them safely to Israel. Allowing the entry of Israeli doctors into a war zone in Gaza creates a real danger to the safety of the doctors and to the interests of the State. There is no reason to place the State in this danger. Beyond what is necessary, it should be noted that prima facie there should be no difficulty in the first petitioner finding three doctors who are not Israelis — whether in Gaza itself, in Judea and Samaria, in Israel or from the rest of the world — who will be prepared to carry out the required inspection on its behalf. In this matter the petition should be denied.

What of the future?

34. According to the humanitarian rules of international law, military activity has the following two requirements: first, that the rules of conduct should be taught to all combat soldiers and internalized by them, from the Chief of General Staff down to the private (see Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [11], at p. 5 {37}); second, that institutional arrangements are created to allow the implementation of these rules and putting them into practice during combat. An examination of the conduct of the army while fighting in Rafah, as it appears from the petition before us — and we only have what has been presented before us — indicates significant progress as compared with the position two years ago, as it appeared to us from the various petitions (see Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [6]; Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [11], etc.). This is the case regarding the internalization of the obligation to ensure water, medical equipment, medicines, food, evacuation of the wounded, and the burial of the dead. This is also the case regarding the preparedness of the army and the creation of arrangements for realizing the humanitarian obligations. The establishment of the humanitarian centre and the District Coordination Office, as well as the assignment of a liaison officer from the Coordination Office to each battalion have greatly facilitated the implementation of humanitarian principles.

35. Within the framework of the internalization of humanitarian laws, it should be emphasized that the duty of the military commander is not restricted merely to preventing the army from harming the lives and dignity of the local residents (the ‘negative’ duty: see para. 11 supra). He also has a ‘positive’ duty (ibid.). He must protect the lives and dignity of the local residents, all of which subject to the restrictions of time and place. Thus, for example, with regard to the burial of the local residents, the military commander was satisfied when the bodies were transferred to A-Najar Hospital, but this was not enough. He is obliged to do his utmost to ensure that the bodies are brought to a dignified burial according to local custom. The same is true with regard to advance preparations in order to ensure there are sufficient supplies of food and water in the area. Damage to the water supply is something that should be foreseen from the outset, and if it cannot be avoided, a solution to this problem must be arranged. Sufficient supplies of medicines, medical equipment and food should be prepared in advance. Harm to local inhabitants is to be expected and if, despite every effort to limit this, in the end there are casualties among the local inhabitants, preparations should be made for this from the outset. The respondent should not rely solely on international and Israeli aid organizations, even though their aid is important. The recognition that the basic obligation rests with the military commander must be internalized, and it is his job to carry out various measures from the outset so that he can fulfil his duty in times of war.

36. Within the framework of the institutional arrangements, additional measures should be adopted so that the arrangements that were created (see para. 3 supra) will be more effective. We were told that those who called the humanitarian centre waited for many hours. Col. Y. Mordechai said to us several times that matters should have been referred to him, and not to the humanitarian centre. The lack of information led, on several occasions, to inefficiency in aid provided by third parties. Thus, for example, a vehicle of the first petitioner laden with medical equipment and medicines waited at Erez Crossing when the entry point was at Karni Crossing. Moreover, even at Karni Crossing its entry was not allowed, because there were Israeli doctors in the vehicle, and the army was only prepared to allow the entry of doctors who were not Israelis. These issues and others need to be addressed. It is possible that the humanitarian centre needs to be enlarged, and there needs to be more effective communication between it and the District Coordination Office and the Coordination Office’s special liaison officers attached to the combat battalions. It is possible that there is a need — with regard to international and Israeli organizations whose humanitarian involvement is foreseen — to create a direct link between these and the officers of the DCO, thereby bypassing the humanitarian centre. It is possible that there is a need to take other measures. This matter is for the respondent to address when he studies the lessons to be learned from the current events.

