Constitutional Law

Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd. v. Rosenzweig

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5026/04
Date Decided: 
Monday, April 4, 2005
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner, a company that owns a chain of furniture shops, was fined for employing Jews on the Sabbath, contrary to the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951. Subsequently, the petitioner applied under the law for a permit to employ Jews on the Sabbath, but this application was rejected by the first respondent. The petitioner therefore filed a petition in the Supreme Court, arguing that the first respondent’s refusal to grant a permit was unreasonable in the extreme, in view of the economic loss that the petitioner was caused by not being able to employ Jews on the Sabbath. The petitioner further argued that the Hours of Work and Rest Law was unconstitutional, since it violated the basic human right of freedom of occupation.

 

Held: The Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which was originally enacted in 1992, has since 2002 applied not only to laws passed after the Basic Law was introduced but also to laws passed before it came into effect. Therefore the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, is subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

The provisions of the Hours of Work and Rest Law concerning the weekly day of rest satisfy the constitutional tests, since they befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, are intended for a proper purpose and are not excessive.

 

The refusal of the first respondent to grant the first petitioner a permit to employ Jews on the Sabbath was not unreasonable, since the first petitioner failed to present a factual basis to show that its activity during the hours of the weekly rest was essential for the public or a part thereof.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 5026/04

Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd

and 18 others

v

1. Tzvika Rosenzweig, Director of Sabbath Work Permits Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

2. Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment

3. Attorney-General

4. Knesset

5. Haifa Regional Labour Court

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[4 April 2005]

Before President A. Barak and Justices A. Procaccia, M. Naor

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner, a company that owns a chain of furniture shops, was fined for employing Jews on the Sabbath, contrary to the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951. Subsequently, the petitioner applied under the law for a permit to employ Jews on the Sabbath, but this application was rejected by the first respondent. The petitioner therefore filed a petition in the Supreme Court, arguing that the first respondent’s refusal to grant a permit was unreasonable in the extreme, in view of the economic loss that the petitioner was caused by not being able to employ Jews on the Sabbath. The petitioner further argued that the Hours of Work and Rest Law was unconstitutional, since it violated the basic human right of freedom of occupation.

 

Held: The Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which was originally enacted in 1992, has since 2002 applied not only to laws passed after the Basic Law was introduced but also to laws passed before it came into effect. Therefore the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, is subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

The provisions of the Hours of Work and Rest Law concerning the weekly day of rest satisfy the constitutional tests, since they befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, are intended for a proper purpose and are not excessive.

The refusal of the first respondent to grant the first petitioner a permit to employ Jews on the Sabbath was not unreasonable, since the first petitioner failed to present a factual basis to show that its activity during the hours of the weekly rest was essential for the public or a part thereof.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Administrative Offences Law, 5746-1985, s. 8.

Administrative Offences (Administrative Fine — Hours of Work and Rest) Regulations, 5758-1998, rr. 1, 2.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5752-1992, s. 6.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, ss. 2, 4, 10.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (Amendment).

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (Amendment no. 2).

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 5.

Government and Justice Arrangements Ordinance, 5708-1948, s. 18A.

Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, ss. 7, 9, 9A, 12, 12(a), 26(a), 27, 30.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]  LCA 10687/02 Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 1.

[2]  HCJ 1/49 Bajerno v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80.

[3]  HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.

[4]  HCJ 144/72 Lipevsky-Halipi v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 719.

[5]  HCJ 338/87 Margaliot v. Minister of Interior [1988] IsrSC 42(1) 112.

[6]  HCJ 1452/93 Igloo Plumbing Works, Building & Development Contracting Co. Ltd v. Minister of Industry and Trade [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 610.

[7]  CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 221.

[8]  HCJ 2334/02 Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [2004] IsrSC 58(1) 786.

[9]  HCJ 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 243.

[10]  CA 239/92 Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 66.

[11]  HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 235.

[12]  HCJ 1030/99 Oron v. Knesset Speaker [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 640.

[13]  HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 367.

[14]  AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 782.

[15]  HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186.

[16]  HCJ 1683/93 Yavin Plast Ltd v. National Labour Court [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 702.

[17]  HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324.

[18]  HCJ 6652/96 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 117.

[19]  HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [1998] IsrSC 52(2) 433.

[20]  HCJ 6055/95 Tzemah v. Minister of Defence [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241; [1998-9] IsrLR 635.

[21]  HCJ 5936/97 Lam v. Director-General of Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 673; [1998-9] IsrLR 537.

[22]  HCJ 4330/93 Ganem v. Tel-Aviv District Committee, Bar Association [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 221.

[23]  HCJ 1008/01 Arkia Israel Airlines Ltd v. Minister of Transport [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 207.

[24]  HCJ 953/01 Solodkin v. Beit Shemesh Municipality [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 595; [2004] IsrLR 232.

[25]  HCJ 7852/98 Golden Channels & Co. v. Minister of Communications [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 423.

[26]  HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 193.

[27]  HCJ 4915/00 Communications and Productions Network Co. (1992) Ltd v. Government of Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 451.

[28]  HCJ 5812/00 Samandin Mediterranean Sea v. Director of Oil Concerns at Ministry of National Infrastructures [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 312.

[29]  HCJ 4676/94 Meatreal Ltd v. Knesset [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 15.

[30]  CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 529.

[31]  HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255.

[32]  HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229.

[33]  EDA 11280/02 Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [2003] IsrSC 57(4) 1.

[34]  LCA 2316/96 Isaacson v. Parties Registrar [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 529.

[35]  CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 87; [1992-4] IsrLR 170.

[36]  HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149.

[37]  CrimA 217/68 Isramax Ltd v. State of Israel [1968] IsrSC 22(2) 343.

[38]  HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 337.

[39]  HCJ 171/78 Eshkar Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 141.

[40]  HCJ 5073/91 Israel Theatres Ltd v. Netanya Municipality [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 192.

[41]  HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 412.

[42]  HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 1.

[43]  HCJ 8238/96 Abu Arar v. Minister of Interior [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 26.

[44]  HCJ 1255/94 Bezeq, the Israel Telecommunication Corp. Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 661.

[45]  HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [1999] IsrSC 53(2) 728.

[46]  HCJ 4644/00 Jaffora Tabori Ltd v. Second Television and Radio Authority [2000] IsrSC 54(4) 178.

[47]  HCJ 9232/01 Noah, the Israeli Federation of Animal Protection Organizations v. Attorney-General [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 212; [2002-3] IsrLR 225.

[48]  HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264.

 

Israel District Court cases cited:

[49]  CrimC (Jer) 3471/87 State of Israel v. Caplan [1988] IsrDC 5748(2) 265.

 

Israel National Labour Court cases cited:

[50]  LabA 300271/98 Tepco Energy Control Systems and Environment Production Ltd v. Tal, IsrLC 35 703.

[51]  LabA 255/99 Civil Security Ltd v. Shahidem (unreported).

 

American cases cited:

[52]  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

 

Canadian cases cited:

[53]  R. v. Edwards Books and Art [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[54]  Deuteronomy 5, 11-15.

[55]  Exodus 20, 8-11.

 

For the petitioner — R. Krupnik.

For respondents 1-3 — H. Ofek.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

President A. Barak

Is the prohibition against the employment of Jews on the Sabbath[1] under the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation? That is the main question before us in this petition.

The facts

1.    The first petitioner, a furniture marketing company with branches throughout Israel, employs Jewish employees at its branches (petitioners 2-19). These branches are open every day of the week, including on the Sabbath. On 12 March 2003, a fixed-sum administrative fine was imposed on the petitioner in the sum of NIS 15,000, under s. 8 of the Administrative Offences Law, 5746-1985, and rr. 1-2 of the Administrative Offences (Administrative Fine — Hours of Work and Rest) Regulations, 5758-1998. The fine was imposed because of the employment of Jewish employees during the ‘weekly rest,’ contrary to ss. 9, 9A, 26(a) and 27 of the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951 (hereafter — the Hours of Work and Rest Law). When it received the notice that the fine had been imposed, the petitioner applied to the first respondent to receive a permit to employ Jewish employees on Sabbaths and religious holidays. At the same time, the petitioner elected to stand trial, and therefore on 22 May 2003 an indictment was filed against it in the Haifa District Labour Court. An application that it submitted to the Attorney-General to stay the proceedings in the file was rejected on 10 May 2004. This was the reason for the petition, which requires the respondents to come and show cause why the provisions of the law that prohibit the work and employment of Jews on the Sabbath should not be repealed, and why the petitioner should not be given a permit under the Hours of Work and Rest Law.

The petition

2.    The petition aims to achieve two main reliefs. In the constitutional sphere, the petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the provisions of the Hours of Work and Rest Law that prohibit the employment of Jews on the Sabbath. It argues that these provisions violate the freedom of occupation that is enshrined in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and they do not satisfy the conditions of the limitations clause. According to the petitioner, the prohibition of employment on the Sabbath violates the right to freedom of occupation and causes significant economic harm to it and to its employees. It argues that if it is compelled to close its branches on the Sabbath, this will lead to a restriction of its activity and even to the closure of some of its branches that will not be competitive with other companies that do business in the marketing of furniture. It says that its branches are located far away from residential areas and that opening them on the Sabbath does not disturb other people who wish to enjoy rest on the Sabbath. The petitioner does not dispute the need for a day of weekly rest, but it complains that this day has been designated only on the Sabbath. It argues that the employee should be allowed to choose what day of rest he prefers, and act accordingly. In the administrative sphere, the petitioner attacks the discretion of the respondent who refused its request for an employment permit on the Sabbath. According to it, this discretion is unreasonable and disproportionate in the extreme. The unreasonableness derives from the fact that the respondent did not consider the economic harm that is likely to be caused to the petitioner and its employees, who are interested in working on the Sabbath. The petitioner also argues that the respondent ignored its undertaking that it any case its employees would have a weekly rest, in accordance with the law.

3.    The first three respondents ask the court to deny the petition. According to them, the prohibition against working on the Sabbath serves two purposes. One is a social purpose that is based upon a concept of social welfare, which recognizes the right of a person to rest from his work. Repealing the prohibition against employment on the Sabbath will lead, so it is alleged, to an injury to workers from the weaker echelons of society, who require the protection of the legislature against potential exploitation by their employers. The second is a national religious purpose, which realizes the social purpose. It is argued that the Sabbath is the weekly day of rest for Jews, and therefore it is only logical that the legislature prescribed this day as the day of rest in the law. Prescribing a uniform day of rest is capable of furthering the purposes of the day of rest and contributing to the realization of an ‘atmosphere of rest,’ which is consistent with the accepted outlook around the world. With regard to the alleged constitutional violation, the respondents are of the opinion that the purpose underlying the prohibition of employment on the Sabbath befits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, is for a proper purpose and its violation of the freedom of occupation is proportional. The respondents further argue that the question of the constitutionality of employment on the Sabbath has already been decided in this court, in the decision, per Justice D. Dorner, in LCA 10687/02 Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1], in which it was held that the provisions of the law are not void notwithstanding the violation of the freedom of occupation. As for the petitioner’s claim with regard to defects that occurred in the decision of the respondent not to give it a permit for employment on the Sabbath, it was argued that the petitioner does not satisfy the criteria in s. 12 of the law, and therefore its application was rejected.

The normative framework

4.    Section 7 of the Hours of Work and Rest Law provides:

‘Hours of the weekly rest

7. (a) At least thirty six consecutive hours per week are the weekly rest of the worker.

 

(b) The weekly rest shall include —

 

(1) For a Jew — the Sabbath;

 

(2) For someone who is not a Jew — the Sabbath or Sunday or Friday, all of which in accordance with what is acceptable to him as his day of weekly rest.’

Further on the legislature provided that no one should be employed or work during the weekly rest, unless work as aforesaid has been permitted (ss. 9, 9A and 12 of the law, respectively):

‘Prohibition of employment during the weekly rest

9.  Employing a worker during the weekly rest is prohibited, unless it has been permitted under section 12.

 

 

Prohibition of work during the weekly rest

9A. (a) On the prescribed days of rest within the meaning thereof in the Government and Justice Arrangements Ordinance, 5708-1948, the owner of a workshop shall not work in his workshop, not shall the owner of a factory work in his factory, nor shall the owner of a shop trade in his shop.

 

     …

 

 

Permit for employment during the weekly rest

12. (a) The Minister of Labour may permit the employment of a worker during the hours of the weekly rest, or during a part thereof, if he is persuaded that stopping the work for all or part of the weekly rest is likely to harm the defence of the state or the safety of persons or property, or seriously to damage the economy, the work process or the supply of necessities that are, in the opinion of the Minister of Labour, essential for the public or for a part thereof.

 

     (b) A general permit under subsection (a) shall only be given by a decision of a ministerial committee composed of the prime minister, the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Labour.

 

     (c) A special permit under subsection (a) shall give details of the professions or jobs of the workers for whom the permit was given or the departments at the place of work for whose workers the permit was given.’

Against the background of these sections, let us turn to examine the petitioners’ arguments.

The constitutional scrutiny

5.    Freedom of occupation has been a basic right in Israeli law since the founding of the state. Before the enactment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, it was a part of the Israeli version of common law. This was discussed, shortly after the founding of the state, by Justice S.Z. Cheshin, who said:

‘It is a major principle that every person has a natural right to engage in such work or occupation as he shall choose for himself, as long as engaging in work or an occupation is not prohibited by law… this is their right. It is a right that is not written in statute, but it derives from the natural right of every person to look for sources of livelihood and find for himself work by means of which he can support himself’ (HCJ 1/49 Bajerno v. Minister of Police [2], at p. 82).

Since the court gave its decision in Bajerno v. Minister of Police [2], the Supreme Court has affirmed it on several occasions (see A. Barak, Legal Interpretation (vol. 3, 1994), at p. 574). The following remarks of Justice M. Shamgar are well known:

‘The premise that is accepted in a free society is that a person may engage in any work or occupation, as long as no restrictions or prohibitions are prescribed with regard thereto, and these should only be imposed and enforced by the express provision of statute’ (HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [3], at p. 353).

The main case law emphasis has been directed towards the question of the circumstances in which it is possible to interpret a legislative arrangement as one in which there is an express restriction or express prohibition on the freedom of occupation. The basic approach was that the legislator may restrict the freedom of occupation, provided that he expressed this desire clearly, expressly and unambiguously (see Miterani v. Minister of Transport [3], at p. 353; HCJ 144/72 Lipevsky-Halipi v. Minister of Justice [4], at p. 723; HCJ 338/87 Margaliot v. Minister of Interior [5], at p. 114). It follows that no constitutional restrictions were placed on the power of the legislature to harm the freedom of occupation (see Y. Klinghoffer, ‘Freedom of Occupation and Licensing of Businesses,’ 3 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1973) 582; see also HCJ 1452/93 Igloo Plumbing Works, Building & Development Contracting Co. Ltd v. Minister of Industry and Trade [6]).

6.    When the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was passed, a major change took place in the normative arrangement (a ‘constitutional revolution’ in the words of my opinion in CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 353; see also Barak, ‘The Constitutional Revolution — Twelve Years On,’ 1 Law and Business (Mishpat veAsakim) 3 (2004)). The freedom of occupation underwent a change in its normative status (see HCJ 2334/02 Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [8], at p. 791). It became a constitutional super-legislative right (see HCJ 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [9]; CA 239/92 Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [10]; HCJ 4769/95 Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11]; HCJ 1030/99 Oron v. Knesset Speaker [12], at p. 658). The Knesset (as a constitutive body) restricted the power of the Knesset (as a legislative body) to harm the freedom of occupation (see HCJ 1715/97 Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [13], at p. 383). It is not sufficient for the law to impose a restriction on the freedom of occupation expressly, clearly and unambiguously. The constitutionality of this restriction must satisfy the requirements of the limitations clause (s. 4 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). This leads to the conclusion that ‘the legality of a certain occupation does not constitute a criterion when examining the constitutionality of the freedom to engage in that occupation. The constitutionality of this criminal prohibition shall be determined in accordance with its compliance with the conditions prescribed in the limitations clause’ (per Justice A. Grunis, in AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [14], at p. 803). Only when these requirements are satisfied can the freedom of occupation be violated. This also gives expression to the idea that the freedom of occupation, like every other human right, is not absolute. It is relative in nature. ‘It is a major principle of ours that every basic right is not absolute but relative, and it is upheld and observed by finding the proper balance between the various legitimate interests of two individuals or of the individual and the public, interests that are all enshrined and protected in law’ (per Vice-President M. Elon in HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [15], at p. 242 {___}; see also HCJ 1683/93 Yavin Plast Ltd v. National Labour Court [16]; Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [13], at p. 383; Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [8], at p. 791; Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 258). A balance should be found between it and proper considerations of the public good (‘horizontal balancing’: see HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [17], at p. 475 {___}).

7.    In the original Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (enacted on 12 March 1992) there was a temporary provision to the effect that laws enacted prior to the Basic Law would remain in force. Originally it was provided that legislation that was valid prior to the commencement of the Basic Law, which conflicted with the provisions of the Basic Law, would remain valid until two years had passed from the date of commencement of the Basic Law (s. 6). When the original Basic Law was repealed and replaced by a new Basic Law on 10 March 1994, the temporary provision was extended for two years from the date of commencement of the new Basic Law (s. 10). In the amendment made to the Basic Law in 5757-1996 (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (Amendment)) — an amendment that was made after the two years provided in the temporary provision had expired (see HCJ 6652/96 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Interior [18]) — it was provided that a law that conflicted with the provisions of the Basic Law would remain valid until four years had expired from the date of commencement of the Basic Law. This provision was changed in 5758-1998 (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (Amendment no. 2)) — once again after the four years had expired — and it was provided that legislation that was valid before the commencement of the Basic Law would remain valid until 11 Nissan 5762 (14 March 2002). When this date passed, the provision was not changed. It follows that after March 2002 there is no constitutional protection for a law that was valid before the commencement of the Basic Law and that conflicts with the provisions of the Basic Law. It therefore became possible to examine whether legislation — whether it was enacted before the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was passed, or whether it was enacted subsequently — violates the freedom of occupation, without satisfying the provisions of the limitations clause. Therefore one of the laws that is now subject to constitutional scrutiny is the Hours of Work and Rest Law.

8.    Since United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], it is accepted that, for the sake of clear analysis and precise thinking, the constitutional scrutiny is carried out in three stages (see ibid. [7], at p. 428; HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [19], at p. 440; HCJ 6055/95 Tzemah v. Minister of Defence [20], at p. 258 {___}; Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 259; Oron v. Knesset Speaker [12], at p. 657; Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [8], at p. 792). The first stage examines whether a law violates the freedom of occupation, as it is defined in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. For this purpose, we must of course interpret the constitutional provision concerning freedom of occupation (constitutional interpretation) and the provision of the law that is alleged to violate it (legislative interpretation). If there is no violation, the constitutional scrutiny ends. If there is a violation, the constitutional scrutiny progresses to the second stage. The second stage examines whether the violation of the freedom of occupation satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause. If these requirements are satisfied, the constitutional scrutiny ends. If the requirements of the limitations clause are not satisfied, we must progress to the next stage. The third stage examines the constitutional remedy. Let us now turn to the constitutional scrutiny that is required in the case before us.

First stage: does the Hours of Work and Rest Law violate the freedom of occupation?

9.    Section 3 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides:

‘Freedom of occupation

3.  Every citizen or resident of the state is entitled to engage in any occupation, profession or trade.’

I discussed the purpose underlying this provision in one case, where I said:

‘The freedom of occupation as a constitutional right is derived from the autonomy of the individual will. It is an expression of how a person defines himself. By means of freedom of occupation, a person shapes his personality and his status and contributes to the social fabric. This is true according to the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state. It is also true according to the values of the state as a Jewish state. Work makes man unique and is an expression of the image of God in him’ (Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [13], at p. 383; see also Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 256).

Indeed, the freedom of occupation is the freedom of the individual to engage (or not to engage) in any occupation, trade or profession as he sees fit. This is mainly a ‘protective’ right that usually acts against a violation thereof by a government authority (see HCJ 5936/97 Lam v. Director-General of Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [21], at p. 692 {___}). It follows that any legislative arrangement that restricts the liberty of the citizen or the resident to enter into an occupation, profession or trade, or to manage them as he chooses, violates his freedom of occupation:

‘Freedom of occupation is the freedom to act within the framework of an occupation, profession or trade, without prohibitions or restrictions. An act of the government that imposes restrictions on the manner of realizing an occupation, profession or trade, violates… the freedom of occupation’ (HCJ 4330/93 Ganem v. Tel-Aviv District Committee, Bar Association [22], at p. 233).

Therefore, any provision in the law that requires a permit or licence to conduct business violates the freedom of occupation:

‘The law imposes a duty of licensing. A business that was “free” from any licensing obligation becomes a profession when admission into it becomes “regulated.” This transition violates the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation’ (Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [19], at p. 442).

It has therefore been held that the need for a licence in order to practise as a lawyer is a law that violates the freedom of occupation (see Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [8]. at p. 791); the need for a license in order to be a pilot violates the freedom of occupation (HCJ 1008/01 Arkia Israel Airlines Ltd v. Minister of Transport [23], at p. 214); the need for a permit in order to do business as an employment agency violates the freedom of occupation (see Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [19]); the need for a licence in order to operate a taxi violates the freedom of occupation (see Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 261); the need for a permit in order to operate a business that involves gambling violates the freedom of occupation (see Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [14]). This license or permit can relate to the place or substance of the occupation (such as a licence to sell pig meat within the boundaries of a local authority: HCJ 953/01 Solodkin v. Beit Shemesh Municipality [24], at para. 21); a licence to sell a television cable package (HCJ 7852/98 Golden Channels & Co. v. Minister of Communications [25], at p. 429); a licence for gambling within the framework of a members’ club (Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [14]). Finally, the freedom of occupation applies also to the freedom of competition without interference by the state and equality of opportunity (see HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Freight Airlines Ltd v. Prime Minister [26], at p. 227; HCJ 4915/00 Communications and Productions Network Co. (1992) Ltd v. Government of Israel [27], at p. 463; HCJ 5812/00 Samandin Mediterranean Sea v. Director of Oil Concerns at Ministry of National Infrastructures [28], at p. 347; Oron v. Knesset Speaker [12], at p. 658; Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 256; Arkia Israel Airlines Ltd v. Minister of Transport [23]).

10. Against this background, it follows that the provisions of the Hours of Work and Rest Law that prohibit work during the weekly rest violate the freedom of occupation. ‘The prohibition of working on the Sabbath violates the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, as defined in s. 3 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation’ (per Justice D. Dorner in Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1], at p. 5). The restriction on occupation concerns time. It does not address the content or character of the occupation, but the hours when it takes place. The Hours of Work and Rest Law violates the realization of a person’s will to develop his business during the hours of the weekly rest. This violation of freedom of occupation exists whether we are speaking of a private business or a corporation. Both the former and the latter have a right to freedom of occupation. Moreover, the prohibition of working on the Sabbath also violates the freedom of occupation of the worker, who wishes to work in the business on the Sabbath. The prohibition also sometimes violates the freedom of competition of the owner of the business. In view of this conclusion, with regard to the existence of a fundamental violation of the freedom of occupation, we do not need to examine whether the Hours of Work and Rest Law violates additional human rights, such as the right to freedom of religion and freedom from religion (see HCJ 4676/94 Meatreal Ltd v. Knesset [29] and cf. R. v. Edwards Books and Art [53]). Indeed, in the petition before us the constitution debate focused merely on the violation of freedom of occupation by the Hours of Work and Rest Law. Within this framework, the respondents agreed that ‘the Hours of Work and Rest Law does involve a violation of the employer’s freedom of occupation’ (para. 16 of the respondents’ reply). Their argument was that this violation satisfies the requirements of the limitations clause. Let us now turn to this question, which constitutes the second stage of the constitutional scrutiny.

Second stage: does the Hours of Work and Rest Law satisfy the requirements of the limitations clause?

11. A law that violates the freedom of occupation is not unconstitutional for that reason alone. There are many laws that violate constitutional human rights without thereby becoming unconstitutional. For example, the penal laws, the laws concerning arrests and extradition, violate the prohibition against denying or restricting ‘a person’s liberty… by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or in any other way’ (s. 5 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). No one claims that all these laws are unconstitutional (see CrimA 4424/98 Silgado v. State of Israel [30]). We must distinguish between the scope of the right and the protection given to it; between the application of the right and the ability to realize it (see HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [31], at p. 270; HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [32], at p. 33 {___}; A. Barak, Legal Interpretation (vol. 3, 1994), at p. 371). The scope of human rights is also broader than the protection given to them and the ability to realize them under the law. Indeed, human rights are the rights of a person as a part of society. It is possible to restrict human rights in order to realize social goals. Only when these goals are realized is it possible to have human rights. ‘The constitutional right and the violation thereof derive from a common source’ (United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 433). This is why the limitations clause is so central. It is the fulcrum where we find the constitutional balance between the private person and the public, the individual and society. It reflects the approach that alongside human rights there are also human duties (ibid. [7]). The limitations clause has a double function: it is intended to ensure that the human rights provided in the Basic Laws are only violated when certain conditions are fulfilled; it provides the conditions for violating human rights (see United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 433; Stanger v. Knesset Speaker [8], at p. 793). Thus we see that human rights are not absolute; they can be restricted. Notwithstanding, there are limits to the restrictions that can be placed on human rights. These are set out in the limitations clause.

12. The limitations clause in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides (in s. 4):

‘Violation of freedom of occupation

4.  Freedom of occupation may only be violated by a law that befits the values of the State of Israel, is intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent that is not excessive, or under a law as stated by virtue of an express authorization therein.

This clause provides that it is possible to violate the freedom of occupation, and the violation will be constitutional, if the violation satisfies the following conditions: (a) the violation is made by a law or under a law by virtue of an express authorization in the law; (b) the law violating freedom of occupation befits the values of the State of Israel; (c) the law violating freedom of occupation is for a proper purpose; (d) the violation caused by the law to the freedom of occupation is to an extent that is not excessive. For a law that violates the freedom of occupation to pass the constitutional scrutiny in the limitations clause, it must satisfy the four requirements. Are these requirements satisfied by the Hours of Work and Rest Law?

13. The first requirement of the limitations clause is that the violation of the freedom of occupation is made ‘by a law.’ We do not need to examine the significance of this expression (see Barak, Legal Interpretation, supra, at p. 489). There is no dispute that the Hours of Work and Rest Law is a law. The first requirement provided in the limitations clause is satisfied.

14. The second requirement provided in the limitations clause is that the law that violates freedom of occupation ‘befits the values of the State of Israel.’ The limitations clause does not define these values. These can be derived from the purpose clause in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides:

‘Purpose

2.  The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect freedom of occupation in order to enshrine in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’

Thus we see that the ‘values of the State of Israel’ (the limitations clause) are ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (the purpose clause) (see A. Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (2004), at pp. 82, 345), What are these values and does the Hours of Work and Rest Law befit them?

15. We have no need, within the framework of the petition before us, to examine in detail the combination of constitutional terms ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish… state’ and ‘the values of the State of Israel as a… democratic state.’ For the purposes of the petition before us the following three points are sufficient: first, the State of Israel is a Jewish state. I discussed this in one case, where I said that:

‘There are many democratic states. Only one of them is Jewish. Indeed, the reason for the existence of the State of Israel is that it is a Jewish state. This character is central to its existence’ (EDA 11280/02 Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [33], at p. 21).

Similarly it has been said:

‘The fact that Israel is a Jewish state lies at the heart of our existence here… the Jewish people established the Jewish state. This is the beginning and from this we will continue the journey’ (per Justice M. Cheshin in LCA 2316/96 Isaacson v. Parties Registrar [34], at p. 547).

The Jewish state has two main aspects: a Zionist aspect and a traditional-religious aspect (see Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [33], at p. 22; Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra, at p. 87). The Zionist aspect is based on the world of Zionism. The traditional-religious aspect is based on the world of Judaism. Underlying the essence of these two aspects — without exhausting them —

‘… lies the right of every Jew to immigrate to the State of Israel; that Jews will constitute a majority therein; Hebrew is the main official language of the State, and its main religious holidays and symbols reflect the national revival of the Jewish people. Jewish tradition is a central element in its religious and cultural heritage’ (Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [33], at p. 22).

Thus we see that ‘a Jewish state’ is a rich and multi-faceted concept. Second, the State of Israel is a democratic state. Underlying the essence of democracy — without exhausting this concept — are several characteristics. These are based on —

‘… a recognition of the sovereignty of the people as reflected in free and equal elections; a recognition in the essence of human rights, including dignity and equality, the principle of the separation of powers, the rule of law and an independent judiciary’ (Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [33], at p. 23).

Indeed, democracy is based on both the sovereignty of the people and the rule of values that characterize democracy. There is no democracy merely with the sovereignty of the people; there is no democracy merely with the rule of democratic values. So we see that the world of democracy is multi-dimensional and complex (see Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra, at p. 90). Third, the constitutional interpreter should make an effort to achieve an accord and harmony between the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state and its values as a democratic state. Indeed, the expression ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ should be regarded as one idea that is comprised of two elements (Jewish and democratic). Between the two there should be a synthesis and compatibility. ‘Judges, as faithful interpreters of the constitutional text, should do everything in order to achieve this synthesis’ (Central Elections Committee for the Sixteenth Knesset v. Tibi [33], at p. 19). The interpreter should find what is common to both and what unites them. Justice M. Elon rightly said that:

‘It is in the nature of such a synthesis that it seeks what is common to both systems, the Jewish and the democratic, the principles that are common to both, or at least that can be reconciled with them’ (CA 506/88 Shefer v. State of Israel [35], at p. 167 {277}; see also the books and articles cited in Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra, at p. 437, note 345).

16. Does the prohibition against employing someone and working during the weekly rest, which is provided in ss. 9 and 9A of the Hours of Work and Rest Law, befit the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? As we shall see (in para. 20 below), these prohibitions are based on the social need to provide hours of weekly rest to the worker by determining one uniform day of rest that will allow a whole family to be together on the day of rest. This involves a determination based on a religious-national consideration that the weekly rest will include ‘for a Jew — the Sabbath; for someone who is not a Jew — the Sabbath or Sunday or Friday, all of which in accordance with what is acceptable to him as his day of weekly rest’ (s. 7). This determination befits the values of the State of Israel, both as a Jewish state and as a democratic state. Normative unity and harmony, to which we are obliged to aspire, is thereby achieved. This was discussed by Justice D. Dorner, who said:

‘Prescribing the day of rest for Jews on the Sabbath realizes the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state. These two values combine in full harmony in the law under discussion’ (Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1], at p. 5).

17. The values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state well befit the prohibition of employing persons and working during the weekly rest, which is the Sabbath for Jews, and Sunday or Friday for non-Jews. This is the case both for social reasons and for national-religious reasons. An expression of this can be found in the fourth of the Ten Commandments:

‘Observe the day of the Sabbath to sanctify it as the Lord your God commanded you. Six days shall you labour and do all your work. And the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your God; you shall not do any work, either yourself or your son or your daughter or your man-servant or your maid-servant or your ox or your ass or any animal of yours or your stranger that is within your gates, so that your man-servant and your maid-servant shall rest as you do. And you shall remember that you were a slave in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God took you out from there with a strong hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God has commanded you to keep the day of the Sabbath’ (Deuteronomy 5, 11-15 [54]]; for a slightly different text, see Exodus 20, 8-11 [55]).

Indeed, the social aspect and the national-religious aspect of a weekly rest is a golden thread that runs through the world of Jewish religious law. The combination of these two led to the result that observance of the Sabbath became a central element of Judaism. I discussed this in one case where I said:

‘Observance of the Sabbath is a central value in Judaism. The Sabbath is the fourth of the Ten Commandments. It constitutes an original and important Jewish contribution to world culture… it constitutes a cornerstone in Jewish tradition. It is a symbol that clearly expresses the nature of Judaism and the character of the Jewish people. Remove the Sabbath from Judaism and you have removed its soul. Indeed, the Sabbath is a synopsis of the character of Judaism. Many of our people have given their lives for the Sabbath over the course of our bloodstained history’ (HCJ 5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transport [36], at p. 43 {___}).

In a similar spirit, Justice Dorner said:

‘Judaism, which bequeathed to mankind the concept of the weekly day of rest, sanctified the Sabbath as the day of rest of the Jewish people. The Sabbath is a national value no less than a religious value. “The Sabbath is the most ingenious creation of the Jewish spirit” wrote H.N. Bialik… and Ahad HaAm said: “Whoever feels in his heart a real connection with the life of the people throughout the generations cannot in any way imagine a reality of the Jewish people without its Sabbath queen” ’ (Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1], at p. 5).

18. The prohibition of employing someone and of working provided in the Hours of Work and Rest Law befits the values of the State of Israel as a democratic state. The social need to ensure hours of a weekly rest for the worker, while determining a uniform day of rest for all the workers in the economy, in order to allow joint family activity, and by choosing hours of rest against a background of national-religious considerations — the Sabbath for Jews and Friday or Sunday for non-Jews — befits the values of the State of Israel in a democratic state. This was discussed by President S. Adler, who said:

‘The Hours of Work and Rest Law should be interpreted as a law that gives expression to a proper social policy. This policy provides a normative framework of hours of work in the economy and prevents an employee and his employer from agreeing to a framework of work hours that harms the employee’s quality of life. The law restricts the freedom of the individual to determine his work hours, but the purpose in this restriction is to protect the worker against a violation of his humanity. The initial purpose is to advance the quality of life and to protect the dignity of whoever does work by limiting the work day, and thereby in practice defining also the hours of rest’ (LabA 300271/98 Tepco Energy Control Systems and Environment Production Ltd v. Tal [50], at p. 710).

A democratic state seeks to guarantee the rest of the worker and the family bonds that exist if all members of the family have one uniform day of rest. A democratic state takes religious feelings into account in that the day of rest is determined on a religious and national basis. An expression of this can be found in the Weekly Rest (Commerce and Offices) Convention, 1957 (Treaties 12, 693), which provides that all human beings subject to the convention shall ‘be entitled to an uninterrupted weekly rest period comprising not less than 24 hours in the course of each period of seven days’ (art. 6(1)). The convention further provides that ‘The weekly rest period shall, wherever possible, coincide with the day of the week established as a day of rest by the traditions or customs of the country or district’ (art. 6(3)). It is also provided that ‘The traditions and customs of religious minorities shall, as far as possible, be respected’ (art. 6(4)). In various countries that have democratic values, the day of weekly rest has been determined in this spirit (see the Sunday Trading Act 1994 in England, which determines Sunday as the weekly day of rest). The same is true in Canada (see P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (fourth edition, 1997), at p. 491) and in the United States (see J. Choper, Securing Religious Liberty (1995), at p. 136). See also and cf. CrimC (Jer) 3471/87 State of Israel v. Caplan [49], and the references cited there.

19. The third requirement that is enshrined in the limitations clause is that the violation of the freedom of occupation should be made in a law ‘that is intended for a proper purpose.’ A purpose is a proper one —

‘… if it serves an important social purpose that is sensitive to human rights. Therefore, legislation that is intended to protect human rights is certainly enacted for a proper purpose. Moreover, legislation that is intended to realize general social purposes, such as a welfare policy or protecting the public interest, is enacted for a proper purpose’ (United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 434).

A purpose is a proper one ‘if it furthers public purposes that are important to the state and to society with the purpose of providing an infrastructure for communal life and for a social framework that seeks to protect and promote human rights’ (per Justice D. Beinisch in Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 264). A purpose is a proper one if it seeks to balance between the interests of the public as a whole and the harm to the individual; if it is ‘intended to realize important social goals, whose realization is consistent with the character of society as the protector of human rights’ (per Justice T. Or in Oron v. Knesset Speaker [12], at p. 662). In examining the question whether a purpose is a proper one, we should examine two aspects: one aspect concerns the content of the purpose. A purpose is a proper one if it constitutes a social purpose that is sensitive to human rights, or if it is intended to achieve social purposes, such as a welfare policy or protecting the public interest; the second aspect concerns how necessary it is to realize the purpose. A purpose is a proper one if the need to realize it is important for the values of society and the state (see Horev v. Minister of Transport [36], at p. 52 {___}). What is the purpose of the Hours of Work and Rest Law with regard to the weekly rest, and is its purpose a proper one?

20. There are two purposes that underlie the arrangements concerning the hours of weekly rest in the Hours of Work and Rest Law, and these complement one another (see Y. Eliasof, ‘Work during the Weekly Rest,’ Menachem Goldberg Book (2001) 116; see also the debates in the Knesset: Knesset Proceedings vol. 9, at p. 1729): one purpose is a social purpose, which is concerned with the welfare of the worker and gives him social protect (see LabA 255/99 Civil Security Ltd v. Shahidem [51]). The law seeks to realize the social purpose involved in ensuring the health and welfare of workers, by preventing them ‘from work and occupations that exhaust a person, and by requiring his periodic rest’ (per Vice-President Silberg in CrimA 217/68 Isramax Ltd v. State of Israel [37], at p. 357). This day of rest was determined on a uniform basis for the whole economy, thereby promoting the social value whereby the members of the family have the day of rest at the same time. The second purpose is a national-religious purpose, which regards the observance of the Sabbath by Jews as a realization of one of the most important values in Judaism that has a national character. In a similar spirit, designating other days of rest for persons who are not Jewish realizes their religious outlook. These two purposes have been discussed by the court on several occasions. Thus, for example, it was held per President S. Agranat that the reason underlying the weekly rest arrangement in the Hours of Work and Rest Law is:

‘The social value involved in ensuring the health and welfare of employees… it is also clear that it is not a coincidence… that the “weekly rest” includes — for a Jew — specifically the Sabbath, something that shows that the issue of Sabbath observance was regarded… as a national treasure of the Jewish people, which should be protected in the State of Israel, and also in view — in the words of Justice Berinson — “of the religious feelings, which are held by large sectors of the public,” for whom the social value inherent in the legislator’s prohibition against employing Jews on the Sabbath is also sacred to them as a religious value’ (HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [38], at p. 349).

In a similar vein Justice M. Elon said that the arrangement concerning the prohibition of employing persons and working on the Sabbath ‘is based on a whole range of national-religious, social and welfare considerations’ (HCJ 171/78 Eshkar Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [39], at p. 154). The same approach was confirmed by President M. Shamgar:

‘In determining the principle of having a weekly day of rest and fixing it on the Sabbath the legislator sought to realize two interrelated purposes: first, a social purpose, according to which a weekly day of rest should be given to every person so that he can rest from his work, be with his family or with friends and devote time to leisure and recreation according to his choice and preference. The determination of the day of rest is also intended to protect the health of the employee and guarantee him decent work conditions. Second, fixing the day of rest on the Sabbath was done against the background of dictates of Jewish law and Jewish tradition’ (HCJ 5073/91 Israel Theatres Ltd v. Netanya Municipality [40], at p. 206).

This is also the approach of Justice D. Dorner, who says:

‘The purpose of the Hours of Work and Rest Law is therefore a double one: first, it upholds the social right to a weekly day of rest, which requires a public day of rest for the purpose of enforcement… Second, the law is intended to preserve the character of the State of Israel as a Jewish state’ (Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1], at p. 6).

21. Do the two interrelated purposes — the social purpose and the religious purpose — combine to form a ‘proper purpose’? My answer to this is yes. Guaranteeing a day of rest for the employee and employer, determining a uniform day of rest for the whole economy, in a manner that guarantees the welfare of the family, and fixing this day of rest on a national-religious basis (for a Jew — the Sabbath; for someone who is not Jewish — Friday, Saturday or Sunday, according to what is accepted by him as his day of rest), constitutes a ‘proper purpose,’ within the meaning of this expression in the limitations clause. The social purpose serves an important public purpose. It is intended to protect the individual (the employee and the employer) and it is intended to guarantee the welfare of the whole family, all of which while ensuring equality between the religiously observant person and someone who is not religiously observant. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘Protecting the rights of the employee is a proper purpose; ensuring social security for the employee is a proper purpose; preserving the framework of protective laws that will protect employees is a proper purpose. Indeed, this protection of the rights of the employee has a fundamental social importance in our society. It constitutes a proper purpose from a constitutional perspective’ (Tenufa Manpower and Maintenance Services Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [19], at p. 444).

The national-religious purpose is also a proper one. It is mindful of the feelings of the religious public in Israel. It gives expression to the national ties that bind us together as one people. It reflects the tradition and customs in Mandatory Palestine and in Israel (see Eliasof, ‘Work during the Weekly Rest,’ supra). Indeed, in many democratic countries there are laws that establish a weekly day of rest in the economy, and as a rule they provide a uniform day that is consistent with the most common religious outlook in that country (Sunday) (see R. v. Edwards Books and Art [53] (Canada); McGowan v. Maryland [52] (the United States)).

22. The petitioners argue that they accept that an employee must be assured of a weekly rest. Notwithstanding, they ask that the hours of rest should be ‘flexible.’ The meaning of this is that every employer or employee may choose the hours of weekly rest that are convenient for them. According to the petitioners, the choice that requires uniform hours of rest for all Jews involves an improper purpose. I cannot accept this approach. Determining uniform hours of rest for the whole economy is a social-national interest. It makes it possible to take advantage of the rest and to incorporate it in the welfare of the employee and his family. This was discussed by Chief Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada in a judgment that considered the constitutionality of laws that required business to close on Sunday. Chief Justice Dickson wrote:

‘I regard as self-evident the desirability of enabling parents to have regular days off from work in common with their child’s day off from school, and with a day off enjoyed by most other family and community members…

A family visit to an uncle or a grandmother, the attendance of a parent at a child’s sports tournament, a picnic, a swim, or a hike in the park on a summer day, or a family expedition to a zoo, circus, or exhibition – these, and hundreds of other leisure activities with family and friends are amongst the simplest but most profound joys that any of us can know. The aim of protecting workers, families and communities from a diminution of opportunity to experience the fulfilment offered by these activities, and from the alienation of the individual from his or her closest social bonds, is not one which I regard as unimportant or trivial… I am satisfied that the Act is aimed at a pressing and substantial concern. It therefore survives the first part of the inquiry under s. 1’ (R. v. Edwards Books and Art [53], at p. 770).

Admittedly, in determining uniform hours of rest on the Sabbath (for Jews), there is a violation of the freedom of occupation of the employer and the employee. Notwithstanding, this violation serves an important social purpose, and therefore it is a ‘proper purpose’ within the context of the limitations clause.

23. It may be argued that even if it is proper to determine uniform hours of rest, it is not proper to determine these for Jews on the Sabbath. This involves religious coercion for those who wish to employ persons or work on the Sabbath. This religious coercion is undesirable, and its realization leads to the result that the purpose underlying the Hours of Work and Rest Law is improper. I cannot accept this argument. It has been rejected both in the United States (see McGowan v. Maryland [52]) and in Canada (see R. v. Edwards Books and Art [53]). Once we have determined that social considerations rule out a flexible determination of the hours of the weekly rest and justify fixing a day of the week on which the weekly rest can be realized, the fixing of the Sabbath (for Jews) as the day of weekly rest does not involve religious coercion. The coercion is in the very obligation to have the hours of the weekly rest on the day that the law determines, and not according to the wishes of the employer or the employee. The fact that the day chosen to realize this obligation coincides with the Jewish outlook on the Sabbath does not make the coercion religious (see Prof. S. Shetreet, ‘Some Reflections on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Israel,’ 4 Isr. Y. H. R. 194 (1974), at p. 214). This was discussed by Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Edwards Books and Art [53], where he said:

‘Religious freedom is inevitably abridged by legislation which has the effect of impeding conduct integral to the practice of a person’s religion. But it is not necessarily impaired by legislation which requires conduct consistent with the religious beliefs of another person. One is not being compelled to engage in religious practices merely because a statutory obligation coincides with the dictates of a particular religion…

Legislation with a secular inspiration does not abridge the freedom from conformity to religious dogma merely because statutory provisions coincide with the tenets of a religion’ (ibid. [53], at pp. 760, 761).

Indeed, fixing the hours of the weekly rest on the Sabbath does not involve religious coercion; it is an expression of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. Moreover, the case before us concerns the prohibition of working on the Sabbath. Notwithstanding, the law prohibits work not only on the Sabbath but also on additional days of rest which are mainly religious holidays (see s. 9A of the law and s. 18A of the Government and Justice Arrangements Ordinance, 5708-1948). Even in this context of a prohibition of working on religious holidays we should reject an argument that we are speaking of a prohibition that involves religious coercion.

24. The fourth condition for the constitutionality of a law that violates the freedom of occupation is that the violation is ‘to an extent that is not excessive.’ This is a requirement of proportionality. If ‘the proper purpose’ focuses on the purpose of the law that violates the freedom of occupation, proportionality focuses on the measures that the law prescribed to achieve the desired purpose. These measures must be proportionate. In comparative law, an attempt has been made to concretize the requirement of proportionality (see J. Schwarz, European Administrative Law (1992); N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law (1996); The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Evelyn Ellis ed., 1999); M. Eissen, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights,’ The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (R.St.J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, H. Petzold eds., 1993) 125; M. Fordham and T. de la Mare, ‘Identifying the Principle of Proportionality,’ Understanding Human Rights Principles (J. Jowell and J. Cooper eds., 2001) 27; J. Kirk, ‘Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality,’ 21 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 1 (1997); R. Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (2000); D. Beaty, The Ultimate rule of Law (2004)). The Supreme Court, when interpreting the requirement of proportionality in the limitations clause, has adopted this approach (see United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 436; Israel Investment Managers Association v. Minister of Finance [13], at p. 385; Oron v. Knesset Speaker [12], at p. 665; HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [41]; HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [42], at p. 12; Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 279; Horev v. Minister of Transport [36], at p. 53 {___}; HCJ 8238/96 Abu Arar v. Minister of Interior [43], at p. 41; HCJ 1255/94 Bezeq, the Israel Telecommunication Corp. Ltd v. Minister of Communications [44], at p. 687; HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior [45]; HCJ 4644/00 Jaffora Tabori Ltd v. Second Television and Radio Authority [46]; HCJ 9232/01 Noah, the Israeli Federation of Animal Protection Organizations v. Attorney-General [47], at p. 261 {___}; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [48]; see Z. Segal, ‘The Ground of Disproportionality in Public Law,’ 39 HaPraklit 507 (1990); I. Zamir, ‘The Administrative Law of Israel Compared to the Administrative Law of Germany,’ 2 Mishpat uMimshal 109 (1994), at p. 131; D. Dorner, ‘Proportionality,’ The Berinson Book (vol. 2, 2000) 281). According to the accepted approach, the requirement of proportionality is satisfied when the law passes three subtests. We shall discuss there briefly.

25. The first subtest of proportionality is the suitability test. This test requires there to be a relationship according to which the arrangements provided in the law (the means) are suited to the realization of the proper purpose (the end). The means chosen should lead rationally to the realization of the end (see Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [42], at p. 12). The second subtest of proportionality is the least harmful measure test or the necessity test. According to this, the measure chosen by the law should harm the human right to the smallest possible degree. It is possible to employ an analogy of rungs of a ladder. ‘The legislature should begin with the least harmful “rung,” and slowly ascend the ladder until it reaches the rung that allows the proper purpose to be achieved without harming the human right more than necessary’ (United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v. Migdal Cooperative Village [7], at p. 444; see also Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 279. For the analogy of ascending the rungs of a ladder, see D. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (second edition, 1997), at p. 274). The third subtest provides that the measure that was adopted by the law and that violates the human right must be proportionate to the purpose. This is the test of proportionality ‘in the narrow sense.’ Within the framework of this subtest ‘the benefit accruing to the public from the legislation under discussion is weighed against the violation to the constitutional right of the individual as a result of adopting the measure chosen’ (per Justice Beinisch, in Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 279). This subtest is a balancing test. By employing these subtests we can discover the legislature’s margin of appreciation. We should recognize the legislature’s margin of appreciation or margin of proportionality (see Menahem v. Minister of Transport [11], at p. 280; Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [48], at para. 42).

26. Do the provisions of the Hours of Work and Rest Law in so far as they concern the weekly rest satisfy the proportionality tests? My answer is yes. The first proportionality test (the rational connection test) is satisfied. There is a rational connection between the realization of the purposes underlying the Hours of Work and Rest Law and prescribing a prohibition of employing a worker on the day of weekly rest. The second subtest (the least harmful measure test) is also satisfied in the case before us. A choice of flexible hours of rest would not have realized the purpose of the law. Fixed hours of rest are required. The legislature’s choice of the Sabbath (for Jews) and Sunday and Friday (for non-Jews) is consistent with the requirements of proportionality. In this respect it should be recalled that an integral part of the Hours of Work and Rest Law are the provisions concerning matters to which the law does not apply at all, such as policemen, civil servants whose jobs require them to be at the state’s disposal even outside ordinary working hours, sailors and aircraft personnel (s. 30). We should also take into account the matters in which the law gives the Minister of Labour discretion to give (general or special) permits that allow work during the hours of rest. By virtue of this power, various permits have been given, such as in the sectors of hotels, security services, the various emergency services, etc. (see M. Goldberg, Labour Laws (vol. 2, 2003) at p. 21). We should also take into account arrangements in various laws, such as the Municipalities Ordinance [New Version], which authorizes a municipality to regulate the opening and closing of various businesses, including cinemas, restaurants, theatres and cultural institutions within its municipal boundaries or a part thereof. The third subtest is also satisfied in this case. The law realized an important social interest, and the violation of the freedom of occupation is limited. This violation — which is mainly a prohibition of working on the Sabbath — applies in principle equally to all owners of businesses, and therefore prima facie it cannot give an unfair competitive advantage to one competitor or another. This fact is also relevant to the proportionality of the law. Since the three subtests are satisfied, the requirement that the violation of freedom of occupation ‘is not excessive’ is satisfied. This was discussed by Justice Dorner in Handyman Do-It-Yourself v. State of Israel [1]:

‘The prohibition of employing someone on a day of rest without doubt realizes its purposes, and therefore it satisfies the rational connection test, whereas the discretion to give work permits for the Sabbath, which can be exercised, inter alia, also because of the need of the public or parts thereof to receive services on the Sabbath, allows the violation to be minimized… the granting of discretion also realized the test of proportionality because within its framework a balance is struck between the benefit offered by the day of rest and the damage caused by the violation of the freedom of occupation’ (ibid. [1], at p. 7).

We agree with this approach.

27. In summary, we accept that the Hours of Work and Rest Law, in so far as it concerns the hours of the weekly rest, violates the freedom of occupation of the employer and the workers. This violation does not lead to the unconstitutionality of the law. This is because it satisfies the conditions of the limitations clause. It befits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. It was enacted for a proper purpose — a social purpose that is achieved by means of realizing a national-religious consideration. The violation of the freedom of occupation is not excessive. It therefore follows that the constitutional argument of the petitioners should be rejected.

The administrative scrutiny

28. The petitioners’ second argument is that the refusal of the Minister of Labour to give a work permit for the weekly rest is unlawful. This is because of the serious economic harm that the minister’s refusal to give the permit causes them. This argument revolves around s. 12(a) of the Hours of Work and Rest Law, which provides:

‘Permit to employ persons during the weekly rest

12. (a) The Minister of Labour may permit the employment of a worker during the hours of the weekly rest, or during a part thereof, if he is persuaded that stopping the work for all or part of the weekly rest is likely to harm the defence of the state or the safety of persons or property, or seriously to damage the economy, the work process or the supply of necessities that are, in the opinion of the Minister of Labour, essential for the public or for a part thereof.’

The question before us is whether the refusal of the minister to give a permit to the petitioner is unlawful? In my opinion, the answer is no. The petitioners did not succeed in presenting a factual basis to show that its activity during the hours of the weekly rest is ‘essential for the public or for a part thereof.’ Likewise no factual basis was brought before us in support of the claim that the petitioners are being discriminated against, to show that other businesses of the same kind have received permits to work during the hours of the weekly rest, and are competing against them unlawfully.

The result is that the petition is denied.

 

 

Justice M. Naor

1.    I agree with the opinion of my colleague President Barak. I would like to add a few words with regard to the claim of religious coercion raised by the petitioners.

2.    The petitioners are asking for ‘flexible’ hours of rest. According to them, mandating the hours of rest to be specifically on the Sabbath (for Jews) constitutes improper religious coercion (see paras. 22 and 23 of the President’s opinion). In my opinion, it is precisely an arrangement that supposedly allows the worker to choose for himself a day of weekly rest as he wishes that is an arrangement that involves, or at least may involve, coercion. If the law allowed each worker to choose for himself a day of rest, as the petitioners request, in many cases the real choice will be made by the employer and not by the workers. A person who observes the Sabbath and is told by an employer to choose a weekday as his day of rest as a condition for being given employment will refrain for accepting the employment. Even someone who does not observe the Sabbath but prefers that his day of rest will be specifically on the Sabbath, so that he can enjoy being with the members of his family, will not have a free choice. When he goes to find work, the employer may make it clear to him that he will give preference to workers who are prepared to work on the Sabbath. The constraints of obtaining a livelihood may lead to the result that the worker ‘chooses’ a day of rest that is not really his preferred day of rest, and we cannot verify that the choice of another day of rest that is not the Sabbath is really a free choice. Therefore, in addition to all the reasons given by my colleague, in my opinion there is a justification for the law to mandate one day of rest, which is, for Jews, the Sabbath. In my opinion, this binding law protects workers more than a law that allows them, supposedly, a free choice.

 

 

Justice A. Procaccia

1.    I agree with the opinion of my colleague, President Barak, according to which the prohibition of employing Jews in work on the Sabbath that derives from the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 5711-1951, satisfies the constitutionality test in the sense that although it violates the freedom of occupation of the employer and the workers, it satisfies the conditions of the limitations clause since it befits the value of the State of Israel, promotes a proper purpose and satisfies the proportionality test.

2.    I would like to add the following comment:

As the President said, and according to our well-established approach, by having the weekly day of rest on the Sabbath for Jews the legislature sought to realize two interrelated purposes — a social purpose, which is based on a perspective of social welfare, and a national-religious purpose, which is based on the dictates of Jewish religious law and tradition. The essence of the social purpose is that a person can rest on the day of weekly rest, which promotes his physical and spiritual welfare. The day of rest is intended to allow a person to spend time with his family and friends; it is intended to allow him free time for various activities that are important to him, including being involved in cultural and spiritual activities and using his leisure time according to his interests and tastes.

The national-religious purpose of the Sabbath gives equal weight to the religious dictates concerning the day of rest, which reflects the fact that the Sabbath is a national treasure of the Jewish people that should be observed in the Jewish community.

A proper internal balance is required between these two purposes that underlie the prohibition against the employment of a Jew on the Sabbath. Alongside the protection of Sabbath observance from the national-religious aspect, the law leaves the social aspect of the day of rest open to be shaped in accordance with the variety of different lifestyles and tastes in the many sectors of Israeli society. Indeed, there are many different ways in which people decide how to act on the day of weekly rest given to them, each person in accordance with his way of life, belief and lifestyle.

3.    The need for balancing the religious aspect against the social aspect of the Sabbath may sometimes justify a departure from the rule that prohibits work on the Sabbath, in order to allow an individual to fashion the way in which he spends his day of rest as he wishes and also in order to make available to him certain public frameworks that will allow him to realize this right. In the Hours of Work and Rest Law the legislature recognized this, by providing in s. 12(a) of the law that the Minister of Labour has discretion to allow work on the Sabbath where essential needs of the State and the public so require. According to the language of the section, it is obvious that the aforesaid exception will apply to essential needs concerning the defence of the state, the safety of persons and property, economic needs, and work processes. But the provision goes on to provide in a general manner that a work permit may be given also for ‘the supply of necessities that are, in the opinion of the Minister of Labour, essential for the public or for a part thereof.’ This broad power that was given to the minister to permit work on the Sabbath with regard to necessities that are essential for the public or for a part thereof is intended to add to those essential needs of society that concern ensuring the requirements of the physical existence of Israeli residents in the spheres of security, the economy or work processes. It is intended to extend the power to grant permits not only to the supply of essential physical necessities, but also in order to ensure essential necessities of the public or of parts thereof in spiritual matters and the spheres of, culture, art, leisure and entertainment. It is intended to ensure the individual’s quality of life in a free society that has freedom of religion and freedom from religion. It is intended to allow a person to realize in a proportionate manner the social aspect of the Sabbath in accordance with his tastes and his lifestyle, and to give expression thereby to customs, lifestyles and the various cultures in the many strata of Israeli society. The power to give permits for employment on the Sabbath is intended, inter alia, to promote essential needs of the different sectors of the population in order to allow them to fashion their Sabbath as a day of rest according to their own desires.

4.    The scope of the essential departure from the framework of prohibiting employment on the Sabbath that was intended to allow a person to spend his day of rest in accordance with his choice and custom requires constitutional balances between the needs of the individual and those of the public as a whole and between various sectors and cultural groups in Israeli society, which have different beliefs and lifestyles. The designation of the Sabbath as the day of rest for society in Israel requires a proportionate balance between the social aspect and the national-religious aspect of the Sabbath. Making the social aspect completely subservient to the religious aspect will not achieve the proper balance, whereas putting sole emphasis on the social aspect, while recognizing the multifaceted nature of its content, is inconsistent with the recognition of the traditional nature of the Sabbath and its dual nature. Within the framework of the social aspect of the Sabbath we require a recognition of the needs to depart from the prohibitions of employment where this is essential in order to allow the Sabbath to be shaped as the day of rest for the general public in a free, pluralistic and tolerant spirit, without causing disproportionate harm to other social groups, and without uprooting the unique national character of the Sabbath from among the Jewish people. We should thereby recognize that in order to realize the individual character and leisure culture of the individual, we also need public frameworks that will assist and allow this, including public transport that will allow the public to move freely, the opening of museums and cultural institutions, the activity of theatres and cinemas, the holding of lectures and congresses, and the like. Allowing the activity of these institutions may justify giving work permits on the Sabbath to those that operate them. On the other hand, the scope of the concept of ‘a necessity that is essential for the public’ for the purpose of granting work permits on the Sabbath is, by its very nature, limited and restricted, since a careful balance needs to be made between the right of the non-observant individual to realize his liberty to determine the social content of his Sabbath according to his tastes and the sacred value of keeping the Sabbath as a general day of rest of a national-religious character. This requires giving considerable weight and consideration to the needs and beliefs of the religious public, and preventing injuries to its feelings. The proper balance between the social aspect and the national-religious aspect of the Sabbath will benefit the public as a whole, and achieve equality for all citizens, which is the basis of freedom of conscience and religion. This will make it possible to preserve the Sabbath as a national treasure and, at the same time, also as a day of rest reserved for the individual, for his physical and spiritual welfare, according to his personal beliefs and lifestyle.

5.    The fashioning of the Sabbath as a general day of rest that allows the individual a certain degree of freedom to determine what he does according to his lifestyle and beliefs may justify, in appropriate circumstances, granting permits for work on the Sabbath, that will allow this freedom to be realized de facto. This freedom is not unlimited because of the balancing required to protect other values. But within its proper and proportionate framework, it may constitute an ‘essential need’ that may make it possible to depart from the general prohibition of work on the Sabbath. The discretion of the Minister of Labour in this regard is very broad (Miron v. Minister of Labour [38], at p. 355; Eshkar Ltd v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [39], at pp. 149, 153; State of Israel v. Caplan [49], at pp. 281-283).

6.    In the proceeding before us, the petitioner, a company that markets furniture, is seeking relief that asks us to order the Minister of Labour to give it a permit under s. 12 of the law to employ Jews in its shops on the Sabbath and religious holidays. Its arguments is that it must open its shops on Sabbaths and religious holidays in order to withstand the strong competition that exists in the field, since otherwise it anticipates major economic hardships in its future business activity, to the extent that it may need to close down its business altogether.

 There is no basis for intervening in the discretion of the competent authority that refused to give a permit for work on the Sabbath in this case. The ground on which the petitioner relies for this purpose — contending with economic competition in the business sector in which it does business — does not satisfy the criterion of essential necessities of which s. 12 of the Hours of Work and Rest Law speaks. The law even clarified in s. 9A that, as a rule, on days of rest ‘… the owner of a workshop shall not work in his workshop, not shall the owner of a factory work in his factory, nor shall the owner of a shop trade in his shop.’ Engaging in trade, in the normal manner, falls within the general prohibition of work on the Sabbath, and not within the framework of the exceptions thereto.

In view of all of the aforesaid, I agree with the President’s conclusion that this petition should be denied.

 

 

Petition denied.

24 Adar II 5765.

4 April 2005.

 

 

 

[1]    The Jewish Sabbath begins shortly before sunset on Friday and ends at nightfall on Saturday.

Dayan v. Wilk

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 2481/93
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, February 9, 1994
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner applied for a permit to hold an assembly directly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas political party. The District Commissioner of Police refused the permit, because it would violate the rights of privacy of the rabbi, his family and his neighbours.

 

Held: It is necessary to balance the petitioner’s right to freedom of assembly against the right of privacy of the public figure, his family and his neighbours. According to Vice-President Barak, these rights are of equal importance: in principle there is a right to hold an assembly outside the private home of a public figure, but this right must not materially intrude on the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours. When the home is used to some extent also for public activity, then slightly less protection will be given to the right of privacy of the public figure in his home than in a case where the home is not used for public activity. According to Justice S. Levin, the right of privacy of the public figure in his home is of greater importance than the right to hold an assembly outside that home. According to Justice Goldberg, an assembly outside the private home of a public figure should only be allowed when he conducts all or most of his public activity from home.

 

In the present case, Vice-President Barak and Justice Goldberg would have granted the petition and allowed the petitioner to hold an assembly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, if the petitioner had agreed to restrictions of time, place and manner. The petitioner, however, refused to agree to any restrictions.

 

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 2481/93

Yosef Dayan

v.

1. Yehuda Wilk – Jerusalem District Commissioner

2.       Rabbi Ovadya Yosef

3.       Dr Meira Sarel and Professor Shalom

4.       Shoshana Eitan

5.       Ricka Barsela

6.       Oren Sheindel

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[9 February 1994]

Before Vice-President A. Barak and Justices S. Levin, E. Goldberg

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner applied for a permit to hold an assembly directly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, spiritual leader of the Shas political party. The District Commissioner of Police refused the permit, because it would violate the rights of privacy of the rabbi, his family and his neighbours.

 

Held: It is necessary to balance the petitioner’s right to freedom of assembly against the right of privacy of the public figure, his family and his neighbours. According to Vice-President Barak, these rights are of equal importance: in principle there is a right to hold an assembly outside the private home of a public figure, but this right must not materially intrude on the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours. When the home is used to some extent also for public activity, then slightly less protection will be given to the right of privacy of the public figure in his home than in a case where the home is not used for public activity. According to Justice S. Levin, the right of privacy of the public figure in his home is of greater importance than the right to hold an assembly outside that home. According to Justice Goldberg, an assembly outside the private home of a public figure should only be allowed when he conducts all or most of his public activity from home.

In the present case, Vice-President Barak and Justice Goldberg would have granted the petition and allowed the petitioner to hold an assembly outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, if the petitioner had agreed to restrictions of time, place and manner. The petitioner, however, refused to agree to any restrictions.

 

Petition denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, ss. 3, 7, 7(a), 8.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, s. 226.

Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 83, 84, 84(a), 85.

Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, ss. 2(1), 4, 5, 18, 19.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]      HCJ 3080/92 – unreported.

[2]      HCJ 148/79 Saar v. Minister of Interior [1980] IsrSC 34(2) 169.

[3]      FH 16/61 Companies Registrar v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 7.

[4]      HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv–Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[5]      FH 9/77 Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337.

[6]      CA 524/88 Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [1991] IsrSC 45(4) 529.

[7]      HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registrar [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.

[8]      HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commander [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 393; IsrSJ 7 109.

[9]      HCJ 243/62 Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [1962] IsrSC 16 2407; IsrSJ 4 208.

[10]    HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229.

[11]    MApp 82/83 State of Israel v. Alia [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 738.

[12]    HCJ 3815/90 Gilat v. Minister of Police [1991] IsrSC 45(3) 414.

[13]    FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16 430; IsrSJ 4 112.

[14]    EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83.

[15]    HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1.

[16]    FH 9/83 Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 837.

[17]    HCJ 109/70 Coptic Orthodox Mutran of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police [1971] IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[18]      HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 421.

[19]    HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90.

[20]    CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 840.

[23]    HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [1987] IsrSC 41(3) 255.

[22]    HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior [1986] IsrSC 40(2) 701.

[23]    CrimA 126/62 Disenchik v. Attorney-General [1963] IsrSC 17 169; IsrSJ 5 152.

[24]    HCJ 869/92 Zvilli v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Thirteenth Knesset [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 692.

[25]    HCJ 456/73 – unreported.

[26]    HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd v. Minister of Building and Housing [1991] IsrSC 45(5) 50.

[27]    HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229, [1992-4] IsrLR 19.

[28]    CA 461/62 Zim Israeli Shipping Co. Ltd v. Maziar [1963] IsrSC 17 1319; IsrSJ 5 120.

[29]    CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464.

[30]    CA 670/79 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Mizrahi [1987] IsrSC 40(2) 169.

 

Israel Magistrates Court cases cited:

[31]    CrimC (Jer.) 4300/81 – (unreported).

 

Australian cases cited:

[32]    Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29.

 

American cases cited:

[33]    Rowan v. Post Office Dept. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).

[34]    City of Wauwatosa v. King 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971).

[35]    Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollack 343 U.S. 451 (1952).

[36]    Martin v. Struthers 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

[37]    Gregory v. Chicago 394 U.S. 111 (1969).

[38]    Carey v. Brown 447 U.S. 455 (1980).

[39]    Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536 (1965).

[40]    Pruneyard Shopping Centre v. Robins 447 U.S. 74 (1980).

[41]    United Electrical, R. & M. Workers v. Baldwin 67 F. Supp. 235 (1946).

[42]    Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

[43]    Frisby v. Schultz 487 U.S. 77 (1988).

[44]    Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

 

English cases cited:

[45]    Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1979] 3 All ER 21 (PC).

[46]    Francis v. Chief of Police [1973] 2 All ER 251 (PC).

 

German cases cited:

[47]    Ovg. Koblenz, Beschl v. 24.5.86 7B 36/86.

 

Indian cases cited:

[48]    Indulal v. State (1963) 50 A.I.R. Gujarat 259.

 

Canadian cases cited:

[49]    R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

[50]    Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139.

[51]    Cheema v. Ross (1991) 82 D.L.R. (4th) 213.

 

For the first respondent — N. Arad, Director of High Court of Justice Department at State Attorney’s Office.

For respondents 2-6 — Y. Bar Sela.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Vice-President A. Barak

A asks the competent authority in the police force for a permit to hold an assembly. He wants to hold it, together with others, on the pavement outside the apartment of B (in a cooperative house). B is a public figure. His apartment is also used for public purposes. B opposes the granting of the permit. The neighbours also oppose it. What is the scope of discretion of the competent authority in the police force in such circumstances? This is the question before us.

The facts

1.    Rabbi Ovadya Yosef is a spiritual leader. He is the president of the Council of Torah Scholars. This council is the supreme body of the Shas movement. This movement is a political party represented in the Knesset. It is a member of the coalition. Rabbi Yosef lives, together with his wife, in a cooperative house in a residential neighbourhood in Jerusalem (36 Jabotinsky Street). Rabbi Yosef has an office elsewhere (Hizkiyahu HaMelech Street). Persons interested in meeting Rabbi Yosef must arrange such meetings in advance with the rabbi’s office. Rabbi Yosef’s family lives in his private apartment. The rabbi does not regularly hold meetings in his home about matters relating to his public activities. Nonetheless, he receives visits from persons in government at his apartment, such as the Prime Minister, cabinet-ministers, deputy-ministers and members of the Knesset. The frequency of the visits of deputy-ministers and members of the Knesset from the Shas party is four to five visits a month. The Minister of the Interior (a Shas representative) usually visits Rabbi Yosef once a week. The Council of Torah Scholars does not meet in the rabbi’s house.

2.    The petitioner applied to hold an assembly (on 6 May 1993) outside Rabbi Ovadya Yosef’s apartment. He wants to ‘protest the continued participation of Shas in the Government’. He expects two hundred and fifty participants. He wants to use a stage and two loudspeakers. The assembly is to last two hours (19.00-21.00). The demonstrators are to meet at Wingate Square (near the rabbi’s house) and disperse there. On 2 May 1993, the petitioner applied to the Jerusalem District Commissioner of the Israel Police Force to receive a licence for the assembly. Clarifications requested from the petitioner indicated that the demonstrators intend ‘to approach Rabbi Ovadya Yosef’s house with signs and loudspeakers, to erect a stage and protest against the rabbi and the Shas party’. In communications with the petitioner, it was suggested that he hold the assembly in the plaza of the Van Leer Institute (an aerial distance of two hundred meters). This is situated nearby. The petitioner rejected the suggestion.

3.    The Jerusalem District Commissioner (on 4 May 1993) denied the petitioner’s request. The reason was the ‘ruling held by the Supreme Court with regard to a demonstration involving an intrusion into the private domain of a public figure and a harassment in his private life’. The petition before us was filed against this decision. We issued on that day a show cause order as requested. We ordered that Rabbi Ovadya Yosef should be joined as an additional respondent in the petition. We fixed the hearing for 12 May 1993, in view of the statement of the petitioner that he wanted to hold the meeting on a new date. At the beginning of the hearing (on 12 May 1993), we discovered that the service of the court papers on Rabbi Ovadya Yosef was not done properly. We postponed the continued hearing of the petition to a new date, after proper performance of service. We granted an application of residents (the applicants in HCJApp 2593/93) to be joined as additional respondents in the petition. Several days later (on 18 May 1993), we held a hearing on the petition itself. We heard the arguments of the parties. The attorney of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef was asked to submit, within a week, a list of the frequency of the visits of persons in Government to the rabbi’s house during the last month. The parties were given leave to submit further arguments in writing.

The petitioner’s position

4.    According to the petitioner, the police’s position deprives him of his basic right to freedom of speech. The purpose of the assembly is to draw public attention —

‘to the protest of Sefardim (Jews of oriental origin) against the direction in which the rabbi was going. We approach the head of the pyramid in order to influence him, for his opinions influence others.’

The petitioner further claims that the police are discriminating against him. In the past, a permit was given to hold an assembly opposite the private residence of the Prime Minister (in Ramat-Aviv), and opposite the apartments of Supreme Court justices. According to the petitioner, Rabbi Ovadya Yosef carries out his political activity mainly from his apartment. The rabbi is ‘a figure standing at the head of a political movement, and his movement is involved in an acute political controversy among the Israeli public, and it is therefore inconceivable that he is immune to public criticism.’

The position of the police

5.    The position of the Jerusalem District Commissioner is mainly based on the consideration about the intrusion into the private life of a public figure and harassing him in his private life. The first respondent (hereafter — ‘the respondent’) relies on a guideline of the Attorney-General that ‘a permit to hold a demonstration directed against a public figure may be refused if it is to be near his private residence, as distinct from his place of work…’ (Attorney-General’s guideline no. 21.566, (‘freedom of assembly’), s. 12(e)). In the respondent’s opinion, the significance of holding the assembly and its immediate effect is a disturbance, harassment and intrusion into the private life of the rabbi, his family members and his neighbours. In these circumstances, the right of the petitioner and his friends to demonstrate must yield to the right of the rabbi, the members of his family and his neighbours not to be harassed in their private lives. In her arguments before us, Mrs Arad, arguing for the respondent, pointed out that the freedom of speech does not include the freedom to force another person to listen to that speech. A demonstration whose purpose is to put pressure on a specific person should not be permitted in the name of freedom of speech. Within the framework of the considerations for granting a permit, the District Commissioner must take into account the right of privacy of the rabbi and his family. He must also take into account the fact that the demonstration will cause a nuisance. Mrs Arad further argued that the petitioner wants to hold an assembly on public land, but at the entrance to a person’s house, literally adjacent to his private premises. This is likely to constitute a real nuisance to him and intrude upon his privacy. The consideration of preventing an intrusion on privacy is a relevant factor that must be considered. The rabbi and members of his household may become involuntary ‘prisoners’, in that they will be a captive audience; among the District Commissioner’s considerations, he must take into account the reasonable balance required in realizing the right of free speech against the right to privacy. In this respect, the fact that the rabbi has public standing is insufficient to justify an intrusion on his privacy. This right is currently protected both in the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and with regard to the petitioner’s freedom of speech, this can be exercised at some distance from the door of the rabbi’s house, without undermining the purpose of the assembly and the message that it carries to the public.

6.    In his reply, the District Commissioner pointed out that when he refused to grant the permit, he assumed that it referred to the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. He did not imagine that a claim might be made that the rabbi’s apartment is also used as an office. A claim to this effect was never made by the petitioner during the contacts with him. Nonetheless, when the claim was raised, it was also investigated. The attorney of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef explained the actual situation, and in view of this explanation there is no justification for intruding on the privacy of the rabbi and the members of his household. Neither is there any discrimination, for in similar circumstances applications to hold demonstrations outside the private homes of public officials were refused.

7.    In his affidavit of reply, the District Commissioner mentioned another consideration. It is impossible to hold an assembly on the plaza at the intersection of Jabotinsky Street and Marcus Street. The crossroad is a ‘traffic island’, approximately twenty metres in diameter, at an intersection of four main roads. The plaza is covered with decorative plants and grass and there is no access to pedestrians. It was not designed for holding assemblies, erecting platforms, for meetings or for gatherings. An assembly as requested should not be held at the intersection of Jabotinsky Street and Marcus Street since there is no suitable physical location for this. The assembly can be held nearby. Nonetheless, the District Commissioner points out that ‘the most important reason given for refusing the request was in essence the applicants’ demand that the assembly had to take place outside the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef.’

8.    The respondent rejects the claims of discrimination. He points out that in the past a petition was filed against his decision not to allow a demonstration or a disturbance to be held outside the homes of judges. The petition was dismissed in limine (HCJ 3080/92 [1]). Similarly approval was not given in the past to hold demonstrations outside the private home of the Prime Minister, where he lives in Ramat-Aviv.

The position of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef

9.    Rabbi Ovadya Yosef supported the District Commissioner’s position. His attorney pointed out that ‘the rabbi’s apartment is not used as his office, even though, in the course of his daily affairs, important visitors and guests whom the rabbi cannot receive in his office come to the rabbi’s apartment, and the apartment essentially serves as his home where the rabbi spends most of the day and night in study.’ In a statement on behalf of the rabbi, it was also pointed out that —

‘More than the rabbi suffers from the ongoing harm to his ability to enjoy his private apartment, the rabbi’s wife, who is unwell, suffers greatly from the disturbances which include, inter alia, people shouting at her when she goes out and comes in, and banging on the door of the apartment late at night. In addition to this there is the suffering of the neighbours.’

It should also be noted that ‘the congregating of many dozens of people and speeches made with loudspeakers, would constitute a serious and real disturbance to the rabbi’s household and to all the neighbours.’ ‘Both the rabbi and his neighbours who live in the building are entitled to lead their private lives without disturbance and without any disruption of their lifestyle. The rabbi and the members of his household are entitled to leave and enter their home freely, to pass along the pavements adjoining their home, and not to be exposed to fears and injuries.’

The neighbours’ position

10. Respondents 3-6 are neighbours of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. They are residents in the building where his apartment is situated. They wish to support the decision of the District Commissioner. They point out that ‘for some time a kind of mini-demonstration has been held next to the building in the form of a protest vigil. This phenomenon has recurred from time to time over a period of years.’ They add:

‘The most recent protest vigil began several weeks ago. At first it was right in front of the building next to the entrance to the house. The participants in the vigil brought chairs and tables and signs, and they sat around the tables, eating, drinking and talking. In addition, one car or more always accompanied the group, and this contained equipment and supplies. The police surrounded the demonstrators with protective barriers, and on the police barriers the participants hung up protest signs against the Prime Minister, Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, Minister Deri and other similar signs. After a while, and apparently as a result of complaints made by neighbours, the police moved the protest vigil from the front of the building to the side of the building, on the pavement next to the plaza adjacent to the building.’

The neighbours emphasize that the protest vigil has caused an intolerable disturbance to the residents of the building and it has disrupted the lives of the residents of the building. This was the background for the fundamental position of the neighbours. They recognize the importance of freedom of speech. It has the same status as a person’s right to enjoy his privacy and his freedom to enjoy his own home and property without interference. The petitioner can realize his freedom of speech at some distance from the respondents’ house. Among its considerations, the police must take into account the neighbours’ right to privacy, enjoyment of their apartments and quiet living. Just as a property right warrants protection, the right to privacy and enjoyment of property also warrants protection. The neighbours have no other remedy. Applying to the civil court will not help them. An injunction against the organizers is ineffective, for others will come to demonstrate. A civil court can examine the question of nuisance, but not the legality of the permit. The neighbours have the standing to turn to the police and oppose the granting of a permit to the petitioner. From this standing derives their right also to apply to the court against a decision to grant a permit. ‘Just as a person can apply to this honourable court for the right to demonstrate, the door of the honourable court must also be open to anyone in Israel whose privacy is being invaded.’

The normative framework

11. The normative premise is enshrined in s. 84 of the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 (hereafter — ‘the Police Ordinance’). This provision provides that the district commissioner of police may determine — whether in general or in a specific instance — that holding an assembly or a procession requires a licence. This decision depends upon whether the district commissioner of police thinks this is necessary in order ‘to maintain public security or public order’. On the basis of this provision, district commissioners of police have issued general notices whereby anyone who wishes to organize or conduct a procession or an assembly out of doors must obtain a permit (see HCJ 148/79 Saar v. Minister of Interior [2], at p. 173). Under this provision, anyone wishing to organize or hold an assembly (which under s. 83 of the Police Ordinance means a gathering of fifty or more persons for the purpose of hearing a speech or lecture) or a procession  (which means, under the definition in s. 83 of the Police Ordinance is a march or assembly in which 50 or more persons are to walk together) must apply to the district commissioner of police for a licence. The Police Ordinance provides that the officer in charge may grant the licence, refuse it, or grant it subject to conditions (s. 85 of the Police Ordinance). The Police Ordinance does not establish the scope of the discretion given to the officer in charge (see D. Libai, ‘The Right to Assemble and Demonstrate in Israel’, 2 Iyunei Mishpat, 1973, 54, at p. 58). This means that the officer in charge must exercise his discretion within the framework of the purpose for which he was given the authority (see FH 16/61 Companies Registrar v. Kardosh [3]). This purpose includes a specific purpose and a general purpose (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel-Aviv–Jaffa [4] at p. 326). The specific purpose is enshrined in the Police Ordinance, and it concerns maintaining security and public order. The general purpose concerns protecting and promoting fundamental values, such as the freedom of speech, freedom of movement, property rights and the right of privacy. Justice Shamgar discussed this, saying:

‘… the recognition of basic freedoms as a substantial part of the Israeli legal system leads also to the conclusion that the basic freedoms are, both in name and in purpose, a part of the law, i.e., as basic rules that guide and formulate ways of thinking and legal interpretation, and influence these by their character and their purpose’ (FH 9/77 Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 359).

I too discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘… the constitutional premise is the existence and protection of basic rights in a democratic regime. The assumption is that the legislature (parliament or a delegated authority), when passing legislation, wishes to maintain and protect basic rights. It follows that the purpose of all legislation is to maintain and protect basic rights and not to harm them’ (CA 524/88, Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [6], at p. 56).

And in another case I said:

‘The basic principles of the system and basic human rights determine the purpose of legislation. The presumption is that the purpose of legislation is to realize the principles of the system, and to promote human rights in it. These principles constitute a kind of “normative umbrella” that extends over all legislation… they permeate into all legislation and constitute its purpose’ (HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of the Population Registrar at the Ministry of Interior [7], at p. 763.

We will consider these purposes and the relationship between them.

The right to hold an assembly or a procession

12. Holding an assembly, procession or picket is one of the basic human rights in Israel (Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]; HCJ 153/83 Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8]). This right ‘is recognized, alongside the freedom of speech or as deriving therefrom, as belonging to those freedoms which shape the character of the Government in Israel as a democratic government’ (ibid., at p. 398). ‘Through this freedom, means of expression are granted to those who do not have access to political or commercial avenues of expression. For this reason our legal system, like the legal systems of other enlightened democracies, accepts that the right of demonstration and assembly has a recognized place in the hall of basic human rights’ (D. Kretzmer, ‘Allocating Resources to Protect Demonstrations: The Israeli Approach’, Freedom of Expression and the Charter, ed. D. Scheiderman, 1991, 424). In the past, this right was recognized in case-law, and it was one of those ‘basic rights that are “unwritten”, but which derive directly from the character of the State as a freedom-loving democracy.’ (Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [9], at p. 2415 {216}). It appears that now this right can be derived from the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides a statutory constitutional basis for the human right to dignity and liberty. The freedom to express oneself — in words alone or by expressive actions — is a major expression of human dignity and liberty. Indeed, ‘the freedom of demonstration and assembly has a broad ideological basis, at the centre of which is the recognition of the worth of the human being, his dignity, the freedom given to him to develop his personality, and the desire to maintain a democratic form of Government’ (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at p. 398 {114}).

13. In analyzing the constitutional right we did not distinguish between an assembly, a procession or a picket. All three are characterized by the fact that the speaker has a physical presence at the place of the expression. Nonetheless, Israeli law distinguishes between these forms of expression. Thus, for example, a permit is required for holding an  ‘assembly’ or a ‘procession’, but a permit is not required for a picket (see CrimC (Jer.) 4300/81 [31] and Kretzmer, ‘Demonstrations and the Law’, 19 Isr. L. Rev. 1984, 47). This derives from the special arrangements in the Police Ordinance. As we have seen, the Ordinance requires a licence for holding an assembly or a procession. Assembly is defined in s. 83 as follows:

‘ “assembly” – fifty or more persons who have congregated in order to hear a speech or lecture on a political issue or in order to discuss that issue.’

It follows that fifty or more persons holding a picket, without having ‘congregated in order to hear a speech’ does not constitute an assembly. The same is true of forty-nine or less persons who have congregated to hear a speech or lecture. ‘Procession’ is defined in s. 83 as follows:

‘ “procession” – fifty or more persons walking together, or who have congregated in order to walk together, from one place to another, whether they are actually moving or not, and whether they are organized in any specific form or not.’

It follows that fifty or more persons who have not congregated in order to walk together do not constitute a procession. The same applies to forty-nine or less persons who have congregated together to walk together. Other arrangements can be found in the Penal Law, 5737-1977, and in the Protection of Privacy Law. I will first analyse the constitutional rights in accordance with their inherent nature, without reference to these special definitions. Thereafter I will examine the influence of the said provisions, in so far as they are relevant to this case, on the realization of the constitutional rights.

14. An assembly, procession or picket are characterized inter alia by the fact that the participant in an assembly, procession or picket has a physical presence at the place of the expression (see Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at p. 51). This presence may naturally impair the interests and values of others. A procession through city roads is liable to impair the right of movement of those using the roads. An assembly or picket next to a house may impair the use and enjoyment derived by the residents of the building from the land in their possession. An assembly, procession or picket may harm public order. This ‘friction’ between the right of assembly, procession or picketing and other values and interests necessitates a balance between the conflicting rights, involving reciprocal concessions. We will address the nature of this balance below. It expresses the ‘relativity’ of the constitutional right. In this case, it should be emphasized that the restriction of the right of assembly, procession or holding a picket does not derive from the ‘inherent’ nature of the right, or its own innate insufficiency. The restriction of the right of assembly or procession or holding a picket is derived from considerations that are ‘external’ to the right itself, which derive from the existence of competing rights and conflicting interests. Indeed, we must distinguish between matters that are included within the inherent nature of a basic right (‘the extent of the right’) and the degree of recognition given to its inherent nature in a given context (‘the extent of the protection’): see HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [10], at p. 33 {244}, and also F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Cambridge, 1982.).

Property rights and the right of privacy

15. An assembly, procession or picket are all liable to interfere with a person’s ability to use and enjoy his property. When the assembly or picket take place on a person’s property without his consent, they interfere with his property rights. The same applies to an assembly or picket that are supposed to take place in the streets of the city that are intended for assemblies, when they are held outside a person’s house or apartment. In such a case, the assembly or picket may interfere with the person’s ability to enjoy his property, namely the ability to escape into one’s own private property from the pressures of society and the inquisitive public eye. Property rights have been recognized by Israeli case-law as a constitutional right (see Pri HaEmek Agricultural Cooperative Society Ltd v. Sedei Yaakov Workers Settlement Ltd [6]; J. Weissman, Property Rights: General Part, The Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1993, 37). In particular, the assembly, procession and picket interfere with a person’s right of privacy. This right is also a constitutional basic right (see MApp 82/83 State of Israel v. Alia [11], at p. 741, and cf. HCJ 3815/90 Gilat v. Minister of Police [12], at p. 424). These two basic rights — property rights and the right of privacy — were recognized as basic rights by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Basic Law states: ‘One may not harm a person’s property’ (s. 3) and ‘Every person is entitled to privacy and confidentiality’ (s. 7(a)). For the purposes of petition before us, we do not need to set down the boundary between property rights and the right of privacy, or between them and other rights. Since the focus of the petition lies in the violation of the right of privacy, we will consider this issue, and reserve judgment on the question whether, in addition to the violation of the right of privacy, there is also a violation of the resident’s property rights.

16. Every person in Israel is ‘entitled to privacy’ (s. 7(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). The scope of this right is not entirely free of doubt. Much has been written about it (see, inter alia, R. Gavison, ‘Privacy and the Limits of the Law’, 89 Yale L.J., 1979-1980, 421). Now that it has a statutory constitutional basis, it must be interpreted from a ‘broad perspective’ (Justice Agranat in FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [13], at p. 442 {124}) ‘with the understanding that we are dealing with a provision that shapes our way of life… the issue is one of human experience, which must adapt itself to changing realities’ (EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [14], at p. 306 {157}). For this reason a constitutional provision must be construed ‘with a broad outlook, and not in a technical manner’ (HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [15], at p. 618 {100}). This is the source of the approach — accepted in enlightened democratic countries — that a constitutional provision should be interpreted ‘liberally’ (Justice Wilberforce in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [45], at p. 25), with a substantive approach and not a ‘legalistic’ one (in the language of Judge Dickerson in R. v. Big M. Drug Mart Ltd [49]), with an objective approach and not a ‘technical’ or ‘pedantic’ one (in the language of Judge Dixon in Australian National Airways Pty. Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) [32], at p. 81). Against a background of such an approach, it can be held that the constitutional right of privacy includes, inter alia — but without any attempt to encompass all aspects of the right —a person’s right to lead the lifestyle he wishes inside the privacy of his home, without outside disturbance. A man’s home is his castle, and inside it he is entitled to be left to himself, to develop the autonomy of his own private will (see Rowan v. Post Office Dept. (1970) [33], at p. 736). In this respect, the right to privacy is, inter alia — in the language of Prof. Gavison — a restriction on the accessibility of others to the individual (see Gavison, in her article, supra, at p. 428). Indeed, in the tumult of life in modern society, a person’s right of privacy allows him to be on his own and with the cherished members of his family, and enables him to gather strength at home for the following day (see City of Wauwatosa v. King (1971) [34], at p. 537). The right of privacy is therefore intended to ensure that a person does not become a prisoner in his home, and is not compelled to expose himself at home to disturbances that he does not want. In this way, the right of privacy constitutes — in the language of Justice Douglas — the beginning of freedom (see Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollack (1952) [35], at p. 467). Indeed, Warren and Brandeis referred — in their preliminary list on this matter — to a person’s right to be let alone as a right that is the ‘most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man’ (S.D. Warren and L.D. Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 1890-1891, 193). Justice Frankfurter rightly said in the case of Martin v. Struthers (1943) [36], at p. 153, that:

‘….homes are sanctuaries from intrusions upon privacy and of opportunities for leading lives in health and safety.’

In a similar vein, Justice Black said that allowing every person to do as he wishes would ultimately lead to a situation where:

‘…homes, the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of life. Men and women who hold public office would be compelled, simply because they did hold public office, to lose the comforts and privacy of an unpicketed home. I believe that our Constitution, written for the ages, to endure except as changed in the manner it provides, did not create a Government with such monumental weaknesses’ (Gregory v. Chicago (1969) [37], at p. 125).

Justice Brennan made similar remarks in Carey v. Brown (1980) [38], at p. 471, where he stated:

‘Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and woman can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick”.’

Justice Shamgar gave an excellent description of this, when emphasizing that a picket outside or at the door of a person’s home, intrudes on his privacy, for it is liable to —

‘…deprive a person of his tranquillity, his feeling of personal security and the feeling that he can run his own life, without having his private affairs becoming a display for all, and hence the harassment and the resulting infringement of privacy’ (FH 9/83 Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [16], at p. 851).

So we see that the right of privacy draws the line between the individual and society. It defines the boundaries within which the individual is left to himself, for the development of his own individuality, without the interference of others (see T.I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, New York, 1970, 544). Indeed, just as the recognition of human dignity and liberty leads to the recognition of freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration, so the recognition of human dignity and liberty leads to the recognition of a person’s right to be free from unwanted speech. This was discussed by Prof. Black, who said:

‘The claim to freedom from unwanted speech rests on grounds of high policy and on convictions of human dignity closely similar if not identical with those classically brought forward in support of freedom of speech in the usual sense. Forced listening destroys and denies, practically and symbolically, that unfettered interplay and competition among ideas which is the assumed ambient of the communication freedoms’ (C.L. Black, ‘He cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor,’ 53 Colum L. Rev. 1953, 961, 967).

Indeed, just as everything in human rights necessitates freedom of speech, there is nothing in human rights that necessitates the hearing of unwanted speech.

Freedom of movement

17. The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket may conflict with the right of the individual to move freely in the roads and streets. ‘Roads and streets were intended for walking and travelling’ (Saar v. Minister of Interior [2], at p. 177). Just as one person has a constitutional right to hold a procession through a city street, so another has a constitutional right to walk along a city street. This constitutional right exists independently, and it can also be derived from human dignity and liberty.

The public interest

18. Hitherto I have discussed human rights with regard to an assembly, procession or picket. Alongside these rights of the individual, there also exists the public interest (R. Pound, ‘A Survey of Social Interests,’ 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1943-44, 1). These are the interests of the public as such, which it demands as an organized entity. One cannot maintain an organized democratic society without maintaining the public interest in security, order and public peace. Admittedly, one cannot have democratic government merely on the basis of public order alone, but one cannot have democratic Government without public order. Public order is one of the basic values of the legal system (see HCJ 109/70 Coptic Orthodox Mutran of Jerusalem v. Minister of Police [17], at p. 246). The public interest includes public peace, the quiet and tranquillity of daily life, the personal security of a person in his home and in public places, and the proper relationships between individuals and between the individual and government. Indeed, the public interest also includes protection of the human rights of the individual. Without public order it is impossible to ensure human rights. Without order there is no freedom (see HCJ 14/86 Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [18], at p. 433). When a group of people want to hold an assembly, picket or procession in a city street, there is a public interest in maintaining order and security in the city streets, in ensuring the flow of traffic in the streets and in protecting property and privacy. Justice Brennan discussed this in Carey [38] at 471, saying:

‘The state’s interest in protecting the welfare, tranquility and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.’

It follows that there is a public interest in protecting the interest of the individual and it is the interest of the individual to protect the public interest. In a democratic society there is an inseverable link between order and freedom. How can we ensure the proper operation of this link? The answer that our legal system gives to this question lies in the need to balance interests and values when they conflict. The key lies in an attitude of ‘give and take’ and a balance of conflicting values. Human rights are not ‘absolute’. They are ‘relative’. The public interest wishes to ensure proper ‘subsistence areas’ for the relative nature of the right. We will now turn to this matter.

Balancing between conflicting interests

19. As we have seen, the District Commissioner of Police has discretion in granting a licence for an assembly or a procession. This discretion is exercised within the framework of the purpose of the Police Ordinance. This purpose includes the realization of the specific and general aims underlying the Ordinance. As we have seen, these purposes include safeguarding the constitutional right to hold an assembly and a procession, safeguarding the constitutional right to property, privacy and freedom of movement and safeguarding the public interest. No difficulty arises when all the values and interests that must be taken into account point in the same direction. This is certainly the case when there is a request to hold an assembly in the desert, far from any town. The individual exercises his right without harming anyone. The public interest is realized in its entirety. But in the vast majority of cases the individual does not want to hold an assembly in the desert. The individual wants to hold an assembly in the busy streets of the city, or on the quiet promenades of a residential neighbourhood. He wants to convey a message to others by means of a physical presence, and thereby he is likely to injure the rights of others and the public interest. Indeed, giving the protection of the law to the right of assembly and procession to the fullest extent will harm the right of property, the right of privacy and the freedom of movement, which also demand protection to the fullest extent. It necessarily harms the public interest. Therefore a constitutional process is required to restrict the protection given to constitutional rights, so that they are only protected to a partial extent. This restriction is based on the recognition that it is impossible to protect all of the rights to the fullest extent. The fullest protection of the right of A to hold an assembly cannot be reconciled with the fullest protection of the right of B who does not consent to the presence of A on his property (the property right), or who wishes not to be exposed to A’s speech (the right of privacy), or who desires to walk in precisely the same area where A wishes to hold the assembly (the freedom of movement). Indeed, complete protection of human rights contains an inherent contradiction, for human rights are not only directed against the Government, but they are also directed one against another. There exists between them a structure of connected vessels. Therefore an act of constitutional balancing is required (see HCJ 3080/92 [1]). By means of the constitutional balance, proper protection will be given to the various constitutional rights and the public interest in a manner that achieves constitutional harmony. Justice Agranat discussed this, when addressing the relationship between the freedom of speech and public peace:

‘… the right to freedom of speech is not an absolute and unlimited right, but a relative right, which can be restricted and supervised in view of the aim of upholding important socio-political interests that in certain conditions may be preferable to those protected by the realization of the principle of free speech. Delineating the limits of the use of the right of freedom of speech and of the press depends therefore on a process of placing the different values on the scales and, after weighing them, choosing those which, in the circumstances, must prevail (HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Ltd v. Minister of Interior [19], at p. 879 {99}).

Israeli law adopts a similar position with regard to the conflict between other constitutional human rights (such as the conflict between the freedom of speech and the right to reputation; see Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5]; CA 214/89 Avneri v. Shapira [20]; the conflict between freedom of speech and freedom of movement; Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]). Similarly, Israeli law adopts this approach with regard to the conflict between human rights and the public interest (such as the conflict between the freedom of speech and public order; see HCJ 399/85 Kahana v. Broadcasting Authority Management Board [21]; freedom of movement and state security; see HCJ 448/85 Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22]; freedom of speech and judicial integrity; see CrimA 126/62 Disenchik v. Attorney-General [23]; freedom of speech and the public interest in election propaganda; see HCJ 869/92 Zvilli v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Thirteenth Knesset [24]; freedom of assembly and the public interest in the privacy of a public figure; HCJ 456/73 [25] and HCJ 3080/92 [1]).

Principled balance

20. The ideal balance between conflicting human rights — among themselves and between them and the public interest — should be a principled balance; cf. HCJ 991/91 David Pasternak Ltd v. Minister of Building and Housing [26], at p. 60. What characterizes a principled balance — as opposed to an ad hoc balance — is that a ‘rational principle’ (in the language of Justice Agranat in Kol HaAm v. Minister of Interior [19], at p. 881 {--}) is established that reflects ‘a criterion that expresses a principled guideline’, as distinct from a ‘chance, paternalistic criterion, the nature and direction of which cannot be anticipated’ (Justice Shamgar in Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 361). Indeed, the principled balance reflects a general legal norm, which establishes a constitutional principle that applies to all similar cases (see T.A. Aleinkoff, ‘Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing’, 96 Yale L.J. 1986-87, 943, 948).

Different kinds of principled balancing

21. The principled balance cannot be expressed by one formula. I discussed this in one case, when I said:

‘The diversity of possible situations requires a diversity of balancing points. One cannot adopt a single criterion, which can solve all of the problems. The reason for this is that the conflicting interests are not always of the same normative level, and the difficulties raised by the conflict are of diverse kinds’ (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at pp. 401-402 {117}).

In a similar vein, Vice-President Justice Ben-Porat said:

‘… the proper criterion is not fixed and standard for all types of cases… but a proper test must be adopted by considering the nature and importance of the competing principles in our way of thinking as to their relative priority and the degree of protection that we wish to give to every principle or interest’ (Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22], at p. 708).

Take the conflict between the freedom of assembly and procession and property rights. The balance between these two constitutional rights when one wants to hold the assembly or the procession on land belonging to the State or to public authorities is not the same as the balance when the assembly or procession are to be held on private property (see Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8], at p. 402 {117}). Moreover, even with respect to land owned by the State or public authorities, one must distinguish between different kinds of land according to their typical functions. There is therefore a basis for distinguishing between land that has been designated, by social tradition, for holding assemblies or processions (such as streets, roads or airports — see Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada (1991) [50]) and land not designated for that purpose (such as Government offices). Between these two there are intermediate situations, such as State land which is used for courts and prisons (see Cox v. Louisiana (1965) [39], and also H. Kalven, ‘The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana’ [1965] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1). Moreover, with regard to roads and streets, which belong to the State or to public authorities, roads and streets in busy city centres are not the same as roads and streets in residential areas. The same is true of private property. Private property which according to social tradition is the ‘castle’ of the individual (such as his apartment or house) is not the same as private property that according to social tradition is used by the public (such as a shopping centre: see Pruneyard Shopping Centre v. Robins (1980) [40]). Indeed, the balancing formulae vary in accordance with the conflicting values, and within the framework of a given set of values, in accordance with social aims and basic constitutional outlooks. We therefore distinguish between a ‘vertical balance’ and a ‘horizontal balance’. In the ‘vertical balance’, one value that conflicts with another value is superior to it. Nonetheless, this superiority is realized only if the requirements of the balancing formula are fulfilled with regard to the likelihood and extent of the harm to the superior value. Thus, for example, the public interest in public peace and public order prevail over the freedom of speech, provided that there is ‘near certainty’ that real damage will be caused to the public interest if the freedom of speech is not curtailed (see Universal City Studios Inc. v. Film and Play Review Board [10]). Similarly, the public interest in security will prevail over the freedom of movement outside the borders of the state, provided that there is a ‘genuine and serious fear’ of harm to security if the right to leave the country is realized (see Dahar v. Minister of Interior [22]). In the  ‘horizontal balance’ the two conflicting values have equal status. The balancing formula examines the degree of reciprocal concession of each of the rights. Thus, for example, the right of movement and the right to hold a procession are of equal status. The balancing formula will establish conditions relating to place, time and extent in order to allow the two rights to co-exist. Needless to say, these conditions of place, time and extent are liable to change in accordance with the nature of the ‘equal’ rights, the social purposes underlying them and basic constitutional perceptions.

Legislative balancing and judicial balancing

22. As we have seen, the balancing formulae determine the extent of the protection that the legal system gives to constitutional human rights, from which the ‘relativity’ of constitutional human rights is derived. For this reason they are so important. Occasionally it is the constitutive authority, or the legislature (in Israel — the Knesset) that establishes the balancing formula. Thus, for example, the Canadian Charter provides a list of human rights. Alongside these rights, there is a general provision (section 1) according to which these rights are subject:

‘… to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’

In a similar vein, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides a list of human rights. Alongside these, there is a general balancing formula (‘a restriction clause’), whereby:

‘The rights under this Basic Law may only be violated by a law that befits the values of the State of Israel, is intended for a proper purpose, and to an extent that is not excessive.’ (s. 8).

In these situations, there is a statutory balancing formula and the court is required to interpret it and to give it specific content. Sometimes there is no statutory balancing formula. The law (whether legislation or case-law) recognizes human rights and the public interest, even in the absence of a statutory balancing formula. In such a situation, there is no alternative but to develop balancing formulae in case-law. This, for example, is the position in the United States. The First Amendment to the Constitution regarding freedom of speech, establishes this freedom in ‘absolute’ terms (‘Congress shall make no Law… abridging the freedom of speech’). Notwithstanding this, judicial balancing formulae have been established that have moderated the absolute freedom and have restricted the protection given to the freedom of speech, out of consideration for other values. The same is true in Germany. A number of constitutional human rights established in the Basic Law (the Grundgesetz) do not provide balancing formulae, and these have been determined by the courts (see D.P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, Durham, 1989). A similar approach has been adopted in Israel. Alongside the statutory balancing formulae, case-law balancing formulae were established in the past (such as the test of ‘near certainty’: see Israel Filming Studios Ltd v. Geri [9]). This is the method that the courts must adopt in the future, when constitutional human rights established in the Basic Laws are in conflict with one another.

Balancing, ‘weight’ and the ‘enlightened public’

23. Before we proceed to the balance required in the case before us, it should be pointed out that the word ‘balancing’ is merely a metaphor. Behind this word lies a constitutional outlook that the various rights, values and interests do not have the same social importance. ‘Balancing’ between values and interests is merely an examination of the relative social importance of the different values and interests. I discussed this in one case, where I said:

‘These terms — balance, weight — are merely metaphors. They are based on the outlook that society does not regard all principles of equal importance, and that in the absence of statutory guidance, the court must assess the relative social importance of the different principles. Just as there is no man without a shadow, so there is no principle without weight. Determining the balance on the basis of weight means making a social assessment as to the relative importance of the different principles’ (Laor v. Film and Play Review Board [18], at p. 434).

Indeed, the determination of the ‘balance’ is a normative activity. It is intended to reflect the value society attributes to the values and interests within the values of society as a whole. This action is not done in accordance with the subjective attitudes of the judge. It is an expression of the objective attitudes of society. I discussed this in HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [27], at p. 265 {68}, where I said:

‘In determining “the relative social importance”, the court is a “faithful interpreter of the accepted attitudes of the enlightened public, in whose midst it dwells”… These are the attitudes enshrined in basic values and basic conceptions, and not in temporary, passing trends. They reflect the “social awareness of the people in whose midst the judges dwell”… They are an expression of “the national way of life”… They reflect “the nation’s vision and its basic credo”... They are not the product of judicial subjectivity. In attaching weight to the various considerations, the judge aims, to the best of his ability, for judicial objectivity. He does not reflect either his subjective values or his personal considerations. The judge reflects “the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State.”…’

The criterion guiding normative judicial activity is the one established by Justice Landau, according to which the judge is obliged:

‘to be a faithful interpreter of the accepted attitudes of the enlightened public, in whose midst he dwells’ (CA 461/62 Zim Israeli Shipping Co. Ltd v. Maziar [28], at p. 1335 {135}).

The judge must be familiar with the society in which he lives:

‘He must learn about the social consensus, the foundations and values that are common to members of society. He must absorb the legal ethos and the basic principles that make society a democratic society’ (Efrat v. Director of Population Register at Interior Ministry [7], at p. 780).

He must express ‘the conscience of the general public and the value beliefs of society with regard to appropriate and inappropriate behaviour…’ (CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [29], at p. 532). He must give expression to the basic beliefs of society. Against this background, we will now turn to the balancing required in the type of cases to which the case before us belongs.

An assembly, procession or picket outside the apartment of a public figure

24. The petitioner wants to hold an assembly outside the apartment of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. This apartment is used by him and his family for their home. Nonetheless, persons in government visit him there. The apartment is located in an apartment building, in which there are several residents. The building is situated in a residential area. The District Commissioner of Police refused to give the petitioner a licence to hold the assembly. His main reason was the intrusion on the privacy of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef. He also gave a ‘traffic related’ reason, but it was emphasized that the ‘most important reason’ relates to the violation of the right of privacy. On the basis of this factual background, the focus must be on the relationship between the right of someone to hold an assembly with others outside the private residence of a public figure in a residential area and the right of the public figure and his neighbours to protect their privacy. There is no reason, within the framework of the petition before us, to discuss the ‘traffic related’ consideration and the relationship between the petitioner’s right to hold an assembly and the right of any person in the community to move freely on the road or the pavement upon where the assembly is supposed to take place, since this consideration was not the basis for the District Commissioner’s decision. Furthermore, the petitioner wishes to hold the assembly on the pavement or on the road. He does not want to enter the premises belonging to the individual. In these circumstances, we do not need to examine the relationship between the right of assembly and property rights (in the narrow sense). Finally, the permit requested a location outside an apartment which is used by the public figure mainly as his home. It is not a Government office, nor is it even an ‘official’ residence like the President’s House. A change in the designated use of the house changes the proper balance between the conflicting rights. The petition before us focuses on the relationship between the individual’s right to hold an assembly in a residential area and the right of a public figure and his neighbours not to have their privacy in their private apartments violated by the holding of the assembly, and the relationship between these two rights and the public interest in maintaining public order.

The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket next to the private house of a public figure

25. The constitutional premise is that every man has the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket. This right is not restricted only to Government or commercial centres of the city. In terms of its internal scope, the right extends even to holding an assembly, procession or picket in residential areas (see Comment, ‘Picketing the Homes of Public Officials’, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev., 1996-1997, 106). In discussing a picket in a residential area, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in the opinion of Justice Brennan:

‘There can be no doubt that in prohibiting peaceful picketing on the public streets and sidewalks in residential neighbourhoods, the Illinois statute regulates expressive conduct that falls within the first Amendment’s preserve’ (Carey [38], at p. 460).

In explaining this approach, another American court noted that the recognition of the right to hold a protest vigil next to the (private) home of an employer:

‘… brings home the fact that a man may leave his tools at his work but not his conscience or his relations with his fellow man’ (United Electrical, R & M Workers v. Baldwin (1946) [41], at p. 242).

Indeed, in view of the public reasons which underlie the right to hold an assembly, demonstration or picket, there is no substantive difference between an assembly, demonstration, or picket in a residential neighbourhood and an assembly, demonstration or picket in another area. The individual may also wish to express himself in a residential area. Sometimes it is precisely the residential neighbourhood that serves as an effective focal point for expressing that view. It creates the direct link between the petitioner and a public figure, which an assembly or procession in Government areas (such as the Government complex) or commercial areas do not create (see D.M. Taubman, ‘Picketers at the Doorstep’ 9 Harv. Civil Rights L. Rev., 1974, 95, 106). Prof. Kretzmer discussed this, noting that:

‘There are times when demonstrations outside the home of a public figure are the most effective way of communicating a view on a matter of public importance. In other cases such demonstrations may be the only really effective way of communicating that view to the public figure involved. The privacy interests of public figures should not override the expression interest involved in such demonstrations’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

There is also no difference — from the viewpoint of the (inherent) scope of the right to hold an assembly, demonstration or picket — between an ‘official’ residence of a public figure (such as the President’s House or the Prime Minister’s House) and his ‘private’ home. Both of these are a focus for an assembly, demonstration or picket and the reasons that underlie the constitutional right to demonstrate, assemble or picket, exist for both of them.

The right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours

26. ‘Every person has a right to privacy’ (s. 7(a) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). The public figure is also entitled to privacy. The fact that he is a public figure should not deprive him of the right to live within the privacy of his own home, on his own or with his family. It is precisely because of the public exposure involved in his position or office that he needs the quiet and tranquillity of his home, and the privacy is intended to give him these at the end of the day. Indeed, it is the right of public figures ‘to protect at least part of their lives from the media’ (Gavison, ‘Prohibition of Publication that Violates Privacy,’ Civil Rights in Israel, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, ed. R. Gavison, 1982, 177, 200). In one case, the petitioner applied to hold an assembly outside the home of the Foreign Minister. The District Commissioner of Police refused the application. The petition to the Supreme Court was denied. The court said:

‘The freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression upon which the petitioner relied in his petition do not mean that permission is given to intrude on the privacy of a person holding public office and to harass him and the members of his family in their private lives in order to influence him, in this way, with regard to his public activity’ (HCJ 456/73 [25]).

In a similar vein, Prof. Kretzmer stated:

‘All persons, including public figures, are entitled to respect for the privacy of their homes’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

The neighbours of the public figure are entitled to realize their right to privacy. The fact that nearby there lives a person holding public office should not deprive them of that right.

The public interest

27. The public interest in this case is mainly restricted to the realization of the right of assembly, procession and picket on the one hand and the right to privacy on the other hand. As we have seen, the public interest in the freedom of movement was not the basis for the decision in this case. Nor is there any fear of a disturbance of the peace. Indeed, we are concerned with the public interest in protecting the human rights to hold an assembly, procession and picket on the one hand and the privacy of the home on the other. The question is how we can protect, in a democratic society, both the freedom of assembly, procession and picketing and the right of privacy. The answer to this question lies in the necessity of balancing these two values. We will now turn to this balance.

The balance

28. The right to hold an assembly, procession or picket in the city streets and the right to the privacy of a person’s home are constitutional rights in Israel. They are cherished by Israeli democracy. They are rights of equal stature. Neither of them is preferable to the other. Justice Burger rightly pointed out in Rowan [33], at p. 736, ‘… the right of every person “to be let alone” must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate’. It follows from this equality that it is insufficient for there to be a near certainty of a substantial violation of one right in order to deny the other right. Even if it is proved that it is definitely certain that the freedom of assembly, demonstration or picketing will intrude on privacy, this is insufficient to justify denying that freedom. Similarly, even were it proven that it was definitely certain that the full exercise of the right to privacy would violate the right of assembly, procession or picket, denying the right to privacy would still not be justified. Indeed, we are not dealing with a  ‘vertical balance’ which looks for formulae of reasonable likelihood. We are concerned with two human rights of equal standing, and the balance between them must therefore find expression in a reciprocal waiver whereby each right must make a concession to the other in order to allow the coexistence of both. The protection of the law does not extend to either of the rights in its entirety. Each right suffers restrictions of time, place and manner in order to allow the substantive realization of the other right. Indeed, the proper balance between the freedom of speech and privacy is one of the foundations of a sound democratic regime. The balance required between the rights is a horizontal balance. We are dealing here — in the language of Justice Landau in Israel Electricity Co. Ltd v. HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd [5], at p. 343 — ‘not with a “vertical” scale of a “supreme right” as opposed to a normal right’ but with a horizontal delineation of ‘rights of equal standing, without an aim of preferring one right as defined in legislation at the expense of another.’ At the heart of the horizontal balance is the recognition that both freedom of assembly, procession and picketing in the streets and privacy in homes are rights that are cherished by the democratic regime, but in a democratic society it is impossible to give protection to each of these rights to the fullest extent without harming the other right. Democracy therefore requires a reciprocal restriction of the extent of the protection given to each of the rights. This restriction must, in so far as possible, preserve the essence of each of the competing values (see L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Mineola, 2nd ed., 1988, 977). It must try, in so far as possible, to prevent a major violation of one right in upholding the other right. With regard to legislation that violates the freedom of speech in order to uphold the right to privacy, Justice Harlan said:

‘The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is… dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner’ (Cohen v. California (1971) [42], at p. 21).

The horizontal balance results in limitations of time, place and manner for realizing one of the rights in order to maintain the essence of the other right (see, Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, New York, 1966, 75). With regard to legislation restricting the freedom of assembly, procession and protest in order to uphold the right of privacy, Justice Brennan said:

‘The ordinance is subject to the well-settled time, place and manner test; the restriction must be content and viewpoint neutral, leave open ample alternative channels of communication, and be narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest’ (Frisby v. Schultz [43] at 491).

For this reason, Justice Brennan — who was in the minority in that case — thought that legislation which absolutely prohibited picketing in a residential area violated the constitution and was void. On the other hand, legislation passes the constitutional test if it establishes arrangements governing place, time and manner. Justice Brennan wrote, at p. 494:

‘Thus, for example, the government could constitutionally regulate the number of residential pickers, the hours during which a residential picket may take place, or the noise level of such a picket. In short, substantial regulation is permitted to neutralize the intrusive or unduly coercive aspects of picketing around the home. But to say that picketing may be substantially regulated is not to say that it may be prohibited in its entirety. Once size, time, volume, and the like have been controlled to ensure that the picket is no longer intrusive or coercive, only the speech itself remains, conveyed perhaps by a lone, silent individual, walking back and forth with a sign.’

In fact, an assembly or a picket that is held on one occasion is not the same as repeated assemblies or pickets; an assembly or picket held in the morning or afternoon is not the same as an assembly or picket held during hours of rest; an assembly or picket with a large attendance is not the same as an assembly or picket with few participants; an assembly or picket that is supposed to be held over several hours is not the same as a short assembly or picket; an assembly where use is made of loudspeakers or other means of amplifying sound is not the same as one that is held quietly; an assembly held next to a private building is not the same as an assembly held at some distance from it; and an assembly held alongside pickets is not the same as an assembly held without picketing (see A. Kamin, ‘Residential Picketing and the First Amendment’, 61 Nw U. L. Rev, 1966-67, 177; R. E. Rigby, ‘Balancing Free Speech in a Public Forum v. Residential Privacy: Frisby v. Schultz’, 24 New Eng. L. Rev., 1989-90, 888).

Restrictions regarding time, place and manner

29. It follows that in Israel a person in entitled to hold an assembly or picket in a residential area. He is entitled to hold an assembly or picket next to the house of a public figure. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of holding the assembly or picket a proper balance must be guaranteed between a person’s right to hold an assembly or picket and the right of the public figure and his neighbours to their privacy in their apartments. This proper balance reflects the public interest, which the police must protect. Within the framework of the police’s statutory powers, it must ensure that the right of assembly of the one does not substantially intrude on the privacy rights of the other. For this purpose, the police may determine reasonable restrictions of time, place and manner. With regard to time, the police may determine that the assembly may not be held during hours of rest. It may also determine that the assembly will be held for a relatively short time. It may determine — on the basis of equality and without any reference to the substance of the message being conveyed at the demonstration — the frequency for holding demonstrations, so that the right of privacy of the public figure and his neighbours is not seriously violated. It may also take into account the frequency of holding assemblies or pickets in the past. With regard to place, the police can determine that the assembly will take place at a certain distance from the home of the public figure. It may determine that the assembly will not prevent free entry and exit to and from the building. With respect to manner, the police may restrict the number of participants. It may regulate the use of loudspeakers, including their volume and number (see Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) [44]; Francis v. Chief of Police (1973) [46]; Indulal v. State (1963) [48]; Cheema v. Ross (1991) [51]).

A private apartment used for public activity

30. The balances that I have discussed assume that the public figure does not use his private apartment for his public activity. In this situation, the public figure is entitled to the same measure of privacy as his neighbours. The balance may change if the private home of the public figure is also used for his public activity. The extreme case is that of an official residence (e.g., the President’s House or the Prime Minister’s House) which are situated at a distance from residential areas. This residence acts as a symbol of the office and here the public figure carries out both his public and private activity, without it being possible to distinguish them. Because of the unique nature of the official residence, it should generally be regarded as a public building (such as a Government office). The appropriate balance between the freedom of assembly, demonstration or picketing and the right to privacy will therefore in these circumstances tend in favour of the freedom of assembly, demonstration and picketing. An intermediate case is one where there is a basic distinction between the place of the public activity of the public figure and his home, even though the public figure carries out some public activity at his home. In this situation, the proper balance between the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket and the right of privacy must take account of this special situation. The extent of protection for the privacy of a public figure who keeps his public activity and his residential apartment separate is not the same as the extent of protection for privacy when the public figure carries out part of his public activity in his apartment (see: Carey [38], at p. 471; Frisby [43] at p. 479). The proper balance between the constitutional rights must reflect the special function of the home. It follows that the more the private home is used for public activity, the more the balance will tend in ‘favour’ of the freedom of assembly, procession or picketing.

31. It is a special case when the private home of a public figure is also used for a part of his public activity. Nonetheless, this apartment is situated in a residential building, where there live additional residents who are not involved in the public activity. How will the proper balance be made in such a case? It seems to me that, in making the proper balance, one must take account of the special aspects of this complex situation. On the one hand, there is no justification, in a democratic society, for substantially limiting the extent of protection for the privacy to which a ‘private’ resident is entitled, merely because his neighbour is a public figure. On the other hand, there is a justification in a democratic society for demanding some concession with regard to the privacy of a private resident because of the fact that his neighbour is a public figure. This is the ‘price’ that the private neighbour must pay for the public activity of his neighbour. It seems to me that the proper balance between the constitutional rights must take account of this complicated situation. One must therefore guarantee, within the framework of the proper balance, that the ‘private’ neighbour is given substantial protection for his privacy, even if this protection may be slightly less than the protection given to a resident whose neighbour is not a public figure.

From the general to the specific

32. Against the background of this normative framework we must examine the case before us. It seems to me that had the petitioner asked to hold a procession on one occasion — with the number of participants proposed by him — which would pass by the apartment of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef and his neighbours, there would be a basis for approving it, subject to restrictions of time and manner, taking account of the question whether such processions took place in the recent past and taking account of the transport factor. A procession passing by the house intrudes minimally on privacy and it upholds the proper balance between the relevant constitutional rights. Similarly, it appears to me that the petitioner would have been within his constitutional rights — in accordance with the proper balance between these and the rights of the residents of the building — if he had asked to hold a picket on one occasion with a small number of participants, standing silently with signs, without there having been such picketing in the past. Even here there would be justification for fixing restrictions of time and place. The petitioner may hold this picket without a police permit. He is entitled to police protection if he wants to hold this kind of picket (Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [8]). It also seems to me that a picket held within the framework of the proper constitutional balance is a legal activity for the purpose of the Protection of Privacy Law (see ss. 18 and 19). It should be emphasized that with respect to the picket, there was a basis for taking account of the fact that in the recent past pickets have been held next to the house and the extent of the intrusion on privacy that these caused.

33. The petitioner does not want to hold a procession or a picket. His request is to hold a  ‘picketing assembly’. He wants approximately two hundred and fifty people to participate. He wants to use a stage and two loudspeakers. He wants to hold it for two hours (19.00-21.00). Had this assembly been an isolated event, without there having been pickets in the past, it might have been possible to approve it, subject to certain restrictions in terms of time (shortening the length of the assembly) and manner (foregoing the loudspeakers, reducing the number of participants). The problem is that the assembly requested comes against a background where pickets have been held next to the house for a long time. In these circumstances it was proper to consider the overall balance between the freedom of assembly of the petitioner and his friends and the intrusion on the privacy and the property of the residents of the building. Such an examination was not made by the police. It did not take account of the number of pickets that took place in the past, but it was satisfied with the intrusion on privacy as the sole reason for the refusal. In doing so, it acted albeit without discrimination and in accordance with its usual practice. Nonetheless, it did not accord sufficient weight to the freedom of assembly. We asked the petitioner whether he would be prepared to hold the assembly subject to the restrictions that would be placed on him with regard to the size of the assembly (less than two hundred and fifty persons) and with regard to additional factors of manner and time (such as use of loudspeakers, length of the assembly). The petitioner told us that from his viewpoint he was not prepared for any change at all, in the sense of ‘all or nothing’. In these circumstances, there is no point in returning the petition for reconsideration by the respondent, and it should be denied.

Supplementary remarks

34. Our premise in examining the petition before us was the discretion of the District Commissioner of Police. In order to examine this discretion, we needed to examine the relationship between the right to hold an assembly, procession or picket, on the one hand, and property rights and the right of privacy on the other. We established a formula for principled balancing in the relationship between one human right and another. This balancing formula was also sufficient for establishing the extent of the administrative discretion, for in the circumstances before us, there was no reason, in view of the positions of the parties, for taking account of additional considerations. Such considerations, had they existed (such as the fear of a disturbance, the traffic consideration), would have necessitated the establishment of additional balances. Indeed, the case before us is based on normative harmony. There is a complete internal balance between public law and private law. An individual’s right with respect to the Government (to hold an assembly) within the framework of public law is derived from the balance between that individual’s right (to hold an assembly) and another individual’s right (to protect his privacy) within the frameworks of both public and private law. Indeed, if the persons holding the assembly were sued by the persons entitled to privacy for committing a tort (such as private nuisance), the action would be dismissed, since the proper constitutional balance between the human rights determined the proper degree for reasonable use of land to which a person is entitled under the law of torts. Indeed, the various torts of private law — and its other remedies — are merely an expression of the proper balance between constitutional human rights. The source of constitutional human rights is in public law and balancing between them is constitutional. Nonetheless, they are afforded protection, inter alia, within the framework of private law, and in accordance with the doctrines accepted by private law. Reasonableness, fairness, proper behaviour, public policy and similar working concepts of private law are merely instruments of private law that express the constitutional balance between human rights. Note, moreover, that public law does not merely deal with the structure and powers of Government authorities. Public law (and the Basic Laws that reflect them) also deals with the various human rights, their interrelationship and their relationship to Government authority. It follows that one can consider the case before us from the perspective of public law towards private law (by means of the discretion given to a public authority), and one can consider the case before us from the perspective of private law towards public law (by means of torts). The difference in perspective does not change the balance. The law is consistent. But again, this is not always the case. Sometimes the public authority considers general factors of security, law and order and keeping the peace. In such cases, the balance between the various human rights may require one balancing formula, whereas the balance between the human right and the requirements of security, law and order and keeping the peace may require a different balancing formula. Thus, for example, sometimes the balancing formula between human rights that conflict with one another is horizontal, whereas the balance between human rights and considerations of security, law and order and keeping the peace is vertical.

The result is therefore that the petition is denied.

 

 

Justice S. Levin

1.    In HCJ 456/73 [25], this court held, in a short unreported decision, which was given in a petition to allow the petitioner to organize an assembly in the form of a demonstration next to the house of the Foreign Minister, that:

‘Under the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, ss. 84 and 85, the police have discretion to grant the licence requested, to grant it with sureties or with conditions or restrictions, or to refuse it. It appears that the police believe that the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech, on which the petitioner relies in his petition, do not amount to granting a permit to intrude upon the privacy of a person holding public office, and to harass him and the members of his family in their private lives, in order to influence him, in this way, with regard to his public activity. We found nothing wrong with this attitude.’

For that reason the petition was denied.

I rely on that decision, and had my esteemed colleague, the Vice-President, not written his monumental opinion, with his extensive erudition, in accordance with current practice, I would merely have denied the petition, as our predecessors did twenty years ago, without adding to, or subtracting from, the aforesaid; but since I cannot merely remain silent, I have found at least four reasons for supporting the aforesaid view: first, in my opinion a public figure has — no less than the average man, and perhaps even more so — the right to privacy in his home, and for me the saying ‘a man’s home is his castle’ is not merely theoretical and it applies also to public figures. An intrusion on privacy, under ss. 4 and 5 of the Protection of Privacy Law, is a tort and also a criminal offence. Within the framework of an ‘intrusion on privacy’, s. 2(1) of the said law also includes ‘sleuthing or shadowing a person, which may disturb him, or another harassment’; President Shamgar also discussed this in his judgment in Appeals Court Martial v. Vaknin [16], where he wrote, at p. 851, the following:

‘What is “another harassment”? It seems that this may include, for example, the usually acceptable act of walking behind another person wherever he goes, openly and closely and even in protest, which does not constitute trailing him secretly but following him openly. Picketing, by standing next to someone’s home or by his door, is similar to this. Such an act may deprive a person of his tranquillity, his feeling of personal safety and his feeling that he can conduct his life on his own, without his private affairs being on display for others, and therein lies the harassment in the act and the intrusion on privacy that derives from it.’

Second, there is a fear that permitting demonstrations next to the private home of public figures may dissuade potential public figures, who are qualified, from engaging in public activity, and there is even a fear that under the pressure of the demonstration, or under the pressure of the members of his family as a result of the demonstration, the public figure may change his opinion, not for objective reasons but merely to stop the harassments against him. Third, if we allow demonstrations outside the home of a public figure, we will make him, his family and his neighbours the ‘captive audience’ of the demonstrators, since they will be left with no choice but to listen to what they are saying, even if they do not wish to do so. Fourth, a public figure, no less than any other person, has the right — within the proper limits — to prevent the harm caused to him as a result of the demonstration within the framework of civil law (such as the commission of a tort of nuisance or trespass) and to prevent a criminal offence that is about to be committed against him and which derives from the breach of law and order.

2. Notwithstanding the right of privacy of the public figure in his home that is his castle, this court has recognized the freedom of demonstration: Saar v. Minister of Interior [2]; and even though this freedom is not expressly mentioned in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (whereas property rights and the right of privacy and confidentiality are mentioned in ss. 3 and 7), I am prepared to assume, without deciding the matter, that the law does not compel us to prefer one basic right to the other merely because one is not mentioned expressly in the Basic Law whereas the other is mentioned.

Like my esteemed colleague, the Vice-President, I too will not refrain from making a balance between the competing rights, but in my opinion, in the circumstances that have been proved before us, the right of privacy prevails over the right of demonstration. Before explaining my approach in this matter, I would like to make several fundamental assumptions:

First, what is stated in our judgment does not relate to the freedom of demonstration next to the place of work of the public figure and the place of his public activity, with regard to which there are considerations that do not exist in the circumstances of the present case. Second, the decision whether to allow or not to allow an assembly or procession to be held is the duty of the District Commissioner of Police, who is obliged to consider, mainly (but not only) factors of ‘maintaining public safety or law and order’ (s. 84(a) of the Police Ordinance [New Version]). The decisions that the District Commissioner must make must naturally be made within a short time, and too complicated a burden of balancing should not be required of him, since he is not in the legal profession, and he will be unable to discharge it. Third, it is precisely for this reason that I believe that it is sufficient in our case to distinguish between the private home of the public figure and his place of work or the place of his public activity, and we should not incorporate in the balance equation the complicated case where we are dealing with a private home that is used, to some extent, also as a place for public activity. Fourth, in view of the aforesaid, I will assume that because of the minimal public activity of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef in his private apartment, we are merely dealing with the private apartment of the revered Rabbi.

3.    In my opinion, the right of privacy is of great value especially in an open society that tends more and more to interfere in the affairs of its citizens, whether through Government institutions or through the media, supported by the principle of the public’s right to know. In CA 670/79 HaAretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd v. Mizrahi [30], I considered the proper balance between the power of the media to publish incorrect facts about the individual and the right of the individual to his good name, and I held that there is no basis for the attitude that ‘in the prevailing circumstances it is necessary to disturb the delicate balance established in case-law by a greater restriction on the individual’s right to his reputation in favour of extending the power given to the press to publish incorrect facts about him’ (ibid., at p.200). In the case before us we must evaluate the balancing equation between the right of demonstration and the right of privacy, and what was stated above is even more applicable when speaking of a public figure; the acts of the public figure in his public activity, as well as in most areas of his overt private activity, are exposed to the public, and this is also proper in an open and democratic society; there is no doubt that a person who accepts public office exposes himself to a large extent to the watchful public eye. There is only one place whither he can escape from his day’s work at the end of his onerous public activity — to the bosom of his family, protected for a short time from the major external pressures to which he is subject, so that he may renew his strength for tomorrow. This is his private home. This home must be protected to the maximum extent that the law allows.

The extra protection granted to the right of privacy of the public figure in his private home as compared with other basic rights is nothing new and is accepted in other countries; see in Canada: the Cheema [51] case, where the court did not see any reason to distinguish between the rights of a public figure not to be excessively disturbed at his home and the rights of his neighbours not to have their rest disturbed; in the United States, see the Carey [38] judgment, at p. 2295, and especially the minority view of Justice Rehnquist, at p. 2296 et seq.; and the comment of Justice Black in the Gregory [37] case, at pp. 953-954, and also Frisby [43]. Kamin’s article, supra, at p. 182, says something with which I entirely agree:

‘In the Constitutional value scale, the quiet enjoyment and privacy of residential premises — even of the privately-owned homes of public officials — merits higher priority than freedom of speech.’

Kamin gives reasons for this opinion, at p. 228, that if such demonstrations are to be permitted:

‘All demonstrations at the homes of public officials will, of necessity, affect neighbors who are strangers to the political controversy. Does assumption of public office by a householder terminate the right of privacy for him, his family and his neighbors? The question has a pervasive significance in a democratic society. If losing the last redoubt of privacy and repose, if subjecting one’s family and neighbors to the constant harassment of sidewalk demonstrations is the price of holding public office, then the republic shall have lost the services of its ablest citizens.’

He sums up, at pp. 230-231:

‘Residential picketing is neither a primary nor a conventional way of communicating the existence of a grievance to a public officer. Rather, it is an instrument of achieving political results by oppressing and harassing the official and his family.’

In American law also, especially recently, there are signs of a trend that sees a need to balance the right of privacy and tranquillity against the right to demonstrate vertically; in other words, we are not talking of rights on an equal footing but of one right (privacy) that prevails over the other (freedom of demonstration), even when we are speaking of a quiet demonstration held outside the home of a public figure. It therefore appears that in the circumstances of the case before us, when the issue is one of holding a demonstration outside the home of a public figure who lives in the middle of a residential neighbourhood, American law would also have the result of prohibiting the holding of the demonstration.

In Germany: the judgment in the case of Ovg. Koblenz, Beschl v. 24.5.86 7B 36/86 [47] considered the question whether to permit or prohibit a demonstration intended to protest Government policy with regard to nuclear reactors, near the home of Chancellor Kohl’s home (a building used as the Chancellor’s home but where meetings and official events were occasionally held). The Supreme Court for administrative matters held that such a demonstration was prohibited since it violated the rights of the individual. It held that in the balance between the public interest (to hold a demonstration) and the individual interest (the right of the individual, his family and neighbours to enjoy their private property without disturbance), the interest of the individual prevails. The court even added that especially when a public figure is concerned, the importance of the right of privacy and property rights increases, for the public figure is constantly exposed to criticism and his private home is truly his castle, the only place where he can rest and recover from his public work.

If we add to the aforesaid also the interests of the family and the neighbours to prevent nuisance, and the possibility, which has been proved in this case, of holding the demonstration at some distance from the home of Rabbi Ovadya Yosef, I am satisfied that there is no sufficient reason for intervening in the discretion of the first respondent.

