Constitutional Law

Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Commander v. Israel Internet Association

Case/docket number: 
AAA 3782/12
Date Decided: 
Sunday, March 24, 2013
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: In August 2010, the Israel Police ordered major Israeli Internet access providers to block access to eight gambling websites operating outside the State of Israel. The orders were based on section 229 of the Penal Law that permits the District Police Commander to order the closure of any illegal gaming, lottery, or gambling place. The access providers complied with the orders and the Israel Internet Association petitioned the Administrative Affairs Court against the District Commander, contesting the closure, in the interests of Israeli web-users and the general public. The Internet access providers did not petition against the closure of access to the gambling websites. On April 2, 2012 the Administrative Affairs Court (per Judge Michal Rubinstein) granted the petition, holding that the police had no authority to order Internet service providers to block access to gambling websites. 

 

In granting the petition, the Administrative Affairs Court ruled that the Israel Internet Association had an independent right of standing, given the important public interest in enforcing constitutional values and maintaing the rule of law, notwithstanding that no petition was filed by access providers themselves. Furthermore, the closure of Internet websites violated freedom of expression. Even if the content curtailed was of little social utility, websites closure can only be done with legal authority. Primarily the provision in the Penal Law allowed the closure of a physical “place” and did not include the closure of an Internet website. In this context no analogy can be drawn from the closure of prohibited physical places to the closure of prohibited websites, notwithstanding their similar purposes, because the potential for violating freedom of expression and freedom of occupation, and because blocking access to the Internet poses technical, political and legal difficulties, including the possibility of blocking legitimate websites and innocent users. Blocks by third parties – the access providers – also raises questions relating to liability, the manner of blocking and its costs. In view of all these factors the petition was granted.

 

An appeal was filed against the decision in the Supreme Court.

 

Held: Regarding freedom of expression, the Supreme Court agreed unanimously that the content blocked on the gambling websites is limited in this case and hence the violation of free speech that resulted from blocking lawful content on gambling websites is of limited degree and lawful. Moreover, the primary infringement here relates to the website operators’ freedom of occupation. In this regard, the case law has already held that the infringement of freedom of occupation, the infringement satisfies the constitutional tests.

 

With respect to the concern that protected information on websites would be blocked, the Court noted that website owners can make such information available on alternative websites, or even on the same website while blocking only prohibited gambling.

 

Regarding standing, Justice Vogelman ruled that the Internet Association satisfies the conditions for recognizing a public petitioner, given that it seeks to promote the public interest of Internet users, an interest shared by the general public, or significant parts thereof, rather than protect its own special interest. Given this case presents a first attempt to define the boundaries of the district police commander’s authority under section 229 of the Criminal Law to block access to Internet gambling websites, the question is a fundamental one that justifies hearing through public petition. As to the sufficiency of the factual infrastructure, had the Appellants felt that any issue was not sufficiently clarified, they could have acted to remedy the situation. Moreover, the public petitioner is required to present the factual infrastructure sufficient for the proceeding. In the current case the factual infrastructure was indeed sufficient for purposes of judicial review.

 

The dispute and the result involved two basic issues: first, whether the language of the Penal Law authorizing police to close a “place” can and should be interpreted broadly to include a virtual Internet website, which is not a physical place, without a specific legislative amendment. The second and more important question was whether the police can and should be permitted to exercise their authority of closure with respect to a website by way of a third party, namely the access providers. 

 

Justice Vogelman (for the majority, with concurrence by President Grunis), wrote that a gambling website may be viewed as a “place,” and its blocking can also be viewed as its “closing” within the meaning of section 229(A)(1). Additionally, an online gambling site may be considered a “prohibited gaming venue,” under a purposive interpretation of the Criminal Law’s relevant provisions and in the context of time and advancing technology, which render section 229 of the Criminal Law applicable in the “virtual” world. Nonetheless, the main obstacle to such interpretation is the lack of express authority to order private third parties – access providers – to assist in implementing the authority to block websites. According to Justice Vogelman, when the law empowers a governmental agency, it is assumed that the legislature intended that agency, and not another, would implement that authority, and that the agency may act only within the boundaries of the authorizing law. Even if the authorization to close a place can be interpreted as authorizing closing websites, it is not identical to authorizing third parties to block access to websites.

 

This is consistent with the principle of administrative legality which only permits an agency to act within legislation that empowers governmental agencies to order third parties to assist in exercising that agency’s authority. Such authority is not even implied in the Penal law’s provision concerning police authority to order the closing of a place.  Absent explicit statutory source, it is impermissible to compel a person or private entity to act for the authorities. Hence the orders to access providers here violated the principle of administrative legality. The current statutory framework is insufficient because it lacks authorization to order a third party to assist enforcement agencies in exercising their powers.

 

Even though the rule is that the authority is permitted to receive assistance from private persons or entities as far as the technical aspects of fulfilling their task, there is also an interpretative presumption against delegating authority to private entities and in the absence of appropriate legislative framework, enforcement authority cannot be granted to those not part of the enforcement mechanism

 

Even if the access providers were not required to exercise discretion, and the police only requested help from them in the exercise of its authority – in the technical act of blocking a website identified through its IP address specified on the order – it is still necessary to prove that the access providers agreed to assist the police. Once the police imposed an obligation upon access providers, it can no longer be considered assistance – hence the need for explicit statutory authorization.

 

Justice N. Sohlberg, writing for the minority, found that as a rule the court will not grant a public petition where there is a private victim in the background who chose not to apply to the court for relief, and that in light of the website owners failure to file an appeal, it is doubtful whether the Internet association has standing. Furthermore, granting standing when the relevant party did not file a petition might mean that the required factual infrastructure would not be presented to the Court. Nonetheless under the circumstances, where the Administrative Court recognized the Internet Association’s standing and ruled on the merits, it would be inappropriate to reject the appeal for of lack of standing without examining the matter on the merits.

 

Regarding the substantive issue, though a specific legislative arrangement would be preferable, the law’s existing language provides a satisfactory solution as to the police authority to issue orders, and waiting for legislative authority frustrates appropriate response in law enforcement and service of justice.

 

Both in terms of language and purpose the word “space” should be interpreted to also mean virtual space, given that terms that serve in virtual space are borrowed from the tangible world. Accordingly there is no deviation from the principle of legality by finding that “place” also includes virtual space. As the damage wrought by gambling on the Internet is immeasurably greater than that which is caused in physical places and that the legislative purpose was to prevent illegal gambling regardless of its location, a purposive interpretation would and should interpret “place” as meaning virtual space. Accordingly, apart from certain, isolated exceptions, the rule should be that the Internet fits the definition of place.

 

With respect to the difficulty in using third parties for carrying out a criminal proceeding, the law recognizes the possibility to use a third party to present an object necessary for interrogation or trial. Considering the license the State has granted them, access providers bear public responsibility. It is therefore justified to use them to execute orders to restrict access, given that the order requires the technical acts that do not involve any discretion regarding the closing of a site with a particular IP address specified in the order. Regarding the requirement for third party consent, Justice Sohlberg analogized the status of the website owners to receptionist in a physical place whom the police would have been authorized to require to open.

 

Justice Sohlberg also found that failure to petition against blocking access may be viewed as the website’s owner’s consent to to being used to carry out the police order. Justice Sohlberg based this conclusion on the Talmudic rule of "silence is regarded as admission.” 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

                                                                                    AAA 3782/12

 

The Appellants

1. Tel-Aviv Jaffa District Commander – Israel Police

2. Central District Commander – Israel Police

3. Israel Police

 

 

v.

 

The Respondent

The Israel Internet Association

 

The Formal Respondents

1.      012 Smile Telecom Ltd. (pro forma)

2.      018 Xphone Ltd. (pro forma)

3.      Bezeq International Ltd. (pro forma)

4.      013 Netvision Barak Ltd. (pro forma)

 

 

 

In the Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Appeals in Administrative Matters

[24.3.2013]

Before: President A. Grunis, Justices E.Vogelman, N. Sohlberg

 

Appeal against decision of the Tel-Aviv- Jaffa District Court of 2 April 2012 in Case AAF 45505-10-10 handed down by Deputy President Hon. Judge Michal Rubinstein

 

Facts: In August 2010, the Israel Police ordered major Israeli Internet access providers to block access to eight gambling websites operating outside the State of Israel. The orders were based on section 229 of the Penal Law that permits the District Police Commander to order the closure of any illegal gaming, lottery, or gambling place. The access providers complied with the orders and the Israel Internet Association petitioned the Administrative Affairs Court against the District Commander, contesting the closure, in the interests of Israeli web-users and the general public. The Internet access providers did not petition against the closure of access to the gambling websites. On April 2, 2012 the Administrative Affairs Court (per Judge Michal Rubinstein) granted the petition, holding that the police had no authority to order Internet service providers to block access to gambling websites. 

 

In granting the petition, the Administrative Affairs Court ruled that the Israel Internet Association had an independent right of standing, given the important public interest in enforcing constitutional values and maintaing the rule of law, notwithstanding that no petition was filed by access providers themselves. Furthermore, the closure of Internet websites violated freedom of expression. Even if the content curtailed was of little social utility, websites closure can only be done with legal authority. Primarily the provision in the Penal Law allowed the closure of a physical “place” and did not include the closure of an Internet website. In this context no analogy can be drawn from the closure of prohibited physical places to the closure of prohibited websites, notwithstanding their similar purposes, because the potential for violating freedom of expression and freedom of occupation, and because blocking access to the Internet poses technical, political and legal difficulties, including the possibility of blocking legitimate websites and innocent users. Blocks by third parties – the access providers – also raises questions relating to liability, the manner of blocking and its costs. In view of all these factors the petition was granted.

An appeal was filed against the decision in the Supreme Court.

 

Held:

Regarding freedom of expression, the Supreme Court agreed unanimously that the content blocked on the gambling websites is limited in this case and hence the violation of free speech that resulted from blocking lawful content on gambling websites is of limited degree and lawful. Moreover, the primary infringement here relates to the website operators’ freedom of occupation. In this regard, the case law has already held that the infringement of freedom of occupation, the infringement satisfies the constitutional tests.

 

With respect to the concern that protected information on websites would be blocked, the Court noted that website owners can make such information available on alternative websites, or even on the same website while blocking only prohibited gambling.

 

Regarding standing, Justice Vogelman ruled that the Internet Association satisfies the conditions for recognizing a public petitioner, given that it seeks to promote the public interest of Internet users, an interest shared by the general public, or significant parts thereof, rather than protect its own special interest. Given this case presents a first attempt to define the boundaries of the district police commander’s authority under section 229 of the Criminal Law to block access to Internet gambling websites, the question is a fundamental one that justifies hearing through public petition. As to the sufficiency of the factual infrastructure, had the Appellants felt that any issue was not sufficiently clarified, they could have acted to remedy the situation. Moreover, the public petitioner is required to present the factual infrastructure sufficient for the proceeding. In the current case the factual infrastructure was indeed sufficient for purposes of judicial review.

 

The dispute and the result involved two basic issues: first, whether the language of the Penal Law authorizing police to close a “place” can and should be interpreted broadly to include a virtual Internet website, which is not a physical place, without a specific legislative amendment. The second and more important question was whether the police can and should be permitted to exercise their authority of closure with respect to a website by way of a third party, namely the access providers. 

Justice Vogelman (for the majority, with concurrence by President Grunis), wrote that a gambling website may be viewed as a “place,” and its blocking can also be viewed as its “closing” within the meaning of section 229(A)(1). Additionally, an online gambling site may be considered a “prohibited gaming venue,” under a purposive interpretation of the Criminal Law’s relevant provisions and in the context of time and advancing technology, which render section 229 of the Criminal Law applicable in the “virtual” world. Nonetheless, the main obstacle to such interpretation is the lack of express authority to order private third parties – access providers – to assist in implementing the authority to block websites. According to Justice Vogelman, when the law empowers a governmental agency, it is assumed that the legislature intended that agency, and not another, would implement that authority, and that the agency may act only within the boundaries of the authorizing law. Even if the authorization to close a place can be interpreted as authorizing closing websites, it is not identical to authorizing third parties to block access to websites.

 

This is consistent with the principle of administrative legality which only permits an agency to act within legislation that empowers governmental agencies to order third parties to assist in exercising that agency’s authority. Such authority is not even implied in the Penal law’s provision concerning police authority to order the closing of a place.  Absent explicit statutory source, it is impermissible to compel a person or private entity to act for the authorities. Hence the orders to access providers here violated the principle of administrative legality. The current statutory framework is insufficient because it lacks authorization to order a third party to assist enforcement agencies in exercising their powers.

Even though the rule is that the authority is permitted to receive assistance from private persons or entities as far as the technical aspects of fulfilling their task, there is also an interpretative presumption against delegating authority to private entities and in the absence of appropriate legislative framework, enforcement authority cannot be granted to those not part of the enforcement mechanism

Even if the access providers were not required to exercise discretion, and the police only requested help from them in the exercise of its authority – in the technical act of blocking a website identified through its IP address specified on the order – it is still necessary to prove that the access providers agreed to assist the police. Once the police imposed an obligation upon access providers, it can no longer be considered assistance – hence the need for explicit statutory authorization.

 

Justice N. Sohlberg, writing for the minority, found that as a rule the court will not grant a public petition where there is a private victim in the background who chose not to apply to the court for relief, and that in light of the website owners failure to file an appeal, it is doubtful whether the Internet association has standing. Furthermore, granting standing when the relevant party did not file a petition might mean that the required factual infrastructure would not be presented to the Court. Nonetheless under the circumstances, where the Administrative Court recognized the Internet Association’s standing and ruled on the merits, it would be inappropriate to reject the appeal for of lack of standing without examining the matter on the merits.

 

Regarding the substantive issue, though a specific legislative arrangement would be preferable, the law’s existing language provides a satisfactory solution as to the police authority to issue orders, and waiting for legislative authority frustrates appropriate response in law enforcement and service of justice.

Both in terms of language and purpose the word “space” should be interpreted to also mean virtual space, given that terms that serve in virtual space are borrowed from the tangible world. Accordingly there is no deviation from the principle of legality by finding that “place” also includes virtual space. As the damage wrought by gambling on the Internet is immeasurably greater than that which is caused in physical places and that the legislative purpose was to prevent illegal gambling regardless of its location, a purposive interpretation would and should interpret “place” as meaning virtual space. Accordingly, apart from certain, isolated exceptions, the rule should be that the Internet fits the definition of place.

With respect to the difficulty in using third parties for carrying out a criminal proceeding, the law recognizes the possibility to use a third party to present an object necessary for interrogation or trial. Considering the license the State has granted them, access providers bear public responsibility. It is therefore justified to use them to execute orders to restrict access, given that the order requires the technical acts that do not involve any discretion regarding the closing of a site with a particular IP address specified in the order. Regarding the requirement for third party consent, Justice Sohlberg analogized the status of the website owners to receptionist in a physical place whom the police would have been authorized to require to open.

 

Justice Sohlberg also found that failure to petition against blocking access may be viewed as the website’s owner’s consent to to being used to carry out the police order. Justice Sohlberg based this conclusion on the Talmudic rule of "silence is regarded as admission.”

 

Legislation Cited

Administrative Affairs Court Act, 5760-2000, s. 5 (1)

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984, reg. 3(a)

Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) (New Version) Act, 5729-1969, s.20 23

Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement- Communication Data), 5768-2007, s.1, 3 (2)

Interpretation Act 5741-1981, s.17

Penal Law, 5737-1977 s. 224, 228, 229

Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971, s. 3

Prohibition of Discrimination (Products and Services) in Entrance to Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 5761-2001, s.2

Regulation of Sports: Gambling Act, 5727 – 1967

 

Supreme Court Decisions Cited

[1] HCJ 243/62 Israel Films Studios Ltd v. Levi [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.

 

[2] HCJ 651/03 Citizens Right Bureau in Israel v. Chairman of Central Elections to the Sixteenth Knesset [2003] IsrSC 57 (2) 62.

 

[3] AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Member’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [2004] IsrSC 58 (3) 782.

 

[4] HCJ 8070/98 Citizens Rights Office in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior (10.5.04).

 

[5] LCA 4447/07 Mor v. Barak I.T.T. [1995] Society for the Bezeq International Services Ltd (25.3.10).

 

[6] CA 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. Anon (13.5.12).

 

[7]  Cr.A 1439/06 Zaltovski v. State of Israel (28.3.06).

 

[8] CrA. 7430 /10  Anon. State of Israel (5.2.2010).

 

[9] LCrApp 787/79 Mizrahi v. State of Israel [1980] IsrSC 35 (4) 421.

 

[10]  (HCJ 131/85Savizky v. Minster of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19 (2) 369.

 

[11] HCJ 651/03 Citizens Rights Bureau in Israel v. Chairman of the Sixteenth Knesset Central General Elections Committee [2003] IsrSC 57 (2) 62.

 

[12] HCJ 3809/08 Citizens Rights Bureau v. Israel Police (28.5.2012).

 

[13] Association of Renovations Contractors for Restoration v. State of Israel (14.3.2011).

 

[14] HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981], IsrSC 35 (3) 365.

 

[15]  HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense [1988], IsrSC 42 (2) 441.

 

[16] HCJ 287/91 Kargal Ltd v. Investments Center Council [1992], IsrSc 46 (2) 851,

 

[17] HCJ 962/02 Liran v. Attorney General(1.4.2007).

 

[18] HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel-Aviv Municipality [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 393.

[19] HCJ 80/70 Elizur v. Broadcasting Authority [1970],IsrSC 24 (2) 649.

[20] HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Justice  [1987], IsrSC 41 (2) 1.

 

[21] HCJ 606/93 Kiddum Yezumot v. Broadcasting Authority  [1994], IsrSC 48(2) 1.

 

[22] HCJ  2303/90 Philipovitz v. Registrar of Companies [1992], IsrSC 46 (1) 410.

 

[23] (HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and Business v. Minister of Finance, (19.11.2009).

 

[24]  AAA 6848/10 Erez v. Giva’ataim (30.5.2012).

 

[25] HCJ 5031/10 Amutat Ir Amim v. Israel Nature and Parks Authority (26.3.2012).

 

[26]CA 630/97 Local Committee for Planning and Building Nahariya v. Shir Hatzafon Construction Company Ltd [1998] IsrSC 52 (3) at 399.  

 

[27]  HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v ‘Yad Vashem’ Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3)353.

 

[28] 7368/06 Luxury Apartments Ltd v. Mayor of Yabneh (27.6.2011).

 

[29[ HCJ 6824/07 Mana v  Taxation Authority (20.12.2010).

 

[30]  HCJ 7455/05 Legal Forum for Land of Israel v. Israeli Government [2005] 905.

 

United States Decisions Cited

[[31] Center for Democracy & Technology cy & Technology v. Pappert, 337 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D Penn. 2004).

 

 

For the Appellants: Advs. Yuval Roitman; Adv.Orli Aharoni

 

For the Respondent: Adv. Haim Ravia, Adv. Dan-Or Hof; Adv. Yossi Markovitz

 

Judgment

 

Justice N. Sohlberg

 

1.         The Israel Police issued orders restricting access to gambling websites on the Internet. The Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court, sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs (Judge Michal Rubinstein) granted the petition by the Israeli Internet Association and ruled that the orders were issued ultra vires and should therefore be voided. The Israel Police appealed and requested the orders be resotred.

Background

2.         Crime is burgeoning and taking new forms. As a result, on 1 January 2006 Government Decision No. 4618 was adopted, establishing a Standing Committee for Direction and Coordination of Activity in the Battle Against Severe Crime and Organized Crime and their Offshoots. The Committee determined that because its far-reaching and grave consequences the phenomenon of Internet gambling would be a central enforcement target combining several tools – criminal, fiscal, and administrative. This is a growing crime-generating phenomenon that is accessible to a broad segment of the population. Within this context, with the knowledge of the Attorney General and the State Attorney, the Committee decided to restrict Israeli users’ access to gambling websites. Internet access providers were issued warning letters and given a list of gambling sites and their IP addresses to be blocked. The access providers and the website operators were also allowed the opportunity to object. In August 2010 the orders were issued. In October 2010 the Israel Internet Association petitioned to the Administrative Affairs Court to revoke the orders, and in April 2012 the petition was granted

The Ruling of the District Court

3.         The principle elements of the Administrative Affairs Court’s ruling are:

(a)        Locus Standi: The direct victims – the access providers and the website operators – chose not to exercise their right to petition against the orders. Nonetheless the court found there were grounds for recognizing the locus standi of the Israel Internet Association, given that it does not represent the interests of the access providers and website operators, which have primarily commercial interests, but rather as the representative of users in Israel and their rights to free expression and access to information. This is a matter of general public importance pertaining enforcing constitutional values and maintaining the rule of law. 

(b)        Restricting access to Internet gambling sites infringes freedom of expression: The Internet is an excellent tool for exercising the right to access information in a practical, efficient, cheap and reliable manner. It is a democratic tool that promotes equality, enables a decentralized and diverse discourse, facilitates economic growth, and is an excellent platform for business ventures. Access to information is a constitutional right and limitations on the use of Internet are therefore rare. yet, the Internet is also subject to abuse, to violation of copyright, publication of slander, pornography, encouragement of violence, drug abuse etc. The desire to minimize the harm caused by damaging uses of the Internet has led the authorities of different countries to adopt various means, including blocking access to websites that function as platforms for illegal activity, or use technological screening measures. The Israeli approach has been that freedom of expression is “all encompassing” and applies even to expressions that encourage illegal activity.  Still, freedom of expression is not an absolute right. When there are interests that justify it, such as security, or social, political and other interests, freedom of expression may be curbed. When applying a proportionality test, the balance may vary according to the type of expression and its inherent social value weighed against the benefit of restriction. The content of illegal gambling sites – for example game instructions, various lists, graphics and other audio-visual aides – are, generally speaking, of little social value. The expressions are of a purely commercial nature, encouraging acts restricted under criminal law. Conceivably, limiting access to such expressions may be justified by legitimate purpose. But the mere fact that an expression may be harm does not exclude it from protection. As such, restrictions on free speech, even on expressions with little social value such as those in illegal gambling sites, must pass constitutional muster and be legally authorized.  

(c )       The Police has no authority to order Internet access providers to restrict access to gambling websites.  The relevant sections of the Police Ordinance [New Version], 5731-1971 (“Police Ordinance”), and the Penal Law, 5737-1977 (“Penal Law”), through their language and purpose, authorize the Israel Police to order the closing of places where gambling is takes place, but these are only physical places, as opposed to preventing access to an Internet website. A website is not a “place” but rather an amalgamation of information and applications installed in a computer that communicates with other computers via the Internet. Information is transferred from the computer to the server. The police is authorized to order the closing of a “place” of prohibited games or a “place” where lotteries or gambling are held, but preventing access to a website is not equivalent to the closing of a place, and is not covered by that authorization, neither explicitly nor implicitly. That the law grants the police the power to shut down physical places cannot, in itself, be understood as legislative intention to broaden the authority to allow “censorship” power to the police, without clear guidelines for its exercise. Even if the purpose of the orders – reducing the prevalence of gambling – is identical to that of the authorizing closing down physical gambling places, blocked access to a website implicates freedom of expression and freedom of occupation differently.  Blocking access to the Internet poses technical, political and legal difficulties: the concern for possibly blocking legitimate websites or innocent users. Executing blocks by a third party – the access providers – raises questions of liability, methods for blocking and costs. The appropriate legal policy would be to wait for explicit regulation of restrictions to free expression on the Internet in primary legislation, following in depth public debate. “Acrobatic” interpretations should not be invoked to authorize the police to violate civil rights. Furthermore, over the past few years the legislature has considered proposals for legislative amendments on this issue, but the legislative initiatives were hindered for being insufficiently balanced. The subjective and concrete legislative intention indicates a desire not to authorize the police to block access to gambling websites at its own discretion.

In short, the orders to restrict access to gambling websites were issued ultra vires and should be voided. This was the ruling of the Tel-Aviv-Jaffa District Court, sitting as the Court for Administrative Affairs.

Principal Arguments of the Parties

4.         Attorneys for the State argue that the Administrative Affairs Court erred in determining that the Israel Internet Association has standing.  The latter is a public petitioner with no personal interest in the orders, and his petition should therefore have been dismissed in limine, especially given the existence of petitioners who could have presented the factual infrastructure required, yet they ultimately refrained from filing a petition. The petition seeks to permit illegal activity, rather than preserve the rule of law, and there was no justification for conducting a judicial hearing for this kind of petition by a public petitioner. Attorneys for the State further argue that the Administrative Affairs Court erred in holding the orders infringe freedom of expression. The websites subject to the orders do not serve as a venue for expression and their entire raison d’etre is conducting prohibited gambling. There is no justification to fully exempt the Internet from rules that apply to other media. Blocking access to gambling is accepted practice all over the world, and is necessary for crime prevention.

5.         The primary claim the State’s attorneys make is that the police is authorized to order blocking access to websites. The Administrative Affairs Court adopted a “rigid” interpretation that failed to fully account for the law’s language and purpose. The Administrative Affairs Court failed to consider a possible alternative in the authorizing statute. In any case the relevant provision can be seen to include Internet space, as well as physical space: a “place of gambling” is also a “virtual place”. The authority to close a place also encompasses orders to block access to virtual space. The attorney for the State argues that when the law was passed it was impossible to anticipate the existence of virtual space, but the purpose is the same: preventing illegal gambling, which causes immense harm to both the individual and the public. Waiting for primary legislation to explicitly grant parallel authority to virtual space means perpetuating Internet gambling, its grave consequences and its harm, while forcing the police to combat it with hands tied behind its back.

6.         On the other hand, the Israel Internet Association discussed the public interest in Internet access, and as a natural outcome, its right of standing in this petition vis-à-vis its activities to promote Internet use in Israel as a technological, research, educational, social, and business resource. The limited economic interest of website owners and access providers is not comparable to the public interest in having unfettered access to the Internet. This is the purpose of granting standing rights to a public petitioner, thus enabling judicial review in a matter of public and constitutional importance that implicates the rule of law. The Israel Internet Association also emphasized the right to know. “A governing authority which claims the right to decide what the citizen ought to know, will eventually decide what the citizen should think; and there is no greater paradox to true democracy, which is not ‘guided’ from above” (HCJ 243/62 Israel Films Studios Ltd v. Levi [1] at p. 2416). A website consists of layers of information, each of these a protected expression, including: the code, the graphic design, games, trailers, data and explanations. The suspicion of a criminal offense does not excuse limits on expression in advance.

7.         The Israel Internet Association further claims that the law does not authorize the Police to order a third party to block access to gambling websites. An Internet website is neither a “place”, nor “premises” but rather a collection of “pages” which contain information collected from files on a service computer that communicates with other computers via the Internet (Abraham Tenenbaum “On Metaphors in Computer and Internet Law”, Sha’arei Mishpat 4 (2), 356, 374 (2006)). The analogy between “site” and “place” is fundamentally flawed. Blocking access to knowledge is distinguishable from closing a physical place, inter alia because of the infringement upon freedom of expression. Physical closing does not implicate the rights of the general public. Blocking access to knowledge does. Internet access providers are not enforcement agents of the police. They serve as a channel for providing information to Internet users, and they have an immensely important role in exercising the right to access information.

8.         The Israel Internet Association requests we uphold the Administrative Affairs Court’s decision regarding standing based also on the fact that the consequences of blocking access to a website differ from the consequences of blocking a physical place. Blocking access to websites involves technical challenges that may block access to innocuous sites. Blocking may be ineffective, as well. It may have implications for international obligations, and raise questions about access providers’ liability. Costs are likely to be “rolled” onto users. As a matter of judicial policy, infringements upon freedom of expression and access to information should only done in explicit primary legislation. The Knesset debates around private bills on the matter reflect substantive reservations against conferring the police with the requested powers. Upholding the appeal would turn the police into investigator and prosecutor, judge and executor, while performing interpretive acrobatics and infringing free expression.

Discussion and Ruling

9.         I divide the discussion into three categories, following the path taken by the Administrative Affairs Court:

(a) Standing; (b) Freedom of Expression; (c) Police Authority.

 (a)       Right of Standing

10.       As mentioned, the orders compelled Internet providers to block access to a number of websites used for illegal gambling. The access providers and the website owners chose not to challenge the orders. Prima facie, as claimed by the attorney for the State, the Israel Internet Association is stepping into a dispute in which it has no part. The Administrative Affairs Court deviated from the rule that “the court will generally not grant a public petition where there is a private victim who chose not to turn to the court for relief ” (HCJ 651/03 Citizens Right Bureau in Israel v. Chairman of Central Elections to the Sixteenth Knesset [2] at p. 68).  Recognition of standing rights for the Israeli Internet Association prompted the petitions’ adjudication without presenting the Administrative Court with the required factual infrastructure. The precise contents of the websites subject to the orders were not presented, nor was a full description of the technical ability to block access. No basis was presented for the argument – which the Administrative Court found acceptable – that blocking access to gambling sites could also be expected to block other sites.

11.  The Israeli Internet Association further argued before the Administrative Affairs Court that the Internet providers’ right to hearing had been violated. It further argued that the decision to block certain sites was discriminatory. The problem however is that these are not arguments that can be raised by a public petitioner. These are arguments that only the website owners and the access providers could have raised, had they so wished to do so.

12.       It seems that a priori the petition should have been dismissed in limine in the absence of standing. However, post factum, once the Administrative Affairs Court recognized the Israel Internet Association had standing, and ruled as it did on the merits, it seems inappropriate at this stage to uphold the appeal merely based on his issue, without ruling on the merits of the appeal itself. It is incumbent upon us to rule on the legality of the orders.

Freedom of Expression

13.       The attorneys for the parties spoke loftily and at length about freedom of expression and the right to access information that derives from it. Indeed, we must make every effort to avoid infringing the free dialogue in the new “town square” and the flow of information on the Internet. Freedom of expression is the air we breathe, and the right to access information – our daily bread. All the same, in its decision, the Administrative Affairs Court stated that illegal gambling on the Internet certainly is not a protected right, and that in such circumstances indeed there is no “discourse of rights(para. 21). However, the gambling sites also feature additional content: expressions, pictures, texts, explanations, lists and other audio-visual information. According to the Administrative Affairs Court all of these are of social value, concededly of “low value”. Nevertheless, “in the prevention of access to gambling websites the Respondents infringed the freedom of expression of users interested in entering the website and in browsing the information and of the site owners who uploaded the content” (para.23).

14.       This infringement upon free expression was scathingly criticized by the Israel Internet Association, but it appears to me that the alleged infringement is not quite what it was made out to be.  Attorneys for the State dispute this, claiming that the aforementioned gambling websites contain gambling content and nothing else, and that in any event, it is not content of a kind to which access cannot be denied based on freedom of expression. As mentioned, the petition was filed by the Israel Internet Association and not by access providers or website operators, with whom the relevant information is stored. This matter again exemplifies the problematic nature of granting standing to a party meddling in a dispute that is not its own, because the factual infrastructure laid before the court was insufficient and a court may follow it blindly.

15.       Regardless, even had the gambling websites under discussion included legitimate content alongside platforms of illegal gambling, there is nothing to prevent website owners from making the information accessible to users by one of two methods: either on an alternative site, or on the same site, together with blocking possible engagement in prohibited gambling there. The infringement of free expression is therefore quite marginal, if at all.

16.       We should not forget that the closure of a physical gambling place violates the right to property, a basic constitutional right, but is nonetheless permitted and frequently done according to the law. Case law, too, has permitted the closure of a physical gambling place, even when it serves for other legitimate activities (per former Justice Grunis in AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim Restaurant, Members’ Club v. Haifa Municipality [3] at p.798 (hereinafter: Tishim Kadurim). As mentioned above, the Israeli Internet Association argues that not all of the content on the gambling sites at issue is illegal and that these sites serve as platforms for chatting and other legitimate uses. This is a factual claim that requires factual substantiation. But assuming it is correct, we again analogize to a physical gambling place, which may undisputedly be legally closed. In addition to serving for illegal gambling, such a place can also serve as a place for social interaction, where conversations, even on matters of highest importance, may be held. But this would not rise to the level of speech protected by the right to free expression that would prevent closing a physical place of gambling. Visitors would be able to continue to meet, to speak, and to exchange opinions in alternative venues.  Similarly, there is nothing to prevent taking the same action regarding a website where illegal gambling takes place.  Access to the latter would be blocked, and to the extent that other legitimate activities took place on the website, there would be no impediment to continuing those, whether on this site or on another site.

17.       Hence, in terms of practical implementation the concern for violating a fundamental principle has been alleviated. The elevated status of freedom of expression is far beyond dispute. It remains intact and its status is securely enshrined, and access to illegal Internet gambling can be restricted without infringing freedom of expression or the right to access information. I make additional comments on guarding against any infringement of free expression below, in my discussion of discretion in exercising police authority.  

(c)  Police Authority

18.       Law enforcement agencies source their actions in two statutory provisions. Section 3 of the Police Ordinance provides that: “The Israel Police shall work toward prevention and detection of offences, apprehension and prosecution of offenders, safe custody of prisoners, and maintenance of public order and the safety of persons and property”. This is a basic and important provision, but because of its generality is of limited value to us. A more important provision for our purposes is the specific provision of section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, which addresses “closure of places”, as follows:

 “A district police commander may order the closing of a place for prohibited games or a place for the conduct of lotteries or gambling.”

19.       There are two, similar alternatives. The first: “a place of prohibited games”, and the second, “a place for the conduct of lotteries or gambling”. The Administrative Affairs Court focused on the first alternative, which is defined in section 224 of the Penal Law:

“‘Place of prohibited games’: premises where prohibited games are held regularly, whether open to the public or only to certain persons, regardless of whether those premises are also used for some other purpose.”

Based on dictionary definitions in both Hebrew and English, the Administrative Affairs Court ruled that the statutory definition refers to a physical, delineated place; such as a house, building, field (para. 36 of the Administrative Affairs Court opinion). The court relied on Y. Kedmi’s book, which interprets premises “in the broad and comprehensive sense of the concept... Immovable property as distinct from movable property.” (Yaakov Kedmi, The Criminal Law (Part IV)  2283 (2006).

20.       Can the term “premises” be said to include the world of Internet? In my opinion “virtual premises” are also “premises” but this question can be left for future decisions. Section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, as mentioned above, consists of two alternatives. The second alternative, as worded, does not necessitate reference to the definitions section. The question therefore arises as to whether “place” can be broadly interpreted to mean “virtual space”. The Administrative Court answered this question in the negative, with sound, logical and, at first blush, persuasive reason: 

“Moreover, relating to a website as a ‘place’ is inconsistent with its mode of operation. A website, by definition, is an agglomeration of information and applications, installed on a computer, that connects with many other computers over the Internet. When a user ‘enters a website;, their personal computer contacts another computer (‘the website server’) which is found elsewhere, and requests information. The user’s computer has a unique number (IP address) and the website server has a unique number (a different IP address). The website server transmits the information to the personal computer, which uses a browser to arrange the information for reading. When “actions” take place on the website, the personal computer asks for new information from the website server, receives it, and arranges it on the personal computer. Information is transmitted between the personal computer and the server, but there is no “place” here at all. Justice Tenenbaum described this well in his article: ‘The choice of the Hebrew word “site”, intuitively conjures the notion of a geographical site. Perceiving the site as a “place” induces us to say “enter a site”, “exit a site” and the like… all the sites on the Internet are connected to each other and the vulnerability of one also harms the other… the Internet was created, developed and exists by virtue of all the individuals which support it and maintain its integrity. Correct and appropriate public policy must be based on this and facilitate these efforts… a “website” is not a place. In fact, a “site” is nothing more than a computer that holds software that regularly communicates with many other computers’” (para. 37 of the Administrative Affairs Court opinion).

21.       These comments were repeated and reiterated by the attorney for the Israel Internet Society, and I am prepared to endorse them unreservedly. A website, in essence, is not a “place” according to its technological definition. However, even if this is our point of departure, the necessary conclusion does not specifically exclude virtual space from the scope of section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, as will be explained. But prior to doing so a few comments must be made about the Internet, progress and the attempts of law and justice to keep up with the times. 

22.       Humanity in its entirety, laymen and experts, almost all of us are still learning, wondering and marveling at the Internet. Its influence is felt all over the world, but it will certainly take a long while before we can assess its full effect and implications: “We are living at the height of a revolution: Technological development in the computer realm, digital information and digital networks are generating a social, economic and political upheaval (Niva Elkin-Koren and Michael Birnhack, Introduction, in Legal Network: Law and Information Technology (with Niva Elkin-Koren, 2011);

The computer – and with it the Internet – are not merely a mutation of previous life forms that we have known, which we have given a home to in the legal system. They are a new life form, and their movement is not the movement of the life forms with whom we are accustomed to live. They move in the manner of the knight (the horse) in a chess game; its movement is not altogether forward, nor altogether backward or altogether to the side. It is not altogether diagonal. Its movement is a tinkling of this and a tinkling of that, and it exists in its own right. But here is how the new life form differs from the knight: we know in advance how the knight will move and we know, more or less, how to protect ourselves when it attacks us. As for these new life forms of the computer and the Internet – we have yet to fully explore them; we have yet to reach the bottom of the pit. One click in Jerusalem, and you are in Tel-Aviv, a second click and you are in Australia, a third click – and the system rebels and everything is erased as if it never was. We have begun to move at the speed of light whereas our bodies are in the carriage, and our stream of thought moves at the speed of the carriage (Mishael Cheshin, “Introduction” The Computer and the Legal Proceeding: Electronic Evidence and Procedure  (2000).

Some view the Internet as a new universe. “In a short time the Internet has created a new universe of inconceivable dimensions. This universe dominates almost every aspect of civilization, replicates it and corresponds to it” (Rubick Rozental, A Few Comments on the Language of Internet, Legal Network: Law and Information Technology, eds Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, 2011, 61).  The Internet has come to our world, entering into its inner domains, but we still have trouble defining it. It exists all over the world and simultaneously in no place at all. More precisely, there is access to Internet and its activity all over the world, but its existence is “nowhere”.     

23.       As is well known, the law follows sluggishly in the footsteps of innovations, and legislation does not keep up with the pace of scientific progress. Offenders against the law adapt to progress more rapidly than its enforcers. This is axiomatic. The former have no restraints; the latter do. Many years passed between the invention of the computer and the enactment of the Computers Law, (1995). Less than a generation or two passed in terms of computers, and the law is already out of date, because the legislature did not foresee, nor could it have foreseen the innovations in technology. But not only is the legal world perplexed. Psychology too has encountered new phenomena of addiction and psychological injuries, and is attempting to develop updated, “on the go” reponses.  The same is true for sociology, and other disciplines in social sciences, natural sciences and the humanities. Not surprisingly, the world of law too is still unequipped. Some have taken an extreme view, claiming that given the virtual nature of the Internet, it cannot be subjected to the laws of space, time and state (see written references for this approach in the article of Yuval Karniel and Chaim Wismonski, Freedom of Expression, Pornography, and Community in the Internet, Bar Ilan Law Studies 23 (1) 259 (2006); Michal Agmon-Gonen, The Internet as a City of Refuge?! Legal Regulation in Light of the Possibilities of the Technological Bypass Technologies and Globalism of the Net, Legal Network: Law and Information Technology, eds. Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, 2011, 207).

24.       This extraterritorial approach is unacceptable. Concededly, an abundance of legislation that would impair the tremendous benefit inherent in the Internet is undesirable, nor is there any point in legislation which is unenforceable given the characteristics of the network. However, for good or bad, virtual space exerts a tangible influence over the concrete world, and our world will neither consent to nor tolerate the virtual realm’s exemption from the law. Act of pedophilia committed online are still pedophilia, drugs sold via the Internet still have the same addictive and destructive affect as drugs sold on city streets, the terrible harms of Internet gambling are no less damaging than danger from gambling in a physical place. Quite the opposite, the Internet opens new horizons for the world of crime. They should be blocked. The approach of excluding law and justice from virtual space must be kept off bounds.

25.       All the same, undeniably, the legal regulation of activity in virtual space is complex and complicated. Normative claims as to what the law ought to be are difficult to make, nor is it easy to apply the existing law. Not by chance, there are those who have concluded that this is an area best suited for legislation; while others feel that case law is the appropriate method for adjusting the law to the Internet era. Both camps are uncertain about the extent to which Internet users should participate in formulating the rules governing virtual space and their application. (For a comprehensive review of the possible models, see: Iris Yaron Unger Uncovering the Identity of an Anonymous Internet wrongdoer – Comparative Review, The Knesset, Legal Department, Legislation and Legal Research, 2012).  A variety of models in case law and legislation have been adopted by states around the world (Miguel Deutch, Computer Legislation in Israel, Tel-Aviv Law Studies 22 (2) 427, 428 (1999)). The issue is weighty and broad and its influence far-reaching, but I will not elaborate on it beyond what is required for discussing the concrete questions of this appeal: the authority of the police to issue an order restricting access to gambling websites on the Internet.

26.       It seems that a comprehensive statutory regulation of this field, in a precise manner adjusted to the virtual era is preferable.  The question is whether, absent updated and comprehensive legislation, the law as currently worded satisfactorily considers the police’s authority to issue the orders in question. The Administrative Affairs Court decided to defer the legislative process, but to void police powers to order closure of virtual gambling places until the statute is expressly amended to confer such authority. This ruling involves difficulties.

27.       The ‘waiting period’ created restricts, and occasionally frustrates, appropriate responses toward law enforcement and justice.  This approach, coupled with the previously described pace of technological progress, can be expected to lead to a situation where many legislative acts will be neither relevant nor applicable. Even after the legislature has amended the legislation, it is entirely possible that within little time that amendment will no longer be useful. Hence waiting for the legislature to act will not necessarily provide a solution. “The judge interprets the law. Without his interpretation of the law, it cannot be applied. The judge may give a new interpretation. This is a dynamic interpretation that attempts to bridge between the law and changing reality without having to change the law itself. The law remains as it was, but its meaning has changed because the judge gave it a new interpretation that is consistent with society’s new needs. The court ... realizes its judicial role in bridging law and life (Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democratic Society 57 (2004); and see HCJ 8070/98 Citizens Rights Office in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior [4], para. 12 of former Justice Grunis’ opinion; LCA 4447/07 Mor v. Barak I.T.T. [1995] Society for the Bezeq International Services Ltd (hereinafter: Mor) paras. F-I, of Justice Rubinstein’s opinion; CA 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League Limited v. Anon [6] paras. 4-6 of Justice Melcer’s opinion (hereinafter:  Anon)).

28.       On one hand, Internet crime is becoming increasingly sophisticated. On the other, criminal law develops slowly. The chasm between the two must be bridged. The Knesset achieves this through legislation, while the courts through case law. The reality of life does not allow us to wait for the Penal Law to be amended to determine which offences can escape sanction when committed over the Internet and which cannot.  Nor is it legally necessary to wait until the legislature has reviewed all of the criminal law’s provisions and decided which of them are applicable to the Internet. The court must respond to the specific matter brought before it and rule one way or another. This is not a question of ‘judicial legislation’, but rather of ‘judicial creation’. The same criminal offences proscribed many years ago and committed on city streets, are now committed on a larger scale and with greater force via the Internet. Occasionally, the actus reus is identical, the mens rea is identical, the legislative purpose is identical, and the damage, is quite often more extensive and severe in the virtual realm.  

29.       Needless to say, we are still bound by linguistic restraints and cannot deviate from their boundaries to cast our net over whatever we see as a crime or a tort in the “real world” and possibly appears as such in the virtual domain. All the same, the legislative purpose, generally common to all offences, whether committed here or there, requires an interpretative effort to prevent greatly harmful artificial loopholes in enforcement. The tremendous damage that can be wrought by the Internet was descussed by Justice E. Hayut: “The infringement concerned enlists human progress and technological innovations in computing in the service of crime, thus yielding a new and dangerous form of criminality that cannot be taken lightly. This form of criminality does not involve physical-tangible harm that leaves its marks on the victim’s body. It is committed remotely, with the click of a button, but its damage is extensive and carries different levels of implications, including to, as stated, a victim’s personal security and privacy, his property, his business, and his commercial secrets” (Cr.A 1439/06 Zaltovski v. State of Israel [7]). In the same vein, former Justice Grunis wrote: “The Internet is fertile ground for committing different types and categories of criminal activity, and inter alia, activities directed against state security. That the Internet era has made it significantly easier, technically, to commit offences such as a conspiracy to commit an offence cannot be ignored. Hence, in the case before us it is undisputed that “A” and “S” became acquainted by chance… via the Internet. In other words, conceivably, if not for the chance Internet meeting they would not have met and could not have conspired to commit the acts described in the indictment. Hence, the case before us demonstrates a need to impose punishment that deters from the negative and criminal side-effects that accompany technological developments” (CrA. 7430 /10 Anon v. State of Israel [8]). There are numerous other examples, and we take judicial notice of the Internet being exploited for grave and dangerous harm on a broad scale.

30.       Pedophilia is a pernicious scourge on the Internet. Is pedophilic material in virtual space nothing more than a collection of ‘pixels’ – with no substance – that the law is powerless to reach?  In practice, the courts do not stand idly by, and they ideed apply the Penal Law’s provisions to offences committed over the Internet. Naturally, this is not done reflexively, but rather the required physical and mental elements have been examined, under the circumstances of each case, and the principles of criminal law have been applied. (See Assaf Hardoof, Cybercrime, 17 (2010) who sharply criticizes the approach that the Internet’s characteristics undermine the foundations of criminal law. According to his approach, the mental complexities leading to criminal conduct committed in a physical environment also exist on the Internet.)

31.       We will return to the meaning of a “place… of gambling” in section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, which the police is permitted to close. If, according to the Administrative Affairs Court’s decision, it refers to a physical and not virtual place, then logic dictates that this would also be the meaning of a “place… of gambling” immediately above in section 228 of the Penal Law. If so, then not only would the police be prevented from issuing orders restricting access to gambling websites, but it is doubtful it would even be possible to convict a person operating, over the Internet, “a place for prohibited games or a place for the conduct of lotteries or gambling” (section 228 of the Criminal Law). On its face, this would conclusively preclude not only restricting access to illegal gambling websites, but also the enforcing the prohibition of possessing or operating illegal gambling websites. This state of affairs would remain until we are saved by a statutory amendment, which may or may not come soon.

32.       Moreover, in Israeli legislation, the term “place” is used for different offences and in numerous contexts. For example, “public place” is defined in section 34(24) of the Penal Law and is mentioned in numerous other sections concerning offences and punishments; Chapter C of the Preliminary Part of the Penal Law, deals with “Applicability of Penal Laws according to Place Where the Offense Was Committed  (emphasis mine – N.S.). A place in which an Internet website is viewed, or is used is a “place” that establishes judicial jurisdiction. Should we exempt the Internet from the Penal Law going forward because it is excluded from the definition of a “place”? Similarly, would we permit discrimination on the Internet just because it is excluded from the definition of a “public place” in section 2 of the Prohibition of Discrimination (Products and Services) in Entrance to Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 5761-2001? (See e.g. the conviction for supporting a terrorist organization on the Internet, where the internet was found to be a “public place” CrimF (Nazareth) 12641-11-10 State of Israel v. Abu-Salim (Deputy President Yung-Gefer) paras. 47-56 (1.4.12)).

33.       The civil law, too, is frequently required to apply the concept of “place” to the Internet. On more than one occasion courts have held that Internet-based conduct fall within the jurisdiction of courts all over the country. For example, in a breach of copyright and intellectual property case, concerning a website for a virtual shop selling household goods and gifts, the court held that “the picture was presented on the Internet, namely – in each and every place within the area of the State of Israel. It is therefore clear that the place of the omission was in the entire state and by extension in each and every district… the territorial jurisdiction extends to the entire area of the State of Israel” (Comments by Judge Tenenbaum in App. (Magistrates – J-Lem) 8033/06 Steinberg v. Levi (10.4.2007). These remarks, made in his role as judge are inconsistent with his decisive remarks in his role as scholar in the article cited above: that “an Internet site ‘is not a place’, which the Administrative Affairs Court relied upon in the decision appealed here (para. 37)). Even more accurately, all the alternatives stipulated in Regulation 3(a) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 employ the language of “place” (place of residence, place of business, place of creating obligations, place intended for fulfillment of obligations, place of delivery of asset, place of act or omission).  Is it possible to exclude the Internet from territorial jurisdiction because it does not fall into the category of “place”?

34.       Due to space constraints and in the absence of satisfactory arguments it cannot be responsibly councluded that wherever the term “place” appears in primary or secondary legislation it must be applied to the Internet as well. Conceivably, there could be certain, isolated exceptions, but the rule should be that the Internet fits the definition of “place”. The Israeli Internet Association’s claim, which the Administrative Affairs Court accepted, that both in truth and according to its dictionary definition, virtual space is not a “place” is not sufficiently persuasive. The settled, entrenched and well-accepted law is that “the words of the law are not fortresses, to be conquered with the help of dictionaries, but rather the packaging of a living idea which changes according to circumstances of time and place, in order to realize the basic purpose of the law” (comments by then Justice A. Barak (LCrApp 787/79 Mizrahi v. State of Israel [9] at 427). There, the Court held that the “one who escapes from lawful custody” refers not only to an inmate who literally escapes from prison but also to a prisoner who fails to return from furlough: “it may be argued that our concern is with a criminal provision that should be accorded a narrow construction, by attaching only ‘physical’ meaning to the terms ‘custody’ and ‘escape’. I cannot accept this line of thought. A criminal statute, like any other statute should be interpreted neither narrowly nor broadly but instead by attaching to it the logical and natural meaning that realizes the legislative purpose" (ibid).These statements have retained their vitality and are applicable to our case too, and even a fortiori: in that case the issue concerned a criminal offense, whereas our concern here is with an administrative measure.

35.       As stated, the legal world is still not best prepared to handle the Internet, and this is also true of the world of language.  The terms that serve us in virtual space are borrowed from the tangible world. On the Internet we use a “desk top”; the user “cuts”, “copies”, “pastes” and “deletes”; “writes” “notes”; “stores” in “files”; and “sends” to the “recycling bin” and receives “documents” and “junk mail” into a “mail box”. Given this background, the word “place” is by no means exceptional. It would not be a deviation from the ‘principle of legality’, nor from the rules of interpretation were we to determine that “place” also includes virtual space, and that its meaning also encompasses a website. Since we speak of an Internet “site” in our daily conversations, we should remember its dictionary definition and its Talmudic root (b.Zevahim 7a): a “site” is a “place”.

36.       Therefore, in interpreting section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, I see no justification for taking a literal and narrow approach, which interprets the word “place” as a physical place only. In the current modern era, a website is also a type of place. The section’s language also tolerates the classification of virtual space – or perhaps better termed as “computerized space” – as a “place”.

37.       From language to purpose: In the case of Tishim Kadurim [3] then Justice A. Grunis explained the purpose for prohibiting certain games as a value-based goal. Man is born to labor rather than easy enrichment based on luck. Addiction to gambling is a serious scourge that harms the individual, their family and society as a whole. Before the Penal Law there was the Criminal Law Amendment (Prohibited Games, Lotteries and Bets), 5724-1964, and before Justice A. Grunis there was Justice Haim Cohn who made the following remarks about the legislative purpose behind the previous statute:

                        The legislative purpose, as reflected clearly in the nature and the language of the law, is to combat, by criminalization, the scourge of gambling and betting – the scourge of winning money or its equivalent other than by work or other reasonable consideration, but rather by the luck of the draw. Mr. Terlo rightly mentioned the well-known fact that mankind has an evil tendency to try his luck in gambling. One need not have a particularly developed commercial instinct to assess the tremendous prospect for profit in the commercial exploitation of this natural human tendency.  Mr. Terlo said, and I agree with him, that such commercial exploitation, in all of its various forms, produces demoralization. I further add that from my perspective, the wrong that the law seeks to prevent is not only the encouragement of desire for lawful easy enrichment without labor, but also – and perhaps primarily – the placing of an obstacle before the blind, where instead of spending his money on his own sustenance and that of his household, he invests in dubious ventures based on luck (HCJ 131/85 Savizky v. Minster of Finance [10] at 376).

38.  As we can see this plague is nothing new to us. The following is a reliable testimony from two hundred years ago about this phenomenon and the harm it causes, relating to the fate of those who wager on dice: “The number of those involved has multiplied, where their foolish preoccupation is such that they spend nights and days gambling, in their homes, on their roofs and on street corners, until they lose everything. Even if they are wealthy, eventually they lose all and must steal and resort to violence, while their family members starve; their children beg for bread, and there is none to give them, for they do not work to bring food to their families. And one sin leads to another, in that they neglect prayer and fulfillment of the commandments, for when temptation seizes them and they engage in gambling, it is extremely difficult for them to forsake it, as difficult as separating one’s fingernail from one’s flesh. They do not take care of themselves and do not tear away from gambling, even to eat at the time for eating and to sleep at the time for sleeping. One who is addicted to gambling will not leave it even when he is old, for only will-power can separate from it.” (Rabbi Eliezer Papo, Pele Yo’etz, Constantinople, 5584 - 1824).[1] […]

39.   In 1975 the legislature added a provision to the Penal Law Amendment (Prohibited Games, Lotteries and Bets), 5724-1964, which granted the District Commander of the Police the authority to issue an order to close “a place for prohibited games or a place for the conduct of lotteries or gambling” (S.H 5735, No. 779, 222). According to the introduction to the Explanatory Note of the bill, the legislature was dissatisfied with the existing criminal sanction, and sought to close places where prohibited games were conducted, as a preventive measure: “The Law imposes a punishment on the possessor or operator of a place for conducting games with cards, dice, game machines, and the like, But there is no law that prevents the actual existence of such place… The proposed law seeks to establish provisions… by enacting legislation directly designed to address the phenomenon of the crime that thrives in such places, and to confer the authority for the advance prevention of the opening of businesses that are liable to harm public safety and generate crime. It also proposes to stiffen the punishments and to adapt them to any given situation (H.H. 5735-1975).” Incidentally, the Explanatory Note refers to the closing of “a certain place”. In light of our conclusions above, it is not inconceivable that “a certain place” encompasses the Internet, it being a place where anonymity is preserved and where we have no knowledge of a website owner’s or users’ identities, nor do we know what that place is, or where is it located, all of these are considered  “anonymous".

40.       The harm wrought by gambling on the Internet is immeasurably greater than that which is caused in physical place. Gambling websites on the Internet are accessible to all sections of the population, from adult to child, the rich and the poor, the honest and the corrupt, the wise and the legally incompetent. With just a click of a button and press of a key any novice can gamble on the Internet. But not only accessibility is concerning, there is also availability – at  any time and any hour.  Identity can be disguised to enable the use of all features of virtual spaces. All of these come together to exacerbate the phenomenon and its range of harms: addiction, vast loss of funds, money laundering, tax evasion, incidental crime, and more. A large physical gambling venue can hold hundreds, perhaps even thousands of clients, but it pales in comparison to the Internet, which is available to millions of people. With these capacities, the number of victims also rises exponentially, as well as the amounts of funds dubiously invested.

41.       When section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law was enacted, the legislature did not anticipate the Internet and by extension did not consider the illegal gambling that would be conducted there. However, the legislative purpose evidently was to prevent illegal gambling, regardless of location.  The police pursuit of offenders does not end at virtual space; the Internet cannot become a city of refuge. The material factor is not the platform for illegal gambling but rather the phenomenon itself. “Do not look in the canister, but at what is inside (Mishnah, Avot 4.2)” If it is technically possible to close a gambling place, even if the closure is not an enclosure but rather a prevention of access, the legislative purpose should be realized, to the extent possible, through proper interpretation. And again, if we assume that it refers to a physical place, then illegal gambling need not necessarily be conducted in a closed structure, for example, a vast area in which illegal gambling takes place.  The possibility of ordering its closure exists and can be done by preventing access through the gate. The police would be authorized to close the gate and prevent access to a space used for criminal activity. In the same vein, the Internet too is a space: a computerized space (some have used the expression “global public space”. See Jurgenb Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence translations (1989); Tal Samuel-Azran, Global Public Sphere on the Internet: Potential and Limitations, Legal Net:  Law and Information Technology, 433, 434 (Niva Elkin-Koren and Michael Birnhack eds, 2011)). Entrance into computerized space is also through a “gate” embodied by the access provider and the website operator. Concededly, the entrance is not physical, actually consists of communication between computers, but this is immaterial, because the technological definition is inconclusive as to the interpretative question.

42.       Jewish Law can enlighten us. The Torah was given at Mt. Sinai. In the ancient world, modern technology and the Internet era were unimaginable. Nonetheless, the Torah seeks to adapt to present and future reality by way of interpretation, for otherwise it would become a dead letter instead of a living document. Interpretation must adhere to language in order to fulfill the Divine words and to not deviate from them in any way. It was specifically because of this that the Talmudic Sages saw no difficulty in adapting terms such as ox or donkey or camel, used in those times for labor and transport, to the context of vehicles and planes. This is the present need for otherwise Jewish law will no longer be relevant or valuable. Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein made remarks pertinent for our purposes, and they should guide us: 

                        In the developing technological reality the ability to cause damage, physical or even virtual continually increases, without incurring any liability under the criteria of Nahmanides or of Rabbi Yitzhack.[2] The harm may be more abstract and the process of causing it may be more indirect than the minimal threshold for liability under garma.[3] Nonetheless, the result is quite severe.

                        Accordingly, a learned and sharp-minded thief would be able to plan and execute the perfect burglary, with the assistance of grama tools for breaking in, without consequences, whether due to direct damage or force of garmi.  Should we persist to grant exemptions in this kind of scenario based on the law of grama in torts?...

                        The request is simple, the authority exists and eyes are raised in anticipation. In the event that leading Jewish authorities succeed in enacting an amendment for this matter it would provide a  remedy for a real concern for society, and at the same time, would  elevate the glory of the Torah (Lessons of Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, Dina d'Grami, 200 (5760); See also in the comments of Justice N. Hendel, para. 6 Anon.)

43.       Thus far on the laungauge and the purpose. We now proceed to address some of the difficulties the Administrative Affairs Court considered in the decision appealed here, in terms of applying of the law to the virtual sphere. These difficulties also lead the court to conclude that the solution lies with the legislature and not the court, and that it is appropriate to wait for legislative amendment.

44.       A primary difficulty is that the orders restrict access to the Internet through third parties – the access provider. According to the Administrative Affairs Court, based on the Israeli Internet Association’ claim, the law authorizes closing a place, but does not authorizes ordering a third party to prevent access to an Internet site. The claim is a weighty one. Access providers’ legal responsibility poses questions in different legal contexts. For example, in the Mor [5] case the Court held that the provider is not obligated to disclose the identity of anonymous “talkbackers”, and called upon the legislature to regulate the matter. Similarly, in Anon [8] the Court ruled that a supplier cannot be compelled to reveal the particulars of a site owner who breaches copyright in order to file an action for that breach. This decision was also accompanied by a call for legislation of the matter. At the same time, the Court held that if a certain matter did not find a legislative solution, courts would have to provide solutions in case law, and the legal doctrines required to fill in the lacunae were presented. The matter before us is different. Here, it cannot be said that there is no legislative provision that confers authority. There is no need for primary legislation of the issue. The section’s interpretation leads to the conclusion that the section applies to the virtual realm. Legal issues concerning the access provider may be adequately resolved in the context of how the police may exercise its authority to order restricted access to gambling websites. That such difficulties exist should not be a determinative factor in whether the authority exists.

45.       I also believe that the legal challenges involved in restricting access to gambling websites vis-a-vis the access providers were exaggerated. First, using a third party to execute criminal proceeding is not illegitimate. The law recognizes, for example regarding a summons to present evidence for investigation or a trial (section 43 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) (New Version) Act, 5729-1969. Second, given the license they receive from the State, access providers have a public duty. They sit at a central intersection – the “Internet points of control” – and under these circumstances using them to execute orders restricting access is justified.  Third, it appears that had it concerned the closure of a physical place by the police, with third party assistance, there would have been no problem.  The attorneys for the State demonstrated this in another context thus: Illegal gambling is being conducted in an isolated villa. A guard is in charge of the path leading to the villa. Would the police not be authorized to order the policeman to prevent gamblers’ access to the path leading to the villa? Fourth, a police order directed at access providers instructing the to restrict access to illegal gambling websites does not require them to conduct any investigation or inquiry and does not unlawfully breach any of their rights, ordering them only to “execute a technical act that does not involve any discretion of the closing of a site with a particular IP address, explicitly specified in the order” (section 41 of the State’s summations). Case law has stressed that imposing legal responsibility on the supplier raises concerns that should be regulated statutorily (see Rachel Alkalai, Civil Liability of Internet Services Suppliers for Transfer of Harmful Information Hamishpat 6, 151, 154 on the Report by the Knesset Sub-Committee for Communications and Information on the Need for a Legislative Arrangement). However the situation in the case before us differs from the one described there. We do not hold that Internet providers are legally responsible to prevent, on their own initiative, access to websites used for illegal gambling.  Moreover, our ruling does not prevent access providers from petitioning a court in appropriate cases in order to subject it to judicial review. This right is stipulated in section 5(1) of the Administrative Affairs Court Act, 5760-2000 (item no. 7 of the First Schedule). Recall that the access providers did not exercise this right and did not challenge the order.

46. The Israeli Internet Association claims that this is an “unprecedented and exceptional measure” (page 1 of the summations). This is not so. The Administrative Affairs Court recognized that restricting access to Internet websites used for gambling is accepted practice around the world: “The desire to minimize the harm from negative uses has led certain authorities, even in liberal democratic countries, to take various measures against websites that support anti-social activities (see: Betting on the net: An analysis of the Government’s role in addressing Internet gambling, 51 Fed. Comm. L. J. (1999)). One of those measures is blocking access to websites that are breading grounds for illegal activity, by various technological means…” (para. 19 of the opinion) (ed. note: translated form the Hebrew opinion’s translation).  In Australia, a law was enacted in 2001, stipulating that “access providers shall block access to illegal gambling sites should they receive an express demand to do so from the authorities” (ed. note: translated from Hebrew opinion’s translation), subject to the conditions set forth in the Interactive Gambling Bill 2001. In 2006, the United States passed a law prohibiting Internet gambling – the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, which inter alia allows that under certain circumstances, the court may grant orders to compel internet providers to block access to gambling websites (paras. 54- 55 of the Administrative Affairs Court opinion).

47.       Additional restrictions are common around the world. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime deals with the adoption of legislation intended to protect society from crimes committed online (http://conventions.coe.int/Treay/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm). It provides inter alia that all parties to the convention will adopt legislative and other measures as may be necessary to criminalize various acts of child pornography, which is disseminated over computer systems (Article 9). In 1998, Sweden passed a law addressing liability for electronic bulletin boards, including various categories of Internet pages (Act (1998:112) on Responsibility for Electronic Boards).  This statute requires service providers who store information (as distinct from Internet access providers) to make illegal content inaccessible or to remove the content. If further refers to a number of provisions in Sweden’s Penal Law, for example, incitement to racism, or child pornography (http://www.nai.uu.se/forum/about-nai-forum-1/SFS-1998_112-Act_E-boards.pdf.).

48.       Australia established an agency known as Australian Communications and Media, which is charged with, inter alia, regulating Internet content. The agency is authorized to investigate potentially prohibited content on the Internet, and to issue access providers “notice of warning and removal” relating to the contents of Internet websites used for illegal gambling. In Italy, since 2006, Internet gambling has been prohibited, unless on authorized websites.  Internet access providers are required to restrict access to unauthorized websites listed in a “black list” kept by an administrative body: Autonomous Administration of State Monopolies, http: www.aams.gov.it/site.php?id=6560).  As it turns out the restriction of access to websites is an accepted measure, occasionally following an order by an administrative body. The a priori involvement of a judicial body is not always necessary, and there is no need for a criminal investigation to precede the administrative directive. States around the world acknowledge the necessity of restricting prohibited activities on the Internet as well. The State of Israel is not a pioneer in this realm.

Police policy is to exercise this authority with caution. The investigations and intelligence branch prepare the infrastructure required for issuing an order.  Legal counsel to the police examines the material, and so does the State Attorney.  Immediately before issuing the order, the access providers and websites operates are given the right to present their arguments. The decision to issue the order is given at the level of the district commander.  A party who could have been aggrieved may file an application for a second review, and following that, as stated, may also petition the courts. After issuing the order, the police examines it periodically, and at least once a month considers whether to extend it, revoke it or amend it. Against this background, if the police orders, consistent with its authority, a third party to assist it in preventing an offence, and if the latter agrees, why should the court prevent it from doing so? If the same access providers wish to object, the doors of the court are open to them in order to hear their claims.

50.       As we have said, the authority is there; the manner of exercising it is subject to discretion and judicial review. Recall, that the access providers filed no petition to any court, and in this sense, the Internet Association is indeed meddling in a dispute to which it is not a party (HCJ 651/03 Citizens Rights Bureau in Israel v. Chairman of the Sixteenth Knesset Central General Elections Committee PD 57(2), 62.) Regardless, in the absence of appropriate factual infrastructure, there is no practical possibility or legal need to elaborate further on this matter.

51. The Administrative Affairs Court stated that restricting access through the orders in question could incidentally block innocent websites. Attorney for the State responded to this argument, claiming that from a technological perspective this fear was negligible because the IP address can be crossed with the website’s URL address in order to prevent restricted access to innocent sites. Personally, I see no need to rule on this point, given that it was not fleshed out in the Administrative Affairs Court.  The state can consider these claims in light of its discretion to exercise the authority. In preparing the order, the police must ensure that execution by access providers does not harm innocent websites, but only restricts access to the targetted website. Where it is impossible to avoid harm to innocent websites, as a side-effect of blocking access to a gambling website, to the extent that the Israeli Internet Association is correct and such situations indeed occur, the police would not be permitted to order restricting access to the site. Presumably, a provider wishing to avoid harm to innocent websites would present such claims under the right to be heard, in a petition for second review by the police, or in a petition to the court.

52.       The Israeli Internet Association also claimed that restriction of access was ineffective. The attorney for State argued in response that the inefficacy claim directly contradicted the Israel Internet Association’s claim concerning the damage such orders would cause: If the orders are ineffective, then naturally no harm would be caused. In any event, the court has no expertise regarding the efficacy of the orders. The position of the Israel Police – the professional body charged with the matter – is that the orders have a substantial effect and that this is another effective tool against illegal Internet gambling.  The Israel Police is aware of the methods used in an attempt to ’bypass’ the orders (for example, changing the URL website address, or its IP address). But this involves costs and not all end users know how to do it, and the police also has the tools for dealing with ‘bypass’ attempts. Actually, enforcement difficulties are not unique to virtual space and are common in all areas of crime: “For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy war” (Mishlei 24:6).

53.       The Administrative Affairs Court had difficulty not only with “place”, but also with “the closure”. According to the court, “closure is one thing, blocking access is another” (para. 41), and “even a broad interpretation of the law cannot confer the police commander authorities not specified in the law”  (ibid). My opinion is different. If the police is authorized to fully close illegal gambling websites on the Internet, then let alone it should be authorized to block or restrict the access to them. This is a less harmful measure. Section 17(b) of the Interpretation Law 5741-1981 provides that “any authorization to act or compel action implies the auxiliary authorities reasonably required therefore.” Authorization to close (and afortiori if closing is not possible) also means granting powers to block access.

54.       The Israeli Internet Association opposed various claims by the State’s representatives regarding the legislative regulation of the issue. This may be so, and it would have been preferable had they spoken in one voice, but we must remember that the issue raises real doubt. There is nothing to prevent changes in views or thought processes, and in making deliberations more productive. The binding position of the State’s representatives, at the end of the day, is that of the Attorney General, and the arguments were made on his behalf. Without derogating from its claims here, the State also submitted the draft bill to clarify the situation, but one cannot know how the legislative process will develop. The same applies to the four previous draft bills presented to the Knesset. Each one of them attempted to explicitly authorize the police to order access suppliers to block access to gambling websites, but none of them materialized into a legislative act. The Knesset members expressed varying opinions but I do not think it is possible to distill a clear conclusion from their comments regarding the subjective intention of the legislature, as concluded by the Administrative Affairs Court: “The fact that the legislator debated the proposal substantively and decided not to enact it, indicates that its subjective intention was not to apply its principles in fact… the subjective and concrete intention of the legislature in this matter, indicates that it sought not to give the District Commander authority to block access to gambling sites pursuant to his own discretion”  (para. 61). In my view, this conclusion is by no means inevitable. According to the record, some of the Knesset Members felt that a legislative amendment was entirely unnecessary, and that the authority already exists. In view of the differing views, additional possibilities exist. Summing up the debate, the committee chairperson pointed out the difficulties that were raised, but the general position was to conduct another hearing. A small part of the legislative proceedings and a few Knesset members who are members of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee cannot provide a basis for a generalized legislature’s subjective intention.

Final Word

55.  I do not think that there was any justification to cancel the orders issued by the police, with the State Attorney and the Attorney General’s knowledge, to restrict access to gambling websites. First, it is doubtful whether the Israel Internet Association has locus standi in this petition; second, the alleged infringement of free expression is certainly not as serious as was alleged; third, the main point is that section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law constitutes an authorization for the police to issue the orders. This is consistent with the section’s language, its logic, the legislative history and the legislative purpose.  I therefore propose to my colleagues to strike down the decision of the Administrative Affairs Court and to order the restoration of the orders to restrict access to gambling websites.

Note

56.       After reading the opinion of my colleague, Justice U. Vogelman, my impression is that he was slightly tough on the State regarding the use of a third party – access providers – for purposes of exercising the authority under section 229 of the Law. I addressed this point in paragraphs 44-45 above. I will add just this: My colleague mentioned the well known distinction between delegating authority which also includes the exercise of discretion, and receiving assistance in technical matters related to exercising that authority. My colleague acknowledges that the access providers were not required to exercise discretion, and the police only requested their help in exercising its own authority – in the technical act of blocking a website identified by its IP address as specified in the order. However, according to my colleague, it is still necessary to show that the access providers agree to assist the police, and once the police imposed an obligation upon the access providers, it can no longer be considered assistance.

My view is different. First, let us assume that the police district commander seeks to order the closure of a room used for gambling. To do so he orders a third party, in possession of the keys to that place, to lock the door, without requesting consent. Is there anything wrong with that?  Had the place of gambling not been an Internet site, but rather a room in a hotel, would the police not be authorized to order a reception clerk to assist it in exercising its authority to close that room or to open it? Would this require a legislative amendment?

Second, as mentioned in para. 49 above, prior to issuing the order the access providers were given the right to present their claims; the access providers are entitled to request a second review of the decision to issue an order, and the access providers are also permitted to petition the Administrative Affairs Court. In fact, the access providers took none of these steps. They may have reconciled themselves to the orders as a token of good citizenship; they may have an interest in preventing access to gambling websites, because in doing so they reduce their exposure to law suits (for example: parents suing them for their damages as a result of their children’s Internet gambling). I will not belabor the point speculating because the facts suffice: The access providers did not institute any legal proceedings to express their objection to the orders. My colleague seeks to be meticulous about the access providers’ rights, and requires that their consent be “explicit”, “sincere and genuine willingness”. Under the circumstances, my view is different. In the Haggadah of Pessach, tomorrow night, with respect to the son who does not know how to ask, we say “you shall open your mouth for him”. By way of analogy, this is how we relate to a mute, who is incapable or does not know how to present claims or to ensure their rights are protected. Access providers do not fall into this category and I see no justification for treating them under the criterion of “you shall open your mouth for him”, when the gates of the court were open to them, and they knowingly refused to enter. More precisely, in the future too, whenever the police seek to issue an order, Internet providers will be able to object and to present their case before the order is issued, after it is issued, and also to file an administrative petition. It therefore seems that we may appropriately apply the Talmudic rule that “silence is regarded as consent” (Bavli, 87b), to infer their agreement, and thus remove the obstacle to the exercise of the police authority to restrict access to gambling websites.

 

Justice U. Vogelman

Is the District Police Commander of the Israel Police authorized to order Internet access providers to restrict Israeli users’ access to gambling sites on the Internet, under their authority under section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, 5737-1977 (hereinafter: the Penal Law), to close down gambling places? This is the question before us.

General

1.         The appearance of the Internet has radically changed our world.  It enables easy and convenient communication between people. Some use it for interactive entertainment; others use it for electronic trade. Many use it – occasionally on a daily basis – to send electronic mail and for sending instant messages. A countless number of websites enable video and audio, and others enable telephony, files sharing, and the like (Assaf Hardoof, Hapesha Hamekuvan) [CYBERCRIME], 114, 117 (2010)). The web also enables access to immense quantities of information pooled on the Internet – an ever growing collection of documents created by independent authors and stored in servers’ computers. In that sense, the Internet is the most outstanding feature of the “information era” in which we are living, an era in which advanced technological reality enables the immediate transfer of data on a massive scale compared to the world around us (see HCJ 3809/08 Citizens Rights Bureau v. Israel Police [12] para.1 (hereinafter: the “Big Brother” law). In this way the Internet has and continues to contribute to social, economic, scientific and cultural developments around the world. Alongside these numerous advantages, phenomena of lawbreaking are likewise are not absent from the virtual world. The Internet enables activity that is defined as a criminal offence or civil tort, as well as technologies that enable the commission of torts or offences (Michal Agmon-Gonen, The Internet as a City of Refuge?! Legal Regulation in Light of the Possibilities of the Technological Bypass Technologies and Globalism of the Net, in Legal Network: Law and Information Technology, eds. Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, 2011). Illegal gambling enabled by the Internet is part of the content available on the Internet. Gambling websites offer their services from their locations in countries that permit it, and are accessible from different states around the world, including those in which participation in gambling is prohibited or restricted. Over the past few years these websites have become increasingly ubiquitous, given the high financial incentive for establishing them. Online gambling is one of the most profitable branches of trade on the Internet (Chaim Wismonsky, Sentencing Guidelines for Computer Crimes, Bar-Ilan Law Studies 24(1), 81, 88 (2008)).

2.         There is no need to elaborate on the negative social value involved in gambling. My colleague Justice N. Sohlberg also discussed this at length. This phenomenon has seen plenty of opposition, including the claim that a one’s livelihood should be based on work, a vocation or some other legitimate activity rather than easy enrichment based on luck. Whereas participating in gambling is not creative and undermines one’s work-ethic, a person participating in prohibited games may become addicted to this “occupation”, and the addict could cause extensive losses to themselves and their family and ultimately become a burden upon their family and upon society. As known, there are a few legal arrangements that permit gambling games under state auspices, encompassed in the Regulation of Gambling in Sports Act, 5727-1967 and in section 231(a) of the Penal Law. Mifal HaPayis,[4] for example, operates under such a permit. Notwithstanding that state-sponsored permitted gambling enables quick enrichment based on luck and also poses the danger of addiction, it should be distinguished from illegal gambling. Permitted gambling enables fundraising for public causes; they are not usually accompanied by negative elements such as coming under the control of organized crime, and finally, the state can oversee their mangagement and the distribution of funds (see AAA 4436/02 Tishim Kadurim [3] at p. 804,806; Ofer Grusskopf, Paternalism, Public Policy and the Government Monopoly over the Gambling Market, Hamishpat (7) 9, 28 (2002)).  As an aside, it should be noted that in many states gambling is permitted on a wider scale, but needless to say, our decision at this stage is restricted to Israeli Law and the legislatures’ values-based determinations.

3.         Techonolgically, it is now possible to block access to a particular website (compare:  Rachel Alkalai, Civil Liability of Suppliers of Internet Services for Transfer of Damaging Information, Hamishpat  (6) 151, 159 (2001)). This is the background for the orders subject to this proceeding. The events concerning us unfolded as following. At the end of June 2010 Israel Police district commanders sent warning letters to Internet access providers, notifying them of their intention to order blocking Israeli users’ access to various gambling websites (hereinafter: the warning letters). In the warning letters the district commanders specified the URL addresses and IP addresses of these websites. Notably, the Appellants claimed that the website operators also received a similar warning. The Internet access providers received a 48-hour extension to submit their challenges of the orders, and a further extension was granted to providers who so requested. One provider, Respondent 2, exercised its right to object to the orders. In a letter to the district commanders, Respondent 2 claimed that the orders because were unlawful because the district commander is only authorized to order closure of physical places; and also because the Penal Law does not authorize a district commander to use the providers to prevent users in Israel from having access to gambling websites. In August 2010 the police gave notice that it had rejected these claims and the orders forming the subject of the appeal were subsequently issued.

4.         Our decision in this appeal therefore relates to the legality of these orders. My colleague, Justice N. Sohlberg, found that there is a doubt regarding the locus standi of the Israeli Internet Association in this petition; and that there was no justification to declare the orders invalid because they were issued by the district commander without authority, as per the ruling of the District Court. Having read the comprehensive opinion by my colleague, and having considered the matter, I have concluded I cannot concur with the result that he reached. My conclusion precedes the analysis. As detailed below, in my view, section 229(a)(1) is short of authorizing the police to issue the relevant orders. In the first part of my remarks I will discuss the locus standi of the Israeli Internet Association. Next, I discuss the source for the claimed authority – section 229 of the Penal Law, and examine whether it sufficiently authorizes ordering the Internet providers to block access to gambling websites.

Locus Standi of the Public Petitioner

5.         The Israeli Internet Association is a non-profit organization that works to promote the Internet and its integration in Israel. The Association seeks to further the interests of Internet users. It has no self-interest beyond the interests it shares with the general public, or at least with significant parts thereof, and as such its petition is a “public petition”. As a rule, this Court’s jurisprudence has taken a permissive approach to standing rights of public petitioners (HCJ 5188/09 Association of Renovations Contractors for Restoration v. State of Israel  [13] para. 7.) Our firmly settled rule is that a public petition will be recognized where “the matter raised in the petition is of a public nature, which has a direct effect on advancing the rule of law and establishing policies to ensure its existence in practice” (HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [14] at p. 374; see also HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense [15], at 462-463). Who can serve as the public petitioner? It could be any one of many people aggrieved by a certain administrative act (HCJ 287/91 Kargal Ltd v. Investments Center Council [16] at p. 862), including any one who is unable to indicate a personal interest in the matter or harm caused to them personally (HCJ 651/03 Citizens Rights Bureau in Israel v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Sixteenth Knesset [11] at p.68)). The judicial policy on this issue was and still is influenced by fundamental value-based concepts about the role of judicial review in protecting the rule of law and supervising appropriate functioning of public administration. As such, the court should refrain from refusing the hear a person who claims that an administrative authority has violated the rule of law for the sole reason that they have no personal interest in the matter, given that this would lead to providing the authority with a stamp of approval to continue violating the rule of law (HCJ 962/02 Liran v. Attorney General [17] para. 14 (hereinafter: “Liran”). Yitzchack Zamir Administrative Power Vol.1 120-121 (2nd ed. 2010) (hereinafter: Zamir)). Along with broadening of the scope of standing rights, the principle that the court will not generally grant a public petition where there is a particular person or body who has a direct interest in the matter should be preserved, unless they themselves have failed to petition the court for relief in the matter concerning them (see Liran [17]). In the words of former Justice M. Cheshin in HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel-Aviv Municipality [18]: “…in a case of this kind we would tell the public petitioner seeking to claim the right of the individual injured: Why are you meddling in a quarrel which does not involve you? If the victim did not complain about the infringement that he suffered, why have you come to provoke dispute?” (ibid., p. 443).  