37. Against this background, when the arguments in the petition were completed, we wished to ensure that the various military frameworks in the area solve not only the problems raised by the petitioners, but also new problems that, in the nature of things, will arise tomorrow. In this respect, it was agreed that Col. Mordechai would appoint a senior officer who will be in direct contact with the organizations of the petitioners. This is the least that could have been done around the time of the events themselves. The main steps that should be taken will come after studying the lessons at the end of the events.

38. Before we conclude, we wish to thank counsel for the petitioners, Advocate Fatima Al-Aju, who presented the position of the petitioners clearly and responsibly, and counsel for the respondent, Advocates Anar Helman and Yuval Roitman, who within a very short time provided us with the most comprehensive and up-to-date information possible. We also wish to thank Col. Y. Mordechai, who did well in explaining to us the details of the area and the activities of the respondent, and who did all he could to translate humanitarian norms into practice.

The result is that six of the seven reliefs that were requested by the petitioners have been satisfied. The petitioners are not entitled to the seventh relief — the entry of Israeli doctors on behalf of the first petitioner into the area in general and A-Najar Hospital in particular —  because of the danger that the doctors will be taken hostage. In this regard, the respondent’s proposal that doctors who are not Israeli (whether from the Gaza Strip, from Judea and Samaria, from Israel, or from anywhere else in the world), will be allowed to enter the area —  which was rejected by the petitioners — must suffice.

 

 

Justice J. Türkel

I agree.

 

 

            Justice D. Beinisch

I agree with the opinion of the President. I also accept his conclusions in principle, which focus on the duty of the IDF to fulfil its humanitarian obligations deriving from customary international law, from international law enshrined in treaties to which Israel is a party and from the basic rules of Israeli law, in so far as it concerns the obligations imposed on the army vis-à-vis the local civilian population during the fighting; I also accept, in particular, that all the special matters with regard to which operative relief was sought have been resolved as a result of the detailed clarification of the facts concerning the position in the area and from determining the specific obligations that should be imposed on the IDF in order to allow the minimum of normal life required by the civilian population with special reference to medicines, food, medical assistance, water, electricity, treating the wounded and burying the dead with dignity.

I can only join with the important operative conclusion set out in the opinion of the President, that any military operation requires advance preparation in order to deal with the basic requirements of the inhabitants who are in the line of fire during the fighting, or who are likely to be hurt by its consequences and ramifications. This advance preparation should take into account the humanitarian obligations to the civilian population, the possibility of harm to it, and the serious consequences that should be prevented or at least minimized.

Even if it is not possible to foresee every development that may take place during military operations, there is no doubt that the basic needs of the civilian population which at a time of war are in real danger of damage to life, property and basic subsistence, are known and foreseeable. Therefore, within the framework of the operative planning of a military operation, the army must also take into account that part that guarantees the fulfilment of the humanitarian obligations to the civilian population, which is caught between the cynical exploitation of terrorists without any inhibitions, and exposure to the activity of a military force operating against the terror infrastructure. The military forces operating among a civilian population therefore have the double responsibility discussed by my colleague, the President — the obligation to refrain, in so far as possible, from harming the inhabitants, and the positive obligation to ensure that these inhabitants are not harmed, or at least the obligation to minimize the suffering and distress of those persons who find themselves in the war zone and who are exposed to its serious dangers and ravages — all of which while taking into account the necessity arising from the military operations themselves, as required in accordance with the conditions of the time and place, and without derogating from the obligation of the military commander to protect the lives of the soldiers under his command.

Failure to comply with the humanitarian obligations means that those who are injured, and usually, for practical reasons, those organizations that represent them, may apply to the court, which exercises judicial review in times of war as in times of peace. However, the circumstances involved in the judicial review process during actual war time restrict the effectiveness of the judicial review and makes it difficult to implement the solutions sought through the court.