For these reasons I too, like my esteemed colleagues, thought on the day we gave our judgment that the petition should be denied.

 

Justice E. Goldberg

1.    An assembly, which is one of the basic freedoms in Israel, is embodied, even according to its definition in the Police Ordinance [New Version], in the simultaneous existence of two elements: the first element, which is the main one, is the actual physical presence of the demonstrators at the place of the assembly, and the second element is verbal expression on the part of those present on the subject of the assembly. The physical presence is not merely a means of making it possible to hear what is said at the assembly, but in itself it serves as a ‘medium’ for conveying the message which the assemblers wish to convey, and in this the assembly is different from other methods of expression. The presence attracts the attention of the public, arouses awareness of the subject of the assembly and emphasizes the extent of the support for it. This is in addition to the direct application inherent in the presence to whoever is the target of the assembly.

It can therefore be said that the demonstration is one of the effective ways in which those present at an assembly may express themselves, when direct access to the electronic media is not available to everyone, and an application to the written media is likely to be buried in the vast amount of information conveyed in them.

In this respect Prof. Kretzmer said in his article, supra, in Is. L. Rev., at p. 53:

‘The demonstration is a form of expression which exploits the “physical presence factor” in order to communicate a view likely to be lost if communicated in other ways. It is indeed true that the modern demonstration is very often geared towards the news media, and dependent on coverage therein for its success, but it is the unique “physical presence” factor that makes the view expressed “newsworthy”, and which therefore gains the demonstrators access to the media.’

It transpires from what we have said that real implementation of the freedom of speech by way of an assembly occurs when there is a link between the physical presence of the assemblers and the site of the assembly. Without an effective site, the assembly is ineffective.

2.    But the right of assembly, despite its great importance, is not absolute. Other interests and rights conflict with it and they may be harmed by it, albeit temporarily. This is the source of the need to balance between the right to hold an assembly next to the homes of public figures and the property rights and right of privacy of the public figures, members of their families and their neighbours.

Since we said that effectiveness of the site is the very essence of the assembly, the appropriate balance when considering the question whether to permit an assembly next to the home of a public figure lies, in my opinion, in whether there is or is not an alternative site for the assembly, an alternative where the effectiveness will be maintained and not materially impaired. If there is such an alternative, then the right of privacy and property rights will prevail, for the harm to these rights with then be excessive. This is in the spirit of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, which protects property rights (s. 3) and the right of privacy (s. 7(a)), but alongside the protection lies the provision in section 8 that:

‘The rights under this Basic Law may only be violated by a law… and to an extent that is not excessive.

This ‘compromise’ position was adopted by the author of the article, supra, in U. Chi. L. Rev., at p. 140, who said:

‘The practice of residential picketing exerts “injuries” upon the home-owner public official, making of him and his family a captive audience and intruding into the enjoyment and privacy of their home. In weighing the benefits of the residential sites against the detriments, the argument for prohibition of residential picketing is strongest, since only by such prohibition can the homeowner’s interests be protected.

Undeniably, prohibition of residential picketing would work to the detriment of the picketer; he would lose a forum which affords him economy, publicity and effectiveness. These benefits are not completely lost; they can be largely approximated elsewhere. Thus prohibition, its detriments mitigated by the availability of other demonstration sites, offers the most tenable compromise.’

3.    This is the basis for the distinction between a case where an assembly next to the home of the public figure is the only effective site, and a case where there is an effective alternative site. In this context Prof. Kretzmer states:

‘There are times when demonstrations outside the home of a public figure are the most effective way of communicating a view on a matter of public importance. In other cases such demonstrations may be the only really effective way of communicating that view to the public figure involved. The privacy interests of public figures should not override the expression interest involved in such demonstrations’ (Kretzmer, supra, Isr. L. Rev., at 120).

4.    In my opinion, the home of a public figure should be regarded as the only effective site for holding an assembly only when he conducts all or most of his public activity there. In any other case, there is no reason that the site next to the office of the public figure should not be considered an effective alternative. In the first case, the assembly will be allowed outside the home of the public figure, albeit subject to proper restrictions of time, number of participants, holding the assembly and the frequency of assemblies at that site. In the other case, it will be prohibited.

5.    The circumstances in our case fall into the first category, and therefore I would have seen fit to grant the petition, had not the petitioner refused to hold the assembly with the restrictions required to limit the extent of the intrusion on privacy resulting from it.

The result is that the petition should be denied.

 

 

Petition denied.

9 February 1994.

 

 

Full opinion: 

Conterm Ltd. v. Finance Ministry

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 164/97
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, February 4, 1998
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioner acquired a license from the Customs Authority to operate a licensing warehouse on land in dispute between it and the Port and Train Authority. The Customs Authority asked for proof that the petitioner had a right in the land, as required by the regulations, and in return it received an agreement that did not appear to address such a right. The Customs Authority granted the license anyway. When it became aware of the dispute over the land, it refused to renew the license. The central question is whether the petitioner had a duty to disclose the existence of the dispute to the Customs Authority, and more broadly, whether individuals owe a duty of fairness in their dealings with administrative agencies.

 

Held: All three justices held that the Customs Authority had a right to refuse to renew the license, each on different grounds. Justice Zamir held that not only does the government owe a duty of fairness to citizens, but citizens owe a reciprocal duty of fairness to the government, including a duty to disclose information material to a request for a license. Such duty stems from the social contract, in which citizen and government are partners in the democratic enterprise. The petitioner’s breach of such duty in failing to disclose material information of primary importance justified refusing to renew the license. President Barak held that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government. Any duty owed by the individual to the government must be specific to the issue in question and dependent on the proper balance between the interests of society as represented by the government and the rights and freedoms of the individual. The petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to Respondents 1-2 stems from the fact that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. Justice Cheshin held that in his or her dealings with the government, the individual bears no duty to disclose information at its own initiative. The government is better situated to know what information is material and to ask for it. The Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the license, however, does not warrant judicial intervention because the petitioner did not meet a material condition set by the Regulations regarding a right in the land.

 

Objection to order-nisi of February 25, 1997. Petition denied. Order-Nisi rescinded.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

 

HCJ 164/97

Conterm Ltd.

v.

1.  Finance Ministry, Customs and VAT Division

2.  Customs Officer, Ashdod

3.  Port and Train Authority

 

 

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[February 4, 1998]

Before President A. Barak and Justices M. Cheshin, I. Zamir

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioner acquired a license from the Customs Authority to operate a licensing warehouse on land in dispute between it and the Port and Train Authority. The Customs Authority asked for proof that the petitioner had a right in the land, as required by the regulations, and in return it received an agreement that did not appear to address such a right. The Customs Authority granted the license anyway. When it became aware of the dispute over the land, it refused to renew the license. The central question is whether the petitioner had a duty to disclose the existence of the dispute to the Customs Authority, and more broadly, whether individuals owe a duty of fairness in their dealings with administrative agencies.

 

Held: All three justices held that the Customs Authority had a right to refuse to renew the license, each on different grounds. Justice Zamir held that not only does the government owe a duty of fairness to citizens, but citizens owe a reciprocal duty of fairness to the government, including a duty to disclose information material to a request for a license. Such duty stems from the social contract, in which citizen and government are partners in the democratic enterprise. The petitioner’s breach of such duty in failing to disclose material information of primary importance justified refusing to renew the license. President Barak held that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government. Any duty owed by the individual to the government must be specific to the issue in question and dependent on the proper balance between the interests of society as represented by the government and the rights and freedoms of the individual. The petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to Respondents 1-2 stems from the fact that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. Justice Cheshin held that in his or her dealings with the government, the individual bears no duty to disclose information at its own initiative. The government is better situated to know what information is material and to ask for it. The Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the license, however, does not warrant judicial intervention because the petitioner did not meet a material condition set by the Regulations regarding a right in the land.

 

Objection to order-nisi of February 25, 1997. Petition denied. Order-Nisi rescinded.

 

For the petitioner—Yehoshua Wolf and Yaakov Yaniv

For Respondents 1-2 —Dana Briskman, Executive Deputy State Attorney

For Respondent 3 —Yaakov Liraz.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

Basic Law: The Judiciary – s.1(a).

Basic Law: The Government – s.1.

 

Israeli Legislation Cited:

Port and Train Authority Law, 1961.

Contract Law (General Part), 1973 – ss.12, 13, 15, 39, 61(b).

Interpretation Law, 1981 – ss.11, 17(b).

Land Law, 1969 – s. 14.

Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962.

Mandatory Education Law, 1949.

Penal Law, 1977 – ss.262, 491.

Traffic Ordinance [new version] – s.64a.

Shipping Law (Sailors), 1973 – s.39.

Law of Return, 1950.

Business Licensing Law, 1968 – s.1(a)(1).

Customs Ordinance [new version] – s.70(b).

 

Regulations Cited:

Customs Regulations, 1965 – numbers 12, 14, 14(b), 12-23, ch.7, sixth addendum, part 3.

Traffic Regulations, 1961 – numbers 144, 146.

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1] HC 233/53 Alspector v. Mayor of Beit Shean, IsrSC 8 659.

[2] HC 9/49 Bloi v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 2 137.

[3] HC 56/53 Kakanda v. City of Ramla, IsrSC 7 949.

[4] HC 56/76 Berman v. Police Minister, IsrSC 31(2) 687.

[5] HC 799/80 Shallam v. Gun Law, 1949 Licensing Clerk, Oil Administration of Petach Tikvah, Interior Ministry, IsrSC 36(1) 317.

[6] HC 475/81 Deak & Co. Inc. v. Governor of the Bank of Israel, IsrSC 36(1) 803.

[7] CA 433/80 I.B.M. Israel Assets, v. Property Tax Director and Compensation Fund of Tel-Aviv, IsrSC 37(1) 337.

[8] CA 736/87 Yaakobovitch v. Land Appreciation Tax Director of Nazareth, IsrSC 45(3) 365.

[9] CA 1928/93 Securities Authority v. Gabor Savarina Textile Factories., IsrSC 49(3) 177.

[10] CA 338/85 Speigelman v. Chapnik, IsrSC 41(4) 421.

[11] HC 707/80 Ilanot Housing, Building and Development Co. v. Arad Local Council, IsrSC 35(2) 309.

[12] CA 391/80 Mira Lesserson v. Workers Housing Ltd., IsrSC 38(2) 237.

[13] CA 402/76 Azaranikov v. State of Israel, IsrSC 31(1) 270.

[14] HC 640/77 Baranovsky v. Department of Customs and Excise Director, IsrSC 32(2) 75.

[15] HC 566/81 Amrani v. Chief Rabbinical Court, IsrSC 37(2) 1.

[16] HC 221/86 Kanafi v. National Labor Court, IsrSC 41(1) 469.

[17] FH 22/82 Beit Yules Ltd .v. Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd., IsrSC 43(1) 441.

[18] HC 376/81 Lugassi v. Communications Minister, IsrSC 36(1) 449.

[19] HC 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Land Administration, IsrSC 47(3) 853.

[20] HC 840/79, Center for Contractors and Builders in Israel v. Government of Israel, IsrSC 34(3) 729.

[21] HC 549/75 Noach Film Company, Ltd. v. Film Review Council, IsrSC 30(1) 757.

[22] HC 135/75 Cy-Tex Corporation Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister, IsrSC 30(1) 673.

[23] HC 3/58, Berman v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 12 1493.

[24] HC 335/68 Israeli Consumer Council v. Chair of the Gas Services Investigatory Committee, IsrSC 23(1) 324.

[25] HC 135/71 Fresman v. Traffic Supervisor, IsrSC 25(2) 533.

[26] HC 1930/94 Nathan v. Defense Minister, IsrSC 48(4) 643.

[27] HC 656/80 Abu Romi v. Health Minister, IsrSC 35(3) 185.

[28] HC 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessment Committee, Town of Holon, IsrSC 21(1) 69.

[29] HC 421/86 Ashkenazi v. Transportation Minister, IsrSC41(1) 409.

[30] HC 727/88 Awad v. Religious Affairs Minister, IsrSC 42(4) 487.

[31] HC 2911/94 Baki v. Interior Ministry Director-General, IsrSC 48(5) 291.

[32] HC 2918/03 City of Kiryat Gat v. State of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 832.

[33] HC 442/71 Lansky v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 26(2) 337.

[34] HC 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Communications Minister, IsrSC 48(5) 412.

[35] HC 1635/90 Zharzhavski v. Prime Minister, IsrSC 45(1) 749.

[36] HC 669/86 Robin v. Berger, IsrSC 41(1) 73.

[37] HC 142/70 Shapira v. Bar Association Jerusalem Regional Council, IsrSC 25(1) 325.

[38] HC 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Housing and Construction Minister, IsrSC 47(2) 229.

[39] CA 6821/93 United Mizrachi Bank. v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative Village, IsrSC 49(4) 221.

[40] HC 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres, IsrSC 44(3) 353.

[41] CA 148/77 S. Roth v. Yeshufa Construction Ltd., IsrSC 33(1) 617.

[42] CA 207/79 Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. v. Beit Yules Ltd. IsrSC 37(1) 533.

[43] HC 59/80 Be’er Sheva Public Transportation Services Ltd. v. National Labor Court in Jerusalem, IsrSC35(1) 828.

[44] HC 8507/96 Orin v. State of Israel, IsrSC 51(1) 269.

[45] HC 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and Religious Affairs Minister, IsrSC47(5) 485.

[46] CrimA 119/93 Lawrence v. State of Israel, IsrSC 48(4) 1.

[47] HC 1/49 Bazherno v. Police Minister, IsrSC 2 80.

[48] HC 192/61 Kalo v. City of Bat Yam, IsrSC 16 1856.

[49] HC 328/60 Musa v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 17 69.

[50] HC 43/76 Amitar Company, Ltd. v. Tourism Minister, IsrSC 30(3) 554.

[51] HC 208/79 Ineis v. Health Ministry General Director, IsrSC 34(1) 301.

[52] HC 758/88 Kendel v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 46(4) 505.

[53] HC 740/87 Bentali v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 44(1) 443.

[54] CA 186/52 Jerusalem “Eden” Hotel v. Dr. Gerzon, IsrSC 8 1121.

[55] HC 1921/94 Sukar v. Jerusalem District Committee on Construction, Residence, and Industry, IsrSC 48(4) 237.

[56] HC 35/48 M. Breslov & Partners Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister, IsrSC 2 330.

[57] HC 132/57 First v. City of Lod, IsrSC 11 1324.

[58] HC 280/60 “Avik” Ltd. v. Voluntary Authority on Importation of Pharmaceutical Preparations , IsrSC 16 1323.

[59] HC 115/61 Yakiri v. City of Ramat Gan, IsrSC 16 1877.

[60] HC 27/62 Alt v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Local Town Building and Planning Committee, IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[61] HC 278/62 Sarolovitch v. City of Jerusalem, IsrSC 17 508.

[62] HC 329/64 Guri v. Bnei Brak Local Town Building and Planning Committee, IsrSC 19(1) 365.

[63] HC 109/70 Orthodox Coptic Metropolitan in Jerusalem v. Police Minister, IsrSC 25(1) 225.

[64] HC 37/49 Goldstein v. Jaffa Guardian of Abandoned Property, IsrSC 2 716.

[65] HC 143/62 Schlesinger v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 17 225.

[66] HC 58/68 Shalit On His Own Behalf and On Behalf of His Children v. Interior Minister, IsrSC 23(2) 477.

[67] HC 5364/94 Welner v. Chair of Israeli Labor Party, IsrSC49(1) 758.

[68] HC 305/82 Y. Mor v. Central District Regional Planning and Construction Committee, IsrSC 38(1) 141.

[69] HC 107/59 Mei-Dan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Local Planning and Construction Committee, IsrSC 14 800.

 

United States Cases Cited:

[70] Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).

[71] Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).

 

English Cases Cited:

[72] Scruttons v. Midland Silicones [1962] 1 All E.R. 1 (H.L.).

[73] Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 52.

[74] Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Zamir [1980] A.C. 930.

[75] Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Khawaja [1984] A.C. 74.

 

Israeli Books Cited:

[76] H. Klinghofer, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] (1957).

[77] G. Shalev, Dinei Chozim [Contract Law] (1995).

[78] A. Barak, Shikul Da’at Shiputi [Judicial Discretion] (1987).

[79] 2 I. Zamir, Hasamchut Haminhalit [Administrative Authority] (1996).

[80] M. Mautner, Yiridat Haformalism Vialiyat Haarachim Bamishpat Hayisraeli [Decline of Formalism in Israeli Law] (1993).

[81] 1 B. Aktzin, Torat Hamishpat [Jurisprudence] (2nd ed. 1968).

[82] G. Shalev, Chozei Rishut Biyisrael [Contracts]  (1985).

[83] 1 B. Bracha, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] (1987).

[84] M. Cheshin, Mitaltilin Bidin Hanizikin [Chattel in Torts] (1971).

 

Foreign Books Cited:

[85] L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (1985).

[86] L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1988).

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[a] Babylonian Talmud, Order Tractate Shabbat 31:1; 104:2.

[b] Leviticus 19;18; 25;17.

[c] Isaiah 58:7.

[d] Micah 6: 8.

[e] Exodus 21:15, 16.

[f] Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia 59:1.

[g] Mishnah, Tractate Avot, 2:3; 1:10.

[h] Genesis 4:22.

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice I. Zamir

 

            1. The petitioner, Conterm Company Ltd., received a customs license to operate a licensing warehouse.  By law, the license had to be renewed yearly. The Customs Authority refused to renew the license. The petitioner is challenging that refusal; it claims that it has a right to a renewal of the license.

 

            A central question raised in this petitions is the duty of fairness between the administrative agency and the citizen. Usually, that question is directed at the administrative agency: What kind of duty does it owe the citizen? This time, the question is directed at the citizen: Does the citizen owe a duty of fairness (or, in other words, a duty to behave properly) to the administrative agency?

 

The Facts

 

            2. For over 20 years, the petitioner has operated a freight terminal in Ashdod. The terminal operates as a licensing warehouse through a license granted by the customs director, under the seventh chapter (beginning at Regulation 12) of the Customs Regulations, 1965 (hereinafter – the Regulations). The license authorizes the storage of goods for which customs duties apply. The warehouse operates on land which the petitioner owns, in the northern industrial zone of Ashdod, about 50 meters from the railway leading to the Ashdod Port (hereinafter: the main railway).

 

            The petitioner wanted to take advantage of the warehouse’s convenient location by using the railway to make the process of shipping the freight to and from the facility more efficient, minimizing the use of trucks and saving on transportation costs. The petitioner submitted a proposal to the Port and Train Authority, under which it would build, at its expense, an extension of the tracks from the main railway to the warehouse. The extension would allow the petitioner to load freight from the port onto the train, then unload it close to the warehouse and store it there, as well as to load freight from the warehouse onto the train, to send to the port.

 

            The Port and Train Authority, a statutory corporation created by the Port and Train Law, 1961 (hereinafter – the Port Authority), owns and operates the railway. It also owns 44 dunams [4.4 hectares – trans.] of land bordering the main railway on one end, and the warehouse on the other (hereinafter – the land). The petitioner wanted to build the railway extension on the land, which was vacant and unused, so that the railway would reach the warehouse. Toward the end of 1992, it approached the Port Authority with its request.

 

            On June 6, 1994, following extensive negotiations, the petitioner and the Port Authority signed a contract (hereinafter – the contract). Section 2B of the contract declared the following:

 

All lines and systems of the extension will be built on land belonging to the Authority [The Port Authority – I.Z.] and will become its property upon their construction. The company [the petitioner – I.Z.] has no right whatsoever to the Authority’s land in general, and to the land on which the extension is built, in particular.

 

As an appendix to the contract, the parties attached a scheme marking the route of the main railway and the planned extension: The Chief Engineer of Israel Railways signed it on January 3, 1994, and later the petitioner, the Train’s Deputy Director-General for Commerce, Economics, and Finance, and the Train’s Deputy Director-General for Operations signed as well (app. R/7 of the Port Authority’s Statement).

 

            3. Not long after the parties signed the scheme designating the route of the extension (hereinafter – the first scheme), the petitioner approached the Port Authority with a request to change the route of the extension. According to the petitioner, the change was necessary to allow it to set up and operate machinery for loading and unloading bulk seeds. The change would mean that the route of the extension, which, under the first scheme, was to reach the border of the warehouse, would be moved further from the warehouse, close to the main railway. The change would enlarge the open area between the extension and the warehouse.

 

            The Port Authority agreed to the proposed change. The new route of the extension was drawn on a new scheme prepared by the petitioner’s planner, and on May 15, 1995, the Director of the Engineering Department in Israel Railways signed it (hereinafter – the second scheme). The new route was not the only change between the first and second scheme; on the second scheme, the parties labeled the area between the extension and the warehouse as a “storage area.”

 

            4. The appendix to the contract, signed at the same time as the contract itself, gave the petitioner a limited right to use the land (referred to in the appendix as “the plot”). The petitioner was to be allowed to use the land to load and unload freight and to transport it from the train to the warehouse and from the warehouse to the train. According to the appendix:

 

3. The company [the petitioner – I.Z.] may make use of the plot running along the tracks of the train stationed in the extension exclusively for purposes of loading and/or unloading trains which are stationed at the extension for that purpose, so long as they are stationed there.

 

Unloading and/or loading trains include transporting or shipping the freight from the extension to the company’s storage facilities adjacent to the plot and the reverse.

 

4. Any change of any kind to the plot and/or anything attached and/or connected to it requires the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.

 

            5. The petitioner, however, had a larger plan: It intended to use the area of the land not just to load and unload freight from the train and onto the train, as the contract provided, but also to store freight. It planned to enlarge the area of the warehouse to include the area of the land, as well. In order to accomplish this, it needed to do two things. First, it needed to do work on the land, in order to prepare it for use as a licensing warehouse, including fencing in the land to prevent freight from being added or removed without undergoing inspection. This task posed a problem with the Port Authority, which owned the land. The second thing the petitioner needed was a license to use the land as a licensing warehouse. That task posed a problem with The Customs Authority, which is authorized to grant such licenses.

 

            6. The petitioner began working on the first task: preparing the land for storing freight. Under the terms of the contract, the petitioner could not make “any change, of any kind” to the land, without “the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.” Para. 4, supra. However, the petitioner began work on the land without obtaining such approval. Nor did it obtain permission once the work was completed. Without such approval, the petitioner paved the land with asphalt, erected a fence around the perimeter, installed lighting, and built gates. It finished its preparatory work on March 18, 1996.

 

            7. The petitioner and the Port Authority disagree over when the Port Authority became aware of the work that the petitioner was doing on the land. According to the petitioner, the work was done in the presence of representatives of the Port Authority. The Port Authority, on the other hand, claims that it became aware of the work only by coincidence, in early January, 1996, during a tour that its employees took of the land.

 

            In any event, immediately after the tour, on January 8, 1996, the Deputy Director-General for Commerce, Economics, and Finance at Israel Railways (hereinafter: the Railways Deputy) sent the following letter to the Director-General of the petitioner:

 

Pursuant to my tour of the site and the measurements we conducted, I wish to call your attention to the following points:

 

1.     Our measurements show that Conterm has annexed an area of 38.5 dunams [3.85 hectares – trans.].

2.     That area is being used to store containers, in violation of the contract.

3.     The areas have been fenced in, paved, and marked, and Conterm’s equipment and installations have been placed there.

4.     According to the appendix of the contract, you are permitted to use a strip of land along the length of a train only, for loading and unloading trains exclusively.

5.     Seizure and use of the land constitute a violation of the contract.

6.     Be advised that, according to the appendix, we may give anyone approval to use the land.

7.     You must immediately vacate the areas noted above.

8.     Be advised that you will be charged taxes and rent on the areas seized, for the period of time from the seizure until you vacate, as determined by an assessor.

I would appreciate your taking immediate action to vacate the area and to avoid violating the contract between us.

 

            The petitioner gave no response whatsoever to this letter. On March 10, 1996, the Railways Deputy sent another letter to the petitioner’s Director-General. This letter warned of the petitioner’s violations of the contract in a few ways, including violation related to “use of the areas.” It noted that Israel Railways considers the violations to be severe and added that if they are not corrected, Israel Railways will feel free to take action to preserve its rights. The petitioner’s Director-General responded to this letter on March 19, 1996. Regarding the use of the land, he wrote the following:

 

During our last three meetings, we discussed the above-stated issue, and to the best of my recollection, we agreed to find a way to resolve the issue.

 

At this stage, as you agreed, I am waiting to set a date for another meeting with you.

 

By the way, at this stage, the area is being used exclusively for loading and unloading containers.

 

The dispute, however, remained unresolved. On April 18, 1996, counsel for the Port Authority wrote to the petitioner, alerting it to the encroachment onto the Port Authority’s land and the illegal use of the land, including fencing it in and using it for storage. Counsel demanded that the petitioner vacate the land immediately. The Railways Deputy also wrote the petitioner, again, on April 21, 1996, demanding that it vacate the land immediately. The letters went unanswered.

 

            On May 19, 1996, the petitioner wrote to the Deputy Director-General for Operations at Israel Railways in a letter that made no mention whatsoever of the letters sent by the Port Authority demanding evacuation of the land. The petitioner wrote, in part, that,

 

We intend to begin storing empty containers, before they are transported to the ports, and we ask that you price our requests, addressing the factor of the substantial quantities to be transported.

 

On May 23, 1996, The Railways Deputy Director-General for Operations responded by saying that Israel Railways did not intend to transport containers from the Ashdod Port to the petitioner’s warehouse. He also wrote that:

 

I remind you that the contract is about transporting containers between Ashdod and Haifa, not storing empty containers or vehicles in the terminal station.

 

            The Port Authority and the petitioner continued their correspondence and discussions. The former repeatedly demanded that the latter vacate the land. On June 20, 1996, the Director of the Commerce and Transportation Department of Israel Railways wrote the following to the petitioner:

 

1. Pursuant to the discussion that took place in the office of Israel Railways’ Deputy Director-General for Economics, Finance, and Commerce, it became clear that the Conterm Company seized about 40 dunams [four hectares – trans.] of territory belonging to Israel Railways, in the area of the Conterm Ashdod extension. Conterm fenced it in without permission and even placed hundreds of vehicles belonging to the Universal Motors Company and the Mazda Company in the area.

 

2. In that same discussion mentioned above, we demanded that you vacate the area. Thus far, you have failed to do so and continue to seize the area.

 

3. I wish to advise you that in the coming days, Israel Railways intends to sell the area through a public auction. You are therefore asked to vacate the area immediately, removing every object, person, and thing.

 

The Port Authority sent additional letters containing similar contents on July 21, 1996, October 14, 1996, and November 28, 1996.

 

            Throughout the correspondence between the Port Authority and the petitioner, when the Port Authority claimed that the petitioner was trespassing on its property in violation of the contract, the petitioner did not claim that it had a right to the land as renter or lessee, or that it had permission to fence in the land and use it for storage. Only on June 30, 1996, did the petitioner address its right regarding the land. It wrote:

 

 …

3. There is no doubt that Conterm has rights to the above-mentioned area for purposes of loading and unloading trains that are stationed in the extension.

 

4. As you must know, we invested a substantial amount of money in the extension and in preparing the above-mentioned area for operating the extension.

 

5. In addition, there is no doubt that Conterm has certain rights in the area by virtue of the [written – trans.] agreement and the agreements between the parties.

 

 

8. On the other hand, given the current circumstances, we suggest that the parties negotiate in order to find a mutually-agreed upon solution for how the above-mentioned area will be operated.

 

            The Railways Deputy responded to that letter on July 21, 1996:

 

2. Conterm has no rights to the above-mentioned area, even if it made investments. Such investments were done without our approval, and there were no agreements over use of the area.

 

3. Areas cannot be allocated except through a bidding process, except in rare circumstances, which do not exist in this case.

 

8. When the parties did not resolve the dispute through negotiation, as the petitioner suggested, the Port Authority brought an action of ejectment against the petitioner in Ashdod Magistrate’s Court. That action is still pending in the Magistrate’s Court.

 

            The Magistrate’s Court will decide the dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner, and its resolution, whatever it may be, is not the concern of this court. If that is the case, then how is their dispute relevant to the issue before us? That dispute is also the root of the argument between the petitioner and The Customs Authority at the heart of this petition. How?

 

9. The petitioner took the first route – preparing the land for storage of freight – at the same time that it took the second route: On June 8, 1995, a year after the contract was signed and shortly after the second scheme was signed, the petitioner asked the Customs Authority branch in Ashdod for a license to enlarge the area of the warehouse to include the area of the land, as well, meaning the area between the extension and the warehouse. The petitioner and Customs engaged in a process of verification to make sure that the petitioner met the criteria necessary to receive a license to operate a licensing warehouse.

 

            According to Regulation 14 of the Regulations, an application for a license must be submitted to the Customs branch “in the form provided in the Sixth Addendum.” The Sixth Addendum details what must be included in an application, including the following:

 

Below are the details of the warehouse:

 

We declare that we own the warehouse registered in the Land Registry as Block Number … Parcel … we are in possession of it under the terms of a rental contract or lease with … for a period of … years, beginning on …. and ending on … attached is a schematic description of the warehouse and the marked areas of the requested warehouse …

 

According to the addendum, these details must be submitted whether the application is for a new license or “if changes are made in the area or in the size of the warehouse.” The implication is that the Regulations require applicants to declare that they own, rent, or lease the warehouse, as a condition of receiving a license for a new licensing warehouse or of expanding an existing one.

 

            This condition seems appropriate, or at least reasonable. In any event, the petitioner does not challenge the legality of the condition or of any other provision of the Regulations.

 

            10. Pursuant to this regulation, and after the petitioner applied for a license for the land, on December 5, 1995, the Ashdod Customs branch wrote to the petitioner asking for various details and documents, including “a rental or lease contract for the additional area.”

 

            In response, on December 11, 1995, the petitioner sent the Customs branch the June 6, 1994 contract and attached a map prepared by its surveyor on December 7, 1995 (Appendix 7 to the Petition).

 

            The Customs Authority presumed that the petitioner met all the conditions set forth in the Regulations for receiving a license. Among other things, the Customs Authority presumed that the petitioner held rights to the land, as required by the Regulations. It was unaware of the fierce dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner over the rights to the land, a dispute expressed in a number of ways, including in letters that the Port Authority sent the petitioner on January 8, 1996. Therefore, once the Customs Authority concluded that the land had been properly prepared for use as a licensing warehouse, it decided to grant the petitioner the license it had requested, on July 1, 1996.

 

            11. So long as the petitioner communicated in these two parallel tracks, with the Port Authority on one hand, and the Customs Authority on the other, each agency separate from the other, it seemed as though the petitioner had achieved what it set out to obtain. When the two agencies communicated with each other, however, their relationships with the petitioner hit a snag.

 

            In September 1996, the Customs Authority learned of the dispute between the Port Authority and the petitioner over rights to the land. On September 25, 1996, the Customs Authority wrote to the Port Authority asking for the precise status of the petitioner with respect to the land and “whether, under the contract signed with you, the Conterm Company has a right to store containers in the area.” The Port Authority responded by saying that the petitioner has a right to load and unload the trains stationed at the extension but not to store containers on the land. After receiving this response, the Customs Authority asked the petitioner for an explanation. On November 18, 1996, the petitioner responded by telling the Customs Authority that it had an “understanding” with representatives of the Railway allowing the petitioner to store freight on the land and that, “the arrangement has not been put on paper because of Israel Railways’ limitations.” It attached the second scheme, on which the area of the land was labeled “storage area.” The petitioner added that “this document is irrefutable, decisive evidence of the Authority’s intentions, beyond what is said in the agreement.” The Customs Authority, however, was unconvinced. It decided not to renew the petitioner’s license for the land. On December 26, 1996, the Customs Authority informed the petitioner that it was canceling the authorization it had granted the petitioner to use the land as a licensing warehouse, and that the license granted the petitioner for 1997 would be renewed exclusive of the area of the land. In the same notice, the Customs Authority also demanded that the petitioner remove the freight from the land and put it into a licensing warehouse within 30 days.

 

            12. The petitioner claims that the Customs Authority did not have the right to revoke the license it had granted to use the land as a licensing warehouse. It therefore filed this petition against the Customs Authority, later joining the Port Authority as respondent. The petitioner is asking for an order obligating the Customs Authority to include the area of the land in the license for 1997.

 

            At an early stage of the proceedings, we issued an order-nisi and decided that the license to use the area of the land as a licensing warehouse would remain valid in the interim.

 

            On September 10, 1997, we decided to deny the petition without giving an explanation at the time, and we imposed court costs on the petitioner in the sum of 25,000 NIS to be paid to Respondents 1 and 2 and 25,000 NIS to Respondent 3.

 

            We now explain our decision.

 

The Reasons for Revoking the License

 

13. The Customs Authority gives two reasons for its refusal to include the area of the land in the license granted the petitioner for 1997: the first – substantive; the second – procedural.

 

The first reason: Under the Regulations, the petitioner is not eligible to receive a license for the area of the land. The Regulations stipulate that without rights to the land (through ownership, rental, or lease), there is no right to a license. If it becomes clear that a license was granted to someone who has no right in the land, because of misrepresentation or mistake, that license can be revoked. Therefore, the Customs Authority’s realization that the petitioner had no right in the land is reason enough not to renew the license for the area of the land.

 

This reason, of course, touches on the private law dispute between the petitioner and the Port Authority over rights to the land.

 

The Custom Authority’s second reason is the petitioner’s procedural obligation to disclose all material information regarding its application for a license, including information about rights to the land. By failing to disclose material information on this issue to the Customs Authority, the petitioner violated this obligation. This violation alone is reason enough not to renew the license for the area of the land.

 

This second reason is entirely the province of public law: the claim is that a citizen applying for a license has an obligation to disclose information material to the license to the administrative agency.

 

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that neither the substantive nor the procedural reason justify the Custom Authority’s decision. First, the petitioner claims that its dispute with the Port Authority over rights to the land is not the concern of the Customs Authority. In any event, the petitioner claims, the dispute does not constitute a reason to revoke a license already granted. Second, the petitioner claims, it fulfilled any disclosure obligation to the Customs Authority that may have existed by submitting the June 6, 1994 contract it signed with the Port Authority regarding the rights to the land.

 

We will examine each of these reasons in order.

 

Rights to the Land

 

14.  The petitioner claims that, “With all due respect, the relations between the petitioner and the PTA [Port and Train Authority – I.Z.] are not the concern of the Customs Authority.” It also argues that, “It is inconceivable that, at a point at which a dispute has yet to be decided, and it could go either way, the Director of Customs should take a stance and adopt the PTA’s version.”

 

Indeed, it is an old precedent that an agency authorized to grant a license must make that decision based on considerations from the field of public law, not private law. HC 233/53 Alspector v. Mayor of Beit Shean (hereinafter – the Alspector case[1]), held that a local council may not condition receipt of a license to operate a business in an apartment on the consent of the apartment owner. As Justice Berinson held (at 665):

 

By opening a store in his apartment without the consent of the apartment owner, the applicant may indeed be violating the terms of his lease. If that is the case, the apartment owner may fight his fight with the applicant. That is not the concern of the municipality, however, and it cannot serve as the basis for refusing to grant the license.

 

See also HC 9/49 Bloi v. Interior Minister [2]; HC 56/53 Kakanda v. City of Ramla [3].

 

            This precedent would seem to construct a high wall between private and public law.  See H. Klinghofer, Mishpat Minhali [76] at 128-30. That is not the case. Today, it is well-known that there is no clear and rigid separation between these two fields. They are separated by a widely-spaced net, easily passed through or jumped over. The two fields are becoming more and more intermingled, and there is nothing wrong with that. In principle, therefore, considerations from the field of private law may influence an administrative agency’s decision. In any event, it depends on the context: the nature of the power, the nature of the agency, and the circumstances in question. For example, is it illegitimate for a municipality to refuse to grant a license to operate a business, or for a planning and building committee to refuse to grant a license to erect a building, when it is clear that the license applicant has no rights to the land of which he or she has taken possession?

 

            The Alspecter case, supra, provided for this possibility. Justice Berinson qualified the rule he stated:

 

If the case involved a construction permit to make changes to the building, which could not be issued without the request or consent of the building owner, then the reason would be valid.

 

The same is true in the case before us. The Regulations require that an applicant for a license declare that he or she has a right in the land. See para.9, supra. It is therefore clear that the question of rights in the land is relevant. The Customs Authority may and even must take it into consideration. It may and even must clarify the answer. Under the Regulations, it should require a license applicant to declare what kind of right he or she has in the land. If a license applicant declares that he or she has no right in the land, the Customs Authority may and even must deny the application for a license. The same is true of a situation in which the applicant declared that it has a right in the land, but an investigation by the Customs Authority reveals the declaration to be false or misleading. In either case, under the Regulations, the Customs Authority need not, and may not even be permitted, to give a license to a trespasser.

 

            If the petitioner does not have a right in the land, the Customs Authority was under no obligation to grant the license. Indeed, the Customs Authority claims that if it had known that the petitioner had no such right, it would not have granted the license.

 

            15. The petitioner, however, argues that even if the Customs Authority could have refused to grant the license from the outset, it may not revoke a license already granted. There is a difference between prospectivity and retrospectivity: the holder of a license purchased a right, and revoking a vested right is different, and more difficult, than refusing to grant the right in the first place. Therefore, not every consideration sufficient to refuse to grant a new license justifies refusing to renew an existing license.

 

            The case law distinguishes between refusing to grant a new license and refusing to renew an existing license. The considerations relevant for renewing a license are not identical to the considerations for granting a license; the weight of the considerations may vary. More so than is the case for granting a new license, in renewing an existing license, the balance tips toward the citizen, in order to protect the right that the license gave him or her.

 

            However, if the agency’s grant of the license stemmed from a substantive error, it generally may revoke the license or refuse to renew it, particularly if the applicant is responsible for the mistake. See e.g. HC 56/76 Berman v. Police Minister [4]. As Justice Barak said in HC 799/80 Shallam v. Gun Law, 1949 Licensing Clerk, Oil Administration of Petach Tikvah, Interior Ministry [5] at 331:

 

 

As is known, the administrative law rule is that an administrative agency may generally review its decision and correct it “for the following reasons: deceit, fraud, mistake, surprise, inadvertence, new evidence that has come to light, changed conditions” …

 

There seems to be no doubt that deceit by the license applicant is generally grounds in itself to justify revoking a license … what happens, however, if the problem is pure mistake, not caused by the applicant, but rather solely the fault of the agency? In a case like that, the license may still be revoked, but the power to do so must be exercised only in special circumstances.

 

Justice Barak continued in HC 475/81 Deak & Co. Inc. v. Governor of the Bank of Israel [6] at 807:

 

 Once a license is granted, its holder may assume that the application was investigated with the required care and that he or she may now invest money and effort into running the business for which a license was granted, without having to worry that the administrative agency will change its mind. At the same time, where the agency has the formal authority to revoke a license, under extraordinary circumstances, it may be justified in exercising it. Such circumstances may involve facts in existence prior to the granting of the license but which became apparent to the administrative agency only afterward … they may also involve new facts which came about after the license was already granted.

 

Deciding whether a set of facts justifies revoking a license or refusing to renew it depends on the balance of interests in each set of circumstances, primarily the balance between the license-holder’s interests and those of the general public, which the administrative agency represents.

 

            In balancing these interests, the ramifications of the mistake in the administrative process are of particular importance. Did the mistake cause the administrative agency to make an ultra vires decision or a decision that violates the law in some other way? Or is the decision, though undesirable from the point of view of the agency, nevertheless legal? In CA 433/80 I.B.M. Israel Assets v. Property Tax Director and Compensation Fund of Tel-Aviv [7] at 351, Justice Bach classified the different kinds of administrative mistakes into three categories:

 

1. A decision that violates the law or is ultra vires in some other way;

2. A decision resulting from a technical bureaucratic mistake, made inadvertently;

3. A decision involving an oversight, meaning that a clerk improperly implemented the agency policy or exercised discretion unreasonably.

 

What is the difference between each kind?

 

Public agencies generally can go back on the first two types of decisions which are mistaken or in other ways contrary to the law and make new decisions in their place;

 

The third kind of decision, involving only some kind of ‘oversight’ in an exercise of discretion, is different. The agency will generally be bound by its decision, especially when the citizen has already begun to take action in accordance with the original decision.

Id. at 351-52 (Bach, J.).

 

See also CA 736/87 Yaakobovitch v. Land Appreciation Tax Director of Nazareth [8] at 372;  CA 1928/93 Securities Authority v. Gabor Savarina Textile Factories [9] at 191-92.

 

            16. Under the case law, then, whether the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license was justified depends on the circumstances. If the Customs Authority mistakenly believed that the petitioner had rights in the land, as required by the Regulations, and only after granting the license did it realize the mistake, particularly if the petitioner is to blame for the mistake, then the petitioner holds a license to which it is not entitled under the Regulations, and the balance will tip toward refusing to renew it. Are those the circumstances in this case?

 

            Before discussing whether the circumstances justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license, I will examine the second reason cited for the refusal to renew. The Customs Authority also claims that the petitioner violated its duty to disclose information material to the license, meaning information material to its rights in the land. Does the petitioner owe such a duty to the Customs Authority?

 

The Citizen’s Duty to the Agency

 

            17. Contract law imposes a duty on contractual parties, regardless of their identities, to disclose information material to the circumstances at hand.  That duty derives from the duty to negotiate a contract formation in good faith and using acceptable forms of behavior, under section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part), 1973. It also derives from the obligation to act in good faith and use acceptable forms of behavior in fulfilling a duty and exercising a right stemming from the contract, under section 39 of the Law. Section 15 governs the consequences of failing to disclose information which must be disclosed under the circumstances. According to Section 15, a party who enters a contract because of a misrepresentation made by the other party has the right to void the contract. What is considered misrepresentation? Under the section, it includes, “nondisclosure of facts which the other party should have disclosed by law, by custom, or under the circumstances.” The rule incorporates the duty of good faith under sections 12 and 39 of the Law, including the duty to disclose facts. See e.g. CA 338/85 Speigelman v. Chapnik at 426 [10]. See also G. Shalev, Dinei Chozim [77] at 55, 223. Contract law imposes a duty to disclose material facts, and non-disclosure of such facts is grounds for voiding the contract.

 

            This duty applies to contracts between the citizen and the administrative agency, obligating the citizen as well as the agency. See, e.g., HC 707/80 Ilanot Housing, Building and Development Co. v. Arad Local Council [11] at 312. See also Shalev, supra [77] at 652.

 

            In public law, however, there is no similar statute imposing a duty to disclose material facts on parties in a power relationship involving a lawful exercise of authority, such as in a citizen’s application for a license. Must we conclude that, in the context of this relationship, both the administrative agency as well as the citizen may conceal material facts from each other?

 

            No properly-functioning society could accept that possibility. If the law forbids people from misleading each other, including concealing material facts, a fortiari it forbids people from misleading an administrative agency, which is the embodiment of the public. A person who misleads an administrative agency misleads the public, even if only indirectly. The result may be that the agency, in the name of the public and sometimes at its expense, grants a benefit to a person who misled the agency and who is not entitled to the benefit. Misleading an administrative agency harms the public as a whole. If contract law forbids a person from misleading another, including by concealing material facts, could public law permit a person to mislead the public? Justice Alon’s comments on good faith are instructive here:

 

Just as the legal system forbids a contractual party from “using the contract to play the scoundrel,” so it also forbids and prohibits the party from using the law or public activity, in any area of law, to play the “scoundrel.”

CA 391/80 Mira Lesserson v. Workers Housing Ltd. [12] at 262.

 

            The legal system cannot allow that possibility to take place. It delineates two ways of preventing misrepresentation, including the concealment of material facts, in public law as well. The first way is to copy the duty to act in good faith, as established by the Contract Law (General Part), from private law into public law. The second way is to establish a special public law rule.

 

            First, we will evaluate whether the duty to act in good faith applies in public law, and whether it applies to a citizen in his or her dealings with an administrative agency.

 

The Duty of Good Faith

 

            18. Although they are designed primarily to apply to contracts, the provisions of the Contract Law (General Part) have other applications as well:

 

Where appropriate and with the necessary changes, the provisions of this law apply to legal actions not involving contracts and to obligations that do not stem from a contract.

Id. at sec. 61(b).

 

Under the simple language of the statute, the provisions of sections 12 and 39, which impose a duty of good faith, can also apply to the actions of an administrative agency, so long as they are “legal actions.” Undoubtedly, an administrative agency, acting by law to grant rights to a citizen or to impose obligations on him or her, engages in legal actions. Such actions may, for example, include granting a license or pension, confiscating land, and assessing taxes. It would therefore seem right to say that the Contract Law (General Part) imposes a duty of good faith on the agency to the citizen and on the citizen to the agency, when they engage in these actions.

 

            Indeed, the case law supports this position. President Sussman addressed the principle established by section 39 of the Contract Law (General Part), imposing a duty of good faith:

 

As an expression of a universal rule of behavior between persons and between a person and an agency, this principle imposes obligations beyond this context, and it also applies in public law.

CA 402/76 Azaranikov v. State of Israel [13] at 274.

 

See also HC 640/77 Baranovsky v. Department of Customs and Excise Director [14] at 78; HC 566/81 Amrani v. Chief Rabbinical Court [15] at 10; HC 221/86 Kanafi v. National Labor Court [16] at 476-77.

 

            True, thus far, the Court’s application of this principle in public law has been limited to imposing a duty on the administrative agency, vis à vis the citizen. The principle, however, as established by the Contract Law (General Part), applies to both parties. It would seem, therefore, that we can use the principle to impose a duty of good faith on the citizen vis à vis the administrative agency.

 

            The duty of good faith requires one party to disclose material information to another. See para. 17, supra. It would therefore seem that a citizen who applies to an administrative agency for a license or other benefit has an obligation to disclose the information material to the application. If the citizen violates this duty, and the agency, as a result, grants the license or other benefit, the agency may void its decision.

 

            19. The public law duty of good faith that we might impose on both parties to the legal actions of an administrative agency is not necessarily the same duty as that imposed on parties to a contract. The duty of good faith varies with the circumstances. Good faith in the relationship between parties to a sales contract is not necessarily the same as the good faith between trustee and beneficiary or principle and agent. See FH 22/82 Beit Yules Ltd .v. Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. [17] at 484. If good faith changes according to the type of contract, it certainly changes according to the field of law. Section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part) applies the statutory provisions, including those addressing good faith, to legal actions not involving contracts, only “where appropriate and with the necessary changes.” In translating the duty of good faith into public law, we can therefore adapt it to the special nature of that field. See HC 376/81 Lugassi v. Communications Minister [18] (hereinafter – the Lugassi case) at 465.

 

            It is possible, then, to apply the duty of good faith, with adaptations, into the field of public law and to require the citizen to disclose material information to the agency. Is that what the rule is?

 

            20. The question is not whether it is possible, but rather whether it is desirable, to copy the duty of good faith, with the necessary changes, from private law into public law. Section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part) says that the statutory provisions apply to legal actions not involving contracts only “where appropriate.” Is it appropriate to impose a duty of good faith in public law? As noted, some justices have said yes. Para. 18, supra. However, some justices believe that the duty of good faith, as established in private law, is inappropriate for public law.

 

            Justice Shamgar discussed this issue in the Lugassi case [18]. He said that while an administrative agency must act in good faith, that duty does not arise from the Contract Law (General Part). In his words (at 455-56):

 

The intention [of Section 61(b) of this law – I.Z.] was not that a norm from contract law would be adopted as is into administrative law, which, for a long time, has already had a robust, existing rule about good faith, derived from another source. In any event, the condition that the provisions of the statute will be applied ‘where appropriate and with the necessary changes’ means there should not be a simplistic standardization of private law and public law rules. It is preferable not to take things out of the context of their subject matter and primary legal source. In any case, we do not need to look at what is said in section 61(b) in order to evaluate the good faith of an administrative agency, the way it acts, and its fulfillment of its duties …

 

Justice Ben-Porat concurred in that opinion (Id. at 465).

 

            I, too, agree with Justice Shamgar. From the outset, administrative agencies had a duty of proper behavior vis à vis the citizen, irrespective of the duty of good faith established in the Contract Law (General Part). There is no need, and it would not be a good idea, to uproot the agency’s duty of proper behavior, which sprouted long ago in public law soil, and to replace it with a good faith duty that sprouted later, in a different kind of soil, namely that of private law. This is especially true because there is a difference between the two duties. The soil of private law bore one species of the duty of good faith, while the soil of public law bore a different species. The fact that those species bear the same name might blur the distinction. Differentiating the names can help make the difference more pronounced and preserve the distinction in substance, and indeed, today we do use different names: in private law, there is a duty of good faith; in public law, there is a duty of fairness.

 

            To be sure, there is a duty of good faith in public law, as well, but it generally has a different meaning: we say that an administrative agency is not acting in good faith when it knows it is not acting according to the law, such as when it makes a decision based on an irrelevant consideration, knowing the consideration is illegitimate. See e.g. the Lugassi case [18] at 459-60. We should preserve the distinction between the meanings of each phrase: in public law, good faith refers to the mental state of the administrative agency (which can also be called arbitrariness or malice), while fairness refers to the behavior (including omissions) of the administrative agency.

 

            21. What, then, is the difference between the duty of good faith in private law and the duty of fairness in public law? The difference in the nature of the duties reflects a difference in the nature of the relationships. First of all, the relationship between an administrative agency and a citizen is generally a relationship of authority, under the law, while the relationship between citizens is generally one of equality, under an agreement. Moreover, the relationship between an agency and a citizen, as is common in relationships of authority, is one of trusteeship. Professor A. Barak explained that well in his book, Judicial Discretion [78]:

 

In determining the content of an administrative duty of fairness, the judge must compare it to the contractual duty of good faith. The two are not one and the same. The contractual duty of good faith sets a minimum level of fairness based on contractual “rivalry.” Each contractual party seeks to achieve his or her self-interest, and the rules of good faith are designed to guarantee “a fair game,” set by the ethical perspective of enlightened Israeli society. The administrative duty of fairness is different. It is not based on rivalry between the self-interest of the public agency and the interest of the citizen. The public agency takes care of the general interest, including the interest of the citizen. The public agency has no “self” interest of its own. The duty of fairness in administrative law therefore imposes a higher-level duty than the “contractual” duty of good faith. This is not minimal fairness, but rather the fairness imposed on a body charged with achieving the collective interest.

Id. at 487-88. See also Id. at 473-75.

 

Justice Dorner addressed this point as well:

 

The duty of administrative fairness – rooted in the status of the agency as a trustee of the public – is more exacting than the duty of good faith required of an individual.

HC 4422/92 Efran v. Israel Land Administration [19] at 860.

 

            I think these principles lead to an additional conclusion. For administrative agencies, we should distinguish between two areas: actions in the field of private law and actions in the field of public law. When an administrative agency acts in the field of private law, such as by forming a contract, it bears a double duty: the private law duty of good faith and the public law duty of fairness. In practice, however, because the duty of fairness is more exacting, it will generally encompass the duty of good faith. As a practical matter, within the field of private law, the duty of fairness suffices. On the other hand, when the agency acts in the field of public law, such as by considering an application for a license, the duty of good faith does not apply at all. Because the agency bears a similar duty – the duty of fairness – we might say, in the language of section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part), that the duty of good faith is not appropriate. See also Shalev, supra [77] at 45. Practically, we can say that the administrative agency is subject to the duty of fairness in all its actions, whether in public or private law, and there is no need to subject it to the duty of good faith.

 

            What, then, is the duty of fairness?

 

Duty of Fairness

 

            22. A cornerstone of public administrative law is that the administrative agency, as the trustee of the public, must behave fairly. See e.g. HC 840/79, Center for Contractors and Builders in Israel v. Government of Israel [20] at 745-46. The administrative agency owes a duty of fairness, first and foremost, to the public. This is the duty of a trustee to a beneficiary. In practice, because the public is composed of people, the duty does not just apply to the public as an abstract body but also to every person.

 

            It is often said that the administrative agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. One can say that, but we should bear in mind that, in this context, citizen means person, including a resident who is not a citizen and a collective body such as a corporation.

 

            The duty of fairness that an administrative authority owes the citizen is the conceptual source for various rules governing the relationship between the agency and the citizen. An example of this is the rule requiring the agency to grant the right to be heard to those affected by its decisions. As President Agranat said:

 

The reason for the above-stated rule [the citizen’s right to be heard before the administrative agency – I.Z.] is to guarantee that the administrative agency will address the citizen’s concern with fairness …

HC 549/75 Noach Film Company, Ltd. v. Film Review Council [21] at 767.

 

            The same is true of the rule about fulfilling administrative promises. In Justice Berinson’s words:

 

[If – trans.] a promise is given by an official, within the bounds of his or her authority, with the intention of giving it legal validity, where the other party accepted it as such, then public fairness demands that the promise in fact be fulfilled, even if the citizen did not change his or her position for the worse in reliance on the promise.

HC 135/75 Cy-Tex Corporation Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister [22] at 676.

 

23. Such is the duty of fairness imposed on the administrative agency to the citizen. Does just the administrative agency bear the duty of fairness, while the citizen is exempt from the obligation to treat the agency fairly?

 

The answer is that the relationship between the agency and the citizen is, in fact, two-sided. In my opinion, the citizen should therefore owe a duty of fairness to the agency, as the agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. This requirement is deeply rooted: it springs from the social contract at the foundation of the state. Under this contract, as it is understood in a democratic state, the agency and the citizen stand not on opposite sides of the barricade but rather side-by-side, as partners in the state. In a democracy, as Justice Silberg said, “the government is part of the very body of the citizen …” HC 3/58, Berman v. Interior Minister [23] at 1511. The government [… – ed.] has a duty to serve the public – to guarantee safety and order; to provide essential services; to protect the dignity and liberty of every citizen; to do social justice. The public administration, however, which has nothing of its own, can only give the public what it receives from the public. It is desirable, indeed, necessary, that the relationship between the administration and the public be a reciprocal relationship of give-and-take. The same is true of the relationship between the public administration and the citizen. As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything. A citizen’s right vis à vis the agency is coupled with an obligation vis à vis the agency. This is the essence of the social contract among citizens and between citizens and the public administration. It is also the root of the existence of the state.

 

24. The citizen’s obligations to the state, in essence, to the public, are generally delineated in the statute books: the duty to pay taxes, to go to school until a certain age, to serve in the army, and others. Duties may also, however, arise from judicial case law. That is how the administrative agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen arose. That is also how the citizen’s duty of fairness to the administrative agency arises.

 

If the citizen did not bear a duty of fairness to the administrative agency, we might say that the citizen bears a duty of good faith in his or her relationship with the agency, under section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part). See para. 18, supra. The duty of fairness, in this context, however, is preferable to the duty of good faith. First, the duties involved in the relationship between the administrative agency and the citizen should not come from different sources, meaning that the agency bears the duty of fairness, whose source is public law, and the citizen bears the duty of good faith, whose source is private law. The harmony between the citizen and the agency will be enriched if reciprocal duties arise from a single source, namely public law.

 

Second, the relationship between the citizen and the administrative agency, which represents the public, is substantially different from the relationship between citizens. When the agency acts within the field of public law, therefore, we should not copy the duty of good faith from private law and apply it, even with changes, to the relationship between the citizen and the agency. It is better to allow the case law to develop the duty that arises from this relationship in its own way, appropriate to the environment in which the duty lives, namely the environment of public law. I call this duty, arising from public law, the duty of fairness.

 

25. What does the duty of fairness include? There is no comprehensive answer, even within the context of the agency’s duty to the citizen, except to say that this court has long recognized such a duty. Indeed, we would do well not to give a comprehensive answer. The concept of the duty of fairness, by nature, is opaque. It can and should be filled with content from time to time, according to changing needs, rather than delineated into a rigid definition. It should be open-ended, so that new rules can be added and subtracted as necessary.

 

The same is certainly true of the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency. This duty is a new concept. It must develop gradually, as the common law does, from case to case, until the time is ripe to formulate rules.

 

Having said that, and without pretending to make any final ruling, I would like to suggest guidelines to characterize a citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency:

 

(a) In a well-ordered society, the duty of fairness must express the appropriate relationship between the public administration, which acts as the trustee of the public, and citizens, who are the public. This relationship is a reciprocal relationship between partners in a goal-oriented activity, based on respect, trust, and reliability. The duty of fairness should develop from this foundation, gradually becoming a system of flexible rules by which both citizen and agency must and can abide. Compare this with the nature of the duty of good faith, FH 22/82 [17] at 484-85.

 

(b) As noted, an agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen is different from the citizen’s duty of fairness to another citizen, because of the different nature of the two kinds of relationships. See para. 21, supra. Similarly, the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency may differ from his or her duty of good faith to a fellow citizen.

 

(c) It would seem that a citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency differs from the agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen, because of the difference between the status of a citizen and the status of an agency. The agency is a trustee of the public, including of the citizen, and the duties stemming from that status differ from the duties owed by a citizen.

 

(d) The citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency, like the agency’s duty of fairness to the citizen, varies with the circumstances of each case. One example is the agency’s duty to hear the citizen, which derives from the duty of fairness. Ordinarily, the agency fulfills that duty by providing an opportunity for the citizen to submit something in writing; in certain circumstances, the duty of fairness may obligate the agency to conduct an oral hearing or even to allow the citizen to examine witnesses. As Justice Sussman said in HC 335/68 Israeli Consumer Council v. Chair of the Gas Services Investigatory Committee [24] at 334:

 

There is no standard rule we can set for the way the agency must proceed on every issue, except to say that it must treat the citizen with fairness. The appropriate level of fairness depends on the circumstances.

 

We can say the same thing about the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency: the decision about whether, in a particular case, the citizen must behave in a certain way toward the agency depends on the circumstances.

 

            26. While I will not attempt to define the citizen’s duty of fairness to the agency, I will suggest, again, without setting a rigid rule, examples of duties that derive from the duty of fairness.

 

            In my opinion, the duty to act with the speed appropriate to the circumstances derives from the duty of fairness. The agency owes such duty to the citizen. See sec. 11 of the Interpretation Law, 1981. See also HC 135/71 Fresman v. Traffic Supervisor [25] at 540. In my opinion, the citizen owes a similar duty to the administrative agency.

 

            Similarly, the requirement that a citizen not shirk obligations that he or she has undertaken to the agency derives from the duty of fairness. See e.g. HC 1930/94 Nathan v. Defense Minister [26], p. 655 and thereafter.

 

            Elsewhere I noted an additional example:

 

It is a question whether a person who alleges that an agency is acting outside the scope of its authority may suppress that allegation, only to raise it later, if and when it becomes convenient to do so. For example, may a person choose to wait and see how the agency decides: to keep quiet if it decides in his or her favor, not saying a word about authority, but if the agency decides against him or her, to argue that the action was ultra vires from the outset? That question remains open. In my opinion, the right rule is that a person who has allegations against an administrative agency must compile them and present all of them to the agency at the earliest opportunity to do so, rather than suppress part of them until he or she feels like raising them. That rule applies to an allegation of ultra vires actions. Such an allegation means that the agency must remove itself from the case and that perhaps another agency can and must deal with it. It is inappropriate to let the administrative agency continue to take the trouble, and possibly to trouble others, for a pointless discussion.  We might say that alongside the agency’s duty to treat the citizen with fairness, a parallel duty is imposed on the citizen to treat the agency with fairness. The duty of fairness obligates a citizen who claims that an agency acted without authority to raise that claim at the earliest opportunity.

2 I. Zamir, Hasamchut Haminhalit [79] at 696-97.

 

The Duty to Disclose

 

            27. The duty of fairness is the source of the duty to disclose information material to the matter at hand. This duty is owed, first and foremost, by the administrative agency to the citizen. It is expressed in the agency’s obligation to hear the citizen before making a decision that could harm his or her interests. As Justice Barak said in HC 656/80 Abu Romi v. Health Minister [27] at 189:

 

The right to a hearing is not properly observed unless [the agency – trans.] brings information that has been received in the citizen’s case to his or her attention and provides an opportunity to respond to it appropriately.

 

            It is also expressed in the agency’s duty, in certain circumstances, to grant a citizen access to the agency file connected to his or her case. As Justice Witkon said in HC 337/66 Estate of Kalman Fital v. Assessment Committee, Town of Holon [28] at 71-72:

 

A legitimate administration in a free society does not approve of all of this ‘secrecy,’ which erects a barrier between the government and the citizen ....

 

The petitioner’s demand [to see the agency file – I.Z.] is justified, not just because his right to access the documents stems from the provisions of the statute, but – and primarily – because the common sense and elementary fairness in the public relations between government and citizen inexorably lead to this conclusion.

 

The agency’s obligation to disclose information to the citizen has been expressed in additional contexts, in legislation and in case law, and it continues to develop.

 

            28. The citizen also owes a duty to disclose material information. As noted, in private law, a citizen owes a duty of disclosure to other citizens, as part of the duty to act in good faith. Para. 17, supra. A citizen who petitions the court for a remedy against an administrative agency also owes that duty. For example, President Shamgar discussed that duty (which is part of the duty to act with clean hands) in HC 421/86 Ashkenazi v. Transportation Minister [29] at 410:

 

A primary rule that has always guided this court is that someone who petitions the High Court of Justice must disclose all relevant facts to the Court. Someone who conceals facts that bear on the petition does not deserve a remedy from the Court.

 

            The citizen bears a similar duty to the administrative agency, not just in the field of private law, but also in public law. That duty may be imposed by legislation, as a condition of receiving a certain license or benefit. However, even if there is no statutorily-imposed duty, it exists under the common law as an expression of the duty of fairness. Fairness does not tolerate a situation in which a citizen seeks a license or benefit from an administrative agency to which he or she is not entitled or in some other way tries to influence the agency’s decision through misrepresentation, including by concealing information. Disclosure of material, reliable information by a citizen applying to the agency is not just a moral imperative, it is also a practical need. After all, an agency must make its decision based on the relevant considerations. If the citizen conceals material information, it is likely to eliminate relevant factors from the agency’s awareness, obstruct the work of balancing considerations, and distort the agency’s decision. As a result, the agency is likely to make a wrong or perhaps even illegal decision, to the detriment of the public. For example, it may grant a license to someone who is not qualified, or give a money grant from the public treasury to someone who is not eligible. Hence the rule, derived from the duty of fairness, that a citizen must disclose to the agency material and reliable information related to the issue at hand.

 

            29. The Court articulated this rule in HC 727/88 Awad v. Religious Affairs Minister (hereinafter – the Awad case) [30]. There, the Minister of Religious Affairs authorized the appointment of the petitioner as chair of the religious council in Rosh Haayin. The minister later discovered that the petitioner had been convicted of stealing in the course of his job as treasurer of the religious council. The minister rescinded his approval of the appointment, and the petitioner challenged that decision. The Court held that a candidate’s qualifications for a job, including whether he has a criminal past, are relevant considerations that the minister properly took into account in deciding about the appointment. Justice Barak added:

 

In formulating his position on these qualifications, the minister accessed a set of facts that did not comport with reality. The minister knew nothing about the petitioner’s conviction in the past. Moreover, under the circumstances, the petitioner had a duty to inform the local council about his conviction, and both the local council and the petitioner had a duty to inform the minister about the conviction. The duty of good faith and fairness require nothing less …

Id. at 492.

 

            30. What does the citizen’s duty to disclose material information to the agency require? At this stage, the answer is unclear. At this stage, the circumstances of each case will determine what the duty to disclose requires in that particular case. As time goes by, a clearer answer will surely arise from the case law. Even at this stage, however, the following thoughts emerge:

 

            (a) Regarding the scope: The duty does not necessarily apply to every relationship between the citizen and the administrative agency. It primarily applies to cases in which a citizen requests something from the administrative agency, such as a license, appointment, or other benefit, in contrast to cases in which the agency exercises power without being asked to do so by the citizen, particularly if such power harms the citizen. There may definitely, however, be exceptional cases in which the scope of the duty expands or contracts, depending on the special circumstances of each case.

 

            (b) Regarding the substance: The citizen is only obligated to give the agency information that he or she has or can access and that is relevant to the issue at hand. Such a consideration should be taken into account by the agency, and it may affect the content of the decision. In other words, the citizen need not give the agency information about an irrelevant consideration, which the agency, in any event, is barred from taking into account.

 

            (c) The relevant considerations are often numerous and diverse, some of which are primary and some of which are secondary. Generally, as a practical matter, the agency cannot and is not required to take all relevant considerations into account, but rather only the primary ones. There is therefore no need, and it would be impractical, to require the citizen to disclose all relevant considerations to the agency, with no exceptions. It suffices if the citizen discloses the primary considerations that could substantially influence the agency’s decision. The citizen, like the agency, must behave reasonably. In other words, the right test for the level of disclosure is the test of the reasonable citizen, and perhaps more accurately, the test of the reasonable and fair citizen.

 

            (d) The citizen’s duty to disclose does not exempt the administrative agency from its duty to do its own check of the facts that form the basis for its exercise of authority.

 

            31. An additional question of great practical importance is the question of the consequences of the citizen’s breach of this duty. Does a breach of the citizen’s duty to disclose necessarily lead to revoking the agency’s decision? The answer is no. The consequences of breaching the duty depend on every case and its circumstances. In some cases, the breach may justify revoking the decision, whether it’s a decision to give a license, award a pension, make an appointment, or do something else; in other cases, the breach may justify changing an aspect of the decision, declining to renew the license, or another choice that does not rise to the level of revoking the original decision; and sometimes, the circumstances will not justify making a change to the citizen’s detriment.

 

As a matter of principle, on this issue and for others, we should distinguish between breach of a duty and the implications of the breach. That is the case when an administrative agency breaches a duty; not every breach voids the decision. On this issue, I noted:

We should distinguish carefully between a rule obligating an administrative agency and the remedy that the court grants for violating the rule. The rule exists on one plane, and the remedy on another. Ex poste, the considerations that the court weighs may differ from the considerations binding the agency ex ante. Therefore, the agency should fulfill its duty under the case law to grant a hearing, without regard to the anticipated or potential result of breaching the duty.

HC 2911/94 Baki v. Interior Ministry Director-General [31] at 304.

 

            See also HC 2918/03 City of Kiryat Gat v. State of Israel [32] at 848.

            32. The same is true of a citizen’s duty of disclosure owed to the administrative agency – we should distinguish between the duty to disclose and the implications of breaching that duty. The duty of disclosure exists in its own right, and the citizen is not exempt from it, even in circumstances in which breaching the duty would not justify voiding the agency’s decision or taking other steps against the citizen. The set of considerations requiring the citizen to fulfill the duty differs from the set of considerations guiding the agency (or, at the stage of review, the court) in its response to the breach.

            Any response to a citizen’s breach of duty must take into account the need to respect and carry out administrative decisions. The administrative decision may grant a right to a citizen or create an expectation upon which he or she relies, and denying that right, frustrating that expectation, or undermining either of them by voiding or changing the decision should be done only after seriously considering the matter. Which considerations come to bear on the duty of disclosure?

            First, it matters what information the citizen failed to disclose to the agency. Was it of primary or secondary importance for the matter at hand? Was it information that the citizen had, should have had, or should have taken the trouble to obtain? Was it information of which the agency was aware or should have been aware from its own sources, or information that, by its nature, is available to the citizen but not the agency? The important question here is whether the citizen’s disclosure of the information was reasonably likely to have changed the agency’s decision. If the information is a relevant consideration of substantive importance, and the agency did not take it into account before making the decision, then the decision is flawed, irrespective of the citizen’s breach of the duty, and that flaw is sometimes enough to justify voiding the decision.

            An additional consideration of substantial importance concerns the citizen’s intention.  Do the circumstances indicate that the citizen intended to mislead the agency in order to influence its decision, or did the citizen willfully remain blind or act negligently? If so, breach of the duty is very serious, and in some cases may even rise to the level of criminal behavior. In any event, in a case like that, the citizen’s reliance interest becomes so weak as perhaps to disappear entirely. A citizen who knowingly misleads the agency, knowing that the agency’s decision will be based on the misinformation, cannot use his or her reliance interest to prevent the agency from changing or voiding its decision.

            Similarly, it is always relevant to consider the harm to the public interest that is likely to result from the citizen’s breach of the duty, weighed against the damage that the citizen will likely suffer if the agency changes or cancels its decision.

            There may be additional considerations. Consider, for example, HC 135/71, supra [25]. In that case, the Traffic Supervisor decided to revoke a taxi license after finding out that in applying for the license, the license-holder gave misleading information about the period of time in which he had worked as a taxi-driver. Acting President Sussman said:

The petitioner misled the agency about the time in which he had worked as a taxi-driver. That mistake is what led the agency, against the rules, to award him more points than he was entitled to receive. Had the agency known the truth, it would not have awarded him the license. Just as a contracting party who is misled may void the contract, so too, in administrative law, can an agency revoke a license it granted, if it did so because of fraud or misrepresentation …

Id. At 539.

            Nevertheless, the Court held that, under the circumstances of that case, the Traffic Supervisor erred in revoking the license. Why? Primarily “because the respondents failed to act with the required promptness. They delayed the matter too long, for no reasonable purpose.” Id. at 541.

            Whether the administrative agency may revoke the decision, change its terms, refuse to renew a license or take other action against a citizen who violated the duty to disclose depends on the balance of the relevant considerations. It is incumbent upon the administrative agency to exercise caution before taking action against a citizen who violated the duty of disclosure, to make sure it does not shirk the proper execution of its job, does not treat the citizen’s minor violations strictly, as if they were major, and does not cause more harm to the citizen than is warranted by the circumstances.

            What, then do the circumstances warrant in the case before us?

 

The Case at Bar

 

33. The case at bar requires us to examine two claims which, according to the Customs Authority, justify its refusal to renew the petitioner’s license. Supra para. 13. The first claim concerns the petitioner’s rights in the land for which the license was granted: the Customs Authority was justified in refusing to renew the license once it learned that the petitioner had no rights in the land, as required by the Regulations. The second claim concerns the petitioner’s duty of disclosure owed to the Customs Authority: the petitioner breached its duty when, prior to receiving the license, it failed to disclose material information about its rights in the land to the Customs Authority. According to the Customs Authority, the very breach of that duty justifies refusing to renew the license.

 

34. First, regarding the petitioner’s rights in the land: As mentioned, under the Regulations, a license applicant must declare to the Customs Authority that it is the owner, renter, or lessee of the land for which the license is requested. Supra para. 9. That right in the land is, according to the Regulations, a condition of or at least a relevant consideration in applying for the license. Did the petitioner have such a right?

 

When asked by the Customs Authority to produce a rental agreement or lease for the land, the petitioner sent the contract. Supra para. 10. The contract, however, is neither a rental agreement nor a lease, and it does not appear to be one either on its face or upon close scrutiny. Indeed, the petitioner itself does not claim that the contract, by itself, grants a right to rent or lease the land. Paragraph 12 of the petition says that, “the contract itself contains no explicit prohibition against the petitioner storing freight in the area.” Of course, the absence of an explicit prohibition on storage is not the same as the petitioner’s receiving permission to store freight on land that doesn’t belong to it. Does the contract grant that permission? The petitioner fails to point to a single clause of the contract that says that the petitioner was granted a right to lease or rent or even permission to store freight on the land. Moreover, paragraph 13 of the petition says that, “After signing the agreement, the representatives of the P.A. [Port Authority – I.Z.] and the petitioner’s representatives reached an agreement that … among other purposes, the area would be used for storing freight.” In other words, the agreement on storage was reached only after the contract was signed. Paragraph 29 of the petition says that, “The understanding regarding the size of the area, its boundaries, and its designations was reached after the signing.” The petitioner, however, in response to the Customs Authority’s request to produce a rental or lease agreement, produced only the contract, as though it granted it a right to rent or lease the land. It added nothing about an agreement or understanding reached after the contract was signed. In other words, to the Customs Authority, the petitioner produced only the contract, as though it granted it a right of rental or lease, even though the petitioner itself acknowledged that the contract granted no such right, and that is the right that the Regulations require.

 

It is therefore necessary to clarify whether the petitioner was granted such right, as it claims, after the contract was signed. Recall that according to the appendix to the contract, signed along with the contract, the petitioner may use the land “exclusively for the purposes of loading and/or unloading trains” and that, “Any change of any kind to the plot and/or anything attached and/or connected to it requires the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.” Supra para. 4. The petitioner, however, does not claim to have any such permission from the Director-General of Israel Railways or from anyone else authorized or pretending to be authorized to write on behalf of the director-general.

 

Moreover, on January 1, 1996, a year and a half after the contract was signed, the Railways Deputy told the petitioner in writing that it was not permitted to use the land for purposes other than loading and unloading, that “[s]eizure and use of the land constitute a violation of the contract,” and that “[y]ou must immediately vacate the areas noted above.” Supra para. 7. One would think that the petitioner, consistent with its version of the story, would rush to tell the Railways Deputy that the agreement reached after the signing of the contract gave it a right to store freight on the land. However, the petitioner failed to respond to the letter entirely. Only two months later, in response to an additional letter sent by the Railways Deputy, did the petitioner address the question of use of the land. In that response, however, it did not claim that there was no basis for the charge of contractual violation or that there was no basis for demanding that it vacate the land, because it was using the area pursuant to an agreement. The Director-General of the petitioner wrote to the Railways Deputy, saying only that, during the course of the last meetings on the subject, “to the best of my recollection, we agreed to find a way to resolve the issue.” Even afterward, in the months during which the Port Authority repeated its demands that the petitioner immediately vacate the land, the petitioner never said that it had a right of rental or lease in the land or that it had a right to fence in the land and use it to store freight. Supra para. 7.

 

During the course of this petition, the petitioner had another chance to produce proof about its right to rent or lease the land. Bear in mind that the petitioner is challenging the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew its license for the land, after the Customs Authority concluded that the petitioner did not and does not have a right in the land. How does the petitioner respond to this stance of the Customs Authority? Its answer is based on two claims, outlined in paragraph 30 of the petition:

 

The scheme clearly contains a notation that the area in question is intended for storage. That document was signed by the Director of the Engineering Department in the P.A./Israel Railways, and the petitioner claims that it is binding in every way. This scheme comes in addition to the oral understandings and agreements reached between the P.A. representatives and the petitioner, and together they constitute the basis for the extensive project and investment undertaken in reliance on the [written – trans.] agreement and the additional agreements and understandings.

 

The petitioner, however, provides no details whatsoever about those agreements and understandings (who agreed or understood, what was agreed or understood, etc.), and it provides no documents to support that claim. It merely makes the claim, which is unsupported by the correspondence between the petitioner and the Port Authority and has no weight as a evidence. We should further recall that, according to the contract, the oral agreements and understandings that the petitioner claims took place are insufficient to authorize transferring a large piece of land to the possession and use of the petitioner, contradicting the contract’s explicit provisions, including the provision requiring “the advance written approval of the Director-General of Israel Railways.”

 

            The sole piece of evidence left for the petitioner is the scheme, that is, the second scheme from May 15, 1995, in which the area of land is marked as “storage area.” Supra para. 3. The petitioner presents the second scheme (signed a year after the contract was signed) as if it were the only scheme. That is not the case. The first scheme was prepared as early as January 3, 1994 (a year and a half before the contract was signed) and signed by the petitioner and two deputies director-general of the Railways, who also signed the contract itself. The first scheme outlines the route of the extension, and it includes no marks designating land use, whether for storage or any other purpose. The second scheme was prepared, as noted above, a year and a half later, by the petitioner’s planner, in order to mark the new extension route proposed by the petitioner. It was signed not by the two deputies director-general who signed the first scheme, but rather only by the Director of the Railways Engineering Department.

 

            The petitioner claims that the second scheme is proof that the Port Authority agreed to let it use the land for storage. The Port Authority counters that in signing the second scheme, the Director of the Israel Railways Engineering Department intended only to approve the new route of the extension from an engineering point of view and not to approve the use of the land, something he was neither involved in nor even authorized to decide. In paragraph 7 of its response affidavit, the Port Authority claims that:

 

According to what he told me, all that Mr. Doron Rubin, Director of the Israel Railways Engineering Department, was asked to do was to sign the back of the scheme from 1995, to indicate approval of the extension route from an engineering point of view. Under these circumstances, claiming that his signature granted rights in the land to the petitioner, just because the petitioner’s planner added the words “storage area” in the margins of the plan, without bothering to call it to Mr. Rubin’s attention, is pure temerity, and it stems from a failure to behave in good faith.

 

            35. Are these claims and evidence enough to rule that the petitioner has no right in the land? Definitely not. Whether the petitioner has a right in the land is an open question, currently pending before the Magistrate’s Court in Ashdod, as part of the action of ejectment brought by the Port Authority against the petitioner. The Magistrate’s Court will rule on that question in light of the arguments and evidence brought before it. Supra para. 8. That, however, is not the question that the Customs Authority faced, and it is not the question before this court. The question before us is whether, in considering whether to renew the license, the Customs Authority had sufficient evidence to decide the issue. As is known, the evidence required to base a decision by an administrative agency differs in substance and in weight from the evidence required to base a judgment by a court. Administrative agencies act according to the test of administrative evidence, not the rules of evidence used in court. Under this test, the administrative agency must have before it sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable person would rely, under the circumstances, in order to make the decision in question. See HC 442/71 Lansky v. Interior Minister [33] at 357; HC 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Communications Minister [34] at 423-24. Such evidence may be sufficient to form the basis for a refusal to renew a license or a revocation of the license. See e.g. HC 475/81, supra [6] at 808.

 

            In my opinion, under the test of administrative evidence, the Customs Authority could have decided at the outset that the petitioner had no right in the land, as required by the Regulations for receipt of a license. The contract itself, which on its face is neither a rental or lease agreement, would have been sufficient evidence for that decision. A fortiari, it would have been sufficient afterward, in view of the Port Authority’s opposition to the petitioner’s seizure and possession of the land. Under the test of administrative evidence, the evidence, which would have been sufficient for a refusal to grant the license at the outset, is also sufficient to determine, for purposes of renewing the license, that the petitioner has no right in the land, as required by the Regulations.

 

            The conclusion is therefore that the Customs Authority granted the license to the petitioner based on a mistake caused by the petitioner’s representation regarding its right in the land. Once the mistake was discovered, and it became clear that, under the Regulations, the petitioner was not entitled to the license, the Customs Authority had the grounds needed under the case law to refuse to renew the license or even to revoke it.

 

            36. Nevertheless, under the facts of this case, I have doubts as to whether these grounds by themselves are sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the license for the land. My doubt stems from two sources: First, the Customs Authority is not absolved of responsibility for the mistake that, once discovered, motivated it to decline to renew the petitioner’s license. As noted, when the petitioner applied for the license, the Customs Authority asked it to send a rental or lease agreement for the land, and it sent the contract. The contract, on its face, is neither a rental nor a lease agreement, and that is obvious to a lawyer after a surface reading of it. However, the Customs representative who handled the petitioner’s application did not bother to read the contract at all. The Customs Authority explained that in paragraph 8 of its response affidavit:

 

The Customs Authority representatives who approved the petitioner’s request assumed, based on the relationship of trust that had developed between the two and in light of the assumption that the petitioner was acting in good faith, that the contract submitted by the petitioner indeed granted it storage rights in the area in question and that there was no reason not to approve the request.

 

            This explanation does not absolve the Customs Authority of responsibility. In every case, the Customs Authority, like any administrative agency, must take reasonable steps to clarify whether the conditions set by the statute or regulations for its exercise of authority have been met. This is the administrative agency’s duty owed to the public, which has endowed it with authority, subject to certain conditions. The agency may not exempt itself of the responsibility to investigate those conditions just because it assumes, hopes, or trusts that the citizen will act in good faith.

 

            Furthermore, the citizen can assume that the agency conducts a reasonable investigation of the conditions necessary to exercise its authority, and that if the agency grants the request, the citizen may generally rely on the that decision. As Justice Barak said:

 

A license grantee may assume that the necessary checks were done and that the he or she may begin investments and activities without fear that everything will be re-opened just because of a mistake. There is another reason, and it is connected to proper public administration. Administrative agencies should establish a system of checks and investigations that will allow it to arrive at its stance in advance, before the license is granted. Only under an illegitimate and dangerous system of administration would the agency first grant a license and only afterward investigate.

HC 799/80, supra [5] at 331.

 

The question therefore becomes whether, under the circumstances of this case, the mistake regarding the petitioner’s rights in the land was sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the license.

 

The second source of doubt is the fact that the balance of damages seems to tip toward the petitioner. On the one hand, the petitioner invested a lot of money in preparing the land to serve as a licensing warehouse, negotiated with clients, has operated the warehouse for months, and will certainly suffer substantial damage when forced to stop using the land as a licensing warehouse, particularly if it is forced to do so immediately. On the other hand, what damage would result if the petitioner continues to use the land as a licensing warehouse until the civil court rules on the Port Authority’s action to eject the petitioner from the land? From the point of view of the Customs Authority, there is no practical damage, because the land has been properly prepared for use as a licensing warehouse, and only the question of the petitioner’s rights in it remains open. There is therefore no concern that the petitioner will store goods on which customs duties are owed unsafely or unsupervised. What of the damage caused to the Port Authority? Such damage does not appear to be a relevant consideration for the Customs Authority’s decision whether to renew the petitioner’s license. In any event, should the civil court rule that the petitioner has no right in the land and that it is occupying the land as a trespasser, the Port Authority may, should it so desire, sue the petitioner for money damages in the form of the appropriate amount of rent, purging the petitioner of unjust enrichment, or request any other remedy.

 

If that is the case, should the Customs Authority renew the petitioner’s license temporarily, pending the civil court’s ruling on its right in the land? In the final balance, were I required to rule on this case based exclusively on the question of the right in the land, I think that I would rule against the petitioner, despite my doubt. The primary reason is that, based on the administrative evidence, the Customs Authority’s granting of the license was not just an error in judgment but was actually illegal, because it contradicted the Regulations requiring that a license-holder have a right in the land. In principle, an administrative agency is not supposed to accept an illegal situation. Indeed, if it were a question of freezing the current situation for just a brief period, pending a final ruling on the question of the right in the land, it would have been possible to maintain the status quo, out of consideration for the damage that the petitioner would otherwise suffer. In practice, however, years may pass before the courts will give a final ruling, including on any appeals. It would not serve the public interest to allow the petitioner, which apparently received the license in violation of the Regulations, to maintain the license and benefit from it for a long period of time, while the authorized agency is helpless to correct the problem. Therefore, as noted, if I had to rule on this case based on this reason alone, I think that, despite the doubt, I would deny the petition.

 

However, if any doubt remained about whether this reason is sufficient to justify the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license for the land, the second reason, namely breach of the duty to disclose, removes any doubt I might have harbored.

 

37. As noted, as part of the petitioner’s duty to disclose owed to the Customs Authority, the petitioner had an obligation to disclose information material to the license requested. Supra text beginning on para. 27. I have no doubt that the petitioner violated that duty.

 

This was the case from the petitioner’s first step in this case. When asked by the Customs Authority to produce a “rental contract or lease” for the land, the petitioner sent the Customs Authority the contract (in December 1995), noting in its cover letter that, “Enclosed is the rental/lease agreement with the Port Authority and the Railways.” However, as noted, that contract is neither a rental agreement nor a lease. Even the petitioner acknowledges in its petition that its claim to a right in the land is based on understandings and agreements made later. Supra para. 34. The petitioner, however, did not tell the Customs Authority that its right in the land derives not from the contract but rather from later understandings and agreements. Had it said that in the letter sent to the Customs Authority, the Customs Authority would likely have sought to clarify what those understandings and agreements are and why they are not included in the appendix to the contract or in another document.

 

Moreover, the petitioner sent the contract to the Customs Authority without attaching the first scheme, which presents the extension route as it was first established. Supra paras. 2-3. Therefore, the picture presented to the Customs Authority was incomplete and inaccurate. Had the petitioner attached the first scheme as well, which left a smaller area between the extension and the warehouse, along with an explanation about the change in the route, the Customs Authority might have investigated and discovered the situation as the Port Authority viewed it.

 

In any event, the petitioner knew very well that the Customs Authority required it to have a right of rental or lease in the land, and that after it submitted the contract, the Customs Authority believed that the petitioner did indeed have such a right.

 

Even if the petitioner believed it had such a right, not long after it submitted the contract to the Customs Authority, it learned that the Port Authority thought otherwise. The letter sent to the petitioner on January 8, 1996 said, in the name of the Port Authority, that the petitioner had seized the land in violation of the contract and that it must immediately vacate the land. The Port Authority repeated that stance over and over for a period of months. Supra para. 7. During that time, the petitioner’s application for a license was pending before the Customs Authority until it decided, on July 1, 1996, to grant the license requested. The petitioner should have known, if it did not in fact know, that this information about the stance of the Port Authority was material to the Customs Authority’s decision on its application for a license. The petitioner itself submitted the contract to the Customs Authority as proof of its rental or lease right in the land. That being the case, during the months in which it engaged in regular communications with the Customs Authority about the license, how could the petitioner have neglected to inform it that the other party to the contract vehemently denied that the contract imparted any such right whatsoever to the petitioner?

 

If the case involved private individuals, we might have said that the petitioner was obligated to disclose that information to the other party as part of its duty to act in good faith during negotiations leading to the formation of a contract, under section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part), and that the other party could consider the failure to disclose as a misrepresentation under section 15 of that law and therefore void the contract. In this case, because we are dealing with an administrative agency and not a private individual, we can say that the petitioner breached its duty owed the Customs Authority to disclose material information.

 

Violation of the duty to disclose may result from a random mistake or from deliberate misrepresentation. It is often difficult to distinguish between the two, and in any event it is difficult to prove that the violation resulted from that latter. Generally, however, there is no need to prove that. It is sufficient that, under the facts of the case, the citizen, as a reasonable and fair person, had a duty to disclose the material information to the agency, and that the citizen’s violation of such duty caused the agency to be misled.

 

38. Misleading an administrative agency by a citizen’s failure to disclose information material to its application for a license or other benefit causes substantial harm, not just to the agency but also to the public. It is clearly in the public interest to avoid such misrepresentation. The public also has an interest in revoking a license or other benefit given by the agency as a result of such misrepresentation. Such misrepresentation, if it is not de minimus, is therefore likely to justify a decision by the administrative agency to revoke the license or other benefit granted, especially if there are grounds to believe that the agency would not have granted the license or benefit, but for the misrepresentation.

 

This is the case before us. The Customs Authority says that, had the petitioner disclosed the full picture of its rights in the land, either at the start of the license application process or at any time before the decision was made, it would not have given the petitioner the license it requested. This claim is persuasive.

 

The consequence is thus that the Customs Authority’s refusal to renew the petitioner’s license for the land was justified.

 

I therefore conclude that the petition should be denied, and the petitioner should pay court costs.

 

Addendum: Person and State

 

39. Finished but not complete. President Barak responds to me: He agrees with the outcome I reach but not with the route I take to reach it. As for the result, he agrees that the petitioner owes the Customs Authority a duty of disclosure, that it violated such duty, and that the petition should therefore be denied. As for the route, he does not agree that the duty of disclosure imposed upon the petitioner derives from a general duty of proper behavior owed by the citizen to the public administration. In his opinion, the duty of disclosure is circumscribed, and it is wrong and perhaps even dangerous to impose a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen, toward the public administration.

 

Because there is no dispute over the outcome, the dispute over the way to get there may seem abstract and marginal. In actuality, however, it is a dispute of principle and importance. It reflects a difference in world views about the nature of the state or, at least, the proper relationship between a person and the state.

 

What is the proper relationship between a person and the state? The point of departure is rooted in the general rule, which is essentially the basic rule of jurisprudence, that every person, including every legal entity, must behave properly in every case, according to the circumstances. That, in my opinion, is the entire body of jurisprudence in a nutshell. As for the rest: go and learn. Indeed, jurisprudence has developed an extensive system of different rules for the proper way to behave in various situations. Beyond those rules, however, and in addition to them, there is a general duty of proper behavior.

 

In private law, which governs relationships between individuals, the general duty is a duty of good faith. That duty applies to contractual relations as well as to other legal acts. It can serve as a conceptual explanation for the existing rules, a legal source from which new rules are derived, and even a duty in itself.

 

In public law, which governs relationships between an individual and the public, the duty is customarily called the duty of fairness. Like the duty of good faith, the duty of fairness requires proper behavior under the circumstances of the case.

 

There is no dispute that the public administration owes a duty of fairness to the citizen. Does the citizen, however, owe a parallel, if not identical, duty to the public administration? The Court has yet to address that question. Now that it has come before us and created a dispute, I see fit to add a few words to explain my position.

 

            40. President Barak does not see a justification for imposing on the citizen a duty of fairness parallel to that owed by the public administration, because the relationship between the citizen and the public administration is asymmetrical. I agree that there is no symmetry. However there is, or at least ought to be, reciprocity.

 

            There is no symmetry because the public administration is the trustee of the public, meaning that of every citizen, while the citizen is not the trustee of the public administration. To clarify: the loyalty owed by the public administration to the citizen is not a legal duty. It is not even a legal relationship. In that way, it differs from the duty of loyalty in private law. In public law, as opposed to private law, loyalty is just a conceptual duty. It expresses the idea that the public administration draws its authority from the public and must exercise that authority for the sake of the public, in the way that public decides. Inter alia, it must exercise its authority with fairness. Various duties owed by the public administration to the citizen arise from fairness, including the duties that the legislature imposes and those that the courts impose.

 

            The citizen, on the other hand, is not the trustee of the public administration but rather the beneficiary. Obviously, then, the citizen’s legal duties owed the public administration cannot be identical to the legal duties owed by the public administration to the citizen. However, it is just as clear that the citizen is not exempt from owing legal duties to the public administration. The citizen is subject to various legal duties imposed by the legislature and by the courts. For example, it is agreed that the citizen must produce a driver’s license to a police officer; may not insult a public servant; and must disclose material information to an agency from which he or she applies for a license to operate a business. These and other duties are not imposed upon the citizen arbitrarily. They are supposed to express the proper way for the citizen to treat the public administration. In that way, they share common ground – a general duty of proper behavior. That duty constitutes a central ingredient in the culture of our lives. It is also necessary for society to function efficiently and legitimately. What, then, is that duty, and how is it distinct from the duty which the public administration owes the citizen?

 

            41. As a conceptual matter, the duty of loyalty owed by the public administration to the citizen is expressed in legal duties which can be roughly divided into three groups: first, authority; second, reasonableness; and third, fairness.

 

            On the issue of authority, every administrative agency has a duty to refrain from exceeding the bounds of its statutorily delineated-power. That is the duty of authority in the broad sense. The duty of authority, in this sense, requires the agency to do only what the statute authorizes it to do, using only the means that the statute authorizes it to use. It includes, for example, the duty to consult with a certain body or to receive authorization from another body, depending on what the statute stipulates. That duty, of course, does not apply to the citizen, who has not been granted authority by the statute.

 

            In addition, the administrative agency has a duty to act, not just within the bounds of authority defined by the statute, but also with reasonableness. That is the duty of reasonableness in the broad sense. The duty of reasonableness, in this sense, tells the agency to exercise its discretion properly. It is composed of two secondary duties: the agency must exercise its authority for a proper purpose; it must consider the relevant considerations and ignore the irrelevant ones; it must give each relevant consideration the proper weight and balance the various considerations (that is the duty of reasonableness in the narrow sense); and it must not harm the citizen to an extent greater than necessary. The citizen also does not owe the duty of reasonableness, because such duty relates to the discretion entailed in authority [which has been delegated – trans.], and the citizen has no such authority.

 

            The duty of fairness relates to the administrative process, meaning the way in which the administrative agency exercises its authority vis à vis the citizen. It is expressed in various duties, like the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation into the circumstances of the case, to lend an ear to the claims of the citizen, to allow the citizen to access documents concerning the matter at hand, and to explain its decision. The common denominator in these duties is the duty to behave properly toward the citizen. It is commonly said that such duty derives from the duty of loyalty that the public administration owes the citizen. That is true, but it is not the only source. The status of the agency as the trustee of the public adds another dimension to this duty, but the duty, at its core, derives from a different source. It derives, first of all, from the basic duty of proper behavior in societal relationships, which includes fairness. Because it derives from this duty, which is not unique to the relationship between the public administration and the citizen, it can apply to the public administration’s duty to the citizen as well as to the citizen’s duty to the public administration.

 

            There may therefore be uncertainty over whether the duty of fairness, as opposed to the duty of authority and the duty of reasonableness, creates a parallel duty which the citizen owes the public administration. President Barak answers that question in the negative. However, his answer gives the duty of fairness a broad meaning. It includes the duty of procedural fairness but also substantive fairness, like, for example, the duty not to discriminate and not to work for an illegitimate goal. In my opinion, the duty of substantive fairness, which concerns administrative discretion, is not part of the duty of fairness but rather part of the duty of reasonableness. That duty is obviously not imposed on the citizen, because the citizen has no authority and therefore cannot be obligated to consider the relevant considerations or fulfill other conditions of exercising authority.

 

            The dispute between President Barak and me is limited to the question of whether the citizen bears a general duty of proper behavior toward the public administration within the field that President Barak refers to as procedural, as opposed to substantive.

 

            42. President Barak objects to imposing a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen vis à vis  the public administration, irrespective of its nature and scope, on two primary grounds: one concerns the reason, and the other concerns the result.

 

            President Barak believes that, first of all, the reason which leads to imposing a duty of proper behavior on the public administration, owed to the citizen, does not lead to imposing a parallel duty on the citizen, owed to the public administration. “A general duty like this,” he says (in paragraph 8), “is inappropriate.” Why? The major reason is this:

 

… The view that the government is the trustee of the public is the basis for imposing a general duty of fairness that government owes to the individual. This view is based on a democratic perspective which puts individual liberty at the basis of the social structure. These reasons for imposing a duty do not exist in a relationship between the individual and the government. The individual is not the trustee of the government … the proper perspective on democracy means that there is no room to impose a duty of fairness that the citizen owes the government. Imposing a general duty of fairness would radically alter the perspective on democracy and the place that the individual occupies within it.

Para. 6.

 

 

            What, however, is the proper perspective on democracy? Obviously, there are many perspectives on democracy – from popular democracy to Western democracy; from formal democracy to substantive democracy; and within substantive democracy, there are different perspectives on what the substance is. There is no dispute that the State of Israel is not just a formal democracy that makes do with choosing representative institutions every few years, primarily the legislative and executive branches. The State of Israel is a substantive democracy, all of whose representative institutions are guided by basic values, at the center of which is human dignity and liberty, in order to serve the human being as a human being. The Court has used that perspective on democracy to establish basic human rights, develop them, and defend them against violation by other institutions. However, even within the context of substantive democracy, with human rights as the consensus, there may still be different perspectives on the proper relationship between the state and the individual.

 

            President Barak believes that, “A democratic regime is based on the recognition of each individual’s human rights … the role of the government is to maintain a society that respects human rights.” Para. 3, infra. Indeed currently, that is the prevalent perspective on the democratic regime here. In my opinion, however, it only captures part of it. A democratic regime is more than recognition and protection of human rights. Human rights are indeed a value of the utmost importance, but they are not the only value. A person is more than a bundle of rights. A person is also a bundle of needs, proclivities, and aspirations. We cannot, therefore, say that the role of the government is to respect human rights – period. That is indeed a role of the utmost importance, but it is only one role among others. In the same breath, we must also say that an additional role is to advance the well-being of people – all people. Another role is to achieve social justice – justice for all. Human rights are not supposed to overshadow personal well-being and social justice. Human rights must not be just for those who have enough. Every person must have enough, so that he or she can enjoy human rights, in actuality and not just by law. This role is integrated, and the government is not the only one who must fill it. It is, first and foremost, the role of society. In other words, each of us must fill that role. Need we fill the role by helping the public administration? Yes. May we shirk the role and impose it on the public administration? No. In fulfilling that role, each of us must take a system of duties upon himself or herself, not just toward other people but also toward society. That, in my opinion, is the proper perspective on a democratic society – rights existing side-by-side with duties. While there is no symmetry in the relationship between the individual and society, there is reciprocity.

 

            That is my view on the social contract. It is not a historical fact whose content is determinable, and it is not even a legal document whose meaning is debatable. The social contract is nothing but an idea that expresses the character that society should have. In my opinion, the desirable character of a society should guarantee not just human rights but also personal well-being and social justice. Toward that end, society does not make do with imparting people with rights; it also imposes duties upon them. That is the soul of democracy.

 

            The State of Israel is a Jewish and democratic state. The Court, as a branch of the state, must be guided by the very democratic values it simultaneously advances. It unquestionably does that and always has. The Court primarily develops and cultivates human rights. However, to be hand-on-heart honest, does it not do so at the expense of other values? The Court devotes it primary efforts and dedicates its first rung on the ladder of priorities to human rights. That is the case in practice, even more so in the rhetoric, and appropriately so: human rights should stand at the top of the ladder of priorities. However, the perspective on democracy as a government which protects human rights is a one-dimensional perspective. Democracy is more complicated and, frankly, better than that. The right perspective on democracy must put personal well-being and social justice together with human rights at the top of the ladder of priorities. The practice and rhetoric of the Court ought to reflect that perspective more clearly.

 

            43. In my opinion, President Barak’s perspective on democracy derives from a feeling of tension or even conflict between the state and the citizen. The state, through this perspective, is a regime that stands against the citizen. Indeed, the government of today is no longer what it was: it is not a totalitarian regime, either monarchical or colonial. Today, in a democracy, the government is the trustee of the people, and it therefore bears a general duty to take care of the public, which includes a duty to protect human rights. That perspective, however, still views the government as a body external to the citizen. It may be a new government, but it has grown from the roots of a totalitarian regime, meaning the roots of paternalism. Even today, the government is like a big brother or beneficent mother whose duty it is to take care of the child, while the child owes obedience and gratitude in return.

 

            This perspective is reflected in the very way we talk about the government. Indeed, the government as trustee. A government, at best, which is legitimate and enlightened. But still a government. It operates externally. And I, as a citizen, am subject to it. Fear its heavy hand. Ask that it leave me alone. Look for ways of restraining it.

 

            It is not the term which is determinative. The perspective is determinative. The term only reveals the perspective. Therefore, even if we find another expression, and replace “government” with “public administration,” nothing will change unless we change the perspective.

 

            44. I reject this perspective. I would like to see the state as a partnership. Of course, not a partnership in the private law sense, and not even a partnership as a legal relationship, but rather a partnership as a conceptual perspective which replaces the perspective of the state as a regime.

 

            According to this perspective, the state is the joint project of all citizens. It includes a division of roles. Those roles dictate the legal relationships. Civil servants play an important role, which entails authority and duties. It gives them control and obligates them as trustees. They are not, however, a regime above me. They are still our partners.

 

            The partnership perspective has implications for the system of rights and duties that apply to both the citizen and the public administration. The partnership is not limited to periodic elections in which the citizen empowers the Knesset and the government to manage national affairs as it sees fit for a few years, until the next elections. Partnership means giving the citizen a real opportunity to participate in the daily running of the country’s national life, and an opportunity, in practice, to act and influence on a daily basis, not just through elections. It requires more publicity and openness of the public administration; additional avenues for early consultation with the relevant bodies outside the public administration; willingness to incorporate those bodies in its regular activities. Administrative regulations stand out as an example. On a regular basis, ministers and other agencies issue a tremendous number of regulations, many of which have the same practical importance as statutes. Unlike the case of statutes, however, the agency authorized to issue regulations does not tend to publish a draft of the regulations and does not hold a public discussion before those regulations enter into force. That process reflects aspects of the government perspective. It is inconsistent with the partnership perspective. The partnership perspective advances democracy to a higher level. It correctly expresses the idea of rule of the people.

 

            The government perspective encourages the citizen to demand personal benefits from the government. It does not encourage the citizen to contribute to society. It tempts the citizen to think: I gave the government power and responsibility, and it should repay me with rights and services. It owes me. This is not a perspective of partnership.

 

            45. The partnership perspective also has implications for the duty that the citizen owes the public administration. The public administration is essentially a public servant. The public servant is flesh of my flesh. He or she works for me and for my benefit. We are partners who have different jobs within the state. According to that perspective, I owe a general duty of proper behavior to the public servant. It is inconceivable that I would owe such a duty such a duty to my employer, my neighbor, as a bus driver or shop salesperson (and it doesn’t matter if we call it good faith or anything else) but not to a public servant, who works for me and for my benefit. Such a duty arises obviously from the partnership relationship between the citizen and the public servant.

 

            I call this duty the duty of fairness. It is a term of convenience. It does not matter very much. We could also call it a duty of good faith. It means a general duty of proper behavior. Proper behavior is an elementary duty. All persons owe it to all other persons. In my opinion, perhaps even a fortiori, the citizen owes it to the public servant.

            The general duty of proper behavior, like the general duty of good faith, does not pretend to be a positive description. In reality, good faith is often lacking in interpersonal relationships. That does not, however, invalidate the duty. The duty is a legal norm, and it exists as such even when breached in practice. The same is true of the duty of fairness that the administrative agency owes the citizen. In reality, the administrative agency may not behave fairly toward the citizen. Nevertheless, and perhaps for that very reason, the duty of fairness is necessary as a legal norm. The norm sends a message, educates, and serves as a tool for adjudicating disputes. For this reason, we also need the norm of a duty of proper behavior owed by the citizen to the administrative agency.

            46. President Barak objects to imposing a general duty of proper behavior on the citizen, to the public administration, not just because he sees no conceptual reason to do so, but also because he is concerned about the practical consequence that will result. In paragraph 13, he says:

The theoretical basis determines how the arrangement develops. The theory determines the practice. In my view, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, because such a duty would be inconsistent with the way we view the individual in society ... “Fairness” is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state.

            Indeed, theoretical perspectives have practical importance. However, the court is responsible for translating the theoretical perspectives into rules of behavior. That principle applies to the theoretical perspective on the duty of fairness owed by the public administration to the citizen. The Court used that perspective to say that various duties that have long been imposed on the public administration, such as the duty to hold a hearing and the duty to disclose, derive from the duty of fairness. The Court, however, has not imposed any additional duties just because they arise from the theoretical perspective on the duty of fairness. The Court will determine that a duty derives from the duty of fairness only after it concludes that the relevant considerations justify imposing such duty on the public administration.

            The same holds true in the opposite direction. In this judgment, the Court holds that, under certain circumstances, the citizen owes a duty of disclosure to the public administration. The Court established that duty by balancing the good of the public against human rights. Having established that duty, I suggest holding that it derives from the duty of fairness. This is the expected course of things. It is also the appropriate course. It may be presumed that if the Court determines that a citizen owes a general duty of fairness to the public administration, the theoretical perspective will not motivate the Court to impose a particular sub-duty on the citizen, unless it concludes that the relevant considerations justify it. It may also be presumed that the Court will only impose additional duties on the citizen through a careful and controlled process, exercising restraint, in order to maintain an appropriate balance in the relationship between the citizen and the public administration.

            47. Clearly, the system of rules derived from the citizen's duty of fairness will differ from the system of rules derived from the public administration's duty of fairness. The name may be the same, but the content is different. In this sense, there is no difference between the duty of fairness and the duty of good faith. For example, the duty of good faith owed by an agent to the principal differs from the duty of good faith owed by the principal to the agent. See para. 25, supra.

            However, in this case, President Barak and I do not dispute the content of the duty of fairness. On that question, I don't think we would disagree. In this case, we agree that, under certain circumstances, the citizen owes a duty of disclosure to the public administration. I expect that there are additional cases in which we would agree that the citizen does or does not owe additional duties. Our disagreement is not over one duty or another, but rather over a prior question which expresses a theoretical perspective: whether the citizen owes the public administration a general duty of fairness, regardless of what the content of that duty may be.

            48. In my opinion, the theoretical perspective that a citizen owes a general duty of fairness to the public administration causes no damage and poses no risk. To the contrary: this perspective adds a helpful theoretical and practical benefit to law and to society. It sends an appropriate message. Fairness is an appropriate message in every human relationship. That is true (in the garb of good faith) of the way people treat each other, and it is true (in the garb of fairness) of the way the public servant treats the citizen. Could it be possible that the way the citizen treats the public servant is the sole exception to this rule? As a person and as a citizen, I willingly assume a duty of fairness to public servants.

 

President A. Barak

            I agree with the result at which my colleague, Justice Zamir arrived: that the petition should be denied. That conclusion is based on the view that the petitioner violated the duty of disclosure owed to Respondent 1. My colleague also recognizes the petitioner's duty of disclosure. The difference in our positions concerns the source of that duty. My colleague sees the duty of disclosure as part of a general duty of fairness which the individual owes the government. I disagree. I will briefly explain my position.

            1. Today, it is universally agreed that the government owes the individual a duty of fairness. This duty is owed by anyone who wields governmental authority. It is owed to any individual, as part of his or her personhood. It applies to every governmental function (legislative, executive, judicial). At first, the legal system recognizes particular duties which the government owed the individual, such as the duty to hear opposing sides, the duty to give reasons, and the duty to behavior reasonably and not arbitrarily. After a while, the system sought and found a general principle at the core of each particular duty. This is the duty of fairness. See HC 840/79, supra [20] at 745. At first, it was just a principle that summarized the particular duties that had already been recognized. Later, it came to be recognized as a super-principal which gives rise to the various duties. The view is that the principle has a life of its own. It is not just a summary of the specific duties recognized in the past. Over the years, new duties that had not been recognized in the past arose from this principle. Indeed, that is – in the Viscount Simonds' words – the "genius" of case law. Scruttons v. Midland Silicones(1962) [72] at 7. It recognizes particular duties that, over time, come to be viewed as an expression of a general principle from which new particular duties arise, which come to be viewed as an expression of a general principle (new or old) from which new particular duties arise, and so on. In the case before us, first the specific duties were recognized, such as the duty to conduct a hearing and avoid a conflict of interests. Later, the legal system derived from them the general principle that, in relationships between the government and the individual, the government must behave fairly toward the individual. Such fairness is both procedural and substantive. Procedural fairness requires the government to establish a procedure that is fair to the individual. For example, the government must hear the individual before making a decision in his or her case, and it may not subject itself to a conflict of interests. Substantive fairness requires the government to consider appropriate considerations (for example, the duty to act reasonably, without discrimination or arbitrariness and not for an inappropriate purpose).  The categories of fairness (procedural and substantive) are never closed or rigid, and they never rest on their lees. HC 1635/90 Zharzhavski v. Prime Minister [35] at 841.

            Why does the government owe a general duty of fairness to the individual? Such duty stems from the view that the governmental authority does not act for itself but rather on behalf of the public. In our legal system, the governmental authority is seen as the trustee of the public who owes the public a duty of fairness. I said as much in one case:

The state, through those who act in its name, is the trustee of the public, put in charge of the collective interest and public assets in order to use them for the collective good …

This special status subjects the state to a duty to behave with reason, integrity, purity of heart, and good faith. The state may not discriminate, act arbitrarily, or in bad faith, or allow itself to be subject to a conflict of interests. It must maintain the rules of natural justice. In short, it must act fairly.

HC 840/79, supra [20] at 745-46.

            Indeed, my view is that the government is the trustee of the collective. My position is that the government is nothing in itself, and anything that it has, it has for the sake of the public. See HC 669/86 Rubin v. Berger [36] at 78. Justice H. Cohen articulated this position:

The individual is different from the public body. The former does as he or she pleases, granting or refusing as he or she wishes, while the latter exists only to serve the collective. It has nothing of its own. All that it has, it holds in trust. On its own, it has no rights or duties beyond, different, or separate from those arising from the trusteeship or granted it or imposed upon it by statutory provisions.

HC 142/70 Shapira v. Bar Association Jerusalem Regional Committee [37] at 331.

My theoretical point of departure is therefore that the government is a trustee, trusteeship requires fairness, and fairness (procedural and substantive) requires behavior based not on self-interest but rather on the need to advance the collective good. See HC 1635/90, supra [36] at 841. See also HC 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Housing and Construction Minister [38] at 258.

            3. Why do I see the government as the public trustee? The reason is that a democratic society is based on the recognition of individual human rights. These rights are natural to people by virtue of their personhood. The government does not grant these rights to people; the rights pre-exist the government. The role of the government is to maintain a society that establishes human rights. Of course, as a matter of daily life in society, human rights sometimes must be infringed. We cannot protect human rights without infringing on human rights. A democratic government is not characterized by the fact that it never violates human rights. Human rights are not a recipe for national destruction. A democratic society is characterized by the fact that an infringement of human rights must be done for a purpose which advances human rights, and the infringement must be to an extent no greater than necessary. A democratic society allows human rights to be infringed upon in order to maintain a social framework that preserves human rights. The right of the individual and its violation derive from a common source. CA 68211/93 United Mizrachi Bank. v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative Village (hereinafter – the Mizrachi Bank case [39]) at 433. Within the context of this view, the role of the government is to take care of the public. The government in itself has no “private” interest of its own. The government exists for the sake of individuals. The government does not exist for its “own” sake. Those who represent the government have no “self” interest that must be protected. They must act to achieve the collective interest. Indeed, there is a serious concern – a concern which history has repeatedly validated – that representatives of the government will develop their own interests and use the tremendous power granted them for purposes that do not reflect the collective good. The duty of loyalty seeks to prevent that. The duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government takes care of the public and not itself; the general duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government takes care of the public and not itself; the general duty of fairness seeks to guarantee that governmental authority is exercised in a way that serves the collective, and not the government itself.

            4. These reasons, which lie at the core of the general duty of loyalty, determine its content. The general duty of loyalty seeks to guarantee that the government does not achieve “its own self-interest” but rather the collective interest. The duty of loyalty does not set the “rules of the game” between “rivals.” It sets rules of behavior for “friends.” Indeed, like the trustee of a private trust, the government must suppress any “private” or “self” interest. It must exercise its powers for the sake of the public and the collective. Therefore, the government must act with integrity and purity of heart; it must abide by the rules of natural justice; its actions must recognize the equality of persons; it must keep its promises (see HC 135/75, supra [22] at 676); it must provide the public with information (HC 142/70, supra [37]); it must take only relevant considerations into account; it must abide by public ethics in its actions (see HC 1601/90 Shalit v. Peres [40] at 365); it must act in a way that allows it to achieve the public task imposed on it.

            5. Do individuals, in their relationships, bear a general duty of fairness to each other? The answer is no. The law takes as its point of departure that people have rights (in the broad sense) vis à vis each other. The law recognizes the individual's self-interest and the power of the individual to protect that interest and achieve it. The law does not require an individual to suppress his or her self-interest and give priority to the interest of another person (who would also have to suppress his or her own self-interest). The law does not ask for that level of altruism. The law recognizes the self-interest of the individual and his or her will to achieve it. Of course, the individual may not cheat or defraud, but he or she is not asked to ignore his or her personal interest in dealings with others. Our legal system does not recognize that “quality of righteousness” (as Justice Alon called it in CA 148/77 Roth v. Yeshufa Construction Ltd. [41] at 635). However, over the years, our perspective on the proper relationship between individuals has changed. The perspective that has developed is that the “buyer beware” maxim is inappropriate in interpersonal relationships; it would be wrong to allow each individual to achieve his or her desire without considering those with whom he or she comes into contact.  There was a need to raise the threshold for what is considered proper behavior between individuals in their relationships. In private law, emerging principles of social solidarity and social justice set a standard of achieving the reasonable expectations of parties in private law. See M. Mautner, Yiridat Haformalism Vialiyat Haarachim Bamishpat Hayisraeli [80] at 57. Altruistic [in Jewish tradition: “angelic” – trans.] behavior is not required, but it is no longer acceptable for the individual to ignore the interests of others (in Jewish tradition: “wolfish” behavior – trans.]. The accepted view is that individuals must act in good faith in their interpersonal relationships [in Jewish tradition: behave like a person]. See CA 207/79 Raviv Moshe & Partners, Ltd. v. Beit Yules Ltd. (hereinafter – the Raviv case [42]) at 543. The legal system recognizes a general duty of good faith in contractual negotiations and in executing legal actions in private law. Sec. 12, 39, and 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part). It has also recognized the prohibition on abusing a right. Sec. 14 of the Land Law, 1969. These duties, as important as they are, do not impose a duty of altruism. They do not require the individual to ignore his or her own self-interest. In contracts, the duty of good faith does not require a contractual party to relinquish the self-interest he or she has in the contract and its execution. The duty of good faith imposes a duty on a contractual party to consider the interest that is common to himself or herself and the other party to the contract. The duty of good faith requires the holders of a contract to act to realize their common intent, through dedication to the joint goal that they had in making the contract and consistency in achieving their joint expectations. HC 59/80 Be’er Sheva Public Transportation Services Ltd. v. National Labor Court in Jerusalem [43] at 834. As a rule, for relationships between individuals, the law does not impose the duty of fairness it imposes on the government in its relationships with the individual. The duty of good faith imposed on individuals in their interpersonal relationships is “easier” than the duty of fairness imposed on the government in its dealings with individuals. HC 4422/92 [19] at 860. Good faith starts with the assumption that the individual takes care of his or her own interests. Good faith seeks to guarantee that he or she does so appropriately, taking into consideration the justified expectations of the other party. Good faith does not assume that each party will take care of the interests of the other, at the expense of his or her own interests. Good faith is based on the assumption that each contractual party takes care of his or her own interests, but it seeks to guarantee that he or she exercises integrity in doing so, safeguarding the joint mission of the parties, as befits a civilized society. See FH 22/82, supra [17] at 485. Good faith sets rules for a fair game between “rivals.” In contrast, the duty of fairness sets rules for a fair game between “friends.” The duty of fairness does not view the government and the individual as “rivals.” The government must take care of the collective to which the individual belongs. The government's duty of fairness – like, in some ways, an agent's duty of fairness to the principal, a director's to a company, a guardian's to those with whose care he or she is charged – is a “heavier” duty than the duty of good faith.

            6. Does an individual owe a general duty of fairness to the government? In order to answer that question, we must return to the discussion of the reasons for imposing on the government a general duty of fairness to the individual. As we have seen, the view that the government is the trustee of the public is the basis for imposing a general duty of fairness that government owes to the individual. This view is based on a democratic perspective which puts individual liberty at the basis of the social structure. These reasons for imposing a duty do not exist in a relationship between the individual and the government. The individual is not the trustee of the government. The individual does not seek to advance the liberty of the government. Democracy recognizes the liberty of the individual from the government, but not the liberty of the government from the individual. An individual may do anything that the law does not prohibit. The government may do nothing that the law does not permit. 1 B. Aktzin, Torat Hamishpat [81] at 128. A democratic perspective recognizes the individual's independent will and independent interest. A democratic perspective does not recognize the government's independent will and independent interest, because the government acts for the sake of the public and the collective. In a democratic society, we cannot say that the individual has nothing for himself or herself, and that all that he or she has is for the sake of the collective. These words are true of the government. The proper perspective on democracy means that there is no room to impose a duty of fairness that the citizen owes the government. Imposing a general duty of fairness would radically alter the perspective on democracy and the place that the individual occupies within it. My colleague, Justice Zamir, says that the social contract is the source of the general duty of fairness. I would not draw that conclusion from the social contract. Our accepted view of the social contract is that it establishes a limited government authorized to serve the people and allow them to realize their natural rights. This view gives rise to the government's general duty of fairness to the individual. It does not give rise to a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government.

            7. This analysis does not mean that the individual has no duties to the government. Democracy is not just human rights. Democracy is also human duties – duties to other individuals and duties to the government. Indeed, democracy is based on social life and national interests. The government acts for the sake of the public. To facilitate that activity, we must give it rights (in the broad sense), because otherwise it would not be able to achieve the collective interest. Giving rights to the government means imposing duties on the individual, to the government. The purpose of these duties is to make it possible for the government to achieve the objectives imposed upon it in a democratic society. They derive from social life and the need to advance the liberty of every individual. They are based on a view of a social welfare state and social solidarity. They derive from a proper view of the individual as someone who is shaped by society and therefore whose personality necessarily includes a “social aspect” that gives rise to an internal need to take the collective into consideration. These duties also derive from society's demand of the individual, as a member of society, to act for the sake of the collective. They are the product of the balance between the needs of the collective and the needs of the individual. We should recall, however, that the individual's duties to the government and the government's duty to the individual are different. They stem from different sources; they have different scopes. The existence of the government's general duty of fairness to the individual does not entail – as a matter of neither logic nor policy – the existence of a general duty of fairness owed by the citizen to the government.

            8. What duties does the individual owe the government, and how do they differ from the government's duty of fairness to the individual? The individual's duties are based on a view of the individual in a democratic society and the role of the government in a democracy. Their point of departure is individual liberty, on one hand, and the role of the government on the other. There is tension between those two poles, because the government must act for the collective good, and the collective good is likely to conflict with the rights of the individual. That tension is released in various and sundry duties imposed on the individual, to the government. These duties are not based on a general duty imposed on every individual. Creating such a general duty would be inappropriate. By their nature, the duties that the individual owes the government are the product of balancing conflicting values. They are a compromise between the individual's human rights and the collective interest of the public. In this balance, as the infringement on individual rights intensifies and the public interest weakens, the duty owed by the individual will become more moderate. In contrast, as the infringement on individual rights becomes more moderate and the public interest becomes stronger, the duty owed by the individual becomes stronger. Between those extremes lie the hard cases in which the violation of human rights is severe and the public interest is strong. In these situations, each society finds a balance point –which gives rise to the individual's duty – depending on its views about the appropriate relationship between the individual and the collective, between the person and the public.

            9. The complex relationship between the individual and the government is not based on a one general duty owed by the individual to the government. The individual's duties are sporadic, and their content changes according to the circumstances. The individual owes no general duty to the government beyond the duty to obey the law, and he or she certainly owes no general duty of fairness. The individual's duties are “specific.” For some issues, the individual's duties to the government are weaker than the duties of good faith that individuals owe each other in private law, and they may be limited to a duty not to mislead. For other issues, the individual's duties may be identical in scope to the duties of good faith that individuals owe each other. Indeed, in order to facilitate the government's activities in the field of private law, in his or her private law dealings with the government, the individual should bear the same duties of good faith that he or she owes to other individuals. The individual should not be given a break in his or her dealings with the government as it forms contracts or engages in other legal actions in order to fulfill its role. The provisions of sections 12 and 39 of the Contract Law (General Part) therefore apply to every legal action (see section 61(b) of the Contract Law (General Part)) in which the individual engages vis à vis the government. See G. Shalev, Chozei Rishut Biyisrael [82] at 59. For other issues, the individual's duties may be similar in scope to the duties of fairness imposed on the government. Sometimes, the individual may owe even more serious duties.  Indeed, the individual must sometimes sacrifice his or her life in defense of the state. We must, however, keep in mind, that the duties of the individual – unlike the general duty of fairness – are specific in nature and different in character. They result from the balance, at various points, between individual liberty and the collective good. They depend on the special circumstances of each case, entailing an investigation into whether the individual fulfilled his or her duty to the government, the source of the duty, and its scope. I therefore cannot concur with the position of my colleague, Justice Zamir, that the relationship between the agency and the individual is two-sided, such that “the citizen should therefore owe a duty of fairness to the agency, as the agency owes a duty of fairness to the citizen.” No such symmetry exists. The agency's duties to the individual are separate from the individual's duties to the government. The philosophy at the root of each duty differs, as does the scope of each. The relationship between the individual and the government may be two-sided, but they are neither reciprocal nor equal. As my colleague, Justice Zamir, rightfully points out, the proper relationship between the administrative agency and the citizen is “a reciprocal relationship of give-and-take.” Supra para. 23. However, the “give” and the “take” are not identical. The individual gives part of his or her liberty in exchange for a social life that defends his or her liberty. My colleague correctly notes that, “As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything.” Id. However, that does not mean that the duty of the individual and the duty of the agency are identical in content. A principal is not entitled to the loyalty of an agent unless he or she fulfills his or her duties to the agent. However, the principal's duty to the agent differs from the agent's duty to the principal. The agent owes a duty of loyalty and fairness. The principal does not. My colleague points out that, parallel to the right that citizen enjoys from the agency, the citizen bears a duty to the agency. That does not mean that the individual's duty to the agency is the same as the agency's duty to the individual. Parallel to the right that the individual enjoys from the agency, the agency bears a duty to the individual. That duty includes the duty of fairness. Parallel to the right that agency enjoys from the individual, the individual owes a duty. The right of the agency is not general, and therefore neither is the duty of the individual (beyond the duty to obey the law). The right of the agency is specific, and it changes according to the issue in question. The individual's duty, derived from that right, is also specific, and it changes according to the issue in question.

            10. Under the circumstances of this case, does the petitioner owe a duty to Respondents 1 and 2? If so, what is the scope of that duty, and what are its sources? My answer is that the petitioner indeed owes a duty of disclosure to Respondents 1 and 2. It must disclose the fact that it has a civil-law relationship with Respondent 3 (The Port Authority). In my opinion, this duty – grounded in the Regulations – includes the duty to disclose its relationship and communications with the Port Authority. Such information is relevant to the execution of a governmental task. It is only natural for the Customs Authority to seek to ensure that it does not give the authority to store goods on which customs duties have yet to be paid to someone whose possession of the land – and therefore, of the goods – is in question. In order for there to be security in protecting goods on which customs duties have yet to be paid, the protector must have stable rights in the land. For that reason, information about the civil-law relationship between the petitioner and Respondent 3 (the Port Authority) – including the information that there is a dispute between them – is material to the decision of Respondents 1 and 2 (Customs). The source of the duty of disclosure is the power of the government to grant a license to the individual (the petitioner). Granting the license must be done for the relevant reasons, based on the proper factual infrastructure. We want the government's decision to be proper and to advance the social interests that justified giving the government the power to make it. That is why the decision must be based on the proper factual infrastructure. Hence, the agency has a duty to collect the factual data, assess them as necessary, and use them to determine – within the rules of administrative evidence – the factual infrastructure relevant to making the governmental decision. While the governmental agency bears the burden of collecting the data and assessing them, the individual must assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license. The harm to the individual in imposing this duty is minimal, while the advancement of the collective interest is substantial. In the final balance, it is therefore appropriate to require the individual – who is applying for the license or permit from the government – to disclose the factual data material to the factual infrastructure which will serve as the basis of the government's exercise of discretion. This is particularly true of information which the applicant knows, but the agency does not. If the individual requests a license or permit from the government, and in order to exercise its discretion, the government needs facts known to the individual, the individual bears the burden of disclosing those facts to the government, unless there is another social interest that weighs against disclosure (such as privacy). The basis for the duty of disclosure is two-fold: First, it is a particular aspect of the principle of good faith, which, through parallel reasoning from private law, applies. If two rivals negotiating a contract bear a duty of disclosure, then it is only natural that such duty applies to negotiations over a governmental license, which is intended for the good of the collective, including the individual. However, the good faith that individuals owe each other is different from the good faith that individuals owe the government. Good faith between individuals is rooted in a conflict of interests. It is good faith between “rivals.” In contrast, the good faith owed the individual to the government is based on the agency's governmental role to act for the collective good, including that of the individual requesting the license. The difference in these basic positions means that good faith differs in these two situations, despite their commonalities concerning the duty to disclose. Second, we can view the basis for the duty as part of a special administrative law that applies to the relationship between the individual and the government, having nothing to do with the principle of good faith. Either way, the duty of disclosure does not derive from a general duty of fairness. Furthermore, there is no recognized general duty of disclosure owed by the individual to the government. The duty of disclosure is always the product of the balance between the right of the individual and the needs of the collective. It exists only where the balance between these values justifies it. It does not always exist. For example, a suspect has the right to remain silent during a criminal proceeding. He or she need not disclose information to the government, if such information may be incriminating. The duty of disclosure I discuss is a duty which is limited to the kinds of issues addressed in this petition.  It applies to licensing governments through which an individual applies for a license. Under those circumstances, I accept that the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion. Of course, the duty of disclosure may exist in additional areas. We will address that question when the time comes, by balancing the conflicting values. The duty of disclosure may exist for Issue X, but not for Issue Y.

            11. Of course, we might see a general trend of raising the threshold of what is considered proper behavior of the individual toward the government. We might say that, just as Israeli society raised the threshold of morality in behavior between individuals by requiring them to act in good faith, so should it raise the threshold of morality in behavior of individuals vis à vis the government. We might try to avoid introducing competition into the relationship between the individual and the government, such that the individual could exploit any mistake by the government for his or her personal benefit. However, that trend should be approached with caution. Taken to an extreme, it could turn things topsy-turvy, making the individual the trustee of the government, thereby destroying the democratic nature of the government. We would do well to use the standards of Israeli democracy to evaluate carefully any trend toward stepping up the individual's duty of proper behavior to the government. Such trend must withstand the balance between individual liberty and the collective interest.

            12. One might ask how my approach differs from that of my colleague, Justice Zamir. After all, he also recognizes the individual's duty of disclosure to the government under the circumstances of the present case. Indeed, we do not disagree that, under the circumstances of this case, the individual bears a duty of disclosure. Our dispute concerns the source of that duty. My colleague's position is that the duty derives from a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. In my opinion, there is no such general duty of fairness, because the individual is not the trustee of the government. The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision. In this case, our paths meet. My colleague's general duty of fairness imposes a duty of identical scope as the one I would require, for the special circumstances raised by this petition. Our agreement in this particular zone does not mean we agree on the entire front. Our paths may part ways in other circumstances.

            13. One might argue that the difference in our positions is purely semantic. Isn't the duty of disclosure that I espouse the same as my colleague's duty of fairness? After all, my colleague, Justice Zamir, thinks that the individual's duty of fairness to the government may change with the circumstances of each case. Why not adopt his view, while making sure that a general duty of fairness, of a flexible nature, always leads to the same solutions as I would reach using my approach? There are three reasons not to do so: First, the theoretical basis of a legal arrangement is significant for determining its content and boundaries. The theoretical basis determines how the arrangement develops. The theory determines the practice. In my view, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, because such a duty would be inconsistent with the way we view the individual in society. The individual's duty to the government must be specifically defined according to the special circumstances of every case, by balancing the conflicting values. The scope of the duty and its content change according to the circumstance, and the principle of fairness – which derives from the principle of loyalty – is not the common denominator of all these duties. Second, words have a force of their own. They have a life of their own. “Fairness” is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state. There is some concern that, in the future, if we face the problem of whether the individual owes a particular duty to the government, the question we will ask is whether such a duty flows from the principle of fairness. The law will then try to answer that question, and the duty of fairness will determine how we address the issue. In my opinion, we need to ask a different question. The question is whether the right balance between individual liberty and the collective good allows us to recognize that duty. These two questions are different, and they should not be interchanged. Third, “fairness” – and the duties derived from it – should not be given a double-meaning, sometimes referring to duties arising from a relationship of trusteeship and sometimes referring to duties that have nothing to do with trusteeship. Justice Zamir correctly notes that:

The fact that those species bear the same name might blur the distinction. Differentiating the names can help make the difference more pronounced and preserve the distinction in substance.

Para. 20.

            This approach itself warns against using the term fairness to describe both the duty that the individual owes the government as well as the duty that the government owes the individual. The sources of these duties differ, the scope of each differs, and they develop differently. They may sometimes intersect – as is the case of the duty of disclosure in this petition – but that does not mean we should blur the differences between them.

            14. One might wonder: Can we “really” say that the individual does not owe a duty of fairness to the government? Should we recognize an individual's freedom not to be fair to the government? Of course, if fairness means not to defraud or cheat, then of course the individual owes a duty of fairness to the government (and to other individuals). However, the term fairness is not just the opposite of deception. Fairness is a normative concept. It is an objective concept. It determines standards of behavior. It is a “code” which activates various duties of proper behavior. For the government's dealings with the individual – which derive from the role of the government as a trustee – fairness means the highest standard of proper behavior. It is a standard of behavior that originates in the view that the government has no self-interest, and that it can only aspire to ensure the collective good. Private law imposes a similar (but not identical) duty only on those who owe a duty of loyalty, such as a trustee, agent, director, or guardian. That is the reason we do not say that individuals owe (objective) duties of fairness to each other. The duty of good faith (as stated in the Contract Law (General Part)) applies to relationships between individuals, not the duty of fairness. That is why I believe that the individual owes no general duty of fairness to the government.

            For these reasons, I concur with my colleague's conclusion but disagree with his reasons.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

            1. Not long after the close of the proceedings, we decided that the petition should be denied, and that is how we ultimately ruled. However, from the outset, we knew that we arrived at that conclusion from different places and in different ways. Now is the time for each of us to name those places of origin and to map our routes to our common destination.

            2. My colleagues’ opinions laid out in front of me are comprehensive. They stretch out into a broad, panoramic view of fairness and good faith, of the individual and the government, of the relationships among individuals and between individuals and the government, of friends and not-friends, of the social contract, and of brotherhood. I wish to address two of these: the duty of fairness that the individual owes the government and the status and authority of a public agency to decide disputes between individuals. I will start with the first and end with the second.

Disagreements over the Issue of Fairness

 

            3. My two colleagues, each in his own way, present two different theses that, in some senses even oppose and rip each other. My colleague, Justice Zamir, soars to heights of noble and lofty principles like fairness and good faith – the principles and what lies between and around them – seeking to create a pillar of fire and a pillar of smoke [biblical: guiding light for desert travel – trans.] by which the camp can navigate, mapping the duties of the individual to the government. Truth be told, my colleague presents fairness as a central pillar upon which the entire tent hangs. In our language – the language of jurists – he says that within the context of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the government, in principle, the individual owes a duty of fairness to the government. My colleague carves out secondary duties from the general duty of fairness: daily duties which are outlined in the case law and in books on administrative law.