6.         My colleague Justice N. Sohlberg felt that the Internet Association was “meddling in a quarrel which does not involve it”. I do not share this position. In the case before us, the Internet Association has raised grave claims about the alleged overstepping of authority in issuing orders to Internet access providers. Our concern is with a first attempt to define the scope of the district commanders’ authorities under section 229 of the Penal Law, in terms of blocking access to Internet gambling websites. This is a fundamental question. It is undisputed that the administrative authority’s activity within the boundaries of its authority are central to maintaining the rule of law. This Court has already held that claims of exceeding of authority are categorized as claims that justify broadening standing rights, for “...a court takes a more lenient attitude to the right of standing of persons not directly and substantially harmed where it concerns exceeding authority of a tribunal or agency, or where it concerns an act committed unlawfully, as distinct from other cases” (per Justice Kister in HCJ 80/70 Elizur v. Broadcasting Authority [19] at p.649; compare HCJ 852/86 Aloni v. Minister of Justice  [20], at p.63).

7.         One of the underlying considerations in Justice N. Sohlberg’s position on the Internet Association’s standing was the concern that conducting a proceeding on the part of the Internet Association might mean that the court would not be presented with the required factual foundation.  While I do not deny this concern, it seems that it need not undermine the Association’s standing.  First, we may assume that had the Appellants who participated in the proceedings in the lower court wished to clarify any factual matter or otherwise, they would have done so. For example, consider the Appellant’s complaint that the trial court was not presented with a full description of the technological ability to order blocking access to the websites. Without making an iron clad determination on the question at this stage, it suffices to say that nothing prevented the Appellants themselves from presenting data on this point, to the extent that they disputed the factual infrastructure in the petition. Second, nothing prevents the public petitioner from presenting the necessary factual foundation. In this case, too, I do not find the legal foundation presented to the Court to have hindered judicial review. Consequently, in my view, there is no ground for us to intervene in the District Court’s ruling that the Internet Association has locus standi in this proceeding.

With this in mind we can proceed to the merits of the matter.

The Question of Authority

8. Section 229(a)(1) of the Penal Law, titled “Closure of Places” provides that “A district police commander of the Israel Police may order the closing of... a place for prohibited games or a place for the conduct of lotteries or gambling”. In section 224 of the Law, a “place of prohibited games” is defined as “premises in which prohibited games are habitually conducted, whether open to the public or only to certain persons; regardless of whether those premises are also used for some other purpose”. In order to determine that the orders directed at the access providers requiring them to block access to gambling websites, are within the authority detailed in section 229 of the Law, three interpretative moves are necessary. First, we must determined that a website fits the definition of “place” as defined by the law; second, that blocking access to the website is the equivalent of “closing” as defined in the Law; and third, that the access providers can be used to exercise such authority.

9.         I am prepared to assume, in line with my colleague Justice N. Sohlberg’s holding that a website could constitute a “place” as defined in different contexts in our legislation, and that an online gambling website may be viewed as a “place of prohibited games” as defined in section 229 of the Penal Law. In this regard, I tend to agree that a purposive interpretation of this legislation, in the spirit of the times and technological progress, may indeed lead us to the conclusion my colleague reached that section 229 of the Penal Law could be also applied to “the virtual world” (compare Assaf Hardoof Criminal Law for Internet Users: The Virtual Actus Reus, HaPraklit (forthcoming) (52) 67, 122-124 (2012) (hereinafter - Hardoof)).

10.       Regarding the infringement of free expression. Internet sites indeed serve for voicing opinions and exchanging ideas, but – as is well known – the law does not treat each and every expression similarly. Even had some of the gambling websites included pictures, explanations concerning the rules of different games, information about gambling relations, chat rooms, and others – this is content located at the periphery of the protected value. As such, even if blocking gambling websites may cause blocking access to lawful content, it must be remembered that the value of the “expression”, which we are asked to protect, is not high and that the extent of protection afforded corresponds to the extent of the interest in question (HCJ 606/93 Kiddum Yezumot v. Broadcasting Authority [21] at p. 28). Moreover, to the extent that it concerns the blocking concrete websites, it seems that the primary infringement relates to the website operators’ freedom of occupation. Our precedents have already held that this is an infringement that passes constitutional tests (Tishim Kadurim [3] at pp.814-815). However, despite this and though I am prepared to assume that the extent of the infringement of freedom of expression is limited, I think it important to note that I share the general approach of the District Court, that when dealing with the sensitive topic of blocking Internet websites, we should particularly scrutinize the concern for infringement of freedom of expression. With respect to gambling websites, and only to them, my opinion, as mentioned above, is that the infringement of free expression that resulted from blocking lawful content on the gambling websites, is of a limited degree, On the other hand, it is certainly possible that other cases will reache us in the future, where there may be reason to significantly broaden the scope of protection afforded to expressions displayed on any particular website. Each site has its own characteristics.

11.       Aadditionally, the sensitivity of the matter – blocking websites – has another aspect , given that the trial court also found that blocking illegal gambling websites could also block access to “innocent” sites which the order did not target.  An unintentional block may occur because a number of websites, not linked to each other, may be located on a server with the same address. Regarding this point, the trial court referred to Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert [31] 337, F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D Penn. 2004), in which the United States Federal Court struck down a law that enabled censorship of pedophile websites, among others because of the filtering of “innocent” websites. The Appellants, for their part, challenge this holding. They claim that from a technological perspective, the fear of blocking sites that are unconnected to gambling activity is negligible, because the access providers were requested to block websites based on the combination of the IP address and the website address (the URL). This combination of the IP address and the URL address, allegedly, minimizes any possibility of blocking innocent websites. Apparently, this point was not fully clarified because even after examining of the papers filed with the trial court, it is unclear whether it is technologically possible to block only “targeted” gambling websites, as alleged by the Appellant, or perhaps, technologically, it poses difficulties. If indeed, there is danger of blocking “innocent” websites, then this would clearly constitute a grave infringement of free expression and the right to access information – an infringement that would necessitate explicit statutory authorization as well as compliance with the limitations clause.

12.       Had the question of blocking “innocent” websites been the only difficulty arising from this case, it might have been appropriate to remand to the trial court for an in-depth examination of this issue. However, the central obstacle the Appellants face is fundamental and disconnected to the previous question, namely using a third party to execute an authority, without explicit statutory empowerment to do so. In my view, section 229 cannot be sourced to exercise the authority by giving an order directed at a third party – the Internet access providers. My colleague, Justice N. Sohlberg, found that restricting access to gambling websites through a third party does raise concerns, but in his view these difficulties do not negate the authority to do so. My view is different, and I will clarify my reasons.

13.       Our concern is with a district police commander who issued orders to the Internet access providers to block access to gambling sites. These are “personal orders” – in other words, orders directed at a particular person or entity, imposing a prohibition or a duty upon them. This is an individualized rule of conduct. This kind of order, like any administrative decision, requires a written statutory source (Zamir, at 284).  The question therefore is whether the district police commander is authorized to order the providers – a private body that is not accused of any offence – to perform various actions on behalf of the Israel Police, and to actually serve as its long arm. This authority, arguably, is found in section 229 of the Penal Law, which authorizes the district commander to order the “closure” of places used for gambling.  As mentioned, I accept that had law enforcement authorities been able to affect the closure of websites used for gambling criminalized under Israeli Law (for example by disconnecting the website from its connection to the Internet or by shutting down the server’s activity) there would be no question regarding authority.  However, in this case, the relevant websites were not actually “closed”. Instead, the district police commanders ordered third parties – the Internet access providers – to block access to those websites. The issue then becomes whether the powers granted by by section 229 support doing so.

14.       When a governmental authority is conferred with a power, according to settled case law, the authority must exercise this power itself. When the legislature specifies an authorized office holder, it is presumed the legislature wishes that particular office holder, and that alone, exercise it (HCJ 2303/90 Philipovitz v. Registrar of Companies [22] (hereinafter: Philipovitz), at p. 420; see also Daphne Barak-Erez Administrative Power, 178 -170 (hereinafter: Barak-Erez)). These comments are particularly true for criminal enforcement. In the absence of appropriate legislation, law enforcement authority cannot be given to those not part of the enforcement mechanism. Criminal enforcement authority is one of the classic authorities of the state. This authority enables the state to fulfill its responsibility to enforce criminal law through its own execution. It is the state that exercises the Government’s authority over the individual in the criminal proceeding. Therefore, the state – having established the behavioral norms and having been charged with their enforcement – is the entity directly responsible for caution and restraint required for exercising this power. It is the entity that is accountable to the public for the way it executes its powers (HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center for Law and Business v. Minister of Finance [23], para. 28 of former President D. Beinisch’s opinon and para. 14 of Justice A. Procaccia’s opinion.)

15.       By attempting to source the authority in section 229 of the Penal Law, the State maintains it is exercising the authority by itself, and that enlisting Internet access providers to block gambling websites is merely exercising auxiliary powers that administrative agency must employ in order to exercise its authority (section 17 of the Interpretation Law, 5741-1981). I cannot accept this construction. As well known, there is a distinction between delegating authority that includes exercise discretion regarding a particular authority, and receiving assistance in technical matters related to exercising the authority (Philipovitz [22] at p. 424). Whereas the authority is permitted to receive assistance from private bodies about technical aspects of fulfilling their task, there is also a presumption against delegating authority to private entities (AAA 6848/10 Erez v. Giva’ataim [24] para 18; HCJ 5031/10 Amutat Ir Amim v. Israel Nature and Parks Authority [25] para. 18). Here, the access providers were not required to exercise discretion regarding the websites to which access was to be blocked. As such, it could be argued on its face that the authority did not delegate power but only requested assistance in exercising it, and that such assistance is in principle permitted. However, where assistance is concerned, the first and foremost element to demonstrate is that the person or entity whose assistance is required consents to assisting the authority, regardless of whether consent is motivated by commercial and economic motives (compare to Philipovitz [22] at 415), or by voluntary motives. The most important thing is that the authority may receive assistance only from those seeking to offer assistance based on pure and genuine motives and after securing explicit consent. When the authority imposes a duty on a person or entity to perform any act, one can no longer speak of assistance. In our case, the Appellants claim that the expression “closing of a place for prohibited games” mentioned in the relevant section of the Penal Law, also contains the possibility of ordering closure of access routes to that place using auxiliary authority. This is not so. Our concern is with orders that compel a private body – the Internet access providers – to “assist” the authority. Consequently the argument that the providers are an entity that grants its services voluntarily must fail. This is doubly important when the orders themselves warned, in bold print, that failure to comply with the order could constitute an offence of breaching a statutory provision, an offense of assisting the conduct of prohibited games, and an offence of assisting to maintain a place for prohibited games (sections 287, 225, and 228 of the Penal Law, combined with section 31 thereof).

16.       Additionally, I wish to clarify that were there an explicit statutory authorization it could be possible to “impose a duty” and receive assistance from any person for the purpose of realize various legislative goals. Indeed, different pieces of legislation empower an authority to order a third party to assist it, even in the criminal context. For example, section 20 of the Criminal Procedure (Arrest and Search) Ordinance [New Version], 5729-1969 provides that every person must help a police officer to arrest any person whom they are authorized to arrest. In a matter close to our own, a similar arrangement exists: the Criminal Procedure (Powers of Enforcement-Communication Data), 5768-2007 (also known as the “Big Brother Law”) allows Israeli investigatory authorities to be assisted by “holder[s] of a Bezeq license” (as defined there) in order to receive communications data on Bezeq subscribers for various purposes, such as discovering and preventing offences (section 1 and section 3(2) of this law). The various Internet providers are among the companies that may be required to submit communications data (see in the matter of the “Big Brother” law, para.2). This affirmation however also implies the opposite. Imposing a duty, coupled with a sanction, requires legislative bases. Without explicit legislative authority, it is impossible to charge a private entity with performing actions for the authority (compare: Civ.App. 90868/00 (District-T.A.) Netvision Ltd. v. Israel Defense Force- Military Police, para.9 (22.6.2000); Crim.F. 40206/05 (District-T.A.) State of Israel v. Philosof para. 8 b) (5.2.2007)). We are thus left with the need for explicit lawful authorization. In our case however, the language of section 229 of the Penal Law does not contain so much as the slightest hint of an authorization to impose a duty on a third party. And for good reason. Such authorization involves complex matters of law and policy.  In 2008, when the Knesset deliberated over the legislative amendments that would confer authority to block access to gambling websites, representatives of the Minister of Justice (as well as representatives of the police) expressed reservations about conferring authority as stated, for various reasons which will not be addressed here. Today the position of the authorities – with the support from the Attorney General – is different. Of course, the authorities are not bound by their former position, but the only lawful way to confer the district commander with the authority to order a third party service provider, in my view, is an amendment to primary legislation (an amendment which, needless to say, would have to satisfy the limitations clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). Accordingly, the manner in which the orders were issued here deviated from the principle of administrative legality, which is a fundamental norm of administrative law. “This principle teaches that the power of the public authority flows from the powers conferred upon it by law and nothing else. It is the law that grants the license to act, and defines the boundaries of its scope. This is the ABC of administrative law” (Baruch Beracha, Administrative Law, Vol.1 35 (1987); CA 630/97 Local Committee for Planning and Building Nahariya v. Shir Hatzafon Construction Company Ltd [26], at pp. 403-404; HCJ 5394/92 Hoppert v.'Yad Vashem' Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority[27] at , 362 (1994);  HCJ 7368/06 Luxury Apartments Ltd v. Mayor of Yabneh [28], para. 33; see also HCJ 6824/07 Mana v  Taxation Authority[29]; HCJ 7455/05 Legal Forum for Land of Israel v. Israeli Government [30] at p. 910; Zamir, at 74-890; Barak-Erez at p. 97 and on). This is especially so in context of a mandatory authority, as anchored in the Penal law (see and compare Hardoof at p. 124).

17.       Could future legislation enable imposing the task of blocking gambling websites upon Internet access providers? An arrangement of this kind might take several forms. The legislature might determine that a court must grant such an order; it might grant the district police commanders – or any other authority – the authority to issue these orders, without petitioning a court (compare with “Big Brother” Law, para. 2). We assume that this legislation would also resolve additional concerns stemming from imposing the duty on access providers, while considering the costs likely involved in ensuring effective blocks, including the definition of access providers’ responsibility towards third parties, such as users and website owners whose access to them is blocked, and the like. In any event, it is clear that in our legal system the legislature is branch competent to consider the appropriate way to handle blocking access (Hardoof, ibid). Therefore we shall not jump the gun. We are not required at this point to pronounce on future legislation that has yet to be enacted and the details of remain unknown (and which, as mentioned, will also have to satisfy the limitations clause).

Other Legal Systems

18.       My colleague, Justice N. Sohlberg, found that restricting access to websites used for gambling is acceptable practice all over the world. Before we consider his comparative analysis, we should again note that the treatment of gambling in some countries is more lenient and as such no conclusive analogy can be drawn from the existing law in those countries to our legal system. On the merits of the matter, while certain countries receive assistance from Internet access providers to block gambling websites, as noted by my colleague, these are generally arrangements explicitly mandated by legislation, rather than acts designed to exercise general administrative powers. I will provide some examples.

19.       In the United States, gambling is regulated primarily at the state level rather than the federal level. There are significant differences between the various states in whether and how they view gambling and how they treat it. Federal legislation is therefore designed to assist states in enforcing local gambling laws where gambling activity extends beyond state-lines. Four primary pieces of federal legislation serve the authorities dealing with the gambling phenomenon: The first is the Federal Wire Act, of 1961 (18 U.S.C. §1084), which targets interstate gambling through linear communication. Though this law was enacted years before the Internet came into common use, and long before the online gambling became prevalent, this is legislation that authorities relied upon in the earlier days of the problem (see e.g. United States v. Cohen 260 F. 3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001)). The second act regulating the issue is the Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. §1955) that was passed to battle organized crime that used gambling businesses as a main source of income, and it regulates the criminal responsibility of owners of large gambling businesses. The third is the Travel Act of 1961 (18 U.S.C. §1952), which prohibits the use of mail and interstate travel and travel outside the United States for unlawful purposes, including illegal gambling. The forth piece of legislation is the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (31 U.S.C. §5361-67), which prohibits gambling businesses from knowingly receiving payment linked to one’s participation in online gambling. It is interesting to note that law enforcement authorities occasionally found it difficult to rely on old statutes to receive Internet access providers’ assistance in closing gambling websites. Hence, for example, in April 2009 authorities in Minnesota instructed Internet service providers to block state residents’ access to 200 online gambling sites – an instruction given under the Federal Wire Act. However, this was challenged in court based on the argument that this act is inconsistent with the First Amendment’s protections for freedom of expression, and with the Commerce Clause (Edward Morse, Survey of Significant Developments in Internet Gambling, 65 Bus. Law, 309, 315 (2009)). In response, the Minnesota enforcement authorities withdrew the orders issues to the access providers (Lindo J. Shorey, Anthony R. Holtzman, Survey of Significant Developments in Internet Gambling 66 Bus. Law. 252 (2010)  

20.       In Australia, the Australian Communications and Media Authority’s power to order providers to block access to illegal gambling sites is regulated in detail in the “Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (sections 24-31) and in the regulatory code enacted under it (Interactive Gambling Industry Code (December 2001)). In Italy, a state my colleague referred to in his opinion, authorities’ authorization to order access providers to block illegal gambling sites is also set in legislation. Section 50(1) of Law No. 296 of 27 December 2006 (the Budget Law for 2007) established the authority of AAMS (Amministrazione Autonoma dei Monopoli di Stato), an organ of the Italian Ministry of Finance, to instruct, in an order to the communications bodies, to take measures toward removing illegal gambling websites, while setting an administrative fine of €30,000-80,000 for any breach by the communication providers. Under this law, Administrative Order No. 1034/CGV of 2 January 2007 was issued. It details the manner of exercising the power. According to the AAMS data, as of October 2010, 24000 websites were included in the “black list”. Every month hundreds of websites are added.

21.       Therefore we must conclude that even were there countries around the world that recognize the possibility of assistance from Internet access providers in blocking illegal gambling websites – this possibility is authorized there in explicit legislation. Where the subject was not regulated in explicit legislation, questions s about the power of the authorities to do so were raised in various countries, for reasons similar to those given by the District Court.

Afterword

 22.  Before concluding I would like to respond briefly to my colleague Justice N. Sohlberg’s comment regarding my position (para. 56 of his opinion). I wish to clarify that the thrust of my opinion does not turn on the interest of the access providers and the question of their concrete consent to blocking the websites. The conclusion I reached is based on the rule that an authority can only act within the boundaries of the powers the law conferred upon it, and that when exercising police powers the strict application of this rule is especially important. I would point out that I do not accept, as a given, my colleague’s assumption that a third party can be compelled to become “the long arm” of the police without its consent. Take a situation in which the reception clerk of a hotel (an example my colleague provides) fears a confrontation with criminal elements and has no interest in coming into contact with them. Would it also be possible then to compel the clerk to close the room? In my view this question is not free of doubt, but regardless, this we are required to rule on this question. In our case the totality of the circumstances that I presented and the sensitivity of the material discussed, in my view, lead to the conclusion that the existing authorization lacks the power necessary for exercising the alleged authority. 

Epilogue

I have reached the conclusion that section 229 of the Criminal Law does not authorize a district police chief to issue orders directed at Internet access providers, ordering them to block access to gambling websites. In my view, this requires express statutory authorization and the current arrangement is insufficient, because it does not contain authorization to order a third party to assist the enforcement authorities in exercising the power.

            For this reason, were my opinion to be followed, I would dismiss the appeal against the decision of the Administrative Affairs Court and would order the Appellants to pay the Respondents’ attorneys fee, for the sum of NIS 25,000.

 

                                                                                                Justice

 

President A. Grunis

My colleagues, N. Sohlberg and U. Vogelman are in dispute both about the preliminary issue of the locus standi of the Appellant and about the substantive issue of the district police commander’s authority. Regarding the first matter I see no reason to express a position. My colleague, Justice N. Sohlberg who addressed the position that the Appellant had no locus standi in the Administrative Affairs Court, analyzed the substantive issue, and concluded that it would not be proper to allow the appeal based on the preliminary issue without having considered the legality of the orders issued by the district police commanders. Under these circumstances I agree that it is appropriate to address the issue on its merits. Regarding the substantive issue, I concur with Justice U. Vogelman. That is to say, that I agree that the district commanders of the Israel Police do not currently have the authority to issue orders to Internet access providers to block access to gambling websites. The solution lies with the legislature.

 

                                                                                                            The President

 

It was decided by a majority opinion (President A. Grunis and Justice U. Vogelman) against Justice N. Sohlberg’s dissent, to dismiss the appeal, and to order the Appellants to pay the Respondent’s attorneys fees in the sum of NIS 25,000.

 

Handed down today 13th Nissan 5773 (24 March 2013).

 

 

 

[1]  Justice Sohlberg goes on to cite an anonymous poem about the many evils of gambling. See original Hebrew version of decision.

[2]  Rabbi Yitzchak, abbreviated at R”I – was one of the Baalei Tosafot- 11th-12th century Talmudic commentators [Translator]

[3] Talmudic term for indirect damage for which liability may be incurred – Translator.

[4] Lottery and games organization in Israel, proceeds of which go to public causes.

Eitanit Construction Products v. State

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 6971/11
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, April 2, 2013
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

This is a motion challenging the constitutionality of section 74 of the Prevention of Hazards from Asbestos and Harmful Dust Act, 2011 (“Asbestos Act”). The motion is directed primarily at the obligation of the moving party (“Eitanit”), an asbestos-cement factory in the Nahariya area, to shoulder the cost of half the project’s expenses, up to NIS 150m.

 

The High Court of Justice (written by Justice Hendel, and with Chief Justice Grunis and Justice Zylbertal concurring) dismissed the motion and ruled that section 74 of the Asbestos Act infringes on Eitanit’s right to property but does not discriminate against it. The Court held that section 74 applies only to industrial waste that is a result of Eitanit’s factory work processes. Since Eitanit’s right to property was infringed, the High Court of Justice only addressed the issue of whether the infringement was acceptable under the limitation clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The High Court of Justice relied heavily on comparative law, because, among other considerations, this is a new legal issue with an obviously universal aspect, and because no aspects unique to Israel were demonstrated. Additionally, the High Court of Justice emphasized that this was a matter of judicial review, rather than administrative review, which impacts the extent of permissible discretion by the Knesset.

 

The High Court of Justice clarified that the source of rights infringement is primary legislation, that is, a statute that was enacted by the Knesset in a proper procedure. The Court rejected Eitanit’s claim that this is not a “statute” in terms of the limitation clause because it is a specific, personal statute. It is a formalistic test, which inquires mainly whether the infringement upon basic rights was done in or by authorization of primary legislation. Here, the answer was in the affirmative. The High Court of Justice found that the purpose of section 74 of the Act was to launch a project to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. This is a worthy and important purpose, which fits the values of the State of Israel. The High Court of Justice was prepared to assume that a secondary purpose of the Asbestos Act was realizing the principle of “the polluter should pay” and found this, too, to be a worthy and appropriate purpose.

 

The High Court of Justice addressed whether the means identified in section 74 of the Asbestos Act was proportionate. First, the High Court of Justice examined the rational connection, considering both purposes, and held that for both there is a fit between the means and the purpose. As to whether these were the least restrictive means, the High Court of Justice found that the option of “self implementation” that Eitanit proposed would not realize the purpose of section 74. Additionally, the Court found that the mechanism the legislature chose includes checks and balances that minimize the harm for Eitanit. As for the narrow proportionality test, the Court held that section 74 of the Act does not specifically target Eitanit, but the focus on Eitanit is a result of the reality caused by Eitanit itself.

 

On the issue of strict liability, the Court ruled that although it is a problematic and harsh regime, three considerations reduce its difficulty: considerations of justice and fairness, deterrence and assuming costs, the evidentiary difficulty in fault-based liability systems; support for strict liability in many countries around the world; and a certain dimension of Eitanit’s factual awareness regarding asbestos harms. The High Court of Justice found the Asbestos Act is one of narrow active application. It applies for an existing situation, but this is no ordinary active application: all the factual elements have existed in the past, and section 74 does not apply to the future. It was also found that had the Act been completely applicable retroactively, that would not have been determinative, but rather another factor in the constitutional balance. The Court found three mitigating factors: the element of expectation or knowledge of risk, the scope of the danger, and the rise in many countries’ support for retroactive liability. In summary, the Court ruled that, although the infringement of Eitanit’s rights should not be disregarded and the legislature created a new landscape, the infringement passes constitutional muster under the tests set in the limitations clause. 

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Full text of the opinion: 

 

In the Supreme Court as High Court of Justice

 

HCJ 6971/11

 

Before:                                    The Honorable President A. Grunis

                                    His Honor Justice N. Hendel

                                    His Honor Justice Z. Zylbertal

 

The Petitioner

 

                                    1.         Eitanit Construction Products Ltd.

 

                                    v.

 

The Respondents:

 

                                    1.         The State of Israel

                                    2.         The Knesset

                                    3.         Minister of Environmental Protection

                                    4.         Minister of the Treasury

5.         Mate Asher Municipality

                                    6.         Israel Union for Environmental Defense

                                    7.         Association for Quality of Life and the Environment in

Nahariya

 

                                    Petition for Temporary Injunction and Interim Order

 

Date of session:           23th Elul 5772; October 9, 2012

 

                                    Adv. Pinchas Rubin

                                    For the Petitioner

 

                                    Adv. Sharon Rotanshker

                                    For Respondents 1, 3-4

 

                                    Adv. Avital Semplinski

                                    For the Second Respondent

 

                                    Adv. Eitan Maimoni

                                    For the Fifth Respondent

 

                                    Adv. Keren Halperin-Mosseri

                                    For the Sixth Respondent

 

                                    Adv. Moshe Goldblat

                                    For the Seventh Respondent

 

 

 

 

Judgment

 

Justice N. Hendel

1.A petition against the constitutionality of section 74 of the Prevention of Hazards from Asbestos and Harmful Dust Act, 2011 (“Asbestos Act”) is before us. This section declares the launch of a project to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee (“The Project”). The petition objects primarily to the requirement that the Petitioner, Eitanit Construction Products Ltd. (“Eitanit”), to shoulder half of the expenses of the project, up to NIS 150m.

General Background – Asbestos:

2.Asbestos is an umbrella term for a group of fiber minerals, with high insulation and resilience properties. Because of these qualities, for hundreds of years asbestos has been widely used for industrial purposes, such as producing protective gloves and other gear, acoustic insulation boards and more.

Currently, it is known that crisp asbestos, that is: asbestos in ground or powder state, is a dangerous substance that may cause cancer. Crisp asbestos releases tiny fibers into the air, which enter the respiratory system and harm lung tissue. Among the first diseases recognized as linked to asbestos was asbestositis: the shrinking and scarring of lung tissue, which causes shortage of breath and a decline in lung functions. Another disease is mesothelioma: a cancerous tumor that harms the lungs, heart and abdomen.

The petition before us, as will be explained below, deals with a material called asbestos-cement. It is a compound made of approximately 10% asbestos and 90% cement, in hard from. Out of this asbestos-cement mixture products such as pipes and boards may be manufactured. As long as the asbestos-cement remains in hard from, the asbestos fibers are contained in the cement. This may change when the asbestos cement – or the product manufactured from asbestos-cement – is eroded, cracked or broken, then the dangerous asbestos fibers are released into the air.

Awareness of the dangers of asbestos has grown over time. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, information about the prevalence of asbstositis among workers exposed to asbestos has accumulated. Later reports proliferated about different cancers among asbestos workers. In 1976, after a comprehensive examination of the scientific material, the International Agency for Research of Cancer (IARC) recognized asbestos as a substance certain to cause cancer in humans (Class I). Additional research indicated that health risks were caused not only to asbestos workers but to those who live in close proximity to asbestos mines, as well as family members of asbestos workers (generally, for an updated review of asbestos risks by IRAC, see Monographs.iarc.fr/ENG/Monographs/vol100C/mono100C-11.pdf)

The Petitioners and the Asbestos Industry

3.In 1952 Eitanit set up an asbestos-cement factory in the Nahariya area (“the factory”). Work in the factory included two stages: in the first stage, the factory imported raw asbestos to Israel and made asbestos-cement out of it. In the second stage, final asbestos-cement products, such as pipes and boards, were manufactured. The factory was closed in 1997.

Over the years, and during production processes, a significant amount of industrial asbestos waste was amassed in the factory (“the waste”). Eitanit disposed of the waste in two ways: one, it sold or gave away the waste to third parties, which I will refer to as end users, that used the waste primarily for surfacing, for instance to pave roads or parking lots. Second, Eitanit buried the waste in the ground. The first method of removing the waste – that is, selling or giving it away, probably stopped around the late 70’s.

In any event, the waste was distributed in dozens of locations around the Western Galilee. Both the waste that was buried and the waste that was used for surfacing risks area residents’ health to this day. The waste is partly crumbled, causing asbestos fibers to be released into the air. Additionally, the daily use of the surfaces which were covered with asbestos uncovers masses of crisp asbestos and create a health hazard. Surveys commissioned by the State revealed that the asbestos waste distributed in the Western Galilee amounts to about 30,000 cubed meters and the State evaluates that the clean soil that was polluted by this waste amounts to about 150,000 cubed meters The Petitioner, however, believes that the ratio between the waste and the polluted soil is 1:3, not 1:5.

The Previous Proceedings Regarding the Petitioner:

4.The petition before us deals, as mentioned, with a project to remove asbestos waste that arguably came from Eitanit’s factory. But this is not the first round of proceedings on this matter between Eitanit and State authorities.

As some point, Eitanit began to remove some of the asbestos waste to a site within Shlomi municipality (Hanita mine), without permit or license to do so. In 1981 the Ministry of Health demanded Eitanit cease from this practice and the site was closed. Consequently, Eitanit buried waste at the Sheikh Danon site, also without permit or license. In March 2002 the Ministry of Environmental Protection (“the Ministry”) issued conditions for temporary permits that would allow restoring the site at Sheikh Danon. In a petition by Eitanit against the Ministry, which was dismissed, the court pointed out that the demand to require Eitanit shoulder the cost of the site’s restoration is “natural and obvious” (AP 589/02). Ultimately, in 2003, after additional legal proceedings, the Sheikh Danon site also closed.

In 1998, after the factory was shut down, the City of Nahariya initiated a project to build an amusement park called “The Children’s Land.” The park was meant to be located on the beach, adjacent to the closed factory. When it was revealed that the area was polluted with asbestos, the Ministry issued a decree to preserve cleanliness, according to section 13b of the Maintenance of Cleanliness Act 1984. The City of Nahariya announced it would clean the area from asbestos, and consequently sued Eitanit for reimbursement of costs. In 2007 the dispute between the City and Eitanit regarding that area was settled.

In 2005 the Minister of Environmental Protection (the Minister) met with representatives of Eitanit and of the City, in an attempt to reach an agreement for co-funding asbestos waste removal from the Western Galilee. The attempt failed. In May 2007 negotiations between the parties resumed. Eitanit proposed, among others, that it remove the waste on its own. In November 2008, the Ministry notified Eitanit of a decision that the State would no longer facilitate a mutual agreement.

In December 2008 the Asbestos Act memorandum was distributed. The Act aimed to resolve a whole host of environmental issues around asbestos hazards in Israel. Among others, the Act included a specific section that addressed the project of removing asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. This is section 59 of the bill, which eventually became section 74 of the final Act and is the section at the center of this petition. We will address the Act and the section in further depth. Briefly, the section required Eitanit to fund half the project to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. In 2009 the bill passed its first reading, and was referred to the Interior Committee and the Environmental Protection Committee. Eitanit’s representatives attended the committee’s meetings, and presented their arguments against the proposed arrangement. In March 2011, the bill passed its second and third readings.

Simultaneously, the Ministry published a tender to select a corporation that would manage the removal project. Negotiations were conducted with Eitanit, along with others, and in December 2009, it proposed participating in the project at the cost of NIS 10m, a sum that was later updated to NIS 15m. There were big gaps between parties regarding calculating costs, including due to different estimations of the amount of soil polluted and of the cost of removal. In November 2010, when the negotiation was complete, the Ministry of the Treasury notified Eitanit that its financial proposal for the project was rejected and Eitanit responded by withdrawing the proposal altogether.

In June 2011, after the Act’s publication, Eitanit complained to the Minister of Environmental Protection that section 74 creates extraordinarily important constitutional problems. It suggested the Minister institute regulations that would prevent, or at least reduce, the infringement of Eitanit’s rights. In response, the Minister emphasized that the constitutional issues were already discussed comprehensively and thoroughly before the bill passed. Later, in August 2011, the Minister provided Eitanit with a draft of instructions for implementing section 74 for its review. The draft did not satisfy Eitanit, and correspondence between the parties continued. Eventually, in September 2011, the Minister signed the final version of the instructions. Once Eitanit concluded it had exhausted the proceedings to temper section 74, without a satisfactory minimization of its harm, it filed the petition before us.

On the Prevention of Hazards from Asbestos and Harmful Dust Act (Asbestos Act)

5.The Asbestos Act was designed to reduce the environmental and health hazards caused by asbestos or by other harmful dusts. The purpose is ensuring an adequate environment under the principle of preventative care and the improvement of quality of life and the environment (section 1).

The Act expressly prohibits manufacture, import, possession and use of asbestos in any way and for any purpose, unless permitted by the Act (section 3). The Act regulates the continual use of existing asbestos in public places and factories (sections 4-8). The Act prohibits anyone from creating an asbestos hazard, that is: causing the existence of asbestos fibers in the air, and requires the creator of the hazard to remove it at their own expense (sections 10-11). The Act also regulates methods for handling asbestos, including the granting of licenses and working with asbestos (chapters E-F). There is also an option to apply several of the Act’s provisions to other materials that may be defined as harmful dust (section 71).

Section 74 was designated to address the asbestos hazards in the Western Galilee. This is the section the petition before us focuses on. The language of the section is as follows:

“(a)            In this section –

“the project to remove asbestos from the Western Galilee” – a project to locate, remove, and bury asbestos waste which originated from a factory for asbestos manufacture in the Western Galilee, which was buried or distributed in a radius of up to 15 KM from the factory, except for land owned by asbestos companies, at an extent and measures instructed by the Minister in consultation with the Minister of the Treasury, and as it pertains to the funding aspects of the project, with the consent of the Minister of the Treasury;

“Asbestos Companies” – companies that manufactured asbestos in the Western Galilee prior to the day this Act came into effect.

(b)              The project of asbestos removal from the Western Galilee will be funded through the State budget, payments from asbestos companies, and payments from local authorities within whose jurisdiction the project will take place (“local authorities”).

(c)              A separate account will be managed in a trust to preserve cleanliness and will be used to fund costs, direct or indirect, of the project for asbestos removal from the Western Galilee (in this section – “the separate account”).

(d)             The Minister, with the Minister of the Treasury’s consent, after providing the local authorities and the asbestos companies the opportunity to present their arguments, will order the sums that the local authorities and the asbestos companies will transfer into the separate account and the schedule for payments, as long as the entire sum from asbestos companies will be equal to the entire sum from the state budget and the local authorities combined. However, the entire sum from the asbestos companies may not exceed NIS 150m.

(e)              While setting payment sums and schedules according to section (d), the Minister will consider, among others, the scope of the state budget dedicated to funding the project generally, the sums already actually expended, and regarding local authorities – the identity of property rights holders in the land where asbestos is found, the use of these lands and the extent of the authorities’ responsibility over them, as well as the local authorities financial state.

In other words, a project for the removal of asbestos waste from Eitanit’s factory that was buried or distributed in a radius of up to 15 KM from the factory would be launched. In this regard “asbestos waste” includes asbestos that was broken, cracked or fractured, or broken as well as asbestos that is unused (as defined in section 2). It should be noted that the statute does not explicitly mention Eitanit’s name, but instead uses general language – “asbestos companies” and “a factory for asbestos manufacture”. Still, as will be clarified below, there is no dispute that the statute in effect targets only Eitanit and its factory; it is the only company in the Western Galilee area that manufactured asbestos.

The project would be funded from three budgetary sources: the State, the local authorities in whose jurisdiction the project will take place, and Eitanit (who, as mentioned, is not explicitly mentioned by name in the section.) The Minister will establish the extent and process of the project. Additionally, the Minister will set the sums that the local authorities and that Eitanit will transfer, once their arguments are heard. Setting the amounts of participation is subject to two restrictions. First, the sum that Eitanit transfers will be equal to the total sum the State and the local authorities transfer, combined. Second, the sum Eitanit transfers must not exceed NIS 150m.

In September 2011 the Minister signed the implementation instructions. They stipulate that the project will take five years, and will be executed by a managing company chosen by tender. A local authority’s participation will be calculated as 10% of the removal cost, through equally valuable operations, including restoration. To set the sums required from Eitanit, the company will receive itemized reports of expenses every three months, along with a detailed report of the sites where the removal was done and the amount of waste removed. Eitanit will have 30 days to respond to each bill (annexure 20 to the State’s responding papers.)

The Parties’ Arguments

6.Eitanit claims, in essence, that section 74 infringes its right to property and rights to equality, without passing the conditions of the limitations clause.

The infringement on property rights manifests in the very imposition of financial burdens, exacerbated by the severe and retroactive responsibility without demonstrating fault or liability. The infringement of equality was caused by discriminating against Eitanit compared to others – asbestos importers, end users and future polluters – who have been partially or fully absolved from any liability regarding asbestos waste.

The infringement of property and equality does not pass, as the argument goes, the tests set by the limitations clause. It is not an infringement or restriction by statute, as this is personal legislation. It is not for a worthy purpose that befits the values of the State of Israel, as Eitanit was retroactively tainted as a lawbreaker without evidence it actually did pollute the land. And finally, the infringement is not proportional: the statute does not advance the end of channeling the conduct of offenders or to deter them, so that there is no rational connection between the ends and the selected means. Other less restrictive means were available, for instance: allowing Eitanit to execute the project on its own or valuing its participation in funding the project according to the extent of its liability. In any case, the benefits of this section are minimized compared to the harms caused to Eitanit.

Ultimately, Eitanit asks we void section 74. Alternatively, it suggests other remedies, in the following order of preference: directing the Minister to set regulations that would de facto release Eitanit from the mandates of section 74, allowing more proportional means (such as paving paths or performing other aspects of the project by Eitanit), directing the Minister to hold a proceeding where Eitanit could be heard and the Minister would be able to consider the extent of its liability regarding the entire area effected by the project.

7.The State emphasizes that section 74 is designed to apply only to industrial waste that resulted from Eitanit’s factory’s operations. It does not apply to complete asbestos-cement products that were purchased by end users and then disassembled and discarded, but only to the waste that Eitanit produced.

The State is willing to assume that the statute infringes upon Eitanit’s property rights. However it disputes the infringement to the right to property: it raises misgivings as to whether the right to equality should apply to corporations, and argues that in any case Eitanit’s right to equality was not infringed here as there is a relevant difference between Eitanit and the other entities it had identified.

The State continued its constitutional analysis on this foundation. The infringement is by statute, albeit personal legislation. The infringement is for a worthy purpose – the removal of serious environmental hazard in the Western Galilee. The statute relies on the principle of “the polluter must pay” that derives from rationales as efficiency, deterrence, and justice. As for the issue of proportionality, there is an obvious connection between the ends – cleaning the Galilee from asbestos waste, and the means – launching the project. The mean selected is mild, as Eitanit shoulders only about half of the project’s cost, and in any case no more than NIS 150m. The proposal that Eitanit itself will clear the land was discussed between the parties for a long period of time, but turned out to be impractical and ineffective. Finally, the benefit derived from the statute (eliminating proven health risks) far outweighs the harm caused to Eitanit, if any.

8.Many of the sites intended for waste removal are located within the territory of the local authority of Mate Asher, the Fifth Respondent. In its response to the petition, the local authority emphasized that Eitanit turned a substantial profit from selling asbestos-cement waste, though it knew in real time, or at the very least should have known – about the dangerous outcomes of asbestos exposure. The local authority additionally notes that the basic rights on which Eitanit hangs its hat, if any, should yield to the rights to life and to bodily integrity of those actually and potentially harmed by asbestos.

The Sixth and Seventh Respondents are public non-governmental organizations active in environmental preservation and protection. They reiterate that the statute was born out of all the failed attempts to consensually address Eitanit’s financial liability. In this regard, the Respondents refer to the principle of extended producer responsibility (EPR), which would have manufacturers responsible for their products’ environmental impact during the entire life cycle of the product. This principle is applied in different contexts in many of the OECD states, an organization of which Israel is now a member.

9.To paint a complete picture, we should note that on October 9, 2012 a hearing was held for this petition. At the end of the hearing we ordered the parties to notify the Court, within 60 days, whether a settlement was possible. On November 16, 2012, the Respondents notified the Court that they believe any arrangement different to that which the legislature mandated in section 74 would be inappropriate. We must therefore rule on this petition.

It should also be noted that Ms. Ayelet Bruner has moved to join as respondent. As the motion explains, her husband – a resident of Kibbutz Kabri, which is adjacent to the factory – died of mesothelioma due to asbestos dust exposure, and Ms. Bruner has therefore filed a tort suit against Eitanit and the State. Ms. Bruner argues that she holds additional evidence that Eitanit and the State notified here at the relevant times about the risks of asbestos. Under the circumstances her arguments were included, explicitly or implicitly, in the other parties’ arguments, and thus we do not believe it appropriate to formally join her to the petition.

Discussion and Ruling

I. Comparative Law

10.The issue before us is universal. It stems from the connection between humanity and the land. In more detail, it is a result of the conflict between humanity’s desire to control the environment and the cost of this progress.

The dialectics that arise because of humanity’s ambition to develop and evolve is addressed in Jewish law, and is timeless. Its roots can be found in the first human himself. In the Book of Genesis, man is commanded: “be fruitful and multiply and inherit the earth” (Genesis 1, 28). In his monumental manifest, “The Lonely Man of Faith,” written almost 50 years ago, Rabbi Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik mentions that in the beginning of the Book of Genesis there are two descriptions of the creation of man to emphasize his two facets. The first man, described in chapter 1 of Genesis, about whom it was said that he was “created in God’s image” (Genesis, 1, 27), is creative. “He engages in creative work, trying to imitate his Maker … In doing all this, Adam the first is trying to carry out the mandate … "to fill the earth and subdue it." … man’s dignity, manifested in man’s awareness of his responsibility and ability to fulfill his duty, cannot be realized as long as he does not control his surroundings… there is no dignity without responsibility, and one cannot shoulder responsibility as long as one cannot fulfill the commitments involved… we have obtained the following triple equation: human dignity-responsibility-majesty.” (The Lonely Man of Faith, J.B. Soloveitchik, Tradition Magazine (summer 1965), Rabbinical Council of America. Hebrew translation by Mossad HaRav Kook Publishing, 8th edition, 2002, pp. 13-18.) Control over the environment – a mixed blessing. In conquering nature, humanity is impressive in its creativity and progression from one generation to the next. However, its comprehension is limited. Humanity cannot know, at the same time it controls the environment, what toll this “progress” may take.

Jewish law was even sensitive to this aspect. The rule is – do not destroy (Talmudic Encyclopedia, volume 3, under “do not destroy”, in Hebrew – “Bal Tashchit”.) Originally, the prohibition is on destroying fruit-bearing trees during a wartime siege: “should you siege a city many days in order to fight and conquer, you shall not destroy its trees.” (Leviticus 20, 19-20). However, Jewish law’s sages interpreted the prohibition broadly. The Book of Education (=Sefer ha-Chinnuch), that summarizes all 613 commandments (authored in the 13th century, likely by Rav Aharon Levi of Barcelona), explains the reasons and application of this commandment:

“The root of the commandment is known to be teaching us to love good and utility and stick to it, and in turn good will stick to us and we will distance from all evil and destruction. It is a way of the pious and men of action, peace lovers, those who rejoice in the good of people and bring them closer to the Torah, who will lose not even a mustard seed, and will grieve any loss or destruction that they come across, and if they could they would rescue anything from ruin with all their might.” (Torah portion of “Judges” [=Shoftim].)

Rav Shneor Zalman of Lyadi, (founder of Chabad Russia in the 18th century) believes the “do not destroy” prohibition applies even to the abandoned:

“Just as one must be careful of loss, damage or harm to one’s body, so must he be careful of loss, damage or harm to his funds. And anyone who breaks tools or clothes or demolishes a building or clogs a pool or discards food or spoils anything else that should be enjoyed by people is violating the commandment ‘do not destroy’… even if abandoned.” (Shulchan Aruch Harav, Choshen Mishpat…)

Therefore the matter is not preserving the property rights of others in the private sense, but of the environment as a right to property.

The above functions as normative background to the issue at hand. In recent years, all around the world, countries have been required to face different dilemmas regarding the environment. A significant portion of these dilemmas incorporates legal, economical and moral aspects, among others. Among these, the removal of polluting waste – the issue at the core of this petition – is a matter that carries real weight. Asbestos, specifically, has proven to be a strong, efficient material, with many uses. Over time, its harm was discovered to tremendously outweigh its utility.

Since the 20th century, different countries have faced the problem of cleaning the environment from asbestos, determining who must shoulder the burden of implementing and funding the task. Therefore, I found it fit to turn to the relevant legal framework in several key countries overseas. Of course, we should not automatically apply those here. But because of the universal character of the issue before us, I believe there are benefits to paying attention to legal trends in the world. It should be noted, before presenting the legal situation in other countries, that the legislation I mention applies to asbestos as part of a broader group of polluting or dangerous materials.

11.In 1980 the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was passed in order to address environmental hazards. CERCLA was designed to regulate the removal of polluting materials from dangerous waste sites that were abandoned or stopped operating. It places the obligation to fund the cleaning process on the creator of the hazard (see Karen S. Danahy, CERCLA Retroactive Liability in the Aftermath of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 48 B 509, 530 (2000)). Below we focus on two elements of CERCLA that are particularly pertinent to the case at hand: strict liability and retroactivity.

The case law has found CERCLA to establish strict liability. There is no question whether, and to what extent the hazard creator violated its duty of reasonable care or is in any way blameworthy for the risk it created. Therefore the creator of the hazard will be liable even without proof that a duty of care was not fulfilled (Alexandra Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 Wake Forrest L. Rev. 903 (2004) and see Israel Gilad, Tort Law – Liability’s Limits, 1190 B.H.S. 167 (2012), which addresses the distinction between strict liability and absolute liability, where the latter “is not subject to any defenses.”) Although the principle of strict liability was not written explicitly into CERCLA, the case law found that the legislative history – including minutes from committees and general discussions in the House of Representative and Congress – reveal this was the legislature’s intent (see New York v. Shore Reality Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2nd Cir. 1985); General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys. Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990); Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. V. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 608 (2009)).

The strict liability standard did not appear out of nowhere. At common law, strict liability is a prevalent standard for particularly dangerous tortuous activity. A British judgment from the 19th century, Rylands v. Fletcher, considered a water reservoir that exploded and flooded a neighboring coalmine (Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)). The House of Lords held the defendant liable, though no negligence by him was proven, because the reservoir was found to be “likely to do mischief if it escapes.” Nowadays, the second and third Restatement of Torts notes that whoever conducts abnormally dangerous activity will be liable for damages resulting from that activity, even if maximal precautions were taken (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(1) (1977); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 20 (2010)). This is the historical-legal foundation from which CRECLA’s strict liability standard stems.

Based on the legislative history, the case law and the scholarship presented about CERCLA, another reason for strict liability arises: conventional legal methods have failed to combat the occurrence of polluting waste. This reason, which is rooted in the legal realism school of thought, has helped to shape legal policy. Among other considerations in favor of placing strict liability are reasons of justice: in the absence of blameworthiness, it is justified to place a risk on the party who created that risk and has financially benefited from it (Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. Enntl. Aff. L. Rev. 579 (1993)). While the legislation has been opposed for placing liability without fault, the position that allocating costs to the polluter was found to outweigh placing those costs on all of society. This was also due to the link between the polluter and harm, both in terms of creating that harm and in terms of profiting from it.

From another perspective, one might ask what is the economic benefit in placing liability without fault? Where is the deterrence in this? The answer is in the distinction between cost internalization and cost externalization. Under this theory, whoever handles material that pollutes or is likely to pollute should consider the possibility of strict liability. To reduce potential future costs, such party would initiate from the get-go research and experimental activity the produce a more cost-effective and environmentally friendly product, or at least one that has less potential for harm. The polluting party, who has expertise and capabilities, is in a better position to take such preventive measures. Under this approach, it is strict liability that creates deterrence (for more, see Mark Wilde, Civil Liability for Environmental Damage: A Comparative Analysis of Law and Policy in Europe and the United States (2002); Lucas Bergkamp, Liability and Environment: Private and Public Law Aspects of Civil Liability for Environmental Harm in an International Context (2001)).

As mentioned, CERCLA imposes liability even on whoever produced and distributed dangerous materials before the legislation’s enactment, though this activity was permissible at the time. CERCLA had to face facts already on the ground. In this context, too, the American statute did not explicitly create retroactive liability. American law, it should be reiterated, includes a rebuttable presumption that legislation does not apply retroactively, unless the legislative intent was clearly different (Landsgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). However, the case law recognized CERCLA’s retroactive application, realizing this was clearly the legislative intent. It was understood from the statute’s language, its history and the payment mechanisms it established (U.S. v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); U.S. v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997)).

CERCLA’s retroactive application survived judicial review. The case law held that this aspect of the statute did not violate due process, because of its rational and legitimate purpose to clear sites that are no longer in operation of their dangerous waste. Additionally, the legislation was not arbitrary or irrational because it burdened the entity that polluted and profited from that pollution (U.S. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986)). The case law found that without retroactive application achieving the legislation’s purpose – cleaning existing waste – is impossible. We should note the similarities between these tests to those in Israeli law’s limitation clause.

12.In 2004, a directive was passed by the European Union (“EU”) regarding the liability for environmental harms: Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage (ELD). The core principle of the directive is “the polluter must pay” – whoever caused environmental harm through their actions must shoulder the financial consequences.

The ELD’s instructions do not require EU member states to set retroactive application. Put differently: liability applies to environmental damage even if it occurred before the statutory prohibition came into effect. As to the scope of liability, the ELD directive distinguishes between categories. The first is that of strict liability and it applies to harm caused by dangerous activities listed in the directive’s third appendix. The second category is of fault-based liability, and it applies to all other activity that may have caused harm to nature reserves or protected animal species. Notably, earlier versions of the directive expressed support for broader application of strict liability. In 1993 the Commission issued a “green document”, a non-binding working paper of sorts, that detailed the justifications for a strict liability standard for environmental damage (Commission Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage (COM 1993) 47 final (May 14, 1993)). Consequently a semi-binding principles document, a “White Paper” was issued in 2000 (Commission White Paper on Environmental Liability (COM 2000) 66 final (Feb. 9, 2000)). This document discussed at length the evidentiary challenges of a fault-based standard, which may be resolved by a strict liability standard, and argued that there is greater level of justice in imposing strict liability on polluters. Additionally, the doctrine of cost internalization was emphasized as a measure of deterrence.

In reality, European countries adopted various approaches (on the legal state in Europe, see: Chris Clarke, Update Comparative Legal Study (2001); Robert v. Percival, Katherine H. Copper & Matthew M. Gravens, CERCLA in a Global Context, 41 SW. L. Rev. 727 (2012); N.S.J. Koeman, Environmental Law in Europe (1999). Sweden imposes strict liability for any pollution that harms or may harm people and the environment (Sweden Environmental Code, 1998). Such is the law in Switzerland, which is not a member of the EU (Environmental Protection Act of 1983, §4), and in France (Percival, Cooper & Gravens, 740). Holland distinguishes between two pieces of legislations: the statute from 1982 (Soil Clean-up (Interim) Act of 1982) applies retroactively from 1975 onward, because a polluter from that date forward ought to know it may be liable for its actions. This means that should the state remove pollution created after 1975, it may demand the polluter to shoulder costs, as held by the Holland Supreme Court (State v. Van Wijngaarden and State v. Akzo Resins (24.4.1992)). The legislation from 1994 focuses on administrative orders for removal of hazards. The agency employs this legislation, with a degree of success, to order a polluter or landowner to remove pollutions created before 1975. There is also a mechanism of environmental insurance shared by Dutch insurance companies (Nederlandse Milieupool), which aims to provide coverage, including for costs incurred by removing pollution, through direct payments to end users (Percival, Cooper & Gravens, 744; Wilde 203). In Spain, the relevant statute (Wastes Law tit. V (B.O.E. 96, 1998)) places responsibility for cleaning the polluted site on the polluter. This is retroactive and strict liability. In 1998 Germany adopted the federal statute that regulates protection of land from pollution (The Federal Soil Protection Act). The Act establishes strict liability, but the scope of actual compensation may be reduced according to the extent of the polluters’ liability. In Finland, new legislation from 2000 (Environmental Protection Act) applies strict liability on any kind of pollution, but not retroactively. The situation in Britain is highly similar to the legal situation in the United States under CERCLA. The British Environmental Protection Act of 1995 imposes retroactive strict liability for removal of hazards, regardless of the time the pollution was created and without an exhaustive list of polluting materials.

In Canada, relevant environmental legislation is not federal. Generally, legislation in most of Canada’s provinces is based on the principle of “the polluter must pay” while adopting strict liability standards. In Saskatchewan, legislation imposes strict liability to remove hazards on their creator (Environmental Management and Protection Act). In Nova Scotia, anyone who releases polluting material into the environment is obligated to reverse the pollution and remove the polluting material (Nova Scotia Environment Act, 1994-1995 S.N.S., ss. 67(2), 68(2)). The most restrictive standard of liability is that of British Columbia (Environmental Management Act, S.B.C.). This statute requires the manufacturer of a dangerous material, or anyone interested in that dangerous material’s removal, to remove it, as well as places retroactive strict liability upon them for the removal and rehabilitation of the polluted area. The statute clarifies that this obligation applies even when no legislation prohibited pollution at the time the pollution was created.

The Constitution of South Africa guarantees the right of each person to an environment that is not harmful to health or welfare (S. Afr. Const. §24(a), 1996). Following this right, South Africa’s National Environmental Management Act of 1999 (NEMA) requires anyone who has polluted or harmed the environment to remove that hazard and rehabilitate the damaged area. The statue does not explicitly establish strict liability, but the South African High Court (Transvaal Provincial Division) ruled that strict liability applies to owners of polluted land. However, the court ruled that the legislation is not retroactive as the legislature did not intend as such (Chief Pule Shardrack VII Bareki and Others v. Gencor Limited and Others (2005)). 

13.To end this part, let us recall that the environmental policy termed “Extended Producer Responsibility” (ERP) is widespread in Europe. This policy aims to extend the manufacturer’s liability to a product’s entire life cycle, even after the product is out of the manufacturer’s possession, or is no longer in use. It is rooted in the expectation that a more suitable policy would incentivize manufacturers to factor in, as early as when a product is being designed, environmental concerns such as improving the prospects for recycling the product, reducing the use of materials, etc. (see an overview by the OECD: www.oecd.org/env/tools-evaluation/eprpoliciesanIsrSCroductsdesigneconomictheoryandselectedcasestudies.htm).

In practice, the EPR doctrine brings different policy tools together: burial tolls, deposits, subsidies, and other taxes. Therefore, for example, in 1994 the EU issued a directive regarding packaging waste. The directive regulates manufacturing packages, as well as sets quantity goals for collecting and recycling packaging waste (for more on implementing the EPR policy in European Union countries see: Aaron Ezroj, Extended Producer Responsibility Programs in the European Union, 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 199 (2009)).

14.In summary, the overview above reveals different and similar components. As far as imposing strict liability on the polluter, a consensus emerges, certainly regarding inherently dangerous materials such as asbestos. Of course there are countries that have tied the extent of that strict liability to the level of fault. As for retroactive application, it appears there are different approaches: those who support retroactive application and those who oppose it. The implication of this review on our case will be clarified below.

II. Constitutional Analysis

15.We now turn to examining the constitutionality of section 74 in Israeli law. First we must consider the rights Eitanit argues were violated. Then we may discuss whether that violation, if any and to what extent, passes the tests established in the limitation clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

A. The Violated Rights

(1). The Right to Property

16.The right to property is enshrined in our law in section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This right is accorded to corporations as well (see HCJ 4885/03 Israel Poultry Farmers Organization, Cooperative Agricultural Union Ltd. v. the Government of Israel, IsrSC 59(2) 14, (2004) at para 41 of Justice Beinisch’s opinion and citations there.)

The State agrees that section 74 infringes Eitanit’s right to property. In any event, this point needs no elaboration. I will only remark that according to Eitanit its property rights are violated not only by imposing financial obligations, but also by imposing a seemingly retroactive obligation without examining whether Eitanit is at fault. I will address these to aspects of section 74 in depth below.

(2) The Right to Equality

17.Eitanit’s argument is twofold. First, it should enjoy constitutional protection of its right to equality. Second, this right has been violated.

Still, the first prong is not at all simple. In Israel, constitutional protection of equality rights flows from the constitutional protection of human dignity. This is because the right to equality is not explicit in the Basic Laws. It is a hybrid model of sorts, in the sense that violations of equality rights are recognized only in the – rather broad – context of harms to human dignity. In regards to the latter the case law has adopted the approach that the constitutional protection covers not only humiliation or indignities, but also other aspects closely related to human dignity. For our purposes, this means that the constitutional protection of equality applies only to discrimination that humiliates and disgraces, or discrimination that is closely linked to human dignity (HCJ 5427/02, Movement for Quality of Government v. the Knesset, IsrSC 61(1) 619, at para 38 of President Barak’s opinion (2006); HCJ 6304/09 L.H.B v. the Attorney General, at para 76 of Justice Procaccia’s opinion (Sep. 2, 2010)). In this view, it is doubtful whether the constitutional right to equality should extend to a legal entity that is not flesh and blood (compare: HCJ 4593/05 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. the Prime Minister, at para 10 of President Barak’s opinion (Sep. 9, 2006); HCJ 956/06 Israel Bank Union v. Minister of Communication, at p. 12 of Justice Hayut’s opinion (March 25, 2007); Ofer Sitbon, On People, Corporations, and everything in between, Kiryat HaMishpat 8, 107 (2009)).

In the case before there is no need to decide the general issue of the scope of constitutional protection for corporations’ equality rights. The reason for it is that I believe, as detailed next, Eitanit was not discriminated against at all. Incidentally, there may be instances where discrimination or lack of equality in the corporation context would require consideration. Two examples suffice: first, a statute that taxes a company owned by Arabs differently than a company owned by Jews. Even if the State would argue that the taxation applies to the corporation and not the individual, this is a matter that must be adjudicated. This example is easier because although there is discrimination between corporations – it is based on grounds involving people. The second example, which is the more pertinent for our purposes, is that of a corporation that claims a certain tax is imposed only on that corporation and not on any other corporation in the country. The argument is clear and notable, and renders discussion. However the violation, to the extent it exists, is not one of human dignity as applied to a corporation but of the right to property. The approach that infringements upon human dignity do not apply to a corporation, does not absolve the state from its duty to fend off the argument that the statute infringes upon the right to property, even if that infringement stems from a discrimination claim. Clearly, fleshing out the infringement upon property is different than fleshing out a direct infringement upon equality. The State may overcome the argument about violations of property rights in at least two ways: first, that there is no violation, and second, that the violation withstands the limitations clause. In our case, to me, the State’s response on this point is satisfactory even if we assume that a corporation has a constitutional right to equality, and this is also true when we explore the lack of equality in the context of infringement of property rights.

18.On one hand, Eitanit claims it suffered discrimination because it was required to shoulder the costs of removing asbestos waste discarded by asbestos importers. Additionally it is required to bear removal costs instead of those who have purchased final asbestos-cement product from Eitanit over the years, used them, and ultimately discarded of them. Obviously, there are financial ramifications to this.

Yet these arguments must be rejected in light of the statute’s language. The “waste population” subject to section 74 is industrial waste that came from operations at Eitanit’s factory. This definition excludes two types of waste: (a) completed asbestos-cement products, such as pipes and boards, that have been passed on to end users and then dismantled, discarded and gradually became waste (“the first exception”); (b) asbestos waste that came from production processes of others besides Eitanit (“the second exception”). These two exceptions are not included in the definition of “waste population” to which section 74 applies.

To clarify, the record reveals that professionals can easily distinguish asbestos waste that originated in production processes from completed asbestos-cement products that have been discarded post-use (the first exception). First, asbestos waste is a batter-like, non-homogenous mix that comprises of lumps and excess raw asbestos, cement, board and pipe debris made out of asbestos-cement. Additionally, some of the waste sites are built in layers: a layer of waste, above it a layer of soil, then again a layer of waste, and so on. In some sites the sacks used to bring in the waste were visible. These techniques indicated the methodical and lengthy process of waste removal, through burial or surfacing. These are not  random or accidental piles of asbestos-cement products that have been worn out and discarded absentmindedly.

This said, the language of the statute releases Eitanit from paying for the second exception – asbestos waste that originated in the production processes of others. This raises a separate question: how do we know that Eitanit will not be required to pay for waste that did not come from its own factory, under the second exception? There are several indications for this. First, section 74 targets only waste found in a radius of 15 KM from Eitanit’s factory. Second, Eitanit’s factory was at the time the only factory in Israel to process raw asbestos into final asbestos-cement products. The industrial waste from these production processes has unique characteristics, as discussed above. Other factories processed completed asbestos-cement products, and thus their industrial waste would have been consistent of only asbestos-cement and dust. Third, there is no evidence that other factories had indeed removed their waste in the same manner Eitanit did. Fourth, there is no evidence that asbestos importers operating in Israel alongside Eitanit at the relevant time, distributed asbestos in the area, and in any event the State clarifies that those importers used materials for acoustic and thermal isolation without cement. Fifth, in a survey from 2007, different witnesses reported out of their personal knowledge purchasing or receiving the waste from the factory and scattering it in the ground. These finding have been confirmed, the State argues, by soil samples and drilling.

The mounting of all this evidence, along with the above findings about the type of waste and its systematic discarding, indicates – to me – that there is a “presumption of burial” against Eitanit in the context of section 74. This presumption means that asbestos waste with certain common characteristics, that was buried in systematic and organized methods, all in a limited and confined area in the factory’s vicinity, would have come out of Eitanit’s factory. Lest we forget: this is a rebuttable presumption. After all, the legislature afforded Eitanit a right of hearing before the Minister, about specific areas where waste did not originate from Eitanit’s factory (according to section 74(d) of the Act and according to the instructions by the Minister – see above section 5, and the State’s attorney declaration that the content of the objection and the relevant instruction’s interpretation – p. 9, line 28 of the hearing transcript).

To summarize, the Act requires Eitanit to bear the cost of removing industrial waste that originated from the operations in its factory. Eitanit’s arguments in this regard cannot be addressed to the legislature, as the legislature expressly stipulated that Eitanit is only responsible for its own waste. These arguments may be relevant, at most, at the administrative level, if and when there are challenges to the Act’s implementation, and not at the clearly constitutional level we are concerned with here.

19.The argument regarding the end users, who received asbestos waste from Eitanit and used it to cover soil, is more complicated. Analytically, Eitanit’s argument is twofold. First, Eitanit was required to pay while the end users were exempted from direct payments. Second, Eitanit was required to pay for waste from which the end users also benefited. In my mind, the answers to the first aspect effectively resolve the difficulties in the second aspect. The main point is there is a relevant difference that justifies distinguishing the end users, who were not directly required to bear costs, and Eitanit. Recall that not every distinction is prohibited discrimination. Warranted distinctions, which are based on a relevant difference, will not usually be seen as prohibited discrimination (for example see the matter of LHB, para 77; HCJ 10203/03 The National Census Inc. v. The Attorney General, para 53 of Justice Procaccia’s opinion (August 20, 2008)). To me, there are three differences between Eitanit and the end users: the awareness test, the control test, and the profit test. Each and every one of these independently, let alone put together, constitutes a relevant difference that separates Eitanit from the end users and that warrants the distinction between them – from both aspects.

First, it appears from the material before us, that in the relevant time period, Eitanit had a notable advantage of information compared to the end users. This advantage manifested, primarily, in scientific knowledge that existed – or should have existed – for Eitanit even at that time about the potential health risk posed by asbestos waste. Indeed, there is no intention to find fault in Eitanit on neither the criminal or tort levels. Rather the presumption is that Eitanit must pay due to strict liability, not as a result of a finding that it breached any duties of care. However, the focus is on Eitanit’s awareness of potential risk caused by asbestos compared to other entities – the end users – to whom it asks to be considered similarly situated. The relevance of the awareness issue will be discussed more below.

In May 1969 Professor Schilling visited Eitanit’s factory. At the time, Professor Schilling headed the Department for Occupational Health at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. After his visit, Professor Schilling authored a report, which was attached as Annexure 7 to the Respondents’ reply. In the report, Schilling points to severe health risks that are caused by exposure to dust in asbestos factories, including asbestositis, lung cancer and mesothelioma. He emphasized that the factory must take immediate precautions to reduce the risk of these diseases’ development.

In 1970, an organization of Israeli occupational doctors dedicated a conference to issues of employees and asbestos-cement factories. During the conference, an article written in collaboration with the factory representatives was presented. This article was submitted as Annexure 8. As early as the opening paragraph, the authors state that there is “clear awareness of health risks caused by asbestos and the prevalence of cases of asbestositis on one hand, and cancer on the other.

In April 1976, Yekutiel Federman, one of the holders of controlling interest in Eitanit, sent a letter to the factory manager, Mr. B. Friedrich. In that letter Mr. Federman states that: “The asbestos industry is currently the target of a witch hunt… Should we receive a positive report that proves the allegations are exaggerated and are not serious, and that it is more dangerous to walk down a street breathing in gas emissions from cars, and this report will be prepared by the Ernst Bergman Foundation, which is renowned in the science community, we will be able to combat the attacks academically and scientifically.” This letter, too, demonstrates that Eitanit was aware, at this stage if not sooner, of the scientific claims that were common at the time about the severe health risks caused by asbestos.

What is more, certain aspects of that time’s labor laws indicated the dangers of asbestos. As early as 1945 the British Mandate defined asbestositis as an occupational disease. This meant that a diagnosis of a factory worker with the disease was required to be reported. Additionally, the employment of women and teenagers in processing asbestos or its industrial use was prohibited. These directives were incorporated into Israeli law in the early 1950s. In 1964 The Safety at Work Regulations (Medical Examinations of Workers with Asbestos Dust, Talc and Silicon) 1964 were legislated. The Regulations set restrictions on the ways asbestos workers were employed, and required that workers receive periodic medical examinations. In 1978 The Safety at Work Regulations (Restrictions on Spraying Asbestos) 1978 were added. Those prohibited spraying crisp asbestos for isolation purposes. All of these were in force during the same period when, by Eitanit’s own admission, it passed on the waste to the end users, let alone when the waste was buried in the ground. Later, in 1984, the old Regulations – from both 1964 and 1978 – were incorporated into The Safety at Work Regulations (Occupational Hygiene of the Public and Workers with Harmful Dust) 1984. The new Regulations additionally prohibited the use of asbestos to pave roads. In 1988 this prohibition was expanded to manufacturing, importing and selling asbestos for road paving.

On the other hand, we do not have a sufficient factual foundation about the scope and depth of the end users’ awareness of the health risks caused by asbestos waste. However, on its face, it is doubtful that Eitanit and the end users are in the same category as far as what was known or should have been know. For decades, Eitanit imported raw asbestos, processed it into asbestos-cement, and manufactured final products from it. In effect, it was the dominant – if not only – entity in this industry. By virtue of this position Eitanit was likely familiar in real time with the relevant scientific research about Asbestos’ health risks. Not only did Eitanit apparently follow the developments, but was an active observer in the research (see, for example the article from 1970 and the Mr. Federman’s letter from April 1976, mentioned above). As an employer of asbestos workers, Eitanit was also subject by law to different duties that reflected the health risks asbestos posed. The end users, on the other hand, are in a different category. The material shows that they were not manufacturers of asbestos, nor were they industrial factories, but mainly the towns, kibbutzes and private persons in the area. These are probably not experts in asbestos, asbestos employers or workers, or even active in the scientific research scene.

Analogously, tort law attributes significant weight to knowledge gaps between parties. For instance, a doctor’s duty to disclose to clients stems from the presumption that there are major knowledge gaps between the parties, though their scope may change from case to case (see for this topic, CA 2342/09 Joubran v. Misgav Ledach Hospital (April 6, 2011)). Similarly, the scope of an insurance agent to a consumer depends, among others, on whether there are information gaps between the consumer and the insurance agent or insurer (LCA 5696/06, Saif vs. Mari, para 14 (Sep 21, 2009)).

Truth be told, factoring in the knowledge gaps between Eitanit and the end users is only part of a broader context. Eitanit is distinct from the end users because the products and waste left a factory it owns. This fact points to the material difference between Eitanit and the end users – Eitanit is the manufacturer of the waste. The end users were Eitanit’s customers. These are two different groups that must be distinguished. The distinction is consistent with the principles of EPR, mentioned above. The duties placed on manufacturers are not as the duties placed on the user. The manufacturer has control over the product’s design, assembly, and finalization. In any event is it highly logical to place extended liability on the manufacturer and placing financial burdens upon it, both for reasons of justice and fairness and of economic efficiency. In the matter at hand, the control test has an additional aspect. It is appropriate to weigh the fact that arises from the record, that Eitanit sold the waste for a low price, sometimes giving it away. This, too, solidifies the link between Eitanit and the waste, including that which is not on factory grounds, but in the land around it up to 15 KM. The awareness test thus connects to the control test and to economical aspects, and we must not neglect the profit test.

Applying economic approaches to law, it is clear that Eitanit and the end users are not similarly situated, as a function of the profit test. Comparative case law, primarily American case law, finds merit in placing the costs of asbestos removal on the manufacturing corporation because of its status as manufacturer. This consideration is relevant not only from an economical stand point, which may justify shifting the financial burden of removing hazards to the manufacturer’s shoulders, but also for reasons of justice and fairness. From this perspective, there is no discrimination against the petitioner but achieving the statutory purpose of “the polluter must pay.” We come back to this point when examining the issue of a worthy purpose which is, of course, one of the tests established by section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

To summarize this point: there were knowledge gaps – actual and theoretical – between Eitanit and the end users. Moreover, Eitanit, as a manufacturer is clearly distinguishable from the end users. This distinction reflects the difference between the two aspects of the control test, as well as the profit test. The combination of all these – awareness, control and profit – establish, in my view, a relevant difference between Eitanit and the end users, in terms of its obligation to share up to half of the costs of removing the waste.

20.Eitanit additionally, claims it suffered discrimination compared to the local authorities. Eitanit bases its claim on the right to be heard by the Minister which section 74 grants the local authorities and which allows them to reduce the rate of their participation in funding the project. In reality, an arbitrary and low rate of only 10% was set in regulations which go as far as permitting “payment” of this rate by provision of services. Eitanit, on the other hand, was denied the option of carrying out the project on its own.

Here, too, I believe Eitanit and the local authorities are not similarly situated. There is a relevant difference between Eitanit and the local authorities, based on reasons stated above: Eitanit is the manufacturer of the waste, and created its implications. The local authorities, as the record reflects, are not even part of the “end users” addressed earlier. Their link to the waste is indirect, and they are merely a default in funding the project. Furthermore, the mechanism set in the Act splits the costs equally between Eitanit (on one end) and the local authorities and the state (on the other end.) Each and every Shekel that is reduced from the local authorities’ obligations will be added to the bill served to the State. Put together, the local authorities and the State will fund only half of the project’s cost. The result, therefore, is that – willing or not – taxpayers will directly shoulder at least half of the project’s costs. For this reason, too, the discrimination claim must fall.

21.Finally, Eitanit claims it was discriminated against in comparison with future polluters. It argues the Act stipulates that anyone creating asbestos hazards will bear the costs of removal according to their share of liability, and they will be permitted to remove the hazard (section 11(e) of the Act). Additionally, a bill for Prevention Soil Pollution and Restoration of Polluted Grounds 2011 (“the bill”) is pending before the Knesset. The bill, Eitanit maintains, is more lenient toward owners of polluted properties and considers the extent of their fault. Contrastingly, Eitanit bears the brunt of a strict liability standard regardless of fault and it is denied the opportunity to remover the waste on its own.

Regarding the claim of discrimination in terms of the bill, I see no reason to discuss a claim of discrimination in a bill that has yet to have been passed. As far as the discrimination claims about other statutory provisions go, I do not find it necessary to examine these provisions in detail, nor to consider whether they are discriminatory against Eitanit or perhaps favor it. This is because the project of removing asbestos waste from the Western Galilee merits regulation unique to it. I will elaborate on this point below, in relation to the argument that the Act constitutes personal legislation. As an aside, recall that the new asbestos statute prohibits manufacture of asbestos products, places full responsibility for pollution on the polluter, and only allows the polluter to remove the waste independently with the property owner’s consent. On its face, it does not appear that the statutory arrangement that applies to the petitioner is clearly more egregious than statutory arrangements that will exist going forward. Quite the contrary.

22.To conclude this part, I accept Eitanit’s argument that section 74 infringes upon its property rights. However, Eitanit’s argument about a violation of its equality right, insofar that it is a right independent of the property right, and this for the reasons described above. Based on these conclusions, I move on to examine whether the infringement on Eitanit’s right to property passes the tests set in the limitations clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, entitled “Violations of Rights”:

“There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except in legislation befitting the values of the State of Israel, designed for a worthy purpose, and to an extent no greater than required or by such a law enacted with explicit authorization therein.”

B. Violation of Rights In Legislation Or By Explicit Authorization Therein

23.Eitanit’s position is that the said violation of the right to property (and in its view the right to equality, too) is not in legislation or by authorization in legislation, because the Act constitutes personal legislation, with a specific target – Eitanit. Eitanit maintains that a statute that is not generally applicable cannot be considered legislation for the purposes of the limitations clause.

I cannot accept Eitanit’s position. Recall that the case law found the prong “in legislation or by authorization therein” to be a formalistic test that seeks whether the infringement upon basic rights was done by primary legislation or was authorized by primary legislation (see the matter of The National Census, para 9 of President Beinisch’s opinion; the matter of L.H.B, para 104 to Justice Procaccia’s opinion; see also Aharon Barak, Interpretation in Law Volume 3 – Constitutional Interpretation, 489-498 (1994)). To compare, section 5 of the European Covenant of Human Rights addresses ways to limit liberties, including a requirement that the limitation is done in legislation, or in the Covenant’s language: “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law). Similar language appears in section 10(2) of the Covenant regarding limits on free speech. The European Court of Human Rights pronounced, in various contexts, on the interpretation of “in legislation,” and concluded that in order for a particular provision to be considered legislation for these purposes, it must be clear and accessible, that is, published to everyone (see: Tonilo v. San Marino & Italy, §46 (26.6.2012); Telegraaf Media v. Netherland, §§89-102 (22.11.2012)).

The piece of legislation at hand is a product of extended preparation. After passing the Knesset’s first reading, the Act was considered by the Knesset’s Interior and Environmental Protection Committee. The Committee dedicated over ten meetings to discuss the details of the Act. During the discussions, the constitutional issue was also examined. Eitanit argued boisterously, but its arguments were rejected. Once the Committee completed is process, the Act passed in second and third readings and was published officially. This in mind, the argument that the final produce is not legislation must fail. It appears Eitanit’s arguments about the lack of the Act’s general application repeat, in a sense, the arguments about discrimination against it – arguments I have addressed at length above – or, in a different sense, are claims about the Act’s wrongful purpose, claims that I will address below. And again recall: the Act does not expressly mention Eitanit or its factory. Instead, it uses terms such as “asbestos companies” and “factory for the manufacture of asbestos.” It is true, however, and undisputed, that only Eitanit meets the definitions in section 74. This matter might increase the need to guarantee the Act is proportional and does not overly infringe Eitanit’s property rights. Still, that the Act effectively only applies to Eitanit is not in and of itself sufficient for a finding that the Act is not “legislation.”

C. For a Worthy Purpose Befitting the Values of the State of Israel

24.What is the purpose of section 74, and is this purpose worthy and befitting? Section 1 states the Act’s general purpose: to minimize asbestos hazards in Israel. This is also the source for section 74’s actual purpose: to launch a project for the removal of asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. The explanations that accompanied the Act’s bill, as well as the State’s response in this petition, described how this severe and unique environmental hazard was formed in the Western Galilee. A very large amount of asbestos waste was scattered or buried in many dozens of sites. Some of the waste is buried deep underground, and some is used in surfacing trails, private gardens, agricultural land and the like – all, as mentioned, in dozens of different locations. I elaborated upon the harms caused by this waste in depth, and it is unnecessary to repeat it all here. The purpose of section 74, therefore, is to remove or reduce as much as possible this health risk, which in some ways is a “time bomb” threatening the health and welfare of many of the area’s residents. There is no doubt then that it is a worthy and important purpose, and the sooner it is achieved, the better.

This purpose is not only worthy, but also befits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State. I recently discussed Jewish law’s approach to protecting the environment, from a religious and civil perspective (HCJ 1756/10 The City of Ashkelon v. The Minister of the Interior (January 2, 2013)). I specifically mentioned Jewish law’s approach to attending to waste and the financial mechanisms it put in place in order to achieve this.

Additionally, the purpose of section 74 is worthy because it realizes area residents’ rights to health and to quality environment. There is no need here to go into the constitutionality or the scope of these rights (see: HCJ 3071/05 Luzon v. The Government of Israel (July 28, 2008); HCJ 11044/04 Solomtin v. The Minister of Health, paras 11-13 to Justice Procaccia’s opinion (June 27, 2011); Daniel Sperling and Nissim Cohen, The Impact of The Arrangements Act and Supreme Court Decisions on Health Policy and the Status of the Right to Health in Israel, Laws (4) 154, 218-225 (2012)). All these are complex, serious and weighty questions, but they are irrelevant to the case at hand. All that matters here is that cleaning waste is meant to remove a grave hazard that threatens the health of residents, and it is a welcome initiative. As presented above, this concern to the health of residents is typical of democratic states, which have invested substantial efforts in regulating removal in modern environmental legislation.

25.The State presents an additional reason for the way section 74 sets the funding mechanism: the principle of “the polluter must pay”. Truthfully, I am not convinced this principle is in fact the purpose of the Act in terms of the limitations clause. Arguably, this principle justifies choosing this particular mechanism, rather than the legislative goal. Put differently: it is the justification for the means chosen to achieve the end. Therefore, the principle must pass the limitations clause in the context of proportionality, not in terms of purpose. Yet the state explicitly argues that the Act has the purpose of realizing the principle of “the polluter must pay” (p. 9 of the record). However, even under this approach the principle is not a single purpose, but is intertwined with the central purpose, which is cleaning the Western Galilee from Asbestos Waste.