The court does not examine the wisdom of the policy underlying military operations, nor does it intervene in the considerations involved in determining the need for military action, and this was discussed by the President in his opinion. Judicial review, which refers to the rules of international and Israeli law in times of war, requires a detailed investigation of the issues concerning the upholding of the law. The problem is that judicial review concerning the fulfilment of humanitarian obligations during wartime is limited for many reasons. First, from a practical viewpoint, the urgency with which the court is required to hold the judicial review process, while dynamic developments are taking place in the field of battle, makes it difficult to carry out the process and to make an investigation of the facts required to authenticate the contentions of the parties. Unlike the process of judicial review in regular petitions, where the mechanism of ascertaining the facts takes place after they have occurred and the particulars has been clarified, and the factual picture has been set out before the court, judicial review that seeks to examine the need for relief when the combat activities are still in progress requires a judicial proceeding of a special kind, and the petition before us is a clear example of this. The petition was heard while the changes and developments in the field were taking place during the hearing itself. The parties that presented their arguments before us based their contentions on continuous reports from the field of battle, and these reports changed the circumstances and the facts during the hearing of the petition. The factual description of ascertaining the particulars as aforesaid finds expression in the opinion of the President. In such circumstances, the judicial review process is limited and suffers from the lack of adequate arrangements with which to ascertain the relevant particulars in order to examine them in real time and to grant effective relief for them.

Second, judicial review that takes place during combat brings the court closer to the war zone in a way that requires us to find a balance between the conflicting values, a balance that derives from the court’s need not to intervene in the combat operations themselves, and at the same time to ensure that the war is conducted within the framework of the law and while complying with humanitarian obligations. These constraints do not deter the court from exercising judicial review in real time and from making operative orders, in so far as these are required in order to comply with the obligations of the military commander to uphold the rules of law during the combat. Judicial review is exercised despite the constraints that we have discussed, and this is not the first time that we have examined the issue of complying with the humanitarian rules during combat, while the cannons roar and the sounds of gunfire are still heard in the war zone.

The burden placed on the combat forces in such circumstances is a heavy one, but the weight of the burden cannot provide an exemption from the duty to discharge it, and a condition for complying with it properly is the advance preparation required of the military commanders. I therefore agree with the President’s ruling that institutional arrangements must be created to implement the humanitarian rules required during times of combat. This requires the setting up of a proper infrastructure and logistic planning before military operations are commenced, inter alia as required by the scope of the planned military action. These must guarantee the supply of medical services, equipment and medicines, the possibility of sending these to the war zone, the supply of essential services to the civilian population, food and water, the preparation of alternatives to the existing infrastructure that may be damaged and proper preparation for evacuating the wounded and burying the dead. This also applies to the other issues that can be foreseen and anticipated. No less important is the necessity of having an effective mechanism whose purpose is to monitor the needs of the population, on the one hand, and coordinate with the auxiliary forces on which the army relies in such a situation — humanitarian organizations, local authorities and organizations that represent the population vis-à-vis the army, on the other hand. The facts surrounding such preparations are not at all simple in a reality such as ours, where we are dealing with a hostile population, a population that recoils from any measure that may be interpreted as collaboration, and a population that is cynically exploited by terror organizations for their own purposes. But the reality, no matter how difficult, is the reality within which framework the military commander must comply with the humanitarian rules even in time of war.

Preparing detailed guidelines, preparing a logistic system in advance and determining rules of conduct for the combat forces vis-à-vis the population that is being harmed, and also creating a direct mechanism for maintaining contact with the various organizations operating on behalf of and in the interests of the population — these are capable of ensuring an improvement in the position even if they do not guarantee, in the very difficult reality that Israel finds itself, optimal solutions. These arrangements are capable of guaranteeing an aspiration to minimize the harm to the civilian population, compliance with the rules of international and Israeli law, and the adopting of measures to find effective solutions while reducing the need for judicial intervention to achieve the objectives of the law.

 

Petitions denied.

10 Sivan 5764.

30 May 2004.

 

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