            My colleague, the President, opposes this view and, holding buckets of water, throws cold water on the flames of fairness. Unlike my colleague, Justice Zamir, who steers a course between basic principles – primarily fairness –from which he derives the individual’s duties to the government, my colleague, the President, believes that the individual’s duties to the government are “specific” and “sporadic,” and that their content changes, depending on the issue. In the opinion of my colleague, the President, the individual’s duties to the government derive from the balance that is conducted, for every issue, between opposing forces; fairness, as such, is not a primary foundation – if you like, not a necessary foundation – for the creation of these duties.

            4. As for our issue, my two colleagues are of the same mind. Our issue is the case in which the individual applies for a license from the government, and the question is this: what duty does the individual owe the government to disclose – at his or her initiative – factual information relevant to the government’s exercise of discretion? My colleague, Justice Zamir, believes that a secondary duty to disclose that information can be carved out of the duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. The idea is that the individual’s duty to disclose information to the government is just subsidiary to the parent duty of fairness that the individual owes the government. My colleague, the President, agrees that such a duty of disclosure should be imposed. In his words, “the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows that are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.” He also says that, “the individual must assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license.” As for the source of that duty to disclose relevant information, President Barak says, “The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision.”

            5. My colleague, Justice Zamir, concerns himself with basic principles which are supposed to govern the relationship between the individual and the government – meaning, the fairness that the individual, in his opinion, owes the government. On the other hand, President Barak believes that the process of discovering and creating the individual’s duties to the government is the same as the process of discovering and creating any right or duty in law – for our purposes, in administrative law. These processes do not use the duty of fairness, as such, as a generative foundation. For our purposes, President Barak grounds himself in the daily plane of administrative law: the duties that the individual owes the government in the gray area of administrative law and the individual’s duty to supply the government with the information that allows it to exercise discretion properly and decide as we would expect it to decide. In any event, President Barak’s opinion is that the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government.

            6. To sum up: My colleague, Justice Zamir, inserts the foundation of fairness as a primary, generative foundation in founding the duties of the individual to the government. In contrast, my colleague, President Barak, rejects this thesis of fairness. In his opinion, we should predicate the individual’s duties to the government within each system by considering the interests appropriate to each issue and studying their force (“the balancing process”).

            7. The careful reader will understand that my colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to inject a foundation of content – a foundation of fairness – into the process of creating the individual’s duties to the government. He believes that this foundation of content should influence the development and determination of the extent of these duties. My colleague, President Barak, denies that such foundation of content exists within this context. He applies the balancing formula used throughout our legal system (for our purposes, within the field of public law) to the creation of duties that the individual owes the government.

            My colleagues would appear to take very different positions, such that their paths crossed through happenstance, to bring them to the same place. Just as someone crossing from east to west might meet someone crossing from north to south, after which the two part ways, so did my colleagues meet for a fleeting moment, shake hands in greeting, and then continue on their way, one going west and the other, south. That is how it would appear. I personally am not convinced that that is how it really is. Upon close inspection, it seems to me, that the difference between my colleagues is primarily a difference in rhetoric. That it was not blind fate that brought them to the same destination.

            8. First, I will say that each of my colleagues creates models made of different materials and belonging to different orders. My colleague, Justice Zamir, is concerned with a model of content to determine the individual’s relationship to the government.  He sees fairness as a cornerstone of the relationship between the individual and the government and builds a model for creating the individual’s duties to the government around that principle. My colleague, President Barak, disagrees with the use of fairness as a primary generative foundation for determining the individual’s duties to the government. At the same time, as an alternative model to the model of content, he presents us with a structural model. In his words, “The individual's duty to the government must be specifically defined according to the special circumstances of every case, by balancing the conflicting values. The scope of the duty and its content change according to the circumstance, and the principle of fairness – which derives from the principle of loyalty – is not the common denominator of all these duties.” Para. 13 of his opinion. My colleague, the President, does not determine the content of the individual’s duties to the government, but rather the technique for determining those [duties – trans.]. He therefore does not see himself as rejecting the possibility that a consideration of fairness, even in its broad sense, could sometimes enter the mix of considerations which determine the creation of the individual’s duties to the government. Indeed, in the Awad case, President Barak imposed, in certain cases, a “duty of good faith and fairness” on the individual to the government. Supra [30] at 492. See also para. 28 and subsequent text, infra. My colleagues, then, are not as far apart as they seem upon first glance.

            9. There is more. My colleague, President Barak, objects to the all-encompassing doctrine of fairness of my colleague, Justice Zamir. He even objects to the use of the term “fairness” as such. He therefore says, inter alia, that “words have a force of their own. They have a life of their own. ‘Fairness’ is a concept that may lead to the creation of duties whose nature is inconsistent with individual liberty in a democratic state.” Para. 13 of his opinion. Upon reading these words, I hurry to shake my colleague’s hand firmly and warmly. I have also believed – and still believe – that words can have a magical kind of power, and we should stay as far away from magic as possible.. That is one of the reasons I so strongly objected to using the phrase, “constitutional revolution” to describe the accumulated weight of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the Mizrachi Bank  case [39], I expressed this opinion about adding the words, “constitutional revolution” (on p. 567, para. 135):

I see the label, “revolution” as problematic. Isn’t it sufficient to say that there has been a ‘change’ in the path of the legal system? I say this because labels can sometimes blind us, leading us to allow our wishes to fulfill themselves. Moreover, even if we said that the Basic Laws have the potential to work very important changes in the Israeli legal system – and we have said that – the term, “constitutional revolution” means a lot more than the term, change. It not only creates over-excitement, but also, by adding force and energy to one side of the equation, it sucks away force and energy from the other side. Is that the right way for us to build a constitution?

            I fear that careless words will create an entity with a force of its own. If that is our concern, however, let us proclaim loudly and clearly that in discussing the duty of fairness that the individual owes the government, we do not intend to create a dynamic, creative, generative doctrine. We seek only to note what is appropriate and desirable in interpersonal relationships. If we take this course, we, along with everyone else, will know that we have only stated the obvious about the proper way for the individual to behave. That is not, however, what my colleague, Justice Zamir, means. He intends to create a real, live, generative principle. We must address that principle, and not something similar.

            10. Generally: My colleague, Justice Zamir, created a general principle of fairness as a principle that binds the individual in his or her dealings with the government. My colleague, President Barak, objects to creating this general principle, but he does not rule it out as a factor in determining the individual’s duties to the government in these and other legal contexts.

On the Duty of Fairness

 

            11. My colleague, Justice Zamir, demands that we impose a general duty of fairness on the individual, to the government. In his opinion, that duty derives from the social contract at the core of the existence of the state, a contract that makes the citizen and the government partners in the same act of creation: “As a moral and a practical matter, the citizen cannot assume that he or she may demand and receive from the agency without being obligated to provide anything. A citizen’s right vis à vis the agency is coupled with an obligation vis à vis the agency. This is the essence of the social contract among citizens and between citizens and the public administration. It is also the root of the existence of the state.” Para. 23 of his opinion.

            Who could disagree with these noble words of my colleague? How could we help but agree? The individual owes a duty of fairness to the government, says my colleague. Can we say that this is not the law? Can we say that the individual may not behave with fairness – or may behave without fairness – to the government? Can a court say such things? Are these the proper norms of behavior to establish for the relationship between the individual and the government? Indeed, the requirement of fairness captures the heart and lifts the spirit. Only someone apathetic to things beautiful would rise up against the duty of fairness suggested to us. We would appear to be in a sort of trap. We have no choice but to agree to my colleague’s words, or risk being thought of as troublemakers upsetting the proper order of things. And still, I find it difficult to agree.

            12. We measure the relationship between the individual and the government and administrative state using the relationship that members of society have with each other as the model. We can build a few models of human relationships to understand the reciprocal relationships among individuals within society. Hillel’s saying is the foundation, the basis: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor.” Babylonian Talmud, Order Tractate Shabbat 31, 1 [a]. Hillel goes on to say: “That is the whole Torah. The rest is commentary; go and learn.” Of course, that is not the minimum level of conduct we need present to a well-ordered society and for the proper education of the individual. For now, however, we will allow it to suffice. That is one model. We might resort to a higher level, primarily through the use of “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18 [b]), which is the second model. This level is higher than the first because, among other reasons, it does not just impose prohibitions on the individual – negative commandments – it imposes positive duties on the individual. An even higher level of conduct – the third model – stems from the principle that, “Is it not to share your bread with the hungry, and bring the homeless poor into your house; when you see the naked, to cover him, and not to hide yourself from your own flesh?” Isaiah 58:7 [c]. That is the highest degree of love of humanity and of kindness. As Micah the Prophet coined in his wonderful saying – wonderful throughout the generations – about human relationships:

He has showed you, O man, what is good;
and what does the Lord require of you
but to do justice, and to love kindness,
and to walk humbly with your God?

Micah 7:8 [d].

            “Do justice” is primarily about “what is hateful to you” and a little about “love”: mostly negative commandments, and a few positive ones. “Love kindness” is the purest form of love of humanity. If you like: love of love. This is not the place to discuss “humbly.”

13. Law’s primary objective is to order the relationships between individuals in society and to make sure that society is organized properly.  A person is a wonderfully complex creature. The relationships between individuals in society are also complex, and in some ways, they are more complex than the complexity of the individual. From among the wealth of relationships between individuals, the law cuts out a part that seems appropriate for organization and definition by the legal system, and it imposes a network of legal norms on that part.

            Among the three models presented, the law is primarily interested in the first model (the minimal model of “don’t do”): Don’t murder, don’t steal, don’t lie, whoever strikes his father or mother shall be put to death (Exodus 21:15, [e]), and whoever curses his father or mother shall be put to death (Id., verse 17). Lord Atkin discussed this point in the well-known case of Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) [73], saying what has become a classic:

The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.

Id.at 580.

The law borrows from the second model, as well, but very lightly. Honor your father and mother (a positive commandment whose reach is broader than the negative commandment not to hit or curse). Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy (a positive commandment alongside a negative one: don’t do any work, etc.)  The third model is supposed to serve the law primarily as a source of inspiration. It is just an illustration of the statement that the law seeks to impose itself on a certain segment of human relationships while leaving other parts of those relationships alone.

14. Against the backdrop of three alternative – or partially cumulative – models, let us evaluate the duty of fairness that individuals in society may owe each other. A superficial glance shows that the duty of fairness is a duty that knows no boundaries. It exists in each of the three models, differently in each, derived from the fundamental principles at the core of each. Examine, consider, and you will know.  We will thus find, perhaps surprisingly so, that the term “fairness” – as well as the term, duty of fairness – is a kind of “framework-term,” whose content varies with the model constructing it, the world surrounding it, and the world in which it lives. “Fairness” in the first model differs from fairness in the second, and “fairness” in the second model differs from fairness in the third. “Fairness” in the second model, for example, includes the “fairness” of the first model, but the reverse is not the case.

15. To the issue of concern to us: When my colleague, Justice Zamir, said that the individual owes the government a duty of fairness, what kind of fairness did he mean?  My colleague told us only that the duty of fairness can vary from issue to issue, depending on the circumstances. But what is the content of that fairness, and which circumstances will fill the fairness with its content? What functioning order did the duty of fairness join, and which model shall we use? Perhaps it is a different model from the three we mentioned? We can’t do anything until we answer that question, which is the central issue. I said, and I will repeat: The duty of fairness is a duty that knows no boundaries – it lives and exists in law and outside law. For example, it exists in the realm of morality – and we therefore must define things precisely: Which part of that all-inclusive duty of fairness – fairness in the broad sense – is the law supposed to take under its protective wing and establish legal sanctions for violating the duty? Which part of “fairness” will the law adopt, and which part will it leave to other systems of norms?

I will give an example from another context: It is strictly forbidden for a person to shame another in public. If Rueben embarrasses Simon in public, the law will come to Simon’s aid by granting him a right in the form of the law against defamation. The law has taken this part under its protective wing. However, if Gad shames Zevulun in public, the law may not grant Zevulun a legal right, even though Gad’s deed was worse than Rueben’s. Of Gad’s deeds, we might say: “He who publicly puts his neighbor to shame has no portion in the world-to-come.” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Metzia, 59:1 [f]. We might say that, and no more. Both Rueben and Gad owed a duty of fairness to Simon and Zevulun (respectively); Both Rueben and Gad breached the duty owed; and nevertheless, Rueben is subject to the legal sanction, while Gad is given no sanction (in this world). The question for our purposes is: Which part of the all-inclusive duty of fairness should the law cloak with a legal sanction – by creating a legal duty of fairness – and which part of the all-inclusive legal duty of fairness should the law leave to other systems of norms, like the educational system, the ruling culture, discussions among members of society, and the like.

And perhaps tomorrow I will be asked: Must the individual be fair to other individuals and to the government? Does the individual owe a duty of fairness to other individuals in society and to the government? My answer to that question will be unequivocally: Yes, the individual owes a duty of fairness. That, however, is not the question which currently troubles us. The question currently before us does not just concern the duty of fairness. It concerns the legal duty of fairness that the individual owes the government. We have yet to understand the nature of that duty, its content, and its way.

16. Our discussion so far: To say that the individual owes a (legal) duty of fairness to the government – by itself – is just a label on a jug, a formal legal-conceptual framework. Until we find out the criteria for creating this “duty of loyalty,” which beverage to pour into the jug, what is the formula for creating the beverage, we have as good as said nothing. To be precise: Because we have created the label – the label and not the content – it would not seem appropriate to discuss the existence of a general “duty of fairness.” After all, it is possible that, after determining the formula for creating the duty, we will learn that we have only the tail-end of a duty or the tip of fairness, such that it would be inappropriate and incorrect to talk about a “general duty of fairness.” As such, it would be misleading if, prior to determining the scope of the duty – prior to determining the criteria for outlining its borders – we were to talk about its existence. I therefore deny – with full force – the existence of a general duty of fairness owed by an individual to the government, until we learn what that duty is, what bounds have been set for it, and of what materials it is made.

 

On the Individual, the State, and the Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the State

17. I have been asked to hold that the individual owes a general duty of fairness to the government, and that the content of that duty will be determined periodically by the case law and by analyzing this or that set of facts. According to my colleague, Justice Zamir, the duty of fairness arises from the social contract at the foundation of the state, a contract which holds that the individual and the agency are not rivals but rather partners in a joint enterprise. And just as partners in a project owe each other a general duty of fairness, so do the government and its individuals owe a reciprocal duty of fairness. The general duty of fairness that the state owes its individuals is well-established, and now my colleague suggests that we impose a duty of fairness on the individual toward the government.

18. Section 12 of the Contract Law (General Part) tells us that, “In negotiations to form a contract, a person must behave in an acceptable way and in good faith.” In the Raviv case [42], the Court had to interpret this statutory provision and its applications on private bidding (in other words, bidding not held by a public agency). The question asked was what duty of good faith is imposed on individuals in negotiations between themselves to form a contract, how should the law be interpreted, how will the bounds of that duty be outlined. In short: On which track should we put the relationship between individuals in commercial negotiations they conduct. Using the metaphor that Thomas Hobbes created, my colleague, Justice Barak, held that this relationship would not be one in which “person to person – behaves like a wolf” (Homo Homini Lupus). At the same time, we will not put this relationship on the path of “person to person – behaves like an angel” (Homo Homini Deus (vel Angelus)). My colleague suggested that the relationship between people should move along the lines of “person to person – behaves like a person” (Homo Homini – Homo). We will, of course, agree; how could we not? We will not agree to establish a norm of behavior of person to person – behaves like a wolf (really, person to person, like a wolf to a lamb; we should recall that a wolf has no better friend than his or her fellow wolf who lives together in the same pack). At the same time, it would be inappropriate to establish that person to person – behaves like an angel. Establishing this standard of behavior would not be realistic, and there is no point in setting a norm by which people will not abide. The recommended and appropriate standard of behavior is therefore that person to person – behaves like a person.

I have established, and not just by the process of elimination, the formula for the duty of fairness between people: person to person – behaves like a person. This formula, however, like the formula for fairness, merely presents us with a label on an empty jug. We are now supposed to pour a beverage into the jug, because only then will we know the content of fairness. The question is: what norm will we establish for relationships between people? How should a person behave toward another person? What standard of behavior will we require that people use toward each other? What will be the content of the good faith established by law? We have returned to our starting point, and again, we must continue to grope around in the dark.

19. Before we touch on fairness itself, let us talk a bit about those who share in the duty of fairness, about the individual and about the government. My colleague, Justice Zamir, feels a certain discomfort in holding that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the “government.” The government is always the government, and the term “government” sounds to us like a body that rules us and instructs us what to do and what not to do. The determination that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the “government” grates on my colleague’s ears. Don’t call it the government, he tells us, but rather an agency, an administrative agency, the state. As if changing the name and switching the label will change the content. Of course, I will not object to calling the government an agency or an administrative agency, but I will add that, even after changing the name, we are talking about the government, about the relationship between the individual and the government, and about the duty of fairness that we are asked to impose on the individual toward the government. By the way: the term “agency” [also “authority” – trans.] is, in some ways, harsher than the term government. As the sages teach us: “Be wary of the government [authorities – trans.], for they get friendly with a person only for their own convenience; They look like friends when it is to their benefit, but they do not stand by a person when he is in need.” Mishnah, Avot 2:3 [g]. Pinhas Kehati interprets it to mean, “When dealing with the ruling powers, do not reveal to its agents too much of your affairs, and do not rely on their promises …” See also Mishnah, Avot 1:10 [g]: “Shemaiah says, ‘Love work. Hate authority. Don’t get friendly with the government.’” Is the relevance of this advice of our sages limited to the time at which they wrote it?

            20. We could or could not agree with the statement that people owe each other a duty of fairness. In either event, we understand what is being said to us. However, when we hear that a person owes a duty of fairness to an administrative agency, we struggle to understand the words. For all that concerns a prohibition on doing certain things, we can understand imposing this duty on the individual – whether the prohibition concerns other individuals or an administrative agency. A prohibition imposed on someone, from whatever source, sort of concentrates itself on the person bound by the prohibition, and therefore it can be understood to exist in its own right. The term “fairness” is different, because it is more than just a prohibition against doing certain things. “Fairness” implies – and it should imply – not just a prohibition against doing something but rather an obligation to do something, a positive obligation to do something for another person. The term “fairness” itself implicates the relationships people have with each other. A person may or may not be fair to another person, and he or she will still be a person. In this context, what content shall we pour into the statement that the individual owes a duty of fairness to the agency, if the agency is not a person at all? How can we impose a duty of fairness on a person to someone who is not a person at all?

            21. An administrative agency – every administrative agency, and we can add all the governmental powers, meaning the state itself – is just a term, a concept, the product of our thoughts. Furthermore, an administrative agency – like the state – is not a tool, a device, an instrument, for achieving certain purposes, like the wheel in the hand of a sailor and the axe in the hand of the woodworker. The state, as such, has no life of its own. We can agree that we could not exist without the framework of the state, but that statement of reality cannot make the state into something it is not. That is true of the state, and that is true of the administrative agency.

            An administrative agency charged with giving licenses in a certain field, for example, licenses to operate a business, seems like a machine, like the machines that dispense café au lait or bottles of cold drinks. Like the machine, the administrative agency has licenses to operate a business in its stomach. Press a series of buttons – one after the other in a certain order – pay what you are required to pay (a fee), and you get what you asked for. If you do not press the right buttons, or you press them in the wrong order, you will not get what you asked for: café au lait, a bottle of a cold drink, a license to operate a business. Indeed, in this way, an authorized agency may differ from a machine, because an agency is imparted with discretion, while it is difficult to grant discretion to a machine (is it?). Perhaps we should recall that a machine – unlike an authorized agency – does not operate arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or condescendingly. In any event, just as we would find it difficult to outline a duty of fairness owed a machine, so will we find it difficult to establish a duty of fairness toward an “agency” that is anything more than a legal concept.

            Perhaps you might say: Aren’t the “agency,” the “government,” indeed bodies to which we should owe a duty of fairness? After all, they are no more than virtual creations (although they can hurt an individual). And what about those who work for the agency, who are flesh-and-blood? Why shouldn’t we say that the individual owes a duty of fairness to them? The answer to that question is that those employees of the agency are just the agents of the (conceptual) agency, who do its bidding. They have nothing but what the agency has, because they do not operate for themselves but rather for the agency. And if we found it difficult to hold that the individual should owe a duty of fairness to an “agency,” we may not create something out of nothing by identifying the employees of the agency with the agency.

            22. To remove any doubt, I will quickly clarify that we should not identify state with “homeland” (with “society,” with “people,” or with “nation”). A homeland is the birthplace of a person: it is the land in which he or she grew up and was educated, it is the landscape of his or her childhood, it is the society in which he or she lives. A homeland is our home, a homeland is our family: “Love of the home is the mother of love for the homeland.” Someone who loves the homeland is a patriot. “Homeland” is not “state.” The term homeland is intangible, and therefore we must resort to symbols: the flag, the symbol. In the not-so-distant past, a person of authority called the state flag a stick with a rag stuck to it, and I had this to say about it:

The flag of Israel is not “just an expression of a stick with a blue-and-white rag stuck to it.” The flag of Israel is me and you, he and she, they, we, and our children. Even for those who have left and will not return to us, we, all of us, we are not a rag.

HC 8507/96 Orin v. State of Israel [44] at 277.

The state is a tool and an instrument to achieve certain purposes. It is not like my extended family, the homeland. Licenses to operate a business are given by the state – not the homeland – and we should therefore be careful not to confuse unlike things.

23. I will return to our subject and note – as an opening comment – that conceptually, I find it difficult to recognize the individual’s duty of fairness toward the administrative agency. That is just the beginning of the journey, however. After trampling for a long time through the hallway, the time has come for us to put ourselves into the drawing room and examine our surroundings.

24. Unlike my colleague, Justice Zamir, I do not think that the relationship between the individual and the government is a “friendly” relationship, as though the two were friends, between whom the duty of fairness would naturally arise. On my station of embarkation for the journey – the journey to discover the duties that the individual owes the government – hangs a sign, and on the sign, written in big letters, is the word, “freedom.” My view about the status of the individual in his or her relationship with government agencies and the administration is that the individual may and is entitled to do anything (or to omit doing anything) that he or she is not prohibited from doing (or required to do), unless he or she bears a duty to do it (or not to do it).Most of the duties that the law imposes on the individual are negative duties – don’t murder, don’t steal – and that is the minimal level required for a properly-functioning society. The individual may owe some positive legal duties, but the law explicitly sets out these duties, and they are few. Examples include: the duty to serve in the military; the duty to pay taxes; parents’ duties to their children under the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962 and the Mandatory Education Law, 1949; the duty certain people owe protected persons; the duty to prevent a crime (sec. 262 of the Penal Law, 1977), and others.

Beyond those explicit negative and positive duties, the individual owes no legal duty to the government, and in my opinion, it would not be proper to obligate him or her with additional duties. The individual has a right to do as he or she pleases, and he or she acts on his or her own account. The individual has a right, a right of the highest virtue: a right to freedom and permission which has the virtue of law (or the virtue of a basic law). Cf. HC 3872/93 Mitral Ltd. v. Prime Minister and Religious Affairs Minister [45] at 29 and subsequent text. The individual is born free in the law and remains free in the law all the days of his or her life, until it is established that he or she owes some kind of duty. Someone who abstains from prohibited acts and performs the positive duties explicitly imposed on him fulfils his or her duty in law. He or she owes nothing to no one and nothing to the government. He or she is not a saint. He or she is not a righteous person. He or she does what is required of him or her. He or she is an ordinary citizen.

In my opinion, this is the liberal-democratic station of embarkation, and I personally think that we should adopt it and cultivate it. A healthy, appropriate society does not exist without volunteer works, altruism, and assistance to “the poor and the elderly,” but these exist – for the most part – outside the framework of law. Indeed, the law does sometimes adopt a duty that can be characterized as an altruistic duty, such as: the duty to offer assistance to the victim of a traffic accident and duties incident to it (sec. 64A of the Traffic Ordinance [New Version] and Regulations 144 and 146 of the Traffic Regulations, 1961); the duty to save lives at sea (sec. 39 of the Shipping Law (Sailors), 1973); the duty to offer assistance to a public servant under certain circumstances (sec. 491 of the Penal Law). See also, CrimA 119/93 Lawrence v. State of Israel [46] at 29 and subsequent text; A. Barak, Shikul Da’at Shiputi [78] at 463-64. These, however, are exceptions to the rule.

25. That is generally the case in law, and that is the case, in my opinion, of the relationship between the individual and the government. In principle, I am not prepared to recognize the duty of an individual toward the government, whether we call such duty a duty of fairness or something else, unless that duty is explicitly or implicitly required by law. Because of the Basic Laws, once a duty is established by law, that duty is supposed to adjust to the restrictions imposed by the Basic Laws. That is all. My colleague, Justice Zamir, will forgive me, but I am hard-pressed to shake off the impression that, in his opinion, he sketches a Utopian state of fairness, a state in which the majority breathes fairness, a state in which people hurry to inquire into the welfare of each other, a state in which the majority seeks the collective good, all the time. What can we do if we don’t live in a Utopian state of this kind? And since that is the case, in my opinion, it is inappropriate to impose a duty of fairness on the individual to the government, a duty that a Utopian state could impose on its individuals.

Moreover, the individual and the government do not have equal rights. They do not have equal powers, and they are not of equal status. Nor are they friends. The government has most of the power, most of the force, most of the wealth, such that the individual – however much power, force, and wealth he or she may have – is not in the same league. The government has nothing of its own; anything it has, it holds in trust – for the good and benefit of the individual. However, the normative-legal statement that this is the status of the government vis à vis the citizen cannot take away from the phenomenon we witness on a daily, hourly basis: the individual standing in line at the government counter, and the line winds and plods forward, longer and longer. Some call this phenomenon, “bureaucracy,” and others call it something else. Whatever its name, it is all-too-familiar to us all. This is why, in the past, the courts were called to the aid of the individual facing this huge machine – they were called in the past, are called today, and will continue to be called in the future. This is the reason that the courts established the principle of the trust that the government owes the individual. For the same reason, the case law has established a duty of fairness that the government owes the individual. This principle and this duty stem from the agency’s abundant authority, its excess power, and its ability to deprive the individual of a benefit which he or she could have enjoyed, had it not been prohibited.

The duty of fairness owed by the government to the individuals in society derives from the excess power that the government wields, from the tremendous force that the government holds. The duty of fairness is designed to serve, among other means, as a check on the power and a restraint of the force. Can we say the same thing about the individual vis à vis the government? The individual, after all, is Gulliver in the land of the giants: The giants surround the feast, and Gulliver stands on the dining table, the entire tiny length of him, every bone in his body, quivering in terror. He is like a salt shaker to them, like the stub of a carrot. One simple exhalation of breath, and Gulliver is no more. I could understand imposing a “duty of fairness” on the giants, owed to Gulliver. I find it difficult to understand imposing a duty of fairness – a matching duty – on Gulliver. Duties – including the duty of fairness – are intended to restrain power, force, wealth. What power does the individual have, relative to the government?

26. Consider a license required to establish and operate a business. Originally, the individual was permitted and allowed to engage in any business or profession in order to support himself or herself and his or her family. Abel shepherded his sheep without a shepherding license; Cain worked the land without a license to plough and plant; and Tubal-Cain forged instruments of bronze and iron (Genesis, 4:22 [h]), without having obtained a business license. It was their natural right, and “every person has a natural, imparted right to engage in the job or profession he or she chooses, so long as engaging in that job or profession is not prohibited by law.” HC 1/49 Bazherno v. Police Minister [47] at 82 (S.Z. Cheshin, J.). When the legislature forbad some professions unless certain preliminary conditions were met – it made its prohibition, and we must abide by it in letter and in spirit. However, that very prohibition and the exemption from the prohibition are what create the government’s duty to the individual, the duty of fairness and the other duties similar to it in form and character. The individual’s duty to equip himself or herself with a license to engage in a certain business, as well as the government’s ability to provide the individual with that license, are what create the duty of fairness owed by the government to the individual. Despite my searching and poking around, I found no source from which we could hew a duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. The principle is the principle of individual liberty, and this principle – by itself – does not generate a duty of fairness.

27. A final word on the duty of fairness, a duty which I am not prepared to recognize. Because the proposed duty of fairness is a duty, violating the said duty is supposed to create a legal counter-action, a sanction that will be applied against the violator for violating a duty imposed on him or her. Because the individual’s duty is owed to the government, that would mean that the government could impose a sanction against the individual, if the latter violated his or her duty. It is as though we are being asked to equip the government with a kind of penal authority against an individual who violated a duty of fairness owed the government. For example: by suspending or revoking the license.

Indeed, in addition to other obstacles that this legal structure would create for us – problems entrenched in the principle of legality and the principle of separation of powers – this path would collide with a doctrine well-established in the case law. The doctrine is that an authorized agency may not take into account, as part of its considerations, the consideration that the individual acted with unclean hands. For example, in HC 192/61 Kalo v. City of Bat Yam, the petitioner opened a butcher shop without receiving a license. When he applied for a license, the municipality responded by saying that it would not consider his application because “he opened the butcher shop without a license, taking the law into his own hands.” The Court responded by saying that the doctrine of unclean hands is a consideration that the Court may consider – the Court and not the administrative agency. The Court held that:

The municipality is different from this court.  Section 7 of the Courts Law, 1957 authorizes this court to grant a remedy, at its discretion, while the municipality must consider an application submitted to it and make a decision on the merits, irrespective of the applicant’s behavior. I do not approve of the decision of the municipality’s licensing committee not to consider the applicant’s request because he opened the store without a license. Moreover, the applicant has already been subject to criminal proceedings for that deed, and he has been convicted of violating that ordinance. A local authority must serve as an example for its citizens by stringently abiding by the law, because if it fails to do so, the citizen will follow its example. The licensing committee’s June 25, 1961 decision disregards this duty …

HC 192/61, supra [48] at 1858 (Sussman, J.). See also HC 328/60 Musa v. Interior Minister [49] at 79 (Sussman, J.).

The difference between an act (or omission) that constitutes unclean hands and a breach of the duty of fairness – if you prefer, the difference between the clean-hands requirement and the duty of fairness – is minimal. It would not be difficult for us to locate a violation of the duty of fairness within the bounds of the doctrine of unclean hands. In other words, recognizing the proposed duty of fairness would seriously erode the doctrine well-established in the case law, namely that an agency cannot consider an applicant’s lack of clean hands. This would be done without giving the Kalo [48] doctrine an opportunity to defend itself and justify its continued applicability. And if we were to examine the matter a bit more closely, we would see that the Kalo [48] doctrine clearly and appropriately expresses the principle of separation of powers and the principle of legality. Would it be right for us to give up on this expression of principles lying at the base of the legal system?

            The Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the Government As Derived from the Agency’s Authority

28. My colleague, President Barak, disagrees with my colleague, Justice Zamir, about imposing a general duty of fairness on the individual, owed to the government. In his opinion, there is no appropriate legal source for this duty of fairness, and in any event, the duty has no place in Israeli law. So far, my colleague, the President, and I are traveling in the same carriage, side by side. However, at this point, we will part company, he to travel in his carriage, and I to continue in mine.

29. According to my colleague, the President, the individual does not owe a general duty of fairness to the government, but he or she may, in the balance of rights and duties between him or her and the government, owe certain duties to the government. For our purposes, as my colleague, the President says – meaning, in a system in which an individual requests any sort of license from the government – the individual owes a duty to the government. And what is that duty? The duty is to bring to the agency’s attention the facts that the agency needs in order to appropriately and properly exercise its lawful authority. The governmental decision, my colleague says, “must be based on the proper factual infrastructure. Hence, the agency has a duty to collect the factual data, assess them as necessary, and use them to determine … the factual infrastructure relevant to making the governmental decision.” This is the source from which we learn about the individual’s duty, which is the duty to “assist the governmental agency in building the factual infrastructure that serves as the basis for the governmental decision of whether or not to grant the license.” Therefore, an individual applying for a license or permit from the government bears a duty “to disclose the factual data material to the factual infrastructure which will serve as the basis of the government's exercise of discretion.” In a slightly different formulation, “If the individual requests a license or permit from the government, and in order to exercise its discretion, the government needs facts known to the individual, the individual bears the burden of disclosing those facts to the government …” Again, “The duty of disclosure I discuss … applies to licensing regimes through which an individual applies for a license. Under those circumstances, I accept that the individual should be required to disclose the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.”

We therefore find that, instead of the all-encompassing duty that my colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to impose on the individual vis à vis the government – the general duty of fairness – within a system in which an individual seeks a license from the government, my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose a duty to disclose “the facts he or she knows which are relevant to the exercise of governmental discretion.” Instead of the duty that my colleague, Justice Zamir establishes – a duty that emanates a whiff of social morality – my colleague, the President, makes do with an ordinary duty belonging to the ranks of day-to-day administrative law. An ordinary duty – but a duty nonetheless.

30. To these ideas, I will add my own contribution: just as I found it difficult to accept the yoke of a general duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government, so do I find it difficult to add my support to a duty to make the appropriate disclosures of facts relevant to exercising discretion. If my opinion were to hold sway, the individual would owe the government neither a general duty of fairness nor a duty to disclose relevant facts. I am not saying that an individual is released from the yoke of any duty owed the government. I do, however, say that the individual’s duties to the government are far more limited than those that my colleagues – each in his own way – seek to impose. I will discuss those duties later. For now, I will try to explain why I find it difficult to concur with President Barak on the issue of a duty to disclose the facts relevant to the exercise of discretion.

31. We read the sign hung on the embarkation point of our journey, and I will remind you that engraved upon it is the word “freedom.” “Freedom” means that the individual owes no duty to the government other than the duties that a provision of law – including of case law – imposes upon him or her, whether it is a positive or negative duty. The penal code, for example, which is filled to the brim with negative duties, constitutes negative duties which are explicitly imposed by law (however they may be formulated), and they are the minimum duties that make a society human. These duties restrict the individual’s freedom, the freedom with which we began our journey. Alongside these negative duties reside positive duties which the law imposes on the individual. Examples of these duties include the duty to serve in the military and the duty to pay taxes. Other examples are the duties that parents owe their children and those that certain individuals owe to protected persons and to helpless persons. It is superfluous to note something which everyone knows – that there are far fewer positive duties than negative duties. That is not for naught. We have decided that, in principle, negative duties burden the individual less than positive duties, meaning that negative duties invade an individual’s area of freedom less than positive duties. In other words, consistent with liberal democracy and individual rights – among other things – it is easier to impose negative duties on the individual than positive duties. We learn from this that before imposing a positive duty on an individual, we must consider and reconsider whether our decision goes too far, whether we have exceeded what is appropriate and permissible under the basic perspective accepted in our society.

Why do I say all this? Because my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose on a license or permit applicant a positive duty to disclose details relevant to the exercise of the authority imparted to the government. And I say that before imposing this positive duty on the individual, we carefully examine if we have exhausted other ways of achieving the goal we seek to achieve, without imposing a positive duty on the individual.

32. I personally found it difficult to understand where the duty of disclosure that my colleague, President Barak, seeks to impose on a license applicant came from. We all agree, of course, that an authorized agency which has the power to give – or to refuse to give – a license to an individual bears a primary duty to assemble all the relevant information necessary to lay a factual basis for exercising its discretion. However, this duty to assemble information is imposed on the agency, not on the individual seeking to receive a license. The agency is the trustee of the public, and as a faithful trustee, it must rest on its lees until is assembles all the information relevant to the issue, because only on a solid foundation can one build a house that will not collapse. What is the basis for saying, as does my colleague, President Barak, that, “The source of the duty of disclosure in the present case is the view that a proper exercise of governmental authority requires the individual to make appropriate disclosures to the government concerning material facts which serve as the basis for the governmental decision?” What does the duty imposed on the agency tell us about the duty imposed on the individual? Aren’t these two duties, in some ways, contradictory? What is the basis for saying that the duty imposed on the government in itself breeds a duty imposed on the individual?

Another Opinion

            33. I think that just one bridge can bridge the gap between the duty imposed on the agency and the duty that has been said to be imposed on the individual. The bridge is this: in the course of fulfilling its duty to assemble information, the governmental agency may – may, and even must – ask the license applicant to hand over the facts which he or she has (and of which the agency may not know from other sources). This is the case, for example, where the written law itself – the statute or regulations – sets pre-conditions for receiving a license. In our case, the law requires an applicant for a license to operate a licensing warehouse to possess a warehouse it owns, rents, or leases. Regulation 14 and the Sixth Addendum to the Customs Regulations. Once the law sets preconditions for applying for a license, it is elementary that the government agency can require the applicant to provide reliable information regarding the existence of those preconditions (unrelated to any duty of fairness). We should recall the holding that, if the law explicitly sets certain preconditions for granting a license, and the law does not impart the agency with additional discretion, the agency may not add conditions to the ones established. HC 43/76 Amitar Company, Ltd. v. Tourism Minister [50] at 559-60; HC 208/79 Ineis v. Health Ministry General Director [51] at 304; 1 B. Bracha, Mishpat Minhali [Administrative Law] [83], n.52 on p.164. If the agency lacks the authority to add conditions to the conditions, as a matter of course, it lacks the authority to demand information about those conditions which it has no authority to set for a license applicant.

            34. Therefore: where the law explicitly sets preconditions for granting a license, the agency has the authority and may – may and even must – require a license applicant to convince it that those conditions have been met, that it disclose the information necessary to prove that those conditions have been met. Another typical case is where the written law does not explicitly set preconditions for granting a license, but we know the scope of the agency’s discretion – meaning, the authority of the agency to set the conditions that must be met for it to grant the license – through the purpose of the statute. Once we know learn and discover that the agency’s discretion depends on certain considerations, we know for ourselves that the agency is authorized to collect information about those issues in order to fulfill its role. This authority to set conditions includes the secondary authority to require a license applicant to provide the requested information (unless the applicant has a right under the law not to disclose the information, and if that is the claim, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that right), because only if the license applicant fulfills that requirement, can the agency properly perform what the law requires of it. Section 17(b) of the Interpretation Law, under which “authority to do something or to require it to be done – means the secondary authorities necessary thereto, to an acceptable extent.” Authorizing a governmental agency to grant a license – or to refuse to grant a license – includes the secondary authority to demand information from the license applicant. This secondary authority is necessary for the agency “to an acceptable extent,” to allow it to exercise its discretion properly.

            35. This is the bridge that bridges the gap between the duty imposed on a governmental agency to exercise its discretion in the best way possible and the duty imposed on a license applicant to provide information to the agency; if receiving the information from the license applicant is necessary for the government agency to exercise its discretion properly, it has the authority, and it may require the individual – via a law, regulations, or internal regulations, or on a case-by-case basis – to provide information in the area of its exercise of discretion. When asked to provide information, the individual must provide the required information, to the extent it is required and in the way it is required. However, the government bears the burden of initiating the requirement – by setting preconditions normatively or on a case-by-case basis – and the individual bears no duty other than the duty to respond to the demands placed on him or her. I personally would not agree to impose a case-law duty on the individual – as my colleagues propose – whether it is a general duty of fairness, as my colleague, Justice Zamir proposes, or a duty of the individual to provide, at his or her own initiative, information relevant to the agency’s exercise of discretion, as my colleague, President Barak, suggests.

            36. The agency is the one with the experience, as its job is to grant license of the kind discussed: in our case, licenses to operate a licensing facility. In other case: a business license. In yet another situation: a driver’s license. The daily business of a governmental agency allows it to accumulate experience and knowledge about the requirements that it should impose on license applicants including the questions it should ask them. That is how the governmental agency acquires experience – precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line [Isaiah 28:10 – trans.] – and when a license applicant approaches it, it can ask him or her questions and demand answers and information. Who are we to impose a duty on the individual – be it a general duty of fairness or a duty to provide relevant information – when the agency, in the course of the proper fulfillment of its role, knows how to ask for the information it desires?

            Moreover, because it is experienced in its field, the governmental agency knows what relevant information it needs to exercise its discretion properly. On the other hand, how will the individual know what information the agency needs – meaning, what information is relevant – if the agency does not explicitly ask him or her to provide it? Doesn’t the individual have a right to assume that information which the agency does not explicitly request is not relevant information? Is it relevant that he was convicted of beating his wife ten years prior to submitting the application? Is it relevant that she has refused to make maintenance payments to dependents? And if the individual has not been explicitly asked to give the agency information about prior convictions, why should we require him or her to volunteer information that is embarrassing to him or her? May he or she not assume that such information is not relevant, because he or she was not asked to provide it to the agency? Furthermore, the duty to disclose information would be imposed on the individual only if the agency omitted something – did not fulfill its duty properly – and did not ask the individual to provide this or that important piece of information. If the agency omitted something by not demanding a certain piece of information from the individual, why should we require the individual to “know” that such information is relevant and to provide it to the agency at his or her initiative?

            37. In our case, a precondition for granting a license to operate a licensing warehouse is that the applicant possess a warehouse that he or she owns, rents, or leases for a particular time, from day X to day Y. Sixth Addendum to the Customs Regulations. The license applicant has a duty to give the agency information about the “warehouse” he or she possesses. The regulations explicitly provide, in detail and in a way that leaves no room for doubt, that the applicant must give the agency information about his or her rights in the warehouse. We have no need for a duty of fairness or any other case-law duty imposed on the individual to provide relevant information to the agency. The license applicant’s duty is explicitly written and established in the law, and we have no need to resort to a duty from any other source.

            To draw a comparison, assume, arguendo, that the Customs Regulations did not explicitly require – as they currently do – that an applicant for a license to operate a licensing warehouse possess a licensing warehouse which he or she owns, rents, or leases. Let us further assume that the agency does not explicitly require the applicant to prove ownership or a rental right in the licensing warehouse. Can we say that the applicant must – at his or her initiative – provide the agency with information about the warehouse or be viewed as someone who violated a duty owed, because the information is relevant information? I wonder.

            38. Here, we should differentiate between the duty of disclosure that the individual owes an agency and the duty of disclosure that the individual owes another individual with whom he or she is supposed to form a contract. Under section 15 of the Contract Law (General Part), someone who forms a contract because of a mistake stemming from the other party’s misrepresentation may void the contract. For this purpose, “misrepresentation” means: “nondisclosure of facts which the other party should have disclosed by law, by custom, or under the circumstances.” We learn about the scope of this duty that the law imposes on those about to enter into a contract from the positions that parties occupy in relation to each other. The two are not just “rivals,” but they are also supposed to have equal power. A priori, one may not require and has no authority to require the other to provide material or relevant information about the contract. This is the source of the duty which the law imposes on the parties – mutually – and the sanction it imposes for failing to fulfill such duty. On the other hand, the relationship between the individual and the government is different from North to South, if only because of the position of power which the government occupies in relation to the individual. When the individual applies for a license or permit from the government, the government has the right and authority to require the individual to provide information material and relevant to the license. Once the government has been granted this power, there is no need to impose a duty on the individual vis à vis the government.

More on the Individual’s Duty of Fairness to the Government

            39. In the Awad case [30], the petitioner was a member of the Rosh Haayin Religious Council and was even chosen to be its chairman. It became clear that the Minister of Religious Affairs agreed to the petitioner’s appointment without knowing that he had previously – in the context of his tenure as the treasurer of the Religious Council – been convinced of crimes of theft. Because of a prior petition submitted to the High Court of Justice, the Minister of Religious Affairs informed the petitioner that this appointment [as chairman – trans.] was terminated, as was his appointment as a member of the Religious Council, because it became clear that approval of the appointment to the Religious Council (the petitioner was the candidate of the local council) “was granted through a mistake and/or misrepresentation, namely concealment of the fact that the petitioner had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and therefore is not suited to serve as a member of the Religious Council.” Id at 490. In considering the Awad [30] petition challenging the decision of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the Court held that the prior conviction of a candidate for the Religious Council is an appropriate consideration in the question of whether or not to select him as a member. The Court then considered the next question, whether the minister could “revoke his approval of the petitioner’s candidacy as submitted by the local council, based on the claim that at the time he gave his approval, the minister did not know that the petitioner had committed a crime of moral turpitude?” Id.at 492. The Court held that the minister could revoke his approval. On this issue, Justice Barak wrote:

Personal integrity, the lack of a criminal past, etc. are considerations material to this issue. The minister arrived at his stance regarding these considerations by examining a set of facts that does not comport with reality. The minister knew nothing about the petitioner’s prior conviction. Moreover, under the circumstances, the petitioner had a duty to disclose the fact of his conviction to the local council, and both the local council and the petitioner had a duty to inform the minister of it. The duty of good faith and fairness require this step to be taken. Reg. v. Home Secretary, ex p. Zamir (1980) at 950. Therefore, we are dealing with a material mistake in the minister’s approval, because of a lack of information about facts which were required to be brought to the attention of the minister. The result is that an appointment was made which seriously undermines the integrity and image of the civil service, as well as public faith in it. I think the combined weight of these facts is another reason to allow the minister to revoke his approval. In the proper balance between the public interest in the integrity of the civil service and public faith in the public administration, on the one hand, and the public interest in the uninterrupted activities of the administrative agency and the petitioner’s personal interest in the continued validity of his appointment, on the other hand, the first interest trumps.

Id.

            My colleague, Justice Zamir, uses these words to establish, inter alia, the general duty of fairness which he tries to impose on someone who applies for a license from an agency. Para. 29 of his opinion. I wish to tarry and ponder this a bit.

            40. No one would disagree that a candidate for a Religious Council must be an honest person; the question of a candidate’s integrity – if you like, his criminal past – is a primary consideration in the authorities’ discretion whether or not to choose him as a member of the Religious Council. There is further agreement that – from the public’s perspective – a candidate for the position should disclose – at the beginning of the process – his unsavory past. The question is whether the candidate bears a legal duty to disclose his criminal past to the authorities selecting him; and if such a legal duty does exist, what sanction might the candidate bear if he omits fulfilling the duty imposed on him? It seems to me that the question of the duty – “the duty of good faith and fairness” – was not relevant in the Awad case [30], and to the extent it was relevant, it remained hidden in the margins.

            Justice Barak held that the question of Awad’s criminal conviction constituted an important factor in his appointment, and that the minister’s ignorance of that criminal past constituted a serious deficiency of discretion. As he held, “we are dealing with a material mistake in the minister’s approval … (emphasis added – M.Ch.).” I will, of course, agree. However, if that is the case, of what relevance is the duty of good faith and fairness? Let us assume, for example, that because of an omission or negligence, Awad was not asked about his criminal past, and the subject came up only by coincidence. In that case, wouldn’t the minister’s approval still be tainted by a “material mistake?” And in that case, wouldn’t Awad’s appointment as a member of the Religious Council still be an appointment which, in the words of Justice Barak, “seriously undermines the integrity and image of the civil service, as well as public faith in it?” If so, how is the “duty of good faith and fairness” relevant? Another case: assume, for example, that Awad was asked about his criminal past; that he responded honestly to the questions asked; but that his answers got lost somewhere on the way to the minister. In a case like that, wouldn’t his appointment still seriously undermine the integrity of the civil service and so forth? Wouldn’t the minister’s approval under these circumstances still be tainted by a material mistake? Indeed, in this last case, we might feel personal empathy for Awad, but I doubt it would change the conclusions and results of the court decision.

            41. From this we learn, in my opinion, that the primary question does not concern the duty of fairness that Awad owed the authorities but rather the material mistake they made in exercising their discretion. Once the agency learned that it had made a material mistake in its discretion, it was allowed – in principle – to revoke its decision, even if it doesn’t always have such power. See e.g. the Awad case [30] at 492; see also the citations in para. 15 of Justice Zamir’s opinion. The primary question concerns the substantive aspects of the discretion, as Justice Barak held:

We face the following question: May the Minister of Religious Affairs revoke his approval of the petitioner’s candidacy, as proposed by the local council, with the claim that at the time he gave his approval, the minister did not know that the petitioner had committed a crime of moral turpitude? In my opinion, the answer to that question is in the affirmative.

Id. at 492.

            Indeed, a candidate’s knowing concealment and denial of negative information about his character is likely to work to his disadvantage. It seems to me, however, that the main issue is not the duty of fairness or its violation, but rather the very fact that the authorized agency made a material mistake in exercising its discretion.

            42. The main point: in any case in which an authorized agency’s decision is tainted by a material mistake, the agency may and has the authority – as a matter of principle – to revoke the decision. The question of the duty of fairness that an individual owes (or does not owe) to the government is not relevant, because the agency’s mistake was and remains material, whether or not we say the individual owed a duty of fairness.

            43. In order to ground the duty of fairness owed by an individual to the government, Justice Zamir relies on Justice Barak’s comments in the Awad case [30] (see the citation in para. 39, supra). Justice Barak, for his part – in the Awad case [30] – extrapolated from the comments of Lord Wilberforce in Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Zamir (1980) (hereinafter – the Zamir case [74]). In that case, Zamir, a citizen and resident of Pakistan, applied for an entrance visa to the United Kingdom, in order to join his father, who had been living in the United Kingdom for ten years. This took place in 1972. Zamir completed an application form for a visa and described himself as a bachelor, as he indeed was (at the time, he was 15 years old). His application was granted in 1975. In 1976, while still in Pakistan, Zamir married, and one month later, he traveled to the United Kingdom on the visa he had received. At the time he entered the United Kingdom, he did not disclose to the authorities that he had married, and he was not asked about his marital status. An immigration clerk approved Zamir’s entrance into the United Kingdom for an unlimited period of time. After a while – when Zamir’s wife and son applied to join him – the truth was discovered, and the agencies sought to deport Zamir from the United Kingdom. Zamir petitioned the court, challenging the decision to deport him, and his petition was rejected by two levels of the court system. His case now reached the House of Lords. The House of Lords also rejected Zamir’s petition. In the course of his opinion, Lord Wilberforce said:

It is clear on general principles of law that deception may arise from conduct, or from conduct accompanied by silence as to a material fact. It can be no answer to a claim that such deception has occurred to say that no question was asked... I would, indeed, go further than this – a point so far left open in the Court of Appeal. In my opinion an alien seeking entry to the United Kingdom owes a positive duty of candour on all material facts which denote a change of circumstances since the issue of the entry clearance (emphasis added – M. Ch.).

Id.at 950. 

 

            In other words: Lord Wilberforce recognizes a duty of fairness owed by the individual to the government. “A positive duty of candour” means that the individual owes a duty to disclose information to the agency, even if he or she is not asked about it. My colleague, Justice Zamir, calls it the duty of fairness.

            44. However, this rule – in that formulation – did not last long. It was overruled (with the concurrence of Lord Wilberforce) four years after the Zamir case [74], in the decision made in Reg. v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Khawaja (1984) (hereinafter – the Khawaja case [75]). The facts in the the Khawaja case [75] were similar to the facts of the Zamir case [74], except that this time, the House of Lords rescinded the duty of fairness that Lord Wilberforce established in the Zamir case [74]. In the later case, the House of Lords held that a person applying for an entrance visa to the United Kingdom does not bear a duty to disclose material information (“duty of fairness”). The individual’s only duty is not to engage in fraud or deception. Regarding the Zamir case [74] (which was the law in the the Khawaja case [75]), the House of Lords held that Zamir’s behavior, in fact, rose to the level of deception (because in entering the United Kingdom, he implicitly presented himself as a bachelor, when he was in fact married). Lord Fraser says in his opinion (with which the other judges concurred) that Lord Wilberforce’s comments (cited above) in the Zamir case were dicta. He went on to hold that:

At the time when his [Lord Wilberforce’s – M. Ch.] speech was delivered I agreed with all of it ... but on further reflection, in the light of the arguments in the present appeal, has convinced me that it would be wrong to construe the Immigration Act 1971 as if it imposed on persons applying for leave to enter a duty of candour approximating to uberrima fides. But, of course, deception may arise from silence as to a material fact in some circumstances; for example, the silence of the appellant Khawaja about the fact of his marriage to Mrs. Butt and the fact that she had accompanied him on the flight to Manchester were, in my view, capable of constituting deception, even if he had not told any direct lies to the immigration officer.

Id. at 97.

            Lord Wilberforce himself agreed (Id.at 99) that his comments in the Zamir case [74] were dicta, and that the case in question had been a typical case of deceit (by Zamir). The other judges agreed with Lord Fraser. See Lord Bridge’s opinion at 118-19, 126; Lord Scarman’s opinion at 107, 108. Lord Scarman also expresses reservations about Lord Wilberforce’s comments in the Zamir case [74], and goes on to say the following: All agree that an applicant to enter the United Kingdom bears a duty to answer the questions he or she is asked honestly and to provide the information requested. He or she bears no additional duties. The applicant does not know which facts are material. The immigration clerk is the one who knows which facts are material to his or her decision, and therefore the individual should not bear a duty to provide material facts. Lord Scarman writes:

It is certainly an entrant’s duty to answer truthfully the questions put to him and to provide such information as is required of him... But the Act goes no further. He may, or may not, know what facts are material. The immigration officer does, or ought to, know the matters relevant to the decision he has to make. Immigration control is, no doubt, an important safeguard for our society... To allow officers to rely on an entrant honouring a duty of positive candour, by which is meant a duty to volunteer relevant information, would seem perhaps a disingenuous approach to the administration of control... The Immigration Act does impose a duty not to deceive the immigration officer. It makes no express provision for any higher or more comprehensive duty: nor is it possible, in my view, to imply any such duty. Accordingly I reject the view that there is a duty of positive candour imposed by the immigration laws and that mere non-disclosure by an entrant of material facts in the absence of fraud is a breach of the immigration laws.

Id. at 107-08.

            The English law perspective is clearly that the individual does not owe a “duty of fairness” to the government, and therefore, he or she does not owe a duty to disclose information. This is the case where the individual does not engage in an act of fraud and deceit.

            45. A note: Even though I express reservations about Lord Wilberforce’s comments in the Zamir case [74] regarding the duty the individual owes the government, I liked the comment he made in the Khawaja case [75] regarding his comments in the Zamir case [74]. In his opinion in the Khawaja case [75], Lord Wilberforce said that his comments in the Zamir case [74] about “a positive duty of candour” owed by the individual to the government were not necessary to reach the decision, because that case was “a case of clear deception.” He went on to say that:

I ventured the opinion that a system of consideration of individual cases for the privilege of admission to this country can only work humanely and efficiently on a basis of candour and good faith on the part of those seeking entry. If here I trespassed on to the ground of moral judgment, I am unrepentant.

Id. at 99.

            That is what we said in another place: there is a legal “duty of fairness” and there is a “duty of fairness” belonging to social morality, and the two are not the same. Lord Wilberforce sought to take a “duty of fairness” from the institution of social morality and bring it to the order of law. His intention was good – we all agree – but establishing the norm as he suggested would have the legal system adopt a mode of proper behavior that is best left to other normative orders.

            Lord Wilberforce concludes his comments with a statement the likes of which we are not accustomed to hearing in judgments of the House of Lords (or in judgments of other courts). If, in founding a duty of fairness in the Zamir case [74], he says – the same duty of fairness that the individual owes the government – I trespassed into the area of moral adjudication, I do not regret my words. Lord Wilberforce’s speech is among the noblest of any made in the United Kingdom at that time.

            By the way: There is reason to think that the duty of fairness that Lord Wilberforce discusses in the Zamir case [74] was not presented as an all-encompassing doctrine of law but rather as a duty limited to the subject of immigration. He alludes to that in his comments in the Zamir case [74], in which he presents immigrants as those requesting a privilege, meaning those who have a lower-ranked right. Id. at 950 (In Israel, the law is that someone who is not a citizen or an immigrant under the Law of Return, 1950, does not have a right to enter or remain in Israel except by permission. See e.g. HC 758/88 Kendel v. Interior Minister [52] at 520; HC 740/87 Bentali v. Interior Minister [53]; and citations therein). As a fundamental rule, the state does not owe a duty to foreigners seeking to settle in its territory. And if, in an immigrant’s first step on the territory of the homeland that adopted him or her, he or she tries to trick the authorities, we can understand – if not necessarily justify – the view that in doing so, the applicant forfeits his or her right to immigrate.

            46. My opinion, as noted, is that the individual does not owe a duty of fairness to the government. In other words, for our case, the individual need not disclose, at his or her initiative, material information that the agency needs to exercise its authority. Of course, that does not mean that the individual owes no duty whatsoever to the agency. It means only that such duty is limited to the duty not to deceive, to lie, to cheat, to mislead, to spin a web of lies about the agency. As it is written, “You shall not wrong one another, but you shall fear your God …” Leviticus 25:17 [b]. It goes without saying that I am referring not only to active deceit – such as when the individual gives the agency false information – but also to implied deceit, through silence or behavior. This was the case of the Pakistani citizen, Zamir, who in entering the United Kingdom, implicitly presented himself as single, knowing full well that his entrance was permitted under an entrance visa in which he presented himself as a single.

            The same is true of our case: the petitioner knew full well about the precondition it had to meet, namely that it possess the warehouse for which it sought a license as an owner or through a rental contract. From the outset, it was required to produce certain documents, including “a contract of rental or lease for the additional area.” Despite that requirement, the petitioner sent the Customs Authority documents that did not give it – as it knew – a right to rent or lease. The petitioner knew those documents did not meet the precondition required of it. The fact that the customs agents did not properly check what they were supposed to check and did not demand what they were supposed to demand, cannot absolve the petitioner of responsibility for the serious deed it did. As a matter of fact, the petitioner spun a web of lies about the Customs Authority, breaching the duty it owed the agency. When the agency therefore sought to revoke the license, the petitioner could not deny the act of misrepresentation it committed, and in any event, it could not raise a claim worth hearing. A license issued through an act of deception by the grantee is a license flawed from inception, and the necessary conclusion is that the agency had a right to revoke the license. There are exceptions to the rule, but these would be mandated by the special circumstances of a particular case. See e.g. HC 135/71 [25]. The main point of our case is that the petitioner complicated things for itself not just by failing to disclose information, meaning by breaching the duty of fairness that it allegedly owed the Customs Authority, but also by intentionally misleading it. The Regulations imposed a serious of preconditions which needed to be met before the petitioner could receive a license for a licensing facility; not only did the petitioner fail to meet those conditions, but it intentionally misled the agency about their fulfillment, exacerbating its sin.

            47. Thus far, we have discussed the duty of fairness. I now want to move on to the second issue that I wish to address, and it is the issue of a public agency’s authority to adjudicate a dispute between individuals.

On the Status of an Administrative Agency in a Dispute Between Individuals

            48. What is the status, and what is the authority, of an administrative agency to adjudicate – directly or indirectly – a dispute between individuals? An administrative authority is born and conceived in public law, its formation is a formation of public law, it breathes the air of public law, its gait is the gait of public law. Knowing all this, I will ask: When an administrative authority is called to address an issue within its authority, must it limit its considerations to public law considerations, or can we say, perhaps, that it may consider considerations from the field of private law? And if we take this latter path and say that the administrative agency may consider considerations from the field of private law, does this statement conceal a subsidiary statement that the administrative agency may and has the authority – as a derivative of its exercise of power– to adjudicate disputes between individuals?

            49. My colleague, Justice Zamir, tells us that, “it is an old precedent” that an agency authorized to grant a license is supposed to limit itself to considerations from the field of public law, and to take care not to cross into considerations from the field of private law. At first, I thought that the descriptive “old” refers to a dignified rule, like a fine wine which improves as it ages. However, upon further reading, I realized that my colleague was actually referring to the opposite. “Old” meant obsolete. That realization kept me up at night.

            50. We will never, never change a precedent nor apply a precedent without knowing where it comes from – who were its mother and father, in what environment it was born and grew up – and where it is headed. Know from where you come and to where you go. Let us recall that, if we only knew the force motivating precedent and law, we would know their boundaries and their limitations. Regarding precedent (but not law), we will add: cessante ratione legis cessat lex ipsa. When the reason of the precedent ceases, the precedent itself ceases. What is the precedent in our case, and what is the force urging it along its way? According to my colleague, what was the precedent in our case, and what was the force urging it forward, at the time?

            51. Personally, I have never encountered an all-encompassing rule that an administrative agency many not take into account, as part of its quorum of considerations, considerations from the field of private law. Reuben, a café owner, asks for permission to hire a band that will play and make his guests’ stay more pleasant. Can anyone say that the municipality may not clarify how much the playing will intrude upon the neighbors’ peace and quiet? Would we bar the municipality from considering this factor of the neighbors’ quality of life? Would we tell the municipality – and the neighbors – that the subject of the nuisance is a subject “from the field of private law” which the agency therefore must ignore, referring the irate neighbors to a civil court?  We have never encountered a case-law rule like this, if only because it has never been established. Indeed, a license that a municipality gives to hire a band in a café does not include a license to permit playing that rises to the level of nuisance. CA 186/52 Jerusalem “Eden” Hotel v. Dr. Gerzon [54] at 1132-33. This rule is self-evident, because a municipality does not have the legal authority to permit a nuisance. We would not hold that a municipality, at the outset, may not include, in its quorum of considerations, the possibility that the band’s playing will rise to the level of a nuisance. The case law has not held as such, and in my humble opinion, it should not hold as such. I would not know for what purpose a rule like this – were it established – would be designed, or what social or other objective it would serve. On the contrary: a rule like this, if established, would place the burden on the neighbors, and in the overall social balance, this burden is inappropriate and unjustified. This is true of a license to hire a band in a café, and it is true of any other administrative act. The rule is not – nor was it – that an administrative agency may not include, in its quorum of considerations, considerations from the field of private law simply because they are from the field of private law.

            By the way, “suitable environmental quality and the prevention of nuisances and hazards” is, today, one of the declared purposes of the Business Licensing Law, 1968 (sec. 1(a)(1)). The authorized agency therefore may – indeed, must – consider the issue of nuisance. Even if that were not part of the law – in the absence of an explicit prohibition – the agency may, and even must, consider the issue of a nuisance to the neighbors.  

            52. Similar things have been said about the traditional distinction between private and public law. We are told that times have changed, and that today – unlike in the past – the distinction between private and public law is not so clear and rigid. In the end, we are told, private and public law are one – they frequent the same places, and a natural process of osmosis takes place between them: principles and doctrines from one area penetrate and seep into the other, and on chance occasions, we discover that a rule from one area has made its way into the other. This integration of fields, we hear, breeds “hybrid creatures” – a kind of amphibian – and these creatures, at least some of them, take their orders from private and public law.

            I confess: These statements, and others like them – although I, too, have written them – have troubled me in the past, and they continue to trouble me today. Indeed, regarding the division of jurisdiction between the High Court of Justice and the civil courts, the legislature has forced us to divide the law into two. See e.g. HC 1921/94 Sukar v. Jerusalem District Committee on Construction, Residence, and Industry [55]. Regarding the substantive law, however, I see no difference between our era and bygone days. As a matter of fact, when was there a “clear and rigid” distinction between public and private law? The opposite is true: English common law jurists always took pride in the fact that in Britain, the common law ruled, and that administrative law is just an extension of the common law.

            53. Having said all that we have said, we cannot, of course, ignore the historic legal development, the development which presented us with the legal system as we have it today. The legal system is divided into families, and this division is designed to affect the content of the norms themselves. This is true of the family of contract law, the family of tort law, the family of property law, the family of administrative law, and other legal families. It is superfluous to note that, throughout the years, there have been intermarriages – an inevitable phenomenon within the areas of a single legal system – and “hybrid creatures” have been born. We cannot avoid determining, however, that this historic development has had a prominent effect on the formation of the legal system as we know it today.

            54. The division of the legal system into private and public law is similar – similar but not identical – to the internal division of private law into different branches of law. This is the case, for example, of the division between contract law and tort law. These two kinds of legal classifications, while not identical, bear a resemblance to each other. This is certainly true of the technique of division. I said as much in another context:

Classification imposes order on the primordial rules of law. The legal system's basic principles determine the categories of classification [… ed.] The doctrines applicable to the rules associated into one category (capacity, consideration, mitigating damages, etc.) derive from the classification, and the classification derives from them. At particular points in time, the classification is made based on equality of the doctrines that apply to particular rules of law. Once the classification is made, and once the doctrine has been created and applied to a particular section of law, the doctrine rules over those associated rules of law, because they are located in a single section of law. That is true, making the necessary adjustments, when a specific rule of law is born, which is included in a particular section of law (whether explicitly or via its “interpretation”), because it will then be ruled by that section’s doctrines. This, of course, is merely a presumption (sometimes, it is not the case). The different points of departure of a classification may bring about a change in the legal rule. The point of departure may be chosen, a priori or a postiari, and in the latter case, great importance attaches to the historical events that had a hand in shaping the legal system.

M. Cheshin, Mitaltilin Bidin Hanizikin [Chattel in Torts] [84], n. 2 on p. 161.

In Israeli law, because of the jurisdictional divide between the courts, the distinction between public and private law became particularly sharp. The general view was that the High Court of Justice specializes in public law, while the civil court specializes in private law. If you add a few doctrines that have always governed in the High Court of Justice (clean-hands, delay, taking the law into one’s own hands, a done deed, intervention “for reasons of justice,” etc.), you will understand why the classification between public and private law has been so deeply rooted. However, it is nearly certain that, if public law petitions were brought before the ordinary civil court, the division of law between private and public law would be similar – though not identical – to the division of the law between contract law and torts.

55. Let us return to the matter in question. As I noted above, I know of no doctrine prohibiting an administrative agency from benefiting from private law considerations, simply because they belong to private law. Does that mean that every administrative agency may consider every private law consideration for every issue it addresses? Of course that is not the law. In the Alspector case [1], the local council refused to give the petitioner – a tenant – a license to open a convenience store in his apartment. The reason for the refusal: the landlord did not agree to turn a room in the apartment into a store. The court held that this consideration by the local council was illegitimate, as Justice Berinson’s opinion stated:

We fail to see the validity of that explanation … while in opening a store in his apartment without the landlord’s approval, the applicant may violate his lease, if that is the case, the landlord may come and fight his fight with the applicant. None of that however, is the municipality’s concern, and it cannot serve as the basis for refusing to grant the license.

Id. at 664-65.

How are we to understand Justice Berinson’s comments? In my opinion, Justice Berinson did not intend to establish a doctrine that private law considerations, as such, are illegitimate considerations for an administrative agency to use. For if he intended to make that ruling, we would protest: what is the source of that doctrine, and what is the justification for it? The Court, however, did not make that ruling. The Court’s holding did not concern private law considerations as such, but rather an attempt by the administrative agency to decide a dispute that arose between landlord and tenant by refusing to give the tenant a license. The Court thought in the following way: it would seem as though the petitioner is entitled to a license to open a store, because he fulfilled all the preconditions established by law for opening a store. So? The landlord claims that operating the store would violate the lease he signed with the tenant? The landlord is welcome to come and sue in the court with the proper jurisdiction to hear the complaint. The agency is not authorized to decide the dispute between the parties, and once the petitioner has fulfilled all the preconditions necessary to open a store, it must approve his application.

56. We therefore find the following: at the very least, in the absence of explicit statutory authorization, it seems that an administrative agency may not adjudicate civil disputes between individuals. It would seem as though an administrative agency may not take a dispute between individuals into account as a consideration in its decision over whether or not to approve an application. The consideration of a dispute between the applicant and a third party is external to the agency’s decision-making process. We are not talking about invalidating a consideration because it belongs to private law. The rule is the following: an administrative agency may not take into account considerations which the statute does not permit it to consider, whether they originate in private or public law. And one of the forbidden considerations is that the agency may not adjudicate a dispute that has arisen between the petitioner and another individual.

To be precise: there is no doubt that, once the preconditions necessary to receive a license have been filled, the administrative agency must approve the application submitted. There is nothing remarkable about that, and what we just said falls under the category of idem per idem. The novelty is in the statement that adjudicating disputes between individuals would seem to be outside the administrative agency’s scope of activity, and that the consideration of a dispute of the kind discussed above is a consideration that will be summarily rejected.

            57. This rule – forbidding the administrative agency from deciding – even indirectly – disputes between individuals, has been accepted in the case law as a doctrine, and I have never found a reservation to it. See e.g. HC 9/49 [2]; HC 35/48 M. Breslov & Partners Ltd. v. Trade and Industry Minister [56]; HC 56/53, supra [3]; HC 132/57 First v. City of Lod [57]; HC 280/60 “Avik” Ltd. v. Voluntary Authority on Importation of Pharmaceutical Preparations (the Avik case [58]); HC 115/61 Yakiri v. City of Ramat Gan [59]; HC 27/62 Alt v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Local Town Building and Planning Committee (the Alt case [60]); HC 278/62 Sarolovitch v. City of Jerusalem (the Sarolovitch case [61]); HC 329/64 Guri v. Bnei Brak Local Town Building and Planning Committee at 370.

 

            58. One extension of this rule is that the police may not eject someone from land on grounds of incursion unless the incursion is "recent." If the incursion is not "recent," the police must refer the complainant to the court authorized to grant a remedy. See e.g. HC 109/70 Orthodox Coptic Metropolitan in Jerusalem v. Police Minister (the Coptic Metropolitan case [63]) at 240-44 (Agranat, J.); HC 37/49 Goldstein v. Jaffa Guardian of Abandoned Property [64] at 726 (Agranat, J.). By the way, the same doctrine governs other areas of law, like a registrar clerk's duty to record the documented information given him or her into the Population Registry (like the fact of marriage), without the authority to investigate the legal validity of that information (for example: whether or not the marriage is valid). See HC 143/62 Schlesinger v. Interior Minister [65]; HC 58/68 Shalit On His Own Behalf and On Behalf of His Children v. Interior Minister [66].

 

            59. What is the logic of the rule? What motivates and maintains it all these years? In my opinion, the answer lies in our legal system's structural need to designate and to allocate the primary functions and areas of activity to each of the three branches of government. To express it in the negative: the structural need of our legal system and system of government – as a matter of principle – to remove the primary powers designated for one branch from the domain of the other two. When we place the three branches side-by-side, we know for certain that the judicial branch is designed to judge. As section 1(a) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary says, "These are the courts given the authority to judge …" The authority of the judiciary is to judge, meaning to decide disputes. See HC 5364/94 Welner v. Chair of Israeli Labor Party [67] at 786 (Barak, Dep. Pres.). Unlike the judiciary, the primary function of the government and the public administration is to execute. As section 1 of the Basic Law: The Government says, "The government is the executive branch of the state." For our purposes, we can say that the structural principle in our system is the need to designate the power to judge – the power to decide disputes – to the judiciary, and to deprive the executive branch of that power. Thus, for example, in the Alspector case [1] and in subsequent related cases, had we recognized the power of the administrative branch to refuse to grant a license to an applicant because a third party claimed – claimed, and may even have proven by documentation – that receipt of the license and operation of the business would lead to his right being violated, we would have augmented the powers of the administrative branch, equipping it with the authority to judge. Because we are bound by the presumption that, in the absence of explicit and unambiguous authorization, the courts – and only the courts – will judge, as a matter of course, we prohibit the administrative branch from making itself judge in a dispute outside its domain.

           

            For those who insist on precision, I will add that I am aware of the phenomenon that the borders separating the powers are not hermetic, and that a system of separation of powers is based on "checks and balances." I will recall, however, that the foundation is the principle of separation, and that those very "checks and balances" are built on that same foundation.

 

            60. I will further note that in the U.S. legal system, a similar question arises concerning Congress's authority to pass legislation imparting the executive branch with judicial powers. The question is whether such grant of authority undermines constitutional principles, according to which the power to judge rests with the court system. The development of the case law on this issue is a fascinating story in itself, but I will not expand on it here. See e.g. L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices [85]; L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law [86];  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor (1986) [70]; Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co.[71].

 

            We negate the authority of administrative and governmental agencies to adjudicate and issue rulings – even temporarily – in a dispute between individuals for the principled reason of separation of powers (using “checks and balances”), and the main point of doing so is to prevent one branch from encroaching on the domain of another. That is the way to preserve the distinct function of the judiciary to judge, guaranteeing the right of litigants to a just trial conducted by an independent body. There is a supplemental reason – a daily reason – and it is that the executive branch lacks the appropriate work tools to issue rulings and adjudicate disputes. Each of the three branches has adapted to its environment and role – it has specialized in its area of activity and created work tools to execute its function to the best of its ability.  Just as the court lacks the appropriate tools to engage in execution, so does the executive branch lack the appropriate tools to judge. The (surviving) plants and animals have adapted to their environments, as have the three branches of government. The best way to adjudicate disputes is the court’s way, and we therefore prevent administrative and governmental agencies from adjudicating disputes. They were not trained for it, and they are not the ones who bear the burden of doing justice for individuals who have quarreled. As Justice Berinson wrote in the Alt case [60], regarding a local planning and construction committee:

 

The local committee – like the regional committee – is not a legal body for determining the rights of conflicting parties. Neither is capable of deciding factual and legal questions concerning the mutual rights and duties of the asset’s owners and the actual or potential harm they would suffer. Their considerations are considerations of town planning and construction, and no more. The possibility that the rights of another will be infringed by construction done pursuant to a license issued by the local committee is not for the respondents to address, unless the opposing party alleging the infringement of rights has direct legal standing in the subject of the hearing …”

Id. at 1334.

 

See also HC 305/82 Y. Mor v. Central District Regional Planning and Construction Committee [68] at 148-49 (Or, J.).

 

            62. My colleague, Justice Zamir, seeks to prove that private law considerations can affect the decision of an administrative agency, and that there is “nothing wrong with that.” Along those lines, he writes:

 

For example, is it illegitimate for a municipality to refuse to grant a license to operate a business, or for a planning and building committee to refuse to grant a license to erect a building, when it is clear that the license applicant has no rights to the land of which he or she has taken possession (emphasis added – M.Ch.)?

 

Later, my colleague addresses the subject of the petitioner, saying that “under the Regulations, the Customs Authority need not, and may not even be permitted, to give a license to a trespasser.”

 

63. Now I will say my opinion. I do not disagree with my colleague that private law considerations may enter into a governmental or administrative agency’s quorum of considerations. That is my position, too. I personally think that statement, to some extent, amounts to bringing apples to an orchard. Not only is there nothing wrong in it, but it may bring about a lot of good. I agree with my colleague concerning the example he cites, namely that where it is unambiguously clear that an applicant’s request is based on an obstruction of justice, the authorized agency may – may, and perhaps even must – reject the application. However, as a matter of methodology, we cannot, from this example, deduce the rule that my colleague seeks to deduce. The reason is simple: the example is an extreme one, and it wouldn’t be right to learn the median from the extreme.

 

Our sages teach us: “Fools cannot serve as an example.” Tractate Shabbat 104:2 [a]. The reason is self-evident: fools act differently than those who are not fools. Their thought processes are not like those of an ordinary person; they do things that ordinary people would not do. We therefore do not deduce examples from either their thought processes or from their acts and omissions, and we do not analogize from their behavior to the general behavior of people. Just as we do not draw generalizations from fools, so do we not draw generalizations from extreme events. An extreme, by nature, has no choice but to carry the mental or emotional baggage characteristic of an extreme. In trying to draw analogies from extreme to median, therefore, we are likely to be led astray by that same baggage which is relevant – perhaps even essential – to the extreme, but nonexistent in the median, because it is the median. The extreme is graced with the qualities of an extreme, its unique value is the value of an extreme, and the qualities of the median are not necessarily the qualities of the extreme. For the matter of our concern, it is interesting to note that the rule about a “recent” incursion (supra para. 58) is explicitly founded the extremity of the case, and the rule is therefore limited to that same extreme case. As Justice Agranat held in the Coptic Metropolitan case [63]:

 

The duty of the police to come to the aid of a person in the above situation and to help him or her extract the asset from the one who has seized it depends on two conditions, both of which must be met: (a) the request for police assistance is made at the time the incursion is still “recent”; (b) it is clear to the police that there is no doubt and no question about the fact of incursion without permission.

Id. at 240.

 

            Only in cases of a disturbance of the peace – as demonstrated by Justice Agranat’s comments – may (and even must) the police intervene in a dispute between individuals. And if the disturbance of the peace is not immediate or the fact of incursion is in doubt, the police may not intervene in a dispute between individuals. Justice Agranat made the same point, with the necessary adjustments, in the Avik case [54], supra, as did Justice Landau in the Sarolovitch case [61], p. 514, and it is applicable here, too.

 

            64. Finally: So far, we have discussed the principle of negating the authority of the governmental and administrative agencies to intervene in a civil dispute between individuals. The substantive authority of the agencies, on the other hand, depends on the law for the issue in question. The law sets the framework for the agency’s authority, which in turn determines the range in which it may operate and exercise discretion. The Alt case [60], for example, made that holding, distinguishing a prior ruling on the same issue (HC 107/59 Mei-Dan v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Local Planning and Construction Committee (the Mei-Dan case [69]) at 805). In the Mei-Dan case [69], because the law explicitly granted standing to the owner of the asset, the agency was permitted to include, within its quorum of considerations, “disputes” between the owner of the asset and its possessor. In the Alt case [60], on the other hand, the law, as interpreted by the Court, did not grant standing to the owner of the asset, and the Court therefore held that such disputes were outside the agency’s field.

 

            65. Returning the case at bar: We began our journey with section 70(b) of the Customs Ordinance [new version], according to which, “In the Regulations, the government may establish the conditions under which warehouse licenses will be granted …” I will discuss the broad consensus which the government enjoys to issue regulations concerning licensing warehouses, thus paving the road for understanding how to treat the Regulations. In addressing the Customs Regulations, we find (in Regulation 14(b)) that a license application “will be according to the formulation in the Sixth Addendum,” and the Sixth Addendum in effect establishes the preconditions which a person must fulfill in order to be awarded a license for the warehouse. We are primarily interested in Part 3 of the Sixth Addendum, according to which the license applicant must make, inter alia, the following declarations:

 

We declare that we own the warehouse, and that it is recorded in the Land Registry under the documentation Block number … Parcel … in our possession via a rental or lease contract with … for a period of … years, commencing on … and ending on … Attached is a scheme of the warehouse and markings of the areas of the requested warehouse, approved by Engineer … the address of the warehouse: …

 

            This tells us that the applicant must be the owner, renter, or lessee of the warehouse, and the applicant must prove as much to the Customs Authority. These conditions are reasonable and appropriate. A licensing warehouse is an extension of the Customs Authority itself, in all its dignity, because it stores goods on which customs have not been paid. This is the reason for the requirement of ownership, rental, or lease – a requirement declaring that the applicant possesses the warehouse by right.

 

            Should we understand from this that the Customs Authority can investigate an applicant’s right, as a court would? Indeed, the question of the applicant’s right in the warehouse is a relevant question. It would be wrong to grant a license – more precisely, to interpret the law as though it ordered the granting of a license – to a blatant trespasser or someone whose right in the warehouse is eroded on all sides. However, how deep may the Customs Authority go to clarify the applicant’s right? Do the Regulations mean that the applicant must prove his or her right in the asset beyond a reasonable doubt? By a preponderance of the evidence? Assume, for example, that Gad possesses a warehouse by virtue of a rental contract, but Naftali, the warehouse owner, claims that Gad violated the rental contract; that the contract is therefore terminated; and that Gad must vacate the warehouse immediately. May the agency refuse the application, based on the fact that Gad has not proven his right in the warehouse? Let us further assume that Naftali filed an eviction action against Gad, and that the action is pending at the time the application is submitted to the Authority. May the Authority refuse to grant the application for this reason alone?

 

            66. In our case, there is no dispute that the petitioner possesses and exercises control over the area, as the holder of a right should possess and exercise control over a licensing warehouse. As for the petitioner’s right to possess and exercise control over the area, we cannot say for certain that it is a blatant trespasser. Moreover, for now (even if that was not the case at the outset), the petitioner has, at the very least, preliminary evidence regarding its right to possess the area, in the form of the map that was exchanged between the petitioner[ ] [trans.] and the Port and Train Authority (PTA) marked with the words, “storage area.” Against this background, I will insist and ask: Did the Customs Authority have a right not to renew the petitioner’s license, a license that it itself issued to the petitioner? In other words, I agree that, at the outset, the Customs Authority could have refused to grant the petitioner’s request, because the petitioner did not prove its rights in the licensing warehouse. However, considering what transpired since the petitioner received the license, and considering our holding today, that the question is the renewal of the license, and not the issuance of a new license – couldn’t one claim that, as of today, for purposes of renewing the license, things have changed to the benefit of the petitioner? Furthermore, since we know that the PTA has sued the petitioner to vacate the area, and the suit is pending in the authorized court, doesn’t the Customs Authority’s decision not to renew the petitioner’s license constitute intervention in a dispute between the petitioner and the PTA? Can’t we add that we are witnessing not mere intervention in a civil dispute but rather an adjudication of that dispute (even temporarily)? I will go further: I personally found it difficult to avoid the impression that the Customs Authority was called to the aid of its good friend – the PTA – and that its failure to renew the license was intended to adjudicate, even temporarily, the civil dispute that arose between the petitioner and the PTA.  Indeed, the Customs Authority did not explain to us – it did not even try to explain – which state interests would likely suffer harm if the petitioner’s license were renewed, even just until the court ruled on the eviction action.

 

            6[7 – trans.]. I have explained my serious trepidations – from this angle – in joining the camp of my colleague, Justice Zamir. And if I decided, for now, to drag myself into my colleague’s camp, it is only because I couldn’t say that the Custom Authority’s considerations were flawed – or flawed enough – such that a court should intervene in its decision. Had the issue been a basic right of citizens and residents, I would hold otherwise. I imagine that my colleague, too, would reach a different holding.  However, the issue is not a basic right of citizens and residents but rather a statutory right that a person is requesting. The petitioner is asking to be the trustee of the Customs Authority, to be permitted to hold goods in the warehouse in trust for the Customs Authority. Where a person asks to be recognized as a trustee, asks to be permitted to stop by anytime as an insider in the Customs Authority’s house, I can’t say that it is inappropriate to undertake a meticulous investigation as to whether the preconditions have been met. A similar – but not identical – thing may be said about those immigrants who sought to adopt the United Kingdom as their homeland. Supra para. 45. “Draw me after you – let us make haste” [Song of Solomon 1:4 – trans.]. I was drawn, and I made haste after my colleague.

 

            6[8 – trans.]. The end: At the relevant time, I concurred that the petition should be denied. My concurrence remains as is.

 

 

 

The petition is therefore denied. The petitioner will pay court expenses in the sum of 25,000 NIS to Respondents 1-2 and 25,000 NIS to Respondent 3.

 

 

February 4, 1998.

Neiman v. Chairman of the Elections Committee

Case/docket number: 
EA 2/84
EA 3/84
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, May 15, 1985
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

The Knesset Elections Law establishes a Central Elections Committee, to which are submitted the various proposed candidates lists that wish to participate in the Knesset elections. The Committee reviews the lists to ascertain that they conform to the requirements of the Law, approves such lists as comply and disqualifies any list that does not comply, supervises the conduct of the election campaign and the elections themselves, rules on various issues that arise during the campaign and during the elections and certifies the results of the voting. The Committee is comprised of representatives of the party lists that are represented in the outgoing Knesset. It is chaired by a Justice of the Supreme Court.

 

The Central Elections Committee for the election of the eleventh Knesset disqualified two party lists. One was the "Kach" list, which it disqualified for the reason that it advocates racist and anti-democratic principles, that it openly supports terrorist acts, that it seeks to foment enmity and hatred between different segments of the population and that its goals and objectives negate the fundamentals of the democratic regime that prevails in the country.

               

The Committee also disqualified the "Progressive List for Peace" from participating in the elections on the ground that it contained within it subversive elements and that certain key members of the list conducted themselves in a manner that identified with enemies of the State.

               

Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the Supreme Court allowed these appeals and reversed the Committee's decisions. The lead opinion was written by the President of the court, Justice Shamgar. He held:

               

1.  There are no provisions in the statute concerning any limitations on the qualifications of a candidates list based on the list's beliefs and goals. Although the Yeredor case (see infra) established that the Committee could disqualify a list that sought to achieve the dissolution of the State, statutes and rulings that limit fundamental rights should be construed narrowly. One should not deduce from that precedent that there is room to expand the grounds for disqualifying a list to include less extreme circumstances.

 

2.  Applying the standards set forth in Yeredor to the "Kach" list, one must ask whether this is a body that seeks to prejudice the very existence of the State, whether the party group was declared - before its disqualification - to be an illegal organization, according to statute, or whether it was proved before the Committee or before a court that its goals include the total negation of the State. The distortions in its opinions, the outrage that they arouse and the desire to disassociate oneself from any approval of these ideas, even indirectly, are not sufficient legal grounds to disqualify the list once it has satisfied the statute's formal requirements.

 

3.  No evidence was presented to the Committee from which it might have concluded that the "Progressive List for Peace" meets the criteria of the Yeredor case. The Committee received a statement from the Defense Minister's spokesman to the effect that the Minister was convinced, on the evidence placed before him, that the list contained subversive elements. Although the information placed before a statutory authority need not meet the standards of evidence that apply in court, it is not sufficient that the Committee rely on information that is entirely in the hands of other parties. In this case, the Committee de facto delegated its authority to the Minister of Defense, and it had no right to do so. The classified nature of the information does not relieve a quasi-judicial body, such as the Committee, from its duty to examine the data itself and make up its own mind.

 

The Deputy president of the court, Justice Ben-Porat, concurred in the decision on the ground that, in her view, the Elections Law does not empower the Committee to consider the question whether a list is worthy of participating in the elections. All the Committee is empowered to do is to examine whether the proposed list meets the formal requirements set forth in the Law. Justice Ben-Porat expressed her agreement with the opinion of the dissenting Justice in the Yeredor case.

               

Justice Elon expressed the opinion that the Elections Law requires the Committee to approve a list once it determines that the list satisfies the requirements set forth in the statute. The Committee does not have any discretion to disqualify a list for other reasons. He supported the decision in the Yeredor case as based on a principle that stands above the ordinary canons of interpretation, namely, that the Law is given to live thereby, not to die thereby. Participation in the elections to the Knesset in order to destroy the State and the Knesset are self-contradictory. Society has a natural right to defend itself. But this is a onetime exception that cannot be applied to other grounds for disqualification of a list. He then surveyed the Jewish sources, in law and thought, that encourage intellectual freedom and the exchange of ideas. He rejected the "racist" ideas of the "Kach" list as contrary to Jewish values and to the Biblical conception that all persons are created in the image of God.

               

Justice Barak was of the opinion that the Committee has discretion to disqualify a list if there is a danger that its approval might undermine the very existence of the State or its democratic character. The proper balance between values that conflict with each other is to be found in the degree of probability that the particular harm sought to be prevented will occur. Nothing in the platform of the "Progressive List for Peace" demonstrates that the list seeks to destroy the State or to injure its democratic character. The "Kach" list's ideas are contrary to the general ideals and to the Jewish values on which the State is founded. But, so long as it has not been proved that there is a reasonable possibility of injury to the State's existence or to its democratic character, the list must be approved.

               

Justice Bejski distinguished between negation of the very existence of the State and injury to its democratic character. The necessity for judicial legislation in the case of the former does not justify extending the Yeredor ruling to the latter situation as well, especially when one considers the basically political nature of the issue. The Committee is a partisan political body. If it were given the power to disqualify a list on the ground that it undermines the democratic character of the regime, without statutory definitions and restraints, some lists might be disqualified for reasons of narrow partisan interests, as they happen to appear at a particular moment to a majority of the Committee. Based on the "reasonable possibility" test advocated by Justice Barak, the "Kach" list endangers the democratic character of the State. The reason it is not to be disqualified is that there is no legal authority to do so.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

            EA 2/84

EA 3/84

 

MOSHE NEIMAN ET AL.

v.

CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL ELECTIONS COMMITTEE

   FOR THE ELEVENTH KNESSET

 

 

           

The Supreme Court Sitting as a Court of Election Appeals

[May 15, 1985]

Before Shamgar P., Ben-Porat D.P., Elon J., Barak J. and Bejski J.

 

 

           

Editor's synopsis -

            The Knesset Elections Law establishes a Central Elections Committee, to which are submitted the various proposed candidates lists that wish to participate in the Knesset elections. The Committee reviews the lists to ascertain that they conform to the requirements of the Law, approves such lists as comply and disqualifies any list that does not comply, supervises the conduct of the election campaign and the elections themselves, rules on various issues that arise during the campaign and during the elections and certifies the results of the voting. The Committee is comprised of representatives of the party lists that are represented in the outgoing Knesset. It is chaired by a Justice of the Supreme Court.

           

            The Central Elections Committee for the election of the eleventh Knesset disqualified two party lists. One was the "Kach" list, which it disqualified for the reason that it advocates racist and anti-democratic principles, that it openly supports terrorist acts, that it seeks to foment enmity and hatred between different segments of the population and that its goals and objectives negate the fundamentals of the democratic regime that prevails in the country.

           

            The Committee also disqualified the "Progressive List for Peace" from participating in the elections on the ground that it contained within it subversive elements and that certain key members of the list conducted themselves in a manner that identified with enemies of the State.

           

            Sitting in a panel of five Justices, the Supreme Court allowed these appeals and reversed the Committee's decisions. The lead opinion was written by the President of the court, Justice Shamgar. He held:

           

1.      There are no provisions in the statute concerning any limitations on the qualifications of a candidates list based on the list's beliefs and goals. Although the Yeredor case (see infra) established that the Committee could disqualify a list that sought to achieve the dissolution of the State, statutes and rulings that limit fundamental rights should be construed narrowly. One should not deduce from that precedent that there is room to expand the grounds for disqualifying a list to include less extreme circumstances.

 

2.      Applying the standards set forth in Yeredor to the "Kach" list, one must ask whether this is a body that seeks to prejudice the very existence of the State, whether the party group was declared - before its disqualification - to be an illegal organization, according to statute, or whether it was proved before the Committee or before a court that its goals include the total negation of the State. The distortions in its opinions, the outrage that they arouse and the desire to disassociate oneself from any approval of these ideas, even indirectly, are not sufficient legal grounds to disqualify the list once it has satisfied the statute's formal requirements.

 

3.      No evidence was presented to the Committee from which it might have concluded that the "Progressive List for Peace" meets the criteria of the Yeredor case. The Committee received a statement from the Defense Minister's spokesman to the effect that the Minister was convinced, on the evidence placed before him, that the list contained subversive elements. Although the information placed before a statutory authority need not meet the standards of evidence that apply in court, it is not sufficient that the Committee rely on information that is entirely in the hands of other parties. In this case, the Committee de facto delegated its authority to the Minister of Defense, and it had no right to do so. The classified nature of the information does not relieve a quasi-judicial body, such as the Committee, from its duty to examine the data itself and make up its own mind.

 

            The Deputy president of the court, Justice Ben-Porat, concurred in the decision on the ground that, in her view, the Elections Law does not empower the Committee to consider the question whether a list is worthy of participating in the elections. All the Committee is empowered to do is to examine whether the proposed list meets the formal requirements set forth in the Law. Justice Ben-Porat expressed her agreement with the opinion of the dissenting Justice in the Yeredor case.

           

            Justice Elon expressed the opinion that the Elections Law requires the Committee to approve a list once it determines that the list satisfies the requirements set forth in the statute. The Committee does not have any discretion to disqualify a list for other reasons. He supported the decision in the Yeredor case as based on a principle that stands above the ordinary canons of interpretation, namely, that the Law is given to live thereby, not to die thereby. Participation in the elections to the Knesset in order to destroy the State and the Knesset are self-contradictory. Society has a natural right to defend itself. But this is a onetime exception that cannot be applied to other grounds for disqualification of a list. He then surveyed the Jewish sources, in law and thought, that encourage intellectual freedom and the exchange of ideas. He rejected the "racist" ideas of the "Kach" list as contrary to Jewish values and to the Biblical conception that all persons are created in the image of God.

           

            Justice Barak was of the opinion that the Committee has discretion to disqualify a list if there is a danger that its approval might undermine the very existence of the State or its democratic character. The proper balance between values that conflict with each other is to be found in the degree of probability that the particular harm sought to be prevented will occur. Nothing in the platform of the "Progressive List for Peace" demonstrates that the list seeks to destroy the State or to injure its democratic character. The "Kach" list's ideas are contrary to the general ideals and to the Jewish values on which the State is founded. But, so long as it has not been proved that there is a reasonable possibility of injury to the State's existence or to its democratic character, the list must be approved.

           

            Justice Bejski distinguished between negation of the very existence of the State and injury to its democratic character. The necessity for judicial legislation in the case of the former does not justify extending the Yeredor ruling to the latter situation as well, especially when one considers the basically political nature of the issue. The Committee is a partisan political body. If it were given the power to disqualify a list on the ground that it undermines the democratic character of the regime, without statutory definitions and restraints, some lists might be disqualified for reasons of narrow partisan interests, as they happen to appear at a particular moment to a majority of the Committee. Based on the "reasonable possibility" test advocated by Justice Barak, the "Kach" list endangers the democratic character of the State. The reason it is not to be disqualified is that there is no legal authority to do so.

 

Note - In the elections to the eleventh Knesset, the "Progressive List for Peace" and the "Kach" list each gained one seat in the Knesset. The eleventh Knesset amended Basic Law: The Knesset, empowering the Elections Committee to disqualify a list if its actions or goals negate the establishment of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, negate the democratic character of the State or incite to racism (section 7A). Based on the third alternative, the Central Elections Committee for the elections to the twelfth Knesset disqualified the "Kach" list from participating in the elections. The Committee rejected a challenge to the "Progressive List for Peace" that was based on the first alternative. The Supreme Court turned down appeals from both decisions (EA 1/88, Neiman et al. v. The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset, P.D. 42(4) 177; E.A. 2/88, Ben Shalom et al. v. Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset, P.D. 43(4) 221).

 

 

Israel cases referred to:

[1] E.A. 1/65, Yeredor v.Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19P.D.(3)365.

[2] H.C. 253/64, Gharis v. Haifa District Commissioner 18P.D.(4)673.

[3] C.A. 723/74, "Ha-aretz" Newspaper v. Israel Electric Corporation 31P.D.(2)281.

[4] H.C. 75/76, Hilron Ltd. V. Fruit Marketing Council 24P.D.(3)645.

[5] H.C. 337/81, Mitrani v. Minister of Transport 37P.D.(3)337.

[6] H.C. 581/80, Amsalem v. Prison Service Commissioner 35P.D.(2)325.

[7] S.S.A. 1/66, Pascal v. Attorney-General 24P.D.(3)71.

[8] C.A. 292/66, Axelrod v. Yitzhakian and Counter-Appeal 24P.D.(4)387.

[9] H.C. 245/66, Bustenai v. Inspector General of Police 24P.D.(4)441.

[10] H.C. 1/49, Bejerano v. Minister of Police 2P.D.80; 3P.E.54.

[11] H.C. 74/51, Contractors Association v. Minister of Commerce and industry 5P.D. 1544.

[12] H.C. 517/72, Snowcrest (Israel) Ltd. v. Mayor of Bene Berak 27P.D.(1)632.

[13] H.C. 442/71, Lansky v. Minister of the Interior 26P.D.(2)337.

[14] H.C. 56/76, Berman v. Minister of Police 31P.D.(2)687.

[15] H.C. 272/74, Kefar Azar Moshav Ovdim Ltd. v. Minister of Labour 29P.D.(2)667.

[16] H.C. 13/80, "Noon" Preservatives Ltd. v. State of Israel - Ministry of Health 34P.D. (2)693.

[17] H.C. 214/52, Shohat v. Inspector General of Police 7P.D.987; 17P.E.60.

[18] H.C. 288/51, 33/52 Atzlean v. Commander and Governor of Galilee 9P.D.689;19P.E.90.

[19] H.C. 554/81, Baranse v. Commander of Central Command 36P.D.(4)247.

[20] H.C. 297/82, Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37P.D.(3)29.

[21] F.H. 9/77, Israel Electric Corporation v. "Ha'aretz" Newspaper Ltd. 32P.D.(3)337.

[22] H.C. 141/82, Rubinstein v. Chairman of the Knesset 37P.D.(3)141; S.J. vol. VIII, supra p. 60.

[23] H.C. 246, 260/81, Agudat Derekh Eretz v. Broadcast Authority 35P.D.(4)1; S.J. vol. VIII, supra p. 21.

[24] H. C. 292/83, "Neemanei Har Habayit" Society v. Jerusalem Regional Police Commander 38P.D.(2)449.

[25] H.C. 153/83, Levi v. Southern District Police Commander 38P.D.(2)393; S.J.vol.VII,109.

[26] H.C. 73,83/57, "Kol Ha'am" et al. v. Minister of the Interior 7P.D.871; 13P.E.422; S.J.vol.I,90.

[27] H.C. 344/81, Negbi v. Central Elections Committee for the Tenth Knesset 35P.D.(4)837.

[28] C.A.2/77, Azugi v. Azugi 33P.D.(3)1.

[29] H.C. 188/63, Betzul v. Minister of the Interior 19P.D.(1)337. H.C. 188/63, Betzul v. Minister of the Interior 19P.D.(1)337.

[30] C.A. 32/81, Tzonen v. Stahl and Counter Appeal 37P.D.(2)761.

[31] H.C. 152/82, Alon v. Government of Israel 36P.D.(4)449.

[32] H.C. 234/84, "Hadashot" Ltd. v. Minister of Defence 35P.D.(2)477.

[33] F.H. 13/60, Attorney-General v. Matana, 16P.D.(1)430; S.J.vol.IV,122.

[34] Cr.A. 787,881/79, Mizrachi v. State of Israel and Counter-Appeal

35P.D.(4)421.

[35] Cr.A. 696/81, Azulai v. State of Israel 37P.D.(2)565.

[36] H.C. 163/57, Lubin v. TeI-Aviv-Jaffaa Municipality 12P.D.1043; 36P.E.227.

[37] H.C. 10/48, Zive v. Acting Officer in Charge of TeI Aviv Municipal Area 1P.D.85; 1P.E.33.

[38] H.C. 243/82, Zichroni v. Broadcast Authority Management Committee 37P.D.(1)757.

[39] Cr.A. 126/62, Dissenchik v. Attorney-General 17P.D.169; S.J.vol.V,152.

[40] H.C. 148/79, Sa'ar v. Minister of Interior and Police 34(2)P.D. (2)169.

[41] A.D.A. 1/80, Kahana v. Minister of Defence 35P.D.(2)253.

[42] C.A. 165/82, Kibbutz Hatzor v. Rehovot Tax Assessment Officer 39P.D.(2)70.

[43] H.C. 58/68, Shalit v. Minister of the Interior 23P.D.(2)477; S.J.Spec.Vol.(1962-1969)35.

[44] H.C. 29/62, Cohen v. Minister of Defence 16P.D.1023.

[45] H.C. 112/77, Vogel v. Broadcast Authority 31P.D.(3)657.

[46] H.C. 262/62, Peretz v. Kefar Shemaryhau Local Council 16P.D.2101.

[47] H.C. 241/60, Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies 15P.D.(3)1151; S.J. vol. IV, 7.

 

English case referred to:

[48] Rex v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex parte O'Brien (1923) 2 K.B.361 (C.A.).

 

American cases referred to:

[49] Woodby v. Immigration Service 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

[50] Yick Wo. v. Hopkins 118 U.S. 356 (1986).

[51] Williams v. Rhodes 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

[52] Anderson v. Celebrezze 103 S.Ct. 1564 (1983).

[53] Cousins v. Wigoda 419 U.S. 477 (1975).

[54] Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494; 71 S.Ct. 857; 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951).

[55] Communist Party v. Control Board 367 U.S. 1 (1961).

[56] Yates v. United States 354 U.S. 298 (1957).

[57] Communications Assn. v. Douds 339 U.S. 382 (1950).

[58] Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357; 47 S.Ct. 641 (1927).

[59] Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

[60] McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

[61] Gompers v. United States 233 U.S. 604 (1914).

[62] Terminiello v. Chicago 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

[63] United States v. Dennis 183 F. 2d 201 (1950).

[64] Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

[65] Abrams v. United States 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

[66] Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

[67] Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

 

Jewish Law sources referred to:

            These references are not listed here, since they are given their full citation in the body of the case. On the Jewish law sources in general, see note under Abbreviations, supra, p. viii.

           

M. Schecter for the Appellant in E.A. 2/84;

zichrony, Feldman and Barad for the Appellant in E.A. 3/84;

R. Yarak, Director of High Court Matters, State Attorney's Office, for the Respondent.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

            SHAMGAR P.: 1. On June 28, 1984 we decided to allow each of the two appeals, to set aside the decision of the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset of June 17, 1984, with respect to the Kach list, and its decision of June 18, 1984, with respect to the Progressive List for Peace, and to confirm the two mentioned lists for the purpose of section 63 of the Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version), 1969.

 

            At the same time we added:

           

Without derogating from the substantive reasoning called for in these two appeals, we have decided that the court finds it unnecessary at this stage to take a position on the question whether it should adopt the majority or the dissenting opinion in Elections Appeal 1/65 (Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset 19 P.D.(3) 365), since we have reached the conclusion, on the basis of the facts before us, that there was no room to refuse confirmation of the two appellant lists even according to the majority opinion in Elections Appeal 1/65 .

 

We turn now to the substantive reasoning itself.

 

            2. There were two decisions of the Central Elections Committee as to which we convened to hear the appeals of the parties. The first was given, as aforesaid, on June 17, 1984 with reference to the Kach list, and this is the notice that was sent to the list following the decision:

           

I hereby inform you that the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset, at its meeting on June 17, 1984, refused to confirm your list, the Kach list, by majority opinion, on the ground that this list propounds racist and anti-democratic principles that contradict the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, openly supports acts of terror, endeavours to kindle hatred and hostility between different sections of the population in Israel, seeks to violate religious sentiments and values of a sector of the state's citizens, and rejects in its objectives the basic foundations of the democratic regime in Israel.

 

Realisation of this list's principles would constitute a danger to the existence of the democratic regime in Israel and might also cause a breakdown of the public order.

 

            With respect to the Progressive List for Peace, the decision was given on June 18, 1984, and notice was delivered as follows:

           

I hereby inform you that the Central Elections Committee for the Eleventh Knesset, at its meeting on June 18, 1984, refused to confirm your list, the Progressive List for Peace, by majority opinion, on the ground that this list indeed harbours subversive elements and tendencies, and central persons in the list act in a manner identifying themselves with enemies of the state. The majority opinion rested on close scrutiny of all the verified information put before the Minister of Defence, and on the affidavit of General Avigdor Ben-Gal dated September 24, 1980. Likewise the opinion of the majority was reinforced by the statements made by representatives of the list to the Committee and to the Minister of Defence, as recorded in the minutes of June 8, 1984.

A majority of the Committee members was persuaded that this list advocates principles that endanger the integrity and existence of the State of Israel and the preservation of its unique character as a Jewish state in accordance with the founding principles of the state as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Law of Return.

 

            The notices were addressed to counsel for the respective lists and were signed by the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee, Justice Gavriel Bach .

           

            3. The basic statutory definition of the right to submit one's candidacy for election to the Knesset is to be found in section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which provides as follows:

           

Every Israel national who on the day of the submission of a candidates list containing his name is twenty-one years of age or over, shall have the right to be elected to the Knesset unless a court has deprived him of that right by virtue of any Law or he has been sentenced to a penalty of actual imprisonment for a term of five years or more for an offence against the security of the State designated in that behalf by the Knesset Elections Law and five years have not yet passed since the day when he terminated his period of imprisonment.

 

            Section 7 of the same Basic Law lists the state functionaries who are precluded from candidacy for the Knesset because of holding such office.

           

            The procedure for approving lists of candidates is set forth in Chapter F of the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], section 56 of which deals with holders of office who may not be candidates, while section 56a lists the offences which may entail deprival of the right to be elected under section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset. Section 57 prescribes the manner in which candidates lists are to be drawn up, signed and submitted. The other sections of the Chapter deal with representatives of the lists, a security deposit, designations and letters of candidates lists, and rectification of defects in drawing up a candidates list.

                

                 Section 63, titled "Approval of Candidates Lists", reads as follows:

 

A candidates list duly submitted, or rectified in accordance with the previous section, shall be approved by the Central Committee, which shall notify the representative of the list and his deputy of the approval not later than the 20th day before election day.

 

            Section 64 of the Law deals with appeals against a refusal to approve a candidates list, subsection (a) of which provides:

           

            Where the Central Committee refuses to approve a candidates list, either wholly or as to the name of one of the candidates or the designation or letter of the list, it shall, not later than 20 days before election day, notify its refusal to the representative of the list and his deputy, and they may, not later than 18 days before election day, appeal to the Supreme Court against such refusal.

 

            Certain changes concerning these time periods, set forth in sections 62, 63 and 64, applied to the elections to the 11th Knesset, as a result of the Eleventh Knesset Elections (Temporary Provisions) Law, 5744-1984, but these are of no concern here.

           

            So much for the text of the Law. It is clear that the statute says nothing about prohibiting or restricting candidates lists on the basis of the list's principles, its purposes and objectives, or the views of its members. In other words, the text of the pertinent legislation in effect on June 17 or 18, 1984 makes no express provision for the disqualification of a list on any of the grounds included in the notice of exclusion sent by the Central Elections Committee to each of the appellant lists.

           

            4. (a) The authority of the Central Elections Committee to refuse to confirm a list of candidates for the Knesset on grounds of the list's political objectives and character was discussed in this court for the first time in E.A. 1/65 [1] (the Yeredor case). There this court, by a majority opinion, dismissed the appeal of a candidates list (named the Socialists List) which wished to take part in the elections to the Knesset, but had been refused confirmation by the Central Elections Committee. According to the Committee's decision, as cited in the above mentioned appeal, the list was disqualified

           

            for the reason that this candidates list is an illegal association since its promoters negate the integrity and very existence of the State of Israel.

           

            (b) The underlying reasons for the decision of the Central Elections Committee to the Sixth Knesset came largely to the fore in the statement made by the Committee Chairman, Justice Moshe Landau, when summing up his opinion before the Committee members. He mentioned that the list was in fact identical, according to various tests, with the EI-Ard Group, an association that was declared illegal under regulation 84 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, after the Supreme Court had refused to intervene in the District Commissioner's refusal to register it as an amuta* noting that its objectives absolutely and conclusively negated the existence of the State of Israel in general, and its existence within its present borders, in particular (H.C. 213/ 64, Gharis v. Haifa District Commissioner [2]). The society's illegality was not in itself the principal reason for its disqualification by the Elections Committee; rather, the fact was emphasized that the illegality found expression in an endeavour to undermine the existence or integrity of the state. In E.A. 1/65 [1] the Chairman of the Elections Committee was cited as saying, inter alia (at p. 372):

 

            I find a vast difference, as East is separate from West, between a group of people which seeks to undermine the very existence of the state or, in any event, its territorial integrity, and a party that acknowledges the political entity of the state but wishes to alter its internal regime.

           

            He added that Basic Law: The Knesset, does not at all deal with the issue under consideration, but refers only to the personal disqualification of a candidate; however, he thought it permissible to read Basic Law: The Knesset and the Knesset Elections Law, 1959, together with the Cooperative Societies Law, and to read into the Knesset Elections Law an implied condition that an illegal organisation cannot be confirmed as a list. A list that is illegal in the sense that it is opposed to the very existence of the state cannot be confirmed, because the Knesset, which is the sovereign institution in the state and expresses the will of the people, cannot incorporate within it an element that negates the very existence of the state.

           

            (c) This court's decision in Yeredor [1] represented a majority opinion. Cohn J., dissenting, held that there was no statutory provision from which one could deduce the authority of the Central Elections Committee to refuse to confirm a list that has met all the formal conditions specified in chapter F of the Law, whatever the nature of the list's platform or objectives. In his opinion, the legislator's silence and the absence of any statutory provision allowing the disqualification of a candidates list on grounds of its character and platform, deprived the Elections Committee's decision of all legal effect and (it) contravened, in spirit, the principle of the rule of law. Therefore, the decision had to be set aside, and he so ruled.

           

            (d) The President (Agranat) and Sussman J. (representing the majority opinion) took the contrary view that the character of the candidates list was in polar opposition to the very purpose of the elections, because in essence and objective the list negated the existence of the state, and it wished to bring about the annihilation of the State of Israel. Agranat P. said (at pp. 385-386):

           

            Indeed, there can be no doubt - and this is clearly deduced from the statements made in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State - that Israel is not only a sovereign, independent and freedom-seeking state, characterized by a regime of the people's government, but it was also established as "a Jewish State in the Land of Israel", for the act of its establishment was effected first and foremost by virtue of "the natural and historic right of the Jewish people to live like any independent nation in its own sovereign state, and that act was a realization of the aspirations of generations towards the redemption of Israel.

 

At the present stage of the state's existence, I need hardly remark, these words express the nation's vision and credo and we are therefore obliged to bear them in mind "when we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the State" (H.C.73, 87/53 Kol Ha'am v. Minister of interior 7P.D. 871, 884). The import of that creed is that the matter of the continuity - or if you wish: "the perpetuity of the State of Israel is a fundamental constitutional fact", which no state authority, whether administrative, judicial or quasijudicial, may disclaim when exercising its power.

 

            The statements of the President and of his concurring colleague, Sussman J., recognise that in the normal course of affairs the Central Elections Committee does not have authority to refuse the confirmation of lists that meet the formal statutory requirements. But it happens - as in E.A. 1/65[1] - that extreme and exceptional constitutional factors converge to create a direct confrontation between the very grant of the right to compete in elections and the clear purpose of the elections, or - in more specific and precise terms - there arises a polar conflict between participation in the elections and the intention of the list to destroy the body, in the election of which it wishes to take part. In these circumstances, the committee is authorised to deny the right of participation in the elections, on the merits of the matter.

           

            In the opinion of Agranat P., the basic constitutional premise that the court must take into account in interpreting the laws of the state is that the State of Israel is an existent state, and that its continuity and perpetuity cannot be questioned. This interpretative approach has direct bearing on the problem that arises when one wishes to reconcile a statutory provision that establishes the governmental institution for which the elections are being held, and the negation of its existence advocated by candidates of a list that wishes to take part in the elections. The answer is that this question - whether or not to act for the liquidation of the state and negation of its sovereignty-cannot arise at all on the agenda of the Knesset, for its very presentation contradicts what Agranat P. called the will of the people residing in Zion and its vision and credo. The effect of all this is that a candidates list which denies that doctrine does not have any right, as a list, to take part in the elections for the house of representatives. A group of persons whose unconcealed political objective is not merely "to alter the internal constitutional regime of the state" but "to undermine its very existence", as emphasised by the chairman of the Central Elections Committee, cannot a priori have any right to take part in the process of formulating the will of the people, and cannot, therefore, present its candidacy in the Knesset elections.

 

            Sussman J. elaborated this point (at pp. 389-390):

           

..."An illegal purpose", in the present context does not mean a purpose that aspires to change the internal order of government. This order is not sacred, nor is its alteration a crime that entails punishment. Rather an "illegal purpose" in this context is a purpose that aims to destroy the state, to bring disaster upon the majority of its inhabitants for whom it was established, and to join forces with its enemies... Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so too a state does not have to agree to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its judges are not allowed to sit back idly in despair at the absence of a positive legal directive when a litigant asks them for assistance in order to bring an end to the state. Likewise no other state authority should serve as an instrument in the hands of those whose, perhaps sole, purpose is the annihilation of the state.

(Emphasis added - M.S.).

 

            It transpires that even the judges of the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1] did not consider themselves authorised to fill the gap in the law, in its simple sense, so as to add reservations related to the objectives and character of a candidates list, of the kind that can be found in the elections laws of some countries. All that was decided in Yeredor was that even where the existing law contains no provision allowing disqualification of a list, one must avoid the extreme, substantive and logical contradiction that would allow those who seek an end to the existence of the state and its authorities, to compete in the Knesset elections. One should not deduce from this that the court considered the Elections Committee or itself competent to add to the law and to assume the authority to deny a list its rights, even when no such extreme background conditions operate, and even when such polar conflict between participation in elections and the wish to uproot that elected body's existence, does not arise. Here, the interpretative leap does not entail the lesser power. On the contrary, only an extreme situation permits a kind of judicial legislation that goes beyond the written text so as to fill a gap, because existential necessity, and certainly also constitutional logic, require that it be filled.

 

            The described limitation on the court's possible scope of action, which arises from the existing constitutional situation, therefore found expression also in the conclusion of Sussman J., that there was no identity between the legal situation in a different country - where an express constitutional provision allowing disqualification of a candidates list had been enacted - and our constitutional situation. He said (at p. 390):

           

            ...The German constitutional court, in discussing the question of the legality of a political party, spoke of a "fighting democracy" which does not open its doors to acts of subversion masquerading as legitimate parliamentary activity. As far as I am concerned, as regards Israel, I am satisfied with a "self-defending democracy", and we have the tools to protect the existence of the state even though we do not find them enumerated in the Elections Law.

 

            5. (a) In summary, it appears to have been the opinion of the dissenting judge, Cohn J., that this court does not, today, have any authority to refuse to confirm a candidates list that meets the formal requirements, whereas the judges of the majority opinion held that the court does indeed have such authority, but only with respect to a candidates list that negates the very existence of the state. Because of the importance of this reasoning in application to the instant issue, it should be elaborated further.

           

            (b) The remarks of Cohn J. as to the lack of authority to disqualify a list, regardless of its provocative character and nature, were clear-cut; in his view it was required and necessary that the legislature determine express provisions as to the disqualification of lists and that a particular body - be it the Central Elections Committee, or the Knesset itself, or the court - be vested with the authority to exclude from the Knesset "heretics of the kind who are traitors to the state and aid its enemies". However, the Central Elections Committee and the court may not assume such authority ex nihilo so as to add restrictions and limitations to the election laws. Thus (ibid. p. 379):

           

            In a state governed by the rule of law a person may not be deprived of any right, be he the most dangerous criminal and despicable traitor, except and only in accord with the law. Neither the Central Elections Committee nor this court legislate in this state; the Knesset is the legislative authority, and it empowers designated bodies, if it so wishes, to mete out treatment in accord with a man's conduct and the outcome of his actions. In the absence of such legislative authorization, neither common sense, necessity, love of country nor any other consideration whatever, justify taking the law into one's own hands and depriving another person of his right .

 

          Any measure that is contrary to law or is taken without lawful authority and is calculated to deprive a person of his civil rights, is invalid, in his opinion, and an Israel judge will not uphold it. He added (ibid. p. 382):

         

          There are states in which the security of the state, or the sanctity of the religion, or the achievements of the revolution and the dangers of the counter-revolution, and similar kinds of values, pardon any crime and atone for any action performed without authority and contrary to the law. Some of these states have invented for themselves a natural law which is superior to any legal norm and annuls it when necessary, in the sense that necessity knows no law. These are not the way of the State of Israel; its ways are those of the law, and the law issues from the Knesset or under its express authorization.

(On this aspect, cf. S. Guberman, "Israel's Supra-Constitution", 2 Israel L.R. 445 (1967), at 460.)

 

          Also the majority justices did not believe that the full range of the problem, in all its variations, potentially arising before the Central Elections Committee, could be solved comprehensively without recourse to express legislation. It is absolutely clear from their choice of language that the path they chose was dictated by the extreme nature of the case before them. One cannot deduce from their opinions that they found the constitutional state of affairs satisfactory or that the existing statutory arrangement might be left as it was, and that the solution of these problems - effected in some countries according to constitutional guidelines - be left to the Central Elections Committee, with the changing political coloration of its members, for them to contend with the issue from time to time, to the best of their understanding.

         

          To sharpen the perspective and to indicate additional problems stemming from the fact that the current law deals only with the formal qualifications of the candidates lists, one might mention here, for example, that a right of appeal to the Supreme Court is granted to a disqualified list alone, and if the Elections Committee had chosen to confirm a list of the kind disqualified in E.A. 1/65, there would be no right of appeal available to any other party or body wishing to challenge that decision. The right of appeal under the prevailing law exists only in case of refusal to confirm a list, and not in case of its confirmation.

         

          The approach taken by the majority in E.A. 1/65 [1] pays regard to the essence of fundamental constitutional concepts, but beyond that, and in light of what has already been said, it must be considered in its proper context: a given answer to a constitutional issue might be good and correct for the solution of an extreme, complex problem that arises at a given time, but it should not necessarily be considered a guideline - and certainly not a cure-all - for every additional constitutional complication that public authorities encounter. The conclusion that ought to have been drawn at the time, also from the majority opinion, is that one who seeks to test the qualifications of lists according to their substance and objectives, beyond mere formal criteria, must find for that purpose a legal foundation expressed in a legislative act; the power of the Elections Committee to act without express statutory provision can be exercised only in very exceptional cases, namely: with respect to a list that seeks the annihilation of the state. This should have been clear to anyone interested in the conferment of further powers, such as those found in the constitution of the present German Republic. Yet from 1965 until now there has been no legislative initiative in this respect, neither on the part of the executive branch nor, more important, on the part of the legislature, which normally itself takes the initiative in relation to the enactment of electoral laws (but see the bill for the Knesset Elections (Amendment No. 9) Law, 1968, introduced by Y.H. Klinghoffer, M.K.). Naturally, this is doubly significant in light of the limited scope of E.A. 1/65 [1] (in terms of the circumstances of its application), upon which the Central Elections Committee again sought to rely when making the two decisions which form the subject of the present appeals. Moreover, in addition to the clearly restrictive language of the judgment in E.A. 1/65 [1], there is the restrictive interpretative approach that accompanies any limitation of a fundamental constitutional right.

 

            Our frame of reference, as will be seen below, is that the right to take part in elections and to compete for the voter's ballot is a fundamental civil right, since it emanates from the doctrines of both civil equality and the freedom of expression. A statutory provision or judicial rule which seeks to limit a right is not given a broad sweeping interpretation; on the contrary, their proper interpretation is restrictive and strict (Ha'aretz v. Electricity Corporation [3], at p. 295; Hilron v. Council for Fruit Manufacture and Marketing [4], at p. 653).

           

            As stated in Ha'aretz [3]:

           

            Any statutory limitation on the scope and extent of such right shall be interpreted in a restrictive manner so as to give the said right maximum existence and not to limit it in any degree beyond the clear and express statutory language (H.C. 75/76, Hilron, at p. 653). The freedom of expression and a statutory provision that limits it are not of equal and identical status; to the extent that it is compatible with the written word, the existence of the right should at all times be preferred to a statutory provision designed to limit it. In summary, the standard which accords protection of the freedom of expression primary consideration when that right conflicts with another should find full expression not only when the legislature shapes the provisions of the statute but also in the interpretation of the statute and the application of its directives to circumstances in which its substance and operation are tested in practice .

           

            This is the case when weighing a principle that determines a fundamental right as against a statutory provision that limits it; likewise, a fortiori, when balancing a statutory provision that confers a fundamental right against the intention or wish to restrict it without express statutory authority thereto (cf. H.C. 337/81 [5]).

           

            Hence in accordance with our accepted practice in the interpretation of statutes, there is no room to widen the reach and form an expansive interpretation of the majority opinion in Yeredor [1] and attempt to derive therefrom what is not really there; that is, as if there were room for substantive extension of the inherent disqualificatory power vested in the Central Elections Committee, so that it applies also to cases in which the exceptional circumstances of Yeredor are not present.

           

            It should be clarified that we related to this court's ruling in Yeredor as a primary standard in the present case because the minutes of the deliberations before the Committee reveal that it intended to act within the framework of this court's earlier decision, and thought that it was indeed doing so. Thus, from a strictly formal point of view, we could have disposed of the matter conclusively by merely examining this approach of the Committee. However, in order to complete the picture and encompass the oretical aspects of the matter, it will be dealt with on the merits and independently of our earlier ruling, so as to allay any doubt as to whether there is room for extending the scope of the ruling in Yeredor, that is, whether there is room in the present case to add grounds for disqualification by sole virtue of a new ruling by this court, unsupported by any Knesset enactment. We shall discuss this matter separately, below.

           

            6. By adopting the criteria of the majority opinion in E.A. 1/65[1], we could immediately decide the matter before us. As appears from our decision of June 26, 1984, no facts were brought before the Central Elections Committee from which it could have concluded that either or both of the appellant lists were, as far as known and proven, of a character and identity found by the majority in Yeredor [1] to constitute grounds for disqualifying a list. The reasons for this conclusion differ for each of the lists.

           

            7. In applying the criteria of the majority opinion in E.A. 1/65[1] to the issue of approval of the Kach list, one must pose and be guided by questions corresponding to the rules adopted in that case:

              

(a) Are we dealing with an entity that seeks to undermine the very existence of the state?

(b) Was this entity regarded, prior to the deliberations of the Elections Committee, as a prohibited association or an organisation declared illegal, under one of the enabling enactments in this regard (chapter 8, title 2 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977; regulation 84 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations; section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 5708-1948)?

(c) Was it proven to the Committee, or to us, that the goals of the list utterly negate the existence of the State of Israel? In the words of Sussman J., an illegal purpose does not mean a purpose that aspires merely to change the order of government. We should add that the distortion in the views expressed by the list and its spokespersons, or the opposition and even disgust which these arouse, and the desire to avoid any indirect affirmation of the list's very existence and the dissemination of its views - all of these are insufficient legal reason, in the present state of the law, for disqualifying the list. We shall later return to this aspect.

 

            In order to give the answer, matters should be assessed as they stand, according to their plain meaning and substance. There is no room for a forced description that would bring the facts artificially within the parameters of the Yeredor ruling. It is not enough to seize upon the expressions used by the court in Yeredor [1] in order to describe correctly the facts pertaining to the nature and activities of the Kach list. The repugnance aroused by the views and opinions expressed by a list does not permit the confusion of dissimilar elements, nor provide an opening for an expansive subjective interpretation that is unsuited to substantive judicial examination in general and constitutional inquiry in particular.

           

            Accordingly one cannot escape the conclusion that the answers to the three questions posed above, are in the negative, and it follows that by the criteria of the Yeredor ruling, there was no occasion to disqualify the Kach list.

           

            8. (a) As regards the Progressive List for Peace, the gist of the argument against it was that its leader should be regarded as a kind of reviver or continuer of the EI-Ard Movement, so that everything said and decided in respect of the Socialists List in Yeredor [1] applies also to it.

           

            (b) The composition of the Socialists List did not, in fact, coincide with the leadership of the EI-Ard movement, but it did reflect that movement, which was declared illegal and whose objects were defined as unlawful by this court, since some of those who headed it were also at the head of EI-Ard. The Socialists List comprised only ten candidates, and among them there were five, that is one half, who had been members of the illegal EI-Ard, which advocated the liquidation of the state. In the present case, on the other hand, we are dealing with a list of 120 candidates, only one of whom - the person at its head - belonged in the past to the EI-Ard movement. The head of the list, Advocate Miyaari, a past member of EI-Ard, contended that he did not regard the list as a continuation of that unlawful movement, and the mixed composition of the list of candidates appears, prima facie, to support this thesis. He further explained in his appearance before the Elections Committee that he no longer represents the views of EI-Ard and dissociates himself from the P.L.O. Covenant.

 

          Clearly, the mere denial of ideological association with a past entity cannot in itself amount to an irrebuttable presumption, juris et de jure that such is the case. Evidence could have been brought before the Committee in refutation of such denial and seeming to point to an opposite conclusion. In this regard two questions arise. First, what is the measure of proof, that is, what must be proven to the Central Elections Committee and upon whom lies the burden of proof? A second and separate question is, what is the decision-making process before the Committee, and to what extent can it avail itself of decisions of other authorities? The first matter concerns substance and quantity; the second concerns the manner of adducing evidence.

         

          How does this apply?

         

          The decision to disqualify a list lies with the Central Elections Committee, hence any ground for disqualification must be proved before it. That is to say, once a list has complied with the formal statutory requirements (a sufficient number of signatures in the required form, their submission to the Committee, etc.), it has fulfilled its obligation, and anyone attributing to the list a shortcoming, in its nature or objectives, bears the burden of proving so and convincing the Committee, which has the authority to decide the matter. It follows that if it was claimed that the Progressive List for Peace is a list seeking the liquidation of the state, like for example the EI-Ard movement, or the Socialists List which followed in its footsteps, and that it is nothing but the same old hostile and subversive movement in new garb, evidence to prove that thesis should have been brought before the Central Elections Committee.

         

          Material required to be brought before a statutory authority does not necessarily have to be submitted in the form of evidence admissible in a court of law and proven in the manner in which evidence is presented in court. An authority exercising discretion vested in it by law is not bound by the laws of evidence applicable in a court of law unless otherwise provided by statute (which is not the case here), and it may base its decisions on information that reaches it even if not given to proof in court proceedings where the law of evidence obtains (H.C. 581/80[6], at 328; S.S.A. 1/66[7], at 78). Thus a tribunal or other authority upon which a power of decision has been conferred by law, may base its decision on uncorroborated evidence when a court would require corroboration, or it may accept evidence not admissible in ordinary judicial proceedings (C.A. 292/66[8], at 391; H.C. 245/66[9], at 446; but cf. H.C. 1/49[10], at 84, where it was explained that mere rumour is not sufficient to found the authority's decision; and see also H.C. 74/51[11], at 1552, and H.C. 517/72[12], at 637). As we have said, the court will tend to set aside a decision grounded only on rumour or unsubstantiated surmise and conjecture, but if factual evidence is brought before the authority, upon which it can base its evaluation and decision - that is, material of such evidentiary value that reasonable people would find it a sufficient foundation for inferring the nature and activities of those concerned (see also H.C. 442/71[13]) - the court will not incline to interfere with the authority's conclusion. As was said in H.C. 442/71[13], not all hearsay testimony can have weight in the view of the authority, for example testimony which is nothing more than vague rumour. But the question of the weight and credibility of the testimony is a matter for the authority to decide, and no rules can be laid down in advance on how it must proceed, except that the testimony - having regard to the subject, the content and the witness - must be such that a reasonable person would regard it as possessing evidentiary value and rely upon it.

 

            A statutory authority is not dependent in its decision on a previous finding by a judicial body (H.C. 56/76[14], at 692), and the power of decision is vested in its hands. Once vested with such decisory authority, it does not discharge its duty if it bases its decision on weak or unconvincing evidence. In this connection I would not construe literally the general dicta sometimes found in the case law that it is enough, as it were, for a statutory authority to have before it some material (H.C. 272/74[15], at 672; H.C. 13/80[16], at 696). According to my understanding, the expression some material does not refer to bits and pieces of material, but to such as a reasonable person might find a basis for forming an opinion, a belief or a suspicion, as the case may be.

           

            H.C. 56/76[14] dealt with the question of denying existing rights, and there it was said that for the purpose of its decision the authority must have before it persuasive and credible evidence that leaves no room for doubt. I accept the implication of this dictum that with regard to the denial of existing rights - a fortiori fundamental rights - equivocal evidence will not suffice. As is the accepted situation in the United States, I think that the evidence required to persuade a statutory authority of a justification for denying a fundamental right must be clear, unequivocal and convincing (see Woodby v. Immigration Service (1966) [49], which concerned evidence before the administrative authority prior to issuing a deportation order; see also C.T. McCormick, On Evidence (St. Paul, 3rd ed., by E.W. Cleary and others, 1984) 1023).

           

            The more important the right, the greater the required weight and force of the evidence that is to serve as a basis for a decision in diminution of the right.

           

            Incidentally, I am not dealing here with the interesting question of the demarcation of power between a statutory authority and a court, so far as concerns the upholding of evidence and the line between law and fact (B. Schwartz and H.W.R. Wade, Legal Control of Government (Oxford, 1972) 226, 235; C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London, 1984) 311). That is to say, I am not dealing here with the issue of when a court should intervene on a question of fact, since that is not necessary in the present context.

           

            So much as regards the material that may serve as a basis for decision in the circumstances of this case. I now turn to the other question, the manner of reaching a decision.

           

            9. (a) As was stated in H.C. 214/52[17], the evidence should have been brought before the decision-making authority, that is, in the present case, before the Central Elections Committee. However, with respect to the Progressive List for Peace no evidence was actually presented to the Elections Committee upon which it could have concluded that the list suffered a blemish of the kind that founded the majority decision in Yeredor [1].

           

            (b) In the decision of the Elections Committee, the text of which was cited at the commencement of this judgment, it was maintained that this list -

           

...harbours subversive elements and tendencies, and central persons in the list act in a manner identifying themselves with enemies of the state.

 

That is the conclusion. Now as to the factual basis:

 

. .The majority opinion rested on close scrutiny of all the verified information put before the Minister of Defence and on the affidavit of General Avigdor Ben-Gal dated September 24, 1980. Likewise the majority opinion was reinforced by the statements made by representatives of the list to the Committee and to the Minister of Defence...

 

            The information placed before the Minister of Defence was not presented to the Elections Committee and did not come to its knowledge during the course of its deliberations. It received a notice from the spokesperson of the Minister of Defence, that -

           

...After a basic examination of all the verified information placed before him, including the oral declarations and arguments submitted by the list's representatives, the Minister of Defence is convinced that there are indeed subversive elements and tendencies among groups associated with the list and central persons on the list act by way of identification with the enemies of the State.

           

            The nature and details of the verified information before the Minister of Defence remained entirely unknown, not one iota thereof was put before the Committee, and the language of the notice as a whole was vague and ambiguous. Such a notice, which contains no factual details, does not constitute any kind of evidence.

           

            If "elements and tendencies" are present among the groups associated with the list, what is their weight in it? Does this refer to one out of the one hundred and twenty, or to ten of them? What are these "elements", that is, is the reference to groups of people or to programs or views? What is the practical meaning of the term "subversive"? And so on. After all, matters such as these lend themselves to varied evaluations and interpretations, and it is the Committee itself that must draw the conclusion according to its own best discretion. Moreover, as already said, abstract descriptions and generalised conclusions formulated to follow verbatim the observations of this Court in Yeredor [1], are not sufficient if not duly founded on facts brought to the attention of the Committee and considered by it on their merits.