As I said, I doubt whether the principle of “the polluter must pay” is a purpose – even secondary – of the Act. It is possible this position, which upgrades the means to the level of an end, is meant to boost the legitimacy of the selected funding mechanism. Another possibility is that the State grabbed the bull by its horns. In other words, being aware of the distinct difficulties presented by the principle of “the polluter must pay” and by applying it, the State categorized it as a secondary purpose, willing to subject it to the proper constitutional review. But, as I will clarify, I cannot accept that this categorization of the principle as an end will injure Eitanit and prevent it from examining the proportionality of the funding mechanism established in section 74. For the purpose of ruling in this petition, I am willing to assume – for the sake of a complete discussion – that the principle of “the polluter must pay” is a secondary purpose of the Act in terms of the limitations clause. This approach demands that the matter be subject to a strict review of proportionality. Lest we forget, the worthy purpose test is but a threshold requirement (Aharon Barak, Proportionality in Law, 297 (2010)). That is, in the absence of a worthy purpose, a statute must fail constitutional review. For this reason precisely the worthy purpose test is not conclusive. It is not the end of the enquiry, but its beginning. The difficult task of constitutional review is yet before us. As former President Barak wrote: “It is a mistake to examine constitutionality of means through the lens of the end’s constitutionality. It would be too premature” (Id. at 299). Thus we must first evaluate whether the principle of “the polluter must pay” is indeed a worthy purpose befitting the values of the State of Israel. This discussion is separate from the discussion whether the principle of “the polluter must pay” and its application in the present case is proportional, given that it places strict liability, and does so retroactively.

The principle of “the polluter must pay” is simple. Whoever caused the pollution will fund its removal and be liable for harms that have and will continue to be caused. This principle stems also from efficiency reasons, with the premise that placing the financial burden on polluters will incentivize them to minimize the scope of the pollution. The goal is to reduce the amount of waste to be removed and to encourage the polluter to take precautions and develop “green” technology. This economical approach finds support in the theory of costs internalization. Coupled with the considerations of justice, which dictate that it is unfair for the polluter, who has profited from polluting, would deflect costs toward the public (see: Marsha Glefi, Ruth Plato-Shinar and Amichai Kerner, Lenders’ Liability for Environmental Hazards Caused by Borrowers, The Attorney (50) 439, 443-47 (2010); Isaschar Rozen-Tzvi, Who The Hell Does This Waste Belong To? Waste Removal and Environmental Justice in Israel, Law Research (23) 487, 553-54 (2007)). This approach was recognized by many democratic states, as reviewed above.

We will note that in Jewish law, too, the basic obligation of waste management is placed on the waste’s owner. It is thus generally prohibited to remove raw materials – such as rocks and dust – or actual waste into public spaces, and the owner is expected to be liable in torts, or subjected to fines (Tosefta Bava Kamma 2; Tosefta Bava Metzia 11, Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 30, 1; Maimonides, Yad ha-Chazaka, Hilchot Nizke Mammon 13, 13-17; Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, 414, 2; also see my opinion on the matter of The City of Hulon.)

The principle of “the polluter must pay” is well established in our current law. It is also the answer to the Petitioner’s claim that section 74 is out of place in the legal landscape. The Prevention of Environmental Hazards Act (Civil Suits) 1992, authorizes courts to order anyone who causes environmental hazards to cease from doing so, to correct the hazard, or to restore, and this regardless to the level of fault, if any (section 2-4.) Additionally, a string of legislative amendments in this vein was incorporated into The Environmental Protection Act (The Polluter Must Pay) (Legislative Amendments) 2008. Further, in terms of industrial waste, the principle of “the polluter must pay” translates into a similar principle of “manufacturer responsibility”. That practical meaning of this is that the costs of taking care of and recycling waste will generally be placed upon the factory that manufactured the polluting products in its production processes (see above regarding EPR policies). This has many aspects in the new environmental legislation in Israel. We will mention here The Environmental Care for Electric and Electronic Equipment and Batteries Act 2012, The Regulation of Care for Packaging Act 2011, The Beverage Container Deposit Act 2001 – amended in 2010 to set quotas for bottle collection by manufacturers, The Removal and Recycling of Tires Act 2007, and The Preservation of Cleanliness Act 1984 – amended in 2007 to set a mechanism for burial tax (see the matter of The City of Hullon, para 31 of Justice Barak-Erez’s opinion).

Incidentally, the State points out that the principle of “the polluter must pay” is reflected in statutes that were already in effect when Eitanit created the asbestos waste. For instance, section 54(1) to The People’s Health Ordinance, num. 40 of 1940 stipulates that the local authority or the ministry are authorized to order a person who created a hazard to remove it. For these purposes, a hazard is any place whose state or use endanger or damage public health (section 53).

To summarize, Eitanit does not dispute that the purpose of the Act insofar that it is to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee is a “worthy social purpose” (see section 107 of the petition). The Petitioner’s primary opposition is for the principle of “the polluter must pay”, particularly in terms of the strict liability standard and the retroactive application. In this context, Eitanit challenges the efficiency of applying the principle of “the polluter must pay” and the fairness in applying it. Therefore, assuming that “the polluter must pay” is a worthy purpose because of its contribution to ecology, the question remains whether the funding mechanism is proportional. This question leads us to the main issue, which is the establishment of retroactive and strict liability.

D. Proportionality

26.The last requirement of the limitations clause is that the infringement of a constitutional right is “to an extent no greater than required”. This is the proportionality requirement. The case law has articulated three sub-prongs for evaluating the proportionality of infringements of constitutional rights: the rational connection test, the least restrictive means test, and the cost-benefit test (narrow proportionality). 

Before we begin, recall that the proportionality criterion does not dictate selecting only one mean to achieving the legislative end. There is a collection of – perhaps many – alternative measures, all of which may in themselves be proportional. These measures are different in terms of the scope of their infringement on constitutional rights, as well as how they may achieve the legislative purpose. This creates a range of proportionality within which the legislature may operate. The legislature has room to maneuver, and it may choose certain alternatives over others so long as they sit within the range of proportionality (compare: HCJ 2605/05, The Academic Center for Law and Business v. The Minister of the Treasury, para 46 of President Beinisch’s opinion (November 19, 2009)).

(1) Rational Connection

27.Under the first proportionality sub-test, we must examine whether there is a logical link between the Act’s purpose and the means selected to achieve it. As I have discussed above, for purposes of our discussion, the Act has two goals: to clean the Western Galilee of asbestos waste, and to realize the principle of “the polluter must pay”. These are the legislative ends. The means that legislature selected is the mechanism set in section 74, specifically its funding aspect (which is at the core of this petition). We will explore the link between the selected means and each of the purposes.

28.Regarding the first purpose, I do not find it necessary to elaborate, because the link here between the means and the end is practically obvious. The first purpose is to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. The selected means is the relevant project, arranging for its budget and funding and authorizing the Minister to establish operative regulations. The means leads directly to the end.

29.As for the second purpose, the case is more complex. Eitanit raises a string of questions about the link between the funding mechanism established and the principle of “the polluter must pay”. Eitanit’s criticism includes four arguments. First, Eitanit claims there is no evidence it scattered the waste. Second, Eitanit is subjected to strict liability, and it is required to pay for conduct that was not legally proscribed at the time. Second, Eitanit maintains that a significant portion of the waste was distributed by the end users and not by Eitanit. Third, Eitanit challenges the strict liability imposed upon it, along with the requirement to pay for conduct that was not statutorily prohibited at the time. Fourth, Eitanit argues that it must pay for past-conduct such that the aspect of channeling behavior and deterrence is non-existing here. Retroactive payment, Eitanit believes, is also unfair. Therefore there is no link, to Eitanit, between the type of payment the Act imposed upon it and the principle of “the polluter must pay”.

The first argument raises a factual issue, which I have addressed above. Repeated briefly, the accumulation of several indications demonstrates that there is a “presumption of burial” against Eitanit in terms of section 74: the asbestos waste, that has similar characteristics, was buried by organized and systematic techniques, and all in a limited area around the factory. Even if this not an absolute presumption, Eitanit has the opportunity to argue that the waste in a specific location did not originate in its factory. To what extent a petitioner may attack the factual basis for the Act is a good question. I my view, such attack is not identical to attacking the factual basis for an administrative decision, or even to an administrative petition in the High Court of Justice, or to a factual dispute between parties of the civil or criminal case. Yet, as mentioned before, the broad legal issue need not be decided here, as the factual basis is well substantiated. The truly relevant question is what this factual basis means.

The second argument does not negate the rational connection between the means and the end either. It is true that some of the waste was layered on the ground by the end users. However, one of the important justifications for the principle of “the polluter must pay” is cost internalization by whoever benefited from creating the pollution. In our case, Eitanit fits this criterion because it profited from the production processes that resulted in buildup of industrial waste. Additionally, it profited – albeit indirectly – from passing the waste from the factory on to the end users. In any event, there is a clear rational link between the means – mandating that Eitanit share the cost of removing the waste – and the relevant purpose – the principle of “the polluter must pay”. Eitanit’s arguments on this point may be seen from a different angle that focuses the discussion on the question of equal burden. In other words, why would Eitanit alone shoulder the financial burden and not the end users? The answer is twofold. First, there is no discrimination between Eitanit and the end users. I discussed this in depth above. Second, the possibility of a different allocation of financial burdens as to reduce the harms to Eitanit. I will discuss this below, when analyzing proportionality’s second and third sub-prongs.

The third and fourth arguments revolve round the strict liability and its retroactive application. Regarding the rational link between the means – the funding mechanism – and the secondary purpose – the principle of “the polluter must pay,” it seems that imposing payments on the entity that created the hazard and benefited from it advances this purpose and puts it into practice. Refer to the discussion above as to how the principle of “the polluter must pay” is based on justice and fairness. It is only reasonable and logical that whoever created a hazard and was the primary beneficiary of it would be the one required to pay for it. In this context, it would be appropriate to combine the two purposes the State finds in the Act. It is necessary, as Eitanit also agrees, to remove the asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. The legislature elected, as did other legislatures in democratic states, to impose special costs on the asbestos company – the manufacturer and direct profit-maker – compared to others, including the public.

To sum up this point, this is not a case where the means do not promote the end. The contrary is true. Recall that the “the rational connection test, like the worthy purpose test – is a threshold test. It is not a balancing test. It does not weigh the worthy purpose against the infringement” (Proportionality in Law, p. 387). However, there is the approach that the first sub-prong is not technical: “this sub-test is not satisfied with the existence of a merely technical causal connection between the means and the end. Therefore the requirement for a rational link is designed, among others, to restrict arbitrary, unfair or illogical means” (HCJ 2887/04 Abu Madigam v. Israeli Land Authority, IsrSC 62(2) 57, para 37 of Justice Arbel’s opinion (2007)). In my own opinion, the natural place for testing the justice and fairness of a means is in the contest of the second sub-prong, and more so in the third sub-prong. That said, I am willing to assume that in extreme cases where the means’ arbitrariness and unfairness are obvious this should be considered even in the first sub-prong. This certainly is not the case: here, applying the second and third sub-prongs will shed light on the extent of justice and fairness in the chosen means.

(2) The Least Restrictive Means

30.We now approach proportionality’s second sub-test. The question before us is whether, of all the alternative means that may achieve the purpose of the Act, the means selected is that which least infringes Eitanit’s right to property. Put differently, we ask whether there is a less restrictive alternative that will similarly achieve the Act’s purpose (compare HCJ 10202/06 The City of Nahariya v. The West Bank Military Commander, p. 12 (November 11, 2012)).

In this context, Eitanit identifies two alternatives for the mechanism established by the Act. One is to “repair” the sites where the waste serves to cover the land. The second is allowing Eitanit to execute the removal project on its own. We will explore each alternative.

31.The first alternative is only generally argued by Eitanit, without adding details that can illuminate the primary relevant question: is it expected to achieve the same purpose while harming Eitanit less. Recall, that, as Eitanit presented things, re-covering and sealing the paths that were surfaced with asbestos is a partial solution to the waste problem at best. Whether this is a real fix, including for the paths themselves, is doubtful. Moreover it is unclear to Eitanit what the solution for other types of waste, such as waste that was buried underground. We cannot therefore find that the suggested alternative would sufficiently accomplish the Act’s purpose of cleaning the Western Galilee from asbestos waste, while lessening the harm to Eitanit.

32.We are left with the second alternative: Eitanit’s consent to removing the waste independently, instead of paying for removal (the “self-removal” alternative). However, the Petitioner did not meet its burden to prove that this alternative will serve the Act’s purpose adequately.

The task of removing the asbestos waste was discussed among the parties for a long time. Eitanit’s proposal to remove the waste, through a sub-contractor it will employ, was also subject to discussion. After several rounds of negotiation, the proposal was rejected. I will here refer to a detailed and reasoned letter that Mr. Oshik Ben-Atar, a senior deputy to the Accountant General, sent to Eitanit in November 2010, in which the State notified Eitanit that its self-removal proposal is impractical. The letter states that Eitanit estimated the project to cost between NIS 166-300m, if not more (see also section 120 of the petition). These are substantial gaps that elicit concerns that Eitanit’s low estimate will prevent it from completely and successfully executing the project. This is coupled with the doubt that Eitanit has, on its face, little incentive to execute the project as best as possible. This is also because it is not expected to profit from executing the project and it has no incentive to conduct thorough surveying and locating all the polluted sites.

Eitanit maintains the recently completed removal of asbestos from a certain area, under State supervision, and the costs of that removal was approximately 65% lower than the costs estimated by the State. The State, on the other hand, maintains that the experience with Eitanit in this regard is not positive. The State supervises Eitanit’s work to restore waste sites in Sheikh Danon and in Shlomi, as well as work to remove asbestos waste in other areas. These projects have been found to have professional deficiencies, and these deficiencies have caused major delays in the projects.

I do not intend to rule on the factual disputes between the parties, as if this were a civil dispute or an administrative petition. Such a ruling is not necessary for our purposes. We are concerned with section 74 of the Act, not with administrative or appellate review. The question before us is whether there is an alternative means that will impose less harm upon Eitanit, while achieving the legislative purpose behind section 74. From this perspective, Eitanit has not met its burden. I am not persuaded that the self-removal option will lead to the end that inspired enacting section 74 – cleaning the Western Galilee from asbestos waste. We were even presented with material that supports the State’s position, or at the very least demonstrates its logic.

33.The perspective we so far employed has been negative: whether there are alternatives that achieve the statutory purpose while lessening the harm caused to Eitanit. Eitanit emphasized this approach. However, the issue can be examined, simultaneously, in a positive perspective: whether the mechanism elected by the legislature includes checks and balances that reduce the harm caused. In this contest there are five elements: (1) Eitanit would be required to pay no more than half of the estimated removal costs – half, perhaps less but certainly no more; (2) In any event, Eitanit’s funding obligation shall not exceed NIS 150m; (3) The funding mechanism the legislature selected, along with supplementary instructions from the Minister, ensure that this is not a fine or a compensation. Eitanit’s financial obligation will be used to (partially) cover the costs of removal alone; (4) The relevant removal project is limited to a radius of 15 KM around the factory. Section 74 does not compel Eitanit to participate in funding the removal of asbestos waste if that waste is in locations beyond that area. Finally, the Minister’s instructions create a mechanism of supervision and checks that will allow Eitanit to challenge each and every payment it is required to submit in terms of specific waste sites.

The five elements mentioned are no hypothesis or creative interpretation. These are checks and balances built into the explicit language of section 74 and its supplementary instructions. They reduce the harm caused to Eitanit’s property, while still achieving the primary purpose of cleaning the Western Galilee of asbestos waste and the secondary purpose of “the polluter must pay” (to the extent this purpose exists).

The elements above can be categorized through three questions: how much, for what, and how. “How much”: 50 percent, which shall not exceed NIS 150m. In examples from the United States and from other countries, some legislation required funding up to 100 percent, without setting a maximum amount. The gap in the amount is substantial. It is another rebuttal for Eitanit’s argument that it would have been appropriate to impose some liability for removing the waste upon the end users. As mentioned before, I am not persuaded that the maximum amount set does not reflect a fair estimate of potential costs. Moreover, even were the Petitioner to dispute the estimates for removal, because the State bears half the costs, it has no interest in inflating costs. “For what”: for cleaning a defined area. The significance of this is that there is no penalty or sanction. Restricting the project that Eitanit must fund further supports the conclusion that the means of imposing liability is not an end unto itself. The “for what” element is joined by the scope of the territory – a 15 KM radius around the factory. This area is not only limited but also reflects the history of Eitanit’s conduct in terms of distributing industrial asbestos waste. This history include the fact that Eitanit buried some of the asbestos waste, as well as passed it on to the end users in the area for very low cost, or no cost at all. This supports the assumption that implementing the principle of “the polluter must pay” is neither arbitrary nor irrational. The third question is “how”: the section includes an internal mechanism that ensures that Eitanit is able to present its position as to the periodical invoices it would receive. The reservations Eitanit may raise in this context are not limited to calculations, but also to the issue of whether particular piles of waste in fact originated in its factory. The State stipulated this in section 121 of its responding papers. This element contributes to the proportionality of the selected means. The internal mechanism emphasizes supervision rather than top-down orders.

(3) Narrow Proportionality

34.We are thus left with the third and last sub-prong of constitutional review: the narrow proportionality test. This tests measures the appropriate ratio “between the public benefit of a statute subject to constitutional review and the infringement of a constitutional right caused by that legislation (the matter of The Academic Center, para 50 of President Beinisch’s opinion; see also HJC 2651/09 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. The Minister of the Interior, para 22 of Justice Naor’s opinion (June 15, 2011). It weighs cost against benefit in the constitutional sense – social gain versus infringement of rights.

The case law expressed the view that “this is the most important of the three sub-prongs” (Justice Dorner in HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Security, IsrSC 49(4) 94,140 (1995)). Either way, it is not a threshold test. Being the last obstacle in the constitutional journey a spotlight is pointed at this test. Though it is termed “narrow proportionality” is it not narrow at all. It poses a special challenge to judges. In my view, and precisely because of it, the test may develop over time – including setting standards for its application – more than the other sub-tests.

In any event – in our case – it is crystal clear that the Act is immensely beneficial. Therefore, it may be determined that the section is unconstitutional only if the infringement on Eitanit’s property rights – the other side of this equation – is so great that it eclipses the benefit.

By imposing financial obligation, section 74 infringes upon Eitanit’s right to property. Its arguments articulate three aspects that exacerbating the infringement: (1) the Act is personal; (2) the Act imposes strict liability; (3) the Act is retroactive. For each aspect, I first present the substance of the harm argued, then the actual scope of the harm: has the Act crossed the constitutional line and thus must be struck down; is the harm indeed as severe as argued or can it be mitigated by elements of the Act. This analysis will illuminate the constitutionality of the ratio between the cost and the benefit.

Personal Act

35.It is undisputed that even though the Act does not explicitly mention Eitanit, it is personal legislation as it effectively applies specifically to Eitanit.

In a broad sense, one of the basic traits of a statute, that in principle distinguishes it from other arbitrary norms, is its general application. This trait usually manifests in application over a non-specific group of subjects, or in that the statue mandates, prohibits or authorizes constant or organized conduct (aspects discussed by H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961); see also Chaim Ganz, On The Generality of Legal Norms, Iyunei Mishpat (17) 579, 579-85 (1992)). This distinction constitutes one of the differences between a law that addresses the public at large and a judicial decision that addresses a single individual. Therefore, arguably, though this is a statute enacted through the proper legislative process, substantively, it is so flawed that it infringes Eitanit’s right to property.

I respond to this with the justification for Act targeting only Eitanit. It is not a question of numbers, that is, how many are subjected to the Act, and the fewer the number, the more personal the statute. Rather, we must ask whether there is good reason for applying a statute only to a limited group. The examination must be done carefully when few are concerned, let alone when only one factory is.

What is the context around section 74? It appears there is no arbitrariness, whim, or specific persecution. The legislature prioritized a project for cleaning the Western Galilee. The section was designed to respond to a unique situation – extensive accumulations of asbestos waste, in a defined geographical area, that was created systematically by one dominant entity. Eitanit presented no arguments to the effect that this is not exclusive to the Western Galilee. It should also be noted that Eitanit enjoyed its status as a lone and dominant manufacturer in the local asbestos market.

The heart of the matter is that Eitanit’s special position is not born of legislation but of reality. Presumably, and as reflected in comparative foreign legislation, in a more sizable country, the market would include more than one player. And yet, the Israeli Act was designed to remove the waste through the shared – but not full – participation of the entity that created it and profited from it. That this is a single entity does not compromise justice or fairness. From this perspective, I do not believe that the fact that Eitanit was a single factory indicates, in constitutional terms, excessive infringement of property rights. In my opinion, these considerations mitigate the alleged harm caused by the sections lack of general application. I will also note that to the extent that Eitanit claims that the Act’s lack of general application is discriminatory, I cannot accept this argument for the reasons detailed at length above, when discussing the issue of infringement of equality.

Incidentally, the Israeli legal code already includes complete statues that are clearly personal. For instance, President Haim Weitzman Act (Retirement and Estate) 1953 sets the retirement amount that was paid to the first President’s widow. Another example is the Bank Shares Settlement Act 1993, which addressed the nationalization and privatization processes of the four big banks at the time (Leumi, HaPoalim, Discount, and Mizrahi), in light of the bank shares crisis of the 1980s. These examples support the argument that unique situations calls for unique legislation, and may even justify personal statutes.

Strict liability

36.The Petitioner points to another factor that exacerbates the infringement upon its property: the de facto strict liability standard. In other words, the legislature imposed upon Eitanit liability for polluting activity it committed in the past, though on its face these activities did not constitute breaching any duty of care at the time, and in any event no court found otherwise. Eitanit argues this aspect exacerbates the infringement upon its property rights.

It is true that on its face, strict liability raises concerns and warrants examination. In my view though, three factors mitigate, or balance out, the constitutional challenge involved in imposing strict liability.

First, the support for imposing strict liability in comparative law, which I elaborate on further below. Second, imposing strict liability in the context of removing polluters relies on weighty considerations. I mentioned justice and fairness, along with the economic rationales of deterrence and cost internalization. Another justification is the evidentiary challenges that follow from a fault-based standard, and may be avoided through a strict liability standard (see above the discussion of European and American law). Third, I believe that in this case there is a unique element that takes a little bit of the sting out of strict liability. Foreseeability is a relevant consideration when it comes to strict liability. Thus in American law, for instance, The Third Restatement of Torts explains that strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity is desirable. Activity is found to be abnormally dangerous when several cumulative conditions are met including that the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of harm, and that the activity is not one of common usage even when the actor has taken reasonable precautions (Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §20 (2010); see further Gilad, p. 1293-97). In light of this, foreseeability sets the limits of strict liability in one sense, and justifies the imposition itself, in another. It should be noted that the Restatement is not binding law in the United States, but it is considered to reflect the current state of the law and is commonly used in American case law. It is also true that in the United States, waste pollution is regulated in specialized legislation. However, in my opinion, the above is relevant for constitutional challenges to strict liability.

Jewish law may serve to clarify the point. The Mishna states, in the context of torts, that “one will always err, whether by mistake or on purpose, whether awake or asleep” (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 26a). This is a type of strict liability. Maimonides qualifies the scope of liability:

“When do we say that the person asleep must pay? When two who slept side by side, and one of them rolled over and injured the other or ripped his clothing. But if one was asleep and another joined him and lay by his side – the person coming last is the wrongdoer, and if the person asleep caused the injury, the latter would be absolved. And likewise if a pot were placed next to the sleeping person and the latter broke it, he would be absolved, as the person who placed the pot is the negligent wrongdoer” (Mishneh Torah, Book of Torts, Hilchot Chovel U’Mazzik 1, 11.)

This teaches us that if, for example, a person sleeps in another’s home by a lamp and during their sleep they strike and break it, they must break it. However, if after a person has fallen asleep, someone places the lamp by their side, and during the night the sleeping person breaks it, they are not liable for the damage. The relevance to our matter is that even with a strict liability standard, putting an object in play without the knowledge of the injuring party, may absolve them from responsibility. This approach is reminiscent of the innocent owner defense: under the CERCLA, a landowner is not liable if at the time they purchased the land they “did not know, and had no reason to know, that they had any hazardous substance” (42 U.S.C §9601(35)(A)(i)).

In our case, the material shows that Eitanit’s activity with the waste was not conducted without any foreseeability or knowledge about the harms of asbestos. I have discussed this, when examining the knowledge gaps between Eitanit and the end users. Professor Shilling’s report from 1969 detailed the health risks caused by exposure to asbestos dust, including asbestositis and cancer. An article from 1970, authored in collaboration with representatives from Eitanti’s factory, states that there is “clear awareness of health risks caused by asbestos, and the prevalence of asbestositis cases on one hand, and of cancer on the other.” A letter from 1976 by Mr. Yekutiel Federman, one of Eitanit’s controlling shareholders, addresses the scientific research of the time that discussed asbestos health risks. Additionally, Eitanit, as an employer of asbestos workers, was subject to different labor laws that acknowledged the risks caused by asbestos: defining asbestositis as a vocational disease, prohibitions against employing teens and women in asbestos factories, the requirement for periodical medical examinations, and so on.

This means, in other words, that Eitanit had a certain extent of factual foreseeability or knowledge about asbestos health risks. It should be noted, to clear any doubts, that I am not dealing here with the necessary bar to meet the burden of proof for tort, criminal or other liability. This is not the topic of discussion, nor is it the standard. We are concerned with constitutional review. The issue at hand is what the scope of harm Eitanit has been caused is, and particularly – what weight should be attributed to imposing strict liability. In this view, the indicators I have listed should not be ignored, as they demonstrate Eitanit’s foreseeability or knowledge – even some – and all to the extent relevant for the matter at hand.

As a court comes to examine whether there is constitutionality of the infringement caused by imposing financial obligations on Eitanit, I believe that even partial knowledge lessens the infringement of her property rights. Put differently, even in the absence of liability or in the existence of strict liability, the link between the liable party and the conduct still warrants scrutiny. Put differently still: had section 74 imposed liability on a different company that did not manufacture asbestos in the relevant time period, or did so but not in the Western Galilee, the concerns around section 74 would significantly multiply. And again recall that section 74 does not impose on Eitanit tort or criminal responsibility. The statute does not convict, taint, or even attribute liability to Eitanit. And the means chosen is not a fine or compensation. It is designed to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. Of course, this does not mean that the legislature may impose liability arbitrarily and as it sees fit. Therefore section 74 must be tested according to the limitations clause. We believe, as explained above, that there is a link between Eitanit and the waste that justifies the strict liability standard set in the section.

To summarize, though strict liability poses difficulties, considering the circumstances as a whole, the existence of similar standards regarding removal of dangerous buried waste in many other countries, the justification of “the polluter must pay”, the element of Eitanit’s knowledge or foreseeability about the specific harms and risks, and the type of financial obligation that is not a fine or compensation but the cost of cleaning the area in order to halt the development of serious harms to the residents and the environment, it seems that the benefits outweighs the infringement of the right.

Retroactive Legislation

37.A separate issue arises as to the temporal application of the Act. Eitanit claims that this is retroactive legislation, and therefore increases the infringement of its property rights. By this logic a retroactive statute comes into effect after conduct was complete, but changes the rules of the game for the future. The State, though, believes that the statute applies actively, and thus Eitanit’s claim is mitigated. That State’s position is that retroactive legislation cannot be precluded in every scenario. Who is correct about this? The issue of temporal application is complex. Therefore, first we generally present the relevant terms. Then we analyze the issue in the context for section 74, including the extent of harm to Eitanit.

Retroactive legislation changes for the past the legal status of activity that occurred before the legislation came into effect. Retrospective legislation changes for the future the legal consequences of activity that occurred before the legislation came into effect. Prospective legislation changes for the future the legal statues of activity that will occur after the legislation comes into effect.

To illustrate the differences, consider the following hypothetical: Reuben smokes a cigarette in a public space on January 1, 2012. At the time this was not prohibited. On February 1, 2012, a statute was enacted that imposes a steep fine on smoking in public places. If the new statute applies only on whoever smokes in public places from February 2, 2012 on, this is a prospective statute. If however, the statute stipulates that it came into effect on January 1, 2012, it is a retroactive statue. It alters the legal status of Reuben’s smoking, and subjects him to a fine. However, the statute is retrospective if it stipulates that anyone who smokes between January 1, 2012 and the day the statute was enacted did not commit any offence, but is required to participate in a class offered by the Ministry of Health about the harms of second-hand smoking. The statute did not alter for the past the legal status of Reuben’s smoking – which is not an offense – but did change for the future the consequences of his action. In this case, the unique status of a retrospective statute is obvious: the statute clarifies that Reuben did not commit an offense and the consequences he must face are not a fine or penalty, which is inconsistent with retroactive legislation. Reuben would still have to bear certain consequences for his past conduct, which is inconsistent with prospective legislation. It should be noted that this distinction, between retrospective application and retroactive application, is not acceptable by all, but has been established in the jurisprudence of this Court and in several other legal systems, such as Canada (for more on these definitions, see CA 1613/19 Arviv v. The State of Israel, IsrSC 46(2), 765 (1992); Aharon Barak Interpretation in Law, vol 2 – Legislative Interpretation, 609-45 (1994); Yoram Margaliot, Discrimination in Regulating Financial Savings and its Proposed Solution, Mishpatim 31, 529, 552-56 (2001); Yaniv Rosnai, Retroactivity: More Than Just ‘A Matter of Time’!, Law and Business 9 395 (2008); Daphne Barak-Erez Administrative Law, vol 1, 351-52 (2009)).

Another categorization that may be relevant for our purposes is active legislation: a piece of legislation that changes for the future the legal consequences of a situation that already existed the day the statute came into effect. Obviously, active legislation is closely linked to retrospective legislation. The difference between the two is that active legislation applies to situations that exist in the present, whereas retrospective legislation applies to activity that has already concluded in the past. For the hypothetical above, assume that the new statute would believe the impact of smoking in public places to leave residue for two months, and impose obligations accordingly – this is active legislation. It is another way to justify obligating whoever had smoked in a public place a month prior to the statute’s effect to participate in the course, as the hypothetical goes.

In his book, Professor Barak presents another example to illustrate the difference between retrospective application and active application. The difference depends on the purposive interpretation of the relevant statute:

“Take a new statue that stipulates that anyone convicted of an offense cannot serve as a Knesset Member. Would the term ‘anyone convicted of an offense’ point to an activity or a situation? Would applying the statute on anyone who was convicted of an offense before the law came into effect constitute retrospective application?... If the statutory purpose is to set an additional sanction – beyond the criminal sanction – for anyone convicted, then it addresses the activity that led to the conviction in the past. Applying the new law to such activity constitutes retrospective application of the statute. However, if the statutory purpose is to ensure public trust in elected officials and government institutions, then it addresses the situation of ‘convicted’. Applying the new statute on a situation that existed before the statute came into effect and continues to exist in the present does not constitute its retrospective application” (Aharon Barak Interpretation in Law, vol 2 – Legislative Interpretation, 628 (1994).

38.Equipped with these tools, where does the case before us fall? Section 74 of the Act requires Eitanit to shoulder the costs of removing waste it buried in the ground or passed on to the end users. On one hand, this is not retroactive application: the section does not change the past, and does not define Eitanit’s past conduct as an offense or as conduct that creates liability in torts. On the other hand, this is not prospective application, as we are concerned with removing existing waste and not waste that will accumulate in the future. The question is therefore whether this is active or retrospective application. On one had, arguably, this is active application: the Act addressed a current situation – waste that threatens public health. This is the State’s position. Alternatively, it can be argued that this is retrospective application: the Act changes the legal consequence of the burial and giving away that Eitanit did in the past, and imposes a new sanction on Eitanit. This is, effectively, Eitanit’s position.

The dispute between the parties is not merely theoretical, and the categorization of section 74’s temporal application holds constitutional significance, because the four main categories of temporal application – prospective, retrospective, active, and retroactive – may be organized along a “spectrum of legitimacy”. This spectrum reflects how we treat a piece of legislation. The premise for the “spectrum of legitimacy” is as such: the more the statute sends its tentacles significantly toward the past – so do more concerns come up about the statute’s legitimacy. The intuition behind this has many rationales: the rules of the game must be clearer from the outset, for reasons of justice and fairness, and the legislature should not be permitted to change them retroactively. Additionally, retroactive changing of rules compromises public trust in the legislature, limits the statute’s ability to channel future behavior, and undermines stability and certainty. It should be emphasized that a statute should not automatically struck down only for its location on the spectrum. Yet the justification for a statute’s temporal application must be more persuasive (this is not so for criminal legislation, see section 3 of the Penal Law 1977; a similar state exists in Canada: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms §11(g), in India: Constitution of India, §20(1), in South Africa: Constitution of South Africa, Chapter 2 – Bill of Rights, §35(3)(1), and in Norway: Kongeriket Norges Grunnlov, §97).

On one end of the “spectrum of legitimacy” we find prospective application. This is more acceptable because it has no impact on past actions or past situations. On the other end we find retroactive application. This application is the type most difficult to swallow because it pulls the rug from underneath activity that has already been concluded and changes its legal meaning. Active application is situated between retrospective application and prospective application, because it applies to situations that are rooted in the past but that continue into the present. Therefore, in some sense, it is more acceptable and reasonable than retrospective application, which entirely addresses actions that have ended in the past. Thus the relative importance of the issue before us, about the categorization of section 74 – retrospective or active?

I have given much thought to this question. It is true that the Act applies to an existing situation. We are concerned with removing waste that is already buried in the ground, or is used to cover it in order to create different types of surfaces (roads, pavement, etc.). In this sense, the law applies actively. Yet I believe that categorizing section 74 under active application misses the point. Recall that this is not a case where only several of the factual elements have occurred in the past. Here, all the factual elements have occurred in the past: the waste has already been buried or placed as surfaces. In such a case, I doubt whether active application in the traditional sense is appropriate (compare: CA 6066/97 The City of Tel Aviv-Yaffo v. Even Or, IsrSC 54(3) 749, 755 (2000)). Moreover, section 74 does not address the future at all. Consider, for comparison, the example by Professor Barak that I presented above, about the new law that would stipulate that anyone convicted of a crime would be excluded from serving as a Member of Knesset. Such a hypothetical statute is partly concerned with the past (people who have already been convicted), and partly concerned with the future (people who would be convicted in the future). However, section 74 is not future facing at all. It addresses asbestos waste that Eitanit buried in the distant and not so distant past. The section does not address, and neither does it purport to do so, the burial of asbestos waste going forward. This is the concern of other sections of the Act, but not section 74. It is possible, then, that we are faced with a new category – narrow active application. Going back to the “spectrum of legitimacy”, I believe section 74 and the category of narrow active application are closer to the legitimacy position of retrospective application than to that of active application. Either way, the probability that section 74 is not an obviously retroactive statute, weakens Eitanit’s claim regarding the extent of the infringement of its property rights.

Still, without deciding the theoretical question of the Act’s categorization, we must keep in mind that even were this a strictly retroactive statute – and that is certainly not the case here – it should not mean that statute must be automatically struck down. We would still need to examine the entirety of arguments, factors, and considerations regarding the statute, in light of the limitations clause, including the statutory purpose, its benefits and its infringements of protected rights (compare: HCJ 1149/95, Arko Electric Industries Ltd. v. The Mayor of the City of Rishon L’Tzion, IsrSC 54(5) 547, para 10 of Justice Strasberg-Cohen’s opinion (2000); HCJ 4562/92, Sandberg v. The Broadcast Authority, IsrSC 50(2) 793, para 33 (1996)). In other words, the analysis I have conducted so far regarding temporal application is yet another consideration in the cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, another consideration but not a decisive one.

In my view, balancing benefit against the infringement of rights, there are three considerations that support the former and tip the scale against the harm caused by the statute’s retroactive application. Again, I do not believe this is per se retroactive application, but for purposes of convenience and brevity I will so term it. Of course this is not merely a matter of convenience: section 74 and its unique formulation, reeks of retroactivity, even if it should not be categorized as such.

As for the first consideration, my position above regarding the element of foreseeability characterizes Eitanit’s conduct to a certain extent. This has implications not just for issue of strict liability, but also for that of retroactivity. United States courts, as explained, interpreted CERCLA as having retroactive application, even though this is not explicit in its language, and though American law has a rebuttable presumption against retroactive application. One reason for this interpretation was linked to the foreseeability element: “While the generator defendants profited from inexpensive wasted disposal method that may have been technically ‘legal’ prior to CERCLA’s enactment… it was certainly foreseeable at the time that improper disposal could cause enormous damage to the environment.” (U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F. 2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988))

Put differently, while it is true that waste removal activity was formalistically permitted at the time, it was still possible even then to expect that such activity would cause grave harm to the health of residents and to the environment. In other words, foreseeability or awareness of the harm is some justification for imposing “retroactive” liability. We see a similar line of thinking in Holland, as I explained above. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that a law from 1982 applies retroactively from January 1, 1975 onward. This date was chosen because starting then every polluter should have been aware that it was likely to be liable for polluting. Therefore, foreseeability or expectation of harm – not in the criminal or civil sense, but for the purposes of constitutional review – may justify retroactive application.

This is coupled with a second consideration: the extreme harm to the public. This risk is not reduced over time, and it must be addressed. Doing so increases the social benefit that comes out of section 74, even if it holds quasi-retroactive elements. Ignoring the risk caused by asbestos amounts to exposing citizens to a ticking time bomb. No wonder the legislature seeks solutions. Removing asbestos waste is an urgent priority. Failing to do so is not an option – “You shall not overlook” (Leviticus 22, 3). Regardless, the responsibility for an asbestos hazard already created will be quasi-retroactive. Therefore the question is not whether to impose retroactive liability, but whom to impose it upon (including the option of distributing costs between different parties). Of the options to impose financial obligations on the polluting corporation and imposing it on the public, fairness requires that we opt for the former. Indeed, the Israeli legislature’s solution, regulated through section 74, is designed so that at most only half of the expenses are placed on Eitanit.

Regarding the third consideration, we turn again to comparative law. Many countries – though not all of them – have recognized retroactive application. This position, as explained above, is primarily justified by fairness and necessity.

I am not ignorant to the fact that in terms of section 74 there is some link, perhaps even intermingling, of the concerns about retroactivity with the concerns about strict liability. This is understandable. As far as the infringement of Eitanit’s property right, retroactivity and strict liability walk hand in hand. The two, together and separately, raise concerns about imposing financial burdens on Eitanit for actions that were not impermissible when taken, and were not even found to constitute a breach of any duty of care. Ultimately, we must look into the details of section 74. This examination reveals that, on one hand, there is no finding of fault, but on the other hand, there are policy reasons, as mentioned, that warrant the conclusion that the infringement is outweighed by the benefits.

39.For the purposes of the third sub-test, the narrow proportionality test, three of Eitanit’s arguments were emphasized for the difficulties they create: personal legislation, strict liability, and retroactive application. Having analyzed each of these arguments independently, it appears the extent of the harm is not as great as initially thought. The additional conclusion is that Eitanit failed to demonstrate that the infringement upon its property rights surpasses section 74’s extensive benefit to the public.

Remarks Before Summarizing

40.Before I finish applying the limitations clause to this case, I should emphasize two important points. These were weaved throughout the constitutional analysis, but it would be appropriate to bring them to the fore of the discussion in order to acknowledge their significance.

The first point is the comparative law one. We are concerned with a legal area completely new to Israeli law. The issues raised here, were raised in similar dress in many other countries. Asbestos, as a member in the group of dangerous and polluting materials, is a problem that crosses borders. When a court subjects a case like this to constitutional review, I believe there is significance to the fact that many countries have walked a similar path to that of section 74. Caution is warranted when looking abroad as the Israeli system is independent. 65 years from the country’s founding, Israeli law can be seen as a dynamic creation with a life of its own. Israeli law defines the question, and supplies the answer. However, beyond the fact that this is an issue common to Israel and to other countries, I have not seen the matter to be unique – certainly not clearly or obviously – to Israel and distinct from that in other countries around the world. This is not to say that the State has absolved itself by demonstrating that the statue legislated here is consistent with international consensus. But by the same token, it cannot be said that comparative law is an irrelevant consideration, particularly when it reveals that other countries’ constitutional jurisprudence regarding similar statutes enriches our constitutional discussion. The project of comparison supports the state’s argument that section 74 is constitutional. This is a factor that should be taken into account here (and see CA 1326/07 Hammer v. Amit, para. 34 of Deputy President Rivlin’s opinion (May 28, 2012), re wrongful birth). However, this is certainly no substitution for independent constitutional review under section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

Substantively, the above review of the legal state in Western countries reveals one clear point: that a standard of strict liability is common and acceptable in the context of removing dangerous and polluting materials. Thus in the United States, where the courts found the legislative intent behind CERCLA was to establish a strict liability standard. The European Union’s Directive, the ELD, recommends imposing strict liability on harm caused by dangerous activities listed in the third annexure. This type of liability was de facto imposed in Sweden, France, Holland, Germany (to some extent), Finland and the United Kingdom. This is also the case in many other countries that are not members of the European Union, such as Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. Retroactivity is less common, compared to strict liability, but it exists, too. In the United States CERCLA’s retroactivity passed judicial review. So did the statutes of British Columbia. Some European states adopted retroactivity as well, including Spain, the United Kingdom, and Holland (to some extent).

We have seen the commonalities. We have noted that they are material. To the relevance of this, I move onto the second point. We are concerned with constitutional review, rather than administrative. The test is not reasonableness, but the limitations clause in section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The range of possibilities is broader, though in order to remain within this range a statute must meet the specific conditions the legislature set in the limitations clause. A court is aware of its own limits, but also of its responsibility. As noted, there is no single legislative fix for a legal problem. But in our case, it was possible to reach a statutory framework that would have passed constitutional review. Section 8 is the key. In our case, my opinion is that the State is correct that the legislature overcame all the obstacles.

Summary

41.The petition before us focused on the constitutionality of section 74 of the Asbestos Act, and of the project it launched to remove asbestos waste from the Western Galilee.

First, we must locate the rights infringed. My conclusion is that section 74, with which we are concerned, infringes Eitanit’s property rights. Indeed, the State conceded this right is infringed. Still, I do not believe that section 74 discriminates against Eitanit compared with other entities: the legislature did not obligate Eitanit to pay for final asbestos-cement products that were discarded by the end users, nor for asbestos waste that originated from other factories’ manufacturing processes. The “waste population” that is, the waste to which section 74 applies, includes only the industrial waste that came from the production processes in Eitanit’s factory.

In this context, I explained why Eitanit’s participation in removing the waste that was used for covering surfaces is justified over that of the end users. I believe there is a significant and relevant difference between Eitanit and the end users, which is based on three tests: the awareness test – Eitanit had an obvious advantage in knowledge compared to the end users. For decades Eitanit was Israel’s primary importer, manufacturer and marketer of asbestos. By virtue of this position Eitanit was familiar with the scientific research on asbestos risks and was also subject to the different statutory obligations that reflected these health risks. Under the control test, Eitanit is the manufacturer while the end users were the consumers or customers. As a manufacturer, Eitanit controlled the production of waste and its distribution, and in any event there is much logic in placing the financial burden on it. Under the profit test, there is clear justification for requiring the corporation that produces asbestos, and which more than any other entity had profited from the activity that caused the polluting hazard, to shoulder the costs of removal. All these reasons hold even more force in terms of the distinction between Eitanit and the local authorities, which do not even constitute “end users.”

Once I have concluded that Eitanit’s right to property was infringed, the issue became whether the infringement could pass muster under the limitations clause of section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The comparative law in the background of this analysis was reviewed at length, among others because this is a novel legal issue that carries clear universal aspects and because no unique characteristics were presented for the Israeli context. Another point that should be emphasized is that we are charged with constitutional review, not administrative review. This influences the breadth of the Knesset’s discretion.

I first clarified that the infringement was made through primary legislation, that is, a statute that the Knesset passed appropriately and legally. Eitanit’s argument that this is not a “statute” for the purposes of the limitations clause because it is a personal statute is incorrect. It is a formal test that inquires mainly whether the infringement upon basic rights was made in primary legislation or according to such legislation. In this case, the answer is in the affirmative.

In the next step we explore the purpose of section 74. The sections’ primary purpose is to launch a project for the removal of asbestos from the Western Galilee. This is encompassed in the statute’s broader purpose: minimizing asbestos hazards in Israel. There is no doubt that this is an important and worthy purpose, befitting the values of the State of Israel. Indeed, it appears even Eitanit does not dispute this. I tend to think that this is the sole purpose of the statute. However, the State articulates another purpose: realizing the principle of “the polluter must pay.” I, myself, believe that this principle justifies the funding mechanism selected in the Act, rather than its purpose. Yet for the sake of a comprehensive analysis I assumed that “the polluter must pay” was a secondary purpose of the Act. Here, too, I find this to be an appropriate and befitting purpose: “the polluter must pay” principle relies on important and worthy rationales – efficiency considerations, cost internalization, justice and fairness – and it is even reflected in Jewish law and an array of recent pieces of legislation in Israel.

Is the means selected in section 74 proportional? I first examined the issue of the rational connection, in terms of each of the two purposes. As for the primary purpose, the link between the means and the end are obvious: the project directly leads to achieving the end of cleaning asbestos waste from the Western Galilee. As for the secondary purpose – “the polluter must pay” – here, again, I find a fit between the means and the end: placing financial obligations on Eitanit, which profited from burying the waste or passing it on to the end users, achieves the end of “the polluter must pay.” Even the legislature’s choice to impose a kind of retroactive and strict liability advances the principle of “the polluter must pay,” primarily from the perspective of justice and fairness.

The next step is the least restrictive means test. Here, the main alternative that Eitanit proposed is the self-performance, that is, that Eitanit or a contractor it would hire would remove the waste independently. However this option was already discussed by Eitanit and the State for a long period of time and was ultimately rejected. Under such circumstances I was not persuaded that the self-performance alternative would achieve the purpose behind section 74 – cleaning the Western Galilee from asbestos waste. Additionally, from a positive perspective, the mechanism the legislature opted for incorporates checks and balances that limit the harm to Eitanit. Eitanit would not be required to fund more than half of the removal project’s estimated costs, and in any event no more than NIS 150m. The funding mechanism insures that this is not a fine or compensation, but rather a fund dedicated to removing the waste. The removal project is limited to a radius of 15KM around the factory, and in any case there is a mechanism for checking and monitoring the length of the project, which allows Eitanit to challenge any requirement to pay for specific waste piles.

The final step is the narrow proportionality test. In this context I emphasized three points at the heart of Eitanit’s claims. On the generality issue, it is undisputed that section 74 specifically targets Eitanit, and Eitanit alone (aside from the State and the local authorities.) Only that the focus on Eitanit is not a whim that took over the legislature, but an outcome of the reality that was created by Eitanit itself. The section was designed to address a unique situation: a large amount of waste, in a defined geographical area, created systematically by one dominant entity – Eitanit.

On the issue of strict liability, it is true that on its face this is a harsh standard that raises questions and concerns. However, three considerations alleviate these difficulties. First, there are weighty justifications for strict liability, primarily justice and fairness, deterrence and cost internalization, as well as the evidentiary challenges of a fault-based standard. Second, there is support for strict liability in many European countries, in the United States, and in other countries. Third, a certain extent of factual expectation or awareness by Eitanit regarding the risks of asbestos (of course, not in the tort or criminal sense.)

Finally, in the issue of the Act’s temporal application, my conclusion is that the Act carries a narrow active application. Though it does apply to an existing state of affairs, there is no active application in the regular sense. All the factual elements have materialized completely in the past and section 74 does not at all address the future. Regardless, even if this was a completely retroactive statute – this is not a determinative factor, but merely another consideration in the constitutional fabric. At this point I discussed three mitigating elements: first, the expectation or knowledge element regarding the risk. Second, the scope of the risk; the finding that failure to treat the asbestos waste leaves many citizens exposed to a ticking time bomb in terms of their health. We cannot leave things as they are. In weighing imposing costs on Eitanit against imposing costs on the public, Eitanit’s connection to the waste as its producer puts the thumb on the scale, or at least allows for it. And third, the support for imposing retroactive liability in the United States and in other countries (such as Spain and Britain.)

We cannot ignore the infringement on Eitanit’s rights, or that the legislature created a new regime. However, it is my view that the infringement upon Eitanit’s constitutional rights – as an outcome of section 74 – passes the tests of the limitations clause.

Final Thoughts

42.Such is the way of the law. It is challenged by an ever-changing reality that requires the legislature to find solutions for problems that in one way or another threaten society. To achieve this purpose, occasionally there is need to design statutes that rely on new perspectives on legal principles. This was also the case in the past, and we shall present several examples of this.

The common law found it difficult to find legal justification to impose upon a stranger the duty to assist another person in distress. Still, for certain circumstances where official rescue services are far removed, the law has created obligations to rescue, for example the duty to save lives at sea, imposed on ships passing by (Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C.P.D. 295, 304-305 (1880); The Beaver, 3 Chr. Rob. 292 (1801); Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy, The Law of the Sea and Human Rights, 1 Panoptica Vitoria 1, 4-5 (2007)). Another example is the possibility of filing class action suits. Given the concern that absent a primary injured party who suffered damages in substantial amounts injuring parties would continue their harmful behavior, the law has developed this new procedural tool and recognized the possibility to file suit on behalf of a large group of injured parties. The novelty is both in the legal possibility to create a group of plaintiffs, who in large part did not express any position on the matter, and in the economical consequences even for a strong defendant (see the Class Action Act, 2006). Another example is the development of corporate law, on different levels. First, the recognition of a corporation’s independent status as a separate legal entity and the elimination of stock holders’ personal liability was a legal novelty and was a significant incentive to use the legal tool of incorporation. Later in legal history the pendulum swung back, to some extent. The legislature began imposing various obligations on the organs and office holders of corporations, such as duties of care and trust, based on understanding the web of interests that dictate their actions (Irit Haviv-Segal, Corporate Law, chapter 10 (2007); P. M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 American Journal of Legal History, 237 (2010)).

As we can see, the law has gone through an evolution. To fit the it to reality, laws were passed that on their face strayed from the legal norms that were familiar and entrenched up to that point. It seems that our case, too, as part of Israel’s new environmental legislation, joins this list. The great potential for harm that asbestos waste causes and the complexity of the issue demand a solution that does not move on the currently acceptable axis of tort liability. As a rule, finding solutions to intricate problems is not necessarily a legal compromise in the sense of giving in. This is how the law advances. Hand in hand, in the constitutional era of recognizing rights, it is the role of the Court to make sure that the legislature’s selected solution meets the constitutional standards of the limitations clause. The mere existence of a problem does not open the gate for any solution. Judicial work is subtle, but necessary. In a constitutional regime, one would hope that the legislature would exercise better care. It would be aware that Basic Laws look over its shoulder “watches through the windows, peeking through the cracks (Song of Songs 2, 9.) It would strive to withstand constitutional review. This hope does not always materialize. In our case, section 74 includes elements that reflect the legislature’s attempt to meet constitutional standards. This attempt has been successful.

43.Ultimately, I would propose to my colleagues to reject the petition, and under the circumstances and the merits to require Eitanit to pay costs and attorneys’ fees as follows: for respondents 1, 3 and 4 together a sum of NIC 100,000; to respondent 5 and respondents 6-7, a sum of NIS 70,000 for the entire group; and for respondent 2 a sum of NIS 25,000.

 

___________________

Justice

 

 

 

President A. Grunis

I concur.

 

 

___________________

President

 

 

 

 

 

Justice T. Zylbertal

I concur.

 

 

___________________

Justice

 

 

Decided according to the judgment of Justice N. Hendel.

 

Handed down today, April 2, 2013.

 

 

 

 

 

 

ACUM v. EMI

Case/docket number: 
CA 5365/11
Date Decided: 
Tuesday, September 3, 2013
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.] 

 

In 2004 the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority determined that the activity of ACUM (a corporation that operates to manage its members’ copyrights in musical works in Israel) constitutes a monopoly on managing copyright over musical works. In 2011 the Antitrust Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) approved the activity of ACUM as a cartel, subject to a series of requirements (“the permanent requirements”), which would be in force for five years starting from the date of their approval. The disputes at the center of the appeals related to the requirement that at least a third of ACUM’s board of directors consist of external directors (the ACUM appeal) and the requirement regarding the exclusion of rights in a work from management by ACUM. It was argued that the mechanism was overly narrow, as consent of all joint owners of a work is necessary for exclusion, or for segmentation under the four specific categories that permit partial exclusion of the rights (the EMI Israel appeal).

 

The Supreme Court (opinion written by Justice D. Barak-Erez, Justice Z. Zylbertal and Justice E. Rubinstein concurring) dismissed both appeals on the following grounds –

 

The requirements for ACUM’s operation should balance the authors’ property rights in their works with the public interest in a market free of monopolistic effects, a unique interest when in the context of a market of works, which inherently must be accessible to the public (albeit for payment). The analysis focused on two issues: the requirement to appoint public directors and the scope of the rights exclusion mechanism. Both should be examined from the unique perspective that combines the purpose of copyright law with that of antitrust law, considering the balance that both fields of law must achieve between individual property rights and economic interests, on the one hand, and the general public interest, on the other hand.

 

Regarding the requirement that at least a third of appointed members to the board of directors be external public directors (the practical meaning of which was the appointment of a total of four such directors), ACUM failed in its challenges to both the requirement itself and the number of external directors it was obligated to appoint.

 

The appointment of public directors is one of the mechanisms that facilitates supervising a company’s conduct and that of its directors and controlling shareholders. It helps deal with the various representative problems associated with its activity. Their appointment also adds a professional dimension to the company that would increase its adequate management; the appointment of public directors to ACUM’s board is consistent with the purpose of the cartel’s approval. Although ACUM is not a public company, it effectively manages a resource that has clear public aspects, and in fact those aspects of ACUM’s activity are the basis for the cartel's approval. At the same time ACUM’s monopolistic characteristics and its status as a cartel in the copyright of musical works per se grant it a public dimension. The requirement to appoint public directors to provide another layer of supervision over ACUM’s activity is therefore warranted by and inherent to the rationale of the cartel’s approval from the point of view of protecting both authors and users. The Court added that making the cartel’s approval subject to the appointment of public directors, even when a public corporation in the ordinary sense is not involved, has already been done in the past, for example with respect to the recycling corporation. Moreover, the public directors might represent cross-group interests that carry broader considerations as to the general interest of artists as a whole, rather than representing the interest of certain artists groups, which may conflict. Moreover, without laying down rigid rules, there is prima facie basis for the argument that the importance of a public director is in fact greater in a corporation like ACUM, which is not led by a clear control group and has diverse ownership.

 

In fact, ACUM itself also acknowledged the advantages of appointing public directors, and the updated language in its articles of incorporation now requires the appointment of two public directors. The basic aspect of the dispute, which had to a certain extent become one of extent and degree, had thereby been somewhat resolved. In this respect, the Court believed that the proportion of directors that was fixed – one third of the total members of the board – was not excessive or unreasonable, considering the character of ACUM as a corporation with diverse ownership and especially in light of the concern for abuse that always exists regarding a cartel.

 

Under the circumstances, there is no need to rule on whether ACUM should be regarded as a hybrid entity, and in any event a complete discussion of the criteria for recognizing an entity as such is unnecessary.  However, it is not superfluous to note that ACUM’s activity does fit many of the factors mentioned in case law as indicative of a hybrid entity. Those factors, even if insufficient to categorize ACUM as a hybrid entity in the ordinary sense of the term, do shed further light on the basic justification of the Director-General’s requirement. Although the appointment of public directors is not ordinarily considered one of a hybrid entity’s duties, the fact that ACUM is an entity that owes important duties to the public can serve as a factor in how the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority exercises power when subjecting a cartel to requirements.

 

Two questions were at the root of the dispute regarding the requirements about the rights exclusion mechanism. First, whether the requirement for consent by all joint owners of a work in order to exclude it from ACUM’s catalog is justified or whether that power should be held individually by each of the artists; and secondly, how delicate and precise should the “segmentation” mechanism be in the scope of the exclusion ability, in light of distinctions between a work’s different types of use.

 

As a point of departure it can be assumed that works of the type that ACUM manages are often ones to which several artists share the rights. Conditioning exclusion upon the consent of all rights owners will undoubtedly burden the individual artist who seeks to exclude her own work. However, this is not an undue burden considering the purpose of the permanent permit.

 

The most important tool available to ACUM in the collective management of the rights is the grant of a sweeping license, known as a “blanket license,” which permits the licensee to use ACUM’s entire catalog. From the perspective of transaction costs, the advantages of a blanket license are the primary reason for ACUM’s activity, despite the conflicts with antitrust law. Given the typical ownership structure of a musical work, an exclusion ability that is not conditional upon the consent of other owners effectively means that a single author, regardless of their role in creating the work, may exclude the entire work from ACUM’s blanket license system.  Thus, a user who wishes to make lawful use of the work would have to negotiate with the excluding author in addition to acquiring the blanket license from ACUM.  Such a state of affairs would greatly limit the benefit the cartel provides the user public to the point that it is doubtful whether the cartel is indeed “in the public interest” in terms of section 9 of the Antitrust Law. Furthermore, accepting that consent by all joint owners of the work is not necessary in order to exclude it might also allow for some of the artists’ opportunistic exploitation of the exclusion, creating “extortion” or “free-riding” problems.

 

Ultimately, even in the narrow exclusion regime joint artists can contractually regulate the scope of the work’s exclusion from collective management in advance. Indeed, the narrow exclusion regime merely provides the default for the inclusion of a joint work in ACUM’s catalog. Insofar as the authors wish to regulate decision-making differently in managing joint works, they are at liberty to do so. Presumably such an arrangement, which would be made in a timely manner and before any of the parties is in a position to potentially exploit or become a free rider, would help to limit the coordination challenges in obtaining consent for excluding joint work, as detailed by EMI Israel and Anana. Therefore, the default prescribed – that in the absence of agreement to the contrary between owners of rights in a joint work, all of their consent is necessary in order to exclude it from management by ACUM – is a proper one.

 

Finally, the Court considered the rights exclusion mechanism that enables artists to exclude their rights in some – rather than all – uses but only in one of four specific alternatives – “exclusion packages” that make limited “segmentation” possible according to types of use. The dispute between the parties revolved around the precision of the necessary segmentation. While the current segmentation mechanism essentially distinguishes between audio and audio-visual uses, EMI Israel (supported by Anana) also wished to distinguish between use in “old media” – like television and radio – and use in “new media” – like Internet and cellular phone services.

 

Here, the Court held that the exclusion mechanism approved by the Tribunal should be upheld, subject to the question of excluding “new media” – on conditions and restraints – being comprehensively reviewed during the cartel approval’s renewal proceeding.

 

The distinction between “new” media and “old” media raises fundamental and practical difficulties. The issue is a developing one and more experience and study are necessary to achieve a proper balance. The world of communications is characterized by constant, rapid technological development. In light of this reality the distinction between “old media” and “new media” is not a binary dichotomy, nor is it permanent or stable.

 

Reviewing the implications of excluding “new media” shows that there is not necessarily any justification for completely prohibiting excluding works from “new media” uses. Nevertheless, there are clear indicators that the same applies only to a limited exclusion mechanism, which focuses on certain types of “new media” uses and strives to minimize harm to users. Such exclusion mechanisms cannot be based merely on the technological distinction between “old media” and “new media” and allow a sweeping exclusion of all uses of the latter, as EMI Israel and Anana propose. In any event, examining the possibility of another “new media” exclusion category and fashioning the boundaries of that category should be done with care after studying interested parties’ positions about the issue and all the relevant facts. As mentioned, this is a matter that the Antitrust Tribunal ought to consider when the extension of the cartel’s approval comes before it. This position is also supported by a factor that concerns the temporary nature of the approval – for only five years. At the end of that period (two years of which have already elapsed), the Tribunal will reconsider approving the cartel, at which time it can also reconsider the extent of the exclusion mechanism’s “segmentation,” in light of the five years’ experience gained with a “narrow” exclusion mechanism. International experience could also enrich the set of information available to the Tribunal.

 

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeals, deciding not to intervene in the requirements attached to the cartel’s approval. Currently, the requirements for the permanent permit, including those challenged in the appeals, are all necessary to dispel the concerns naturally raised by a cartel concerning the collective management of copyright. These conditions are necessary to ensure that the cartel’s benefit to the public does indeed exceed the harm perceived from it. At the same time, the possibility remains that the proper balance between the rights of authors and the general public interest might in the future dictate a result different from that reached by the Tribunal in terms of integrating the distinction between different types of “new media” and “old media” in the rights exclusion mechanism.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting As a Court of Civil Appeals

CA 5365/11

CA 5489/11

 

Before:

His Honor, Justice E. Rubinstein

His Honor, Justice Z. Zylbertal

Her Honor, Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

 

 

 

The Appellant in CA 5365/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5489/11:

 

ACUM – The Association of Composers

 

 

v.

 

 

The Appellant in CA 5489/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5365/11:

 

EMI Music Publishing Ltd

 

 

v.

 

 

The Respondents:

1. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority

 

2. The Association of Restaurants in Israel

 

3. Partner Communications Company

 

4. The Association of Function Hall & Garden Owners

 

5. Golden Channels

 

6. Matav Cable Communication Systems

 

7. Tevel Israel International Communications

 

8. Anana Ltd

 

9. EMI Music Publishing Ltd

       

 

Appeals against the judgment of the Antitrust Tribunal in Jerusalem on June 2, 2011 in AC 513/04 by Her Honor Judge N. Ben-Or

 

Date of Session:

Nisan 3, 5773 (March 14, 2013)

 

 

On behalf of the Appellant in CA 5365/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5489/11:

Adv. Uri Sorek, Adv. Assaf Neuman

 

 

On behalf of the Appellant in CA 5489/11 and the Ninth Respondent in CA 5365/11:

Adv. Michelle Keynes

 

 

 

 

 

On behalf of the First Respondent:

Adv. Uri Schwartz, Adv. Yael Sheinin, Adv. Elad Mekdasi

 

 

On behalf of the Third Respondent:

Adv. Eyal Sagi, Adv. Amir Vang

 

 

On behalf of the Fourth to Seventh Respondents:

Exempt from appearance and representation

 

 

On behalf of the Eighth Respondent:

Adv. Ronit Amir-Yaniv, Adv. Ido Hitman

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

1.         Which principles should guide the activity of ACUM with regard to the management of copyright in musical works in Israel? This question has been presented to us in full force against the background of the finding by the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority that ACUM’s activity creates a cartel, in order to review the conditions prescribed for the approval of the cartel in a way that will balance the rights of authors with the general interest of works being used in public.

 

Background and Previous Proceedings

 

2.         “The Association of Composers, Authors and Publishers,” known as ACUM, is a corporation that operates in order to manage the copyright of its members – lyricists, composers, arrangers, translators, and others – in Israel. ACUM members transfer their rights in their works to it, whilst ACUM acts on their behalf in order to license the use of those works in consideration for royalties that it collects for its members. Ordinarily, the licenses that ACUM grants are sweeping licenses ("blanket licenses") that permit licensees to make use of the whole repertoire of works managed by ACUM (mainly by making them accessible to the public in various ways). In addition, ACUM is bound by agreements with foreign copyright collective management entities (hereinafter "affiliates"), by virtue of which it administers in Israel the rights that are managed by the affiliates abroad.

 

3.         On April 30, 2004 the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (hereinafter "the Director-General") published a ruling pursuant to section 34(a)(1) of the Antitrust Law, 5748-1988 (hereinafter "the Antitrust Law" or "the Law") according to which ACUM’s activity involves the creation of cartels (both between ACUM members and between ACUM and the affiliates) and a declaration under section 26(a) of the Law that ACUM’s activity as a cartel creates a monopoly in the market of managing copyright in musical works (or more precisely, with regard to management of  broadcasting, public performance, copying, recording, and synchronization rights in those works). The decision was made by the then Director-General, Mr. Dror Strom. However, it also reflects the position of the officers who have succeeded him, Ms. Ronit Kan and currently, Prof. David Gilo, as detailed below. Reference to the position of the Antitrust Authority will henceforth be made without specifically referring to those successors, using the general title – the Director-General.

 

4.         At that stage, ACUM instigated legal proceedings before the Antitrust Tribunal (hereinafter "the Tribunal") – an appeal against the determination of the Director-General that its activity involves cartels (AT 512/04) or, alternatively, an application for the approval of a cartel in accordance with sections 7 and 9 of the Antitrust Law, on the grounds that the cartel's approval is necessary in the public interest (AT 513/04). Both proceedings were heard together. Subsequently, to ACUM’s request, the appeal it filed was withdrawn, leaving only its application for approval of the cartel. The Director-General did not oppose the cartel's approval considering the public importance involved in ACUM's activity, as explained below, but the Tribunal was moved to set conditions to the approval so as to protect not only the public interest but also the individual rights of authors.

 

5.         To make its continued activity possible until completion of the litigation, ACUM filed a request for a provisional permit for operation of the cartel. The Tribunal granted the request and on December 28, 2004 it granted a provisional permit for ACUM’s activity subject to certain conditions (hereinafter "the Provisional Permit"). As detailed below, those conditions regulated, inter alia, situations in which authors could exclude rights in certain works from ACUM’s management so that those authors, rather than ACUM, would themselves deal with granting licenses to exercise those rights (hereinafter "the Exclusion Mechanism"). Over the years the Provisional Permit was extended from time to time based on of the Director-General’s recommendation, various amendments and modifications introduced to its terms. The last of those provisional permits (before the Tribunal's judgment), granted on February 24, 2009, introduced several significant changes, including making the Exclusion Mechanism "tougher," as detailed below.

 

6.         In addition to the position of the Director-General, oppositions to the cartel's approval were filed to the Tribunal by several other entities, including the Association of Function Hall & Garden Owners, Partner Communications Company (hereinafter "Partner"), the Association of Restaurants in Israel, and several cable companies – Golden Channels, Matav and Tevel (hereinafter "the cable companies") (whose activity has since been consolidated).

 

7.         At a later stage, an application to join the proceedings was made by two publishers that represent authors, the publishers themselves being members of ACUM – Anana Ltd (hereinafter "Anana") and EMI Music Publishing (Israel) Ltd (hereinafter "EMI Israel"). Those applications, like the time when they were made, were explained by the changes that had been made to the Provisional Permit’s conditions on February 24, 2009 as regards the Exclusion Mechanism. On December 1, 2009, the Tribunal partially allowed the applicants to join the proceedings in the sense that it permitted each of the two applicants to file a brief document with reference to the conditions that were acceptable to them and to make summations without extending the existing factual basis of the discussion.

 

8.         In its decision of January 25, 2009, the Tribunal stated that by consent of the parties it would rule based on the parties’ summations and supplemental oral arguments, without hearing evidence. The decision further stated that all of the parties agreed to ACUM's approval as a cartel, and took issue merely with regard to the terms of that approval. Consequently, the conditions of the Provisional Permit of February 24, 2009 (hereinafter "the Provisional Conditions") would serve as point of reference for the parties' positions. Accordingly, each of the parties filed its reservations regarding the Provisional Conditions in such manner that enabled the Tribunal to decide which of the conditions would be adopted as is within the permanent conditions, and which would be modified.

 

9.         On June 2, 2011 the Tribunal approved ACUM’s activity as a cartel, subject to a series of conditions (hereinafter "the Permanent Conditions"), which would remain in force for five years from the date of their approval. The Tribunal stated that the basic premise for reviewing the parties' arguments with regard to the conditions was that the anticipated benefit from the cartel substantially exceeded the damage likely to be caused by it, as required by section 10 of the Antitrust Law. In this context, it was explained that ACUM’s activity benefited not only its members – copyright owners (hereinafter "the authors") but also the general public who uses the works it manages (hereinafter "the users"): on the one hand, the sweeping licenses permit the users to make use of the whole repertoire of works that ACUM holds, thereby sparing the public from having to locate the owners of various rights and to negotiate individually with each of them; on the other hand, the sweeping licenses also benefit the authors since they streamline (and, to a great extent, enable) collection of royalties and enforcement of their rights.

 

10.       Since all parties agreed on principle to the approval of the cartel, the Tribunal hearing focused on the nature of the conditions to which the approval should be subject in order to dispel concern as to its abuse with regard to authors or users. The point of departure for the hearing was, as aforesaid, the Provisional Conditions, some of which were agreed upon by all parties, whilst others were in dispute. The disputes on which the appeal before us focuses pertain to the conditions prescribing the extent of the duty owed by ACUM to appoint external directors and the extent of ACUM members’ ability to exclude their rights from its management, as detailed below.

 

11.       Other controversies, including those concerning the definition of acts that would be construed as an abuse of ACUM's position and the way in which ACUM should act in taking legal action against users, were ultimately not considered by us since only few of the arguments concerning them were raised within the written appeal, while the arguments before us did not in fact concentrate on them.

 

12.       The appointment of external directors – the position of the Director-General was that a condition should be added to the Permanent Conditions to the effect that ACUM should appoint external directors in a proportion of no less than one third of the total members of its board and those directors would be responsible for the internal plan to enforce antitrust law that ACUM is obliged to implement (in accordance with section 10 of the Provisional Conditions). ACUM objected to this requirement, on the grounds, inter alia, that it is not a public company where the appointment of external directors is necessary in order to protect minority rights, and in any event ACUM's articles of association ensure due representation for each category of its members, and even guarantee numerical balance between the categories.

 

13.       The Tribunal accepted the Director-General's position on this matter, noting that a corporation for the collective management of copyright naturally raises concern as to the abuse of power against the authors themselves. Appointing a substantial number of external directors and entrusting them with the internal enforcement plan, it was held, would help deal with that concern, especially considering the fact that the corporation's members are dispersed and lack management expertise. The Tribunal also attributed importance to the fact that from ACUM's position in the proceedings it appeared that ACUM itself acknowledged the need to appoint external directors and was willing to do so even before the Tribunal’s judgment in order to reinforce the "managerial, professional, economic character of ACUM's board of directors".

 

14.       The extent of ACUM members’ ability to exclude rights from ACUM’s management – the Provisional Permit that ACUM had originally obtained (in 2004) included, in section 2.3 of the Provisional Conditions, a mechanism permitting a member to give notice "at any time, of his desire to assume all or any of the copyright with regard to any of his works, with regard to all users or specific categories of users," such that the works included in the notice would cease to be part of ACUM's repertoire, and copyright ownership would revert to the notifying member (hereinafter "the broad exclusion mechanism"). Underlying this mechanism was the concept that a “liberal” option to exclude any right in a work, even specifically, would intensify competition and increase the authors' power against ACUM. Later on, based on the experience accrued from the implementation of this arrangement, the Antitrust Authority reached the conclusion that the broad exclusion mechanism was not yielding the anticipated results with regard to enhancing market competition, and in contrast was aggravating the concern for abuse of the exclusion ability. For example, it turned out, according to the Director-General, that the broad exclusion mechanism that enabled interested authors, inter alia, to exclude from ACUM's management merely the use of "new media" (such as mobile phones and the Internet) and to leave it with the power to grant sweeping licenses for broadcasting rights only in "traditional media" (like television and radio), might undermine the justification for ACUM's existence as a corporation whose purpose is to reduce the substantial transaction costs involved in individually contracting with each of the authors. Accordingly, in 2009 the exclusion mechanism in section 2.3 of the Provisional Conditions was limited in two ways: first, the Provisional Conditions provided that an exclusion notice could only be given with the consent of all joint authors in a collective work whose exclusion was sought (for example, the lyricist, the composer of the music, and the arranger); second, it was provided that partial exclusion, namely exclusion of some of the uses of the work, could only be done in accordance with four "exclusion baskets" concerning different categories of use (hereinafter "the narrow exclusion mechanism"): presentation of the work in an audio format (for example radio broadcasting); its presentation in an audio-visual format (for example in a television program); copying the work; and recording it. The narrow exclusion mechanism therefore did not permit the author to exclude the work in various formats at his discretion, as specifically chosen by him (for example, excluding the work's use only with regard to mobile phones).

 

15.       The Director-General's position, joined by ACUM, Partner, and the cable companies on this issue, was that the narrow exclusion mechanism should be included in the Permanent Conditions. In contrast, EMI Israel and Anana believed that the broad exclusion mechanism should be adopted with regard to both aspects that distinguish it from the narrow exclusion mechanism and they challenged both the requirement for unanimous consent of all authors of a joint work and the restriction of exclusion according to "exclusion baskets."

 

16.       EMI Israel pleaded that the narrow exclusion mechanism improperly infringed on the constitutional property rights of the authors it represented, both because the predefined "exclusion baskets" limit the prerogative of the right’s owner to permit or prohibit certain uses of his work, and because the vast majority of musical works managed by ACUM are jointly owned by several authors. Under these circumstances, it was argued, making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of the other owners in fact negates the ability of a given author to permit or prohibit the use of his work. EMI Israel further asserted that adopting the narrow exclusion mechanism would compromise the competition among ACUM's members in the sense that only large corporations would be able to afford managing rights outside of ACUM, while individual authors would not be able to bear the financial and logistical burden it involves.

 

17.       Anana pleaded that adopting the narrow exclusion mechanism would lead to infringement on its reliance interest, given the fact that, relying upon the wording of the broad exclusion mechanism, it had already excluded works it managed from ACUM's repertoire with regard to the use of "new media" that it would now have to restore. In addition, it made a series of arguments concerning the restrictions set forth in the narrow exclusion mechanism – a lack of distinction between authors whose contribution to a joint work was significant and authors whose contribution was negligible (who nevertheless obtain a de facto veto right to exclude the work); impairing the ability of authors to maximize their profits; as well as infringing on the moral aspect of the author’s right (in the sense that an author who wishes to preclude the use of his work for religious, image-related, or moral reasons would find it difficult to do so under the narrow exclusion regime). Anana further contended that making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of all joint authors effectively makes it a dead letter since joint authors would frustrate any attempt to reach the necessary agreements.

 

18.       The Tribunal held that the approval should be made conditional upon a narrow exclusion mechanism and in that respect it adopted the position of ACUM and the Director-General (joined by Partner and the cable companies). The Tribunal explained that such exclusion mechanism provided an appropriate answer to the necessary balance between enhancing market competition and protecting the individual author's proprietary right. The Tribunal went on to state that a corporation for the collective management of copyright is in any event not intended to enable its members to realize their rights in full. On the contrary, such arrangement is based upon a waiver of complete and total freedom with regard to the works in consideration for reducing the cost of managing and enforcing copyrights. EMI Israel and Anana, the Tribunal held, were in fact seeking to enjoy the benefits of belonging to a cartel without bearing the costs. The Tribunal further explained that copyright grants an author a monopoly that may harm the general public, a concern which is intensified when authors are incorporated in a cartel. Therefore, there is no reason to avoid subjecting the cartel's approval to conditions that restrict the individual author's proprietary right in his work.

 

19.       As aforesaid, the Tribunal ultimately approved ACUM's activity as a cartel, subject to a series of conditions, including those mentioned above. The two appeals before us – the appeal by ACUM and the appeal by EMI Israel – were filed against its said judgment – as detailed below.

 

The Appeals

                       

20.       ACUM's appeal (CA 5365/11) concerns, as aforesaid, only one aspect of the Tribunal's judgment – the condition regarding the duty to appoint external directors. Its arguments in this respect are directed both against the basic obligation to appoint external directors and against their number.

 

21.       EMI Israel’s appeal (CA 5489/11) originally revolved around several of the other conditions to which the Tribunal made the permanent permit subject, but at the hearing before us EMI Israel concentrated its arguments on the details of the condition regulating the rights exclusion mechanism. It should be noted that Anana, which did not appeal the Tribunal’s judgment, appeared at the hearing as a respondent and in that capacity it presented arguments in support of EMI Israel's basic position.

 

22.       Generally, EMI Israel believes that the narrow exclusion mechanism impairs the protection of the authors' rights and reinforces ACUM's monopoly. More specifically, EMI Israel pleads that implementing the narrow exclusion mechanism would lead to infringement on authors' proprietary rights and would impair the possibility of creating a competitive copyright market. According to EMI Israel, the protection of copyright necessitates both recognition of the power of each author to implement the exclusion mechanism with regard to a work he helped create, even without obtaining the other authors’ consent, as well as authors’ right to exclude their works outside of the "exclusion baskets" that necessitate "crude" and imprecise choices that do not express important distinctions, primarily the distinction between "old" media (like radio and television) and "new" media (such as mobile phones).

 

23.       On the other hand, the Director-General believes that both appeals should be dismissed. He supports the Tribunal’s judgment and emphasizes that the conditions it approved are required in order to protect authors and users against the monopolistic power of ACUM and in order to protect the public interest involved in the use of the works.

 

Our Ruling

 

24.       Having reviewed the parties' arguments we have reached the conclusion that both appeals should be dismissed. We are convinced that, at the moment, the Permanent Conditions, including the conditions against which the appeals have been addressed, are all necessary in order to dispel the concerns raised inherently by a cartel related to the collective management of copyright. These conditions are necessary in order to ensure that the cartel’s benefit to the public will exceed the perceived damage from it. Indeed, as detailed below, reviewing the parties' arguments has made it clear that the distinction between "new" and "old" media within the exclusion mechanism is an evolving issue, the regulation of which should be monitored. However, as noted, the approval and its conditions have been set for a period of five years, of which two have already passed (as the conditions relating to the narrow exclusion mechanism were approved by the Tribunal in June 2011). At the end of that period, it will be possible to revisit the conditions and the way they are being implemented in order to make decisions towards the future. In that sense, our ruling reflects the facts presented in the proceedings, including the experience accumulated in the Israeli market and its existing uses of copyright.

 

The Normative Framework: Between Copyright Law and Antitrust Law

 

25.       Two normative frameworks frame our discussion: copyright law – as a framework that seeks, inter alia, to balance the author's rights in his work and the public interest to enjoy the fruit of the work for the benefit of all, in order to promote culture and knowledge; and antitrust law – which recognizes, inter alia, the possibility of approving a cartel, subject to conditions aimed at protecting the public from the abuse of monopolistic power. Copyright law is currently governed by a relatively new statute – the Copyright Law, 5768-2007 (hereinafter "the Copyright Law"), which replaced the relevant British Mandate statute, while the issues concerning the activity of cartels are regulated by the Antitrust Law.

 

26.       The activity of ACUM should be evaluated and examined according to these two perspectives. As mentioned in the introduction to our judgment, ACUM was established for the collective management of copyright in musical works. From the perspective of copyright, that management should be for the benefit of authors and in the name of protecting their rights, but without neglecting the public's ability to enjoy the works; from the perspective of antitrust law, that management, which constitutes a cartel and monopoly, should be for the benefit of the public and should ensure that public access to the works is not unreasonably denied. More specifically, in order to comply with the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of the Antitrust Law with regard to the approval of a cartel, it has to be ensured that the benefit to the public from such collective management substantially exceeds the damages that it might cause to all or some of the public.