           

            To summarize, since the material remained in the possession of the Minister of Defence or General Ben-Gal, as the case may be, the Committee did not have before it factual details upon which to ground its decision, but rested its decision on a discretion exercised by others on the basis of information brought before those others. We shall deal with this question more extensively later on.

           

            (c) At this point we may pause briefly to consider the manner in which the Committee arrived at its decision, and the limits of judicial review thereof. So far as concerns this court, the accepted view is that in reviewing the action of a statutory authority we examine, in general, whether the modes of deliberation were lawful, and whether the authority had before it material on which it could base its decision (H.C. 288/51, 33/52[18]; H.C. 554/81[19], at 251).

           

            This general observation may be broken down into elements. Lawful deliberation means, generally, that the principles of natural justice have not been violated; that the procedures prescribed by statute and applying to the authority, or set out in the regulations under which it functions, have been observed; that the decision was rendered by the competent person and that it was commensurate with the material jurisdiction of the decision-making authority; that the decision-making authority exercised its power in furtherance of its purpose; that no mistake of law occurred and that the decision was not tainted by fraud or influenced thereby; that the decision was made on the basis of supporting evidence, and, finally, that it was not contrary to law for some other reason. The exercise of a power in furtherance of that power's purpose means, in general, that no extraneous considerations were taken into account; that the authority did not overlook relevant information; that the power was exercised for the purpose for which it was granted; that the discretion was exercised by those empowered thereto, and that there is no room for concluding that the decision is marked by unreasonableness so extreme that no reasonable authority could have made it, or that the exercise of the power was simply arbitrary. This list, long though it may be, clearly does not purport to be exhaustive, and it may well be set out in a different order if compared with the other elements mentioned above.

 

            It was mentioned that the authority must act within the frame of the power vested in it. In the present case the limits of the power of the Committee were not defined by statute but by the precedents of this court, yet as far as the Committee is concerned, this cannot add to its powers. Once its powers have been lawfully defined, it is obliged to exercise them within its prescribed limits, and primarily according to objective standards (R.C. Austin, "Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion - At the Rubicon; Whither Now?" 28 Current Legal Prob (1975) 150, 152), just as it would do had its powers been delimited by statute. In the existing legal situation, the Committee has no power to spread its wings and lay down new limits to its powers, at its discretion and choice, nor may it now exercise its powers according to subjective tests.

           

            The guidelines for judicial review are to a large extent a reflection of the mode of procedure that is binding upon the authority whose functioning is under review. Among other things, the manner of exercising discretion was emphasised, but here the stress must be laid on a single point, that when speaking of a lawful decision based on material upon which a reasonable person might rely in coming to a decision, we mean a decision which results from examination and consideration on the part of the person authorised to decide. In this context it should be emphasised that it is not sufficient to rely exclusively on information that was only in the possession of other persons, or on conclusions reached by others according to information before another who is not the party authorised to decide under the statute.

           

            (d) The authority is the decision-making body, since in it alone did the legislature vest the power to decide the matter. The authority cannot delegate its decisory power to another unless expressly so authorised by the legislature, and in the absence of such authority it is obliged to reach its decision upon an independent examination of the facts. Applying the foregoing to the present case, our conclusion will be that the Elections Committee itself ought to have been satisfied on the facts before it that the candidates list was affected by a disqualifying feature. That, however, did not happen here. The indirect reliance upon information that was presented only before another agency, all or some of the details of which were not at all known to the Committee, signifies that the Elections Committee did not consider the matter and that it was not the Committee that disqualified the list on an independent and considered decision, but that it sought to rely on information unknown to it and available, if at all, only to another agency. Incidentally, the other agency mentioned did not purport to decide the matter, since the Minister of Defence decided nothing, not even a matter within the scope of his authority. In fact, the Committee thereby vested in the Minister of Defence, unbeknown to him and with no foundation in law, the power to disqualify a list of candidates. For it rested content with the fact that the material, the nature and details of which it had no knowledge, had been brought before an executive agency and had convinced the latter to draw the attention of the Committee to the matter in a general way without specifying the grounds for so doing. Such de facto delegation of powers lacks any basis in the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] or any other statute, and goes beyond all accepted constitutional and legal concepts. It entails, on the one hand, making the Minister of Defence the actual decider with respect to disqualification of a list for purposes of the election laws, for which there is no legal foundation, and on the other hand it strips the powers of the Elections Committee of all content.

 

            (e) Needless to add, the Committee could have regarded the submission of the material to the Minister of Defence as the initial ground for its own deliberation and inquiry, but at some stage the material should have come before it, since the Committee cannot discharge its function by having another, of whatever status, decide in its stead and thus in fact assume its power. Nor can the Committee unburden itself of the duty to exercise its discretion in the light of its own consideration of the material. A competent authority need not itself engage in gathering the facts, and it may pass this task on to others acting on its behalf, but at the final stage. before making its decision, the competent authority itself must consider the matter and draw its conclusions on the basis of the collected facts (H.C. 214/52[17], at 990; H.C. 297/82[20]).

           

            When the chairman of the Committee, Justice Bach, opened the deliberations of the Committee, he informed it that the Minister of Defence did not see fit to disclose to the Committee the factual details, but that it had been suggested to him to examine the material. The chairman rightly refused to do so, and explained that examination by him alone would still not resolve the legal problem, since in the absence of a statutory power to appoint someone (an individual or a subcommittee) to examine the material on its behalf, this suggestion would not provide the Committee itself with the information which is required to be before it for the purpose of its decision. I can only express my full agreement with these observations of Justice Bach.

           

            To summarize this point, the classification and secrecy of the evidentiary material do not exempt a quasi-judicial authority (such as the Elections Committee in its capacity in the present matter - E.A. 1/65[1], at 337) from fulfilling its duty to apprise itself of the facts and to decide the matter on its own, on the strength of tested information.

           

            The consideration whether or not to disclose material that is secret for reasons of state security, rests with the person so authorised by law, that is, in the present case, the Minister of Defence. This applies to proceedings before judicial instances (section 44 of the Evidence Ordinance [New Version], 1971), as well as quasi-judicial bodies empowered to take evidence (ibid. section 52) and any other authority. But if the Minister chooses not to disclose the material by reason of its secrecy - and as aforesaid, this power indeed rests with him - there remains before the Committee nothing but general statements in the nature of summary conclusions drawn by someone else, and that is not a sufficient discharge of its duty, as a quasi-judicial body, itself to consider and decide on the matter of disqualifying the list.

           

            The question often arises, whether an authority may be persuaded by and adopt the opinion of an expert, and the answer is affirmative, provided there comes before the authority, for the purpose of its decision, not simply the expert's final conclusion but also substantive material upon which he founded his opinion. The duty of an authority vested with defined powers to arrive at an independent decision on a matter entrusted to it for resolution, does not terminate even when experts have examined the matter. The Committee could have looked into the information gathered by the Defence authorities and availed itself of an accompanying opinion, but it was not free to forgo independent knowledge and inquiry and thereby rid itself of the duty of lawfully deciding.

           

            10. (a) The reference to the affidavit of General Ben-Gal of 1980 also does not alter the situation. In that affidavit General Ben-Gal explained his reasons for issuing administrative orders at the time, after having himself examined the material relating to Advocate Miyaari. But just as the Committee may not forgo a substantive decision based on information examined by itself and rely on information brought to the attention of the Minister of Defence alone, so too it could not rely merely on the fact that four years earlier General Ben-Gal had been convinced that there existed material concerning Advocate Miyaari which was sufficiently persuasive to require the latter's restriction for reasons of security, for one of the purposes enumerated in regulation 108 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

           

            [Ed. - After reviewing the contents of General Ben-Gal's affidavit, Shamgar P. discounted the tendency and sufficiency of this evidence as a ground for disqualification of the List by the Elections Committee, even were it legally permitted to base its decision solely on another's accepted general opinion. The learned President then continued:]

 

            (d) The inquiry made by General Ben-Gal before giving his decision under regulation 110 of the Defence Regulations, well illustrates the proper course to be followed by a decision-making authority. The deponent was aware that he could not rest his decision on the evaluation of the police or the security service. Only after the particulars of the matter were brought before him and he examined them in detail did he decide, in 1980, to exercise his power under regulation 110 and to sign a restriction order.

           

            To sum up, it is the duty of the decision-making authority to examine the facts; others may gather them, classify and organise them - provided that the integrity and accuracy of the picture is not affected - and may even add their advice, recommendations and opinions, but the decision must rest on an independent consideration of the matter and not on that of others.

           

            (e) The affidavit of the person named "David", also presented to the High Court of Justice in 1980, does not add any detail which might have rendered the members the Committee aware of the factual ground and reason for their decision .

           

            (f) The representations made on behalf of the List before the Minister of Defence and the Committee, however much they aroused the objection of the Minister or the members of the Committee, do not in themselves, by their substance and content, display the nature or measure of proof required here. They were no more than expressions of a political view, already voiced inside and outside the Knesset without being regarded as a ground for any legal action, and they did not contain the elements impliedly attributed to them in the decision of the Elections Committee. As already noted, there must be a factual connection between the conclusions and their underlying grounds. What is more, the Committee regarded those representations as supportive of its conclusion, as stated in its decision, but what is the force of such support when essentially there is nothing to support?

           

            11. (a) If the security authorities possessed information, one wonders at its general concealment from the Committee, and why the Committee rested content with the laconic description in the notice of the Defence Minister's spokesperson.

           

            There is no point in laying down guidelines concerning matters that are unknown to this court, but one may assume that the security authorities also considered the possibility of distinguishing between a concise description of a given event, which could be brought to the knowledge of the Committee, and disclosure of personal identifying particulars which might seriously impair security. In any event, apart from the notice of the Minister, nothing but the affidavit of General Ben-Gal was submitted to the Committee, and that dealt with agitation and the organisation of demonstrations and strikes rather than subversive actions to liquidate the state.

 

            (b) It is possible that the inability or unwillingness of the security authorities to present material to the Committee pertaining to the security considerations that motivated their deliberations at the time of submission of the Knesset candidates lists, are a reflection of the fact that the Elections Committee - a broad body composed according to political criteria - is not the appropriate forum for dealing with such classified matters. That in itself cannot be a reason or justification for the Committee to base its decision on information which it has not seen or heard, and which is within the knowledge of only a few members of the executive branch who cannot share it with others. The failure of a statutory body to make its independent decision is, in this case, tantamount to a failure to decide properly, and ipso facto devoids its act of legality and validity.

           

            (c) Some of the Committee members relied for some reason on the fact that this court would examine the classified material that the Committee itself did not examine. As pointed out to them by the chairman, Justice Bach, this assumption had no legal foundation: this court examines the decision of the Committee, and it has no independent power to disqualify lists. It accordingly does not consider anything but the material that was before the Committee.

           

            12. To remove all doubt I will add that the foregoing is not necessarily to be regarded as a definitive conclusion that the apprehensions voiced in connection with the orientation of certain candidates on the List are baseless, and for the present purpose no such conclusion is required. As explained, the Committee's considerations were required to be based on clear, unequivocal and persuasive material - which a reasonable person would regard as indicative of a tendency of the kind defined in the majority opinion in Yeredor [1]. If such material existed, however, it was not brought before the Central Elections Committee. It follows that the Committee could not have applied to the List the legally required yardstick, as enunciated by this court in the past.

           

            This in itself would suffice for the appeal to be allowed, and we have indeed so decided.

           

            13. (a) Thus far we have analysed the factual and legal data on the basis of the statutory law and the rulings of this court in effect at the time of the hearing of these two appeals. However, as already noted, this matter should be examined from a further perspective - that of the separate question whether the rules governing disqualification of a list allow for expansion beyond what was laid down in Yeredor [1], and whether a legal basis could be found for the decisions of the Central Elections Committee - not on its understanding of the substantive prevailing law, but by broadening the judicial rule.

 

            (b) Any redefinition of the limits of the Elections Committee's authority and of the scope of the prohibitions against participation in the elections, has implications for the two lists concerned. That is so even though we have decided the case of the Progressive List for Peace not only upon analysis of the material demonstrating its objectives, tendencies and activities, but also, largely on ground of the process by which the decision was reached. Essentially the substantive problem is whether a list can be disqualified, in the case of Kach, on grounds of its non-adherence to principles of democracy, tolerance and morality accepted by a majority of the public, and on account of its hostility to a defined sector of the general population. In the case of the Progressive List for Peace, the question arises whether a list can be disqualified because of its members' attempt to establish political contacts for the purpose of talks with a hostile organisation or enemy states, while at the same time explicitly disavowing the objective of annihilating the State of Israel, which earlier was the ground for the decision regarding the participation of EI-Ard members in the elections. Also to be considered in this regard, is that the general prosecuting authorities did not regard those known contacts as a criminal offence and instituted no legal proceedings in that connection.

           

            (c) The character of the issue also dictates the method of its examination. The following matters will accordingly be examined: first, the nature of the right under discussion; second, the manner in which its boundaries are defined; third, the principled reasons that induced the court in Yeredor to delineate the boundaries as detailed above; and fourth, the possibility of altering these bounds, as indicated in paragraph (a).

           

            Before undertaking our detailed examination, there is need to further clarify the essential question before us, namely: whether the Central Elections Committee is competent to impose additional restrictions on the right to participate in the Knesset elections, beyond those expressly authorized in Basic Law: The Knesset, or in any other enactment.

           

            14. The yardsticks for testing the answers to the above questions should properly be grounded in constitutional principles. Thus Professor Ronald Dworkin's words are apt, when he writes: "Judicial decisions ..... even in hard cases ..... should be generated by principles not policy" ("Hard Cases", 88 Harv. L. Rev. (1974-75)1057,1060).

 

            As far as I am concerned, judicial decisions in constitutional matters should be rested, even in hard cases, on grounds of principle and not on reasons and motives of policy formed in accord with what appears to meet the needs of the hour and the sentiments of the majority.

           

            The adoption of a general guideline based on principles and not on occasional transient factors, wherever the need for judicial decision arises, as suggested by Professor Dworkin, is a separate matter that does not merit discussion here, and I, for one, do not consider myself bound by it. The reference here is to the standard to be adopted when discussing constitutional questions or legal problems that have constitutional implications. In such circumstances the choice of standard is not to be considered merely as a scholarly imperative or as a just and reasoned advice convincing on its own. Rather the choice dictated by adherence to legal principles inheres in the very nature of the subject. It stems from the need to formulate guiding principles for the functioning of a given political or social body adhering to the fundamental concepts that lend a special status to constitutional civil rights. One must bear in mind, inter alit, that when constitutional matters are under review, their import and implications have to be considered in the long term, and proper weight must be given to their impact on the political and social framework within which they operate. If these are subjugated to the needs of the hour and we adopt a casuistic approach in constitutional matters, particularly concerning the rights and freedom of the individual, we shall miss the mark and deal less than justly with the subject.

           

            15. What is the form and standing of a fundamental civil right in our law? The protection of individual rights derives from fundamental constitutional principles forming a substantive and integral part of the law applying in Israel. The integration of fundamental constitutional rights in our law takes various forms: recognition of the fundamental freedoms does not express itself only in abstract doctrines that guide the actions of governmental bodies, but also entails the formal and concrete conclusion that these freedoms constitute part of the substantive law, in accord with their name and designation. The legal status of a fundamental right within the abstract and theoretical system of rules was referred to in H.C. 337/81[5], at 355-356:

           

            Proper protection of the status of a given liberty is not achieved through mere declaration of its existence, although one should not fail to appreciate the didactic value of a declarative determination; such determination is an essential starting point in the process of moulding the right, in the course of which it gains concrete substance, and is likewise a starting point for introducing the legal principle that it embodies into extra-legal areas, such as the social or moral sphere. It should be added in this context that it is doubtful whether a given fundamental right can be viable without continuous, positive and reciprocal interaction between the legal and the socio-moral areas.

 

To recognise the existence of a fundamental right is to accord it a place as part of our substantive law. In other words, it is not merely a declarative principle representing beliefs and opinions, but is one of the fundamental components of the law in effect in Israel. In this respect it has already been said (in C.A. 723/74, at 294-295) :

 

The absence in the State of Israel of any single legislative enactment enjoying supreme protected status and embodying the constitutional principles, does not mean that we do not have statutory provisions of constitutional substance or that our legal system does not contain constitutional legal principles defining the fundamental human and civil rights. Our conception and view of the law in effect in Israel is that it encompasses fundamental rules as regards the existence and protection of personal liberties, even if the bill of Basic Law: Human and Civil Rights has not yet become law.

 

The bill of the new Basic Law is intended to formulate principles and delineate their scope, and its central function is to root them in a written statute so as to protect them against risks of temporal crises. It is designed to serve as a vehicle for the expression of values which will serve to educate the citizen, and to restrain in advance those who seek to infringe the limits of his rights. Yet already now the fundamental liberties are rooted...in our basic legal perspectives and are a substantive part of the law in effect in Israel.

 

            These legal principles influence the patterns of legal thought and interpretation, which are inspired by their force and direction (F.H. 9/77[21], at 359). Our legal rules relating to fundamental liberties thus serve as a connecting link between these liberties as mere abstract ideas and ordinary legal provisions, which are influenced in their content and language by recognition of the fundamental rights. For, together with the principled legal rules, some of the rights are also integrated in specific statutory provisions, which were influenced and have even been governed by them from the time of their formulation and throughout their existence and actual implementation (see, e.g., section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and H.C. 141/82[22], at 156).

           

            The delineation of the rights in terms of the wording of the Law is the basic and primary footing upon which their actual protection depends; the very existence of a statute lends tangible expression as well as stability to the political regime and its prevailing fundamental concepts. The stability stems from the existence of a statutory norm embodying the standard against which the legality of the acts of governmental agencies is measured. Therefore, it is of special significance and weight that the constitutional principles defining the fundamental rights be given explicit expression in a legislative act and not merely remain in the realm of the oral or unwritten law. In this way it is ensured that the substance and scope of the rights will be defined in clear language, upon which the individual citizen can rest his demands and claims. Therein, among other things, lies the importance and value of a written constitution, whose absence in our system is conspicuous each time a constitutional issue arises for legal deliberation.

 

            The main expression of the rule of law is that it is not the rule of people - in accord with their unrestrained decisions, considerations and aspirations - but rests on the provisions of stable norms that are applied and binding in equal fashion. The definition of a right and even its inclusion in a statute are not conclusive of its effective protection, for they do not exhaust the existence of the right. The actual realisation of the rights is expressed in honoring them in their actual implementation, in an equal manner and without unjust discrimination. The value and force of a statute that grants rights is that the rights determined therein are more than an abstract idea, proper in spirit and purpose; rather, the written word renders them concrete and positive, to be applied under standards of equality for equals that may not be departed from for invalid reasons (Yick Wo v. Hopkins 118 US 356 (1886)). Last to be mentioned, though not in order of importance, is the norm that when rights are violated, every person injured thereby will be shown equal consideration and given equal treatment (Tussman and Ten Broek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws", 37 Calif. L.R. (1948-49) 341).

 

            16. The political rights are among the most important and decisive fundamental freedoms. Thus Professor Bernard Schwartz remarks:

           

            Among the most precious rights of citizenship are those denoted as political. Without such rights, indeed, it may be doubted that an individual can be said truly to attain the dignity of citizenship.

(A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Part III, Rights of the Person, p. 777.)

 

            The main political rights are these four: the right to vote, the right to be elected, the right to assemble for a meeting or demonstration, and the right to address a petition (see also section 48 of the bill of Basic Law: Charter of Fundamental Human Rights).

           

            As regards the right to be elected, the determination in section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset that every Israeli citizen, who is 21 years old or over at the time of submission of a candidates list which includes his name, is entitled to be elected to the Knesset (unless the conditions specified in the concluding part of the section are found to exist) serves to define a right, ideologically based mainly on the principle of political equality, the duty to uphold which derives also from section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (H.C. 141/82[22], at 156; H.C. 246, 260/81[23], at 19). So far, the right to be elected has found expression in our judicial decisions mainly in the context of equal opportunity, but the directive of the Basic Law reflects a broader and more general import of that right. Incidentally, in providing for the right to be elected in the Basic Law, the Israel legislator gave express and positive recognition to what is only indirectly derived from the U. S. constitutional provisions, without any explicit mention in the text of that Constitution ("Developments in the Law of Elections", 88 Harv. L Rev. (1974\75) 1111, at 1135).

 

            Professor Schwartz says in this connection (op. cit., 778-779):

           

            ...though there are no other express provisions in the matter, it may be stated today that there is a right to hold public office that inheres in the status of citizenship.... One may go further and say that the right of a citizen to hold office is the general rule - with ineligibility the exception. A citizen may not be deprived of this right without proof of some disqualification specifically declared by law. One court has gone so far as to assert that "the lexicon of democracy condemns all attempts to restrict one's right to run for office".

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

            The legislature may restrict the right to be elected by determining eligibility qualifications, but the accepted practice in countries with similar systems of government to ours, is that there is no lawful restriction in this area except under express statutory directive.

           

            In the U.S. a thesis was developed that even the right to elect becomes incomplete where the freedom to be elected is restricted. In other words, a restriction on the right of a party faction to contend not only limits the activities of the faction but also narrows the right of the individual to cast his vote in the manner he considers most effective. From this follows the view that the right to vote and the right to associate in promoting an elections list are but two sides of the same coin. Thus Justice Black regarded the two rights as -

           

            ...two different though overlapping kinds of rights- the right of the individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.

(Williams v. Rhodes [51], at 30).

 

            In other words, restriction of the right to be elected limits not only the rights of a person running for office, but also the rights of the voters to elect a candidate according to their preference by virtue of their right to enjoy equally with others everything accorded under the Elections Law to persons holding the right to vote. From the voter's point of view a restriction of the right to be elected indirectly narrows also his freedom of expression, since he is deprived thereby of his ability to associate with others in promoting his views and opinions as they would have been presented by his preferred candidate. Hence the court is required to exercise great caution in scrutinising the nature of such restrictions so as to ensure that they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. See Anderson v. Celebrezze [52]; Cousins v. Wigoda [53]; R.D. Rotunda, "Constitutional and Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the wake of Cousins v. Wigoda", 53 Tex. L.R. (1975) 935; Nowak, Rotunda and Young, Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 1983), 777.

           

            In summary, the right to participate in elections is a fundamental political right that gives expression to the idea of equality, freedom of expression and freedom of association, whence it follows that this right is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society.

           

            Thus far as regards the nature of the right.

           

            17. In Mitrani v. Min. of Transport [5], it was said, with respect to the conditions and limitations that may be imposed on a fundamental freedom, that the standing accorded any one of the fundamental personal rights in a given political or social framework reflects the notions and shapes the character of that framework. The oretical constitutional premise which holds that a fundamental right endures and subsists in its full scope so long as it has not been limited by the law, is more than a mere technical-formal indication of the ways in which the right may be limited. Likewise, that premise serves not only to underpin the principle of legality; rather its primary purpose is to express the superior legal status of a fundamental right, so that any restriction of the right must be founded on express statutory authority. The court there went on to say (ibid., p. 355):

           

            Determination of defined and special procedures for changing a fundamental right is, to a large extent, the principal means of assuring that the matter will be properly examined in substantive terms. The right should not be limited except after careful study and deliberation, since curtailment of the scope of the right might bring in its train a distortion of the character of the social or political regime, to a greater or lesser degree. We have indeed said that the place of a fundamental right within a given legal system mirrors the extent of the substantive rule of law, and any change in the scope of the right necessarily affects also the continued existence of the rule of law. Hence the importance of defined legislative procedures, which offer the sole means of changing the application and scope of a fundamental right.

 

            The exercise and practical implementation of a fundamental right are not absolute. In concrete given circumstances the use of a certain right by one person might conflict with another person's lawful right, as was indicated by my esteemed colleague, Barak J., in a different but related context (Temple Mount Loyalists v. Police Commander of the Jerusalem Region [24], at 455):

           

The freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship, to the extent that it is given concrete expression, is not an absolute freedom (see Cantwell v. State of Connecticut 310 U.S. 296 (1940). My right to pray does not allow me to trespass on my neighbour's property or to subject him to a nuisance. Freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is a relative freedom. It must be balanced against other rights and interests that similarly merit protection, such as private and public property and the freedom of movement. One of the interests to be considered is the public order and security. "The freedom of religion must be qualified: no society can accept the notion that its fundamental concepts as to public order may be frustrated for the sole reason that they are incompatible with the demands of a particular religion" (Rubinstein, op. cit., at 135). The point was elucidated by Justices Black and Douglas in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943), at 643-644:

 

No well-ordered society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the state, as to everything they will or will not do. The First Amendment does not go so far. Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which are... imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and pressing imminent dangers.

(See also H.C. 153/83[25]).

 

            If there is a substantial probability that the exercise of a certain right will jeopardise the public order and security in a concrete case, the competent statutory body may limit the practical exercise of the right in those circumstances. But this generates no general right of a statutory body, not so authorised by law, to nullify or qualify the essential right regardless of concrete factual circumstances from which arises such substantial probability of the public security being endangered. This means, for example, that a distinction must be made between a prohibition imposed by a competent agency against holding a demonstration in a certain place at a certain time, and a blanket prior prohibition of the right to demonstrate, in any place at any time, imposed on a defined group of people. Obviously a general prohibition of that nature can be determined only under a legislative provision that authorizes the statutory body to impose it (H. C. 337/81[5]). I need hardly reiterate that the a priori application of general prohibitions against the exercise of the basic freedoms has a direct and negative implication as regards the character and nature of the regime under which they are imposed.

 

            The subject can also be approached from a different angle, namely: the existence of a basic right does not grant immunity from legal proceedings to one who exercises it in contravention of the law. The right to demonstrate carries no permit to breach the public peace or to commit an assault, and a demonstrator who commits an act defined as a criminal offence will be prosecuted, when no general reliance upon the right of demonstration will save him. In other words, the general freedom offers no blanket license to perpetrate criminal acts. The converse is true, too. The right to take legal measures following the commission of a crime and the authority to restrict the exercise of rights in concrete cases, constituting criminal action or giving rise to a substantial probability of danger to the public peace, do not transform the authority in such cases into a general authority to prohibit and restrict in advance the various liberties of citizens, or of classes of citizens, unless the legislature has expressly enacted such authority. The authority to restrict civil rights - including the right to participate as a candidate in the Knesset elections - is not generated ex nihilo, nor is it a natural extension, in character or scope, of the authority to prevent crime and bring criminals to justice. The question of an a priori general withdrawal of a right is on a different level of discussion and of a different legal character. One should distinguish between the formal and the normative elements, and discuss each separately: the legal authority to impose a restriction is one matter; the import of the restriction in terms of its impact on individual liberties, is another matter.

           

            General prohibitions on enjoyment of the freedom of expression or the freedom of demonstration can only derive, in democratic states, from the exercise of an express constitutional power associated with special times of emergency. They are not in the category of a general and obvious inherent power which an authority may exercise without being so empowered by law. As aforesaid, no liberty may be denied in advance except in relation to a substantial and unavoidable probability of the commission of a criminal offence or an impairment of the public security or welfare (see H. C. 153/83[25]), and even then such power must derive from some statutory provision (for instance authorising the prohibition of a demonstration or the refusal of a licence to hold it, as may be provided in the statute concerned). Hence in Yeredor [1] the court, for the purpose of comparison, referred to a number of statutory provisions in English, American and German law which in one way or another imposed limitations on the right to be elected. In England and the United States, however, such general limitations are by and large related only to the candidate's criminal record, along the lines of what is laid down at the end of section 6 of Basic Law : The Knesset (presently we shall refer to special statutory provisions in the United States, as in the Smith Act).

 

            The Constitution of the Federal German Republic, on the other hand, makes express provision for the prohibition of political parties, which also affects the right to campaign for election (see P. Franz, "Unconstitutional and Outlawed Political Parties: A German-American Comparison", 5 B. C. Int'l & Comp. L Rev (1982) 51; H.W. Ruhrman, "KPD Verbotsurteil, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift" Dez. (1956) 1817). This provision is embodied in article 21(2) of the Basic Law of May 23, 1949 (Grundgesetz - BG B1 5.1) - the German Constitution. It prescribes that parties oriented by their purposes or the conduct of their supporters towards impairing the fundamental order of a free democracy or the removal or endangerment of the existence of the Republic, are unconstitutional, and entrusts the resolution of the unconstitutionality question to the Constitutional Court, leaving the particulars to be regulated by statute. To complete and supplement this constitutional provision the Law of Parties was enacted on July 24, 1967.

           

            Since the establishment of the Federal Republic the Constitutional Court has outlawed the existence of two parties under the above provision of the German Constitution: the neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (decision of October 23, 1952, 2 BVerf.GS. 1) and the Communist party (KPD) (decision of August 17, 1956, 5 BVerf. G. 85, rendered by the Constitutional Court after protracted hearings over a period of some four years; see Dr. T. Maunz, Grundgesetz, (Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Muenchen), Vol. II, pars. 4-21).

           

            Incidentally, the thesis that between the two World Wars the German Republic, based on the Weimar Constitution, lacked stability because it did not have the power and authority to ban political parties is unfounded. Under article 48(2) of the Weimar Constitution and the laws for the protection of the Republic (21.7.1922, I Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBI) 585; 2.6.1927, I RGBI 125; 25.3.1930, I RGBI 91), that obtained until the changes introduced by the Nazi regime, in Prussia alone some thirty parties and other political entities were banned between 1922 and 1929 (Maurer, "Das Verbot Politischer Parteien", 96 Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts (1971) 203, 206).

           

            It was not the absence of statutory power that was decisive in this area but a variety of deeper-seated factors, which need not be analysed here but have been mentioned before in another context (F.H. 9/77[21], at 361).

           

            18. (a) Article 21(2) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic confers on the Constitutional Court the power to ban the existence of a political party. Under the pertinent German case law such ban applies not only to the party banned, according to its actual name and identity at the time of the judicial-constitutional decision, but also to bodies and entities seeking to take its place (ersatz Organisationen) (Maunz, op. cit., at 12). A vague and general intention to impair the fundamental order is not sufficient ground to permit the banning of a party. An aggressive, militant and active stance is required, but the orientation of a party may be deduced from its declared purposes or the conduct of its supporters (ibid., at 38).

           

            In a democratic regime the dilemma often arises of an apparent conflict between maintaining freedom of expression and the desire to uphold democratic principles even in the face of those who seek to do away with them yet, to that end and for their own convenience, avail themselves of the very democratic principles against which they conspire. In this connection commentators on the above Constitution pointed out that

           

...it is possible to reconcile the contradictory principles of the amenability of the political regime to historical changes (on the one hand), and preservation of the existing regime (on the other hand) only by way of practical-political reason, with cautious advancement and gradual changes ensuring the continuing existence of the whole.

(3 Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (1976) 32).

 

            With regard to these problematics, the American legal scholar, L.H. Tribe, observed (see "Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech", 10 SW. U. L.Rev. (1978) 237, 239):

           

It should be clear that no satisfactory theory of free speech can presuppose or guarantee the permanent existence of any particular social system. For example, a free speech theory must permit evolution from a society built on the ideals of liberal individualism to a society aspiring to more communitarian visions - just as it must permit evolution from communitarianism to individualism.

 

            (b) The direction indicated by Tribe is clearly formulated, but its application to day-to-day political life is more difficult. That which is permitted ought also to imply that which is forbidden, but drawing the line between the permitted and forbidden is not easy, and not infrequently the fear will arise that something of the freedom of expression or association has been sacrificed to create a wider security margin and to block in advance any trend from which the actual danger that arises may be far from a substantial probability. The German Constitution set down clear bounds, positive and negative, that are not necessarily tied to an ex post facto examination of the purposes and activities of the political party. From the power to ban the existence of a party, where the conditions laid down in Article 21(2) are fulfilled, the Constitutional Court has deduced also what the absence of a banning provision means. In other words, the Constitutional Court concluded from the permissible exercise of article 21(2) that it may not impose prohibitions on a political party. A party whose existence has not been banned under article 21(2) is free to act as a lawful body for all purposes (provided, of course, it is not a camouflaged substitue for a banned body).

 

            As observed by Franz, op cit., at 63:

           

            ... almost as a counterweight to its enormous party-prohibition power, the court has found that this clause provides a "privilege" to a party, under which both the party and its officials, when lawfully acting on behalf of the party, are to be free from government discrimination and governmental intervention as long as the Constitutional Court has not found the party to be unconstitutional. Through this interpretation, Article 21(2) retains a continuing vitality, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court last prohibited a party over twenty years ago.

           

            The court based this "party-privilege" on the theory that a judgment of a party's unconstitutionality is operative not declarative. The court's judgment of a party's unconstitutionality is, in other words, a "performative utterance" that changes something in the world. A party becomes unconstitutional only when the court adjudges it so. The court does not "discover" unconstitutional parties and merely label them as such.

           

            The declaration of a party ban under the above Constitution is constitutive and not declarative. So long as the prohibition has not been pronounced, the activity of the party is deemed lawful, hence it is not possible to employ measures on grounds of past organisation, in the manner of the thesis posited in the American judgment in Dennis v. United States (1951) [54], with which we will deal below. It follows that a party may not be discriminated against or restricted in its activity so long as the Constitutional Court has not decided to exercise its power under Article 21(2). For this reason the German Constitutional Court invalidated the text of election laws that restricted in advance the prospects of parties which, in the view of the majority, constituted "a political danger to democracy" (decision of 9.3.76, 41 BVerf. G. 399) - with reference to a political organisation that had not been banned under Article 21(2).

           

            19. (a) The Constitution of the United States has no provision that permits the banning of political organisations because of their views, but the American legislator has adopted several measures in ordinary legislation to ban the existence of the U.S. Communist Party and to restrict the activities of organisations that are generally subversive. These are the main enactments:

           

            (1) The Smith Act of 1940 (18 U.S.C. (1946 ed), pars. 10, 11 - now 18 U.S.C.A. par. 2385, 54 Stat. 67D 671) defines a new criminal offence, i.e. -

           

            (2)(a) ... (1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

           

            In the fifties and sixties this provision was applied to bring criminal charges against officers and activists of the American Communist Party.

           

            (2) The Communist Control Act of 1954 (Pub. L. No. 83637; 68 Stat. 775 (1954)) rendered the existence of the Communist Party unlawful and prevented its participation in the Federal elections and in various state and local elections.

           

            (3) The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 proceeded from the declared premise that the Communist Party constitutes a clear and present danger to the security of the United States, and imposed a duty of registering bodies and organisations connected in any way with that party or its activities (on the interpretation of the provisions of this Act, see Communist Party v. Control Board (1961) [55]). It appears that this law has not been applied since the beginning of the fifties.

           

            (b) In reliance upon the Smith Act, legal proceedings were initiated in the fifties and early sixties against certain activists of the American Communist Party (Dennis v. United States [54]; Yates v. United States (1957) [56]).

           

            The outcome of these two cases differed as regards the final decision, but in both the court mapped out the guiding principles for construing the provisions dealing with the offence of organising for and advocating any purpose defined in section 2 of the Smith Act. The majority in the Dennis case [54] made it clear that a requirement for conviction, under the Act as phrased, is an unlawful intention to overthrow the government by force or violence. Freedom of expression gives no immunity from legal proceedings to those who support and advocate staging a revolution - in circumstances of a clear and present danger of commission of the forbidden act, that is, the overthrow of the government.

           

            Freedom of expression indeed rests on the assumption that -

           

            ...speech can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in the wisest governmental policies.

(Dennis [54], at 503, per Vinson C.J. , following Communications Assn. v. Douds [57], at 396.)

 

            At times, however, the conclusion is required that the immediate danger outweighs the wish to preserve freedom of expression (ibid, at 509, per Vinson C.J.):

           

            Overthrow of the government by force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech.

           

            As was held in that case, the government need not sit back and wait for a putsch to take place. If the authorities know that an entity aspiring to revolution is trying to educate its members and organise them in such manner that they will carry out their leaders' decision to commit an illegal act, that will require the authorities to take action as well. The argument that there is no occasion for the governmental authorities to be overconcerned since they in any event command sufficient forces to overcome any uprising, if such occurs, is not weighty enough to call for a protracted inactivity, to wait-and-see.

           

            (c) In the Dennis case [54], on the other hand, warnings were also voiced against excessive use of the "clear and present danger" test. Frankfurter J., who concurred in the majority opinion, referred to the comment of Prof. P.A. Freund (Understanding the Supreme Court, 27) that the test is not to be taken too simplistically, and that a number of factors must always be considered before exercise of the power, including, inter alia: the comparative gravity of the danger in relation to preservation of the values of freedom of expression and political activity; the possibility of employing more moderate means of control, and the need to examine in depth the specific intent accompanying the spoken words. Simplistic reliance on the above mentioned test is no substitute for the weighing of values.

           

            Black J. dissented from the majority opinion and viewed the conviction as a far-reaching violation of the freedom of expression. An assembly for the purpose of disseminating ideas and viewpoints ought not to have led, according to Justice Black's thesis, to conviction for conspiracy to overthrow the government. He added, in a mixed tone of regret and optimism (Dennis [54], at 581):

           

            Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these Communist Petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society.

           

            In other words, a decision to restrict the exercise of a given liberty should not be governed by momentary pressures or passions, and a more tolerant, long-term evaluation is required.

           

            Douglas J., also in the minority, sought to qualify the restriction on freedom of expression that flowed from the conviction of the accused conspirators in the Dennis case [54]. To give foundation to his point of view he referred, inter alia, to the comments of Brandeis J. in Whitney v. California (1927) [58], noting as follows (Dennis [54], at 585-586):

           

            The restraint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear, on more than passionate opposition against the speech, on more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is allowed. The classic statement of these conditions was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 376-377:

 

Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it... But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immeidately acted on... In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

 

...To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

(Emphasis added - M.S.)

 

          (d) In the Yates case [56] the meaning of the term "advocacy" was somewhat narrowed, in relation to the expression of opinions about overthrowing the government. The court distinguished between support of abstract ideas and advocacy to carry out illegal acts. As explained there, the Smith Act was not designed to prohibit beliefs and opinions, but only advocacy and incitement to the commission of acts.

         

          20. The above examination of some of the conclusions reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dennis [54] and Yates [56], is for comparative purposes alone, and is not exhaustive of the rules emerging from American case law in this area.

         

          One may learn from the legislative as well as the interpretative approach in the United States, that the starting premise there differs somewhat from the practice under the German Constitution. The latter creates an express and exclusive constitutional basis for the prohibition of a political entity, and once a political body has been declared illegal it follows that no act may be done on its behalf in the area of organisation, dissemination of views, activities and the like. The banned entity is ipso facto precluded from participating in an election campaign. As explained above, the provision in the German Constitution that enables the banning of a political party, reinforces indirectly the conclusion as to the general lawfulness of the political activity undertaken by a body that has not been so banned. For the present purpose one may add that whatever be the views of the party, so long as its existence has not been prohibited by the Constitutional Court under the legal order prevailing there, its participation in elections may not be prevented.

         

          The American approach, as expressed in the Smith Act, puts the emphasis on the character of the actions carried out from time to time. According to the nature of these it is determined whether or not an unlawful act has been committed, and in this respect a preliminary declaration as to the banning of the body is not a condition precedent for the institution of legal proceedings on account of the body's organisational activities.

         

          21. The foregoing demonstrates the nature of our subject as regards its general legal classification. We are concerned here with one of the fundamental political rights. The pertinent provisions of the statutory law embody no authorisation for its restriction on grounds of the purposes and nature of the candidates list. In other words, the court cannot rest its decision upon a statutory provision that delineates in advance the scope of its power and expressly empowers the court to prohibit the participation in elections of a given list or of a type of list. Hence the need of the court to consider (both at the time of giving its judgment in the Yeredor case [1], and now when dealing with the two lists in the present case) to what extent an innate authority is vested in the Central Elections Committee to restrict freedoms and narrow fundamental rights without having been expressly empowered to do so by statute.

 

          What are the powers of the Central Elections Committee and those of this court in the absence of statutory guidance? The principle of legality and the pursuit of the rule of law, which shrinks from restricting liberties without statutory sanction, as well as the special deference we must pay to the various freedoms - all these support the thesis that a fundamental right may not be restricted without statutory authority (H.C. 337/81[5], at 355). The proper and desirable fundamental aim is that rights should be maintained without limitation. Even when rights conflict one with the other, one must consider which of them prevails in the circumstances, or in what circumstances should the one prevail and in what circumstances should the other - and one has recourse to a value test that seeks to maintain the rights as far as possible side by side and not one at the expense of the other. This court cannot and ought not detach itself from the general legal context, and its interpretation is necessarily governed by the constitutional nature of the matter brought before it.

         

          The path taken by the majority in Yeredor [1] represented an optimal exercise of the court's power, and in light of its reasoning we can only conclude that in any less extreme factual situation, the majority of the court in Yeredor [1] also, would have refrained from disqualifying the list.

         

          In other words, the court faced a situation in which it had to fashion criteria ex nihilo for determining when the right to participate in elections was subject to restriction. In any event the court could only act on the premise that the existence of the state, its institutions and the elections thereto was a supreme necessity; and in so doing it had to be guided by the basic perspective that no liberty or right was to be prejudiced except in the most extreme cases. Only the far-reaching significance of the objective to liquidate the state engendered the court's readiness to assume a power amounting to the absolute denial of a right. It thus adopted a twofold test that integrates the supreme, basic constitutional concept of the existence of the state with the practical criterion of "substantial probability". That means that the court rested its decision on the (list's) illicit purpose that goes to the very root of (the state's) existence and on a test constructed in accord with the qualitative weight of the danger, its imminence and its clarity.

         

          What we have said above serves to answer the fourth question we earlier posed, i.e., to what extent, if at all, may the decision of the Supreme Court in Yeredor [1] be supplemented. That is, can the kinds of cases in which a list may be banned from participation in elections be added to by virtue of judicial decision alone, without prior statutory sanction?

 

          The clear answer to this question, which founded our decision of June 28, 1984, is in the negative. Only the polar conflict between the objective of eradicating the state, on the one hand, and the desire to participate in elections to state institutions, on the other, could have called forth a judicial determination resting on an ultimate principle and not requiring concrete legal substantiation founded on express statutory provision. Participation in fashioning the image of the state, through Knesset membership, on the part of those who contest its very existence, is a contradiction in terms, and it was this profound inner contradiction that freed the majority in Yeredor [1] from the limitation imposed by the absence of any written legislative endorsement. However, had it been attempted to add variously to that, and had there developed an expansive case law with new circumstances added and elaborated in which the right to participate in elections might be denied without statutory ground, for reasons unconnected with the above substantive contradiction, the result might have been the clearest injury to the character of the political regime under which we live, and subversive of the fundamental notions by which it is nourished. The addition of further grounds for disqualifying a list would not be of mere quantitative import, but would entail transition to another dimension. Instead of reliance on the fundamental value of the existence of the state, which alone can bridge the legal gap engendered by the lack of statutory guidance, recourse would be had to substantive evaluation or to a value judgment concerning the party list based on its platform. So to do requires express and clear legislation, which demarcates limits and does not leave matters for resolution by way of unqualified discretion. A prominent feature of the democratic regime is not merely that it establishes checks and balances between the different branches of government, but also that it refrains as far as possible from entrusting unlimited discretion to any particular branch. The executive, the legislature and the judiciary must all act within their constitutional confines in such a manner that the fundamental values serve them as their foundations as well as defined tests for exercising discretion.

         

     The danger in choosing an alternative course is not to be discounted. If a committee composed entirely according to political party affiliation considered itself free to decide, by the ordinary majority required, that one list or another is disqualified from participating in the elections, notwithstanding the lack of any enabling statutory authority or normative standards delimiting the committee's discretion and prescribing the circumstances for its exercise of such power - the result might be to reduce substantially the general scope of the political right to participate in elections. In this regard it matters little that initially the committee exercises its power only with respect to entities which are obnoxious to a majority of the public. In the absence of any binding qualifying standard, it would be no surprise if the first selection for disqualification is a list of the kind that a majority of the public finds objectionable. We learn from the experience in other countries that the first examples do indeed relate to the extreme cases, but a less than strict observance of the rule of law and the fundamental freedoms gradually calls forth less extreme examples, as is well known.

 

          Alongside the danger that democracy will be abused by those seeking its eradication or weakening, is the contrary danger that excessive anxiety to preserve democracy will render its principles purely theoretical and alienated from its practical significance, imposing multiple a priori limitations and prohibitions on liberties.

         

          One should bear in mind in this connection that the dilemma of the limitation of liberties, that frequently assails governmental authorities, generally does not arise in relation to the rights of bodies whose existence and ideas are not controversial. It arises most acutely when views are voiced that arouse firm objection on the part of the majority, and even outrage the feelings of listeners. The true test for the existence of a right arises not in times when the current events express composure, tolerance and understanding, but at moments of pain and vexation, when there is little sympathy for the person claiming a certain right or for his views. The individual's right to personal liberty and the preservation of his rights against unlawful imprisonment or bodily torture, does not arise for debate only upon investigation of a respectable citizen's complaint that he was mistakenly taken into custody and mistreated by a police officer. The right is also truly tested when persons suspected of murder or rape are arrested, taken to prison and interrogated there. Protection of the freedom of speech or freedom of demonstration is important not only when words of wisdom are spoken, quietly and reflectively, for the existence of the right is not problematic where there is civilised and calm debate. But it is far more difficult to preserve freedom of expression and similar or associated fundamental rights, where beliefs, opinions and views are aired of a nature found outrageous and reprehensible.

         

          We have seen that it is not sufficient to create a mere formal statutory basis for the authority of the Committee or this court. That is indeed an essential precondition for authority to restrict the right of candidacy in elections, but over and above that need, substantive normative definition of the nature of the discretion and its limits is also required. That is to say, the legislative act must consist of two components: one is satisfied by the formal act of vesting authority; the other - which must be treated with great care - is the definition of circumstances in which the authority may be exercised.

         

          The central problem is the need to determine standards founded on democratic beliefs and viewpoints that must be applied also to persons who do not adhere to democracy and its values - quite the contrary! Professor John Rawls of Harvard named this challenge "The Toleration of the Intolerant" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1971) p. 216).

 

            This matter must be treated with great circumspection. The statutory restriction of the right of party lists to contend in elections when they seek to jeopardise the very existence of the state, creates no special problems. But as one widens the circle encompassing the classes of bodies whose candidacy is sought to be inhibited in advance, one also widens the possible impact of such legislation on the continuing existence and realisation of our fundamental democratic concepts. Thus, as in Britain and in other countries, we have found no room to prohibit the candidacy of lists that would establish a political regime of the kind that exists in some other countries and differs radically from our own. Are there grounds to depart therefrom? Of course, this court will not encroach upon the domain of the legislature, yet it is proper to stress again the caution that is required in this regard, lest any proposed new legislation bring about a change in an unintended direction. In any event, I am not persuaded that there is any reason to discard past truths or to determine new standards that might substantially restrict any of those clear manifestations of the democratic political regime that we have accepted so far.

           

            The fundamental liberties - including freedom of expression, freedom of belief and equality in competing for public office, are all inherent in our governmental system and, therefore, in our legal system too. In every society one finds a variety of differing views and opinions; in a free society the diversity is manifest, in a totalitarian society the diversity is masked and concealed. Exchange of opinions, clarification of views, public debate, the urge to know, learn and convince - all these are essential tools in the service of every opinion, view and belief in a free society. The act of classifying citizens and distinguishing between them, some of whom are granted rights and others not, contradicts the truth that underlies the freedoms and, in its theoretical essence, manifests the same internal contradiction as does a person who decries democracy while utilising the rights it confers. Even with unpopular views and opinions must one contend and seek methods of persuasion. Prohibitions and restrictions are extreme devices of the last resort. The premise is that freedom of speech finds prominent expression when accorded also to those whose opinions appear to be mistaken and even dangerous (per Scrutton J. in the O'Brien case [48], at 382, and see Agranat J. in Kol Ha'am [26], at 878). Adopting a similar approach in Dennis v. U.S. [54], Frankfurter J. quoted these words of Sir. W. Haley, Director-General of the British Broadcasting Authority (at pp. 553-554):

           

...there are powerful forces in the world today misusing the privilege of liberty in order to destroy her. ... [But] no debate is ever permanently won by shutting one's ears or by even the most Draconian policy of silencing opponents. The debate must be won. And it must be won with full information. Where there are lies, they must be shown for what they are. Where there are errors, they must be refuted. It would be a major defeat if the enemies of democracy forced us to abandon our faith in the power of informed discussion and so brought us down to their own level.

           

            No person has a monopoly over truth, opinion and reason, and it has been said that what appears today to be simple and self-evident may seem uncertain tomorrow, or as it was put by Learned Hand: (The Spirit of Liberty, (New York, 2nd ed. 1953), p. 82):

           

            ...(the) certainties of today may become the superstitions of tomorrow. . we have no warrant of assurance save by everlasting readiness to test and test again...

           

            True, liberty does not mean licentiousness, and there are circumstances that necessitate the imposition of restraints, just as it is necessary to take legal measures against the commission of various crimes (Kol Ha'am [26]; Levi v. Southern District Police Commander [25]). However, the restrictions must not only be based on express statutory provision but, more importantly, they must also be imposed only as an extreme measure of last resort in face of a substantial probability of danger. There must always be a rational connection between the degree of danger and the measures taken; and even if the advocacy of a certain view raises just indignation, that is not sufficient to cause the total denial of a basic right. A democracy that acts to restrict freedoms when this is not an existential necessity, as indicated above, loses its spirit and force.

           

            In summary, the practical maintenance of fundamental liberties should not be influenced by transient events or the prevailing sentiments, and where restraints on fundamental rights are necessary, these must not be improvised and moulded according to momentary needs. In a state that regards the rule of law as the principal means for protecting its citizens from diverse internal dangers and believes in the moral power of democracy, a person's liberty may not be restricted except by law and may not be denied him merely on grounds of objection, however forceful, to the content of his statements. Restraints on liberties to prevent dangers that are a substantial probability is sometimes a cruel necessity, but the introduction and implementation of restrictions and prohibitions - except as an extreme measure of last resort in face of a "substantial probability" of danger - could in the long term have the same effect on the fundamental liberties, and cause them the same harm, as is threatened by the advocacy of their restriction on the part of those who object to the very existence of such freedoms.

           

            22. For the above reasons I decided at the time, together with my esteemed colleagues, to set aside the decisions of the Elections Committee.

           

            BEN-PORAT D.P. My esteemed colleague, Shamgar P., has dealt extensively and impressively with all aspects of the problem at the core of the two appeals before us. Accordingly, I shall content myself with a brief exposition of the lines of thought which guided me to concur in the opinion of my colleagues that the appeals should be admitted.

           

            After much thought I have reached the conclusion - which on the face of it might seem somewhat strange - that the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 (hereinafter - "the Elections Law") does not grant the Central Elections Committee (hereinafter - "the Committee") any authority to consider the worthiness of a given list to be a contestant in the elections by virtue of its platform or objectives. Its sole duty is to examine whether the list complies with the technical requirements enumerated in sections 6 and 7 of Basic Law: The Knesset (hereinafter - "the Basic Law") and in various sections of the Elections Law, inter alia: whether the candidate meets the conditions of age, citizenship, etc.; whether the list has the required number of signatures, and so on. Once a list is submitted in compliance with all the conditions, and at the proper time, it has been "lawfully submitted" and must be confirmed; if not - it must be rejected.

           

            I have said that on the surface my conclusion that the legislature entrusted the Committee with a purely technical-ministerial function, might seem somewhat "strange". For, on the one hand it may be urged that it is vital to prevent the infiltration of a dangerous list into the elected body, and it would be better therefore to recognize the power of the Committee to take this weighty consideration into account when asked to grant its approval to a list. On the other hand, however, it emerges from the case law to which I shall presently refer (and which, on the face of it, is unacceptable to me, with all due respect), that there is no judicial forum competent to set aside the Committee's approval of a list. On the contrary, if the Committee has approved a list, no matter how dangerous its purposes, that is the end of the matter and its decision cannot be questioned either by way of appeal or before the High Court of Justice. Recognition of a power in the Committee to grant a list final approval, to the exclusion of all judicial review, is an unacceptable result.

           

            It appears that the Kach List, submitted to the Committee for the elections to the Tenth (i.e. prior) Knesset, was approved by a majority vote, contrary to the view of the Committee chairman (Justice Etzioni) who favoured its disqualification. His opposition was based on certain publications on behalf of Kach, which stated:

           

            ...In order to deter those who are intent on seducing Jewish girls to assimilate we propose mandatory imprisonment for a term of five years without mitigation of sentence or reduction of the term of incarceration for every non-Jew who has sexual relations with a Jewess...

 

To prevent further deterioration we demand that an end be put to all plans of the Ministry of Education to encourage social relations between non-Jews and Jews and also to carry out schooling only in separate schools for Jews and Arabs... This is only by way of initial steps since it is clear that the true solution of the Kach program is to motivate the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael to migrate to their own countries.

 

            As already mentioned, a Committee majority prevailed over the chairman and decided to approve the list. At a further meeting, when those present were informed of the Attorney-General's position that certain publications of this list amounted to a criminal offence, the Committee stood by its decision.

           

            Four Israeli citizens, among them Mr. Moshe Negbi who pleaded on behalf of them all, felt impelled to counter what they considered an impending evil and petitioned the High Court of Justice (in H.C. 344/81[27], hereinafter - the Negbi case) for an order nisi against the Committee (and the Kach list) to show cause why it should not reverse its decision to approve the list, and disqualify it. Mr. Negbi was aware of section 137 of the Elections Law, which provides:

           

Any complaint as to an act or omission under this Law shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Committee, and, save as otherwise provided in this Law, no court shall entertain an application for relief relating to any such act or omission or to any decision or direction of the Central Committee, the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Committee, the chairman of the Committee, a District Committee or a Polling Committee.

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

            To overcome the difficulty, Mr. Negbi submitted the argument, rightly called "sharp", that section 137 presented no obstacle because the Committee's approval was in no any way based on the Elections Law but on what have been called supra-constitutional principles. In other words, according to the Elections Law the Committee must only consider whether the requisite conditions have been met, materially and technically, in order to deem the list "duly submitted", and no more.

           

            However, according to the rule of the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1], it is also empowered, so it was argued, to consider supra-constitutional considerations (for instance whether the list is in any way subversive of the existence of the state). Such a consideration, he submitted, goes beyond the strict confines of the Elections Law, hence it is also beyond the ambit of section 137 of the Elections Law and is amenable to judicial review by the High Court of Justice. On the other hand, if a supra-consitutional consideration is a matter within the scope of the Elections Law, then the Committee exceeded its power, which is confined entirely to a technical-ministerial examination, i.e. whether a list has been "duly submitted".

 

          This argument was rejected, the court holding as follows (ibid., at 839-840, per Barak J.):

         

The decision of the Central Elections Committee to approve or refuse to approve a list is taken by the Committee by virtue of the power vested in it under the Elections Law, according to which the candidates lists are submitted to the Elections Committee (section 57(i)), and the Committee either approves or refuses to approve them (sections 63 and 64)... The constitutional-or if you wish the "supra-constitutional" - principles dealt with in Yeredor case, E.A. 1/65, do not sever the act of the Elections Committee from the Elections Law, and the application of these principles by the Committee in actual practice is not excluded from the immunity prescribed in section 137 of the Elections Law. The legal principles laid down in the Yeredor case, E.A. 1/65, comprise a complex of relevant considerations which the Central Elections Committee may or even must take into account when acting under the Elections Law, and in doing so it is immune from judicial review.

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

          Further on it was stated that even if the Committee erred in exercising its discretion, this does not mean that the decision went beyond the scope of its power under the Elections Law. In the words of Barak J. (ibid. at 840):

         

...Just as a correct decision by the Committee is protected from judicial review, so too is an incorrect decision.

 

          Accordingly, it was on the basis of the immunity covering the decisions and acts of the Committee under section 137 of the Elections Law, that it was decided to dismiss the petition, which meant that the Committee's approval of the Kach list was final and could not be challenged, whether the decision was correct or erroneous. That is to say, even assuming that judicial review were to reveal that the platform or purposes of the Kach list call for its disqualification, it remains legislatively decreed (in light of section 137 of the Elections Law) that the Committee's approval is final and binding.

         

          I must confess that in reading the judgment I formed the impression that it does not distinguish between approval and non-approval by the Committee, as if in both cases its action is covered by the immunity of section 137 (see the passages cited above), but this is not so. To the contrary, the Elections Law does indeed "provide otherwise" (in the sense of section 137), regarding the Committee's refusal to approve a list in section 64(a), which reads:

 

            Where the Central Committee refuses to approve a candidates list, either wholly or as to the name of one of the candidates or the designation or letter of the list, it shall, not later than the 20th day before election day, notify its refusal to the representative of the list and his deputy, and they may, not later than the 18th day before election day, appeal to the Supreme Court against such refusal.

           

            In other words, the symmetry that seemingly emerges from the Negbi case [27], does not exist at all: while the approval of a list is immune from judicial review, the legislature did grant a right of appeal to a list that considers itself prejudiced by the Committee's refusal to approve it. That is to say, the legislature saw no need for judicial review in case of approval of a list, but sought to prevent the injustice that might be caused to a list when the Committee refuses to approve it. If we construe this asymmetry in light of the ruling in Negbi [27], we must inevitably conclude that a decision of the Committee to approve a list is conclusive, regardless of any differences among its members as to the worthiness of the list to campaign in the elections to the Knesset because of its unacceptable platform and that there is no way to challenge such approval, whether by way of appeal or by petition to the High Court of Justice. On the other hand, the Committee's decision to refuse to approve the list is subject to the list's right of appeal to the Supreme Court (section 64(a)).

           

            If this asymmetry relates solely to ministerial examination of the conditions prescribed by the Elections Law (and the Basic Law), it seems reasonable and is even logically compelling. Where a list has been approved, there is no one at all to appeal the decision (unless a minority of the Committee members be permitted to appeal against the majority). It is possible also to understand it is better that a list be allowed (even erroneously) to participate in the elections, than be disqualified without just cause. In this way the principles of democracy are preserved, by the fact that a list barred from contesting benefits from a right of appeal and judicial review of the refusal. On the other hand, were the Committee empowered to take into account superior principles (for example, the fact that the list's platform undermines the existence of the state) and not merely to conduct a ministerial examination, then such asymmetry would be puzzling. The approval of a list subversive of the existence of the state and seeking its annihilation is far more dangerous than a refusal to approve it. It is clear that ensuring the existence of the state takes precedence even over the principles of democracy. Hence, had the legislature intended to embody also such a consideration in the frame of the Elections Law, logic would dictate that it should confer the right of judicial review precisely and primarily when the Committee's decision is to approve a list that endangers state security. If one maintained otherwise, an erroneous decision by the Committee to approve a list that aspires to destroy the state could well be disastrous. Moreover, the natural forum for judicial review of a decision to approve a given list is, to the best of my understanding, the High Court of Justice and not an appellate instance, since there is no one to appeal such approval. Another possible course (for example) is to vest in the Attorney-General a right of appeal against a list's approval. But, as aforesaid, the immunity extended to the approval of a list by the Elections Committee is absolute.

 

          It should be noted that if we are dealing with superior principles, there is no reason to stop at the point where a list is in fact directly subversive, and there is good reason for also barring from the contest a list that aspires to a grave violation of basic democratic principles. Furthermore, without going into detail, it is at times difficult to establish a clear-cut division between crass subversion of the foundations of democracy and an aspiration to destroy the state.

         

          I am aware of the answer given by my esteemed colleague, Barak J., to this asymmetry. His view is that in case of the approval of a list which endangers the existence of the state, the Knesset will be impelled to act. I wonder why the refusal to approve such a list invokes judicial scrutiny, with all the haste necessitated by the impending elections, whereas its approval is a matter for the Knesset and not (for example) the High Court of Justice. In my opinion it is important to prevent such a list from entering the contest, and during the elections period it is difficult to expect the Knesset to find the time to resolve a matter of this kind. Moreover, if the Kach list had attained the "cut-off' percentage in the elections to the previous Knesset, when its participation was approved by the Committee, would the Central Elections Committee have been competent to refuse to approve its participation in the next elections? I wonder. Let us assume that a veteran Knesset faction submits a list to the Committee which is valid in all formal respects, but a majority of the Committee members think that by reason of its past conduct the list is subversive. Would the Committee be competent to refuse approval? The answer, to my mind, is that the Knesset - and it alone - has the power to outlaw an existing party faction. One should bear in mind that it was only by mere chance that the Kach list did not obtain the "cut-off" quota of votes in the previous elections to the Knesset and was not therefore a party-faction in the outgoing Knesset. This line of reasoning also supports my conclusion, that the function of the Committee is merely technical-ministerial. Incidentally, unlike my esteemed colleague, Barak J., I think that the platform of a party-faction would be sufficient ground for the competent body (if such existed) to disqualify it, and it would not be necessary to wait (if the platform is illegitimate) until that faction proves by its conduct that it indeed carries out the platform in practice.

         

            I am conscious of the weighty considerations that moved the majority Justices in Yeredor to hold that the power to disqualify a subversive list was a practical necessity. Those proceedings concerned an appeal against the Committee's refusal to approve the Socialist list, the court holding that a party list whose aim is to destroy the state cannot be allowed to participate in elections to the Israel house of representatives. To so decide as an appellate instance, it was obviously necessary for the court to recognise also (as it did) the Committee's power to disqualify such a list. The reason is simple: the function of an appellate instance, by its very nature, is to determine what decision should have been made by the body against which the appeal was brought. However, assuming that the list (Socialists) had been approved by the Committee (as was the Kach list in the elections to the Tenth Knesset), if only by a single decisive vote, it might be asked whether the immunity extending to such approval would have rendered that list any the less dangerous to the existence of the state? Yet such approval, as already indicated, has absolute immunity from judicial review.

           

            Had it been decided in the Negbi matter [27], that for lack of an appeal (or an appellant) against approval, the doors of the High Court of Justice were open to anyone with locus standi, I might have been inclined to accept the majority judgment in Yeredor [1], if only for the reason that both approval and refusal by the Committee could be judicially reviewed (whether by the High Court of Justice or an appellate instance). I might have been so "inclined" since one of two solutions is possible: "supra - constitutional" considerations are either extraneous to the Elections Law or they fall within its scope. In other words, if the procedure to challenge a Committee refusal (on ground of subversion) is by way of appeal, then the same procedure should also be available to challenge a Committee approval (say at the instance of the Attorney-General, but no such provision is made in the Law). In any event, if the High Court of Justice cannot be approached in case of approval of a list, yet we find ourselves faced as we are here with an appeal against the Committee's refusal, the question of asymmetry in the existing interpretation arises most acutely.

           

            In view of the rule laid down in Negbi [27], and so long as it remains unchanged, I cannot, with all due respect and modesty, see any way to adopt the solution according to which the danger posed by a particular list will be subject to judicial review when the Committee withholds its approval, but will not be reviewable precisely when the Committee approves the list, albeit mistakenly (that is, even when it is in fact dangerous and given to disqualification). I have read with interest the opinions of my esteemed colleagues but have not found in them any reference to the Negbi decision, nor a satisfactory answer to the question how any judicial instance (the High Court of Justice or an appeal court) can remedy the situation if the Elections Committee (whether for political reasons or erroneously) approves a list that aspires to annihilate the state. Such is the consequence of perpetuating the asymmetry. Thus the duty to disqualify the list is held by my esteemed colleague, Elon J., in paragraph 13 of his judgment, to be entrusted to the Central Elections Committee; but if the Committee fails to discharge its duty - how shall we rectify the error? Clearly the statement of my esteemed colleague (ibid.), "in that case we are obliged to disqualify it", is not given to implementation in the existing situation. Likewise, the distinction made by my esteemed colleagues between annihilation of the state and prejudice to democracy is in my humble opinion very questionable. Not only does grave prejudice to democracy pose a danger also to the state's existence, but is itself among the "superior principles" that merit consideration. I nevertheless reiterate, that in case of conflict between principles of democracy and security considerations affecting the very existence of the state, clearly the existence of the state must be given first priority, however important the other principles may be.

 

          In light of the situation I have described I hold to the opinion (as a lesser evil) - also expressed in the dissenting opinion of Cohn J. in Yeredor [1] - that the Elections Law charged the Committee with the sole function of examining compliance with the conditions prescribed by statute. That and no more. The legislature apparently believed - assuming it considered the matter at all - that the supra-constitutional aspects would be dealt with by the Knesset itself, if the need ever arose in the future. The danger that a problematic list would appear and also exceed the "cut-off" quotient of votes, apparently seemed slender or remote. Another possibility, that of petitioning the High Court of Justice in matters vitally affecting the State of Israel, was blocked by the above mentioned ruling in the Negbi case [27].

 

          Support for the attribution of a limited function to the Committee can be found in section 63 of the Elections Law, which provides:

         

          A candidates list duly submitted ... shall be approved by the Central Committee, which shall give notice of ... the approval ...

(Emphasis added - M.B.P.)

 

          Literally at least the text indicates a purely technical examination, as explained succinctly by Cohn J. in Yeredor ([1] at 376 ff.). In this manner the asymmetry loses its significance (as explained above).

         

          This state of affairs, however, is undesirable and in the present reality even intolerable. It is time to enact a law protecting the state against the entry of subversive lists into its legislative body. A state that wishes to survive and remain committed to the principles of democracy, must take care that these are not overwhelmed by destructive elements from within, all in the frame of legitimate campaigning, as it were, for election to the Knesset.

         

          On a previous occasion I agreed that even the majority in Yeredor [1], did not hold the Committee empowered to reject a list that sought to undermine the foundations of democracy, because the question never arose in that case. The fact that the discussion focused solely on the question of state subversion appears from Sussman J.'s description of the political purpose under discussion there (ibid., at 389):

 

          ...a purpose that aspires to annihilate the state, to bring catastrophe upon most of its inhabitants for whose sake it was established, and to form alliance with its enemies.

          As regards the Progressive List for Peace, the esteemed President has already explained in his opinion that privileged material is not "evidence". On the contrary, the meaning of the very privilege is that such evidence may not be proffered, disclosed or relied upon. Thus the preclusion of essential evidence in judicial proceedings because of privilege, will cause the litigant in need of that evidence to fail, for the reason that he is unable to bring evidence that is (so I assume) essential. In other words, privileged material lacks evidentiary force, and it is mistaken to think that the very privilege is in the nature of proof upon which the Committee or this court could rely to conclude that this list aims at annihilation of the state.

         

          Finally, a marginal observation, that I must not be understood to agree with what my esteemed colleague, Shamgar P., said in relation to F.H. 9/77[21] and C.A. 723/74[3]. Vieing with the interest of freedom of expression is the legitimate interest of the individual in his good reputation, and it seems to me that the majority judgment in that precedent expresses the correct balance between the two.

         

          In summary of my opinion that the Central Elections Committee - hence also this court sitting on appeal - is not competent to disqualify a list because it seeks to undermine the existence of the state, I shall restate my main considerations:

         

          A. The Elections Law grants a list a right of appeal to this court against the Committee's refusal to confirm its participation. On the other hand, it absolutely precludes any judicial review (whether by a court of appeal or the High Court of Justice) of a Committee decision approving a list's participation in the elections. In the precedents, too, no ground is found for such review of the Committee's approval (the Negbi case [27]).

         

          B. The above policy reflects the legislature's fear that a list might be wrongly disqualified, and its lack of concern over the possibility of a list's wrong approval. This policy is consonant only with a technical-ministerial function, according to which the Committee must confirm all lists duly submitted in that (formal) sense. An erroneous approval is a "windfall" for the list (because of the lack of review). But the Committee's mistaken refusal to approve the list, provides the list with a right of appeal.

 

            C. The concern that a list might be unlawfully excluded from the contest is consonant with a liberal approach and the desire to ensure wide participation in the electoral contest, as far as possible without hindrance or restriction.

           

            D. Had the legislature assigned to the Committee the function of examining the substance of a list's platform (whether, for instance, it is subversive of the state's existence), it should have designated as a first requirement a judicial or other forum with the power of review, particularly of, the approval of a list by the Committee. If the Committee were to err in such examination, it would be imperative to provide for the possibility of correcting the error, otherwise the security of the state might be endangered and a subversive list allowed to become part of the house of representatives. To leave the solution of the problem, if and when it arises, to the Knesset itself (as Barak J. suggests), is in my view, impractical, since in the midst of elections the Knesset cannot be expected to free itself for this task, and it is important, moreover, to prevent such a list's very entry into the contest.

           

            E. It follows from the above that to invest the Committee with a conclusive power to approve a list, as regards the legitimacy of its platform, is so unwise and unreasonable as to be inconceivable.

           

            F. If the Committee is competent to take into account not only technical but also substantive considerations and on that basis to disqualify a list (for instance) because of its subversive objectives, it is difficult to see how such power may be confined solely to the submission of a new list, as distinct from a list submitted by an outgoing and even longstanding Knesset party or faction. To the best of my understanding this matter is left to the Knesset itself.

           

            I wish to emphasise the immediate and urgent need for appropriate legislation to prevent the infiltration of subversive lists into the house of representatives, perhaps by extending the existing framework so as to embrace, besides direct danger to the existence of the state, also crass violations of basic democratic principles.

           

            ELON J. 1. When I agreed with my esteemed colleagues to allow the two appeals now before us, I did so in reliance upon the majority opinion in the Yeredor case [1]. The rule that emerges from that case is that the Elections Committee is competent to consider the election platform of a party list, and to disqualify that list from participating in elections to the Knesset, only when its platform negates the very existence of the State of Israel, or its integrity. In the present matter, that has not been proved to be the purpose of those promoting the Progressive List for Peace, as was well explained by the learned President. And as regards the Kach list, it falls entirely outside the reach of this ground for disqualification. I might have rested content with that explanation of my opinion - considering the particular circumstances accompanying this judgment, as well as the tradition that brevity is blessed: "And (Boaz) said unto the reapers*, the Lord be with you" (Ruth 2:4). But having regard to the opinions of my esteemed colleagues, I wish to add some further comments. In particular, I do not find their explanations of the Yeredor majority ruling fully exhaustive of its implications and I accordingly see need to elucidate it further. My esteemed colleague, Barak J., expands the Yeredor ruling to cover also a list that negates the democratic nature of the state. He further renders it a precondition to the disqualification of a list, for any reason whatever, that the realisation of that list's ideas is a reasonable possibility. I disagree with him on both scores. I also attach much importance to a Knesset enactment that will delimit the borders of the permitted and the forbidden respecting the matter in issue here - provided that enactment prescribes clear standards. I shall endeavour to explain briefly the reasons for my position in this matter.

 

            2. The majority ruling in the Yeredor matter [1] was a great innovation, and it cannot be explained or even understood in terms of our accepted methods of interpretation. It is well known that the methods of interpretation vary with the interpreter, and this court has said (see C.A. 2/77[28], at 11) -

           

... which is only natural and comprehensible, considering that the rule of the Jewish scholars, "the judge has only what his eyes see", applies primarily to the modes of interpreting the law and the rules for its construction. The view of one judge differs from that of another. All depends on the eyes that penetrate the very heart of the law, its aim and purpose, and not merely the superficial meaning of the text. Some adopt an expansive method of interpretation... others advocate restrictive and strict interpretation... Still others proceed along various middle paths in order to find the proper balance.

 

            From amongst these differing approaches that which commends itself to me holds (ibid., at 12). -

           

...Let not the judge be likened to a mountain palm, and let him not abstain from the task of construction, so long as it is possible, even if strained, to reconcile the matter with the written text, if by doing so a result contrary to the declared purpose of the legislature can be avoided...

 

            It has been said further (H.C. 188/63[29], at 350, per Berinson J.):

           

               We are interpreters and not simply linguists. A good interpreter of the law is one who carries out the legislature's will.

           

            I also accept that the interpretation of a statutory provision must heed the spirit of the law and of the entire legal system. The judge should not rest content with the act of deciding alone, but must adopt a decisory policy. As we said elsewhere (C.A. 32/81[30], at 767):

           

               Such a process of decision-making pursuant to legal policy, which prevails over the legal rule since it itself is part of the law, is a common phenomenon in the decisions of the courts.

           

            But there is a limit to all these methods of interpretation which the judge may not exceed or transgress: the will of the legislature, as it finds expression in its enactments. This prohibition against trespassing upon the domain of the legislature derives from the fundamental principles of the legal system concerning the boundaries of the three branches of government, and the judge may not enter the domain of the law-maker. Just as ascertainment of the legislature's will is one of the fundamental principles of legal policy, so too is it fundamental not to raise ourselves above the legislature but to accept its fiat.

           

            3. The Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version) (hereinafter - the Elections Law) prescribes the fundamental right of every Israeli citizen to be elected to the Knesset, the circumstances in which this right may be denied, and the various requirements concerning the submission of candidates lists and similar provisions (section 56 and chapter six of the Law). The conclusion to be drawn from all these provisions is that the legislature directed and intended that only on the given grounds, and no other, may the Committee refuse to approve an election list. One may not infer in any manner from these grounds - which are technical and formal - the existence of additional grounds, such as flow from examination of the content of a list's platform. There is good reason for the legislature's wish to limit the possibility of disqualifying a list to purely technical-formal grounds. On the one hand it wanted to safeguard the right to be elected, a fundamental right in the democratic regime; on the other, it lacked the confidence to entrust a power of disqualification - on grounds of a party list's substance and content, to a body mainly composed (except for its chairman) of party-political representatives, whose considerations might be ideological-political.

           

            Furthermore, the Elections Law prescribes, mandatorily, that a list meeting the enumerated requirements "shall be approved by the Central Committee" (section 63). In that situation, the court may not assume, nor confer upon the Elections Committee, a discretionary power to disqualify a list for reasons not specified in the Law, when that discretion was withheld by the legislator. We are not concerned here with the application of rules of interpretation, but with acceptance of the rule of law, which is paramount in our legal system.

 

            4. Prima facie this legal situation would lead to the conclusion reached by Cohn J. in the Yeredor case [1], and by my esteemed colleague, Ben Porat D.P., in the present matter, that there exists no competent power to disqualify a list whose platform embodies liquidation of the state and impairment of its territorial integrity. Indeed, had the majority in the Yeredor case reached its conclusion by applying the rules of interpretation as to the balancing of contradictory fundamental interests and the exercise of discretion in that process, I too would have thought that such power does not fall within the scope of the Committee's authority. But that was not the ground for the majority decision, which is clear from its reasoning. Thus Agranat P. said (ibid. p. 387):

           

I agree that ordinarily it is not for the Central Elections Committee, when exercising its power to decide upon approval of one or other list of candidates, to examine the candidates in detail or to question their political views. This rule, however, ceased to apply in the present matter the moment the attention of the Elections Committee had been drawn to the fact that the appellant list was to be identified with a group of people held by the High Court of Justice to be an illegal association, because its purpose was to deny utterly and absolutely the existence of the State of Israel in general, and its existence within its present borders in particular, and that in consequence the same group had been declared an illegal organisation. In view of these facts, the Central Committee was left no discretion or alternative but to decide against approving the appellant list.

(Emphasis added - M.E.)

 

And Sussman J., concurring with the President, added (at p. 389):

 

I also have no doubt that the Elections Law did not empower the Central Elections Committee to approve or refuse to approve a candidates list at its discretion. The opposite of such discretion is implied in section 23 of the said Law; nor is the grant of such discretion consistent with the composition of the Committee, which is a body composed entirely according to political criteria based on the representation in the outgoing Knesset - except for the chairman of the Committee, who is a justice of the Supreme Court. That was not, however, the question before us. The question as defined by the chairman of the Committee at its sitting on September 29, 1965 (p. 27 of the Committee's minutes), was whether the Committee may examine the legitimacy of the list according to a principle that is not written in the statute book.

(Emphasis added - M. E.)

 

            The disqualification of the list in Yeredor was not, therefore, a consequence of the exercise of discretion, or of a balancing of interests, or the rules of interpretation. The Committee "was left no discretion or alternative" but to disqualify the list. For what reason? Sussman J. goes on to say (at p. 390):

           

Just as a person does not have to agree to be killed, so also the state does not have to agree to be annihilated and wiped off the map. Judges may not sit with arms folded in despair at the absence of a positive law to invoke when a party asks them to assist in bringing an end to the state. Likewise no other state authority is required to serve as a tool in the hands of someone who has set the annihilation of the state as a goal, and perhaps has no other goal but that.

 

            It is a contradiction in terms to participate in elections to the legislature in order to abolish the legislature, for the Knesset cannot exist together with those who seek to destroy it. That is an innate contradiction which cannot be reconciled, and the matter is not at all contingent - as my esteemed colleague, Barak J., maintains - upon the existence of a "reasonable possibility" that the members of such list will achieve their evil design. (I shall refer again later to the "reasonable possibility" criterion.) And by virtue of "natural law" and "the right of self-defence of organised society" (per Sussman J., ibid.) there is no alternative but to prevent the list from carrying out its scheme. This lack of choice does not stem from any of the ordinary rules of interpretation, but is founded on a supreme imperative in Judaism: "and man shall live thereby - and not die thereby" (Leviticus 18:5, B.T. Yoma 85b). As for the reservation expressed by my colleague, Barak J., I should make it clear that the legislature may be presumed to expect that the court and every other state authority will have recourse to and apply this supreme imperative, which exists by virtue of natural law. It is hardly necessary to say that this presumption is given to rebuttal where the legislature provides explicitly and unequivocally that the Elections Committee need not or shall not disqualify a list, even when it contests the very existence of the state or its territorial integrity.

           

            5. As I said at the outset, the reasoning behind the Yeredor ruling marks a great innovation in our case law. It does not add a new rule to the ordinary modes of interpretation, but lays down a one-time principle superimposed on the ordinary modes of interpretation. This principle, by its very nature, is confined to the special case of an intent to put an end to the existence of the state or impair the integrity of its borders, and does not apply in any other case, no matter how reprehensible to us the list's political and cultural views. In every other situation the matter invokes the ordinary methods of interpretation, the principle of balancing interests and fundamental rights, the discretion of the body empowered to interpret and consider the matter. And since the legislature never conferred such discretion on any body whatever, the necessary conclusion is that except for the case of a party list whose object is to annihilate the state and impair its integrity - there is no one empowered to prevent any list, whatever its platform, from participating in Knesset elections.

 

            6. As we have seen, this material difference between a list that contests the very existence of the state and one that propounds any other kind of objectionable and questionable ideas, was central to the majority opinion in Yeredor. And just as their observations stress the necessity, as an "imperative of life", to disqualify a list intent on annihilating the state, so too they stress the enjoinder against disqualifying a list for other reasons relating to the content of its platform. Agranat P. dwelt on the point that in a democratic state it is not permissible to preclude the candidacy of any group of people seeking election to the Knesset in order to promote its own ends, except when the purpose is to annihilate the state, in which case it is imperative to disqualify the list (ibid., pp. 387-388). Sussman J. reiterated the point (ibid. p. 389):

           

An "unlawful purpose" in the present context does not mean a purpose that aspires to change the governmental order. That order is not sacrosanct, and its change is not a punishable crime. Rather an "unlawful purpose" is a purpose that aspires to annihilate the state, to bring catastrophe upon most of the inhabitants for whose sake it was established, and to form alliance with its enemies.

(Emphasis added - M.E.)

 

            A clear and exhaustive analysis of this distinction was made by Justice Landau, then serving as chairman of the Knesset Elections Committee, whose views were cited by his colleagues in the Yeredor decision ([1], at 372):

           

...I do not find it at all difficult to draw a line between this list - whose purposes were defined in its rules of association and parts whereof were also mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court - and other political parties who aspire to change the internal constitutional regime of the state... I find a vast difference, as between East and West, between a group of people which seeks to undermine the very existence of the state, or in any event its territorial integrity, and a party that acknowledges the political entity of the state but wishes to alter its internal regime.

 

            The question raised here was what will the morrow bring if we apply the same statutory provision against other parties. I know of no other party in the state against which I could apply the same provision...

 

Hence (ibid., at 374) -

 

...There is no dispute, and the learned chairman explained this to the Committee in unequivocal terms, that a list of candidates who oppose a certain statute and wish to repeal or amend it, or who oppose the composition of the existing government and wish to change it, and the like, is entirely legitimate, and no one would consider disqualifying it.

 

            7. These observations on the rules of democracy made by three past Presidents of the Supreme Court were valid when they were uttered and are even more apposite today. After the Yeredor decision, our legal system underwent a change, and in 1980 the Knesset enacted the Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, which now constitutes one of the basic laws of the State of Israel that form its underpinnings. The fundamental principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, that "the State of Israel ... will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel" which served only as basic guidelines but lacked full legal efficacy, became with the enactment of the Foundations of Law, fundamental legal principles, underlying the entire legal system in the state, namely: "the principles of freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage" (section 1 of the Law). It seems to me that there is no issue more amenable to examination in accordance with these principles of Israel's heritage than the one now before us.

           

            My esteemed colleagues expanded upon the views of legal scholars and philosophers in various legal and political systems on the issue of freedom of expression and opinion, whose views are not always in alignment with and sometimes even contradict each other. Such an examination is most important, since it helps to broaden the horizons and deepen the study of a subject common to all enlightened and progressive legal systems. And in this respect I may comment that in an examination of this kind one must always bear in mind the political background and the legal framework in which the statements are made, since these may vary from those in Israel. Since the different conceptions of scholars the world over have been well elaborated by my esteemed colleagues, I see no need to deal with them again. As I have indicated, we would do well to nourish the answer to our present problem on principles of the Jewish heritage. These we shall now seek to elucidate.

           

            First a preliminary remark. It is common knowledge that abundant differences of opinion and conflicting approaches mark also Jewish thought throughout the ages - even the halakhic system itself, as will be shown later. No party to litigation will find it difficult to glean from its recesses some support for his arguments or views. Such is the case in relation to every matter, including freedom of expression and opinion and other questions which will be dealt with below. It goes without saying that all these views and approaches have contributed together to deepening and enriching Jewish thought at all times. But whoever embarks upon the quest for knowledge must distinguish between statements made for particular times and circumstances and statements made for all times, between a generally accepted view and an exceptional one, and the like distinctions and implications. From this vast and abundant treasure, it is possible to gather much that is significant for the requirements of one's own generation and age, so as to answer contemporary needs and at the same time replenish the treasure of Jewish thought and the heritage of Israel. This reality and the duty to make such distinctions are of the essence of Jewish thought - and of the halakha itself - as is the nature of every conceptual system. The subject is multi-faceted, but this is not the occasion to expand on it (see Rabbi A.I. Kook, Eder HaYekar (Jerusalem, 1967) 13-28; see also M.R. Konvitz, Preface to Judaism and Human Rights (M.R. Konvitz, ed., New York, 1972) 11.)

 

            8. We shall have recourse to the heritage of Israel in relation to two questions: the principle of freedom of opinion and expression, and the legitimacy of the Kach list platform. I shall start with freedom of opinion and expression.

           

            The prophets of Israel and their prophecies have long served as the paradigm of impassioned and uncompromising rebuke of governmental abuse of might and power, and of a corrupt public or individual. They condemn oppression of the poor and exploitation of the widowed, the repression of individual and community rights, and deviation from the spirit and substance of the Torah and halakha. The firm stand and struggle of the prophets of Israel, even when the evoke severe and angry reactions, has been an inexhaustible source of inspiration in the struggle for freedom of expression and for contemporary enlightened democratic regimes. This is common knowledge, not in need of proof, and common currency for every student of political and democratic theory.

           

            I believe there is no more penetrating and encompassing description of the freedom of expression and the importance of every individual opinion - even that of a single individual - than the Talmudic statement regarding the disputes between Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai: "both are the words of the living God" (B.T. Eruvin 13b; J.T. Berakhot 1:4; J.T. Yevamot 1:6). For practical purposes, as a binding form of conduct, the halakha is according to Bet Hillel "because they were kindly and modest" (see Rashi to Eruvin 13b), but the views of Bet Shammai remained legitimate and material in the world of the halakha. This approach became characteristic of the halakha.

  

                      The "rebellious elder", even after the Sanhedrin - the highest tribunal of the nation - had ruled contrary to his opinion, could continue to hold to his views and "teach as he had done before", provided he did not actually rule accordingly (Mishna, Sanhedrin 11:2; B.T. Sanhedrin 86b). Moreover, a minority view might in time become generally accepted and acted upon. Rabbi Judah said: "The opinion of a single person is recorded along with that of the many, in case time makes it necessary to rely upon it" (Tosefta (Zuckermandel) "Eduyot 1:4; see also Mishna, Eduyot 1:5). Also:

         

Although the view of a single person is not accepted at first, and many disagree with him, at another time the majority may accept his reasoning and the law be decided accordingly, for the entire Torah was so given to Moses at times to forbid and at times to permit, and when he was asked: "until when shall we deliberate?" he answered: "follow the majority; because both are the living word of God".

(R. Samson of Sens, Talmudic scholar of France and Palestine at the turn of the 13th century, commentary to Mishna, Eduyot 1:5).

 

            And still striking today are the words of Akavia ben Mahalalel, who differed from his fellow scholars:

           

            Akavia ben Mahalalel testified concerning four matters. They said to him: "Akavia, withdraw these four things which you say, and we will make you presiding judge of the court". He said to them: "better I be called a fool all my days than I become even for one hour a wicked man before the Almighty; and let not men say: he withdrew his opinions for the sake of holding office".

(Mishna Eduyot 5:6; and see further M. Elon, Jewish Law, Its History, Sources and Principles (2d ed., Jerusalem, 1978) 870-878).

 

            This plurality of views is no negative phenomenon or defect, but is substantive to the world of the halakha. "There is no instability or shortcoming, such as to say that he causes more than one law to exist, Heaven forbid! On the contrary - such is the way of the Torah, and both are the words of the living God" (R. Hayyim ben Bezalel, introduction to Vikuah Mayim Hayyim (Prague, 16th century); and see in detail Elon, op. cit., at 1145-149). Moreover, plurality of views and approaches has the power to create harmony and unity out of difference. As the last of the codifiers, R. Yehiel Michal Epstein, said at the beginning of this century (Arukh Ha Shulhan, Hoshen Mishpat, Introduction):

           

            All the disputes of the Tannaim and the Amoraim, of the Gaonim and the codifiers, are truly the words of the living God, and all are aspects of the halakha. Indeed that is the glory of our pure and holy Torah, the entire Torah is a song, and the glory of a song is when it is sung in different voices. And this is the essence of its pleasantness.

           

            Indeed this basic conception that "both are the words of the living God" has at all times exerted a decisive influence on the mode and substance of halakhic codification as well as decision. I have dealt elsewhere with the subject and need not enlarge upon it here (Elon, op. cit., at 870, and the references in note 94).

           

            The plurality of views plays a material and fruitful role generally in the life of a just society. The rabbis even composed a special benediction to fit the secret encompassed in this notable phenomenon of a plurality of views in society: "If one sees a large crowd of people, one should say: Blessed is He who is wise in secrets; for neither their faces nor their thoughts are alike" (Tosefta (Zuckermandel), Berakhot 7: 5; and see B. T. Berakhot 58a). This is a blessing for wisdom and creativity: "Just as the nature of creation still renders the countenances of all people different, so also are we to believe that wisdom is still shared by men each differing from the other" (Vikuah Mayyim Hayyim, supra). Such a plurality of views should be respected by our leaders and government, as the following midrashic comments instructively indicate (Numbers Rabbah, Pinhas, 21:2; Tanhuma, Pinhas 10):

           

            Just as the countenances (of people) are not alike, so also their views, and each person has his own opinion ... Thus on the point of death Moses begged of God: "Master of the Universe, the views of every one are well known to you and your children's views are not all alike. When I depart from them, I pray, appoint them a leader who will be tolerant of each person's view".

           

            That is the lesson of leadership and government in the heritage of Israel - tolerance for every individual and every group, according to their opinions and outlooks. And this is the great secret of tolerance and listening to the other, and the great potency of the right of every individual and every group to express their opinions, that they are not only essential to an orderly and enlightened regime but also vital to its creative power. For in the real world "two opposing elements converge and fructify; how much more so in the spiritual world" (Rabbi A.I. Kook, HaNir (Jerusalem, 1909) 47; Eder HaYekar, 13 ff.)

           

            9. When in the plurality of opinions - itself welcome and vital - there is sounded a view that is injurious to society's spiritual and cultural foundation, that society must defend itself and its views. This end must be achieved first and foremost by persuasion and education. Education, as we all know, does not mean merely preaching to others, to those who have strayed from the desired path, but includes self-examination and reflection upon the spiritual and cultural image of that society in which thorns and thistles have sprung up. And when the need arises, a cultured society will employ legislation to punish those who incite and agitate to challenge and threaten it. Those who so deserve, whose transgression has been adequately proved before the judicial authorities, will be punished accordingly. The legislature, needless to say, may employ even the most extreme measure of silencing such views by denying those who express them the right to be elected to its own house; which means also, as indicated by my learned colleague, Shamgar P., denial of the right of those adhering to such views to vote for and elect persons of their choice. This is the legal right of the Knesset, which represents the will of the people, and I shall later make some observations as to the extent to which it is proper, in my view, for the legislature to exercise this right and enact such an extreme and far-reaching measure as withdrawal of the right to elect and be elected.

 

            As I said at the outset, in our democratic regime the denial of such a fundamental right does not lie with the judiciary in the absence of express authorization by the legislature - which represents the will of the people, and whence the judiciary draws its authority and power. If the court were to assume such power without legislative authorization, that itself would constitute an injury to an enlightened democracy, whose very foundation lies in the rule of the law - not of the legislature, the rule of justice - and not of the judge (see H.C. 152/82 [31], at 472-474; HC 234/84 [32], at 484). A further danger is threatened by the court's assumption of such power of disqualification, without express authority and guidance from the legislature, as to the scope and measure of such disqualification. The democratic character of the State of Israel found expression in the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of ensuring complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex, and guaranteeing freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. These principles serve as our guiding light. The Jewish character of the State of Israel found expression in the Declaration of Independence in the very definition of the state as a Jewish State, and not merely as a state of Jews, in the opening of its gates to Jewish immigration for Ingathering of Exiles (as was expressed later in the Law of Return, 5710-1950), and so on. These principles likewise serve to guide us. This constellation of principles forms part of the Jewish state's special make-up. Prominent Zionist thinkers of all trends and streams, Jews of varying world outlook, citizens of the State of Israel of different ethnic and religious belonging, have all reflected upon and continue to debate the practical significance and application of the principles of the Declaration of Independence in the Jewish state. How and by what standard will the court adjudge the content of a party platform that is not reconcilable with each and every one of the complex of principles set out in the Declaration of Independence?

  

                      My esteemed colleague, Barak J., says that disqualification of a list because its platform does not comport with the principles of democracy upon which the State of Israel is founded, may only be effected when there exists a reasonable possibility that the members of that list will indeed achieve their aims; and when the court examines the existence of such reasonable possibility it must "consider the entire social scene in all its various aspects. It should analyse social processes ... not only past events but also the probability of potential future happenings". Does the Court have the tools for this task, which rests entirely on social-sociological considerations and entails no judicial decision at all? According to what guidelines and rules will the court make its decision? Indeed, my esteemed colleague holds this examination to amount to "a prophecy in the guise of a legal decision", in the words of Jackson J. in the Dennis case. I would suggest that as judges we refrain from acting as prophets. The illustrious scholar, Maimonides, appositely remarks:

         

          The Holy One did not permit us to learn from the prophets [how to rule on the law - M. Elon] but from the scholars, the men of reasoning and opinion; and He did not say: "you shall come unto the prophet that shall be in those days" but "you shall come unto the priests and levites and unto the judge (that shall be in those days)".

(Deuteronomy 17:9) (Introduction to Commentary on the Mishnah; and see Elon, op. cit., at 224-225).

 

          If that is so in Jewish Law, which the Jewish scholars recognised as deriving from a supra-human source, all the more so in a legal system that is based entirely on wise men, men of reasoning and opinions, and applied by them. Moreover, as already indicated, the power to disqualify a list for social, ideological and sociological reasons is vested primarily in the Central Elections Committee, which - except for its chairman - is a political body par excellence, whose various members adhere each to his own long held political opinions, and it is much to be apprehended that they will not easily be open to considered and impartial deliberation of so conspicuous a politico-social issue.

         

          10. What I have said suffices to indicate the abundance of problems and difficulties that face us when we begin to consider disqualifying a list because of the content of its platform. From this viewpoint, the case of the Kach list hardly serves to illustrate the reality of these difficulties. For the content of its platform and the aspirations of its initiators and leaders are of such gravity, and so patently mischievous in terms of the cultural and democratic image of the State of Israel, that - had we been vested with the power of disqualification - we could conclude that it should not be allowed to participate with the other lists in campaigning for election to the Knesset. And as far as I am concerned, the most severe and serious aspect of the Kach platform - even more than its distorted outlook as to safeguarding the democratic foundations of the regime in the State of Israel - is that this list and its leaders seek support in the Torah and the halakha. Let us look at this aspect briefly.

 

            A basic element in Judaism is the idea that man was created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27). The Torah so opens, and from this concept the halakha derives certain fundamental principles regarding the value of man - every human being as such - his equality and the love of him:

           

            He [R. Akiva] used to say, beloved is man in that he was created in the image of God, but it is a mark of a greater love that it was made known to him that he had been created in the image of God, as it is said (Genesis 9:6), "For in the image of God made He man".

(Mishna, Avot 3:18).

 

            And it was by reason of this verse that the sons of Noah were prohibited from spilling blood, even before the Torah was given. Very instructive is the difference of opinion between two leading Tannaim as to the crowning value in human relations:

           

            "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself" [Leviticus 19:18], R. Akiva said, this is a major rule of the Torah. Ben Azai said, "This is the book of the generations of Adam" [on the day God created man He did so in the image of God-Genesis 5:1] – this is the greater rule.

(Sifra, Kedoshim, 4:10).

 

            According to R. Akiva the supreme value in human relations is love of one's fellow man; and according to Ben Azai, the supreme and preferred value is the equality of man, since every man was created in the image of God. And these two values - equality and love of one's fellow - came together as one at the hands of the Jewish nation, together forming a cornerstone of Judaism throughout its generations and history. It is also stated in connection with this fundamental issue :

           

Ben Azai said, "This is the book of the generations of Adam"-this is a major rule of the Torah; Rabbi Akiva said, "You shall love your neighbor as yourself"- that is a greater rule; so that people should not say, since I have been demeaned, my fellow man shall also be demeaned...Rabbi Tanhuma said: if you do so, then know whom you are demeaning - "in the image of God He created him".

(Genesis Rabbah, 24:7).

 

            The great rule of loving your neighbor as yourself is not just a matter of the heart, or an abstract love without commitment, but refers to a practical way of life. And Hillel formulated the rule thus: "Do not do to others what is hateful to yourself". The commentators have dwelt on the fact that this negative formulation lent the principle a meaning that makes it compatible with human nature:

           

For a man cannot in his heart love his neighbor as he loves his own self; and in any event R. Akiva has already taught us: your life comes before your neighbor's.

(Nachmanides, Leviticus 19:18).

 

            R. Akiva, for whom the predominant rule was "Love your neighbor as yourself", himself taught that in times of danger - to the individual and to the community - it may be that "your life comes before your neighbor's" (B.T. Bava Metzia 62a).

           

            The Jewish nation is enjoined to fight for its existence and to ward off those who conspire to harm and dispossess it of its sovereignty and its land. But the enemy too retains the value and dignity of a human being. When Jehoshaphat, king of Judea, was victorious over the Ammonites and Moabites, the people stood and sang "Praise the Lord for His mercy endures for ever" (2 Chronicles 20:21-22). On this the scholars commented (T.B. Megilla 10b):

           

R. Johanan said: Why are the words "for He is good" omitted from this thanksgiving [in relation to the corresponding phrase in Psalms 107:1]? Because the Holy One does not rejoice in the downfall of the wicked. And R. Johanan further said: what is the meaning of the verse "and one came not near the other all the night" [Exodus 14:20; the reference is to the Israelites and the Egyptians at the crossing of the Red Sea]? The ministering angels wanted to chant their hymns, but the Holy One said: "the work of my hands is being drowned in the sea and shall you chant hymns?"

 

            My esteemed colleague, Barak J. , referred to the instructive observations of Rabbi A.I. Kook on the love of mankind. Rabbi Kook indeed uttered profound words on this important theme in Judaism. In the chapter from which Barak J. quotes, he went on to say (Middot Hare'ayah, Ahavah 5):

           

            The love of mankind should be alive in the heart and soul, the love of the individual and the love of all peoples, the desire for their uplifting and their spiritual and material welfare... An internal love from the recesses of the heart and soul, to benefit all peoples, improve their possessions and render their lives blissful...

 

            Also illuminating in this context and in Judaism generally, is R. Kook's teaching on the relationship between the "natural, customary morality" of every cultured person and the moral demands of Judaism:

           

The love of mankind needs much fostering, to be expanded as befits it, against the apparent superficiality of its inadequate application in terms of the Torah and customary morality, as if there can be conflict or at least indifference regarding such love, which ought always to fill the chambers of the soul.

(Ibid., Ahavah 10; and cf. Orot HaKodesh, vol. III, p. 318.)

 

            Thus the Torah and customary morality complement and reinforce one another as a dual requirement in nurturing and educating the Jew.

           

It is forbidden that the fear of Heaven suppress the natural morality of mankind, for then the fear of Heaven is no longer pure. A sign of pure fear of Heaven is when natural morality, inherent in the very nature of man, proceeds to rise to even loftier heights than it might otherwise reach. But if fear of Heaven is portrayed in such fashion that life would have a greater tendency to do good and to benefit individuals and society without its influence, and the force of that active agent diminishes under its influence, such fear of Heaven is deficient.

(Orot HaKodesh, vol. III, Preface, paragraph 11, p. 27).

 

And further on (ibid., paragraph 16, p. 32):

 

The visible natural morality must be manifested before the substantive paths of the concealed superior morality can be revealed in the soul. Only in this manner, by establishing first the firm basic foundation, can we erect the upper structure, the summit of which is in heaven. The wider and deeper the roots of the tree spread, the fresher, stronger and more fruitful the branches, and its leaves will not wither.

 

            The demand of morality in Judaism adds to and complements the moral conduct required of civilized and enlightened society, and whoever ignores the latter is deficient in the former.

           

            11. These fundamental perceptions also determined the attitude of Jewish law to a national minority living under Jewish rule. A series of basic Jewish precepts are grounded in the Torah in the historical memory of the nation, in its suffering as a minority under the rule of others: "For you were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Exodus 23:9; Leviticus 19:30; 22:20; 29:9 and so on).

           

 Furthermore, "You shall not abhor an Egyptian, because you were a stranger in his land" (Deut. 23:8). Racism, which has brought so much suffering to mankind, even to this very day, is alien to Judaism, and has been categorically rejected by it. A foreigner who joins the Jewish people becomes one of its members, with all rights and obligations: "You shall have one statute, both for the stranger and for him that is born in the land" (Numbers 9:14); "Neither let the alien that has joined himself to the Lord say - The Lord will surely separate me from His people ... For My house shall be called a house of prayer for all peoples" (Isaiah 56: 37). This applies not only to the future but even to the past. And thus wrote Maimonides in response to R. Ovadiah Ger Tzedek (a righteous convert) (Responsa (Freiman ed.) 369):

 

            Every one who converts, down to the end of days, and every one who professes the unity of the Holy One blessed be He as written in the Torah, is a disciple of our Patriarch Abraham ... and all are members of his family... No difference at all exists between us and them in any respect. And let not your pedigree be slight in your eyes; if our pedigree relates to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, yours relates to Him who created the world by his word.

           

            The Jewish people does not "gather souls" in order to draw members of other nations into its fold (Genesis 12:5; Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 8:10). This serves to express, among other things, the protection which Judaism gives to minorities to live by their own culture and heritage. The practice, common in ancient - and in less ancient times - of a minority's assimilation and absorbtion into the majority according to the principle of cujus regio cujus religio by virtue of which many minorities were persecuted until they adopted under duress the religion of the ruling majority, was categorically rejected in the world of the halakha. For this reason, when Israel was most powerful the bet din did not accept converts throughout the times of David and Solomon. "In the time of David -in case they came out of fear, and in the time of Solomon-in case they came out of attraction to the greatness and goodness of the kingdom of Israel" (Yad, Hilkhot lssurei Bi'ah 3:15).

           

            The halakha defined a member of a national minority as possessing the status of a "resident alien" (ger toshav) and the only condition that attached to that status was observance of the seven Noachide Laws, i.e., those elementary obligations of law and order which all civilised peoples are commanded to observe, and which the scholars regarded as a kind of universal natural justice (Maimonides, Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah 14:7; B.T. Sanhedrin 56a; Nahmanides, Commentary to Genesis 34:13; and cf. Elon, op. cit., 183 ff.). A national minority is entitled to all the civil and political rights enjoyed by other residents: "...A stranger and a sojourner shall live with you" (Leviticus 25:35); "Resident aliens are treated with courtesy and loving-kindness as an Israelite, since we are commanded to sustain their life ... and since you are commanded to sustain the life of a resident alien, he is healed gratuitously" (Yad Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12; Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 10:2). And the scholars also said (Deut. 23:17 and Tractate Gerim 3:4):

 

A resident alien shall not be settled in border districts nor in poor habitation but in a good residence in the centre of the Land of Israel where he can pursue his skills, as it is written: he shall dwell with you, in the midst of you, in the place which he shall choose within one of your gates, where it pleases him best, and you shall not oppress him.

 

          The fundamental guiding principles as regards the attitude of the Jewish State to its overall population, are the fundamental principles of the halakha in general, as pointed out by Maimonides (Yad, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:12):

         

For it is stated: The Lord is good to all and His tender mercies extend to all His works, and further: Its [the Torah's] ways are ways of pleasantness and all its paths are peace.

 

          I have cited just a small portion of the halakhic rules of government affecting minority rights in a Jewish state, and need not elaborate any further here.

         

          I shall end these observations with the inspiring words of Maimonides on the aspiration of the generations for messianic times, which "differ from present times solely in servitude to earthly governmental power" (Hilkhot Melakhim 12:2, relying on Samuel's statements in B.T. Sanhedrin 91b, 99a and elsewhere). He writes:

         

The scholars and the prophets did not yearn for messianic times that they might dominate the world or rule over the gentiles, nor to be exalted by the nations and to eat, drink and rejoice - but to be free for the study of Torah and its wisdom without oppression or disturbance - to gain everlasting life, as we explained in the laws relating to repentance. In those times there shall be neither famine nor war, neither jealousy nor strife - goodness will be abundant and all pleasant things profuse. The whole world will be preoccupied only to know the Lord. Hence Israelites will be wise and will know things that lie obscure and attain understanding of their Creator according to their human capacity, as it is written, "For the earth shall be full of knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea". (Isaiah 11:9) (Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim, 12:45).

 

          Israel's sovereignty and Jewish government - not in order to dominate the world or rule over the gentiles, but so that Israel no longer suffer oppression, and may engage in the study of Torah and its wisdom, and the earth may be filled with knowledge. These significant words of the greatest of Jewish thinkers embody the aim and image of the Jewish State.

 

            12. The content of the Kach platform and the purpose of its promoters and leaders, as reflected in the material presented to us, stand in blatant contrast to the world of Judaism - its ways and perspectives, to the past of the Jewish nation and its future aspirations. They contradict absolutely the fundamental principles of human and national morality, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel, and the very foundations of present-day enlightened democracies. They come to transplant in the Jewish State notions and deeds of the most decadent of nations. This phenomenon should cause grave concern among the people who dwell in Zion. This court is charged with the preservation of the law and its interpretation, and the duty of inculcating the values of Judaism and civilization, of the dignity of man and the equality of all who are created in the divine image, rests primarily upon those whom the legislature and the executive branch have chosen for the task. When, however, such a seriously dangerous phenomenon is brought to our attention, we may not refrain from sounding the alarm against the ruinous effects of its possible spread upon the character, image and future of the Jewish State. The remedy lies, in the first place, in a reassessment of the ways of educators and pupils alike, in all walks of our society.

 

            13. It was not, therefore, for lack of sensitivity to the gravity of the Kach list phenomenon that we refrained from endorsing its disqualification, but because the legislature has not empowered us or the Central Elections Committee to disqualify a list from participating in elections to the Knesset on ground of the content of its platform. The only exception is a list that avowedly seeks to abolish the sovereignty of the state or impair the integrity of its borders, in which case we - and any other competent state body - are bound to disqualify it, by virtue of the paramount principle "thou shalt live by them", as we explained at the outset.

 

            The consequence of not disqualifying the Kach list is difficult and saddening, considering the content of its platform, but it is right and proper not only in terms of our respect for the rule of law but also because it precludes the drawing of undesirable conclusions in such an important and complex matter. As I have already indicated, such a fateful and farreaching determination as denial of the right to be elected to the Knesset, on ideological grounds, should properly be made with the approval of a majority of the public, through the legislature, with clear limitations and definitions provided. A general legislative power that sanctions disqualification of a list because its promoters or its platform are opposed to the democratic principles on which the State of Israel rests or which are to be found in the Declaration of Independence, or any other like general and indeterminate formulation, would be so inherently uncertain and vague that this court could not exercise it in actual fact. This certainly applies to a body such as the Central Elections Committee, which is mainly composed (apart from its chairman) of members with defined political views and inclinations. Democratic principles, including those enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, are by their very nature subject to interpretation in different ways, and incorporate different, sometimes contradictory, world views and fundamental perspectives. So it is in the enlightened democracies in general, and so it is in our society in particular, where social, religious, economic and constitutional problems are legitimate subjects of controversy.

 

            Here it is appropriate to return to the Yeredor matter [1], and cite again the comments concerning the vast difference between an entity that undermines the very existence of the state, or in any event its territorial integrity, and a faction that acknowledges the existence of the state but desires to change its internal regime (at p. 372); or opposes a particular statute and seeks its repeal or amendment (at 374); or "aspires to change the governmental order, an order that is not sacrosanct, and its change not a punishable offence" (per Sussman P., at 389). These observations alone are enough to illustrate the objective as well as subjective difficulty of the court in circumscribing the permitted and the forbidden - the court having the function and authority to rule on the interpretation of a statutory enactment, its purpose and application, and not on an issue that turns entirely on world views, the recesses of the heart, and the social image of the regime. In the view of my esteemed colleague, Barak J., the existing situation is preferable to "unbalanced legislation". My view is otherwise, and in paraphrase of my esteemed colleague I would say that detailed legislation is preferable to adjudication that may well be unbalanced. Only the legislature may and can prescribe the criterion, from among the principles of democracy and the Declaration of Independence, which when disregarded justifies the disqualification of a list, and what shall be the degree of the violation and the likelihood of the danger from the violation of such principle that is required for the purpose of disqualification. Such clear determinations are the preserve of the legislature as well as its duty.

           

            That is certainly no easy task, and perhaps its difficulty accounts for the legislature's silence so far. But this task is the legislature's entirely, from which it cannot be absolved. The grave and unwelcome phenomena apparent from the appeal before us, in terms of the image and character of our state, call for the legislature to accomplish this vital task without further delay.

           

            14. In conclusion, for the reasons given above, I concur in the opinion of my esteemed colleagues that the two appeals should be allowed. The appeal of the Progressive List for Peace - because it was not proven that it seeks to liquidate the State of Israel or impair the integrity of its borders, thus leaving no occasion to apply the Yeredor ruling. And in the case of the Kach list - because it falls outside the ambit of the Yeredor ruling, since neither we nor the Central Elections Committee are empowered to disqualify it.

           

            BARAK J. 1. I have read with great interest the comprehensive and important judgment of my colleague, Shamgar P. and I concur, not only in the result reached by him, which we have already announced, but also in the main points of his reasoning. Like him, I am of the opinion that the ratio decidendi of E.A. 1/65[1] (hereinafter "the Yeredor ruling") is confined to a refusal to confirm a list that contests the very existence of the State and wishes to annihilate it. The application of this test was not argued at all with respect to the Kach list, and it was argued but not proven with respect to the Progressive List for Peace. In this matter I believe that the burden of proof lies with the party arguing for the refusal of a list's confirmation, and that it must be discharged by competent "administrative evidence", that is, "such testimony as any reasonable person would consider to be of probative value and upon which he would rely to a greater or lesser degree" (per Agranat P. in H.C. 442/71[13], at 357; H.C. 297/ 82[20], at 37). If I nevertheless choose to add some reflections of my own, it is to elucidate my position on the question whether the Yeredor ruling should be extended and applied also to a case in which the election platform of the list rejects, not the very existence of the state, but its democratic character. Such elucidation would have been relatively simple had I been of the opinion, held by Cohn J. in Yeredor and by Ben-Porat D.P. in the present matter, that the Elections Committee does not have any authority to refuse to confirm a list on grounds of the content of its election platform. That is not my view. I am of the opinion, as was the majority view in the Yeredor case, that the Elections Committee is authorized to refuse confirmation of a list by reason of the content of its platform. Moreover, I am of the opinion that for our present purpose one should not distinguish between a platform that negates the existence of the state and a platform that recognises the existence of the state but disavows its democratic character. At the same time, however, my approach is that the Committee should exercise this authority - with respect to both a platform that rejects the existence of the state and one that rejects its democratic character - only where there is a reasonable possibility that these ideas will be realized. Since such a possibility was by no means established in the present matter, I formed the opinion that there was no ground for refusing to confirm the participation of the Kach list in the elections. My approach thus differs from both the majority and the minority approaches in the Yeredor case. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that it is sufficient for the list to reject the existence of the state in order not to confirm its participation in the elections. Unlike the minority, I do not believe that the Elections Committee has no authority at all to refuse confirmation of a list whose platform rejects the existence of the state. As already indicated, my opinion is that the authority of non-confirmation exists with respect to both a platform that rejects the existence of the state and one that rejects its democratic character; but the exercise of such authority in both cases must be on ground of a reasonable possibility that the "threat"' will be translated into practise. It appears to me that my approach is very similar to that of my colleague, the President, who also stresses a number of times that the authority might inhere in special circumstances where there is a substantial probability that the exercise of a fundamental civil right will cause harm that is sought to be prevented. Yet my colleague is not prepared to follow my approach entirely, so that I find it necessary to set forth my reasoning. I shall begin with an analysis of the ruling in Yeredor [1], with an examination of the law as regards an election list that negates the existence of the state, and thereafter proceed to examine the issue before us of a list that negates the democratic character of the state.

 

            The "Yeredor" Rule: Negating the Existence of the State

           

            2. As we have seen, the question in Yeredor [1] was whether the Elections Committee may competently refuse to confirm a list for participation in the elections if it negates the very existence of the state. On this matter opinions were divided. The dissenting judge, Cohn J., was of the opinion that the Elections Committee is not vested with such authority. It appears that even those who question the correctness of this position do not deny the legitimacy of Cohn J.'s approach. It is well founded on accepted legal arguments in our "interpretative community". It relies, on the one hand, on the legislator's silence and, on the other hand, on a reluctance to read into the law a broad authority which would contradict fundamental principles of our system as regards the citizen's basic right to express himself and to vote. Arguments of this kind are often reflected in this court's rulings, they have significant force and power (see, e.g. , H.C. 337/ 81[5]), and I myself have recourse to them and accept their validity. But the approach of Cohn J. is not the only possible one. That of the majority judges - Agranat P. and Sussman J. - and of Justice Landau when heading the Elections Committee, is likewise well-founded in accepted legal arguments in our "interpretative community". According to this approach, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 (hereinafter - "the Elections Law") established the Elections Committee and granted it powers to refuse to confirm a list on certain grounds. These grounds can be supplemented, by way of interpretation, which addition is required by the basic principles of our system - principles which serve in the interpretation of statutes. Where the legislature provides that a list "shall be confirmed by the Central Committee" (section 63 of the Elections Law), the court, in applying the interpretative rules of its system, may determine that it is dealing with a directive which confers authority, and despite the mandatory language used, the Elections Committee must necessarily be conceded a discretionary power in order that the fundamental principles of our system be realized. It is true that the linguistic foundation for this interpretative result is weak, but it is decreed by the very fact that we are dealing with the interpretation of a basic constitutional provision. Such basic provisions should be construed according to a "spacious view" - in the words of Frankfurter J. in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer [59], quoted by Agranat D.P. in F.H. 13/60[33] at 442 - and on the understanding that we are dealing with a provision that determines a way of life. The interpretation of an ordinary legislative provision is not the same as that of a fundamental constitutional provision. Familiar to us is the statement made by Justice Marshall, upon fashioning the American constitutional perspective, that when interpreting the constitution it should always be borne in mind that it is not an ordinary document - "it is a constitution we are expounding" (M'Culloch v. Maryland [60]). We are concerned with a human endeavour that must adapt itself to a changing reality. We have said that an ordinary statute is not a [linguistic] fortress to be conquered with the help of a dictionary but rather the cloak of a living legislative idea (Cr.A. 787/79[34], at 427); this approach should guide us a fortiori in interpreting provisions of a constitutional character. In the well-known words of Holmes J. (Gompers v. U.S. [61]):

 

            The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions... Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.

           

            We may, therefore, construe the wording of a basic constitutional provision that determines a mandatory duty, in a manner that gives discretion to the authorized person - if such discretion is essential to realising the fundamental principles of the system. The American courts faced a similar problem in interpreting the First Amendment to the Constitution which states in unequivocal language that "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." The Supreme Court did not hesitate to hold, in a long line of precedents, that despite the unequivocal language which denies Congress any discretion in the matter, it does have authority to limit freedom of speech and the press in certain cases. (See Lahav and Kretzmer, "The Charter of Civil Rights in Israel: Constitutional Gain or Illusion", 7 Mishpatim 154 (1976).) Indeed, our own Supreme Court has often taken this very approach that narrows or broadens the statutory language so as to realize the fundamental principles of our legal system (Cr. A. 696/81[35] at 574). For a legislative enactment in general, and a fundamental statutory provision in particular, is not a one-time act isolated from the general way of life. The statute gains substance within the framework of a given political and legal system. It constitutes one brick in a whole structure built on the given foundations of that regime and law, which constitute the "primary concepts of that society" (H.C. 163/57[36] at 1051). When a statute provides that a certain person shall decide every dispute, it is clear that he is not obliged to hear a dispute in which he has a personal interest. We interpret the general mandatory language against the background of our constitutional regime and the principles of equality, justice, fairness and morality in our system. Their application narrows the scope of the general language, or expands that of specific language, and this can transform discretionary authority into mandatory authority, and mandatory authority into discretionary authority. "The law of the people", said Agranat P. "must be deduced in the context of its national way of life" (H.C. 73/53[26] at 884). Therefore, every law must be interpreted in the light of the Declaration of Independence, which expresses "the vision and credo of the people" (Smoira P. in H.C. 10/48[37] at 89). Justice H. Cohn himself said in similar vein:

 

When we talk of an enlightened democratic legislature, guided by good practices, lofty principles and concepts of justice, not only are we not allowed to assume that it has abolished them, but its enactments must be faithfully interpreted on the assumption that any law passed by it has been adapted to the framework of the existing "law', in all its multiple and varied components.

(Cohn, "Faithful Interpretation in Three Senses", 7 Mishpatim 5, 6).

 

            According to this approach, the majority position in Yeredor [1] is founded on a firm interpretative base. The existence of the state, its "continuity and perpetuity" - in the words of Agranat P. in Yeredor - is certainly a fundamental principle of our legal system (cf. Pound, "A Survey of Social Interests", 57 Harv.L.Rev. 1). The Elections Law should be interpreted in light of this principle, by virtue of which the authority of the Elections Committee may be expanded so as to allow it not to confirm the participation in elections of a list that rejects the very existence of the state and aspires to its annihilation.

           

            3. It appears, therefore, that both the majority and the minority opinions in Yeredor are possible from an interpretative point of view. Thus we face a real dilemma in which the judge must exercise the "sovereign prerogative of choice" (see Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (1952) 239). How is this choice to be made? It seems to me that the key lies in the fundamental principles of the system, which both the majority and the minority relied upon. The majority put its trust in the principle of the state's continuity and perpetuity; the minority in the principle of the citizen's freedom to vote and be elected. It appears to me that the correct course of interpretation must take into account all principles, those relied upon by the proponents of both views. Indeed, I believe that the interpreter-judge should not adopt a particular fundamental principle and neglect another. The judge should have recourse to all the fundamental principles and not choose only those that commend themselves to him as proper.

           

            4. One might ask: how can one take into account all the fundamental principles when some of them lead to a narrow interpretation that denies the Committee's authority (as in the minority opinion) whereas others lead to a broad interpretation that extends authority to the Committee (as in the majority opinion)? What should a judge do when the fundamental principles are contradictory and lead to different constructions in a given situation? This is not a new phenomenon, nor is it peculiar to the case before us. The judge often encounters fundamental values that contradict one another. It is not unusual to find one principle in conflict with another and a thesis opposed by its antithesis. Justice Cardozo commented:

 

Again the task of judging is found to be a choice between antithetical extremes. We seem to see the working of an Hegelian philosophy of history whereby the tendency of every principle is to create its own antithesis or rival.

(Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, (1928) 62).

 

            Indeed, the basic tenets of the system often march in pairs, each having its own direction. (See Dickinson, "The Law Behind the Law", 20 Col.L.Rev. 113,123.) The decisions of the Supreme Court bear testimony to this phenomenon. Thus, for instance, the principle of state security, public order and public security competes with those of freedom of expression (H.C. 73/53[26]), freedom of procession (H.C. 153/83[25]), freedom of religious worship (H.C. 292/83[24]) and freedom of information (H.C. 243/62[38]). The principles of judicial integrity (Cr.A. 696/81[35]) and a person's good reputation (F.H. 9/77[21]) conflict on occasion with the principle of freedom of expression.

           

            5. When the judge encounters fundamental principles of his system that contradict each other - for instance, the preservation of the state and the freedom of expression and the vote - he must take them all into account. The judge must place the principles alongside each other and give each its proper weight and, having done so, he must strike a balance between the various principles. In the words of Justice Frankfurter:

           

The core of the difficulty is that there is hardly a question of any real difficulty before the Court that does not entail more than one so-called principle... Judges cannot leave such contradiction between two conflicting "truths" as "part of the mystery of things". They have to adjudicate. If the conflict cannot be resolved, the task of the Court is to arrive at an accommodation of the contending claims. This is the core of the difficulties and misunderstandings about the judicial process. This, for any conscientious judge, is the agony of his duty.

(F. Frankfurter, Of Law and Man (New York, 1956) 31,43).

 

            The judges of Israel also face this unavoidable task. This is a process in which "we weigh various competing interests in the balance and, after reflection, select those which, in the circumstances, predominate" (Agranat P. in H.C. 73/53[26], at 879), and which constitutes "the interpretative starting point" (Shamgar P. in F.H. 9/77[21], at 361). This was the approach of the Supreme Court in the Kol Ha'am case [26], where the court held that the authority of the Minister of the Interior must be exercised with a proper regard for the objectives of freedom of expression, on the one hand, and public security, on the other. In reaching that conclusion the court did not adopt the one principle and reject the other, but balanced the two. Taking a similar approach in the matter of a Police District Commander's authority as regards the holding of demonstrations, this court noted (H.C. 153/83[25], at 401) that such balancing requires -

 

          ... a judicial determination - in the absence of statutory guidance - as to the relative grading of the different interests, which will ensure resolution of the question whether these interests rank equally in importance or whether one takes preference over the other. Likewise, in the case of interests of equal standing, this balancing process calls for a judicial determination as to which interest shall defer to the other. Thus a judicial pronouncement has to be made with respect to the "limits of sufferance" of the various rights.

         

          It follows that where fundamental values of the system incline in conflicting directions, the court must take them all into account. It must allow the different values to vie with each other, and balance them in accord with their weight and force at the point of friction. Holmes J. said in this respect (op cit., p. 181):

         

          Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.

         

          6. This same approach, requiring the balancing of competing values, should be adopted also where the platform of a list seeking to participate in the elections, negates the very existence of the state. It appears to me that a judge construing the Elections Law may not ignore the fundamental principles referred to by Cohn J. in the Yeredor case. He must take into account the citizen's fundamental right to elect and be elected. My colleague, Shamgar P., noted justly that "the right to participate in elections is a fundamental political right that gives expression to the idea of equality, to the freedom of expression and to the freedom of association" and, hence, "is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society". These principles must be considered in the interpretation of every legislative enactment, including the Elections Law. But, by the same token, it is impossible to ignore the fundamental principles referred to by Justice Landau (in the Elections Committee) and by Agranat P. and Sussman J. in the Yeredor case. It is inconceivable that we should interpret a statute without taking into account the principle that "the State of Israel is an existent state whose continuity and perpetuity is not to be questioned" (Yeredor, at 386). A constitution is not a prescription for suicide, and civil rights are not a stage for national extinction (cf. Jackson J. in Terminiello v. Chicago [62], at 37). The laws of a nation should be interpreted on the assumption that it wishes to continue existing. Civil rights are nourished by the existence of the state and ought not become a tool for its annihilation. Therefore, judicial interpretation has no alternative but to seek a proper balance between the competing values of the continued existence of the state, on the one hand, and freedom of expression and election, on the other. Frankfurter J. commented thus on the matter (Dennis v. U.S. [54], at 524):

 

       The demands of free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.

      

       7. How is the balancing of values, as they compete for primacy in the Yeredor case, to be accomplished? The interest in the state's existence and the interest in the right to vote are not equal. The first clearly precedes the second, since it is a condition for the existence of the second (cf. F.H. 9/77[21]). This court likewise held with respect to conflict between the principle of state security and the public peace, and that of freedom of expression (H.C. 73/53[26]), freedom of demonstration (H.C. 153/83[25]) and freedom of worship (H.C. 292/83[24]). Certainly the same approach should be taken where the very existence of the state is in the balance. It follows that we are concerned with achieving a balance that requires a judicial determination as to the probability that realization of the right to vote will prejudice the interest of the state's continued existence. What, then, is the criterion for weighing the probability of prejudice to the state's existence that would justify a denial of the right to vote? Of course, there is no answer to this question in the Elections Law, and the Supreme Court must provide it. The Supreme Court has faced such questions in related issues. Thus, for example, where the conflicting interests were state security and the freedom of expression, the Supreme Court adopted the test of "probable" danger, while rejecting the known American formula of a "clear and present danger" (H. C. 73/53[26]). The same "probability" test was applied with regard to a conflict between the principle of the public peace and that of the freedom of demonstration, worship and information (H.C. 243/82[38]). However, where the conflict was between the principle of free speech and that of judicial integrity, the court used the standard of a "reasonable possibility" (Cr.A. 696/81[35]), following Cr.A. 126/62[39]. Indeed, when adopting the standard of probability one should not follow a general, universal criterion, since it depends on the force of the different values that come into conflict within a given legal context (H.C. 153/83[25], at 403). The question always is whether the measure of harm, weighed against the possibility that it may not actually occur, justifies violation of a civil right so as to prevent the danger (see Hand J. in U.S. v. Dennis [63]). Professor Schauer remarks in this connection:

      

       Evaluation of the interest in national security requires a determination of the extent of the harm should the argued effect actually occur, the probability of that effect occurring and the immediacy of the effect. The more serious the effect, the less certain and less immediate that effect need be.

            (Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982) 199).

           

            According to this approach it is clear that when the interest is that of the state's existence, the damage that may occur is so great that there is no need to require the existence of a clear and present danger or a substantial probability of danger. Furthermore, these formulae are appropriate in cases of concrete, specific and special dangers related to defined events. It is not possible to apply them when dealing with social phenomena that are part of a continuing process. Indeed, the matter calls for wide margins of security, because no unnecessary risks can be taken, and once a list has been confirmed the Elections Committee cannot, at a later stage after the elections, retract its decision. Nonetheless, the principle of freedom of expression and the right to elect and to be elected are precious values, and we should not, therefore, accept a test of probability for which a mere remote danger suffices. It appears to me that the proper balance will be found in a test of "reasonable probability", to which this Court has had recourse in the past (cf. Cr.A. 696/81[35], following Cr.A. 126/62[39]). Certainly, this test "does not constitute a precise formula that can be easily or certainly adapted to every single case" (Agranat P. in Kol-Ha'am [26], at 888). On the contrary - this is a difficult formula that leaves broad margins of uncertainty, but in the absence of a legislative formula it commends itself to me as the most appropriate one.

           

            8. It follows that I find myself taking a position that is not identical with either the majority or the minority opinion in Yeredor. Like the majority view, I too hold that the Elections Committee may refuse to confirm a list for participation in the elections, if its platform negates the existence of the state. However, I do not rest content with the list's "bad tendency" - in the words of Agranat P. in Kol Ha'am [36] - but would require a reasonable possibility that the list's platform will actually be realised. (For a similar approach, see Lahav, "On the Freedom of Expression in the Supreme Court Precedents", 7 "Mishaptim 375 (1976) at 416.) I regret that this requirement was not specified in the Yeredor case. Had the majority adopted that requirement, it might still have reached its same disqualificatory conclusion, since the case involved an organisation which the Minister of Defence had seen fit to declare illegal, which had acted as an arm of terrorist organisations existing in neighbouring Arab states, and which posed a general threat to the state with perhaps a real possibility of endangering its very existence. It is interesting to note the reference made by the minority judge to this aspect (Yeredor [1], at 381):

           

            Moreover, even where the law expressly authorised the denial of a certain civil right - which right was a fundamental civil right, such as freedom of opinion and speech - this court refused to support the exercise of that legal power where the denial was not necessary to prevent a present, clear and substantial danger (H.C. 73/53 - Kol Ha'am). I fail to discern the substantial, clear or immediate danger to the State, its institutions or its rights, in the participation of this candidates list in the Knesset elections. And if one wishes to argue that this danger is concealed from the courts and known only to the security agencies of the Government, I would reply that the material before the Central Elections Committee, which was also submitted to us, does not justify and certainly does not compel a finding that such danger exists. Indeed, the attention of the Committee members was not drawn to any substantial danger supposedly imminent. In the absence of as a sanction for past conduct and opinions; and the Central Elections Committee is certainly not authorised to impose a sanction like that.

           

            Can one assume that if a substantial danger had been proven, Cohn J. too, would have been prepared to take it into account? Should one not hold that the minority judge also would not have accepted the Elections Law as a prescription for national suicide? Still, it should be noted that the above remarks of Cohn J. were obiter dicta, and his main approach was that the Committee had no authority to deny a list's participation on grounds of its platform. I cannot agree with that approach, for if there is proved to be a reasonable possibility that the platform negating the state's existence might be realised, the Elections Committee certainly has the authority, even the duty, to disqualify the list from participating in the elections.

           

            9. Thus far I have not discussed the fact that the authority of disqualification - according to my interpretation, upon a "reasonable possibility" test - is vested in the Elections Committee, which is a body representing mainly political interests. It has occurred to me that this political composition may be indicative of the legislature's disinclination to rest the Committee's vested authority to decide upon a list's participation in the elections, on a party-platform test. Indeed, this is an important argument for, in principle, I believe that a body's authority can be inferred from its structure and composition (cf. J. Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966) 674). Nevertheless, it appears to me that this argument should be treated as part of a structural whole, and not as conclusive in itself. Thus, for example, in municipal elections the like authority is given to an elections officer who is an administrative functionary, and it cannot conceivably be argued that a different law applies there for that reason. Therefore one ought not deduce from the composition of the Elections Committee a decisive conclusion that, in the instant situation, would preclude application of the fundamental principles of our system and their internal balance. My colleague, Miriam Ben Porat D.P., has emphasized the fact that once the Elections Committee decides to confirm a list's participation in the elections, there is no appeal to the Supreme Court (H. C. 344/81[27]). According to her approach, this indicates that the Elections Committee is not authorized to weigh considerations affecting the state's existence, since she holds that it is inconceivable for the legislature to vest such power, without any possibility of an appeal or challenge, in the hands of a political committee. Although I share this approach in principle, I do not believe that it is decisive in the present matter for several reasons. Firstly, the Elections Committee is presumed to weigh material considerations with respect to both confirmation and non confirmation of a list. Secondly, it is necessary in every system to determine who shall have standing to apply to the court for a list's disqualification; in general, this power is given to political functionaries. From this point of view one can regard the Elections Committee as a preliminary obstacle to approaching the court. Finally, in the unusual event that the Elections Committee confirms a list which poses a reasonable possibility and, perhaps, even a certainty of danger to the very existence of the state, the Knesset always retains the power to prevent that disastrous consequence by legislative means.

 

Negation of the Democratic Character of the State

 

            10. So far I have examined the Election Committee's authority to withhold the right of participation in elections from a list that negates the very existence of the state. What is the Committee's authority as regards a list that acknowledges the state's existence but disavows its democratic character? In my opinion, here too we should adopt a like method of analysis. It appears to me that just as the existence of the state is a fundamental tenet in our legal system, so is its existence as a democratic state. The Declaration of Independence - in the light of which our legislation is construed - indicates that Israel rests "upon foundations of liberty, justice and peace as envisioned by the Prophets of Israel" and that it will ensure "complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without distinction of creed, race and sex". All this presupposes not only the actual existence of the state but also its democratic essence, for it is impossible to ensure equality, liberty and justice without maintaining a democratic regime under which these principles will be realized. "The system of laws under which the political institutions in Israel have been established and function are witness to the fact that this is indeed a state founded on democracy" (Agranat P. in Kol Ha'am [26], at 884). Indeed, the distinction between questions pertaining to the state's existence and those touching upon its democratic nature, is at times difficult and complex. Can we not say, with a large measure of justice, that sometimes a danger to the existence of our democratic regime endangers also our existence, for our strength is in our regime? Can we not say that our democracy, our equality and our fundamental values are our strongest forces? Is it at all possible to distinguish questions about the state's existence from those about the essence of its democratic regime? Would the State of Israel without the Declaration of Independence be the same State of Israel? Is there any essential difference between denying the state's right of existence and recognising its continued existence under the flag of the Palestine Liberation Organisation?