 

27.       In many ways, the controversies that have arisen before us pinpoint once again the dilemmas that underlie copyright law. Recognition of copyright is aimed at encouraging the creation and dissemination of expression but also at balancing this benefit against the costs of limiting access to protected works (cf: Guy Pesach, The Theoretical Basis for the Recognition of Copyright, 31 Mishpatim 359, 410 (2001)). In the words of Vice President (retired) S. Levin:

 

            "In Anglo-American law the basic justification for these laws is perceived as the desire to provide an incentive to the author in order to achieve maximum access to the work by the public at large. This is the heritage of Israeli copyright law" (CA 326/00 Holon Municipality v. NMC Music Ltd, PD 47(3) 658, 671 (2003)).

 

Copyright Management Corporations: ACUM as a Test Case

 

28.       The case before us should be examined not only in light of the general principles of copyright law, on the one hand, and antitrust law, on the other hand, but also in light of the experience accumulated from copyright management through corporations established for such purpose. ACUM is a local corporation that was established back in pre-state Israel (see: Michael Birnhack, Colonial Copyright: Intellectual Property in Mandate Palestine 185-186 (2012)). Nevertheless, more broadly speaking it is merely one of many examples of corporations known as "copyright collection societies" or collective management organizations" (hereinafter "collective management corporations"). Such corporations operate in many countries and thereby provide an answer to a genuine need of authors who cannot routinely manage the grant of licenses to use their works, collect royalties, and enforce copyright law on those who infringe their rights. These corporations manage the rights of many authors collectively and thereby contribute to reducing the costs of negotiating with users and reducing enforcement costs. At the same time, the mechanism of collective management also benefits the public who uses the works because it allows bringing these works to the public on a regular basis. The collective management corporation typically offers users "a blanket license" in relation to the corporation's whole repertoire, thereby saving them the need to negotiate individually with each of the authors of works included in the repertoire. Such users are for the most part broadcasting stations owners, producers, hall owners, and others, through whom the works are made accessible to the public at large (see: Ariel Katz, Monopoly and Competition in the Collective Management of Public Performing Rights, 2 Din Ve'Devarim 551 (2006); Guy Pesach, Associations for the Collective Management of Rights – Another Look at Effectiveness and Fairness, 2 Din Ve'Devarim 621 (2006) (hereinafter "Pesach"); Walter Arthur Copinger, Copinger on Copyright, pp 1790-1794 (16th ed., 2011) (hereinafter "Copinger")).

 

29.       Alongside recognizing the fact that collective management corporations are a well-known and widespread phenomenon, the concern that accompanies their activity is also acknowledged. Collective management of copyright involves a significant challenge from the perspective of antitrust law, considering the fact that it has centralized characteristics and therefore raises the concerns involved in the creation of a cartel, including the concern of acquiring and abusing monopolistic market power, either by demanding high royalties or in other ways. Against those disadvantages, we usually weigh the necessity of such activity for effectively managing copyright and it is therefore common to regard collective management corporations as "natural monopolies" (and, to a certain extent, something of a necessary evil) and to allow them to operate subject to supervisory mechanisms and regulation (see: Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, 1 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 541, 544-548, 551-553 (2005) (hereinafter "Katz"); Copinger, pp 1798-1800). It is along these lines that the activity of the two major collective management corporations in the U.S. – the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc (BMI) – is regulated by special judicial orders ("consent decrees") as part of antitrust law. These orders, whose conditions are revised from time to time, place collective management corporations under a host of constraints in order to ensure their compliance with the competition criteria set forth in antitrust law (for a discussion of the supervisory mechanisms of collective management corporations in the U.S., see: Stanley M. Besen, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 Va. L. Rev. 383 (1992).) Similarly, collective management corporations that operate in Europe are under supervision, subject to the antitrust law of the European Union (see: Lucie Gaibault & Stef Van Gompe, Collective Management in the European Union, in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights 135 (2nd edition, Daniel Gervias ed. 2010); Copinger, pp 1801-1808).

 

The Conditions in Dispute: Public Directors and the Exclusion Mechanism

 

30.       As already mentioned, the controversy before us does not concern the basic authority for ACUM’s operation as a cartel but rather the conditions that have been prescribed for its activity, or, more precisely, two of these conditions. In that sense, the discussion is based on the accepted notion, explained above, which views collective management corporations as something of a "natural monopoly," the existence of which is essential but their activity necessitates supervision and restraint in order to protect the public from the potential negative effects of substantial market power being accumulated by a single entity. The conditions for ACUM’s operation should therefore express the balance between the proprietary right of authors and the public interest in a market free of monopolistic influences, which acquires a unique aspect with regard to the market of creative works that naturally need to be accessible to the public (albeit for a fee).

 

31.       Ultimately, the hearing in this case revolved around two matters: the requirement to appoint directors, and the scope of the rights exclusion mechanism. Both of these need to be examined from the unique point of view that combines the purposes of copyright law with those of antitrust law, paying attention to the balance that both those sets of laws seek to achieve between individual proprietary rights and economic interests, on the one hand, and the public interest, on the other hand.

 

The Appointment of Public Directors: Between the Public Interest and the Interest of the Rights Owners

 

32.       The first condition that was prescribed for the approval of the cartel was to appoint public directors who will constitute a third of the total number of board members (which in practice means appointing four such directors). As aforesaid, ACUM has objected to this condition both in principle and in practice.

 

33.       In principle, ACUM asserted that it is not a public company and therefore there is no justification to enforce on it a supervisory mechanism appropriate to public companies. In this context, it was further asserted that its board of directors includes a delicate balance between all the sectors ACUM represents, which in itself ensures protection of the public interest (article 30.2 of ACUM's current articles of association provides that the company's board of directors shall consist of nine members that include two lyricists, a writer, two easy listening composers, one composer of concert music, one publisher, and two external directors). ACUM also noted that its corporate governance is dispersed and therefore does not raise an "agency problem" of the type with which the mechanism of external directors is designed to deal. ACUM also asserted that in any event it has in place adequate mechanisms to resolve potential disputes and conflicts of interest, including an internal arbitration mechanism as well as the Permanent Conditions that prohibit ACUM from discriminating between its members. According to ACUM, the appointment of public directors would "dilute" the authors' control over their property rights. In practice, ACUM further noted the costs involved in the appointment of the requisite number of public directors, which lead ACUM to be willing to appoint no more than two public directors.

 

34.       According to the Director-General, the need to appoint public directors stems from two factors: first, it will help ensure that ACUM serves the interests of all its member authors, taking into account the interests of individual authors rather than only the group interests of certain categories of authors. Second, the appointments will ensure that at least some of the directors have professional skills in the area of corporate management.

 

35.       With regard to the proportion of public directors on the board, the Director-General's position is that the requirement that no less than a third of the board would be comprised of external directors is justified, since the need for external directors is specifically greater under ACUM’s circumstances, where the corporate structure is dispersed and lacks a distinct controlling shareholder. In this respect the Director-General went on to explain that, in his opinion, ACUM's members need even more protection than "ordinary" shareholders, considering the fact that their livelihood depends on the corporation and they cannot sell their shares to "realize their profits."

 

36.       Having reviewed all this, we have reached the overall conclusion that ACUM's case in this respect should be dismissed.

 

37.       The appointment of public directors – that is, directors who are not employees or shareholders of the company – is one mechanism which allows supervising the behavior of the company, its managers, and its controlling shareholders and helps dispel the various agency problems involved in its activity (see: Irit Haviv-Segal, Company Law, 429, 438 (2007) (hereinafter "Haviv-Segal")). It can be said that the essential contribution of the public director lies in the "external dimension" that he brings to the board's work – as someone who reviews matters referred to the board from a broad, objective, and balanced perspective that also takes into account the public implications of its activity. The provisions of section 240(a1)(1) of the Companies Law, 5759-1999 (hereinafter "the Companies Law"), according to which a public director shall have professional skills or accounting and financial expertise, ensure that his appointment will add a professional dimension to the company that will contribute to its satisfactory management (see: Joseph Gross, The New Companies Law, 386-387 (Fourth Edition, 2007) (hereinafter "Gross")).

 

38.       The mechanism of appointing public directors is typically operated in the context of the activity of public companies – section 239 of the Companies Law requires a public company to appoint at least two public directors, whilst sections 114 and 115(a) of that Law require a public company's board of directors to appoint an audit committee from amongst its members, on which all the public directors shall serve. In addition, there are laws that impose a duty to appoint public directors to serve on the board of certain corporations whose shares are not held by the public, but whose activity has other public importance. Thus, for example, a mutual fund must appoint at least five directors to serve on its board and the proportion of public directors is the same as required of a public company (see: section 16(a) of the Joint Investments Trust Law, 5754-1994); while an insurance company, as defined in the Control of Financial Services (Insurance) Law, 5741-1981, must appoint public directors who will constitute a third of the total members of its board (see: section 2(1) of the Control of Financial Services (Insurance) (Board of Directors and Its Committees) Regulations, 5767-2007). In addition, the board of directors of a company that manages provident funds is required to appoint an investment committee for each fund it manages, the majority of committee members being qualified to serve as public directors (see: section 11(a) of the Control of Financial Services (Provident Funds) Law, 5765-2005).

 

39.       Having reviewed the case, we are satisfied that the condition concerning the appointment of public directors to serve on ACUM's board is consistent with the purpose underlying the approval of the cartel. Although ACUM is not a public company, it does essentially manage a resource that has clear public aspects. From the point of view of the authors, ACUM provides an essential service, without which it would be difficult for them to produce financial benefit from their works. In many ways, that is also the case from the point of view of the public at large: the protected works belong to the authors (and to whoever has acquired rights in them) but it is important that they are used in such a way that will also benefit the general public. Indeed, these public aspects of ACUM's activity underlie its approval as a cartel. At the same time, ACUM's monopolistic characteristics and its status as a cartel in the domain of musical copyright grant it a public dimension in and of themselves. The requirement to appoint external directors to provide a further layer of supervision over ACUM's activity is therefore called for and inherent to the rationale of the cartel's approval in order to protect both authors and users. It should be noted that making the approval of a cartel conditional upon the appointment of external directors, even when the corporation in question is not a public corporation in the ordinary sense, is not unprecedented. Thus, for example, the approval as a cartel of the recycling corporation that was established as a joint venture of manufacturers and importers of soft drinks in Israel was made subject to a similar condition (see section 4 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Recycling Corporation, as approved in AT (J'lem) 4445/01 Shufersal Ltd v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (November 5, 2001)). The same applies to the approval as cartels of two other collective management corporations: the Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd. (hereinafter "PIL") (see section 11.3 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd., as approved in AT (J'lem) 3574/00 The Israeli Federation of Independent Record Producers Ltd. v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (April 29, 2004)), and the Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes (hereinafter "IFPI") (see: section 13.3 of the Conditions for the Operation of the Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes Ltd, as approved in AC (J'lem) 705/07 The Israeli Federation for Records and Cassettes Ltd. v. The Director-General of the Antitrust Authority (February 3, 2011).

 

40.       With regard to authors' protection, there appears to be grounds to the argument concerning the importance of protecting the common interests of ACUM's members, regardless of the “category” to which they belong. Public directors can express "cross-category" interests that concern the benefit of authors generally in their relationship with ACUM, as opposed to the benefit of particular categories of authors. Moreover, without laying out hard and fast rules, it can be said that there is prima facie grounds to the assertion that the importance of the public director institution is in fact greater in a corporation characterized by dispersed ownership, in the absence of controlling shareholders, as is the case with ACUM. The agency problem in companies of this type is characterized by interest gaps between management and shareholders (as opposed to interest gaps between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, which are typical of companies that have controlling shareholders). Some view the appointment of public directors as a central mechanism for dealing with such gaps (see Haviv-Segal, pp 438-439). Clear expression of this distinction can be found in the First Schedule to the Companies Law, which contains suggested provisions for the corporate governance of public companies. Paragraph 1 of the Schedule prescribes the recommended percentage of independent directors, distinguishing between companies that do and do not have controlling shareholders. With regard to the latter, the Schedule provides that a majority of the directors should be independent, whilst in the former it provides that it is sufficient for a third of the directors to be independent.

 

41.       Furthermore, even assuming that the present structure of ACUM's board of directors faithfully represents its member authors, that structure does not prima facie guarantee that the protection of authors will also take into account the public interest more broadly. Indeed, a public director's fiduciary duty to the company is no different than that of an ordinary director, in the sense that he too must act for the benefit of the company (see: Gross, p. 406; cf: CA 610/94 Buchbinder v. The Official Receiver, para. 43 (May 11, 2003)). However, the public director will presumably represent a broader, more objective point of view, cognizant of the public implications of the corporation's activity.

 

42.       Moreover, as already explained, the appointment of public directors also has great importance as regards guaranteeing a minimum number of directors with professional managerial skills. In fact, ACUM itself acknowledged the professional advantages of appointing public directors even before the Tribunal's judgment was handed off and the revised version of ACUM's articles of association now require the appointment of two such directors. The fundamental aspect of this controversy has thus somewhat eroded and it has become a matter of extent and degree. We believe that the proportion of directors set forth in the Permanent Conditions – a third of the board members – is not excessive or unreasonable, considering ACUM’s character as a corporation whose ownership is dispersed and especially given the lingering concern of abusing monopolistic power.

 

43.       This discussion, which is "internal" and concentrates on corporate and antitrust law, can be supplemented by an "external" discussion, based on the significance that entities with public aspects have from the perspective of public law. According to this Court's case law, a private corporation whose activity has clear public aspects might be regarded as a "hybrid" entity, which places it under additional duties over and above those it is subject to in accordance with private law. Care must be taken not to overextend the category of hybrid entities in order to avoid eroding the significance of acknowledging a public status and blurring the lines between the public and private spheres. Moreover, under the current circumstances, there is no need to rule on whether ACUM should be regarded as a hybrid entity and a complete discussion of the criteria for the recognition of an entity as hybrid is unnecessary. However, it should be noted that ACUM's activity does entail many of the criteria mentioned in previous case law as characterizing a hybrid entity. Thus, for example, in HCJ 731/86 Micro Daf v. Israel Electric Corporation Ltd PD 41(2) 449 (1987) (hereinafter "Micro Daf"), where the question of hybrid entities was discussed for the first time – in the context of the Electric Corporation's activity – the factors taken into account were the monopolistic aspect of the corporation's activity, the nature of the resource it manages, and the fact that statutory powers have been entrusted to it. These factors were not considered an "exhaustive list" and since then entities which lacked those characteristics, at least to the same extent, have also been recognized as hybrid (see: CA 294/91 Jerusalem Community Hevra Kadisha Burial Society v. Kastenbaum PD 46(2) 464 (1992)). For further discussion, see: Daphne Barak-Erez, Administrative Law vol. 3 - Economic Administrative Law 463-492 (2013)). With regard to ACUM, the monopolistic aspect of its activity is beyond dispute. In Israel, although there are other collective management corporations, including the abovementioned PIL and IFPI, the product they supply – licenses for the broadcasting and public playing of sound recordings – does not substitute the product ACUM supplies. As the Director-General stated in his declaration, ACUM has no direct competitors in its relevant market and although formally nothing stops authors from managing their works themselves, few of them find such course of action practical or worthwhile, so that in fact the vast majority of works for which royalties are paid in Israel are under the management of ACUM. The same applies to the implications that the resource managed by ACUM has on the general public. Although the licenses that ACUM offers are acquired by a relatively small category of users, those licenses feature the right to play the works in public (or make them otherwise available to the public). Hence, they have a very significant effect on public access to the works. In other words, the public aspect of ACUM's activity also derives from the fact that the product it supplies is not in fact the musical works themselves but rather the collective management mechanism, which facilitates (and to a great extent enables) playing those works in public and therefore constitutes a product of clear public importance. Finally, although ACUM does not exercise statutory powers, its approval as a cartel entrusts it with power that derives from a statutory decision established in the Antitrust Law. These characteristics, even if they are insufficient to define ACUM as a hybrid entity in the ordinary sense of the term (and, as aforesaid, we have no need to rule on this issue), do support the basic justification for the Director-General's requirement under the current circumstances. Indeed, the appointment of public directors is ordinarily not imposed on a hybrid entity. However, the fact that ACUM constitutes an entity that owes important duties to the public can serve as a factor in the Director-General's decision to subject a cartel to conditions.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism

 

44.       The other condition at the center of the litigation before us concerns, as aforesaid, the rights exclusion mechanism. Underlying the controversy were two questions: first, is the requirement for the consent of all joint authors of a work in order to exclude it from ACUM's repertoire justified or should that power be held by each of the authors individually? Second, how delicate and precise should the "segmentation" mechanism be with regard to the exclusion ability, as regards the distinction between different types of uses? We shall clarify those questions below.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism: the Consent of All Authors or a Personal Right?

 

45.       The requirement that the exclusion of the work should be conditional upon the agreement of all its authors prima facie imposes a constraint on the right of each of the authors to control the rewards of his work. For that reason it has been criticized by EMI Israel and Anana. In contrast, the position of the Director-General and ACUM is that making the exclusion conditional upon the consent of the other authors is essential to protect both users and authors. The main argument regarding the protection of users relates to the concern that a "liberal" exclusion mechanism that would give an independent exclusion right to each author would impair ACUM's ability to offer sweeping licenses and thereby undermine the basic justification for its existence from the perspective of public interest. With regard to the protection of authors, it is asserted that the ability to exclude rights without the agreement of the other authors would encourage abuse of that power by "powerful" authors at the expense of the other authors of the work. ACUM explained that if each author of a joint work could exclude his rights from ACUM’s repertoire without the agreement of the other authors, it would grant veto power to that author to prevent works from being used by those to whom other authors wish to grant permission. ACUM also emphasized that where the rights in a work are vested in several authors veto power will forever be involved and the remaining question is only which veto power is least damaging: that of an author wishing to prevent the work's exclusion and leave it with ACUM's repertoire, or that of the excluding author to prevent any use of a work contrary to the position of the other authors. According to ACUM, the former is infinitely preferable. Having reviewed the case, we have reached the overall conclusion that we accept the position of the Director-General and ACUM in this respect.

 

46.       We accept as a starting point for our discussion the (reasonable) assumption that the rights in the type of works that ACUM manages are often shared by several authors. This can be illustrated by the typical case of a song. According to copyright law, every song is made up of several independent works, the rights in each of which are vested in different authors – the words of the song are a literary work owned by the lyricist; the music is a musical work owned by the composer. Moreover, there are also cases in which several composers or lyricists collaborate in the process of creating a work and in such cases the circle of rights owners expands even further. Considering this situation, it is easy to understand EMI Israel and Anana's grievances: making the exclusion power conditional upon the agreement of all authors undoubtedly burdens the individual author who seeks to exclude his work. However, this does not suffice. The question before us is whether this burden is justified, considering the purpose of the permanent permit – and our answer to that question is in the affirmative.

 

47.       In order to discuss this question it is necessary to return to the original reasons that led to managing rights through a corporation like ACUM. The most important tool available to ACUM for the collective management of rights is the grant of a sweeping license known as a "blanket license," the advantages of which in terms of transaction costs constitute the basic reason that legitimates ACUM's activity, despite difficulties in terms of antitrust law. Extending the ability to exclude rights from ACUM's management will naturally impair its ability to offer blanket licenses and thereby reduce the public benefit from its operation as a cartel. Over-extending that possibility will impair the public benefit from ACUM’s activity to such extent that it will no longer be the case necessarily that the benefit substantially exceeds the potential damages to the public interest from the cartel's operation. Having considered matters, we are satisfied that the grant of a personal "exclusion right" to each author would amount to such over-extension. Considering the typical ownership structure of musical works, an exclusion mechanism that is not conditional upon the agreement of the other authors effectively means granting authority to a single author, regardless of his part in the work, to exclude the work as a whole from ACUM's blanket license regime. Thus, a user who wishes to make lawful use of the work would have to negotiate with the excluding author in addition to acquiring the sweeping license from ACUM. Such a state of affairs would greatly limit the benefit of the cartel for users to the point of raising doubts as to whether the cartel is indeed "in the public interest," as required by section 9 of the Antitrust Law whenever a cartel is approved.

 

48.       Furthermore – accepting the position whereby the consent of all the authors of a joint work is unnecessary to exclude it would also raise difficulties for the relationship between the authors themselves as it may enable some of the authors – usually the more "powerful" ones – to exploit their exclusion power at the expense of the other authors. This may occur in situations where the user has already acquired most of the rights to use the work by means of a blanket license and merely needs to "supplement" the excluded right. This may give rise to phenomena of "extortion" and "free-riding," so that the remaining owner of the right will demand exceptionally high license fees for his share. We have already discussed the problem of such a state of affairs from the user's point of view. However, in truth, the problem also exists from the perspective of the excluding author making excess profit at the expense of the other authors. This difficulty is intensified in light of the fact that the ability to exclude rights from ACUM's management – given the complexity involved in negotiating with users individually – would essentially be of benefit to powerful rights owners, like large publishers, as opposed to individual, independent authors.

 

49.       It should be noted that we have so far used the expression "joint authorship" in order to describe all the cases in which the rights in a particular song are shared by several authors, although in fact it is prima facie possible to distinguish between two models of joint authorship. One model, of "joint authorship in indefinite shares," relates to two or more authors who collaborated in such way that it is impossible to distinguish the share of each of them in the finished work. In such a case, the work is considered a "joint work" according to section 1 of the Copyright Law. The other model, of "joint authorship in definite shares," involves a finished product, like a song, which is made up of several units, each of which was created by a different author and is a protected work in itself (for example the words of the song, which were written by one author, constitute a literary work; while the music, which was composed by another author, constitutes a musical work). The authors in such a case are not regarded as joint authors according to the Copyright Law, despite the fact that their relationship is substantively founded upon sharing. It is interesting to note that the American copyright law does distinguish between works where the shares of the various authors are inseparable and works where the shares of the various authors are interdependent. Nevertheless, both situations are considered "joint work" (see: Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.4 (2002) (hereinafter "Nimmer"). In any event, for the purpose of the present discussion concerning the ability of authors to exclude rights from ACUM’s management we need not consider this distinction. In both cases, splitting the licensing authority would place practical obstacles for using the joint work.

 

50.       In fact, the controversy before us derives not only from the different interests that the various parties represent but also from the fact that the Copyright Law does not expressly regulate the issues to which joint authorship gives rise (see: Michael Birnhack, A Cultural Reading: the Law and the Creative Field, Authoring Rights: Readings in Copyright Law 83, 105-106 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pesach, Editors, 2009) (hereinafter "Birnhack"); Gilad Wexelman, Corporate Creation and Cooperative Creation, Authoring Rights: Readings in Copyright Law, 167, 177-178 (2009) (hereinafter "Wexelman"). Cf  Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles, Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works and Entrepreneurship, 75 Or. L. Rev. 257 (1996)). In fact, the only arrangement the Law establishes with regard to joint works (as defined in section 1) relates to the period of protection of the work, which is measured according to the age of the surviving joint author, plus 70 years (section 39 of the Copyright Law).

 

51.       Additionally, reference to comparative law does not yield an unequivocal answer, considering the numerous potential approaches to this issue. Thus, for example, subject to certain restrictions, the law in the U.S. vests each of the joint authors with an independent right to permit use of their work even without the consent of the other authors, provided that they are paid their proportional share of the profit produced from the work (see: Nimmer § 6.10; Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 123, 149-150 (2002)). In contrast, according to the approach prevailing in English law, the agreement of all authors is necessary in order to permit use (see: Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, section 173(2). See also: Copinger, p 334.) For the purpose of the ruling before us, we must be cognizant of the fact that the variety of existing approaches regarding copyright management of joint works attests not only to the great complexity of the matter but also to the fact that recognizing authors' proprietary rights does not inherently dictate a particular result.

 

52.       Since there is no specific regulation of the issue of jointly owned copyright within the Copyright Law, we may turn to legislation in other contexts concerning the joint ownership of property rights. Detailed regulation of this sort exists regarding the joint ownership of land in sections 27 to 36 of the Land Law, 5729-1969 (hereinafter "the Land Law"). According to section 9(e) of the Movable Property Law, 5731-1971 (hereinafter "the Movable Property Law"), arrangements concerning joint ownership of land essentially apply to movable property too, "save as may be otherwise provided in a co-ownership agreement." By virtue of section 13(a) of the Movable Property Law, such arrangements also apply to joint ownership of "rights." Nevertheless, reference to the Land Law with regard to the legal regime governing joint authorship should be made with care. As Prof. Michael Birnhack has noted:

 

            "Even if a model of joint authorship is prescribed, the socio-legal institution can be designed in various ways, ranging from management based on the decisions of all owners, through consent-based management, to each author having freedom of use. Selecting the appropriate point on this range should be influenced by an understanding of the law concerning the creative process and the reciprocal relationship between joint authors, between each of them and the work, or anywhere else where the work and its significance are formed" (Birnhack, p 106).

 

Similarly, Dr. Gilad Wexelman has also written:

 

            "A joint work raises problems of a different type, when compared with the joint ownership of tangible resources and applying the doctrines that exist regarding joint ownership of tangible resources to joint authorship is therefore improper and inappropriate. These doctrines do not provide the necessary solutions for joint authorship. The inference deriving from this is that it is appropriate to adopt a broader, different conception of the joint authorship process, rather than a conception influenced by the private property model" (Wexelman, p 178).

 

53.       One way or the other, before we seek to draw an analogy based on the arrangements relating to joint ownership of land, it is important to emphasize that we need not consider the legal regime that governs the relationship between joint authors as an independent issue. The question of joint authorship should be analyzed in the case before us merely in the particular context of a joint work's management by a collective management corporation like ACUM – which naturally goes beyond the default rules that apply to joint authorship. In any case, under the circumstances,  reference to the existing legal arrangements regarding the management of joint rights should serve merely as a framework and a starting point for the discussion.

 

54.       The arrangement prescribed in the Land Law concerning joint ownership is based on a concept of management by majority decisions, except for matters that go beyond ordinary management and use, in which unanimous agreement is required. In this respect, section 30 of the Land Law provides:

 

            (a)       The owner of a majority of the shares in any joint property may determine all matters relating to the ordinary management and use of the property.

 

            (b)       A joint owner who considers himself aggrieved by a determination under subsection (a) may apply to the Court for directions and the Court shall decide as seems just and expedient under the circumstances of the case.

 

            (c)       Any matter outside the scope of ordinary management and use requires the consent of all the joint owners.

 

55.       The joint owners of a land can agree upon a different method for the management of their rights but, as provided in section 29 of the Land Law, this is the arrangement that applies "unless otherwise provided in a joint ownership agreement" (subsection (c)) (see also: CA 810/82 Zol Bo Ltd. v. Zeida PD 37(4) 737 (1983); CA 663/87 Nathan v. Greener PD 45(1) 104 (1990)).

 

56.       At the same time, section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law provides that each joint owner may, without the consent of the other joint owners, make reasonable use of the joint property, provided that he does not prevent another joint owner from conducting such use. In other words, none of the joint owners of land may stop his fellow owners from using the property, so long as it applies to reasonable use.

 

57.       What can be learned from these arrangements for the case in question? Applying the arrangement prescribed in section 30, mutatis mutandis, leads to the conclusion that the requirement of a "unanimous" decision is appropriate insofar as management or use out of the ordinary is involved. It can therefore be argued that the management of copyright through an entity like ACUM is the ordinary, accepted method worldwide for the management of individual authors' rights, and departing from that arrangement therefore constitutes an "extraordinary" decision outside the ordinary realm of rights management. It should therefore be made unanimously, exactly as provided by the conditions that have been approved.

 

58.       Indeed, as stated above, the considerations relevant to joint ownership of land are not necessarily apt with respect to joint authorship. Thus, for example, the arrangement contained in the Land Law can be seen as "hostile" to a state of joint ownership, recognizing that joint ownership of land may burden its efficient management. Section 37 of the Land Law therefore provides that "each joint owner of immovable property is entitled at any time to demand the dissolution of the joint ownership." Yet, joint authorship is not a "pathological" condition. On the contrary, the process of authorship frequently involves collaboration – either direct or indirect – between several authors and dissolving the joint authorship should not be regarded as socially desirable. It is also likely to be more difficult to appraise the value of the work for the purchase of one of the joint authors' shares than severing the joint ownership of land. Consequently, as already mentioned, the analogy from the Land Law should be drawn with all due care. However, even taking into account the difference between joint ownership of land and joint authorship, it does appear that the requirement of unanimous consent for the exclusion mechanism is proper. Particularly because joint authorship is a "natural" condition and typical of many works, it is appropriate to be apprehensive about an exclusion mechanism that is based on each of the authors having an individual right of action, reinforcing the status of strong authors and burdening public access to the works, as explained below.

 

59.       Examining the rule with regard to the reasonable use of jointly owned land also leads, prima facie, to a similar conclusion. By drawing an analogy based on section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law it can be inferred that leaving the work under the management of ACUM constitutes reasonable use, considering the fact that it is the typical, widespread method for the collection of royalties. According to this logic, there appears no justification for adopting an exclusion mechanism that enables a joint author, who so desires, to prevent his fellow author from making reasonable use of the work, by excluding it from the collectively managed repertoire.

 

60.       It should be noted that this Court has previously considered the question of collaboration between joint authors, in CA 1567/99 Sivan v. Sheffer PD 57(2) 913 (2003) (hereinafter "Sivan"). Under the circumstances of that case, we recognized the right of each of the joint authors to terminate a contract that had been made in connection with the use of the rights when the contract was breached. Can it therefore be inferred that it would be proper in the current case to permit each of the joint authors to individually decide on exclusion? Despite the apparent similarity between the situations, in fact they are quite different and the conclusion should therefore be different too. In Sivan the issue was the rescission of a contract due to its breach and ipso facto it was possible to rely on the principle that whosever right has been infringed on is not required to forgive the infringement. This result is supported by considerations deriving from the law of obligations and in particular from the issue of multiple creditors. In contrast, in the case at hand, the question is posed for the purpose of delineating the ordinary rules of management, in the absence of any alleged breach. The relevant considerations are thus different, and so is the result that they dictate. Indeed, in Sivan the Court has made a clear distinction between these two questions. In fact, it noted that it was not ruling on the question of unilateral exercise of copyright in a joint work, which is more similar to the present case, and it went on to state that section 31(a)(1) of the Land Law prima facie makes it possible to adopt a flexible approach in such cases (Sivan p 942).

 

61.       Taking a broader view, it appears that the position presented to us by EMI Israel and Anana does not give proper weight to the effect of high transaction costs and free-riding in the management of multiple ownership resources, a phenomenon referred to as "the tragedy of the anti-commons" alongside the better-known term "the tragedy of the common property" or "the tragedy of the commons" (see generally: Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L. Rev 621 (1998); James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. L. & Econ. 1 (2000)). Indeed, the narrow exclusion mechanism that the Tribunal approved appears more suitable for dealing with these phenomena. In connection with joint authorship, “the tragedy of the anti-commons” is manifested in sub-optimal use of the work as a result of uncoordinated behavior by its owners. In a legal regime where a license to use a particular work necessitates the agreement of all its owners, each of the owners might act to maximize his own profits by claiming a high fee for agreeing to its use, without considering the negative externality that such behavior for the other owners. Ultimately many users will find it difficult to meet the overall price required of them and the work will be used to a lesser extent, thus harming both the joint authors and the public, whose access to the work has been limited. It is common to believe that the solution to this problem is one of the major advantages embodied in the activity of collective management corporations (see: Katz, p 561; Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, The Market for Intellectual Property: the Case of Complementary Oligopoly in The Economics of Copyright 162, 168-169, Wendy J. Gordon & Richard Watt eds. 2003 (hereinafter "Parisi & Depoorter")). Since dealing with the market failings associated with joint authorship is one advantage that justifies the monopolistic activity of corporations like ACUM, great importance is attributed to the design of an exclusion mechanism that will not frustrate that advantage by vesting veto power in each joint author who wishes to preclude use of a joint work.

 

62.       Ultimately, even under the narrow exclusion regime joint authors can agree in advance, contractually, on the scope of their understandings with regard to the work's exclusion from collective management. In fact, the narrow exclusion regime merely provides the default with regard to the inclusion of a joint work in the repertoire managed by ACUM. Insofar as the authors wish to agree on a different decision-making mechanism with respect to the management of joint works, they are at liberty to do so. Presumably such an arrangement, made before any of the parties is in a position for extortion or "free-riding," will help limit the coordination difficulties asserted by EMI Israel and Anana with regard to obtaining the consents necessary for the exclusion of a joint work. In view of the aforesaid, the default mechanism prescribed – according to which in the absence of an agreement between the joint authors to the contrary, the consent of all authors is necessary to exclude the work from management by ACUM – is appropriate.

 

The Rights Exclusion Mechanism: the Degree of Segmentation and the Distinction between New and Old Media

 

63.       As mentioned above, the arguments by EMI Israel and Anana also revolved around the fact that the "exclusion packages" defined in the Permanent Conditions do not distinguish between uses for the purpose of "old media" and uses for the purpose of "new media." In this respect Anana reiterated the case that it made before the Tribunal concerning the impairment of authors' ability to exhaust the full financial potential embodied in their works by excluding the works from management by ACUM solely with regard to "new media," and concerning the damage caused to Anana itself, having prima facie relied upon the previous exclusion mechanism in excluding rights that it will now have to restore to ACUM’s management.

 

64.       In contrast, the Director-General and ACUM argued before us that categorizing the necessary permissions according to types of media will allow ACUM members to abuse their power against users by forcing them to purchase specific uses (for example using the work on a cellular platform) in addition to the general fee for the license awarded through ACUM. In addition, ACUM mentioned that the adoption of a "liberal" exclusion regime enabling a precise "segmentation" of the excluded uses of any work would involve a significant logistic and financial burden on its ability to manage copyright of its repertoire.

 

65.       Deciding between the conflicting positions in this respect has proven to be more complex than the parties' arguments revealed. In truth, as we explain below, both positions are extreme and fail to fully address the difficulties they entail. Consequently, at present, we believe that the exclusion mechanism approved by the Tribunal should be upheld, provided that the question of excluding "new media" – subject to conditions and constraints – will be comprehensively reviewed towards the renewal of the cartel’s approval. We shall explain our said position.

 

66.       The present exclusion mechanism, as expressed in section 2.3 of the Permanent Conditions, enables an author to exclude his rights completely, in respect of all their potential uses. Moreover, the mechanism allows excluding the rights in respect of some of the uses, yet solely in accordance with one of four alternatives – "the exclusion packages" that stand at the center of the discussion. Because of their importance, we shall lay them out in full below:           

 

            "2.3.1  Excluding the rights for audiovisual broadcasting, including synchronization and recording for the purposes of such broadcasting, and including the provision of interactive and/or on demand services and any similar service, including by television, Internet, telephony or mobile phone.

 

            2.3.2   Excluding the broadcasting rights by means of audio, including recording for the purposes of such broadcasting, and including the provision of interactive and/or on demand services and any similar service, including by television, Internet, telephony or mobile phone.

 

2.3.3   Excluding the right of copying. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that excluding the right of copying does not include the right of copying for broadcasting purposes.

 

2.3.4   Excluding the right of imprinting and/or recording. For the avoidance of doubt, it is clarified that excluding the right of imprinting and/or recording does not include the right of imprinting and/or recording for broadcasting purposes".

 

67.       The alternatives at the center of the present controversy are the first and the second (and to a limited extent also the fourth, insofar as the exercise of the right of copying is aimed at integrating a musical work in the soundtrack of an audiovisual work). These alternatives deal with uses that make the work available to the general public – its broadcasting on television or radio, making it accessible by means of "streaming" technology, which enables viewing or listening to content through the Internet without copying it to the user's computer, and the like. The main distinction that the exclusion mechanism makes in this context is between presenting the work by audiovisual means and presenting it by audio only. Thus, for example, given the present situation, an author can be represented by ACUM for the purpose of playing songs on the radio but not for using them in the format of television content.

 

68.       Presumably, maximum protection of the author's rights and his financial interests should have enabled every author to make specific exclusion decisions as much as possible – even with reference to a specific work in a particular use. Along these lines, ACUM's present exclusion mechanism permits, as aforesaid, limited "segmentation" by types of use. However, it has been argued before us that this does not suffice. The dispute revolved around the degree of precision required by segmentation. While the present segmentation mechanism essentially distinguishes between audio and audiovisual uses, EMI Israel (supported by Anana) also wishes to distinguish between "old media" – like television and radio – and "new media" – such as the Internet and cellular phone services. This position was presented to us as warranted by technological progress and the launching of new channels to use works, as well as the protection of the author's prerogative to manage the works he owns. However, as we explain below, this position raises fundamental and practical difficulties and thus cannot be adopted in the format in which it was presented.

 

69.       It should be stated that the question of excluding "new media" should first be considered in light of the two perspectives that fashion the discussion as a whole – that of copyright law and that of antitrust law. However, in this context, it is important to bear in mind another point of view which relates to the interface between law and technology and focuses on the adaptation of the legal framework to technological developments as well as its implications to future technological development, for better or worse (see and compare: Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Trade-Off: Property Rules, Liability Rules and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 951 (2012)).

 

70.       At the outset, we should consider the fact that the ability to exclude "new media" that EMI Israel seeks to adopt relies primarily on a technological distinction between "old" and "new" communication platforms. This distinction is replete with difficulties. The world of communications is characterized by constant, rapid technological development. More importantly, the technological aspect of this area is characterized by a phenomenon sometimes called "technology collapse": with the development of technology the walls that separate various media platforms gradually collapse and different types of technology "collapse" into each other, creating new interfaces. Thus, for example, a movie that is distributed through the Internet is also available for viewing on a smartphone, while traditional radio stations also broadcast songs and programs by streaming technology over the Internet. Given this technological reality, the distinction between "old media" and "new media" is not dichotomous, nor is it permanent or stable. In fact, EMI Israel and Anana did not even explain how these categories should be defined in their view, and settled for giving clear-cut examples (such as using a song as a ringtone), which were insufficient to delineate the boundaries of the distinction. Their case therefore left many practical questions unanswered. For example, no explanation was given as to whether the transmission of television broadcasts through the Internet to be viewed on smartphones would, according to the proposed approach, require a license for "new media" or "old media" or in any event how would this example be classified to one category or the other. The rapid, constant development of new communication technology guarantees that questions of this type will not remain theoretical. In this context, we should note the interesting case of the American company MobiTV, which at the beginning of the 21st century developed technology that enabled receiving satellite or cable broadcasts and viewing them on mobile phones. A dispute (which gave rise to several legal proceedings) arose between MobiTV and ASCAP, one of the two largest collective management corporations in the U.S. The dispute concerned the purchase of a blanket license necessary to legitimate the transmissions, as a result, among other things, of MobiTV's objection to being charged a "new media" rate even though the content it offered its customers was the same as broadcast by traditional means (although ultimately the judgment did not rule on this question directly. See: United States v. ASCAP, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 (SDNY 2010)). With regard to the controversy relating to the classification of MobiTV's services as "new media," see also its preliminary response in the legal proceeding it initiated (Applicant Mobitv, Inc's Pre-Trial Memorandum at 25, United States v. ASCAP, 712 F. Supp. 2d 206 (SDNY 2010)).

 

71.       Insofar as the distinction between "new media" and "old media" is intended to extend to situations in which the content of radio and television programs is transmitted through the Internet to computer screens or by cellular phone services to mobile phone screens, adopting this distinction is likely to have a "chilling effect" on the use of the works in "old media" too. This is because users would presumably refrain in advance from integrating excluded works in productions intended for "old media," if only given their concern of future marketing constraints in "new media." Thus, for example, when a television program is produced, certain songs might not be included in it – as a cautionary measure – so as not to impair the possibility of broadcasting the program over the Internet too. Such indirect implications are not always clear "in real time" to an author who wishes to exclude his work, but recognizing them might also be weighed against the distinction proposed by EMI Israel and Anana.

 

72.       Another aspect to be considered is the likely implications of the exclusion mechanism on cyberspace users. In their arguments before us EMI Israel and Anana concentrated on institutional and corporate users, such as large communications companies, thereby presenting only a partial perspective on the matter in dispute. However, the exclusion mechanism they sought to adopt is not intended to apply only to such users. In fact, a sweeping exclusion of "new media" uses is likely to lead, without distinction, to difficulties for small website operators, including, for example, Internet radio operators, for which the ability to contract with collective management corporations constitutes a lawful, practical way for making regular use of a wide variety of works (and indeed some believe that the activity of collective management corporations is of especial importance for authorized use of musical works over the Internet. See, for example: Daniel Gervais, The Landscape of Collective Management Schemes 34 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 591, 601 (2011) (hereinafter "Gervais, Landscape"). For a discussion of the importance of collectively managing works in a digital environment, see also: Recommendation 2005/737/EC on collective cross-border management of copyright and related right for legitimate online music services [2005] OJ L276/54 (hereinafter "the 2005 EC recommendation"); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market (July 11, 2012) (hereinafter "the 2012 proposed directive"). See also Copinger, pp 1816-1826).

 

73.       The effects of the requirement to distinguish the use of new technologies on making works accessible to the public should also be considered in view of past experience in similar contexts. Thus, for example, in New York Times Co. v. Tasini 533 US 483 (2001) (hereinafter "Tasini"), the US Supreme Court considered whether a newspaper (the New York Times) could upload articles by freelance writes to a computer database. After lengthy litigation, the US Supreme Court accepted the position of the writers who argued that the license previously given to the newspaper was merely for the purpose of printed publication, as opposed to electronic media. Following the judgment the newspaper had to acquire permission from the writers to publish their articles in the database. Yet, since the newspaper believed that taking such action would not be financially viable, the result in practice was the removal of the articles from the database, thereby denying public access to them. We do not need to go into the merits of the judicial ruling in Tasini insofar as it relates to the understandings between the newspaper and its writers at the relevant times. In fact, the ruling in Tasini is not directly relevant to the technological aspects of the publication format and is instead focused on whether uploading the articles to a general computerized database (of numerous articles from various newspapers and journals) could be construed as a newspaper publication (indeed, in another case of similar circumstances the Supreme Court of Canada held that a newspaper could copy articles published in its printed edition to digital CDs containing articles of that newspaper alone. See: Robertson v. Thomson Corp. 2006 SCC 43 (2006)). Nevertheless, the results of this case embody an important lesson. Taking the broader view it teaches us that an arrangement that does not take into account the dynamic nature of uses might prove to burden and damage the public interest. Taking a forward-looking view, it appears that experience teaches us that it is difficult to base licenses for use on a distinction between technologies as this might subsequently frustrate broad access to cultural assets (see also: Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Lessons from the Anticommons: The Economics of New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 90 Ky. L. J. 295 (2001-2002)).

 

74.       What is the experience of other legal systems regarding the exclusion of "new media"? On the face of it, this is an important question, considering the fact that the challenges of technology in the area of copyright are by no means unique to Israel. However, for the reasons detailed below, the benefit of a comparative study has proven limited at the present stage of developments in the area.

 

75.       Truth be told, reference to legal developments in Europe and the U.S. shows that the exclusion of "new media" is often recognized as possible. Presumably, this reinforces the position of EMI Israel and Anana. However, studying matters in depth indicates that this experience has limited application to the case before us, because, among other reasons, the issue under consideration here is still in the early stages of formulation, trial, and controversy in other systems too.

 

76.       The two major collective management corporations in the U.S. – BMI and ASCAP – recently permitted two of their members (including global EMI) to exclude the rights owned by them from collective management for the purpose of certain aspects of the works' use in "new media" (as detailed on their websites – http://www.bmi.com and http://www.ascap.com). Yet, it is important to note that the ability to do so is embodied in the decisions of the corporations themselves rather than the result of external regulation. Moreover, the American rights management corporations operate in a different way than ACUM in the sense that they manage only one type of rights – public performance rights, which concern the permission to perform the work in public, to broadcast it, or to make it available to the public (but not the permission to copy the works or integrate them in audiovisual productions). That is, the starting point for the exclusion is a market of rights that is more "split" than the market in which users and authors operate in Israel. This background is likely to influence the factors relating to the desirable exclusion mechanism. Subsequently, it should be noted that reference to the exclusion of "new media" from administration by collective management corporations in the U.S. is not made in "all or nothing" terms, and in fact includes certain restrictions. For example, BMI's most up to date announcement on the matter (as published on its website) has clarified that the ability to exclude "new media" is aimed at cases where the work's use necessitates more than one type of license, while ASCAP has emphasized in addition that exclusion is possible with regard to making works accessible to the public exclusively through "new media," and does not apply to users that are broadcasters. Finally, and this is a major point, it cannot be ignored that some of the decisions on these matters are very recent (for example, BMI's announcement, of February 11, 2013, was published long after the litigation between the parties before the Tribunal had ended). It is therefore difficult to draw inferences from other legal systems' sustainable experience in this area. In fact, it can be said that at this stage the secondary effects of the "shock waves" that the new reforms have created for users have not yet been fully clarified, although the existence of such "shock waves" is already apparent. For example, we may point to a new development – lawsuits brought by users against management corporations to reduce the fee charged for a "blanket license," since "the blanket" no longer covers "new media" too (for instance, the claim brought against ASCAP by a large Internet radio company called Pandora at the end of 2012, which is still pending. For reports in the media about the case, see, for example: Don Jeffrey, Pandora Media Sues ASCAP Seeking Lower Songwriter Fees (November 6, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/pandora-media-sues-ascap-seekin... Ed Christman, Pandora Files Motion to Keep Low Publishing Rates (June 20, 2013) available at http://www.billboard.com/ biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1567890/pandora-files-motion-to-keep-low-publi-shing-rates).

 

77.       In principle, European law permits a rights owner to join a collective management corporation even when he seeks to reserve the use of the rights on the Internet or through CDs (see: Commission Decision of August 6, 2002 in case COMP/C2/37.219 Banghalter/Homem Christo (Daft Punk) v. SACEM. See also: section 5(3) of the 2005 Commission recommendation and the 2012 proposed directive, mentioned above). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that this arrangement is also the result of factors irrelevant to Israeli reality, primarily the desire to reach a standard, coordinated pan-European regulation where there are multiple collective management corporations.

 

78.       Another factor that should be mentioned parenthetically involves the broader context in which the exclusion mechanism is embodied, with regard to the acceptance of the Conditions towards authors' freedom of action and freedom of choice. In this context, for example, it is significant that the Permanent Conditions ensure the right of each of ACUM’s members to contract with users individually and to offer them individual licenses to use certain works alongside the management of those works by ACUM, without excluding them from its repertoire (section 2.4 of the Permanent Conditions). This is similar to the U.S. practice and different from the norm in Europe, where most collective management corporations require exclusivity from their members in respect of all rights in their work (see: Gervais, Landscape, p 598). Indeed, it is possible that this course of action will not be frequently used and it is likely to be significant mainly from the perspective of users who do not require blanket licenses but rather individual licenses for certain works. However, from a more general perspective, this mechanism creates something of a balancing effect on ACUM's coercive power (see also and compare: Parisi & Deporter, pp 170-172).

 

79.       More generally, it can be said that EMI Israel and Anana’s requirement to allow a sweeping exclusion of "new media" uses was based on the assumption that they are entitled to enjoy the fruits of the cartel while realizing the financial potential embodied in the works they manage to its fullest. That is a mistake. Indeed, once ACUM's activity was recognized as a cartel, which raises concern of abuse of monopolistic power against the public, it can no longer be said that ACUM members are entitled to fully exercise their proprietary rights while enjoying the benefits of the cartel. Although the cartel has been approved, its approval was made subject to conditions. Those conditions bear a price that ACUM and its member authors must pay in order to balance the excess benefits such membership confers and to ensure that the public is protected against the concerns involved in the cartel's activity. In fact, what we have previously stated regarding the exclusion of a work without the consent of all joint authors is also appropriate with regard to the issue of segmentation – the adoption of a segmentation mechanism that enables the exclusion of works based on a technological distinction between new and old media, without reservation, might reduce the benefit that ACUM’s activity yields for the public to such extent that may undermine the justification of its approval as a cartel.

 

80.       We can therefore sum up and say that even if the ability to exclude "new media" uses should not be outright dismissed, EMI Israel and Anana have at present failed to lay a substantial foundation for the considerations and details of the exclusion mechanism they wish to adopt, regarding, inter alia, the ability of such a mechanism to provide an answer to the concerns indicated above. For that reason, we cannot accept their position. We should parenthetically emphasize that we have not ignored the possibility that the ability of an author to manage his works independently in the realm of "new media" might prove to be significant for some authors, including "small" or independent ones. The Internet is a flexible technological platform that is far more accessible to private agents than traditional media. It allows direct, convenient, and relatively easy communication between the rights owner and the individual user and thereby yields more direct patterns of consumption, sometimes dramatically reducing transaction costs and thus enabling "small" authors to profit from their works without the assistance of collective management mechanisms (see: Casey Rae-Hunter, Better Mousetraps: Licensing, Access and Innovation in the New Music Marketplace, Journal of Business & Technology Law 7(1) 35, 39 (2012)). However, this is merely one of many considerations and it has not been argued before us. Thus, for example, in contrast, the ability to exclude "new media" might actually be damaging to small authors in particular given the "dilution" it would generate in the value of blanket licenses. Consequently, as a general rule and as already mentioned, the question of "new media" should be revisited comprehensively as part of the cartel's re-approval at the end of the five-year period allotted to it. This is based on the understanding that one cannot rule out in advance the possibility that a delineated and limited format of "new media" exclusion (insofar as such a format is proposed in the future) might enable interested authors greater independence in the management of their works, without impairing the interests of the public at large, to an extent that will undermine the reasons underlying the cartel's approval.

 

81.       In other words, the precise definition of the "exclusion category" sought in respect of "new media" is likely to have a decisive impact on whether the overall exclusion mechanism yields a balanced result. An important, albeit not the only, aspect of this definition relates to the phenomena of "technology collapse" and "content leakage" that we have already considered. As previously mentioned, a sweeping, generalized definition of "new media" regarding the exclusion ability would yield uncertainty in respect of the scope of the excluded uses, might lead to many users being charged double fees (not only by ACUM but also by authors themselves), and would create a "chilling effect" from the users’ perspective, as they might refrain from including an excluded work in productions intended for "old media" based on their concern that new media marketing will be limited in future. In contrast, a narrower definition of excludable uses, particularly a definition that focuses on uses designated for new media (for example the production of a ringtone based on an existing tune) would help reduce the awkwardness that numerous exclusion possibilities yield, moderate the negative effects of "content leakage" between different technological platforms from the users’ perspective, and reduce the damage caused to their financial interests. In this context, we may add that part of the negative experience accumulated from the operation of the broad exclusion mechanism (in the scope of the Provisional Conditions for ACUM’s activity before their 2009 amendment) resulted from the fact that it granted complete flexibility with regard to the exclusion format and did not consider the significance of the term "new media" nor did it regulate the boundaries of the exclusion options related to it.

 

82.       To complete the picture it should be noted that the issue of excluding rights in "new media" from collective management as part of a cartel's approval in Israel has not arisen for the first time in ACUM’s case. As already mentioned, the Tribunal had authorized in the past the activity of two other collective management corporations that were also considered a cartel – PIL and IFPI. In both cases the conditions for the approval regulate the corporation members’ ability to exclude rights from collective management in accordance with a predetermined "exclusion basket," and include several categories concerning various Internet and mobile phone uses (see: section 3.3 of the conditions for the operation of IFPI and section 2.2 of the conditions for the operation of PIL). Recognition of this is prima facie relevant to the discussion. However, we should consider the fact that both those entities deal with the management of producers rights (the owners of sound recordings), an area which is not identical to the area in which ACUM operates (management of composers, songwriters, and arrangers rights). We expected the parties before us to refer to this comparison – one way or the other – but they failed to do so. Each of them clung to the position of "all or nothing" and sided, respectively, either with a complete exclusion of "new media" or an absolute negation of the ability to exclude new media uses. Thus, the option of excluding "new media" and the conditions for it were not fully addressed.

 

83.       What emerges from all the aforementioned is this: reviewing the implications of excluding "new media" shows that it is not necessarily justified to completely negate the option to exclude works for the purposes of "new media." Nevertheless, there are clear indications that this applies only to a limited exclusion mechanism, which concentrates on certain types of "new media" uses and strives to minimize the harm caused to users. Such an exclusion mechanism cannot be based merely on a technological distinction between "old media" and "new media" which allows a sweeping exclusion of all uses of the latter type – as proposed by EMI Israel and Anana. In any event, examining the possibility of another exclusion category concerning "new media" and fashioning the boundaries of that category should be done with care after studying the positions of all interested parties and all the relevant facts. As aforesaid, this matter is for the Tribunal to consider when the extension of the cartel's approval arises. Our position is also supported by the temporary nature of the approval – for only five years. At the end of that period (two years of which have already passed), the Tribunal will revisit the approval of the cartel, at which time it can also reconsider the scope of the exclusion mechanism's "segmentation," on the basis of five years’ experience with the operation of a "narrow" exclusion mechanism. That experience will join with lessons already learned from the operation of an unlimited exclusion mechanism (as part of the Provisional Conditions) and will help the Tribunal evaluate the possibility of adopting a balanced, intermediate alternative that will permit the exclusion of limited uses for the purposes of "new media," without undermining ACUM’s purpose as a collective management corporation. Presumably, by the time the Tribunal considers the extension of the cartel's approval, international experience on this issue will also be established which will enrich the set of facts before the Tribunal.

 

84.       To sum up, our opinion is that the conditions for the permanent approval should be left as they are for the time being, including the issue of excluding works for the purposes of "new media," based on the assumption that the Tribunal will be able to revisit this issue when the current conditions expire. It should be emphasized that this does not express any substantive holding regarding the result to which the Tribunal should reach on this or any other issue, beyond the general statement that the possibility of permitting a limited, well-defined exclusion of "new media" uses should not be ruled out. On the basis of the up-to-date facts laid out before it, the Tribunal will presumably reach a correct decision regarding the proper and most effective way to do so, insofar as it deems fit to follow such path.

 

Conclusion

 

85.       The appeals before us revolved around ACUM’s activity, yet they necessitated a broad discussion with regard to the collective management of copyright, considering not only the complexity of jointly owned works that derive from the talents of several authors but also the complexity of the variety of uses in a constantly changing technological world. At the present time we have reached the overall view that according to the facts before us we should not intervene in the conditions attached to the cartel's approval – from the perspective of balancing the proprietary rights of all authors against the public interest of accessibility to works that are part of the general cultural repertoire and it is therefore important to avoid placing substantial barriers to their use. We have not ruled out the possibility that in future the proper balance between authors’ rights and the public interest might dictate a different result with respect to integrating the distinction between different types of "new media" and "old media" in the rights exclusion mechanism. To a great extent, this issue represents the challenge of collectively managing rights in the modern era with its changing technological and business environment, where the practice of collective management is more essential than ever but also raises more serious difficulties and complexities than ever. The answer to these challenges (both with regard to "the segmentation mechanism" and with regard to other matters discussed before us) lies in a delicate, changing balance between the relevant interests. As we have mentioned, this balance might be affected by changes in technological platforms and business practices, by studying new information, and by lessons derived from ACUM’s activity in Israel and the operation of collective management corporations worldwide.

 

86.       In conclusion, I would suggest to my fellow justices to dismiss both appeals. ACUM would bear the Director-General's costs in the amount of NIS 20,000. EMI Israel would bear the Director-General's costs in the amount of NIS 40,000 and Partner's costs in the amount of NIS 10,000.

Justice Z. Zylbertal

 

I concur.

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

 

A.        I concur with the comprehensive opinion of my colleague, Justice Barak-Erez.

 

B.        Without wishing to gild the lily, I would like to add brief remarks. We are dealing with ACUM, a special entity established in 1936, during the British Mandate, to protect the rights of authors and artists in their intellectual property and it is as though it has always been a fundamental Israeli institution. Indeed, perhaps if we could start over today it would have been possible to think of other ways of organization for this purpose, not necessarily a private company, but such is the situation we are facing, in which we are called upon to have our say. However, even given the current situation, the challenges of dealing with the rights of those in need of ACUM’s services are ever-changing, especially with the dynamic technology, and it is not without reason that my colleague qualified the second part of her opinion with regard to the exclusion mechanism, by looking to the future.

 

C.        With regard to public directors, the Tribunal was indeed right in its decision. In my opinion, the more the better, provided that these directors do their work faithfully as agents of the public and it is to be hoped that this is the norm, in which case the financial expense involved is justified. Regarding their duties, see Prof. J. Gross, Directors and Officers in the Era of Corporate Governance (Second Edition, 2011) Chapter I, p 1 et seq and the references there; and see also Amendment No. 8 to the Companies Law (2008) with regard to the possibility of appointing independent directors; I. Bahat, Companies, 12th edition, 5771-2011, 386. My colleague described in detail the circumstances of this case but also added notes drawn from general public law, namely when a particular entity appears to be hybrid, and as derived from this analysis – the fact that ACUM is similar to that model in view of its duties to the public, without deeming it necessary to rule that it is indeed a hybrid entity. I myself would tend to say that we are indeed dealing with a hybrid entity, whether we take a relatively narrow view of it, through the eyes of its direct beneficiaries, or a broader view of the general population of users; see also my comments in ALAA 1106/04 Haifa Local Planning and Building Committee v. The Electric Corporation (2006), paras. C and D.

 

D.        The author A. Harel in his work Hybrid Entities – Private Entities in Administrative Law (5768) enumerates (pp 118-125) criteria for analyzing the hybrid nature of an entity, including a vital public function, providing a service to the public, not-for-profit activity, a monopoly, the concentration of great power that might be abused, and functional public funding. When dealing with a monopoly, as in the case before us, although ACUM is incorporated as a private company, it is painted in bold colors of hybridity, in particular considering the narrow choice given to individuals (ibid, 115). Indeed, in a rapidly changing world of varied technological possibilities for using works, the interest of authors and artists, as well as the general public, is one of fairness towards everyone; see also D. Barak-Erez, Citizen, Subject, Consumer and Government in a Changing Country (2012), 119, 121, who characterizes an entity as hybrid, when, inter alia, it serves as an actual substitute for government involvement. In the case before us, as implied above, the matter could have presumably been dealt with through a regulatory framework and this component justifies, in my view, a thorough discussion of the issue of public representatives. Indeed, before us is a private company, yet this is merely its framework and shell while its content is significantly broader; even the name attests to its belonging to the public realm – the Association of Composers, Authors and Publishers. ACUM's articles of association (as last approved on July 21, 2013 according to its website) include external directors and the controversy consists merely of their number. According to its website, ACUM presently has approximately 7,500 author members; don’t they deserve extensive protection against a potential clash of interests between various groups within the company?

 

E.         Now a few words on the role of external directors, which is the current legal term, or public directors; as we know, the Companies Law, 5759-1999 refers to an external director (article five, sections 239 et seq) but the literature uses this expression interchangeably with public director, as it was termed in the Companies Ordinance (section 96(b)(c)). Indeed, according to the learned author J. Gross (Directors and Officers in the Era of Corporate Governance (2011) 92), the external director "does not represent the regulator or the general public. He owes a fiduciary duty to the company and to it alone and he only has to bear the interest of the company in mind"; and see also Dr. O. Haviv-Segal, Company Law (2007) 438. However, even if this narrow definition is correct in principle, without going into a comprehensive discussion, the current case involves a special instance of a "private-non-private" company, which does not strive to maximize its profits. In this context, see by analogy the statement by Haviv-Segal, ibid, about the external director’s function in restraining "opportunistic behavior" by a controlling shareholder or management: "in this respect the external director can be regarded as the representative of the public shareholders on the company's board of directors." We should also mention (Gross, p 93) that the external director "brings with him knowledge, experience, and objective judgment and might balance the various views within the company, especially when the board of directors is made up of several cohesive groups"; he is "removed from the shareholders' personal interests… can express objective opinions in cases where differences have arisen between various groups in the company and balance the different interests in the company…". By analogy, this statement is presumably consistent with the present case, despite ACUM's "private" corporate framework. Therefore, the external directors have a particularly important role from the broad, overall perspective of the interests of ACUM's members generally as well as the public at large; see also Hadara Bar-Mor, Corporate Law III (5769-2009) 307-309. Thus, we should not intervene in the ruling of the Tribunal on this matter.

 

Regarding my colleague's remarks concerning the rights exclusion mechanism and old and new media, what can be inferred from them is a lesson in complexity and arbiter humility. We are dealing with money and maximizing authors’ benefit but the question is whether the baby won’t be thrown out with the bathwater. My colleague pointed out the difficulties and her conclusion is that more experience and study is necessary in order to reach a proper balance (see para. 82). My sense is that this appears difficult and challenging; the technological means are constantly changing before our very eyes, along with their implications to the issue before us, and hence solutions are likely to be short-lived. The regulator, the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority, has an extremely important role in this respect since the Tribunal has only what its eyes can see, while the Director-General is equipped with available monitoring tools. Finally, this summer I have had the opportunity to serve as a "secondary partner" in three intellectual property decisions. Their common denominator is the complexity caused by time, complexity of different types, technological and economic. Studying the fascinating collection CopyrightReadings in Copyright Law (M. Birnhack & G. Pesach, 5769-2009) reveals a variety of insights that will concern us a great deal in the future. Apart from the need to plough through the specific material, the constant changes, perhaps more than in any other area of civil law, also place the courts, and equally so – the regulatory entities, under weighty responsibility. The tension between property and competition, and between the long, short and medium term, poses real challenges. The professionalism of the regulators – be it the Patent Office or, as aforesaid, the Director-General of the Antitrust Authority – helps courts in making their rulings but does not relieve them of their responsibility. In these matters comparative law may also be useful. The bottom line is that this judgment ought to be a starting point for lessons to be learned; over, but not done.

 

Held as per the opinion of Justice D. Barak-Erez

 

September 3, 2013 (Elul 28, 5773)

Full opinion: 

Gottesman v. Vardi

Case/docket number: 
CA 1697/11
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, January 23, 2013
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

[This abstract is not part of the Court's opinion and is provided for the reader's convenience. It has been translated from a Hebrew version prepared by Nevo Press Ltd. and is used with its kind permission.]

 

The Second Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Gottesman") is an architect who designed a unique dwelling (hereinafter referred to as "the house") for the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Vardi"). Gottesman asked to photograph the house in order to showcase it on his firm's website. Vardi refused. In addition, Gottesman published computer simulations of Vardi's house on the website without giving details that would identify the house owner. Vardi brought an action against Gottesman, pleading infringement of privacy. In his claim, Vardi referred to section 2(11) of the Law concerning "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life, including his sexual history, state of health or conduct in the private domain." The District Court allowed the claim and held that Vardi's privacy had been infringed as a result of the exposure of his house on the Internet and that Vardi's right of privacy superseded Gottesman's economic interest. A permanent injunction was therefore ordered restraining Gottesman and his firm from making any use of photographs or simulations showing Vardi's house. Hence the appeal.

 

The Supreme Court (per Justice U. Vogelman; Justice S. Joubran and Justice N. Sohlberg concurring) allowed the appeal partially on the following grounds –

 

The right of privacy is one of the most important human rights in Israel and since the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed, it is even vested with constitutional status. The prohibition of infringing privacy is currently embodied in the Protection of Privacy Law. Section 1 of the Law provides that "no person shall infringe the privacy of another without his consent." As has already been held, the definition of "privacy" is not simple. Section 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law prescribes what an infringement of privacy is. In his claim, Vardi referred to section 2(11) of the Law, which concerns "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life, including his sexual history, state of health or conduct in the private domain." The most relevant alternative herein is "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life" and also, to some extent, "publishing any matter relating to [a person's] conduct in the private domain."

 

The answer to the question of what is regarded as a matter relating to "a person's intimate life" is not simple, and the question is whether that expression also embraces publications relating to a person's home. A person's home is not one of those concrete matters that are mentioned in section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law - "a person's state of health" and "his conduct in the private domain." Nevertheless, according to the Court, information concerning a person's home might, in certain situations, fall within the scope of "a person's intimate life." For the publication of information concerning a person's home to be construed as an infringement of privacy as defined in the Law, we must determine whether it is such as to cross that threshold of intimacy, after which it can be said that "a person's intimate life" has been infringed.

 

In the instant case, reviewing all the circumstances leads to the conclusion that publishing the simulations of the interior of Vardi's house does indeed involve infringement of "a person's intimate life." The interior of a person's home is one's castle, and one is entitled to be let alone in it. Inside a person's home one exercises one's right to privacy in the clearest form. A person therefore has a reasonable expectation that pictures of the interior of one's home will not be published at large without one's consent. In the instant case, studying the simulations of Vardi's home as published on the website shows that, despite the fact that they are computer simulations, the impression gained from them is very tangible. Although the simulations do show the house in a "sterile" condition, namely without Vardi's personal belongings appearing in them, the items of furniture in them are very similar indeed to the existing furniture; they expose "personal" spaces in the house, like the bedroom and bathroom; and they are such as to attest to Vardi's lifestyle and also demonstrate, in the words of the section, "his conduct in the private domain."

 

The simulations of the exterior of the home should be treated differently. Ordinarily, the front of a house is exposed to passersby. It is in the "public eye." Consequently, insofar as the front of a house is visible from the street, it is clear that showing its picture or simulation will not give rise to any infringement of privacy. The right of privacy does not extend to information that is already in the possession of the public. Therefore, when certain information is in any event in the public domain, the view that the right of privacy is not infringed is appropriate. Even if Vardi is correct in his plea that the simulations of the home's exterior show his house from angles that necessitate access to the grounds of the house, a photograph from "the public domain" is not involved. There is no question that portraying the front of a person's house in public does not give rise to an infringement similar in extent to that caused by displaying the interior of one's house. The front of a person's house does not have the same "intimacy" as characteristic of the intimate rooms of one's home. In that sense, the simulations of the home's exterior are not "information" that is sufficiently close to the nucleus of the interest protected by section 2(11) of the Law. In other words, publishing simulations of the home's exterior does not give rise to an infringement that might infringe "a person's intimate life."

 

The wording of section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law shows us that in order for the publication of a matter to constitute an infringement of privacy, it has to be established that the information published makes it possible to identify a person. That is to say that insofar as a reasonable person would be unable to connect the information published with a specific person there will not be an infringement of privacy. In that connection it was explained that it is not necessary for a person's name or picture to appear alongside the publication; it suffices for it to be possible by some means to connect the information with a specific person by "reverse engineering." Clearly, such "reverse engineering" is mainly likely to occur when the information published includes clear and unique characteristics.

 

In the case herein the Court reached the conclusion that although Vardi's name is not mentioned in the publication, the simulations' publication is likely to make it possible to identify him by other means in view of those unique characteristics relating to Vardi's house that distinguish it from other houses.

 

Even if the information published does indeed relate to "a person's intimate life." the Protection of Privacy Law requires it to be established that the infringement was not of "no real significance." In this connection, it has to be shown that the infringement of privacy was not committed as a "trivial act." In the instant case, the publication of the simulations is not "a trivial act." The simulations tangibly show the interior of Vardi's home and in that way enable the public at large to gain an impression of the home owner's lifestyle and manners. There is no doubt that when any clear picture of a person's home is made visible, and especially the intimate rooms, the publication is likely to give him an intense feeling of discomfort. Such being the case, bringing the lawsuit herein seems, on the face of it, to be in good faith, and it is certainly not a frivolous or vexatious claim. However, that is not the case with regard to the publication of simulations of the front of the house. Even if publication of simulations of the home's exterior might cause some infringement, it is minor and trivial, in respect of which there is no cause for the grant of relief.

 

Another element necessary for the award of relief on a cause of infringement of privacy is negation of the existence of the circumstances of one of the defenses prescribed in section 18 of the Law. Nevertheless, a party seeking shelter behind those defenses must show that he acted in good faith. Good faith is "like a gate and only if it is traversed will the circumstances in which the specific infringement of privacy was committed be examined." It is therefore necessary to prove that the person committing the infringement acted in the belief that the infringement was in the scope of the defenses prescribed by the Law. In order to prove good faith, the defendant or accused can have recourse to the presumption mentioned in section 20(a) of the Protection of Privacy Law – that the infringement of privacy was committed under any of the circumstances referred to in section 18(2) and that it did not exceed the limits reasonable under those circumstances.  Against that presumption that is available to the defendant or accused, the plaintiff or prosecutor can have recourse to the presumption mentioned in section 20(b) of the Law and establish that the publisher knew that he had exceeded the reasonable.

 

In this case, Gottesman relied on two defenses – those prescribed in sections 18(2)(a) and (c). As regards the defense prescribed in section 18(2)(a) of the Law, since Vardi made it perfectly clear to Gottesman that he strongly objected to publication without the latter signing the undertaking, it is difficult to conceive that the infringement was committed without Gottesman knowing "that an infringement of privacy might occur," as required by the section. It is therefore clear that the plea in respect of the defense under that section cannot be upheld. As regards the defence under section 18(2)(c), relating to an infringement committed in defense of "a legitimate personal interest" of the infringer, the section necessitates a balance be struck between the right of privacy and other conflicting values, and the expression "legitimate personal interest" should be construed "by striking a balance between the desire to protect the interest of the injured party and safeguard his privacy, on the one hand, and the contrary interests of the infringer, on the other hand."  In the instant case, on the artistic-creative level, one can understand Gottesman's desire to expose Vardi's house to the public, a work that is unquestionably of unique quality and size. In addition, there is nothing wrong with Gottesman's desire to publicize his work for economic reasons as well, because displaying the work might certainly enable its author to establish goodwill and attract clients.  In the overall balance between the competing rights and interests, the Court reached the conclusion that it is inappropriate to apply the defense of section 18(2)(c) to publishing simulations of the interior of Vardi's house.

 

The Protection of Privacy Law provides that an infringement of privacy will not occur where there is consent to the infringement (section 1). To be precise, consent is not cause that justifies an infringement of the rights of privacy. Consent itself is an inherent part of the right, so that if it is given, a right of action does not arise. Consent can be express or implied, but it is best to exercise extreme care in determining that consent to publication has been obtained. Along those lines it was held that from the fact that an individual agreed to disclose certain particulars to one person or several persons, it cannot be inferred that he is precluded from objecting to the publication of those particulars to the public at large. In the instant case, it appears that such consent was not consummated. No substance was found in the plea that Vardi's agreeing to the publication of other pictures of the house suggests that implied consent was also given to Gottesman. Actually, the fact that other publications were specifically made subject to signing an undertaking, which was ultimately not signed in the instant case, demonstrates the absence of consent herein.

 

From the aforegoing it emerges that publishing the simulations showing the front of the house does not give rise to an infringement of privacy and in any event not an infringement of real significance, as defined in section 6 of the Protection of Privacy Law. On the other hand, the simulations showing the interior of the house do infringe "his intimate life" and despite their anonymous publication, it is possible to connect them with the Respondent. It was also found that it is not an infringement "of no real significance," and the defenses prescribed in section 18(2) of the Protection of Privacy Law are inapplicable. Consequently, because the infringement of the Respondent's privacy was made without his consent to the publication, there is no alternative but to find that publication of the simulations of the interior of his home on the website cannot be permitted. The appeal is therefore allowed in part, to the effect that the injunction remains in force with respect to publishing simulations of the home's interior on the website. In other words, there is no bar to publishing simulations of the home's exterior on the site. In view of that result, the liability for costs at first instance was set aside and no order for costs was made in the instant proceedings.

 

Justice N. Sohlberg concurred in the aforegoing and added from Jewish law with regard to the distinction between the front of the house and its interior.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

In the Supreme Court

Sitting As a Court of Civil Appeals

CA 1697/11

 

Before:

His Honor, Justice S. Joubran

His Honor, Justice U. Vogelman

His Honor, Justice N. Sohlberg

 

 

 

 

The Appellants:

 

1.  A. Gottesman Architecture Ltd

2.  Asaf Gottesman

 

 

v.

 

 

The Respondent:

Arie Vardi

     

 

Appeal against the judgment of the District Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (Her Honor Judge A. Baron) of January 17, 2011 in CF 1222/09

 

On behalf of the Appellants:

Adv. Hillel Ish-Shalom, Adv. Roy Kubovsky, Adv. Guy Lotem

 

 

On behalf of the Respondent:

Adv. Eran Presenti

JUDGMENT

Justice U. Vogelman

 

            An architect designed a unique house for a client and asked to photograph it in order to show it on his firm's website. The client refused. The architect published computer simulations of the client's house on the website, without giving details identifying the owner of the house. Does this case give rise to an infringement of privacy? That is the question that faces us.

 

The Main Facts and Proceedings

 

1.         The Second Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Gottesman") is an architect who heads a firm of architects. At the beginning of the year 2000 the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Vardi") commissioned Gottesman's services for the latter to design his residence for him. The parties do not dispute the fact that the project was one of a kind and a house was ultimately built that was exceptional as regards its size, the type of materials used in its construction and its unique design. Despite the extensive scale of the project, no written agreement was ever made between Vardi and Gottesman, either with regard to the commissioning of the architectural work or concerning the possibility of documenting and photographing the building for Gottesman's purposes.

 

2.         Even before the construction was completed, Gottesman asked Vardi to photograph his house, as was his firm's practice. Vardi, for his part, made the photographs conditional upon Gottesman and the intended photographer signing a letter of commitment in respect of the photographs' use. According to the wording proposed by Vardi, Gottesman and the photographer would be obliged to apply to him in writing whenever they wanted to make use of the pictures and obtain his express consent. The two were also required to undertake to pay Vardi agreed damages without proof of loss for any breach of that undertaking: Gottesman - $500,000 and the photographer - $50,000 (hereinafter referred to as "the letter of commitment"). Gottesman asserted that the letter of commitment that Vardi proposed was a new requirement that was contrary to a previous understanding between the parties in respect of photographing the house. Vardi, on the other hand, expressed anger at the fact that Gottesman categorically denied the importance of protecting his privacy. No agreement was ultimately made between the parties and in the absence of any understanding, professional photographs of Vardi's house were not taken.

 

To complete the picture, it should be noted that at the relevant time photographs of Vardi's house were published in two places: firstly, pictures of the house exterior were published in a book that was printed in hundreds of copies, published by Apex Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "Apex"), which had installed windows and shutters in Vardi's house; secondly, pictures were published on the website of the carpenter who had done carpentry work in Vardi's house. Both Apex and the carpenter had signed a letter of commitment in favour of Vardi with regard to using pictures of his house in terms similar to those that Gottesman had been asked to sign.

 

3.         Since Gottesman had not been permitted to photograph Vardi's house he commissioned the services of a studio that specialised in the creation of computer simulations in order to create an artificial simulation of the architectural work in Vardi's house. Those simulations, which look very similar to actual photographs, were published on the website of Gottesman's firm (hereinafter referred to as "the website"). There were no details identifying the owner of the house or its address alongside the pictures. After Vardi discovered that the computer simulations had found their way onto the website, he filed a lawsuit in the Tel Aviv Magistrates Court against Gottesman and his firm, in which he applied for a permanent injunction restraining them from making any use of photographs or simulations showing his house. At the same time as bringing the action, a motion was also filed for the provisional relief of removing the simulations from the website. An order prohibiting publication of the existence of the legal proceedings, including any identifying detail in respect of any of the parties to the action, was also sought. On November 11, 2008, during a Magistrates Court hearing of the motion for provisional relief, the parties reached an understanding with regard to publicising Vardi's house on the website until the motion for provisional relief is heard on its merit. In that understanding it was provided that the simulations would be removed from the website and other pictures of the house, which had already been published in the Apex book with Vardi's consent, would be published instead (hereinafter referred to as "the procedural arrangement"). On September 24, 2008 the Court (Her Honour Judge Z. Agi) allowed the application for the award of an interim gag order. Nevertheless, the Court ordered the trial to be remitted to the Tel Aviv District Court because it was found that the relief sought in the action was within its residual jurisdiction since it was an application for a permanent mandatory order incapable of financial quantification. Both the procedural arrangement and the gag order remained in force during the trial of the action.

 

The Judgement of the Lower Court

 

4.         The District Court (Her Honour Judge A. Baron), to which the trial was remitted, allowed Vardi's claim and held that his privacy had been infringed as a result of the exposure of his home on the Internet. It was held that although the simulations did not include personal belongings or intimate items, they did make it possible to obtain an impression of the lifestyle in the house, the habits of its occupants and their financial position. On the other hand, the Court dismissed the plea that removing the simulations would infringe the freedom of occupation and intellectual property rights of Gottesman and his firm. Consequently, against the infringement of Vardi's privacy, the Court weighed the harm to the economic interest that Gottesman and his firm would sustain, if they could not use the simulations in order to attract potential clients. In balancing them, the Court held that Vardi's right of privacy outweighed Gottesman's economic interest. Alongside that, the Court held that Vardi had not expressly or impliedly agreed to publication of the pictures or simulations. It was found that even if there had been talk between the parties about publishing pictures of the house in some or other framework, no express agreement had been reached to take and publish photographs. It was also held that there was no implied agreement to publishing the pictures. Amongst other things, the Court declined to treat the working relationship between Gottesman and Vardi or the fact that Gottesman had designed and planned the house as implied consent to the use of the simulations. It was further held that Vardi's agreeing to allow Apex and the carpenter to make certain use of photographs did not constitute implied agreement to similar use by Gottesman. Finally, the Court stated that even had Vardi's agreement been obtained, the agreement was unenforceable by virtue of section 3 of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731-1970. A permanent injunction was therefore awarded restraining Gottesman and his firm from making any use of photographs or simulations showing Vardi's house, and the procedural arrangement that the parties had reached was annulled/rescinded. The sweeping gag order in the case was also removed and replaced by a mere prohibition of publishing the evidence.

 

The Parties' Arguments on Appeal

 

5.         In the appeal herein Gottesman and his firm reiterated their assertion that they should be permitted to publish the simulations on the website. At the outset, the Appellants dispute the lower court's finding that showing the computer simulations infringes "the privacy of a person's intimate life", within the meaning of the definition in section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981 (hereinafter referred to as "the Protection of Privacy Law" or "the Law"). Firstly, it was pleaded that showing the computer simulations of a house without specifying details identifying the owner cannot be construed as an infringement of privacy as defined in the Protection of Privacy Law. According to the Appellants, in order to prove an infringement of privacy as a result of the information published, it has to be shown that a link can be made between the information and a specific "person". In the instant case, it was argued, the computer simulations were shown in a "sterile" state, based on the planning position before the occupants entered the house and while making certain modifications. Alongside that, it was asserted that in any event there was no infringement of "the privacy of a person's intimate life" because the section relates to highly intimate information, such as a person's sexual proclivity or state of health. The same goes all the more so, according to the Appellants, in respect of the simulations that show the outside of the house and the spaces designated for hospitality. In the alternative, the Appellants plead that even if an infringement of privacy was caused, it did not give rise to a cause of action since it is a minor infringement "of no real significance", as defined in section 6 of the Protection of Privacy Law, because the simulations were published anonymously, without specifying personal details.