           

            11. It appears to me, therefore, that just as we must interpret the Elections Law on the basis of a proper balance between the principle of the state's existence and that of the freedom to elect and be elected, so too we must interpret the Elections Law on the basis of a proper balance between the principle of the state's democratic regime and that of the freedom of election. In its interpretation the court may not consider merely the principle of the state's democratic character, thereby ignoring the important fundamental principle of the freedom to elect and be elected. But, likewise, the court may not take into account only the principle of the freedom to elect and be elected, while ignoring the framework of the regime and the law under which that right is exercised, i.e our own democratic regime. As in the Yeredor case [1], so in the matter before us, there is no avoiding a proper balance between the competing values. As with the threat to the very existence of the state, so with the threat to its democratic character, the balance finds expression in the formulation of a proper standard to determine the likelihood of realisation of the danger. As we have seen, that standard is shaped by the extent of the anticipated damage and the chance that it may not come about. It appears to me that in this connection too we should adopt the standard of reasonable possibility, and not probability, because of the supreme importance of the interest in the state's democratic character. Furthermore, as we have seen, the probability test is appropriate in the context of a concrete, defined event, and inappropriate in the context of an overall social framework (see O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice (Princeton, 1961) 140). As with the issue of the state's existence, so here we should maintain broad margins of safety. Still, to meet this standard of reasonable possibility, a "bad tendency" alone will not suffice, and it requires substantial proof of a reasonable possibility that the anticipated danger will actually come about. It follows from what we said above, that the same standard of "reasonable possibility" can be applied to the threat both to the state's existence and to its democratic character. It should not be inferred that these two values are thus seen to be on the same level. The difference between the two will find expression in the different balances that are called for when applying the "reasonable possibility" standard (see C.A. Auerbach, "The Communist Control Act of 1954: A Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech" 23 U. Chicago L.R. 173 (1956)).

           

            12. The import of the balancing process is no more than to convey that the right to vote, like the rights of expression, procession, information, assembly, and all other "political rights" are not absolute but relative rights (H.C. 148/79[40]). It was so noted by Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California ([59], at 373):

           

            Although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.

           

            The same applies to the right to elect and be elected. This right too is one of the citizen's fundamental rights (Reynolds v. Sims [64]), but it is not an absolute right, only a relative one. It can be restricted if there is a reasonable possibility that its exercise will deprive the state of its democratic character. Thus a delicate balance is attained between principles and values that mark democracy. On the one hand, the fundamental right to political expression is not to be denied merely because of the nature of the political view. Quite the contrary, the power of democracy lies in the freedom it allows to express opinions, however offensive to others. On the other hand, democracy is allowed to protect itself, and it need not commit suicide so as to prove its vitality.

           

Reasonable Possibility

 

            13. What is a "reasonable possibility" of injury to the existence of the state or its democratic character? The answer to this question is not at all simple since it requires examination on the particulars required to be taken into account. It appears to me that one should not take into account only the possibility of a change by parliamentary means, through a majority vote in the Knesset. I believe the scope of the examination should be widened to take into account all the social possibilities. The parliamentary test frequently constitutes but a last formal stage in a social system, in which the legitimate activity of a list that rejects the very existence of the state or its democratic character, could injure the social fabric. It appears to me that all these should be taken into account. The danger of a vote in the Knesset is no greater than a danger that the lawful activity of a list which rejects the state, or democracy, might reinforce phenomena that impair the legitimacy of the state, or democracy itself, in the eyes of the public. The reasonable possibility test should encompass the entire social scene, in all its various aspects. It should analyse social processes in the course of which a marginal entity that disavows the state or democracy might gradually accumulate strength until reaching the stage where it constitutes a danger to the existence of the state or its democratic regime. Kirchheimer remarks in this connection (op. cit., 137):

           

            He must consider past experience, future expectations, the ends pursued and the means applied by the revolutionary group, the doctrine it subscribes to, and the relation, if any, between doctrine and action patterns.

           

            The test indeed imposes a difficult task on the Elections Committee and on the Supreme Court. They must examine not only past events, but also the probability of potential future events. This examination amounts to a "prophecy...in the guise of a legal decision" in the words of Jackson J. in the Dennis case ([54] at 570). But this is a task to which a political body is accustomed, and it is not alien even to a legal proceeding which often calls for a decision founded on the examination of social processes.

  

                      14. In determining the reasonableness of the possibility that explicit or implicit ideas of a list will be translated into practice, one must consider the various means that may be adopted so as to mitigate the risk, short of actual denial of the right of election. In fact, the drastic measure of withholding the right to participate in elections should not be taken unless the alternative means are insufficient adequately to reduce the danger to the state or its democratic regime. In this respect two important points should be made. First, one should consider whether methods of persuasion, explanation and education would not act to mitigate the danger. Often the soft face of education towards democracy and its values is preferable to the stiff hand of governmental intervention. These words of Justice Brandeis, quoted by my colleague, Shamgar P., are well-known (Whitney v. California [58], at 377):

         

          If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.

         

          Second, there is room to consider other governmental measures that fall short of actually barring the list from participation in the elections. Thus, for example, activity against the state and its regime might constitute a criminal offence, and those associating together might constitute an illegal association under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945. Often the danger to the state and its democratic foundations can be reduced by punitive means - which might also entail the withdrawal of immunity from a Knesset member involved in criminal activity - before using the sharp measure of depriving the list of its right to participate in the elections.

         

          From the general to the particular

15. In the instant matter we have examined the platform of the Progressive List for Peace but have not found in it any indication, explicit or implicit, of a desire to bring about the annihilation of the state or to impair its democratic character. That being the case, the appeal must be admitted without any need to apply the test of a reasonable possibility. Not so with respect to the Kach list. Here the Elections Committee studied the Kach list and its publications, concluding that this material showed the list "propounds racist and anti-democratic principles that contradict the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel". On the basis of this finding the list was denied participation in the elections. In so doing the Committee erred, for the platform alone is not sufficient, and the Elections Committee must consider whether the list poses a reasonable possibility of harm to the democratic character of the state. Words, opinions and views are not sufficient. There must be evidence of the existence of a reasonable possibility of activities that endanger the democratic character of the state. For this purpose one may take into account the past conduct of the faction, its members and its leaders, and the future dangers they hold out. No evidence was brought in this respect, nor was any attempt made to do so. True, there was much evidence before the Committee that the platform of the Kach list impairs the democratic character of the State. There was even evidence that it seriously intends to realise its objectives and does not renounce them. Indeed, the evidence shows that it has engaged in several overt acts to realise its platform. Thus, for example, the head of the list and one of its members were taken into "administrative detention" under the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979, on the basis of information that they were planning attacks against Arabs. That detention was confirmed by the President of the District Court, and an appeal against his decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court which found that the activity of the two constituted a danger to national security (A.D.A. 1/80[41]). So too, a number of the list's activists were convicted in the Magistrate's Court of improper conduct in a public place (Cr. F. 135/82, not published). But all this is not enough. The question is not whether the list is serious in its designs, but whether there is a serious possibility that its purposes will be accomplished. The question does not, therefore, concern the list internally, rather the list in relation to the state. The question is whether the possibility that the platform of the list will be realised, is a reasonable one, or whether such a possibility is most remote. In my opinion there was no evidence before the Committee of any such reasonable possibility. On the contrary: the administrative detention and the criminal trial that were brought to the Committee's attention reinforce the possibility that there are accepted means of defence at democracy's disposal, and there is no need, as yet, to adopt the drastic measure of denying the right to be elected. Indeed, neither the Committee nor this court was confronted with any factual data on which to base a finding that the list creates a possible danger to democracy in Israel. There was no fact from which to conclude that the Israeli democracy had lost, or that there was a reasonable possibility it would lose, its capacity to defend itself against this list - whether by educational or governmental measures. In the main, all that was proven was "bad tendency" - in the words of Agranat P. in the Kol Ha'am case [26] - and attempts to translate it into practice. That alone will not suffice. In these circumstances there was no justification for depriving the list of its right to take part in the elections. Note! I have no doubt that the ideas of Kach are racist and that its principles violate the fundamental doctrines on which the democratic regime of the state is founded. I am also convinced that they contradict the spirit and essence of Judaism, in all its various forms. In the words of Maimonides (Yad, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 12:3):

 

            For this reason, but a single man was created, to teach us that if any man destroys a single life in the world, Scripture imputes to him as though he had destroyed the whole world; and if any man preserves one life, Scripture ascribes it to him as though he had preserved the whole world. Furthermore, all human beings are fashioned after the pattern of the first man, yet no two faces are exactly alike. Therefore, every man may well say, "For my sake the world was created".

                     

The same approach is echoed by Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook:

 

The most supreme value in the love of living creatures should be taken to be the love of man, which extends to all mankind. Despite differences of opinion among religions and faiths, and despite differences of race and geographic location, it is proper to understand the various nations and groups, to attempt to learn their nature and characteristics, in order to base love of humanity on foundations close to reality. For only on a soul rich in the love of living creatures and love of man can the love of the nation rise in its exalted nobility and its practical and spiritual greatness. And narrow mindedness, which sees only ugliness and impurity in all that is beyond the boundary of the particular nation, and beyond the border also of Israel, is one of the more terrible darknesses causing general destruction to all good spiritual edifices that guide by their light every gentle soul.

(See Z. Yaron, Teachings of Rabbi Kook (W.Z.O. Publications, 1973/4), 304.)

 

            If we have decided to sanction the list's participation in the elections, it is not because we accept any particular item in its platform. On the contrary, we have held, and reiterate once more, that its approach contradicts our fundamental conception and the general and Jewish values upon which our national edifice is being constructed. But so long as it has not been proven to the satisfaction of the Elections Committee, and to this court, that the list creates a reasonable possibility of danger to the existence of the state or its democratic character, there is no alternative but to allow it to participate in the elections.

           

From the Particular to the General

 

            16. I have accordingly reached the conclusion that under our existing law, the Elections Committee may refuse to confirm the participation in elections of lists that negate the existence of the state or its democratic character. However, that authority may not be exercised except where the Elections Committee is persuaded by the evidence before it that participation of the list in the elections raises a reasonable possibility of danger to the existence of the state or its democratic character. This approach stems entirely from the creative sources of the judicial process. This process is creative, but constrained within limits. The judge is not as free as the legislature. Therefore, I did not consider myself free to ignore the various principles, values and interests that compete for precedence, and I considered myself obliged to balance them in accord with a standard suited to the nature of the problem. It follows that my examination is interpretative. It seeks to exhaust the statutory language and has recourse to "supra-norms" with respect to the existence of the state, as an interpretative guideline. The same approach was taken by Justice Landau in the Central Elections Committee, in connection with the Yeredor matter. He said:

           

As chairman of the forum of first instance, the Central Elections Committee, I focused my statements on an interpretation of the statute - albeit a broad interpretation, so as to prevent undermining of the constitutional foundations of our regime and of the very existence of the state itself. I believe that this is also the line of reasoning taken by Agranat P. I do not think that the criticism of this approach is justified. We never entertained any doubt as to the sovereignty of the legislature, from whose word the judge may not depart, and which can change any ruling of the court. In lofty matters such as these, it may be presumed that the legislature will address the issue despite its many other occupations. But it is also clear that the court may exercise its discretion in interpreting the legislative word and, with respect to legislation of constitutional significance, that interpretation must derive inspiration from the fundamental notions upon which our constitutional regime is founded.

(M. Landau, "Ruling and Discretion in the Administration of Law", 1 Mishpasim 292 (1969), at 306.)

 

          That is my opinion as well. We are dealing with the interpretation of a legislative text through recourse to the ordinary rules of interpretation. One of those rules is that the statutory language should be interpreted in light of the accepted fundamental values of our legal system (Cr. A. 696/81[35], at 574; C.A. [42]), one of which - among the more important of them, but not the only one - is the principle of maintaining the state's existence. This interpretative approach exhausts the judicial process and lies at its core. It follows from the doctrine of the separation of powers and is consistent with our conception of the democratic state. My colleague, Elon J., is of the opinion that this interpretative approach entails a denial of the Elections Committee's authority. If that is the case, whence the judge's power to contradict the word of the legislature? Let us suppose an express statutory provision that the Elections Committee may refuse (to), or shall not, disqualify a list that negates the very existence of the state. Would Justice Elon still persist in holding that the Elections Committee must prohibit the list's participation in the elections? In my opinion, that result indeed follows from his approach. But how can it be reconciled with the approach of my colleagues - to which I too subscribe - that the judge may not raise himself above the legislature, and that the rule of law, not the rule of the judge, governs our regime? Indeed the "extra-interpretative" approach is not new, and it has been referred to in the past. (See, e.g., Guberman, "Israel's Supra-Constitution", 2 Israel L R 455 (1967).) In this respect I need only adopt again the comment of Landau J. with reference to the Yeredor case, made in his above mentioned article (at p. 306):

         

That decision has evoked criticism. It is said that the court exceeded its authority, thus violating the principle of the rule of law. In my opinion, that is too mechanistic a view of the court's role in interpreting the law. I agree with the statements of Dr. Rubinstein in his article "The Rule of Law: The Formal and the Substantive Perspective":

 

The rule of law is meaningless without basic premises that stand above the positive system of law...The role of the jurist, who has the knowledge and training for this purpose, is to apply the meta-legal principle and to effectuate it through the deductive methods offered him by the juridical technique.

 

That is the role of judicial discretion in the interpretation of the law, so as to bring it into harmony with the foundations of the existing constitutional regime in the state. We know too that the boundaries between the interpretation of statutes and their supplementation where needed, are not defined, and that there are borderline areas. The leading decisions given in this spirit in the first twenty years of the state's existence - and their number is significant - have given our constitutional regime its special character, no less than the legislative enactments of the Knesset. This line of thought is the principal heritage to come down to us from the world of the Common Law, and it links our legal system to that world.

 

            Indeed, my approach in the instant case is based not on "supernorms", raised above the law, but on "supreme principles" that pervade the law and emerge from it. My approach posits no "supra-constitutional" "natural law" that overrides the statutory law. It is a positivist "intraconstitutional" approach, which examines the nature of the law and interprets it according to accepted interpretative criteria. The law, in the words of Sussman P. (H.C. 58/68[43], at 513) is "a creature that thrives in its environment", which environment includes not only the immediate legislative context but also broader circles of accepted principles, fundamental purposes and basic standards that comprise a kind of "normative umbrella" encompassing the entire field of the statutory law (C.A. 165/82[42]). In this manner the judge fulfills his proper role and does not trespass upon the domain of the legislature.

           

            17. I would note, nevertheless, that even were I to resort to such "supra" principles, I would reach the same conclusion. The supra-constitutional rule relied upon by Sussman J. "is actually, so far as concerns the instant matter, no more than the right of self-defence of a society organised within a state" (Yeredor [1], 390.) But when, and in what circumstances, is this rule to be applied? Is a remote fear of a theoretical danger a sufficient ground for applying these principles? The answer appears to be that even with the application of a "supra" principle one must determine a ratio of probability between the danger and its avoidance. Indeed, even the supra-constitutional rule is a legal rule, and as such it too requires interpretation. It appears to me, therefore, that if I were to have recourse to it, I would hold that the supra-constitutional principle may be applied only in the case of a reasonable possibility that the danger will be realised. It follows that I would reach the very same conclusion as I did through interpretation of the Elections Law itself.

 

            18. From the aspect of the general constitutional structure, it is desirable that this question of barring a list from participation in the elections, on grounds relating to the content of its platform, be regulated by legislation and not be left open to judicial interpretation. In this respect I am in agreement with my colleague, Deputy President Miriam Ben-Porat. But the main problem is the substance of that legislation. In my opinion the present situation is preferable to legislation lacking a proper balance, from which might result damage to democracy outweighing any benefit to the democratic process. It cannot be denied that a democracy wishing to withhold the electoral right from lists which reject democracy, is confronted with a philosophico-political difficulty. The difficulty lies in the dilemma - or, if you wish, the paradox: is the barring of antidemocratic lists from participation in the elections compatible with democracy itself, or is the democratic entity not itself taking an anti-democratic measure? This is an old question, and Plato discerned it in asking whether complete freedom does not entail enslavement, and whether the freedom of choice granted by democracy does not lead to tyranny (see, in this respect, Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 1, 123, 265). Opinions on this issue are divided among philosophers and political scientists. Some maintain that the essence of democracy lies in full freedom of expression, extended under all circumstances and for all opinions, including those that might undermine the very democracy itself (see A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom; Constitutional Powers of the People (N.Y. 1965)). Others - who constitute a majority - hold that a democracy has the right, under its own internal logic, to exclude election lists that disavow democracy itself from participation in the democratic process (see J.R. Pennock, Democratic Political Theory (1979), 377; Kirchheimer, Political Justice (1961), 119). But even those holding the latter view lack agreement as to the desirable solution. Some advocate the solution adopted in Germany, in both the Weimar and the post World War II periods, according to which a party that negated the democratic character of the state could not take part in the democratic process. In Yeredor ([1] at 384), Cohn J. noted that this legislative course might also serve our own legislature as an example. For all its merits, one cannot ignore its many deficiencies, since it denies a fundamental political right solely on grounds of content (of party platform), without any examination of the prospects of its realisation. Ought it not be said that the true test of the ideas of liberty, justice and equality, and the other fundamental principles that form the "credo" of our constitutional regime, is in their inner strength, their inherent truth, and not in their coercive power? Ought it not be maintained that the weakness of racism and incitement lies in their inherent falsehood which is exposed to all precisely in the free exchange of opinions and ideas that is unique to democracy. Justice Holmes explained the notion thus (Abrams v. U.S. [65], at 630):

 

            The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.

 

            Is there no danger that boundaries will be trespassed and that the stamp of racism and incitement will be imprinted on the views of a political opponent merely because they are unpopular? Should we not say that the test of democracy, where there is no reasonable probability of danger that the controversial views will be realized, lies precisely in its toleration of opinions, however odious they may be? Freedom of expression is not the freedom to express an accepted opinion, but rather the freedom to express a deviant opinion. Bach J. elucidated the point in instructing the Elections Committee. He noted that the Elections Committee could extend the Yeredor ruling also to bar the participation of a list whose platform rejects the foundations of democracy, and he also believed that this extended principle should be applied in relation to the Kach list. Nevertheless, he wished it to be taken into consideration that

           

...above all, the right to elect and be elected to the Knesset is among every citizen's central and most hallowed civil rights in a democratic regime - the denial of this right is an exceptional measure which can be justified only in extraordinary cases... This rule is put to the test especially in relation to controversial lists. Ordinary, accepted lists present no challenge to it. But the rule is tested precisely where there is strong objection and aversion to the list on the part of certain or broad sections of the public. Precisely in such case must we generally take care to allow the expression of those opinions and leave the decision as to their weight and justification to the public in a free vote.

 

            As Jackson J. said in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette ([66] at 642):

           

But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

 

            One might argue that these words are fit and proper for the great and powerful America, which can allow itself such a "liberal" approach, whereas we must act very cautiously since our state is small, its regime is young, and it is surrounded by enemies that pose a real threat to it. Indeed, that difference exists, but our own strength is in our moral force and our adherence to the principles of democracy notwithstanding the surrounding danger. In this respect our strength is great, and we can say out loud that even if we do not agree with a certain opinion we would give our lives for the right to make it heard. The legislative question involved is truly weighty and hard. We should hope to find the proper balance, that takes into account the entire picture, in all its complexity.

 

            For these reasons I joined my colleagues in admitting the appeals, setting aside the decision of the Elections Committee, and confirming the participation of the two lists - Kach and the Progressive List for Peace - in the Knesset elections.

           

            BEJSKI J.: 1. Because of the proximity of the elections, we were pressed for time in deciding the two appeals brought before us. Despite the different considerations and reasons of the Elections Committee in refusing to confirm each of the two lists, we found a common denominator that required us to admit both appeals, since that result followed from adoption of the majority opinion in Yeredor [1], and even more so were we to adopt the minority opinion there. My esteemed colleagues have elaborated extensively and incisively upon the important constitutional issue in all its varied complexities, as regards both principles and consequences, and the absence of statutory guidance has brought to the fore differences of approach to the desirable solution of a conflict between basic fundamental rights. If one accepts the minority opinion in Yeredor, as does the esteemed Deputy President, the conclusion is unequivocal as regards each of the two lists concerned. According to this perspective, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 does not grant the Central Elections Committee authority to deny any list the right to contend in the elections, irrespective of its objectives and declared platform.

           

            If such list meets the formal, technical conditions determined in the Law, and none of its candidates are found to be disqualified under section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset, the position is clear-the list must be confirmed as a lawfully submitted one. And if one adheres to the majority opinion in Yeredor - in its narrow, restrictive sense one might also reach the same result, since the majority opinion is limited in application to a list whose objectives negate the integrity of the State of Israel and its very existence. The reason for the refusal of the Central Elections Committee (hereinafter "the Committee") to confirm the Progressive List for Peace comes very close to attributing such objectives to it, and with regard to this list the decision turns on the evidence, that is, whether the objectives attributed to it were proven sufficiently. In this connection I can already say at this point that I am in agreement with the reasoning in the esteemed President's instructive opinion, and this list's appeal should accordingly be upheld.

 

            The reason for the refusal to confirm the Kach list attributes to it subversion of the foundations of the democratic regime in that it propounds racist principles, supports acts of terrorism, attempts to incite to hatred and hostility among different sectors of the population in Israel, and intends to violate the religious sentiments and values of a section of the state citizens. It is clear that this reason strays from the basis of the majority ruling in Yeredor. Hence, adherence to the majority ruling, as regards the narrow issue of negation of the state's very existence, provides no ground for disqualifying the Kach list, unless the ruling is expanded, by way of judicial legislation, to disqualify also a list which in essential nature propounds anti-democratic principles and seeks to undermine the foundations of the state's democratic regime. Obviously, this reasoning too would require the Committee to examine and be persuaded, in accepted probative manner, that the allegations against that list are substantial. In the case of Kach the Committee reached that conclusion.

           

            2. Counsel for the state indeed invites us to expand the Yeredor ruling, and to hold that the Committee is authorised to disqualify not only a list that negates the very existence of the state but also one that disavows and undermines the principles of democracy as perceived by the free Western world. He contends that Kach is such a list, and therefore it was justly disqualified by the Committee.

           

            It is possible to understand Mr. Yarak's argument that it is not necessary to regard this reasoning as an expansion of the majority opinion in Yeredor, because it was said in that case (following the Kol Ha'am decision [26] at 884) that any element posing a danger to the perpetuity of the State of Israel could not be countenanced; this was a constitutional foundation "which no state authority, whether administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial, may disclaim when exercising its power" (Yeredor [1] at 386). The existence of the state in its present form is tightly linked to the democratic foundations on which it is based and the state cannot be protected without protecting its democratic foundations. In other words, subversion of the principles of democracy is tantamount to subversion of the very existence of the state, for the State of Israel inscribed in the Declaration of Independence, as a constitutional principle, that "it will rest upon foundations of liberty, justice and peace as envisioned by the prophets of Israel. It will maintain complete equality of social and political rights for all its citizens, without distinction of creed, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture...".

           

            Mr. Yarak argues further that if the legislator has not seen fit to provide express statutory protection for the values of democracy, that is because these supra-principles have always been acknowledged in the case law as the basis of our regime, as regards both the recognition of rights and the creation of corresponding duties (H.C. 1/49[10] at 83; H.C. 73,87/53[26]; H.C. 148/79[40]), including rights and duties that are not written in the statute book but are recognised in law as stemming from the essential nature of our democratic regime (H.C. 29/62[44], at 1027; H.C. 112/77[45]; H.C. 262/62[46]; H.C. 337/ 81[5]; C.A. 723/74[3], at 295).

 

            3. It is true that to undermine the foundations of democracy is largely the same as undermining the foundations of the state as presently constituted. A democracy may defend itself against such phenomena, and the difficult dilemma which faces most Western democracies relates to the permissible means of defence. That defence is not at all easy since subversive groups often, perhaps mostly, take advantage of the benefits of freedom of speech and assembly under a democratic regime, in order to achieve their goals. Extreme examples of this phenomenon are found in the events overtaking Italy in the 1920's, Germany in the 1930's and Czechoslovakia in the 1940's. The dilemma as to the methods of self-defence - and perhaps also of waging war against groups of a totalitarian nature, is compounded sevenfold because of the fundamental values of democracy which, by its nature, is open to a plurality of opinions and world views. In 1763 Voltaire is reputed to have said that even if he objected to all that his opponent said, he would defend the right to say it with his own life. Open discourse, the right to make unconventional statements, exertion of influence to change ways of thinking on controversial And in the aforementioned Dennis case, Frankfurter J. said ([54] at 551):

           

            This difficult dilemma does not spare us either, and we have to contend with it from time to time. I choose to mention only one decision, the well-known El-Ard case (H.C. 253/64[2], at 679), from which reverberates the warning of Witkon J. concerning events of the kind seen in the recent past, when different totalitarian entities exploited the freedoms of speech, press and association granted them by the state, under the auspices of which to carry out their own destructive policies. It was said there (following H.C. 241/60[47], at 1170):

           

"These freedoms are valuable possessions, the tradition of a democratic regime in a free country, but precisely for that reason they may not be used as a pretext or tool by those who seek to undermine that regime." Likewise in the present matter. And the encouragement given the El-Ard Movement from across the borders alerts us to its potential danger to the State of Israel. It would be blind folly to sanction it.

 

But at the same time the other side of the dilemma was expressed:

 

The freedom of association is of the essence of a democratic regime and a fundamental civil right. Far be it from us to deny that right and disqualify an association for the sole reason that its goal, or one of its goals, is to strive towards changing the existing legal situation in the state. ... However, no free regime will lend support and recognition to a movement that undermines the regime itself.

 

            If we maintain that the right to freedom of association and speech is of the essence of a democratic regime, and that "a regime that does not honor the freedom and right of a minority to express its views cannot claim to be a true democracy" (G. Leibholz, Politics and Law (Leyden, 1965) 44), that does not imply that one may deviate from the fundamental doctrines of that regime in the name of democracy and under its guise. One who claims rights in the name of democracy must himself act in accord with its rules. In the words of Schauer (Free Speech, A Philosophical Enquiry, Cambridge University Press, p. 190):

           

            Superficially, we might say that advocacy of legal change should be permitted, but that advocacy of violent or unlawful means of change should not be protected by the Free Speech Principle. After all, people should not be able to rely on freedom of speech derived, here, primarily from the argument from democracy, for the purpose of going outside the process of democracy. It is not that fairness or consistency requires that those who claim rights under a principle must themselves subscribe to that principle, although such an argument is quite plausible. Rather, speech that produces extra-legal change undermines the process of rational deliberation that is the a priori value of a democratic system.

 

And further on (at 194):

 

That is, if freedom of speech is justified by its relationship to the legal system, and especially if it is justified by its ability to ensure the functioning of a system of laws, then speech directed at weakening or destroying that legal system would appear to have little claim to protection.

 

            Pennock's comment is apposite (Democratic Political Theory, Princeton University Press, p. 377):

           

...It would seem strange to dub as undemocratic a provision designed to prevent democracy from committing suicide.

 

            4. Measures of self-defence against acts subversive of the foundations of democracy are accordingly not considered prohibited, although in theory one can say that self-defence by the extreme method of suppressing or forbidding organisation entails an antidemocratic act. That is a price that must be paid, and it does not appear to be too heavy where a danger to national security or a state of emergency arises, which dangers are regarded as sufficient to deny freedom of speech or organisation. Against this background, the doctrine of a "clear and present danger" was evolved in the U. S. A. , as expressed in Whitney v. People of State of California [58] and modified in Dennis v. U.S.[54] at 507), and especially in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969 [67]), 444). The doctrine's development and the considerations that guided the U.S. courts were discussed extensively in the opinion of the esteemed President, and there is no need for repetition, except to note that when Douglas J. retreated from the "clear and present danger" test in the Brandenburg case, he said (at p. 456):

 

            The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation, is the line between ideas and overt acts.

           

            Any test we adopt, be it the criterion of a clear and present danger, or that of an overt act, or the "reasonable possibility" test now suggested by my esteemed colleague Barak J., immediately poses a twofold dilemma: one relates to the proper time when the defensive reaction may and should come; the other concerns the dimension of the permissible measures, that is, whether radical elimination of the danger, in its infancy, or other lesser means. The tolerance that democracy espouses calls for forbearance also with respect to the timing, until the maturation of the selected test. Still, Leibholz warns (op.cit., at 87):

           

But usually the process of enlightening a misled public opinion in democracy is a very delicate undertaking. The slowness of its tempo may even have disastrous consequences: the warning voices may remain unheard and the reversal of public opinion may come too late.

 

            After comprehensively analysing the lurking dangers, when a democracy fails to act in time and tolerantly seeks to reach compromise and understanding, the author adds (at 160):

           

All these well-timed, tactical, so called understandings only confirm the old experience, that states, like men, are very slow to learn the lesson taught by history, even contemporary history, and to guide their policy and actions accordingly.

 

            It is commonly agreed that governmental intervention against subversive bodies is justified and even necessary. Our historical memory also justifies timely, even prior intervention. That is necessary especially where the group does not stop at mere words but proceeds to act in destructive ways. However, the concrete dilemma concerns the permissible active modes of protection and their limits. Ought the conclusion be to bar the group from participation in public life, to outlaw it, or does it suffice to impose some form of control over the group's activities. The answer involves many factors and considerations - political, educational, economic, military, and the like, and above all the virility of the democracy, the composition of the population and its capacity to withstand external onslaughts. This complex array suggests that the answer lies properly in the political domain. Thus Lippincott opines (Democracy's Dilemma (1965) 199-220) :

 

            It is a task of the highest statesmanship. In order to carry it out, at a minimum cost, democracy will need all the wisdom of which it is capable.

 

            5. I have made these observations to explain why I believe we cannot admit the argument of counsel for the state, i.e. that it is supposedly self-evident that the Yeredor ruling [1] should be extended also to bodies which undermine the foundations of democracy, since that amounts to undermining the very existence of the state; likewise the argument that at in any event, and for the same reason, there is room to expand the Yeredor ruling beyond the narrow confines of the matter decided there. It is clear to me, and so it was unequivocally stated in the majority opinion, that only the vital need and the interest in the state's continued existence moved the court to take the extreme position of withholding the right to be elected, albeit by virtue of inherent authority, based on natural law, from someone whose avowed purpose is the destruction of the state. In the words of Sussman J. (Yeredor [1] at 390):

           

            Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so a state too does not have to agree to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its judges are not allowed to sit back idly in despair at the absence of a positive rule of law when a litigant asks them for assistance in order to bring an end to the state.

 

            The majority judges were not prepared to go any further, as was explicitly stated by Agranat J. (ibid. p. 387):

           

As already indicated, I agree that the Central Elections Committee, in exercising its power to decide upon the confirmation of a candidates list, is not ordinarily empowered to inquire into the candidates' worthiness or to reflect upon their political views.

 

            Sussman J. spoke in a similar vein (ibid. p. 389). One might ask: since in the Yeredor case the court, without statutory sanction, assumed the power to deny a fundamental right, why shouldn't we extend that power to another cardinal matter that poses a danger to democracy, and is closely related to that dealt with in Yeredor - where the court saw fit to forestall the danger? The answer is that the two are not alike. Negating the very existence of the state is not the same as subverting the foundations of democracy. If in regard to the former question the court felt itself constrained to go beyond its ordinary bounds and to resort to natural law, that does not mean that the court will extend such judicial legislation beyond the call of necessity. Certainly not where it is concerned with an essentially political matter lying primarily in the domain of the legislature - upon which the court will not encroach except through the modes of interpretation. Even in the Federal Republic of Germany, where section 21(2) of its Basic Law of 1949 expressly authorises the Constitutional Court to decide whether the objectives or tendencies of a party are to impair the democratic foundations of the Republic, that court is enjoined to act with restraint when exercising powers of a political nature. Leibholz says (op.cit., at 299):

 

As custodian of the constitution, the constitutional judge has to watch out that the Supreme Court does not usurp political power and authority. He must respect the well-determined tendencies of the modern state. Out of this, it results that the constitutional judge, in the exercise of his powers, must wisely restrain himself.

 

And in the aforementioned Dennis case, Frankfurter J. said ([54] at 551):

 

To make validity of legislation depend on judicial reading of events still in the womb of time - a forecast, that is, of the outcome of forces at best appreciated only with knowledge of the topmost secrets of nations - is to charge the judiciary with duties beyond its equipment.

 

            The authors Nowak, Rotunda and Young comment in similar vein (Constitutional Law (2nd ed.) at 779):

           

Although the Supreme Court has recognized that basic constitutional rights are intertwined in the electoral process, the Court also has noted that elections are largely political creatures and the Courts should refrain from getting too involved in basically political decisions.

(See also G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford, 1971).)

 

            If that is the situation in relation to the review and interpretation of the provisions of a written constitution, a fortiori in our case where there is no enacted provision and we are asked to usurp the legislator's function by way of expansive judicial legislation.

           

            It bears reminder that it is the Committee's function to decide on disqualification and the court has only a power of review. The Committee is a clearly partisan political body, and it is constituted only for the purposes of, and with the powers granted by, the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version], 1969 - and no more. If without defined and qualified legislative authority this Committee is extended the power to decide which lists undermine the foundations of the democratic regime, lists might be disqualified on grounds of narrow party interests, as deemed fit at the time by a chance or contrived majority in the Committee. Nor should one forget the fervour of elections, with all it entails.

 

            It follows from everything I have said that I adopt the majority opinion in the Yeredor ruling, as it was limited and confined to the disqualification of a list that negates the very existence of the state or aspires to its destruction and the repudiation of its sovereignty.

           

            That is the outer limit. Like my esteemed colleagues, I too am aware of and troubled by those occasional subversive forays, which from time to time might cause serious harm to the values of democracy if there is no planned, timely defence against them. However, I am not prepared to uphold the extreme sanction of disqualifying a list and denying the fundamental right to be elected, without legislative authority.

           

            6. I have read attentively and with pleasure the interesting opinion of my esteemed colleague, Barak J., who, in his own way, finds it possible to expand the Yeredor ruling to apply also to a list whose platform negates the democratic character of the state, provided a reasonable possibility of the realization of its objectives has been shown. My colleague proceeds on the assumption that this authority stems from section 63 of the Knesset Elections Law, and, therefore, the court may apply its system's rules of interpretation to hold that this is an empowering provision; that despite the mandatory language, the Elections Committee must be vested with discretionary authority so as to realize the fundamental principles of the system.

           

            My understanding is that the authority granted under section 63 is not merely limited to a "lawfully submitted" candidates list but, moreover, the power to refuse to confirm a list can only be based on section 6 of Basic Law: The Knesset (apart from technical-formal grounds that do not concern us here). That section grants the right to be elected to every national who is twenty-one years of age or over, and provides that a candidate may be disqualified only if a court has deprived him of that right by law or if he has been sentenced to five or more years imprisonment for certain offences against national security, as prescribed in that Law.

           

            We are accordingly dealing with a very circumscribed and narrow authority, deviation from which is not a matter of interpretation or discretion, but one of legislation proper on a subject that has no connection whatever with the matter for which the authority was granted. Moreover, the judicial exception made related only to a danger to the very existence of the state, as was the opinion of Sussman J. in Yeredor, with which I find myself in agreement. It is one matter to refuse to confirm a list that was not lawfully submitted, with which alone section 63 deals, and an entirely different matter to disqualify a list because of its platform or the views of its members, which is nowhere mentioned in the statute. Where the legislature sought to obstruct the path to election of a person sentenced to five or more years of actual imprisonment for an offence against state security, it said as much; in that respect there is room for judicial interpretation, for example as to what constitutes an offence against national security, and so on.

 

            In his instructive article on "Judicial Legislation", (13 Mishpatim (1983), 25 at 39) Justice Barak said:

           

The judiciary is not omnipotent; it is not 'sovereign' in judicial legislation. It is not free to choose the content of a legal norm. Judicial legislation is subject to external limitations that define its formal legitimate sphere ... It is clear that the judge interpreter may not impart to the law a meaning that commends itself to him as interpreter, without it being rooted in minimal connections to the legislative enactment.

 

            And in another article he said ("On the Judge as Interpreter", 12 Mishpatim (1982) 248, at 255):

           

It is possible to give the language of the law a broad or narrow interpretation, an ordinary or exceptional interpretation, but generally one must find an Archimedean foothold for the purpose in the statutory text. There must be, generally, a minimal verbal connection between the language and the purpose. The interpreter may not achieve a purpose that has no hold, however weak, in the statutory language.

 

            I am in full agreement with the above statements, and precisely for that reason I cannot find it possible to extend the Yeredor ruling beyond the issue decided according to the majority opinion, since the statute lacks that "Archimedean-foothold" upon which broad and expansive interpretation can be grounded and constructed. As far as I am concerned, we are not facing here any option of broad or narrow interpretation, but rather the total absence of any statutory provision on the matter concerning us in which we could find some foothold. We cannot forget that we are dealing with such a fundamental matter as the denial of the right to be elected; and if the majority opinion in the Yeredor case followed the unusual course that it did, the matter is explained by the disproportionate weight between the considerations, on the one hand, of negation of the existing integrity of the state and, on the other hand, the right to be elected. From this aspect of both the issue and the conclusion are indeed exceptional, and every other consideration must give way in face of the danger entailed in the negation of the very existence of the state. It is different in the instant case, where the court has little justification for invading so deeply the preserve of the legislature merely on the ground that for nearly two decades that body has kept silent on such an important question of principle as that which arose so acutely in the Yeredor case.

 

            Indeed, my esteemed colleague Barak J. also spoke of the desirability that this issue - the barring of a list from participation in the elections on grounds relating to the content of its platform - be regulated through legislation and not be left open for judicial interpretation. My difficulty is that I cannot find any basis and foothold upon which to construct such judicial interpretation, and for that reason I cannot adopt the solution proposed by my colleague. However, the very appeal to the legislature as regards the need for statutory regulation of the matter, to which I wholeheartedly subscribe, reinforces my view that in its absence we should not trespass upon the domain of the legislature in such a cardinal matter. Like my colleague Barak J., I too am apprehensive of an unbalanced legislative treatment of the subject, but one can assume that the broad considerations and difficult deliberations that accompanied each of us in deciding this case will not escape the attention of the legislature. And once it has spoken, the court will have a basis for interpretation for which there will undoubtedly yet be need.

           

            7. I now come to the other question on which I disagree with my esteemed colleague, Barak J. If I had found it possible to agree with him on the principled question regarding the Committee's authority to disqualify a list on grounds of its platform, objectives and activity - if designed to endanger the foundations of democracy, I would have reached the conclusion that the Kach list had been lawfully disqualified and that we should not intervene.

           

            My colleague says: "Words, opinions and views are not sufficient. There must be evidence that there exists a reasonable possibility of acts that endanger the democratic character of the state." For the sake of argument I am prepared to accompany him this far, though it should not be inferred that I accept the "reasonable possibility" test. However, even according to that test, if one accepts it as correct, I ask myself: what more evidence is required and could be offered in discharge of the burden of proof, than was actually proven with respect to the Kach list?

           

            The Committee had before it scores of publications, booklets, pamphlets, posters, articles, all full of insufferable racist hatred. They speak of deporting the Arab population to other countries, while those remaining in Israel are to become alien residents without national rights. They advocate denying social security benefits to Arabs so as not to subsidize population growth in that sector.

  

          At press conferences views are voiced, mainly by the head of the list, in support of terrorism against Arabs as a religious act in sanctification of God's name. In one public appearance Rabbi Kahana said that if he were appointed Minister of Defence, there would be no mosques and Arabs on the Temple Mount within half a year. In his platform he calls for enacting a law that would impose a sentence of 5 years mandatory imprisonment on a non Jew who engages in intercourse with a Jewish woman. There were also calls against the employment of Arabs, as well as justification for laying explosives on the Temple Mount.

 

          Lest one say that these are only words and opinions which do not amount to a "reasonable possibility" of endangering the democratic character of the state, the Committee had information about members of the list who went to Arab settlements to convince them that they had no place in this country, and that if they did not leave voluntarily with compensation paid, other means would be found. Legal and illegal demonstrations were held to disseminate these views. The Committee had before it court judgments convicting members of the movement in respect of these activities (Cr.F.(Jerusalem)134/82; Cr.F.(Tel Aviv) 167/73). In A.D.A. 1/80[41], this court justified the administrative detention of the head of the list and his comrade, and it was said there:

         

          ...in the instant case the danger to national security, which the orders were intended to prevent, is of such gravity that it is proper to confirm the detention orders despite the violation of the detainees' right to defend themselves.

         

          Lack of space prohibits the specification of all these activities and suffice it to say that they go beyond mere words and opinions, amounting to continuous and consistent action and deeds. And if indeed all these are not sufficient evidence of a danger to the democratic character of the state, then I do not know what more need or could be proven. And in appearing before the Committee, the head of the list gave a lengthy explanatory speech, in which he not only did not deny what was attributed to him and proven against the list, but actually repeated the racist "credo". The speech was long and there is no need to repeat it here, except for one or two extracts by way of illustration: "I now ask all the members of the Committee whether an Arab may live in a Jewish democratic state in peace, in quiet, in democracy, in procreation, to become a majority here and turn this state into one that is not Jewish but Arab?" (p.38). After explaining his conception of an "alien-resident" - that is, "he is not a citizen, does not cast a vote for the Knesset, he has cultural, religious, economic, social rights and no more" - he says: "If he is willing, then by all means, let him dwell here; if not, he shall leave. How? Whoever is prepared to leave quietly, nicely, peacefully, receives money for his property. If not so, the Government will send him out, as did the Poles, the Czechs, the Greeks, the Turks, and all those" (page 39 of the Committee minutes).

 

            These tones reverberate so ominously from the not too distant past, that a democratic state like ours may justifiably defend itself against them despite all the patience and tolerance decreed by democracy for the another person's views. And, as was proven, the Kach list does not even try to disguise its platform, as is sometimes done so as not to arouse fear and suspicion regarding the true goals. Even the affidavit submitted to this court in support of the notice of appeal displays plentiful mention of these views, and without quoting them I shall refer particularly to pages 2-4 of the affidavit. Still I feel obliged to add that even if the platform of the Kach list were untainted with these blemishes, the platform alone does not present the full picture. A platform can be camouflaged. Therefore, the Committee is certainly allowed to base itself on material other than the platform, to the extent that it is indicative of the real objectives of the list and its activity, and so far as reliable. And here, as aforementioned, there was no denial-quite the contrary!

           

            Like the Central Elections Committee, with all the material before it, I am persuaded that there was good reason to regard the Kach list as one that advocates racist and antidemocratic principles, as set forth in the letter of the Committee Chairman, Justice G. Bach, dated June 17th, 1984.

           

            And if in our decision on June 28th, 1984, I concurred in the opinion of my colleagues on the bench that this list should not be disqualified - that was not due to lack of evidence as to its character and purposes constituting a danger to the foundations of democracy, by any standard. As I have explained, it was because I found no lawful authority to do so and did not consider it possible to extend the Yeredor ruling without having been granted such authority by the legislature.

           

            Both appeals allowed.

           

            Judgment given on May 15, 1985.

 


* A lawful non-profit society - Ed.

* A play on the Hebrew word kotzer, which means reaper but also means one who is brief - Ed..

Negev Coexistence Forum v. Ministry of Infrastructure

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3511/02
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 16, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: This petition concerns an urgent petition for an interim order. Petitioners request that the State build a bridge over Wadi Hebron in order to enable children to reach the regional public school. The State recognizes the urgent need for erecting a bridge, but claims that it is not possible within the framework of current regional planning laws.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Basic Law: the Judiciary has a constitutional status superior to ordinary legislation. This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction but also applies to its conferral of power to grant remedies. The Court, however, will generally abstain from granting a remedy under the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. The Court held that, under the circumstances, use of its authority pursuant to the Basic Law was justified. As such, the Court ordered the State to build, as quickly as possible, a bridge over Wadi Hebron.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

                                                                                                                HCJ 3511/02

 

  1. Negev Coexistence Forum
  2. The Association of Forty
  3. Communal Council of the Settlement of Um Batin

v.                     

  1. The Ministry of Infrastructure
  2. Drainage and Infrastructure Development Administration
  3. Water Commissioner
  4. Ministry of the Environment
  5. Ministry of Health
  6. Ministry of the Interior
  7. Ministry of the Treasury
  8. Drainage Authority of Shikmah Bsor
  9. Omer Regional Council
  10. Meitar Regional Council
  11. Tel Sheva Regional Council
  12. Bnei Shimon Regional Council
  13. The Government of Israel
  14. The Israel Lands Administration

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 16, 2003]

Before Justice E. Mazza, Justices D. Dorner and E. Levi

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

 

Facts: This petition concerns an urgent petition for an interim order. Petitioners request that the State build a bridge over Wadi Hebron in order to enable children to reach the regional public school. The State recognizes the urgent need for erecting a bridge, but claims that it is not possible within the framework of current regional planning laws.

 

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Basic Law: the Judiciary has a constitutional status superior to ordinary legislation. This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction but also applies to its conferral of power to grant remedies. The Court, however, will generally abstain from granting a remedy under the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. The Court held that, under the circumstances, use of its authority pursuant to the Basic Law was justified. As such, the Court ordered the State to build, as quickly as possible, a bridge over Wadi Hebron.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: The Judiciary, §15

 

Legislation Cited:

Planning and Building Law-1965, § 151

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 2208/02 Salama v. Minister of Interior Affairs, IsrSC 56(5) 950

[2]HCJ 101/74 Building and Development in the Negev Inc. v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 28(2) 449

 

Israeli District Court Cases Cited:

[3]CA (Tel-Aviv) 71208/00 Bar Ilan v. State of Israel (unreported decision)

 

Israeli Magistrate Court Cases Cited:

[4]CA (Tel-Aviv) 15237/97 State of Israel v. Bar Ilan (unreported decision)

 

Petition granted.

 

On behalf of the petitioners— D. Fish; L. Golan

On behalf of respondents 1-7, 13, 14—A. Koren  

JUDGMENT

Justice E. Mazza

This petition, submitted on April 25, 2002, concerns the problem of the sewage flowing in Wadi Hebron, which has been afflicting residents of the scattered Bedouin settlement of “Um Batin.” One petition requested that we issue an interim order requiring the state to immediately erect small bridges for passage by foot and by car over the wadi “in order to immediately alleviate this constraint on the residents’ freedom of movement into the settlement and outside of it, as well as to preserve their health and prevent incidents of drowning.”  In response, the State asserted, that, although the government had decided to establish a permanent settlement for the scattered settlement of Um Batin, “until the permanent settlement is planned, there are practical and normative difficulties in arranging access roads to the illegal settlement.”  The State described the planning difficulty:

 

The district planning scheme states that building permits will not be issued, nor will lands be allowed to be used, unless such is done pursuant to the regional scheme.  No such regional planning scheme exists for the area where the scattered settlement of Um Batin and the adjacent riverbed are located.  Until a detailed planning scheme, which will allow for the issuance of building permits, is approved, or until a regional planning scheme that modifies the above-mentioned rule is approved, no building will be permitted in that area, not even small bridges. 

 

On May 20, 2002, Justice Levi ordered that the application for an interim order be decided by the panel hearing the petition.  On September 11, 2002 we held oral arguments and decided:

 

[t]he petition raises a difficult problem which demands a practical resolution within a short period of time.  The solution offered by the government is not satisfactory.  We understand that a meeting is to be held on September 30, 2002 for the purpose of developing a solution—unfortunately only temporarily—for the issue dealt with in the petition.  Before deciding how to deal with the petition, we ask that, before the end of October, the State Advocate submit supplementary briefs setting out the suggested plan and a tentative schedule for its execution.  We expect that the arrangement will be one that can be practically implemented within a short period of time. 

 

On January 1, 2003, after the State had submitted several updating statements, petitioners submitted an urgent application for an interim order.  The application stated that “due to flooding in Wadi Hebron last week, one of the two unstable, make-shift bridges, which were constructed by the residents of Um Batin of their own accord, collapsed.  All agree that these bridges do not provide a solution to the problem and are not a substitute for safe, well-designed bridges. When the bridges collapsed, only a miracle prevented human casualties. The one remaining bridge is narrow and unstable and only allows for individual passage.” Additionally, petitioners explained that “since the bridge that collapsed had been located near a school, and since crossing the strong water currents is dangerous for the children, the settlement’s elementary schools were closed” on rainy days. 

 

In its response, the State reiterated its claim that, from a planning perspective, building even only temporary small bridges is impossible.   However, the State noted that significant changes in the planning situation are expected over the next few months, which will allow for the issuing of permits for building stable small bridges.

 

Following an urgent hearing on January 9, 2003, the State accepted the responsibility “of examining possible legal means of either situating a new small bridge on the location that is predisposed to flooding, or rehabilitating or strengthening the currently standing bridge.” However, in a statement submitted on January 14, 2003, the State asserted that it had not succeeded in finding such a legal means. At the same time, the State claimed that the Ministry of the Interior had committed itself to building such bridges within the coming months, as soon as the planning arrangements were confirmed.

 

We begin by noting that we have reservations regarding the State’s claim that the Planning and Building Law does not allow the construction of a temporary bridge without a building permit.  For example, in the case of the Maccabia Bridge tragedy, the defendants were acquitted of a charge of illegally building a bridge without a permit.  The court there stated, based on a number of Supreme Court precedents, that planning laws do not apply to temporary structures. See Crim. A. (Tel-Aviv) 71208/00 Bar Ilan v. State of Israel, [3]; CA (Tel-Aviv) 15237/97 State of Israel v. Bar Ilan, [4]. However, we need not resolve this issue at this time.  This is because we are of the opinion that we have the authority to issue the requested urgent interim order, even under the assumption that planning laws do not allow this.

 

Section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary states:

 

The Supreme Court shall sit also as a High Court of Justice. When so sitting, it shall hear matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice and which are not within the jurisdiction of another court.

 

The normative status of this law is constitutional and superior to ordinary law. See HCJ 2208/02 Salama v. Minister of Interior Affairs, [1] at par. 2.  This superior status is not limited to the Basic Law’s grant of jurisdiction—an interpretation which may possibly be gleaned from some of the judgments regarding this section—but also applies to its conferral of the power to grant remedies. Justice Berinson noted as much in his precedent-setting judgment in HCJ 101/74 Building and Development in the Negev Inc. v. The  Minister of Defense, [2] at 455:

 

We should note that, just as there is no limit to our subject matter jurisdiction, (aside from refraining from interfering with matters under the authority of another court), similarly, and perhaps even more so, there is no limit to the remedies that this court may offer the citizens who have been harmed by an act or omission of the government or a public authority. This Court may grant any remedy or relief it sees fit as necessary for the sake of justice.

 

Nevertheless, the High Court of Justice will generally abstain from granting a remedy under section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary if that remedy does not accord with other legislation, even if that legislation is subordinate to the Basic Law.  However, in outstanding circumstances, when the case “cries out for help,” and there is no alternative way to legally provide “relief for the sake of justice,” the court will not abstain from taking advantage of this “unconventional” authority. 

 

This is a “Kafkaesque” situation that cries out for help. Young children are required to endanger their lives in order to reach the public school that the State of Israel erected near their homes, or, alternatively, to refrain from attending school on rainy days.  The State does not deny its duty to build a small bridge for passage over the wadi in order to prevent these dangers.  It claims, however, that the law prevents it from doing so for the next few months.  It is unthinkable that planning laws are intended to prevent the building of emergency temporary structures for the sake of saving lives.  Even if we were to assume that this was their intention, planning laws cannot overcome the constitutional and superior rule found in section 15(c) of the Basic Law: The Judiciary.  This is especially true when the rules which here allegedly prevent the granting of building permits for the bridges are located in inferior secondary legislation—regulation 17(2) of the Planning Regulations (Substantial Deviation from a Plan)-2002, and section 8.1 of the regional planning scheme RCP 14/4—and not in the relevant primary legislation, the Planning and Building Law-1965, § 151.

 

As such, due to the outstanding circumstances of this case, we have decided to issue an interim order instructing the State to build, in the shortest possible period of time, a stable small bridge over Wadi Hebron, which will allow the children of the scattered settlement of Um Batin to safely cross over the wadi on their way to school.  In their final statement, petitioners requested that additional bridges be built on the path to the regional medical clinic and at the entrance to the village.  This request was not mentioned in their urgent application on January 1, 2003, or in the hearing which was held on January 9, 2002.  As such, we have disregarded this request.

 

January 16, 2003

 

 

 

Translated by:    Leora Dahan

Edited by:             Eli Greenbaum

 

Comments, questions and suggestions are all welcomed, and may be directed towards elig@supreme.court.gov.il

 

 

 

Najar v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
CrimA 10828/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, July 28, 2005
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The appellant, a Bedouin, stabbed his sister to death. Initially, he said that the reason why he did this was that his sister, who was unmarried, intended to travel alone to Egypt, and this would dishonour the family. At his trial, the appellant testified that in addition his sister had made a statement questioning his paternity of his children. The appellant claimed that the killing of his sister was the result of provocation, and therefore he should be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. Inter alia he argued that the court should take into account the fact that in Bedouin culture it was unacceptable for unmarried women to travel alone.

 

Held: No argument of ‘family honour’ as a motive for killing someone will be allowed by the court in Israel. The human dignity of the victim and the sanctity of life take precedence over family honour.

 

Appeal denied.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

CrimA 10828/03

Taha Najar

v

State of Israel

 

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Criminal Appeals

[28 July 2005]

Before Justices M. Naor, E. Rubinstein, Y. Adiel

 

Appeal of the judgment of the Haifa District Court (Vice-President H. Pizam and Justices S. Stemer, R. Shapiro) on 15 December 2002 in CrimC 221/01.

 

Facts: The appellant, a Bedouin, stabbed his sister to death. Initially, he said that the reason why he did this was that his sister, who was unmarried, intended to travel alone to Egypt, and this would dishonour the family. At his trial, the appellant testified that in addition his sister had made a statement questioning his paternity of his children. The appellant claimed that the killing of his sister was the result of provocation, and therefore he should be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder. Inter alia he argued that the court should take into account the fact that in Bedouin culture it was unacceptable for unmarried women to travel alone.

 

Held: No argument of ‘family honour’ as a motive for killing someone will be allowed by the court in Israel. The human dignity of the victim and the sanctity of life take precedence over family honour.

 

Appeal denied.

 

Legislation cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 1.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, ss. 300, 300(a), 300(a)(2), 300A, 301.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]  CrimA 6167/99 Ben Shalush v. State of Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 577.

[2]  CrimA 290/87 Sabah v. State of Israel [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 358.

[3]  CrimA 228/01 Kalev v. State of Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(5) 365.

[4]  CrimA 339/84 Rabinovitch v. State of Israel [1985] IsrSC 39(4) 253.

[5]  CrimA 299/81 Tatruashwili v. State of Israel [1982] IsrSC 36(1) 141.

[6]  CrimA 6819/01 Gershuni v. State of Israel (not yet reported).

[7]  CrimA 402/87 State of Israel v. Jondi [1988] IsrSC 42(3) 383.

[8]  CrimA 686/80 Siman-Tov v. State of Israel [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 253.

[9]  CrimA 396/69 Benno v. State of Israel [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 580.

[10] CrimA 655/78 Schmidman v. Attorney-General [1980] IsrSC 34(1) 63.

[11] CrimA 5413/97 Zorbeliov v. State of Israel [2001] IsrSC 55(2) 541.

[12] CrimA 759/97 Aliabiev v. State of Israel [2001] IsrSC 55(3) 459.

[13] CrimA 1258/03 A v. State of Israel [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 625.

[14] CrimA 3071/92 Azualos v. State of Israel [1996] IsrSC 50(2) 573.

[15] CrimA 3800/05 Abu Balal v. State of Israel (not yet reported).

[16] CrimA 7126/03 Ohanna v. State of Israel (unreported).

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[17] Exodus 20, 12.

[18] Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 56b.

[19] Genesis 9, 6.

[20] Maimonides, Hilechot Melachim (Laws of Kings) 9, 1; 9, 4.

[21] N. Rakover, Law and the Noahides.

 

For the appellant — M. Gilad.

For the respondent — A. Hulta.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

1.   This is an appeal of the judgment of the Haifa District Court (Vice-President Pizam and Justices Stemer and Shapiro) in CrimC 221/01, which was given on 15 December 2002, in which the appellant was convicted of murder with malice aforethought under s. 300 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977. The victim of the murder was his late sister Samia.

2.   (a) According to what is set out in the indictment and in the judgment of the court, on 9 May 2001 the appellant stabbed his 43 year old sister Samia eleven times with a knife, ten times in her back and once in her left hand, and thereby brought about her death.

The judgment found that the appellant discovered that the deceased, who was unmarried and lived with other unmarried sisters in their mother’s home, intended to go within a short time on a trip to Egypt on her own. The appellant opposed the deceased’s trip, because he thought that this was ‘unacceptable behaviour’ according to the customs of the Bedouin community with regard to unmarried women, and he tried to dissuade her from going. On the day of the deed, the appellant came to the deceased’s home and demanded that she give up the planned trip. The deceased refused. Because of her refusal, the appellant decided to kill her, and he subsequently left her home, went to his home, took a knife, hid it under his clothes and returned to her home. The appellant spoke to the deceased once again and demanded that she did not go to Egypt, but her mind remained unchanged. As a result, the appellant stabbed her and brought about her death; he began to stab her while she was standing, and continued even when she collapsed.

(b) The District Court convicted the appellant of an offence of murder with malice aforethought, under s. 300 of the Penal Law, 5737-19 (hereafter: the law). In a detailed verdict, the trial court reviewed the evidence and explained that, in the opinion of the court, the elements of the offence existed.

(c) The main question that was in dispute, before the trial court and now, is whether the prosecution proved the elements of the offence of ‘murder with malice aforethought.’ and especially the intention of the appellant to kill the deceased and the element of a lack of provocation. No one disputes the existence of the actus reus. The aspect of mens rea is composed, under the law — s. 301 of the law and case law — of three elements: a decision to kill, preparation, and an absence of provocation. With regard to the first element — a decision to kill — the District Court found that since this element is based on the fatal outcome and a desire that this outcome will indeed be realized, in our case the appellant confessed in his statement to the police (prosecution exhibit 16, unlike his testimony in the court, which we shall discuss below) that he had formed the desire to kill the deceased already when he went to bring the knife from his home. The manner of killing the deceased also testified to his intention to kill her; the many wounds made with a knife in sensitive parts of the body places the appellant under a presumption that he intended to cause the fatal outcome. The court reached the conclusion that the appellant did not act as an automaton, without any ability of stopping himself, but with independent thought, in a ‘logical’ sequence of actions that led to the realization of his purpose.

With regard to the element of preparation, the District Court held that the acts whereby the appellant went to his home, brought the knife and hid it on his person were sufficient to satisfy this element; this element would have been satisfied even if the knife had been in his possession the whole time, since it would have been sufficient for him to direct it at the deceased in order to satisfy the element of preparation.

In the trial court the appellant argued that the prosecution did not prove the element of the absence of provocation, in view of statements which he alleged the deceased made to him that his children were not his, a matter that was raised only in his testimony in the court, and also in view of the fact that the deceased wanted to travel to Egypt in defiance of the customs of his community. The court held that the deceased did not say anything to the appellant about his children, and even if she did say something, neither that nor her desire to travel to Egypt could constitute either an objective or a subjective provocation.

3.   (a) The appeal before us is against the conviction.

(b) The appellant’s main argument is that he did not intend to kill the deceased, and that the element of a lack of provocation was not satisfied. In this context, the appellant says that because he belongs to the Bedouin community, he refrained from raising the claim with regard to the true nature of the provocation, namely the insult with regard to his children, until his testimony in the court.

Alternatively, it was argued that the appellant’s act was carried out at a time when he was in an emotional state in which his ability to control his behaviour was limited, and therefore the case falls within the scope of s. 300(a) of the Penal Code, which allows a reduced sentence to be given in such cases instead of life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence.

4.   Deliberation and decision

(a) Section 300(a)(2) of the Penal Law provides that someone who brings about the death of a person with malice aforethought shall be charged with murder. Section 301 of the law provides — as aforesaid — the three elements of the component of malice aforethought: the decision to kill, the element of preparation and the absence of provocation.

(b) The decision to kill

(1) The decision to kill requires a mens rea of an intention that is reflected in the rational and voluntary sphere — an expectation of the fatal outcome and a desire or wish to realize it (CrimA 6167/99 Ben Shalush v. State of Israel [1], per Justice Procaccia). Proving the existence of the element of mens rea requires a subjective examination that addresses the expectation of the outcome and the desire to achieve it. In order to examine this, the courts are assisted by presumptions and objective evidence that can cast light on the intention. Thus, for example, case law has adopted a presumption that a person intends the natural consequences that ensure from his actions; in addition, it has formulated a set of subtests in order to reach conclusions about the existence of a decision to kill, in relation to all of the circumstances that accompany the incident (see CrimA 290/87 Sabah v. State of Israel [2], at pp. 364-366, per Justice D. Levin). In CrimA 228/01 Kalev v. State of Israel [3], at pp. 375-377, Justice Beinisch surveyed the various indications that point to the existence of a decision to kill:

‘Thus, for example, an implement that was used for committing the murder can serve as a significant indication of the existence of expectation and intention… the manner of the act and the nature of the injury also testify to the making of the decision to kill; for example, an injury in a sensitive part of the body has been recognized as an indication that proves a decision to kill, even if was only one blow, but it was in a sensitive and dangerous place’ (and see the references cited there).

The same is true of ‘the nature of the incident that led to the murder or previous statements that were made between the parties, and that can show a decision that was made with a sound mind and without provocation’ (ibid., at pp. 376-377).

(2) In our case, the evidence that was proved with regard to the circumstances of the incident and the sequence of events leads to the inevitable conclusion that the appellant reached a decision to kill his sister. In his confession to the police (prosecution exhibit 16A, at p. 2) he says clearly: ‘I said if she was convinced and said to me “I am not going,” I would not kill her, but if she insisted, I would kill her.’ When the deceased did not give in to the appellant’s request to cancel the trip to Egypt and continued to refuse to do so, he took a knife that was approximately 13 cm. long and approximately 4.6 cm. wide and he stabbed her — as aforesaid — eleven times in sensitive parts of her body. Two stab wounds on the right side of the back pierced the right lung, the inferior vena cava and the liver. Seven stab wounds on the left side of the back went through the left lung, an addition wound in the lower back went through the back muscles and another wound pierced the muscles of the left forearm. The number and location of the wounds and the lethal instrument that was used show that the appellant acted with malice aforethought, was aware of the consequences of his actions and desired to bring about the fatal outcome.

(3) As has been seen, the appellant’s claim that he stabbed his sister without having any possibility of controlling his actions is inconsistent with the evidence that was presented with regard to the sequence of events and the manner in which he behaved thereafter, as described above. The appellant made a decision in his heart that if the deceased would not give in to his demand to cancel the trip to Egypt, he would kill her. After the cruel act, he went out to the courtyard and told the members of the family who were present there that he had killed ‘Amu,’ washed his hands and the knife and covered the body with a rug. The appellant’s brother telephoned the police and the appellant himself spoke with the duty officer and told him of the death of the deceased.

(c) Preparation

The element of preparation has been interpreted in case law as a physical element in which the court examines the preparatory acts that accompanied the act of murder or the preparation of the implement that was used to commit the murder (CrimA 339/84 Rabinovitch v. State of Israel [4], at p. 259, per Justice E. Goldberg). It has also been said that ‘the act of preparation may take place on the spot, when the decision to kill is made. In practice, in many cases these two elements interconnect, when they arise and take place very shortly before the actual act of causing the death’ (CrimA 299/81 Tatruashwili v. State of Israel [5], at p. 147, per Justice D. Levin). Thus, for example, in Tatruashwili v. State of Israel [5], by taking the axe that the appellant found in the house, lifting it up and bringing it down on the deceased’s head, the act of preparation was begun and completed.

In the case before us, the District Court as aforesaid reached the substantiated conclusion that the appellant returned to his home after an argument with his late sister in order to bring the knife, and he hid it under his clothes. Notwithstanding, like the trial court I too am of the opinion that even according to the version, which was raised at a late stage, that the knife was in the appellant’s possession all day, bringing it out from under his clothes and directing it at the deceased was sufficient to satisfy the element of mens rea. It would appear that the issues in our case with regard to this point are not complex and speak for themselves.

(d) Absence of provocation

(1) The provocation, whose absence must be proved under s. 301 of the Penal Law is an external provocative act that takes place immediately prior to the act of the killing, and it must be of sufficient intensity to deprive the accused of the power of self-control and his ability to comprehend the possible outcome of his reaction (see the recent case of CrimA 6819/01 Gershuni v. State of Israel [6], per Justice Levy, and the case law cited in my opinion there). Was the appellant provoked? The answer to this cannot be yes.

(2) It is well known that provocation is made up of an objective element and a subjective element.

The subjective element concerns the question whether the provocative or offensive conduct did in practice have an effect on the accused to such an extent that it caused him to lose his self-control (CrimA 402/87 State of Israel v. Jondi [7], at p. 390, per President Shamgar).

The objective element concerns the question whether a civilized person, were he to be placed in the specific situation, would have lost his control and responded in the way in which the accused responded; ‘the objective test is mainly an ethical barrier, which is intended to impose norms of conduct’ (CrimA 686/80 Siman-Tov v. State of Israel [8], at p. 264, per Justice Shamgar) and its purpose is to provide an answer to the question whether the provocation directed at the appellant was so serious, in view of the circumstances of the case, ‘that it can be concluded that most people would have great difficulty in not submitting to its effect and therefore they would be liable to respond in the fatal manner as the accused responded’ (CrimA 396/69 Benno v. State of Israel [9], per President Agranat). In order to clarify this test, we should point out that it has already been held that ‘with regard to uttering curses, in response to which such great pressure was exerted on the neck that it was capable of resulting in the breaking of the bone, it makes no difference whether the appellant was accustomed to cursing in the past or experienced it before the incident for the first time… this cannot be regarded as a provocation that is capable of depriving him of malice aforethought’ (CrimA 655/78 Schmidman v. Attorney-General [10], at p. 73, per Justice Shamgar; see also CrimA 5413/97 Zorbeliov v. State of Israel [11], at p. 554, per Justice Levy).

(3) In our case, the following is the appellant’s version of events, as it developed:

(a) The provocation began with his sister’s ‘declaration of independence’ that she was going to Egypt as an unmarried woman, and it continued with the suppressed version that was raised in the court — an insult to his personal dignity by casting a doubt on whether he was the father of his children. In several statements made by the appellant on the date of the tragic event (9 May 2001) it can be clearly seen that the reason for the killing was the deceased’s desire to go to Egypt. Thus, in the arrest report made by Advanced Staff Sergeant-Major Yitzhak Cohen (prosecution exhibit no. 49) at 1:45 p.m., the appellant said ‘I killed her because she wanted to go to Egypt and I did not agree; I have made the mistake of my life.’ In a memorandum on that day, which was made by Advanced Staff Sergeant-Major Mansour Nazia (prosecution exhibit no. 42), when the appellant was interrogated after making an initial statement that ‘what happened, happened,’ ‘he [the appellant] said to me that he stabbed his sister Samia after he tried to dissuade her from going to Egypt and she insisted’ (p. 3). In a memorandum made by Advanced Staff Sergeant-Major Avi Sabah (prosecution exhibit no. 41), while the appellant was waiting to be interrogated, it is stated that the appellant expressed remorse for his deeds ‘and the whole time said: why did I stab her, I was concerned for my children… he knew and understood exactly what he had done and why, because according to him his sister (the deceased) wanted to go on a trip to Egypt and he refused and she insisted and therefore he murdered her.’ See also prosecution exhibits nos. 15 and 15a of the same date at 2:50 p.m. (Advanced Staff Sergeant-Major Samiah Mansour) and also prosecution exhibit no. 16 — the appellant’s statement — that when she insisted that if she did not go to Egypt she would leave the house, ‘I got up and killed her, now I am sorry… she did not deserve to be killed.’ All the evidence that we have listed hitherto describes the desire of the deceased to travel to Egypt as the reason for the murder. There is no other reason. In prosecution exhibit no. 15 the appellant also said: ‘she argued with me until the end and said to me… you are not my father, my father is dead… and I, since the day that my father died, am responsible for everything in the home, and she did not accept that and said: you are not my father.’

(b) However, a new version with regard to the reason for the killing was raised in the appellant’s testimony in the court (p. 132 of the court record, on 17 February 2002). Admittedly, he still explained that the trip to Egypt was the reason for the quarrel, since it was not in accordance with the customs of the Bedouin community with regard to the proper conduct for unmarried women: ‘from the viewpoint of family honour, I will have no more respect from people if she goes to Egypt. How can I let an unmarried girl travel alone to Egypt… this diminishes my honour and I will feel like a rubbish bin. This is my honour. This is a part of me, this is my flesh and blood’ (p. 131). But (at p. 132) a new factor was added, according to which after the quarrel ‘she [the deceased] said: first of all, you are not my father. You will not decide for me whether I will go or not. Before you decide for me, go and look at your children; you are a kind of black colour, and your children are white… I understood from this that the children were not mine, I lost control, I did not know what I was going to do and what I did, and the incident occurred.’ Later, at p. 133, he said: ‘I saw everything black, as if my wife was having an adulterous relationship with another man… would I keep an adulterous wife in the house?’ The appellant explained his suppression of this story until his testimony in the trial (at p. 135) as follows: ‘It is a question of my honour that people in the village should not hear what she said.’ He claimed that he did not tell this to the psychiatrists who examined him, for the same reason, because of honour (p. 147), but only to his own expert, Dr Naftali. It is not superfluous to point out that in his statement at the police station on the day of the event (prosecution exhibit no. 15a, at p. 16) the appellant was asked whether there was another reason for the murder that he did not wish to disclose, and he replied: ‘No, I say that this was the only reason.’

(c) We have before us, prima facie, two alleged issues of family honour: one is the honour that was offended by the trip of an unmarried woman alone; but since he understood — apparently — that this reason alone would not be accepted, as was certainly made clear to the appellant in various ways after the killing, the appellant raised the version of the personal insult to his dignity, and he also recruited for this purpose his mother, who did not mention her son’s statement in her statement on 9 May 2002 (prosecution exhibit no. 11), but spoke about it in the court (pp. 24-25). This, then, is the essence of the defence argument: the provocation arose from the insult to the honour of the family, and especially to the personal dignity of the appellant.

(4) Defence witness Sheikh Atrash Aakal explained in support (p. 156):

‘Family honour is one of the most sensitive issues with Bedouins, especially so in the Bedouin tribe; every Bedouin has his family honour and tribal honour, and respect for customs. He will not acquiesce to any injury to his honour and the honour of his family, especially where sexual offences are concerned.’

 Later, at p. 157, he said: ‘A trip by a Bedouin girl alone is one of the most serious red lines which no one allows himself to cross in the honour of the Bedouin family and tribe.’ The same applies to the implication that the children were not his: ‘This is an insult of the first order… it will not be forgiven.’ He also said with regard to family honour (p. 161): ‘In Bedouin society we do not justify the murder, but we are caught between the mentality and the customs and Israeli law, which is in our opinion a very respected and just law, and we believe in it, but we pay the price.’

(5) Do these claims support the existence of the subjective element of provocation? In order to consider whether we should accept this at all, it was necessary to believe the appellant’s version with regard to the deceased’s insult with regard to his being the father of his children, as a result of which he allegedly drew out the knife on the spot and killed his sister. The trial court did not believe this at all, and it concluded that the sole motive for killing his sister was the planned trip to Egypt, which was, according to the appellant, an insult to the family and its honour. From reading the evidence it is very hard to imagine that these remarks were made, since it is logical to suppose that had they been said, the appellant would have given expression to them at least to his doctors or someone close in his family during the long months — nine in total, from May 2001 to February 2002 — between the murder and his testimony in court. Indeed, the trial court did not accept the appellant’s explanations with regard to the suppression of this version. Moreover, the intensity of the emotion for provocation must be such ‘that it deprives the person of any ability to understand the consequences of his acts’ (per Justice Procaccia, in CrimA 759/97 Aliabiev v. State of Israel [12], at p. 475; S.Z. Feller, Fundamentals of Criminal Law, at p. 565). This is not what happened in our case, according to all the assembled evidence. It is well known that this court does not tend to intervene in the factual findings, and especially in the determinations of credibility, that are made by the trial court (CrimA 1258/03 A v. State of Israel [13]). Indeed, these statements were not only suppressed for a long time, but they were made at a time when the only version that can be heard is that of the appellant, since the deceased regrettably is no longer with us in order to give her version of this. With regard to the suppressed version, even according to the view that a person’s honour is violated by statements made with regard to his family honour and his personal honour, such as the paternity of his children, it is necessary to believe that the alleged provocation deprived him of self-control in such as way that it led to the act of murder, and life experience tells us that if this were the case, there would have been an immediate expression of this in some way or another, and the version would not have been suppressed in its entirety for such a long time, as it was.

(6) (a) But even if this factual claim of the appellant were accepted, which is not the case, and even if it were sufficient to satisfy the element of subjective provocation, which is not the case, this does not lead at all to a conclusion that a civilized person would, in response to an insult thrown at him in the course of a quarrel, lose his self-control to such an extent that he would take a knife and stab his sister again and again and again. In other words, even were we to assume the existence of the subjective element, the objective element certainly did not exist in my opinion. Who is the ‘civilized person’ whose temper we are examining within the framework of the objective test? Does this include a specific approach to various segments of the population and various cultures and their attitude to ‘murder for reasons of family honour’?

(b) The answer to this was given by President Shamgar in State of Israel v. Jondi [7], at p. 393:

‘We are speaking of a theoretical criterion, which is created by the court on the basis of a kind of synthesis of ideals and reality. The court creates for itself a theoretical image that reflects the expected manner of behaviour of the reasonable person in our society. In other words, we do not create an objective test on the basis of collecting information with regard to the accepted level of conduct in a particular group, but according to a theoretical construction which is the creation of the court, which the court fashions in an image that is admittedly fictional but is also humane. In other words, this is an image that may also fail to deal with a specific situation. Obviously this image is one of the specific time and not of past ages, but it does not mean that the court, in fashioning this image, must necessarily accept, whether it likes it or not, the average of corrupt behaviours and customs, in a specific period, of various groups or persons of various origins or tempers, and that it is not entitled to include within the characteristics of its creation elements of a desirable cultural norm… the objective test does not make any provision for subgroups… which include persons who watch violent films as opposed to those who only watch educational films, or those who place the immediate satisfaction of material desires at the centre of their existence as opposed to those who live a spiritual life.’

 It should be noted that in State of Israel v. Jondi [7] the approach of the District Court, which held by a majority that the objective test of the absence of provocation had not been proved, was overturned, and President Shamgar (with the agreement of Justices S. Levin and E. Goldberg) disagreed with the finding of the District Court that ‘it was very difficult indeed to define the nature and character of “civilized” ’ for this purpose.

(c) With respect, the remarks of President Shamgar are, in my opinion, as valid today as then. Admittedly, in a multi-faceted and multi-cultural society like Israeli society there will be areas where significance and attention will be given to various segments of the population, but there is no place for giving significance to this within the framework of the criminal law, especially in its physical manifestations, and certainly not when we are speaking of taking the life of another against a background of what is called family honour. The criterion is first and foremost an ethical one: the sanctity of life (see s. 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty).

(d) Admittedly, much ink has been spilled with regard to the dilemmas that are presented by the approach of cultural relativity. On the one hand, arguments have been made against the creation of universal moral values and universal human rights that seek to impose ‘enlightened’ western culture on various segments of the population, as a symptom of an approach that does not recognize pluralism and multiculturalism. On the other hand, a dialogue that makes allowances — which is legitimate in itself — for the unique history and culture of every group may act as a magic word, which sometimes clouds its real significance and allows an abuse of that relativity in order to protect values that are incompatible with basic human rights as they have been formulated in our times. ‘Family honour murders’ are one of these. I am aware of the remarks of Prof. Y. Shefer in ‘The Reasonable Man and the Criminal Law,’ 39 HaPraklit 78, an article written in 1990 in which he found that in the serious areas of criminal law no place has been allowed in Israeli case law, inter alia, for provocation of the ‘reasonable person’ in the offence of murder, but I am unable to accept his conclusion, for ethical reasons.

(e) In Dr O. Kamir’s article, ‘How Reasonableness Killed Women — the Hot Blood of the “Reasonable Person” and the “Average Israeli Woman” in the Doctrine of Provocation in Azualos v. State of Israel,’ 6 Pelilim (1998) 137, at pp. 162-168), which concerns the judgment in CrimA 3071/92 Azualos v. State of Israel [14], per President Barak, criticism was directed, inter alia, also at the judgment in State of Israel v. Jondi [7], and the definition cited above from the remarks of President Shamgar (at p. 161). It should be pointed out that in Azualos v. State of Israel [14] the wife of the accused was found in the arms of another man; the accused killed them both, and provocation was proved, such that the offence of manslaughter was substituted for murder. In her article, Dr Kamir discussed the ‘reasonable man’ who invokes the protection of the defence of provocation, and as she says, in a scathing description of the characterization: ‘ “The reasonable man” is a person of honour, vulnerable and sensitive. When his right to his property is violated or his masculinity is violated, he must restore his honour and in the heat of the moment he kills his wife and her lover.’ In her book, A Question of Honour: Israeli Women and Human Dignity and in her article ‘A Love as Strong as Death or a Threat of Harassment’ in Cases concerning Love (O. Ben-Naftali and H. Naveh, eds.), at p. 475, Dr Kamir argues that the concept of honour incorporates four separate concepts: honour, dignity, glory and respect (at p. 476), and that in many ‘honour societies,’ like those of the Mediterranean, the honour of a man as a value — which is the issue that concerns us —depends upon two components: ‘The one is his own extrovert, bold, independent, generous, proud and aggressive behaviour’; and the other is ‘the modesty, naivety, piety, obedience and devotion of the women close to him (his mother, sister, wife and daughters).’ Special importance is attributed to the sexual inaccessibility of the women, since violating the sexuality of a woman is regarded as a source of shame, which violates not only her honour, but also the honour of the man who is responsible for guarding the access to her sexuality; therefore a father or brother of a girl is liable to punish her, and this symbolizes the control of her family over her, since, as aforesaid, by violating the norm of modesty she brings shame on those with whom she grew up. See also Manar Hassan, ‘The Politics of Honour: the Patriarchate, the State and the Murder of Women in the name of Family Honour,’ in Sex, Gender and Politics (1999) (D. Yizraeli et al., eds.) , at p. 267, which regards family honour as ‘a fortified wall behind which all the forces that restrict the liberty of the woman are gathered’ (p. 303); in one place, she describes the murder of a woman by her cousin because she refused to stop smoking, and elsewhere a woman was murdered because she refused to work outside the home. Kanaan Ahlas was murdered because she accepted a position of leadership; and a young murderer quotes the person who murdered his sister, because she said ‘that no one will tell me how to behave’ (see pp. 302-303).

(f) This is not the place to discuss at length the character of the reasonable man and the place that should be given to various outlooks within the framework of this concept, but it is clear that any argument concerning cultural differences and relativity cannot be a cloak for the subjugation and oppression of a segment of the population, which in our case is women, in the name of the value of family honour, and it certainly cannot justify the intolerable way that women are killed in the name of this value. There is no alternative but to make it clear to everyone: there is no place for any argument of ‘family honour’ as a motive for killing someone, whether a family member or not. No act of killing for the reason that family honour has been violated will be shown any understanding by the court in Israel. There is no difference, in this respect, between one murder and another; the human dignity of the victim, which has been irreversibly violated, takes precedence over the honour of the family. The right that is higher than all others is the one that requires no explanation, and was included in the Ten Commandments, ‘You shall not murder’ (Exodus 20, 12 [17]), which is the sixth commandment. Even before that, the spilling of blood appears among the seven commandments given to Noah, which according to Jewish tradition apply to the whole human race (see Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 56b [18]): ‘Whoever spills the blood of man, by man his blood shall be spilled, for in the image of God He made man’ (Genesis 9, 6 [19]). See also Maimonides, Hilechot Melachim (Laws of Kings), 9, 1 [20], who says with regard to this and other commandments, ‘and logic dictates them’; in other words, these commandments are dictated also by human reason and common sense; see also ibid., 9, 4 [20]. See also N. Rakover, Law and the Noahides [21]. In Israel, as aforesaid, the right to life has been incorporated in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

(g) The issue naturally raises a question that goes beyond the scope of this tragic incident and concerns educating people to be tolerant and to eliminate situations in which one person raises his hand against another or turns his knife on another for reasons of family honour. We are now approaching the end of the sixth decade of the existence of the State of Israel, and we are in the twenty-first century, and still concepts of honour of this kind — which I do not denigrate as a matter of tradition, cultural, social and political experience and values — are also being used as an ‘explanation.’ I am aware that learned counsel for the defence does not identify with the explanation, but merely attributed it to his client, to the murder, and nothing more. There are authorities and parties whose task it is — and the court plays a certain role, but not a central one, in this — to act in order to eradicate these concepts in the social context, in addition to the criminal one: the education system, local and community leadership, etc.. It has been argued that it is a part of a value system, but it is not a decree from the Heavens, even if it is not easy to change it. Sheikh Atrash Aakal, who testified, spoke of the difficult position of Bedouins in this context; academic writers show that this old custom still prevails in various places. But it is the task of the Sheikh and others like him, and it is the task of the education system first and foremost, to act to eradicate the erroneous and perverse application of the issue of family honour. An educational process by the education authorities and the relevant leadership is essential, in my opinion, and the sooner the better.

(h) Admittedly, this court recently showed leniency in a case of an offence of a seventy year old man, who was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for offences against his daughter, which, it was claimed, were committed against a background of family honour. Leniency was shown in view of his age and family circumstances, including the attitude of the daughter (CrimA 3800/05 Abu Balal v. State of Israel [15]). But it was expressly stated in that case (per Vice-President Cheshin):

‘Our remarks should not be interpreted as if we are saying that persons who commit an offence against a background of “family honour” should be treated leniently or that offences that are committed against a background of “family honour” should be considered with a tolerant approach. Certainly not.’

(i) I should mention that there is a further hearing pending in this court on the question whether, in determining the existence of the element of the absence of provocation, there is also a justification for considering the objective test (CrimFH 1042/04 Biton v. State of Israel). In Gershuni v. State of Israel [6], I said that I do not agree with those who believe that the objective test should be cancelled, since even in a society that respects the autonomy of the individual, within the framework of human dignity, the sanctity of human life is one of the basic principles in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and it is a normative infrastructure that is shared by all members of society; if we do not assume this, then in my opinion we will undermine the essential basic values of every civilized society.

(j) With regard to the appellant’s claim concerning an emotional disturbance that did not allow him to control his behaviour (s. 300A of the Penal Law), it would appear from the description of the sequence of events that the acts of the appellant were carried out with malice aforethought — not as a spontaneous and uncontrolled response, but out of a desire to protect the family honour and his status as head of the family. Moreover, even from the psychological opinions that were filed in the District Court it does not emerge that the appellant suffers from any psychological illness. In this context I accept the conclusion of the District Court, that even if the appellant suffered from a serious psychological disturbance at the time of committing the murder — an argument that was not accepted — there was no factual or legal causal link between it and his emotional state before the killing; there is no similarity between CrimA 7126/03 Ohanna v. State of Israel [16] (in which manslaughter was substituted for murder) and our case.

5.   Finally, in summary, the appellant murdered the deceased with malice aforethought, intending to bring about the fatal outcome and without proving the claim of provocation. I therefore propose to my colleagues that we should not allow the appeal, and that we should leave the sentence unchanged.

 

 

Justice M. Naor

I agree that the appeal should be denied. The trial court rightly did not accept the suppressed evidence of the appellant with regard to remarks that were purportedly said to him by his late sister, from which it was possible to understand that his wife had been unfaithful to him. I see no need to discuss, within the framework of this appeal, the question of what the law would be had the applicant’s factual claim been accepted, even if only as a result of his being given the benefit of the doubt.

 

Justice Y. Adiel

I agree that the appeal should be denied, as proposed by Justice E. Rubinstein, and I also agree with the comment of Justice M. Naor.

 

Appeal denied.

21 Tammuz 5765.

28 July 2005.

 

 

Nahmani v. Nahmani

Case/docket number: 
CA 5587/93
Date Decided: 
Thursday, March 30, 1995
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: Ruth and Daniel Nahmani, a married couple, were unable to have a child because of an operation that Ruth underwent. They therefore decided to try in-vitro fertilization of Ruth’s ova with Daniel’s sperm and implanting the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother. Under Israeli law, surrogacy was not permitted and in-vitro fertilization was only permitted for implantation in the mother. Because of the great expense of the in-vitro fertilization procedure in the United States, the couple petitioned the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, to allow the in-vitro fertilization procedure to be conducted in Israel, for the purpose of surrogacy in the United States. In that proceeding (HCJ 1237/91), a consent judgment was given allowing the in-vitro fertilization procedure to be done in Israel. The procedure was carried out at Assuta Hospital.

 

Subsequently, Daniel left Ruth and went to live with another woman, who bore him a child. Ruth applied to Assuta Hospital to release the fertilized ova into her possession for the purpose of the surrogacy procedure in the United States, but Daniel opposed this. Assuta Hospital therefore refused to release the fertilized ova. Ruth applied to the Haifa District Court for an order against the hospital to release the fertilized ova, and in its judgment the District Court gave such an order.

 

Daniel appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Supreme Court.

 

Held: (Majority opinion — Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen, Vice-President Barak, Justice D. Levin, Justice I. Zamir) Although a spouse’s right to be a parent is a basic right, this right does not impose a duty on the other spouse to help realize this right. If a spouse does not perform the customary marital duties, these cannot be enforced and the only remedy is divorce. It is not proper legal policy to force someone to be a parent against his will.

 

The consent of Daniel Nahmani to the in-vitro fertilization procedure created a ‘weak’ agreement that cannot be enforced under the strict laws of contract. In addition, the consent to the procedure did not imply consent to continue the procedure even after a separation.

 

(Minority opinion — Justice Ts. E. Tal) The husband was estopped from opposing the continuation of procedure by promissory estoppel, since he gave his consent, his wife reasonably relied on this consent, and she did so irreversibly, by fertilizing her ova with her husband’s sperm.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

CA 5587/93

Daniel Nahmani

v

1.     Ruth Nahmani

2.     Assuta Ltd Private Hospital

3.     Attorney-General

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals

[30 March 1995]

Before Vice-President A. Barak and Justices D. Levin, I. Zamir, T. Strasberg-Cohen, Ts. E. Tal

 

Appeal on the judgment of the Haifa District Court (Justice H. Ariel) on 2 September 1993 in OM 599/92.

 

Facts: Ruth and Daniel Nahmani, a married couple, were unable to have a child because of an operation that Ruth underwent. They therefore decided to try in-vitro fertilization of Ruth’s ova with Daniel’s sperm and implanting the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother. Under Israeli law, surrogacy was not permitted and in-vitro fertilization was only permitted for implantation in the mother. Because of the great expense of the in-vitro fertilization procedure in the United States, the couple petitioned the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, to allow the in-vitro fertilization procedure to be conducted in Israel, for the purpose of surrogacy in the United States. In that proceeding (HCJ 1237/91), a consent judgment was given allowing the in-vitro fertilization procedure to be done in Israel. The procedure was carried out at Assuta Hospital.

Subsequently, Daniel left Ruth and went to live with another woman, who bore him a child. Ruth applied to Assuta Hospital to release the fertilized ova into her possession for the purpose of the surrogacy procedure in the United States, but Daniel opposed this. Assuta Hospital therefore refused to release the fertilized ova. Ruth applied to the Haifa District Court for an order against the hospital to release the fertilized ova, and in its judgment the District Court gave such an order.

Daniel appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Supreme Court.

 

Held: (Majority opinion — Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen, Vice-President Barak, Justice D. Levin, Justice I. Zamir) Although a spouse’s right to be a parent is a basic right, this right does not impose a duty on the other spouse to help realize this right. If a spouse does not perform the customary marital duties, these cannot be enforced and the only remedy is divorce. It is not proper legal policy to force someone to be a parent against his will.

The consent of Daniel Nahmani to the in-vitro fertilization procedure created a ‘weak’ agreement that cannot be enforced under the strict laws of contract. In addition, the consent to the procedure did not imply consent to continue the procedure even after a separation.

(Minority opinion — Justice Ts. E. Tal) The husband was estopped from opposing the continuation of procedure by promissory estoppel, since he gave his consent, his wife reasonably relied on this consent, and she did so irreversibly, by fertilizing her ova with her husband’s sperm.

 

Appeal allowed by majority opinion, Justice Ts. E. Tal dissenting.

 

Basic Laws cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

Statutes cited:

Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, s. 10.

Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973, ss. 25, 26, 28(a), 28(b), 28(c), 39.

Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970, ss. 3(1), 3(2), 3(4), 18(a).

Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962.

Penal Law, 5737-1977, ss. 361, 362, 363, 365.

 

Regulations cited:

Public Health (In-vitro Fertilization) Regulations, 5747-1987, rr. 8(b), 8(b)(3), 9(a), 11, 14(b).

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]        HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 812.

[2]        CA 413/80 A v. B [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 57.

[3]        CA 391/80 Lasserson v. Shikun Ovedim Ltd [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 237.

[4]        CA 614/76 A v. B [1977] IsrSC 31(3) 85.

[5]        CA 5464/93 A v. B (a minor) [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 857.

[6]        CA 451/88 A v. State of Israel [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 330.

[7]        CA 488/77 A v. Attorney-General [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 421.

[8]        CA 232/85 A v. Attorney-General [1986] IsrSC 40(1) 1.

[9]        CA 577/83 Attorney-General v. A [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 461.

[10]     HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Register at Ministry of the Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.

[11]     CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 464.

[12]     CA 245/85 Engelman v. Klein [ 1989] IsrSC 43(1) 772.

[13]     CA 427/86 Blass v. HaShomer HaTzair Kibbutz ‘Dan’ [1989] IsrSC 32(3) 323.

[14]     CA 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon [1985] IsrSC 39(1) 116.

[15]     CA 647/89 Schiffberg v. Avtalion [1992] IsrSC 46(2) 169.

[16]     CA 416/91 Maman v. Triki [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 652.

[17]     HCJ 1635/90 Jerzhevski v. Prime Minister [1991] IsrSC 45(1) 749.

[18]     CA 13/75 Blumenfeld v. Hadar Plast Company Ltd [1975] IsrSC 29(2) 452.

[19]     CA 170/74 Hister v. Fleischer [1975] IsrSC 29(1) 132.

[20]     CA 202/92 — unreported.

[21]     CA 154/80 Borchard Lines Ltd, London v. Hydrobaton Ltd [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 213.

[22]     CA 554/83 Atta Textile Company Ltd v. Estate of Zolotolov [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 282.

[23]     CA 528/86 Polgat Industries Ltd v. Estate of Yaakov Blechner [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 821.

[24]     CA 719/89 Haifa Quarries v. Han-Ron Ltd [1992] IsrSC 46(3) 305.

[25]     CA 479/89 Coptic Mutran v. Halamish — Government-Municipal Corporation for Housing Renovation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Ltd [1992] IsrSC 46(3) 837.

[26]     CA 256/60 Frankel v. American Overseas Food Centers Inc. [1961] IsrSC 15 442.

[27]     CA 381/75 Berkovitz v. Gavrieli [1976] IsrSC 30(1) 442.

[28]     CA 3833/93 Levin v. Levin [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 862.

[29]     HCJ 243/88 Gonzales v. Turgeman [1991] IsrSC 45(2) 626.

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

[30]     CC (Jer.) 574/70 Klinger v. Azrieli Avramovitz Co. Ltd [1975] IsrDC 5735(1) 356.

 

Australian cases cited:

[31]     Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387.

 

American cases cited:

[32]     Davis v. Davis 842 S.W. 2d 588 (1992).

[33]     Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[34]     Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

[35]     Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

[36]     Planned Parenthood v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

 

English cases cited:

[37]     Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130.

[38]     Amalgamated Property Co. v. Texas Bank [1982] QB 84 (CA).

 

Jewish Law sources cited:

[39]     Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 30b.

[40]     Genesis 15, 2; 30, 1.

[41]     Mishnah, Tractate Yevamot 6, 6.

[42]     Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides), Mishneh Torah, Hilechot Ishut, 15, 5.

[43]     Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Even HaEzer, 154, paras. 1, 3, 4.

[44]     Responsum of Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli in Dr Avraham Steinberg ed., Encyclopaedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, vol. 4, pp. 40-41.

[45]     Responsum of Rabbi Shalom Shalush, ‘Fertilization in a Surrogate Womb’, in Orchot, the magazine of the Haifa Religious Council, no. 39, p. 31.

[46]     Rabbi Meir Abulafia, Yad Rama, on Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 72b, 91b.

[47]     Rabbi Shelomo Yitzhaki (Rashi), Commentary on Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 72b.

[48]     Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Yevamot, 65b, 69b

[49]     D. Sinclair, ‘The Prohibition of Abortion’, Jewish Law Annual 5, 177.

[50]     A. Steinberg, ‘Artificial Abortion according to Jewish Law’, Asia 1, 107.

[51]     Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, ‘Termination of Pregnancy according to Jewish Law’, Asia 1, 78.

[52]     Mishnah, Tractate Bava Metzia, 6, 1

[53]     Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava Kama, 100a, 108b.

[54]     Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat, 306, 6.

[55]     Mishnah, Tractate Ketubot, 7, 10.

[56]     Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (Maimonides), Mishneh Torah, Hilechot Gerushin (Laws of Divorce), 2, 20.

[57]     Rabbi Yitzhak bar Sheshet Perfet (Rivash), Responsa, 127.

[58]     Dr Avraham Steinberg ed., Encyclopaedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, vol. 2, the entry ‘In-vitro fertilization’, at p. 115 et seq..

 

For the appellant — D. Har-Even.

For the first respondent — Z. Gruber.

For the third respondent — M. Rubinstein, Director of Civil Department at State-Attorney’s Office; P. Shretzki, Senior assistant and Director of Civil Matters at Haifa District-Attorney’s Office; Dr K. Shalev.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

 

Justice T. Strasberg-Cohen

1.    ‘There are three partners in a man, the Holy One, blessed be He, his father and his mother’ (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Kiddushin 30b [39]). In this case, a rift has occurred between two of the partners, and in an area where spouses have autonomy — the field of family planning and giving birth — the court is asked to intervene and give its opinion. The difficult question on which the court’s decision is required is: does the wife, Ruth Nahmani, have the right to take possession of ova that were removed from her body and that were artificially inseminated with the sperm of her husband, Daniel Nahmani, for the purpose of implanting them in a surrogate mother, when the husband opposes this? (The fertilized ova are frozen and in storage at Assuta Hospital; the procedure is known as in-vitro fertilization — IVF).

We are confronted with a complex and multi-faceted issue whose legal aspect cannot entirely encompass it. The issue is replete with emotional, human, personal and inter-personal, psychological and sociological factors and raises questions of morals, religion, ethics, social values and legal norms. On a similar subject, President M. Shamgar said in his article ‘Questions relating to fertilization and having children’, 39 HaPraklit (1990), 21:

‘These questions are particularly sensitive, for they directly touch the raw nerve of existence. The vast majority of the various legal questions are naturally taken from life, but there are matters that directly attack the problematic nature of our human existence, frontally and not from the side…’

The question before us is one of these, and when considering it we must be extremely cautious, taking special care not to incorporate anyone’s moral or philosophical outlooks, whatever these may be, into the outlook based on the purpose of our legal system (HCJ 5688/92 Wechselbaum v. Minister of Defence [1], at p. 827; CA 413/80 A v. B [2], at p. 80).

Indeed, as the trial judge said, any decision is likely to harm one of the parties, and we must find the ‘most appropriate, correct and just solution in the circumstances of the case’ so that the harm will be less severe; but in doing so, we must find the correct and just solution that is consistent with our approach with regard to basic human rights in our society, their ramifications on the inter-personal aspect of family life and parenthood, the degree of involvement that befits the proper public law policy with regard to State involvement in the legal system on matters of relations between spouses in the complex and sensitive area of having children. Only a consideration of all of these and more can lead us to an ‘appropriate, correct and just solution’. How shall we do this?

Justice Elon said in CA 391/80 Lasserson v. Shikun Ovedim Ltd [3] at p. 264:

‘We have a major rule that a legal system cannot be sustained merely by the body of the law. The body of the legal system needs a soul, and sometimes even an “extra soul”: this soul will be found by the legal system in the form and the image of various ethical norms, which are based upon the supreme principle of doing what is upright and good, and the principle of good faith is one of the most important and special of these ethical norms.’

2.    Because of the public importance of the question, the trial court ordered the Attorney-General to be joined as a party to the action in order that he might express his opinion. The action of the respondent was therefore against the appellant, the hospital in which the fertilized ova are being stored and the Attorney-General.

This is the first case of its kind that has reached the courts in Israel, and even in the Western world there are only a few cases that have been submitted for a judicial decision. Nonetheless, the matter has been discussed by philosophers, researchers, doctors and lawyers, and it has been the subject of research, committees and articles; in several countries it has also been the subject of legislation, and there is also a recent judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis (1992) [32].

In that case, in-vitro fertilization was performed for a married couple, who were subsequently divorced. Each of them remarried, and the woman, who initially wanted the ova for implanting in her body, finally sought to donate them to a childless couple. Her request was not granted. The court was confronted with a question similar to ours, and it analyzed it from the viewpoint of the basic rights of the couple, their contractual rights, the ‘status’ of the fertilized ova and a balance between the interests of the parties. In that decision, Justice Daughtrey began by saying that although she does not have any legislation or legal precedent to help her and guide her in the dispute about the right to the fertilized ova of the estranged spouses, there is a large amount of scholarly material proposing various models for dealing with fertilized ova when unexpected events happen, such as divorce, death, economic reversals or the absence of a desire to continue the procedure. The models range between two extremes: at one extreme are those that hold that in such a case all the fertilized ova should be handed over for the use of the donors of the genetic material or to others for the purpose of implantation, and at the other extreme are those who believe that every fertilized ovum should be destroyed automatically. Between these two approaches is a broad range of other proposals, which although they may provide an easy solution — and this is their attraction — it is impossible to adopt any of these as a perfect solution if we consider the relevant constitutional principles, public policy, the outlook on life that has not yet been created, advanced technology and ethical considerations that have developed in response to scientific knowledge. Considering all of these does not leave room for easy answers to the question before us (see: C.M. Browne & B.J. Hynes, ‘The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law’, 17 J. Legis (1990), 97; J.A. Robertson, ‘Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos’, Hastings Center Report, 1989; L.B. Andrews, ‘The Legal Status of the Embryo’, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 357, 1986-87).

We should therefore focus our consideration of the question with a cautious legal approach, while giving proper weight to all the relevant fields, and without extending the horizon unnecessarily; it would, moreover, be presumptuous to determine rules and norms that affect unforeseen and unexpected situations that the astonishing advances in genetic engineering may bring before us.

Synopsis of the facts

3.    Daniel and Ruth Nahmani were married in March 1984. Three years later, Ruth Nahmani was compelled to undergo an operation and as a result of this she lost her ability to have a normal pregnancy. At the beginning of 1988, the couple decided to try and bring children into the world by means of in-vitro fertilization of Ruth Nahmani’s ova with Daniel Nahmani’s sperm and implanting the ova in the womb of a surrogate mother. Under regulation 11 of the Public Health (In-vitro Fertilization) Regulations, 5747-1987 (hereafter — the Regulations), ‘A fertilized ovum may only be implanted in the woman who will be the mother of the child’, and since it was not possible to implant the ova in the body of Ruth Nahmani, the couple applied to a surrogacy clinic in California, U.S.A., and when they discovered that the cost of the treatment was greater than they could afford, they decided that the fertilization stage would be done in Israel and the surrogacy stage in the United States. This plan also met with difficulties because of the Regulations. The couple then jointly petitioned this court (HCJ 1237/91), and their petition ended in a consent judgment on 6 May 1991, to the effect that the in-vitro fertilization would be done in Israel. Since surrogacy is not permitted in Israel, the couple made an agreement with a surrogacy clinic in the United States, which almost entirely deals with the financial aspect. An additional embryo transfer agreement was supposed to be signed after the surrogate mother was found, but in the end it was not signed because of the rift that developed between the parties. In 1992, Daniel Nahmani left home and went to live with another woman, and in April 1993 she gave birth to his daughter. Since 1992, there has been litigation between the Nahmani couple: maintenance and reconciliation actions on the part of the wife and divorce actions on the part of the husband. The Haifa Rabbinical Court recommended reconciliation, but reconciliation was never achieved. The parties are still married. The family unit has broken up, and they are living separately; Daniel Nahmani has established a new family unit.

When Ruth Nahmani applied to Assuta Hospital and asked for the fertilized ova to be released for the purpose of implanting them in a surrogate mother in the United States, the hospital refused to release the ova because of the opposition of Daniel Nahmani, which he expressed in writing both to the hospital here and to the surrogacy centre in the United States. As a result of this development, Ruth Nahmani filed an action in the Haifa District Court to receive her ova. The learned trial judge, Justice H. Ariel, found in her favour by holding that the hospital must allow here to use the fertilized ova to continue the procedure of implantation in a surrogate mother, and that Daniel Nahmani must refrain from interfering in the continuation of the procedure.

On this decision Daniel Nahmani appealed before us.

The findings of the judgment and the arguments of the parties

4.    The learned judge focused in his decision on the contractual element and reached the conclusion that Daniel Nahmani gave his prior agreement to the procedure of the fertilization for all its stages, including the implanting of the fertilized ova in the womb of the surrogate mother, and that from the moment when the procedure was begun, he could not go back on it, and his further consent was not needed, and he must refrain from interfering in the continuation of the procedure. He cannot rely on a change of circumstances — separation from his wife and establishing a new family unit — as a reason to be released from his consent, since he himself created the circumstances upon which he wishes to rely. The trial judge also added that if the position of the husband were accepted, he would have a ‘trump card’ to obtain unfair advantages in his relationship with his wife with regard to the separation. The learned judge also found support for his position in the Regulations, from which he deduced that there is no need to obtain the consent of the husband prior to the surrogacy procedure when the case involves a married woman.

The arguments of counsel for the parties are numerous and encompass a large number of issues, and they refer to the opinions of scholars, case-law, legislation, analogies from other fields of law and comparative law, which in their opinion have ramifications on the case before us. The arguments encompass the field of basic rights, contracts, torts, property law, the status of the fertilized ova, the question of public policy and proper legal policy. I do not intend to restate all the arguments that were raised; I will mention the main arguments briefly and I shall proceed to try and focus on the most important ones.

The appellant argues that the freedom to decide whether to be a parent is a basic right, and this right should not be denied or restricted. Therefore, parenthood should not be forced on him against his will. In so far as the matter relates to his consent to the procedure, this procedure was based on joint parenthood in the future and he should not be compelled to continue the procedure in the new circumstances that have arisen. He argues that even if his consent should be regarded as an agreement between himself and his wife, it is not enforceable, and his consent is required at every stage, both here and in the United States, and even the Regulations require this, and he should not be compelled to give this consent. Even the balance of convenience works in his favour. With regard to the fertilized ova, they have no independent future right to life without the consent of the two spouses. In any event, the court should not intervene in this sensitive matter which is entirely subject to the autonomy of the individual.

The Attorney-General agrees with the position of Daniel Nahmani and puts the emphasis on basic rights, on the autonomy of the family and the individual, on the need to preserve a person’s freedom and his dignity in so far as this concerns the development of his personality, determining his fate, planning his family and having his children. His position is that Daniel Nahmani should not have parenthood forced upon him and that such coercion is contrary to public policy, the proper legal policy, the principle of equality between human beings and between the sexes, and the basic rights of the individual.

The respondent relies on the judgment given by the District Court and its reasoning, emphasizes the suffering she has endured, the wrong she has been caused, her chances of being a mother that are being taken away from her and her legitimate desire for a child which ought to be protected. According to her, the appellant created the new circumstances which he wants to use in order to be released from the undertaking that he gave previously and on which she relied; as a result of this reliance, she began the whole procedure and carried out her share of it; therefore, he should not be allowed to revoke his consent.

5.    I will first comment on several statements of the trial court.

The learned judge held, inter alia, that ‘when the journey towards birth has begun, the husband should not be allowed to shuffle the cards and drive the wife crazy…’, ‘if he is allowed to do this, he will have control over the woman and at any moment that he wishes… he may change his mind with a unique right of veto’; that if he is allowed to change his mind, this will make the woman putty in his hands, and give him a tool with which to dominate, humiliate and even blackmail her. This is a harsh description which, if it is a true reflection of reality, would be contrary to the principle of equality between people and between the sexes and violate human dignity and liberty, which are fundamental principles of our legal system. But I think that this description of the trial judge, which he regarded as the outcome of a situation in which the husband is allowed a right to revoke his consent, is inconsistent with the facts and with the real legal position. From a factual viewpoint, apart from the actual opposition to the continuation of the procedure, an opposition which undoubtedly causes Ruth Nahmani suffering, grief, frustration and disappointment, the trial judge does not point to any abuse, humiliation, extortion or similar acts on the part of Daniel Nahmani towards his wife, and I too could not find any basis for this in the evidence. The trial judge himself said that ‘the husband’s opposition is not a ruse, he is truly expressing his position that he no longer wants a child from his wife… his position is genuine and principled, and it is consistent with his outlook against the “one-parent” family’. From a legal viewpoint, the case should be examined on the basis of full equality between the sexes. What does this mean? Consider the opposite case; the initial position is the same, but the wife is the one who leaves the husband and begins a new relationship with a companion from whom she has a child. Subsequently, the husband is the one who becomes sterile and wants to achieve parenthood and become a father by means of the fertilized ova, whereas the wife objects to her ova, which were fertilized by the husband’s sperm with her consent, being implanted in a surrogate mother’s womb for the same reasons that the husband raises today to explain his opposition. What would we say then? I think that the correct solution should suit both situations and both sexes and should be considered on the basis of equality in principle, while considering any relevant difference, and without neglecting the harder role — physically and emotionally — of the woman in the procedure of fertilizing the ova.

The question of consent, in every respect, is central to this case, but as will become clear further on, there is no agreement between the parties about the fate of the procedure in the case of separation; therefore, I will first consider the question of parenthood and the constitutional rights of the Nahmani couple from the viewpoint of basic human rights. This question is a dominant factor in deciding the question whether Ruth Nahmani is entitled to continue the fertilization procedure despite her husband’s opposition.

Parenthood and basic rights

6.    Much has been written throughout history about the centrality of parenthood in human life. In the Bible, our ancestress Rachel says: ‘Give me children or else I die’ (Genesis 30, 1 [40]); Abraham our ancestor turned to heaven in his anguish and said: ‘What will You give me, seeing that I am childless’ (Genesis 15, 2 [40]). The first of the 613 commandments of Jewish law is the commandment to be fruitful and multiply. In literature, philosophy, poetry and the other forms of expression in human culture, we find expressions of the force of the desire to bring children into the world as an integral part of self-fulfilment.

Parenthood is a status that involves many rights and duties which can change the personal status of a person and significantly influence his life from psychological, emotional and economic viewpoints. It imposes on the parent a duty to care for the child until he becomes an adult and, more than this, it creates a lifelong psychological and emotional bond with the child and imposes on the parent responsibility for his safety, welfare, growth, education and other needs.

This is discussed by Professor P. Shifman. In describing this responsibility, he says the following:

‘It is long-term, in that it extends over the whole period that the child is a minor, and even more than this, and the concrete characteristics of this responsibility cannot be predicted and defined precisely in advance, since they change according to the development and needs of the child that exist at different times. The duty to the child cannot be discharged by an individual act but it requires continuing and devoted behaviour. This duty is not merely material in essence, i.e., to care for the physical needs of the child, but it is also, and maybe especially, emotional and educational…’ (P. Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 2, The Harry Sacher Institute for Research of Legislation and Comparative Law (1989), 174).

The responsibility of a parent to a child is protected not only by civil sanctions but also by criminal sanctions (see sections 361, 362, 363 and 365 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977); see also the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 5722-1962. With regard to the status of a parent, Justice Shamgar said:

‘… Being included in a social group, or in a defined class of people, sometimes leads to obligations of such critical significance and so crucial from a social and public viewpoint, that it is impossible to allow someone who is included in the group or in the class of people to cast off, by means of a mere contractual arrangement, the burden of an obligation of this kind’ (CA 614/76 A v. B [4], at p. 93).

For the approach of President Shamgar, see CA 5464/93 A v. B (a minor) [5], at p. 863:

‘According to legal and social outlooks, a parent, who is liable for maintenance under the personal law… cannot exempt himself from this duty by contract. In any event, even if he does this, the said contract cannot stop the child from applying to the court in order to sue for his maintenance. However, from the viewpoint of the legal validity and the applicability of section 30 of the Contracts (General Part) Law, such a contract that speaks of an exemption from all responsibility amounts to a gross and unacceptable dereliction of the parental duty towards his child; giving recognition to this dereliction amounts to adopting an approach that violates the human dignity of the child. It, in effect, cancels the basic legal and moral duty of the parent, which reflects our belief that in so far as the living are concerned (as opposed to the dead — see Ecclesiastes 3 19), man is superior to the animal.’

Basic rights

7.    The basic rights that are a normative basis for examining the question before us have been a fundamental element of our legal system for a long time. These are substantive provisions of positive law, some of which are now embodied in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The relevant rights for this case are the human rights protecting a person’s freedom, dignity, body, private life and the freedom to develop personality. The right to parenthood is derived from the right to self-determination, freedom and dignity. ‘The right to parenthood is a basic human right to which every person is entitled’ (CA 451/88 A v. State of Israel [6], at p. 337). In principle, the autonomy to raise a family, family planning and having children is an aspect of privacy. Human freedom includes the freedom of independent decision in matters of marriage, divorce, having children, and every other issue in the field of privacy and autonomy of the individual. This was discussed by Justice Ben-Itto in CA 413/80 A v. B [2] supra, at p. 81:

‘Conception, pregnancy and birth are intimate events, which are entirely within the province of privacy; the State does not intervene in this field except when there are significant reasons, founded on the need to protect the right of the individual or a serious public interest.’

The scholar H. Fenwick writes in this respect:

‘Personal autonomy has been clearly recognized for some time in the USA as strongly linked to privacy; in Doe v. Bolton (1973) Douglas J. said: “The right to privacy means freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, education and upbringing of children”.’ (H. Fenwick, Civil Liberties, London, 1993, 295 (emphases supplied).

See also Roe v. Wade (1973) [33], at p. 726; M. Shamgar, in his article supra, at p. 27; Davis v. Davis [32], at p. 601:

‘… a right to procreational autonomy is inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty…’

The decision to be a parent is the right of a person by virtue of his being autonomous and responsible for his decision and the results of his actions; therefore the right to decide must, in principle, be his, without any State intervention. See Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) [34], at pp. 1688-1689; Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) [35], at p. 453:

‘If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.’

Prof. Shifman says in this regard:

‘The basic attitude of Western legal systems is that society may not, in the absence of significant reasons, intervene in intimate questions of having children. The assumption embodied in this approach is that a person is entitled to realize his desire to be a parent or not to be a parent as a personal decision that he may make by virtue of his right to intimacy’ (P. Shifman, ‘Parent against one’s will — false representation about use of contraception’, 18 Mishpahah 1988, at p. 459; emphases supplied).

This approach is enshrined in the recognition that the family is ‘the most basic and ancient social unit in human history, which was, is and will be the element that protects and ensures the existence of human society…’ (Justice Elon in CA 488/77 A v. Attorney-General [7], at p. 434; see also: Davis v. Davis [32], at p. 601 and the citations there; CA 232/85 A v. Attorney-General [8]; CA 577/83 Attorney-General v. A [9].

8.    The right to be a parent does not impose a duty on either of the spouses to be a parent and does not impose a legal duty on one spouse to help the other to be a parent:

‘Even though having children appears to be one of the purposes of marriage, it is not a purpose that can be realized by means of enforcement. Spouses that do not perform their customary duties to one another are not compelled to do so (except with regard to maintenance), and their only remedy is divorce’ (CA 413/80 A v. B [2], at p. 85; emphases supplied).

Even Jewish law, which imposes a commandment to be fruitful and multiply on the man, but not on the woman (Mishnah, Tractate Yevamot, 6, 6 [41]), does not see fit to enforce this if he does not perform his duty. The refusal gives the wife grounds for divorce but not grounds for enforcement and coercion (Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilechot Ishut, 15, 5 [42]; Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Even HaEzer, 154, 4 [43]).

The yearning for motherhood is a deeply and strongly emotional expression of the desire to achieve parenthood. Even if we assume that it is stronger than the yearning for fatherhood (and there are those who dispute this), it in itself cannot impose a duty on the other spouse to help achieve this yearning, except for a moral duty in the inter-personal sphere, which derives from the marriage itself whose purpose is to establish a family and bring children into it.

In contrast to the right to be a parent stands the right not to be a parent, and these two are intertwined and lie at the centre of basic human rights. The right to be a parent and the right not to be a parent are two sides of the same coin, two constitutional rights that are derived from the right to freedom and self-fulfilment (see Davis v. Davis [32], at p. 601). Nonetheless, realizing the right to be a parent involves imposing significant and serious psychological, emotional, moral and economic burdens for one’s whole lifetime, and a person cannot escape them, whereas realizing the right not to be a parent leaves the status quo as it was. It follows that the weight of the demand to refrain from enforcing parenthood is stronger in balancing the right not to be a parent against the right to be a parent. When the freedom to be a parent is set against an unwillingness to be a parent, it would not be proper for the legal system to act to force parenthood on someone who does not want it. This is a violation of human liberty, autonomy and a person’s right to make his own decision not to be a parent if he does not want to be one.

The desire to minimize State intervention in relationships within the family unit, whether directly or through the legal system, emphasizes the right of autonomy of this unit, which is protected against intervention both in the relationship between the family unit and the State and in the relationship between the members of the family unit inter se. The situations that require intervention are usually sensitive and complex, and intervention is required when a crisis occurs in the family unit that needs State intervention through the courts in order to resolve it, in cases where the parties themselves have not succeeded in doing so.

Equality

9.    The principle of equality between human beings, including between the sexes, is one of the basic principles of our constitutional regime. Equality with regard to parenthood is expressed in legislation whose purpose from a social viewpoint is to allocate equal parenting tasks to the two parents (except of course on a biological level) (see F. Raday, ‘Labour Law and Labour Relations — Trends and Changes in 1988’, Labour Law Annual, vol. 1 (1990), 161, 172, and the statutes cited there. With regard to the trend to promote equality in parenting, see also the draft Women’s Employment Law (Amendment — Paternity Leave), 5755-1994 (a private draft law).

A woman is entitled — in certain circumstances — to have an abortion. She does not need her husband’s consent, and she may do it notwithstanding his opposition. The right of a woman to her own body is what gives her the freedom to terminate a pregnancy without the husband’s consent (CA 413/80 A v. B [2] supra. See also C. Shalev, ‘A Man’s Right to be Equal: The Abortion Issue’, 18 Isr. L. Rev., 1983, 381). I accept the position of Prof. Gans who deduces from this the right of the husband to terminate the fertilization procedure without the consent of the wife. According to him, the right of the wife to abort the embryo at the beginning of the pregnancy (according to those who hold that she has such a right) must necessarily be matched by the right of the husband to stop the proceedings leading to the implanting of his wife’s ova that were fertilized by his sperm in a surrogate mother. The source of the right is the man’s control of his life and the right to plan it (see Ch. Gans, ‘The Frozen Embryos of the Nahmani couple’, 18 Tel-Aviv Uni. L. Rev., 1994, at p. 83; see also P. Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 2, at p. 213, whose position is the same as that of Gans).

From the fact that the husband has no right to prevent an abortion that the wife wants, the trial court sought to deduce that Daniel Nahmani has no right to prevent the continuation of the fertilization procedure which the wife wants. It seems to me that the logical deduction is the opposite one, namely: just as the husband cannot oppose an abortion by the wife, so the wife cannot oppose the husband’s demand to stop the fertilization proceedings. It seems to me that the reason for not giving the ‘father’ the right to oppose an abortion lies not merely in the fact that in a pregnancy we are concerned with the woman’s right to her body (a consideration which does not exist in a case of in-vitro fertilization; with regard to this reason, see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976) [36], at p. 2842), but for an equally important reason, which is a refusal to impose parenthood on the wife (see Roe v. Wade (1973) [33], at p. 727).

It can therefore be said that just as it is not possible to impose parenthood on the wife who does not want it, so it is not possible to do this with regard to the husband. Moreover, if during the pregnancy — which is a much more advanced stage than in-vitro fertilization before implantation — the wife may terminate it without the husband’s consent, this is a priori the case with regard to termination of the in-vitro fertilization procedure before implantation. It follows that also by virtue of the principle of equality we should refrain from imposing parenthood.

10. When we speak of equality, we are conscious, aware and sensitive of the more difficult role of Ruth Nahmani — both physically and emotionally — than that of Daniel Nahmani in the in-vitro fertilization procedure and her evident expectations for the conclusion of the procedure and achieving the desired goal. However, this procedure is merely the beginning of the journey on which the couple set out when they made their joint decision, whereas the issue that we must decide is whether to impose the continuation of that journey for the rest of his life on someone who no longer wants it. This coercion exists even if the desired child grows up with the mother without any relationship with the father who will live in another family unit, since the bond of parenthood cannot be severed.

Public policy and proper legal policy

11. The imposition of parenthood is contrary to ‘public policy’ and proper legal policy, in that it is inconsistent with the basic values protected by our legal system, some of which are now enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. ‘Public policy’ means the central and essential values, interests and principles which a given society at a given time wishes to uphold, protect and develop’ (HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Register at Ministry of the Interior [10], at p. 778). ‘ “Public policy” is the result of balancing and considering conflicting values’ (CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [11], at p. 534; see also: CA 245/85 Engelman v. Klein [12], at p. 785; CA 427/86 Blass v. HaShomer HaTzair Kibbutz ‘Dan’ [13], at p. 325). ‘The principle of private law concerning public policy examines these questions by reflecting in essence all the basic outlooks of the society, including the weight and status of human rights’ (A. Barak, ‘Protected Human Rights and Private Law’, Klinghoffer Book on Public Law, The Harry Sacher Institute for Research of Legislation and Comparative Law, I. Zamir ed. (1993), 163, 200). The same is true of legal policy (see CA 243/83 Jerusalem Municipality v. Gordon [14], at p. 131).

Irrevocable consent to being a parent amounts to a full and eternal waiver of the right not to be a parent. Such a waiver is a waiver of a basic right, with regard to which it has been said: ‘Indeed, we allow individuals — in clearly defined areas — to waive to some extent (but not completely and utterly) their basic rights’ (Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [11], at p. 535). A complete denial of the right of Daniel Nahmani to revoke his consent to be a parent, by enforcing his undertaking, amounts to the creation of a complete and all-embracing waiver by him of a basic right. In general, giving legal force to this by adopting the enforcement mechanism of the legal system is inconsistent with public policy and with proper legal policy.

The revocability of a ‘waiver’ in the personal sphere can be seen from the question of waivers in adoption. Parents may agree to give up their child for adoption, and their consent is usually irrevocable because of the consideration of ‘the best interests of the child’ and the interest of the parents who are about to adopt him. If the parents gave their consent before the child was born, the court may cancel their consent, because a person cannot be held to a waiver made in such a sensitive and personal field, in the absence of real awareness of the nature of the waiver with regard to a child that has not even been born. If the consideration of ‘the best interests of the child’ leaves the scales balanced, the right of the natural parents will prevail and their revocation of their consent to adoption will be recognized, even if they gave it after the child was born (CA 577/83 Attorney-General v. A [9], at p. 477; see the Adoption of Children Law, 5741-1981, section 10).

From all of the aforesaid it can be seen that from the viewpoint of constitutional rights, a decision with regard to parenthood requires the consent of both parents, and without such consent the court should not compel someone to take a step which will end in parenthood against his will. The court system should not compel someone to be a parent even if originally he agreed to this and then changed his mind. This is the case even if we think that he ought to behave otherwise. Not everything that we expect people to do from the viewpoint of ‘And you shall do what is upright and good’ should be enforced by judicial order. Just as it is unthinkable that parenthood should be imposed by natural methods, so parenthood should not be imposed by technological methods. Not everything that is possible from a technological viewpoint is proper from an ethical viewpoint.

12. Hitherto we have discussed basic rights; but I think that consideration of the question before us from the viewpoint of human rights is insufficient to decide it, for we are not concerned with a couple where one of the spouses wishes to bring children into the world and the other opposes this, and the law does not force itself on the ‘objector’; we are concerned rather with spouses who have gone a long way together and given their genetic material from which ova were fertilized and put in frozen storage, in order to bring a child into the world with the help of a surrogate mother. Should the husband be forced to continue the procedure even in this situation? I suspect that he should not. The reasoning for this position requires consideration of the nature of the consent of the spouses and the legal regime within which it operates.

Before I consider the nature of the consent of the Nahmani couple, I will consider the need for the consent of spouses to in-vitro fertilization in foreign legal systems and in our legal system.

The need for consent to in-vitro fertilization in foreign legal systems

13. The question of consent has been considered in various legal systems, whether in legislation, recommendations of committees or case-law. In most enlightened countries there can be seen an unambiguous approach that requires the informed consent of the two spouses to performing the fertilization procedure at each stage. Because in-vitro fertilization is a complex procedure that is carried out in stages which may extend over a period of time, if the relationship between the spouses is disrupted and they quarrel about the fate of the fertilized ova, the general tendency is to demand the consent of both parties for the continuation of the procedure. In England and Western Australia we find statutes that require a valid consent of the donors of the genetic material before use is made of it and these grant a right to revoke the consent (as long as no use has been made of the fertilized ova). In England, see the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990 (Schedule 3, section 4). According to this statute, effective consent is required, and this implies the possibility of changing one’s mind and revoking the consent, at every stage before the fertilized ova are used. Revocation of consent by one of the parties to the agreement requires the institution that is storing the fertilized ova to destroy them. See K. Stern, ‘The Regulation of Assisted Conception in England’, 1 European Journal of Health Law (1994), 60. In Western Australia, see the Human Reproductive Technology Act, 1991, sections 26(1)(a)(i) and 22(4). A similar approach is implied by the Ontario Law Reform Commission. See B. Dickens, ‘Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission’s Project on Human Artificial Reproduction’, Law Reform and Human Reproduction, S.A.M. McLean ed., Aldershot (1992), at pp. 47, 69, recom. 27). In Canada and the United States we find another approach that is expressed, according to which the two donors of the genetic material must agree in advance about the future of the fertilized ova in unexpected contingencies such as a dispute or death. See, in Canada, recommendation 5(1) of the report Medically Assisted Procreation — Law Reform Commission of Canada.

This approach was adopted in Davis v. Davis [32], where it was pointed out that agreements with regard to the future of fertilized ova in the event of divorce, death, etc., are valid. The enforcement of agreements that expressly regulate the future of fertilized ova in the event of unforeseen contingencies is also advocated by the American scholar Prof. Robertson, (see J.A. Robertson, ‘Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos’, Hastings Center Report, 1989). A similar approach can be seen in the recommendations of the Reform Commission in the State of New South Wales, Australia: C. Corns, ‘Deciding the Fate of Frozen Embryos’, Law Inst. J. (1990), at 272, 275.

The approach of the countries that require consent of the two spouses, allow it to be revoked and regulate the destruction of ova in the absence of consent or at the end of a certain period is derived, inter alia, from their approach to the ‘status’ of the fertilized ova. Those who do not recognize the independent right of the ova to develop towards ‘life’ do not think that the State has an interest in protecting the ‘life’ that they do not have, and they regard the genetic donors as persons with a ‘quasi-property’ right in the joint genetic material. Therefore, according to them, they should be given joint control over the fate of the ova and the use thereof. A different approach can be found in the State of Louisiana in the United States which recognizes the right of the ova to continue to develop. Disputes between the spouses are decided in accordance with the interest of the fertilized ova (La. Rev. Stat. 9:131). The right to the fertilized ova is granted to the spouse who is interested in developing them. The trial court in Davis v. Davis [32] decided similarly. This is an approach that is not adopted by most countries in the Western world, and it has met with harsh criticism from the Court of Appeals in that case, and from scholars (see G.J. Annas, ‘A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court’, Standard of Care: The Law of American Bioethics, New York (1993), 71, on the status of the fertilized ova, infra).

The Public Health (In-vitro Fertilization) Regulations

14. In Israel the question of in-vitro fertilization has not been regulated by statute, only in regulations. From the relevant regulations, we shall cite in full regulations 8(b)(3) and 14(b), which state:

‘8.          (b) …

(3) If the woman in whom it is intended to implant the ovum is divorced, and the ovum was fertilized with the sperm of her husband before her divorce — the ovum may be implanted in her only after the consent of her former husband has been obtained.’

‘14. (a) …

     (b) Every act involved in the in-vitro fertilization of a married woman shall be done only after obtaining the consent of her husband.’

The trial judge found support in the regulations for his view that the consent of the husband is not needed to continue the procedure, since he held that his consent was given to the whole procedure ab initio. It seems to me that the regulations do not support this position and that the hospital may not deliver the ova to Ruth Nahmani so that she may continue the procedure, when Daniel Nahmani has expressed his vehement opposition to its continuation. Why is this?

We are dealing with subordinate legislation of the Minister of Health which does not purport to regulate inter-personal relationships between spouses. The arrangement in the regulations is designed for the bodies that handle in-vitro fertilization and the manner in which they must deal with this sensitive subject. The question of receiving fertility treatments is complex, and in addition to its medical aspect it has social and moral aspects. The subordinate legislator does not appear to me to be a source of inspiration for resolving these question in a case of a dispute between spouses. The regulations do not have any direct application in our case since surrogacy is forbidden in Israel, and they cannot apply to a situation which they expressly prohibit. Giving the ova to one of the spouses for implantation in a surrogate mother in the United States constitutes a stage in the surrogacy procedure which is forbidden here and which is supposed to carried out there. The regulations also do not purport to regulate a situation in which one of the spouses revokes his consent, even if this was given ab initio. In such a situation, the medical institution does not have the ability to make a decision, and in the absence of an agreement between the spouses with regard to what will be done with the fertilized ova in a case of a dispute, the institution cannot make an immediate decision.

Moreover, the wording of the regulations cannot support the determination of the trial judge. The text of the regulations is not unambiguous. The interpretation of regulations 8(b)(3) and 14(b) as regulations that make the husband’s consent unnecessary is not the only reasonable construction of these regulations. In any event, regulation 14(b) requires every act involved in the in-vitro fertilization of a married woman to be done only after obtaining her husband’s consent. I think that this is a provision that expresses the spirit and purpose of the regulations. Regulation 8(b)(3), which refers to a divorced woman, includes an arrangement that is intended to clarify that despite the severance of the relationship between the couple, the additional consent of the former husband is required. This regulation does not make his consent unnecessary during the marriage. It can also be said that a state of separation is similar to divorce, and that the revocation of the husband’s consent is connected to this separation, and therefore regulation 8(b)(3) should be applied also in such a case. Moreover, regulation 8(b)(3) contains an idea of the impossibility of permanent consent, since a change in circumstances that casts doubt upon the continued existence of consent requires an additional consent. In any event, one should not deduce from regulation 8(b)(3) anything about the right of the husband to revoke his consent even if it was given ab initio. At most it can be said that the regulations do not consider this situation (it should be noted that the legality of the regulations is under review, in another respect, in a petition for a show-cause order that has been filed in this court).

The public commission

15. It is not only in regulations that we find reference to the issue of in-vitro fertilization. A professional public commission was appointed in June 1991 by the Ministers of Justice and Health to examine the question of in-vitro fertilization and it was composed of renowned experts in all the fields relevant to the issue. The commission considered the matter and in July 1994 submitted a report to the Ministers. This report was submitted in this case by the Attorney-General with the consent of the other parties. With regard to consent, the commission unanimously recommended that:

‘… in the absence of joint and continuing consent, no use should be made of the fertilized ova that were frozen until the end of the freezing period agreed by the spouses but consent that was given at the beginning of the treatment shall be deemed to continue as long as neither of the spouses revokes it in writing’ (emphases supplied).

‘The Commission considered the possibility that the genetic mother or the genetic father would have no other way of realizing genetic parenthood. But giving permission to have a child in such a situation, without joint consent, means forcing fatherhood or motherhood, both from the legal viewpoint and from the emotional viewpoint, in that there will be a child who is born without their consent. The commission was of the opinion that a man or woman should not be forced to be a father or mother against their will, even if they initially consented to this’ (see the Report of the Professional Public Commission for Examining the Issue of In-vitro Fertilization (1994), 36).

16. The approach of Jewish law with regard to consent is not uniform. Although in the past there was no direct consideration of the issue of consent in the circumstances before us, there is such consideration in modern times. Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, who was a member of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate and a member of the Great Rabbinical Court, thought that a husband has the possibility of revoking his consent. He says:

‘Since the husband is separated from the wife and the child who will be born (if at all) will no longer grow up in the joint home of the husband and the wife, we can understand his opposition to giving the fertilized material to a surrogate mother in order that a child may be born as planned. Since a drastic change has occurred, as compared with the position at the time the reciprocal undertaking was made, he should be regarded as being “under duress” when he argues that in such a situation the undertakings can no longer bind him, since he did not give his undertaking for such a case. And he should not be compelled to agree to give over the frozen material so that it may continue to develop, as the wife wants, because she argues that this is her only and last chance whereby she may have a child who will be her child from a biological point of view. Although the wife’s position is understandable, it seems to me that from a legal viewpoint we should not compel the husband — who is the second partner and who also has a share and rights with regard to the fertilized material — to consent to what the wife is asking’ (Responsum of Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli in Dr A. Steinberg ed., Jewish Medical Encyclopaedia, vol. 4, pp. 41-42 [44]).

This was also the opinion of Rabbi Shalom Shalush, a member of the Haifa Regional Rabbinical Court (Responsum of Rabbi Shalom Shalush, ‘Fertilization in a Surrogate Womb’, in Orchot, the magazine of the Haifa Religious Council, no. 39, p. 31 [45]). In discussing the question of a petition made by a husband for an order prohibiting the implantation of ova fertilized by his sperm in a surrogate mother, he held that this fertilization should be prevented and the husband’s petition should be granted, and that preventing such fertilization did not involve a prohibition of killing an embryo.

It follows that most legal systems and our legal system also require in principle the consent of both spouses for performing in-vitro fertilization at every stage. The question is whether Daniel Nahmani gave such consent, and, if so, can he revoke it?

The consent of the Nahmani couple

17. I accept that the Nahmani couple agreed, in the relationship between themselves, to carry out the in-vitro fertilization procedure in order to bring a child into the world. This finding is supported by the evidence, and is implied by the actions done by the spouses towards this goal. The consent was partially implemented, and at the stage before implantation in the surrogate mother, Daniel Nahmani expressed his opposition to the continuation of the procedure. The consent, in so far as it concerns the relations between the spouses, was not directed only at carrying out the technical medical procedures of in-vitro fertilization, but it should be regarded as consent to parenthood, consent to share together, over the years, the feeling of responsibility and commitment involved in the concept of parenthood. Precisely for this reason it should not be said — as is implied by the trial judge — that since for the purpose of the technical procedures no consent is required in addition to that which was given ab initio, it is possible to continue the procedure that will lead to enforced parenthood, notwithstanding the opposition.

What is the status of the consent that was given; what is its scope, what is its nature? Is it subject to any legal framework, and if so, what is that framework? Was an agreement made between the parties, and if so what is its basis and what are its implications? What are the ramifications of the change of circumstances that occurred subsequently on this agreement? Is the person who gave his consent entitled to revoke it and what is the remedy that can be granted, if any?

The status of the consent as an agreement

18. In principle, the autonomy of the human being implies his freedom to act and change his position, whether by way of a disposition in private law or by way of carrying out an act to change his personal status, such as marriage, divorce, having a child, etc.. The question of the status of an undertaking to change one’s personal status is problematic. In analyzing the essence and purpose of the contract, the scholars Friedman and Cohen say that ‘… a benefit to the human psyche — the emotions, dignity, the spirit, entertainment — does not lie within the traditional province of the sphere of contracts’ (D. Friedman & N. Cohen, Contracts, Aviram Press, vol. 1 (1991), 328). These remarks can be illustrated by the status of a promise of marriage in Israeli law, which is a clear example of an emotional partnership. A promise of marriage is a promise to change personal status. It begins with a joint decision that lies within the personal-intimate sphere. In CA 647/89 Schiffberg v. Avtalion [15] and in CA 416/91 Maman v. Triki [16] the problems that arise from classifying a promise of marriage as a binding contract were emphasized. The President mentioned the criticism made by scholars with regard to this classification (see: Friedman & Cohen, supra, at pp. 368-369; N. Cohen, ‘Status, contract and inducing breach of contract’, 39 HaPraklit (1990), 304, 317; P. Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 1, The Harry Sacher Institute for Research of Legislation and Comparative Law (1984), 125-134) and the absolute freedom of a person when deciding whether to enter into marriage was emphasized. The President pointed out that this cause of action is not popular, but uprooting it in its entirety is a matter for the legislator. In several countries the contractual cause of action of breach of promise of marriage has been repealed in legislation. England enacted the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1970, and approximately twenty States in the United States have repealed it. The promise of marriage is therefore, in our legal system, a binding contract, but a breach thereof does not entitle the injured party to enforcement or damages for loss of expectation, merely to compensation for damage suffered. The ideological basis for this can be found in the article of Prof. G. Tedeschi, ‘Some aspects of the concept of contract’, Essays in Law, The Harry Sacher Institute for Research of Legislation and Comparative Law (1978), 54. There we find that the classical contract involves an exchange, and therefore it inherently contains a conflict of interests, whereas in marriage this is not the case. The joint enterprise which is a means in a commercial-economic partnership is the purpose itself of marriage (ibid., at p. 71). See also Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 1, at pp. 131-132, which focuses on the predominantly emotional elements that characterize the promise of marriage. In his opinion, a promise of marriage does not constitute a contract because of its internal content. Living together is the decisive element of the arrangement.

19. It is not merely the promise of marriage that the law regards as a special category of agreement. Even other kinds of agreements fall into a special category; for example, the political agreement. I do not intend to discuss the classification of this agreement, which I believe is disputed (see the opinion of Prof. Cohen, in her article ‘The Political Agreement’, 1 HaMishpat (1993), 59, and contrast with the opinion of Prof. G. Shalev, in her article ‘Political Agreements’, 16 Tel-Aviv L. Rev. (1991), at p. 215). I intend to consider general remarks and questions that were raised by this court with regard to the political agreement, which are relevant to the classification of the agreement before us. HCJ 1635/90 Jerzhevski v. Prime Minister [17] considered the political agreement, which Justice Barak regarded as a binding legal agreement, and he raises — in the course of the legal analysis — general questions that are appropriate in this case:

‘Do the laws of contract apply wherever the parties wish them to apply, or are there perhaps areas that the laws of contract do not reach, despite the wishes of the parties? This question is not new. Thus, for example, in German law it is accepted that certain types of agreements do not fall into the sphere of the laws of contract of private law…

A similar idea is expressed by Flume, who says: “The area of human relations in the family, and the human relationships of love, friendship and social intercourse ‘simply cannot be’ the object of a legally binding agreement” (W. Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, 82, vol. II, 1965)’ (ibid., at p. 837).

Prof. Cohen, in her aforementioned article with regard to political agreements, also raises questions that are pertinent to our case:

‘… What is the law with regard to these agreements? Is there a duty to uphold them or is there no such duty, and each party may uphold it, if he wishes? Perhaps there is even a duty not to uphold them? If there is a duty to uphold them, what is their scope and what are the remedies available to each party for non-compliance?...’ (ibid., at p. 61).

Contracts are classified by Prof. Cohen as  ‘perfect’,  ‘weak’,  ‘void’,  ‘not binding’ and  ‘unjusticiable’ contracts.

‘The legal system protects an agreement that imposes an obligation recognized by law… the question when the law regards a contract as perfect and when it regards it as weak, void or not binding, depends on a variety of reasons. The main reason lies in the purpose of the laws of contract. The contract is a social mechanism, whose main purpose is the creation and distribution of wealth… for this purpose the laws of contract recruit the enforcement power of the State… what is outside their scope [the scope of the laws of contract] represents change, discretion, choice, freedom. Areas where the law wishes to leave freedom of action or discretion are unsuited to the application of the laws of contract. Other reasons that influence the question whether we are concerned with a contract and what is its degree of validity depend on the intentions of the parties, the amount of benefit from the contract as opposed to the damage that it is likely to cause and the background against which it was made’ (ibid., at pp. 62-63; italics and square parentheses supplied).

English law accepts the approach that an intention to create a binding legal relationship is sufficient to create a contract, but when we are concerned with a social agreement or an agreement within the family, there is a presumption, which can be rebutted by the doctrine of reliance, that there is no intention to create a legal relationship (see the criticism of Friedman and Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1, at pp. 371-373).

20. In our case the agreement was made in special circumstances, on an intimate, personal and sensitive matter that lies within the sphere of the human psyche. Notwithstanding, I do not think that this case does not involve any agreement whatsoever. The Nahmani couple expressed consent, determination and resolve with regard to a very serious matter and they took steps to carry out their consent. When two persons continue to give their consent and do not revoke it, their wishes should be respected and the agreement should be acted upon in so far as it concerns matters that they have agreed (provided that they indeed agreed them). Such an agreement — as long as the parties still agree with regard to it — is valid vis-à-vis third parties such as the medical institution or other parties involved in the in-vitro fertilization procedure, and these should respect the joint wishes of the parties (within the framework of the law). Notwithstanding, we are not concerned with an ordinary contract but with an unique contract. It certainly does not fall into the category of  ‘perfect’ contracts. Since it has contractual elements, it can be classed among the  ‘weak’ contracts. Therefore the legal framework that applies to it will also not be the framework of the laws of contract in the strict and narrow sense.

21. From the little said by the Nahmani couple in their testimony in court, no consent can be deduced with regard to a situation in which the family unit would break up. Daniel Nahmani said in his testimony:

‘There were beautiful moments and because of those moments beautiful things were done, and afterwards things changes and the mere fact that we came to separate… when Ruth started this procedure with me I never said or even hinted that we would separate or stop, but the intention that we had then was valid at that time. I do not agree with you that Ruth knew that this procedure would be completed to its end. There were many times that Ruth and I spoke about a situation that we might have a major dispute and certainly the procedure would be stopped… the consent was given when we lived together and we tried to build a family unit; this consent became void from the moment that we separated’ (pp. 22, 27, 29 of the court record).

Ruth Nahmani says in her affidavit that was submitted as evidence-in-chief:

‘The yearning for children, joint children and the willingness to fight… in order to realize our right to be parents to children and to bring children into the world, was shared by us — my husband and me — throughout the procedure…’ (paragraph 16 of the affidavit).

In her cross-examination she added:

‘What guided me and Daniel was the strong desire to be parents… it does not matter when he did it, out of desire, out of love, the moving force was joint, equal, complete…’; ‘in 1990 the question of divorce never arose’ (pp. 11, 16 of the court record).

Even if what was said reflects the true position from the viewpoint of each of the two spouses, it is totally impossible to derive from this that there was a consent between the parties that the procedure would continue in any event, in any situation and in all circumstances. Certainly we cannot deduce a joint intention and joint consent to continue the procedure after separation. It can even be said that the aforementioned statements have a different tone. It can therefore be said that we are not dealing with a case of consent with regard to the fate of the ova if and when a crisis would happen in the marriage, as it did. Here we should remember that if we were dealing with an agreement with regard to the fate of the ova in the event of separation, we would still have to consider whether this could be revoked and whether it could be enforced. This question does not require a decision in this case.

What is the consequence of the absence of consent in these circumstances?

There are several possibilities: first, to regard the agreement as an agreement whose basis has collapsed or as an agreement which has exhausted itself; second, to fill the ‘lacuna’ in the agreement; third, to deduce an implied consent on the part of Daniel Nahmani to the continuation of the procedure even in a set of circumstances completely different from the one which existed at the time that the consent was given. Below I will consider each of these possibilities as potential mechanisms for deciding the difficult problem before us.

Collapse of the basis of the agreement

22. As stated, the case before us is not one of consent between the parties with regard to the fate of the continuation of the procedure, should the family unit break up. What we know clearly is the background in which consent was given and the circumstances in which the husband revoked it. The consent was given when the married couple were living together and trying to create a larger family by bringing a child into the world. The consent was revoked after the family unit collapsed, Daniel Nahmani left the home and instead established a new family unit.

What are the ramifications of the change in circumstances on the validity of the consent of Daniel Nahmani? The doctrine which is closest to the case before us is the doctrine of frustration, which is expressed in section 18(a) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970. A strict application of the doctrine of frustration in our case raises problems. Section 18(a) gives the person in breach of contract a defence argument when performance of the contract has become impossible or fundamentally different from what was agreed. ‘Only a radical change in circumstances will justify a finding that the party in breach is exempt from the consequences of the breach’ (CA 13/75 Blumenfeld v. Hadar Plast Company Ltd [18], at p. 456). As a rule, an event that frustrates a contract is an event external to the contract, over which the parties to the contract have no control. When the frustration is initiated by a party to the contract, the initiator cannot rely on this protection. In addition, there must be no anticipation of the circumstances that frustrate the contract and also an inability to anticipate them, conditions that have been interpreted very narrowly so that the defence of frustration has to a large extent lost its applicability. Thus Israeli case-law has followed English case-law, in which the scope of the exemption when events that frustrate the contract occur is narrow, in view of the outlook of absolute liability. In German and Continental law, the basic attitude to the rules of frustration is more flexible. These systems emphasize human behaviour and the element of absence of fault as a decisive criterion for granting the exemption. Even American law, whose source of inspiration is English law, mollified the requirement of absolute liability, by basing the doctrine of frustration on the more flexible risk criterion. In Israel, the Codification Committee considered, inter alia, a less strict application of the laws of frustration in the spirit of American law, but its deliberations have not yet been included in the law (for an analysis of the doctrine of frustration in Israeli positive law and different legal systems, see G. Shalev, Laws of Contract, Din, 2nd edition (1995), 497-510; see also D. Katzir, Remedies for Breach of Contract, Tamar, vol. 1 (1991), 210-226).

23. A strict application of the doctrine of frustration makes a decision in this case difficult, and if we were concerned with an ordinary contract it is questionable whether this would be possible. But we are concerned with a special contract, and a strict application of the doctrine of frustration is not necessary and is even undesirable. In this category of contracts, the change in Daniel’s emotional relationship with his wife and his unwillingness to bring a joint child into the world when they are no longer together and after he has established a new family should be regarded as an event that frustrates the contract. Prima facie, an external look at the crisis — Daniel leaving the home and establishing a new family unit — points to Daniel Nahmani as the ‘creator’ of the new circumstances on which he wishes to rely in order to be released from his consent. In this sense, an accusatory finger is directed at him in order to deny him the right to revoke his consent. However, I think that in view of the nature of the relationship we are considering, the case cannot be decided in this way. Support for this can be found in the modern approach of ‘no-fault divorce’, in which consideration of the external symptoms that characterize a family crisis is not a comprehensive one. One of the fundamental ideas on which this outlook is based is that:

‘The belief that it is possible to find fault only with one of the spouses and to place the blame for the crisis having occurred on that spouse alone has also been discredited… Therefore fault as it appears to an outsider, with the court imposing a moral judgment on such a tangled and complex set of relationships, should not be regarded as everything’ (Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 1, at p. 300).

The approach of  ‘no-fault divorce’ is not universally accepted. It is a disputed issue that we are not required to resolve. It is not the framework of our deliberation. We are not sitting in judgment on the acts of Daniel Nahmani in the moral sphere and ‘punishing’ him for his behaviour. These are not the criteria for deciding the question whether he has a right to object to the continuation of the procedure. The relationship between spouses is not static. It is by nature dynamic and subject to crises. The feelings of spouses are not always stable. They may change even without any connection to a complex procedure such as in-vitro fertilization. An initial consent to this procedure is not an informed one in the full sense of the word because of the inability to foresee — emotionally and psychologically — what will happen in the future. Spouses do not always deal successfully with the difficulties in their lives together, especially when they are faced with a procedure such as in this case, with its emotional, physical and economic difficulties and the subjective and objective problems that it involves.

24. In any event, even if the crisis was created by Daniel Nahmani, and even if the Rabbinical Court suggested a reconciliation that he did not accept, and even if I personally have reservations about his behaviour, none of these can deny him the right to revoke his consent as a result of a dramatic change of circumstances as stated. The destruction of the family unit is an undisputed fact, and a child who is born into the world will be born without his father wanting him, to a de facto one-parent family in which only his mother will act as a parent. The consent in this case derived its validity from, and is based on, a functioning relationship. Admittedly the collapse of this relationship is not an external event within the accepted sense in the doctrine of frustration, but in view of the special character of the agreement and the major importance of its foundation built on the depths of human emotion, this collapse is sufficient to amount to an act that frustrates the agreement. Remarks in a similar vein were made by Justice H. Cohn in CA 170/74 Hister v. Fleischer [19], at p. 134:

‘The learned judge held that this agreement was frustrated merely because “the good relationship that prevailed between the plaintiff and the defendant when the agreement was made was a basis for making it”, and the continued existence of this good relationship is “the basis for performing the agreement”. When this relationship was irreversibly undermined, the “basis of the agreement” was undermined, and it should therefore be regarded as frustrated. I agree, with all due respect, that an agreement that provides for the parties to the agreement to live together in one apartment can be regarded as frustrated if the relationship between them collapses to such an extent that they can no longer live together’ (emphasis supplied).

See also CA 202/92 [20] in which it was held that the basis for an undertaking to give a gift is a personal relationship between the donor and the recipient and therefore it is a personal basis, and when it collapses the undertaking is frustrated (in that case the beneficiary of the gift died and his heirs were denied it on the basis of this reasoning). See also Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 1, where he suggests that a fundamental change in feelings should be regarded as an act that amounts to frustration with regard to revoking a promise of marriage. He says:

‘… in the case before us the breach is a result of the subjective will of the man, but it can be said that the individual will that accompanies marriage is a substantial part thereof… when a man marries a woman whom he originally thought he loved but is now hated by him, performance of the contract, even if it is at all possible, is nonetheless fundamentally different from what was agreed’ (ibid., at p. 138).

It can therefore be said that when we are concerned with a special agreement, which is not an ordinary contract and is based on an intimate emotional relationship, fundamental changes in the feelings and emotions that underlie this relationship and dramatic changes in the life of a person as a result should be regarded as changes which can change the performance of the agreement into something fundamentally different or even impossible. Someone who has undergone such changes should not be forced to be bound by his original consent.

A contract that is unenforceable (section 3(1) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law)

25. Were it not possible to regard the drastic change in circumstances as frustration of the original agreement, would it be possible to enforce the continuation of the procedure? I think that the answer to this is no, in view of the special character of the agreement before us.

When their life together collapsed, the Nahmani’s original plan became impracticable in the circumstances that had been created, and it is therefore unenforceable. Such a situation is regulated by section 3(1) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, which determines that one of the exceptions to the rule of enforcement exists when ‘the contract is unenforceable’. The agreement before us is unenforceable in the sense that it cannot be carried out within the framework that was intended for its performance, namely the framework of a functioning marriage between the Nahmani couple. Not every agreement that cannot be performed within the framework intended for its performance becomes an ‘unenforceable’ contract, but this is not the case here, where we are concerned with an agreement whose essence, nature and character distinguish it from the ordinary agreement. Admittedly it may be said that the agreement is enforceable in the sense that physically the fertilization procedure can be continued, but because of its special character it cannot be carried out within the framework in which the parties agreed to carry it out, which is a joint family unit into which the child will be born if the procedure succeeds. The agreement is based on an intimate personal relationship and married life. The continued existence of this relationship is the heart and soul of the spouses’ original plan to bring a child into the world by means of in-vitro fertilization. When the relationship was severed, the contract is no longer enforceable within the framework intended for its performance. No enforcement measure of the court can restore the family unit, and in the absence of this unit the original consent that was based on it is unenforceable.

When a contract is unenforceable, the question of responsibility is irrelevant. This has been discussed by Professor Yadin, who said: ‘According to the text of the law, it is irrelevant who or what caused the contract to be unenforceable… it is also irrelevant whether the party in breach — or the injured party — is responsible for the contract being unenforceable…’ (U. Yadin, ‘The Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970’, Commentary on Laws relating to Contracts, G. Tedeschi ed., 2nd edition (1979), at p. 55). These remarks were adopted by Justice Bejski in Lasserson v. Shikun Ovedim Ltd [3] supra, where he clarified that this is also the position in case-law (ibid., at p. 250). The responsibility for the occurrence of the event that makes the performance of the contract impossible is relevant only with regard to the other remedies, but not the remedy of enforcement (Yadin, ibid., at p. 55). When the performance of the contract becomes impossible, there is no longer any basis for the remedy of enforcement.

Filling a lacuna in the agreement

26. The question before us can be examined from another angle. So far we have considered the consent given in a specific set of circumstances, which was frustrated as a result of completely different circumstances. Let us now examine another aspect of the issue, namely the possibility of regarding the agreement as an agreement that has a lacuna in that it does not make any provision for the fate of the procedure in the event of separation. It seems to me that we cannot fill the lacuna by means of a stipulation that gives consent to the whole procedure in a case of separation.

In our case, the consent to the in-vitro fertilization procedure left a lacuna, and the silence of the parties on the question of separation is not in my opinion a ‘negative arrangement’. A lacuna may, in principle, be filled under the Contracts (General Part) Law, 5733-1973 (sections 25-26). In our case, we cannot rely on these sections, even by way of analogy, for the purpose of completing the agreement. We cannot ascertain the intentions of the parties when they made the agreement with regard to the change in circumstances that occurred, and we cannot say that they had common intentions; we cannot ascertain the intentions from the circumstances and certainly we cannot do so according to any practice that prevailed between the parties or any accepted practice in agreements of this sort, since there is no practice in this area. We therefore have a situation in which the parties did not consider a specific interest — the fate of the fertilized ova — in the event of separation:

‘Their silence reflects a lacuna and raises the question: what field of law should properly be applied? Our assumption for this purpose is that it is not impossible that the contract has “run its course” and has now become, in so far as this interest is relevant, merely a historical fact. We now describe as a “lacuna” a situation in which applying the “conventional” rules of interpretation leads to the conclusion that the contract did not consider that interest, and we consider, within the framework of the laws of contract, intervention by means of “recruiting” the techniques that allow formal or informal intervention in the contents of the contract’ (M. Deutch, ‘On Legal Genes and Competition of Rights: The Relation Between the Law of Contract and Unjust Enrichment Laws’, 18 Tel-Aviv Uni. L. Rev. 557 (1994), 566. See also note 41 which refers to intervention in contracts by means of the laws of good faith, implied terms and normative outlooks on fairness).

In our legal system, the judge may, in appropriate circumstances, complete the agreement, when he is satisfied that the parties did not agree with regard to the lacuna (D. Friedman & N. Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1 (1991), 220; CA 154/80 Borchard Lines Ltd, London v. Hydrobaton Ltd [21], at p. 224; CA 554/83 Atta Textile Company Ltd v. Estate of Zolotolov [22], at p. 303). ‘… The court is not authorized to “make a new contract, which is different in its nature, content, scope and application from the one made by the parties themselves” (CA 79/76, at p. 753)’ (CA 528/86 Polgat Industries Ltd v. Estate of Yaakov Blechner [23], at p. 826). The doctrine of the implied term, which we absorbed from English common law, has lost its status since the enactment of the Contracts (General Part) Law. The Contracts (General Part) Law put another tool at our disposal, the principle of good faith stated in section 39 (CA 719/89 Haifa Quarries Ltd v. Han-Ron Ltd [24], at p. 312, and CA 479/89 Coptic Mutran v. Halamish — Government-Municipal Corporation for Housing Renovation in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Ltd [25], at p. 845. On the question of filling a lacuna and the implied term, see also R. Ben-Natan (Kleinberger), ‘The Law of the Implied Term in Present Law — A further study’, 17 Mishpatim (1987), 571). What is implied by the principle of good faith with regard to filling a lacuna in a contract is that it must be filled in a way that realizes its subjective and objective purpose: E. A. Farnsworth, On Contracts, Bolton, vol. 2 (1990), 305. Good faith was not intended to change a contractual arrangement and does not create a new contract between the parties. Good faith demands that a contract is given a meaning that is consistent with the joint intentions of the parties and with the basic principles of the legal system.

Completing the agreement by means of a stipulation that the consent of the Nahmani couple to adopt the procedure of in-vitro fertilization should be regarded as consent to continue the procedure even after separation does not realize the subjective and objective purpose of the agreement. It cannot be said that continuing the course of action that the parties determined in the agreement leads, according to its internal logic, to a completion according to which the procedure will continue even in a case of separation. It cannot be determined that this is implied by the joint intentions of the parties, and it cannot be said that such a stipulation is implied by the basic principles of the legal system with regard to the basic rights of the parties and each one of them, as set out above. Such a completion cannot counteract a ‘blatant breach of the balance of mutual rights’ (Justice Mazza in Coptic Mutran v. Halamish [25] supra, at p. 846).

Enforcement

27. Even if I thought that the original consent between the spouses was that the procedure should continue even in the new circumstances that have been created (and I do not think this), there still arises the difficulty of enforcing this consent, since the significance of this is not merely enforcing the consent to deliver the ova to Ruth Nahmani, but forcing parenthood on a person who does not want it. I suspect that enforcement of this consent is contrary to sections 3(2) and 3(4) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law. Section 3(2) of the law denies an injured party the right of enforcement if ‘enforcement of the contract means compelling someone to do, or to receive, personal work or a personal service’. As Professor Shalev explains, ‘the origin of the rule that denies enforcement of personal work and service lies in the laws of equity, according to which contracts for a personal service should not be enforced. The reason for these laws is to be found in the protection of individual rights’ (Shalev, Laws of Contract, at pp. 528-529). The law is not interested in forcing on someone a relationship that he does not want (see J. D. Calamari & J. M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 2nd edition (1977), 677). This enforcement is likely to inflict a real injury on a person’s individual freedom and require an involvement for which the person is unprepared. Moreover, where the relationship requires cooperation and a healthy relationship, the law cannot bring these about by means of enforcement orders (see: CA 256/60 Frankel v. American Overseas Food Centers Inc. [26], at p. 95; CC (Jer.) 574/70 Klinger v. Azrieli Avramovitz Co. Ltd [30], at p. 363; CA 381/75 Berkovitz v. Gavrieli [27]; J. Chitty, On Contracts — General Principles, London, 26th edition (1989), 1212).

The law denies the remedy of enforcement ‘… for work that must be done specifically by the person who made the commitment — whether we are speaking of a singer, an artist or a surgeon, or whether we are speaking of a cleaning lady or a factory worker…’ (U. Yadin, ‘The Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970’, Commentary on Laws relating to Contracts, G. Tedeschi ed., at p. 57).

28. Against this background it can be said that a priori the agreement before us should not be enforced, since its personal elements far exceed the personal elements of any contract for a personal service. It is inconceivable that a writer who breached his undertaking to write a book should be compelled to continue writing the book when he no longer wishes to do so. Once he has breached his undertaking, the other party may avail himself of various remedies, but not the remedy of enforcement. If this is the case with a literary creation, then with the ultimate creation — bringing a child into the world — it should certainly be the case. The future personal involvement of someone who becomes a parent is a very significant and long-term obligation.

Someone may argue that this is not so, for Ruth Nahmani is not demanding that Daniel Nahmani do anything apart from not preventing her from continuing the procedure and from raising the child who will be born, if at all. This argument cannot be accepted, since, when Daniel Nahmani takes on the status of a parent, he will be liable for all the duties of the parent, and he will not have any legal possibility of evading these (CA 5464/93 A v. B (a minor) [5]). Moreover, we cannot know what may happen in the future that will compel Daniel Nahmani to be significantly involved in the raising of the child whom he does not want, with all the commitments and ramifications that this implies. Such an involvement ensues from the very status of a parent even if the child is not brought up by him. Even from a normative viewpoint the law expects that the parent should take an active role in raising his child. It follows that such an agreement is unenforceable.

29. It can also be said that enforcing the consent of Daniel Nahmani to enter into the status of a parent, despite the fact that he has revoked it, is unjust within the sense of section 3(4) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, which provides that a contract should not be enforced if the enforcement is ‘unjust in the circumstances of the case’. Considering whether the enforcement is just or unjust in the circumstances of the case is done on two levels: on a personal level — the relationship between the parties to the agreement — and on a public level — the effect of the enforcement on the public interest and the basic values of society.

Justice Zamir said in CA 3833/93 Levin v. Levin [28], at pp. 877-878:

‘According to its wording, the section does not require a narrow conception of justice, which is limited to the relationship between the parties to the contract, as opposed to a wide conception of justice, which also includes considerations of the public interest. The language of the law also does not require a narrow scope for the circumstances of the case that includes only the situation and behaviour of the parties to the contract. According to the language of the section, the circumstances of the case may also include external circumstances, and these inter alia may include circumstances relating to the public interest. The language of the section does not prevent the court from asking whether enforcement of the contract is unjust in view of the effect of the enforcement, in the circumstances of the case, on the public interest, including the basic values of society.

This is certainly the case when one considers the purpose of the law. “Every legal system tries to uphold the public interest. This consideration constitutes a moving force in the development of common law, and it is a central consideration in the interpretation of legislation”. See A. Barak, op. cit., at p. 524. The public interest also includes the protection of the basic values of the legal system… It should not be assumed that this section was intended to compel the court to order the enforcement of a contract if considerations of justice between the parties so require, even if the enforcement may harm the public interest, such as access to the courts. On the contrary, the interpretation that upholds the purpose of the law, which also includes the public interest, requires that when the court considers whether to enforce a contract, it also takes considerations of the public interest into account… It follows that justice in section 3(4) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law is not merely personal justice, but also includes public justice’ (emphases supplied).

I agree with this approach, which is also found in other legal systems where, in an action for enforcement of a contract, the court takes into account considerations of the public interest. I will not repeat the personal circumstances and the constitutional and public aspects that were set out in detail above. On a personal level, our sympathy lies with Ruth Nahmani, but sympathy does not create a right. On a public level, enforcement conflicts with basic human rights, and therefore it is inconsistent with the public interest and proper legal policy, which we considered at length above. For ‘public policy’ in a contractual context, see Jerusalem Community Burial Society v. Kestenbaum [11], at pp. 533-535. It can therefore be said that even within the framework of section 3(4) of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, the agreement under consideration should not be enforced.

Several additional issues deserve attention, and I will consider these briefly:

Estoppel

30. An additional argument raised by Ruth Nahmani is the argument of estoppel. This argument has two aspects, the factual aspect and the legal aspect. On a factual level, a person making an argument of estoppel by representation or promissory estoppel must prove that a clear representation was made to him, he acted on it, adversely changed his position and that it was reasonable for him to do so. It follows that there must be a representation or a promise, reliance and a causal relationship between the two (Friedman and Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1 (1991), 91-92; G. Shalev, ‘Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith’, 16 Mishpatim (1986), 295, 296-308). For the requirement of causation, see G. Spencer Bower and A. K. Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation, London, 3rd edition (1977), 102-103.

In our case, there is — from a factual viewpoint — no basis for the argument that Daniel Nahmani made a representation or gave a promise that the procedure would continue even in a case of separation. In this context, I have already considered the evidence and the testimonies of the parties themselves, and I will not add anything. It also cannot be deduced that the consent to the procedure, which was given when they were living together, implies consent to the continuation of the procedure even in the event of a separation. Moreover, it is not possible to hold that Ruth Nahmani entered into the process in reliance on such a promise or representation and that she would not have begun the procedure if she had taken into account the risk of separation and refusal. She took into account the risks that the procedure would fail, which she knew, and nonetheless decided to begin it; it can be assumed, a fortiori, that she would not have been daunted from beginning the procedure by a risk of separation and a refusal to continue the procedure which did not exist at all at the time of the consent to begin it. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the factual basis does not exist for applying the doctrine of estoppel. In addition, the legal aspect does not allow us to apply the doctrine. On this level, the existence of a promise and the contents of the promise are of paramount importance, and these are lacking in this case. This doctrine is applied when a promise or a representation exist, but for some reason they are not legally valid (such as non-compliance with a requirement of writing, where such a requirement exists). But in the absence of a promise or a representation upon which one may rely, the doctrine of estoppel should not be applied, since its purpose is to give binding legal force to promises that do have such force (Prof. N. Cohen, ‘Contract Law and Good Faith in Negotiation: Formalism versus Justice’, 37 HaPraklit (1986), 13; see also Shalev, ‘Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith’, 16 Mishpatim (1986), 295, 298-300).

Moreover, estoppel cannot provide more than the laws of contract can provide. The usual remedy under this doctrine is reliance damages and not enforcement, and if it is not possible to compensate, it is still not possible to grant a remedy of enforcement if under the laws of contract this remedy would not have been granted, since there is no basis for granting it as explained above (Friedman & Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1 (1991), 92-93, 637-642). Also from the viewpoint of the public interest, one cannot achieve through estoppel what cannot be achieved under the general law, for reasons of ‘public policy’ (Shifman, Family Law in Israel, vol. 1, at p. 85; A. Bendor, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Administrative Law (doctoral thesis), at p. 45 and the references cited there).

It should be noted that the argument of estoppel is used in English law as a defence argument, whereas in American law it is used also as an argument of the plaintiff. In our legal system the question has not yet been decided, although it has been raised, and it appears that scholars follow an approach similar to the American one, which I tend to adopt in the appropriate circumstances (see Friedman and Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1, at p. 44).

In view of the aforesaid, the argument of estoppel cannot, in my opinion, succeed in this case.

The difficulties involved in the in-vitro fertilization procedure

31. One of the arguments made by counsel for the Attorney-General is that one should take into account the many difficulties still involved in the in-vitro fertilization procedure which is the first stage of bringing a child into the world. I do not consider these difficulties in themselves an obstacle to granting the relief sought by Ruth Nahmani, were she to have a right to receive what she is seeking. We are in the pre-surrogate stages, and the path to completing the procedure is long, arduous and uncertain, from the medical, legal and economic viewpoints. From a medical viewpoint, the success rate is currently low; from a legal viewpoint the institute in the United States requires the consent of both spouses to carry out the implantation, and they must be married and living together (see the unsigned surrogate agreement, plaintiff’s exhibit 3). The problems that arise with regard to the status of the child, the surrogate mother, the need for consent to hand over the child, the factual and legal conflict between the status of the surrogate and the status of the genetic mother with regard to their maternal status and the legal status of the child are complex and cannot be easily solved. All of these are without doubt real problems; but were I to think that Ruth Nahmani had a right to force parenthood on Daniel Nahmani through the court, I would not regard these difficulties as an obstacle in her path to trying to achieve motherhood.

An alternative possibility of achieving motherhood

32. Another argument that was raised was the possibility that Ruth Nahmani could achieve motherhood in another way. I do not accept the argument that Ruth Nahmani could become a mother in a different way, and for that reason she is not entitled to force Daniel Nahmani to continue the procedure. It is almost certain that this is her last chance of achieving biological motherhood. One must take account of her age, her physiological condition, her small chances of success in a new fertilization, the need to find an unrelated donor (when she is still married) or to resort to the adoption of a child that is not hers, the time factor, and the emotional and physical effort involved in all of these. All of these are unattractive alternatives, and they cannot be compared with the use of her ova, fertilized with the sperm of her husband during their married life, which are ready for implanting. Therefore, were I to think that Ruth Nahmani had a right to continue the procedure against the wishes of Daniel Nahmani, I would not regard this argument as an obstacle in her path.

The ‘status’ of the fertilized ova

33. As stated, the status of the fertilized ova has ramifications for the question of consent. I will consider this only from the viewpoint of the question whether their status can support the position of one of the parties. If the approach is — as in most Western countries — that the ova do not have a right to ‘life’, then controlling their fate lies with the two persons who contributed their genetic material; if however the approach is that they do have an independent right to develop into ‘life’, the spouse who wishes to continue the process will have a right to them.

I shall not presume to make a comprehensive analysis of this complex subject to which different societies at different times attribute different elements which are not only in the sphere of law. We are concerned here with the sphere of philosophical, social and theological outlooks on the nature of man and his creation. There are some who try to derive the status of fertilized ova from the status of the embryo. The legal status of these, including their right to continue to develop, is not regulated in Israel by legislation. The Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law does not apply to them, according to the definition of the term ‘man’ in that law. In the aforementioned article of the President (M. Shamgar, ‘Questions relating to fertilization and having children’, 39 HaPraklit (1990) 30), he reviews the question of ‘Who is a man’ in various countries and at various times, beginning with the philosophical school of the Pythagoreans, and he continues through the Middle Ages down to the present day. From this review we see that across a section of human civilization the date on which man begins his existence is recognized to be no earlier than the stage of implantation. This is not the only opinion, and there is another approach that life begins from the moment of fertilization (ibid., at pp. 30-31). We also find a legal survey of the different approaches to this subject, in so far as it concerns abortions, in CA 413/80 A v. B [2], at p. 81 (see also the Report of the Professional Public Commission for Examining the Issue of In-vitro Fertilization, at p. 52). In Davis v. Davis (1992) [32] the issue was considered comprehensively and in depth. The court there reached the conclusion that the fertilized ova are not ‘property’ nor are they a ‘person’ or an embryo, but a ‘pre-embryo’. They belong to an intermediate category, and although they should be treated with dignity because of the potential for life that they contain, the State has no interest in protecting their ‘life’ and in compelling the donors of the genetic material or either of them to continue the procedure against their will. The countries that do not regard the fertilized ova as ‘persons’ require the consent of both donors of the genetic material to all stages of the procedure of fertilization, and they allow each party to revoke his consent. They also order the destruction of the fertilized ova in the absence of consent or at the end of a certain period. This is the law in England, Western Australia, France, the recommendations for reform in Canada, Ontario and New South Wales (the law in these jurisdictions was mentioned above when we considered the law in foreign countries — paragraph 13; with regard to the law in France, see C. Byk, ‘France: Law Reform and Human Reproduction’, Law Reform and Human Reproduction, S.A.M. McLean ed., 131, 160). There are other opinions, and States such as Louisiana and Victoria recognize the right of the fertilized ova to protection of their ‘life’ (see La. Rev. Stat. 9:122, 9:129, 9:130 (Louisiana); the Infertility (Medical Procedures) Act (Victoria); L. Waller, ‘Australia: The Law and Infertility — the Victorian Experience’, Law Reform and Human Reproduction, supra, at 17, 25).

34. The approach of our legal system is like the approach of most Western countries.

In ancient Jewish law sources, a situation of in-vitro fertilization was not considered and could not have been considered. The status of fertilized ova can be deduced from an analogy with the status of the embryo. There is a distinction between the stage from which someone who injures an embryo is like someone who injures a person, and the stage at which this is not the case. In Jewish law, we find a distinction between determining the time when ‘the soul enters from a theological viewpoint’ and the prohibition of abortion from a legal viewpoint. Rabbi Meir Abulafia, one of the leaders of Spanish Jewry in the thirteenth century, writes that the soul enters the body at the moment of fertilization (Rabbi Meir Abulafia, Yad Rama, on Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 91b [46]). However, with regard to the abortion of an embryo on account of a danger to the mother’s life, he holds that the embryo is not a person in its own right until it comes out of his mother (Rabbi Meir Abulafia, Yad Rama, on Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 72b [46]): ‘But as long as it is inside, it is not a person and the Torah is not concerned about it’ (see also Rabbi Shelomoh Yitzhaki (Rashi), Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin, 72b [47]). Rabbi Hisda says that until the fortieth day of pregnancy, the embryo is ‘mere water’ (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Yevamot, 69b [48]). According to most contemporary authorities, fertilized ova have not reached the stage where the prohibition of ‘abortion’ applies. Even according to the minority of authorities who hold that the prohibition of abortion applies also to an early stage of the pregnancy, it is doubtful whether this prohibition includes a prohibition of destroying a fertilized ovum before it is implanted in a woman’s womb (with regard to the prohibition of abortion, see: D. Sinclair, ‘The Prohibition of Abortion’, Jewish Law Annual, 5 177 [49]; A. Steinberg, ‘Artificial Abortion according to Jewish Law’, Asia 1, 107 [50], and also a responsum of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, ‘Termination of Pregnancy according to Jewish Law’, Asia 1, 78 [51]).

The Regulations indicate a similar approach to that of Jewish law and the approach of most countries of the Western world as expressed in legislation, the recommendations of the various commissions and case-law. According to regulation 9(a), the fertilized ovum shall be frozen for a period that does not exceed five years. The commission that examined all the aspects of the issue recommended that after the storage period the ova could be used for research or could be destroyed. It follows that according to their approach, too, the ova do not have a right to ‘life’ that should be protected. In conclusion, for our purposes the fertilized ovum is not at a stage when it should have its ‘life’ protected, since it does not have life in the accepted meaning of this expression (see also Report of the Professional Public Commission for Examining the Issue of In-vitro Fertilization, 1994, at p. 59). There is therefore no basis for recognizing the right of the fertilized ovum as a positive right that imposes a duty on its ‘parents’ to continue the procedure that will lead it to develop into human life, and the State has no interest in protecting its ‘life’ by compelling one of the donors of the genetic material to continue the procedure (it is possible that the fertilized ova will be entitled to protection against genetic manipulations and against trading in them, etc.).

The best interests of the child

35. The Attorney-General also based his position on the principle of the best interests of the child. The need to consider the best interests of the child also arises, in his opinion, from the Regulations that consider, inter alia, problematic situations from the viewpoint of the composition of the family into which the child will be born (regulation 8(b)). According to this argument, the court should not facilitate the birth of a child into a dispute and a one-parent family, when the starting point of the child yet to be born raises so many problems. The factor of the best interests of the child was considered also by the Commission, which recommended that the consent of both spouses should be required for the implanting also for the reason ‘that children being born into a dispute should not be encouraged’ (Report of the Professional Public Commission for Examining the Issue of In-vitro Fertilization, 1994, at p. 36). The best interests of the child as a preferred consideration with regard to the question before us can be seen also in the approach of several European countries such as Germany, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, as opposed to approaches that give greater preference to the technical developments and the advancement of these, such as the approach in Spain, England and France (for these approaches, see R. Andorno, ‘Procréation Médicalement Assistée’, Revue Internationale De Droit Comparé (1994), 142, 145).

We are not required to take a principled stand with regard to the question of the weight that should be attributed in general to the best interests of the child for the purpose of making a decision on the variety of questions involved in artificial fertilization in general and in-vitro fertilization in particular. It is sufficient for me to say that in this case I do not think that this aspect has great weight.

Were Ruth Nahmani entitled to have here wishes granted and the procedure were successful, a child would be born to a couple who were married when the child was created, and he would have two parents. According to the finding of the trial judge, on the basis of his impression of Ruth Nahmani, she is a very positive woman who would fulfil her role as a mother in the best possible way. The fact that the child who is yet to be born would grow up with his mother, while his father has a family of his own, is a common phenomenon in Israel. One-parent families are accepted in our society with understanding and are even entitled to various forms of assistance. Unfortunately, there are many children being raised in our society by one of their two parents, whether because of divorce or death or because the family was a one-parent family ab initio. I am not unaware that in all those cases where the separation or death occur after the child is born the starting point of his life is a family unit that appears protected, whereas in our case the starting point begins with a ‘deficit’. Notwithstanding, in view of the reality in our society and the personal details of Ruth Nahmani, I would not attribute weight to the question of the best interests of the child to the point that I would deny her what she wishes for this reason; this, unfortunately, she cannot receive for other reasons set out in this opinion.

Conclusion

36. If I have taken the trouble to consider the problem before us from various starting points and from different legal aspects, this is mainly because I have been mindful throughout of the distress and personal circumstances of Ruth Nahmani; but with every sympathy for her position, we cannot grant her application and force fatherhood on Daniel Nahmani. A person cannot always rely on the court system to help him in times of distress. The relationship between spouses should be based on love, friendship, understanding, support, trust and consideration. Sometimes this relationship collapses, expectations fade, hopes vanish and dreams are shattered. Not in every case can the victim find a remedy for his injuries in court orders, where enforcement is impossible, is improper in view of the circumstances and under the law, and is inconsistent with the basic rights of the individual in our society.

In this respect, the remarks of Vice-President Elon with regard to a similar problem (taking a child from an Israeli couple who wished to adopt her and returning her to her biological parents in Brazil), are apt. In describing the relationship between ‘law and justice, difficulty and pain’ Justice Elon said:

‘The difficulty lies in the pain of loss in the hearts of the respondents. After it became clear to them that they would not bring a child into the world, and after they were told that they would not be placed on the list for adopting a child in Israel, they set all their hopes on what they had been told, that they could adopt a small girl conceived and born in a distant land, in Brazil… It is painful that this has been their fate — the suffering of love, and suffering because of love’ (HCJ 243/88 Gonzales v. Turgeman [29], at pp. 653-654).

For these reasons, I can only recommend to my colleagues to allow the appeal, overturn the judgment of the trial court, and dismiss the claim of Ruth Nahmani, without an order for costs.

 

 

Vice-President A. Barak

I agree.

 

 

Justice D. Levin

I agree.

 

 

Justice I. Zamir

I agree.

 

 

Justice Ts. E. Tal

1.    The couple began jointly and with one mind on the painful path of in-vitro fertilization. Together they struggled against the health authorities to be allowed to have a child through a surrogate mother abroad (HCJ 1237/91).

Subsequently, the husband left the home and established a new family with another woman, who even bore him a child, The wife remained alone, and her only hope was to have a child from her and her husband’s fertilized ova. Therefore she asked Assuta Hospital to give her the ova that were frozen there, in order to continue, on her own, the procedure that they began. The hospital refused because of the husband’s opposition. The wife petitioned the trial court against the hospital and against the husband. The court (Justice H. Ariel) granted her petition and rejected the husband’s opposition. This is the basis for the appeal before us.

2.    The human situation before us lies mostly in the social-moral sphere and only to a small extent in the legal sphere. But society has no tools for making decisions and enforcing them in the moral and social sphere, so it leaves the problem for the court to solve.

I have read the excellent and well-constructed opinion of my colleague, Justice Strasberg-Cohen; in her well-reasoned opinion she suggests that the husband’s appeal should be allowed.

But there is not always only one legal solution. Sometimes different potential solutions compete with one another. This is particularly the case with a painful human problem like the one before us. And where there is such a competition, we should, in my opinion, prefer the solution that appears to be more just.

In our case, by means of the separation that the husband created and his opposition to the wife’s petition, he is trying to extinguish her last spark of hope to be a mother, while he himself has established a new home and has been blessed with a child. If there is a solution that can also give the wife her desire, I think that that is the more just solution, and it should be preferred.

3.    The opinion of Justice Strasberg-Cohen is based — in a nutshell — one two points:

— Fatherhood should not be forced on the husband against his will, since this involves a violation of basic rights.

— A ‘weak’ and essentially unenforceable agreement, an agreement that was made when they lived in harmony and there was no agreement as to what would happen when there was no harmony, should not be enforced against the husband. In such a situation, ‘sitting and doing nothing is preferable’.

In my remarks below, I will try to justify a different approach, which will lead to a different solution.

4.    The right of the husband not to have fatherhood forced on him against his will

It is indeed one of the basic rights, which concerns the protection of human liberty, dignity, privacy and autonomy, to make decisions in the field of family and parenthood. But this right is not absolute, and there are cases where it is overridden by the liberty, dignity, privacy and autonomy of others.

Consider, for example, a person from whom a woman has conceived without his knowledge, as in the Biblical case of Lot, or who was deceived into thinking that the woman was taking effective contraceptive measures, which she did not take. There is no doubt that such a person has a good reason not to have fatherhood forced on him against his will. Nonetheless, his autonomy is overridden by her autonomy and that of her body, his dignity by her dignity, and his privacy by her privacy, and even if, like Job, he will curse the ‘night that gave birth to man’, in the end he will be a father against his will, with all the obligations imposed on a father towards his child, from which none are exempt. This should certainly be the case here, where the husband gave his informed and willing consent to be a father, and only later changed his mind.

One might say that the two cases are different. In the former case the right of the husband is countered by the preferred right not to interfere actively with the body of the wife.

To this we can reply: first, in our case the wife took an additional step and allowed a very serious and painful interference in her body in order to bring about the present position. If we allow the husband to change his mind at this stage, the result is that, from a retrospective viewpoint, the interference in the wife’s body was for nothing, and her dignity and privacy were violated. That is not all. The right of the wife and her desire to be a mother are also basic rights relating to her liberty and dignity, privacy and autonomy, and why should these be secondary to those of the husband? Who has measured parenthood and weighed motherhood? On the contrary, there are indeed reasons why he should be secondary to her, since he changed his mind after a serious violation of her dignity, privacy and body, and ‘anyone who changes his mind has the lower hand’ (Mishnah, Tractate Bava Metzia, 6 1 [52]).

5.    The proper legal policy

My colleague, Justice Strasberg-Cohen, is of the opinion that ‘it would not be proper for the legal system to act to force parenthood on someone who does not want it’.

From the appellant’s viewpoint, we are not concerned with forcing biological parenthood on him. The procedure leading to biological parenthood began willingly. If the court does not intervene — as I indeed propose — the non-intervention will not involve any compulsion. On the contrary, the intervention of the court which leads to the procedure being stopped, is itself biological compulsion, which forces infertility on the wife. Therefore, in a paraphrase of my colleague’s remarks, ‘it would not be proper for the legal system to act to force infertility on someone who does not want it’.

But the crux of the matter is not enforcing parenthood but forcing obligations that derive from fatherhood. In other words, is it proper to allow the biological procedure to continue, when at the end of it, if it is successful, it will impose an emotional burden and financial obligations on the appellant, against his will.

Let us assume that the agreement (by implication and by behaviour) between the spouses is weak and unenforceable and requires renewed consent at every stage — and let us ignore it for a moment as if it had never existed. Does there currently exist any legal norm that can guide us in deciding the said question of enforcing obligations?

Such a norm does not exist, and my colleague’s statement that it would not be proper for the legal system to act to enforce parenthood is in itself the creation of a new norm. We are therefore in the sphere of ‘developing the law’, about which Prof. A. Barak wrote:

‘… In Israel, this activity [of developing law] is regarded as belonging to the judiciary, which acts according to a variety of considerations, some of which are ethical in character and some of which have the nature of legal policy…’ (A. Barak, ‘The Different Kinds of Legal Creation: Interpretation, Filling a Lacuna and Development of the Law’, 39 HaPraklit (1990), 267, 286).

What are the considerations of ethics and legal policy for creating a norm in a situation where the wishes of the husband and the wishes of the wife conflict? On the one hand, we must consider the autonomy of the husband who no longer wants the planned child and also the emotional and financial inconvenience of the husband if the child is born. On the other hand, we must consider the autonomy of the wife, who wants the planned child and her right to be a parent, which is one of the most basic human rights among the existential aspirations of the individual and society as a whole.

In principle, it seems to me that the ethical and the legal-policy considerations tip the scales the other way. For we are not talking of forcing parenthood on a person against his will, as explained above, but of the opposite question, whether we should create a new legal norm that will allow the husband to force infertility on the wife.

The court is obliged to decide between these two evils: ‘forced parenthood’, or more correctly ‘forced obligations of parenthood’, on the one hand, and infertility, also forced, on the other hand. We cannot evade our duty by adopting a policy of ‘sitting and doing nothing’, because both decisions will result in one of these two evils. In the case before us, for the reasons stated above, the norm which does not compel infertility is in my opinion preferable. Moreover, infertility, which is enforced, constitutes the absolute opposite of the most basic and fundamental right of a woman. ‘Forced’ parenthood, on the other hand, imposes emotional burdens and various obligations, which are not to the parent’s liking. In this ‘balance of evils’, the inconvenience of ‘forced’ parenthood is in my opinion insignificant when compared with the absolute denial of the fundamental right to be a parent.

In summary, the husband originally agreed to be the father of the child who would be born to the wife by means of in-vitro fertilization. Now he has changed his mind, but against his right not to continue the procedure that will, possibly, lead to his parenthood, we have the right of the wife which in my opinion is preferable, and his right is set aside in favour of her right.

6.    The contractual aspect

From the contractual aspect, the ‘agreement’ does indeed have the weaknesses that my colleagues listed. It is ‘weak’ and it was made when there was harmony between the spouses, it does not state what will happen if a separation occurs, the agreement is on the borderline between an enforceable and unenforceable agreement, and it has all the other aspects that my colleague attributed to it.

But from the procedural aspect, the trial court was not asked for a remedy of enforcing the agreement. The petition, by means of an originating motion, was directed against the hospital to release the ova and against the husband not to object thereto. In these circumstances, I accept the wife’s argument that the husband is estopped from objecting. When an argument is estopped, we assume that the argument, on its merits, may be a good one. But because of the behaviour of the person making the argument towards the other party, the reliance of the other party on that behaviour and a change in the position of the person so relying as a result, we do not allow the person making the argument to be heard on that argument.

In our case, the wife underwent a serious and painful invasive procedure to her body in order to extract the ova, on the basis of the consent of the husband to fertilize them. When they were fertilized, the wife was deprived of any alternative, such as fertilizing them with the sperm of a ‘donor’. She changed her position irreversibly on the basis of his behaviour. It follows that even if he has good arguments about the unenforceability of the agreement and about the need for renewed consent at every stage on the way to parenthood and all his other arguments, as elucidated so well by my colleague, these may not be heard and we do not allow the husband to make them.

The estoppel we are concerned with is promissory estoppel which was developed in England, and was accepted — in an even wider form — in American law. This estoppel, in recognized circumstances, prevents a person from denying a promise that he gave to another in order that the other would rely on it and act on it, when the other did indeed rely on it and change his position.

The common element in this estoppel and the classic estoppel (estoppel by representation) is the element of reliance. In one case there is a change of position relying on a promise and in the other a change of position relying on a factual representation.

‘From a modern viewpoint it may be said that the two types of estoppel are designed to protect a reliance interest. The common element of reliance provides an ethical basis for the rules concerning the various kinds of estoppel. Indeed, both estoppel by representation and promissory estoppel are based on principles of justice and equity, logic and fairness, and both of these contain elements of proper morality and human relations’ (G. Shalev, ‘Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith’, 16 Mishpatim (1986), 295, 296).

See also M.P. Thomson, ‘From Representation to Expectation: Estoppel as a Cause of Action’, 42 Cambridge L. J. (1983), 257, 277:

‘Equitable estoppel is a rule of fairness by which the courts protect the reliance and expectations of innocent parties from defeat by those who have induced those reliances and expectations.’

Incidentally, it can be said that the modern ‘reliance interest’ was recognized already in Talmudic law. Jewish law holds that someone who gives free advice which turns out to be erroneous is exempt from paying. But if the person asking said to the adviser: ‘See, I am relying on you’, the adviser is liable to pay (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava Kama, 100a [53]. This is also the ruling of Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Hoshen Mishpat, 306, 6 [54]: ‘If a person shows a coin to a dealer and he says it is genuine and it turns out to be counterfeit… he is liable to pay even though it was gratuitous [advice], provided that the person said to the dealer I am relying on you, or there was a statement to the effect that he was relying on his inspection and would not show it to others’.

Whereas in a case of the classic estoppel an element of damage or adversely changing one’s position is required for it to apply, the promissory estoppel is applicable even without this, since it applies, according to Lord Denning, ‘even if there is no damage to the recipient of the promise’ (Shalev, ‘Promise, Estoppel and Good Faith’, 16 Mishpatim (1986), 295, 296). It is universally agreed that it is sufficient that an injustice is suffered by the recipient of the promise (ibid., note 7).

This is not the place to discuss at length the history of this doctrine, and I will satisfy myself with the main points. It began in England, in the opinion of Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd (1947) [37].

Since then this doctrine has become stronger and discarded provisos and restrictions, so that it has become a major and simple rule. Lord Denning, this time as Master of the Rolls, listed many kinds of limitations that formerly restricted the rules of estoppel, such as: it is merely a rule of evidence, estoppel does not create a cause of action, estoppel does not exempt one from the need for consideration, etc.. These limitations were ‘buried’ and the rule was left a simple one:

‘All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption — either of fact or of law — whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference — on which they have conducted the dealings between them — neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands’ (Amalgamated Property Co. v. Texas Bank (1982) [38], at p. 122).

In American law, this rule is expressed in its widest form (Restatement, 2nd, Contracts §90(1)), and it gives the recipient of the promise not only the right of estoppel but also the right of enforcement. In Australia also the High Court has ruled in favour of a recipient of a promise by virtue of promissory estoppel, which served in that case as the cause of action (Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) [31]; see also S. Gardner, ‘Equitable Estoppel, Unconscionability and the Enforcement of Promises’, 104 L. Q. Rev. (1988), 362).

In Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher, the respondent, Maher, erroneously thought that a binding agreement had been made between him and the appellant company, and relying on this he changed his position (he destroyed a building on his land in order to erect a building that would be leased to the company). According to the majority opinion, promissory estoppel applied to this case in Maher’s favour (according to the minority opinion, the classic estoppel applied in this case). Inter alia the court said:

‘In all cases where an equity created by estoppel is raised, the party raising the equity has acted or abstained from acting on an assumption or expectation as to the legal relationship between himself and the party who induced him to adopt the assumption or expectation… Though the party raising the estoppel may be under no mistake as to the facts, he assumes that a particular legal relationship exists or expects that a particular legal relationship will exist between himself and the party who induced the assumption or expectation. The assumption or expectation may involve an error of law. Thus a promissory or a proprietary estoppel may arise when a party, not mistaking any facts, erroneously attributes a binding legal effect to a promise made without consideration’ (Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) [31], at pp. 420-421; emphasis supplied).

Similarly, in our case the wife has changed her position, irreversibly, in reliance on the consent of her husband to act jointly with her to bring a child into the world in the way that they began. It is clear that the wife’s reliance was on the husband’s consent to bring a child into the world in the way that they began, and not on his partial consent to the first stage only, with a possibility of changing his mind. If both parties did not think about a possible change of circumstances, this means that they also did not think about stages and changes on the way, but about the final goal. The two parties did not think that the agreement was weak and unenforceable. As in Maher’s case, here too no binding agreement was made, but the wife acted in reliance on what she thought was an agreement ‘to the end’; and the wife changed her position, on the basis of the consent to that final goal.

The essence of estoppel is not the validity or the content of the promise, but the reasonableness of the reliance. When the wife reasonably relied on the husband’s promise, something that the husband should have anticipated — and which he did in fact anticipate — he is estopped even if the exact contents of the promise did not extend to all the circumstances as they turned out. After a reasonable reliance and an irrevocable change in the wife’s situation, the law provides that the extent of the estoppel will be determined in accordance with that reasonable reliance.

The scholars Friedman and Cohen are of the opinion that this principle was absorbed in our law before the Contracts (General Part) Law (D. Friedman & N. Cohen, Contracts, vol. 1, at pp. 531-533). Even ‘today, despite the enactment of the Contracts Law, case-law continues to make use of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, whether independently, or as a part of the principle of good faith…’ (ibid., at p. 533; see also the citations there to the decisions of the Supreme Court).

It seems to me, therefore, that the husband is prevented and estopped from arguing against the wife that he may revoke his consent, even if we are indeed concerned with a ‘weak’ agreement that is, by nature, of doubtful enforceability. We are not dealing with the enforcement of an agreement, but with estopping the husband from objecting to the continuation of the procedure.

It is true that the circumstances have changed, as a result of the separation that has occurred. But the husband is also estopped with regard to this argument, since it is he who has changed the situation. I am not looking to find him ‘guilty’, but someone who effects a change cannot argue that he is entitled to benefit from the change that he himself made, to the detriment of the other party (cf. section 28(a) and (b) of the Contracts Law (General Part); admittedly under sub-section (c) this rule does not apply when that party was free, under the terms of the contract, to act as he did, but the assumption that in the present case the husband was free to change the situation is precisely the assumption we are being asked to make).

7.    Moreover, from the contractual viewpoint, the agreement under discussion is an agreement of behaviour. In the absence of an express agreement, we assume that it did not include an undertaking to continue the procedure even if the spouses would undergo a separation.

This assumption is not necessarily correct. To the same degree we could have assumed that the husband — out of ethical considerations — agreed to fulfil the one and only hope of the wife to become a mother in any situation, even if a separation would occur. This is not a mere speculation. It has strong support in the ‘unwritten terms’ that Jewish law attributes to such a situation. Let me explain.

Jewish law has accepted the doctrine that a husband should not be forced to divorce his wife except in the cases listed in the Mishnah ‘And these are the cases where we compel him to divorce: someone afflicted with boils, etc.’ (Mishnah, Tractate Ketubot, 7, 10 [55]). This is also the rule in Shulhan Aruch (Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Even HaEzer, 154, 1 [43]). But there are also exceptions to this rule. In one of these — where a ‘wife comes with an argument’ that she has been married for ten years and had no children from her husband, and she wishes to be divorced on the grounds that she needs support in her old age and someone who will take care of her funeral arrangements — we compel the husband to divorce her, so that she may marry another, from whom perhaps she may have a child. The Talmud recounts the case of a wife who came to Rabbi Ami and asked to be divorced. He rejected her request and said that a woman is not commanded to be fruitful and multiply. She said to him: ‘In her old age, what will happen to such a woman?’ He said: ‘In such a case, we certainly use enforcement’. Similarly there was a case of a wife who came to Rabbi Nahman and after she argued that she needed a ‘support and someone to bury her’, Rabbi Nahman ruled that in such a case the husband is compelled to divorce her (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Yevamot, 65b [48]).

However, compelling a divorce in a case where the law does not allow this amounts to an  ‘artificial’ divorce and is invalid. This is stated by Maimonides (Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon, Mishneh Torah, Hilechot Gerushin, 2, 20 [56]):

‘… If the law does not allow him to be compelled to give a divorce and a Jewish court made a mistake or if they were inexpert judges and forced him to divorce her — it is an invalid divorce.’

One might ask the following question: if a ‘wife comes with an argument’ that is not listed in the Mishnah at all and the husband is compelled to divorce her, how do we compel him to divorce her and are unconcerned that the divorce is artificial?

This question was discussed by Rabbi Yitzhak bar Sheshet, one of the most prominent arbiters of the fourteenth century in Spain and Morocco (Rabbi Yitzhak bar Sheshet, Responsa, 127 [57]). He explains that the enforcement applied by the court is not, in fact, for the husband to perform the divorce but for him to fulfil one of his obligations to his wife, such as the duty of marital intercourse. If, however, he is unwilling or unable and he chooses to escape the enforcement by means of divorcing her, this is a divorce of his own free will.

‘And this is like a case of someone to whom money is lent, and he was imprisoned for that debt, and his wife’s relations said to him: if you divorce your wife, we will pay that debt and you will be released from prison. He agrees to this and divorces her willingly. Would anyone say that this is an artificial divorce, because he did it in order to get out of prison? No, since he was not imprisoned in order to divorce her, but on account of his debt, and the divorce is not artificial but voluntary’ (ibid. [57]).

But in a case where he may be compelled to carry out his obligations, such as her maintenance, and she does not want a divorce, we compel him to carry out his obligation to support her.

‘Someone who says that he will not provide food and support is compelled to provide support. And if the court cannot compel him to provide support, such as in a case where he does not have the wherewithal to support her and does not want to work to earn money to support her, if she wishes, he is compelled to divorce her immediately and give her the Ketubah. This is also the law with regard to someone who does not want to have marital intercourse’ (Rabbi Yosef Karo, Shulhan Aruch, Even HaEzer, 154, 3 [43]).

It can therefore be seen that the ‘primary’ enforcement is to carry out the obligation. The enforcement to divorce is merely a ‘secondary’ enforcement.

The secondary enforcement to divorce a ‘wife who comes with an argument’ implies that the husband has the primary duty — above and beyond his obligation under the commandment to be fruitful and multiply — to give a child to his wife if she wishes one, so that she may be able to be supported in her old age and when she dies; and where the primary enforcement to carry out the obligation can be done, he is compelled to carry it out. In summary, the enforcement is to carry out the obligation. And if the performance of the obligation can be achieved by enforcement — such as the obligation to support the wife — he is compelled to perform the obligation. Even an obligation that cannot in practice be achieved by means of enforcement (such as the duty of marital intercourse) is enforced, but if the husband chooses to divorce her with her consent, it is a valid divorce.

This is why I said above that this ‘agreement of behaviour’ between the spouses includes not only a consent to try and bring a child into the world when there is harmony between them, but also an obligation to give her a child to support her, even if they separate.

Admittedly, here the impediment to having a child originates with the wife. Thus it may be argued that in such a case we would not compel a husband to divorce her, since she would not have a child even with a different husband. But after he agreed to enable her to have a child, knowing the true facts, and knowing that the impediment came from her, this consent becomes once again an absolute obligation. It can be proved from the discussion in the Talmud (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Bava Kama, 108b [53]) that a moral duty that a person undertakes to another becomes a binding legal duty.

In our case we are not concerned with compelling the husband to perform a divorce, since the wife does not want a divorce, but with compelling him to carry out his moral duty to her, and it is similar to a case where we compel him to support her. What is the enforcement here? It is estopping him from objecting to the continuation of the procedure that was begun with consent.

8.    I am not unaware of the responsum of Rabbi Shaul Yisraeli, mentioned in the opinion of my colleague, which concludes that the husband should not be compelled to continue the procedure. The Rabbi considered the matter in detail from the viewpoint of divorce, whereas it is clear that the consent of the husband to the cooperation happened when there was harmony between them and the child that would be born would grow up with both parents in one home. Now that a separation has occurred, it is like being ‘under duress’, and since the circumstances have changed, the husband is entitled to change his mind.

I am not of sufficient stature to disagree with the Rabbi, but even under Jewish law different approaches are possible, and these lead to different solutions. The problem is a new one and was not considered in this form in the responsa of Medieval and Modern scholars. Contemporary scholars are considering this law by means of various analogies, and there are arguments in both directions.

It cannot therefore be said that ‘Jewish law’ has a clear position on this matter.

9.    I will conclude as I began. There are cases where a man has the obligations of fatherhood forced on him, even if he did not agree to this ab initio, and his basic rights are overridden by values and the basic rights of the wife. This is certainly the case where he agreed to fatherhood ab initio, as in the case before us.

Since as a result of his behaviour and his consent — irrespective of any fault — the wife changed her position irrevocably, so that she was deprived of any option of having her ova fertilized by the sperm of a donor, the husband is estopped from opposing the continuation of the process, even if he has arguments that are good in themselves. This is the very essence of estoppel, that it silences good arguments. Arguments that are not good do not need to be estopped.

We can read into the implied agreement that was made by the behaviour of the parties a moral undertaking of the husband to agree to the demand ‘Give me children or else I die’. Such an undertaking, when the wife ‘comes with an argument’, can be enforced by estopping the opposition of the husband.

Since this solution seems to me more just, as it did to Justice Ariel in the trial court, I would suggest that we deny the husband’s appeal.

In all of the above I have not considered the problems relating to such a child, when he is born, from the viewpoint of his family ties in Jewish and civil law. There are many opinions in this regard as to whether the child is deemed the child of the woman who gives birth to him or the child of the genetic mother. And what is the law with regard to marrying the relations of both of these, and the intestacy of both of these and his father’s intestacy (see a synopsis of the opinions on this subject in Dr Avraham Steinberg ed., Encyclopaedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, vol. 2, the entry ‘In-vitro fertilization’, at pp. 115 et seq. [58].

We do not need to consider all these, since the argument of a ‘support for my old age’ does not depend on motherhood in Jewish or civil law, but on the reality of the mother raising the child. If indeed she succeeds in raising her genetic child in her home, this will, in so far as it is possible, fulfil the woman’s yearning and needs.

I am not unaware of the Public Health (In-vitro Fertilization) Regulations, but these regulations are not necessarily an obstacle to the continuation of the procedure, since they do not apply precisely to the case before us (where there is no divorce).

Indeed, the Professional Public Commission for Examining the Issue of In-vitro Fertilization recommended in 1994 that the whole procedure should be carried out only with joint and continuing consent. Certainly this should ideally be the case, as explained in the Commission’s Report and in the opinion of my colleague. When the recommendations of the Commission are incorporated in binding rules, all those who need in-vitro fertilization will know ab initio what to expect. But we are dealing with a special case, post factum. If my approach is correct, the recommendations of the Commission should not be an obstacle for Mrs Nahmani.

I therefore propose that we deny the appeal.

 

 

Appeal allowed by majority opinion, Justice Ts. E. Tal dissenting.

28 Adar II 5755

30 March 1995.

 

Full opinion: 

Nafsu v. Chief Military Advocate

Case/docket number: 
CA 124/87
Date Decided: 
Sunday, May 24, 1987
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Introduction to the full text: 

The appellant, an IDF officer holding the rank of lieutenant, was convicted by a special military court of treason under Section 43(7) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and of aggravated espionage under Section 113(b) of the Penal Code, 1977. These accusations referred to the conveying of information on the IDF to the enemy, namely, to a Lebanese resident whose name is specified in the charge sheet and proved in court, and who on the relevant date, that is in 1979, was a senior commander in the Al-Fatah organization. The appellant was further convicted on two charges relating to the offence of assisting the enemy under Section 44 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and aiding the enemy in wartime under Section 99 of the Penal Code, 1977, in connection with his meeting with another resident of southern Lebanon whose name is specified and confirmed as in the case of the aforementioned person, with the aim of having the appellant carry out missions of transferring combat materiel to Israel. Finally, he was convicted on eight counts relating to the offence of treason, under Section 43(2) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and aid to the enemy in wartime under Section 99(a) of the Penal Code, 1977, which with respect to their facts refer to the transfer of bags with combat materiel upon the request of the aforementioned person from Lebanon to Israel. The special court sentenced the appellant to 18 years' imprisonment. His sentence also included expulsion from the army, which automatically means cancellation of his military rank.

Full text of the opinion: 

C.A. 124/87

 

LIEUTENANT IZAT NAFSU

v.

CHIEF MILITARY ADVOCATE

 

 

In the Supreme Court sitting as a Court of Appeals

[24 May 1987]

Before: Shamgar F., Bejsky J. and Goldberg J.

 

 

 

 

Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955

Appeal of the verdict of the Military Appeals Court, file 202/82/a, of 29.6.86,

given by S. Ziv, Judge Y. Shilo and A. Ravid, dated 24 May 1987.

 

 

A. Kamar, Dr. Z. Hadar, M. Kamar and Y. Kamar for the appellant.

Brig. Gen. A. Nevo and Col. U. Shoham for the respondent.

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

The President:

 

1. The appellant, an IDF officer holding the rank of lieutenant, was convicted by a special military court of treason under Section 43(7) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and of aggravated espionage under Section 113(b) of the Penal Code, 1977. These accusations referred to the conveying of information on the IDF to the enemy, namely, to a Lebanese resident whose name is specified in the charge sheet and proved in court, and who on the relevant date, that is in 1979, was a senior commander in the Al-Fatah organization. The appellant was further convicted on two charges relating to the offence of assisting the enemy under Section 44 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and aiding the enemy in wartime under Section 99 of the Penal Code, 1977, in connection with his meeting with another resident of southern Lebanon whose name is specified and confirmed as in the case of the aforementioned person, with the aim of having the appellant carry out missions of transferring combat materiel to Israel. Finally, he was convicted on eight counts relating to the offence of treason, under Section 43(2) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, and aid to the enemy in wartime under Section 99(a) of the Penal Code, 1977, which with respect to their facts refer to the transfer of bags with combat materiel upon the request of the aforementioned person from Lebanon to Israel. The special court sentenced the appellant to 18 years' imprisonment. His sentence also included expulsion from the army, which automatically means cancellation of his military rank.

 

2. The appellant's appeal to the Military Appeals Court was rejected.

 

3. The appellant asked for and received permission to appeal to the present court, in accordance with the provisions and conditions specified in Section 440(t) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, passed by the Knesset several days before the judgment in the appeal was handed down.

 

4. The appellant's appeal was against his conviction. The appellant's arguments in his appeal addressed to this court, were in the main those which served as the basis of his defence in the special military court, and were also adduced before the Military Appeals Court: the special military court convicted the appellant on the basis of his written confessions, which were given to investigators of the General Security Service, and which, in the opinion of the court, were found to contain "an additional element," as required by the laws of evidence. The appellant's claim was that his confessions were inadmissible and did not constitute the truth. According to him, the confessions were made after GSS investigators exerted unacceptable means of pressure against him, which bars their admissibility under Section 477 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, according to which a military court will not accept a defendant's confession as evidence unless it is convinced that it was given of the defendant's own free will. The appellant says violent acts were carried out against him, which included pulling his hair, pushing him around, throwing him to the ground, kicking, scratching and insults. He was ordered to strip and sent to take a cold shower. He was prevented from sleeping for many hours during the day and especially at night and he had to stand in the yard of the prison facility for long hours even when he was not being interrogated. He was also threatened that his mother and wife would be arrested and that personal information about him, which was in the interrogators' possession. would be made public.

            The special court did not accept these arguments of the appellant, which were denied by his interrogators in their testimonies. The Military Appeals Court saw no reason to intervene in the judgment of the court of the first instance, that had seen and heard the above-mentioned witnesses, and had been able to formulate a first-hand impression of them.

           

5. With the opening of the hearing before this court, the learned representative of the state, Chief Military Advocate Brig. Gen. Amnon Nevo, who appeared before us together with Col. Uri Shoham, declared that prior to hearing the appeal, he himself, along with the General Security Service had examined the facts of the case and discovered new evidence and facts which indicated that there had been truth in most of the appellant's claims regarding the pressures exerted upon him with respect to his confessions, and which, he maintains, affected his free will. The following is the essence of his remarks, as made before us and as submitted to us in writing:

 

"Following an examination conducted by the GSS at its initiative, after objections and reflections on the whole affair were raised within the service (29 January 1987), and following questioning conducted by myself personally during the past month since I was apprised of the findings of the GSS examination, new evidence and facts have been revealed and the following doubts arose in the episode in question:

 

"1. Mini-trial

            Most claims of the defendant at the 'mini-trial' regarding the pressures exerted on him to give confessions, which, he argues, affected his free will, with the exception of direct means of violence, such as kicks and slaps, were examined and found basically correct..."

           

            According to the conclusions of the chief military advocate, the testimony of the GSS interrogators in the court of the first instance had not been entirely truthful when they denied exerting undue pressures in obtaining confessions from the appellant. Except for their contention that there was no hitting or slapping, most of the appellant's claims regarding the conduct of the investigation have been validated. In view of the above, the chief military advocate in concurrence with the A-G have accepted the appeal before them that the confessions were inadmissible, and find it incumbent upon the state to overturn the conviction regarding the transfer of combat materiel, based on these confessions. Brig. Gen. Nevo announced that he is also forgoing the argument that the conviction of conveying information to the enemy can be based on evidence other than the confessions to GSS investigators, which, he maintains, is implicit in the material before us. It is noteworthy that in view of the aforementioned stand of the general prosecution, we saw no place to examine other items of evidence at the court's initiative.

           

            Brig. Gen. Nevo informed us that instead, with the approval of the attorney general, he had reached the following agreed settlement with the appellant and his learned lawyers, the full text of which is given hereinafter, and which we have been asked to approve:

           

"Agreement

            The sides wish to inform this honourable court that they have reached the following agreement on the issue of the appeal:

           

1. The prosecution agrees to the annulment of the verdict of the Military Appeals Court, file 202/82/a and of the verdict of the special military court, file 80/3, on the issue of the appeal.

 

2. The appellant admits to the offense of exceeding his authority to the point of endangering the security of the state under Sec. 73 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955. The following are the details: the appellant, while serving as a special-duties officer at Southern Lebanon Region HQ, on unknown dates in 1979 or proximate thereto, did exceed his authority and by so doing was liable to harm the security of the state or the operations of the army, according to the following facts:

            (a) As part of his mission as a special-duties officer in the Southern Lebanon Region [SLR], the appellant, together with the Christian Forces, toured the village of Shuba in Southern Lebanon on an unknown date in 1979.

            On one of the occasions when he visited the village, he was asked by an informer of the SLR (who shall herein be called "X"- his full name appears in the agreement - M. Sh.) to come to his house and meet there with a person involved in hostile terrorist activity, who was ready to provide the IDF authorities with important information. The appellant accompanied "X" to his home and there met a stranger who presented himself as being connected with the terrorists and able to provide information regarding their activity in the eastern sector of the SLR. The stranger introduced himself as "Y" (his full name appears in the agreement - M. Sh.).

            (b) In a second meeting two months later at the home of "X", "Y" told the appellant that he was a senior commander in Fatah and that their previous meeting had been photographed secretly. "Y" demanded that the appellant co-operate with him and give him information about IDF activity in the sector. In the event the appellant refused, "Y" threatened to convey the photographs in his possession to Israeli Intelligence. After an exchange of words between them, the appellant got up and left.

            (c) The appellant informed no one about these meetings.

           

3. The appellant and the prosecution will be free to present whatever arguments they see fit regarding the punishment, on the basis of these facts only. The prosecution will argue that a punishment of expulsion from the army is not commensurate with the circumstances of the matter."

 

            As the agreement indicates, we now have before us on the part of the appellant an admission of guilt, as entailed under Sec. 354(a) of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, including an admission of facts which support the charge.

           

            Since this confession conflicts with the appellant's statements in the special military court and his arguments in the Military Appeals Court - when he denied any connection with "Y" and any meeting or acquaintance with him - we found fit to examine thoroughly why the appellant had changed his story. Principally, we wished to examine whether the appellant had not admitted wrongdoing because his strength had given out and he was no longer able to bear the penalty of imprisonment he was serving. We therefore heard also the statement of the appellant himself, who insisted that the facts detailed in the agreement describe the whole truth - that is, they constitute, as he says, a description of what occurred, no more and no less. The appellant explained to us that he had considered the matter and had heard the explanations of defence counsel, and his confession does not constitute submission to the pressure of prison but is, as noted, a description of what took place. After we were convinced that the appellant was acting on the basis of his own free consideration, and after we reached the conclusion that the appellant's description could be consistent with the basic facts as they were presented to the court, we decided to accept his confession, and we stated so in our decision which was given prior to hearing the arguments regarding the penalty to be meted out.

 

            We therefore decided to annul the conviction and the punishment meted out by the special military court, and instead to convict the appellant of an offence under Sec. 73 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, in accordance with the facts spelled out in the written statement of confession, above.

           

6. As we noted, implicit in the above is that the appellant's absolute denial in the first court were not truthful.

 

            In the face of this conclusion, it became clear to us from the words of the learned representative of the state that in his opinion, the General Security Service interrogators had gone beyond the bounds of the permissible with respect to the cumulative weight of their deeds, and had compounded this misdeed by giving false testimony to the special military court about the interrogation of the appellant and by denying his principal contentions regarding the methods of interrogation.

           

            Nothing can detract from the gravity of this conclusion, which points to these witnesses' disavowal of their duty to tell the truth in testifying before a legal tribunal. These actions constitute a severe blow to the credibility of a heretofore unquestioned arm of the state. The court was thereby deprived of the ability to decide in the case of the appellant on the basis of truthful data, and the standing and force of the court were harmed when it was misled by the statements of the interrogators.

           

            We find that the acts revealed in this case have been reprehensible, in that they led the court into incorrect findings and conclusions. We direct the attention of the A-G to the obligation of adopting the decisive measures necessary to uproot this phenomenon.

           

7. In this connection it should also be noted that in the special court it also emerged that the General Security Service interrogators who conducted the interrogation of the appellant, did not keep the notes and other auxiliary records which they took down in the course of the interrogation, and erased recordings of the various stages of the interrogation when in their opinion their investigation was completed. As a result, the general prosecution and the defence alike were deprived of information about the course of the interrogation as this was reflected in the notes and recordings, and this ipso facto limited their ability to question the witnesses who had taken part in the interrogation; and the appellant's ability to support, through the notes or recordings, his contentions regarding the interrogation, was also affected. The learned representative of the state informed us, that a few years after the episode, and principally in the wake of the judgment handed down by this court in the Abu-Sneineh case (appeal 343/ 82, Abu-Sneineh vs. State of Israel - not published), orders were issued requiring that records be kept and that every notation and every recording be preserved. In this connection it bears re-emphasizing that an investigation by the General Security Service which leads to legal proceedings (irrespective of the original intention of those who initiate the investigation) must be conducted in accordance with the same rules which apply to the police in its investigations; and just as the latter must meticulously keep records and preserve every notation and every recording made during the investigation, so, too, must the General Security Service.

 

            We did not see the orders issued in this matter about which we were informed by the learned representative of the state, and therefore we direct the attention of the attorney-general to the advisability of re-examining whether the existing orders meet the requirements set forth above.

           

            We are also given to understand, from the words of the learned representative of the state, that an examination by a special team is now underway regarding the methods of interrogation employed by the General Security Service. The present case illustrates the urgency and importance of this matter.

           

8. We turn now to the appropriate punishment for the deeds admitted to by the appellant. Sec. 73 of the Military Jurisdiction Law, 1955, which bears the marginal heading "Exceeding Authority to the Point of Endangering State Security," states that a soldier who exceeded his authority and thereby harmed or could have harmed the security of the state or the operations of the army or the operations of the armed forces who are acting in concert with the army, is liable to a prison term of five years; if he did the act knowingly (an argument not adduced here) he shall be liable to ten years' imprisonment.

 

            The act admitted to by the appellant bears grave aspects: it relates to activity in an area where at that time terrorist forces were also operating. When the appellant was invited to meet with a person linked to hostile terrorist activity who was ready to provide information, he was obligated to report this at least post factum. This obligation stems, in itself, from what is required in order to maintain the orderly activity of the military framework. Further, it derives from security reasons, since in a case like this, one should examine who it is that is making contact, at his initiative, with the IDF, and whether anything is known about him. It is unnecessary to emphasize that without this kind of report and examination, at least following the meeting, the appellant or anyone else who might act with him or in his stead, could fall into a trap laid by the terrorists which could endanger human life and state security.

           

            In this case the appellant erred twice in failing to report, and the second case was actually far more serious than the first, since he found, at a later stage, that the person in question was not someone who sought, ostensibly, to serve as an IDF informer, but a senior Fatah man who was acting on behalf of this organization. According to him, he photographed the first meeting and wanted to exploit this for extortion. The absence of a report and of any other action deprived the relevant authorities of information on this matter, and this was liable to create difficulties for anyone succeeding the appellant, or any other officer who might easily have found himself in similar circumstances. It also prevented information about the activity of "X", in whose home the meeting was held, and about whom it then became quite clear that he was connected with the senior Fatah commander.

 

            Finally, it bears noting that the appellant also did nothing whatsoever to stop "Y" or to neutralize him in some other way. That he made do with leaving the place is not the kind of reaction required under these circumstances from an IDF officer who encountered a senior terrorist.

           

            In contradistinction to the significance, as described, of the appellant's commissions and omissions, to his credit stands his positive military record as this is indicated, inter alia, by the written character testimonies of Brig. Gen. (res.) Binyamin Ben-Eliezer and Lt. Col. (res.) Yoram Hamizrahi and the head of the Kafr Kama local council.

           

            Essentially, we must take a lenient view of the fact that the appellant has already been imprisoned for many years (7 and a half years) after being convicted of an offence of extreme gravity, while it now emerges that his conviction, based on confessions given to GSS interrogators, was devoid of any legal basis and that the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence he has now admitted to, is far less than the prison term he has already served.

           

            In view of these considerations, we have decided to sentence the appellant to 24 months' imprisonment from the date of his detention, and to demote him to master sergeant. Since he has already served his penalty, he is to be released.

           

            We assume that the military authorities will know how to compensate the appellant, who served a longer prison term than was meted out to him in the wake of this appeal.

           

            Marginally, we express our displeasure at the fact that while this matter was still pending before us, the media carried reports which exceeded what is permitted under the Law. This absence of restraint adversely affected the atmosphere needed to do justice, and it is to be avoided.

           

This judgment shall be published in full. Given this day, 24.5.87.

 

The Movement for Quality in Government v. State of Israel

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 3094/93
HCJ 4319/93
HCJ 4478/93
AHC 4409/93
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, September 8, 1993
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (1) In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2) An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (1) Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2) Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3) Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4) Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5) In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (1) The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2) Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3) Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (1) When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2) Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3) The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (1) Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2) The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3) This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (1) The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2) Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3) In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G. (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (1) The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2) The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3) Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.  (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (1) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2) When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3) If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4) If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5) When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I. (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1) One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2) In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

            (3) A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

H.C.J 3094/93

H.C.J 4319/93

H.C.J 4478/93

A.H.C. 4409/93

 

1. The Movement for Quality in Government in Israel

 (H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93).

2. Moshe Kirstein

 (H.C. 4478/93)

3.Adv. Zeev Trainin

 (A.H.C. 4409/93)

v.

1. State of Israel

2. Prime Minister

3. Attorney General

4. Rabbi Arye Deri

5. Shas, International Organization of Tora Observant Sepharadic Jews

 

In the Supreme Court Sitting as High Court of Justice

[September 8, 93]

Shamgar P., Barak J., D. Levin, J. Goldeberg J., Mazza J.

           

Editor's Summary*

 

                These petitions concern the continued tenure in office of the fourth respondent as a Minister in the Government, after he was charged with accepting a bribe, breach of trust on the part of a public servant, obtaining something by deceit under aggravating circumstances, false entry in corporate documents and stealing by a director

               

                The petitioner in H.C. 4319, 3094/93, argued that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to the 4th respondent's tenure of office as a Minister. This petitioner's approach is similar to that of the third respondent, as expressed in his application to the second respondent. In the opinion of the second respondent he is not in duty bound by law to use the powers vested in him by section 2lA of the Basic Law: the Government in order to remove the 4th respondent from his office as a Minister. The second respondent drew attention to the letter which the fourth respondent had deposited with him before the fifth respondent had joined the Government, in which he undertook that "if and when an indictment be brought "against him in court, he would suspend himself from the Government of his own accord. The second respondent saw, and sees, this arrangement, as expressed in the said letter, not only as a unilateral undertaking by the 4th respondent, but also as a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the letter are fulfilled.

 

                According to the argument, the suspicions raised in the past against the fourth respondent, despite which he was elected to the Knesset, were no less serious than those contained in the indictment. It was argued, therefore, inter alia, that there was no real change of circumstances which justified the exercise of the power under the above section 21A, which is a discretionary power. It was argued further that the arrangment in the Basic Law: The Government with respect to Ministers and Deputy Ministers is a negative one - that is, there is no obligatory provision of law there.

               

                The High Court held as follows:

               

A.      (l)       In section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government the 3rd respondent was given the power to transfer a Minister from office without being bound by any extraneous obligations while exercising his power in accordance with its legislative purpose.

 

          (2)     An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, a State service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law.

 

B.      (l)       Section l3A of the Basic Law: the Government was intended, from the point of view of legislative purpose, to prevent agreement and under­takings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

 

          (2)     Section 13A(b) is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations and all the more so when the law demands it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance of the power of the authority, within the framework of a political deal.

 

          (3)     Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power was under consideration. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot exercise it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

          (4)     Where there are considerations which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove someone from office, it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

 

          (5)     In the present circumstances the 4th respondent's undertaking, which can be seen to be an agreed bilateral arrangement, drastically defies the prohibitions in section 13A(2) of the Basic Law: The Government and should be deemed to be absolutely invalid.

 

C.      (I)      The power conferred by section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution.

 

          (2)     Insofar as exercising discretion is concerned there is no difference between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: not only can the unreasonable exercise of a power be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

          (3)     Even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weight up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

 

D.      (l)       When examining the possibility of exercising a power the statutory authority must take account of all the relevant elements: that is, of all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it, it being obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances.

 

          (2)     Where parliamentary-political life is concerned, one cannot rule out taking account of circumstances which arise due to political considerations.

 

          (3)     The question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations.

 

E.      (I)      Discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our consti­tutional and legal system make failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

 

          (2)     The power granted by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in the  web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. The power is vested also in order to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide, and serve as, an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct, land, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in the system of government, on the values upon which the system of government and law is built, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

          (3)     This has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. The reference is to the law of the country according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain circumstances, into something extremely unreasonable.

 

 

F.       (l)       The fact that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset, and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence, does not make the exercise of the power under section 21 A of the Basic Law: The Government when the circumstances demand it, redundant.

 

          (2)     Suspending a decision, following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset- if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the Government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to inter­preting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the second respondent under this section.

 

          (3)     In the present case the indictment against the fourth respondent includes allegations of corruption of an extremely serious nature. Even though it only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution and even though it is not a judgment, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of signi­ficance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for establishing the nature of the acts attributed in the indictment.

 

G.      (Per Justice E. Mazza):

 

          (l)       The second respondent sought to take issue with the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office and did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of his reasons.

 

          (2)     The approach is contrary to the constitutional principle according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive.

 

          (3)     Even after it has been explained to the second respondent that the agreement which he had made with the forth respondent was invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand, while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the third respondent:

 

H.      (Per Justice D. Levin):

 

          (I)      A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions had points of view and to the political and social path of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the government set-up.

 

          (2)     When the minister fulfills an administrative function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice. Within the framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice. If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. If that be the position in general, how much more so would it be the case when a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law.

 

          (3)     If an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy, it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office. It would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he be convinced of his own innocence and clean hands.

 

          (4)     If the minister does not do this then the second respondent must weight up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government to remove the minister from office.

 

          (5)     When a demand that the exercise his discretion be made he may take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, as it is only natural and understandable that the second respondent will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. But the implications of the indictment cannot be ignored and the minister cannot be left in office as though nothing had occurred for the sake of the Government's survival and because of the desire to further government policy, however important this may be.

 

I.       (Per Justice E. Goldberg):

 

          (1)     One cannot deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter under consideration. But this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration.

 

          (2)     In any clash between the two aspects one cannot say that the public administration norm will not apply at all only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister.

 

          (3)     A balance between the two aspects makes it obligatory that the court's power to intervene in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be limited to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office.

 

Israel Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]   Election Appeals 2,3/84 Neimann v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for the llth Knesset; Avni v. The Same 39 (2) P.D. 225.

[2]        H.C. 1523, 1540/90 Levi v. The Prime Minister 44 (2) P.D. 213.

[3]        H.C. 1635/90 Jarjevsky v. The Prime Minister 45 (1) P.D. 749.

[4]        H.C. 142/70 Shapira v. The Israel Bar, Jerusalem 25 (1) P.D. 325.

[5]        H.C. 4566/90 Dekel v. The Minister of Finance 45 (1) P.D. 28.

[6]        F.H. 16/61 Register of Companies v. Kardosh 16 P.D. 1209.

[7]        H.C. 297/82 Berger v. Minister of the Interior 37 (3) P.D. 29.

[8]        H.C. 156/75 Daka v. Minister of Transport 30(2) P.D. 94.

[9]        H.C. 190/57 Asaig v. Minister of Defence 12 P.D. 52.

[10]      H.C. 2/80 Bat v. Minister of Religious Affairs 34(3) P.D. 144.

[11]      H.C. 596/75 Maccabi Tel-Aviv v. Broadcasting Authority 30 (1) P.D. 772.

 

[12] H.C. 542/76, 103/77 Int. Consortium v. Director General, Ministry of Communications 31 (3) P.D. 477.

[13]      H.C. 653/79 Azriel v. Director of Licensing Department 35 (2) P.D. 85

[14]      H.C. 376/81 Lugassi v. Minister of Communications 36 (2) P.D. 499.

[15]      H.C. 4267, 4287, 4634/93 "Amitay" v. The Prime Minister 47 (5) P.D. 441.

[16] H.C. 6177, 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing 47 (2) P.D. 229.

 

English Cases Cited:

[17]      Rex v. Robert. Ex parte Scurr [1924] 2 K.B. 695 (C.A.)

 

E. Shraga, E. Shapira - for the petitioners in H.C. 3094/93 and H.C. 4319/93;

The Petitoner in H.C. 4478/93 - appeared on his own behalf;

D. Beinish, N. Arad- For the First three respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93.

Z. Agmon, Y. Hirch - for the 4th, 5th respondents in H.C. 3094/93, H.C. 4319/93 and H.C. 4478/93;

The Applicant in A.H.C. 4409/93 - appeared on his own behalf.

 

JUDGMENT

The President:

 

The petitions

 

            1. These petitions are aimed against Rabbi Arye Deri's continuing to serve as a member of the Government in his capacity as the Minister of the Interior.

 

            The petition in H.C. 4319/93 evolves directly from the fact that an indictment was filed against Minister Arye Deri; that in H.C. 3094/ 93, which preceded the former petition, deals with the chain of events before the indictment. In the course of proceedings the petition in H.C. 3094/93 was waived, as the petition in H.C. 4319/93 took its place. The petition in H.C. 3094/93 is therefore cancelled.

           

            The petitions in A.H.C. 4409/93 and H.C. 4478/93 are applications to be joined as respondent and petitioner, respectively, in the main petition.

 

            2. (a) The indictment against Minister Arye Deri was submitted to the Knesset on August 2, 1993. It was accompanied by a request that the question of lifting Minister Deri's immunity in accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the Immunity, Rights and Duties of Knesset Members Law, 1951, be considered. The Knesset Committee discussed the said request already on 3.8.93 and decided to continue their deliberations on 26.9.93.

           

            (b) The Indictment

           

            The indictment contains the following offences against the law:

           

            (1) Accepting a bribe contrary to section 290 of the Penal Code, 1977 (hereinafter "the Code").

           

            (2) Breach of trust on the part of a public servant, contrary to section 284 of the Code.

           

            (3) Obtaining by deceit under aggravating circumstances, contrary to the last part of section 415 of the Code.

           

            (4) False entry in corporate documents, contrary to section 423 of the Code.

           

            (5) Stealing by a director, contrary to section 392 of the Code.

           

            Each of the above provisions of the Code embrace a substantial number of acts and not only an isolated one.

           

            (c) The facts, whose legal headlines appear above, and which reflect the prima facie evidence in the hands of the prosecution, are described in detail in an indictment which consists of 50 pages. The events dealt with in the indictment concern Minister Deri's exploitation of his office and standing, at first when he served as an assistant to the Minister of the Interior and in charge of his office, in his capacity as the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior, and afterwards as Minister of the Interior. He fraudulently caused money to flow from state funds to various societies in which he was either active himself or was otherwise involved; these societies transferred to him, either directly, or by making payments to others on his behalf, over a long period of time and on many occasions, bribe money, in exchange for his assistance in getting funds for them. The sum total of these bribes was NIS 135,000 (at the time of payment their value was about $ 71,000). In addition there were sums of money, whose value then was about $95,000, which were transferred in other ways, as well as other gratuities.

 

            Another section deals with the use of the respondent's position and connections, as an official of the Interior Ministry, in order to further the granting of a sum of NIS 500,000 to a society in which he was active, by moving the Ministry of Religious Affairs through false representations. This money was used in a deceitful manner and not for the declared purpose, with the aid of fraudulent records and various misrepresentations.

           

            A third section deals with conspiring to move government bodies to grant land to persons, who had bought plots in Nebi Samuel from one of the above societies, when it transpired that the society in question could not fulfil its obligations towards them. The respondent acted in a manner involving an absolute clash of interests, concealed facts and made false representations in order to receive privileges and money - for his societies - and through them for himself.

           

            Within the framework of his activities for the purpose of forwarding the affairs of the societies which paid him bribe money in exchange for his services, the respondent initiated a grant of NIS 200,000 from the Jerusalem Municipality to one of these societies. For this purpose an extraordinary sum was budgeted, contrary to Interior Ministry practices.

           

            An additional matter concerns the appointment of Moshe Weinberg, his accomplice in most of the above offences, to the post of chairman of the appointed Local Council of Lehavim, in order to enable him to draw a salary and have an official car. This Weinberg had previously been a real estate and haulage agent and for some time had been the respondent's driver. Weinberg was heavily debt-ridden and his appointment to public office was intended to rescue him from his troubles.

 

3. The Parties' Arguments

 

            From the parties 'written and oral arguments before us it would appear that the petitioners maintain that proper legal and public norms demand an immediate end to Minister Arye Deri's tenure of office. This approach is consistent with that of the Attorney General who told the Prime Minister, both in writing and verbally, that once the above indictment had been submitted to the Knesset, on August 2, 1993, it was only proper that Minister Deri's tenure of office be terminated. Mr. Harish, the Attorney General, said the following in a letter dated August 6, 1993:

           

"From now and until the end of his trial it would be contrary to the basic principles of law and government, and also unethical, for Mr. Deri to continue to serve as a Minister in the Government."

 

            In written arguments the Attorney General added further details and summed up his stand as follows:

           

            "(a) The letter containing the undertaking which Minister Deri deposited with the Prime Minister (a document to which we shall refer later - M.S.) made his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government and a member thereof basically conditional; and, therefore, nothing is being taken away from him today, only the question of granting a conditional right to his very tenure as Minister of the Interior in the Government, being at issue.

           

            (b) From the moment that Minister Deri signed his letter the circumstances changed, mainly because the suspicions and evidence that had not been thoroughly examined before then became embodied, in a clear and concrete indictment, into offences involving ignominy for the person accused of them.

           

            (c) As long as there is a weighty suspicion that Minister Deri committed these offences, his trustworthiness as a person in charge of public money on behalf of the government is questionable; and in this I find even the fear of a conflict of interests insofar as his function as Minister of the Interior is concerned, mainly with respect to the manner in which he exercises his discretion in matters connected to subjects bound up with the suspicions against him.

           

            (d) Insofar as the allegations in the indictment and the offences of which he is suspected are concerned, the indictment which is before the Knesset today must be seen as having progressed beyond the corridors of the court, and Minister Deri must therefore immediately honour his undertaking to suspend himself from the Government. In this matter the process of lifting his immunity will not serve as a stumbling-block in the way of the duty to terminate his tenure of office as a Minister in the Government."

           

            4. Minister Arye Deri informed the court , through the learned counsel for the International Organization of Torah Observant Sepharadic Jews (Shas) (the 5th respondent), that he saw no room for appearing and putting his case before us personally as expression would be given to his stand in the arguments brought on behalf of the 5th respondent, whom he represents in the Government. He added that he would of course honour any decision of the court.

           

            5. The stand of the Prime Minister, as conveyed to us by the Attorney General and which can also be gathered from the written material submitted by the Attorney General, is that he is not obliged by force of law to exercise the power vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to remove Minister Deri from office .

           

            In this context the Prime Minister referred, in his letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, to the course of events in the matter before us which accompanied the formation of the Government in July, 1992: about a year ago, in a letter dated July 2, 1992, the Attorney General brought the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that an investigation was being conducted by the police against Minister Deri. In his letter the Attorney General spoke of "heavy suspicion of criminal acts which have not yet been thoroughly examined and clarified" and mentioned the use to which Minister Deri had put his right to remain silent. On July 6, 1992, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Attorney General, and on the strength of what was agreed there, with the consensus of the Attorney General, Minister Deri deposited a letter with the Prime Minister in the following language:

 

"If Shas joins the Government which you will head, and if Shas decides that I should be a member of the Government, and in the light of the Attorney General's letter to me concerning my affairs, and on the strength of your request to me, I hereby inform you that if and when an indictment is brought against me in court I will suspend myself from the Government of my own accord."

 

            The Prime Minister saw, and sees, in the arrangement to which expression is given in the above letter, not only a unilateral undertaking by Minister Deri but a parallel undertaking on his part not to exercise his power under section 2IA of the Basic Law: The Government, unless the circumstantial conditions laid down in the above letter ("...when and if an indictment is brought...in court") are fulfilled.

           

            In July, 1992, a Government was formed which included Minister Deri. His letter was brought at the time to the notice of the Knesset, as required by section 13B of the Basic Law: The Government, and exposed openly to the public.

           

            In the Prime Minister's letter of August 22, 1993, to the Attorney General, which is in the nature of a reply to the detailed and reasoned opinion of the Attorney General, of August 6, 1993, a substantive part of which was quoted above, he notes that he does not accept the Attorney General's approach, in accordance with which, since July, 1992, there had occurred a change of circumstances expressed centrally in the submission of the indictment to the Knesset, for the following reasons: in the meantime Minister Deri had abandoned his right of silence and answered his interrogators' questions; the suspicions of July, 1992, were no less serious than those embodied now in the indictment, and perhaps even the opposite was the case; the fear of a conflict of interests raised by the Attorney General in his above letter was exposed and known at the time the Government was formed.

           

            It was argued further that cognisance should be taken of the fact that in the matter of removal from office the legislature had laid down express provisions for electees and for functionaries other than ministers or deputy ministers, as can be seen in the State Service (Discipline) Law, 1963, in section 42B of the Basic Law: the Knesset, in section 20 of the Local Authorities (Election and Tenure of Head and Deputy Heads) Law, 1975, etc. On the other hand, the Basic Law: The Government makes no provision for the suspension of ministers and deputy ministers or their removal from office because of suspicions, investigations or criminal charges. Which means that when the legislature saw fit to enact obligatory provisions for the removal from office on account of criminal acts, it did so by law. The arrangement in the Basic Law: The Government, in respect of ministers and deputy ministers, is a negative one, which means that there is no similar obligatory provision of law there.

           

            As stated in the Prime Minister's letter of 22.8.93:

           

"In this serious matter there exists, according to the law, a fundamental and substantive difference between electees and functionaries. And it was not only incidentally that the legislature enacted different provisions for these two categories. The electee serves by virtue of the confidence of the public which elected him in a democratic process, and which has the power to remove him from office in the same manner if he is found to be tainted. There must, therefore, be very serious reasons for removing an electee from office or suspending him, such as a criminal conviction of an ignominious nature, a prison sentence, etc. - which does not apply to ordinary functionaries."

 

            The Prime Minister also referred to the precedent which was created, in his opinion, in the case of Aharon Abuhazeira, who continued to serve in the Government while two criminal actions were being conducted against him, and the then Attorney General, Professor I. Zamir, took no action whatsoever.

 

            As noted, it is argued that there is no legal norm for the matter before us, and that the opinion of the Attorney General is based on public norms pertaining to the confidence of the public in the system of government. But according to the Prime Minister this should be countered by a norm of no less public importance - that is, confidence in the Prime Minister, who formed a Government on the strength of an undertaking which received the approval of the Attorney General, and who is now asked to breach his undertaking on a public and personal plane without any real change in the circumstances. The Prime Minister sums this up in the following manner:

 

"The matter before us is unique and special, as it has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of interpreting a law but concerns a confrontation between two public norms. And this is particularly so after I made an undertaking in this matter, and even acted upon it, on the strength of your opinion given me only about a year ago, and for dishonouring which undertaking I can find no possibility, reason or justification."

 

            6. The 5th respondent, in a written declaration and in the arguments before us by its learned counsel, Advocate Zvi Agmon, also supported the idea that there is no binding law concerning the removal of a minister from office because he has been indicted. Insofar as a member of the Knesset who is also a member of the Government is concerned, he was of the opinion that what was operative here was the Knesset's confidence in the Government. Section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government was enacted only in 1991 and until then the Prime Minister had no power to dismiss a minister, the termination of whose tenure of office could be effected only by his resignation or by the resignation of the whole Government. This section, he argued further, was intended mainly for the purpose of preventing "irregularities" in the Government's actions. At any rate its application in any particular instance came entirely within the discretion of the Prime Minister.

           

            Advocate Agmon, whose arguments paralleled to a great extent the stand of the Prime Minister, as apparent from his letters and from the speeches of the State Attorney who appeared on his behalf before us, referred also, for the purpose of comparison, to express laws concerning removal from office of other functionaries and sought thereby to bolster his conclusion that the absence of legislation concerning ministers is not coincidental. He found this interpretational conclusion to be logical for the following reason: according to the constitutional construction of the regime in Israel, the Government rules by virtue of the confidence of the Knesset, and is collectively responsible to the Knesset. The Knesset is the elected representative of the people as a whole and it can decide when a minister's tenure of office should be terminated, and when not, by using its sovereign power to express a lack of confidence in the Government and, indirectly, in a minister serving in the Government.

 

            In the course of proceedings before us the learned counsel for the 5th respondent agreed that the above section 21A could possibly be applied in the case before us, but added that just as its application should be reasonable so could a decision concerning its non-application be reasonable.

           

            7. Advocate Zeev Trainin, the petitioner in A.H.C. 4409/93, argued before us that the court should take into account the party-political repercussions of any decision concerning Minister Deri's removal from office. Mr. Moshe Kirstein, the petitioner in H.C. 4478/93, who asked to be joined as an additional petitioner, and in whose case no order nisi was given, argued that this court must not intervene in the dismissal of a minister as long as there is no express provision of law on the subject.

           

            8. The Legal Subjects On Which The Proceedings Were Based

           

            We shall now proceed to analyse the arguments before us. Two central legal problems were raised before us. The first is the legal validity of the undertaking which the Prime Minister claimed he had imposed upon himself when Minister Arye Deri signed the letter of July 6, 1992, (the contents of which were given in full above) before him.

 

            The second question bears on the nature of the Prime Minister's powers under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government, which deals with removal of a minister from office.

           

            We shall commence with the question of the undertaking of July 6, 1992.

           

            9. Undertaking not to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            According to the simple wording of the letter of July 6, 1992, it contains a declaration by Minister Arye Deri, dressed as an undertaking on his part, that in the given circumstances, as set out there, he would suspend himself of his own accord from the Government. This declaration was bound up with negotiations for forming a Government , and came following upon a letter from the Attorney General in which he sought to inform the Prime Minister of the existence of an investigation against Minister Deri and of the general substance of the investigation. The Attorney General's letter did not only convey information, but it also contained expressions of doubt concerning the advisability of including in the Government someone concerning whom, at the time, investigations, as described in the said letter, were being conducted. In this context the letter said that it was advisable that the Prime Minister take account of the facts described when weighing up - if at all - the question of the candidacy of Minister Deri for office in the Government which he (the first respondent) was about to form.

           

            After the first respondent had given due consideration to the contents of the Attorney General's letter and had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, on the basis of the written undertaking of July 6, 1992, and following upon it, it is reasonable to conclude that what was contained in the above undertaking was acceptable to both parties: that is, that the yardstick provided for in the undertaking would guide both Minister Deri and the Prime Minister. In other words, just as the one undertook to leave the Government in given circumstances, as described in the under­taking, so did the other, who had decided to include Minister Deri in the Government, take it upon himself to honour the condition concerning the timing of the resignation from office contained in the undertaking. From a legal point of view the conclusion is, therefore, that the Prime Minister agreed not to remove Minister Deri from office as long as the conditions laid down in the above undertaking of Minister Deri had not been met.

           

            10. An undertaking to restrict in advance the power to remove a person from office in the Knesset, the Government, state service, an association established by law, a government company or any other public body, would be incompatible with the express and clear provisions of the Basic Law: The Government, and would also not be consistent with the general principles of administrative law. Fettering the power clashes with the legislative purpose of vesting the power, in accordance with which the Prime Minister may remove (a person) from office when the circumstances brought to his attention justify or demand this, and there is no reservation or condition attached to this save for the substantive necessity to exercise this power for its legislative purpose.

           

            11. (a) The relevant provision of enacted law is contained in section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, which states that:

           

            "Where, by law, power is given to remove a person from office in the Knesset, in the Government, in state service, in an association established by law, in a government company or in any other public body - no agreement and no undertaking concerning the non-removal of that person from office may be made."

           

            The "power to remove a person from office" is, in the case under consideration, the power of the Prime Minister by virtue of section 21A of the Basic Law. The prohibition against giving an undertaking in connection therewith, as contained in section 13A, is unequivocal.

           

            In other words, while section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government vests the Prime Minister with the power to remove a minister from office, without being tied to any extraneous undertaking and while exercising his power within the confines of the aim of the law (see E.A. 2,3/84 [1], at p. 252, opposite A) an undertaking not to exercise this power to remove from office, unless the conditions contained in the above letter have been met, is equivalent to an undertaking on the part of the Prime Minister to limit in advance his statutory power, whatever the factual circumstances which might occur.

           

            The said section 13A was added to the Basic Law: The Government on the strength of the Basic Law: The Knesset (12th amendment) which came into force on 22.2.91; that is, only one-and-a-half years before the above undertaking, signed by Minister Deri, was given. The amendment to the law came at the initiative of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset and it is patently clear from its content, including what is contained in sections 13A (a) and (c), that this addendum to the law is a sequel to what was held by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90 [2], and an echo of the problems raised in the proceedings in H.C. 1635/90 [3].

           

            (b) From the point of view of legislative purpose, section 13A , with all three of its sub-sections, is intended to prevent agreements and undertakings expressive of faulty and invalid processes in political life in general and in parliamentary life in particular.

           

            (c) Subsection 13A(a) deals with an agreement containing an undertaking concerning the office of a minister or deputy minister, and is intended to prevent the acquisition of support from a member of the Knesset who belongs to another party, in exchange for a promise to appoint a minister or deputy minister.

           

            (d) Subsection 13A(b), with which we are concerned here, is intended to preserve and ensure the freedom of discretion of the holder of a statutory power, in order to enable him to exercise his power to remove a person from office - when this is called for on the grounds of substantive considerations, and all the more so when the law requires it. It is intended to prevent negation and cancellation in advance, in the framework of a political deal, of the power of the authority.

           

            The legal power to appoint and the legal power to remove from office were granted by law to any particular functionary in order to enable him to carry out the administrative duties within his charge, in accordance with the law which granted him the power and subject to the conditions, if any, attached to it by the legislature. Exercise of the power must be reviewed against existing conditions or conditions created at the time when the exercise of the power is weighed up. A promise in advance not to exercise a power means that the holder of the power cannot use it even when the circumstances make it necessary to do so, as he fettered himself in advance. In this manner the power would be deprived of content and purpose.

 

            What is said above flows from the standing and duties of a public functionary, either elected or appointed, and is encompassed in them. The powers of a functionary in public service are intended to be used for the general good. Every electee and every holder of office is a servant of the general public (H.C. 4566/ 90,[5]). As we have explained on more than one occasion , this means that the power to appoint or to remove from office should be exercised fairly, without extraneous considerations and for the good of the public.

           

            In every instance when the exercise of such power is required it is only right that the said exercise be reviewed in the light of the circumstances and of all the factors, and while striking a proper and reasonable balance between the various considerations. But, according to the provisions of section 13A(b), the holder of the power is forbidden, inter alia, to fetter his considerations in advance in order to give preference thereby to the political-party consideration whatever the weight of the other factors may be. That is to say, where considerations arise which, in the light of all the data, require the exercise of the power to remove (a person) from office (a subject to which we will return and discuss later) it is unlawful for the holder of the power to refrain from exercising it because he has promised in advance that he would not do so even if the circumstances should demand it.

           

            (e) The last subsection of section 13A - subsection(c) - deals directly with the circumstances which were examined and disqualified by this court in H.C. 1523, 1540/90, [2], above, (financial guarantees) and there is no need to discuss it in detail here.

           

            (f) To sum up, section 13A as a whole comes to prohibit limitation of freedom of action on the part of an authority. It demarcates the boundaries of what is permissible and what is forbidden in the matters described here, in order to cultivate public integrity and to limit the things which can be used, lawfully, as rewards in political deals. Section I3A seeks to ensure that a statutory power conferred on a functionary for the purpose of carrying out his duties will be used by him for the general good. Furthermore, section 13A clothes in legal-statutory dress desirable and obligatory public norms and the prohibitions laid down by law which complement them.

 

            As mentioned above, it was already held by this court, before the enactment of section 13A, that the acts described in it are contrary to the general principles of law.

           

            12. In the light of the thesis propounded by the first and fifth respondents, in accordance with which it is not a unilateral obligation on the part of Minister Deri which we are dealing with, but a bilateral agreement - which is a reasonable conclusion, per se, in the light of all the circumstances - the bilateral obligation which emerges from Minister Deri's letter of July 6, 1992, quoted above, should be seen as an obligation which drastically defies the prohibition in the above section 13A(b). It must, therefore, be deemed to be absolutely invalid: it does not contain any valid limitation of the Prime Minister's power to exercise the right vested in him by section 21A of the Basic Law.

           

            13. It must be understood that the question of whether the parties to the agreement had been aware of the existence of section 13A(b), or not, is irrelevant insofar as the validity of the obligation is concerned. The question of this validity depends entirely on the clear wording of section 13A(b) and nothing further need be added.

           

            In the course of proceedings we were asked to draw the Prime Minister's attention to the provisions of the above section 13A(b), and following upon this the State Attorney informed us that the Prime Minister had in fact not been aware at the time of the existence of the above provision in the Basic Law: The Government, but that this did not affect his stand on the substance of the matter. In his opinion he was not in duty bound to exercise the power vested in him by sections 20 and 21A(a) of the Basic Law, for the reasons already quoted above , without there being any connection with the legality of the above undertaking.

           

            We must, therefore, proceed to examine the second question, which is that of a Prime Minister's exercise of his power to remove a Minister from office, within the meaning of section 21A(a) of the Basic Law.

           

            14. The Power to Remove a Minister from Office

           

            (a) Section 21A(a) provides that:

           

            "The Prime Minister may, after informing the Government of his intention to do so, remove a Minister from office; the Minister's tenure of office is terminated 48 hours after the notice of removal from office has been handed to him , save if the Prime Minister changes his mind before then."

           

            The power conferred by section 21A(a) is a discretionary one. Discretion is generally granted to any statutory authority in order that it may have freedom of action in fulfilling its variegated functions in circumstances which vary and change from time to time. In that way the authority is enabled to weigh up the circumstances in every problem brought before it and find an appropriate solution. (F.H. 16/61 [6], at p. 1215).

           

            But, even when the power is a discretionary one it still has a normative framework. The usual rules regarding reasonability, fairness, good faith, integrity, absence of arbitrariness and discrimination, etc., apply to every exercise of administrative discretion (see my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in H.C. 297/82 [7], at p. 34).

           

            (b) Furthermore, as already noted in the past, there is no difference for purposes of the matter before us - that is for purposes of the exercise of discretion - between exercising a power and refraining from exercising that power: where the preliminary conditions required for exercising the power exist it is incumbent upon the statutory authority to act. It follows that even when the authority refrains from exercising its discretionary power its decision to do so is subject to the usual criteria applicable to statutory powers, that is, it can be reviewed to discover whether it was based on reasonable considerations or whether the combination of circumstances did not in fact demand the exercise of the power.

The decision can also be reviewed to see whether it was not unreasonable or was not based on arbitrariness or discrimination, which could disqualify the acts or omissions of the authority. That is to say, not only the unreasonable exercise of a power can be invalidated, but also refraining to exercise a discretionary power for unreasonable reasons can lead to the conclusion that it was invalid.

 

            (c) In this context I said, in the above H.C. 297/82 [7], that laying down initial arrangements in a law which vest a particular functionary with the ability to exercise a power in certain defined circumstances, does not only mean giving power and authority, but also means ascribing fundamental meanings to the power which include a duty with respect to the manner in which it is used.

           

            So that attached to the grant of power there is, inter alia, the duty to weigh up whether it is necessary to exercise it and the proper measures to be taken in this context. Secondly, it is understandable and well-known that from the grant of power to a particular functionary there evolves the duty to deal with petitions and requests aimed at moving the holder of the power to exercise it in one way or another. Finally, insofar as examining and dealing with requests in the context of exercising a power is concerned, the nature and content of the manner in which this is done must be consistent with the basic standards laid down in judgments of this court, and any departure therefrom could have repercussions on the validity of any decision. In other words, even when the "may" is not necessarily "must", that is, even when the legislator did not impose a duty to exercise a power in a defined manner, or when the duty to exercise a power does not follow from the substance of a matter, there is born and arises, together with the grant of a power, the duty to weigh up also the very need and justification for exercising it.

           

            (d) I will add that the holder of a power has the discretion to decide on a matter despite the existence of a decision in principle on the subject-matter of the power. For this latter decision may require re-evaluation in general or with respect to the concrete case. H.W.R. Wade, in discussing this subject, had the following to say, under the heading "Over Rigid Policies" (Administrative Law, p. 330):

 

"An authority can fail to give its mind to a case, and thus fail to exercise its discretion lawfully, by blindly following a policy laid down in advance".

           

            That does not mean that a fundamental decision, which provides for a desirable policy or method of operation, should not be adopted, but that decision must also be the fruit of an orderly process, and even then every concrete case deserves substantive consideration in order to examine whether to apply to it, either positively or negatively, the guiding rule according to which the authority acts.

           

            Till now we have discussed what was said in H.C. 297/82 [7] in connection with the duty to weigh up , in every ordinary case, all the data and circumstances, before deciding whether to exercise a power or refrain from doing so.

           

            15. When there is a possibility of exercising a power, the statutory authority must give its mind to all the relevant elements, that is to all the subjects which create a mosaic of the data before it. But it is obvious that it cannot take account of extraneous circumstances. However, in order to remove all doubt I will add that where parliamentary-political life is concerned one cannot deny taking account considerations which arise due to political considerations. But, as my esteemed colleague, Justice Goldberg, pointed out in H.C. 1635/90 [3], quoted above, (at p. 866) it should be remembered that we are not dealing, in the context of the case before us, with the binding validity of a political agreement, but with the question of whether an act carried out, or due to be carried out, following upon an agreement, is unlawful or invalid according to the norms of administrative law recognised by us: that is, whether the content of the act is consistent with the basic principles of an enlightened State.

           

            Therefore, the question of whether the result was reasonable or not would depend, amongst other things, on whether proper weight was given to all the various considerations. When certain considerations are given preference over others to an unreasonable extent, a decision would be invalid. In other words, as long as every element is given due and reasonable weight, in the circumstances of the case, there can be no complaints. But, when one consideration is preferred over another, despite the fact that the weight, substance or content of the rejected consideration clearly and obviously indicated that it should have been the preferred one, or that the scales were weighted in its favour, then the decision would be stamped with unreasonableness.

 

            I said, in H.C. 156/75 [8], at p. 105, that there could be circumstances in which the statutory authority did not give weight to any extraneous consideration and only took relevant considera­tions into account, but nevertheless gave the latter so little weight as to make the final conclusion invalid.

           

            That is the rule with respect to "good faith" on the part of a statutory authority. Unreasonableness can be discovered even when there was good faith at the basis of a decision. As Judge Scrutton remarked: "Some of the most honest people are the most unreasonable" (R. v. Roberts, Ex Parte Scurr (l924) [17], at p. 719).

           

            16. In the framework of the arguments before us some of the respondents referred repeatedly to other laws dealing with functionaries other than ministers and deputy ministers, containing detailed provisions concerning their removal from office. They sought to learn from the positive arrangements in other laws that there is a negative arrangement in the case of ministers and deputy ministers: that is, that for them there is no provision of law laying down in advance the circumstances in which the power to remove them must be exercised. There is no legal basis for this argument. There are laws which detail the circumstances in which removal from office is allowed or required. But there is nothing in that to indicate a negative arrangement for removal from office of a minister or deputy minister. The matter of removal from office of a minister is anchored today in the above section 21A of the Basic Law and the absence of any detailed circumstances in which this is permitted or required only goes to show that the law, for this purpose, is the general law concerning statutory powers. The main rules for exercising such powers have already been explained above, and will still be enlarged upon. Furthermore, the absence of detailed provisions permits of the removal from office in a wider diversity of cases than those detailed in the laws dealing with other electees or appointed functionaries. At a later stage we shall deal with those circumstances in which there is a legal duty to exercise the power of removal.

 

            17. Against the background of a general description of the relevant provisions of the law we shall now deal directly with the case before us. There are occasions when discretionary power becomes a power which it is a duty to exercise. (H.C. 190/57 [9]; H.C. 2/80 [10], at p. 146, and see also Professor B. Bracha, "Administrative Law" (Schocken Publications, 1986), 149). That is, there are circumstances in which the conclusion may be drawn - with respect also to a discretionary power - that refraining from exercising a power is so unreasonable as to descend to the roots of the matter (H.C.596/75 [11]; H.C. 542/76, 103/77 [12], at p. 483). In order to adapt this to the case before us: an authority is in duty bound to exercise a power when the factual circumstances are such that the basic values of our constitutional and legal system make the failure to exercise it so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            Unreasonableness which goes to the root of the matter invalidates a decision of an administrative authority (see H.C. 297/82 [7] above; H.C. 653/79 [13]; H.C. 376/81, [14]).

           

            It is true that the power under section 21A above can be exercised in order to enable the government to function properly and to lead to the removal of a minister who does not fit in with the web of government policy or who defies the principle of collective responsibility. Those are, of course, only examples of what is commonly known as "irregularities". But this does not amount to a comprehensive description of the borderlines of the power under section 21A, the general nature of which points to its breadth and depth. This also does not constitute a description of the complete legislative purpose of the provision in this section of the law. The said provision of law is intended also to enable a reaction, in the form of removal from office, to a serious event in which a member of the government is involved, when that event, be it either an act or an omission, reflects on the status of the government, on its public image, on its ability to provide and serve as an example, on its capacity to ingrain proper standards of conduct and, mainly, when it has repercussions on the public's confidence in our system of government, on the values upon which our system of government and law is built and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

            In order to remove all doubt I will add that what is said here has no reference to moral norms which have no basis in law. We are talking here about the law which exists here and according to which failure to exercise a power vested in a functionary converts the omission, in certain given circumstances, to something extremely unreasonable. This is a conclusion based on law and not one which is anchored only on abstract values without any legal basis, as could have been imagined from some of the arguments propounded before us.

           

            It was argued at length before us that the Government depends on the confidence of the Knesset and that this gives transcendental expression to the broad public's confidence in the Government. I am prepared to accept this. I am also prepared to accept the distinction between a public servant and a public electee (see H.C. 4287/93 [15], in the case of Deputy Minister Pinchasi). But the confidence of the Knesset does not make the exercise of the power under section 21A, when the circumstances demand it, redundant. Furthermore, the constitutional reciprocal bond between the Government and the Knesset, and from there to the public, is a two-way one. The Government must also serve as a drafter of norms of governmental behaviour and must act in a manner which creates confidence. Suspending a decision following upon the revelation of serious offences on the part of a minister, because of the contention that there is no room for action on the part of the Prime Minister until the Knesset - if in fact it does - brings a vote of no-confidence in the government in order to effect, indirectly, the dismissal of the minister, would amount to interpreting the very meaningful legal provision in section 21A as a minor key provision intended to promote internal disciplinary measures only. This is a mistaken estimate of the scope of the power given to the Prime Minister under section 21A and constitutes unreasonable refrainment from exercising a power granted by the legislator.

 

            18. At this stage a short pause in the presentation of the legal background is called for, in order to return to the facts of the case. We described above the main points of the indictment presented to the Knesset. The indictment includes extremely serious allegations concerning corruption. The indictment is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution. But, insofar as continued office in the Government is concerned, even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, and which has now become public knowledge, is of significance. There are circumstances which are significant from the point of view of reasonability, not only for purposes of judicial determination but also for judging the acts attributed to an individual, as clothed in the official dress of an accusation ready for presentation to the judicial instances.

           

            In the case under consideration the lifting of immunity is also required as it affects a member of the Knesset. But the proceedings for lifting immunity do not change the content and significance of the indictment and what is alleged in it. If a minister who is charged with receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels in bribes and of abuse, in other ways, of government office, continues to serve in the Government this would reflect in a far-reaching manner on the image of government in Israel, and on its good faith and integrity. This has a direct effect on the question of reasonability according to the provisions of law (for changes flowing from the differentiation between a public servant and a minister - see also H.C. 6177, 6163/92 [6]).

           

            19. It was pointed out in the arguments before us that there is a precedent for the continued service of a minister in the Government despite the fact that indictments containing serious charges against him were brought.

           

            In my opinion no precedent was established. There was in the past an invalid omission which does not consecrate the system. A past invalid act or omission only demonstrates to what extent each individual act of political convenience becomes harmful, from the aspect of obligatory standards of conduct, as people will seek to learn from it, to imitate it and to regard it, for some reason or other, as a precedent.

           

            In our constitutional history there are more esteemable instances of reactions following upon criminal allegations which it would be preferable to copy.

           

            20. I can now sum up my opinion in the case before us:

            (a) The power under section 21A is a discretionary power.

           

            (b) A government promise not to remove a functionary from office has no validity.

           

            (c) The authority must weigh up whether to exercise its power, when this is demanded or is obligatory, in an orderly and systematic manner, and must use it for the purpose for which it is granted while refraining from applying extraneous considerations.

           

            (d) Parliamentary-political considerations can be legitimate in certain circumstances, but they must be examined with an eye to finding a fine balance with other considerations. When the fact that there is prima facie evidence that a criminal offence has been committed by a member of the Government is one of the other considerations, then the seriousness of the (alleged) offence is a relevant factor. The more serious the offence the less weighty would the other considerations be. I will add that in the context of the matter before us I saw no cause for dealing with the more general subjects discussed in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice D. Levin.

           

            (e) Whoever exercises discretion must keep in mind all the relevant and influential components and factors and must find a reasonable balance amongst them. Giving undue weight to one component or another, can invalidate a decision.

           

            (f) There are circumstances which make the exercise of a discretionary power obligatory. Failure to exercise the power in such circumstances can be found to be so unreasonable as to go to the root of the matter.

           

            (g) An invalid act in the past demands prevention of perpetuation, and not imitation. A blunder in the past does not give a license for the future.

           

            (h) The offences attributed to Minister Deri are outstandingly serious and failure to exercise the power to remove him from office is unreasonable to an extreme extent. Reliance in this case on an undertaking which is inconsistent with the provisions of section 13 A of the Basic Law, has no place.

           

            The damage to confidence in the government as a result of the failure to remove from office a person accused of the crime of corruption is far more serious than the damage to confidence as a result of failure to honour an undertaking which is prohibited by law. As already explained, we are not dealing here with the question of confidence as a moral norm, but with the provisions of law which deal with the reasonableness of failure to exercise a power.

           

            21. I am of the opinion, therefore, that we should declare that the Prime Minister is required by law to exercise his power under section 21A of the Basic Law: The Government to terminate the tenure of office of Minister Deri. In this sense the order nisi should be made absolute.

           

Justice A. Barak: I concur.

Justice A. Mazza:

 

            I concur with the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President.

           

            The stand adopted by the Prime Minister in the matter before us was based, for the main part, on the existence of a political agreement with Minister Deri, made at the advice of the Attorney General, on the eve of the formation of the Government. And having failed to be convinced of the justice of the Attorney General's argument that there had been a substantive change in the circumstances since the agreement was reached, the Prime Minister decided that he had to choose between two norms of at least equal weight: one, on the basis of which the Attorney General had argued that as long as Minister Deri was not cleared of the suspicions levelled against him with the tabling of the indictment against him in the Knesset he could not continue in office in the Government; and the other, which is connected with the fear of a blow to his trustworthiness, as Prime Minister, in the eyes of the public, of he did not honour his part of the agreement with the Minister. There was, therefore, a basis for assuming that unless the Prime Minister was mistaken in thinking that his obligation to Minister Deri was a valid one and that his credibility in the eyes of the public depended upon his honouring it, he would have refrained from taking the stand which led to the petititoners' application to this court for a remedy on behalf of the public. But this was not the case.

 

 

            From the Prime Minister's letter of 22. 8. 93 to the Attorney General, a copy of which was submitted to us during the course of proceedings, it appears that even after his attention was called to the provisions of section 13A(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, his stand remained substantively the same, on the basis of other reasons enumerated in the letter, in which he takes issue with the Attorney General's approach (as detailed in the letter of 6.8.93 to the Prime Minister). In his letter the Prime Minister indicated that there was, in his opinion, a difference between elected functionaries and appointed public servants and he referred also to the case of Minister Abu-Hazeira, as though this were a precedent. But the main reason given by the Prime Minister for not acting on the opinion of the Attorney General was his reliance on his obligation towards Minister Deri, upon the honouring of which his credibility in the eyes of the public ostensibly depended.

           

            The distinction between the principal and the secondary in the Prime Minister's reasons can be seen from a reading of his letter. But there is also a fundamental difference in the content of the reasons: a fear of harm to his credibility in the eyes of the public is a reason with public significance. In presenting this reason the Prime Minister relied on the assumption (albeit a mistaken one) that there existed a political agreement by which he was bound. This reason, even though not legally admissible, is at least understandable. This is not the case insofar as the Prime Minister's other reasons are concerned. The Prime Minister did not give expression to an independent public stand with the aid of these reasons, but sought to take issue with the opinion of the Attorney General concerning the very substance of the legal norm applicable to the subject of removing a minister from office.

 

            This approach is contrary to the constitutional principle, long since accepted in our system of law, according to which the Attorney General is the person qualified to interpret the law vis-a-vis the executive (see paragraph 42 of the judgment of my esteemed colleague, Justice Barak, in the Pinhasi case, H.C. 4287/93 [15]). And the Prime Minister, with all due respect, could not be heard at all on the grounds of these reasons. I was, therefore, sorry to learn that even after it had been explained to the Prime Minister that the agreement which he had made with Minister Deri had been invalid ab initio, he had stuck to his original stand while seeking to justify it with the aid of legal reasons which contradicted the binding legal opinion of the Attorney General.

 

            As to the question of what is the legal norm applicable to the case before us, the decision lies clearly with the Attorney General. There is, therefore, no cause for enlarging on it. Only recently did Justice Barak explain what the proper legal norm is, in H.C. 6163/92 [16] and again in the Pinhasi case [15]. And also from the reasons contained in the judgment of my esteemed colleague, the President, the conclusion must be drawn that the law applicable to the continued tenure in office of Minister Deri is no different, if not even more apt.

 

Justice D. Levin:

 

            I agree with the conclusions of the President and I am party to the main points in his legal analysis and to the approach taken towards the central matters at the focus of the proceedings before us, on the basis of which the required result is obvious and obligatory in the circumstances of the case.

           

            However, I would like to add some comments on the subjects which were under discussion and which, in my opinion, call for further enlargement and emphasis.

           

            (a) I agree that a member of the Knesset earns his status by virtue of the confidence placed in him by the voting public, which saw in him someone who faithfully represents its sentiments and viewpoints - either politically or because of his attitude to social and economic matters and his approach to matters of faith and culture. Once he has been elected by this particular public, then it is only natural that he should regard himself as being in duty bound to remain faithful to his electors. If, heaven forbid, he should disappoint them, if the confidence which they placed in him should be shattered, for any reason, then when the time comes he would have to face, politically, the judgment of the electors.