 

6.         Even if there was an infringement of Vardi's privacy, the Appellants plead that the defence of good faith applies in the circumstances prescribed in the Protection of Privacy Law. In particular, it was pleaded that the Appellants did not imagine that the publication would infringe Vardi's privacy and they are therefore entitled to the defence prescribed in section 18(2)(a) of the Law ("he did not know and need not have known that an infringement of privacy might occur"). It was further pleaded that the publication was intended to serve Gottesman's moral right to obtain fitting credit for his work, which he has by virtue of an architect's copyright in his work (section 4 of the Copyright Law, 5768-2007 (hereinafter referred to as "the Copyright Law")). According to the Appellants, this entitles them to the defence under section 18(2)(c) of the Protection of Privacy Law ("the infringement was committed in defence of a legitimate personal interest of the infringer") because, according to them, the moral right should enable the architect to publish computer simulations of his work.

 

7.         The Appellants further argue that it was inappropriate for the lower court to find that the element of "absence of consent" necessary to establish an infringement of privacy had been fulfilled. The Appellants first protest the finding that Vardi's consent was necessary in this context. Such consent, according to them, would only be necessary if Gottesman had sought to enter Vardi's house and photograph it in the private domain. However, they assert, it is unnecessary to obtain consent when involved is the use of the architectural plans and simulations created on the basis of them. Secondly, they argue, Vardi had originally agreed to the house being photographed and in any event his implied agreement to publishing the simulations could be inferred from the agreement that he had given to publish pictures of the house in the Apex book and on the carpenter's website, and also from the principle agreement to the procedural arrangement. Therefore, the Appellants maintained, Vardi's attempts to procure Gottesman's signature to the letter of commitment should be construed as an attempt contrary to a previous understanding between the parties. Such being the case, it should be held that Gottesman's refusal to sign the said document is irrelevant. Finally, the Appellants argue that it should be presumed that had Vardi wished to limit the use of the work, he would have done so from the outset in an express agreement.

 

8.         Vardi, for his part, endorses the lower court's ruling. According to him, publishing the simulations on the website constitutes an infringement of his and his family's privacy. According to Vardi, the fact that simulations, rather than actual pictures, were published on the website was aimed at circumventing the Protection of Privacy Law because the simulations show the house almost exactly as it really is and it is easy to link them with it. In view of that, Vardi seeks to adopt the District Court's finding that publishing the simulations on the website should be treated as publication of a matter relating to a person's "intimate life", as provided in section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law and it therefore involves an infringement of privacy. According to Vardi, the Appellants cannot benefit from the defences prescribed in the Law: as regards the defence under section 18(2)(a) of the Law, which deals with the absence of knowledge of an infringement of privacy, it is asserted that Vardi emphasised to Gottesman that he jealously guards his privacy, and his attorney also demanded that the Appellants remove the pictures from the website immediately; as regards the defence under section 18(2)(c) of the Law, it was pleaded that the Appellants were not protecting a "legitimate personal interest" by publishing the simulations but merely sought to produce an economic gain. In any event, Vardi argued, the essential requirement of good faith to establish the said defences was not fulfilled in the present case because the Appellants had failed to remove the pictures at his request.

 

9.         Furthermore, according to Vardi, the case herein does not give rise to a clash between copyright law and protection of privacy law. An architect, according to Vardi, has no copyright in a house that was built but at most in the two-dimensional plans of the house and even those, it is argued, cannot be published by the architect without the client's consent. Consequently photographing the house and circulating the photographs, including by way of simulations, is not an inherent right of the architect. Even were copyright involved, Vardi asserts, it is an economic right which does not supersede the right to privacy. In this context, Vardi emphasizes that the lower court was not moved to award relief that would preclude the Appellants from showing the project to customers and in professional circles; instead an injunction restraining publication at large, on the Internet, or in a book or magazine, was sought. Such being the case, according to Vardi, the Appellants' freedom of occupation or copyright was not infringed. Finally, Vardi maintains that the plea of copyright infringement was merely made by Gottesman incidentally and in an unspecified manner at the trial in the lower court and it is therefore a prohibited "amendment of pleadings" on appeal.

 

10.       The parties also took issue with regard to the formation of consent to publish the simulations. Vardi asserts that his agreement to the publication of the simulations was not obtained. According to him, during the years of the relationship between the parties, his confidence in Gottesman had lessened and he had therefore chosen to ask for any understanding in respect of photographing his house and using the pictures to be put in writing. A written undertaking along those lines did not come about and, such being the case, according to Vardi, no agreement was consummated between the parties in respect of publication. In that connection Vardi rejects the Appellants' argument that agreement to publication could be inferred from the procedural arrangement that the parties reached or from the agreement that was given to the carpenter and Apex for publication. According to him, a person is entitled to control his privacy so that consent to waive privacy should be made knowingly and expressly.

 

The Procedural Progression

 

11.       On April 2, 2012 we had an appeal hearing in the presence of the parties before a bench headed by the (now retired) Deputy President, Justice E. Rivlin. At the hearing we believed that it would be best for the dispute between the parties to be resolved in mediation. The parties accepted our proposal and agreed to go to mediation. Unfortunately, the mediation did not prove successful and the parties notified us on July 27, 2012 that they had not reached an overall understanding. Prior thereto, in May 2012, the Deputy President retired and he was replaced by my colleague, Justice N. Solberg (as decided by the President, A. Grunis on August 13, 2012). In view of the change to the bench since the hearing, the parties were permitted to supplement summations in writing. The time for a ruling has now been reached.

 

Discussion and Ruling

 

The Right to Privacy

 

12.       The right to privacy is one of the most important human rights in Israel. It is one of the freedoms that mould the character of the regime in Israel as a democratic one (HCJ 6650/04 Jane Doe v. The Netanya Regional Rabbinical Court, para 8 (May 14, 2006) (hereinafter referred to as "Jane Doe")). Since the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed, it is even vested with constitutional status (section 7 of the Basic Law). Privacy enables a person to develop his selfhood and to determine the degree of society's involvement in his personal behaviour and acts. It is his "proprietary, personal and psychological castle" (Crim. App. 5026/97 Gilam v. State of Israel, para 9 (June 13, 1999) (hereinafter referred to as "Gilam")). The right to privacy therefore extends the line between the private and the public, between self and society. It draws a domain in which the individual is left to himself, to develop his "self", without the involvement of others (HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. The Jerusalem District Commander, PD 45(2) 456, 471 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as "Dayan"). It "embodies the individual's interest not to be bothered by others in his intimate life" (CA 8825/03 Clalit Health Services v. The Ministry of Defence, para 21 (April 11, 2007)).

 

Infringement of Privacy – Section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law

 

13.       The prohibition of infringing privacy is currently embodied in the Protection of Privacy Law. Section 1 of the Law provides that "no person shall infringe the privacy of another without his consent". As has already been held, the definition of "privacy" is not simple (HCJ 6824/07 Manna v. The Tax Authority, para 34 (December 20, 2010); CA 4963/07 Yediot Aharonot Ltd v. John Doe, para 9 (February 27, 2008) (hereinafter referred to as "Yediot Aharonot")). Section 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law prescribes what an infringement of privacy is. In his claim, Vardi referred to section 2(11) of the Law, which concerns "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life, including his sexual history, state of health or conduct in the private domain". Of the three alternatives mentioned in the section, the most relevant herein is "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life" and also, to some extent, "publishing any matter relating to [a person's] conduct in the private domain". In order to delineate the expression "any matter relating to a person's intimate life", two matters should be clarified: firstly, what is a matter relating to a person's "intimate life"; and secondly, whether the information published indeed makes it possible to identify a "person".

 

(a)       A Person's Intimate Life

 

14.       Firstly, as regards the expression "a person's intimate life": what can fall within that definition? "Intimate life" is also a vague expression, the boundaries of which are unclear (Eli Halm, Protection of Privacy Law, 148 (2003) (hereinafter referred to as "Halm")). It is therefore clear that the answer to the question as to what will be regarded as a matter relating to "a person's intimate life" is not plain and simple and that "like many expressions that we encounter in the law books and ordinary life, their interpretation depends on the context and the purpose for which the interpretation is needed (see and compare the opinion of Justice T. Strasburg-Cohen in CA 439/88, The Registrar of Databases v. Ventura, PD 48(3) 808, 835 (1994) (hereinafter referred to as "Ventura"); also compare the opinion of Justice G. Bach in the same case, p 821). In this respect I would mention that I do not accept the interpretation that a high threshold of intimacy needs to be crossed – for example matters relating to a person's sexual history – in order to establish infringement of "a person's intimate life". That interpretation, which Gottesman propounded, relies on the fact that section 2(11) provides that infringement of privacy is "publishing any matter relating to a person's intimate life, including his sexual history" (emphasis added – UV). However, studying the legislative history of the Protection of Privacy Law indicates that the ending, after the word "including", was added to the section merely to clarify that "a person's sexual history" is also a matter relating to his "intimate life" (see the Explanatory Notes on the Draft Protection of Privacy (Amendment No. 8) (Prohibition of Publishing a Matter of Sexual History) Law, 5766-2005). In that sense the addendum is merely to clarify and elucidate (see ALA 2985/96 Medalsi v. Goni PD 50(2) 81, 86 (1996). See also: Aharon  Barak, Legal Interpretation, Volume II, Legislative Interpretation 137-138 (1993)).

 

15.       Having said all that, the first issue to clarify is whether the phrase "a person's intimate life" also embraces publications concerning a person's home. A person's home is not one of those concrete matters that are mentioned in section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law – "a person's state of health" and "his conduct in the private domain". Nevertheless, information relating to a person's home might certainly fall within the scope of "a person's intimate life". Indeed, a person's home gains a place of honour in the case law relating to privacy. Thus, for example, in Dayan, His Honour the Deputy President (as he then was) A. Barak held that:

 

            "The constitutional right to privacy extends, inter alia […] to a person's right to conduct the lifestyle that he wants in his own home, without interference from outside […] The right to privacy is therefore intended to ensure that a person will not be a prisoner in his own home and will not be forced to expose himself in his own home to interference that he does not want" (ibid, p 470; see also Jane Doe, para 10; Gilam, para 9).

 

Nevertheless, as I see it, these statements are not to be understood literally as relating merely to the physical aspect of the home. As President A. Grunis noted in respect of the statement cited above from Dayan, "it should be understood more broadly, metaphorically, along the lines of the expression coined by Warren & Brandeis, 'the right to be let alone'" (HCJ 8070/98 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Ministry of the Interior PD 58(4) 842, 856 (2004); see also Yediot Aharonot, para 9). It should therefore be said that information relating to a person's home will not necessarily always be included in the scope of the matters concerning a "person's intimate life". For the publication of information relating to a person's home to be construed as an infringement of privacy, as defined in the Law, it is necessary to see whether it is such as to cross that threshold of intimacy, beyond which it may be said that "a person's intimate life" was infringed. In the instant case, reviewing all the circumstances leads to the conclusion that publishing the simulations of Vardi's house interior does indeed involve infringement of "a person's intimate life". The interior of a person's home is his castle and he is entitled to be let alone in it. Inside a person's home he exercises his right to privacy in the clearest form. A person therefore has a reasonable expectation that pictures of the interior of his home will not be published at large without his consent. In the instant case, studying the simulations of Vardi's home as published on the website shows that, despite the fact that they are computer simulations, the impression gained from them is very tangible. In this respect I accept the findings of the trial instance that "since the simulations show Vardi's house as it really is, it matters not whether they are the result of computer work or a camera" (p 13 of the lower court's judgement). And note, although the simulations do show the house in a "sterile" condition, namely without Vardi's personal belongings appearing in them, the items of furniture in them are very similar indeed to the existing furniture; they expose "personal" spaces in the house, like the bedroom and bathroom; and they are such as to attest to Vardi's lifestyle and also demonstrate, in the words of the section, "his conduct in the private domain".

 

16.       The simulations of the house exterior should be treated differently. Ordinarily, the front of a house is exposed to passers-by. It is in the "public eye". Consequently, insofar as the front of a house is visible from the street, it is clear that showing its picture or simulation will not give rise to any infringement of privacy (see also CF (J'lem District) 7236/05 Levin v. Ravid Stones, para 14 (May 15, 2006)). The right of privacy does not extend to information that is already in the possession of the public. Therefore, when certain information is in any event in the public domain, the view that the right of privacy is not howsoever infringed is appropriate. (For similar statements in American law, see Jackson v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 731 300 N.W. 2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Reece v. Grissom, 154 Ga. App. 194, 196, 267 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).  See also David A. Elder, Privacy Torts 3-45, 3-44 (2002) (hereinafter referred to as "Elder"); James A. Henderson, Richard N. Pearson and John A. Siliciano, The Torts Process 930-31 (4th ed. 1994).)

 

17.       According to Vardi, a distinction should be made between the situation described above, in which the front of the house as visible from the street is shown, and the simulations published by Gottesman on the website. Vardi asserts that the simulations of the house exterior that Gottesman posted on the website of his firm show the house from an angle that necessitates access to the grounds of the house, from which passers-by cannot obtain an impression of it. In that sense, Vardi pleads, a photograph from "the public domain" is not involved. Even if Vardi is right in that plea, there is no question that portraying the front of a person's house in public does not give rise to an infringement similar in extent to that caused by displaying the interior of his house. Whilst the interior of a person's house is visible only to his invited guests, the front of his house is less "private". The front of a person's house does not have the same "intimacy" that is characteristic of the intimate rooms of his home. In that sense, the simulations of the house exterior are not "information" that is sufficiently close to the nucleus of the interest protected by section 2(11) of the Law. Hence, whilst the simulations that portray the internal spaces of the house might infringe "a person's intimate life", publishing simulations of the house exterior does not give rise to such an infringement.

 

(b)       "A Person's" – the Requirement of Identification

 

18.       The wording of section 2(11) of the Protection of Privacy Law shows us that in order for the publication of a matter to constitute an infringement of privacy, it has to be established that the information published makes it possible to identify a person. When can it be said that information published does indeed make it possible to identify a person so that an infringement of privacy does arise?  Essentially, it appears that the answer is that an infringement of privacy will not arise where the requirement of "identification" is not fulfilled, namely insofar as a reasonable person would be unable to connect the information published with a specific person. On this point I would immediately clarify, ex abundanti cautela, that we might in future come across cases in which it will be possible to consider making that requirement more flexible. Those will be the exceptions in which particularly sensitive information is published to the point that even if it cannot be connected with someone, the very publication will create in the one to whom the information relates a serious sense of his privacy's violation, so that its protection will be justified. We shall leave discussion of such matters for when they arise since that is not the case herein.

 

19.       In order to comprehend the nature of the identification requirement, recourse may be had, by way of analogy, to defamation law that we can use as an aid to interpretation and source of inspiration (see CA 723/74 Haaretz Newspaper Ltd v. The Israel Electric Corporation Ltd, PD 31(2) 281, 293 (1977); Dan Hay, The Protection of Privacy in Israel, 91-97 (2006) (hereinafter referred to as "Hay") and the references there). This is because in many senses an infringement of privacy is similar to the damage caused to reputation as a result of publishing defamatory information. Even before the enactment of the Defamation Law, 5725-1965 (hereinafter referred to as "The Defamation Law"), this Court insisted that in a claim on a cause of defamation it has to be established that the focus of the publication is a specific person. It was therefore held that the plaintiff on such a cause will be obstructed by the fact that he cannot be identified in the picture that was published (CA 68/56 Rabinowitz v. Mirlin PD 11 1224, 1226 (1957)). This requirement was intensified after the Defamation Law was enacted. Indeed, a question similar to that facing us was considered at length in the context of defamation law in CA 8345/08. Ben Nathan v Bachri (July 27, 2011) (hereinafter referred to as "Jenin Jenin "). In that case the Court considered the criteria whereby it could be held that defamation addressed at a group defames its members (ibid, para 18). The Court held in that case that "[…] For cause to arise to take proceedings in respect of the publication of defamation it has to be shown that it relates to an individual or certain individuals and when the proceedings are taken by the injured party, he must show that the statement relates to him" (ibid, para 32. Emphasis added – UV). What is important with respect to the instant case is that the inference was drawn, inter alia, from the fact that the section of the relevant statute (section 1 the Defamation Law) provides – as in the case herein – that the subject of the statement must be a "person" (ibid).

 

20.       By way of comparison, in American law a similar criterion is also accepted in respect of the infringement of privacy. According to the case law there, the requirement of identification has been recognised as an essential one that confronts anyone seeking to assert the infringement of his privacy. Such being the case, where the plaintiff's image or name was not used, the courts in the USA have held that in practice no infringement of privacy arises (see: Branson v Fawcett Publications, 124 F. Supp. 429, 431-32 (E.D. III 1954); Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. 446 F. 2d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 1971) (hereinafter referred to as "Rawls"). See also: Elder, pp 3-40). Consequently, as regards publications such as a photo of a person's house, car, dog or more, that are made without mention of some or other person's name, it has been held that they do not constitute an infringement of privacy, even if subjectively a person feels that his privacy has been infringed (Rawls, ibid; Samuel H. Hofstadter and George Horowitz, The Right of Privacy, 44 (1964)).

 

21.       From the aforegoing it prima facie appears that it suffices for the information published to be shown anonymously in order to avoid the possibility of infringing privacy. However, in this respect it should be taken into account that even information that is shown anonymously might establish a connection with a specific person. In other words, even if the name of the person is not expressly mentioned alongside the information, it has to be ensured that he cannot be identified by other means, for example: if in the publication numerous identifying details are given from which it might be possible to deduce with whom the publication is dealing (see: Hay, p 115). If we treat the prohibition as merely the specification of a person's name, "it would make a mockery of the Law because it is enough to mention numerous identifying details in order to make it clear in many cases who is involved" (Zeev Segal, The Right of Privacy against the Right to Know, Iyunei Mishpat  IX 175, 190 (1983) (hereinafter referred to as "Segal)). As held in Jenin Jenin, "the requirement of identification is substantive, rather than technical. The question is not whether the name of a person is expressly mentioned in the statement published […] The requirement of identification will be fulfilled in those cases where what is published is attributable to the individual who asserts damage implied from the publication or as a result of extrinsic circumstances or a combination of the publication and the extrinsic circumstances" (ibid, para 34).

 

22.       In order to analyse whether it is possible to connect a person with particular information, a criterion of "de-anonymising" has been proposed in the literature. According to the criterion, if anyone has a key that will make reverse engineering possible, namely to attribute the information published to a particular person, then it can be said from the outset that the information is identifying (Michael Birnhack, Private Space – Privacy, Law & Technology, 191-193 (2010)). As aforesaid, it is therefore not necessary for a person's name or picture to appear alongside the publication; it suffices for it to be possible by some means to connect the information with a specific person by "reverse engineering". Clearly, such "reverse engineering" is mainly likely to occur when the information published includes clear and unique characteristics (cf: Motschenbacher v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)).

 

23.       In the instant case, is the requirement that the publication deal with a "person" fulfilled? To that end it is necessary to substantiate the conclusion that despite the anonymous publication of the simulations on the Gottesman website, they can be linked with Vardi. In the case herein we have reached the conclusion that although Vardi's name is not mentioned in the publication, the simulations' publication is likely to make it possible to identify him by other means in view of those unique characteristics relating to Vardi's house. As the lower court held, Vardi's house is a "project of a unique type". In this connection the lower court described Vardi's house as "spectacular and extraordinary as regards its size, the type of materials used in its construction, its unique design and also as regards the investment in each one of the architectural details that make it up". Gottesman himself attested to the project as a "one-off project" and in his appeal he described the house as "a spectacular, extravagant and extraordinary residence […] one of the largest houses in Israel and the largest designed by the Appellants". On the Gottesman website the unique design of the house is described as including the use of special materials like blue glass, unique metal, illuminated gardens and more. All these constitute distinctive construction characteristics that distinguish Vardi's house from others. These indicate that Vardi's house is unlike any other; it is an extraordinary, unique work of architecture. In view of that, it appears that recourse may be had to the simulations published on the Gottesman website for the purpose of that "reverse engineering" that will make it possible to deduce that the simulations shown on the website in fact simulate Vardi's house.

 

Section 6 of the Protection of Privacy Law –Infringement of No Real Significance

 

24.       Even if the information published does indeed relate to "a person's intimate life", the Protection of Privacy Law requires it to be established that the infringement was not of "no real significance" (section 6 of the Protection of Privacy Law). In this connection, it has to be shown that the infringement of privacy was not done as a "trivial act" because such an infringement vests no right to relief (The Association for Civil Rights, p 863). The intention of the section is to do away with vexatious lawsuits, in respect of which no reasonable person would take the trouble of going to court (cf section 4 of the Civil Wrongs Ordnance [New Version]; see also CF (TA Magistrates) 199509/02 Tzadik v. Haaretz Newspaper Publishing Ltd, para 10 (January 22, 2014); Hay, p 124).

 

25. In the instant case, the publication of the simulations is not "a trivial act". The simulations that appeared on the Gottesman website tangibly show the interior of Vardi's home and in that way enable the public at large to gain an impression of the home owner's lifestyle and manners. There is no doubt that when any clear image of a person's home is made visible, and especially his intimate rooms – the bedroom, bathroom etc. – the publication is likely to give him an intense feeling of discomfort. The nature of those rooms is that they are concealed from the eye, and usually from the eyes of invited guests as well. That is where a person expects more than anything that he will be secluded from the public eye. Such being the case, bringing the lawsuit herein seems to be in good faith on the face of it and it is certainly not a frivolous or vexatious claim. It is such as to express the deep sense of discomfort caused to Vardi by the publication – which to my mind also has objective foundation in the circumstances. However, that is not the case with regard to the publication of the simulations of the front of the house. As I mentioned above, in that connection I tend to believe that even if publication of the simulations of the house exterior might cause some infringement, it is minor and trivial, in respect of which there is no cause for the grant of relief.

 

Defences to a Plea of Privacy Infringement (Section 18 of the Law)

 

26.       Another element necessary for the award of relief on a cause of infringement of privacy is negation of the existence of the circumstances of one of the defences prescribed in section 18 of the Law. Those defences demonstrate that the Protection of Privacy Law does not make the right of privacy an "absolute" one (CA 1928/93 The Securities Authority v. Gibor Sabrina Textile Enterprises Ltd, PD 49(3) 177, 193 (1995)). The defences prescribed in the Law might therefore bar a civil claim or criminal proceedings in respect of the infringement of privacy. Nevertheless, a party seeking to shelter behind those defences must show that he acted in good faith. Good faith is "like a gate and only if it is traversed will the circumstances in which the specific infringement of privacy was committed be examined" (Gilam, para 8). It should be noted that the case law has interpreted this as a requirement of subjective good faith. It is therefore necessary to prove that the person committing the infringement acted in the belief that the infringement was in the scope of the defences prescribed by the Law (Jane Doe, para 24). In order to prove good faith, the defendant or accused can have recourse to the presumption mentioned in section 20(a) of the Protection of Privacy Law, according to which:

 

            "20.     (a)       Where the accused or defendant proves that he committed the infringement of privacy under any of the circumstances referred to in section 18(2) and that it did not exceed the limits reasonable under those circumstances, he shall be presumed to have committed it in good faith."

 

In this connection the court will review "the form, substance and extent of the publication in order to see whether the publisher has fulfilled his duty, for which the defence extends to him, or went beyond that and exceeded the 'limits reasonable' in connection with which the legislative norm was framed" (Segal, p 199).

 

Against that presumption that is available to the defendant or accused, the plaintiff or prosecutor can have recourse to the presumption mentioned in section 20(b) of the Law:

 

            "20.     (b)       The accused or defendant shall be presumed not to have committed the infringement of privacy in good faith if in committing it he knowingly went further than was reasonably necessary for the purposes of the matters protected by the section."

 

In this respect, proving that the publisher knew that he had exceeded the reasonable is equivalent to establishing the absence of the publisher's subjective good faith because it will demonstrate "his indifference to the consequence involving infringement more than  necessary to protect the value recognised by the Law" (Segal, ibid).

 

27.       In his appeal Gottesman relied on two defences – those prescribed in sections 18(2)(a) and (c), which provide as follows:

 

 

            "18.     In any criminal or civil proceedings for infringement of privacy, it shall be a good defence if one of the following is the case:

 

                        […]

 

                        (2)       the defendant or accused committed the infringement in good faith in any of the following circumstances:

 

                                    (a)       he did not know and need not have known that an infringement of privacy might occur;

 

                                    […]

 

                                    (c)       the infringement was committed in defence of a legitimate personal interest of the infringer;

 

                                    […]"

 

28.       We shall therefore review whether the infringing act was committed in one of the circumstances mentioned in section 18(2) – and in our case, the circumstances prescribed in section 18(2)(a) or 18(2)(c)            of the Law. As regards the defence prescribed in section 18(2)(a) of the Law, as the lower court held, before publication Vardi repeatedly emphasised to Gottesman that he jealously guarded his privacy and he was resolute in his refusal to publicise the house or parts of it. Consequently, from such time as Vardi made it perfectly clear to Gottesman that he strongly objected to publication without the latter signing the letter of commitment, it is difficult to conceive that the infringement was committed without Gottesman "knowing […] that an infringement of privacy might occur", as the section requires. Clearly, therefore, the plea with regard to the defence under that section cannot be upheld.

 

29.       We should now examine whether Gottesman has available the defence under section 18(2)(b), which concerns an infringement committed in order to protect a "legitimate personal interest" of the infringer. The section necessitates a balance to be made between the right of privacy and other conflicting values, and the expression "legitimate personal interest" should be construed "by making a balance between the desire to protect the interest of the injured party and safeguard his privacy, on the one hand and the contrary interests of the infringer, on the other hand" (Crim App 1132/96 Hatuha v. State of Israel, para 8 (January 20, 1998)). In the instant case, Gottesman and his firm have a twofold interest in publishing the simulations: both a creative interest and a business interest. It cannot be disputed that Gottesman has the moral right in his architectural work. Such being the case, he is entitled to the work being credited to him, namely to his work being identified with his name. This expresses recognition of the author's personality and the attempt to respect the personal connection between the author and his work (sections 45 and 46 of the Copyright Law; see also: Tony Greenman, The Moral Right – From Droit Moral to Moral Rights, Authoring Rights – Readings on the Copyright Law 439, 439-440 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pesach, Editors, 2009)). The desire to safeguard the freedom of creative expression means that the transfer of an architect's economic rights in his work will not preclude his expressing himself in the same artistic style and motifs in other works (cf Sara Presenti, Copyright Law, vol. II (3rd edition, 2008)), and in the instant case, that the work can be exposed to other circles. Consequently, on the artistic-creative level, one can understand Gottesman's desire to expose to the public Vardi's house, a work that is unquestionably of unique quality and size. In addition, there is nothing wrong in Gottesman's desire to publicise his work for economic reasons as well because displaying the work might certainly enable its author to establish a reputation and attract clients. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned, in the scope of the defence under section 18(2)(c) a balance needs to be made between the infringement of Vardi's privacy and the legitimate personal interest of Gottesman. As mentioned above, as I see it, showing the interior of Vardi's home gives rise to a considerable infringement of his privacy. On the other hand, the harm to Gottesman's legitimate personal interest is limited. This is because Vardi's request was limited to precluding publication of the simulations on the website and, such being the case, there is nothing to stop Gottesman from making use of simulations for his business purposes, exposing them on a more limited scale, for example by showing them to clients in his office or to professional circles, a matter to which Vardi has himself agreed in writing (paragraph 23 of his summations). In this connection, certain weight should also be given to the fact that Gottesman could have given full expression to his interest in publishing the simulations by making an express agreement in such respect with Vardi in real time. To this should be added the fact – as explained above – that Gottesman can also show the simulations of the house exterior on the website. In the overall balance between the competing rights and interests, the outcome is therefore that it is inappropriate to apply the defence of section 18(2)(c) to publishing simulations of the interior of Vardi's house. Having found that publication of the simulations does not fall within one of the circumstances mentioned in section 18(2) of the Law, we have no need to consider the question of good faith or the application of the presumptions prescribed in section 20 of the Law.

 

Absence of Consent to Infringement of Privacy

 

30.       Having reached the conclusion that that there is an infringement, of real significance, of Vardi's privacy, in respect of which it cannot be said that it is covered by one of the defences prescribed in the Law, we must rule whether Vardi's consent was given to the publication discussed herein. The Protection of Privacy Law provides that an infringement of privacy will not occur where there is consent to the infringement (section 1). Such consent can be expressed or implied (section 3 of the Protection of Privacy Law; Jane Doe, para 20). The reason for that requirement is that "the right of privacy is to protect the individual, and as a rule society cannot protect an adult against his will" (Crim App 4463/93 Birav v. State of Israel, PD 49(5) 447, 458 (1996)). And note, consent is not cause to justify an infringement of the rights of privacy. Consent itself is an inherent part of the right so that if it is given, a right of action does not arise (Halm, p 41). Although consent for the purpose of infringement of privacy can be inferred from a series of cases and modes of behaviour (Hay, p 122), it is best to exercise extreme care in determining that consent to publication has been obtained. "Care should be taken not to apply the justifying force of consent to cases in which it is clear that there is no real consent and the use of the consent is therefore constructive and fictitious" (Ruth Gavison, Prohibiting Publication That Infringes Privacy, Human Rights in Israel – Collection of Articles in Honour of Haim H. Cohn, 177, 199 (1982)). It has been held along these lines that from the fact that an individual agreed to disclose certain particulars to one person or several persons, it cannot be inferred that he is precluded from objecting to the publication of those particulars to the public at large (Ventura, p 822); and that even the existence of a close relationship such as marriage does not per se indicate implied consent to one partner's infringement of the other's privacy (Jane Doe, para 20).

 

31.       From the general to the particular – in the instant case it appears that such consent was not obtained. I would mention at the outset that I do not accept Gottesman's claim that Vardi's consent to the publication was not necessary because all that was published were the simulations based on the architectural plans. Insofar as that publication causes an infringement of privacy, then it is subject to the principle that "no person shall infringe the privacy of another without his consent" (section 1 of the Protection of Privacy Law). In the instant case, it would appear that such consent was not consummated. As the lower court held, the relationship between Vardi and Gottesman was conducted on the basis of oral understandings, without the issue of consent to publication reaching exhaustive discussion between the parties. Vardi's requirement that photographs of his home could only be taken subject to signing the letter of commitment that he proposed therefore did not constitute a departure from a previous understanding between the parties but an unsuccessful attempt to reach an understanding. Since that agreement was not signed, express consent to publication was not obtained. Indeed, as aforesaid, the existence of consent can also be inferred. However, we have not found substance to the plea that Vardi's agreeing to the publication of other pictures of the house infers that implied consent was also given to Gottesman. Actually, the fact that other publications were specifically made subject to signing the said letter of commitment is such as to demonstrate the absence of consent in the instant case. Our conclusion is therefore that consent to the infringement of privacy was not obtained.

 

Conclusion

 

32.       In conclusion, we have found that publishing the simulations showing the front of Vardi's house does not give rise to an infringement of privacy and in any event not an infringement of real significance, as defined in section 6 of the Law. On the other hand, we have reached the conclusion that the simulations showing the interior of Vardi's house do infringe "his intimate life" and that despite their anonymous publication, it is possible to connect them with Vardi. It has also been found that it is not an infringement "of no real significance" and that the defences prescribed in section 18(2) of the Protection of Privacy Law are inapplicable. Because the infringement of Vardi's privacy was made without his consent to the publication, there is no alternative but to find that publication of the simulations of the interior of his home on the website cannot be permitted.

 

I therefore suggest to my colleagues to allow the appeal in part to the effect that the injunction remains in force in respect of publishing the simulations of the house interior on the website. The meaning of this is that there is no bar to simulations of the house exterior being published on the site. In view of that result, I suggest to my colleagues to set aside the liability for costs at first instance and make no order for costs in the current instance.

 

 

 

Justice S. Joubran

 

I concur.

 

 

 

Justice N. Sohlberg

 

I concur with the judgement of my colleague Justice U. Vogelman. The distinction that he made between the front of the house and the house interior, has deep roots in Jewish law. The Torah forbids a creditor to enter his fellow's home in order to collect his debt: "When you make a loan of any kind to your neighbor, do not go into his house to get what he is offering as a pledge.  Stay outside and let the man to whom you are making the loan bring the pledge out to you" (Deuteronomy 24:10-11). Although a lender and borrower, rather than strangers, are involved, the respect of privacy requires that the house not be entered; the homeowner brings the pledge outside. Despite the fact that the borrower has a debt to the lender and the lender's prima facie moral right to enter the borrower's house in order to take steps to secure repayment of the debt, the Torah prohibits entry to the borrower's house. The Torah did not make do with a moral provision but prescribed a legal right for the protection of privacy (see: N. Rakover, The Protection of Privacy (5766-2006) 265).

 

Jewish law protects a person's privacy not only by precluding admittance to the private domain but also by precluding "damage by sight" [hezek reiyah] from outside. As we know, Bilam sought to curse the Children of Israel when he saw them dwelling in the desert according to their tribes but he found himself blessing, instead of cursing, them and he said "How goodly are your tents, O Jacob, your dwelling places, O Israel" (Deuteronomy 24:5). This is interpreted by the Talmud as follows: "What did Bilam see? He saw that the openings of their tents did not exactly face each other, whereupon he exclaimed, worthy are these that the divine presence should rest upon them". That is to say that when Bilam saw that the tents of the Israelites were positioned so that their openings did not face each other and were directed in such a way as to ensure the privacy of everyone, he was filled with admiration and said: "How goodly are your tents, O Jacob, your dwelling places, O Israel!" (N. Rakover, ibid, pp 269-272). The Code of Jewish Law [The Shulchan Aruch] (Choshen Mishpat, 154:3) lays down the rule: "A person shall not open a window onto his neighbour's courtyard. And even one of the people who share the courtyard and has sought to open a window in his house onto the courtyard shall be restrained by his partner because he can see him from it. And if he has opened one, it shall be blocked. And if the people who share the courtyard with him have given him permission to open a window or door, he may, but he shall not open a door opposite a door or a window opposite a window and shall distance them from each other. And if it is to another courtyard, onto which he has been given permission to open a door or window, he should distance it from his neighbour's door or window until he cannot see in it at all". This is not the place for details of the Jewish law (see at length, Rakover, ibid) but merely for the principle of respecting a person's privacy. That is how God [HaKadosh Baruch Hu] acted when he called to Adam from the entrance to the Garden of Eden, from which we shall learn: "A person should never suddenly enter his neighbour's house. And every person shall learn the appropriate mode of behaviour [derech eretz] from God, who stood at the entrance to the Garden of Eden and called upon Adam, as it is said: "But the Lord God called to the man and said 'where are you'?" (Genesis 3:9; Derech Eretz Raba, Chapter 5).

 

We can therefore see the distinction between the interior and exterior back from ancient times. A few years ago I heard the lawsuit of a man and his wife who had built a rounded wall of unique design, made of basalt manufactured by Ravid Stones Ltd, at the front of their house. In order to promote its sales, the company published a photograph of the front of the house in the press, on the Internet and in a catalogue. The plaintiffs asserted infringement of their privacy, amongst other things. I stated there that the list of acts in section 2 of the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981, that involve an infringement of privacy, does not contain "a prohibition against publishing the front of a person's home; and not without reason. A person's homeon the inside – is his castle. The front of it that faces outward is naturally exposed to the whole world. Any person passing by may savour the outer beauty of the house. A photograph of the front of the house from the public domain does not involve an infringement of privacy" (CF (J'lem) 7263/05 Levin v. Ravid Stones, para 14 (May 15, 2006)).

 

I therefore concur with my colleague's judgement, on the basis of its reasoning.

 

 

 

Held as stated in the opinion of Justice U. Vogelman.

 

January 23, 2013

 

 

 

 

Full opinion: 

Jerusalem Open House for Gay Pride v. Jerusalem Municipality

Case/docket number: 
AAA 343/09
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

Facts: The Jerusalem municipality (the respondent) provides financial support to various institutions throughout the city. Institutions requesting funding are required to apply to the different municipality departments that distribute the funds, in accordance with prescribed criteria. The appellant is a registered charity that works for the gay community in the city; it operates a community center in Jerusalem for the gay community, and conducts a series of annual gay pride events in the city, including the annual gay pride parade. During the years 2005 through 2008, the appellant requested financial support from the respondent by filing applications with the respondent’s Culture Department (requesting assistance through both the ongoing support track and the projects track) and from the Social Affairs Department (requesting assistance through the track involving promotion of the status of women until 2007 when all such support was terminated, through the community councils and centers track, through the youth activity track, and from the Division for Youth and Young Adults). These applications were filed in accordance with the criteria established for assistance. All of the requests were denied, on grounds relating to the tests each track established to determine receipt of support. The appellant petitioned the Court for Administrative Affairs in the Jerusalem District Court, on the grounds that the municipality’s decisions were discriminatory. The lower court upheld the municipality’s decisions regarding the denial of funding, and the present appeal followed. As a procedural matter, the decisions regarding all four years are being adjudicated together.

 

Held: The appellant’s discrimination claims must be evaluated in light of a local authority’s duty to distribute funds on the basis of equality. This duty is identical to the statutory duty imposed on state entities regarding the distribution of funds to public institutions through section 3A of the Foundations of the Budget Act. Section 3A dictates that funds must be distributed to categories of institutions rather than to individual institutions and that all decisions regarding the recipients of government funding must be based on clear, transparent, and equal criteria. Thus, all such decisions must be based solely on relevant considerations, and no improper motivations may be involved; the refusal to give weight to relevant considerations is equivalent to affirmatively considering completely irrelevant factors. Furthermore, even a decision based on relevant grounds can be unreasonable if the outcome shows that substantive equality has been denied. For example, statistical outcomes may be particularly relevant when a decision is reached by a collective body and motivations cannot be determined. Relevancy is determined on two levels – first through a determination that the boundaries of the group affected by the decision had been delineated on relevant grounds (a determination which is to be based on constitutional criteria for equality), and second that all those within the group were being treated equally (a determination which is to be based on administrative law criteria for equality).

 

In light of these principles, a review of the various criteria relied upon in denying the appellant funding shows that the municipality’s decisions were defective only in one respect. Thus, the appeal can be allowed to proceed only with regard to the decision to deny the appellant funding through the community councils and centers track.  That denial was based on a rule that only centers providing services on a geographic-regional basis were entitled to receive funding, meaning that the unique needs of the geographically dispersed gay community would not be met by any source of financial support from the municipality. The rule therefore gave rise to a denial of substantive equality - particularly in light of the fact that other similarly dispersed communities were receiving support through various municipal departments. As such, the Court awarded appellant the support it had requested through this track. The remedy provided is an expansion of an existing criterion used for the provision of support through the community councils and centers track, rather than the addition of a new one.

 

Appeal allowed.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

 

AAA 343/09

 

Jerusalem Open House for Gay Pride and Tolerance

v.

  1. Jerusalem Municipality
  2. Mayor of Jerusalem

 

The Supreme Court

Sitting as a Court of Appeals for Administrative Affairs

[17 March 2010]

 

Before Justices E. Hayut, H. Melcer and I. Amit

 

Appeal of an Administrative Affairs decision of the Jerusalem District Court dated 10 November 2008 in AA 8187/08, issued by the Honorable Judge I. Adiel.

 

Facts: The Jerusalem municipality (the respondent) provides financial support to various institutions throughout the city. Institutions requesting funding are required to apply to the different municipality departments that distribute the funds, in accordance with prescribed criteria. The appellant is a registered charity that works for the gay community in the city; it operates a community center in Jerusalem for the gay community, and conducts a series of annual gay pride events in the city, including the annual gay pride parade. During the years 2005 through 2008, the appellant requested financial support from the respondent by filing applications with the respondent’s Culture Department (requesting assistance through both the ongoing support track and the projects track) and from the Social Affairs Department (requesting assistance through the track involving promotion of the status of women until 2007 when all such support was terminated, through the community councils and centers track, through the youth activity track, and from the Division for Youth and Young Adults). These applications were filed in accordance with the criteria established for assistance. All of the requests were denied, on grounds relating to the tests each track established to determine receipt of support. The appellant petitioned the Court for Administrative Affairs in the Jerusalem District Court, on the grounds that the municipality’s decisions were discriminatory. The lower court upheld the municipality’s decisions regarding the denial of funding, and the present appeal followed. As a procedural matter, the decisions regarding all four years are being adjudicated together.

 

Held: The appellant’s discrimination claims must be evaluated in light of a local authority’s duty to distribute funds on the basis of equality. This duty is identical to the statutory duty imposed on state entities regarding the distribution of funds to public institutions through section 3A of the Foundations of the Budget Act. Section 3A dictates that funds must be distributed to categories of institutions rather than to individual institutions and that all decisions regarding the recipients of government funding must be based on clear, transparent, and equal criteria. Thus, all such decisions must be based solely on relevant considerations, and no improper motivations may be involved; the refusal to give weight to relevant considerations is equivalent to affirmatively considering completely irrelevant factors. Furthermore, even a decision based on relevant grounds can be unreasonable if the outcome shows that substantive equality has been denied. For example, statistical outcomes may be particularly relevant when a decision is reached by a collective body and motivations cannot be determined. Relevancy is determined on two levels – first through a determination that the boundaries of the group affected by the decision had been delineated on relevant grounds (a determination which is to be based on constitutional criteria for equality), and second that all those within the group were being treated equally (a determination which is to be based on administrative law criteria for equality).

In light of these principles, a review of the various criteria relied upon in denying the appellant funding shows that the municipality’s decisions were defective only in one respect. Thus, the appeal can be allowed to proceed only with regard to the decision to deny the appellant funding through the community councils and centers track.  That denial was based on a rule that only centers providing services on a geographic-regional basis were entitled to receive funding, meaning that the unique needs of the geographically dispersed gay community would not be met by any source of financial support from the municipality. The rule therefore gave rise to a denial of substantive equality - particularly in light of the fact that other similarly dispersed communities were receiving support through various municipal departments. As such, the Court awarded appellant the support it had requested through this track. The remedy provided is an expansion of an existing criterion used for the provision of support through the community councils and centers track, rather than the addition of a new one.

 

Appeal allowed.

 

Legislation cited

Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748–1988 (Amendment 1) (5742–1992)

Foundations of the Budget Law, 5745–1985

Libel Law (Amendment No. 5), 5737–1977

Mandatory Tenders Law (Amendment No. 12), 5762–2002

Penal Code (Amendment No. 22), 5748–1988

Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758–1998, s. 3(a)(5)

Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law, 5761–2000, s. 3(a)

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]       HCJ 4533/02 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality (2004) (unreported).

[2]       HCJ 10903/04 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality (2003) (unreported).

[3]       AAA 5905/06 Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance (2007) (unreported).

[4]       HCJ 8912/05 Mifgashim – Society for Educational and Social Involvement v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport (2007) (unreported).

[5]       HCJ 6976/05 Zinman College of Physical Education at the Wingate Institute, Ltd v. Ministry of Education, Culture, Science & Sport (2009) (unreported).

[6]       HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion (2010) (unreported).

[7]       HCJ 1438/98 Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1999] IsrSC 53 (5) 337.

[8]       HCJ 59/88 MK Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [1989] IsrSC 35 (1) 421).

[9]       HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister (2006) (unreported).

[10]     HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54 (2) 164.

[11]     HCJ 11020/05 Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education (2006) (unreported).

[12]     HCJ 5264/05 Yeshivat Shavei Shomron v. Minister of Finance (2005) (unreported).

[13]     HCJ 11585/05 Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. Ministry of Absorption (2009) (unreported).

[14]     AAA 4515/08 State of Israel v. Ne’eman (2009)(unreported).

[15]     HCJ 5325/01 LCN Society for the Promotion of Women’s Basketball v. Ramat Hasharon Local Council [2004] 58(5) IsrSC 79.

[16]     HCJ 10285/04 Haifa Motzkin Municipal Women’s Basketball League v. Haifa Municipality (2005) (unreported).

[17]     HCJ 10104/04 Peace Now – Sha’al Educational Services v. Director of Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria (2006) (unreported).

[18]     HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53 (2) 241.

[19]     HCJ 4500/07 Yachimovich v. Second Television and Radio Authority (2007) (unreported).

[20]     HCJ 3551/97 Brenner v. Jewish Religious Services Law Ministers Committee [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 754.

[21]     HCJ 6300/93 Center for Training of Rabbinical Court Pleaders v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 441.

[22]     HCJ 571/89 Moskowitz v. Board of Appraisers [1990] IsrSC 54(2) 236.

[23]     HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693.

[24]     HCJ 2671/98 Israel Women's Network v. Minister of Labour and Social. Affairs [1998] IsrSC 52(3) 630.

[25]     HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel Aviv Municipality [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 393.

[26]     HCJ 7111/95 Center for Local Government v. Knesset [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 485.

[27]     HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94.

[28]     HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309.

[29]     HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Cargo Airlines v. Prime Minister [1998] IsrSC 52(4) 193.

[30]     HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset (2006) (unreported).

[31]     HCJ 7178/08 Forum of the Druze and Circassian Council Heads in Israel v. Government of Israel (2009) (unreport     ed)

[32]     HCJ 1067/08 “Noar k’Halacha” Association v. Minister of Education (2009).

[33]     HCJ 9722/04 Polgat Jeans Ltd v. Government of Israel (2009) (unreported).

[34]     HCJ 7691/95 Sagay v. Government of Israel [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 577.

[35]     HCJ 205/94 Nof v. Ministry of Defense [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 449.

[36]     HCJ 5304/02 Israel Association of Victims of Work Accidents and Widows of Victims of Work Accidents v. Knesset [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 134.

[37]     HCJ 9863/06 Karan - Society of Combat Veteran Quadriplegics v. State of Israel v.State of Israel - Minister of Health (2008) (not yet reported).

[38]     HCJ 11075/04 Girby v. Minister of Education Culture and Sports - Chairman of the Council of Higher Education (2007) (unreported).

[39]     HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 259.

[40]     HCJFH 4191/97 Recanat v. National Labour Court [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 330.

[41]     HCJ 720/82 Elizur Religious Athletic Association, Nahariya Branch v. Nahariya Municipality [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 17.

[42]     HCJ 727/00 Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils in Israelv. Minister of Construction and Housing [2009] IsrSC 56(2) 79.

[43]     HCJ 6407/06 Doron, Tikotsky, Amir, Mizrachi, Attorneys at Law v. Minister of Finance [2007](unreported).

[44]     HCJ 11956/05 Bashara v. Minister of Construction and Housing (2006) (unreported).

[45]     HCJ200/83 Watad v. Minister of Finance [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 113.

[46]     HCJ 986/05 Peled v. Tel Aviv-JaffaMunicipality (2005) (unreported).

[47]     HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. (2006) (unreported).

[48]     HCJ 240/98 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [2000] IsrSC 54 (2) 164.

[49]     HCJ 8186/03 Tali School Education Fund v. Ministry of Education (2004) (unreported).

[50]     HCJ 528/88 Avitan v. Israel Land Administration [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 297.

[51]     HCJ 4906/98 Am Hofshi Organization for Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education and Culture v. Ministry of Housing [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 503.

[52]     HCJ 244/00 New Dialogue Society for Democratic Dialogue v. Minister of. National Infrastructure [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 25.

[53]     HCJ 721/94 ElAl Airlines v. Yonatan Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749.

[54]     HCJ 273/97 Protection of Individual Rights Association v. Minister of Education [1997] IsrSC. 51(5) 822.

[55]     HCJ 1778/99 Nicole Brenner-Kadish v. Minister of the Interior [2000] IsrSC 54(2) 368.

[56]     HCJ 293/00 A v. Supreme Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem [2000] IsrSC55(3) 318.

[57]     CA 10280/01 Yaros-Hakak v. Attorney General [2005] IsrSC 59(5) 64.

[58]     HCJ 8988/06 Yehuda Meshi Zahav v. Ilan Franko, Jerusalem District Police Commander (2006) (unreported).

[59]     HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administration (2006) (unreported).

[60]     HCJ 5277/07 Baruch Marzel v. Jerusalem District Police Commander (2007) (unreported).

[61]     HCJ 6924/98 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. State of Israel et. al. IsrSC [2001] IsrSC 55(5) 15).

[62]     HCJ 9547/06 New Fund for Promotion and Encouragement of Film and Television Production v. Israel Cinema Council (2008) (unreported).

[63]     HCJ 1313/01 Keren Yaldenu Merkazei Tikvateinuv. Ministry of Education and Culture (2002) (unreported).

[64]     HCJ 6437/04 Tabouri v. Ministry of Education and Culture [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 369.

[65]     HCJ 7426/08 Tebeka Advocacy for Equality and Justice for Ethiopian Israelis v. Minister of Education et al (2010) (unreported).

[66]     HCJ 678/88 Kefar Veradim v. Minister of Finance [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 501.

[67]     HCJ 637/89 Constitution for the State of Israel v. Minister of Finance [1991] IsrSC 46 (1) 191.

[68]     HCJ 5496/97 Mordi et al. v. Minister of Agriculture [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 540.

 

Israeli District Court Cases Cited

[69]     AP(Jer) 526/05 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality (2005) (unreported).

[70]     SFC (Jer) 843/05 State of Israel v. Shlisel (2006) (unreported).

[71]     AP(Jer) 219/06 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality(2005) (unreported).

[72]     AP(TA) 1187/05 Condominium Representation v. Petach Tikva Municipality (2005) (unreported).

[73]     AP(Jer) 1754/09 Jewish Center for Pluralism – Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel v. Jerusalem City Council (2010) (unreported).

 

     American Cases Cited

[74]     Ricci v. DeStefano 557 U.S. ___ (2009)

[75]     Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1987).

 

For the appellant — G. Barnea, E. Horowitz.

For the respondents — E. Got, R. Bar Zohar.

 

JUDGMENT

 

Justice I. Amit

This is an appeal against a judgment of the Jerusalem Court for Administrative Affairs, dated 10 November 2008 (Deputy President Y. Adiel) in AA 8187/08, which denied the petition brought by the Jerusalem Open House for Gay Pride and Tolerance (Registered Charity) (hereinafter: “the appellant”) against the Jerusalem Municipality (hereinafter: “the Municipality” or “respondent 1”) and against its mayor (hereinafter: “the Mayor” or “respondent 2”) (hereinafter, together: “the respondents”).

1.    The petition heardin the lower court related to the rejection by respondent 2 of the appellant’s application for financial support for various activities it conducted during the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. In its petition, the appellant argued that the Municipality, including its various departments, had established criteria for the provision of support which effectively created insurmountable obstacles for the Jerusalem gay, lesbian and transgender community, (hereinafter, and in accordance with the community’s preferred name: “the LGBT community”), which the appellant represents.

In short, the lower court held that although the importance of the appellant’s activity was undisputed, such activity did not meet the criteria established by the Municipality for entitlement to support. As a result, it held and that there was no cause to intervene with the Municipality’s stated criteria, nor in its exercise of judgment in implementing said criteria in determining the appellant’s entitlement to support. This issue is raised before us in the present appeal.

The parties to the appeal

2.    The appellant is a registered non-profit organization, established in 1997; its purpose is the promotion of pluralism and social tolerance. Approximately ten years ago, it established a community center that operates in the Jerusalem city center (hereinafter: “the community center” or “the Open House”) for the city’s LGBT community. According to the appellant, the LGBT community constitutes approximately 10% of the general population, as well as 10% of the residents of Jerusalem. The appellant has stated that it works to integrate the LGBT community within Jerusalem’s urban fabric, as an inseparable part thereof; it offers numerous activities year-round to members of Jerusalem’s LGBT community and these activities have no parallel elsewhere in the city. According to the appellant, it is the only organization providing essential services to the city’s LGBT community, creating a much-needed framework for the community to support each other. The appellant states that among other things, the Open House provides: social and cultural services, emotional-social support services directed specifically at the LGBT community, and approximately seventy events each month including support groups, discussions, lectures, religious and tradition-related events, social get-togethers, and various cultural events. This activity extends to the broader public both in and outside of Jerusalem, such that the activity of the Open House serves other groups within the Jerusalem public who do not identify as LGBT, but who are interested in upholding the values of tolerance, pluralism and liberalism in the city. According to the appellant’s declaration, the individuals who come to its community center represent a characteristic slice of the Jerusalem population, coming from all sectors within the spectrum of that population: secular people, religious and ultra-Orthodox people, Arabs, Christians, Jews, young people, the elderly, men and women. Additionally, since 2002, the appellant has conducted the gay pride events in Jerusalem, which include the gay pride parade, the gay pride “happening” and a series of activities that take place within the framework of the gay pride events.

3.    The respondent is the Jerusalem Municipality, which is responsible for providing services to the city’s residents. Among the other activities conducted by the Municipality, it provides financial support each year to entities that operate in a variety of fields. The support is provided from public funds that are received from various national government ministries, and from public funds from the Municipality itself.

Chronology of the proceedings between the parties

4.    This is not the first time that the parties have met in court, and the appellant has made many appeals to the courts regarding support. In the following pages, we will survey the procedural history between the parties. We apologize to the reader for the lengthy descriptions of the proceedings, which are necessary to provide a proper explanation of the background of the current appeal.

The appellant conducted gay pride events in Jerusalem for the first time in 2002. These events included the gay pride parade, a gay pride “happening,” and a series of additional events such as cultural performances, lectures, discussions, and film screenings. The appellant petitioned this Court when its application for financial support for the gay pride events in 2002 was rejected. The petition was stricken after the Municipality accepted the Court’s recommendation to pay the appellant NIS 40,000 towards funding the gay pride events, though such payment did not constitute the Municipality’s acknowledgement of the appellant’s right to funding for similar events in the future (HCJ 4533/02 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality[1]).

The appellant held the gay pride events in Jerusalem again in the years 2003 and 2004; these events included various activities such as literature evenings, workshops, lectures, exhibits, film screenings, parties, etc. When its application for support from the Municipality for these events was denied, the appellant again petitioned this Court. In this petition, the Court was asked to order the Municipality to provide the appellant with support to finance its activities during the years 2003 and 2004,and to require that the Minister of the Interior and the Attorney General establish new and updated procedures for the provision of financing by local authorities. Following the submission of that petition, the Minister of the Interior began working to publish an updated procedure for provision of local authority financial support as quickly as possible. The new regulations would replace the old procedure, most recently revised in 1985. The petition against the Minister of the Interior was therefore stricken, and the Minister was ordered to pay the petitioner’s costs. With respect to the Municipality, the Court held that if the appellant’s application for support for 2005 was rejected as well, the appellant would be entitled to file a petition against the Municipality regarding its applications for support for that year and for the years 2003 and 2004 as well (HCJ 10903/04 Jerusalem Open House for Gay Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality [2]).

We note that on 23 August 2006, following said decision, the Ministry of the Interior published a Director-General’s directive on the subject of support from local authorities for public institutions (Director-General Directive no. 2006/4 (hereinafter: “the new procedure”)).

5.    Moving backward chronologically, we note that on 24 April 2004, the Mayor appointed a public committee to establish criteria for the distribution of funds to cultural and artistic institutions operating in the city. The committee was headed by Professor Arnon Zuckerman (President of Bezalel and past director of the Israel Broadcasting Authority) and had many members, including senior figures from the fields of art and culture (hereinafter: “the Zuckerman Committee”).

The Zuckerman Committee considered the matter for a year and a half. It was assisted by a financial consulting firm in formulating measurable criteria for assessing the amount of support to be given to each cultural institution. The criteria recommended by the Zuckerman Committee members (hereinafter: “the Zuckerman criteria”) were adopted by the City Council on 10 October, 2006.

According to the Zuckerman criteria, the city provides support through the ongoing support track to institutions that are primarily involved in professional artistic creation, and which have been recognized by the Culture Administration at the Ministry of Education. These institutions are given support on the basis of three key criteria: quantitative activity data; contribution to the establishment of Jerusalem as the cultural capital of the State of Israel and as a global tourist center, based on international cultural and artistic projects; and artistic and cultural importance. An “advisory committee” determines which institutions are potentially eligible for support; the committee is comprised of Municipality employees and of representatives of the public who have relevant skills, do not hold positions with the Municipality, and whose appointment to the committee is not a conflict of interest.

Separate and apart from the criteria for support from the ongoing support track, the Zuckerman Committee recommended that 10% of the budget for support in the area of culture should be allocated for one-time or multi-year projects in the areas of professional art, amateur works, folklore, Jewish tradition, and Arab culture (hereinafter: “the project track”).

6.    As the 2005 gay pride events approached, various groups within the public voiced their opposition to those events being held in Jerusalem. The then Mayor also stated his opposition. The Municipality refused to take various measures for the gay pride events, including the hanging of flags purchased by the appellant along the planned route of the gay pride parade. The appellant then filed an administrative petition in the District Court in June 2005, asking that the Municipality be ordered to make it possible for the gay pride events to be held. This petition included a request that the Municipality be ordered to hang the gay pride flags in a number of Jerusalem streets, and that the respondents, the Minister of the Interior and the Israel Police, be ordered to refrain from any act that would be likely to interfere with the parade and the assembly.

The appellant’s petition was granted. In her decision, Judge M. Arad held that the Municipality must make public areas available to the entire public, including various groups within it. The decision noted that the municipality must enable pluralism and allow the expression of different opinions to flourish. The court ordered the respondents to take all action required in order for the gay pride events to be held, including hanging the flags in the streets, and ordered the Municipality and the Mayor to pay the appellant’s expenses (AP (Jer) 526/05 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality[69]).

As a result of the judgment, the 2005 gay pride events, including the parade, took place in Jerusalem in timely fashion. During the parade, there were a number of confrontations between participants and protesters; these reached their peak in an incident during which three parade participants were stabbed with a knife. (The stabber was convicted, inter alia, of attempted murder, and was given a ten-year prison sentence (SFC(Jer) 843/05 State of Israel v. Shlisel [70]).

7.    The appellant’s applications for support for the year 2005: The appellant applied to the Municipality for support for the purpose of establishing, expanding, and enriching its activity. The application for support from the Municipality’s Social Affairs Department referred to three areas: community centers and councils; advancement of the status of women; and youth and young adults.

The appellant stated that the activity in its community center creates a safe space for all who enter, and offers various opportunities for youth, women, and other sectors within the LGBT community who have special needs (such as elderly men, religious men and women, Arabs, and others).

The appellant’s application noted that it runs two main types of activities advancing the status of women. The first involves varied social activity, including various meetings for women within the LGBT community for the purpose of nurturing friendship and providing entertainment. The second involves the “Women’s Talk” meetings, a type of social activity in which women from the LGBT community discuss a variety of subjects. This is in addition to other activities held on a weekly basis, such as a women’s basketball team and a “do-it-yourself” workshop, designed to empower women in the LGBT community.

The application also noted that the appellant maintains three frameworks providing separate types of content for youth and young adults: a youth group for ages 15-18; a group for young adults ages 18-23; and an open night for young adults. The activity takes place once a week at the Open House, and the community center is open only to youth and young adults while these activities take place, allowing the participants to maintain relative anonymity. The programs are run by a professional youth coordinator, and the appellant’s professional staff, comprising volunteers, social workers and psychologists. The appellant sought to expand this activity and to add a special framework for new immigrant youth, who have additional and particular needs related to their connection to the LGBT community.

8.    The appellant submitted an additional funding application to both the ongoing support track and the projects track of the Municipality’s Culture Department. The appellant listed a number of activities, mostly connected to sexual orientation, in the areas of film, literature, research, theater, lectures and dialogues, art, and more. With regard to the projects track, the application noted in particular the gay pride events for the year 2005, which included, inter alia, literary events dealing with religion, sexual orientation and sector identity, cultural events at the Jerusalem Cinemathèque, parties, a special exhibit, a pluralistic gay pride Sabbath Eve event, a discussion of lesbian sexuality, and more.

9.    The Municipality rejected all the appellant’s applications for support for 2005. Apparently, the applications that were submitted to the Social Affairs Department were not passed on to either the Municipality funding committee nor to the City Council; at the very least, the appellant received no notice from the Municipality regarding these applications. The application addressed to the Culture Department was rejected by the City Council in light of the Funding Committee’s recommendation, which had relied on the recommendation of the Professional Allocations Committee and that of the Advisory Committee. This last committee conducted two discussions of the appellant’s application for support and concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the Zuckerman criteria, either for the ongoing support track or for the projects track.

10.  Because its applications for support in 2005 were also rejected, the appellant submitted a petition to the Court for Administrative Affairs in which it asked the court to order the Municipality to provide the appellant with support for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005, and to order the Municipality to set relevant, transparent and equal criteria for the distribution of the support funds[equal criteria in the sense that their implementation leads to all groups receiving equal treatment — hereinafter: equal criteria].In its petition, the appellant raised, inter alia, claims of favoritism and of conflicts of interest regarding some of the members of the advisory committee —the professional advisory committee that operates in the framework of the Zuckerman criteria. The conflict of interest claim alleged that some members of the advisory committee were connected to entities that successfully requested and received support from the Culture Department. In her decision of28 May 2006, Judge Y. Tzur accepted the appellant’s arguments against the Municipality (AP(Jer) 219/06 Jerusalem Open House for Pride and for Tolerance v. Jerusalem Municipality [71] (hereinafter: “Judge Tzur’s decision”). Judge Tzur held that the Municipality’s decisions regarding the appellant’s applications for support for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005 violated the principle of equality, and failed to comply with both the provisions established in the support procedure and the rules of proper administration. The Municipality was ordered to provide the appellant with support funds for those years.

Regarding the year 2003, the court noted that the municipality’s decision to deny the application was not supported by any reasoning and contradicted the recommendation of the Municipality’s own professional body, which had recommended that the appellant be granted support in 2003. Therefore, the court held that the Municipality had not presented transparent and equal criteria for the provision of support, and had failed to present a proper context to enable a substantive examination of its decision. The Municipality was then required to provide funding to the appellant for the year 2003 in the amount of NIS 100,000.

Regarding the year 2004, the court held that in rejecting the appellant’s application, the funding committee had failed to include its reasoning, ignored the decision of the professional staff and the professional recommendations of the Municipality’s legal adviser and of its comptroller, and violated the principles of equality and transparency. Judge Tzur also held that the committee’s decision was unreasonable and defective in terms of the propriety of its proceeding. The Municipality was therefore required to provide the appellant with support for the year 2004 in the amount of NIS 125,000.

Regarding the year 2005, the court held in favor of the appellant, finding support for the claims of bias and conflict of interest. It also held that the claim that appellant’s funding application was rejected because it did not meet the Zuckerman criteria was discriminatory. It further held that although the criteria were relevant and equal on their face, the unequal outcome indicated otherwise. The court held that the threshold requirement that the main activity of an institution must be in at least one of the fields of professional art to qualify for funding had led to the unequal outcome. The court also found that the Zuckerman criteria were deficient in that they omitted important objectives such as the encouragement and nurturing of cultural and artistic legacies of my raid and unique population sectors. The court therefore directed the Municipality to supplement the existing criteria with new criteria designed to include the development of the values of pluralism, the cultural and social activity of minority groups invested in preserving their uniqueness, and the special needs of minority groups.

The court supported its holdings by noting the Municipality’s conduct towards the appellant and the manner in which the Municipality had handled the appellant’s applications for support in previous years; together, these indicated an unfavorable atmosphere within the Municipality towards the appellant, as well as a reasonable suspicion that the Municipality had discriminated against appellant.

Regarding the appellant’s 2005 application for support from the Social Affairs Department, the court criticized the Municipality for not presenting any explanation or factual background for its decision; the Municipality had failed to submit documentation showing any discussion whatsoever of the appellant’s application for support from the Social Affairs Department. On the substantive level, the court rejected the Municipality’s claim that the application had been denied because the appellant was not an organization whose main purpose was the advancement of the status of women. The court held that the appellant’s application for support from the Social Affairs Department should have been examined on a substantive level, and that at the very least it should not have been summarily rejected. In light of this, the Municipality was ordered to provide the appellant with the sum of NIS 125,000 in financial support for the year 2005, subject to the submission of financial statements.

11.  The Municipality’s appeal of Judge Tzur’s decision to this Court was denied, with the Municipality’s consent, with respect to the years 2003 and 2004. Regarding 2005, this Court held that the matter should be returned to the Court for Administrative Affairs, and that the appellant could submit an amended petition in which it could expand the grounds of the claim, including in relation to support for social activity, for activity directed at youth and young adults, and for “marginal culture” projects, etc. In addition, this Court held that the appellant could supplement the amended petition, to the extent necessary, with a petition regarding the applications for support for the years 2006 and 2007 (AAA 5905/06 Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House for Pride and Tolerance [3]).

12.  In light of Judge Tzur’s decision and of the judgment in Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3], the Zuckerman Committee met again on 13 December 2007 to discuss the support criteria that it had recommended. The Committee saw no need to change the criteria, and recommended that the Culture Department direct the limited budget to those institutions focused primarily on professional art in an effort to realize the goal of establishing Jerusalem as a cultural capital; the recommendation was that this should be done by “ensuring the activity of the creative artistic institutions within the city” (emphasis added – I.A.). The Committee went on to clarify that these criteria were not intended “to exclude unique communities and sectors from the ongoing support track, as long as such entities are engaged in regular artistic activity.” As an example, the Committee pointed to a number of entities representing communities or minority sectors that had received support after they were found to meet the professional-artistic requirement, as distinguished from the community-sectoral requirement (such as the “Antea Art Gallery” which operates within the framework of the “Woman’s Voice” organization, and the “Noah’s Ark Theater” which works with actors and artists from CIS countries). The Committee reiterated that the budget for the projects track “did include projects of communities and minority sectors with special needs.”

13.  The appellant’s applications for support for the year 2006: In 2006, the appellant submitted applications for support to the Municipality’s Culture Department and to its Social Affairs Department.

As was the case in 2005, the application for support submitted to the Social Affairs Department related to three tracks: the centers and community councils track; the activity for youth and young adults track; and the advancement of the status of women track. The application for support from the Culture Department was addressed to both the ongoing support track and the projects track, with respect to, inter alia, the world gay pride events that were held in Jerusalem that year.

14. The Municipality’s professional allocations committee approved in principle the appellant’s application for support from the Culture Department for the world gay pride events in 2006, subject to the submission of various documents to the committee. In the end, the appellant’s application for support was denied due to its failure to comply with the Accountant-General’s Directive of 25 February 2004, entitled “Supervision of Entities Receiving Support from the State Budget — Limitations on Administrative and General Expenses”(hereinafter: “the Accountant-General’s Directives”). According to this Directive, financial support may not be given to entities that deviate from the “Management and General” expenses framework. The Municipality also denied the applications for support addressed to the ongoing support track at the Culture Department for the same reason.

The appellant’s applications from the Social Affairs Department were all denied as well, for various reasons, as will be described below.

15.  The appellant’s applications for support for the year 2007: In 2007, the appellant again submitted applications for support to the Municipality’s Social Affairs Department, its Culture Department, and the Division for the Advancement of Youth and Young Adults.

As with the applications for support in 2005-2006, the application for support from the Social Affairs Department related to three tracks: the community centers and councils track, the activity for youth and young adults track, and the advancement of the status of women track. The application to the Culture Department referred to the ongoing support track and to the projects track. The application addressed to the Division for the Advancement of Youth and Young Adults (hereinafter: “the Division for the Advancement of Youth” or “the Division”) was submitted by the appellant after the director of the Division, Mr. Shabtai Amedi, and his deputy, Mr. Reuven Bachar, visited the Open House. Mr.Amedi returned for a second visit.

16.  In its letter of 9 August 2007, the Municipality rejected the appellant’s application for support from the Social Affairs Department on the grounds that the appellant was not recognized by the National Association of Community Centers or by the Jerusalem Association of Community Councils and Centers. The Municipality did not refer in its letter to the application for support from the youth activity track, nor the application for support from the advancement of the status of women track.

In an additional letter dated 9 December 2007, the Municipality responded that it had decided to reject the two applications submitted to the Culture Department, since they did not meet the criteria for the funding of cultural institutions. The letter also noted that parades did not fall within the framework of a recognized project for the purposes of support from the Culture Department’s projects track.

The appellant’s application for support from the Division for the Advancement of Youth was also rejected, on the grounds that the appellant did not satisfy the Division’s alienated youth track criteria for support: only a limited number of young people participated in the appellant’s activity, the activity was of a social character, and the leaders lacked the necessary professional knowledge.

The petition submitted to the lower court and the remedies sought in the context thereof

17.  Following the rejection of the appellant’s applications for support for the years 2006 and 2007, and in accordance with the judgment in Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3], the appellant submitted the petition that is the subject of this appeal (AA 8187/08)to the lower court on 10 March 2008. In this petition, the court was asked to order the Municipality, and the City Council and its funding committee to renew its consideration of the appellant’s applications for support for these years. Appellant also asked the court to establish relevant, equal, and transparent criteria for the distribution of support funds, or alternatively, to direct the Municipality itself to promote and fund social, cultural and youth activities for the welfare of the LGBT community.

The judgment in the lower court

18.  Rejection of the applications for support from the Culture Department through the ongoing support track: The lower court held that the Municipality was not implementing the Accountant-General’s Directive in a consistent or orderly fashion, that the Municipality was approving support for entities that did not satisfy the conditions established in the Directive, and that it could not explain the provision of support to some ten organizations that did not meet the conditions in the Directive. The court consequently accepted the appellant’s argument that petitioner’s claim that it rejected appellant’s funding applications in an attempt to comport with the Accountant-General’s Directive in fact did not justify its rejection of its appellant’s applications for support.

The court rejected the appellant’s claims based on favoritism and a conflict of interest. These claims asserted that other entities that had requested and received support for cultural activity had been members of the advisory committee. The court found that the relevant committee members had not taken part in the deliberations concerning the institutions in which they had an interest, and that they had not attempted to influence the views of the other members of the advisory committee. The court noted that even if some interference had been proven, as the appellant had claimed, the effect would have been no more than the nullification of the decisions that were tainted by a conflict of interest, and would not have entitled the appellant to receive the support requested.

19.  On the substantive level, the lower court held that the distinction between “professional art” and the appellant’s cultural activity was a relevant distinction relating to the nature of the activity. The appellant acted as a consumer of culture and not as a producer of culture, and certainly not as a professional producer thereof. The appellant had not demonstrated that the Municipality’s Culture Department had funded any other activities similar to those that it conducts, or any other population group with similar characteristics. Accordingly, the appellant had not established any justification for intervention in the Municipality’s exercise of judgment in reaching its decision to deny support for the appellant’s ongoing cultural activity—a decision that fell within the bounds of the Municipality’s discretion, and which could not, therefore, be deemed a discriminatory act.

20.  Regarding the support for activity concerning “culture on the margins”, as described by the guidelines established in the judgment in Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3], the lower court held that even assuming that the term “culture on the margins” does not necessarily refer only to culture in the fields of professional art, there would still be no cause for interfering in the Municipality’s exercise of its discretion. Ignoring the Zuckerman critieria would be tantamount to, forcing the Municipality to also allocate support to cultural activity that does not fall within the parameters of professional art. Even if it were proper to require the Municipality to support activity defined as “culture on the margins”, the appellant’s main area of involvement is not the creation of culture, but rather the consumption of culture, and thus it would not be entitled to support under this heading either.

21.  Rejection of the applications for support from the Culture Department through the projects track: The court held that the “local” gay pride events for the years 2005 and 2007 did not constitute cultural events justifying support; rather, they were events that were intended to deliver a social message to the public.

Regarding the world gay pride events that were held in 2006, the Municipality itself recognized that some of these met the criteria established for support from the Culture Department’s projects track, but it refused to provide financial support on the grounds that the implementation reports submitted by the appellant did not make the required distinction between those elements of the world gay pride events in 2006 that were entitled to support and those that were not. The court held that it was not improper to attach a proportionate part of the general logistical expenses to the application that constituted part of a broader project, to the extent that a more exact calculation was not practically possible, and insofar as such submission did not detract from the Municipality’s right to examine the calculation method —something that it had not done in this case. Nevertheless, the court accepted the Municipality’s argument that the appellant had not responded to the demand that it attach a financial statement certified by an accountant, and that the Municipality was therefore entitled, for this reason alone, to reject the application for support for the 2006 world gay pride events as well.

22.  Rejection of applications for support from the Social Affairs Department through the community centers and councils track: The lower court held that the provision of support to community councils was only justified in light of the strong connection between the Municipality and the community centers and councils that operate in Jerusalem. This connection is expressed on an organizational level in the fact that the Municipality holds 49.7% of the share capital of the Jerusalem Association of Community Councils and Centers Ltd., and that the Mayor is the chairman of the Association’s board of directors. The connection also exists in relation to the content of the activity conducted by the centers and councils, and is reflected in the fact that the community councils operate on a geographic basis, with each council constituting a type of mini-municipality for the region in which it is located, and acting as the long arm of the Municipality in terms of providing the city’s residents with access to municipal services. The court found that this indicated a material difference between the community centers and councils operating in Jerusalem and the Open House, which is the appellant’s community center, and that the latter therefore does not belong to the same category as the former. As such, the provision of support to the community centers and councils but not the Open House does not constitute discrimination against the appellant, and the Municipality should not be ordered to provide support to the Open House, even if the importance of the social activity conducted there is undisputed.

It was further held that the appellant had not proven that the Municipality did finance other institutions that belonged to the same peer group as the appellant. To the contrary: the material presented by the Municipality showed that many institutions that conduct social activity directed at population groups with special needs had also been denied support.

23.  Rejection of the applications for support from the Social Affairs Department through the advancement of the status of women track: Regarding the application for the years 2005–2006, the court held that the appellant could not be viewed as an institution whose primary purpose was the advancement of the status of women, considering that only 1.75% of its expenses were incurred for this cause. It was also held that the Municipality’s decision to carry out its own activities for the advancement of the status of women beginning in the year 2007 was entirely appropriate.

24.  Rejection of the applications for support from the Social Affairs Department through the activity for youth track: The lower court held that this type of support was given to youth movements and organizations that were recognized by the Ministry of Education, and that since the appellant did not fall within the definition of a youth movement or a youth organization, rejection of the application was justified and the appellant was not entitled to support through this track.

25.  Rejection of the applications for support from the Division for the Promotion of Youth: The Division for the Promotion of Youth, which is a municipal body, provides support to two categories of youth. The first consists of young people who are at risk due to involvement with drugs, and the second consists of “alienated youth”, who are defined by the Division as youth who are not included in any full-time educational or occupational framework. The appellant’s application for support for LGBT youth was rejected on the basis of this division into two groups, because the requested support could not be characterized as support for either of the groups. However, the lower court clarified that the purpose of the Division is to operate on behalf of and to support youth who are at risk. Therefore, since it is undisputed that LGBT youth are at risk and that they are therefore a part of the relevant peer group, the court held that the Municipality’s failure to provide support to LGBT youth did constitute a discriminatory act

Nevertheless, the court denied the appellant’s petition because it had not asked, in its petition, to include the youth belonging to the LGBT community within the youth population that was entitled to receive care in the framework of the Division, but had instead sought to receive the Municipality’s support for the appellant’s own activity. In any event, the Municipality is prepared to expand the Division’s activity to include young adults who belong to the LGBT community. The Division’s director indicated as such in a proposal, which appellant subsequently rejected. Once the Municipality had decided to focus the Division’s activity on providing professional treatment for youth, rather than social activity — even if such activity has some therapeutic aspects, such as the activity carried out by the appellant —there was no cause for intervention in the Municipality’s exercise of its judgment.

The court also dismissed the appellant’s argument that it was discriminated against in relation to the “Friends of Bait Ham [Warm Home] Association”, which is the only institution that did receive support funds from the Division. The court also held that although there is a significant similarity between the work of the “Friends of Bait Ham” and that of the Division, the appellant did not conduct any comparison between its own activity and that of the Association. Thus, the court was unable to determine that the appellant had suffered from discrimination vis-à-vis that Association.

26.  In summary, the court denied the appellant’s petition for financial support through any of the tracks. The appeal before us deals with this outcome of the lower court’s decision.

The appellant’s application for support for the year 2008

27.  Even before the lower court rendered its decision, the appellant submitted applications for support for the year 2008. As in 2007, applications were submitted to the Social Affairs Department, the Culture Department and the Division for the Advancement of Youth, and these applications, too, were denied. The appellant therefore submitted an additional petition to the Court for Administrative Affairs(AP 9091/08). During the hearing of that petition, the parties reached an agreement that our judgment regarding the current appeal will also apply to the year 2008. Additionally, the Municipality agreed that if it were ordered to pay appellant, it would not seek to argue that the support budget for 2008 has been distributed already. Subject to this declaration, the petition was withdrawn.

Interim summary

28.  We will review the milestones that led to the appeal before us. The Municipality provided NIS 40,000 in support for the appellant’s activity (the gay pride events for the year 2002), in the context of a settlement of Jerusalem Open House v. Jerusalem Municipality [1]. In accordance with the decision rendered in Jerusalem Open House v. Jerusalem Municipality [2], the appellant filed a petition in the Court for Administrative Affairs regarding the years 2003-2005, a petition which Judge Tzur granted in her judgment. Following an appeal submitted by the Municipality against that decision (Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3]), the case was returned to the Court for Administrative Affairs with respect to support for the years 2006-2007. The lower court denied the petitions for all three years, and the appeal before us was brought against this denial. Our decision will have consequences regarding the appellant’s applications for the year 2008 as well, as agreed to by both parties.

Summary of the parties’ arguments based on discrimination and the application of equal criteria

29.  We have noted that all of the appellant’s applications for support over the years were rejected by various bodies within the Municipality (other than an application submitted to the Culture Department’s project track in 2006). The Culture Department rejected the applications in reliance on the Zuckerman criteria. The Social Affairs Department rejected the applications on the grounds that the appellant did not fit within the narrow confines of the criteria established for the purpose of providing support to community centers, to organizations involved in the advancement of women or to those that work with youth. The Division for the Advancement of Youth rejected the appellant’s application on the grounds that it did not satisfy the Division’s criteria.

In light of this and against the background of the LGBT community’s special needs, the appellant focused its arguments on the principle of equality and on a discrimination claim —based on either direct intentional discrimination, or on discrimination that manifests itself in a disparate outcome.