 

            (b) The situation is different when an elected member of the Knesset takes upon himself, on behalf of the faction to which he belongs and which he represents, an official duty within the framework of the executive, as a member of the Government and a minister in charge of a government office, or as a deputy minister.

           

            He then owes a duty of loyalty and a greater degree of responsibility to his electors, to the Knesset which gave him its confidence and to an even greater extent to the general public which he is called upon to serve faithfully.

           

            For, whoever is given executive power by force of law will be found to influence by his acts, or, heaven forbid, by his omissions, for good or for bad, the rights of the general body of citizens and residents of the country. He is their trustee and he must behave towards all of them with fidelity, honesty and fairness and without discrimination. That is the challenge and he will be judged in accordance with how he meets it.

           

            (c) A minister who sits at the government table as a representative of a party or movement undoubtedly fulfills a political function. He gives expression thereby to opinions and points of view, and to the political and social paths of the public which elected him and of the movement which regards him as its representative in the governmental set-up. But, in my opinion, when fulfilling his administrative function, as a minister or even as a deputy minister, as one in charge of a government office and directing its operation, then his political function must give precedence to his administrative function, which has its own rules of conduct.

           

            When fulfilling this function he is subject to review by the High Court of Justice, when moved to do so. Within tile framework of this review the court will examine whether the minister was punctilious about applying proper administrative procedures, whether he exercised his authority in accordance with the general principles laid down by law and judicial precedents, and whether, when providing a service to the citizen as a public trustee, he behaved fairly, reasonably, equitably and without prejudice.

 

            If he sins against any of these principles then his political function should, generally, not serve as a defence. He would have to face the said review and, if the circumstances warrant it, be indicted and stand trial.

           

            If that is the position in general, how much more so is it the case when, heaven forbid, a minister errs and becomes tainted with the stain of an offence against the law. The nature of the offence and of the circumstances in which it was committed could make the possibility of his continuing in office questionable.

           

            I do not suggest that we lay down any hard and fast rules on this subject and decide in a sweeping manner when and how conclusions should be drawn. For, first and foremost, it is the political system which must react, within the framework of the proper political-democratic process. But there may be exceptional situations, such as the one before us, when our intervention is required in order to lay down specific, obligatory norms of behaviour.

           

            (d) It seems to me, for example, that if, heaven forbid, an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offences which by their circumstantial nature and content involve ignominy - such as, for example, if a minister is charged with accepting bribes, with fraud, with cheating state authorities, with lying or making false entries in documents - then it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office.

           

            I would think, if this should unfortunately occur, that it would be proper for the minister to reach this conclusion of his own accord for the sake of public hygiene and as a mark of respect for the principles of the rule of law, even if he is convinced of his own innocence and clean hands. He should allow the process of establishing the truth to be exhausted and await comprehensive clarification of the matter.

 

            (e) If he does not do this then the Prime Minister must weigh up whether circumstances have not arisen which would demand the exercise of his power, under section 21A(a) of the Basic Law: The Government, to remove a minister from office. As this power is a discretionary one, the Prime Minister may exercise it but is not, on the face of it, in duty bound to do so.

           

            When a demand that he exercise his discretion be brought, he can take into consideration parliamentary-political aspects, since, as already noted, a minister has a twofold function, both political and administrative. It is only natural and understandable, in my opinion, that the Prime Minister will seek to preserve his government and save it from collapsing. For the sake of ensuring so important and vital a need he can, on an appropriate occasion, forgive "irregularities" in the conduct or pronouncements of a minister, and even opposition to binding decisions of the Government, as all this would come within the confines of the minister's political function, which would be examined and criticised on the credibility plane before the Knesset and the voters.

           

            This is not the case, in my opinion, when the question is one of a minister who sinned against integrity, and who committed offences involving ignominy, such as the examples given above, especially when the offences attributed to him were allegedly committed in the process of fulfilling his office. In such cases the credibility of the Government and its ministers in the eyes of the public must take precedence over any other consideration.

           

            I dismiss out of hand the argument that for the sake of the survival of the Government and the coalition at its base, and because of the desire to further government policy, however important it may be, the implications of the presentation of the above indictment can be ignored, everyday proceedings can be continued, and the minister can be left in office as though nothing occurred.

           

            (f) I think that in our case, too, the Prime Minister actually realised that if Minister Deri should be indicted on the charges being investigated when he was appointed, he would have to suspend himself, and that if he did not do so, he, the Prime Minister, would have to exercise his authority to suspend him.

 

            I would like to assume that the Prime Minister saw this as an inevitable consequence, not only because he faced coalition pressure, but also because, as someone responsible for the existence of an enlightened regime, he thought, to the best of his conscience, that that was what he had to do.

           

            I do not think that there is any difference, or that there should be any difference, from the normative aspect, between an indictment which has already been brought before a court and one which, at some stage, has only been presented to the Knesset Committee for purposes of lifting immunity.

           

            (g) In the course of proceedings before us we heard from counsel for the fifth respondent (Shas), albeit in muted terms, that Minister Arye Deri had earned the confidence of his electors despite the lengthy police investigation conducted against him, and despite the suspicions which hovered above him. It can be assumed that this occurred because they honestly believed that the candidate whom they favoured was innocent, clean and pure of the suspicions against him.

           

            One cannot know if they would have behaved similarly if, heaven forbid, the charge against him had been proved in a court of law or even if the indictment against him, containing allegations of serious offences, was pending in court.

           

            But I do not see any importance in this and there is nothing in it to indicate anything, as this is not the main issue, the main issue being the need for our democratic and enlightened "camp" to remain pure and that persons tainted with corruption and crimes of the nature indicated above do not harm government morality.

           

            It should be emphasised, in order to avoid any mis­understanding, that what I have said on this last subject is purely theoretical. There is nothing in what I have said which can, heaven forbid, establish facts and hand down judgment in the case of Minister Arye Deri, which must still be decided within the framework authorised to do so and be thoroughly cleared up, so that the factual truth may come to light.

 

            As already stated, I concur with the conclusion suggested by the President in his judgment.

           

Justice E. Goldberg:

 

            In contradistinction to public servants, to whom the State Service (Appointments) Law, 1959, applies, a minister and a deputy minister are not appointed to office only because of their skills, qualities and personal standards. Party and coalition interests are at the centre of their appointments, and the texture of public life is not affected by the appointment of a minister or deputy minister who is not exactly blessed with characteristics of the highest quality. The question is whether the confidence of the public in the government is harmed when a minister or deputy minister, against whom an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy has been framed, remains in office.

           

            The answer to this question is not simple or unambiguous. For if we should say that in every such case the confidence of the public in government institutions would inevitably be harmed, we should also have to say that such harm would be caused when a member of the Knesset is found guilty of an offence involving ignominy and is sentenced to imprisonment. For such member of the Knesset would not only participate in legislation, and serve in a quasi-judicial capacity when considering the lifting of another Knesset member's immunity, but it is possible that he would also be a member of one of the Knesset committees, be it the Finance Committee, which deals with the public's money, or the Knesset Control Committee, whose task it is to fix norms of proper management, or any other committee, which deals with public matters of first importance. And, nevertheless, the legislature was not afraid that the public's confidence in the Knesset would be harmed because of this, and provided, in section 6 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, that every citizen is entitled to be elected to the Knesset save "if a court denies him this right by law, or if he is given a prison sentence of five years or more for an offence against the security of the State, as laid down in the Elections to the Knesset Law, and five years have not elapsed since the day he completed this sentence."

 

            Is it not a fact that when a person elected by the public is the issue then the democratic principle takes precedence over any other public interest, even though a Knesset member also fulfills a public service and the Knesset is one of the authorities of the State.

           

            As a minister and deputy minister fulfil political functions, as already stated, could it not be said, in a case where an indictment containing an offence involving ignominy is brought against one of them, that it is the "price of democracy" and that criticism of his appointment belongs to the Knesset, which can pass a vote of no-confidence in the Government for making an appointment which in its, the Knesset's, opinion is not proper.

           

            Furthermore, would not our (the High Court's) intervention in such a matter be interference in "the composition" of the Government and upset the balance between the authorities? One cannot, therefore, deny the existence of a political aspect in the matter before us. But, on the other hand, this aspect must not be regarded as divorced from public administration. I am of the opinion that in any clash between the two aspects we cannot say that the public administration norm, which we have already held is applicable to a public servant (see H.C. 6163/92 [16]), will not apply at all, only because the functionary is a minister or deputy minister. Such a consequence would not only constitute a 'double standard", but would also mean the application of double and conflicting legal norms - one for the ordinary public servant and another for the politician who holds office - which is a violation of the principle of equality before the law.

           

            The clash between the two aspects does not mean that the one must supersede the other. All that is required is that a balance should be found between them. This balance makes it obligatory that the court's intervention in the exercise of discretion of whosoever is empowered by law to remove a minister or deputy minister from office be in small measure, and that it be restricted to cases in which the seriousness of the circumstances in which the alleged offence was committed cannot be reconciled with continuation in office. In other words, our intervention would occur, save in such cases, only when the administrative authority, which has been given the discretionary power, departs, in the circumstances of the case, radically from reasonability by leaving the minister, or deputy minister, in office.

 

            I am of the opinion that the seriousness of the circumstances, in the case before us, as is evident from the indictment, tips the scales and makes the removal from office of the minister obligatory. I therefore concur with the judgment of the President, on all counts.

           

            Decided as held in the President's judgment.

           

Judgment handed down on 8.9.93.

 


*               Edited by Prof. A. Enker

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 1993/03
Date Decided: 
Thursday, October 9, 2003
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Prime Minister appointed respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner asks that the High Court of Justice order the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment.

 

Held: The Court, by majority vote, held that it would not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 1993/03

 

The Movement for Quality Government in Israel

v.

  1. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon
  2. The Attorney-General, Mr. Elyakim Rubenstein
  3. The Minister for Public Security, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[October 9, 2003]

Before Vice-President T. Or, Justices E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, D. Dorner, J. Türkel, D. Beinish, and E. Rivlin

 

Objection to an order nisi.

 

Facts: The Prime Minister appointed respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner asks that the High Court of Justice order the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment.

 

Held: The Court, by majority vote, held that it would not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: The Government, 2001

Basic Law: The Government, 1992

Basic Law: The Government, 1968

 

Statutes Cited:

Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971, § 7

Criminal Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law, 1981, §§ 14, 16

Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951

 

Israeli Supreme Court Cases Cited:

[1]HCJ 3846/91 Maoz v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 46(5) 423

[2]HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney, IsrSC 51(3) 1

[3]HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 51(3) 46

[4]HCJ 2624/97, 2827/97, 2830/97Yedid Ronal, Adv. v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 51(3) 71

[5]HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93 and 4634/93Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 441

[6]HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing, IsrSC 47(2) 229

[7]HCJ 727/88 Awad v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 42(4) 487

[8]HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. The Prime Minister of Israel, IsrSC 55(2) 455

[9]HCJ 325/85 MK Muhammad Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel, IsrSC 39(3) 122

[10]HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel, IsrSC 49(1) 661

[11]428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 40(3) 505

[12]HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v.The Knesset Speaker, IsrSC 39(3) 141

[13]HCJ 306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee, IsrSC 35(4) 118

[14]HCJ 403/71 Alcourdi v. The National Labor Court, IsrSC 26(2) 66

[15]HCJ 222/68 Chugim Le’umiyim Agudah Reshuma v. Police Minister, IsrSC 24(2) 141

[16]HCJ 758/88 Kendel v. The Minister of Internal Affairs, IsrSC 46(4) 505

[17]HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, IsrSC 55(4) 800

[18]HCJ 971/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset Committee, IsrSC 56(6) 117

[19]HCJ 652/81 MK Yossi Sarid v. Knesset Speaker Menachem Svidor, IsrSC 36(2) 197

[20]HCJ 2136/95 Gutman v. Knesset Speaker Prof. Shevach Weiss, IsrSC 49(4) 845

[21]HCJ 3872/93 Mitrael Ltd. v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 47(5) 485

[22]HCJ 935/89 Uri Ganor, Adv. v. Attorney-General, IsrSC 44(2) 485

[23]HCJ 4140/95 Superpharm (Israel) Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Administration, IsrSC 54(1) 49

[24]HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel, IsrSC 41(4) 169

[25]CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative, IsrSC 49(4) 221

[26]HCJ 3434/96 Dr. Menachem Hoffnung v. The Knesset Speaker, IsrSC 50(3) 57

[27]HCJ 7111/95 The Center for Local Government v. The Knesset, IsrSC 50(3) 485

[28]CA 492/73 Schpeizer v. Israeli Sports Betting Council, IsrSC 29(1) 22

[29]HCJ 162/72 Dr. Kinross v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 27(1) 238

[30]APP 7440/97, LCA 6172 State of Israel v. Golan, IsrSC 52(1) 1

[31]RAP 1088/86 Mahmud v. Local Council for the Planning and Construction of the Eastern Galilee, IsrSC 44(2) 417

[32]HCJ 98/54 Lazerovitz v. Food Inspector, Jerusalem, IsrSC 10 40

[33]HCJ 4769/90 Zidan v. The Minister of Labor and Social –Welfare, IsrSC 47(2) 147

[34]CA 184/80 Eigler v. Magen Insurance Company, IsrSC 35(3) 518

[35]HCJ 3687/00 Ashkenazi v. Prime Minister Ehud Barak, IsrSC (unreported decision)

[36]HCJ 6029/99 Jonathan Pollard v. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, IsrSC 54(1) 241

[37]HCJ 4769/95 Ron Menachem v. The Minister of Transportation, IsrSC

[38]HCJ 561/75 Ashkenazi v. The Minister of Defense, IsrSC 30(3) 309

[39]HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. The Prime Minister, IsrSC 47(1) 37

[40]HCJ 8666/99 Temple Mount Faithful Movement v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 54(1) 199

[41]HCJ 46/00 Ayalon Jordan, Adv. v. The Prime Minister, (unreported decision)

[42]HCJ 6057/99 Victims of Terror Staff v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[43]HCJ 7307/98 Pollack v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[44]HCJ 2455/94 “B’tzedek Organization v. The Government of Israel (unreported decision)

[45]HCJ 4877/93 Victims of Arab Terror v. State of Israel (unreported decision)

[46]HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. The President of Israel 5 801

[47]3094/93 Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. State of Israel, IsrSC 47(5) 404

[48]HCJ 194/93 MK Gonen Segev v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, IsrSC 49(5) 57

[49]HCJ 251/88 Wajia Udeh v. The Head of the Jaljulia Local Council, IsrSC 42(4) 837

[50]Dis.App. 4123/95 Or v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner, IsrSC 49(5) 184

[51]HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney-General, IsrSC 52(4) 547

[52]CA 6763/98 Ram Carmi v. State of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 418

[53]HCJ 531/79 Likud Faction of Petah Tikva v. City Council of Petah Tikva, IsrSC 34(2) 566

[54]HCJ 244/86 Revivo v. The Head of the Ofakim Local Council, IsrSC 42(3) 183

[55]CA 6983/94 Shimon Pachima v. Michael Peretz, IsrSC 51(5) 829

[56]HCJ 7805/00 Roni Aloni v. Comptroller of the Jerusalem Municipality, IsrSC 57(4) 577

[57]HCJ 3975/95 Prof. Shmuel Caniel v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 53(5) 459

[58]HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance, IsrSC 45(1) 28

[59]HCJ 6673/01 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Minister of Transportation, IsrSC 56(1) 799

[60]HCJ 142/70 Shapira v. Local Committee of Chamber of Advocates, IsrSC 25(1) 325

[61]HCJ 2671/98 Women’s Lobby v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare, IsrSC 52(3) 630

[62]HCJ 103/96 Pinchas Cohen, Adv.  v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 50(4) 309

[63]HCJ 7256/95 Fishler v. The Inspector General of the Israel Police, IsrSC 50(5) 1

[64]HCJ 2682/98 Appel v. The State Attorney, IsrSC 55(3) 134

[65]HCJ 4539/92 Kablero v. The Attorney-General, IsrSC 50(3) 50

[66]HCJ 442/71 Lanski v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 26(2) 337

[67]CA 5709/95 Ben-Shlomo v. Director of The Value Added Tax Authority, IsrSC 52(4) 241

[68]HCJ 164/97 Kontram Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance, IsrSC 52(1) 289

[69]HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, IsrSC 48(5) 412

[70]HCJ 1227/98 Malevsky v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 52(4) 690

[71]HCJ 932/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Chairman of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments, IsrSC 53(3) 769

[72]HCJ 4668/01 MK Yossi Sarid v. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, IsrSC 56(2) 265

[73]HCJ 5795/97 MK Yossi Sarid v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 51(4) 799

[74]HCJ 1635/90 Zersevsky v The Prime Minister, IsrSC 45(1) 749

[75]HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party, IsrSC 49(1) 758

[76]CA 4012/96 Benny Shachaf Freights and Investments (1976) Ltd v. First International Bank of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 492

[77]CA 3602/97 Income Tax and Property Tax Commissioner, Minister of Finance, State of Israel v. Daniel Shachar, IsrSC 56(2) 297

[78]HCJ 7279/98 MK Sarid v. The Government of Israel, IsrSC 55(1) 740

[79]HCJ 595/89 Shimon v. Appointee of Ministry of the Interior, Southern District, IsrSC 44(1) 409

[80]HCJ 1715/97 The Israel Association of Investment Managers v. The Minister of Finance, IsrSC 51(4) 367

[81]HCJ 288/00 Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Minister of the Interior, IsrSC 55(5) 673

[82]CrimA State of Israel v. Zeguri, IsrSC 56(4) 401

[83]CrimA 6251/94 Ben-Ari v. State of Israel, IsrSC 49(3) 45

[84]HCJ 3679/94 National Association of Directors and Authorized Signatories of the First International Bank of Israel v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Labor Court, IsrSC 49(1) 573

[85]HCJ 279/60 Gil Theaters v. Ya’ari, IsrSC 15 673

[86]HCJ 6499/99 The National Religious Party v. Rabbi Shlomo Ben-Ezra, IsrSC 53(5) 606

[87]CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 50(5) 221

[88]HCJ 320/96 Yael German v. The Municipal Council of Herzliya, IsrSC 52(2) 222

[89]CrimApp 8087/95 Za’ada v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 50(2) 133

[90]HCJ 3132/92 Mushlav v. The District Committee for Planning and Building, Northern District, IsrSC 47(3) 741

 

United States Cases:

[91]Marbury v. Madison

[92]Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)

[93]INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)

 

Israeli Books Cited

[94]Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Statutory Interpretation (1995)

[95]I Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority (1996)

[96]Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation (1995)

[97]II Amnon Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 687 (5th ed. 1997)

 

Israeli Articles Cited:

[98]Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Law, 3 Mishpat Umimshal 408 (1996)

[99]Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of Regulations  , 21 HaPraklit 463 (1965)

[100]Itzchak Zamir, Law and Politics, in Klinghoffer, Public Law 209 (1993)

[101]Itzchak Zamir, Political Appointments, 20 Mishpatim 23 (1990)

[102]Avigdor Klagsbald, Public Duty, ‘Criminal Past’ and Administrative Evidence, 2 HaMishpat 93 (1995)

[103]Daphne Barak-Erez, The High Court of Justice as Attorney-General, 5(2) Plilim 219 (1997)

[104]Aharon Barak, On Power and Values in Israel, in I A Collection of Writings 382 (H. H. Cohen & Y. Zamir ed. 2000)

[105]Aharon Barak, Conflict of Interest in the Performance of Office, 10 Mishpatim 11 (1980)

[106]Itzchak Zamir, Ethics in Politics, 17 Mishpatim 255-58 (1988)

 

Foreign Books Cited:

[107]Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 22 (2d ed. 1961)

 

Jewish Law Sources Cited:

[108]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 114A

[109]Maimonides, Laws of the Sanhedrin, 10:1

[110]Exodus 31:2, 35:30

[111]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 55a

[112]Shulkhan Arukh, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:4

[113]Arukh Hashulkhan, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:8

[114]Ribash, Responsa 271

[115]Rabbi A.Y. Kook, Be’er Eliyahu

[116]Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 7b

[117]Maimonides, Laws of Temple Vessels, 4:21

[118]Maimonides Reponsa, Chapter 111

[119]Shulkhan Arukh, Chosen Hamishpat, 53:25

[120]Zaken Abraham Responsa, Yoreh Deah, 30

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice E. Rivlin

1. This petition was submitted by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel. Petitioner seeks to prevent the appointment of respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the office of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner’s central assertion is that, because of his connection to four specific affairs, Hanegbi is unfit to serve in this capacity. The details of these affairs are described below.

The Facts and the Petition

2. The elections to the Sixteenth Knesset took place at the beginning of 2003. After the elections, respondent 1, in his capacity as Prime Minister, was charged by the President with the task of forming a new government. Respondent 1 decided to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security. Once the intentions of respondent 1 were made public, but before the new government had been sworn in, this petition was submitted. The petition asked that we order the Prime Minister not to appoint respondent 3. Petitioner further sought an interim order against this appointment.

The petition details several affairs in which respondent 3 was involved and which, it is asserted, make him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

The first affair occurred in 1982. The affair culminated in the filing of an indictment against Hanegbi, who was subsequently convicted. At the time, Hanegbi was a student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was involved in an altercation on campus. The Magistrate Court convicted Hanegbi of brawling in a public place, and imposed a suspended prison sentence and a fine.

The details of the second affair were described at length in HCJ 3846/91 Pinchas Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 423. In 1982, Hanegbi, together with three others, filed a complaint with the police. The complaint alleged that several members of the Student Union and the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had carried out “the greatest fraud in the history of Israeli aviation.” After the police investigation, a number of people were criminally charged, including Pinchas Maoz, who had been serving as external legal advisor to ISTA. Maoz was subsequently acquitted by the Magistrate Court. Hanegbi had been a witness in the case and, according to the court’s opinion, “factual truth was not always a guiding light” in his testimony. The court noted that “the witness did not provide precise answers and avoided topics that did not square with his version of the events.” After this court case, Maoz and others attempted to have Hanegbi indicted for perjury, relaying misleading information, or presenting conflicting testimonies. The Attorney-General decided that the chance of conviction was too small to warrant an indictment. Similarly, this Court decided, “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth,” that it would not intervene in the decision of the Attorney-General.

The third affair concerns Hanegbi’s appointment of Roni Bar-On to the office of Attorney-General. At the time, Hanegbi was serving as Minister of Justice. It was alleged that Hanegbi had misled the Government and the Prime Minister about the opinion of the President of the Supreme Court regarding the appointment. The police recommended that Hanegbi be prosecuted for fraud and breach of trust. However, the Attorney-General decided to close the case for lack of evidence. A memorandum of the State Attorney’s Office criticized Hanegbi’s conduct and characterized it as “a deviation from acceptable standards of behavior.” The State Attorney’s Office, however, did not believe that Hanegbi’s actions amounted to a criminal offense. For a more extensive treatment of this affair and its ramifications, see HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. The State Attorney’s Office [2], at 1; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [hereinafter – Bar-On [3]], at 46; HCJ 2624/97, 2827/97, and 2830/97 Yedid Ronal, Adv. v. The Government of Israel [4], at 71.

At this point it is important to mention that, in Bar-On  [3], petitioner requested that Hanegbi be removed from his position as Minister of Justice. That petition made claims that are very similar to those asserted here. That petition was rejected, and we shall expand on the significance of that case and its ramifications for the current petition.

Finally, we come to the fourth affair, and the most important. It constitutes the chief addition to the facts already laid out in Bar-On [3]. The affair involved the actions of Hanegbi who, at the time, was serving as the head of the “Derech Tzleha” association. As in the previous affairs, here, too, a decision was made not to indict Hanegbi. The Attorney-General, however, saw fit to publish a “public report” on the issue detailing the findings of the police investigation. It described how, in 1994, Hanegbi and MK Avraham Burg prepared a private bill in the Knesset, entitled “The National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Bill.” The purpose of the draft legislation was to improve road safety and, to further this goal, government body would be established to spearhead the campaign against traffic accidents. The bill was placed before the Knesset and passed a preliminary reading. It was then transferred to the Knesset Finance Committee for consideration. The Committee established a subcommittee, with Hanegbi at its head, with the task of preparing the bill for the next stages of legislation.

While he worked for the enactment of the National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Bill, Hanegbi founded a non-profit organization called Derech Tzleha. At first he served as chairman of the organization, and later he became its director-general. He received a salary and benefits for his work. According to the police findings detailed in the report, “MK Hanegbi received from the organization, directly or indirectly, the vast majority of the sum [raised by the organization – amounting to approximately NIS 375,000] in the form of his salary, a company car, reimbursement of expenses, a cellular phone, as well as in the form of a notice of support which was published three days before the Likud primaries.” After his appointment to the office of Health Minister in 1996, Hanegbi resigned as director-general of the organization.

Hanegbi was examined by the Knesset Ethics Committee regarding his involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair. The Committee concluded that Hanegbi had placed himself in a situation involving a conflict of interests, and had benefited from work performed outside of his work at the Knesset. Hanegbi was censured by the Committee and his pay docked for two months.

3. Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair were fully investigated by the police. The police recommended prosecuting Hanegbi for accepting a bribe, fraud, breach of trust, and other offenses. Even the State Attorney’s Office held initially that, while Hanegbi could not be indicted for accepting a bribe, he could be indicted for fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, obtaining by fraud, and falsifying corporate documents. A hearing was held and, following a chain of events not relevant to this case, the Attorney-General decided that, lack of evidence, and in line with the opinion of the State Attorney, no indictment could be filed against Hanegbi. In the report, the Attorney-General summarized his opinion:

In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered filing an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied.

 

The Attorney-General became aware of Hanegbi’s possible appointment to the post of Minister of Public Security. At this point, he presented his opinion to the Prime Minister:

Although according to statute and judicial precedent there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment itself is prima facie problematic from a civic perspective.

 

      Despite the Attorney-General’s counsel, the Prime Minister decided to follow through with Hanegbi’s appointment to the office of Minister of Public Security. It should be noted that, during his previous term as Prime Minister, after the elections to the Fifteenth Knesset, Sharon had resolved not to appoint Hanegbi to serve as a minister in any office responsible for law enforcement. This was in accordance with “advice mainly from a civic perspective,” which he had received from the Attorney-General.

4.   Petitioner asserts that, in all of the above affairs, as well as in other situations of lesser significance, Hanegbi fell afoul of the law and of ethical principles. It is true that, aside from the brawling affair in 1982, Hanegbi was never actually served with an indictment. However, petitioner believes that Hanegbi’s involvement in each of the above affairs, certainly when these are viewed in aggregate, makes the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him to the office of Minister of Public Security unreasonable in the extreme. In this context, it is necessary to give added weight to the decision of the Ethics Committee regarding Hanegbi and the reports published by the State Attorney’s Office and the Attorney-General regarding the role Hanegbi played in the Bar-On and Derech Tzleha affairs. Petitioner argues that the facts that emerge from all the above affairs establish grounds for intervening in the decision of the Prime Minister in keeping with the “rule of administrative evidence.” In relation to Hanegbi’s appointment to the position of Minister of Public Security, the provisions of criminal law are not the only parameter. Petitioner further argues that Hanegbi’s appointment would damage the effectiveness of the police and its public image.

Petitioner further argued that Hanegbi was investigated on more than one occasion by the police, who recommended that he be served with an indictment. This being the case, petitioner alleges, it is reasonable to expect that “innumerable situations involving a conflict of interest will arise should Hanegbi serve in that capacity.” In particular, a conflict of interest would undoubtedly arise in considerations of promotion for any police officers responsible for investigating him in the past, or when setting budgets for various divisions of the police.

5.   Respondents, by contrast, are of the opinion that there are no grounds for interfering with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security. The Prime Minister acted within the parameters of his authority, and the affairs raised by petitioner do not establish that his decision was unreasonable in the extreme. The Prime Minister, they point out, diligently weighed all of the pertinent issues. He considered Hanegbi’s professional abilities, his vast experience, his suitability for the job, as well as the view of the Attorney-General concerning the appointment. The Prime Minister also took into account parliamentary and political factors relating to the formation of the government. Respondents argued that the balance struck by the Prime Minister among these various considerations does not deviate from the decisions of this Court.

Respondents emphasize the wide “range of reasonableness” afforded by the courts to a decision of the Prime Minister in a case of this sort. They point out that, as opposed to earlier cases where this Court did order the Prime Minister to remove a minister or deputy-minister from office, in our case no indictment has been filed against Hanegbi since 1982. With regards to the Derech Tzleha affair, as with the other affairs in Bar-On [3], the case was closed for lack of evidence. Therefore, Respondent 3 is presumed innocent until proven guilty. In any event, there is no justification for arriving at a conclusion different than the one reached by the Court in Bar-On [3]. This is especially pertinent in light of the fact that the current version of Basic Law: The Government, as opposed to the previous version of that law, contains an explicit provision for terminating the office of a minister convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. The respondents further point out that the decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security was approved by a vote of confidence in the Knesset.

Regarding the petitioner’s concerns that the appointment will raise a conflict of interest concerning the police officers who investigated him, Hanegbi stresses that he bears no grudge against those officers. Respondents maintain that there are no conflicting interests whatsoever. It cannot be claimed that the hypothetical fear of negative sentiments between Hanegbi and his investigators warrants intervention in a decision of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, Israel Police is an autonomous body, and the decisions of the minister regarding the appointment of senior officers are subject to the rules of administrative law.

The petition asks us to order the Prime Minister not to appoint respondent 3 to the office of Minister of Public Security. Petitioner requested an injunction to prevent Hanegbi from serving in this capacity. This was rejected. The petition concentrates on his eligibility for such appointment. However, since Hanegbi has been serving in this function for some time now, the petition actually focuses on whether he should continue to hold the office. There is a difference between appointment and termination of office. However, this difference is in fact irrelevant when examining the Prime Minister’s discretion, as we shall explain. See also HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93 and 4634/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel [hereinafter – Pinhasi], [5] at 469.

On March 10, 2003, a panel of three judges heard the parties’ arguments and an order nisi was issued against the Prime Minister. On August 11, 2003 we decided to expand the panel hearing the case, and final arguments were heard by the expanded bench on August 26, 2003.

In my opinion, the petition should be denied.

The Normative Framework

6.   The Government is composed of a Prime Minister and other ministers – section 5(a) of Basic Law: The Government. Section 7(a) of the Basic Law sets down that:

When a new Government has to be constituted, the President of the State shall, after consultation with representatives of party groups in the Knesset, assign the task of forming a Government to a Knesset Member who has notified him that he is prepared to accept the task.

 

Once the Government has been formed, it presents itself to the Knesset, announces the basic lines of its policy, its composition and the distribution of functions among the ministers, and asks for a vote of confidence from the Knesset. After the vote of confidence, the Government has been formed, and the ministers assume office. Section 13(d) of the Basic Law. The Knesset Member who formed the Government becomes its head. Section 13(c) of the Basic Law.

 

We see from here that the task of forming the Government is assigned by the President to the Knesset Member who is the designated Prime Minister. We further see that the Government is formed once the Knesset approves it.

 

The Basic Law adds that the Government may appoint an additional minister. The Government must notify the Knesset of this and, upon receiving the approval of the Knesset, the additional minister assumes office. Section 15 of the Basic Law. The Prime Minister is further authorized to remove a minister from his post, as stated in section 22(b) of the Basic Law:

 

The Prime Minister may, after notifying the Government of his intention to do so, remove a minister from his post.

 

7.   Section 6 of the Basic Law lists a number of criteria for ministers to be considered fit to hold office. These include:

(c)(1) A person who was convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment, and seven years have not yet passed since the day on which he finished serving his term of imprisonment or since the handing down of his sentence – whichever was later, shall not be appointed minister, unless the Chairman of the Central Elections Committee rules that the circumstances of the offense do not involve moral turpitude.

(2) The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee shall not so rule if a court has determined that the offense involved moral turpitude.

 

Likewise, we find in section 23(b):

 

Should a minister be convicted by a court, it shall state in its verdict whether the offense involves moral turpitude; should the court so state, the minister’s tenure shall cease on the date of such verdict.

 

We find a similar provision for the service of a deputy-minister in section 27 of the Basic Law. It should be noted that section 16(b) of the 1992 version of the Basic Law: The Government, provided that:

A person convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and ten years not having passed since the date on which he finished serving his period of imprisonment, may not be appointed as a minister.

However, the 1992 Basic Law contained no provision requiring the removal of a minister convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.

A careful examination of the provisions of the Basic Law reveals, therefore, that the Prime Minister is given the principal authority in the formation of the Government. He has the responsibility of choosing the Government’s ministers, of adding ministers and removing them. Nonetheless, the ministers assume their offices only after an expression of confidence in the Government. A conviction may prevent the appointment of a minister, or his continuation in office, as per sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law, as detailed above.

Returning to the case at hand, no one disputes that none of the criteria that would render Hanegbi unfit for office, set out in sections 6(c) and 23(b), have been met. These criteria, as we have seen, deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime. Hanegbi, however, was never convicted – or even indicted – except for the brawling affair in 1982. This affair does not constitute an impediment to assuming office according to the Basic Law. As such no issue of authority or “statutory eligibility” is at stake here. The only issue is Prime Ministerial discretion: Was there a flaw in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security which warrants the intervention of this Court? On this question this Court has previously ruled:

 

We must distinguish between questions of competence, (or authority), and questions of discretion. The absence of an express statutory provision regarding the fitness of someone with a criminal past establishes the candidate’s competence. However, it does not preclude the possibility of considering his past within the framework of exercising the administrative discretion given to the authority making the appointment. Indeed, the criminal past of a candidate for public office is a relevant consideration, which the authority making the appointment is entitled and even obligated to take into account before making the appointment.

 

See HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction & Housing [6], at 256-57.

 

8. As such, even though there is no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, this alone does not render superfluous the need to examine the Prime Minister’s discretion to choose Hanegbi. “Fitness is one issue; discretion quite another.” See Pinhasi [5], at 457; see also HCJ 727/88 Awad v. The Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at 491, and HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. The Prime Minister of Israel [8], at 477. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to note that the criteria for eligibility laid down by the legislature are not irrelevant to the discretion granted to the Prime Minister. The more we depart from the statutory criteria, the more difficult it will be to find justification for interfering with the Prime Minister’s discretion. Indeed, the legislature has established that it is specifically the conviction of a minister of an offense involving moral turpitude which renders him unfit to continue in office. It would not be a simple matter, therefore, for the Court to rule that the minister should also be rendered unfit in situations where he was acquitted of wrongdoing, or when it was even decided not to indict him. We shall return to this point later.

 

The petition calls for an examination of the Prime Minister’s judgment in appointing Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security. However, before undertaking this examination, we must first delineate the criteria for judicial review of such decisions.

 

Judicial Review

 

9. All organs of government are subject to judicial review. See HCJ 325/85 MK Muhammad Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel [9], at 127-28. The power of judicial review over decisions of the Knesset, the Government, and the other governing institutions is the cornerstone of a democracy which upholds the rule of law. It reflects the formal rule of law, meaning that all of the organs of government are subordinate to the law. It also means that everything is subject to judicial review, which is intended to guarantee that the law is kept. See HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel [10], at 698. The law governs all matters. “The reach of Government is high, but the law reaches higher than all.” 428/86 Barzilai v. The Government of Israel [11], at 585. The rule of law prevails, not the rule of man. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) [91]. The rule of law requires us to balance the diverse values, principles, and interests of a democratic society. The government is empowered to exercise its discretion in a manner that ensures a just balance of the appropriate considerations. See Eisenberg [6].

 

This perception of the purpose of judicial review is reflected in the ideal relationship between the three branches of government. Each branch is separate and enjoys freedom to fulfill its role. However, each branch is also framed by – and subordinate to – the constitution and the law.

 

The function of the judicial branch is to ensure that none of the other branches overstep their bounds, and that they act in accordance with the normative provisions by which they are bound.

 

See HCJ 1843/93, [10] at 699; HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v.The Knesset Speaker [12], at 141.

 

The doctrine of the separation of powers does not imply that each branch may act as it wishes. Separation of powers means that each branch is independent in dealing with its own affairs, so long as it operates within the bounds of its authority.

 

Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of the Constitutionality of Law, 3 Mishpat Umimshal 408 (1996) [98]. See also II Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law: Constitutional Interpretation 256-57 (1993) [96]; HCJ 306/81 Platto-Sharon v. Knesset Committee [13], at 141. The Court’s power to review other government bodies is a corollary of the fact that it is the branch responsible for the interpretation of the law, see Kach [12], at 152.

 

All of these principles – the rule of law, the separation of powers, the checks and balances that accompany this separation, the power of judicial review, and the other mechanisms of democracy – form the central pillars of a democratic society. They constitute the essential conditions for the preservation of human rights. They form the nucleus of any democratic society that strives to promote human welfare.

 

In light of the above, it has been stated on more than one occasion that this Court is charged with overseeing the legality and reasonableness of the activities of the State. See HCJ 403/71 Alcourdi v. The National Labor Court [14], at 72. The Court’s powers of judgment and judicial review of government authorities constitute “an integral part of a truly democratic society, and anyone undermining this is liable to topple one of the pillars of the state.” HCJ 222/68 Chugim Le’umiyim Agudah Reshuma v. Police Minister [15], at 172. This is because:

 

Absolutism, however benevolent, is the enemy of freedom. We are free people, and one who is born free or knows freedom will subjugate himself neither to another person nor to an absolute opinion.

 

See HCJ 758/88 Kendel v. The Minister of Internal Affairs [16], at 528 (Cheshin, J).

 

10. At the same time, care must be taken to distinguish between the power of the Court to exercise judicial review over other branches of the government – a power which, as stated above, is extremely broad in nature – and the Court’s readiness to interfere with the decisions of the other branches within the spheres of their authority. The question of the actual existence of judicial review is separate from the issue of when judicial review should be exercised. See Miari [9], at 128; HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee [17], at 809. This Court has adopted different principles in a variety of cases pertaining to the judicial review of actions and decisions of government authorities. The common denominator among these principles is an attempt to exhibit judicial self-restraint. Among these principles we may specify the “range of reasonableness,” the “presumption of suitability,” the “presumption of lawfulness,” the principle that the Court will not overrule the discretion of one branch of government, and the limits set by administrative law. These principles are not mere lip service to the limitations on judicial review. Rather, they are an indivisible and necessary part of it. Their application depends on the type of body under review and the power that has been exercised.

 

11. To be sure, the decision whether to exercise judicial review will depend on an examination of the authority being reviewed. See Livnat [17], at 809. To this end one must take into account the status of the body in question, its position in the system of government, the extent and nature of the powers granted to it, whether the body was elected or appointed, and other similar factors. Thus, for example, when the Court proceeds to review decisions of the Knesset, it takes into account the special status of this body, and acts with the required caution and self-restraint necessitated by this status. After all, the Knesset is the elected body of the State. It is elected by the citizens of the State, and it has the power to legislate laws and enact a constitution for the State. See HCJ 971/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Knesset Committee [18], at 548; and HCJ 652/81 MK Yossi Sarid v. Knesset Speaker Menachem Svidor [19], at 197.

 

The special status of the Knesset, as set forth in the Basic Laws and in the structure of our democracy, requires that the Court exercise its discretion in performing judicial review of its actions with caution and self-restraint.

 

See Livnat [17], at 809. See also 2136/95 Gutman v. Knesset Speaker Prof. Shevach Weiss [20], at 851. Similar sentiments have been voiced regarding decisions of the Government:

 

The status of the Government as the executive branch of the State is special, for it executes the will of the State, as provided in section 1 of Basic Law: The Government.

 

See HCJ 3872/93 Mitrael Ltd. v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Religious Affairs [21], at 497.

 

12. The criteria for the exercise of judicial review are derived not only from the identity of the body subject to review. They are also derived from the character of the decision under scrutiny. See Livnat [17], at 809. The nature of the power which was or was not exercised is especially significant for setting the limits of judicial review. See Sarid [19], at 201. In one case, Justice Zamir expanded on this:

 

The question of whether an administrative decision is unreasonable in the extreme depends on the limits of the range of reasonableness. This delineates the extent to which the administrative authority may employ its discretion for the purpose of making decisions. The range of reasonableness of every administrative authority depends on the nature of its power, the language and purpose of its authorizing law, the identity of the authorized body, the issue addressed by the power, and whether the power is exercised mainly on the basis of factual considerations, policy considerations, or professional criteria, such as medical or engineering evaluations. The range of reasonableness varies according to these factors: it may widen or narrow depending on the circumstances.

Bar-On [3], at 57. Similar sentiments were expressed by Vice-President (then Justice) Or:

The range of reasonableness delineates the area within which the decisions of an authority are reasonable, meaning that there are no grounds for the intervention of the Court. Yet this area is not uniform in all cases. It may change in accordance with the circumstances of the specific case. It is derived from the nature of the subject being judged. It is derived from the nature of the relevant values in any given matter.

See Yahav [2], at 28.

In other words, the “range of reasonableness” is influenced by the “bounds of deference.” Reasonableness is a normative concept. It may be defined as the identification of the relevant considerations and the balance which is struck between these considerations according to their weight. See HCJ 935/89 Uri Ganor, Adv. v. Attorney-General [22], at 513. When reviewing an act of the executive branch, the Court determines whether a reasonable authority would have been permitted to act in a similar manner. Often enough there is more than one decision which a reasonable authority could make. In these circumstances, the authority may act within the “range of reasonableness.” Any decision that comes within the range of reasonableness will not be subject to the Court’s intervention. The Court may only intervene in those decisions which deviate in an extreme manner from the range of reasonableness. Ganor [22], at 514.

Deference, by contrast, is an institutional concept. Deference means that, in examining decisions of other authorities acting within the boundaries of their authority, the Court will not evaluate the wisdom of these decisions or overrule their discretion. The Court does not regard itself as a supra-governing body. See 1843/93 [10], at 499; see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) [92]; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) [93]. This Court recognizes the fact that:

The Knesset and the Government were elected by the public. They were allocated certain areas within which they are empowered to act in the name of the public. The Court recognizes that these areas were allocated to the Knesset and the Government, and not to the Court. It is also cognizant of the fact that in these areas preference was given to the Knesset and the Government over the Court. The body entrusted with the promulgation of laws is the Knesset. Likewise, the authority to determine social and economic policies, as well as the authority to execute laws, was given to the Government. The underlying principles of democracy, among them the separation of powers, require that the Court not trespass the boundaries of the Knesset and the Government.

See I Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority 89-90 (1996) [95].

13. Judicial review thus requires striking a balance between respecting decisions of government authorities within their area of power and the need to preserve the rule of law and protect human rights. This is one of the axioms of democracy. This balance is not static, but changes according to the character of the power under discussion.

While the Court has determined that it holds the power to scrutinize the legality of the decisions of the Knesset, it has itself curtailed this power: It does not intervene in the decisions of the Knesset, even when these run contrary to law, unless they are capable of harming the fabric of parliamentary life or the foundations of the constitution. Likewise, the Court is generally reluctant to substitute its own discretion for the discretion of the Government or any other administrative authority. For the most part, the Court refrains from intervening in matters of policy. This includes not only foreign policy, but also social and economic policy. Only in extreme circumstances is the Court willing to invalidate administrative decisions due to a lack of reasonableness.

See [95], at 90. See also HCJ 4140/95 Superpharm (Israel) Ltd. v. Customs and Excise Administration [23], at 69.

Based on the above, this Court held, in HCJ 971/99 [18] that, in determining the character of judicial review, a thorough analysis of the act of government under review should be undertaken. In that judgment we dealt with the judicial review of Knesset decisions. We defined three broad categories of decisions: completed acts of legislation; intra-parliamentary processes; and quasi-judicial decisions. The Court held that, when dealing with quasi-judicial activity of the Knesset, its judicial review will be “ordinary.” In such situations, the Knesset does not differ from  any other quasi-judicial body. See HCJ 1843/93, [10] at 701; HCJ 652/81, [19] at 202; HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel [24], at 195. In quasi-judicial decisions, the Knesset is involved neither in “political” activity nor in its own internal legislative processes, and the need to preserve the basic fairness of the parliamentary process prevails.

The situation is different when we review intra-parliamentary processes of the Knesset – decisions affecting the Knesset’s own internal guidelines and working procedures. Judicial review may be exercised here only with caution. A balance must be struck between the rule of law, which requires every political entity to respect the law, and the principle that the internal workings of the Knesset are its own affairs, that “belong to the legislative authority under the separation of powers doctrine.” See Sarid [19], at 202-03. Therefore, the Court will intervene in such decisions only where significant harm is caused to the fabric of parliamentary life and the foundations of the constitution. HCJ 652/81 [19] at 204; HCJ 1843/93, [10], at 700.

In reviewing the constitutionality of a law passed by the Knesset, however, additional principles also come into play. Ordinary legislation must respect those human rights enshrined in the Basic Laws, and may not violate these except according to the guidelines of those Basic Laws. Legislation will be presumed to be constitutional; this is a consequence of the requirement not to blur the boundaries between the authorities. See CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Agricultural Cooperative, [25] at 574. This presumption of constitutionality, however, does not apply to the issue of whether a law that does infringe a constitutional right fulfills the requirements of the Limitations Clause. See Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law – Constitutional Interpretation (1995) [96]. This Court must  respect the law, as an expression of the will of the people. Therefore, before this Court strikes down a law, it must thoroughly scrutinize its language as well as its purpose. It must be stringent and must be completely convinced that the law is irreparably flawed. See HCJ 3434/96 Dr. Menachem Hoffnung v. The Knesset Speaker [26], at 57. This Court will only strike down a law in a clear case of significant damage to fundamental rights or values. See HCJ 7111/95 The Center for Local Government v. The Knesset [27], at 485.

Therefore, when reviewing the decisions of other government authorities, this Court takes into account the status and function of the body under review, along with the character of its decision. These, in turn, influence how we exercise judicial review and the criteria that guide it. Our statements in HCJ 971/99 [18] regarding the Knesset and its committees can also be applied to decisions of the executive branch and the Prime Minister.

14. Judicial Review of Decisions of the Government and the Prime Minister

Any government is subject to judicial review… Therefore the Court must ask itself – when reviewing the reasonableness and proportionality of the government’s decisions – whether the decision is one that a reasonable government would be permitted to make. The Court should not ask itself what decision it would have made had it been in the government’s place.

See Weiss [8], at 470.

We review decisions of the government and the Prime Minister, just as we review decisions of any other administrative body.

The government’s discretion, like the discretion of any minister within the government or any other authority, is constrained by legal guidelines, and the Court is charged with upholding these guidelines. Among other things, the government must exercise its authority based on relevant considerations, not on external factors. These must fall within the range of reasonableness and proportionality.

Id, at 477-78. Any authority may at some point make a decision which is not reasonable or is not in line with administrative law. The government is no exception. See CA 492/73 Schpeizer v. Israeli Sports Betting Council [28], at 22, 26.

Much authority is vested in the hands of the government. The exercise of its powers is examined by the Court, pursuant to the principles of administrative and public law. As with the legislature, here too the extent of our review depends both on the status of the body under review as well as on the character of the decision being scrutinized.

With regard to the status of the body under review:  This Court must be mindful of the status of the government. This is especially true when speaking of the “core” meaning of the term “government” – “government in the sense of ‘Cabinet,’ or group of ministers; the  body that is  responsible for defining the policy of the executive branch.” See II Amnon Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in the State of Israel 687 (5th ed. 1997) [97]. The government is the executive arm of the State. See section 1 of Basic Law: The Government. In examining the discretion of the government, the Prime Minister, and other ministers, this Court must consider their status at the highest tier of the executive branch. See Mitrael [21], at 497; HCJ 162/72 Dr. Kinross v. The State of Israel [29], at 238. Similarly, this Court must delve deeply into the nature of the action or decision under judicial review. The bounds of the “range of reasonableness” regarding decisions of the government or any of its members widen or narrow depending on the type of the power exercised. See APP 7440/97, LCA 6172 State of Israel v. Golan [30], at 17-18. Indeed, at the outset of any judicial review of decisions or actions of the government, this Court adjusts its sights according to the act. Hence, in certain contexts, the power of judicial review is exercised with great caution.

Thus, for example, all governmental acts enjoy a presumption of legality, see RAP 1088/86 Mahmud v. Local Council for the Planning and Construction of the Eastern Galilee [31], at 417. This assumption applies with even greater force to regulations. See HCJ 98/54 Lazerovitz v. Food Inspector, Jerusalem [32], at 48; compare Aharon Barak, Judicial Review of Regulations  , 21 HaPraklit 463 (1965) [99]. The courts have developed different principles for review.

The purpose of these principles, at the heart of judicial policy, is to protect the constitutional standards laid down by an administrative authority. Their purpose is also to protect the expectations of the general public which created these standards.

See HCJ 4769/90 Zidan v. The Minister of Labor and Social –Welfare [33], at 171-2.

The Court will not rush to strike down regulations as unreasonable, and will not usurp the place of another authority. Therefore, this Court will strike down regulations only if they are found to be totally unreasonable. Id. See also CA 184/80 Eigler v. Magen Insurance Company [34], at 523; Kinross [29].

On another level, when this Court examines the working methods of the government and its committees, it must act similar to when it reviews the Knesset’s intra-parliamentary processes. Regarding the working methods of the government, see section 31(e) and (f) of the Basic Law. See also Rubinstein, [99] at 720-24. This being an internal matter of the government, and in light of the political implications that the issue may have, this Court only exercises judicial review with the utmost caution.

15. Such caution is also employed when dealing with basic matters of policy. The Court is not accustomed to intervening in “patently political matters.” See HCJ 3687/00 Ashkenazi v. Prime Minister Ehud Barak [35], at 1040. The Court is not a part of the government, and it will not manage its affairs.  See HCJ 6029/99 Jonathan Pollard v. Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak [36], at 241. This is especially true concerning the power of the government to manage foreign policy and the security of the State.

The strength of the government’s authority, and the nature of the issue at hand – foreign relations and security, war and peace – imply that the judiciary must grant the government wide latitude in such areas. Within that range the Court will not substitute the government’s discretion with  its own.

See Weiss [8], at 471-72.

With respect to decisions on political matters, or decisions pertaining to economic policy, the Court will intervene only in very exceptional circumstances. For the most part it will leave these matters to the political arena.

The choice between different policies is a matter for the government, and policy is clearly the Knesset’s domain. A choice which falls within the range of reasonableness is not a matter for the Court .

See Weiss [8]. Therefore,

The Court will not instruct the Prime Minister or the members of his government to adopt a policy of privatization or nationalization. A matter that lies within the government’s power is a matter for the government and its ministers to decide, not for the Court.

Id. See HCJ 4769/95 Ron Menachem v. The Minister of Transportation [37], at 235; HCJ 561/75 Ashkenazi v. The Minister of Defense [38], at 309; HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. The Prime Minister [39], at 37; HCJ 8666/99 Temple Mount Faithful Movement v. The Attorney-General [40], at 199; HCJ 46/00 Ayalon Jordan, Adv. v. The Prime Minister [41], at 5; HCJ 6057/99 Victims of Terror Staff v. The Government of Israel [42], at 284; HCJ 7307/98 Pollack v. The Government of Israel [43], at 424; HCJ 2455/94 “B’tzedek Organization v. The Government of Israel [44], at 292; HCJ 4877/93 Victims of Arab Terror v. State of Israel [45], at 257; Itzchak Zamir, “Law and Politics,” in Klinghoffer’s work on Public Law 209 (1993) [100].

16. This brings us to another matter, where this Court has only limited powers of intervention. I refer to the formation of a government. This includes the building of a coalition, the appointment of ministers and deputy-ministers, the addition and removal of ministers, the distribution of tasks among the ministers, the transfer of power from one minister to another, the consolidation, division, termination and formation of ministries, and the transfer of responsibilities from one ministry to another. See section 31 of the Basic Law. Compare  HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. The President of Israel [46], at 814 (Smoira, J.). We will focus on one of these powers – the power of the Prime Minister to choose ministers and assign them roles.

Judicial Review of Decisions Relating to the Formation of the Government

17. The discretion of the Prime Minister regarding the appointment of a minister is certainly subject to the review of this Court. This applies to any kind of appointment. In terms of the fundamental power of judicial review, the selection of a minister is no different from any decision made by the Prime Minister, or any other minister or public authority. All these decisions are examined in light of the principles of administrative law. It should be noted that:

Not only the exercise of authority in unreasonable circumstances, but also the failure to exercise a discretionary power due to unreasonable considerations, can lead to the conclusion that the decision is invalid.

See 3094/93 Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. State of Israel [hereinafter: Deri [47]], at 419-20. Therefore, both the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a person and his decision not to remove one from office are subject to the accepted standards of reasonableness, integrity, proportionality, good faith, and the absence of arbitrariness or discrimination.

The importance of judicial review in this context stems from the fact that the Prime Minister’s decision that a particular individual shall serve in a particular position, or that one person shall replace another, may have a large influence both on the functioning of a public authority and the public’s confidence in that authority. With respect to the latter, it has already been held that:

The key to the existence of a public service worthy of the title is the public’s confidence in its integrity… Public confidence is the backbone of public authorities, and it enables them to fulfill their function.

See Eisenberg [6], at 261 (Barak, P.); see also Itzchak Zamir, Political Appointments, 20 Mishpatim 23 (1990) [101]. It was therefore held that:

The appointment of a person with a criminal past – especially a serious criminal past, such as a person who committed an offense involving moral turpitude – harms the essential interests of the public service. It undermines its proper functioning. It undermines the moral and personal authority of the office holder and his ability to convince and lead. It undermines the confidence that the general public has for the organs of government.

See Eisenberg [6], at 261. It is therefore clear that a person’s criminal past is an important consideration concerning his suitability for public office. Eisenberg [6] addressed the government’s decision to appoint Yosef Ginosar as director-general of the Ministry of Construction & Housing, despite his involvement in the “Bus 300” and Nafso affairs. The judgment referred to the trustee status of public authorities, and their duty to consider the criminal past of a potential public servant.

A public authority is a trustee and it has a duty to consider the criminal past of a candidate before making an appointment. The appointment of a public servant with a criminal past affects the functioning of a public authority and the attitude of the public to it. It has both direct and indirect ramifications on the public’s confidence in the authority. The authority making the appointment must take these considerations into account … A public authority does not run like a business, and it has a duty of trust to the public. It may employ workers with a criminal past, and the consideration of rehabilitating the criminal should be taken into account. Nonetheless, it is not the only consideration. The public authority must review an intricate and complex array of considerations, including the consideration relating to the effect of the appointment on the civil service and the public’s confidence in it.

Id. at 258 (Barak, P). In another case, which dealt with the appointment of Itamar Rabinovitz as Israeli ambassador to the United States, the Court ruled:

A criminal past does not disqualify the candidate. It merely influences the decision of the appointing authority. See HCJ 727/88 Awad v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at 491. When exercising its discretion, the appointing authority – the Prime Minister in the present case – must take into account a host of factors. Assuming that the candidate is fit for the post in all other respects, the appointing authority must also give weight to the criminal past of the candidate.

The weight given to a criminal past is not set in stone. It varies according to the nature of the criminal past and its circumstances on the one hand, and the nature of the office and its essential objectives on the other. When the different considerations point in different directions, balance must be sought according to the basic axioms of Israeli law… Sometimes the case is a borderline one. The criminal past is weighed against all the other considerations. In such cases, any decision made by the appointing authority is legitimate, and this Court will not substitute the discretion of the public authority with its own.

See HCJ 194/93 MK Gonen Segev v. Minister of Foreign Affairs [48], at 61-62.

18. The same applies when considering the candidacy of an publicly elected official for the office of minister or deputy-minister. There, too, the Prime Minister is entitled – and at times even required – to take into account the candidate’s involvement in criminal proceedings. This was noted in Pinhasi [5]:

We accept that an elected public official is not the same as a civil servant. The elected official is chosen by the people and is subject to their evaluation. The civil servant is chosen by the people’s representatives and is subject to their evaluation. However, this does not mean that the elected official is accountable to the voter alone and is not bound by the law. The opinion of the voters does not influence the evaluation of the courts, and it is unable to change this evaluation. The very fact that he is chosen by the people requires him to act in a more exacting and ethical manner than a ‘regular’ civil servant. Someone elected by the people must be a model citizen. He must be accountable to the public and deserving of the trust the people place in him. Therefore, when a government authority is granted the power to terminate an office, it must exercise this power where the official undermines the public’s trust in the authority. This applies whether the official is elected – as in a Member of Knesset serving as a deputy-minister – or is a public servant who may be dismissed by a minister.

Id. at 470 (Barak, P). Therefore:

The differentiation between an elected official and a public servant, though important, does not grant the elected official immunity against the termination of his tenure if he is suspected of committing serious crimes.

Id. at 472. The efficient functioning of the government, the integrity of its members, and the confidence of the public in them, are all cornerstones of Israel’s system of governance.

In an enlightened democratic society, public officials, who are elected by the people and enjoy the confidence of the people, are required to conform to a high standard of ethical behavior – both on the personal and public planes – to enable them to continue to serve in office.

See HCJ 251/88 Wajia Udeh v. The Head of the Jaljulia Local Council [49], at 839. These fundamental concepts also received expression in the words of President Shamgar, regarding the objectives of the version of the Basic Law: The Government which was current at that time, which granted the Prime Minister the power to remove a minister from office.

The provisions of the said law are also intended to facilitate a proper response – through removal from office – to a serious affair in which the minister was involved. This applies when the incident, being an act or a failure to act, has ramifications for the status of the government or the public’s perception of it. It also applies if the affair undermines the government’s ability to lead and serve as an example, or its ability to instill fitting modes of conduct. Most importantly, the provisions apply when the affair has ramifications for the public’s trust in the system of governance and law, its values, and the duties which the average citizen must fulfill as a result.

See Deri [47], at 404.

The powers granted to the Prime Minister to appoint and dismiss ministers thus serve to improve the government’s image and functioning, and public confidence in it. A radical deviation from the range of reasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of these powers constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.

19. There is no doubt that the range of reasonableness afforded to Prime Minister when determining the composition of his government is very wide. This is due both to the status of the Prime Minister as head of the executive branch and the nature of the power with which we are dealing. The wide leeway afforded to the Prime Minister in this regard is a direct result of the lack of legal principles which are effective tools in the administration of the executive branches in the modern state.

The power of the Prime Minister to determine the composition of his government is a:

[S]pecial type of power, due to both the Prime Minister’s role in the formation of the government and to the political character of the government. It encompasses a vast array of considerations and spans a wide range of reasonableness.

Bar-On  [3] at 58 (Zamir, J.). After all, who could be better placed than the Prime Minister to divide up the appointments in the government he is forming? Who other than the Prime Minister could take into account all the delicate balances and differing needs of forming a government? Who other than the Prime Minister could weigh all the parliamentary, political, and factional considerations which are an inextricable part of the process? On the last question, it has been remarked:

Parliamentary and political considerations may be legitimate under certain circumstances, though they must be examined as part of a proper balance of the other considerations.

Deri [47], at 423 (Shamgar, P). To these words, Justice Levin added:

When the Prime Minister is required to exercise his discretion [regarding the dismissal of a minister – E.R.], he may consider parliamentary and political aspects. As stated above, the function of a minister is both political and administrative. I consider it natural and self-evident that the Prime Minister will seek to preserve his government from disintegration. For the sake of this vital aim he may, in an appropriate case, overlook ‘deviations’ in the conduct of his ministers, such as outbursts against the binding decisions of the government and even antagonism towards such decisions. These things are a function of politics whose credibility is examined by the Knesset and the voter.

Id. at 427. In the same case it was noted:

As distinct from civil servants, who are subject to the State Service Law (Appointments), 1959, ministers and deputy-ministers are not appointed solely on the basis of their abilities, talents and personal qualities. Rather, party and coalition interests are at the basis of these appointments. The structure of public life is not weakened by the appointment of a minister or deputy-minister who is not endowed with especially superior character traits, or who is not appropriate for the position.

Id. at 428 (Goldberg, J). In a similar vein:

The discretion granted in the Basic Law: The Government regarding the dismissal of a deputy-minister is extremely wide. Among other considerations, the authority holder is permitted, and even obligated, to consider the deputy-minister’s performance and success in the job. “Political” considerations, which may be invalid in other contexts, are appropriate reasons for dismissing a deputy-minister. The need to form a coalition and to guarantee the continuing confidence of the Knesset is certainly a pertinent consideration.

See Pinhasi [5], at 463 (Barak, P).

20. The Prime Minister is thus empowered with the authority to form the government. This is the law, as evidenced clearly by sections 7, 13 and 22 of the Basic Law, and it is also the natural state of affairs. The power to appoint and dismiss ministers is a discretionary one. This discretion is wide, as it encompasses a host of considerations and a significant political dimension. It is regarding such discretion that the Court recognizes a wide “range of deference.”

Accordingly, the Court must set itself a narrow range of intervention regarding the Prime Minister’s decisions on the formation of his government, and exercise its powers of judicial review with caution.

The balance necessitates that this Court’s intervention in the discretion of those authorized to remove a minister or deputy-minister from office should be sparing and limited to those situations where the gravity of the offense cannot be reconciled with his continued service.

See Deri [47], at 429 (Goldberg, J.). This is how the appropriateness of intervention should be decided. The Prime Minister’s discretion, so long as there is no radical deviation from the standard of reasonableness, should not be scrutinized by the Court. The public should examine the Prime Minister’s discretion using the means available to it in a democratic society, as should the Knesset, via the powers granted it by law. Justice Zamir noted this in Bar-On  [3]:

The section which grants the Prime Minister the power to remove a minister from office is intended mainly to prevent “corruption” in the government. For this purpose the law has afforded the Prime Minister discretion so wide that any decision to dismiss a minister whose conduct has deviated from the norm will fall, generally speaking, within the range of reasonableness. The Court will not intervene in such a decision. Similarly, the Prime Minister’s decision not to remove a minister from office will also generally fall within the range of reasonableness. In such cases the Court will also not intervene in this decision. Both of these decisions were entrusted by law to the Prime Minister, and not to the Court. The Prime Minister will be held accountable for his decision by the Knesset and by the public, and they may respond, should they so desire, via avenues which the law opens to them.

Id. at 59-60.

It should be emphasized that appointments of government ministers must be approved by the Knesset, as provided in section 13(d) of the Basic Law. This states that:

The government is constituted when the Knesset has expressed confidence in it, and the ministers shall then assume office.

The fact that every minister’s appointment has received parliamentary approval should not be discounted.

Improper Conduct of a Minister

21. We stated above that the range of prime ministerial discretion with regard to the formation of a government is wide. In contrast, the place for judicial intervention in this discretion is narrow. Nevertheless, the Court’s powers of intervention in a decision of the Prime Minister to appoint or dismiss a minister whose conduct has been improper are not limited to a case where the minister has actually been convicted of an offense. Nor are they limited to cases where an indictment was filed against the minister or where he was the subject of a police investigation. The Court has held:

The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case may be so serious that it would be extremely unreasonable to permit him to continue his tenure. This could apply even in cases when no criminal offense was actually committed.

Bar-On  [3], at 64. However, it is clear that a conviction of a serious crime cannot be compared to a conviction of a minor crime. It is also clear that being convicted is not the same as being indicted, and being indicted is not the same as being investigated by the police. Finally, none of these are comparable to situations in which it is found that no grounds exist for prosecuting an individual, or where the actions attributed to that individual are within public ethical norms. The balance between the various considerations depends on the severity of the acts attributed to the candidate, and whether the suspicion is sufficient to warrant a charge or conviction. As was noted in Eisenberg [6]:

Someone who committed an offense in his childhood cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense as an adult; someone who committed one offense cannot be compared with someone who committed many offenses; someone who committed a minor offense cannot be compared with someone who committed a serious offense; someone who committed an offense in mitigating circumstances cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense in aggravating circumstances; someone who committed an offense and expressed regret cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense and did not express any regret for it; someone who committed a ‘technical’ offense cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense involving moral turpitude; someone who committed an offense many years ago cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense only recently; someone who committed an offense in order to further his own agenda cannot be compared with someone who committed an offense in the service of the State.

 

Id. at 261 (Barak, P.). In the two cases where this Court determined that the Prime Minister had an obligation to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister, an indictment alleging serious crimes had been filed against that minister or deputy-minister. Thus, in Deri [47], it was determined that the Prime Minister’s failure to remove Arye Deri from the post of Minister of the Interior constituted extreme unreasonableness. An indictment had in fact been filed against Deri, accusing him of corruption which was “extremely severe.” In that case, the Court noted that a guilty verdict had not yet been handed down against Deri.

 

An indictment is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collated by the prosecution. However, as far as continued office in the government is concerned, even the prima facie evidence collated in the indictment, which has now become public knowledge, is of significance. There are circumstances which are significant in terms of the reasonableness [of continuing office], not just a conclusive judicial ruling but also the nature of the actions attributed to someone, since they wear the official dress of an accusation ready for presentation to the court.

[I]f a minister who is charged with receiving hundreds of thousands of shekels in bribes, and other forms of abuse of public office, continues to serve in the government, this could have serious ramifications for the image of government in Israel, and for its good faith and integrity. This has a direct effect on the question of reasonableness pursuant to the provisions of law.

Id. at 422-23. Justice Levin commented on this issue:

There are situations in which, due to the nature of the offense and the circumstances in which it was committed, it must be asked whether [the minister] should continue serving in his position.

I do not suggest that we lay down any hard and fast rules on this subject and decide in a sweeping manner when and how conclusions should be drawn. For, first and foremost, it is the political system which must react, within the framework of the proper political-democratic process. But there may be exceptional situations, such as the one before us, when our intervention is required, in order to lay down specific standards of conduct.      

It seems to me, for example, that if, heaven forbid, an indictment based on prima facie evidence is brought against a minister, indicating that he is suspected of serious offenses ignominious in nature and circumstance – such as, purely for illustration purposes, if a minister is charged with accepting bribes, with fraud, with cheating state authorities, with lying or with making falsifying documents – then it would not be proper or reasonable for him to continue in office.

Id. at 426-27.

22. The Pinhasi case [5] also concerned the continuation of tenure of a deputy-minister who was indicted for allegedly making false entries in corporate documents, false testimony, and an attempt to receive goods by fraud. The Court related to the impact of an indictment upon the discretion of the Prime Minister:

Clearly a public servant who has been convicted of an offense is not the same as one who has only been indicted. The difference is expressed in the weight to be attached to considerations of public confidence, but not in the actual requirement to take such a consideration into account.

Id. at 462 (Barak, P). Furthermore:

Weight must be attached to the consideration of the public’s confidence in the public authorities when a public servant is convicted or confesses to the deeds attributed to him. But this differs from the weight attached when the issue is merely the filing of an indictment in a case where the accused insists on his innocence. Nonetheless, this should not be the deciding consideration. The issue at hand concerns the act of termination of office by the government authority. No criminal conviction is necessary to substantiate this act. The pressumption of innocence granted to every accused does not prevent the termination of tenure of a government official. The only condition is that the government authority making the decision must have evidence which, in light of the circumstances, is such that “any reasonable person would see its probative value and would rely on it.”

Id. at 467-68. Indeed, in that case, it was determined that the offenses allegedly committed by the deputy-minister indicated a “moral defect” in his conduct. Therefore, it was held, the offenses could be classified as “offenses of moral turpitude in the particular circumstances.” In light of this, it was concluded that for the deputy-minister to continue in his tenure, after being charged with such serious offenses, would harm both the respect that the citizen feels towards the government and the public’s confidence in the government authorities. The government’s paradigm of leadership would be undermined, and the credibility of the deputy-minister would be significantly damaged. The Court therefore determined that the only reasonable recourse was to terminate the deputy-minister’s tenure. Id. at 469. See also Avigdor Klagsbald, Public Duty, ‘Criminal Past’ and Administrative Evidence, 2 HaMishpat 93 (1995) [102].

The conclusion which follows from all this is that, even though an indictment carries less weight than a conviction, indictment for a serious offense may obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister. Deri and Pinhasi show that the existence of an indictment alleging serious offenses, based on prima facie evidence, is sufficient to harm the public’s trust and the integrity of the public service and, as such, necessitates the dismissal of the minister or deputy-minister.

23. What, therefore, would the law be in those cases in which no indictment was filed? This Court could be required to review the Prime Minister’s discretion concerning the tenure of an individual guilty of unacceptable, but not criminal, conduct. Before us we have a case in which the law enforcement authorities have decided not to press charges against a minister due to the lack of a reasonable chance of a conviction. To the best of their professional knowledge, the defendant would be acquitted in court if there was an indictment. In such cases, I am of the opinion that it would require truly extreme and exceptional circumstances in order for the Court to obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from making an appointment or to terminate one.

It is worth pointing out here that, as we have already detailed, the Basic Law: The Government outlines, in subsections 6(c) and 23(b), the concerning the appointment and dismissal of a minister. These sections explicitly provide the ramifications of a minister’s conviction of an offense. The Deri and Pinhasi cases also set out the law governing the termination of tenure. When those cases were decided, the 1997 version of the Basic Law, which contained no provision requiring the dismissal of a minister convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, was in effect. The Court, in making these rulings, acted without recourse to any of the statutory criteria which now exist. Sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law of 2001 pertain to the fitness of a minister to serve. As we have seen, these sections do not rule out judicial review of the Prime Minister’s discretion even in cases that do not fall within the categories mentioned. Therefore, the precedents of Deri and Pinhasi still stand.

In this manner, the court has created a fine balance between the obligation of deference which applies to situations such as these, and the other considerations with which this Court is charged. However, the further we depart from the statutory criteria of fitness, the harder it will be, according to the existing law, to regard the appointment of a minister, or the non-termination of his tenure, as an extreme deviation from the range of reasonableness. The loss inherent to expanding the limits of the precedents set by this Court is liable to be greater than the gain.

24. In examining the Prime Minister’s discretion to appoint a minister who was investigated but not indicted, we need not look far for a precedent. Respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, was himself the subject of a ruling of this Court approximately six years ago, in Bar-On [3]. At that time, the same petitioner requested that we order the Prime Minister to dismiss Hanegbi from the post of Minister of Justice. As explained above, Hanegbi’s name was at that time linked to three out of the four affairs which petitioner brings against him today, namely: the “brawling affair” of 1982; the ISTA affair, which lasted from 1982 to 1992; and the Bar-On affair of 1997. No one argues that there is any material difference between the Ministry of Justice, which Hanegbi led during Bar-On [3], and the Ministry of Public Security, which he now heads. Therefore we can shed light on the case at hand using the previous ruling.

In Bar-On [3] this Court determined that:

There never was and never will be a situation in which a sullied reputation is enough to obligate the Prime Minister by law to remove a minister from his position.

Id. at 57 (Zamir, J.). The Court further expounded:

There is no doubt that it is legitimate to demonstrate disapproval of a minister’s conduct if it diverges from the standards of what is right and proper. The public expects that every minister, as a leader of the public, shall set an example of proper conduct. This applies even more to the public’s expectations of the Minister of Justice.

Id. at 59 (Zamir, J.). As emphasized by Justice Zamir, the power to appoint ministers belongs to the Prime Minister and it is an undeniably broad power. The Prime Minister may decide to dismiss a minister whose conduct diverges from acceptable standards, or he may decide to retain such a minister. Both decisions will generally be within the range of reasonableness.

The responsibility for either of these decisions was entrusted by the law to the Prime Minister, and not to the Court. The Prime Minister is held accountable for his decisions by the Knesset and by the public, and these bodies may respond, if they so desire, using the means provided by law.

Id. at 60. Moreover:

The Court may refrain from intervening in the Prime Minister’s decision on whether or not to remove a minister on account of unacceptable conduct. However, by so doing the Court does not imply that the Prime Minister’s decision is correct and appropriate, any more than it implies that the minister’s conduct itself is appropriate. The Court merely affirms that the Prime Minister’s decision and the minister’s conduct have not broken the law. It does not mean that they are not unethical. It is certainly possible that were the Court in the Prime Minister’s shoes, it would made a different decision, and it is also possible that the Court does not approve of the minister’s conduct. However, the ethical responsibility for the administrative authority, as well as the responsibility for its efficiency and wisdom, as distinct from its legal responsibility, is not entrusted to the Court.

Id. at 61 (Zamir, J.). Furthermore:

The court system aspires, by means of legislation and precedent, to raise the ethical standards of society, and also improve the conduct of the public administration. This is its purpose. It is a worthwhile purpose and one it performs well. It has succeeded in promoting values and inculcating the standards of a civilized society.

However, the law cannot and should not replace ethics – except to a limited extent, on a case-by-case basis, in a controlled and cautious manner…

The same applies regarding the conduct of publicly elected officials. The law does not respond to the conduct of elected public officials except in very serious situations, where unethical conduct is likely to become illegal conduct…

The Court’s decision that a minister or deputy-minister is unfit for service creates tension between the law and the democratic system. The law is built, to a large extent, on values, whereas democracy is built, first and foremost, on representation… The Court is required to achieve a balance between these two interests.

Id. at 62-63. In a different context Justice Zamir emphasized:

The Court must also take into account the fact that every so often the public desires to be represented by an individual who is known not to be of sterling character.

See Dis.App. 4123/95 Or v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner [50], at 190.

25. Similar sentiments were expressed by Justice Dorner, in a separate case concerning the eligibility of MK Pinhasi to serve as chairman of the Knesset Committee. Pinhasi had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Justice Dorner pointed out that:

It is indeed legitimate for there to be a review of the reasons why respondent, who has been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, was elected chairman of a committee which possesses quasi-judicial powers.

It is possible that this choice carries an undesirable message. But this is a matter of taste, which is given over to the discretion of the Knesset Committee. And when the time comes this discretion will be subject to the public’s approval.

See HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney-General [51], at 557-58. It was also noted:

The issue is not whether the Knesset Committee’s decision to appoint MK Pinhasi as its chairman was a good one or not. This is a matter of rights and obligations, authorities and powers. It is true that the Knesset Committee’s decision sent shockwaves beyond the realm of the Knesset; but these shockwaves are still too weak to require the exercise of power in the judicial realm.

Id. at 562-63 (Cheshin, J).

26. It is clearly no simple matter for the law to deal with conduct that is improper but not illegal. It is even more of a stretch to impose an obligation on the Prime Minister, on grounds of reasonableness, to remove a minister accused of such conduct from office. As Justice Zamir pointed out in Bar-On [3], the balance that must be struck is substantive and not mechanical in nature. Therefore, we must not ignore the possibility – albeit a remote one in my eyes – that even conduct of a minister or deputy-minister that does not amount to a criminal offense, can obligate the Prime Minister to remove him from office. However, in order for this Court to rule in this manner, the conduct of this minister must be

[S]o extremely severe as to be extremely unreasonable to permit him to continue in office.

Id. at 63-64. In order for the Court to conclude that it must order the Prime Minister to remove a minister from office, despite the fact that the latter has not been convicted or even indicted, the circumstances must be exceptional and extreme.

There exists a vast difference between an extreme situation like this, which forms an exception to the law, and a broad ruling which would render unfit any minister or deputy-minister whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards. The proposal to expand the existing ruling so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss the minister or deputy-minister, even though it has good intentions, is not appropriate. It is likely to do more harm than good.

Id. And in the same case, it was also noted:

Only in the most extreme cases would the Court require the Prime Minister to exercise his power [to remove a minister from his position]. These cases would involve the existence of administrative evidence of serious criminal offenses. Such a situation would constitute a serious risk to public confidence in the government authorities. To this might also be added cases of extreme deviation from the integrity required of individuals in the high office of minister.

Id. at 68 (Or, V.P.).

Do Tzahi Hanegbi’s actions constitute such extreme circumstances?

Hanegbi’s Actions

27. I have repeated dicta from Bar-On [3] concerning the Prime Minister’s decision to retain Hanegbi as Minister of Justice. I did so because I believe that there is no alternative other than to reach a similar conclusion in the case at hand.

As stated above, four affairs have been cited to discredit Hanegbi. The brawling affair resulted in Hanegbi’s conviction in 1982 for brawling in a public place, for which he received a suspended prison sentence and a fine. There is no doubt that for our purposes this is a trivial and ancient affair. The events at the basis of the “ISTA affair” also occurred more than twenty years ago, and culminated in the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute Hanegbi. The Court did not see fit to intervene in this decision. See Maoz [1], at 423. With regard to these two affairs, the words of President Barak in Eisenberg [6] are enlightening:

The lapse of time between the offense and the proposed appointment is an important factor. The more years that have passed, the weaker the link between the person and his crime. His appointment to public office will therefore not harm its functioning and the public’s confidence in him and the civil service. Indeed, a criminal past, even with regard to a serious offense, is not an absolute bar to appointment to public office. This applies even to a senior position. Time heals wounds. The candidate is rehabilitated. The “enlightened public” will no longer feel that his appointment harms the integrity of the service and its ability to function, but rather [that his disqualification is] a vindictive and inappropriate execution of “judgment.” In such circumstances, there can be no basis for regarding the appointment of such a candidate to public office as unreasonable. The period of time that must pass between the crime and serving the sentence and the appointment varies according to the circumstances.

Id. at 267. The third affair, the Bar-On affair, also did not culminate in an indictment against Hanegbi, due to lack of evidence. The State Attorney’s Office published its opinion, in which it condemned Hanegbi’s behavior, calling it “a deviation from the accepted standards of conduct.” Nonetheless, it concluded that such conduct did not amount to a criminal offense.

The point is that all three affairs were presented to the Court in Bar-On [3]. Yet the Court concluded that there was no reason to intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision not to remove Hanegbi from the office of Minister of Justice.

28. This leaves us with the fourth affair, the “Derech Tzleha” affair. We should recall that Hanegbi faced a Knesset Ethics Committee hearing on this matter, and as a result he was censured and his pay docked for two months. In terms of the criminal investigation, it was decided not to prosecute Hanegbi since the Attorney-General believed that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction, not even for breach of trust. In his report, the Attorney-General revealed that:

The scenario did, in our opinion, justify an inquiry, and we even considered that grounds existed for an indictment. However, there had to be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, which, with the completion of the file, was ultimately not the case.

 

It should also be noted that the Derech Tzleha investigation of Hanegbi took place while he was still Minister of Justice. For our purposes, the major differences between then and now are the final decision not to prosecute Hanegbi and the passage of time since the affair.

 

Under these circumstances, I believe that there is no justification whatsoever for differing from the conclusions of Bar-On [3]. It is true that the Derech Tzleha affair occurred since then, but this affair, like the Bar-On affair, did not culminate in an indictment. It may therefore be stated that the only thing that has changed since the ruling on Bar-On [3], is that once again the decision was made not to indict Hanegbi. This fact alone, based on the previous judgment concerning Hanegbi, is not sufficient to render a candidate unfit to serve as a minister. It seems to me, therefore, that if we are to follow the course charted by this Court – not so long ago and in a case pertaining to Hanegbi himself – in this case we must not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision.

The Derech Tzleha affair concluded with a “public report” published by the Attorney-General. The question must be asked: How else should the conclusions of the public report be acted upon, if not through the voter’s discretion in casting his vote, and the Prime Minister’s discretion to appoint the members of his government? The Derech Tzleha affair did not culminate in an indictment. It is therefore fitting that Hanegbi’s involvement in it should be resolved on the political level.

In any event, this affair does not constitute the necessary “extreme and exceptional circumstances” which would obligate the Court to intervene and order the Prime Minister to remove the minister. It should be emphasized that we do not turn a blind eye to the affairs in which Hanegbi has been involved. Not everything that we have seen pleases us. However, we must always remember that the public is also watching. Hanegbi’s actions, and the Prime Minister’s decisions regarding these, are under public scrutiny. The public will ultimately have its say about all it has seen.

29. Petitioner alleges that the cumulative force of these affairs is enough to push the Prime Minister’s decision regarding Hanegbi outside the range of reasonableness. This claim raises the question – what is this “cumulative force” which can topple the appointment of a minister? The cumulative force of the brawling affair, the ISTA affair and the Bar-On affair was not enough to render Hanegbi unfit to serve as Minister of Justice. Why then, when the weight of the Derech Tzleha affair is added, are the scales tipped towards the invalidation of Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security? No one can claim that this fine line is clearly demarcated. And it is apparent that in such cases we should aspire to find a guiding line. This line should, on the one hand, be flexible and enable a substantive examination of cases which arise in the future. On the other hand, its criteria must be as clear as possible, so that they may be applied in the future and acted upon accordingly. It is wrong to send a message which is unclear. Rather we ought to strive for a general precedent which will pave the way for future rulings. Therefore, we must be fully convinced that the situation requires the candidate be disqualified in order to interfere with the Prime Minister’s power to appoint ministers. The Court is not required to give its stamp of approval to the appointment of every public official who has behaved improperly or is suspected of such conduct. Nor is the candidate required to seek this approval before assuming the office designated by the Prime Minister.

30. It is noteworthy that the circumstances of Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair, as well as the Attorney-General’s opinion regarding his appointment as a minister, were brought to the Prime Minister’s attention after the elections for the Fifteenth Knesset. At that time the Prime Minister accepted the Attorney-General’s counsel – “counsel which was mainly from a civic perspective” – and refrained from appointing Hanegbi as a minister in any ministry responsible for law enforcement. After the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset, the Attorney-General once again offered his opinion to the Prime Minister. He stated that even though there existed no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, from a civic perspective, “the appointment itself is prima facie problematic.” After weighing all the considerations, the Prime Minister did decide to appoint Hanegbi to that office, and the reasons for his decision are detailed in his affidavit. The Prime Minister believed that Hanegbi had a number of points in his favor, including natural talents, vast knowledge and experience amassed during many years in senior public and state positions, and professional accomplishments. Additionally, the Prime Minister believed that Hanegbi’s personal philosophy and the nature of the position, besides the political and coalition considerations, made him the preferred candidate for Minister of Public Security.

The Prime Minister explained that he considered the various affairs to which Hanegbi’s name was linked, as well as allegations of the danger of a conflict of interest were Hanegbi to serve as Minister of Public Security. According to his affidavit, the Prime Minister also considered the Attorney-General’s position regarding the prima facie problem with the appointment. According to the Attorney-General, this problem remains from a civic perspective. Compare Daphne Barak-Erez, The High Court of Justice as Attorney-General, 5(2) Plilim 219 (1997) [103]. According to the Prime Minister, the scales were ultimately tipped in favor of appointing Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. The appointment was then approved by the Knesset, as provided in section 13(d) of Basic Law: The Government.

31. It is true, of course, that that the Court’s scales could have tipped the other way. The weight attached by the Court to the various considerations taken into account by the Prime Minister could have been different. But this Court is not a “supra-prime minister.” It is not for the Court to decide those matters which the Prime Minister is authorized to decide. The Court will not substitute its own discretion for that of the authorized power. The Court will not ask itself whether it would have acted in the same manner if the power were in its hands. The Court does not scrutinize the wisdom of the other government authorities, only the legality of their actions. See also Aharon Barak, On Power and Values in Israel, in I A Collection of Writings 382 (H. H. Cohen & Y. Zamir ed. 2000) [104]. When the Court examines the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decisions regarding the formation of his government, it recognizes that only in exceptional and rare cases should the Prime Minister’s discretion be replaced by that of the Court. The case at hand does not fall into that category.

32. Petitioner focuses on two reasons why Hanegbi should be dismissed: first, the possible damage to public confidence as a result of his appointment as minister in charge of public security and the police; and second, the risk of a conflict of interest in performing certain duties of the minister. With regard to the first reason, this is not enough to constitute grounds for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. We related to this above, and we would only add here that petitioner takes issue specifically with Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As far as this line of reasoning is concerned, there is nothing to stop Hanegbi from being appointed as a minister in a different ministry – except, perhaps, the Ministry of Justice. This position raises a difficulty. It is hard to imagine that an individual whose appointment as Minister of Public Security would cause such severe damage to the public’s trust that we must strike down the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him, would be able to head another ministry – such as the Ministry of Education or the Finance Ministry. It is difficult to accept that an individual who is so patently unfit to serve in a ministry responsible for law enforcement could, without any hindrance, serve in a ministry entrusted with the state’s foreign policy or its security.

We thus come to the second part of this petition, the concern regarding a conflict of interest. We shall assume that petitioner’s only claim against Hanegbi’s appointment specifically as Minister of Public Security is the fear of a conflict of interest in context of the minister’s role. Petitioner takes issue with Hanegbi’s ability to function as Minister of Public Security in light of his drastic change in status – from being interrogated by the police to leading the police as Minister of Public Security. Petitioner is of the opinion that ill will may remain between Hanegbi and those who investigated him. This being the case, the appointment of Hanegbi as overseer of his investigators may do irreparable harm to the functioning of the police, along with the public’s faith in it. Petitioner raises the possibility of a conflict of interest if and when the minister exercises his power regarding senior appointments in the Investigations Branch, as pursuant to section 7 of the Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971.

33. We would first state that respondents have raised doubts as to whether petitioner’s claim actually constitutes a conflict of interest. Indeed, this category is usually reserved for cases in which an individual has been entrusted with a certain interest, and there exists a substantial possibility of conflict between this interest and another. This could be either a proprietary or personal interest of his own, or another interest with which he has been entrusted. See CA 6763/98 Ram Carmi v. State of Israel [52], at 427-28; HCJ 531/79 Likud Faction of Petah Tikva v. City Council of Petah Tikva [53], at 566; Aharon Barak, Conflict of interest in the Performance of Office, 10 Mishpatim 11 (1980) [105].

The principle regarding conflicts of interest, as interpreted by the courts, prohibits a public servant from being in a situation of conflict between a government interest and a personal interest, or between two different government interests. See HCJ 244/86 Revivo v. The Head of the Ofakim Local Council [54], at 183. Apparently, in our case, petitioner’s allegation does not relate to an interest in conflict with the minister’s public duty. Rather, it relates to the possibility that Hanegbi may harbor a grudge against his investigators. Such feelings might influence decisions made by him concerning those investigators.

It should be made clear that the prohibition against conflicts of interest is intended to prevent decisions which are influenced by conflicting interests:

The fundamental purpose of the prohibition of conflict of interest is to guarantee public duty’s are fulfilled out of relevant considerations of the public good alone, and not out of outside influences and considerations. It also aims to ensure that the public’s confidence in the public authority is not damaged because the latter’s actions are liable to be influenced by outside considerations.

CA 6983/94 Shimon Pachima v. Michael Peretz [55], at 835. The following explains the reasoning behind the rule concerning conflicting interests:

First of all, there is a pragmatic reason. The public servant who has been entrusted with a certain power is required to exercise that power after reviewing all relevant considerations – and only these considerations. When the public servant is put into a situation of a conflict of interest, there is a concern that he may also take into account the conflicting interest when exercising his power. This may result in an improper use of the power. The law is designed to prevent this risk. Secondly, there is a matter of values. The existence of an orderly, fair and responsible public service requires the public’s faith that decisions taken by civil servants are germane and honest. A civil servant found in a situation of conflicting interests damages the public’s faith in the system of governance. The public begins to suspect that outside considerations are influencing civil servants and his faith in the system of governance is shaken. The law is designed to prevent this.

See Likud [53] at 571. It is clear that there exists a link between a conflict of interests and outside considerations.

When a public official is involved in a conflict of interest, the concern is raised that outside considerations may be guiding him. These outside considerations are likely to influence the functioning of the body he leads; to sway his decisions through irrelevant considerations; and cause him to stray from the path of proper administration.

HCJ 7805/00 Roni Aloni v. Comptroller of the Jerusalem Municipality [56], at 1121. The prohibition against conflicting interests comes, in other words, to prevent the damage caused by outside considerations, which stem from the conflicting interest.  Situations of possible conflicts of interests are frequently examined, and when there exists a reasonable concern of such a conflict, the result tends to be termination of office. “The goal is to prevent the trouble before it occurs.” See Likud [53], at 572.

On the other hand, there are situations where there is no concern of a conflict of interests, but only of an outside consideration which does not flow from a conflicting interest. In such cases, a post factum check will be performed. In general, we do not speak of a “concern (in advance) of outside considerations,” but rather of a post factum examination of whether the considerations behind the decision or action were appropriate or extraneous. See, Ron Menachem [37], at 235; HCJ 3975/95 Prof. Shmuel Caniel v. The Government of Israel [57], at 459. Regarding appointments to the civil service the Court has stated:

When a public official appoints a civil servant out of extraneous considerations of party-political interests, this appointment is invalid. It constitutes a betrayal of the public which authorized the appointing power.

HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance [58], at 35; see also HCJ 6673/01 The Movement for Quality Government v. The Minister of Transportation [59], at 808-9. The same applies with respect to outside considerations of vengefulness or grudges. There exists a dichotomy between the prevention of conflicting interests and the post factum inquiry into extraneous considerations. And the case at hand would apparently fall into the category of extraneous considerations.

However, regardless of whether we classify the case before us as a conflict of interests or a more general concern for outside considerations influencing the decisions of a minister – the end result will be the same. This is because it is clear to us that, in this case, petitioner’s claim does not carry the required weight to render the Prime Minister’s decision unreasonable.

We are not saying that vengefulness or a personal grudge, which influences the decision of an authority to appoint an individual to a particular position, does not constitute an extraneous consideration. It certainly is an extraneous consideration, and may thus cause the decision to be struck down. It is true that Hanegbi was investigated in the past by the police, who recommended he be tried. However, it is also true that the Attorney-General did not adopt the recommendation because he concluded that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction. This being the case, the facts are unable to substantiate a genuine concern – which is not merely theoretical – of any outside considerations guiding Hanegbi’s actions. We are not entitled to assume the existence of such a concern, which would render the Prime Minister’s decision unreasonable in the extreme.

A person’s anger can fester into a grudge, and a grudge into to feelings of vengefulness towards the object of the anger. By the same token, satisfaction with the conduct of a person or body can result in gratitude, which could lead to partiality and favoritism. But this is a mere possibility, and not a certainty. We have determined that the circumstances of this petition are not substantial enough to establish a factual presumption of any real concern that future actions of respondent 3 , will be tainted by extraneous considerations. In the absence of any evidence to substantiate the petitioner’s concern, there is no reason for this Court’s intervention.

Respondent 3 wishes to reinforce this conclusion with a theoretical example. Assume that the police investigated a case and reach the conclusion that there was nothing untoward in the actions of the individual under investigation. It would be ludicrous to argue, claims Hanegbi, that this person should not be appointed as the minister in charge of his former investigators, due to the concern that he might show partiality towards them. This example is somewhat divorced from the case at hand. It could be more closely likened to a case where an individual was prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor and was acquitted. The appointment of the acquitted individual to the position of Minister of Justice, the minister in charge of the Public Prosecutor, is not merely a  theoretical example. It has happened. And no one claimed that the appointment could not stand.

Hanegbi was not prosecuted. The reason for this was that the Attorney-General believed that he would have been acquitted. He notified the Prime Minister of his opinion. He also informed the Prime Minister that there was no legal impediment to the appointment of Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security. The Prime Minister refused to adopt the Attorney-General’s “civic” recommendation. This was his prerogative and does not constitute a cause for intervention under the circumstances.

We have already stated that the considerations which play a part in the decision to appoint a minister to a particular governmental position are many and varied. A sizeable portion of these are political considerations. The Court does not put itself in the Prime Minister’s shoes. It does not scrutinize the wisdom of the decision, it merely reviews its legality. In the circumstances of the case at hand, pursuant to the law as interpreted in previous rulings, we find it difficult to point to any illegality.

34. This decision also takes into account the nature of the minister’s powers in the matter at hand. We must not demean or belittle the importance of these powers. However, the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-director-general,” and in the context relevant to this case he has powers of supervision, authorization and the determination of policy. In its response to the petition, the state points out that with regard to the process of appointing high-ranking police officers, the minister’s exercise of his power is:

[S]ubject to the principles of administrative law. As such it is contingent on obligatory consultation, and consideration of the opinion the inspector-general of the police and additional professional bodies, prior to the appointment. As a rule, it is the police inspector-general who makes recommendations to the minister with respect to the

 

candidates for each and every position. This is because the inspector-general, as the head of the police system, will need to work with the officer who is appointed. The minister may only reject the inspector-general’s candidate, or the appointment of an individual to a position against the inspector-general’s recommendation, for very serious reasons. Such reasons are subject to judicial review.

It goes without saying that if, in the future, anyone should feel that a certain decision of Hanegbi regarding a particular officer was tainted by an administrative defect, such as a conflict of interest, partiality, or extraneous considerations, the doors of this Court are open to him.

35. In conclusion, we have not been convinced that the Prime Minister’s decision regarding Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security was extremely unreasonable to a degree that would warrant the Court’s intervention. As a result, we have no choice but to reject the petition. Under the circumstances, I would make no order for costs.

Vice-President T. Or

I have studied the opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, in depth, and I concur with his conclusion. My colleague set forth a broad thesis addressing the principles guiding the exercise of judicial review over administrative bodies. I agree with the majority of his findings. However, I wish to condense the scope of his thesis and apply it to the case at hand.

1. The petition before us was filed by the Movement for Quality Government in Israel. The petition is directed against the decision of respondent 1, the Prime Minster, to appoint respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the position of Minister of Public Security in the government formed after the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset. The central question of the petition is whether this Court should intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision and annul the appointment. It should be emphasized that the key word here is “intervention.” Our purpose here is not to decide whether the appointment of Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security was appropriate. That role is entrusted by law to the Prime Minister. Our task is to decide whether the appointment was flawed, in which case we have no choice other than to intervene and revoke it.

Factual Basis and Essence of the Petition

2. The facts as the basis of the petition have been detailed in the opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin. For sake of convenience, I shall briefly review these. Petitioner alleges that Hanegbi’s involvement in the four main affairs described in the petition makes him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

The first affair occurred in 1979. Respondent 3 was involved in a skirmish between students, as a result of which he was convicted, in 1982, of brawling in a public place. Hanegbi was fined and given a suspended prison sentence.

The second affair pertains to a complaint filed with the police in 1982 by Hanegbi and others. The complaint alleged that a number of leaders of the Student’s Union and of the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had perpetrated an act of fraud. As a result, a number of individuals were prosecuted, among them advocate Pinchas Maoz, who at the time served as external legal advisor to ISTA. Maoz was acquitted of all charges. In its judgment, the court related to the lack of credibility of Hanegbi’s testimony. As a result, Maoz and others asked that respondent 3 be charged with perjury. The Attorney-General decided not to file an indictment due to the small chance of a conviction. A petition against this decision was dismissed by this Court “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth.” See HCJ 3846/91 Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 439.

The third affair relates to the appointment of advocate Roni Bar-On to the position of Attorney-General. Respondent served at the time as Minster of Justice. As a result of allegations against Hanegbi regarding his involvement in this appointment, the police recommended that that Hanegbi be prosecuted for fraud and breach of trust. The Attorney-General decided to close the file for lack of evidence. The State Attorney’s Office issued a public report on the matter, criticizing respondent’s conduct. Nevertheless, it too maintained that his actions did not constitute a criminal offense. As a result of this affair, petitioner petitioned this Court requesting respondent’s removal from his position as Minister of Justice. The petition was rejected. See HCJ 2533/97 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [Bar-On [3]], at 46.

The fourth affair focuses on a non-profit organization by the name of Derech Tzleha which was headed by respondent. In a public report, the Attorney-General summarized the affair as follows: In 1994, respondent and MK Avraham Burg prepared a private bill aiming to enhance road safety. The draft legislation was placed before the Knesset and passed a preliminary reading, and was then transferred to the Finance Committee for deliberation. The committee put together a sub-committee, headed by Hanegbi, to work on the bill. While working to enact the National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, respondent established Derech Tzleha, which also promoted road safety. Initially, respondent served as chairman of the organization and at later became its director-general. For this he received a salary and other benefits from the organization. Directly and indirectly he ultimately pocketed most of the funds it had raised – some NIS 375,000. Hanegbi’s conduct in this matter was the subject of a hearing by the Knesset Ethics Committee. The committee decided that respondent had placed himself in a situation of conflicting interests and had benefited from work outside the Knesset while serving as an MK. Hanegbi was accordingly censured and his salary was frozen for two months.

Respondent’s actions were also investigated by the police, who recommended Hanegbi be indicted on several counts. Initially, the Attorney-General and the State Attorney maintained that respondent should be prosecuted for other offenses as well. However, following a further chain of events, the Attorney-General decided, with the consent of the State Attorney, not to file an indictment due to a lack of evidence.

In an amendment to its petition, petitioner detailed two further affairs in which the respondent was allegedly involved. One pertained to an advertisement in a propaganda newspaper disseminated to members of the Likud Party in the run-up to the elections for the Sixteenth Knesset. The ad praised Hanegbi’s efforts to appoint members of the Likud Party and Likud Central Committee to senior positions in the Ministry of the Environment. The other affair concerned a proposal which respondent brought before the government, while serving as Minister of Justice, regarding the appointment of members of the National Estates Commission. This proposal was adopted by the government. Petitioner maintains that respondent concealed the fact that those candidates had been declared unfit by the Appointments Review Committee. No order nisi was issued in either of the above two affairs. Furthermore, the factual basis that was presented before us was not sufficient to justify a detailed examination of the affairs.

3. Based on the above affairs, petitioner makes two central arguments against respondent’s appointment to the office of Minister of Public Security. Its first claim is that through his involvement in these affairs, respondent violated principles of ethics and sound administration, and therefore the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security was extremely unreasonable. Petitioner points to the affairs as a whole, alleging that their cumulative weight attests to respondent’s unfitness for the post of Minister of Public Security.

Its second claim is that as Minister of Public Security, respondent may find himself in a conflict of interest. He was investigated on more than one occasion by the police, who actually recommended that he be prosecuted – though this recommendation was not adopted by the Attorney-General. A conflict could arise if the minister were to find himself deciding the question of promotion for any of his former investigators. It would also arise when he has to allocate funds to various police departments and divisions under the charge of his investigators.

The Normative Framework

4. The normative framework for evaluating petitioner’s claims has been elucidated by my colleague, Justice Rivlin. In this matter too, I do not intend to repeat all that has been said, but only the essential parts necessary for a decision in this matter.

The task of forming a government is assigned by the President to the Member of Knesset who is the designated Prime Minister. The constitution of the government and the assumption of office by the ministers take effect when the Knesset expresses its confidence in the government. See sections 7(a), 13(c) and, 13(d) of Basic Law: The Government. Section 6 of Basic Law: The Government lists a number of criteria for the eligibility of ministers. See also section 23(b). None of the criteria for unfitness provided by the law have been found to apply to respondent. Nevertheless, the statutory criteria provided by law do not constitute an exhaustive list of causes for rendering a person unfit to be a minister. The appointing body must take into account a candidate’s criminal history and past conduct when considering whether or not to appoint them as minister, or to any other public position. See HCJ 6177, 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing [6], at 261-67. Should the appointing body ignore the relevant considerations, or ascribe inappropriate weight to all or some of them, this may be indicative of extreme unreasonableness, and the decision may be struck down by the Court on grounds of unlawfulness.

Whether the Court intervenes in an administrative decision or refrains from such intervention depends on the status and role of the body under review. The nature of the decision under scrutiny is also a consideration. The Court addressed this in Bar-On [3], where it stated:

The range of reasonableness of every administrative authority depends on the nature of its power, the language and purpose of its authorizing law, the identity of the authorized body, the issue addressed by the power, and whether the power is exercised mainly on the basis of factual considerations, policy considerations, or professional criteria, such as medical or engineering evaluations. The range of reasonableness varies according to these factors: it may widen or narrow depending on the circumstances. In accordance with this the judicial review varies as well. Even though the principle of reasonableness which governs the exercise of judicial review is the same with respect to each and every authority, the application of the principle may vary from authority to authority, depending on the range of reasonableness. The wider the range of reasonableness, the more limited will be the review.

Id. at 57; see also HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney [2],  at 28-32; HCJ 2624/97 Ronel Yedid. v. State of Israel [4], at 71.

5. No one disputes that the Prime Minister’s authority to form a government is discretionary in character and thus subject to the review of this Court. See HCJ 4267/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at 441 [Pinhasi [5]]; HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]], at 404. However, there is also no dispute that when the Prime Minister exercises his discretion to appoint a minister, there exists an extremely wide range of reasonableness within which the Court will not intervene. This is due both to the Prime Minister’s status as a publicly elected official and the head of the executive body, and the nature of this authority.

The unique character of a prime ministerial decision on the makeup of the government and its ramifications for the scope of judicial review were discussed in Bar-On [3] in connection to the dismissal of a minister. That case determined that the Prime Minister’s authority is one-of-a-kind, both due to the status of the Prime Minister in forming the government and the political character of the government. When exercising this authority, a plethora of considerations are taken into account. Id. 58-59. See also Yahav [2], at 28-32; and Deri [47] (Shamgar, P. and Levine, J. ).

We further note that, in the present case, the appointing authority was elected by the public and stands on the top rung of executive ladder. Additionally, his appointment of a minister requires the approval of the Knesset. In the case at hand, the Knesset expressed confidence in the government and caused the appointment to take effect. The judicial review is thus applied to a decision of the Prime Minister that has received the approval of the Knesset. As a result, the scope of the judicial review of this decision is narrow and restricted. Nonetheless, in cases where this Court is convinced that the Prime Minister’s decision showed extreme lack of reasonableness, it will not hesitate to exercise its powers of review.

Moving from the general to the specific, we will first evaluate the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decision in light of the past affairs in which respondent 3 was involved. We will then discuss the claim that respondent could find himself in a conflict of interest while occupying the position of Minister of Public Security.

Reasonableness of the Decision – Previous Affairs

7. In order to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision in the case at hand, we will first present the Prime Minister’s reasons for appointing Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. These considerations, detailed in his affadavit, were as follows:

16. My decision to appoint Minister Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security was made after I had evaluated all the relevant considerations, including the advice of the Attorney-General and the basis of this advice… and I struck a proper balance among these considerations. Among other factors, I took into account the minister’s many talents, his many years of experience in various demanding public and state offices, the gravity of the role of head of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as other coalition-related considerations, all of which are now detailed.

17. Minister Tzahi Hanegbi has served, over a continuous period of many years, in a number of high-ranking and demanding public and governmental offices. These have included: Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office; Minister of Health; Minister of the Environment; Minister of Transportation; Member of the Twelfth through Sixteenth Knessets inclusive; Chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee; Member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; and Member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

In addition, for a period of approximately three years, between 1996 and 1999, Hanegbi served as Minister of Justice, within which framework he served as a member of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs – the so-called “State Security Cabinet”; as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and Law Enforcement; as Chairman of the Committee for the Selection of Judges; as a Member of the Committee for the Selection of Military Judges; and as a Member of the Ministerial Committee for Privatization.

Over the last two decades, I have become personally acquainted with the abilities and talents of Minister Hanegbi. In view of Hanegbi’s many professional achievements in all of the offices in which he served as minister, I have chosen him to serve as the Minister of Public Security, an office which currently faces unique and extremely important challenges.

Minister Hanegbi has a broad national perspective, which was expressed during his years as Minister of Justice, notwithstanding his investigation during that term regarding the Derech Tzleha affair. He has a wealth of experience in the management of complex ministries; and a broad knowledge in the field of security, which he gained in a variety of public roles, as listed above. It is my belief that all this qualifies him to successfully run the Ministry of Public Security.

In my view, the nature of the position offered to Minister Hanegbi and the particular powers exercised by the Minister of Public Security do not create any significant concern of conflicts of interest which might affect the minister’s conduct or impair his professionalism and the integrity of his discretion when exercising his authority … We need to remember that the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-Inspector-General” who wields direct control over all matters pertaining to Israel Police, and this is true especially insofar as the Investigations Branch is concerned…

At the time of making the decision, I considered the position of the Attorney-General with respect to the Derech Tzleha affair. The Attorney-General regarded Hanegbi’s appointment as being prima facie problematic from a civic perspective, though from the strictly legal standpoint, according to statutes and case law, there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment.

In this regard, it should be noted that the actions attributed to Minister Hanegbi occurred between 1994 and the beginning of 1996. When Minister Hanegbi was interrogated, he did not take advantage of his right to silence. Rather he cooperated in full with his investigators. In my view, these facts were significant to the decision not to indict Hanegbi and for public confidence in him.

18. I have taken into account all of the relevant considerations, which include  the qualifications and abilities required of the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General’s position, and Minister Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair and the other affairs, Hanegbi’s capabilities and his experience, as well as political and coalition considerations. After giving these considerations their appropriate weight,, it cannot be said that the decision to appoint Hanegbi deviates in an extreme manner from the standard of reasonableness (emphasis not in the original).

As such, we see that the Prime Minister did not ignore respondent’s involvement in the various affairs cited by petitioner, including the Derech Tzleha affair. However, after he weighed respondent’s role in these affairs against other considerations, which included respondent’s qualifications, coalition-related needs, and other considerations mentioned by him, he decided to appoint respondent.

8. Among the considerations that an administrative authority, including the Prime Minister, must take into account when appointing a public official is the candidate’s criminal past. Clearly a criminal conviction is not required in order to justify a decision not to appoint a particular person. Convincing administrative evidence of serious crimes which pose a genuine risk to public confidence is all that is required. Moreover, an administrative authority must also consider behavior of the candidate that deviates from the norms of sound administration and ethics, even if these do not amount to a criminal offense. Nonetheless, the existence of administrative evidence of a crime, or of conduct that deviates from public norms or ethical principles, is not necessarily enough to force the administrative authority to not to make the appointment. The authority must consider the nature and severity of the acts attributed to the candidate and balance this against other considerations, such as the abilities of the candidate and his suitability for the position. See para. 17 of the decision of my colleague, Justice Rivlin.

There may be situations in which evidence exists of serious criminal offenses committed by a candidate and, as a result, his abilities or qualifications, manifold as these may be, do not justify his appointment as a minister. Therefore, the central question in this case is whether, in light of the evidence submitted by petitioner regarding the conduct of respondent 3, the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security is marred by an extreme lack of reasonableness and requires our intervention.

My answer to this is negative. I will now examine each piece of evidence adduced by petitioner. Later I will examine whether the cumulative weight of all the evidence should have caused the Prime Minister to decide against the appointment.   

9. With respect to the decision of conviction in the brawling affair, I concur with the conclusion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, that it is an “ancient and trivial affair.” The crime which respondent was  convicted of took place 24 years ago and he has served his sentence. The offense did not involve moral turpitude or lack of integrity. This conviction has been erased from legal memory. See sections 14 and 16 of the Criminal Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders Law, 1981.

Similarly, more than twenty years have elapsed since the ISTA affair, and it has been relegated to the history books. As stated above, the Attorney-General decided at the time not to prosecute respondent over the affair, and we did not see fit to intervene with his decision. In light of more than two decades of wide and varied public activity by respondent since then, including his appointment as Minister of Justice, I believe that the affair does not invalidate respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. 

10. We now consider the Bar-On affair. As was stated above, due to respondent’s involvement in this affair the police recommended that Hanegbi be charged with fraud and breach of trust. Ultimately the Attorney-General decided not to indict respondent. The State Attorney issued an opinion on the matter, noting that “even among us [in the State Attorney’s Office] there were those who maintained that there were grounds for prosecuting the Minister of Justice.” However, in the end, after evaluating the evidence, the final conclusion was that “respondent’s conduct did not amount to a criminal offense.”  Nevertheless, the State Attorney saw fit to express her own opinion regarding one of the affairs examined, saying that it was not a crime “even though it was a deviation from the norms of proper conduct.”

All of the evidence presented by petitioner in the case at hand was examined by this Court in Bar-On [3]. Yet, the Court decided, in light of the circumstances, that the Prime Minister’s decision not to dismiss respondent as Minister of Justice did not deviate from the range of reasonableness, and did not justify intervention.

As an interim conclusion, we note that none of the three affairs discussed until this point, whether viewed individually or cumulatively, disqualify respondent from service as a minister, not even as Minister of Justice or Public Security. This is clear in light of this Court’s decision in Bar-On [3].

We have yet to evaluate the fourth affair, the Derech Tzleha affair. This affair is most relevant to the case at hand, being the only addition to the factual basis which was previously presented to this Court in Bar-On [3]. Regarding this affair, petitioner adduces two pieces of administrative evidence which the Prime Minister should have considered when evaluating respondent’s candidacy for a ministerial position in his government. These are the opinion of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee. Is this evidence sufficient to justify respondent’s removal from the office of Minister of Public Security? We shall first consider the opinion of the Attorney-General.

12. At a certain point during the Derech Tzleha affair, the relevant bodies maintained that grounds existed for indicting respondent. The police recommended that respondent be charged with taking bribes, fraud, breach of trust, and other offenses. The evidence was examined by the State Attorney who decided to prosecute respondent for the offenses of fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, and falsifying corporate documents. After hearing respondent’s version of events, the Attorney-General, with the State Attorney’s consent, decided to prosecute respondent for fraud and breach of trust, as well as other offenses. The file was transferred to the Jerusalem District Attorney for the final preparation of the charge sheet. At this point, difficulties arose in proving the various elements of the crime and a decision was made not to prosecute respondent. In the report written by the Attorney-General on this matter, he summarizes his opinion as follows:

13. At the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest was strong enough to amount to a “corrupt” breach of trust which damages public confidence according to the criteria provided in the clause on the need for proof of suspected crimes. This is especially true regarding proof of the criminal intent required in these offenses, that MK Hanegbi was aware that he was acting in a corrupt manner which was detrimental to the public.

 

14. These evidentiary difficulties are primarily the result of the fact that the organization from which Hanegbi received benefit, which he had established with the aid of his friends and long-time associates, had no interests independent of his own, and certainly none which conflicted with his own. During the period of its operations, Hanegbi served as its chairman and subsequently as its director-general, and he dictated the agenda. Similarly, there is no evidence at all which indicates that the organization ever pressured Hanegbi regarding his activities as an MK nor was there even a suspicion of such pressure, which could have indicated the existence of a corrupt conflict of interest. On the contrary, it was MK Hanegbi who directed the other members of the organization in different activities.

 

15. In particular, an evidential doubt still remains regarding the criminal intent. The question is whether, by receiving benefits from the organization, Hanegbi was aware that he was placing himself in a conflict of interest which amounted to a corrupt breach of trust, in connection with the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, which Hanegbi initiated and promoted over a long period of time. Furthermore, assuming that the suspicion is that Hanegbi had “bribed himself” using the organization, it is impossible to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that it fulfills the criteria of a crime by an MK in a matter related to advancing legislation in the Knesset. There is evidence of breach of trust, but it is weak…

 

19. All of the above deals with suspicions against MK Hanegbi even though the evidence was insufficient to substantiate a blatant conflict of interest – a criminal conflict of interest – in order to prove the crimes of fraud and breach of trust. An MK established an organization for an important public cause. He raised money which, as director-general of the organization, he was supposed to channel towards that public cause. Instead, with the consent of the organization’s members – who are his friends – he used most of the funds raised by the organization for his own benefit, in order to fund activities he performed in his capacity as an MK… Even so, regarding the aspect of intent of the offense, this was not the only organization that served as a tool for earning salary or benefits in the public sector. Moreover, MK Hanegbi reported his income from the organization to both the Knesset Speaker and the Knesset legal advisor, and this creates difficulties in proving the necessary criminal intent.

 

20. It should be noted that at that time, pursuant to the Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951, a Knesset Member was permitted to receive a salary for “an additional occupation” provided that it did not exceed half of his salary as an MK. The law stipulated that such payment should not engender “a potential conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as an MK.” In 1998, the section was amended and today it is prohibited for an MK to engage in any additional occupation for remuneration.

 

21. In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered filing an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied. (emphasis not in the original).

 

The facts of the affair demonstrate the shifting position of the prosecution regarding whether to prosecute respondent 3 for his involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair. This indicates that the case was reviewed and reconsidered by the prosecuting bodies. No doubt it was a difficult decision. But at the end of the day it was decided not to indict respondent. Petitioner is not challenging this decision –not even indirectly. Nor is petitioner arguing that, the Prime Minister, based on the facts he was presented, should have concluded that respondent had committed crimes during this affair. In any event, it is not likely that the Court would accept a claim that the Prime Minister should have reached a conclusion different from the Attorney-General. After all, the Prime Minister is not expected to study all of the complex investigative material in order to reach an independent conclusion in this matter. He was entitled to rely on the opinion of the Attorney-General, who possesses the authority and the appropriate tools to analyze the evidence and draw the necessary legal conclusions. The Attorney-General’s report indicates that the difficulty in proving that a crime was committed stemmed primarily from the need to show criminal intent. It is presumed that the Attorney-General’s decision not to prosecute respondent was grounded in the evidence – which he reviewed in full, unlike this Court. Under those circumstances he decided that the small chance of proving criminal intent meant that an indictment was unjustified.

 

It seems to me, therefore, that based on the facts before us we must assume that respondent committed no crime in the Derech Tzleha affair. Petitioner does not claim otherwise. But this does not mean the case is closed. Petitioner claims that the conduct attributed to respondent in the Derech Tzleha affair, as reflected in the Attorney-General’s public report and in the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee, violated the principles of sound administration and ethics. Despite this, the Prime Minister maintained that respondent was fit for office. In my opinion, this conclusion does not warrant the Court’s intervention. I shall now explain why.

13. The case at hand is similar to Pinhasi [5] and Deri [47]. All these cases deal with setting the boundaries between law and ethics. In this matter I refer to Bar-On [3] which explained that “the law cannot and need not replace ethics, except in part, on a case by case basis, in a cautious and controlled way.” Id. at 62 (Zamir, J.). The same applies to the conduct of publicly elected officials. A judicial decision whether to intervene in the discretion of a public body depends on the balance between the interest of representation – allowing the public to be represented as it wishes – and the ethical interest of preserving appropriate ethical standards among elected officials. See Or  v. State of Israel – Civil Service Commissioner [50], at 191. This balance is not technical but rather substantive in nature. See Bar-On [3], at 63; Pinhasi [5], at 474 (Barak, J.).

In Bar-On, it was added:

Because the test is substantive and not merely formalistic in nature, it cannot be stated categorically that that only an indictment for a serious crime, or at least an investigation into such a crime, will justify termination of office. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case, even if it does not amount to a criminal offense, may be so very severe that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to remain in office. However it is still a long way between an extreme case of this sort, which would be exceptional, and a comprehensive rule which rendered unfit any minister or deputy-minister in case of conduct that deviated from proper behavioral norms. The proposal to expand the existing law, so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister or deputy-minister, although well-intentioned, is inappropriate and liable to do more harm than good.

Id. at 63-64 (Zamir, J.).

14. It is true that when deciding whether or not to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security the Prime Minister should have considered respondent’s conduct in the Derech Tzleha affair, even if it did not amount to a criminal offense. However, in my opinion, the conduct was not severe enough for us to declare the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security extremely unreasonable, and strike it down. It should be recalled that the Attorney-General’s report determined: “At the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove, to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest was strong enough to amount to a ‘corrupt’ breach of trust which damages public confidence according to the criteria provided in the clause on the need for proof of suspected crimes.” See para. 13.

Furthermore, the Attorney-General makes it clear that respondent, in his capacity as MK, had no conflicting interest, and certainly none that conflicted with the interests of the organization which he headed. It was also noted that respondent reported his activities and income to the relevant authorities. The Attorney-General also emphasized that, at that time, a Member of Knesset was not barred from having an additional occupation. In terms of this report, it cannot be concluded that respondent’s conduct was severe enough to render him unfit, to assume the office of Minister of Public Security. There may be pros and cons regarding a particular individual’s appointment as minister. However, unless, that appointment deviates from the range of reasonableness in an extreme way, the decision is left to the Prime Minister, and the Court should not intervene. Only in extreme cases is it appropriate for the Court to intervene in the Prime Minister’s task of forming a government.

15. To this we add that the reasonableness of the Prime Minister’s decision is supported by the position presented to him by the Attorney-General prior to respondent’s appointment. It was the Attorney-General’s opinion that “despite the fact that according to statute and case law there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment is still problematic from a civic perspective...” See para. 15 of the Prime Minister’s affidavit. This may be understood to mean that, legally speaking, there is no impediment to respondent’s appointment, even though his conduct warrants criticism. The point is that the Attorney-General informed the Prime Minister that, in terms of the law, the appointment was legitimate. The Attorney-General reiterated this stance before the Court. The Prime Minister ultimately relied on the Attorney-General’s opinion, regarding both  the lack of “sufficient evidence of a criminal offense by respondent in the Derech Tzleha affair,” and the legality of respondent’s appointment in light of his conduct. Obviously if we were to conclude that the Attorney-General’s opinion was inappropriate and without basis, things would be different. However this is not our position.

16. The Knesset Ethics Committee addressed this case as follows:

20.A. MK Hanegbi served simultaneously as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of the Derech Tzleha organization and as Chairman of the Economics Committee. This created the possibility of a conflict of interest between the additional occupation and the his role as a Knesset Member, in violation of the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Knesset Members Immunity (Rights and Obligations) Law, 1951, as worded at that time.

B. MK Hanegbi received material benefit as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of Derech Tzleha, which had as one of its principle objectives the advancement of a law which Hanegbi himself had initiated. In doing so, he violated section 4 of the Rules of Ethics for Knesset Members, which prohibits a Member of Knesset from receiving any material benefit for an activities performed outside of the Knesset in his capacity as Knesset Member.

C. Towards the end of the term of the Thirteenth Knesset, MK Hanegbi returned to his position as Chairman of the Finance Committee. As such, a potential conflict of interest was created relating to the Fuel Economy Law, since MK Hanegbi was receiving benefits from Derech Tzleha, which had accepted contributions from major fuel corporations. In this situation, MK Hanegbi should have transferred the bill to another MK and, by failing to do so, violated the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Immunity Law, as worded at that time.

    D. As a result of the above, the Ethics Committee reprimands MK Tzahi Hanegbi and deprives him of his salary for a period of two months…

See The Decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee regarding the complaints of MKs Eli Goldschmidt and Haim Oron, and regarding the complaint of Justice Minister Tzahi Hanegbi against MK Eli Goldschmidt, dated May 24, 1999.

It is my opinion that the above decision does not justify our intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. This decision concerns the realm of ethics. Respondent’s conduct as described by the Ethics Committee is clearly unsatisfactory and deserving of criticism. However, it does not constitute the kind of severe deviation that would justify the intervention of this Court in the respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security.

17. Does the cumulative weight of the four affairs involving Hanegbi render the Prime Minister’s decision extremely unreasonable, even though no affair on its own is sufficient? Petitioner asserts that respondent’s conduct, as reflected in all the affairs put together, shows that he is unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

It is true that when an administrative authority considers a public appointment, it must weigh not only each individual piece of administrative evidence that the candidate committed a crime, but also the cumulative weight of the evidence. It is possible in certain cases that the sum total of the evidence will be greater than its parts. The appointing authority must take this extra weight into account during its deliberations. The Court will intervene in an authority’s decision only if the cumulative weight of all of the evidence undoubtedly has extra weight which, if ignored, renders its decision extremely unreasonable. This is not true of the present case. The brawling and ISTA affairs were too long ago to have any bearing on the later affairs. Regarding the Bar-On affair, this Court has already decided that it is no impediment to respondent’s remaining in the position of Minister of Justice. In my opinion, the cumulative evidence in the Derech Tzleha affair does not justify the intervention of the Court in the Prime Minister’s decision under the stated criteria for such intervention. I reiterate that the key term in this case is “intervention.” The question is not what the Court would have done in the Prime Minister’s stead. Rather it is whether the Court is obligated to intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security in light of the four affairs. Under the circumstance, my answer is no.

Claim of Conflict of Interest

18. As stated above, petitioner claims that respondent should not be appointed as Minister of Public Security for the additional reason that his appointment will create a potential conflict of interest. The source of this claim is that respondent was investigated by the police regarding the Bar-On affair and the Derech Tzleha affair. In both of these cases, the police recommended that Hanegbi be prosecuted, though this course was not adopted by the Attorney-General. In petitioner’s opinion, a conflict of interest is liable to arise with respect to promotions for high-ranking police officers  who have previously investigated him. A conflict may also arise when the minister allocates budgets to police departments under the charge of his former investigators. In other words, petitioner claims that respondent may not handle certain promotions or budgets objectively. He may not base his decisions only on the relevant and legitimate considerations and the best interests of the police. Instead he is liable to be swayed by his own personal “interest” which is to “get even” with his former investigators and to avenge himself on them.

Before we evaluate this claim, we note that respondents raised doubts as to the correct classification of this claim. They say that there is no conflict of interest since a “desire for revenge” does not constitute an interest that conflicts with Hanegbi’s public duties as minister. The concern is rather that extraneous considerations will play a part in Hanegbi’s decisions. On the other hand, it could be argued that if a minister wishes to get even with his investigators this can be construed as an interest in the broad sense of the word. Anyone serving in a public office is forbidden to enter a situation involving potential conflict of interest. This is to ensure that the official will be able to fulfill his duties according to those considerations and interests which are relevant to his role. He must not be influenced by potentially conflicting considerations, such as personal interests or those pertaining to another public post occupied by him. Therefore, a conflict of interest could arise where the official is prejudiced against certain people, where there exists a genuine risk that he will act on this prejudice, and where this conflicts with the interest of fulfilling his role properly. This would be a known and foreseeable risk that the official will be unable to ignore extraneous considerations in certain situations.

Returning to our case, at issue here is whether there is a genuine risk that respondent will find himself in a conflict of interest as Minister of Public Security. The person who fills this role wields considerable power over police appointments and budgets. Is a genuine risk posed by the fact that he was investigated by the police and his investigators recommended he be prosecuted? Is there a real concern that his decisions will not be based exclusively on relevant considerations, since they will directly affect his investigators?

19. My answer to this is no. Generally speaking, investigators do not embark on “crusades” against their subjects. They are not interested in harming them. Investigators do not deliberately choose, for non-material reasons, to investigate any particular individual. While conducting their investigation they perform their duties pursuant to the law. They exercise their professional discretion. In general, if they recommend that a suspect be prosecuted this stems not from their desire to unjustly or cruelly maltreat him, but to exercise their professional judgment to the best of their ability. Everyone, including respondent, presumably understands this situation. A suspect is presumed to understand that his investigators are just doing their job, and are fulfilling duties which must be performed. Therefore, the concern that a suspect will bear a grudge against his investigators is remote and weak. It does not justify the disqualification of the appointment.

Needless to say, the situation could be different if, during the investigation of the potential Minister of Public Security, the suspect had developed animosity towards his investigators. Such a case could be if the suspect claimed, during or following the investigation, that his investigators treated him in an unlawful manner or harassed him, or other similar claims. Under such circumstances, the risk of a conflict of interest is real, and various solutions would have to be considered for neutralizing that concern.

According to the evidence before us, this is not the case with respect to respondent. Despite the passage of years since his investigation, no such claim was ever made by him against his investigators, either prior to or following his appointment as Minister of Public Security. On the contrary, respondent states the following in his affidavit:

4. The concern that I might interfere with the appointment of one of my investigators, impede his advancement, or plot against him, is spurious. I have made it clear on more than one occasion, including to my investigators themselves, that I have no complaints about them, and that I respect their duty to fully investigate every case. This is certainly true since the Attorney-General instructed the police to open an investigation. Moreover, my investigators treated me in a sensitive and respectful manner.

5. The concern that due to a conflict of interest I will deprive any particular division of the Ministry of Public Security of its budget is neither reasonable nor realistic. The budget proposal is prepared by the ministry’s planning department, in conjunction with National Headquarters, under the supervision of the Police Inspector-General and in coordination with the Budgets Division of the Finance Ministry. The ministry’s budget requires the approval of the government, the Finance Committee and the Knesset plenum. Therefore, there is no basis for the concern that I might use the budget in order to “get even” with one division or other. Neither could I consider any extraneous factors whatsoever in connection with the ministry’s budget, whose preparation, approval, and execution are handled by so many bodies.

Petitioner fails to bring any evidence whatsoever to refute this claim, or to point to any action or statement of respondent that contradicts his stated position. Under these circumstances, there is no cause for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent as Minister of Public Security. No genuine concern of a conflict of interest or extraneous considerations can be inferred solely from the fact that he was investigated in the past by the police.

In conclusion, I concur with the position of my colleague, Justice

 

Rivlin, according to which the petition is denied.

 

Justice M. Cheshin

 

1. I have read the opinions of my colleagues Justice Rivlin and Vice President Or. The comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice Rivlin, elucidates the basic principles governing the relationship between the judicial branch, the legislative branch, and the executive branch. It focuses on judicial intervention – specifically that of the High Court of Justice – in acts of the Knesset and the government. My description of some of these principles might have been structured differently, but on the substantive level I concur with my colleague and my reservations are secondary. Apparently, this was also the position of my colleague, the Vice President. However, I was unable to concur with my colleagues’ application of these principles to the case before us, and I therefore decided to write my own opinion.

2. This petition seeks to prevent the appointment of respondent 3, Mr. Tzahi Hanegbi, to the office of Minister of Public Security, due to his involvement in four separate affairs, especially the Derech Tzleha affair. Hanegbi was indicted in only one of these four affairs, the earliest and the least serious of the four. Petitioner claims, however, that the effect of the cases must be considered cumulatively and points out that, as Minister of Public Security, Hanegbi will be in charge of the police officers who investigated his involvement and who recommended his indictment. They also note that the Attorney-General recommended that the Prime Minister withhold the appointment. All of these factors create a “critical mass” that render Hanegbi unfit to serve as minister in charge of the system of investigation and law enforcement in Israel. Petitioner therefore requests that we order the Prime Minister to not appoint Hanegbi to the position of Minister of Public Security.

 

The Principal Facts

 

3.   Following the election of the Sixteenth Knesset on 28 January, 2003, and pursuant to section 7 of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, the President charged the incumbent Prime Minister and Knesset Member, Ariel Sharon, with the formation of a government. Once the ministers of the new government had been designated, the public was informed that Hanegbi, who had served as the Minister of Justice between 1996 and 1999, and as the Minister of the Environment in the previous government, was to be Minister of Public Security – the minister in charge of the Israeli Police.

4.   When the planned appointment of respondent as Minister of Public Security became public knowledge – prior to the establishment of the government – this petition was filed. Petitioners requested this Court to issue an order nisi and an injunction instructing the Prime Minister to abstain from making the appointment. Petitioner further requested an order instructing the Attorney-General to direct the Prime Minister not to make the appointment. The Court did not issue an injunction but, on March 10, 2003, several days after the formation of the government and Hanegbi’s induction as Minister of Public Security, the Court issued an order nisi against the Prime Minister instructing him to justify Hanegbi’s appointment. No order was issued against the Attorney-General.

5.   Petitioner argues that Hanegbi is not fit to serve as Minister of Public Security, primarily due to his involvement in four separate affairs. Petitioner also cites two additional dealings that came to light while the respondent was serving as Minister of Justice and as Minister of the Environment. Neither had criminal implications. These are of secondary importance, however, and we will not lump them together with the other four affairs upon which we now focus.

6. The first affair takes us back to 1982, when respondent stood trial and was convicted of brawling in a public place following a fight that he was involved in as a student. The Court imposed a suspended prison sentence and a fine. Today, the case is of marginal importance, due to both the passage of time as well Hanegbi’s age at the time of the offense. Notably, this is the only case in which Hanegbi stood trial and was convicted or sentenced.

7.   The second case, known as the “ISTA Affair,” began in 1980 and continued until 1992. It is described at length in HCJ 3846/91 Pinchas Maoz v. The Attorney-General [1], at 423. For our purposes, these are the relevant facts: Respondent and others filed a complaint with the police that certain leaders of the Students Union and of the International Israel Youth and Student Travel Company (ISTA) had committed “the greatest act of fraud in the history of Israeli aviation.” [1], at 426. The complaint led to a police investigation, which culminated in the indictment of seven people, including Pinchas Maoz, an experienced advocate and law lecturer who also served as the external legal advisor to ISTA at the time. Maoz was acquitted of all charges by the Magistrate’s Court, and in its judgment the court noted with regard to Hanegbi that “factual truth was not always a guiding light in his testimony … the witness did not provide precise answers and avoided topics that did not square with his version of the events.” [1], at 428. Advocate Maoz then asked the Attorney-General to indict Hanegbi for lying under oath, for relaying misleading information, and for presenting contradictory testimonies, but the Attorney-General decided that the chances of conviction were too low to warrant a trial. Maoz petitioned the decision of the Attorney-General to the High Court of Justice. On December 7, 1992, the Court ruled “after a great deal of hesitation – literally by a hairsbreadth” that while an indictment could reasonably have been filed against respondent, it would not intervene in the Attorney General’s decision:

 

The Attorney-General weighed all of the facts and, in deciding whether or not to indict Hanegbi, and concluded that the small chance of a conviction did not warrant an indictment. On the basis of our comments above, it is easy to form the impression that, had he decided to indict Hanegbi, we would have regarded this as reasonable. But the question before us is not what this Court, or any of its judges, would have decided in the Attorney-General’s place.

Id. at 439 (Or, J).

 

8.   The third affair, known as the “Bar-On affair,” concerned the appointment of Advocate Roni Bar-On to the position of Attorney-General. It is alleged that respondent, then Minister of Justice, behaved unlawfully during the appointment process, and even misled the government and the Prime Minister regarding the position of the President of the Supreme Court on the appointment. The facts of the case were described at length in three Supreme Court judgments. See HCJ 2534/97 MK Yona Yahav v. State Attorney [2]; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Israeli Government [hereinafter: Bar-on [3]]; HCJ 2624/97 Ronal v. The Government of Israel [4].

 

For our purposes we will content ourselves with a brief account of the principal elements. Respondent was suspected of fraud and breach of trust. The police recommended that an indictment be filed against him. The Attorney-General, however, with the consent of the State Attorney, recommended that the investigation file be closed for lack of evidence. The affair also dealt with the appointment of Bar-On as Attorney-General, and we shall now cite part of the State Attorney’s opinion on this matter, as quoted in Bar-on [3]:

 

The Minister of Justice [the respondent here] was aware that Bar-On’s name had been mentioned in the Prime Minister’s Office, prior to Michael Ben-Yair’s [the previous Attorney-General] notice of resignation. The Minister of Justice also knew that, within the Prime Minister’s Office, Bar-on was not considered the natural candidate, due his factional affiliation in the Likud.

No doubt the Minister of Justice had an interest in the appointment of Bar-On, who was his mentor and friend. Hanegbi also claims that, in his opinion, Bar-On was qualified for the position.

The Minister of Justice’s engineering of Bar-On’s appointment was concealed from the public eye at the time. Government ministers were apprised of it at a cabinet meeting, leaving them no time to conduct any discussions or investigation. The Minister of Justice repeatedly emphasized that, in the past, Attorney-Generals had been appointed in a similar manner, without the name of the candidate being presented to the cabinet.

The Minister of Justice received information from the President of the Supreme Court, A. Barak, that could have disqualified Bar-On, information that required consideration. He failed to present the true significance of these comments to the Prime Minister and merely informed the cabinet that President Barak was aware of the appointment. His manner of mentioning the subject could have led to the conclusion that President Barak had nothing to say about the appointment, and perhaps even assented to it. The truth, of course, was otherwise.

Id. at 50-51. It was further noted:

In our case, the Minister of Justice [the respondent here] failed to inform the cabinet of the Supreme Court President’s negative view of the appointment of Bar-On as Attorney-General. In this context, the State Attorney stated:

“During the Cabinet meeting, Minister Kahalani asked the Minister of Justice whether the Prime Minister had approved the appointment. Hanegbi replied, saying: ‘Yes. I also brought it to the attention of the President of the Supreme Court, and, naturally, also to the Attorney-General, who gave his approval’

Minister David Levi was asked how he had understood these words. He reported that his understanding was that the Minister of Justice had mentioned the names of Barak and Ben-Yair in order to show that the appointment had passed through conventional channels.

Considering what President Barak actually said about Bar-On’s appointment, merely mentioning that Barak had been informed of it, without reporting what he had actually said about it, is problematic. This statement creates the impression that President Barak had nothing to say about the appointment, or at least that he did not say anything which mattered one way or another.”

Id. at 65-66 (Goldberg, J.). As stated, the Attorney-General and the State Attorney decided that this evidence was insufficient to charge respondent with a criminal offense. But, at the same time, the State Attorney criticized respondent’s conduct, writing that this constituted a “deviation from appropriate norms of conduct” and that it was not “above criticism.” Id. at 52. Nonetheless, the State Attorney did not believe that respondent’s conduct amounted to a criminal offense.

These harsh words triggered a public outcry, which led to the filing of three petitions with the High Court of Justice. We will complete our review of the Bar-On affair by noting that the arguments made in Bar-On [3] – a petition which sought to remove respondent from the office of Minister of Justice – bear a striking resemblance to the arguments raised in the petition before us. The main difference lies in the addition of the Derech Tzleha affair to the previous three affairs.

9.   The Derech Tzleha affair began in July 1997. The case concerned respondent’s actions as the head of the non-profit organization known as Derech Tzleha. The facts were detailed at length in an opinion of the Attorney-General, which was published on March 6, 2001, following his decision not to indict respondent. We will present some of the comments stated in the report:

The Findings of the Investigation

h. In 1994, MK Hanegbi and MK Abraham Burg prepared a private bill in the Knesset entitled “The National Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law.” The purpose of the draft legislation was to improve road safety, particularly by the establishment of a government body, which would consolidate all of the authorities, units and governmental bodies involved in the battle against traffic accidents. The bill was placed before the Knesset on July 25, 1994 and, on October 12, 1994, it passed a preliminary reading. It was then transferred to the Finance Committee for deliberation. A sub-committee was established, with Hanegbi as its chairman, with the task of preparing the bill for the next stages.

i. Concurrently, and in the framework of his public activities for the enactment of the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, MK Hanegbi established Derech Tzleha, which he and his colleagues registered as a non-profit organization on October 12, 1994. The object of the organization, according to its by-laws, was to reduce the carnage on the roads through education, public activism, and legislation. In practice, its principal and perhaps chief object was the promotion of the Traffic Accidents Law by public activism and enlisting the support of Knesset Members and ministers.

j. The organization’s activities were limited, comprising the following: sending letters to MKs, cabinet ministers, council heads, and other public figures, persuading them to support the Traffic Accidents Law; the production of three advertisements in support of the law; the publication of a pamphlet which brought together the protocols of the sub-committee headed by Hanegbi, and its dissemination among the Knesset Members; one-time correspondence with a medical organization regarding the establishment of a fund for road-accident victims; planning demonstrations; setting up a signing booth; initiating and organizing a special meeting of the Knesset Finance Committee on the Modi’in road; sending requests to hundreds of “famous” people from a number of fields, asking them to add their names to an advertisement in support of the law; and publication of a newspaper advertisement in support, after the law had passed the first reading.

 

The rules of the organization prohibited the distribution of profits or benefits to members, whose activities were supposed to be voluntary. Hanegbi initially served, until September 12, 1995, as chairman of the organization. On October 1, 1995, he resigned his membership of the organization, and was appointed as director, and began receiving a salary and other benefits. As a result, the vast majority of the organization’s resources went to his wages, company car, and expenses, all of these being related to Hanegbi’s public activities as an MK. After his appointment as Minister of Health following the elections to the Fourteenth Knesset in 1996, Hanegbi resigned from his position as director. A short time later, the organization entered into voluntary liquidation.

 

k. The organization raised approximately NIS 375,000. The findings of the investigation indicated that MK Hanegbi received the vast majority of this amount through his salary, company car, expenses, and cellular phone, as well as in the form of a notice of support which was published three days before the Likud primaries.

 

The report continues with a chapter entitled “Suspicions” where we read the following:

 

Suspicions

 

13. The investigation raised suspicions that MK Hanegbi received these benefits as payment for his activities as a Member of the Knesset, and especially for his efforts in promoting the Traffic Accidents Law. If this was found to be true, he would have been guilty of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust, and offenses connected to the management of a corporation.

 

After examining the evidence, we found that, while serving as an MK, Hanegbi functioned both as the chairman of the Finance Committee of the Knesset, and as the chairman of the sub-committee that was engaged in the promotion of a law. Concurrently, he also held a central position in the organization, whose main object was the enactment of the Traffic Accidents Law. This situation created a prima facie conflict of interests. While he did declare his income from the organization to the Knesset Speaker, Hanegbi failed to inform the committee members that he was both one of the founders of the organization and its chief. And, as we already stated, while serving as chairman of the sub-committee charged with the advancing the Traffic Accidents Law, and in his capacity as a Member of the Knesset, he was receiving a salary and significant benefits from the organization that he had established. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the evidence was insufficient to prove, to the degree required in a criminal case, that the conflict of interest amounted to a “corrupt” breach of trust. This is especially true regarding proof of the criminal intent required in these offenses: that MK Hanegbi was aware that he was acting in a corrupt manner which was detrimental to the public.

 

14. These evidentiary difficulties result primarily from  the fact that the organization from which Hanegbi received benefits, which he had established with the aid of his friends and long-time associates, had no interests independent of his own, and certainly none which conflicted with his own. During the period of its operations, Hanegbi served as the organization’s chairman and subsequently as its director-general, and he dictated the agenda. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that the organization ever pressured Hanegbi regarding his activities as an MK, nor was there even a suspicion of such pressure, which could have indicated the existence of a corrupt conflict of interest. On the contrary, it was MK Hanegbi who directed the other members of the organization in its different activities.

 

15. In particular, an evidentiary doubt still remains regarding the criminal intent. The question is whether, by receiving benefits from the organization, Hanegbi was aware that he was placing himself in a conflict of interest which amounted to a corrupt breach of trust, in connection with the Campaign Against Traffic Accidents Law, which Hanegbi initiated and promoted over a long period of time. Furthermore, assuming that the suspicion is that Hanegbi had “bribed himself” using the organization, it is impossible to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that this fulfills the criteria of a crime by an MK in a matter related to advancing legislation in the Knesset. The case law regards the offence of “breach of trust” as a consciously corrupt conflict of interests. In the case at hand, however, there is insufficient evidence of that kind of conflicting interest. Moreover, the organization did not represent any particular, sectarian-interest group; its purpose was rather to rouse public interest in the battle against road accidents.

 

16. Fuel Economy Law – MK Hanegbi served in rotation with MK Gideon Pat as the chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee. This committee dealt, among other things, with the Fuel Economy Law. During the period in which MK Pat served as committee chairman, two months before MK Hanegbi became committee chairman, the organization received contributions from fuel companies.  The sum received amounted to about 10% of the total contributions received by the organization. According to the findings of the investigation, the overwhelming majority of the representatives of the fuel companies were unaware of Hanegbi’s involvement in the organization. None of them knew that Hanegbi was receiving benefits from the association to which they were contributing. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to prove that Hanegbi felt any sense of obligation to these companies. The intensity of the conflict of interests is therefore considerably weakened. Furthermore, during the relevant period, there was no chance of promoting the enactment of the Fuel Economy Law in view of the government’s opposition to that law. No evidence was found of Hanegbi having influenced the handling of the law.

 

17. The Knesset Ethics Committee reviewed two complaints concerning the benefits that Hanegbi received from the organization. It was alleged that the salary he received from the organization created a conflict of interest. This was in violation of the provisions of the Knesset Members Immunity Law, which forbids a Knesset Member from engaging in any occupation or additional occupation which creates a possible conflicting interests. It also contravened the Rules of Ethics for Members of the Knesset, which prohibit a Knesset Member from receiving, whether directly or indirectly, any material benefit for an act that he has performed within the framework of his duties or his status as a Member of the Knesset. On May 24, 1999, following its deliberations, the Ethics Committee found Hanegbi guilty. It ruled that the chairman of a Knesset Committee could not preside over deliberations of a particular issue while simultaneously occupying a key position in an organization whose chief aim was to promote that issue. This is true even if his duties in the organization were voluntary. The Committee further determined that the fact that MK Hanegbi was chairman and director-general of the organization while also serving as the chairman of the Finance Committee created the possibility of a conflict of interest between his additional occupation and his role as a Knesset Member. The Ethics Committee accordingly censured Hanegbi and docked his salary for two months.

 

18. However, the criteria for conviction in criminal proceedings differ from those governing disciplinary proceedings. People are frequently the target of disciplinary proceedings even when the allegations against them are not overtly criminal. The findings of the Ethics Committee, in accordance with the facts upon which they were based and the additional evidence gathered by the police, are insufficient to prove the offenses of fraud and breach of trust. Here, an MK dealing with the legislative arrangement for a particular cause was simultaneously the recipient of a salary and benefits from an organization which spearheaded the same cause, albeit with the association’s approval. It has long been our opinion that these facts may involve a breach of trust. However this is difficult to prove. We now confront the issue again, in view of the report given to the Knesset Speaker and his legal advisor, as detailed below.

 

19. The evidence against Hangebi was insufficient to substantiate a criminal conflict of interest in order to prove the crimes of fraud and breach of trust. An MK established an organization for an important public cause. He raised money for that cause which, as director-general of an organization, he was supposed to channel towards that public cause. Instead, with the consent of the organization’s members – who were his friends – he used most of the funds raised for his own benefit, in order to fund activities he performs in his capacity as an MK. All of this occurred after Hanegbi had submitted a private bill, which he believed to be tremendously important, as he admitted during investigations, and while he was receiving a salary in his capacity as an MK.  Even so, regarding the mens rea of the offense, this was not the only organization that served as a tool for earning salary or benefits in the public sector. Moreover, MK Hanegbi reported his income from the organization to both the Knesset Speaker and the Knesset legal advisor, and this creates difficulties in proving the necessary criminal intent.

 

20. It should be noted that, at that time, pursuant to the Knesset Members Immunity Law (Rights and Duties), 1951, a Knesset Member was permitted to receive salary for “an additional occupation” provided that it did not exceed half of his salary as an MK. The law stipulated that such payment should not engender “a potential conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as an MK.” In 1998, the section was amended and today it is prohibited for an MK to engage in any additional occupation for remuneration.

 

10. As stated in the Attorney-General’s report, respondent’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair led to disciplinary proceedings in the Knesset Ethics Committee. The committee determined that Hanegbi had placed himself in a conflict of interest, in contravention of the Ethics Rules, and therefore imposed two penalties on him: a reprimand and a two-month salary freeze. In its decision of May 24, 1999, the committee wrote:

 

20.A. MK Hanegbi served simultaneously as chairman, and subsequently as director-general, of the Derech Tzleha organization, and as chairman of the Economics Committee. This created the possibility of a conflict of interest between the additional occupation and his role as a Knesset Member, in violation of the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Knesset Members Immunity (Rights and Obligations) Law, 1951.

 

B. MK Hanegbi received material benefit as chairman, and subsequently director-general, of Derech Tzleha, which had as one of its principle objectives the advancement of a law which Hanegbi himself had initiated. In doing so, he violated section 4 of the Rules of Ethics for Knesset Members, which prohibits a Member of Knesset from receiving any material benefit for an activities performed outside of the Knesset in his capacity as Knesset Member.

C. Towards the end of the term of the Thirteenth Knesset, MK Hanegbi returned to his position as chairman of the Finance Committee. This gave rise to a potential conflict of interest concerning the Fuel Economy Law, since MK Hanegbi was receiving benefits from Derech Tzleha, which had accepted contributions from major fuel corporations. In this situation, MK Hanegbi should have transferred the bill to another MK, and by failing to do so, violated the provisions of section 13A(a)(3) of the Immunity Law, as worded at that time.

11. Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair were investigated by the police. In June 1999, they recommended to the State Attorney’s Office that Hanegbi be indicted for accepting a bribe, fraud, breach of trust, and related offenses. The evidentiary material gathered by the police was examined and considered by the Attorney-General and the State Attorney. At the beginning of 2000, the decision was taken to indict respondent for fraud and breach of trust, fraud and breach of trust by a corporation, and falsifying corporate documents, all subject to a preliminary hearing. The Attorney-General decided, with the consent of the State Attorney, that “after extensive legal deliberation … grounds exist to indict MK Hanegbi for fraud, breach of trust and additional offenses.”

In anticipation of the proceedings to remove Hanegbi’s immunity as a Member of Knesset, the file was transferred to the Jerusalem District Attorney’s Office. It was here that the tables turned. In the words of the Attorney-General in his report: “At this stage of the process, difficulties arose once again regarding proof of the components of the various offenses, primarily regarding fraud and breach of trust. In view of our doubts regarding the reasonable probability of a conviction, the State Attorney and I decided to close the file.”

As such, no indictment was filed; instead, a public report was issued. This report gave a detailed account of the circumstances of the case. Its first section stated: “We would emphasize that the events, for which MK Hanegbi was both convicted and penalized by the Knesset Ethics Committee in 1999, indicated impropriety which, in our view, reached the level of an offense. However, we ultimately decided that there was no reasonable chance of obtaining a conviction.” In conclusion, the Attorney-General wrote:

In summary, we believed that the circumstances warranted an investigation, and we even considered that there ought to be an indictment. However, there must be a reasonable likelihood of a conviction, and this requirement, with the final preparation of the file, was ultimately not satisfied.

 

12. This concludes our review of the four cases upon which this petition is based.

13. The Attorney-General’s view was that respondent’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha affair made it inappropriate to appoint him as Minister of Public Security or to other positions connected with law enforcement. Accordingly, when he became aware of the intention to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General advised the Prime Minister to refrain from making the appointment, because “[a]lthough, according to statute and case law there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment, the appointment itself is prima facie problematic from a civic perspective.” Notwithstanding this advice, the Prime Minister decided that it was appropriate to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security. Notably, when the previous government was appointed in 2001, and in the direct aftermath of the Derech Tzleha case, the Attorney-General also advised the Prime Minister against appointing respondent to any ministry entrusted with law enforcement. The advice was given “primarily from a civic perspective” and, on that occasion, the Prime Minister accepted the advice.

 

The Dispute

 

14. We are confronted with three principal affairs: the ISTA affair, the Bar-On affair and Derech Tzleha affair. In all of these cases, Hanegbi was suspected of criminal offenses and, in the latter two, the police recommended that he be indicted. However, he was never actually indicted and, as such, he was not convicted. The question therefore arises: Can a person be prevented from serving as a cabinet minister on account of suspected criminal offenses? If so, can Hanegbi be prevented from serving as a cabinet minister because of his involvement in these affairs? Petitioner does not contest Hanegbi’s appointment as a cabinet minister per se. Rather, the claim is that he is unfit for service as a minister charged with law enforcement and, for our purposes, as Minister of Public Security. This, in turn, raises the following question: Assuming that Hanegbi is fit to serve as a member of the cabinet and a minister, is he nonetheless unfit to be Minister of Public Security? Is the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security so unreasonable as to require this Court’s intervention? Even at this early stage I would state that there is no dispute between the parties regarding facts or the law. They dispute, however, the application of the law to Hanegbi.

15. Petitioner’s claim, in brief, is that, under the circumstances, there is a legal impediment to Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. Though Hanegbi was not indicted in any of the three cases, his involvement in them makes the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him as the “Police Minister” blatantly unreasonable. Petitioner argues that the appointment irreparably damage the public’s confidence in the system of government and the police. Furthermore, there is also a serious chance that the appointment will cause irreversible damage to the functioning of the police, even if only because of the “bad blood” between Hanegbi and the police officers who investigated him and recommended his indictment. Furthermore, the Police Ordinance (New Version), 1971, grants the Minister of Public Security extensive powers over the police. For example, the appointment and promotion of senior officers (section 7 of the ordinance), which includes the ability to appoint the Inspector-General of Israel Police. See section 8A (stating that the government appoints the Inspector-General pursuant to the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security). Respondent may frequently find himself in a serious conflict of interest when handling the promotion of those who investigated him and who recommended his indictment. The latter will fear, and rightly so, that he will take revenge even if they have discharged their duties properly. Therefore, maintains petitioner, the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, is unreasonable.

16. Respondents to the petition – the Prime Minister, Mr. Hanegbi, and the Attorney-General – oppose petitioner’s request. In their view, Basic Law: The Government grants the Prime Minister particularly broad discretion regarding the appointment and removal of ministers. Furthermore, there is an inverse relationship between the breadth of the Prime Minister’s discretion and the constraints upon the High Court’s power to instruct him how to act. It is true that, in special circumstances, the Court can order the Prime Minister to remove a minister from his post, but an examination of the case law indicates that the Court can only exercise that power in rare and exceptional cases. See HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 404 [hereinafter: Deri [47]]; HCJ 4267/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, at 441 [hereinafter: Pinhasi [5]]; and Bar-On [3]. These are cases where indictments – indictments alleging particularly serious offenses – were filed against a minister.

The Prime Minister and Attorney-General on the one hand, and Hanegbi on the other, continue to assert, each in their own way, that this is not one of those rare cases in which the Court will intervene with the Prime Minister’s discretion. How so? Hanegbi was not even indicted and, as such, was certainly not convicted. Consequently, there are no legal grounds for preventing him serving as a cabinet minister. Hanegbi is presumed innocent until proven guilty. To prevent him from serving in any particular position without having stood trial violates the principles of justice, even if only because he has never been given the opportunity to prove his innocence (and especially since he is under no obligation to do so). The appointment may indeed be “problematic on the civic level” (in the words of the Attorney-General). However, the Prime Minister was aware of this, and having considered all of the pertinent factors, he decided that Hanegbi, with his variety of talents and experience, was the best candidate for the job. With regard to concerns over conflicting interests in relation to those police officers who interrogated him, we have Hanegbi’s assurance that that he bears against them no grudge. Furthermore, adds Hanegbi, his power to intervene in the professional decisions of the police is limited. The conclusion dictated by all of the above is that the Prime Minister exercised his powers lawfully; his decision was a reasonable one, and, in any event, it does not deviate from the range of reasonableness.

 

17. This concludes our review of the basic issues in dispute and the central claims of the parties.

 

The Legal Framework

 

18. We must first establish the legal point of reference from which to begin our investigation. We were requested to order the Prime Minister to remove respondent from his position as Minister of Public Security. Two questions present themselves in this regard. First: is the Prime Minister empowered to remove Hanegbi from acting as the Minister of Public Security? Second: if so, should the Court, under the circumstances, order the Prime Minister to remove Hanegbi from his position? These questions raise the issue of fitness to serve as a minister. We will now address the concept of “fitness” in its broadest sense.

19.             The current version of Basic Law: The Government, the 2001 version, contains provisions concerning the fitness – or, more precisely the unfitness – of persons with a criminal record to serve as ministers. These provisions address a person’s non-appointment as a minister, as well as their dismissal. The unfitness of a person with a criminal past is regulated by section 6(c) of the Basic Law:

Fitness of Ministers

6. (a) …

…………….

(c) (1) A person who was convicted of an offense and sentenced to prison, and seven years have not yet passed since the day on which he finished serving his term of imprisonment or since the handing down of his sentence – whichever was later  – shall not be appointed minister, unless the Chairman of the Central Election Committee states that the circumstances of the offense do not involve moral turpitude.

(2) The Chairman of the Central Elections Committee shall not so rule if a court has determined that the offense involved moral turpitude.

 

As such, where a person was imprisoned for a crime involving moral turpitude, and seven years have not yet passed since the completion of the sentence (or the sentencing) – the conviction will prevent his appointment as a minister. Parenthetically, we would add that this provision replaced section 16(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 1992, which was even more stringent about membership in the cabinet.

 

Furthermore, pursuant to section 23(b) of the Basic Law: The Government, 2001, the office of a minister is terminated when he is convicted of an offense of moral turpitude.

 

Termination of the Tenure of a Minister Pursuant to an Offense

23. (a) …

(b) Should a minister be convicted by the court, it shall state in its verdict whether the offense involves moral turpitude; should the court so state, the minister’s tenure shall cease on the day of such verdict.

 

The language of the statute is unequivocal: Conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude means the termination of tenure, with no reservation or discretion. The statutory provision acts as a guillotine: once certain “objective” conditions exist, the law itself prevents the minister from continuing to serve in that capacity.

 

These are the explicit statutory provisions governing unfitness to serve as a minister due to criminal involvement.

 

20. Together with the above explicit statutory provisions, there are also provisions regulating the Prime Minister’s power to terminate the tenure of a minister. Section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001 provides:

 

Termination of the Tenure of a Minister

22. (a) …

(b) The Prime Minister may, by way of written notification, remove a minister from his post; the removal of a minister will take effect 48 hours after the letter notifying thereof was given to the minister, unless the Prime Minister retracts it prior to such time.

 

This statutory provision, with minor differences, was also contained in section 21A of Basic Law: The Government, 1968, following its amendment of 1981, and in section 35(b) of Basic Law: The Government of 1992.

 

  1. In light of these statutory provisions, the question is whether the unfitness provisions of sections 6(c) and 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, limit the discretion afforded to the Prime Minister under section 22(b) of the Basic Law? In other words, with respect to a minister or ministerial candidate with a criminal past, do sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law provide the sole and exclusive framework for the Prime Minister’s authority? It could be argued, for example, that the legislature went out of its way to specify certain preconditions to disqualify a minister with a criminal past from office. Can a negative inference be drawn from this that a minister will not be regarded as unfit to serve unless the statutory preconditions for unfitness are satisfied? Also, regarding a minister’s criminal past which does not fulfill the statutory conditions of unfitness specified in section 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, does the Prime Minister have no authority to terminate a minister’s tenure? If so, does it not follow that the person is a fit candidate for a ministerial post?

 

The above questions were discussed at length in Deri [47] and in Bar-On [3]. Pinhasi [5] discussed the same issues in relation to a deputy-minister. The Court’s answer was clear and unequivocal: the explicit statutory provisions cited above in no way restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion or the Court’s discretion to review the Prime Minister’s decision. It will be recalled that those cases involved the judicial review of the Prime Minister’s decision not to terminate the tenure of a minister. The Court ruled as follows: the Prime Minister is vested with the power to terminate, or retain, the tenure of a minister (or deputy-minister); the statutory provisions do not restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion to dismiss a minister; the additional statutory provisions do not limit the scope of section 21A of Basic Law: The Government (1968-1981; currently section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001); and no negative inference can be drawn from the absence of provisions governing the termination of tenure. See Deri [47], at 421; Pinhasi [5], at 456-57.

 

In this context the Court distinguished between unfitness for a particular office and discretion concerning an appointment to office or removal from office. Sections 6(c) and 23(b) of the Basic Law deal with “fitness” and, as such, do not restrict the Prime Minister’s discretion regarding the non-appointment of a person to a particular office, or his removal:

 

We must distinguish between questions of fitness (or authority), and questions of discretion. The absence of any express statutory provision regarding the unfitness of someone with a criminal past establishes the candidate’s fitness. However, it does not preclude the possibility of considering his past within the framework of exercising the administrative discretion given to the authority making the appointment. Indeed, the criminal past of a candidate for public office is a relevant consideration, which the authority making the appointment is entitled and even obligated to take into account.

 

HCJ 6163/92, 6177 Eisenberg v. Minister of Construction and Housing, at 256-57 [6]. This rule was actually established prior to the enactment of section 23(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001. However, not only does this statutory provision not touch on the issue of discretion – the wording of the law makes clear that the termination of tenure occurs automatically under certain circumstances – but the logic behind the law sheds light on our case.

 

22.             The general principle is, therefore, that the Prime Minister is empowered to refrain from appointing a person as a minister, or to dismiss a minister, even in cases not covered by the stringent conditions expressly stated in the law. Once it has been established that the Prime Minister has the power to remove a minister from office, it follows automatically, as a matter of principle, that this discretion is subject to the judicial review of the High Court of Justice.

 
The Exercise of Discretion
 
The Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers as Public Trustees

 

23. This brings us to the main point. There is no explicit statutory provision (not even in section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government) that sets out criteria governing prime ministerial discretion in determining the composition of the government. This is true of both appointments and dismissals. Nor is there any statutory restriction of the Prime Minister’s discretion. The discretion of the Prime Minister may therefore be based upon a variety of pertinent considerations. But, like any other legal discretion, it is constrained by the basic principles of administrative law, which form the foundation of public administration and inform it at all levels. First and foremost among these principles is the principle of trusteeship. All those empowered on behalf of the state are believed to exercise their powers for the good of all, and their status obligates them to act as trustees in the exercise of their powers. In the canonical words of Justice Cohen:

 

[T]he private sector differs from the public sector, for while the former acts as it pleases, giving and taking at will, the latter exists solely for the purpose of serving the public, and possesses nothing of its own. Whatever it has it owns as a trustee, and it has no rights or obligations in addition to, or distinct from, the rights of the trusteeship or those conferred or imposed by statutory provisions.

 

HCJ 142/70 Shapira v. Local Committee of Chamber of Advocates [60], at 331. See also Deri [47], at 417; Pinhasi [5], at 461-63; Bar-On [3], at 55-56; HCJ 4566/90 Dekel v. Minister of Finance [58], at 33.

 

24. In other words: Those exercising authority on behalf of the state or any other public authority – in our case, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Security – must constantly be aware that their affairs are not their own. They are dealing with matters that concern others and are obligated to conduct themselves with fairness and integrity, in strict compliance with the principles of public administration. Within the area of private law the individual can behave with a measure of the “caprice,” though such “caprice” is not what it used to be, nor should it be. But in the realm of public law – constitutional and administrative law – caprice is a terminal illness. Those who wield authority conferred on them by law, however insignificant that authority may be, must strictly scrutinize all their decisions and actions. They must never forget that all their decisions and actions are on behalf of others, not their own interests. Fortunate is the community whose leaders understand not only the prerogatives but also the limitations of their power. As the High Court recently stated:

 

When acting in the domain of public law, the appointing authority operates in the capacity of a public trustee. Just as a trustee possesses nothing of his own, so too, the appointing authority possesses nothing of its own. It must conduct itself in the manner of the trustee: acting with integrity and fairness, considering only relevant factors, acting with reasonableness, equality, and without discrimination.

 

Those with the power to appoint or decide must therefore act with integrity and fairness, without considering irrelevant factors, guided by principles of reasonableness and equality, and without discrimination. Any failure to discharge this duty opens the door to inappropriate appointments or decisions. The wrong people are appointed and the right people overlooked, and the public good is harmed. But the necessity of imposing these obligations on persons with the powers to make appointments or decisions relating to particular individuals extends beyond the propriety or legality of particular appointments or choices. The scourge of inappropriate appointments must be stopped, in order to preserve the very existence of the public service. Moreover, those appointed illegally are liable to adopt similarly illegal methods when they have to make appointments themselves. The fathers have eaten sour grapes and the sons who witnessed their fathers will also eat sour grapes. Cf. Ezekiel 18:2. And, we all know where this path leads.

 

HCJ 2671/98 Women’s Lobby v. The Minister of Labor and Welfare, [61] at 649-50. These words deal with appointments to the public service (specifically the deputy director-general of the National Insurance Institute), but also they also apply, under different circumstances, to the case before us.

 

25. We have seen that the Prime Minister and all ministers are in fact trustees, holding their offices in trust for the public. We can further infer from this that, when considering the appointment, or the continued service, of a minister with a criminal past, the Prime Minister must conduct himself as a trustee dealing with the public’s affairs. How does a trustee ensure the propriety of his conduct? My colleagues have elucidated the guiding principles, wisely and at length; adding to their comments would be superfluous. I will cite just a few of the comments made by them in this context, which will be instructive for our purposes. For example:

 

The statutory provision [empowering the Prime Minister to dismiss a minister] is also intended to constitute a response, in the form of removal from office, to a serious incident involving a minister. This applies when that occurrence, whether act or omission, affects the stature of the government, its public image, its ability to lead and serve as a role model and its capacity to inculcate proper behavioral norms. It applies primarily when the incident impacts the public’s confidence in our system of government, on the constitutive values of our system of government and law, and on the duties of the ordinary citizen which arise from them.

 

Deri [47], at 422 (Shamgar, P). Furthermore:

 

The Prime Minister, the government, and all of its ministers are in the position of trustees. This position requires them to consider whether to terminate the tenure of a deputy-minister against whom an indictment has been filed, the offenses being particularly grave. The Attorney-General may decide that there is sufficient evidence for an indictment. Under these circumstances, the continued service of this minister is liable to diminish public confidence in the ruling authorities. The authorities must therefore consider the matter with the utmost gravity. For it must be remembered: the government’s ability to rule is based on the confidence of the public. Without public confidence, the government cannot function.

 

Pinhasi [5], at 461 (Barak, J). Similarly:

 

An elected public official is like a cantor leading the prayers. The cantor is the community’s mouthpiece. He presents himself as impoverished in deeds, humble and frightened. So, too, the public servant. Like the prayer leader, he possesses nothing of his own. What he has belongs to the community he serves. Decency, honesty, and purity of heart are the hallmark of a worthy cantor, and this is the pillar of fire which guides the public servant in his path. This is the only way in which he can properly serve the community that chose him as its leader, and the only way for him to win the public’s confidence. It is well known that if the nation lacks confidence in its leaders, disorder prevails and society disintegrates. The higher they ascend the ladder of leadership, the greater our demand for honesty and integrity from our leaders.

 

HCJ 103/96 Pinchas Cohen, Adv.  v. The Attorney-General [62], at 326.

 

The same applies to the government, which enjoys a particular status and image in the public eye. It must maintain public confidence in the Israeli system of governance and in our constitutive values. There is an inherent need for the government and the administration to conduct themselves in a manner that is ethical, decent and dignified. Hence, under certain circumstances, the duty of the Prime Minister to remove a minister from office becomes a duty, a power that the Prime Minister is obligated to exercise. What then are the particular circumstances that transform the Prime Minister’s power to dismiss a minister into a duty?

Indictment of a Public Trustee: Trusteeship and Public Confidence

26. In Deri [47], an indictment was filed against the Minister of the Interior, Aryeh Deri, for the offenses of bribery, breach of trust by a public servant, the fraudulent receipt of goods in aggravated circumstances, and falsifying corporate documents and theft by a director. See Deri [47], at 410. In Pinhasi [5] an indictment was filed against the Deputy-Minister of Religious Affairs, Raphael Pinhasi, for falsifying corporate documents, false testimony and attempting to receive goods by fraud. See Pinhasi [5], at 447. In both cases the Court was required to decide whether the indictments were sufficiently grave to compel the Prime Minister to remove the minister and the deputy-minister from office. The Court decided in the affirmative in both cases:

 

In summary, based on the Deri and Pinhasi cases, the rule is that where an indictment for a serious offense is filed against a minister or a deputy-minister, the Prime Minister is duty-bound to remove the minister or deputy-minister from their post. Under these circumstances, the Prime Minister’s refusal to discharge that duty will be regarded as unreasonable in the extreme. Consequently, in the event of such a refusal, the Court can order the Prime Minister to exercise his power to remove the minister or deputy-minister from his position. Today, too, the Prime Minister’s refusal to remove a minister or deputy-minister who has been indicted for a serious offense will be regarded as extremely unreasonable, justifying this Court’s intervention.

 

See Bar-On [3], at 56 (Zamir, J.). The rule is crystal clear: “The Prime Minister’s refusal to remove from office a minister or deputy-minister who has been indicted for a serious offense will be regarded as extremely unreasonable, justifying this Court’s intervention.”

 

27. The duty of trusteeship owed by the Prime Minister and other ministers is inextricably linked to public confidence in the government. A trustee who behaves appropriately wins trust; a trustee who does not live up to the required standards will not enjoy the public’s confidence. The government needs the trust both of the Knesset and of the public as a whole. If it behaves as a trustee should, it becomes the repository of public confidence. Where the government betrays its trusteeship, public confidence in the government is shattered, and the Court will intervene. This is what the Court did when it forced the Prime Minister to dismiss Minister Deri and Deputy-Minister Pinhasi.

 

One might ask: why should the Court trouble itself with the question of public confidence in the government by directing the Prime Minister to remove officials from their positions, as it did in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5]? The public will presumably express its loss of confidence in the government at the ballot box. Why then should the Court issue orders concerning the relationship between the people and the government? Furthermore, the principle of decentralization and the relationship of respect owed by the judiciary to the executive and legislative branches, especially with respect to the internal management of these branches, obligates the Court to distance itself from the question of the composition of the government. This is the government’s exclusive domain, and it ought to remain that way, subject to the express provisions of the law.

 

28. This narrow conception of the relationship between the judiciary and the other authorities is one possible view – possible but undesirable. The Supreme Court rejected it – and rightly so – in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5], and Bar-On [3]. The Court premised its decisions on the issue of public confidence, and this too was the right path. The Court explained its position as follows:

 

Without public confidence in the public authorities, the latter become an empty vessel. Public confidence is the mainstay of the public authorities and enables them to discharge their functions.

 

Eisenberg [6], at 262 (Barak, J.). Later, in discussing public confidence in the government, the Court dealt with past actions that may tarnish the image of a candidate to public office:

 

Public confidence in the organs of government is one of the most important assets of the governing authority and of the state. When the public loses confidence in the ruling authorities, it also loses its belief in the social contract of communal life. Paramount importance ought to be given to maintaining, preserving, and promoting the feeling that public servants are not masters and that they discharge their duties for the sake of the public, honestly and incorruptibly. The purity of the service and of its members is the foundation of the civil service and the basis of our social structure …. This consideration is central and must therefore be accorded significant weight in the overall decision regarding the appointment of a candidate with a criminal past.

 

Id. at 262. This ruling was reaffirmed in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5], and Bar-On [3]. As stated in Pinchas Cohen [62]: “[I]t is well known that if the nation lacks confidence in its leaders, disorder prevails and society disintegrates.” Therefore, when confronted with a concern that a particular act or omission will severely impair the public’s confidence in its leadership, the Court cannot stand idly by, claiming that this matter is not its concern. Judicial intervention in such cases is a form of self-defense – the self-defense of the entire state, of which the judiciary itself is part. How would this Court respond if it was accused of being silent in the face of such a travesty? This was our holding in both Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], and we will be guided by it.

 

Indictment and Evidence in Support of the Indictment; Evidence without an Indictment

 

29. As we have already observed, the law provides that where an indictment for a serious offense is filed against a minister, the Prime Minister is obligated to remove that minister from office. By extension, his refusal to remove the minister under those circumstances is considered to be unreasonable in the extreme and warrants judicial intervention. Now, it could be asked: is this, in fact, the correct interpretation of the law?

 

30. An indictment is no more than a document bearing the signature of an attorney, the Attorney-General, or any other authority. The signatory affirms that to the best of his understanding, the police file contains prima facie evidence that the accused committed the offenses in the indictment. An indictment effectively amounts to an expert opinion of its signatory that, prima facie, the defendant has committed the offenses specified in the indictment. And the question necessarily arises: Is this sufficient? In other words, is the understanding of the signatory – however elevated his status may be – that a person has, prima facie, committed various offenses, sufficient to compel the minister or deputy-minister to step down, without giving them the  chance to present their case? Were this to be provided by statute, we would accept it (subject, of course, to the basic principles of fair procedure). However, should we make this our holding: that an indictment for serious offenses obligates the Prime Minister to remove a minister and deputy-minister from office? Was this the impact of the ruling in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5]? It is clear to us that this is not the law and that this was not the Court’s intention in those cases.

31. In our opinion, a correct understanding of those cases is that we cannot rely upon an indictment, even if it bears the signature of so exalted a personage as the Attorney-General himself. Rather, the indictment is a document that consolidates the evidence collected in the police file, evidence that prima facie incriminates the accused of the offenses ascribed to him. The indictment may be likened to a container with a label that attests to its contents. Its essence is the evidence gathered in the police file, and the basic assumption is that the indictment is a proper summation of that evidence. In both the Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], the Court was careful to emphasize this point. In Deri [47] the Court enumerated the offenses of which Deri was suspected, declaring immediately afterward that: “The facts, which reflect the prima facie evidence in the hands of the prosecution, are described at length in the indictment spanning 50 pages.” Id. at 410. The Court added:

 

We described the main points of the indictment presented to the Knesset in the case at hand. The indictment includes particularly serious allegations of corruption, but it is not a judgment. It only reflects the prima facie evidence collected by the prosecution. But, for the purpose of continued service in the government, significance is also attached to prima facie evidence collected in the indictment, which has now become public knowledge. In terms of the reasonableness of certain actions, circumstances are not assessed solely in terms of their ability to generate a hard and fast judicial determination. It is also significant what type of actions have been attributed to an individual, when clad in the official dress of an indictment ready for filing before the courts.

 

Id. at 422-23. It was added:

 

[A]nd if, heaven forbid, an indictment is filed against a minister, based on prima facie evidence, which ascribes to the minister serious offenses that involve moral turpitude both by definition and under the circumstances – e.g. where a minister is charged with accepting bribes, fraud, deceiving state authorities, lying, or making false reports – then it would be neither appropriate nor reasonable for him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 427 (Levin, J.). In both Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], the basic assumption was that there was prima facie evidence in support of the accusations. The import of Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5] is that, where there is evidence in the police file in support of an indictment filed against a minister or deputy-minister for serious offenses, then such evidence may obligate the Prime Minister to remove the minister or deputy-minister from office. The salient element is not the indictment as such, but rather the prima facie evidence that has crystallized into an indictment.

 

32. This interpretation of the ruling is unavoidable. The other interpretation – that an indictment alone is sufficient to remove a minister from office – would deviate from basic legal principles of fairness and justice. Consider the case of a minister who is a candidate for removal exclusively because of the indictment filed against him for serious offenses. He wishes to argue that the indictment was based upon a mistaken understanding of the evidence collected in the police file, and that the charges against him are groundless. The most basic principles of justice require the Court to listen to his claims, and not to refer him to the criminal proceedings to assert his claims. Any other response would undermine the fundamental respect enjoyed by the Court. Furthermore, to confer on an indictment the status of a conclusive document, in terms of the termination of a minister’s office, is tantamount to divesting the Court of its discretionary power, and transferring this power to the attorney who signed the indictment. Such a divestment of judicial power is unacceptable. The Court cannot divest itself of its power to adjudicate and rule in accordance with the evidence submitted to it. Discretion in judicial proceedings belongs exclusively to the Court and the fundamental principle in that context is that the Court cannot delegate its discretion to others, be it to the Attorney-General, or to any of the attorneys in the State Attorney’s Office. By extension, it will not regard an indictment as an irrefutable, conclusive document. The indictment per se will not determine the fate of a minister.

 

33. To summarize: the rule is that an indictment for serious offenses may lead to a minister’s removal from office. The proper interpretation of this rule is that an indictment constitutes an expert opinion that the police file contains evidence which adequately supports the charges against the minister. It is the supporting evidence behind the indictment that weighs against the minister, and not the indictment itself. Concededly, the indictment adds a certain degree of weight to the probative power of the evidence in the police file, but it is by no means conclusive. An indictment for serious offenses, even particularly serious offenses, does not tip the scales against the minister. But, as we shall shortly observe, the reverse true is not true either – the absence of an indictment does not tip the scales in his favor.

 

34. We have established that the conclusive element – whether to the minister’s detriment or to his advantage – is not the indictment per se. Consequently, we must examine the evidence itself, and assess its importance for the case at hand. And we must also discharge another duty: an examination of the reasons and circumstances that convinced the Attorney-General, or the State Attorney’s Office, not to file an indictment. Consider a case in which the evidence collected justified an indictment for a particularly serious offense, but the key witness absconded from the country, as a result of which the Attorney-General refrained from filing an indictment. In that kind of case, can one say that the Court may in good conscience refuse to address the matter, and release itself from all responsibility, for the simple reason that no indictment was filed? I think not.

35. The above would also apply to a decision not to file an indictment, and even to a decision to close a police file. It will be recalled that police files are closed for a variety of reasons, and closing a police file without filing an indictment in no way indicates that no offense was committed, or that there is no evidence attesting to guilt. Thus, for example, the category of closing a file “for lack of evidence,” includes cases in which the prosecutor has evidence that connects a particular person with the commission of an offense, only that such evidence is insufficient to prove the commission of an offense beyond all reasonable doubt, the requirement in criminal law. This Court addressed this question in HCJ 7256/95 Fishler v. The Inspector General of the Israel Police [63]:

 

[F]iles which are closed for lack of sufficient evidence also include investigations of serious and even extremely serious offenses. There are cases in which the investigative bodies have information that leads to the re-opening of a file which was previously closed. This was referred to in the memorandum on the Crime Register and Rehabilitation of Offenders (Various Amendments) Law, 1996, which wasrecently disseminated by the Ministry of Justice:

 

Where prosecuting authorities close a file for lack of evidence, this does not mean that they have concluded that the suspect did not commit the offense. Closing a file on those grounds may occasionally be purely the result of technical factors, such as a doubt as to whether particular evidence will constitute corroboration, or where the key witness has left the country or otherwise absconded. Accordingly, information contained in these files may still be relevant for those bodies entitled to receive information on closed files, just as information regarding files closed on other grounds is relevant to such bodies.

 

Id. at 9-10, (Goldberg, J.). A similar argument was expressed in a later case:

 

On January 2, 1994, the State Attorney issued guidelines regarding the exercise of discretion (Guideline No. 1.3 “The Closure of Files Due to Insufficient Evidence and Due to Lack of Guilt.” The Guidelines clarify the procedure of closing a file due to insufficient evidence. Within the basic framework which governs the closure of files on the statutory grounds of “insufficient evidence,” the guidelines establish a secondary category – the grounds of “lack of guilt.” According to the Guidelines, when a prosecuting attorney concludes “…that there is evidence in the investigation file which raises the suspicion that a person has committed a certain offense, but the evidence is not sufficient for proof of guilt, and is therefore insufficient for indictment – the file regarding that suspect will be closed on the grounds of ‘insufficient evidence,’ and the reason for closing the file will be recorded accordingly.” (para. 2). Where, however, the attorney is convinced “that no offense was committed in the same matter, or that there is no trace of evidence as to its commission, the file will be closed due to a ‘lack of guilt,’ and not due to ‘insufficient evidence’” (para. 6). The Guidelines clarify that the closure of a file due to a lack of guilt – a category not mentioned in the statute – is intended “to prevent the perception of there being any element of doubt as to the innocence of a person suspected of a particular matter, which would cause him unjustified harm” (para. 7). This Court adopted the distinction between a file closed due to “insufficient evidence” and a file closed due to “lack of guilt,” and has ruled that it is justified to close a file for “insufficient evidence” and not “lack of guilt” when the existing evidence leaves a reasonable doubt regarding the suspect’s innocence.

HCJ 2682/98 Appel v. The State Attorney [64], at 137-38 (Strasbourg-Cohen, J.). Compare HCJ 4539/92 Kablero v. The Attorney-General [65], at 56. As stated above: the Court will decide, based on the evidence before it, and not merely because an indictment was filed. Similarly, the Court will examine the reason for not filing an indictment, and this reason will be an apposite consideration in its examination of the entirety of considerations, but no more than that.

36. The rule is that the power to remove a minister from office – which may occasionally become mandatory – is not restricted to cases in which an indictment was filed against the minister. As stated in Pinhasi [5]:

[C]ircumstances may arise in which the mere opening of an investigation justifies the termination of tenure. By contrast, circumstances may arise in which even a conviction does not justify the termination of tenure. In this respect, the particular section under which the indictment is filed is not conclusive. The determinative factors are the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense and the other circumstances of the case.

Id. at 474 (Barak, J.). In Bar-On [3] it was noted:

 

Because the test is substantive and not merely formalistic in nature, it cannot be stated categorically that that only an indictment issued with respect to a serious crime, or at least an investigation with respect to the performance of such a crime, are capable of justifying termination of office. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the conduct of a minister or deputy-minister in a specific case, even if it does not amount to a criminal offense, may be so very severe, to the point that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 63-64 (Zamir, J.). But these comments were soon qualified:

 

But there exists a vast difference between an extreme situation like this, which forms an exception to the law, and a broad ruling which would render unfit any minister or deputy-minister whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards. The proposal to expand the existing ruling so that such conduct would obligate the Prime Minister to dismiss the minister or deputy-minister, even though that proposal is motivated by good intentions, is not appropriate. It is likely to do more harm than good.

 

Id. (Zamir, J.). We unreservedly concur with these comments, but every case must be determined according to its particular circumstances. We must distinguish between two different types of cases. The first is of a minister or deputy-minister “whose conduct deviates from acceptable standards.” On this basis alone, he cannot be allowed to remain in office. The second is of a minister who has not been indicted due to lack of evidence, even though there exists reliable administrative evidence that he committed a particularly serious offense. The reason he was not indicted was because in the offense could not be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

Administrative Discretion; Administrative Evidence; “Criminal Past”; Presumption of Innocence

37. Our position is that the evidence in the police file is the primary determinant of the parameters of discretion. This places us firmly in the realm of administrative discretion and judicial review of the discretion exercised by a competent authority. To avoid any suspicion of intentional disregard, we would hasten to add the following: we are aware that the procedure confronting us is not a regular administrative procedure, like the denial of a license to grow cabbage (a subject of great importance to the applicant). And yet, the guiding principles are identical, whether the case is momentous or trivial in nature. The manner of implementation may change, as we will shortly show, but the principles are the same.

38. It is well known that the rules of evidence in administrative law differ from the rules of evidence in criminal and civil law. An administrative authority is entitled, and indeed obligated, to consider evidence that would not be admissible in a criminal or civil proceeding. For example, where a person’s candidacy is being considered for an office or a job, the reasonableness of the appointment will be assessed in accordance with the rules of administrative evidence. These rules of evidence are less strict than their counterparts in civil and criminal judicial procedures. Administrative evidence is evidence which “any reasonable person would regard as having probative value and would rely upon to any particular degree.” See HCJ 442/71 Lanski v. Minister of the Interior [66], at 357. The well of potential evidence is bottomless, and clearly includes evidence that is not admissible in criminal or civil judicial proceedings. Compare Lanski [66]; CA 5709/95 Ben-Shlomo v. Director of The Value Added Tax Authority [67], at 251; II Itzchak Zamir, Administrative Authority 751 (1996).

This type of framework is capable of accommodating findings in a judgment made against a third party, to which the candidate himself was not a party. Compare Eisenberg [6], at 272. This includes findings of a police investigation, and decisions of the State Attorney which did not crystallize into an indictment. Compare Fishler [63], Kablero [65], and Appel [64]. The question is whether the competent authority was presented with “sufficient evidence on which a reasonable person could rely, under the circumstances, in order to adopt the decision in question.” See HCJ 164/97 Kontram Ltd. v. Ministry of Finance [68], at 332.

In the administrative realm, therefore, the litmus test is neither technical-legal nor mechanical in nature. The test is one of reasonableness, of common sense. This applies both to the selection of the information on which the authority chooses to rely, and to the weight of the various factors under consideration. This point has been noted by the Court:

In order for an authority to rely on a particular piece of information, the latter must satisfy the test of admissibility for administrative evidence. This test is a flexible one. It allows the administrative authority to consider evidence that is not admissible in court, such as hearsay. Even so, not every wild rumor provides sufficient basis to substantiate a finding. The test is therefore one of reasonableness: the administrative authority is entitled to rely on information that relates to a matter on which a reasonable person (or more precisely – a reasonable authority) would rely in order to reach a decision regarding the matter in question.

The relevant information, which is the information that satisfies the test of administrative evidence, becomes the foundation of the decision. This foundation must be sufficiently sturdy to support the decision. What is the meaning of “sufficiently” for this purpose? Here, too, the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence is a question of reasonableness. In other words, the nature of the facts must be such that a reasonable authority would rely upon it in order to adopt the decision.

HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd. v. Minister of Communications, [69] at 424-25 (Zamir, J.). Regarding the distinction between the filing of an indictment and a conviction, compare Deri [47], at 422-23, and Pinhasi [5], at 462.

39. The boundaries of administrative evidence also cover a person’s “criminal past.” As is well known, in criminal proceedings, at the crucial sentencing stage importance is often attached to the offender’s past criminal convictions in order to show his “criminal past.” This is not the case in administrative procedure: a person’s “criminal past” can also be proven on the basis of administrative evidence, not just a judicial conviction. This point was made in Bar-On [3]:

Only in the most extreme cases will the Court compel the Prime Minister to exercise this power [to remove a minister from office]. These are cases in which there is administrative evidence of the commission of serious criminal offenses and a threat of serious damage to public confidence in the government authorities. One could perhaps add cases of extreme deviation from the moral integrity required of a person serving as a minister.

Id. at 68 (Or, J.). The Court related to this again more recently:

 

Generally, an administrative authority establishes facts on the basis of administrative evidence. Administrative evidence is evidence that a reasonable person (or reasonable administrative authority) would rely upon under the circumstances. This rule was established long ago and is now generally applied in all matters. The Court has also affirmed its application in various contexts with regard to the proving a person’s criminal past or criminal conduct. The Court has affirmed its application regarding decisions of the Parole Boards to revoke a prisoner’s leave pass, due to the commission of an offense; regarding the decision of a military commander to destroy a building following a murder; regarding the President’s power to pardon “criminals;” and similarly regarding the appointment of a person with a criminal past to public office.

HCJ 1227/98 Malevsky v. Minister of the Interior [70], at 715-16.

As we have already determined, these rules fully apply to an appointment to a public office, and in this context, ex hypothesi, there is no room for a strict application of the “presumption of innocence.” This presumption informs us that a person is presumed innocent until convicted. It applies to the criminal procedure and to the punishment of an offender in the manner set out by law. As for the administrative procedure when an authority is required to rule regarding a person’s “criminal past,” it can do so on the basis of administrative evidence, without a criminal conviction. This rule was dealt with at length in Eisenberg [6], where the Court distinguished between a criminal conviction, and a person’s “criminal past” under administrative law. The Court stated:

 

A criminal past for purposes of a particular appointment is not to be identified with a criminal conviction. We are dealing with an administrative decision of the government to appoint a particular person to a public position. This is not a decision to a statutory penalty. While there can be no criminal punishment without a conviction, this does not apply to an appointment. With respect to an appointment, it is the factual picture with which the appointing authority was presented that is relevant. The relevant question is, therefore, given the facts as presented to the authority, could a reasonable authority have deduced the commission of a criminal offense? If so, this would be sufficient in order to establish “a criminal past” for purposes of deciding the reasonableness of the appointment. Of course, for purposes of determining the reasonableness of the administrative decision, the commission of the criminal offenses attributed to the candidate is the decisive factor. A criminal conviction is clearly sufficient “evidence” of this, but there are other forms of evidence, such as a confession before a competent authority.

The applicable rule in the case before us is the “principle of administrative evidence.” A governmental authority is permitted to base its findings upon evidence which, under the circumstances, is such that “any reasonable person would have regard to its probative value and would have relied upon it.” An administrative finding may be based upon “material whose evidential value is such that reasonable people would regard it as sufficient to draw conclusions regarding the nature and occupations of the persons concerned.”

Id. at 268. This ruling has embedded itself deep within Israeli law. See  HCJ 932/99 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Chairman of the Committee for the Examination of Appointments [71], at 769; HCJ 4668/01 MK Yossi Sarid v. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon [hereinafter: Bus 300 [72]], at 265; HCJ 5795/97 MK Yossi Sarid v. Minister of Defense [73], at 799. And, in accordance with Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5], this is also the rule for the examination of appointments and the tenure of ministers and deputy-ministers:

[W]e must consider the fact that we are only concerned with an indictment prepared by the Attorney-General. Deputy-Minister Pinhasi has not been convicted, and continues to protest his innocence. The weight attached to the concern for the public’s confidence in the authorities when a public figure has been convicted or admits to an offense is not the same as the weight of that consideration when there is only an indictment, and when the accused protests his innocence. Even so, this consideration should not be given conclusive weight. Our concern is with a governmental act of termination of office. In order to justify such an act, there is no need for a criminal conviction. While every accused person enjoys a presumption of innocence, that presumption does not prevent the termination of the office held by the accused. The only condition is that the governmental authority making the decision must have evidence, which under the circumstances is such that “any reasonable person would regard it as having probative weight and would rely upon it.” Justice Shamgar also made this point, ruling that an administrative finding can be based on:

“ [M]aterial whose evidential value is such that reasonable people would regard it as sufficient for drawing conclusions regarding the character and conduct of the persons concerned.”

And Justice Sussman commented in a similar vein:

“[T]he rule that a person is presumed innocent in the absence of evidence to the contrary, does not imply – and nor am I aware of any other legal principle which implies – that an administrative authority which must be convinced of a person’s criminal past may only determine that he has a criminal past if he was convicted by the courts.

Should we strike down the commissioner’s refusal to appoint a candidate as a civil servant when such refusal was based on reasonable evidence of a criminal past, simply due to the lack of a conviction? Let us assume that this applicant desired to be accepted into the public service, and the Commissioner refused to accept him for the above reasons. Would we force the Commissioner to accept him due to the lack of a conviction?

An administrative authority is empowered to make a decision regarding an individual’s personal history, but is not empowered to swear in witnesses and collect evidence in the manner that it is collected in court. Therefore there it is appropriate that its decision be based on evidence which would persuade a reasonable person as to the applicant’s past. This will apply even where the evidence is not admissible in a court of law, and even where it lacks significance in judicial proceedings.”

I also addressed this issue in Eisenberg, at 268:

“[W]hen assessing the reasonableness of a decision of an appointing governmental authority, the decisive factor is the criminal offenses attributed to the candidate. A criminal conviction is certainly an appropriate “proof,” but there are other means of proof.

       The relevant principle in our case is the “principle of administrative evidence.”

Pinhasi [5] at 467-69.

40. In this context we would do well to recall respondent’s claim regarding the presumption of innocence. Respondent informs us:

The presumption of innocence is one of the most basic rights conferred on all citizens in any democratic regime. It is intended to protect a person who has not yet been convicted from restrictions and sanctions which express his status as a criminal. The principle is well-known and well-established. Any determination regarding Hanegbi’s unfitness to serve in particular positions necessarily expresses at least a limited presumption of his guilt, and diminishes the presumption of his innocence.

Moreover, respondent claims that it is an elementary human right that a person be allowed to defend himself against an accusation. Respondent claims:

[T]his elementary right, “a person’s lawful right to defend himself,” was effectively denied to Minister Hanegbi due to the decision not to file an indictment or try him. Paradoxically, if petitioner’s claim is accepted, the result will be that this decision was the most damaging of all, because he no longer has the legal means to prove his innocence.

Respondent here confuses two distinct issues, and hence his conclusion is mistaken. A clear distinction must be made between respondent as a private individual, and respondent as a minister. Furthermore, he is not just any minister, but the Minister for Public Security, in charge of law enforcement. The presumption of innocence resembles the right to silence. Both are granted to a person as a private individual. Consequently, as long as a person’s guilt has not been proven beyond all reasonable doubt, and with due legal process, he is presumed to be innocent of any crime, and no penal sanction may be imposed upon him. But there is no connection between criminal proceedings – the object of which is the imposition of sanctions – and a person’s appointment as a public official. Is the mere fact that a person has not been indicted sufficient, in and of itself, to render him “fit” to be a minister? From the legal standpoint, surely more is required? If this is respondent’s view, then it contradicts the law. “The presumption of innocence – enjoyed by every accused person – does not prevent the termination of service of a public official.” See Pinhasi [5], at 468. Following this holding, I declare that, for our purposes, there is no requirement for evidence beyond all reasonable doubt in order to render a person unfit for service as a minister. As noted in Bar-On:

It cannot be stated in an unequivocal manner that a person’s removal from office can only be justified where an indictment has been filed or an investigation has begun.

Id. at 63. Even evidence of less import than that obtained in a criminal investigation may be sufficient. This is even more true in our case, especially when we consider two elements. First, the cumulative effect of the accumulated cases against respondent. Second, the fact that the Prime Minister insists that respondent not only be a minister, but specifically the Minister of Public Security, the minister in charge of the police and law enforcement.

 “Political” Considerations; Intervention in the Prime Minister’s Discretion

41. Until now we have referred to considerations of a person’s “criminal past.” But these are just a small part of the whole picture that the Prime Minister must consider when making a ministerial appointment, or when considering whether to remove a person from office. We all know that a person’s “criminal past” is not the only factor which the Prime Minister is permitted and obligated to consider when deciding whether a particular person will be a minister, or will be removed from office. Furthermore, in the political reality with which all are familiar, these are not even the main considerations. The parameters of the Prime Minister’s discretion are very broad, and take in a wide array of considerations, among them the candidate’s suitability for the office, the best interests of the public in the broad sense, and others.

42. In this question – whether to appoint or dismiss a minister – the Prime Minister is entitled to consider a wide range of factors. Furthermore, the political context of the appointment means that the Prime Minister’s considerations also include “political” considerations such as the formation of a stable and viable coalition. For our purposes, these considerations are entirely legitimate. In fact, these considerations are central to the establishment of a government and its continued existence. In this regard, Justice Barak stated the following:

“Political” considerations – which may be illegitimate in other contexts – are appropriate when considering the removal of a deputy-minister from office. The need to maintain a coalition and to secure the continued confidence of the Knesset is certainly a relevant consideration. Similarly, weight must be given to the fact that the deputy-minister has not been convicted in court. All that there is against him is an indictment, and an indictment does not amount to a conviction.

Pinhasi [5], at 463. See also Deri [47], at 423, 427, 429.

43. The range of reasonableness is as broad as the power itself, and the court’s power to intervene in the Prime Minister’s discretion is limited to the same degree. Accordingly, deciding whether the Prime Minister deviated from the range of reasonableness is particularly difficult. In fact, it is only in rare and exceptional cases that the Court will see fit to intervene in the acts of the executive regarding cabinet appointments.

The breadth of the Prime Minister’s discretion requires our special attention. His power is unique. Compare Bar-On [3], at 57-59. The scope of judicial intervention is inversely related to the scope of the Prime Ministerial discretion; the latter expands as the former contracts. The fact that we do not agree with the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a particular individual as a minister or to a particular ministry is not enough to strike down the decision. It is not our role, nor is it within our power, to evaluate the merits of a decision. We must confine ourselves to the question of its legality. Accordingly, the Court may only strike down a prime ministerial decision concerning the removal or retention of a minister allegedly involved in criminal acts in unusual and exceptional circumstances.

44. It is certainly conceivable that the Court might be averse to a particular decision of the executive branch. But it is incumbent upon us to make a clear distinction between those acts and omissions which belong to the ethical realm and do not enter the realm of the law, and those that belong to both the ethical and legal realms. The latter are acts and omissions flawed by extreme unreasonableness which may thus be subject to judicial annulment. Particular acts or omissions of the executive branch may be ethically problematic, but the Court will not interfere with them unless they are also illegal. “[T]he law cannot, and should not replace ethics, except to limited extent, on a case-by-case basis, in a controlled and cautious process.” See Bar-On [3], at 62. Hence, where a decision is unethical, but remains a matter of ethics, we are not empowered to intervene. Compare also Itzchak Zamir, Ethics in Politics, 17 Mishpatim 255-58 (1988) [106].

We must remember that the judicial branch is charged exclusively with upholding the law and of those ethical areas that have been incorporated into the law. See Bar-On [3], at 61; HCJ 1635/90 Zersevsky v The Prime Minister [74], at 764; HCJ 1843/93 Pinhasi v. Knesset Israel [10], at 698-99; HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Israeli Labor Party [75], at 818; HCJ 7367/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Attorney-General [51], at 561.

“It’s Not Done”

45. All the same, it must be remembered that the intensity and the scope of judicial intervention in acts of the executive depends on the executive’s conduct. Ideally, a government is meant to operate in compliance with the principle that “it’s not done.” This is essentially a concept of governmental culture as distinct from a legal concept. What it means is that there are certain things that the executive should not do simply because they are not done, according to the appropriate norms of conduct in society. A person who is act in contravention of these norms is to be condemned. As the scope of “it’s not done” expands, the scope for judicial intervention contracts. Fortunate is the society whose government has internalized the culture of “it’s not done.” Fortunate is the Court that is not required to decide matters relating to the culture of “it’s not done.”

From the General to the Specific

46. This completes our discussion of the basic legal framework. Applying these principles to respondent’s case, we ask ourselves the following question: was his appointment as Minister of Public Security so flawed that it must be regarded as an invalid appointment, or an appointment which should be invalidated? Was the respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security so extreme a deviation from the range of reasonableness as to warrant a ruling that, from the legal standpoint, respondent is not worthy of continuing to hold that office?

47. This Court issued an order nisi directing the Prime Minister to explain his reasons for appointing respondent as Minister of Public Security despite the fact that, from a legal standpoint, the appointment was fundamentally flawed. Both the Prime Minister and respondent replied to the order nisi, but the Prime Minister’s response is the crucial one. In our comments above we surveyed the principle factors that should govern the Prime Minister’s discretion when deciding on the appointment of a minister, or on his removal from office. We will now examine the considerations that led the Prime Minister to appoint Hanegbi as Minister of Public Security, and why, in his opinion, Hanegbi is fit to continue serving in that capacity. However, instead of describing and summarizing the Prime Minister’s comments, we will let the Prime Minister speak for himself, and we will simply listen. In his affidavit to the Court, the Prime Minister informed us as follows:

 

16. My decision to appoint Minister Hanegbi to the office of Minister of Public Security was made after I had evaluated all the relevant considerations, including the advice of the Attorney-General and the basis of this advice, as detailed above, and I struck a proper balance among these considerations. Among other factors, I took into account the minister’s many talents, his many years of experience in various demanding public and state offices, the gravity of the role of head of the Ministry of Public Security, as well as other coalition-related considerations, all of which are now detailed.

 

17. Minister Tzahi Hanegbi has served, over a continuous period of many years, in a number of high-ranking and demanding public and governmental offices. These have included: Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office; Minister of Health; Minister of the Environment; Minister of Transportation; Member of the twelfth through sixteenth Knessets inclusive; Chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee; Member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; and Member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee.

In addition, for a period of approximately three years, between 1996 and 1999, Hanegbi served as Minister of Justice, within which framework he served as a member of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs – the so-called “State Security Cabinet”; as Chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and Law Enforcement; as Chairman of the Committee for the Selection of Judges; as a member of the Committee for the Selection of Military Judges; and as a member of the Ministerial Committee for Privatization.

Over the last two decades, I have become personally acquainted with the abilities and talents of Minister Hanegbi. In view of Hanegbi’s many professional achievements in all of the offices in which he served as minister, I have chosen him to serve as the Minister of Public Security, an office currently faces unique and extremely important challenges.

Minister Hanegbi has a broad national perspective, which was expressed during his years as Minister of Justice, notwithstanding his investigation during that term regarding the Derech Tzleha affair. He has a wealth of experience in the management of complex ministries; and a broad knowledge in the field of security, which he gained in a variety of public roles, as listed above. It is my belief that all this qualifies him to successfully run the Ministry of Public Security.

In my view, the nature of the position offered to Minister Hanegbi and the particular powers exercised by the Minister of Public Security do not create any significant concern of conflicts of interest which might affect the minister’s conduct or impair his professionalism and the integrity of his discretion when exercising his authority … We need to remember that the Minister of Public Security is not a “supra-Inspector-General” who wields direct control over all matters pertaining to Israel Police, and this is true especially insofar as the Investigations Branch is concerned. The minister’s powers consist of broad powers of supervision, approval, planning, and the provision of guidance where necessary. In discharging his duties it is essential that there be a close and ongoing connection with police bodies. The decisions and actions of the Minister of Public Security are not the product of his personal preferences; they are the product of cautious and calculated discretion, backed up by extensive data provided by the police bodies. With respect to investigations, the minister is not involved in specific cases; his concern is exclusively with matters of policy.

At the time of making the decision, I considered the position of the Attorney-General with respect to the Derech Tzleha affair. The Attorney-General regarded Hanegbi’s appointment as being prima facie problematic from a civic perspective, though from the strictly legal standpoint, according to existing statutes and case law, there appears to be no legal impediment to the appointment.

In this regard, it should be noted that the events relating to Minister Hanegbi occurred between 1994 and the beginning of 1996. When Minister Hanegbi was interrogated, he did not take advantage of his right to silence. Rather he cooperated in full with his investigators. In my view, these facts were significant to the decision not to indict Hanegbi and for public confidence in him.

18. I have taken into account all of the relevant considerations, which include  the qualifications and abilities required of the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General’s position, and Minister Hanegbi’s actions in the Derech Tzleha affair and the other affairs, Hanegbi’s capabilities and his experience, as well as political and coalition considerations. After giving these considerations their appropriate weight, it cannot be said that the decision to appoint Hanegbi deviates in an extreme manner from the standard of reasonableness.

48.The Prime Minister thus informs us that he considered Hanegbi’s manifold talents, his many years of experience in demanding public and government offices, and his professional achievements in all of his roles. The Prime Minister expresses his confidence that there is no real concern of a conflict of interest in Hanegbi’s duties as Minister of Public Security, and in this context he also explains that the Minister of Public Security, is not a “supra-Inspector-General.” The Prime Minister also informs us took the Derech Tzleha case into consideration, but he did not find it to be an impediment to Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As for the concern that Hanegbi will face a conflict of interest as Minister of Public Security, the Prime Minister refers to the numerous statutory supervisory mechanisms, and faithfully assures us that this fear has no basis. Once again, we will let the Prime Minister speak for himself:

21. Regarding the claim of conflicting interests: petitioner is concerned that a possible conflict of interest will arise whenever the promotion of any of Hanegbi’s investigators is on the agenda, when allocating budgets for certain branches or departments, and in relation to the disciplinary powers conferred upon the minister. In this context, it should be mentioned that during the entire period of Hanegbi’s service as Minister of Justice, no claim was ever made which could have substantiated the fear raised by petitioner.

First, it should be made clear that ever since the 1988 Amendment to the Police Ordinance (Amendment No. 9), the Minister of Public Security does not have any powers in matters of disciplinary adjudication.

It should be emphasized that, notwithstanding the minister’s overall ministerial responsibility, which finds expression in various provisions of the Police Ordinance, the Israel Police and those at its helm are managerially independent. This is evidenced both in explicit provisions, such as section 9 of the Ordinance, and on a practical level – in working procedures which express the principle of the independence of the police.

Regarding the appointment process, section 7 of the Police Ordinance establishes and regulates the minister’s power to appoint a senior police officer, i.e. an officer from the rank of deputy commander upwards. The manner of exercising the power is subject to the rules of administrative law, including the duty of consultation with the Inspector-General of the police and additional professional bodies, prior to making the appointment. As a rule, the Inspector-General of the police submits his own candidates to the minister for each particular role; for as head of the system, it is the Inspector-General who has to work with the particular officer who is chosen. Rejection of the Inspector-General’s candidate and appointments that are made against the Inspector-General’s judgment, require weighty considerations, all of which are subject to judicial review in accordance with the principles of administrative law.

Regarding the budgetary issue, section 9 of the Ordinance makes the Inspector-General responsible for all expenditures connected to the administration and operation of the police. Besides this section, the provisions of the Foundations of the Budget Law, establish the responsibility of the Minister of Public Security, like any other minister, for the budget of the ministry over which he is charged. For our purposes, this also includes responsibility for the budgets of auxiliary units – Israel Police and the Prison Services.

The Ministry of Public Security’s Director-General, through the Planning, Budgeting and Inspection Department, is charged with the formulation of the ministry’s budget. Before preparing the budget proposal, the minister and the Inspector-General determine the priorities and policies for the coming year. They work closely together on this task. On the basis of these policies, the budget proposal is prepared by the planning division in coordination with the various police departments. The budget proposal is then presented for the approval of the Inspector-General, the Director-General and the minister.

Like the Director-General and the Inspector-General, the minister does not interfere with the budget’s particulars. Their role is to assess whether the budget proposal that was prepared in fact expresses the policies and the priorities determined by them.

Once the budgetary framework for each department has been fixed, the head of each police branch is responsible for the allocation of the budget within his branch, and within its auxiliary and subordinate units, down to the level of the individual police station and the individual policeman. In this respect, the head of a police branch has independent discretion.

The coordination required between the Inspector-General and the minister at the level of policy and priorities, together with the independent discretion of the police in budgetary details, remove any basis for concerns of conflicts of interest, or inappropriate considerations.

Therefore, there exists an array of internal mechanisms governing all matters relating to the minister’s functions. Respondents wish to reiterate that with respect to investigations, the Minister of Public Security deals exclusively with matters of policy, and does not interfere with specific investigations.

49. Hangebi also made various declarations similar to those of the Prime Minister and, like the Prime Minister, he stresses that his role is to set out policy. He does not regard himself as authorized to interfere with the decisions of the police taken at the professional level. In the words of his affidavit:

The internal management of the Israel Police and its head [the Inspector-General] is totally independent of the Minister of Public Security has ministerial responsibility for the police, but he is not a “supra-Inspector-General”; he has no disciplinary powers of adjudication, and no power to intervene in particular investigations. The police budget proposal is drawn up by the planning division in cooperation and coordination with headquarters and the budget division of the Finance Ministry. In addition to the minister’s approval, the ministry budget also requires the approval of the Finance Committee and the Knesset.

50. Respondents’ claims – both those of the Prime Minister and of Hanegbi himself – aim to minimize  respondent’s authority as the Minister of Public Security as much as possible. In support of their position they cite the lack of authority for disciplinary adjudication, the Inspector-General’s independence with respect to the management of the police, the fact that ministerial powers are subject to consultation, consideration of the views of the Inspector-General and other professional bodies, and the extreme difficulty of making any appointment without the Inspector-General’s consent. Regarding the budget, the planning division handles its preparation, with the cooperation of the other police departments; the Inspector-General is responsible for supervision of expenditure; and he does not intervene in the details of the budget. On the policy level, there must be coordination between the minister and the Inspector-General. Regarding investigations, the minister deals exclusively with determinations of policy. These claims attempt to demonstrate that there is no fear that the minister will act illegally.

Hanegbi further informed us that he bears no grudge against those police officers who investigated him, and that he has no intention of impeding their promotion or harming them in any other way. In his own words:

 

The concern that I might interfere with the appointment of one of my investigators, impede his advancement, or plot against him, is spurious. I have made it clear on more than one occasion, including to my investigators themselves, that I have no complaints about them, and that I respect their duty to fully investigate every case. This is certainly true since the Attorney-General instructed the police to open an investigation. Moreover, my investigators treated me in a sensitive and respectful manner.

51. Do the Prime Minister’s words, reinforced by Hanegbi’s own comments, place Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security within the legal range of reasonableness? Do Hanegbi’s virtues, combined with his accumulated achievements in public office, tip the scale in his favor? When assessing pros and cons, duties and responsibilities, we must remember that the scope of discretion here is particularly broad, comprising a wide range of legitimate considerations, including “political” considerations, such as the candidate’s electoral power and the ability to put together a coalition and establish a government. In Bar-On [3] we stated:

Petitioner claims that the Justice Minister’s “was found to have behaved in contravention of the standards of proper public administration by applying defective criteria which violate the principles of integrity.” Petitioner claims that “a minister may have no blot on his character,” especially the Minister of Justice. Petitioner concludes, therefore, that since the Minister of Justice is tainted, the Prime Minister is obligated to remove him from office.

Without deciding whether petitioner’s presentation reflects the desirable law, it is definitely an incorrect presentation of the existing law. In our less-than-ideal world, the mere fact that a minister’s record is blemished is not sufficient to legally obligate the Prime Minster to remove him from office. The Prime Minister is only obligated to dismiss a minister, under section 35(b) of Basic Law: The Government, when his refusal to do so would be unreasonable in the extreme.

Id. at 57 (Zamir, J.). Evidently, a blemished record is not sufficient in this case. The blemish must be serious, perhaps even a permanent stain, in order to obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from appointing a minister or to remove a minister from office. Personally, I am not certain I can give my unreserved agreement to this formulation. “A respected scholar whose cloak is stained – is liable to the death penalty.” Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 114A [108]. A minister must be above reproach. In this context we should recall that not just a conviction, or a pending indictment, but also less severe circumstances may obligate the Prime Minister to refrain from appointing that person as a minister, or to remove a minister from office. See para. 22 above.

52.The Prime Minister’s affidavit (and also Hanegbi’s) contains a lengthy description of Hanegbi’s virtues and merits, and only relates sparingly to his faults and failures. Regarding the Derech Tzleha case, the Prime Minister informs us as follows:

15. As indicated in the Attorney-General’s opinion of 2001, which is appended in full to this affidavit, the events at the basis of the Derech Tzleha case, occurred between 1994 and 1996. In 1999, the Knesset Ethics Committee found Hanegbi to be at fault, and he was punished. The Attorney-General claimed that these acts indicated impropriety, which according to those concerned, constituted an offense. At the end of the day, the decision was made that there was no reasonable chance of conviction, and it was decided to close the file for lack of evidence. Notably, the entire investigation was conducted at a time when Hanegbi was serving as Minister of Justice.

In March 2001, immediately prior to the formation of the government (following the elections of February 2001), the Attorney-General informed the Prime Minister of Minister Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha case. He advised the Prime Minister, for reasons primarily from a civic perspective, not to appoint Hanegbi to any of the ministries dealing with law enforcement. The reason for this was that the file had been closed relatively recently. At that time, I did not appoint Minister Hanegbi to one of these offices.

This time around, immediately after being informed, post factum, of the decision to appoint Hanegbi as the Minister of Public Security, the Attorney-General appraised Dov Weisglas, Director-General of the Prime Minister’s Office, of his position regarding the appointment. The Attorney-General said that while strictly speaking there was no legal impediment to the appointment, it was nonetheless problematic, prima facie, from a civic perspective. The Attorney-General also discussed the matter with Minister Hanegbi, and heard his position that there were no grounds for blocking the appointment, since the closure of the file for lack of evidence had prevented him from proving his innocence. He further stressed that the Minister of Public Security is not responsible for specific investigations and does not interfere with them.

It should be clarified here that, it is part of the role of the Attorney-General to express his opinion about governmental deliberations, orally or in writing, regarding public ethical issues, including non-legal matters. It is then up to the executive branch to take this position into consideration.

The other three affairs are only mentioned in the Prime Minister’s affidavit, in the context of an assortment of legally related claims. One can only wonder, is a police recommendation to indict a minister a regular every-day situation? Does the Attorney-General make a habit of writing long and detailed opinions regarding his decision not to indict a minister? It would have been appropriate for the Prime Minister to elaborate and explain his decision to ignore the Attorney-General’s recommendation, just as he elaborated on Hanegbi’s talents and merits. Ultimately, this matter is not a formal legal issue. Rather it is a matter of basics principles, running deep to the very foundations of our self-image. Our way of life as individuals and as a society depends on such a decision.

53. All agree that the realm of politics differs from the realm of law. The considerations may be the same in each realm, but the weight given to these considerations. “We accept that the Court should be guided by the formula of what is ”just and efficienct,” except that justice must precede efficiency.” See CA 4012/96 Benny Shachaf Freights and Investments (1976) Ltd v. First International Bank of Israel [76], at 505; CA 3602/97 Income Tax and Property Tax Commissioner, Minister of Finance, State of Israel v. Daniel Shachar [77], at 331-32. This principle holds in the realm of law, but not in the realm of politics. This is clearly evidenced in the Prime Minister’s affidavit, which elaborates on the appointment, while devoting minimal attention to the principle of justice in its broader sense. Here we must add that a person’s efficiency and his broad experience in government service are certainly valid and appropriate considerations. However, they do not necessarily tip the scales when weighed against serious considerations concerning improper actions on a public-ethical level. The Court made this point in Bus 300 [72]:

Where there is a clear and direct connection between past offenses committed by the candidate, and the post he is designated to fill, the conclusion may be that his criminal past renders him absolutely unfit for that particular position. Under these circumstances, considerations that might have been regarded as supporting his appointment had he been a candidate for another position (for example the passage of time since the execution of the offense, his regret, his efficient functioning since the offense, and his professional talents) will be of no avail, and his candidacy will be rejected. In determining whether such a connection exists, the considerations cannot be limited to the essence of the offenses and their circumstances, the position in which he committed the offenses and the position now designated for him. Consideration must also be given to the gravity of the moral blemish of the offense. In other words, a connection which renders a candidate unfit is not only a function of the weight ascribed to his criminal past in assessing his professional ability to serve in the new position, but also of his moral stature in respect to the position. Where a close connection exists between the candidate’s criminal past and the position for which he is a candidate, his candidacy should be disqualified, unless there is a real and pressing state of emergency that necessitates his appointment as a uniquely qualified candidate.

See also HCJ 7279/98 MK Sarid v. The Government of Israel [78], at 762.

54. I confess that respondent’s case bothers me deeply. I cannot agree with the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General, and certainly not with respondent, that the matter is clear from a legal standpoint. I cannot agree that judicial intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision is forbidden by law. At the same time, even if our intervention is permitted, we will not rush to instruct the Prime Minister what to do and what not to do. During these proceedings it has been mentioned on a number of occasions that a “cloud” hovers over respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. But a single cloud is insufficient to strike down a person’s appointment as minister. A gathering of many dark and threatening clouds is necessary. 

55. Are there dark clouds gathered over respondent? Regarding his manifold and proven executive talents, as manifested by his years in the public service, I have no quarrel with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister believes that respondent has proven himself as an effective executive figure. Petitioner did not contest this assertion, and we too can accept it. This assessment, however, relates only to his executive capabilities; it does not reflect the ethical problems with respondent’s actions, which we dealt with at length above. When assessing the undisputed acts of respondent, even if the Attorney-General does not consider them sufficient for a criminal conviction, I have difficulty in agreeing with my colleague, Justice Rivlin, that there is absolutely no justification for interfering with the Prime Minister’s discretion. We can accept the Attorney-General’s determination that there was insufficient evidence in the police file for a conviction in court, but we have difficulty in accepting that there is no hard and convincing administrative evidence for the purposes of this case. In this context, it is appropriate for us to recall comments made in Eisenberg [6]:

 

For this purpose, the gravity of the offence is determined not by its ”position” in the Penal Law, but by its implications on considerations that underlie the appointment. Consequently, an offence should be regarded as serious where its very essence and the circumstances of its commission not only undermine law and order in general (such as murder, robbery, or rape) but also the foundations of government structure (such as bribery, fraud and breach of trust, perjury, fabricating evidence, or obstructing the course of justice). A candidate who has committed these offences and holds a senior office in the civil service undermines the public trust in the executive authority and the civil service. He will have difficulty in serving as an example and a model for his subordinates. He will have difficulty requiring of them what is required of every civil servant but which he himself has profaned. He will have difficulty in radiating fairness, trust, prestige, honesty and integrity to the general public. All of these will affect, to a large degree of certainty, the status, functioning and position of the civil service in a democratic society.

 

Id. at 266.

 

56. This is the general rule guiding the judicial assessment of respondent’s actions. And it is even more true when applied to the complex relationship between respondent and the police. In this respect, we should recall the police investigations that led to the recommendations to indict him.

 

The cases against respondent, and their cumulative weight in particular, enjoin us from ignoring the “critical mass” that was created by the Derech Tzleha affair, which came to light after the Bar-On case was closed. Even if we ignore the first affair (the brawling), the cumulative weight of the other three cases, and especially the last two, removes the question of respondent’s appointment from the realm of ethics and public morality, and places it squarely in the realm of law. There exist considerations which may necessitate the termination of a minister’s service in the government, such as the stature of the government and its public image, public confidence in the government, and the need for the government and the administration to conduct itself in a manner which is honorable, fair and worthy of respect. The more we examine these cases, the harder it is to understand how respondent can function as Minister of Public Security. In making these comments we also take into consideration the gradual deterioration of the standards of conduct of public figures and leaders, a decline that has led to desensitization and the lowering of national standards of public morality.

57.We are also witness to a conflict between considerations of efficiency and executive abilities on the one hand, and the morality of respondent’s actions, his stature and his dealings with the police, on the other hand. Which of these considerations outweighs the others? Is there a possibility for some kind of compromise between the conflicting considerations? We should remember that the Court is not empowered to decide; that role belongs to others. The Court’s role rather is to supervise and review compliance with principles of law and justice.

 

58. As for the judicial evaluation of respondent’s actions, we will not add any further explanations of the affairs. We will concentrate primarily on the relations between respondent and the upper echelons of Israel Police, particularly with the Investigations Branch. As noted above, the police investigated respondent and, on more than one occasion, recommended that he be indicted. Respondent informs us that he bears no grudge against the investigators. Regarding the future, respondent adds that all of his actions will be closely watched, and that there will be no abatement of public scrutiny. Respondent declares in his affidavit:

 

In the event that any of my future actions provide any substantial concern regarding a conflict of interest or the involvement of extraneous considerations in my decisions, I am absolutely certain that the doors of this Court will be open to petitioners. My actions will be the test. I see no reason for discussing hypothetical and far-fetched possibilities at this time. We will cross each bridge as we come to it. From that perspective, the petition is premature and theoretical, and should be dismissed.

 

This is a fine declaration, and it is correct, on the whole. Nevertheless, the fact remains that respondent was until recently the subject of a police investigation, in which evidence was collected, and which culminated in the investigators’ recommendation to indict him for offenses involving moral turpitude. This being the case, we cannot agree that he should now be placed in charge of the police, including his investigators and their superiors. Presumably, police investigators are uncomfortable when requested to investigate a minister suspected of committing an offense, whether by act or omission. I need not explain why. However, the entire matter becomes surreal when the subject of the investigation, shortly after the investigators recommend his indictment, becomes their superior. Yesterday, the investigator sat in the director’s chair, interrogating the minister. Today, the former suspect sits in the director’s chair and the interrogator is subordinate. My colleague, Justice Rivlin referred to the “bounds of deference” that inform the relationship between the authorities. I would sooner talk in terms of human dignity. Does not this role reversal, where the suspect has so soon become the boss and the investigator his subordinate, thoughtlessly trample on the dignity that should inform the relationship between people? Both the investigator and the suspect are human beings. Should we deal such a blow to the dignity of the police investigator?

59. In the Derech Tzleha affair, the police investigation culminated in 1999 in a recommendation to indict respondent. At the beginning of 2000, the prosecution, headed by the Attorney-General, decided to indict respondent for a number of offenses, subject to a preliminary hearing (see para. 11 above). The preliminary hearing was conducted in September 2000. While justifying the investigation, the Attorney-General decided in March 2001 against an indictment, given that there was no reasonable chance of conviction. The Bar-On affair occurred in January through April 1997, with the judgments on the petitions that challenged the Attorney-General’s decision being handed down in June 1997. In addition to these two cases, we should also mention the ISTA case, which was closed in 1992. Parenthetically, it could be said that a person who holds himself up as a trustee – and ministers all have this status, as we have seen – should voluntarily declare himself unfit to act as the superior of those who recently investigated him for criminal offenses. All the more so in light of the fact that the investigators recommended that he be indicted. After all, human beings are not angels.

60. The conflict of interest between respondent and the higher echelons of Israel Police, particularly the upper ranks of the Investigations Branch, cannot be ignored. The Minister of Public Security is empowered to appoint police officers from the rank of deputy commander upwards (section 7 of the Police Ordinance). The Inspector-General of the Police is appointed by the government, on the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security (section 8A of the Police Ordinance). Of course, the minister’s power in making appointments is subject to particular conditions (as claimed by the Prime Minister): administrative law, hearing the position of the Inspector-General, and others. Still, we find it difficult to accept that these factors alone obviate all concerns regarding conflicts of interest in the relations between respondent and the Police Investigations Branch. In light of all this, we find it difficult to understand how respondent is capable of being unbiased in making senior appointments, promotions of officers, and dismissals in the Investigations Branch.

 

61. Respondent claims that his investigators numbered no more than five or six, and he therefore asks: can he be prevented from serving as Minister of Public Security because of five or six people. There are two answers. First, as we observed, our concern here is not with a conflict of interest alone, but rather with respondent’s behavior in general. Second, and most importantly: indeed there were five or six people who directly interrogated respondent, but what about their superiors? And the superiors of their superiors? Each rank has a rank above it, to which it is answerable and subordinate. We know that respondent was a minister at the time of both the Bar-On and Derech Tzleha investigations. Presumably, his interrogation was authorized by the upper echelons of the Investigations Branch. In other words, the tension between respondent and the police is not confined to only five or six police personnel.

 

62. The Investigations Branch of the Police forms a central part of the Ministry of Public Security and, by definition, the Minister of Public Security is in charge of this branch. We agree that the minister is not personally involved in particular investigations being conducted by the branch. Respondent explicitly declared that he has “no power to intervene in particular investigations.” However, respondent is neither able nor empowered to divest himself of the power to make appointments in the Investigations Branch, and this is the pitfall. On the one hand, respondent is both empowered and obligated to appoint officers in the Investigations Branch. On the other hand, the past relations between the Investigations Branch and respondent make it difficult to accept that respondent is capable of making totally unbiased appointments. The conflict of interest is inescapable. We must add to this equation the considerations, detailed above, which disqualify a person from appointment to a particular office. The combination of all of these leads us to the conclusion that, from a legal standpoint, respondent’s service as Minister of Public Security is inappropriate and unacceptable.

 

63. This conclusion, based on the law and the facts presented to us, was difficult one and, even in writing this judgment, I wavered. For example, it was extremely difficult to weigh the conflicting considerations – efficiency on the one hand and morality on the other – because these considerations are not comparable. Like oil and water – they do not mix. Ultimately I decided that we should be guided by legal principles, which have long been firmly entrenched in our system. The first and most important rule is that the Court will not invalidate an executive-administrative act unless all other alternatives have been exhausted, and there is no other option. Accordingly, where there is a request to render a person unfit for a public office, “the tendency is to initially consider more moderate means, and only to implement the extreme measure as a last option.” See MK Sarid [78], at 758 (Or, J.). The tendency is to “try to limit the use of the extreme measure of disqualification, save as a last resort, if there is no other more moderate way of neutralizing the fear of conflicting interests.” Id. at 762-63. Furthermore:

 

The rule [concerning conflicting interests] should be implemented in a responsible and cautious manner, because to use it recklessly, without the proper balance, may deter talented and capable people from seeking offices that they are qualified to fill, even when there is no serious threat to their honesty and integrity.

 

CA 6983/94 Pachima v. Peretz [55], at 835 (Strasbourg-Cohen, J.). As such, “it is better to eliminate the potential conflict of interest and limit activity or prevent it in a particular area, and not remove a person from office.” Id. at 838.

 

This was also the opinion of Justice Beinisch (whose opinion was the minority view):

 

The mere determination that there is a conflict of interest does not automatically necessitate the person’s removal from office. This solution is the last and most extreme resort, only to be adopted in those cases where the conflict of interest is so intense that there is no other way to prevent it. There are a number of intermediate solutions between removal from office and full service in an office, and the decision should be based on the degree of the conflict, its intensity and its centrality to the role of the public official.

 

Id. at 854. In a similar vein:

 

The picture is not entirely “black and white.” The solution to a conflict of interest is not necessarily disqualification from a particular office. There are a number of other options that can be exercised at different levels, ranging from full service in a particular office to outright disqualification from that office. Removal from office should not be the first solution, but rather the last resort. Prior to disqualifying a person, there must be an assessment whether other less drastic measures might not fulfill the criteria at the basis of the laws against conflicting interests.

 

HCJ 595/89 Shimon v. Appointee of Ministry of the Interior, Southern District [79], at 418 (Barak, J.).

 

In this sense, the Court’s role is to “find the cure that fits the disease,” which each problem having its own solution. See also CA 6763/98 Carmi v. State of Israel [52] (Rivlin, J.).

 

64. It is obvious that this rule has the same basis as other legal principles. The “blue pencil rule,” for example, directs us, wherever possible, to differentiate between the diseased organs and the healthy organs of a body. The same rule applies to law, contracts and all other legal mechanisms. After the differentiation, we proceed to ignore the diseased parts, and emphasize the healthy parts. See HCJ 1715/97 The Israel Association of Investment Managers v. The Minister of Finance [80], at 413-14. This is similar to the legal principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which means that where a text containing a legal norm allows two interpretations, then the interpretation supporting the norm is chosen over the interpretation negating it. See HCJ 288/00 Israel Union for Environmental Defense v. Minister of the Interior [81], at 696-97. These principles are almost self-evident and may also contain elements of natural law. On an abstract level they are all derived from the principle of proportionality, a principle that guides us in all our paths.

 

65. Having considered these principles, I initially thought that the solution to the question at hand lay between two polar opposites. The first is petitioner’s position, which would have respondent disqualified outright. The second is respondents’ position, which maintains respondent is perfectly fit for the office. I thought that the appropriate solution could be a differential one, which means making a rough distinction between Hanegbi’s various activities, the aim being to avoid having to disqualify him from service as Minister of Public Security. I did attempt to differentiate between the activities, but this proved impossible. The different roles of the Minister of Public Security are interdependent, and the various departments of the Ministry of Public Security are closely intertwined. Any separation between the areas would effectively create a new system, which we have no power to establish. There is no escaping the conclusion that respondent cannot properly fulfill the role of Minister of Public Security.

 

66. I would not be doing my job faithfully if I did not now briefly relate to three additional issues which arose during the proceedings.

 

Appointment and Election

 

67. Respondent and the state claim that, by expressing confidence in the government in office, the Knesset also expressed its confidence in respondent, and we must therefore refrain from interfering with the Knesset’s discretion. I cannot accept this claim. First, the Knesset expressed its confidence in the government in general. Second, it is not disputed that the Prime Minister is currently empowered to remove respondent from office without receiving Knesset approval. It is his exercise of that discretion which we review. Consequently, the Knesset is not involved in the case before us.

 

68. In this context we will add that we are not speaking of respondent as an elected Member of the Knesset. We have not been asked to interfere with respondent’s status as an MK, and it is doubtful whether we have any power in that respect. HCJ 7367/97 See The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Attorney-General [51], at 547 which deals with the appointment of MK Pinhasi as the chairman of the Knesset Committee. Our concern here is with respondent’s appointment as Minister of Public Security and not with his status as an elected Member of Knesset. As Minister of Public Security, respondent is subject to the same rules that would apply to a minister who is not a Member of the Knesset.

 

The Difference between the Minister of Public Security and Other Ministers

 

69. Petitioner’s claims focus on respondent’s fitness as Minster of Public Security specifically. It has no issue with him serving in any other ministerial role, except perhaps as Minister of Justice, who is charged with law enforcement, like the Minister of Public Security. My colleague Justice Rivlin takes issue with this proposition. For if indeed respondent is unworthy of serving as Minister of Public Security, how can he serve as a minister in charge of any other area? In the words of my colleague (para. 32 of his opinion):

 

Petitioner focuses on two reasons why Hanegbi should be dismissed. First, the possible damage to public confidence as a result of his appointment as minister in charge of public security and the police. Second, the risk of a conflict of interest in performing certain ministerial duties. As to the first reason, this is not enough to constitute grounds for intervention in the Prime Minister’s decision. We related to this above, and we would only add here that petitioner takes issue specifically with Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public Security. As far as this line of reasoning is concerned, there is nothing to stop Hanegbi from being appointed as a minister in a different ministry – except, perhaps, the Ministry of Justice. This position raises a difficulty. It is hard to imagine that an individual, whose appointment as Minister of Public Security would cause such severe damage to the public’s trust that we must strike down the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint him, would be able to head another ministry – such as the Ministry of Education or the Finance Ministry. It is difficult to accept that an individual who is so patently unfit to serve in a ministry responsible for law enforcement could, without any hindrance, serve in a ministry entrusted with the state’s foreign policy or its security. We thus come to the second part of this petition, the concern regarding a conflict of interest (emphases in the original – M.C.).

 

There are three answers to this question. First, petitioner confined itself to the role of Minister of Public Security because respondent is currently serving in that capacity. Neither this self-imposed limiting of the petition nor our judgment can determine that respondent is able to serve in a different ministerial role. The question was not asked, and as such, we will not rule on it. Second, in our case there is the additional concern of conflicting interests due to the particular relationship between respondent and the police (a point dealt with by my colleague). Finally, according to the principle of proportionality, there must be a correlation between the substance of the claims that render a person unfit for a particular public office, and the office that he actually holds, or for which he is a candidate. Each office is different, and the principle of proportionality obliges us to limit the harm caused to a particular person. A “balance” must be struck between conflicting considerations, and the considerations themselves differ from case to case. According to Eisenberg [6]:

 

[T]he nature of the position to be filled by the public servant will also influence the weight accorded to a criminal past in the filling of the post. A junior position is not comparable to a senior position. A position that does not involve the control, supervision, direction and guidance of others is not comparable with a position involving authority and responsibility for other people and responsibility for discipline. The job of a leader cannot be compared with the jobs of those being led. An office with no special ethical requirements cannot be compared to an office whose essence demands high ethical standards.

Id. at 263. The Minister of Public Security is the minister in charge of law enforcement. As such, comments made regarding the Minister of Justice are also applicable to him:

 

Clearly, there is room for reservations regarding the minister’s conduct, to the extent that it diverges from the norm of appropriate conduct. The public expects that any minister, being a public leader, will provide an example of appropriate conduct. This is especially true in the case of the Minister of Justice, from whom the public expects this kind of conduct. More than any other minister, the Minister of Justice is responsible for the rule of law and the values of the law. In his personality and in his conduct he symbolizes not only the preservation of the law, but also that which is good and honest beyond the letter of the law.

 

Bar-On [3], at 59 (Zamir, J.).

 

Differences of Opinion Regarding the Scope of the Range of Reasonableness

 

70. Respondent has made the following argument: The question here is whether, by refusing to dismiss respondent as Minister of Public Security, the Prime Minister deviated from the range of reasonableness in an extreme manner. Some of the justices on this panel feel that the Prime Minister acted reasonably; at the very least they consider that there was insufficient proof to warrant intervening in his discretion. This view inevitably influences the decisions of other justices. Judicial intervention in the discretion of an authority is only warranted when that discretion is an extreme deviation from the range of reasonableness. If some of the justices maintain that the discretion does not deviate from the range of reasonableness, then how can other justices on the same panel rule that his discretion is an extreme deviation? Under these circumstances the rulings of the other justices could themselves be regarded as unreasonable. Alternatively, it indicates that those rulings based on the judgments of the other justices are unreasonable. Hanegbi claims that this reasoning is not applicable in a criminal procedure. He agrees that where one judge has doubts regarding the guilt of the accused, that doubt should not affect his colleagues on the panel. However, he claims that the rule is different in an administrative procedure.

 

71. I see no reason for distinguishing between a criminal procedure and an administrative procedure. In both, doubt and reasonableness are given over to the individual discretion of each judge, within the bounds of the overall legal context. Administrative law and assessments of reasonableness have often been a source of dispute between judges. See CrimA State of Israel v. Zeguri [82], at 427. Furthermore:

 

Every judge decides individually; and his decision in a trial is the product of his own conviction and his own conscience.

 

Every judge decides individually. The fact that my colleagues on the panel have doubts regarding whether the accused committed the offense of which he is accused does not cause me to have doubts too. It is forbidden for me to doubt solely because my colleagues doubt. My colleague’s doubt is not infectious, and does not pass from one heart to another, from one conscience to another, even if my colleague is greater, wiser, older, or more experienced than me. This is the independence of a judge in its deepest sense, the inner independence of the judge.

 

CrimA 6251/94 Ben-Ari v. State of Israel [83], at 107-8. In the words of the Court, “[e]ach and every judge is a lone knight wandering the plains of law and justice.” See HCJ 3679/94 National Association of Directors and Authorized Signatories of the First International Bank of Israel v. Tel Aviv/Jaffa District Labor Court [84], at 593. It is true that:

 

The judge must always be receptive to the opinions of others, and be prepared to listen to other people. However, the simple fact that another person has a different opinion, however important this dissenter may be, must not affect his own discretion (all subject to explicit legal provisions, such as binding precedents).

 

As Maimonides taught (Laws of the Sanhedrin, 10:1 [109]):

 

A judge in a capital case who rules guilty or not guilty not due to his own reasoning, but because he followed the view of his colleague, has transgressed. Of this the Torah said: Do not respond to grievance by yielding to the majority to pervert the law. From tradition we learn that at the moment of deciding you must not say, it is sufficient that I am like another – rather you must say what you believe.

 

In Conclusion

 

72. In considering Hanegbi’s appointment as Minister of Public security, or his removal from the position, the Prime Minister was presumably confronted with two conflicting categories of considerations. On the one hand: public considerations against the appointment due to the concern that his past would conflict with his role as Public Security Minister and lead to the improper management of the police, and the loss of public confidence in the government. And on the other hand: political considerations relating to the need to establish a stable coalition to support the government and preserve its structure, including respondent’s proven executive talents. The Prime Minister chose the latter considerations over the former, and decided to appoint respondent to the office, and, later on, to allow him to remain in office. In my colleagues’ view, having regard for the political nature of the case before us, the Prime Minister’s decision did not deviate from the legal boundaries of reasonableness. I cannot agree.

When the President charges a Knesset Member with the formation of a government with himself at its head, the Knesset Member will do his best to fulfill that task by forming a stable government that can weather the storms. The consideration of forming a government that will win the Knesset’s confidence becomes a primary consideration for the Prime Minister-elect, after having agreed upon the policies acceptable to prospective coalition partners. Generally, the other relevant considerations play a secondary role in the forming of a government. In other words:

As distinct from public servants, who are subject to the provisions of the State Service Law (Appointments) 1959, a minister and deputy-minister are not appointed to their positions exclusively by virtue of their qualifications, talents and personal virtues. Party and coalition interests form the basis of these appointments.

Deri [47], at 428 (Goldberg, J.). These comments were made regarding the formulation and appointing of the government. Nonetheless, in conducting a judicial review of the final composition, the Court must assess whether the considerations which were secondary in the eyes of the Prime Minister were in fact given appropriate weight. If these considerations were overlooked to a great extent it could render the decision a deviation from the boundaries of discretion. If the Court does not uphold the basic principles of public law and morality, then who will?

73. Under these circumstances, our concern is with the candidate’s moral suitability to be a minister, as well as his relations with the police over whom he has been appointed. Were these considerations given the weight they deserve? We have observed that, in reality, these considerations were allocated but a small part of their deserved weight. We also observed that these factors ought to have been given far more consideration. The unavoidable conclusion is therefore that the Prime Minister’s discretion was fatally flawed.

 

 

74. Judicial invalidation of the Prime Minister’s discretion does not make the Court a “supra-Prime Minister,” as my colleague Justice Rivlin put it. The Court did not attain that status in Deri [47], Pinhasi [5] and Eisenberg [6], and in a not insignificant number of other cases. Striking down a prime ministerial decision falls within the boundaries of legitimate judicial review of the administration’s activities. It is part of the “checks and balances” which exist in a democratic system characterized by the principle of the separation of powers between the authorities. I think that it is our duty, the duty of the Court, especially in these times, to protect the police in general, and the Investigations Branch in particular. This is the reasoning for my conclusion.

 

Epilogue

 

75. Our decision in this case has been far from simple and straightforward. Of this, I am well aware. Yet I could not allow myself to just let things slide, to avert my gaze and pretend nothing has happened.

 

76.            On the basis of the above, I propose to my colleagues that we make the order final, and declare that the Prime Minister is obligated to exercise his power under section 22(b) of Basic Law: The Government, 2001, and remove Minister Tzahi Hanegbi from his position as Minister of Public Security.

 

 

Justice D. Beinisch

 

1. We have been asked to deal with the question of whether the appointment of respondent 3 to the position of Minister of Public Security is so unreasonable as to warrant the Court’s intervention to strike down this decision. This is a very important question. We must be very sensitive when interfering in the decisions of the executive authority and of the Prime Minister, who have been granted broad discretion. The utmost caution and a meticulous examination of the legal issues is necessary in ruling in this petition. This is especially true since this petition concerns the process of forming the government and appointing its ministers.

 

Prior to reaching my own conclusions on the subject, I reviewed the opinions of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin, Vice-President Or and Justice Cheshin. The first opinion deals with the rather broad topic of deference between the authorities. My opinion will deal exclusively with the question the Vice-President posed in his opinion – judicial intervention in the circumstances here. My colleague, Justice Cheshin, thoroughly analyzed the issues raised by the appointment, as well as the normative legal framework, and concluded that the decision to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security should be struck down due to the fact that it is unreasonable in the extreme. It should be mentioned, at the outset, that I agree with my colleague, Justice Cheshin: under the circumstances and at the present time, respondent’s appointment is not compatible with the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest.

 

2. From a reading of the opinions in this case, it becomes clear that there exists no fundamental dispute as to the nature or quality of the statutory power granted the Prime Minister to appoint ministers and dismiss them, pursuant to Basic Law: The Government. This is also true regarding the extent to which this Court can review this power. The statutory discretion granted to the Prime Minister to fill cabinet posts and remove the occupants of these posts is extremely broad. Our rulings have already established, undisputably, that the factors the Prime minister may consider when deciding whether to appoint or dismiss ministers include political considerations such as the stability of the government and the formation of a viable coalition. These and other political considerations are legitimate, and even essential, in the process of establishing a government and appointing ministers.

 

Accordingly, and in light of the nature of the Prime Minister’s power to appoint and dismiss ministers, it would take a radical deviation from the range of reasonableness for the Court to intervene in these decisions. Having said that, my colleague Justice Rivlin, who emphasizes the limits of intervention and their narrow scope, also notes that:

 

The discretion of the Prime Minister regarding the appointment of a minister is certainly subject to the review of this Court. This applies to any kind of appointment.

 

He further stated that:

 

The powers granted to the Prime Minister to appoint and dismiss ministers serve to improve the government’s image and functioning, and public confidence in it. A radical deviation from the range of reasonableness in the exercise or non-exercise of these powers constitutes grounds for judicial intervention.

 

See paras. 17 and 18 of Judge Rivlin’s ruling. There is obviously nothing innovative about these findings; they merely reflect the precedents set forth by this Court in a number of rulings that deal with judicial intervention to remove ministers. The primary cases are: HCJ 3094/93, 4319/93, 4478/93; HCApp 4409/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]]; HCJ 4267/93, 4287/93, 4634/93 Amitai – Citizens for Sound Administration and Moral Integrity v. Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel [Pinhasi [5]]; HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Bar-On [3]].

 

We also agree that the question is not whether the Court feels comfortable with the Prime Minister’s appointment of a certain person to a specific post. Such a question does not constitute a cause for judicial review. It is not the Court’s role to examine the wisdom of the appointment, the suitability of the person for the post, or his likelihood of success. These considerations are entrusted to the elected Prime Minister, and it is up to the Knesset and the voter to redress such decisions. Therefore, we will act with much caution and restraint when considering the disqualification of an appointment. Disqualification can only be justified in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, where there was a legal defect either in the appointment process or the appointment itself. This defect must be at the core of the administrative discretion afforded to the authority, no matter how broad his powers may be.

 

My colleagues, each in their own way, have laid out the factual details of this petition. This mainly concerns the criminal affairs in which Hanegbi has been involved as a suspect or subject of investigation despite the fact that, at the end of the day, he was not tried concerning these affairs. So, too, my colleagues have already discussed the normative framework in which the Prime Minister exercises his power to appoint ministers or to remove them from their posts, as well as the grounds which would enable this Court to exercise judicial review. Therefore, I will refrain from expanding on these matters and will instead limit myself to a discussion of the flaw which I see in the appointment here.

 

3. The petition is based on two principal claims. The first claim is that Hanegbi is not fit to act as Minister of Public Security due to his involvement in a number of criminal affairs, the latest and most central being the so-called Derech Tzleha affair. In a previous petition filed by petitioner – Bar-On [3] – it was already determined that that there was nothing in the first three affairs to render respondent unfit for the post held by him at the time – that of Minister of Justice. This includes the affair in which Bar-On was appointed to the position of Attorney-General. Petitioner now claims that the latest affair, which concerns Hanegbi’s involvement in the Derech Tzleha organization, when added to the previous affairs, tips the balance and renders him unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security.

 

The other grounds for the intervention of the Court, according to petitioner, are that the appointment of respondent as Minister of Public Security contravenes the rule against conflicts of interest. As a result, petitioner asserts he is not fit for the office.

 

4. As to petitioner’s first claim, regarding the criminal affairs Hanegbi was allegedly involved in, or investigated about, I take issue with those who feel this is insufficient to warrant judicial review of the decision to appoint him as Minister of Public Security.

 

I agree with my colleague Justice Cheshin, that one must distinguish between the presumption of innocence to which a person who has neither been tried nor convicted of a crime is entitled, and the question of whether he is suited for public office in light of such allegations. I also agree that, in appointing someone to public office, the authorities are permitted and even required to take into account a person’s “criminal past” based on administrative evidence. It should not be said that this decision rests solely on whether the public prosecutor’s office filed an indictment. The discretionary power exercised by the public prosecutor’s office when deciding whether or not to indict someone serves a different purpose than that exercised to prevent an appointment or remove a person from public office. See HCJ 6163/92, 6177/92 Eisenberg v. The Minister of Housing and Construction [6], at 268; Pinhasi [5], at 467-69.

 

This Court has already determined that there are no hard and fast rules pertaining to when it is appropriate to bar a person from public office. On one hand, it would be erroneous to hold that an indictment automatically renders a person unfit for such a post. At the same time, however, the lack of an indictment is not the hallmark of fitness. There are a host of factors which must be taken into account when considering disqualification. These include the type of office, the type of misconduct attributed to the official, how strongly such behavior reflects on the person’s fitness, and the strength of the evidence for the alleged wrongdoing. See Bar-On [3], at 62-63 (Zamir, J.).

 

We must take into account that the other criminal affairs in which Hanegbi was allegedly involved, as well as the impact these affairs on his role as Minister of Justice, have already been examined by this Court in Bar-On [3]. The Court expressed its opinion on the issue, and did not see fit to interfere with Hanegbi’s tenure as Minister of Justice.

 

As to the Derech Tzleha affair, this should not be viewed as my colleague Justice Rivlin sees it, as yet another chapter in the affair that was already judged by this Court in Bar-On [3]. This affair involved an extensive investigation. From the outset, the police recommended the indictment of respondent, and even the Attorney-General was in favor of this after an initial examination of the evidence. The evidence was then once again examined by the Attorney-General himself, as well as by a contingent of attorneys. It is apparent from the report that the evidence was repeatedly inspected with great thoroughness. At the end of the day, however, the evidence was not deemed sufficient to indict respondent. The close examination of the evidence, as detailed in the Attorney-General’s report, and the high professional caliber of those who performed the examination, begs the conclusion that there is no evidentiary basis for the criminal involvement of respondent in this affair. Under the circumstances, and after having examined the opinion of the Attorney-General and the decision of the Knesset Ethics Committee, I have not been convinced that the factual basis presented to me is sufficiently grave as to render respondent unfit to serve as Minister of Public Security. It is true that the largely undisputed facts, which are apparent in the opinions of the Attorney-General and the Knesset Ethics Committee, indicate unethical behavior by respondent. Nevertheless, I do not believe that, based on the Derech Tzleha affair, the decision to appoint respondent 3 as Minister of Public Security is extremely unreasonable on the legal level.

 

5. The petition’s second claim troubled me. According to this claim, following the investigation in the Derech Tzleha affair, there exists a conflict of interest between respondent’s ability to fulfill his position as Minister of Public Security, charged with the public interest in the investigative field, and his relationship with the Investigations Branch of the police. After much deliberation, I have arrived at the conclusion that respondents did not supply a satisfactory answer to why this does not constitute a conflict of interest.

 

First, it must be stated that respondents did not convince us that petitioner’s claim should not be classified as a conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflicts of interest is predicated on the principle that a person in a public role should avoid the “prejudice” or “bias” which results from the conflict between the faithful execution of his public duties and an interest of his own. There is a substantive and foreseeable a priori concern regarding the existence of an extraneous consideration and this concern falls under the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest. If such a concern exists on the basis of objective criteria, respondent need not actually be put to the test in order to determine if an actual conflict of interest exists. For a comprehensive discussion of this subject, see HCJ 531/79 The Likud Faction of the Petach Tikva Municipality v. The City Council of Petach Tikva [53], at 569-76; see also CA 6983/94 Pachima v. Peretz [55], at 835-36.

 

In his affidavit, the Prime Minister expanded at length on respondent’s fitness for senior and demanding public offices. He emphasized his vast experience in the administration of complex departments and the “broad knowledge of the field of security.” All of these qualify respondent 3, in the Prime Minister’s opinion, to “lead the Ministry of Public Security in the best possible manner.” The Prime Minister’s statement focuses a considerable amount of attention on Hanegbi’s organizational skills and his ability to cope with the security roles entrusted to the Ministry of Public Security. All these considerations are part of the Prime Minister’s discretion and it is not our place to interfere with them. Nonetheless, the Minister of Public Security is responsible to the public on behalf of the government concerning all aspects of Israel Police; security operations constitute only one facet of this post, albeit an important one, especially nowadays. It is well-known that the Israel Police is also empowered to carry out investigations and to enforce the law in Israel. In this respect, petitioner claims that respondent 3 is liable to find himself in a conflict of interest when placed in charge of the very people who investigated him not so long ago in the Derech Tzleha affair and who recommended that he be brought to trial. Respondents countered this by pointing out that the minister is not a “supra-Inspector-General,” “with direct control or authority over everything that happens in the Israel Police, and this is especially true regarding everything that occurs in its Investigations Branch.”

 

It is true that the minister is not in charge of individual police investigations and is not even involved in them. He is also not a “supra-Inspector-General,” as respondents maintain. Yet the import, stature, and influence of the minister on the structure of the police and its budget should not be ignored. After all, the minister is responsible for setting the working priorities of the police and, most importantly, for the appointment and dismissal of senior officers. According to the Police Ordinance (New Version), the minister is in charge of appointing every senior police officer from the rank of deputy commander upwards. Accordingly, the minister appoints the senior officers of the Investigations Branch, including the head of this branch, and he also has the power to fire them. He is also responsible for recommending who should fill the office of Inspector-General. Indeed, respondents are correct in their assertion that a duty of consultation applies to the minister pursuant to the rules of administrative law, prior to deciding who will fill the senior ranks of the Investigations Branch. However, this duty is not sufficient, by itself, to negate the existence of a conflict of interest.

 

As part of his role as Minister of Public Security, it is necessary for respondent 3 to set police policy, including policy for the Investigations Branch, and it is in his power to influence the stature of this branch, its standards, and its work assignments. Yet, only a short while ago he himself was the subject of a series of investigations which, despite being essential and permitted by the law, were substantially damaging for him. It should be recalled that, at the conclusion of the previous two investigations, the Investigations Branch recommended that respondent be indicted.

 

To this, we note that the the situation in which the senior officers involved in the investigation of respondent find themselves in. Even though there is no doubt these people have no personal grudge against respondent, since they were merely doing their job, respondent still has significant powers to decide their fate and influence their rank and place in the police hierarchy. How will this conflict affect their trust in respondent’s decisions, and how will he exercise the hierarchical authority he wields over them?

 

This is not to infer that we believe that respondent seeks vengeance against his interrogators. Not in the least. He has declared that this is not the case and I am willing to assume that he will make every effort to ignore his personal feelings. However, an actual conflict of interest exists when there a near certainty of “prejudice” or “bias,” even “unintentionally and unknowingly.” As stated by Justice Cohen:

 

We will state at once that we have not had even a shred of evidence presented to us that would cause us or petitioner to have even the slightest doubt as to whether respondent has not or will not carry out his role of Chairman of the Appeals Committee in absolute good faith and objectivity, to the best of his knowledge and capabilities. Even according to petitioner, there is no requirement that the “corrupt viewpoint” or bias actually exist or be proven. The claim is that even though these do not actually exist, “a reasonable person would consider that, under the circumstances, there exists a real possibility of bias or prejudice.”

 

HCJ 279/60 Gil Theaters v. Ya’ari [85], at 675-76. Furthermore:  

 

When we apply the term bias, this should not be taken to mean that respondent will knowingly or intentionally favor a certain side. When we talk of a corrupt viewpoint, this should not be misconstrued as implying that respondent’s viewpoint has been corrupted through the accepting of actual bribes. The intention is that bias, by its very nature, is inevitable or probable, even if it is not willful or intentional, since every person favors his own interests.

 

Likud Faction [53], at 570.

6. I am aware that the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest should be interpreted with prudence and moderation. I can accept that, just because a person has been investigated, this should not necessarily prevent him from subsequently serving as the minister in charge of the Investigations Branch. Yet in the case of respondent 3 we are not talking about events that occurred in the dim and distant past. Respondent’s encounter with the Investigations Branch ended only in June 1999, at which point it was recommended to the prosecuting authorities to indict him. This case was only closed in March 2001. The investigation of respondent by officers of the Investigations Branch has not yet been relegated to the history books of the Israel Police. Respondent also possesses no small amount of prior experience with the investigators of the Investigations Branch. Can it be said that he is so divorced from the past that he would be capable of fulfilling his post with complete objectivity? According to the rule prohibiting conflicts of interest, a person should not be placed in a situation in which he is liable to be influenced by extraneous considerations in the line of duty.

 

I would also like to add that we have already noted that the rule against conflicts of interest will not necessarily bring about a person’s disqualification from a post, provided that less drastic means can be found to circumvent the specific problem. There is a tendency to utilize such extreme measures only as a last resort, when there is no other way to neutralize the concern about a conflict of interest. As I mentioned elsewhere:

 

The mere determination that there is a conflict of interest does not automatically necessitate removal from office. This solution is the last and most extreme resort, only to be adopted in those cases where the conflict of interest is so intense that there is no other way to prevent it. There are a number of intermediary solutions between removal and full service in an office, and the decision should be based on the degree of the conflict, its intensity, and its centrality to the role of the public official.

 

In general, conflicts of interests can only be isolated when they appear in an institutional setting, in which it is possible to pinpoint where the interests overlap and to prevent this. Indeed, it is possible to neutralize a conflict of interest even when the conflicting interest is personal. For this to be the case, however, the public servant’s interest must be one that can be avoided or which can be isolated from those areas of overlap with his public role.

 

Pachima [55], at 854.

In light of the above, I, like my colleague, Justice Cheshin, considered the possibility of keeping respondent 3 in his post as Minister of Public Security, while eliminating the conflict of interest. Had respondents shown me such a way, it is possible I would have avoided the decision that Hanegbi is unfit to continue as Minister of Public Security. In its place, I may have considered it sufficient to merely ban him from serving in ministerial roles pertaining to the Investigations Branch, in a manner that would ensure there were no conflicts of interest. However, no such solution was presented to me. Moreover, as stated above, it is difficult to find such a solution. The Minister of Public Security’s powers over the Investigations Branch are, in part, statutory; an example of this is his authority to appoint the upper echelon of police officers. The investigations system is an integral part of the Israel Police, and the minister is in charge of setting general policy, priorities, and budget for the police. In light of this, to take away the control of investigative matters from the Minister of Public Security is liable to be harmful both to the minister and to his general ability to function in his role. It seems difficult, therefore, to separate him from these issues so long as he is an acting minister. In any event, such a course would apparently require a shift in the division of the labor and the intra-governmental responsibilities of ministers. This is something we will refrain from interfering with.

 

It should be noted that, in the main arguments of respondent 3, he reiterated that the claim of a conflict of interest should be rejected. At the conclusion of his argument, in para. 20.12., he stated: “[e]ven if there does exist a conflict of interest, there are much less drastic ways of neutralizing it and these should be preferred.” Despite searching, I could not find what alternative means were being referred to here which would properly address the problem of the conflict of interest. Had my colleagues shared in my opinion, there may conceivably have been room to ask respondent 3 to set forth arguments regarding this issue, and to propose a solution which would neutralize the conflict of interest without the need to remove him from his office. As long as no such solution is found, I feel that there is no way to avoid removing Hanegbi from his office as Minister of Public Security.

Justice E. Mazza

Like my colleagues Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, I feel that petitioner did not present us with a clear justification for intervening in the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint respondent 3 to the office of Minister of Justice. Based on their well explained and properly detailed reasons – in most of which, if not all, I concur – I hereby join them in concluding that this petition should be denied.                               

Justice Y. Türkel

1. In my opinion, the petition should be denied. I concur with the opinion of my esteemed colleague, Justice Rivlin, who laid out the appropriate reasoning. I also concur with the reasons laid out by my esteemed colleague, Vice-President Or. In my opinion, it would have been sufficient to predicate the denial of this petition on two grounds:

a) The first ground is that approximately six years ago this Court, in a panel of five Justices, dealt with a petition requesting that respondent be removed from his post as Minister of Justice. It decided, by a majority of four, to reject the petition without granting an order nisi. See HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [3], at 46. That petition concerned three out of the four affairs raised by the petition here – the “brawling affair,” the “ISTA affair,” and the “Bar-On affair” – and it dealt with the fundamental questions currently under discussion. In that petition, the Court found no adequate reason to remove respondent 3 from his post. The only new factor here is the fourth affair – the “Derech Tzleha affair” – and the appointment of respondent to the post of Minister of Public Security. I believe that this fourth affair, per se, and even in conjunction with the previous affairs, does not amount to a justification for respondent’s removal from office. It should also be mentioned that the distinction that petitioner draws between the office of the Minister of Justice and the office of the Minister of Public Security is, unfortunately, erroneous.

 

b) There is a midrash in the Talmud that can shed light on the second reason, which is more at the heart of the dispute than the first one. This midrash states that no appointments to high offices can be made unless the public is consulted first. This midrash is based on the two biblical verses: “And the Lord spoke unto Moses saying: See, I have called by name Bezalel the son of Uri, the son of Hur, of the tribe of Judah.” (Exodus 31:2) [110], and “And Moses said unto the children of Israel: See, the Lord hath called by name Bezalel the son of Uri” (Exodus, 35:30) [110].

 

Said Rabbi Isaac: A public appointment is not made without first consulting the public, in accordance with the text: “See, the Lord hath called by name.”

 

Said the Holy One, Blessed be He, to Moses: Moses! Is Bezalel acceptable to you? He answered: Lord of the Universe! If he is acceptable to Thee, all the more so to me! The Lord replied: Even so, go and tell the Israelites. He went and asked the Israelites: Is Bezalel acceptable to you? They answered him: Moses, our teacher! If he is acceptable to the Almighty and to you, he is certainly acceptable to us!

 

Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berakhot 55a [111]. On the requirement to consult with the public, see also Shulkhan Arukh, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:4 [112]; Arukh Hashulkhan, Choshen Hamishpat, 3:8 [113]; Ribash, Responsa 271 [114]; Rabbi A.Y. Kook, Be’er Eliyahu, commentary on the Biur HaGra [115], as well as other sources. See also my comments in HCJ 6499/99 The National Religious Party v. Rabbi Shlomo Ben-Ezra [86], at 624.

 

It seems, therefore, that no appointment could be made unless the public was consulted, despite the fact that both the Lord and Moses expressed their views about the appointment. Regarding the removal of officials who have been the subject of defamation, compare Exodus 18:21 [110]; Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 7b [116]; Maimonides, Laws of Temple Vessels, 4:21 [117]; Maimonides Reponsa, Chapter 111 [118]; Shulkhan Arukh, Chosen Hamishpat, 53:25 [119]; Zaken Abraham Responsa, Yoreh Deah, 30 [120].

 

Respondent 3 was elected to the first slot in his party’s primary elections. He placed third on his party’s list for the elections to the Knesset, and was nominated by the Prime Minister to serve as Minister of Public Security. This appointment was ratified by the Knesset. Therefore, “consultation” with the public did occur and the public had its say. Is our power greater than that of the people? I believe that we can overrule the choice of the people, as expressed through elections to the Knesset, only in rare and extraordinary circumstances. Save with respect to the legality of the appointment, it is not our place, but the public’s, to take issue with the wisdom and ethics of the administrative authority making the appointment. This is not to say that I wish to detract from the Court’s power to speak its mind on issues of ethics and morality. See Bar-On [3], at 61-64 (Zamir, J.). Sometimes it is appropriate that it should do so. But the proposal to expand the rule so that respondent 3’s conduct, as discussed in that case, would “obligate the Prime Minister to remove a minister or deputy-minister from his post, though well-intentioned, would be improper and likely to cause more harm than good.” Id. at 64. There is much to be said for the view that the morals and

 

character of public representatives should be subject to painstaking scrutiny. But in the world in which we live, this goal is unattainable.

 

  1. Therefore, the petition should be denied.

 

 

Justice D. Dorner

I agree with the rulings of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, who hold the petition should be denied. I wish to add three comments to the rulings of my two colleagues.

 

1. Indeed, the discretionary authority for appointing and removing ministers (and deputy-ministers) is not absolute. In addition to the grounds for removal expressly provided in the Basic Law: The Government, there are also the grounds established by HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel [Deri [47]] and HCJ 4267/93 Amitai v. The Prime Minister of Israel [Pinhasi [5]]:

 

When a minister or deputy-minister has been indicted for a serious crime, it is incumbent upon the Prime Minister to remove him from his post. The failure of the Prime Minister to do so will be regarded, under such circumstances, as extremely unreasonable.

 

HCJ 2533/97 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. The Government of Israel, at 56 [Bar-On [3] (Zamir, J.). The Court added that:

 

There is a possibility that, even if a minister’s behavior does not amount to criminal conduct, it may still be so serious that it would be extremely unreasonable to allow him to continue in his post. Even so, this possibility is still far from constituting a sweeping rule that a minister must be removed from office in every instance of behavior that deviates from the norms of appropriate conduct.

 

Id, at 63.

 

As mentioned in my colleagues’ opinions, the fact that legal grounds for removal are limited is a result of the fact that the constitutional authority for the appointment and removal of ministers enables the implementation of policy objectives, including policies that are political in nature. This includes the need to appoint ministers with the proper skills and experience – which is the Prime Minister’s responsibility. From this it follows that it is, first and foremost, the responsibility of the Knesset and the public to review these political appointments. Moreover, restraint is necessary due to the damage that removal from a senior political position causes to a public figure, to his presumption of innocence, and to his ability to accomplish his life’s work. Of course, this fear does not supersede the prohibition against appointments which severely impair the public’s trust in the government. However, there is no room to expand the grounds for removal beyond those already set down in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5].

 

2. The grounds of removal established in Deri [47] and Pinhasi [5] are based on two elements. The first element is that there must be sufficient evidence to justify an indictment, such as evidence that creates a reasonable chance of conviction:

 

An indictment is not a verdict. It only reflects the prima facie evidence that has been collected by the public prosecutor’s office. Yet, continued tenure in the government is impacted even by the prima facie evidence of the indictment. Under certain circumstances, the nature of the individual’s alleged offenses – in addition the final legal ruling – is also significant, as these offenses have been officially presented in the indictment ready for filing with the courts.

 

Deri [47], at 422-23 (Shamgar, P.). The second element is that the evidence must point to the commission of a serious crime, one which involves moral turpitude. Such crimes, including the receipt of bribes, acts of fraud, defrauding state authorities, and the filing of false reports, caused Minister Aryeh Deri and Deputy-Minister Raphael Pinhasi to be declared unfit for office, As stated there:

 

[I]f, heaven forbid, an indictment is filed against a minister, which charges the minister with serious offenses that involve moral turpitude – such as the acceptance of bribes, acts of fraud, deceiving state authorities, lying or with making false reports – then it would be neither proper nor reasonable for him to continue in office.

 

Id. at 427 (Levin. J). Minister Tzahi Hanegbi’s part in the Derech Tzleha affair is the decisive affair in the petition before us. As my colleagues have already indicated, the legality of Hanegbi’s appointment, as affected by the other three affairs, was already dealt with by this Court in Bar-On [3]. In that case, not only was there no indictment, but Hangebi’s file was closed due to the lack of a reasonable chance of a conviction.

 

Indeed, the facts of the crimes Hanegbi is alleged to have committed are not in dispute. Proving the criminal intent, however, turned out to be the primary difficulty. This intent is usually what determines the nature of the behavior and the level of moral turpitude associated with it. See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 22 (2d ed. 1961) [107]; compare also CrimA 2831/95 Elba v. The State of Israel [87], at 319. This intent particularly influences the anti-social element of the crimes of fraud and breach of trust, which are attributed to the minister. As Justice Goldberg stated:

 

The crime of breach of trust is a general offence, yet its factual basis is not adequately defined. As a result, moral guilt is one of the mechanisms for defining the boundaries of this crime. Since moral guilt constitutes a main element of the crime, there are instances where it is necessary for the Court to investigate the defendant’s motives.

 

See HCJ 2534/97 Yahav v. The State Attorney [2], at 16.

 

The Prime Minister saw the Attorney-General’s report, including its conclusion that the file against the minister should be closed due the fact that there was no reasonable chance of a conviction. Certainly, he was obligated to make use of the Attorney-General’s conclusion – and its reasoning – even if the report did not detail the evidence on which this conclusion was founded. Compare HCJ 320/96 Yael German v. The Municipal Council of Herzliya [88], at 239. In any event – and this is the significant factor – petitioner did not attack this report and we have no choice, therefore, other than to accept the Attorney-General’s conclusion.

 

An indictment does not require evidence that guarantees a conviction. When an indictment is filed, the chance of conviction can only be estimated. Moreover, an indictment is only based on the evidence obtained by the police – the defense does not cross examination or present its own evidence. See CrimApp 8087/95 Za’ada v. The State of Israel [89], at 148-49; and Yahav [2], at 12-13. Most significantly, it is possible to indict a suspect even when existing evidence does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is to say, there may be a reasonable chance for conviction, which is what justifies the filing of the indictment, even if the evidence does not rule out every reasonable doubt. It goes without saying, therefore, that the decision not to file an indictment due to the lack of a reasonable chance of conviction possesses, as a rule, an “acquittal value” greater than an acquittal in court. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the appointment of a minister would be proscribed on account of an act for which he was acquitted in court, even if only due to the existence of reasonable doubt. In any event, such a proscription would be all the more inappropriate where the Attorney-General – whose discretion has not been assailed here – has not even filed an indictment, due to the lack of a reasonable chance of conviction.

 

3. It is the conclusion of my colleague, Justice Beinisch, that the petition should be accepted, because of the conflict of interest that exists between Hanegbi’s post as Minister of Public Security and his alleged desire to get revenge on his interrogators and the Investigations Branch. In this regard, I am in agreement with my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, that it is extremely doubtful that a conflict of interest actually exists. Even if there is some type of conflict of interest, it is very slight and does not give rise, under the circumstances, to any reasonable concern that extraneous considerations will hamper the functioning of the Ministry of Public Security and of the police. See HCJ 3132/92 Mushlav v. The District Committee for Planning and Building, Northern District [90], at 747, for an explanation of what constitutes a reasonable concern of an extraneous consideration.

 

Yet, even if the case had been borderline, there would be cause for great hesitation before granting the petition. Granting the petition would mean harming a public figure merely on the basis of a police recommendation to put him on trial, a recommendation rejected by the Attorney-General. The result would be that the very fact of a police recommendation, even if unfounded, would be sufficient to render a person unfit for office or to remove him from a ministerial post. Certainly, had a clear-cut case of conflict of interest been created, due to the police recommendation, it is possible there would be no way of escaping this result. Yet, this is not so in a borderline case.

 

As such, I join the opinion of my colleagues, Justice Rivlin and Vice-President Or, that this petition be denied.

 

 

*******

 

Petition denied according to the majority opinions of Justices Rivlin, Or, Mazza, Turkel and Dorner, against the dissenting opinions of Justices Cheshin and Beinisch.

 

Under the circumstances, no party was ordered to bear costs.

October 9, 2003

 

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