30.  The appellant argues that the Municipality chose criteria and standards for evaluating applications for funding motivated by a desire to exclude the LGBT community from public life in Jerusalem, based on irrelevant and illegitimate considerations. This can be understood from the fact that the Municipality found a variety of indirect routes through which it was ultimately able to finance other activities and events that also did not satisfy the Zuckerman criteria, or which did not satisfy the criteria of the other departments; such funding came either through direct support provided by a different division or department within the Municipality, direct funding of activities, or the “purchase of a service”. The appellant argues that the Municipality’s conduct towards it has been characterized by consistent and direct discrimination against it and against the public it represents. Thus, for example, as the lower court found, the Municipality applied the threshold conditions for satisfying the Accountant-General’s Directive in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion; the Municipality suspended the distribution of financial support in certain areas for which the appellant had submitted applications for support (i.e., the advancement of the status of women track within the Social Affairs Department, and the activity for alienated youth track within the Division for the Advancement of Youth); and the Municipality itself deals with the needs of other minority communities within the city (the ultra-orthodox and Arabs), either providing financial support for such activity or otherwise, while it does nothing to deal with the unique needs of the LGBT community. This element of the appellant’s arguments was presented in order to expose the apparently illegitimate grounds underlying the criteria upon which the Municipality acted, and the manner in which the Municipality applied them with respect to the appellant. (To use a term that is generally expressed by the members of the community, the appellant wished to “out” these illegitimate considerations, used, it contends, in order to exclude the LGBT community from public life in Jerusalem).

The second element of the appellant’s argument is based on the outcome element. According to the appellant, the use of the Zuckerman criteria in the area of culture and the fact that the appellant was unable to fit into any of the categories used by the Culture Department or by the Division for the Promotion of Youth together led to indirect discrimination against the LGBT community and to its exclusion. The outcome is that the appellant — which is the only institution providing for the special needs of the LGBT community—receives no public funding for its unique activity in the areas of culture, society and work with youth. The Municipality’s criteria have a discriminatory effect in terms of the social reality, such that the appellant “is closeted together” with institutions that do not receive support, even though it is entitled, so it argues, to be “placed on the shelf” alongside those groups within the Jerusalem population that do receive Municipality support.

31.  The Municipality counters that the Zuckerman criteria for culture support lead to equal treatment and are reasonable, and that there are many entities that engage in cultural activity — including entities involved in cultural activities that are unique to minority populations —that do not receive support from the Municipality. Regarding social affairs and youth, the appellant did not fit into any of the relevant categories or activities (such as community centers or the status of women), and is thus no different from many other entities conducting various social and youth activities which do not receive financial support.

32.  This is a much abbreviated summary of the parties’ positions regarding the central question that is to be decided here, i.e., the argument that funds have been allocated in a discriminatory and unequal fashion. I see no need to delineate all of the arguments that the parties have raised before us, and these matters will become clear later on. Before we deal with the main question under discussion, we will dispose of one of the claims raised by the appellant which is unrelated to the discrimination claim.

The appellant’s conflict of interest argument

33.  The appellant’s argument regarding this matter is limited to the application for support submitted to the Culture Department in 2005. According to the appellant, two of the members of the advisory committee (Mr. Aaron Goldfinger and Mr. Yigal Molad Hayo) were tainted by a conflict of interest due to their ties to cultural entities that operate in Jerusalem and have received support from the Municipality. The appellant argues that the recommendations from both the advisory committee and the professional allocations committee were therefore severely flawed; these recommendations formed the foundation of the municipality’s decision to deny the appellant’s application for support from the Culture Department in 2005.In this context, the appellant referred to Judge Tzur’s decision, which recognized the conflict of interest claim and held that the said two members of the advisory committee were disqualified from serving on the committee.

I will briefly note that I do not accept the appellant’s arguments regarding this point, for the following reasons:

a.     We must be cautious with regard to the disqualification of suitable individuals due to a potential conflict of interest. The participation of active professionals in decisions that are tied to the distribution of financial support for culture and art promotes the professional artistic objective involved in the distribution of these funds (HCJ 8912/05 Society for Educational and Social Involvement v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4], per Deputy President Rivlin at para. 12).

b.    The general practice is to allow an individual to serve while imposing various restrictions and rules that limit the possibility of a conflict of interest (compare: Mifgashim v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4] and HCJ 6976/05 Zinman College of Physical Education at the Wingate Institute, Ltd v. Ministry of Education, Culture, Science & Sport [5], per Justice Hayut at para. 13).

c.     The advisory committee, which was established at the instigation of the Zuckerman Committee and for the purpose of implementing the Zuckerman criteria, is a body that makes recommendations regarding the distribution of support funds, but it is not a decision-making body (compare Mifgashim v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4], at para. 14).

d.    Committee members Goldfinger and Hayo refrained from participating in discussions concerning the institutions for which they were interested parties.

e.     Even if it is assumed that Goldfinger’s and Hayo’s participation in the Committee was somehow improper — and I am far from holding that it was — the consequence would be, at most, the nullification of the decisions tainted by a conflict of interest. However, such impropriety would still not provide a basis for allowing the appellant to receive the support it sought.

34.  We will now proceed to examine the central question in this appeal. However, prior to examining in detail the parties’ arguments regarding the Zuckerman criteria for support for culture, and regarding the criteria for evaluating applications to the Social Affairs Department and the Division for the Promotion of Youth, as a basis and platform for discussion, we will first conduct a legal review of the subjects that are relevant to this case.

The normative framework – the provisions of s. 3A of the Foundations of the Budget Law

35.  The provisions of s. 3A of the Foundations of the Budget Law, 5745-1985 (hereinafter: “the Budget Foundations Law”) constitute the normative source for the distribution of funds for the support of public institutions. For more about the history of the Budget Foundations Law, see HCJ 4124/00 Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion [6]. The provisions of the Budget Foundations Law require the authorities to act reasonably and on the basis of equality with regard to the distribution of their budgets, while creating clear, transparent and relevant criteria that uphold these values. The text of the section is as follows:

 

 

Support of Public Institutions

 

3A. (a) In this section -

“Public Institution” - An entity that is not a government institution, which operates for the purpose of education, culture, religion, science, art, welfare, health, sports or a similar purpose;

[ . . . ]

 

(d)  The amount set out in a Budget Item for a type of Public Institution shall be divided among Public Institutions of the same type pursuant to equal tests.

 

(e)  The party in charge of the Budget Item shall formulate, in consultation with the Attorney General, equal tests for dividing the amount determined in that Budget Item for the purpose of supporting Public Institutions (hereinafter - the Tests).

 

(f)  The Minister of Finance shall formulate, in consultation with the Attorney General, a procedure pursuant to which applications by Public Institutions for the receipt of support from the state budget shall be submitted and considered (hereinafter - the Procedure).

 

(g)  The Tests and the Procedure shall be published in Reshumot [the Government Gazette].

 (Emphases added – I.A.)

The provisions of s. 3A of the Budget Foundations Law proceed along three axes: the first is a normative-functional axis, meaning that support is given to a type of institution and will not be given, directly or indirectly, to particular institutions; the second axis involves the principle of equality, requiring that support be given according to criteria that are substantively equal; and the third axis involves the administrative authority’s discretion with respect to the distribution of support funds for these and other activities (HCJ 1438/98 Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 384).

Support can only be provided pursuant to clear, relevant and equal criteria “according to the importance of the issue and not the importance of the interested party” (HCJ 59/88 MK Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [8], at p. 707). For further general discussion of the distribution of resources on an equal basis, see HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister[9]. Regarding the principle of equality as applied to the allocation of state budgetary funds for various purposes and subsidies, see HCJ 1113/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [10], at pp. 164, 172, 184.

As a rule, no entity has a vested right in the receipt of support from the state (see HCJ 11020/05 Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education [11], para. 10; HCJ 5264/05 Yeshivat Shavei Shomron v. Minister of Finance [12]). However, once an authority has declared its intent to provide support and establishes criteria under which institutions will receive support, these criteria must comport with the principle of equality (HCJ 11585/05 Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. Ministry of Absorption [13], at para. 10). The same principle applies to both support in general and to any specific benefit. As stated in AAA 4515/08 State of Israel v. Ne'eman [14], at para. 16:

‘In a case in which the authority has discretion to grant a particular benefit, whether to a particular party or to others, then even if it is not required to grant the benefit to anyone, once it has chosen to grant it to others, it may not deny the particular person the benefit if there is no relevant difference between them [ . . . ] This is the general rule, and it is even more applicable when the policy is to provide benefits out of state funds’.

36.  This Court has dealt often with the matter of equality in connection with government authorities’ funding distribution in support of public institutions. Although according to its literal text, the Budget Foundations Law applies to support paid out of the state budget, it has been held that the principle of distributing support according to equal criteria applies to both administrative authorities that are not state organs, and to publicly supported entities (see D. Barak-Erez “Enforcement of the State Budget and Administrative Contracts,” 1 Hamishpat 253 (1993), at p. 254). Additionally, although according to its literal text, the Budget Foundations Law applies only to state institutions, the equal criteria requirement also applies to local authorities who must also follow proper criteria when distributing funds (see: Y. Zamir, Administrative Authority (vol. A, 2010), at p. 248; HCJ 5325/01 LCN Society for the Promotion of Women’s Basketball v. Ramat Hasharon Local Council [15], at p. 89; HCJ 10285/04 Haifa Motzkin Municipal Women’s Basketball League v. Haifa Municipality [16]). One reason for extending the application of the principle of equality to local governments is to cover the distribution of funding from a local authority, in addition to the explicitly covered local projects funded by the central government. (Regarding the distinction between budgeting from the central government and funds derived from city taxes collected by the municipalities, see HCJ 10104/04 Peace Now — Sha’al Educational Services v. Director of Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria [17]). Against this background, a procedure regarding the allocation of support by local authoritiesdiscussed belowwas prescribed.

The principle of equality in the distribution of resources, funds and support thus applies to a local authority as well. Although under certain circumstances, the central government may implement a practice that violates the principle of equality by virtue of an express discriminatory provision included in the Budget Foundations Law itself, any such violation by a local government will still be prohibited according to the principle that “what is permitted for the teacher is forbidden for the students”. Courts have ruled in accordance with this principle regarding the allocation of land to a public institution by a local authority (AP(TA) 1187/05 Condominium Representation v. Petach Tikva Municipality [72]) and regarding the distribution of support funds to unofficial but recognized schools (AP(Jer) 1754/09 Jewish Center for Pluralism—Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel v. Jerusalem City Council [73]).

Alongside all the above, we note the obvious: the Basic Laws require the administrative authorities to exercise their powers in a manner that protects the values protected by said Basic Laws. It should also be emphasized that the duty to act in accordance with the principle of equality regarding the distribution of funding applies independently of s. 3A of the Budget Foundations Law, and the courts have applied the principle of equality both before and after the section’s enactment (Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion [6], per President Beinisch at para. 31).

Procedure for distribution of funding to public institutions by the local authorities

37.  Local authorities distribute funds for their support of public institutions in accordance with the new procedure [described above in para. 4].Section 4.3 of the old procedure of 1985 provided that the “authority shall determine for itself, to the extent possible, the criteria for the provision of support from the authority’s various departments”. According to the new procedure (published on 23 August 2006), the local authority’s funding committee discusses applications for support and judged according to equal criteria established in advance by the local authority. The funding committee’s recommendations are then submitted to the local council for a final decision. Section 8.4 of the new procedure provides that the council may not approve the criteria until it has received a written opinion from the authority’s legal adviser confirming that the criteria are indeed equal. Section 8.5 of the new procedure provides that “the criteria to be prescribed by the local authority, after it has reviewed the opinion of the authority’s legal adviser, will be relevant and equal and will take into consideration the needs of the population of the local authority and the need to provide services to all parts of the population.”

In conclusion, the Jerusalem Municipality must distribute support funds to public institutions in a manner that is appropriate for the Municipality as a public trustee, pursuant to the new procedure and the principle of general equality, in accordance with clear, open, equal, and relevant criteria, taking into consideration the needs of the city’s entire population.

The duty to weigh relevant considerations and to refrain from weighing extraneous considerations

38.  The distribution of funding to public institutions by an administrative or local authority, as in the instant case, constitutes an exercise of administrative power. As such, it must be done in accordance with the rules of administrative law, must be free of any illegitimate or arbitrary considerations, and must not violate the principles of justice. The decision must meet the test of reasonableness. It also must be based on a suitable factual background and on the entire range of relevant considerations, and reflect a proper balancing of all of them. From the government authority’s perspective, improper considerations must remain behind a “veil of ignorance” on which all the relevant considerations should be “screened”. Nevertheless, even when an administrative decision is based on proper and relevant considerations, it may still be found to be unreasonable. This would be the case when the authority has not given any weight at all to a relevant consideration that is essential to the matter. The total avoidance of a relevant consideration is the flipside of the reliance on an extraneous consideration, the significance of which is the same as reliance on a factor that should have been completely ignored. In addition, the weight attributed to the various considerations must be examined, since “the dish may yet be ruined, even if the cook adds all the correct ingredients, but does so in amounts which are significantly different from what is required” (see D. Barak-Erez, Administrative Law (2010), at pp. 725-727).

The duty imposed on an administrative authority to weigh relevant considerations and to refrain from weighing extraneous considerations is examined in light of the law that grants it the authority to act. It is also evaluated in light of the context of each case, and in light of the basic values of the legal system. The basic values of the legal system comprise the “normative matrix” – the concepts of good faith and fairness, the principle of equality, and the principle of pluralism, which can also constitute a relevant consideration (Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at pp. 375-377).

Thus, in examining the Municipality’s decision, we must check whether it involved any “suspicious” considerations that were irrelevant under the circumstances. For example, as Justice Zamir wrote in Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7] (ibid., at p. 374): “There is no doubt that the difference in religious conception. . . is not a relevant consideration; rather, it is an extraneous and illegitimate one for the purpose of the provision of support by the Ministry of Religions . . . ”. And note: a distinction must be made between extraneous considerations and those derived from improper motives. Occasionally, a consideration which is in and of itself a positive and desirable one may be disqualified as extraneous in circumstances in which it is taken into account by an administrative authority that has not been authorized to weigh such considerations (see Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 358). In this case, if the Municipality’s decisions were based on the identity of the organization requesting support and not on the activity for which the support was requested, the consideration is an improper one; the test should be the substance of the activity and not the identity of the applicant, according to the importance of the matter and not the importance of the interested party (see: Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [8], at p. 707; Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education [11]; Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 358).

39.  A basic difficulty arises in connection with proof of extraneous or improper considerations that have come into play. Generally, when administrative authorities do give weight to such extraneous or improper considerations, an attempt is made to camouflage or cover up the real elements forming the basis of their decisions. The discrimination is not declared publicly or flaunted; it is instead hidden beneath the surface, and the criteria that are disclosed are those “that do not tell us the truth, and are instead acts of hypocrisy. They are not criteria, but a form of lip-service, and they do not reflect the real truth” (HCJ 1/98 Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [18], at p. 260). The difficulty in identifying extraneous considerations is exacerbated when a statutory-collective body with many members, such as, in our case, the City Council, makes the administrative decision (see Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p.670, n.132). Indeed, it is difficult for a court to examine what is hidden in the intention of an administrative authority, and the court must therefore rely on a circumstantial or statistical body of evidence. Another possible method is to look for external defects that can provide evidence of the administrative authority’s use of extraneous or improper considerations (HCJ 4500/07 Yachimovich v. Second Television and Radio Authority [19]).One example would be a “silent” decision, which itself attests to it having been based on irrelevant considerations(see and compare: HCJ 3551/97 Brenner v. Jewish Religious Services Law Ministers Committee [20], at pp. 771-772); an administrative authority’s unreasonable delays and procrastinations in the process of reaching a decision (HCJ 6300/93 Center for Training of Rabbinical Court Pleaders v. Minister of Religious Affairs [21],at p. 452); and even a high failure rate in a licensing test, which can indicate an intention to cause examinees to fail on the basis of an extraneous “closing the market” consideration (see HCJ 571/89 Moskowitz v. Board of Appraisers [22], at p. 245; compare Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister[9])).

The duty imposed on an administrative authority to act on the basis of equality, and the prohibition against discrimination

40.  The principle of equality has held a primary position as a basic principle within the Israeli legal system from the very beginning, and I will not add to all that has been written to commend equality, so as not to be bringing even more coals to Newcastle. I will therefore limit myself to presenting a small collection of the praises sung in the case law to the principle of equality: it is “the very soul of our entire constitutional system” (HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [23], at p. 698); “one of the highest principles in the land—head and shoulders above any of the other principles” (HCJ 2671/98 Israel Women’s Network v. Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [24], at p. 650); “It is the foundation of social existence, it is one of the touchstones of a democratic regime” (see HCJ 4112/99 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Tel Aviv Municipality [25], at p. 415). There are those who see the principle of equality as the common denominator and the basis for all basic human rights, and for all other values forming the foundation of democracy (Y. Zamir and M. Sobel, “Equality Before the Law,”5 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 165 (2000), at p. 166). For more on the principle of equality in scholarly journals, see, for example, F. Radday, “On Equality,” 24 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 241 (1994); Y. Sapir, “Implementation of the Principle of Equality in the Case Law of the High Court of Justice,” 37 Hapraklit 143 (1986).

The duty to act on the basis of equality means that equals must be treated equally, and that different parties must be treated differently. Thus, the obverse of equality is discrimination, which is a matter of treating equals differently and unfairly. The recognition of a discrimination claim is a practical expression of the high level at which the principle of equality is placed (Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 673-678). The violation of the principle of equality has been called “the worst of all evils” (HCJ 7111/95 Center for Local Government v. Knesset [26], per Justice Cheshin at p.503); discrimination can lead to humiliation and a violation of human dignity (HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense [27]), at p. 132; and “there is no element which is more destructive to society than its sons and daughters having a sense that they are being subjected to a double standard” (see HCJ 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [28], at p. 332; Moskowitz v. Board of Appraisers [22], per President Barak at para. 13). This is certainly the case when what is involved is “generic” discrimination, part of the “essential core” of discrimination, based on a feature of a person’s identity such as, for example, religion, race or gender. Discrimination such as this has been described as “inflicting a mortal blow on human dignity” (see HCJ 2671/98 Israel Women’s Network v. Minister of Labour and Social. Affairs [24], at pp. 658-659; and compare: A. Barak, The Judge in a Democratic Society (2004), at p. 142). It has been said in the same spirit that “ . . . discrimination (either real or imagined) leads to a sense of mistreatment and frustration; a sense of mistreatment and frustration leading to jealousy. And when jealousy appears, understanding is lost . . .We are prepared to bear a burden and suffering and distress if we know that others who are our equals — are like us and are with us; but we will protest and refuse to accept a situation in which others — who are our equals — receive that which we do not receive” (HCJ 1703/92 C.A.L. Cargo Airlines v. Prime Minister [29], at p. 204).

41.  The obligation to allocate support on an equal basis and without discrimination is therefore derived from the principle of equality. In some circumstances, a violation of that principle is also perceived as being a violation of a constitutional right. The case law has held that the right to dignity that is anchored in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, necessarily includes the right to be treated equally, to the extent that this right is closely and substantively related to the right to human dignity—meaning that it is necessary to examine the nature of a violation of the principle of equality, and the degree of its connection to the concept of human dignity (see HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset [30]; HCJ 7178/08 Forum of the Druze and Circassian Council Heads in Israel v. Government of Israel [31] at para. 8, and the references cited therein;HCJ 1067/08 “Noar k’Halacha” Association v. Minister of Education [32], per Justice H. Melcer at para. 2; HCJ 9722/04 Polgat Jeans Ltd v. Government of Israel [33]; Zamir, Judicial Authority,supra, at pp. 181-182; Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 677-678).

The administrative obligation to act in accordance with the principle of equality is broader than the protection of the constitutional right to be treated equally ,in the sense that it also applies to situations in which the discrimination does not violate the constitutional right to equality, or is not the result of improper motivations and may even be incidental or coincidental (see Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 678-680; and see A. Bendor, “Equality and Administrative Discretion — On Constitutional Equality and Administrative Equality: Shamgar Volume - Articles 1(2003) 287). Thus, an administrative act that affects the economic-business activity and the competition between different businesspeople may be considered unequal, even though it does not raise any constitutional questions. The tendency of the court to interfere in an administrative decision in the framework of its exercise of judicial discretion is contingent upon the magnitude of the violation of equality. A light or non-substantive violation will not incur the same treatment as a serious violation; the more important the interest or the right of the victims, the more likely it is that the court will intervene with respect to the administrative decision (HCJ 7691/95 Sagay v. Government of Israel [34], at pp. 611-612).

42.  In order to establish a relevant distinction between legitimate and prohibited discrimination, we must examine the purpose of the differentiation, the nature of the matter, and the unique circumstances of each case. A typical case of an irrelevant distinction would be a decision that is based on an improper group-based distinction. But there are also situations in which a distinction can be irrelevant even if it is not based on an improper group-based distinction; as opposed to this, a distinction may be relevant even if it relates to a group characteristic that is generally considered to be an improper basis for a distinction (see Barak-Erez,           Administrative Law (2010), supra, at pp. 686-688; M. Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality,” 45 Hapraklit 94(2000), at pp. 97, 113). For examples in the case law regarding the issue of relevancy, see HCJ 205/94 Nof v. Ministry of Defense [35]; Y. Livnat, “The Individual and the Community: A Communitarian Critique of HCJ 205/94 Nof v. Ministry of Defense,” 31 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 219 (2000); Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [18]; Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion [6]; HCJ 5304/02 Israel Association of Victims of Work Accidents and Widows of Victims of Work Accidents v. Knesset [36]; HCJ 9863/06 Karan - Society of Combat Veteran Quadriplegics v. State of Israel -Minister of Health [37]; State of Israel v. Ne’eman [14]; HCJ 11075/04 Girby v. Minister of Education Culture and Sports - Chairman of the Council of Higher Education [38]). Even when the relevancy test is passed and it is determined that a particular distinction is relevant, a question may nevertheless arise as to whether the weight accorded to it was reasonable (Miller v. Minister of Defense [27], at pp. 132-135).

Substantive equality reflects the values of justice and fairness. The question of whether a distinction made by a government authority complies with substantive equality is decided in two stages: at the first stage, the peer group is defined, and at the second stage, a determination is made as to whether the authority is treating all those within the peer group equally (see HCJ 3792/95 National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [39]; Israel Movement for Progressive Judaism v. Ministry of Absorption [13]; Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion [6]; Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7]). At the first stage, the relevant reference group— the “peer group” — is defined and the boundaries of the group are also the boundaries of the required equality. Sometimes, identification of the group is a simple matter and is even established by statute; in other cases, it is difficult to identify the group. The delineation and definition of the boundaries of the peer group involve a consideration of the purpose of the norm, the substance of the matter, the basic values of the legal system, and the unique circumstances of each case; on the basis of these factors, it is possible to determine whether an administrative authority’s decision has been based on either a relevant or an irrelevant consideration (see HCJFH 4191/97 Recanat v. National Labour Court [40], at pp. 346-347; Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 363 and the sources cited there; Karan - Society of Combat Veteran Quadriplegics v. State of Israel -Minister of Health [37], at para. 10). At the second stage, it is necessary to determine whetherthe administrative authority has treated the members of the peer group equally, or whether it is acting discriminatorily towards individual members of the same peer group.

A “rough” analysis allows us to say that the first stage, involving the identification and delineationof the boundaries of the peer group, requires an examination from the perspective of constitutional equality and regarding the possibility of a “suspect” group affiliation, within the “essential core” of discrimination which is based on race, religion, ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation etc.The second stage, atwhich the court examines whether the authority is treating all members of the peer group equally, is based on an administrative equality perspective (Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, supra, at p. 110).

43.  The case law long ago considered the connection between the issue of equality and that of reasonableness (see D. Barak-Erez, Administrative Law (2010), at pp. 689-692). The criteria regarding the elements relevant to equality must be established in a reasonable manner, taking into account the equality that is sought (HCJ 720/82 Elizur Religious Athletic Association, Nahariya Branch v. Nahariya Municipality [41], at p. 21-22). Even when the various considerations are relevant, the weight attributed to them is also examined. Thus, for example, as Justice Zamir wrote in National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [39]:

‘A peer group may have been established on the basis of a relevant consideration, but its establishment as a separate peer group may nevertheless be unjustified. How can this be? It may be that in the circumstances of the particular case, the relevant consideration is of such little importance that it cannot be used to justify the existence of the separate peer group. In such a case, the establishment of a separate peer group on the basis of this consideration is defective not because it involves an extraneous consideration but because of the improper weight attributed to the relevant consideration’ (ibid., at p. 283).

(See also: Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at pp. 363-64; HCJ 727/00 Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils in Israel v. Minister of Construction and Housing [42], at p. 92). Similarly, in HCJ 6407/06 Doron, Tikotsky, Amir, Mizrachi, Attorneys at Law v. Minister of Finance [43], at para. 43, this Court held that the distinction made between the border settlements and the restricted regions, for the purpose of compensation for war damages, was based on relevant considerations and that two different peer groups were involved. Nevertheless, the majority opinion held that the distinction did not justify the substantial disparity in the compensation arrangements for employers in the two different regions, and that the temporary provisions regarding the compensation provided for the month of July during the Second Lebanon War were not reasonable. Regardless, the Court’s ultimate decision was that it would not intervene in the compensation arrangements because the said “unreasonableness” was “cured” in the framework of the overall arrangement.

Realization of the principle of equality through the use of guiding criteria

44.  As is the case with an authority’s internal guidelines, the use of criteria that guide the administrative authority regarding the distribution of support will constitute the high road toward reducing the weight attributed to irrelevant or illegitimate considerations, and toward ensuring equality, while strengthening the objective element in an authority’s decision (National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [39], at p. 277). However, such criteria are not a wonder drug that removes all pain of discrimination, either because of a concern that criteria may be “designed” to fit the party who receives the support, or that the criteria may include a hidden preference or “hidden discrimination” (see Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 695-697; Jewish Center for Pluralism v. Jerusalem City Council [73]; HCJ200/83 Watad v. Minister of Finance [45], at pp.121-122; Cabel v. Prime Minister of Israel [18], at pp. 259-260). It is therefore necessary to examine, in each individual case, whether a particular criterion does not embody a bias that operates either in favor of or against certain individuals or groups.

45.  The case law criticizes the use of a criterion that can be met by only one single group or entity. Justice Hayut wrote as follows in Zinman College v. Ministry of Education, Culture, Science & Sport [8]:

‘. . . We wish to note that given the fact that the Wingate Institute is the only institution that received support pursuant to it and in light of the well-supported doubt raised by the petitioner regarding the ability of any other body whatsoever to meet the requirements established therein, the respondents did well by canceling it, and earlier would have been better’ (ibid., at para. 18).

See also the decision of Judge Solberg of the Court for Administrative Affairs in Jewish Center for Pluralism v. Jerusalem City Council [73], in which he held that the significance of the application of the criteria adopted by the Municipality was the earmarking of a benefit for certain institutions only, and that by adopting such criteria, the Municipality was effectively referring to those institutions by name.

46.  Just as we may not ignore an inherent connection between a certain group and a criterion that is met only by that group, we are also prohibited from ignoring an inherent connection between a certain group and a criterion that will be satisfied by all, except for one particular group. This is because the use of a particular criterion can be used as a cover for the discriminatory treatment of certain groups within the population. Nevertheless, the legality of a particular criterion will depend on the circumstances of each case. Thus, for example, a distinction based on a military service or national service requirement will be deemed to be either a permitted distinction or a case of improper discrimination, depending on the context and the objective of the arrangement under discussion (HCJ 11956/05 Bashara v. Minister of Construction and Housing [44], at para. 9).

An objective–result based test for discrimination

47.  The discrimination issue relates not only to situations in which the administrative authority intended to violate the principle of equality. An administrative authority decision, the results of which are discriminatory in actual effect, maybe disqualified even if the administrative authority did not act with discriminatory intent, and even if the discrimination was implemented unconsciously. Justice Barak’s comments in Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [9] are pertinent here:

‘Prohibited discrimination may also occur without any discriminatory intention or motive on the part of the persons creating the discriminatory norm. Where discrimination is concerned, the discriminatory outcome is sufficient. When the implementation of the norm created by the authority, which may have been formulated without any discriminatory intent, leads to a result that is unequal and discriminatory, the norm is likely to be set aside because of the discrimination that taints it. Discrimination is not determined solely according to the thought and intention of the creator of the discriminatory norm. It is determined also in accordance with the effect that it has de facto [. . .] The test for the existence of discrimination is an objective test that focuses on the outcome of realizing the norm that is under scrutiny. It is not limited to the subjective thinking of the creator of the norm. The question is not whether there is an intention to discriminate against one group or another. The question is what is the final outcome that is created in the social context’ (ibid., at para. 18).

(See, similarly, ibid., per President Barak at para. 19; HCJ 986/05 Peled v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [46], at para. 11; HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al.[47], per President Barak at para. 51; Yekutieli v. Minister of Religion [6] per Justice Levy at para. 3).

48.  It is easier to prove the existence of discrimination in terms of results than it is to prove discrimination in terms of attitude, or discrimination resulting from improper motivation. Nevertheless, an unequal result does not necessarily indicate that there has been discrimination. Each case must be examined separately, in accordance with its circumstances and according to the norm under review, in order to determine whether the result indicates that the norm has a discriminatory effect in the given social reality. It is not at all simple to answer the question of whether an administrative norm whose outcome appears to violate the rights or interests of a particular group is actually discriminatory. An example from American law which demonstrates the difficulty in applying the outcome test is the case of Ricci v. DeStefano [74]. In that case, the judges were divided in their views on the issue of whether a municipality had properly refused to certify the results of an examination for the promotion of firemen, in light of the statistical racial inequality of the results. White firefighters passed the promotion examination at a higher rate than did firefighters belonging to all racial minorities in general, and specifically, at a higher rate than African-American firefighters. The municipality therefore decided not to approve the examination results. The petitioners—all of whom had successfully passed the examination—included a white firefighter who suffered from dyslexia and a Hispanic firefighter. They argued that the municipality’s decision not to certify the test results contravened the principle of equality. The five justices writing for the majority accepted the petitioners’ argument and held that municipality’s decision not to certify the exam results violated the statutorily mandated standard of equality. It was held that the municipality’s refusal to certify the exam results, on the basis of race, did not meet the evidentiary burden required under the circumstances of the case (the strong-basis-in-evidence standard) in order to prove that the promotion examination had been discriminatory. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that the municipality had not carried the burden of proof with respect to the question of whether a less discriminatory, alternative examination method was available. In contrast, the four judges who supported the minority opinion wrote that although support for the petitioners’ position was understandable, the petitioners did not have a vested right to a promotion and the municipality did have the right to invalidate the examination if there was good reason to believe that were it allowed to stand, the municipality would be exposed to discrimination suits. The minority justices also wrote that the majority holding that the municipality did not certify the examination results only because the white firefighters had passed the examination at a much higher rate than the Hispanic firefighters, and especially in comparison to the African-American firefighters, ignored the substantial evidence presented of the many defects in the promotion examination chosen by the municipality. The minority justices noted the existence of different promotion examinations used by other municipalities, which had generated more equally distributed results. (For a critique of the American Supreme Court’s opinion in this case, see L. Guinier & S. Sturm “Trial by Firefighters,” The New York Times (11 July 2009)            (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/11/opinion/11guinier.html).)

49. In HCJ 240/98 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [48], at p. 178, this Court dealt with a petition that attacked the small budget for religious services provided to the Arab public. The analysis was based on a comparison between the percentage of the overall budget given to Arab religious services (2%)and the percentage of the total population the Arab sector constitutes(20%). The petition was denied on the grounds that the arguments were presented only generally, but the Court noted that the gap in the distribution of the budget was an indicator of discrimination against the Arab minority —an example of a self-proving matter. (For a critique of the out come of this decision, see: H. Sommer and M. Pinto, “From Specific Legislation to General Doctrine —The Function of the Judicial Branch in Reinforcing Affirmative Action in Israel,” in Affirmative Action and Ensuring Representation in Israel (2004) 195, at p. 206; Y. Rabin and M. Lodzki-Arad “The Continued Financial Discrimination of the Arab Sector”, 7 Hamishpat505, at p. 508). Thus, when a particular sector within the population receives no financial support or does not receive funding that is commensurate with that sector’s percentage makeup of the total population, the disparity may be evidence of discrimination, based on an examination of the outcome test (Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 700).However, a minor deviation from a relevant group’s proportionate share will not necessarily indicate discrimination, even according to the outcome test (Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [10], at p. 182).

Budgetary constraints and the addition of resources

50.  A budgetary consideration is a relevant and important consideration, which, under certain circumstances, may justify a deviation from the principles of equality and pluralism. Nevertheless, a budgetary difficulty will not, by itself, justify the restriction of a service provided to the public in a manner that selectively harms particular sectors, in violation of these principles (HCJ 8186/03 Tali School Education Fund v. Ministry of Education [49], per Justice Cheshin, at para. 29). An administrative authority occasionally may be required to adopt certain measures even if they involve additional effort and additional resources in order to provide equal treatment (see, Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 368; LCN Society v. Ramat Hasharon Local Council [15]; Sommer & Pinto, “Specific Legislation” and Rabin & Lodzki-Arad, “Continued Financial Discrimination”). It has already been said in this context that “the principle of equality, from a social perspective, is no less important than garbage removal” (Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 368).

Equal results — active correction and affirmative action

51.  The equal results standard and the recourse to actively correct existing inferiority or to affirmative action are closely connected, in that the administrative authority will be required to give more to a party that has suffered from inferior treatment in the past (Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 701-703).

There are those who strongly object to affirmative action, and who view it as constituting reverse discrimination. This approach disqualifies the use of any distinction, either for good or bad, between the majority and the minority, advocating “color-blindness” (see, E. Benvenisti “National Courts and the Protection of National Minorities,” in 3 Alei Mishpat (Academic Center of Law L. Rev.) 463 (2003), at p. 469). According to this approach, the state must maintain neutrality and refrain from supporting or suppressing any particular group. However, according to the affirmative action approach, what is required is “color-consciousness” rather than “color-blindness”, to the extent such consciousness benefits a particular population (see G. Gontovnik, “The Right to Culture in a Liberal Society and in the State of Israel,” 27 Iyuney Mishpat (Tel-Aviv U. L. Rev.) 23 (2003), at p. 46).

Affirmative action is a practice aimed at realizing substantive equality, and the justifications for its use are based on several key arguments: the corrective justice argument, relating to the correction of wrongs that were done in the past to certain groups; the distributive justice argument, concerning the strengthening of certain groups that have been the victims of discrimination; and the pluralism argument, relating to the creation of a heterogeneous society through the introduction of a variety of different views (see Sommer & Pinto, “Specific Legislation”, at p. 198; H. Modrick-Even Chen, Israel Democracy Institute Position Paper 24, Affirmative Action in Israel: Policy Definition and Recommendations for Legislation 9 (2000), at p. 15).

The Israeli legislature has expressed its view concerning the matter of affirmative action in various statutory provisions, such as legislation mandating the appointment of women and minority members as directors in government companies. (Regarding the adoption, in the case law, of an affirmative action policy, see, for example, HCJ 528/88 Avitan v. Israel Land Administration [50], at p. 299; LCN Society v. Ramat Hasharon Local Council [15].)

52. May a court impose an affirmative action policy on an administrative authority, if such a policy has not been enacted through legislation? Judicial intervention intended to prevent discrimination (“Thou shalt not”) is not the same as intervention for the purpose of imposing affirmative-active measures (“Thou shall”) on the authority. It is true that the second type of intervention is more exceptional, but the case law has recognized the fact that sometimes, “when the other’s starting point is an inferior one, it is necessary to give him more in order to bring both parties to an equal level. . .”(see Elizur Religious Athletic Association, Nahariya Branch v. Nahariya Municipality [41], at p. 21; HCJ 4906/98 Am Hofshi Organization for Freedom of Religion, Conscience, Education and Culture v. Ministry of Housing [51], at p. 516). Against this background, there are those who believe that in special situations in which an entire population lacks access to opportunities or to resources, the court can compel the authority to adopt a policy of affirmative action (Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at pp. 707-708).

Equal results and distributive justice

53.An additional aspect of the principle of equality is the principle of distributive justice, which refers to the equal distribution of social resources. According to the case law, an administrative authority must view the principle of distributive justice as an important consideration (HCJ 244/00 New Dialogue Society for Democratic Dialogue v. Minister of. National Infrastructure [52], at pp. 64-66, and see D. Barak-Erez, “Israel Lands Between Public Administration and Privatization: Distributive Justice in the Administrative Process,” Distributive Justice in Israel 203 (2000)).

54.Way station: The support funds and other allocations of resources are like a playing field set up by the authority, even though it was not originally required to do so. The administrative authority sets up gates at the entrance to the playing field, in the form of the prescribed criteria, and only those who succeed in passing through these gates are able to enter the field. It may be that only one group enters the field, or it may be that several groups do so, and at this point the court examines those “peer groups” that have succeeded in entering the field. The court may find that the gates at the entrance to the field are — either intentionally or unintentionally — too narrow, and it may instruct that the gates be widened so that other groups will also be able to enter the field. The gates are widened by substantive equality from a constitutional perspective, often even invoking “big guns” such as active correction, affirmative action and distributive justice. There may also be cases in which the court finds that the entrance gates are suitable and proper, but that the groups who have entered the field and are already playing are not being treated equally amongst themselves. In those cases, where the court finds that it is necessary to intervene, this is done within an administrative law framework.

We have noted that the principles of constitutional and administrative equality apply to local authorities as well. We will precede our application of these principles to the present case with a few words about the group that was defined at the beginning of this opinion as the “LGBT community”, focusing on the appellant.

The LGBT community as the subject of a “suspect” classification

55.  Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is discrimination based on a “suspect” group attribution, and as such it is included within the “essential core” component of the right to equality (Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, supra, at p. 111). When a particular norm appears to violate the rights or interests of certain groups within the population, the court is required to use the “suspect classification” test and to subject the norm to “strict scrutiny” (ibid., at p. 102). For an extended examination of these rules under American law, see L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2nd ed., 1988), at pp. 1456–1553. For the distinction between the various bases for discrimination (race, gender, religion, age, view, sexual orientation, handicaps, etc.), see “Profile of Justice Barak: Equality in a Jewish and Democratic State,” in Aharon Barak Volume (2009) 225, at pp. 226–227.

56.  Israeli law with regard to the LGBT community and the members of that community reflects the changes and transformations that have occurred over the years in Israeli society. Society in Israel has taken the view that the law must deal with the matter of sexual orientation with indifference, in the same way that other details regarding a person or regarding a group, such as age, race, nationality, gender, etc., are treated. There is also a broad consensus that restrictions should not be placed on the activities of the members of the LGBT community, nor should they suffer from adverse discrimination. This position has been expressed in the case law and in legislation that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and the following is a review of only some of the “milestones” that have been reached in this area.

In 1988, the Knesset amended the Penal Code and repealed the criminal prohibition against sexual relations between men (Penal Code (Amendment No. 22), 5748–1988, SH 62);

In 1992, the Knesset amended the Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law(Amendment 1)5742-1992, SH 1377, 2 January1992, at p. 37);

In 1994, in HCJ 721/94 El-Al Airlines v. Yonatan Danielowitz [53], this Court held that El-Al’s practice of granting a free airline ticket to an employee’s partner only if the partner was a member of the opposite sex was invalid and illegal;

In 1997, the Knesset amended the Libel Law and introduced a prohibition against the debasement of a person based on gender or sexual orientation (s. 1(4) of the Libel Law (Amendment No. 5), 5737-1977, SH 1612, 28 February 1977, at p. 70);

In that same year, the Court rendered a decision in HCJ 273/97 Protection of v. Minister of Education [54], nullifying a decision by the Minister of Education to prevent the broadcast of a program directed at young members of the LGBT community. (For an analysis and critique of the decision, see A. Harel, “The Courts and Homosexuality — Respect or Tolerance?” 4 Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 785 (1998);

In 1998, the Knesset enacted the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, which defines “sexual harassment” as including, inter alia, “an intimidating or humiliating reference directed towards a person concerning his gender, or his sexuality, including his sexual orientation” (s. 3(a)(5) of the Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law, 5758-1998, SH 1661, 19 March 1998, at p. 166);

In 2000, in a case involving a lesbian woman who had adopted her female partner’s son in the United States, this Court ordered the Ministry of the Interior to register her as his second mother and to add his name to her identity card (HCJ 1778/99 Nicole Brenner-Kadish v. Minister of the Interior [55]);

In the same year, a judgment was rendered in HCJ 293/00 A v. Supreme Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem [56], in which this Court nullified a decision by the Supreme Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem prohibiting a divorced woman from having her daughters meet with her female life partner;

Additionally, that same year, the Knesset enacted the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law, 5761-2000 (SH 1765, 21 December 2000, at p. 58) which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in the provision of a public good or service, or when granting entry to a public place or providing a service in a public place (s. 3(a) of the Law);

In 2002, the Knesset amended the Mandatory Tenders Law and added a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation in the context of a tender (Mandatory Tenders Law (Amendment No. 12), 5762–2002, SH 1824, 21 January 2002, at p. 100);

In 2004, the Knesset amended the Penal Code, adding s. 144F. The amendment increased the penalty for hate crimes, including crimes motivated by hostility towards a particular public because of their sexual orientation (Crimes Motivated by Racism or Hostility Toward a Particular Public — an Aggravating Circumstance) (Amendment No. 82), 5765–2004, SH 1961, 17 November 2004, at p. 14);

The same year, the Knesset amended the Patients’ Rights Law, 5756–1996, and added a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Patients’ Rights Law (Amendment No. 2), 5765–2004, SH 1962, 29 November 2004, at p. 26);

In 2005, a judgment was rendered in CA 10280/01 Yaros-Hakak v. Attorney General [57], in which the majority opinion held that being a part of a same-sex couple does not negate a person’s legal capacity to adopt his or her partner’s children;

In 2006, a judgment was rendered in HCJ 8988/06 Yehuda Meshi Zahav v. Ilan Franko, Jerusalem District Police Commander [58], in which petitions opposing the holding of the gay pride parade in Jerusalem were denied;

That same year, the Court decided in HCJ 3045/05 Ben-Ari v. Director of Population Administration [59] that the registration clerk at the Population Registry must register, as married, a same-sex couple who were married in a civil marriage conducted abroad in a country in which that ceremony was recognized;

In 2007, a judgment was rendered in HCJ 5277/07 Baruch Marzel v. Jerusalem District Police Commander [60], in which the Court again denied a petition against the holding of the gay pride parade in Jerusalem;

That year, the Knesset enacted the Equal Rights of Persons with Disabilities who are Employed as Persons in Rehabilitation (Temporary Provision) Law 2007 (SH 2109, 8 August 2007, at p. 450), which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation (s. 4 of the Law).

A prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is recognized under certain circumstances even in the framework of private law (see J. Weisman, Property Law: Possession and Use, 357 (2006); B. Medina Economic Justifications for Antidiscrimination Laws”, 3 Alei Mishpat (Academic Center of Law L. Rev.) 37 (2003), at pp.42–43; H. Keren “In Good Faith But Not In Standard Fashion: The Value of Judicial Action that Knows No (Contractual) Bounds,” in Aharon Barak Volume (2009) 411, 446 n.116).

57.  It is therefore not surprising that scholars have described the 1990’s in Israel as the “gay decade”, and the legal changes that took place in the Israeli legal system during those years, in its legislation and case law, as the “gay legal revolution”. Over the course of time, Israeli society developed various mechanisms that provide protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while promoting the rights of the members of the LGBT community to equal treatment, as manifested in the development of the case law and of the legislation, only a part of which was covered by the above survey (see A. Harel, “The Rise and Fall of the Gay Legal Revolution” 7 Hamishpat 195 (2002); M. Mautner, Law and Culture in Israel at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century (2008), at pp. 230–231; A. Kama, “From Terra Incognita to Terra Firma: The Logbook of the Voyage of the Gay Men’s Community into the Israeli Public Sphere”, 38(4) Journal of Homosexuality (2000), at pp. 133–162). Obviously, the treatment of the members of the LGBT community is one of the indices by which Israel can be considered to be a liberal-democratic state, in contrast to the majority of the countries in the Middle East, both near and far, in which the members of the LGBT community are persecuted by the authorities as well as by society. (And we recall the unforgettable words of Iran’s President Ahmadinajad who claimed that there are no gay people in Iran, while a petition brought by a gay Iranian against the authorities in England who wish to return him to his country is pending before the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom; the petitioner in that case seeks asylum in England, as he fears for his life if he returns to Iran. See            http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/current-cases/CCCaseDetails/case_2009_0054.html.)

58.  In light of the statutory provisions enacted by the Israeli legislature, against the background of the case law dealing with members of the LGBT community reviewed above, and without making any definitive determination, it would seem that the situation is no longer one in which there are mere “islands” of rights. Instead, there is an overall constitutional conception that includes the right not to suffer from discrimination based on sexual orientation. What is important here is that the case law and the legislation described above indicate that it has been recognized that discrimination against the members of the LGBT community constitutes a “suspect” classification, that they are deemed a group with a distinct identity necessitating protection against discrimination. Additionally, discrimination based on sexual orientation is part of the “essential core” of prohibited discrimination and as such must be subject to strict scrutiny. (For thoughts as to whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or on the basis of physical disabilities is subject to the same rule as discrimination based on national or religious affiliation, see Gotovnik, “The Right to Culture”, supra, at p.28, n.13).

It should be noted that the LGBT community is also relatively weak politically, either because it constitutes a small percentage of the population or because there is no correlation between the sexual identity of its members and any particular type of voter, or for some other reason (compare: Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, supra, at pp. 102–103). As opposed to other “suspect” classifications, such as women or the disabled, whose aspirations for equality are actively supported by the public, the LGBT community’s struggle has not necessarily enjoyed similar support, and it may even be that among various groups within society, it arouses opposition and emotional rejection that combine stigmas, prejudices and negative stereotypes (compare Sommer & Pinto, “Specific Legislation”, supra, at p. 208, regarding the attitude of Israeli society to discrimination against Israeli Arabs, and HCJ 6924/98 Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. State of Israel et al.[61], at p. 28).

59.  Against the background of the LGBT community constituting the subject of a suspect classification, such that discrimination against it falls within the “essential core” of the types of discrimination proscribed by legislation, we can understand the basis for the appellant’s suspicion that the Municipality was intentionally discriminating against it. There are a number of indications of this: as the lower court found, there is the fact that the Municipality demanded that the appellant comply with the Accountant-General’s Directive but did not require the same of other organizations; the Municipality’s conduct towards the appellant over the years, reflected in the many legal proceedings that the appellant was forced to initiate; public comments made by the previous Mayor against the appellant’s activity; and the fact that the Municipality provided no support, either direct or indirect, for the appellant’s activity. Section 82 of Judge Tzur’s decision also suggested that the Municipality acted inconsistently in order to deny the appellant any support. Thus, in 2003, when the issue of gender was separated from the question of Municipality support funds, the appellant’s application for support for activity for the advancement of the status of the women was rejected because it involved the “fostering of a gender”. However, in 2005, the appellant’s application for support for activity for the advancement of the status of women was rejected because the appellant could not be viewed as being engaged in the advancement and fostering of the status of women in the community. Based on these facts, the appellant argued that over the years, it has been “chasing” the criteria while the criteria have been “running away” from it.

It must be added that the municipal authorities of other major cities in Israel have supported activity involving the welfare of their gay communities or have been conducting such activity themselves. Thus, for example, the municipal governments of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Beersheba and Eilat, as well as the Upper Galilee Regional Council, have all allocated either cash or cash equivalents (services, buildings or job positions) to organizations involved in the welfare of the LGBT community, just as they allocate budgets to organizations that promote the interests other population groups. For a review of what is done in other cities and local authorities on this subject, see the paper submitted on 16 June 2003to the Committee on the Status of Women: “Integration and Discrimination: The Gay, Homosexual, Bisexual and Transgender Community Vis-à-Vis Local Government”, http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/docs/m00655.rtf. See also the Public Notices of the Tel Aviv Municipality (Appendix A/112 of the Evidence File) in which the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality invites the submission of applications for support for culture and art, health and welfare, religion, sports, the LGBT community, religious minorities, and more. The Jerusalem Municipality does not support, in any way whatsoever, activity for the welfare of the LGBT community; this makes it an exception among the various large and central Israeli cities.

60.  As the appellant argues, the LGBT community constitutes some 10% of the population(based on a study carried out in 1948 in the United States by the sex researcher Kinsey), and the residents of Jerusalem are no exception to this rule. I believe that it is neither possible nor necessary to make a final determination of the exact percentage of the general population constituted by members of the LGBT community; there are, furthermore, those who are not willing to disclose their homosexuality to the public, and who remain “in the closet” (Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, supra, at p. 111). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that this is not a transitory group, nor one that constitutes an extremely small percentage of the population, but rather a group comprising a not inconsiderable portion of the population. Hence, according to the outcome test, the appellant is not receiving support that is proportionate to the percentage of the Jerusalem population that the LGBT community comprises.

In fact, the appellant receives no support whatsoever from the Municipality, and as stated by appellant’s counsel in a hearing before us, the appellant and the members of the LGBT community receive no recognition whatsoever from the Municipality. It appears that this lack of recognition of the members of the LGBT community as an identity group that comprises a part of the Jerusalem public and which has special needs is what brings them to court time and time again, in that their calls for help are not heeded, for a person “cries out for what he lacks”:

 

‘A person cries out for what he lacks

If he lacks security, he cries out for security

If he lacks mutual care, he cries out for mutual care

If he lacks pride, he cries out for pride

If he lacks unity, he cries out for unity

A person cries out for what he lacks

If he lacks nothing – he does not cry out . . .’

 

(Meir Ariel, “Cries Out for What He Lacks”).

 

61.  Moving from the general to the particular: we will examine the appellant’s case against the background of the application of the principle of equality to the provision of financial support. We will examine the equality and reasonableness of the Zuckerman criteria in relation to the appellant’s application to the Culture Department, and we will then examine the rejection of the appellant’s application for support from the Social Affairs Department and from the Division for the Advancement of Youth.

An examination of the Zuckerman criteria for support through the ongoing support track

62.  The Zuckerman criteria focus the support that is provided through the ongoing support track on institutions whose main occupation is creativity within the realm of professional art, and which have been recognized by the Culture Administration within the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport. There is no professionalism criterion for funding received through the projects track criteria, and support is given to institutions that carry out one-time or multi-year projects in the areas of “professional art, amateur works, folklore, Jewish tradition, and Arab culture” –provided only that the project is a “cultural event”.

The appellant argues that the Zuckerman criteria discriminate against it in light of the diverse cultural activity that it carries out at its community center, and that even if no intentional discrimination is involved, the criteria do give rise, at the least, to result-oriented discrimination.

On the other hand, the Municipality argues that the Zuckerman criteria are equal and reasonable, and that many institutions that carry out cultural activities — including those carrying out cultural activity that is unique to minority populations —do not receive Municipality support.

The Municipality stressed that the Zuckerman Committee, which is a professional and independent public committee, considered the issue carefully for over one and a half years before submitting its conclusions and recommending criteria for the provision of support. The Zuckerman criteria have been adopted, unchanged, by other municipalities, such as Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Haifa, which indicates that the criteria are both equal and reasonable. The Municipality argues that the Zuckerman criteria were also approved by this Court in Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3], in which it was held that the “appeal is allowed to the extent that it relates to the right of the respondent [the appellant here — I.A.] to receive support from the Culture and Arts Budget”, and therefore issue estoppel now applies.

According to the Municipality, a “withdrawal” from the Zuckerman criteria threshold requirements is liable to lead to a situation in which a large number of institutions would be entitled to support through this track, entailing a reduction in the support amounts for each institution — down to a level that could be described as mere “crumbs” (hereinafter: “the crumbs argument”) (compare: Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 957; Jewish Center for Pluralism v. Jerusalem City Council [73], at para. 16).

63.  As stated, the Zuckerman criteria for support for institutions in the ongoing support track focus the provision of support on institutions whose main occupation is creativity within the areas of professional art. These are the institutions that comprise the peer group established through the application of the criteria, as distinct from institutions, including the appellant, whose main occupation is not professional art.

The starting point for a discussion of this matter is that the court must minimize its intervention in prescribed criteria and in decisions that were adopted in reliance on the recommendations of a professional body such as the Zuckerman Committee, and which are based on professional considerations (HCJ 9547/06 New Fund for Promotion and Encouragement of Film and Television Production v. Israel Cinema Council [62], at para. 6, and the references cited there).

Given this starting point, and considering the substance of the activity which is supported and its objective, the Zuckerman criteria are relevant and are not tainted by extraneous considerations. The criteria are based on a three-part foundation of quantity-quality-contribution to the city of Jerusalem, in accordance with three parameters: the scope of the activity; the contribution to the establishment of Jerusalem as a cultural capital; and artistic and cultural importance. Thus, for example, support is provided within this framework to the Israel Museum, the Symphony Orchestra, the Academy of Music and Dance, the Khan Theater, and others. The support to entities whose main activity is creativity within the fields of professional art appears, on its face, to be relevant, in light of the substance of the matter and the goal of realizing the objective of establishing Jerusalem as a cultural capital. Although it can be argued that the concept of “creativity in the area of professional art” is purely subjective and cannot be assessed objectively, this subjective aspect is unavoidable when we are dealing with cultural and artistic matters (National Youth Theater v. Minister of Science and Arts [39], at p. 278; Mifgashim v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4], at paras. 10–11).

64.  It may be argued that a criterion under which support will be given to institutions whose “main occupation” is creativity in the area of professional art does constitute an unreasonable violation of the principles of equality and pluralism. When this criterion is applied, an institution that allocates a certain percentage of its overall budget to creativity in the areas of professional art, and which provides a solution for the special needs of a particular community will not meet the threshold requirement since the artistic creativity is not its “main” occupation, even though that institution does engage in the creation of professional art and contributes to the establishment of Jerusalem as a cultural capital.

In his decision in Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], Justice Zamir discussed a quantitative criterion for the distribution of support funds, and the reasons that might justify strict scrutiny of such a criterion, which could occasionally lead to its disqualification. Even if a quantitative criterion is based on a relevant consideration, it can be accorded unreasonable weight and thus negate other relevant considerations. Alternatively, the importance attributed to it may prevent such other considerations from being given their proper weight (compare Jewish Center for Pluralism v. Jerusalem City Council [73], at para. 18). Furthermore, the use of a quantitative criterion creates a suspicion that an institutional or conceptual monopoly of large institutions is being created, as well as a concern that the pluralism principle is being violated. The quantitative criterion “prevents the expression, through smaller institutions, of a different religious perspective. From this perspective, the existing tests do violate the principle of pluralism, which is not only an expression of the principle of equality, but also one of the characteristics of a democratic society” (Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at pp. 364–365). It is therefore sometimes necessary to inject the principles of equality and of pluralism into the criteria and into the threshold conditions established by the authority (Tali School Education Fund v. Ministry of Education [49], per Justice Cheshin at para. 29).

65.  Despite the “suspicious nature” of quantitative criteria, I do not believe that the case before us is similar to that of Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], in which the quantitative criterion was the only parameter involved in providing support. That is not the situation in this case, in which the quantitative criterion was only one of the three central parameters of the Zuckerman criteria. Similarly, in Mifgashim v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4], this Court approved criteria that directed financial support only to cultural institutions whose main occupation is professional art. In New Fund for Promotion and Encouragement of Film and Television Production v. Israel Cinema Council [62], the Court approved criteria for funding to be given only to an institution that specialized in documentary cinema, defined as an “entity, at least 75% of whose budget is directed at documentary activity.”

Furthermore, even when the criteria adopted by the administrative authority for the distribution of funds to public institutions violate the principles of equality and pluralism, they are not necessarily invalid, since the principle of equality is a relative value which is to be balanced against other legitimate values and interests, in accordance with the circumstances of each specific case (Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister[8], per President Barak at para. 22). Thus, for example, the principle of equality needs to be balanced against the amount of available financial and human resources (Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 366).

66.  In this case, it appears to me that the Zuckerman Committee— which even the appellant does not dispute is a professional and independent committee — has formulated criteria that are proportionate and reasonable considering the budgetary constraints. These criteria cover only the first, limited circle of institutions that operate at the core of cultural endeavor. The appellant conducts extensive cultural activities at the Open House, but it does not fall within the definition of an institution that engages in “creation” in the area of art and culture; rather, it is engaged in the consumption of culture. As the Municipality argued, even a respected institution such as the Jerusalem Theater does not receive support from the Municipality, because it is a theater that hosts performances and does not produce them itself. Indeed, even the Municipality does not dispute the fact that if the appellant were to engage in a quantity of quality creative activity in the fields of professional art, in a different organizational context whose main activity is cultural creativity (such as an LGBT community theatre), it would be in compliance with the threshold requirements for support through the ongoing support track, and could be included within the peer group that is entitled to support from the Culture Department.

67.  In conclusion, I do not find any grounds for intervening in the Municipality’s decision to focus its support on institutions whose main activity is creativity within the fields of professional art in accordance with the Zuckerman criteria. In light of this conclusion, I will not discuss the question of whether this Court’s decision in Jerusalem Municipality v. Jerusalem Open House [3] has created an issue estoppel. I would mention that that decision opened the door for the appellant to argue for support for “marginal cultural enterprises”, but the appellant did not focus its arguments on this subject. In any event, the appellant has not shown that it acts as a creative factor in this field.

The Zuckerman Criteria for support provided through the projects track

68.  According to the Zuckerman criteria, support through the project track is to be given to entities that conduct one-off or multi-year projects in the areas of “professional art, amateur works, folklore, Jewish tradition, and Arab culture”. Thus, in the projects track, there is no need to comply with the professional threshold conditions, as long as the subject is a “cultural event”. The Zuckerman Committee, which convened on 13 December 2007, also clarified in its decision of that date that the budgeting of that track will “include projects for communities and for minority sectors with special needs.” Thus, the Zuckerman criteria for the projects track do not have any discriminatory effect in terms of the social reality. Even according to the Municipality, some of the gay pride events held in 2006 (i.e., the film festival, various conferences and appearances) potentially entitle the appellant to support.

Nevertheless, the appellant did not receive the support to which it was entitled from the year 2006through the projects track, because it had not attached an implementation report certified by an accountant. At the hearing held before us, the Municipality declared that subject to the production of an accountant’s certification of the implementation report submitted by the appellant, the appellant would receive funding from the projects track for the year 2006, in the amount of NIS 65,000.

In light of the parties’ agreement on this matter, we order that subject to the appellant producing an accountant’s certification of the implementation report, the Municipality will provide the appellants with funding from the projects track for the year 2006, in the amount of NIS 65,000.

As a parenthetical point, we note that the appellant referred in its pleadings to the world gay pride events for 2006 only, so that the question of whether the gay pride events in general constitute a “cultural event” for the purpose of project track support need not be decided in this case. In this connection, I note that the Municipality argued that the gay pride parade, in the context of the gay pride events, is an event through which the right to demonstrate and to march is realized; dozens of parades and demonstrations like it, including those of minority communities, are held in Jerusalem, and these parades do not constitute cultural events that receive support. I will therefore comment only that just as the Municipality found that some of the gay pride events in 2006 did satisfy the definition of a “cultural event” for the purpose of project track support, it may be presumed that each year the Municipality will determine, in similar fashion, which of the annual gay pride events are covered by this definition, and will act accordingly.

At this point, we will proceed to examine the support that the appellant requested from the Social Affairs Department.

The Municipality’s criteria for support from the Social Affairs Department

69.  During the years that are the subject of the appeal, the Municipality’s Social Affairs Department distributed support through three tracks: the youth movements and organizations track; the community centers and councils track; and the advancement of the status of women track. The appellant focused its appeal on the last two tracks, and we will examine each of them separately.

The youth movements and organizations track

70.  The Municipality’s support criteria in this track are the following (emphasis added — I.A.):

1. Support will be provided to community centers and councils— hereinafter, a community center— that have been recognized by the National Organization of Community Centers and/or to the Jerusalem Community Centers and Councils Company Ltd.

2. Any community council must be registered as an independent corporation; its management must include representatives of the community, it must operate in a given geographical area and provide services to the community.

Are these criteria equal and reasonable?

According to the appellant, the Open House serves for all intents and purposes as a community center, and provides a response to the special needs of the members of Jerusalem’s LGBT community. The criteria for support in this track are not equal and they are unreasonable, as the outcome test shows them to be discriminatory, primarily due to the requirement that the applicant operate in a given geographical area. The Municipality’s counter argument is that the purpose of the support in this track is a municipal-geographical one, rather than a functional one. This purpose is indicated both from an organizational perspective, and in terms of the content of the activity that is supported, as the lower court held. Budget constraints would constitute an additional relevant consideration, and the Municipality contends that it is not able to extend the support to many institutions that operate in the social arena for designated and unique functional purposes. The Municipality raised the “crumb argument” in this context as well, contending that any easing of the threshold requirements for the community centers and councils track will lead to a situation in which the number of institutions that will be entitled to support through this track will expand considerably, such that the funding given to the institutions will be so reduced as to constitute only insignificant “crumbs” of support (compare: Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 957).

71.  A decision as to whether the above-mentioned criteria comply with substantive equality is reached, as described above, in two stages. The first involves the delineation of the peer group, taking into account the statute’s purpose, the substance of the matter, the basic values of the legal system, and the particular circumstances of the case. Using these parameters, it is possible to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant considerations for the purpose of deciding the boundaries of the peer group and the reasonableness of the weight attributed to the relevant considerations (see Recanat v. National Labour Court [40], at pp. 346–347; Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 363). At the second stage, a determination is made as to whether the criteria are in compliance with the principle of substantive equality, i.e., whether the administrative authority is according equal treatment within the parameters of the peer group.

72.  Clearly, community centers and councils that operate in a specific neighborhood for the benefit of the residents of that neighborhood are different from community centers and councils that operate for the benefit of “dispersed” communities, such as the appellant’s community center. The appellant’s community center operates in the city center and although it is open to all who wish to enter, it responds primarily to the special needs of the members of the city’s LGBT community, who constitute a sizeable percentage of the city’s residents.

As we noted above, substantive equality requires equal treatment of institutions when any difference between them has no relevance and does not justify differential treatment by the Municipality. This is proper and justified equality (Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 362). Administrative authorities that wish to establish and argue the existence of a relevant difference must rely on relevant considerations relating to the substance of the supported activity, as distinguished from the identity of the entity that receives the support (MK Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [8], at p. 707). The essence of the distribution of funding through the various tracks covered by the Municipality’s Social Affairs Department is to provide for the welfare of all of the city’s residents in terms of social and community affairs, in as equal a manner as possible. Section 8.5 of the new procedure for the distribution of support funds by local authorities establishes this principle, providing that the “the criteria to be established by the authority’s council, after it has reviewed the opinion of the authority’s legal adviser, will be relevant and equal, and they will take into consideration the needs of the population within the local authority and the need to provide services for all parts of the population” (emphasis added — I.A.).

73.  We must distinguish between the objective that the authority wishes to achieve, and the means it selects in order to do so. The objective of the support in the community centers and councils track is to support institutions that make social and community services accessible to all residents of Jerusalem. According to the criteria, the means used to realize this objective, is funding given to the community councils located in the various neighborhoods throughout the city and which operate as micro-municipalities, on a regional-geographic basis only.

I am prepared to assume that making the Municipality’s social and community services accessible to all residents on a neighborhood-geographic basis is a relevant consideration that realizes the objective of the support. The Municipality responds to the needs of all of its residents — including the members of the LGBT community — within the framework of the community councils that operate on a regional-geographic basis. But the Municipality does not provide any response whatsoever to the unique needs of the members of the LGBT community, which is a “dispersed” community whose members do not all live in a particular geographical region. These unique needs are not addressed in the framework of the community councils, nor in any other framework within which the Municipality operates whatsoever. However, the Municipality does respond to the unique needs of other minorities within the city’s population, such as the city’s ultra-Orthodox community and its Arab community. The needs of these communities are addressed, inter alia¸ by Municipality departments that support institutions that operate for the welfare of these communities, as well as through regionally-geographically based community centers. I therefore do not accept the Municipality’s contention that the provision of support to the Open House that the appellant operates is equivalent to the provision of “double support”.

It is not necessary to “inject” the principles of equality, pluralism and distributive justice into the existing criteria in the community centers and councils track in order to reach the conclusion that the appellant’s application for support through this track should be recognized (or at the least, if it is necessary to “inject” these principles, there is no need for a “high dosage”). The appellant runs a community center that operates for the welfare of a “dispersed” community which constitutes a considerable portion of the population, and it responds to the unique needs of that community — needs that are not met by the Municipality or by other bodies. The measure used by the Municipality does not uphold the principle of substantive equality in that it attaches importance only to geographical-regional responses, while ignoring the special needs of the members of the LGBT community.

I am not unaware of the fact that the community centers and councils that are given support in accordance with the current criteria are involved in areas of activity related purely to the neighborhoods in which they operate, such as the promotion of development and urban planning issues, the expansion of residential units in the neighborhood, levying improvement charges, the establishment or removal of police stations in the neighborhood, and more. However, alongside these activities, the community centers also run cultural and sports activities that are typical of the Culture, Youth and Sport Centers, and the appellant’s community center operates similar clubs and social and cultural activities. The center holds social events for women and for men, events for the elderly, events for English, Arabic and Russian speakers, a travel club, a soccer team and more. Regarding culture, the center maintains a library and holds exhibits; it runs a theatre club, screens films, and holds meetings with artists and creative professionals as well as discussions and lectures. During the relevant years, the center operated a reading club that discussed queer theory research. It also held a discussion on sexuality and Russian culture, and a discussion and community conference on the subject of “Homophobia and Coming Out of the Closet” and more. It also responds to the special needs of the Orthodox members of the community: enrichment programs dealing with Judaism and queerness, Kabbalat Shabbat ceremonies (with rabbis representing various streams of Judaism) and celebrations of key holidays (a Purim party, a seder, a student event for Lag Ba’omer, a Rosh Hashana seder, a gay pride succah, a meeting with rabbis for Hanukah candle-lighting). In the field of psychological-social support, the center has operated support groups for women, for the religious, the transgendered, the elderly, bisexuals, and parents of gay men and women. In short, from a substantive perspective, the Open House serves as a community center for all intents and purposes, for a “dispersed” community. In this context I note that no parallel may be drawn from HCJ 1313/01 Keren Yaldenu Merkazei Tikvateinu [63], on which the Municipality relied. In that case, the petition was denied despite the petitioner’s claim that it maintained activities similar to those held by the Culture, Youth and Sport Centers, for the reasons noted in that decision – which were that the government Culture, Youth and Sport Centers Company is not budgeted through the support budget in accordance with section 3a of the Budget Foundations Law.

74.  I myself had difficulty identifying institutions that represent “dispersed” communities whose unique needs are not met by the Municipality in the framework of the existing community centers and councils, or in other ways in the examples offered by the Municipality in its pleadings. But if they do exist, the remedy to be applied with respect to the “crumb” argument would be to exercise “internal prioritization” among all institutions that meet the threshold requirements in a particular year, taking into consideration the budgetary constraints. Additionally, the case law and the legal literature have also noted the possible alternative of holding lotteries among those institutions that fall within the boundaries of the peer group in a particular year (see and compare Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 697; Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [28]; HCJ 6437/04 Tabouri v. Ministry of Education and Culture [64]). These measures would serve to counter the “crumbs” argument discussed above.

75. At the start of our discussion, we mentioned that the LGBT community is a community that can be the subject of a “suspect classification” in terms of the treatment it receives as compared to other specific groups within the general public. Moreover, such concerns are strengthened in light of the relations between it and the Jerusalem Municipality, and in light of the fact that other municipalities do provide support for LGBT community institutions. But even if we presume that the Municipality did not act with discriminatory intent, and even if the discrimination was unconscious, the court may take the outcome test into consideration (see Barak-Erez, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 69; Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [9], per President Barak at para. 18; Peled v. Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [46], at para. 11). Indeed, the outcome test shows that the regional-geographic criterion excludes the appellant, which operates a community center that provides a unique solution for a “dispersed” community with special needs and which constitutes a considerable percentage of the population. These criteria have a discriminatory effect, given the social reality. President Barak’s comments in para. 19 of his opinion in Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [9] are pertinent, mutatis mutandis:

‘ . . . the actual result of using the geographic criterion, with the boundaries that were chosen, is that the map of the national priority areas in education is de facto a map of Jewish towns only. [ . . . ] This is a discriminatory result that cannot stand. This is a result that Israeli democracy cannot tolerate. [ . . . ] Even on the assumption that the respondent had clear reasons when deciding upon the geographic lines that distinguish between national priority areas and other areas, it is not possible to ignore the result arising from these demarcation lines. [ . . . ] The geographic line that was chosen leads to a discriminatory result.

76.  In conclusion, from a substantive equality perspective, the peer group determined on the basis of the geographic-regional test excludes and discriminates against the appellant’s community center. And note: we need not create new criteria especially for the appellant; it is sufficient to expand the threshold condition for funding through the community centers and councils track. This expansion should note that community centers operating for the benefit of “dispersed” communities, which furnish a response to the special needs of communities constituting a considerable percentage of the population and which receive no response from the Municipality or from other entities in some other manner will also be included within the peer group established by the criteria.

The criteria for support from the Social Affairs Department in the Advancement of the Status of Women track

The criteria for support in the Advancement of the Status of Women track provide as follows:

  1. Support will be given to organizations whose main purpose is the advancement of the status of women.
  2. Preference will be given, in terms of the size of allocations, to an organization that incorporates a significant number of organizations that are involved in the field.
  3. Preference will be given to organizations operating from a mainstream perspective in the area of developing female leadership within the community.

The appellant’s application for support for its activity was rejected on the basis of these criteria.

77.  According to the appellant, it advances the status of women by its very nature and by virtue of its activity, and its activity in this field addresses the special needs of lesbian women, who suffer from social repression of two kinds: both because they are women and because they are lesbians. The appellant holds activities for the empowerment of lesbian women in various forms. Among other things, the Open House held a panel discussion dealing with violence among women, a reading and discussion of lesbian poetry, workshops for women, and a series of lectures on the subject of feminism and rights. Additionally, every two weeks, a women’s meeting is held under professional leadership, in which the women discuss intimate subjects through the creation of a listening and sharing space. The appellant argues that the criteria for support provided through this track are not equal and are unreasonable. Regarding 2007, the appellant argues that once the Municipality began to carry out activities for the promotion of women by itself, it is unreasonable that it did not provide for the special needs of lesbian women in the framework of such activities.

The Municipality argues that the appellant is not an institution whose main purpose is to advance the status of women, and it was therefore not entitled to support through this track in the years 2005 and 2006.This is because only 1.75% of the appellant’s budget is dedicated to this purpose. Here as well, the Municipality raised the matter of budget considerations and the “crumbs” argument. According to the Municipality, since the budget for support in the area of social affairs is small and restricted, the criteria are intended to cover only institutions whose main purpose is the advancement of the status of women; if the threshold requirements for the receipt of support were to be expanded so as to include institutions that do not meet this criterion, the number of institutions that would be entitled to support through this track would be very large, and the amounts of support that each institution would be so insignificant as to constitute mere “crumbs” (Panim for Jewish Renewal in Israel v. Minister of Education [11], at p. 957).

The Municipality argues that the main reason for the cancellation of support for this track as of 2007was the Municipality comptroller’s report, which recommended the cancellation, based on, inter alia, the fact that the Municipality had begun to conduct its own activity for the advancement of the status of women, including the appointment of an adviser to the mayor in this field, in accordance with the Local Authorities Law (Adviser for Status of Women Affairs), 5760–2000.

78.  I will first note that our interest is limited to an examination of the Municipality’s denial of the appellant’s application for support for the years 2005–2006, because the Municipality ended all support for the promotion of the status of women track in 2007. As the lower court held, the termination of the support for this track was lawful, in light of the Municipality comptroller’s report. Furthermore, the Municipality was entitled to choose instead to conduct its own activity for the advancement of the status of women, and to cancel the support for this track in the framework of the Social Affairs Department.

79.  Did the Municipality’s criteria for support for the advancement of the status of women track violate the principle of equality?

The voice of lesbian women — like the voice of women belonging to other minority communities within Israeli society such as Arab women, ultra-Orthodox women, women with disabilities, etc. — can be a unique voice. (The claim has been made, within the feminist community itself, that the unique voice of the lesbians has been silenced. See the sources mentioned in Y. Biton, “‘Pain in the Proximity of Honor’ —Compensation for Violation of Constitutional Rights” 9Mishpat U’Mimshal (Law and Government) 137 (2006), at p. 180–181). From this perspective, there may be a basis for the appellant’s contention that as it is the only institution that responds to the needs of lesbian women in Jerusalem, it should receive support for its activity because such activity strengthens this unique voice, and that it would even be appropriate to consider affirmative action for such social activity (see LCN Society v. Ramat Hasharon Local Council [15]; Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, Sommer & Pinto, “Specific Legislation” and Rabin and M. Lodzki-Arad, “Continued Financial Discrimination”). Budgetary considerations, although relevant and important, may be outweighed by the principles of equality and pluralism (see Tali School Education Fund v. Ministry of Education [49], Conservative Movement v. Minister of Religious Affairs [7], at p. 368).

Nevertheless, I do not believe it is necessary to intervene in the Municipality’s decision or in the decision of the lower court regarding this matter, for three reasons. First, as to the substance of the argument, the criterion that establishes that support should be given to institutions “whose main purpose” is the promotion of the status of women is indeed a relevant and legitimate one and does not violate the principle of substantive equality(compare the decisions in Mifgashim v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [4] and New Fund for Promotion and Encouragement of Film and Television Production v. Israel Cinema Council [62], in which a criterion based on a recipient’s “main activity” was approved). As the Municipality argued, there are dozens of entities that are involved in activity for women, including on behalf of minority women, which also do not qualify for support under this criterion because their main activity is not the advancement of the status of women. Second, the entire track for providing support for the advancement of the status of women was cancelled as of 2007, and the subject is thus neither relevant nor forward-looking. And finally, the support to be provided through the community centers and councils track will provide a response with respect to the appellant’s unique activities for lesbian women. These funds are not earmarked for any specific activity, and thus the appellant may allocate whatever it wants from them specifically for activities to promote the status of LGBT women.

80.  In conclusion, I see no need to intervene in the decision of the lower court to uphold the Municipality’s rejection of the appellant’s application for support for the years 2005–2006 on the ground that the appellant is not an institution whose main purpose is the advancement of the status of women.

The Division for the Advancement of Youth

81.  During the years that are the subject of the appeal, the Municipality distributed support funds within the framework of the Division through two tracks: the track dealing with activity for the prevention of drug use and the track dealing with activity for alienated youth — alienated youth being defined as those young people who are not involved in any educational or occupational framework. We note that the track for activity on behalf of alienated youth was cancelled in 2008, because of the Municipality’s interest in focusing on support for institutions working to prevent drug use.

As mentioned, the Division’s managers visited the appellant’s community center, and the appellant’s activity with youth and young adults was explained to them. In the end, the appellant’s application for support for the alienated youth track was also denied. The lower court held that the appellant was doing work on behalf of at-risk youth, but denied the appellant’s petition because the Municipality’s support was only given for professional treatment of youth, and not for social activity for youth, which is the type of activity carried out by the appellant.

The criteria for support in the framework of the Division for the Advancement of Youth at the relevant time were the following:

‘Conditions for provision of support:

  1. Assistance will be given to an entity that assists the residents of Jerusalem, and if it assists individuals who are not residents, the support will be conditioned on the assistance being available for the use of residents of Jerusalem.
  2. Regarding treatment for alcohol and drug addiction — the assistance will be provided to entities that are legally licensed to provide the service according to the Drugs Law and the Regulations enacted pursuant to it.
  3. The entity must act to provide the service according to the provisions of the Youth Law and the Regulations enacted pursuant to it.
  4. The entity must hold any license required by law for institutions operating in this area.
  5. The entity must have proven knowledge of therapy and it must provide the service through licensed professionals.
  6. The representative of the Division for the Advancement of Youth must inspect the entity and form an impression regarding the entity’s work and conduct from a professional-therapeutic perspective. The entity must provide the Division representative with the information needed for the formulation of the Municipality’s position regarding the application for support, including details concerning personnel (size, training); number of patients, etc.
  7. The Division will monitor, professionally, the entity’s use of the support funds, in addition to the Municipality’s supervision and control pursuant to the Support Procedure.

Are these criteria equal? Are they reasonable?

82.  The appellant argues that young people who are part of the LGBT community or who are questioning their sexual identity are considered to be at-risk youth, as the lower court also held. While these young people are not in most cases “alienated youth,” their distress may express itself in withdrawal, depression and suicidal thoughts, but it will not necessarily lead them to drop out of school or leave an occupational framework. This target population is defined as “youth at risk”, in view of the antagonism and homophobia that are very often directed at anyone who admits uncertainty regarding this matter, or who affirms that he or she belongs to the LGBT community. This was also noted in the report of the Shamir Committee on Children in Distress and Youth at Risk, which was submitted to the government in 2005. The report stated that gay and lesbian youth suffer from severe distress due to their fears concerning the responses of those around them to their sexual orientation— responses from their parents, friends, teachers and/or the staff at their schools, etc. According to the appellant, this type of distress is not different and is no less important than other forms of distress such as withdrawal from an educational or occupational framework. The Open House provides a safe place for young men and women to work through their doubts in an accepting environment in which they are neither criticized nor judged, and it allows them to mature with relative security, without facing threats or fears. In this context, the Open House activity is a lifesaver; scientific studies have shown that gay and lesbian youth tend to attempt suicide at a rate that is 3 to 7 times higher than other young people their age because of the hostile environment they face.

The appellant further argues that there is a material difference between the activities carried out by the Municipality and the appellant’s own unique activity for LGBT young people. According to the appellant, LGBT youth and young people who have doubts and concerns regarding their sexual identity are very anxious about exposing themselves to institutional entities such as the Municipality. Owing to this anxiety, they do not turn to the Municipality, and in practice, they will be left without any response to their special needs. If the Municipality were to operate a program that created a “safe space” which neutralized the fears of the youth about exposure, the appellant would be happy to cooperate with the Municipality.

The Municipality, on the other hand, supported the lower court’s conclusion for two main reasons: first, because the appellant’s activity is not directed at alienated youth (young people who are involved in neither an educational nor an occupational framework); second, because the appellant’s activity is not professional-therapeutic, but rather purely social in character, and is of limited scope. The Municipality mentioned that applications for support submitted by similar institutions were also rejected, and that the appellant refused to cooperate professionally with the Division on behalf of young people within the LGBT community.

83.  Alienated youth are defined by the Division as youth who are not in any full educational and/or occupational framework. On its face, the support of institutions that work on behalf of “alienated youth” is based on a substantive consideration, but the relevant question is whether this peer group cannot be expanded to include at-risk youth, even if they do not fit within the definition of “alienated youth.” We repeat that substantive equality requires equal treatment of institutions between which there is no relevant difference, focusing on the character and nature of the supported activity, as distinguished from that of the entity that receives the support (Tzaban v. Minister of Finance [8], at p. 707).

In light of these principles, I accept the lower court’s holding that the alienated youth population and the LGBT youth population belong to the same peer group. As the objective of the Division’s activity is to support at-risk youth populations, these different sub-populations may not be treated differently. The Municipality’s refusal to provide support for the LGBT youth population indicates that it is discriminating against that population, at least at the level of a discriminatory outcome. As the lower court wrote:

‘Non-conformity between the identified at-risk youth populations … (which include LGBT youth), and the target population at which the activity of the Division for the Promotion of Youth(a population which does not include this population) is directed, indicates discrimination against the LGBT youth with respect to the provision of treatment that addresses their special needs as an at-risk population.’

84.  As stated, despite the conclusion reached by the lower court, the appellant’s suit was dismissed on the ground that the appellant does not engage in therapeutic activity for young people, and instead carries out social activity.

The appellant pointed out that the youth receive emotional and social support at the community center, and that the support groups often serve as the only refuge that assists them in dealing with difficult sources of stress from within their families, schools and other forums. Various subjects are discussed in these support groups, such as military service, couple-hood, coming out to parents and to those in their immediate environment, dealing with heterosexuals of their own age at school and in other formal frameworks, etc. The emotional-social support is reflected in the training given to the leaders of the youth and young people’s groups; the coordinator himself is a social worker who provides professional guidance on a regular basis; it is also reflected in the referral of the youth, if needed, to counseling at the Municipality’s psychological-social service or to welfare professionals.

85.  I will say, briefly, that I am not persuaded that there is a clear dividing line between therapeutic activity and social activity among at-risk youth, and there is some merit to the appellant’s argument that the distinction between the two is artificial. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the fact that the Municipality’s representative visited the Open House several times and found few young people participating in the activity, I have concluded that we should not intervene in the Municipality’s exercise of judgment regarding these criteria. In any event, from 2008 onward, once the Municipality had decided to limit the peer group such that support is provided only to institutions involved in the prevention of drug use, it cannot be compelled to support the appellant through the at-risk youth track.

‘And just before the end . . .’

86.  We have noted that the following conditions are met with respect to the appellant: the appellant represents a community that constitutes a not- inconsiderable percentage of the population; this is a group the differential treatment of which will constitute a “suspect” classification; the community is dispersed both geographically and among all groups within the public; members of the LGBT community have unique and distinct needs; and these needs are not being met from other sources.

I have therefore concluded that the criteria for the community centers and councils track must be expanded to include a “dispersed” community such as the LGBT community which is represented by the appellant, whereas the appeal against the Culture Department, the advancement of the status of women track within the Social Affairs Department, and the Division for the Promotion for Youth and Young Adults should be denied. And note: we are not calling for the creation of a new criterion, or for an expansion of the peer group, but rather for the expansion of an existing criterion regarding support from the Social Affairs Department that is provided through the community centers track. It may be said that the result we have reached falls on the seam between the first and second stages of the examination of substantive equality, between the stage at which the criterion itself is examined from the perspective of constitutional equality, and the stage at which the equality defined by the criterion is examined from the perspective of administrative equality.

87.  Therefore, the bottom line of this decision, both with respect to the past and the future, focuses on the community center operated by the appellant. As noted above, the Open House runs a variety of activities that respond to the unique needs of the LGBT community, including activities for young people and for women who are a part of that community. Therefore, from this point forward, when the Municipality reaches a decision regarding funding for the appellant through the community centers and councils track, it must take into consideration the fact that such support must also provide a response to the needs of youth and women who belong to this community. I note that the appellant itself described its applications for support as being alternatives to each other, in the sense that if an application was rejected in one of the tracks/departments, that same application should be evaluated within the criteria of another track/department.

If, in the future, support for community centers is terminated, the appellant will again find itself in a situation in which it plays the game “Grandma made cereal; she gave to this one, and to this one, but she did not give to this one . . .” and the court will then be required to consider the question of whether it should order that a new criterion be created especially for the appellant that is not covered by the ordinary criteria. This consideration would be necessary because this is a group for which a “suspect classification” would arise, and at that point, the Municipality would not be providing any response to the unique needs of the city’s LGBT community, in contrast to the standard practice in Israel’s other large cities.

88.  It appears that the appellant itself has asked the Municipality only for recognition—as opposed to esteem, which is to be achieved through social and political channels —for the members of the LGBT community as a group that stands by itself alongside other groups within the spectrum of the city’s populations. The history of the relations between the parties reveals that whenever the appellant stretched out its hand in an appeal for support, it was met, time after time, with the Municipality’s tightly-shut fist. But “even the fist was once an open palm and fingers” (Y. Amichai, “Remember and Recall”), and we can only express our hope that the Municipality will not again close up its hand, and that the parties will learn to shake hands without the court needing to consider this matter again.

The operative remedy

89.  I therefore propose to my colleagues that we order the Municipality to do the following:

To pay the sum of NIS 65,000 to the appellant — subject to the presentation of an accountant’s certification — for the Municipality’s participation in the costs of the 2006 gay pride events, through the projects track in the Culture Department.

To provide the appellant with support through the community centers track in the Social Affairs Department. I see no reason to redirect the appellant to the funding committee for a further hearing in order to establish the exact amounts, given the fact that a number of years have passed since the applications were submitted. Therefore, taking note of the amounts that were ordered in Judge Tzur’s opinion and taking note of those amounts that were “frozen”, I order the Municipality to pay the appellant NIS 100,000 for each of the years 2005–2008 (for a total of NIS 400,000 in current values) for support through this track. In addition, I recommend to my colleagues that we require the Municipality to pay the appellant’s attorney’s fees in the amount of NIS 30,000, plus VAT.

 

Justice E. Hayut

I agree with the decision of my colleague Justice I. Amit, and concur in the result that he reached. I wish to make three additional side points:

(1)   I am not persuaded that we must carry out a multi-stage examination, even on a “rough cut” level, first of the equality considerations from a constitutional perspective and next of the equality considerations from an administrative perspective. Equality is equality, and in my view we do not need to separate between “constitutional equality” and “administrative equality”, as both constitutional law and administrative law are intended to protect the same basic values, including the right to equality. (This is so despite the difference that of course exists between the remedies that are ordered with regard to each of these two areas of law).

(2)   Israeli law has taken a significant step in both its legislation and its case law towards a constitutional conception that accepts a person’s sexual orientation as part of his/her identity, and recognizes his/her right, which is an integral part of human dignity and of the right to equality that it incorporates, to be free from discrimination in this regard vis-à-vis any other person. It is nevertheless difficult, in this context, to remain complacent in light of the fact (emphasized by my colleague) that our law is more liberal than that of our neighbors in the Middle East. It appears that the phenomena of hatred towards members of the LGBT community, which is occasionally translated into intense violence and even acts of murder or attempted murder (see for example the stabbing that took place during the Jerusalem gay pride parade in 2006, and the event in Bar-noar in Tel Aviv in August 2009, in which two people were murdered and many were injured), indicate that there is still a long way to go until these protected values are properly absorbed by the Israeli public.

(3)   The repeated legal proceedings that the appellant was forced to pursue against the respondents in its attempt to realize its right to some financial support for the various activities that it conducts, and the fact that until now—as aptly phrased by counsel during the hearing—“we chase the criterion and it runs away from us”, have all led me to the same conclusion: Although the support that the appellant will receive as a result of the expansion of the community centers and councils track pursuant to this decision will in some degree respond to the needs of the LGBT community, the respondents should nevertheless do some rethinking of the reasonableness of the existing structure that necessitates this chase. The appellant is currently trying to provide, under a single roof, a response to all the varied needs of this unique community, including the empowerment of lesbian women, the care and support of LGBT youth, and queer cultural events. Nevertheless, it repeatedly finds that it is unable to comply with the separate criteria prescribed by the respondents for the different support tracks. It seems that under these circumstances, and in order to provide a true response to the needs of the LGBT community in Jerusalem in the form of financial support, the proper approach is to strive to achieve — as soon as possible —a state of affairs in which the LGBT community enjoys a special classification in Jerusalem, as it does in other large Israeli cities, by virtue of which resources are allocated to it for all the social, cultural and other activities that its members require, such as those that are conducted by the appellant.

 

Justice H. Melcer

1.    I too agree with the decision of my colleague, Justice I. Amit, and with the comments of the head of the panel, my colleague Justice E. Hayut. Considering the importance of the matter, I wish to add several comments and points of emphasis.

2.    A reading of the appeal and of the voluminous material presented to us indicates that the appellant and those associated with it have made it their goal to promote the ideas expressed by, inter alia, the American playwright Larry Kramer. In his famous play The Normal Heart, Kramer called on the community that the appellant represents to fight for its rights “in every house and neighborhood and in every city and country.”

In this framework, the appellant sought to share in the support that the respondents grant to various parties, and was refused repeatedly, even though such support was the appellant’s last resort.

3.    The discrimination (which is the result of these refusals) was camouflaged through the use of allegedly objective criteria. Regarding this type of violation of the principle of equality (based on a different issue), this Court has already held that “camouflage does not redeem discrimination. Substance will determine the matter, not form” (see Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [10], per Justice Zamir at p. 176). Recently, in HCJ 7426/08 Tebeka Advocacy for Equality and Justice for Ethiopian Israelis v. Minister of Education et al [65],I added to this rule when I stated that “‘the attempt at camouflage’ will in itself prove that the party engaging in the camouflage knows and is aware that the discrimination is prohibited, or inappropriate.”

4.    If we look abroad, we find that a court in the United States, faced with a case that slightly resembles ours, issued a ruling to the effect that even an entity which is not prepared to “recognize” organizations such as the appellant in our case must still accord them equal treatment with regard to the allocation of resources. See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University [75]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., “A Jurisprudence of ‘Coming Out’: Religion, Homosexuality and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law”, 106 Yale L.J. 2411, 2431–2431 (1997); Walter J. Walsh, “The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom and Racial Equality”, 40 How. L.J.513, 530–553 (1997); Jack M. Battaglia, “Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws”, 76 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev 189 (1998–1999).

From the right to the remedy

5.    The relief that we have ordered — the support that we have directed to be provided through the community centers track— is a “quasi-constitutional” remedy, the essence of which is an “addition to” or an “expansion of” an existing criterion, granted in order to eliminate the camouflaged discrimination (see and compare El-Al Airlines v. Yonatan Danilowitz [53],per President Barak at p. 765. See alsoHCJ 678/88 Kefar Veradim v. Minister of Finance [66]; HCJ 637/89 Constitution for the State of Israel v. Minister of Finance [67]; E. Bar-Natan “The “Inward Reading”/”Expansion” Remedy as a Constitutional Remedy in Anglo-Saxon Law and in Israeli Law, LLM thesis, at pp. 70–88 (1999, Tel Aviv University); Tamir, “The Right of Homosexuals and Lesbians to Equality”, supra, at pp. 109–113). Under such circumstances it is sometimes appropriate to consider budgetary issues as well (see the various views expressed in HCJ 5496/97 Mordi et al. v. Minister of Agriculture [68]; Barak-Erez Administrative Law, supra, (vol. 2), at pp. 714–718); however, seeing that such budgetary issues are relatively moderate in our case, and considering the fact that overall, the respondents have in this case caused intentional delays, there is no justification for ordering a graduated remedy.

6.    It would seem that in the twenty-first century the above matters should be completely obvious, but in light of the manner in which the appellant’s many appeals were handled, it is appropriate to emphasize these points. Our decision is directed at doing that, beyond its immediate result (compare E. Gross “‘Danilowitz’, Steiner and Queer Theory” 1 Mishpat Nosaf 47 (2001).

 

Decided as per the decision of Justice I. Amit.

 

14 September 2010

6 Tishrei 5771

Daka v. Minister of the Interior

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 7444/03
Date Decided: 
Monday, February 22, 2010
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The petitioners were married in 1996; petitioner 1 is an Israeli citizen and petitioner 2 was born abroad and at the time of their marriage was a resident of the occupied territories. Following the couple’s marriage, petitioner 2 lived in Israel pursuant to limited duration permits to stay in Israel granted through a family unification process. These permits were regularly renewed until 1999, when she received a permit granting her temporary residence status. In 2003, a government resolution that had been adopted in 2002 and which had reversed previous policy on family unification approvals, was legislatively enacted in the form of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003. That same year, the couple was informed that petitioner 2’s most recent application for the renewal of her residence permit had been denied for security reasons. 

 

Held: (Justice Procaccia). Constitutional rights are not absolute, and the legitimacy of the violation of such a right is determined through a two stage process. The first stage involves a theoretical balancing of the violated right against the values that the government seeks to protect by using the measure that creates the violation. The second stage consists of a second balancing ― based on the results of the theoretical balancing conducted in the first stage ― of the concrete facts involved in each side of the equation in the particular case. In this case, the government’s 2002 resolution and the 2003 Knesset law changed the existing policy regarding family unification, such that the starting point in all such decisions was now that all applications for family unification would be denied unless they fall within certain exclusions including transitional provisions included in the statute. Because the denial of family unification status violates the constitutional right to a family life with a spouse who is or was a resident of the territories, these exclusions must be construed purposively, so that they provide the required balancing. The transitional provision applicable to the petitioners’ particular case is the provision applying to an extension of a residency status that had been granted prior to the new government resolution, and states that such a status “may” be extended ― ruling out an automatic denial of applications for renewal. The provision further stipulates that such extensions are to be allowed “while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment” ― indicating that a security impediment will be a factor to be weighed, but not an automatic ground for denial. Thus, in the case of an application from a non-Israeli spouse who has already lived in Israel for several years pursuant to a valid permit, the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is to be balanced against the strength of any security-related impediment that may be present in the particular case. If the applicant has already been living in Israel for several years and has children who have been born in Israel and are being educated there, the non-renewal of a residence permit is a severe violation. A security-related impediment will justify such a violation only when it is also of great weight. The efficacy of measures less drastic than the non-renewal of the permit must also be considered.

 

In this case, the applicant had been living, working and raising a family in Israel for seven years by the time the application for an extension of her residency status had first been denied. Her family’s strong expectation and interest in continuing their united family life needed to be weighed against the serious security concern raised by the fact that several members of her family were involved in terrorist activity; however, that security interest was an indirect one, because it did not involve the applicant herself and instead involved only her relatives, while there had been no evidence regarding her own involvement in dangerous activity. In such a situation, the state would need to establish that the probability that she herself would present a danger reached the level of near certainty in order to justify the violation of the right to a family life, but no such probability had been proven here. A proper weighing of the intense violation of a right to a family life against an indirect security danger presented by relatives of one applicant would indicate that the applicant should be permitted to stay in Israel, subject to a set of conditions which would include a commitment on her part to cut off all contact with the relatives involved in terrorism and not to visit the territories. In addition, the applicant should receive only permits to stay in Israel that would require renewal every six months, in order to allow proper monitoring of her behavior.

 

(President Beinisch, concurring). The result achieved through the theoretical and concrete balancing presented in Justice Procaccia’s opinion is correct. However, in weighing the interests involved, evidence presented by the security establishment need not be examined on any level higher than a prima facie review of correctness, due to the presumption of propriety that applies with regard to the findings of an administrative authority. In this case, the strength of the evidence of risk presented by the security establishment was clear. However, a proper weighing of the indirect risk against the harm done to the petitioners’ rights would nevertheless lead to the same practical conclusions described in Justice Procaccia’s opinion.

Petition granted.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Full text of the opinion: 

            

HCJ 7444/03

 

1.Balal Masour Daka

2.Manar Rashad Daka

v.

The Minister of the Interior

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[22 February 2010]

 

Before President D. Beinisch and Justices A. Procaccia and S. Joubran

 

Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

 

Facts: The petitioners were married in 1996; petitioner 1 is an Israeli citizen and petitioner 2 was born abroad and at the time of their marriage was a resident of the occupied territories. Following the couple’s marriage, petitioner 2 lived in Israel pursuant to limited duration permits to stay in Israel granted through a family unification process. These permits were regularly renewed until 1999, when she received a permit granting her temporary residence status. In 2003, a government resolution that had been adopted in 2002 and which had reversed previous policy on family unification approvals, was legislatively enacted in the form of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003. That same year, the couple was informed that petitioner 2’s most recent application for the renewal of her residence permit had been denied for security reasons. 

 

Held: (Justice Procaccia). Constitutional rights are not absolute, and the legitimacy of the violation of such a right is determined through a two stage process. The first stage involves a theoretical balancing of the violated right against the values that the government seeks to protect by using the measure that creates the violation. The second stage consists of a second balancing ― based on the results of the theoretical balancing conducted in the first stage ― of the concrete facts involved in each side of the equation in the particular case. In this case, the government’s 2002 resolution and the 2003 Knesset law changed the existing policy regarding family unification, such that the starting point in all such decisions was now that all applications for family unification would be denied unless they fall within certain exclusions including transitional provisions included in the statute. Because the denial of family unification status violates the constitutional right to a family life with a spouse who is or was a resident of the territories, these exclusions must be construed purposively, so that they provide the required balancing. The transitional provision applicable to the petitioners’ particular case is the provision applying to an extension of a residency status that had been granted prior to the new government resolution, and states that such a status “may” be extended ― ruling out an automatic denial of applications for renewal. The provision further stipulates that such extensions are to be allowed “while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment” ― indicating that a security impediment will be a factor to be weighed, but not an automatic ground for denial. Thus, in the case of an application from a non-Israeli spouse who has already lived in Israel for several years pursuant to a valid permit, the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is to be balanced against the strength of any security-related impediment that may be present in the particular case. If the applicant has already been living in Israel for several years and has children who have been born in Israel and are being educated there, the non-renewal of a residence permit is a severe violation. A security-related impediment will justify such a violation only when it is also of great weight. The efficacy of measures less drastic than the non-renewal of the permit must also be considered.

 

In this case, the applicant had been living, working and raising a family in Israel for seven years by the time the application for an extension of her residency status had first been denied. Her family’s strong expectation and interest in continuing their united family life needed to be weighed against the serious security concern raised by the fact that several members of her family were involved in terrorist activity; however, that security interest was an indirect one, because it did not involve the applicant herself and instead involved only her relatives, while there had been no evidence regarding her own involvement in dangerous activity. In such a situation, the state would need to establish that the probability that she herself would present a danger reached the level of near certainty in order to justify the violation of the right to a family life, but no such probability had been proven here. A proper weighing of the intense violation of a right to a family life against an indirect security danger presented by relatives of one applicant would indicate that the applicant should be permitted to stay in Israel, subject to a set of conditions which would include a commitment on her part to cut off all contact with the relatives involved in terrorism and not to visit the territories. In addition, the applicant should receive only permits to stay in Israel that would require renewal every six months, in order to allow proper monitoring of her behavior.

 

(President Beinisch, concurring). The result achieved through the theoretical and concrete balancing presented in Justice Procaccia’s opinion is correct. However, in weighing the interests involved, evidence presented by the security establishment need not be examined on any level higher than a prima facie review of correctness, due to the presumption of propriety that applies with regard to the findings of an administrative authority. In this case, the strength of the evidence of risk presented by the security establishment was clear. However, a proper weighing of the indirect risk against the harm done to the petitioners’ rights would nevertheless lead to the same practical conclusions described in Justice Procaccia’s opinion.

Petition granted.

 

Legislation cited

 

Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision Law), 5763-2003, ss. 3d, 4.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited

 

[1] ..... HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. (2006) (unreported).

[1A] .. HCJ 466/07 MK Zehava Galon v. Attorney General (2012) (unreported).

[2] ..... HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241.

[3]...... HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset (2006) (unreported).

[4] ..... HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352.

[5] ..... HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. MK Rubinstein [2001] IsrSC 55(4) 800.

[6] ..... HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 950.

[7] ..... HCJ 2028/05 Amara v. Minister of the Interior (2006) (unreported).

[8] ..... HCJ 4541/41 Miller v.Minister of Defense [1995] IsrSC 49 (4) 94.

[9] ..... HCJ Horev v. Minister of Transportation [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1.

[10] ... HCJ 6358/05 Vanunu v. Home Front Commander (2006) (unreported).

[11]     HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister (2006) (unreported).

[12]     HCJ 59/83 Cohen v. Jerusalem Municipality [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 318.

[13]     HCJ 237/81 Dabul v. Petah Tikva Municipality [1982] IsrSC 36(3) 365).

[14] ... HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. IDF Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 353.

[15] ... HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995] 49(4) IsrSC 221.

 

For the petitioners ― R. Cohen.

For the respondent ― Y. Gensin, State Prosecutor’s Office.

 

 

JUDGMENT

Justice A. Procaccia

1.    In this petition we are asked to order the Minister of the Interior to reverse his decision to cancel the approval that had been granted for the unification of the petitioners’ family, and to re-issue to petitioner 2 an approval for permanent residency in Israel and prevent her deportation from Israel.

The factual background of the petition

2.    Petitioner 1 was born in Israel and is an Israeli citizen. Petitioner 2 was born in Syria and was a resident of the territories [a term defined by law as referring to a resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria or the Gaza Strip] before she came to Israel. The petitioners were married in January 1996, and subsequently submitted an application for family unification and for petitioner 2 to be granted a permit for permanent residency in Israel. The couple have several children who were born in Israel and who are Israeli citizens. In 1998, the petitioners’ application for family unification was approved, and the “gradual procedure” [regarding residence status for spouses from the territories] was applied to petitioner 2’s case. At first, petitioner 2 was given DCL [District Coordination and Liaison Office] permits valid for a period of 12 months each, and later, in November 1999, she was given an A-5 temporary residence permit. The permit expired on 14 November 2001. On 4 November 2001 the petitioners applied for the permit to be extended. They were told to produce documents attesting to the locus of the center of their lives. Their documents were produced on 18 February 2003. On 12 March 2003, the security establishment stated its opposition to the extension of petitioner 2’s permit to reside in Israel. Consequently, on 24 April 2003, the respondent informed the petitioners that their application for the renewal of petitioner 2’s residence permit had been denied for security reasons. The petition before us followed.

The parties’ arguments

3.    The petitioners ask that we order the respondent to reverse his decision to discontinue the approval of the application for family unification, and to grant petitioner 2 a permit allowing permanent residence in Israel. They argue that the respondent’s cancellation of the family unification approval, which had been granted previously, was extremely unreasonable and disproportionate, as was his refusal to renew petitioner 2’s temporary residence permit. They argue that the Minister is both authorized and required to balance the relevant interests when making decisions on this matter. He has the authority, and the obligation, to consult with expert parties, and to weigh the applicable security considerations among the totality of his considerations and balance them against each other. In this case, they argue, the Minister divested himself of his duty to decide the petitioners’ matter himself, and essentially transferred the decision-making power to the security establishment. According to the petition, the respondent’s considerations in deciding whether or not to cancel a residence permit or to retract a previously granted family unification approval must be different from the considerations he is required to weigh in a preliminary examination of an initial application for family unification. The difference in the type of considerations to be weighed is required by the principle of proportionality, and by the different nature of the harm that can be inflicted on the applicants in the two situations. When approval has previously been given for family unification, only significant and weighty findings, based on the most solid of evidence, will constitute a reasonable ground for the cancellation of an approval or residence permit that have already been issued previously.

According to the petitioners, petitioner 2 presents no security risk for the State of Israel under the circumstances of this case. She has lived in Israel with her husband, studied Hebrew and trained to work as a cosmetician and as an optician; she was licensed to work as an optician by the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. The couple paid a considerable amount for her studies. She had worked previously as a secretary to the President of the Appellate Sharia Court ― a job from which she was dismissed following the intervention of the respondent’s representative. She recently completed a community leadership course organized by the Shatil organization, and she has been socially active and is a member of the Zemer Women’s Council, a position to which she was appointed by the head of the Zemer Local Council. Petitioner 1 has been a government employee for many years and serves as the secretary of the Regional Building and Planning Commission for the Eastern Sharon Region. In reliance on the family unification approval and the residence permit granted to petitioner 2, the couple changed their situation, set down roots, and settled and raised a family in Israel. They argue that cancellation of the family unification approval and of petitioner 2’s residence permit is unreasonable and disproportionate, and signifies the dissolution of their family and a violation of their legitimate expectation to realize their right to a family life, to equality and to protection against discrimination based on nationality or religion.

With regard to the respondent’s arguments, which will be described below, the petitioners reject the argument that the continuation of petitioner 2’s stay in Israel constitutes a risk to public security in light of the involvement of her three brothers in terrorist activity. Petitioner 2 presents no danger, it is argued. The petitioners note that the approval of the family unification application, as well as the renewal of petitioner 2’s temporary residence permit, both occurred while her father was serving in a senior security position in the Palestinian Authority as Chief of Police in Tul-Karem; moreover, both approvals were granted after one of her brothers had been arrested by the Israeli security forces and another brother ― according to information provided by the state ― had undergone military training in Afghanistan. Despite this, there has never been any suspicion that petitioner 2 herself has been involved in any hostile activity against Israel, or that she supports such activity. Moreover, petitioner 2’s father, who had in previous years served as an assistant to the Civil Defense Commander in Tul-Karem, has recently retired, and she is not in regular contact with her brothers, although she did visit with one of them while he was imprisoned in Israel, and is in telephone contact with her parents.

The petitioners expressed their willingness to accept a series of restrictions as a condition for petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel, including an undertaking to break off any contact with her father and her brothers, in response to the concern expressed by the state that her relatives who are involved in terrorism may attempt to draft her to engage in activity against the State of Israel. They also offered to undertake not to enter the territories, to notify the security establishment of any plan to leave Israel and to provide the details of any planned travel, and to undertake that they would not, by either act or omission, act against the security of the State of Israel or against the public peace, or assist any other party in doing so.

4.    The respondent, on his part, argued that the security reasons that give rise to a substantial concern regarding national security and the public peace provide a reasonable and relevant basis for his decision not to renew petitioner 2’s Israeli residence permit in the framework of family unification. According to the respondent, his decision is mainly based on information received to the effect that petitioner 2’s father is in contact with the heads of the Palestinian security forces, and that her three brothers are involved in terrorist activity ― two of them in the framework of organizations operating in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, and the third in the framework of the Islamic Jihad organization. The brothers are involved in terrorist activity at a high risk level, which is directed against the security of the State of Israel and against its existence. This involvement also creates a risk with respect to petitioner 2 as their relative, whose residence in Israel could be exploited by parties who are endangering the Israeli public.

5.    Respondent’s counsel stressed repeatedly in her arguments that the discretion granted to the Minister of the Interior with respect to the examination of an application from a foreign resident for an Israeli residence permit is very broad, and the scope of permissible review of that discretion is very narrow. In the framework of this exercise of discretion, the Minister can and must consider, inter alia, the danger that could be presented to the Israeli public and to the security of the state or to its vital interests as a result of the granting of the application. For the purpose of assessing this danger, the Minister of the Interior is required to consult with experts. When, in the view of the experts, there is a real possibility that such a danger will arise, the Minister of the Interior may take this assessment into consideration, and give it serious weight in his calculation.

6.    The respondent argues that the accumulated experience of the security establishment indicates that terrorist organizations customarily look for relatives of those activists who are residents of the territories ― relatives who live in Israel and carry Israeli papers as a result of a family unification process ― and recruit them in order to promote their objectives. These relatives are an attractive target for the terrorist organizations because of their freedom of movement within the territory of the state, and because of their close familiarity with the area. These relatives can become victims of exploitation by the terrorist organizations, completely unknowingly and innocently. The security risk presented by these relatives is therefore no less than the risk presented by a person who is directly involved in terrorist activity. The nature of the family relationships of those seeking residency status in Israel is relevant to the considerations of the authorized party and should be given proper weight. The relevant question to be considered is whether the residency status and freedom of movement within Israel that will be granted to the applicant are likely to endanger the public peace in light of the applicant’s family connections with terrorist organizations. The respondent’s position is that these connections are sufficient to establish a danger to public peace, especially when there are several relatives who are involved in terrorism, and that it is not necessary for there to have been any negative intelligence information relating directly to the applicant himself. The reasonableness of this position, they argue, is even clearer in light of the severity of the country’s security situation, and the real danger to public peace and state security that arises as a result of an Israeli resident’s connections to terrorists.

7.    The state notes that the main danger presented by petitioner 2 relates to her connection to her three brothers who are actually involved in terrorist activity, both in fundamentalist organizations in the Palestinian Authority’s territory, and in the framework of the World Jihad organization’s activity abroad.

Petitioner 2’s brother, Wa’al Daka, born in 1974, is an activist in World Jihad. He is currently located in the United Arab Emirates and is in contact with various terrorists, including activists in the Al Qaida terrorist organization. He is a member of that organization’s military wing. Wa’al remains in contact with his relatives and with additional terrorists who come to visit him abroad.

Basl Daka, another brother, is a Hamas military activist in Tul-Karem and belongs to the extremist Islamist religious stream. He underwent military training in Afghanistan, and during his interrogation he acknowledged that he had been recruited to the Al Qaida organization and that the training that he underwent there was meant to further the organization’s war of jihad. After his release from prison, he continued his activity on behalf of the Hamas organization in the territories, and is in constant contact with Wa’al and with other Hamas operatives.

Yet another brother, Walid Daka, is a Hamas military operative, who, during his interrogation following his arrest, acknowledged that he had been recruited by the Hamas organization and had taken part in checking out a route in anticipation of a terrorist attack; that he had been given weapons, fired a pistol, and purchased materials for the preparation of bombs and for the purpose of planning attacks, including a plan to poison the water in an Israeli settlement. He was convicted of having committed a series of crimes against regional security in the context of his membership in Hamas. After his release from prison in 2004, he continued his activity in the Hamas organization.

Petitioner 2’s father served as a high level officer and in a senior position within the Palestinian Authority. He served until recently as the Civil Defense Commander in Tul-Karem, and was in contact with the heads of the Palestinian security forces.

The family members are in ongoing contact with each other, and according to the respondent, petitioner 2 has been in continuous contact with the members of her nuclear family and even visited Basl while he was in prison. The respondent argued that petitioner 2 lied when she told the Court that she had severed ties with her family.

The respondent argues that in light of these family connections, petitioner 2 presents a high-level security risk. The serious information regarding her brothers, based on their status and activity in various terrorist entities, and the untrustworthiness of her declarations regarding her connections with them all serve as a proper basis for the respondent’s decision not to allow her continued residence in Israel. The state also notes that since the respondent refused to renew petitioner 2’s residence permit in April of 2003, she has been residing in Israel illegally and has also tried to obtain a job in the Ministry of Justice while using an identity number that was no longer valid.

The course of the deliberations

8.    Several hearings were held regarding this petition, over an extended period of time, during the course of which efforts were made to find practical solutions to which the parties would agree. Unfortunately, these attempts were unsuccessful. Consequently, on 8 July 2008, we issued an order nisi ordering the respondent to show cause why he should not approve petitioner 1’s application for family unification and grant petitioner 2 permanent residency status in Israel. In this context we asked ― that the respondent also consider the possibility of reaching a proportionate arrangement, the crux of which would be to grant petitioner 2 a DCL type temporary residence permit ― one which could be renewed from time to time ― and, if needed, to attach further conditions that would facilitate the monitoring of her conduct and the conduct of her family members. We added that in time, consideration should be given to the possibility of reissuing an A-5 residence permit to petitioner 2, if her circumstances should justify it. The respondent rejected the proposed arrangement. Following this, we heard supplementary oral and written arguments from the parties, and we viewed, ex parte and with the petitioners’ consent, the classified material presented by the state with regard to petitioner 2’s case.

Decision

The question

9.    The question to be decided in this case is whether and in what circumstances the competent authority may cancel a permit that was issued in the past allowing for family unification and for permanent residence in Israel for a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, due to a family relationship between the said spouse and terrorist activists, when there is no security-related intelligence regarding the spouse’s own direct connection with any activity directed against Israel’s security. This question involves a constitutional aspect relating to the basic human right to a family life —in this case, the right of an Israeli citizen to establish a family with a spouse from the territories ― which is juxtaposed against a public interest, the main part of which is the protection of the country’s citizens. An examination of these contrasting interests, and of the manner in which they should be reconciled for the purpose of the exercise of the respondent’s authority, lie at the heart of this petition.

We will first examine the issue in principle, and then the manner in which the principles are to be applied in the case before us.

The constitutional aspect

10.  It is a basic principle that constitutional human rights, although they are given preferred status in the constitutional regime, cannot be implemented in an absolute manner. They are afforded only relative protection when they are set against general interests or contrasting constitutional rights. The required balancing between basic rights and conflicting values requires, first and foremost, a theoretical balancing which views the range of values that are confronting each other conceptually, and which determines their relative weight in the realm of values. After this theoretical balancing is carried out, a more concrete balancing is required ― one that examines the ramifications of the theoretical balancing for the specific circumstances of the case.

The theoretical balancing

11.  The Israeli legal system recognizes the right to a family life as a basic human right; the right of every Israeli spouse to establish a family unit in Israel, under conditions of equality in relation to other Israeli spouses, is a part of human dignity. The right to a family life under conditions of equality is a protected constitutional right pursuant to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

The Citizenship and Entry into Israel (Temporary Provision) Law, 5763-2003 (hereinafter: “the Temporary Provision Law”), involves a severe violation of the right to a family life of an Israeli spouse who is not permitted to realize his right to a family life in Israel with his spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories. The Temporary Provision Law negates the rights of thousands of Israeli Arabs to realize their rights to family life in Israel and thus violates their rights to human dignity (HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior et al. [1]).    

12. In Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], an expanded panel of this Court, consisting of 11 justices, dealt with a series of petitions filed against the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law. We examined the Law from the perspective of the limitations clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and we examined in depth the matter of whether the Law was directed at a proper purpose, and whether it complies with the various aspects of the proportionality test. This examination was conducted against the background of the conflict between the constitutional human right to a family life and to equality, on the one hand, and the security consideration arising under the difficult political and security circumstances that Israeli society is forced to face, on the other. By a single vote, the Court took the position that the Law was constitutional at that time, and that the petitions in that case should be denied. The issue of the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law again became the subject of deliberations in this Court in a case that is currently pending before an expanded panel (HCJ 466/07 MK Zehava Galon v. Attorney General [1A]).

13.  Under these circumstances, and on the assumption that the Law is constitutional under the current legal situation, it falls to us to interpret the Temporary Provision Law and to apply its provisions in a manner that will properly express the conflict between the right to a family, to which all citizens and residents of Israel are entitled, on the one hand, and national security considerations, on the other hand ― while establishing the proper weighting of a basic human right that enjoys a superior position within the range of human rights, and of a public interest with which it is in conflict. The interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the Law under discussion are affected by the constitutional duty to protect the right to a family as a superior right within the range allowed by the law, while providing a correct and proportionate response to the security concern as required by the reality of the current situation, but not beyond the extent that is necessary. The proper balancing between the basic human rights and the security value is necessary not only for the purpose of determining the constitutionality of the Temporary Provision Law, but also for the purpose of construing and implementing the Law’s provisions, as a practical matter.

Indeed,

‘[a] violation of a human right will be recognized only where it is essential for realizing a public interest of such strength that it justifies, from a constitutional viewpoint, a proportionate reduction in the right’ (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 4)).

14. The more significant the right that has been violated, and the more serious the violation, the more substantial the opposing public interest must be in order for the violation to be justified and proportionate. The violation of the basic right can be justified only if there is a correlation between the importance of that right and the weight of the contrasting public interest. The level of the violation must also fit into this correlation:

‘A serious violation of an important right which serves no purpose other than to protect a weak public interest would be considered to be an excessive violation’ (HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at p. 273 (per Justice Zamir)).

At issue in the instant case is the proper balance the right of an Israeli spouse to realize, under conditions of equality, a family life with his spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, on the one hand, and, on the other, the interest of protecting public security. This balance can only be achieved through the application of relative criteria, rather than through the use of absolute values. It is built on a determination of the probability of the degree of danger to life and security on the one hand, versus the importance of the human right to maintain a family on the other hand. In determining the proportionate relationship between the two conflicting values, we must assess, on the one hand, the strength of the public interest ― in terms of the likelihood of a danger to public peace being presented in these situations by the realization of the human right to maintain a family; on the other hand, the level of the violation of the right to a family life resulting from the restriction that the security establishment seeks to impose here must also be assessed. We must examine whether there exists, in the balance that is being sought, an appropriate correlation between the strength of the basic right both in terms of principle and practice, and the level of the security need, and whether the violation of the human right that will result is proportionate under the circumstances.

15.  The human right to a family life is one of the basic elements of human existence; its realization is a condition for reaching fulfillment and a meaningful existence; it is a condition for a person’s self-fulfillment, and for his or her ability to tie his or her life to that of a spouse and children in a true sharing of their fates. It reflects the essence of the human experience and the embodiment of a person’s strivings. The right to a family life is placed at the highest ranking on the scale of human rights. A restriction of this right is permissible only when it is set against a value which is of special power and importance. In the conflict between the value of security and other human rights, including the right to a family life, the security consideration will be the prevail only when there is a near certainty that if the measures leading to the restriction on the right to a family life are not imposed, the public peace will be substantially harmed.

16. The state bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of the probability of a security risk at a level that justifies a restriction of a human right (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 9); HCJ 6427/02 Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset [3] (per President Barak, at paras. 21-22 and 49); Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at pp. 268-269 (per Justice Zamir)). The state must persuade the court that the probability of the public peace being endangered is at least at the level of near certainty, and that it will not be possible to protect against that danger without violating the human right.

17. It has been said, on several occasions, that the “security need” argument, when made by the state, is not a magic formula which is to be accepted without question as soon as it is raised. Although the Court does generally act with restraint when examining the government’s security considerations, the reasonableness of the authorities’ arguments as well as the proportionality of the measures that the authorities seek to implement must nevertheless be examined in depth, whenever the security policy violates human rights (HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4], at pp. 375-376; HCJ 9070/00 MK Livnat v. MK Rubinstein [5], at p. 810). The security risk must be assessed, in the context of this examination, in terms of the probability of its realization, as compared to the magnitude of the violated individual right confronting it, and with respect to the proportionality of the violation of the right which is to be permitted for the purpose of realizing a public interest. The security consideration is examined in a two-stage process: first, the credibility of the security argument is tested; next, the strength of the security interest in terms of the probability that the security risk will in fact be realized is reviewed (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 11)).

18.  The work of carrying out a constitutional balancing is done first on the theoretical level; the next step must be a specific-individual examination with respect to the particular case. A sweeping denial on the part of the authorities of the rights of individuals who wish to realize their basic rights, without carrying out an individual constitutional balancing based on specific information that is unique to the case, is a violation of constitutional principles ― principles that require both a theoretical and a specific balancing. Such a sweeping violation obscures the duty imposed on the administrative authority to give proportionate consideration to all the information that is relevant to the administrative decision, and to reach a decision based on the proper balancing of all the data. It is liable to cause the attribution of a determinative value to one consideration, and a disproportionate discounting of a human right which is of central importance. It can lead to a severe impairment of the values of life and of culture, and to violations of the principles of a democratic regime, which is based on the protection of human rights.

Thus:

‘No one will deny the seriousness of the security situation in which we find ourselves, and the supreme task imposed on the state to protect the lives of its citizens. At the same time, just as we must confront the danger to life and defend ourselves against it, so too we must protect ourselves against the danger of losing security in our values and in the protection of human rights. We must beware the erosion of human rights against the background of security arguments by not maintaining the proper proportion between them. Without insisting on this proportionality, the constitutional approach that protects human rights may be eroded; consequently, cracks may appear in the foundations of our constitution; democratic patterns of life in Israel may be prejudiced and the recognition of human dignity and the right to realize one’s identity may be undermined. We must take care not to be carried away by security arguments like blind persons in the dark, where doing so leads to a violation of a human right. We must examine their credibility and strength in accordance with reliable figures, and assess it in accordance with the tests of logic, common sense and the rules of probability.’ (Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (per Justice Procaccia, at para. 22)).

These principles also apply to an examination of the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the Knesset, and they apply equally to the interpretation of a law and to its practical implementation, where the law itself has been found to be constitutional.

Background and main policy principles of the Temporary Provision Law

19.  On 12 May 2002, the government adopted Resolution 1813 which set in place a new procedure for handling applications for family unification pertaining to Israelis whose spouses are residents of the territories (hereinafter “the Government Resolution”). As of 6 August 2003, the government’s policy has been anchored in the Temporary Provision Law, which has been extended from time to time. The Government Resolution and the enactment of the Temporary Provision Law brought about a change in the family unification policy that had been followed until that time. In the past, the starting point had been that an Israeli citizen could be united with a spouse who had the status of a resident of the territories, absent a ground that nullified such unification, such as a criminal or security-related impediment. This starting point was turned around, and since the enactment in the Law of this policy change, applications for family unification have been rejected, subject to exclusions listed in the Law.

20.  The entry into force of the Government Resolution and the Temporary Provision Law inflicted a serious blow to the constitutional rights of Israeli Arabs ― to their right to create a complete family unit within Israel’s borders with spouses who are residents of the territories. According to the existing legal situation, this violation has been recognized in the case law of this Court as a proportionate violation according to constitutional principles, in light of considerations relating to the security of the state and to the need to protect the citizens of the State of Israel from the potential danger presented by terrorist forces in the territories. The conflicting values that are involved in the right to a family life, on the one hand, and the security interest on the other, underlie the policy against the background of which the Temporary Provision Law was formulated, and this conflict of values affects the correct interpretation of its provisions. Given this situation, in which the basic right of spouses who are residents and citizens of Israel to unite with spouses from the territories is violated, it is necessary to construe the Temporary Provision Law purposively, in a manner that limits the scope of this violation to the degree that is absolutely necessary in order to realize the security objective. Given the strength of the basic right to a family life as an individual constitutional right of the highest order, only a security interest of truly substantial weight will justify its violation; a theoretical and abstract security interest will not justify such a violation. Alongside the principle that the legitimacy of the violation of the right to family life must require the existence of an especially powerful security interest, there is also a need for a narrow interpretation of the scope of the permissible violation of the right to a family life, as well as a liberal interpretation of the exceptions listed in the Temporary Provision Law which allow, within limited boundaries, a deviation from the general policy of rejecting family unification. These exceptions allow the realization of the right to a family life through the grant of an Israeli residence permit to a spouse from the territories, under certain circumstances. The requirement that a violation of the right to a family life be conditioned on the presence of a substantively weighty security interest, and an expansive interpretation of the exceptions in the Law which make possible, under certain conditions, the realization of this right, are the inevitable consequences of the constitutional clash of values involved in the Law’s operation.

The interpretation of the Law and its mode of implementation must reflect the deep constitutional tension that is created as a result of the acute conflict between the right to a family life and the importance of the security consideration under the actual circumstances that characterize Israeli society.

The transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law

21.  The application of the new policy, which prohibits family unification as a rule, necessitated transitional arrangements for residents of the territories who had been granted, prior to the Law’s entry into force, a residence permit or a permit allowing the person to remain in Israel in a family unification framework. A transitional arrangement was also required for those residents of the territories who had submitted an application for family unification prior to the date of the Government Resolution regarding the prohibition on family unification dated 12 May 2002 (hereinafter: “the determinative date”).

 

22.  The following is the text of the transitional provisions:

 

Transition provisions

4. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Law ―

 

(1) The Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, may extend the validity of a license to live in Israel or of a permit to stay in Israel, which were held by a resident of the area prior to the commencement of this Law, while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment as stated in section 3D.

 

 

(2) The area commander may give a permit for a temporary stay in Israel to a resident of an area who filed an application to become a citizen under the Citizenship Law or an application for a license to live in Israel under the Entry into Israel Law, before the first of Sivan 5762 (12 May 2002) and with regard to which, on the date of commencement of this law, no decision had been made, provided that a resident as aforesaid shall not be given citizenship, under the provisions of this paragraph, nor shall he be given a license for temporary residence or permanent residence, under the Entry into Israel Law (emphasis added).

     

23.  The transitional provisions are part of the exceptions adopted in the Law which permit, even after the determinative date, the granting, under certain circumstances, of a residence permit to a spouse from the territories, or of a permit allowing the spouse to remain in Israel for the purpose of family unification. Because these exceptions, and the transitional provisions as a whole, are provisions that promote and are suited to the realization of the constitutional right to a family life, they must, in the context of legislation that violates the basic human right to a family life, be construed and applied broadly. The purpose of the transitional provisions is to uphold the Israeli spouse’s right to a family life under factual circumstances that give rise to a reliance interest and to legitimate expectations regarding that right. Although the legislature has adopted, with regard to new applications for family unification, a policy of a sweeping prohibition on the basis of security considerations, the transitional provisions preserve a certain correlation between the right to a family life and the issue of security considerations, based on individual circumstances. The balance that the legislature found to be proper for the purpose of the transitional arrangement involves, first of all, the possibility that an Israeli residence permit can be extended for a person whose residence in Israel had been permitted prior to the determinative date in the context of family unification. This possibility was also prescribed for a person who had submitted an application for family unification prior to the determinative date and regarding whom a decision had not been reached by that time. However, the permits are to be granted pursuant to the transitional provisions only when there is no security-related impediment relating to the particular individual applicant that justifies a refusal to grant or renew a permit. The transitional provisions also establish that the extension of a residence permit that has already been granted will not allow for the upgrading of the applicant’s status, and the grant of a first-time permit will be limited to a temporary stay permit which may not be upgraded to a higher residency status, as long as the arrangements in the Temporary Provision Law remain in place (HCJ 2208/02 Salameh v. Minister of the Interior [6]).

The security-related impediment in the transitional provisions

24.  The existence of a security-related impediment is liable to prevent the application of the exception incorporated in the transitional provisions which enables the extension, under certain conditions, of an existing residence permit that had been granted to a spouse from the territories in the context of family unification, or which allows for the grant of a new permit to an applicant who had submitted an application prior to the determinative date and regarding whom a decision had not been reached prior to that date. In implementing the transitional provision, the competent authority is required to decide the proportionate relationship between the Israeli spouse’s legitimate expectation to realize his right to be united with a spouse from the territories, as derived from his constitutional right to a family life, on the one hand, and the scope and level of the existing security-related impediment regarding the spouse from the territories, on the other hand. The concept of a “security-related impediment” is not a single-value concept, and its nature can change from case to case, in view, inter alia, of the nature and strength of the conflicting values. The concept of a “security-related impediment” is a framework concept, and its content and weight are affected by the specific context in which it arises. The more concrete the Israeli spouse’s interest is in realizing his right to a family life, the greater the weight that is required of the security-related impediment in order to justify the denial of an application for family unification in the framework of the transitional provisions, in terms of either the extension of an existing residence permit or the approval of an application for a permit that had been submitted prior to the determinative date regarding which a decision had not yet been reached by that date.

A concrete expectation regarding the realization of the right to a family life when a permit for family unification had already been granted and a request has been made for its renewal has a different import than the expectation that exists when no such permit has ever been granted.

25.  Of the two situations to which the transitional provisions relate, it is clear that a couple’s expectation with respect to the renewal of a residence permit when such a permit had already been issued previously is one of great strength. The strength of such an expectation will be greater than that of a couple that has not yet been allowed to enjoy family unification, and whose application for such unification had not yet been answered by the determinative date. Moreover, there may be a difference in terms of the strength of the expectations of a family that has lived in Israel for many years and has set down roots in terms of their life in Israel and who have a number of children who are being raised and educated in Israel, as compared to the strength of the expectations of a young couple that has only recently been permitted to stay together through family unification and who have only been in Israel for a short period and have not yet built a complete family unit or integrated into work and life in Israel. There must be a correlation between the strength of the expectation for a permit pursuant to the transitional provisions, and the special weight of the security-related impediment ― the weightier the expectation for family unification in light of the specific circumstances, the greater the security interest must be to justify the violation of that expectation.

26.  The Temporary Provision Law refers to the security-related impediment in s. 3D as follows:

‘A permit to stay in Israel shall not be given to a resident of the territories pursuant to s. 3, 3A(2), 3B(2) and (3) and 4(2), nor shall a permit to reside in Israel be granted to any other applicant who is not a resident of the territories, if the Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, determines, in accordance with an opinion from the competent security authorities, that the resident of the area or the other applicant or the family member of these are likely to constitute a security risk to the State of Israel; in this section, ‘family member’ shall mean a spouse, parent, child, brother, sister and their spouses. For this purpose, the Minister of the Interior may determine that a resident of the territories or other applicant is liable to constitute a security risk to the State of Israel, on the basis of, inter alia, an opinion by the security personnel that, within the country or territory in which the resident of the territories or the other applicant resides, activity is carried out which is liable to endanger the security of the State of Israel or of its citizens’ (emphasis added).

 This provision authorizes the competent authority to refuse to grant a permit under the exceptions prescribed in the law ― including pursuant to the transitional provisions, with regard to an application for a new permit pursuant to s. 4(2) of the Law ― if the applicant for the permit, or a family member, is liable to present a security risk to the state. The concept of a “family member” for this purpose is defined broadly, and it includes various degrees of family relationship within the nuclear family circle and within a broader circle as well ― a spouse, parent, child, or sibling, or their spouses. Thus, the legislature defined a “security-related impediment” broadly, and includes in it not only a direct risk presented by the permit applicant himself (hereinafter: a “direct security-related impediment”) but also an indirect risk presented by the applicant’s close relatives (hereinafter: an “indirect security-related impediment”).

The security-related impediment in relation to the two alternatives in the transitional provisions

27.  The Law, in its content and its formulation, creates a certain distinction between the manner in which, pursuant to the first transitional provision in s. 4(1) of the Law (hereinafter: the “first transitional provision”), the presence of a security-related impediment affects an applicant seeking a renewal of a residence permit that had been issued in the past, and the manner in which such an impediment affects an applicant seeking a permit for the first time, regarding whom a decision had not yet been rendered prior to the determinative date, and who is therefore subject to the transitional provision in s. 4(2) of the Law (hereinafter: the “second transitional provision”).

28.  The provision in s. 3D of the Law regarding the “security-related impediment” applies directly, pursuant to the text of the second transitional provision in s. 4(2) of the Law ― i.e., to an applicant for a new permit whose application had not yet been approved by the determinative date. For this purpose, the beginning of s. 3D provides that “a permit to stay in Israel shall not be given to a resident of the territories pursuant to . . . s. 4(2)” if the competent authority determines that there is a security-related impediment in the sense of there being a security risk that is presented by the permit applicant or by his family member. Regarding an applicant for a new permit whose entry into Israel has not yet been approved but whose application was pending prior to the determinative date, the Law provides, categorically, that “a permit . . . shall not be granted” in the event that there is a security-related impediment, as defined there.

29.  The first transitional provision, in s. 4(1) of the Law, operates differently. This provision deals with an extension of an existing permit held by a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, and who has been living in Israel by virtue of that permit. The section provides as follows, regarding such a case:

‘The Minister of the Interior or the area commander, as applicable, may extend the validity of a license to live in Israel or of a permit to stay in Israel, which were held by a resident of the area prior to the commencement of this law, while taking into account, inter alia, the existence of a security impediment as stated in section 3D (emphasis added).. 

30.  The difference in the statutory language in each of the two situations is not accidental. It indicates that the security-related impediment is relevant to both the first and second transitional provisions, but the manner in which it is applied in the two situations in terms of the balancing that is to be carried out between the security risk and the level of the violation of the legitimate interest in the realization of the right to a family life differs. Regarding the second transitional provision, which deals with an applicant for a new permit whose entry into Israel, has not yet been allowed and whose application for a family unification permit was pending and undecided as of the determinative date, s. 3D provides that a permit will not be granted if there is a security risk. In contrast, with regard to an applicant for an extension of a family unification permit that was given in the past, the Law provides that the competent authority may extend the duration of the permit “taking into consideration, inter alia, the presence of a security related impediment, as described in s. 3D of the Law.” It appears that this language indicates that in the context of the balancing between the conflicting values, greater weight will be given to the expectation interest of a couple who have already been allowed to unite in the framework of family unification and who wish to continue this shared life, as compared to the weight given to the interest of a couple whose application has not yet been approved prior to the determinative date. Regarding the first transitional provision, only the existence of a security interest which is especially strong will provide a constitutional justification for a violation of the right to family life, if approval for family unification has been granted in the past and the couple is now seeking an extension of such approval. Regarding an applicant whose entry had not yet been allowed prior to the determinative date, a weaker security-related impediment is likely to be sufficient in order to justify a refusal to grant a permit, pursuant to the second transitional provision.

31.  It therefore appears that according to the statutory language and in light of the purpose of the Law, and in light of the constitutional principles governing its mode of implementation, a first-time applicant to whom the second transitional provision in s. 4(2) applies will be directly subject to the provisions of s. 3D of the Law with regard to a security-related impediment. If the Minister of the Interior determines that either such an applicant, who is a resident of the territories, or a family member of such an applicant, is likely to constitute a security risk for the State of Israel, then, according to this provision, a permit to stay in Israel temporarily will “not be granted.” Invocation of this authority does involve the exercise of discretion ― however, when the considerations are balanced, special weight will be granted to the security aspect. In contrast, the provisions of the first transitional provision in s. 4(1) of the Law will apply to an application for an extension of a residence permit, which is submitted by an applicant who has already been granted a family unification permit in the past and who is living in Israel pursuant to that permit. According to that provision, the security-related impediment factor described in s. 3D of the Law constitutes only one of several factors that the Minister of the Interior is required to consider in reaching a decision as to whether to extend the existing Israeli residence permit. In accordance with this provision, the Minister of the Interior, in the framework of the exercise of his authority and judgment, is authorized to and may extend the existing residence permit even if there is a security-related impediment, as stated in s. 3D of the Law. All this is subject to the entire array of circumstances, and to the relative weight to be attributed to each of the relevant factors that are considered in the framework of the constitutional and concrete balancing ― a balancing which is also required in light of the reasonableness standard that must be followed with respect to any administrative decision.

32.  The exercise of the Minister of the Interior’s authority regarding the transitional provisions must comply with the principles of administrative law. Therefore, the Minister of the Interior’s decision must be reached through a proper administrative process, and it must be free of any irrelevant considerations, and of any arbitrariness or any violation of the principles of natural justice. It must be a reasonable decision. Within the bounds of the reasonableness requirement, the decision must be based on an appropriate factual underpinning, and it must be based on all relevant considerations and on those considerations only, and it must be reached by establishing a proper balance among those considerations, within the boundaries of reasonableness. Since the significance of the decision is likely to involve a possible violation of the Israeli spouse’s high-ranking basic constitutional right, it must also satisfy the proportionality requirement established in the limitations clause (HCJ 2028/05 Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at paras. 9-17); HCJ 4541/41 Miller v. Minister of Defense [8]; HCJ Horev v. Minister of Transportation [9], at p. 41; HCJ 6358/05 Vanunu v. Home Front Commander, at para. 12 [10]; HCJ 11163/03 Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [11] (per President Barak, at para. 22)).

The relevant and contrasting considerations in the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law

33.  The significance of the refusal by the competent authority to grant or to renew an Israeli residence permit in the case of a spouse who falls within the purview of the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law in the context of a family unification process is that the right of the Israeli family members ― a spouse, and any minor Israeli children ― to conduct a unified family life will be denied. Juxtaposed against this denial of a right is the purpose of the Temporary Provision Law, which is to protect the security of the Israeli public. Although our case involves a review of the administrative discretion exercised by the administrative authority, the criteria for examining such discretion are also affected by the principles of constitutional law, as the exercise of this authority involves a violation of a basic human right ― i.e., the right to a family life. In light of this, the authority may only be exercised in a manner that satisfies the relevant constitutional tests. The security objective, which underlies this use of the administrative authority, must comply with the tests set out in the limitations clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, when such use is likely to violate the basic right to family life. As a rule, the violation of a basic right for the purpose of protecting the security of the state and that of its residents is deemed to have a proper purpose and to conform to the values of the state as a Jewish and democratic state. The key question, then, is whether the requirement of proportionality has been satisfied with respect to the manner in which the authority has been exercised pursuant to the Temporary Provision Law, when it involves a violation of a basic right to a family life for the purpose of responding to a security need. In such a case, proportionality must be examined according to the sub-tests that have been developed in the case law. The rational connection test, the less-violative means test and the narrow proportionality test are the guiding tests in determining the proportionality of a violation of a constitutional right. The application of these tests to our matter involves the following: first, when the security-related impediment consideration arises in connection with spouses to whom the transitional provisions apply, a correlation is required between, on the one hand, the measure that has been used which prevents family unification, and, on the other hand, the objective of protecting the security of the state and the public peace. Next, it must be the case that the security-related purpose cannot be achieved through the use of any other measure that involves a lesser violation. Finally, the nature and level of the violation of the right to family life and to equality must be in proper proportion to the security objective that is being pursued through the implementation of the measure that prevents the requested unification (Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at para. 11)). For the purpose of applying the narrow proportionality test, it is not necessary to examine the entire range of the security benefits that will be achieved, in comparison to the situation that would prevail if no other measure was taken to prevent the security risk. All that is needed is an examination of the marginal additional benefit to security that is achieved through the termination of the family unification process, compared to the possibility of using alternative security measures ― such as the grant of temporary renewable permits for staying in Israel, which allow the for periodic official review by the true level of danger anticipated from the spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories and who is living in Israel; increased supervision of the spouse staying in Israel; and a commitment from that spouse (whose compliance with such commitment will be tested regularly) to cut off all contact with any hostile elements, along with other possible measures. In applying the proportionality test as stated, there may be a difference in the relative weight to be attributed to a violation of the right to a family life as compared with the security advantage to be gained from the violation in the context of a refusal to renew a residence permit to one who has already received such a permit in a family unification context and is already legally living in Israel, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the relative importance to be attributed to these values in a situation in which the person has not yet been granted such unification status, and has submitted an application prior to the determinative date which had not yet been decided by that date. In the following discussion, we will discuss briefly each of the values that the competent authority is required to consider for the purpose of applying the transitional provisions; we will then discuss whether it would be appropriate to intervene in the authority’s decision under such circumstances.

The violation of the constitutional right to a family life in the context of the transitional provisions

34.  The refusal to grant a first-time family unification permit, or to renew such a permit when one had been granted previously, is a severe violation of the right to a family life ― one which violates a person’s dignity, his personal autonomy and the meaning of his life which is inextricably tied to his ability to realize a full life in the framework of family, with a spouse and children. This violation cuts through the length and breadth of a person’s life, and affects all aspects of his life, as well as his ability to realize his independence fully and completely. It detracts from the person’s ability to fully experience happiness in life, and sentences him to a life of loneliness, detachment and sadness during the best years of his life. The refusal to extend an Israeli residence permit to a spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories, and who is living in Israel in the framework of family unification, is one of the most severe blows that can be inflicted on the fabric of family life and on the spouse who is an Israeli resident. As a rule, it is a more serious violation than that suffered by a couple who have not yet been allowed to unite and live together in Israel (HCJ 59/83 Cohen v. Jerusalem Municipality [12], at 320; HCJ 237/81 Dabul v. Petah Tikva Municipality [13]). When a first-time permit for family unification has been granted, a family unit begins to be established, and the united family begins to put down roots in Israel. The spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories studies Hebrew and integrates himself or herself into the labor market, children are born, these children receive Israeli citizenship and are educated and study in Israeli schools, and the family becomes integrated into Israeli society. The refusal to extend an Israeli residence permit for a person who fulfils the conditions of the first transitional provision thus causes the family to face a tragic decision. They must choose between two alternatives. The first would be the entire family’s removal from Israel, from their relatives, extended family and from their friends; from their life in Israel and from the culture and sources of employment on which they rely ― a removal which would mean the familial, social, economic and cultural disconnection of a unified family that has lived and put down roots in Israel, sometimes for a period of many years. The second possibility is for the couple to separate, with the Israeli spouse remaining in Israel and the foreign spouse returning to his or her original place of residence within the territories, and with the children being separated from one or the other of their parents. The separation of the family members from each other under such circumstances is difficult for all involved ― for the couple and for their children ― and it involves the fracturing of the family’s human, social, cultural, and economic frameworks.

35.  The refusal to grant an application submitted by a resident of the territories to enter into Israel for the purpose of family unification, when no such application has been approved in the past, also carries severe consequences from the perspective of the family that has not yet had the opportunity to build a unified family unit. However, the violation involved in this refusal is of lesser magnitude than that of the violation caused to a party whose residence in Israel has already been approved, and which has already established a full family life in Israel, with all that this implies. This difference in the strength of the expectation of family unification and the extent of the violation of that expectation in the two situations affects the determination of the proper balance between the violation and the level of the security-related impediment in the framework which is necessitated by the proportionality test. This difference finds expression in the wording and purpose of the Law.

The security-related impediment in relation to the transitional provisions in the Temporary Provision Law

36.  The duty of the state to protect its citizens’ lives places the security consideration at the highest level of importance. This consideration has two aspects: a social aspect, which impacts on the state’s duty to protect its citizens’ security; and an individual aspect, which impacts on the right of the individual within the society to enjoy adequate protection of his life and of his well-being ― protection that the government has a responsibility to provide. The right to life is a constitutional human right of the highest order and it ranks first among the human rights protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Nevertheless, the value of protecting life is not a single absolute concept. Its relative weight varies from case to case, according to the probability of the realization of the danger to life that arises in the specific context. Occasionally, the security value will also need to be weighed against other values of special importance, according to their relative weight.

37.  The assessment of the degree of danger presented by a particular person is a complex task. It becomes especially difficult, given the security situation that Israel is currently facing, when what must be assessed is the danger presented by a resident of the territories. The forces battling against Israel are terrorist forces that are frequently assisted by the civilian population. The source of the security danger is likely to relate directly to the spouse who has the status of a resident of the territories ― the spouse who is applying for a family unification permit or an extension of such a permit. This is the case when the applicant for the permit is himself connected to or involved in terrorist activity. However, the danger may relate not to the applicant for the permit himself or herself, but rather, to the applicants’ relatives and family members who are themselves connected to terrorist activity; in these circumstances, the concern is that such family members might make use of their relatives who have been granted family unification status in order to promote their dangerous activities (Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] (per President Barak, at para. 14); Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4]). Therefore, in an assessment of the security risk presented by a resident of the territories seeking family unification status, the evaluation must be not only of the direct danger presented by the applicant himself. Relative weight must also be given to the applicant’s family connections to elements that are involved in terrorism, in light of the potential danger involved in the exploitation of these connections by elements that endanger the security of Israel’s residents. Thus, the definition of the security-related impediment provided in s. 3D of the Law relates not only to the direct security danger presented by the applicant for the permit himself, but also to the indirect security risk presented by the permit applicant’s family connection to elements that endanger the security of the state.

38.  However, it must be stressed that the subject of the security-related impediment referred to in the statutory language is, in all circumstances, the security danger presented by the applicant for the permit himself, whether a direct danger, relating to a concern of direct involvement on the part of the applicant himself in terrorist activity, or an indirect danger, relating to a concern arising from the possibility that the applicant will be wrongfully exploited by family members who are involved in terrorism. The purpose of the analysis of the security-related impediment is not to prevent a danger presented by a relative of the applicant alone; rather, it relates to the effect that this danger will have on the security danger presented by the applicant as a consequence of possible exploitation of the applicant by terrorist elements, for harmful purposes (Ajuri v. IDF Commander [4], at pp. 370-371; HCJ 1730/96 Sabih v. IDF Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region [14], at p. 364). The explanatory notes accompanying the draft version of s. 3D of the Law clearly indicated that the purpose of weighing the danger presented by a family member of an applicant who is a resident of the territories is that it can indicate, in an indirect manner, the level of danger presented by the applicant himself, in light of the general professional assessment of the security establishment that “such a connection between a resident of the territories and a family member, from which a security risk may result, can be exploited, as has often been proven in the past” (explanatory notes to s. 3D, Government Draft Laws, 16 May 2005, at p. 626). Since the level of danger presented by a family member is only a possible indicator of the level of danger presented by a resident of the territories applying for family unification, it is understood that for the purpose of implementing s. 3D of the Temporary Provision Law, the weight of a direct security risk presented by the resident of the territories (which would justify the denial of an application for an Israeli residence permit because of a direct security-related impediment) cannot be compared to the weight of an indirect security-related impediment that arises from the danger presented by the possible potential influence of the foreign spouse’s relative. Naturally, the direct impediment clearly outweighs the indirect impediment, and this disparity between the two situations must be considered on its own merits when the competent authority weighs the particular security risk presented by the spouse who is a resident of the territories against the level of the violation of the right to a family life caused by the refusal to grant a residence permit.

Weighting of the relevant values in applying the transitional provisions

39.  The competent authority that must render a decision regarding the application for a residence permit in the framework of the transitional provisions of the Law must base his decision on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality. Reasonableness is a criterion that is used when reviewing an exercise of administrative discretion; when such exercise of discretion involves a possible violation of basic rights, it must also comply with the proportionality test, as established in constitutional principles and in the limitations clause.

40.  In deciding whether to grant a residence permit within the framework of the transitional provisions, the competent authority must engage in a reasonable and proportionate weighing of the various relevant values that compete with each other with respect to this issue. On the one hand, the authority must weigh the severe violation of the right to a family life that is inflicted on the Israeli resident or citizen if the application is denied. In this context, the authority must take into consideration the violation of the principle of equality that is thus caused, and the strength of the anticipated consequences that the couple and their children will experience, on a human level, as a result of the inability to establish a unified and complete family unit in Israel, which is the permanent place of residence of one of the spouses. In the context of this consideration, and given the policy that has been anchored in the Temporary Provision Law, there is likely to be a difference in the strength and the weight of the harm done to an existing family unit that has been granted unification status in the past and wishes to continue thus, on the one hand, and the harm done to a family that has not yet achieved that status, and whose application for unification was pending and not yet decided on the determinative date. The level of the harm done in the first case is greater, because the significance of the non-renewal of the permit is the dissolution of a family unit that has already been established, the removal of the family from the familial, social and economic roots that have been laid down since the original permit was granted, and the delivery of a heavy blow to the fabric of family life that has developed over the years. In assessing the level of the damage to the family life of an applicant who seeks to extend a residence permit that had been issued in the past for the purpose of family unification, the authority must consider, inter alia, the number of years that the permit holder has resided in Israel, the level of his involvement in life in Israel, the size of his family, the chance that the Israeli spouse will be able ― in the event that they are forced to separate ― to bear the burden of maintaining the family if the other spouse is forced to leave Israel, and the overall significance of the couple’s separation for the existential fate of the family and of the children. Regarding an application for family unification that has not yet received initial approval, what must be weighed is the level of the damage caused if, from the outset, the couple’s establishment of a complete family unit is prevented, as well as the consequences of this damage for the couple and for their children.

41.  The competent authority must weigh the factor of the violation of the right to a family life against the existence of a security-related impediment pertaining to the applicant for the permit ― a direct impediment with regard to the applicant himself, or an indirect impediment that may arise due to the applicant’s connections with family members who present a security risk. Naturally, there will be a difference in the strength and weight of a direct security-related impediment and that of an indirect security-related impediment. The existence of a direct and substantial security-related impediment will justify a refusal to grant approval for family unification, despite the severe violation of the right to family life, regardless of whether the family has already been unified in the past or has not yet been granted unification status. The issue is different when the security-related impediment is indirect. The risk presented by a permit applicant, when such risk stems from the applicant’s family relationship to parties that are connected to terrorism, is a complex matter; the probability of its realization is subject to assessment, and it requires the cautious exercise of judgment. The indirect danger must be measured carefully, and only the proper relative weight ― and not more than that ― must be attributed to it. We must take care to avoid reaching a sweeping conclusion to the effect that every permit applicant whose relative is connected to terrorist activity is totally disqualified for family unification status. Instead, the competent authority must assess the case-specific probability that the permit applicant himself will be subject to influence and pressure from family members and will thus become a direct source of a security danger. In making this assessment, the authority must rely as much as possible on objective data such as the length of the foreign spouse’s stay in Israel during which, notwithstanding the family connections to terrorist groups, there has been no information whatsoever indicating any involvement on the part of the applicant in any activity directed against Israel. Such information could, at least on a prima facie basis, refute an assumption that there is an indirect security-related impediment; when the case involves a wife from the territories who has lived in Israel for many years in a family unification framework and who is raising several children and takes part in supporting the family financially, there is a minimal likelihood that the potential risk of the person’s involvement in hostile activity due to a family connection to individuals involved in terrorism will be realized. The authority should not dismiss the significance of statistical data regarding the number of cases in which it has actually been proven that such a family connection led to the involvement of such residents of the territories in hostile activity against Israel. Such statistical data have not been shown to the Court. It should be noted further that the level of contact that is maintained between a permit applicant and his or her family members who are involved in hostile activity is not necessarily to be given determinative weight, by itself, as a factor that indicates the potential for danger ― although a lowering of the level of such contact, or a breaking off of all such contact, may be required in order to reduce the concern regarding an indirect security risk.

42.  The authority must assess the magnitude of the violation of the right to a family life against the direct or indirect security-related impediment, in view of all the details that are relevant to the case. The greater the impact on the right to a family life, the more substantial the security risk presented by the permit holder must be, whether direct or indirect. Just as the strength of the violation of the right to a family life is not the same in the case of an application for an extension of a permit that had been given in the past as it is in the case of an application for a permit that had not been approved in the past, the strength of the security danger involved in a direct security risk is different than that which is involved when a permit applicant presents only an indirect security risk. The weighting of the contrasting values must be executed carefully. A proper balancing of these elements may in appropriate cases justify the use of proportionate measures in order to achieve the security-related goal ― measures that do not involve an absolute prevention of family unification, and which will enable such unification to take place subject to various conditions, such as the granting of short-term temporary permits that allow for ongoing monitoring of the manner in which the spouse and the family conduct themselves; the stipulation of restrictive conditions regarding continued contact with the family members who are involved in terrorism; and the prohibition of visits within the territories, supervision and ongoing monitoring by the authorities, etc.

Burden of persuasion

43.  The burden of persuasion regarding the probability of the realization of the security risk at a level that justifies the violation of a human right is generally imposed on the state (Movement for Quality Government v. Knesset [3] (per President Barak, at paras. 22 and 49); A. Barak, Legal Interpretation (vol. 3, ‘Constitutional Interpretation,’ (1994); HCJ 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village [15], at pp. 428-429; HCJ Tzemach v. Minister of Defense [2], at pp. 268-269 (per Justice Cheshin)). The state bears the burden of persuading the court that the need to protect the public against a substantive security risk necessitates a substantive violation of a human right, and that the said public need could not be met without causing that violation, or at least that it would not be met by a more moderate violation that does not involve the prevention of family unification. The state must persuade the court that the likelihood of the realization of the security risk is high enough to necessitate the adoption of measures that protect life and security even when such measures violate human rights of the highest constitutional order. When the probability of danger to life is close to certainty, even the most important of constitutional human rights will retreat before these measures. If the probability that the danger will be realized is lower, it may be the case that the security value will not justify any violation whatsoever of a human right, or that it will justify only a lesser violation. The level of the probability of the realization of the danger is juxtaposed against the importance of the values that are violated ― all in accordance with the range of the circumstances that are unique to the case under discussion.

From the general to the specific

44.  In light of the theoretical criteria for applying the transitional provisions of the Law, the question arises as to whether the Minister’s refusal to extend petitioner 2’s Israeli residence permit meets the judicial review test.

The details regarding petitioner 2’s family

45.  Petitioner 1 is a citizen and resident of Israel. He was married to petitioner 2, a resident of the territories, in 1996, and in 1998 their application for family unification was approved. Their children were born in Israel and they are Israeli citizens. At the time that the Minister decided not to renew petitioner 2’s residence permit, they had been married for seven years. Fourteen years have now passed since the beginning of the family’s life in Israel. Over the course of the years, the family has set down roots in Israel. Petitioner 2 studied Hebrew, learned a profession and became involved in public activity. Petitioner 1 is a state employee working at a Building and Planning Commission. The couple’s children were born in Israel, where they are growing up and receiving their education. Israel is the children’s natural environment and it is petitioner 1’s homeland, and the family, as a full and unified unit, wishes to continue to conduct its life in Israel.

This case is covered by the first transitional provision ― meaning that it is an application for an extension of a residence permit that had already been issued in the past, and that the extension is for the purpose of allowing petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel in the framework of family unification. Section 4(1) applies to this case, which gives significant weight to the applicant’s expectations regarding the renewal of the permit and establishes the security-related impediment as only one of a range of additional considerations to be weighed in this matter.

Information regarding the security risk

46.  The state has provided substantial detail regarding the significant security risk presented by petitioner 2’s relatives, who live outside of Israel and are involved in activity in terrorist organizations at a very high risk level. The state specified, in this regard, petitioner 2’s father, since retired, who was employed by the Palestinian Authority’s security forces, and primarily, the involvement of her three brothers in Palestinian and international terrorist organizations, regarding whom the security danger is at a very high level.

The state noted the existence of a potential risk presented by petitioner 2, in the event that her close relatives who are involved in terrorism might influence her and recruit her for their purposes, causing damage to the security of the state. This is a high level indirect security-related impediment with regard to petitioner 2, in light of the nature of the involvement of a number of her relatives in a wide range of terrorist activity.

47.  We reviewed the confidential material that the state provided for our perusal. All that can be said following this review is that the risk from the relatives ― especially on a cumulative basis, given the number of such relatives who are involved ― is high. Nevertheless, it can also be said that petitioner 2 herself is not directly involved in any anti-Israel behavior, and over the course of the years of her stay here ― and as of the current time, she has been here for 14 years ― no direct substantive information has accumulated against her. The family relationship that she maintains with her relatives should not, by itself, be seen as a type of anti-Israeli activity in which she has been engaged. Her visit with her jailed brother does not necessarily indicate that she identifies with his activity ― it is only an expression of her natural family connection with him. In any event, nothing else has been proven regarding this visit. The security risk from petitioner 2’s perspective is thus primarily focused on the indirect risk presented by her relatives, and on the potential danger that her relatives will exploit her to promote objectives that are directed at causing harm to the security of the State of Israel and to its citizens.

The balance between the contrasting considerations

48.  This case is complex, in light of the existence of the petitioners’ high level right to continue their family unification, on the one hand, which stands against an indirect security-related impediment, on the other hand ― albeit one that carries substantial weight, in light of the intense involvement of petitioner 2’s three brothers in a broad and dangerous range of terrorist activity.

49.  The magnitude of the violation of the right to a family life that will follow from the respondent’s refusal to grant renewable permits to remain in Israel is too high in this case. It requires the family, as a complete unit, to either move to a different country ― even though the father and the children are citizens of Israel, the family has established roots in Israel over the course of fourteen years, and the locus of the center of the family’s life is in Israel. The alternative consequence would be the couple’s separation from each other and the division of the family unit into two ― one spouse and the children in one grouping, and the other spouse in the other. It goes without saying that the dissolution of a family unit in this manner will constitute a permanent blow to the family’s unity, to its welfare and to the children’s well-being, and only a very weighty reason can justify such an action.

50.  On the other hand, we cannot make light of the potential security risk generated by the involvement of petitioner 2’s close relatives in terrorist activity. We cannot rule out the possibility that in the context of their activity, they may try to exploit their sister’s family in Israel to promote their objectives. This possibility does exist and cannot be denied, but the probability of its realization remains unclear, in the absence of any direct information indicating the potential for a real risk presented by petitioner 2 from this direction. Petitioner 2’s case is not the same as her brothers’ case, and the potential risk that they present is not the same as the indirect potential risk that she presents. Over the course of the fourteen years that she has lived in Israel, no security-related information whatsoever concerning petitioner 2 has come to the attention of the authorities, other than the fact of her family connections with her parents and with her brothers who have been involved in terrorism for many years.

51.  Under these circumstances, a balancing of the strength of the petitioners’ family right to maintain that family against the indirect potential risk presented by petitioner 2 due to her family connections with her father and her brothers who are involved in terrorism ― while the probability and actual level of that risk remain matters of speculation only ― indicates that there is no justification at the current time for a general cancellation of the Israeli residence permit that was previously issued to petitioner 2 in a family unification framework. Even if a certain level of risk is presented by petitioner 2, which is something that cannot be denied, the risk margin is a tolerable one, and it is a risk that should be taken in order to prevent the break-up of the family or its removal from its environment ― as part of the risk inherent to the maintenance of a constitutional regime that protects human rights.

Nevertheless, a proportionate balancing of the contrasting considerations ― one which assigns the proper weight to the security risk presented here by the protection of the right to family life ― justifies subjecting petitioner 2’s continued residence in Israel to various conditions that will address the security concern that arises with regard to her. These terms are intended, on the one hand, to have a deterrent effect and to serve as a warning to petitioner 2 against continued family contact between her and her family in the territories, some of whom are involved in terrorism, and, on the other hand, to give the security establishment effective means for supervising and monitoring her conduct, in light of the indirect potential risk that she does present. In this manner, there will be a correlation between the strength of the right to a family life and the existing security risk, created by a solution that reflects a proper weighing of the conflicting considerations involved in the matter.

Result

52.  The proper balancing between the contrasting considerations leads to the following results:

As it has not been proven that petitioner 2 presents a security risk that justifies the severe blow involved in a cancellation of the residence permits that had been issued to her in the family unification framework, the Minister of the Interior’s decision not to renew her family unification Israeli residence permit must be reversed.

53.  Nevertheless, in light of the indirect security risk that petitioner 2 presents, her residency status in Israel as of the present time will be approved pursuant to DCL permits that will be issued for six-month periods and which will be renewed from time to time, subject to the continued absence of new circumstances that justify their cancellation.

The issuance of the DCL permits as stated will be conditioned on petitioner 2’s signing of a declaration, to be made to the competent authority, in which she undertakes to comply with the following conditions:

  1. To refrain from maintaining any contact whatsoever ― either direct or indirect ― with any members of her family in the territories, and with other acquaintances and relations in the territories;
  2. To refrain from entering the territories for any purpose and for any length of time whatsoever;
  3. To notify the competent authority in advance of any intention to leave Israel, and to provide full details regarding the planned trip;
  4. To refrain from any act or omission which could directly or indirectly cause harm to the security of the state or the public peace.

The respondent may add additional conditions to these undertakings, to the extent he sees fit.

With the passage of time, and subject to changing circumstances and at his discretion, the respondent may consider restoring the A-5 residence permit that petitioner 2 had held prior to its non-renewal, or he may ease the restrictions involved in the undertakings mentioned above, as he sees fit.

Obviously, if petitioner 2 violates any of these undertakings, such a violation will constitute grounds for cancellation of the permit for remaining in Israel that has been issued to her.

54.  The petition is therefore granted, and the order is made absolute, subject to the conditions described above.

 

Justice S. Joubran

I concur in the opinion of my colleague Justice A. Procaccia, and in the result she has reached in her judgment. Indeed, as my colleague has noted, even the respondent does not claim that petitioner 2 presents a direct security risk, and argues only that her family ties give rise to a concern that she may be exploited by others. Although this concern cannot be ruled out, it does not, by itself, justify the infliction of such significant harm on petitioner 2 in the form of the cancellation of the permits that have been granted to her to remain in Israel as part of the life that she shares with petitioner 1. The concern that others will exploit petitioner 2 as a means for realizing their objectionable purposes does justify an arrangement that provides the security establishment with tools to prevent the danger involved in this situation, by continuing the restrictions on petitioner 2’s stay in Israel and by stipulating conditions for its continuation. It does not, however, warrant a measure that forces petitioner 2 to bear the cost of the actions of the members of her family, through the infliction of such severe harm to her and to her spouse, petitioner 1.

 

President D. Beinisch

I agree with the result reached by my colleague, Justice A. Procaccia, under the circumstances of the petitioners’ case. I also agree with her position that a distinction must be made between a party who seeks the renewal of a residence permit and a party to whom such a permit has not yet been issued ― a distinction which I will discuss below. Together with this, I wish to emphasize a number of points of my own, relating primarily to the criteria that should guide the exercise of judicial review of a decision by the Minister of the Interior not to allow the continued stay in Israel of a person with the status of a resident of the territories who is married to an Israeli, against a background of security-related reasons pertaining to a close relative.

1.    The starting point in an examination of the issue we face in the context of this petition is the determination in the majority opinion in this Court’s judgment in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], that the Temporary Provision Law ― including all of the arrangements contained within it ― is, at present, in compliance with all constitutional tests.

2.    Regarding what is relevant to our case, s. 3D provides expressly that a security-related impediment to the grant of a new permit or to the extension of an existing permit can be based on the presence of a security risk to the State of Israel, the source of which is the resident of the territories or a member of his or her family ― and for this purpose a family member is defined as “a spouse, parent, child, brother and sister and their spouses.” With this formulation, the legislature sought to express the position taken by the security establishment, as was also presented to us at length in the written and oral pleadings, that even when the source of a risk is a close relative and not the foreign spouse himself or herself, harm may be caused to the security of the state. In the words of my colleague Justice Procaccia, this is an “indirect security impediment”. This determination is not new to us, and in Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7], President Barak held that —

‘ . . . a refusal to grant legal status in Israel, due to a security-related impediment connected to the applicant himself, presents no difficulty, provided that the refusal has a proper factual basis. The Temporary Provision Law (emphasis in the original - D.B.) extends the security risk qualification to the members of the applicant’s family as well. Therefore, the consideration of an existing risk involving a close relative is not inherently improper. In the current reality, in light of the serious security dangers that Israel is facing, a security risk presented by a family member of the resident of the territories can establish a basis for rejecting an application for legal status in Israel . . .’ (emphasis added - D.B.).

In light of the above, we must begin with the assumption that a decision not to permit a foreigner’s stay in Israel because of a risk presented by the applicant’s family members is possible, and will, in certain circumstances, overcome any constitutional challenges. (See also para. 94 of President Barak’s opinion in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior et al. [1].) In any event, we may also conclude that the theoretical balancing that is indicated by the provisions of ss. 3D and 4 of the Temporary Provision Law, between the realization of the constitutional right to a family life and the protection of a public security interest (in which additional basic rights are incorporated) is possible, but is subject to the individualized examination of such applications, in the context of the exceptions to the sweeping rule established in s. 2 of the Temporary Provision Law.

3.    I would also add that even though according to the majority opinion in this Court’s decision in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1], the theoretical foundation upon which the sections under discussion is based does not indicate a built-in constitutional difficulty, it is nevertheless the case ― and my colleague discussed this at length ― that any decision not to allow the foreign spouse of an Israeli to remain in Israel will constitute a serious violation of the constitutional right to a family life, as discussed at length and as held in Adalah Legal Center v. Minister of the Interior [1] (see, for example, paras. 6-7 of my opinion there), and as such, a careful examination of any such decision is required. In this context, it was held in Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7] ― and the holding applies to this case as well ― that the Minister of the Interior must exercise his authority pursuant to the provisions of s. 3D “in accordance with the basic principles of Israeli administrative law. He must exercise any powers that may infringe basic constitutional rights in accordance with the criteria prescribed in the limitations clause of the Basic Laws concerning human rights . . . the Minister of the Interior’s determination pursuant to s. 3D must therefore comply with the requirement that it be proportionate.”  

 Thus, for example, if a decision not to extend a residence permit that had been granted in the past is based on the security establishment’s reliance on an issue pertaining to a close relative of the applicant as a ground for refusing the extension, the Minister of the Interior must, in order to ensure that the decision complies with the proportionality test, carry out a meticulous and careful examination of the administrative evidence that has been presented to him and on the basis of which he seeks to define the scope and the degree of the potential danger presented by the foreign spouse for whom residency status is requested. The Minister must establish, through the presentation of substantial administrative evidence, that the applicant does indeed present a security risk, because of the risk presented by his or her family member. (See also Amara v. Minister of the Interior [7], para. 17.) In this context, I would adopt my colleague’s comments in para. 41 of her opinion regarding the set of information to be considered in the context of assessing the danger presented by the applicant, as well as regarding the appropriate weight to be ascribed, in terms of the assessment of the level of the risk, to information indicating a direct security risk coming from the applicant as compared to information regarding an indirect risk based on characteristics of members of the applicant’s family. Nevertheless, I would leave ― as an issue needing further review ― the question of the probability test that my colleague wishes to adopt, as I do not see the need to decide that matter in this context. Additionally, there is no doubt that my colleague is correct in stating that an argument based on a security need should not be accepted without question and that it should instead be examined on its own merits, in accordance with all the details of the specific case. Regarding the two-stage test for examining the security consideration, which my colleague explains in para. 17 of her opinion, it appears that the threshold requirement involved in the first stage would need to be examined on a prima facie basis only, in light of the presumption of propriety enjoyed by an administrative authority. Under these circumstances, the main examination will focus on the strength of the security-based argument, since even when true security considerations have guided the authority in reaching the decision, such considerations can still be subjected to review in order to determine whether they were given disproportionate weight in that the security establishment allowed for excessively wide safety margins. In any event, this issue does not arise to a full extent under the circumstances of this case, since even my colleague acknowledges that we have been presented here with a significant amount of substantial security-related material, and there is no doubt that true security considerations were at the basis of the position taken by the security establishment and that these considerations provided the foundation for the Minister of the Interior’s decision not to extend petitioner 2’s residence in Israel.

On the other hand, and in juxtaposition to any assessment of the risk presented by the applicant for a residence permit in Israel, the Minister of the Interior must, as stated, attribute significant weight to the violation of the right to a family life caused by the decision to disallow the permit. In this context ― and here I share my colleague’s view ― the Minister of the Interior must give significant weight to the applicant’s situation and to the type of application that has been submitted, i.e., to the issue of whether the applicant is requesting, for the first time, permission to stay in Israel, or whether ― as is the case here ― the applicant has already been given a permit in the past pursuant to the criteria that were then applicable, and now seeks to renew that permit. My colleague bases this determination on, inter alia, an interpretation that distinguishes between s. 4(1) and s. 4(2) ― the transitional provisions of the Temporary Provision Law. Such a distinction is also required in accordance with the basic concepts of administrative law, which distinguishes between the non-renewal of a license and the issuing of a new license. At the same time, I believe that in addition to the distinction that my colleague makes between the provisions of s. 4(1) and s. 4(2), an additional distinction should also be made, relating to yet another group, and that this distinction should also be given weight in a review of the application: the distinction between those applicants who had submitted their application prior to the adoption of the Government Resolution in May 2002 and whose matter had not yet been decided (applicants who are covered by s. 4(2) of the Temporary Provision Law) and applicants who have submitted a new application for a residence permit after the Temporary Provision Law entered into effect (and in the context of the exceptions that had been prescribed in that Law over the years). All of these fall within the category of applicants who have not yet been issued a permit, but it would appear that greater weight should be given to the rights of those who had submitted their application many years before, and whose applications had not been answered because of a delay in the progress of the competent authority’s work.

4.    Moving from the general to the specific, the circumstances of this case present a difficult situation, containing various elements that stand at opposite ends of the scale of matters that are to be considered. At one end, there is the substantial information available to the security establishment, to the effect that petitioner 2’s father and brothers are involved in terrorist activity which presents a high risk potential. Thus, the state noted that petitioner 2’s father was, in the past, employed by the Palestinian Authority’s security establishment and that her three brothers are involved in the activity of Palestinian and international terrorist organizations (the latter element being the primary factor to be considered). This involvement of petitioner 2’s family members does indicate a substantial potential risk which could be presented by petitioner 2, primarily due to a concern that her family or possibly the terrorist organizations could exploit her status in Israel and attempt to recruit her to advance their goals. At the other end, there is the fact that petitioner 2 has lived in Israel for many years, and that during some of them she lived here pursuant to a residence permit granted to her by the Minister of the Interior. During the course of these years, she and her Israeli spouse had several children who are Israeli citizens and who are being raised and educated in Israel; she studied Hebrew, acquired professional skills and worked as the secretary to the President of the Sharia Appellate Court. Petitioner 2 is currently active socially in the Women’s Council in Zemer. This indicates that this is a petitioner whose life is bound tightly to the State of Israel, and that she and her Israeli husband have established a family unit here over the course of many years, and the respondent’s decision will cause the dissolution of that unit, while doing much harm to her, her spouse and their children. Under this complex set of circumstances, I agree with my colleague that the proper balancing of all the considerations requires that a solution be found that will allow her to stay in Israel at this time, while creating a framework that will help to reduce the indirect potential security risk that is involved in allowing her to stay. In my view, my colleague’s proposal, according to which, at this time, petitioner 2 will be allowed to stay in Israel through the issuance of permits allowing her to remain in Israel (i.e., DCL permits), which will be valid for six months each and renewable from time to time subject to ongoing reviews to be based on updated information, and that this arrangement will be subject to the range of conditions specified by my colleague in para. 53 of her judgment, expresses a suitable balance for these complicated circumstances.

Therefore, and in light of the above, I concur in my colleague’s conclusion that the petition should be granted.

Petition granted, per the opinion of Justice Procaccia.

 

8 Adar 5770.

22 February 2010.

 

Minister of Justice v. Zohar

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 219/09
Date Decided: 
Monday, November 29, 2010
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The respondent was convicted of various crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1996, after which he was given additional sentences for crimes committed while on leave from jail. In 2004, he applied to the then-President of the State, Moshe Katzav, to reduce the duration of his sentence. Although the Minister of Justice at the time (Tzipi Livni) recommended that the application be denied, the President signed a letter limiting the respondent’s sentence to 32 years. The Minister of Justice refused to countersign the document approving the reduced sentence, as did other Ministers of Justice who served after her. The respondent petitioned the High Court of Justice, asking the Court to order the Minister of Justice to join her signature to that of the President of the State or, alternatively, to declare that the letter approving the reduction of the respondent’s sentence was valid despite the absence of the countersignature. In the original judgment, the majority (Justices Levy and Danziger) granted the petition, with Justice Rubinstein dissenting. The Minister of Justice petitioned for a further hearing.

 

Held:  Majority opinion (President Beinisch; Deputy President Rivlin, Justices Naor, Arbel, Rubinstein, Joubran, Hayut concurring; Justice Levy concurring in part). The pardoning power of the President of the State is an Israeli creation and is not an unqualified presidential prerogative. The basic principles of the Israeli democratic regime necessitate the imposition of a review mechanism for the President’s exercise of the power to pardon. This process is expressed in the statutory requirement that the Minister of Justice must countersign and in the discretion he exercises with respect to the issue of the countersignature. The countersignature, through which the Minister of Justice assumes parliamentary responsibility for his actions, thus enables both parliamentary and judicial review of the exercise of the pardon power. This necessary review process does not grant the Minister of Justice a veto right. The Minister may exercise his discretion to refuse to countersign only in extreme and unusual circumstances – such as when he is persuaded that the pardon decision has been reached improperly. The narrow scope of the Minister’s discretion also reduces the concern that political considerations will enter into the pardoning process.

 

Concurrence in part (Justice Levy) – The discretion given to the Minister of Justice does not allow him to refuse to sign when he finds the President’s decision unreasonable, but only when he finds that decision to have been based on irrelevant considerations, that it was made in bad faith or that it is ultra vires.

 

Minority opinion (Justice Danziger) – The Minister of Justice has no discretion with respect to the countersignature requirement, as the power to pardon has been given only to the President of the State. The entire purpose of the countersignature is to ensure that all relevant material is submitted to him for review and that there were no errors whatsoever. The possibility of the exertion of political pressure on the President – through a grant of discretion to the Minister of Justice – creates the potential for prior understandings between the President and the Minister. The indirect judicial review mechanism described in the judgment in the original petition is the preferred review mechanism with respect to the presidential pardoning power. 

 

Petition granted. Respondent’s matter to be returned to the Special Parole Committee, to the President of the State and to the Minister of Justice.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
concurrence
concurrence
concurrence
concurrence
concurrence
concurrence
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJFH 219/09

 

Minister of Justice

v.

Nir Zohar

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[29 November 2009]

 

Before President D. Beinisch, Deputy President E. Rivlin, Justices E.E. Levy, M. Naor, E. Arbel, E. Rubinstein, S. Joubran, E. Hayut, Y. Danziger

Further Hearing on the judgment of the Supreme Court in HCJ 10021/06, issued on 23 December 2008 by Justices E.E. Levy, E. Rubinstein and Y. Danziger

 

Facts: The respondent was convicted of various crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1996, after which he was given additional sentences for crimes committed while on leave from jail. In 2004, he applied to the then-President of the State, Moshe Katzav, to reduce the duration of his sentence. Although the Minister of Justice at the time (Tzipi Livni) recommended thatthe application be denied, the President signed a letter limiting the respondent’s sentence to 32 years. The Minister of Justice refused to countersign the document approving the reduced sentence, as did other Ministers of Justice who served after her. The respondent petitioned the High Court of Justice, asking the Court to order the Minister of Justice to join her signature to that of the President of the State or, alternatively, to declare that the letter approving the reduction of the respondent’s sentence was valid despite the absence of the countersignature. In the original judgment, the majority (Justices Levy and Danziger) granted the petition, with Justice Rubinstein dissenting. The Minister of Justice petitioned for a further hearing.

 

Held:      Majority opinion: (President Beinisch; Deputy President Rivlin, Justices Naor, Arbel, Rubinstein, Joubran, Hayut concurring; Justice Levy concurring in part). The pardoning power of the President of the State is an Israeli creation and is not an unqualified presidential prerogative. The basic principles of the Israeli democratic regime necessitate the imposition of a review mechanism for the President’s exercise of the power to pardon. This process is expressed in the statutory requirement that the Minister of Justice must countersign and in the discretion he exercises with respect to the issue of the countersignature. The countersignature, through which the Minister of Justice assumes parliamentary responsibility for his actions, thus enables both parliamentary and judicial review of the exercise of the pardon power. This necessary review process does not grant the Minister of Justice a veto right. The Minister may exercise his discretion to refuse to countersign only in extreme and unusual circumstances – such as when he is persuaded that the pardon decision has been reached improperly. The narrow scope of the Minister’s discretion also reduces the concern that political considerations will enter into the pardoning process.

 

Concurrence in part (Justice Levy) – The discretion given to the Minister of Justice does not allow him to refuse to sign when he finds the President’s decision unreasonable, but only when he finds that decision to have been based on irrelevant considerations, that it was made in bad faith or that it is ultra vires.

Minority opinion (Justice Danziger) – The Minister of Justice has no discretion with respect to the countersignature requirement, as the power to pardon has been given only to the President of the State. The entire purpose of the countersignature is to ensure that all relevant material is submitted to him for review and that there were no errors whatsoever. The possibility of the exertion of political pressure on the President – through a grant of discretion to the Minister of Justice – creates the potential for prior understandings between the President and the Minister. The indirect judicial review mechanism described in the judgment in the original petition is the preferred review mechanism with respect to the presidential pardoning power. 

 

Petition granted. Respondent’s matter to be returned to the Special Parole Committee, to the President of the State and to the Minister of Justice.

 

     Legislation cited:

Basic Law: The President of the State, ss. 11(a)(1), 11(a)(3), 11(a)(5) –(6), 11(b), 12, 16.

Palestine Order in Council, arts. 6, 16.

Release from Imprisonment on Parole Law, 5751-2001, s. 29.

Transition Law, 5709-1949, s. 6.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:  

 

[1]       FH 13/60 Attorney General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16 430.

[2]       HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505.

[3]       HCJ 177/50 Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [1951] IsrSC 5 737.

[4]       CrimA 185/59 Matana v. Attorney General [1960] IsrSC 14 970.

[5]       HCJ 706/94 Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [1999] IsrSc 53(5) 389.

[6]       HCJ 73/85 “Kach” Party v. Chairman of the Knesset [1985] 39(3) IsrSC 141.

[7]       HCJ 9631/07 Katz v. President of the State (deleted) (2008) (not yet reported).

[8]       CrimFH 7048/97 Anonymous Parties v. Minister of Defense [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 721.

[9]       HCJ 1637/06 Armon v. Minister of Finance (2010) (not yet reported).

Canadian cases cited:

[10]     Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.

 

For the petitioner — O. Mandel; E. Amir.

For the respondent — S. Faisal.

 

JUDGMENT

 

President D. Beinisch

The President of the State has the power to pardon offenders and to lighten their sentences, pursuant to the provisions of s. 11(b) of Basic Law: The President of the State (hereinafter also: “the Basic Law”), which provides that “[t]he President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof.” Alongside this power, s. 12 of the Basic Law also provides that the signature of the President of the State on an official document – including a letter of pardon or regarding a lightening of a sentence – shall require the countersignature of the Prime Minister or of such other minister as the government shall decide. In a resolution dated 17 April 1949, the Government authorized the Minister of Justice to countersign the President’s official documents regarding pardons and the lightening of sentences (Notice Regarding Countersignature for the Signature of the President of the State, Yalkut Pirsumim [Government Publications] 1949, p. 248). The nature of the countersignature and the degree of discretion that the Minister of Justice may exercise in providing it are the subject of this further hearing.

The main facts

1.    The following facts provide the background for the discussion of the constitutional issue before us in the present case:

In 1996, the respondent, Nir Zohar (whose previous name was Nissim Tzarfati), was convicted of the crimes of murder, rape and kidnapping for the purpose of committing sexual crimes and was sentenced to life in prison. After he began to serve his sentence, while on a furlough from prison, he committed further crimes including extortion under aggravating circumstances, assault, false imprisonment, threatening, possession of a knife, and witness tampering. He received additional prison sentences for these acts.

In 2004, the respondent applied to the President of the State to have the duration of his prison term shortened. In accordance with the standard procedure at the office of the President of the State and the Ministry of Justice, the application was transferred to the Pardons Department at the Ministry of Justice. Pursuant to that procedure, the Pardons Department examines the application and submits its recommendation to the Minister of Justice. Based on this recommendation, the Minister of Justice submits his recommendation to the President of the State. If the recommendation is to grant the application, a letter of pardon or a document approving the lessen sentence is submitted, along with the recommendation, for the President’s signature. If the President grants the application for pardon or for a lesser sentence, the letter of pardon or the document approving the new sentence is delivered to the Minister of Justice for his countersignature. In the case before us, the Pardons Department examined the respondent’s application after receiving opinions from various parties, including, inter alia, the State Attorney, the Israel Police and the Prison Service. Pursuant to s. 29 of the Release from Imprisonment on Parole Law 5751-2001 (hereinafter: “the Parole Law”), a Special Parole Committee reviewed the respondent’s matter as well. The Committee was presented with the relevant information relating to the crimes for which the respondent was convicted and his behavior during the period of his imprisonment. The Committee decided that it was not appropriate to recommend a lighter sentence in light of the severity of the crimes for which the respondent was serving a life sentence and of the crimes he committed during the period of his incarceration. The Committee noted that a person serving a life sentence who seeks to have his sentence lightened should, when making the application, present himself as having behaved appropriately and should establish that there is a chance for a change in his behavior and provide a prediction regarding his future rehabilitation. These factors were not present in the respondent’s application.

2.    Then-Minister of Justice Tzipi Livni accepted the Parole Committee’s conclusion and recommended that the President of the State not grant the application for a lesser sentence. Notwithstanding the Minister of Justice’s recommendation, the then-President of the State, Moshe Katzav, decided to reduce the respondent’s sentence and to set it at 32 years of imprisonment. On 25 December 2005, the letter approving the reduction of the sentence was transmitted from the office of the President of the State for the signature of the Minister of Justice. The Minister, who had, as stated, recommended that the application for a lighter sentence not be granted, asked the President of the State for an explanation of the motivation for the decision to grant the respondent’s application. In response, the legal adviser to the President’s office replied that the decision was based on an improvement that had occurred in the respondent’s behavior. This response did not satisfy the Minister of Justice because – as was argued in the state’s response – neither the factual material provided to the President nor the series of recommendations made to the President mentioned any improvement in the respondent’s behavior. The President did not answer an additional request for clarification sent to him by the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice therefore refused to countersign as required pursuant to s. 12 of the Basic Law. The Ministers of Justice who served after Ms. Livni also refused to countersign the letter approving the lighter sentence.

In light of the Minister of Justice’s refusal to countersign, the respondent petitioned this Court, asking the Court to order the Minister of Justice to add her countersignature to the signature of the President of the State. Alternatively, the Court was asked to rule that the document approving the lighter sentence is valid even without the countersignature.

The judgment in the original petition

3.    The Court, by a majority of opinions, with Justice Rubinstein dissenting, granted the appeal and held that the Minister of Justice’s countersignature does not grant the Minister independent discretion as to whether to grant an application for a pardon or to reject it and does not give the Minister a right to veto the President’s decisions. According to the majority view, the countersignature is intended to ensure that all material relevant to the decision has been properly presented and that all actions preliminary to the pardon decision, which involve various administrative parties, have been taken in proper fashion. The majority held that if the President decides to grant the application after the Minister of Justice has ascertained that all the preliminary actions for the approval of a pardon have been carried out properly, the Minister of Justice has no discretion and he must join his countersignature to the President’s signature.

4.    In a broad and comprehensive decision, Justice Levy analyzed the pardon power and the substance of the Minister of Justice’s countersignature. Justice Levy’s position, according to which the countersignature is not intended to grant any decision-making power to the Minister of Justice with respect to pardon decisions, is based on his view regarding the nature of the pardon power and the unique position that the President of the State holds among the government authorities (Justice Levy’s opinion, at para. 9). As Justice Levy noted, the power to pardon is “an original Israeli creation” in the framework of which the President does not act as an executive authority, and the pardon is not an executive act. The President of the State, Justice Levy held, is accorded a position different from that of all other state authorities and the considerations he weighs in examining applications for pardon express a state and social interest based on universal ethics and national interests, not on political considerations, “the main part of which is based on day-to-day and passing matters” (ibid., at para. 10). “The normative environment” of the pardon power in Israeli law, Justice Levy noted, means that the President “alone has the discretion to decide whether and how to exercise it”; he does not act as an executive agency, he is not subject to any policy designed by the government and he “exercises his power in an independent manner” (ibid., at para. 13). The exclusive status of the President of the State and the unique characteristics of the power to pardon lead to the conclusion, according to Justice Levy, that “a clear distinction must be drawn between the government’s part in the pardon process – as the party making a recommendation at the beginning of the process – and the power of the President as the party who is the sole decision-maker at its end” (ibid.). Granting any discretion to the government in the pardon process, through the Minister of Justice’s countersignature, will – in Justice Levy’s view – lead to undesirable results. He wrote as follows:

‘The placement of a veto power regarding the President’s decisions in the hands of other parties can impact on the status of the institution of the presidency, to the point where it would lose its unique character. It could enable the exercise of improper leverage on the President, which would adversely affect his free exercise of discretion. The involvement of party politics in the judicial branch’s final determinations is a formula for the uprooting of the foundations of our democratic system and of the rule of law in its substantive sense. It can lead to a degradation of the judicial process, undermine the sense that justice is being done and do considerable damage to the public’s faith in the state authorities. Moreover, by eating away at the essential boundary between the executive branch and the courts, it threatens to distort justice’ (ibid., at para. 16).

Justice Levy rejected two possible explanations for the countersignature: one, that it is needed as a “connecting link”, the function of which is to enable indirect judicial review of the President’s pardon decisions; and the other, that the countersignature is required for the purpose of verifying the pardon and ratifying the formal constitutionality of the letter of pardon or of the letter approving the lightening of the sentence (ibid., at paras. 24 and 25). Justice Levy offered a third explanation, according to which the purpose of the countersignature is the following:

‘The countersignature is therefore intended to ensure that all the preliminary actions that administrative parties are required to carry out have been carried out properly, that all the relevant material has been collected and submitted to the President of the State for his review, and that the tools that the administrative authorities are charged with providing, and which the President requires for the purpose of making the decision, have been given to him. If the information has been found to be lacking or mistaken; if it is found that a party asking for a pardon has sought to deceive the President . . . ; if it is found that details that were relevant to the decision were omitted either accidentally or intentionally; if it is found that there was a defect in the recommendation given to the President . . . – in each such case and in others, the Minister’s function is to make certain that the needed correction is made before the Minister affixes, as he is required to do, his signature. And once his signature is affixed, it signifies to the administrative authorities that the road towards implementation of a properly grounded presidential decision has been cleared. Thus, the Minister does not interfere with the President’s discretion, but his function is to ensure that the President does have available to him all that is needed for the purpose of exercising the discretion that he has been given’ (ibid., at para. 28).

According to Justice Levy, the particular purpose of the countersignature is to eliminate the key concern involved in the grant of real discretion to the Minister of Justice, i.e., that there will be political interference in the pardon decisions. Political interference, Justice Levy held, “is likely to accord primacy to narrow interests, the promotion of which reflects a temporary opportunity, consistent with a random alignment of powers, over fundamental principles, which are by their nature far removed from the spirit of the times” (ibid., at para. 15). Political intervention, in the guise of a grant of discretion to the Minister of Justice, can also lead, in Justice Levy’s opinion, to a mixture of personal and general interests and to the exercise of the pardon power from a narrow governmental perspective in a manner that detracts from the objective that underlies the institution of pardon (ibid.).

5.    Justice Danziger concurred in Justice Levy’s position and noted that the “power of the President of the State to pardon offenders is a unique power which is held exclusively by the pardoning authority, and it is intended to grant the President, in this area, complete freedom to decide as he wishes and in accordance with his best understanding.” Justice Danziger therefore found that the “countersignature does not confer upon the government’s representative the status of a partner in the decision concerning the matter of pardons, and certainly does not grant the representative any power to decide regarding the pardon decisions made by the President of the State.” Like Justice Levy, Justice Danziger found that once all the relevant material has been laid before the President of the State, the government representative must countersign and has no discretion in carrying out this function.

6.    In contrast to the approach of the Justices holding the majority opinion, Justice Rubinstein held that the Minister of Justice has discretion to refrain from countersigning, but its exercise will “of course occur only in extremely exceptional circumstances” (Justice Rubinstein’s opinion, at para. 9; emphasis in the original - D.B.). Justice Rubinstein agreed that the countersignature serves as a form of review mechanism with respect to the pardon process, but in his view the purpose of the countersignature is more than that. According to him, the Minister of Justice is also authorized to examine the issue of whether irrelevant considerations had been involved in the President’s decision. At the basis of this conclusion was his assumption that “there is a need for review, for those occasions on which it is required, and for preventing the misuse – heaven forbid – of the power. The Minister’s countersignature must serve as a sort of ‘gatekeeper’ for the President” (ibid.). The signature, stated Justice Rubinstein, is not intended to replace or to limit the President’s broad discretion, but to rule out the exercise of discretion “which is unlawful in that it is defective” (ibid.).

7.    The Minister of Justice filed a petition for a further hearing on this judgment. On 5 February 2009, Vice-President Rivlin granted the petition and ordered a further hearing regarding the issues raised in the judgment. The present deliberation followed.

The arguments of the parties

8.    In the petition for a further hearing and articulated pleadings, the State Attorney’s office, acting on behalf of the Minister of Justice, argued that the majority opinion in the judgment had established a rule that contradicts the approach that has prevailed in Israeli law since the establishment of the State. This holding of the majority opinion, it was argued, transforms the President’s authority into an absolute and exclusive power in a manner that is inconsistent with the Israeli constitutional principle requiring checks and balances. In support of this argument, the State Attorney cited a series of this Court’s rulings and of writings of learned scholars on the subject, which indicate that the Minister of Justice has the authority to investigate the President’s decision regarding a pardon; to review it; to exercise discretion before countersigning the letter of pardon or an approval of a sentence reduction; and, as a practical matter, in exceptional circumstances, to prevent the pardon by refusing to provide the countersignature. According to this argument, a similar conclusion is to be drawn from the deliberations in the Knesset prior to the enactment of s. 12 of the Basic Law: The President of the State, which indicated that the Members of the Knesset had examined the possibility of adding letters of pardon to the list of documents that do not require a countersignature, but that this proposal was rejected. It was also argued that the Knesset Proceedings show that the Knesset was aware of the possibility that the relevant minister might refuse to sign and nevertheless chose to grant that minister the discretion that would allow him to oversee the President and thus prevent a situation in which a sensitive power would be conferred upon a single party without there being any process for reviewing his decisions. In this context, it was noted that the possibility of challenging the President’s decision indirectly would not constitute a suitable alternative to the direct review involved in a countersignature requirement.

In the articulated pleadings in the petition, the State Attorney’s representative also referred to the main argument on which the majority opinion is based – the concern regarding political intervention in judgments rendered by the judiciary. Her view was that there is no real cause for concern regarding such involvement since a court’s decision can be changed only when there is a double signature – one from the President and one from the Minister of Justice. In a case in which the Minister of Justice recommends that a petition be granted but the President does not accept the recommendation, the court’s decision remains in place. As such, it was noted, “a power that is within the discretion of the Minister of Justice may lead to the non-approval of the pardon – i.e., to non-intervention in the judicial authority’s determination – but never to the opposite” (emphasis in the original - D.B.). In addition, it was noted that the concern regarding political intervention is reduced in light of the fact that the Minister of Justice acts with transparency in a professional legal environment and his decisions are subject to parliamentary review and direct judicial review.

As a marginal point, it was argued in the name of the Minister of Justice that the judgment establishes a new rule and that an operative final order had been given without an order nisi having been issued and without the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General being given an opportunity to present their fundamental positions on the issue, which they are only able to raise now in the context of the further hearing.

9.    The argument was made in the respondent’s articulated pleadings that the judgment provides a suitable explanation of the scope of the Minister of Justice’s authority, which is limited to ensuring the propriety of the administrative process that precedes the President’s decision. The limited scope of the countersignature, the respondent argued, results from the exalted position of the institution of the presidency, which is undisputed. The President is not required to provide reasons for his decisions. It was further argued that the majority position does not contradict the prevailing approach in Israeli law and the decision merely overturned the “tradition” that had been adopted by Ministers of Justice in the past. Regarding the application for pardon submitted by the respondent, it was argued that the State had acknowledged in its pleadings that the material submitted to the President is the same as the material viewed by the Minister of Justice. Hence, the respondent argued, the current Minister of Justice should be ordered to add his signature to that of the President of the State and conclude the process of reducing the sentence.

Discussion

10.  This further hearing raises questions relating to the nature of the pardon power of the President of the State and the nature of the countersignature required for a decision to pardon or to lighten a sentence. The countersignature has been mentioned in the past in this Court’s case law, but its nature and the scope of the discretion granted to the Minister of Justice in the context thereof had not been examined directly or comprehensively until the judgment in the original petition. The precedential nature of the subjects discussed in the petition, as well as the fact that they relate to the exercise of a unique power granted to the President of the State, form the basis of this further hearing. I will first state that for the reasons described below, I have decided to join in the conclusions reached in Justice Rubinstein’s minority opinion in the judgment in the original petition. In my view, the majority opinion is very problematic.

Although the present deliberation focuses on the Minister of Justice’s countersignature, it also raises serious constitutional questions. A determination that the countersignature grants only limited discretion to the Minster of Justice (the view adopted by the majority opinion in the judgment in the original petition) or alternatively, that the Minister of Justice may, in exceptional circumstances, prevent the pardon through a refusal to provide a countersignature (as per Justice Rubinstein’s minority opinion) will have significant consequences regarding the power to pardon and regarding the institution of the presidency and its place among the state authorities. The dispute raises a number of questions necessitating the determination of basic presumptions as a starting point of the discussion: Is the exercise of the power to pardon subject to review? Is the elevated position of the President of the State such that the principle of separation of powers does not apply to the exercise of his authority? Does the fact that the power to pardon allows the President of the State to intervene in the activity of other branches affect the analysis of the nature of the countersignature? These are some of the questions that must be answered in our deliberation, which by its nature is influenced by various factors, including the unique characteristics of the power to pardon; the status in our regime of the party wielding the power to pardon, i.e., the President of the State; and the rules established in this Court’s case law regarding the ability to review the President’s decisions, either directly or indirectly.

11.  This is not the first time that the power to pardon has been discussed in depth by this Court. In a number of earlier judgments, basic principles were established with regard to the status of the President of the State as the holder of the power to pardon and criteria were formulated for the exercise of this power. The basic principles established in this case law will guide us as we examine the significance of the countersignature. Two basic principles, in particular, will inform our discussion. The first is that the power to pardon is “a part of the fabric of our democratic lives” and must therefore be interpreted “with a broad view” (FH 13/60 Attorney General v. Matana [1], at p. 442, per Acting President Agranat), as this phrase was interpreted by Justice A. Barak in HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], at p. 581). The significance of a “broad view” is that “we must view the presidential powers as part of the general distribution of powers among the State authorities” (ibid. [2], at p. 595). This means that in interpreting the power to pardon and the countersignature that accompanies it, we must take note of the system of government, the legal system, and the original intent behind the enactment of the Basic Law: President of the State, as well as the legal tradition that has developed since the establishment of the State through to the present time.

12.  The second principle, which is related and ancillary to the first, is to be found in a determination that has been established in our case law over the years – a determination that the institution of pardons in Israel, in the format that has taken shape under our system of government, is an original Israeli creation. It is true that the power to pardon is recognized in various systems of government and that the Israeli power to pardon was originally born prior to the establishment of the State, in art. 16 of the Palestine Order in Council of 1922 which delegated the English monarch’s pardoning power to the High Commissioner; however, in a long line of judgments, this Court has held that the power to pardon is no longer intrinsically related to the English monarch’s power to pardon, but is instead an original, independent and primary power (see, for example, HCJ 177/50 Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [3]; CrimA 185/59 Matana v. Attorney General [4]; Attorney General v. Matana [1]; Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2]). It is interesting to note that although in almost all of these key cases there were disagreements among the justices regarding the scope and nature of the power to pardon, the decisions did establish a clear rule: even though the English monarch’s power to pardon constituted the historical source of the Israeli power to pardon, Israeli courts are not “held captive by our legal heritage and that we lack the vigor to fashion our own constitutional doctrines” (ibid. [2], at p. 534, per President Shamgar).

This basic principle – of the creation of an original power of pardon, separate from the parallel British power – is of great significance in defining the characteristics of the power to pardon and the countersignature. At the basis of this principle is a determination that the President’s power to pardon is not in the nature of a prerogative, as is the English monarch’s power, the exercise of which is not subject to any qualification, limitation or review. This is because the powers and status of the President of Israel are not the same as the status and powers of the English monarch. This Court has previously held that because the President’s power to pardon is original, it must be interpreted in accordance with “Israeli conditions” and in accordance with the law followed in Israel and the normative environment in which the power is exercised in Israel.

13.  An examination of the pardon power from a “broad perspective”, as well as an examination of the impact of the system of government in Israel on the scope of the power and on the nature of the Minister of Justice’s countersignature, leads, in my view, to a different position from that presented by the majority justices in the judgment in the original petition. As stated, the judgment establishes that “the legislature’s instruction, in enacting the Basic Law: The President of The State, was that the President would enjoy independence in exercising his discretion pursuant to the law” (per Justice Levy, at para. 11). The majority justices therefore held that the Minister of Justice has no discretion when joining his countersignature to the President’s signature and the Minister’s function is one that is carried out in full at the stage preceding the decision: checking the completeness and veracity of the factual background presented to the President, which the President requires for deciding the petition. According to the justices concurring in the majority opinion, once the Minister of Justice has transferred the relevant factual material to the office of the President and the President’s decision has been made to either grant a pardon or approve the lightening of a sentence, the Minister is required to attach his signature to that of the President – even if the Minister believes that the application for a pardon or for a lighter sentence should not be granted and even if he believes that the President’s decision is extremely unreasonable or motivated by irrelevant considerations. In the view of the majority justices, the only way to review those decisions to pardon or to lighten a sentence that appear to be improper is through an indirect review of the President’s decision, if various parties within the executive branch were to refuse to carry out the President’s decision to pardon or to lighten the sentence.

In my view, the position of the majority justices is inconsistent with one of the fundamental principles of the democratic system in Israel. The majority position gives the President an absolute power, which remains unchecked and is subject to no review, in a manner that is inconsistent with the concept of checks and balances that characterizes Israeli government and Israeli democracy. It is precisely the uniqueness of the pardoning power – the exercise of which involves extra-judicial considerations of kindness and of mercy; which is not subject to any requirement that reasoning be provided; and the result of which might be intervention in and modification of the activity of any of the other three branches of government – that necessitates the existence of a control and review process, even if that process is reserved only for exceptional cases in which a concern arises that the President’s decision is tainted by an extreme degree of unreasonableness or is motivated by irrelevant considerations.

The judgment of the majority justices in the original petition would seem to confer upon the President of the State and his high office a degree of idealization that is inconsistent with the democratic perception of the Israeli regime. The President does indeed symbolize the state and he has a broad and exceptional power to cancel or modify the acts and decisions of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary with regard to pardons. The President of the State is not a part of any of these authorities, but our legal system nevertheless does not treat the individual who is the head of the state and who symbolizes its values as a personality with unique qualities that vest in him the powers of an absolute monarch. We are all obliged to respect the President, who expresses the sovereignty of the state, but we would all agree that he does not stand above all those values that are the product of the Israeli democratic system. The President is also a human being and we cannot ignore the fact that in unusual and exceptional circumstances – which it is to be hoped will never occur – the President can also, heaven forbid, do something which is out of the ordinary or deviational, having been motivated by irrelevant or improper considerations.

Indeed, those justices who supported the judgment in the original petition agree that it is proper, under appropriate circumstances, to maintain a review process regarding the President’s decision. The principal disagreement turns on the question of whether the main review mechanism is to be found in the countersignature, as my colleague Justice Rubinstein believes, or whether it is to be found, as my colleagues Justice Levy and Justice Danziger held, in a review of the administrative measures that may be carried out after the pardon decision has been made.

As stated, and as will be elucidated below, the mechanism that ensures that there is a review, and which is in conformity with the main principles of the democratic system of government in Israel, is the Minister of Justice’s countersignature and the discretion granted to the Minister in the framework of that signature. A consultation and preparation mechanism is available to the Minister of Justice prior to the time at which he formulates his position regarding the countersignature. This mechanism provides the Minister with the professional tools needed for assessing the petitions for pardon for the purpose of formulating his recommendation to the President of the State. This professional mechanism operates with transparency and is subject to the rules that apply to all actions of administrative agencies. This enables parliamentary and judicial review of the exercise of the Minister of Justice’s discretion; this review is not dependent on the decisions of various parties within the executive branch to either uphold or refrain from upholding a pardon decision. Such review and control should be exercised in the spirit of the unique power granted to the President of the State, taking note of his exalted position in Israel. As will be described below, in my view, the type of review of the power to pardon that is expressed in the countersignature is not the equivalent of a “veto” right held by the Minister of Justice as my colleagues, the majority justices in the judgment in the original petition, believe; rather, it is the equivalent of a discretionary authority, the exercise of which is subject to the exercise of discretion by the President of the State.

14.  The following interpretative discussion begins with the language of the statute and the manner in which the power to pardon and the countersignature have been interpreted in this Court’s case law, with the comments made by Members of Knesset during the process of the enactment of the Basic Law, and with the writings of scholars who addressed the issue. A review of all three indicates that the President of the State was indeed given broad power to pardon offenders or to lighten their sentences, but at the same time, the Minister of Justice was given discretion, the aim of which is to enable parliamentary review and indirect judicial review over the exercise of the President’s power. This conclusion is also supported, as we will see below, by the basic principles that apply to the pardoning power under Israeli law. These basic principles, in my view, lead to a conclusion that this is not an unlimited power. Notwithstanding the broad scope of the power to pardon, it must be viewed against the background of Israel’s system of government and in light of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, there is – and there should be – a review process for the exercise of the power to pardon, which is expressed in the Minister of Justice’s countersignature. We will also examine, below, the question of whether the practice that has developed with respect to the exercise of the power to pardon reaches the level of a constitutional convention – a convention according to which the pardon or the lessening of a sentence takes effect only upon agreement between the President of the State and the Minister of Justice. We will conclude the discussion with a reference to the concern that lies at the basis of the majority view in the decision: the fear of political intervention in the pardon process.

Interpretation of the statutory provisions of ss. 11 and 12 of the Basic Law: President of the State

15.  As stated, the original source of the Israeli power to pardon can be found in art. 6 of the 1922 Palestine Order in Council, by virtue of which the High Commissioner was authorized to pardon offenders and to grant releases from fines and sentences. (For the history of the Basic Law: President of the State and interpretation thereof, see M. Landau, Commentary on the Basic Laws: Basic Law: President of the State (1994), at p. 33 (hereinafter: “Commentary on the Basic Law”). With the establishment of the State, the High Commissioner’s powers were transferred to the Provisional Government. The Constituent Assembly, which became the First Knesset, enacted the Transition Law, 5709-1949 (hereinafter: “Transition Law”) and determined in s. 6 thereof that the President of the State would be authorized to pardon offenders and to reduce their sentences. This section was repealed in 1964, with the enactment of the Basic Law: President of the State, when it was replaced by the power to pardon prescribed in s. 11(b) of the Basic Law.

Section 11 of the Basic Law deals with the functions and powers of the President of the State. Thus, for example, s. 11(a)(1) provides that the President “will sign every law, other than a law relating to his powers”; he will “receive from the Government a report on its meetings” (s. 11(a)(3)); he will “sign such conventions with foreign states as have been ratified by the Knesset” (s. 11(a)(5)); and will “carry out every function assigned to him by law in connection with the appointment and removal from office of justices and other office-holders” (s. 11(a)(6)). Alongside the President’s functions, s. 11(b) establishes the President’s power to pardon and to lighten sentences:

11(b).          The President of the State shall have power to pardon offenders and to lighten penalties by the reduction or commutation thereof.

The President’s broad power is qualified by the countersignature requirement in s. 12 of the Basic Law:

 

12. The signature of the President of the State on an official document, other than a document connected with the formation of a Government, shall require the countersignature of the Prime Minister or of such other Minister as the Government may decide.

Section 12 does not distinguish between the different types of official documents for which a countersignature is required, other than establishing an exception in the case of a document concerning the creation of a government or the dissolution of the Knesset. It thus also establishes a requirement for a countersignature of pardon documents or documents approving a lightened sentence.

Section 11 creates a distinction between the functions assigned to the President and the power given to him to pardon offenders. This distinction is both linguistic (the President’s functions are described as mandatory acts, as opposed to the pardoning power which is described as including a discretionary component) and structural (s. 11(a) is devoted to the President’s functions, while s. 11(b) is devoted to the power to pardon). This distinction between the functions and powers has two main ramifications. First, the distinction affects the scope of the discretion given to the President. While the President’s functions are mandatory functions, which he must carry out by virtue of the law and which do not allow him any exercise of discretion, the power to pardon grants presidential discretion: he may exercise it in a particular case or he may refrain from exercising it (see Landau, Commentary on the Basic Law, supra, at p. 23). Second, it has been argued in the past that the distinction between functions and powers has implications for the countersignature and the discretion that is conferred in its framework. In relation to a function which involves no real discretion, the countersignature also lacks any discretionary component and remains, at its core, a ritual and formal act. By contrast, when the President is authorized to exercise discretion, as he does in the case of the power to pardon, the signing minister is also accorded corresponding discretion (see Landau, Commentary on the Basic Law, supra, at p. 50; on the constitutional framework of pardons in Israel, see also Y.H. Klinghoffer, 27 Ha’uma 320 (1969), at pp. 325-26, text included in an essay by L. Sebba, Personal Pardon and General Pardon – Legal and Phenological Aspects 105 (Doctoral Dissertation in Law – Hebrew University, 1975)).

16.  Support for this position can be found in the two types of documents for which a countersignature is not required: documents relating to the formation of a government and a document in which the President resigns from his position. It is undisputed that in these two areas there is no need – and that it is in fact undesirable – to grant a minister or the government any discretion in the form of a countersignature requirement. This is so because it would not be desirable to give the government or one of its ministers any discretion that could impact on the President’s decision to charge a particular Member of Knesset with the task of forming a government. Similarly, as a matter of course, no governmental discretion should be exercised regarding a President’s decision to resign from his position. It may be understood from those documents for which a countersignature is not required that when the legislature believed that review accompanied by an exercise of discretion by a minister or by the government was not required, the relevant documents were removed from the purview of s. 12 of the Basic Law. Thus, the decision to leave the pardon documents within the scope of s. 12 means that the signing minister is given substantive discretion and the parliamentary responsibility is transferred to his shoulders. Indeed, during the process of the enactment of the Basic Law, a number of Members of Knesset submitted reservations regarding s. 12 and asked to include pardon documents and documents approving the lessening of sentences in the list of documents that do not require a countersignature so that the President “would not be limited and blocked in any manner whatsoever” (in the words of MK Y. Kushnir, Knesset Proceedings 40 (1964), at 2085). These reservations were rejected. Then-Minister of Justice D. Yosef, clarified that the Minister of Justice would not have a veto right over pardon decisions, but the President and the Minister of Justice would have a professional and refined relationship. In the words of D. Yosef:

‘The Minister of Justice, like others, has a relationship with the President and he also knows what is stated in the law. He knows that if the President insists on a particular matter, the Minister of Justice cannot just say “no”. In such a case, they will discuss the matter between themselves, and each will try to persuade the other one, but in any event, the decision to grant a pardon is in the hands of the President alone, although the Minister of Justice must verify his signature’ (ibid., at p. 2086).

17.  This Court’s case law has adopted a similar position. Although, as my colleague Justice Levy noted, the Court has not dealt directly with the nature and scope of the countersignature, a reading of the decisions dealing with the power to pardon and the Minister of Justice’s countersignature indicates that the Court has presumed – as a matter needing neither proof nor preliminary discussion – that the Minister of Justice may exercise discretion before he affixes his signature to letters of pardon or to documents approving the lightening of sentences. Thus, for example, in Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [3], Justice S. Agranat noted the following with regard to the power to pardon pursuant to the Transition Law, which was later replaced by the Basic Law: President of the State:

‘The supervision exercised by the person standing at the head of the state’s legal system – the Minister of Justice – can be seen as a sufficient guarantee of protection of the public and of the preservation of the good name of the prosecutor’s profession. That Minister is in a position to recommend granting a pardon, since in the end, he is the one who is authorized to uphold – if he sees fit to do so – the President’s signature on a pardon letter’ (ibid. [3], at pp. 755-756).

Similarly, in Attorney General v. Matana [1], Justice Z. Berinson noted that:

‘The final decision [regarding pardons] is in the President’s hands, but it appears that he is guided by the investigation and preparatory work which is carried out by the governmental branch, and he acts in accordance with its advice. It transpires that from a practical perspective, this branch is very involved in each specific decision and regarding the general pardon policy, and in any event, without its after-the-fact consent, as manifested in the Minister’s countersignature, the State President is unable to grant a pardon’ (ibid. [1], at p. 472).

In the same case, the Acting President (S. Agranat) noted the following:

‘Every act of pardon on the part of the President requires a countersignature of the Prime Minister or of one of the ministers in the government . . . . This means that even if the decision to pardon or to reduce a sentence must be the personal decision of the President, it is also conditional upon the recommendation of the minister concerned. This minister will ordinarily be the Minister of Justice, who has the means of conducting a detailed investigation into the circumstances of the case before submitting his recommendation to the President. It is clear that this recommendation, and therefore the decision to pardon as well, are subject to review by the Knesset and it is this possibility which must be regarded as the guarantee laid down by law against the danger referred to’ (ibid. [1], at p. 454).

See also the ruling of Deputy President Ben-Porat, who cited with approval these comments of the Acting President and noted that “[t]here is therefore someone who is answerable to the Knesset (the Prime Minister or the ratifying minister) and this safeguard is now fortified by the possibility of challenging the pardoning decision indirectly” (Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], at p. 581). Finally, Justice Cheshin held unequivocally, in HCJ 706/94 Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [5], as follows:

‘We should recall that a letter of pardon – like any official document that the President handles, other than a document regarding the Knesset’s dissolution – requires a countersignature by the Prime Minister or by another minister as decided by the government (s. 12 of the Basic Law: President of the State). An act of pardon or of a reduction of a sentence is therefore a matter of combining one opinion with another: that of the minister with that of the President. Only when there is this combination of views will there be a pardon or a lightening of a sentence.’

18.  Similar comments have been made by most of the scholars who have dealt with the issue. Thus, for example, Prof. C. Klein has noted that the countersignature “symbolizes the assumption of political responsibility by the minister who gives the countersignature” (C. Klein, ‘Panel Discussion on the Subject of Pardons’, 15 Mishpatim 9 (1985), at p. 6). See also Professor Y.H. Klinghoffer’s comments at a symposium on the pardon power:

‘Can these two members of the government – the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice – refuse the President of the State and refrain from providing a countersignature? The problem exists not only with regard to the grant of a pardon; it also relates to the actions of the President in general. I believe that the answer depends on the nature of the President’s action. If the President is required by law to take this action – if the action is, for example the appointment of a justice whom the current Appointments Committee . . . has proposed – then there is also a requirement to provide the countersignature. On the other hand, if the law grants the President discretion regarding a particular matter – if the President can choose, as he wishes, whether or not take the action – then the member of the government has the same discretion and the same choice with respect to the countersignature. The power to pardon offenders is a power involving discretion. Therefore, the member of the government may, in accordance with his discretion, refuse to provide his signature and by thus refusing, prevent the pardon from taking effect. This also appears to be the correct interpretation, when one considers that the purpose of the countersignature . . . is that the government bear parliamentary responsibility for the acts of the head of state’ (Y.H. Klinghoffer, The Constitutional Framework of the Pardon – Symposium on Pardons in Israel (1968), at p. 6).

See also the position taken by A. Rubinstein and B. Medina in their book, Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (2005), at pp. 1062-63. See also Z. Segal, Israeli Democracy (1998) at p. 196; B. Bracha, “The Constitutional Position, the Pardoning Power and Other Powers of the President of the State of Israel”, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (vol. 9, 1979) 190, at pp. 202-203 (1979). See also the comments of Justice (Emeritus) Landau in his Commentary on the Basic Law:

‘It could have been argued that the purpose of the countersignature is only to confirm the validity of the President’s signature on the letter of pardon, which is given only after the President has formulated his position and expressed it in the written document, to which the addition of a countersignature is a function that is imposed on the Minister as a requirement. However, this is not the accepted view and it is also not the custom that has developed concerning this subject. The custom is that the Minister carries out an active role of his own in the process of granting or refusing to grant the pardon. The main reason given for this version of the significance of the countersignature is that the Minister bears parliamentary responsibility with respect to this matter and he must explain to the Knesset, when such explanation is needed, why the pardon was given to a particular party, or why the pardon was not given’ (Commentary on the Basic Law, supra, at p. 42).

19.  A review of the statutory language and interpretations thereof regarding the power to pardon and the countersignature, both in this Court’s case law and scholarly writing on the issue, indicates that the main position adopted under our law is that the countersignature requirement confers discretion upon the Minister of Justice. This is the case even if we allow that the question of the status of the countersignature has been discussed only in dicta accompanying a discussion of the power to pardon, rather than being ruled upon directly. This interpretation, as we will see below, also conforms to the practice that has developed, as a practical matter, with respect to the exercise of the power to pardon. The central importance of this interpretation can be found, in my view, not only in the fact that it conforms to the statutory language and customary practice, but also, primarily, in the fact that it is consistent with the basic principles of Israel’s system of government.

The normative framework of the power to pardon, in light of the fundamental principles of Israel’s system of government

20.  As stated, the source in our law of the power to pardon is the power established in the 1922 Palestine Order in Council in the framework of the British Mandate for Palestine. The circumstances of the birth of the Israeli pardoning power under the shadow of English law has engaged this Court since its earliest days, beginning with decisions that examined the new state’s pardoning power, which was established in the Transition Law and, later, in the Basic Law (see Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [3]; Matana v. Attorney General [4]; Attorney General v. Matana [1]; Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2]). The question that runs through this Court’s case law concerns the impact of the English monarch’s power to pardon on the power to pardon in Israel, in light of the transfer, with certain changes, of the High Commissioner’s powers to the Provisional Government, and with the establishment of the State, to the President of the State. The question arose in our case law in the context of a discussion of the scope of the pardoning power. Thus, for example, in Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [3], a question arose as to whether the grant of a pardon meant an erasure of the crime with all its consequences; in Matana v. Attorney General [4] and in Attorney General v. Matana [1], the Court examined the issue of whether the pardoning power also includes the power to commute a prison sentence to a suspended sentence; and in Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], the question arose as to whether the pardoning power allowed the President of the State to pardon a person before he had been convicted at trial, based on the pardon of the General Security Service men in the “Bus 300 Affair”.

21.  A review of these decisions and other decisions examining the power to pardon reveals that a clear rule has been formulated over the years, according to which the Israeli pardoning power is not a direct continuation of that of the English monarch. “I cannot say,” Justice Z. Berinson stated in Attorney General v. Matana [1], “that the Israeli legislature, in granting power to pardon to the President of the State in the Hebrew language, intended to include in it all the content that the concept of pardon had acquired over the generations in English law – a pardon which comes entirely from the Crown, without any qualification or limitation, by virtue of an ancient royal prerogative” (ibid. [1], at p. 976). This Court has held that the Transition Law, and following it, the Basic Law, “are original Israeli laws” and the President’s powers prescribed in them are “autonomous and original. The Israel legislature, far from ‘copying or omitting’” had built an “independent structure”, “which must be construed as such by the courts” (Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2] at p. 594, per Justice Barak). In the framework of this independent structure, the pardoning power was given to the President of the State who, according to s. 1 of the Basic Law, stands at the head of the state. The determination that the President stands at the head of the state is primarily symbolic and serves to emphasize the parliamentary nature of the State of Israel, as distinguished from states with a presidential system of government, in which the President heads the executive branch (see Landau, Commentary on the Basic Law, supra, at p. 12). The power to pardon grants the institution of the presidency the status of a sort of separate authority– “the pardoning authority,” as Justice Cohn called it – which is conferred on the President of the State as the entity who “in his person, represents the State itself” (Matana v. Attorney General [4], at pp. 463 and 465 respectively).

The nature of the Israeli institution of the presidential pardon, as an independent authority which is detached from the pardoning power of the English monarch, means that the power to pardon should not be viewed as a presidential prerogative, the exercise of which is free of any qualifications or limitations. The English prerogative power is based, as is known, on the fact that the English monarch is perceived as being the source of justice and law, which is not the case with the President of the State under our system of government. At the same time, the decision to confer the power to pardon on the President of the State, who does not stand at the head of the executive branch in Israel, means that the pardoning power should not be seen as one which is controlled by the executive branch, even if it has executive characteristics. The pardoning power falls between these two ends of the spectrum. It does not grant the executive branch any extra weight in the pardon process, but it also does not place exclusive and absolute power in the hands of the President. The pardoning power, like many governmental powers in democracies in general and the Israeli system of government in particular, is the outcome of a delicate balancing act. The Israeli statute, as the above discussion shows, favors the middle road and grants the President of the State a broad power which may be exercised in accordance with the President’s discretion, but it is accompanied by processes that provide for the review of the exercise of that power. The key review process, as described below, is the countersignature requirement.

22.  The pardoning power and the processes for reviewing the exercise of that power are directly tied to the status of the President of the State in Israel. The President symbolizes the state and its democratic system of government and represents social and national unity, as expressed in the series of functions that are given to him, which demonstrate his official position.

It is not for nothing that the power to pardon is given to the President of the State, the individual who has the ability to weigh considerations that are not limited by the boundaries of the black letter law. Indeed, the pardoning power is a unique and special power. It is not exercised in accordance with fixed rules and the discretionary element is central to it. The exercise of the power combines considerations of kindness and mercy, which involve an element of forgiveness and absolution, together with considerations relating to the good of the public as a whole. “The key concept behind the pardoning power,” Deputy President Agranat wrote in Attorney General v. Matana [1], “is that in the use of this power there is a note of forgiveness and atonement; its exercise involves the element of mercy, as opposed to the element of strict law; the significance of this act is that a kindness is done for the person who is pardoned” (ibid. [1], at p. 445). For this reason this Court has held, in its case law, that we require “special legal rules” when we examine pardon decisions, since “we cannot nor would it be appropriate to apply [to pardoning considerations] the same administrative legal rules that ordinarily apply to the decisions of other government or administrative authorities” (Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [5], at p. 414, per Justice Cheshin).

23.  Nevertheless, we should recall that the unique nature of the power to pardon lies not only in the considerations that are weighed when the power is exercised; it is also evidenced by the fact that the pardoning power, by its nature, involves intervention in the activity of the other state authorities. The grant of a pardon or the reduction of a sentence imposed on an offender involves intervention in a determination made by the judicial branch, which has rendered a judgment and imposed a penalty. It is also an intervention in the work of the executive branch, which has investigated and tried the person and is responsible for the execution of the sentence. In certain cases, the grant of a pardon or the lessening of a sentence is also an intervention in the activity of the legislative branch. This is the case, for example, when a statute establishes minimum sentences for a particular crime or requires that a suspended sentence be imposed, and their imposition is thwarted by the pardon. The combination of the broad discretion involved in the exercise of the power to pardon and the power held by the President of the State to change decisions and determinations made by the other branches is what makes the power to pardon a special power with unique strength. In effect, the question to be determined in this further hearing is whether this unique nature of the pardoning power justifies its exemption from the review processes that are standard in the Israeli system of government, the review and control exercised by the Knesset and the judicial branch being chief among them.

In my view, the answer to this is a negative one. Indeed, it cannot be said that the pardoning power is the only governmental power which, when exercised by one branch of government, has the effect of modifying the acts of other branches. However, it is generally the case that in order to preserve the basic principle of “checks and balances” that is standard under democratic rule, the work of one branch is, at different levels, subject to the review exercised by the other branches. Therefore, the view that the President of the State is not subject to any means of review when exercising the power to pardon conflicts with the letter and the spirit of the Basic Law and with the parliamentary nature of the Israeli system of government, which is a “system that recognizes an organizational separation between the branches but supports strong cooperation among them” (Claude Klein, “On the Legal Definition of a Parliamentary System and on Israeli Parliamentarism” in 5 Mishpatim 308 (1974), at p. 315). Such a position would undermine the principle of separation of powers that is a foundation of the Israeli system of government and requires, on the one hand, a separation of powers between the various branches, and on the other hand, the exercise of mutual control among them (see Rubinstein and Medina, Constitutional Law, supra, at pp. 127-128). The basis of the idea of the separation of powers is not a “dictatorship of each branch within its own framework”; rather, there is a “mutual check and balance among the various branches. There are no walls between the branches – rather, there are bridges of checks and balances” (HCJ 73/85 “Kach” Party v. Chairman of the Knesset [6], at p. 158, per Justice Barak). A determination that the President of the State exercises the power to pardon independently, without being subject to substantive review – the major component of which is, in my view, the discretion given to the Minister of Justice in the framework of the countersignature – undermines one of the main principles of the Israeli system of government and would transform the power to pardon into an absolute power that has no place in a democratic regime. In a similar context, Justice Barak quoted the words of Justice Douglas to the effect that absolute powers are “the beginning of the end of liberty” (Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], at p. 588). As President Shamgar noted in that case, “the conferment and exercise of all power can and should properly be subjected to supervision and review” (ibid. [2], at p. 562). This rationale is valid with respect to governmental powers in democratic regimes in general, and also to a power given to the President of the State despite, and precisely because of, his exalted position in our State. Justice Barak’s remarks in Barzilai v. Government of Israel are particularly apt:

‘During the era of absolute rule, when the power of pardon was wielded by the sovereign himself, there would have been little point in examining the division of authority among the different governmental organs. The ruler held supreme authority, and was therefore entitled to grant a pardon (individual or general) when so disposed, before or after conviction or the conduct of an investigation. It is different in a democratic constitutional regime. The sovereignty there lies with the people, the ruler is no longer omnipotent, and the rule itself is divided among the different authorities. Each has to function within its own sphere, though in general synchronization with the others and subject to mutual checks and balances. It is not in keeping with the democratic character of the regime that any authority, be it the President himself, should hold a paramount power which enables it to change a decision of any of the other authorities which have acted within their responsibility in the framework of criminal proceedings. Such a power may be fitting for an absolute ruler who wishes to show grace to his subjects, but is alien to a holder of high office who wants to serve his subjects’ (ibid. [2], at p. 601).

24.  Moreover, the power to pardon not only stands against the background of the principle of the separation of powers; the power expresses that principle since it is a type of control over the actions of the state authorities. Thus, for example, the power to pardon allows the President of the State to act with the flexibility that is sometimes required (see, regarding this matter, Leon Shelef, “Prison Ends with a Pardon”, 44(1) HaPraklit 72 (2008-2010), at pp. 72-73). A good example of this is the power to limit the sentences of those who have been given life sentences. This power to pardon also allows the President to weigh considerations that the various authorities cannot consider in carrying out their functions, which include considerations of kindness and mercy, or considerations that can justify lessening a sentence due to a person’s physical or mental condition. In addition, the pardoning power enables the “correction” of a criminal conviction when there is a concern that there has been a miscarriage of justice or a legal error. Although it is acceptable to raise such claims during a retrial proceeding in our legal system, they can also be relevant to the exercise of the pardoning power (see also the comments of Justice Agranat in Reuven v. Chairman and Members of Law Committee [3], at p. 747, surveying the development of the pardon in England as a means for correcting an improper conviction; see also Rubinstein and Medina, Constitutional Law, supra, at pp. 1064-1066).

25.  It would therefore be wrong to detach the pardoning power from the separation of powers principle. Indeed, the President of the State enjoys a special status as the “head of state”; he does not belong to any of the other branches of government and “[h]e is a kind of additional authority to those four already existing (the legislative, executive, judicial and supervisory authorities)” (Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], per Justice A. Barak, at p. 605). However, this status of the President of the State, as well as the fact that the pardoning power is a unique power, are not sufficient to establish that the power is absolute and not subject to review by the other branches (compare Rubinstein and Medina, Constitutional Law, supra, at p. 1061).

At the same time, although the status of the President of the State and the unique aspects of the power to pardon do not justify deviation from the basic principle in a democratic regime recognizing the importance of mutual review, they have an impact on the nature of the review that is carried out by the other branches. It is sufficient in this context to recall, for example, the nature of judicial review of the President of the State, which consists only of indirect review. As is known, by virtue of s. 13(a) of the Basic Law, no legal action can be taken against the President. However, as Justice Cheshin noted, “the statute directs that the President is immune; the statute does not direct that the President’s actions are immune. And indeed, the President’s actions in the legal realm are neither above the law nor external to it, from which it follows that they are subject to review by the courts” (Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [5], at p. 412; emphasis in the original - D.B.).

26.  The purpose of the countersignature should be viewed against the background of what has been stated above. It expresses the principle according to which “no action is taken in the state for which there is no responsibility (political or legal)” (Klein, “Panel Discussion on the Subject of Pardons”, supra, at p. 16). The countersignature is intended to enable parliamentary review of the exercise of the pardoning power by the President of the State, who does not appear before the Knesset, is not required to report to the Knesset, and takes action at his own discretion. When the Minister of Justice’s signature is joined to that of the President, the Knesset has the ability to supervise the President’s actions by means of the Minister of Justice, who is able to report to the Knesset regarding the pardon decision. As Minister of Justice D. Yosef noted during the Knesset’s deliberations on the second and third readings of the proposed Basic Law: President of the State, although the pardon is the President’s decision, “parliamentary review of the Minister of Justice’s recommendation to the President is appropriate. The President cannot be reviewed with respect to his decisions, but the Minister of Justice can be reviewed regarding his recommendations” (Knesset Proceedings 40 (1964), at 2086). For a similar view, see L. Sebba’s comments in his treatise on the pardoning power:

‘In a state which is based on parliamentary rule, it is standard to enable the legislative branch to supervise what has been done by the executive branch. The President of the State . . . does, from a certain perspective, stand at the head of the executive branch, although he is not entirely identified with it. Since the President of the State, taking into consideration his high office, does not appear before the Knesset and does not report to it, there is no way for the Knesset to receive reports on his actions or to review them. However, if a confirmation from the Government (or from one of its representatives) is attached to the President’s decision, the Government (or the representative) will be charged with defending this decision’ (L. Sebba, Personal Pardon and General Pardon, supra, at p. 243).

27.  Naturally, it is clear that if the Minister of Justice was obligated to accept the President’s decisions on the subject of pardons without objection or appeal, the Minister’s review (or that of the Government or Knesset) would have no force. Review, as described, is possible only if the Minister of Justice has discretion regarding the decision as to whether or not to attach a countersignature. Thus, “the Minister bears the parliamentary and public responsibility for his signature, and it cannot be imposed on him if he is unable to exercise discretion regarding the matter” (see Rubinstein and Medina, Constitutional Law, supra, at pp. 1062-1063). For this reason, it cannot be said that the countersignature is intended only to verify the President’s signature or to confirm that the administrative acts preceding the Minister of Justice’s recommendation to the President were properly executed. Regarding these two matters, what would be the reason for there to be review, if the Minister of Justice were obligated, at the end of the process, to attach his signature even if he believes that the application for pardon should not have been approved? Only real discretion will allow for the full execution of the review process involved in the countersignature. This was the position taken by Knesset member Y. Shoffman, who sought to exclude pardon documents from the list of documents requiring a countersignature, during the discussion of the second and third reading of the proposed law:

‘The idea [of the countersignature] is that the President of the State does not bear political responsibility, because political responsibility is borne by the Government, and therefore any document that he produces must also receive the Government’s or a minister’s countersignature; and if the Knesset finds that this document is incorrect – it will call upon the Government to bear political responsibility, not the President. This is the idea of this clause, and as I said, it is in full conformity with the entire structure of the institution of the President of the State, as we understood it in the proposed law’ (Knesset Proceedings 40 (1964), at 2084).

28.  An acknowledgement of the Minister of Justice’s discretion regarding the decision whether to attach his signature does not lead to the conclusion that the Minister is a full partner in the pardon decisions. The power to pardon is indeed conferred upon the President of the State and he is the principal authority in this regard. The Minister of Justice carries out an important function within the pardon process, but he must exercise his discretion subject to the fact that the primary power is given to the President. Although the Minister of Justice’s discretion is not limited to the issue of verifying the President’s signature or ascertaining that the factual infrastructure required for the President’s decision is complete, this does not mean that there are no limitations on such discretion. The Minister of Justice’s ability to refuse to affix a countersignature must be limited to exceptional and unusual situations. Generally, these will arise only when the Minister is persuaded that the President’s decision has been influenced by irrelevant considerations, was not made in good faith or suffers from a fundamental material flaw.

29.  A similar interpretation regarding the significance of the countersignature and the manner in which the Minister of Justice’s discretion is exercised can be found in Attorney General’s Guideline No. 4.4002 (1 May 1975, 1 June 2003) entitled “Countersignature for the President’s Signature on Pardons” (Attorney General M. Shamgar’s guideline, and a later guideline of Attorney General E. Rubinstein). The Guideline states that the Minister of Justice has the power to refuse to countersign, although the situations in which this may occur are unusual and extreme. The Attorney General’s Guideline, to which we will return below, states that the rule is that the countersignature will be added. There will “not be many” situations in which the Minister of Justice will refuse to countersign and the “exception in which the Minister expresses his opinion to the President that he is not prepared to provide the countersignature must be that exceptional and extreme situation in which the Minister feels that as a matter of conscience, he cannot take part in the act of pardoning and he cannot defend it at all, from a public or parliamentary perspective.”

30.  The countersignature is, first and foremost, intended to enable parliamentary review of the exercise of the pardoning power. However, alongside parliamentary review, the countersignature also enables indirect judicial review of the power to pardon through a direct attack on the actions of the Minister of Justice. This review is carried out on the basis of the reasons formulated in this Court’s case law. Since the Minister of Justice’s signature is required on every letter of pardon or approval of the lessening of a sentence, indirect judicial review does not depend on decisions taken by elements within the executive branch to uphold or refuse to uphold the pardon decision, as proposed in the opinion of my colleague, Justice Levy. Rather, review is made possible, in principle, with each exercise of the Minister of Justice’s discretion. It should be further noted,            as a side point, that the possibility raised by Justice Levy, to the effect that the review mechanism will operate through the bodies involved in the execution of the pardon, who may refuse to carry out the President’s pardon decision, is not a practical one. Such a scenario would actually confer upon these authorities a power that has not been given to them, the power to review the President’s exercise of discretion.

31.  In conclusion, an examination of the normative framework of the pardoning power in Israel leads to the conclusion that the basic principles of the Israeli system of government mandate review processes regarding the exercise of the power to pardon by the President of the State, which are expressed in the Minister of Justice’s countersignature. The review processes, as noted above, do not equate the power of the Minister of Justice to that of the President of the State; rather, the Minister has the status of an authority who assists the President of the State and can, in exceptional, special and unusual cases, prevent the implementation of a pardon.

This interpretation, which views the countersignature as a tool that enables direct parliamentary review and indirect judicial review of the power to pardon, is not, as stated, foreign to Israeli law. It conforms to the language of the Basic Law and is consistent with its legislative history. It comports with Israeli case law and the writings of most scholars who have dealt with the subject. Moreover, the practice that developed over the years regarding the treatment of application for pardons is such that the power to pardon is exercised in the spirit of this interpretation. According to this practice, the Minister of Justice takes an active part in the pardon process; the standard perception, as it has been expressed in reality and as it is presented in the state’s response, is that a decision to pardon or to lighten a sentence can be carried out only with the joint consent of both the President of the State and the Minister of Justice. Proof can be found in the fact that prior to the respondent’s case, there had been no incidents of irreconcilable differences of opinion between the President of the State and the Minister of Justice and they always found a way to exercise the power to pardon in a manner acceptable to both of them. This, of course, does not mean that they were always initially in agreement on the matter. However, it does show that the President of the State and the Minister of Justice felt an obligation to engage in a dialogue and eventually come to an agreement. It may be assumed that this consent meant that the Minister has sometimes retreated from his original position and that sometimes it is the President of the State who has accepted the Minister of Justice’s recommendation.

Indeed, the decision-making processes for pardon applications in Israel are mostly based on a set of customs that developed over the years. This is the case regarding the relationship between the President of the State and the Minister of Justice as well as with regard to the work of the Pardons Department at the Ministry of Justice, whose functions are not anchored in law but in custom. As is known, although applications for pardon are submitted to the President’s residence, they are transferred to the Pardons Department at the Ministry of Justice (see Attorney General’s Guideline no. 4.400 (1 July 1974, 6 March 2003, 8 May 2003), entitled “Procedure for Handling Pardon Applications”). Pardon applications submitted by those tried by a military tribunal or a military court are transferred to the office of the Minister of Defense for his opinion. The Pardons Department at the Ministry of Justice is responsible for preparing all the preliminary clarification stages, after which its recommendation is transmitted to the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice examines the Department’s recommendation and formulates his recommendation to the President of the State. If the Minister of Justice’s recommendation is to grant the petition, a draft letter of pardon or a draft of a document approving a lessened sentence is attached to the recommendation. If, after the President reviews the recommendation, he chooses to reject it, the pardon is not executed. If the President chooses to grant the pardon application, he signs the letter of pardon and transmits it to the Minister of Justice who will affix his countersignature.

This set of procedures, part of which, as stated, is anchored in s. 12 of the Basic Law and part of which is the result of the development of the work procedures that are anchored in the Attorney General’s Guidelines, raises a question that does not necessarily need to be decided in the context of this discussion, viz., whether or not a “constitutional convention” has been created over the years, whereby the Minister of Justice has discretion with regard to attaching a countersignature, and a pardon decision or a decision to lighten a sentence is reached only with the consent of both officials.

Constitutional convention

32.  A constitutional convention, a concept which has not been discussed extensively in our law, is “a rule with a normative basis, which establishes a standard manner of behavior for state authorities and government officials” (Shimon Sheetrit, “Limitations of a Transition Government”, in Yitzhak Zamir Volume on Law, Administration and Society (Y. Dotan and A. Bendor, eds., 2005), 737, at p. 745). Constitutional conventions are mentioned mostly in the context of questions of government authority and the exercise thereof; they can regulate the division of powers among the various government authorities and outline the manner in which a particular power will be exercised. In unusual circumstances they can even determine that a power that is established in a law or in the constitution does not need to be exercised at all. Constitutional conventions can sometimes fill a gap in the constitution or adjust the written statutory or constitutional provisions to changing times. (See the definition of constitutional conventions provided by Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed., 2007), at p. 21, according to which constitutional conventions “prescribe the way in which legal powers shall be exercised. Some conventions have the effect of transferring effective power from the legal holder to another official or institution. Other conventions limit an apparently broad legal power, or even prescribe that a legal power shall not be exercised at all.”) Constitutional conventions, as Sir W. Ivor Jennings, described them –

‘ . . . provide the flesh which clothes the dry bones of the law; they make the legal constitution work; they keep it in touch with the growth of ideas. A constitution does not work itself; it has to be worked by men. It is an instrument of national co-operation, and the spirit of the co-operation is as necessary as the instrument. The constitutional conventions are the rules elaborated for effecting that co-operation’ (W.I. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (1943), at pp. 80-81).

In many states, including England and Canada, constitutional conventions are an integral part of the governmental system and effectively regulate the manner in which key governmental powers are exercised (see, for example, A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1945), at pp. 417-473; P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, at pp. 21-30). Incidentally, it is interesting to note that in England – the source of the Israeli pardoning power – the power to pardon is given to the monarch, but a constitutional convention establishes that the king or queen will exercise his or her power only in accordance with the recommendation of the cabinet minister responsible for the subject. Therefore, if the minister recommends the denial of an application for pardon, the king or the queen will not act contrary to the recommendation, even though, theoretically, the power to pardon belongs to the monarchs (see, for example, the concluding report of the British Ministry of Justice on prerogative powers, including the pardoning power: The Governance of Britain, Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers: Final Report, at p. 15: “The power is exercised by the Sovereign on ministerial advice”, available at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/royal-prerogative.pdf,).

The question of when, in our system, a custom is transformed into a constitutional convention has not been discussed at length in the case law of this Court and the issue has not yet been decided. In similar legal systems, the standard is to invoke three tests that help to determine whether a custom has been transformed into a binding constitutional convention. First, one must examine whether the practice has in some manner taken root as a custom; next, it must be determined whether there is an “awareness of obligation”, i.e., whether the officials and authorities who have acted in accordance with the constitutional convention in the past felt that they were obligated to act do so; and finally, the court must determine whether there is a logical rationale at the basis of the practice that has taken shape over the years and which has become a constitutional convention (see the definition of the tests and the application in the Canadian Federal Supreme Court’s opinion, Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [10], at p. 888; see also P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, at pp. 23-25).

33.  Going beyond what is required, as stated, I believe that generally, the approach presented above also characterizes the attitude towards the development of a “constitutional convention” in our system whereby the constitutional spirit takes shape from the manner in which it is implemented as a practical matter. Furthermore, various stages can be discerned in the development of the implementation of constitutional principles. First, there is a practice, then a “custom” according to which the authorities act, and then finally the custom becomes a “constitutional convention”. Once a custom has become a “constitutional convention”, the authorities, as well as officials, understand that there is an obligation to act in accordance with it and the courts will, as a rule, honor the actions of the authorities that are anchored in the constitutional convention (see P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, at p. 25-26).

Under the tests described above, I tend towards the view that from the manner in which the power to pardon has been exercised in Israel, we can conclude that a “constitutional convention” has crystallized. According to this convention, the Minister of Justice has discretion in terms of providing the countersignature and his actions regarding this matter are carried out in cooperation with the President of the State. From a historical perspective – examined in the context of the first test, that of past precedents – we see that as stated and as far as is known, over the years, there have not been any implacable disputes between the President and the Minister of Justice of the type that have led to the latter’s refusal to countersign. Two key sources indicate that there has been a sense of obligation to act in a certain manner, which is what is examined in the context of the second test. First, this Court’s case law has consistently clarified that the Minister of Justice has discretion with respect to the decision to countersign pardon documents. Second, the Attorney General’s Guidelines dealing with this matter unequivocally established that the countersignature is a matter regarding which the Minister of Justice enjoys discretion and that he or she may, in exceptional cases, refuse to affix his signature. The Attorney General’s Guidelines are extremely important in our context, since, as is known, Attorney General’s Guidelines are binding on the government and the interpretation established in them is an official reflection of the existing law as long as a court has not held otherwise (see: Yitzchak Zamir, Administrative Power (1996), at p. 776; see also “Kach” Party v. Chairman of the Knesset [6], per Justice Barak, at p. 152: “Authority to interpret the law for the executive branch lies with the Attorney General, and his interpretation binds it internally”). Guideline 4.4002 provides that the power to pardon is the President’s, but the need for a countersignature has “led to the development of a custom according to which the Minister conducts the investigation regarding each application for pardon and submits to the President of the State the material regarding the matter, along with his recommendation, either affirmative or negative.” The Guideline also provides that if the President of the State does not accept the Minister’s recommendation to reject the application for pardon, the President and the Minister of Justice must attempt to persuade each other. At the same time, according to the Attorney General, the Minister of Justice can refuse to countersign in an exceptional and extreme case “in which the Minister feels that as a matter of his conscience, he cannot take part in the act of pardoning and he cannot defend it on principle, from a public or parliamentary perspective.” (See also a similar interpretation proffered by Attorney General Meni Mazuz in a letter dated 11 May 2006, attached to the state’s pleadings and marked as A/4.)

The third test for the creation of a constitutional convention examines the rationale underlying the constitutional convention (in the event that one has formed). We discussed this rationale above and found that the countersignature expresses parliamentary responsibility for the exercise of the pardoning power and the ability to subject the pardon decision to judicial review. This responsibility, as stated, results from the main principles of the Israeli system of government, which require a system of checks and balances with respect to the exercise of governmental powers.

34.  The application of the above three tests to the pardoning power, as well as the manner in which the power has been exercised during all the years of the existence of the State of Israel indicate that a developed custom relating to the work of the Pardons Department and to the relationship between the President and the Minister of Justice has reached the level of the creation of a “constitutional convention”. However, as stated, it is not necessary at this time to decide that question. In my view, the existence of a custom – whether or not it has reached the level of a constitutional convention – only strengthens the conclusion that the Minister of Justice has discretion regarding the matter of the countersignature. This conclusion is supported by other important arguments that justify the existence of a review mechanism with respect to the exercise of the pardoning power.

35.  It should also be mentioned that the legislature saw fit to establish additional mechanisms for defining the President’s discretion with respect to pardon decisions. Thus, in 2001, in s. 29 of the Parole Law, the legislature granted discretionary power to the Special Parole Committee that deals with applications submitted by those serving life sentences, to have limitations placed on the duration of their sentences. Section 29 of the Law provides that the Special Parole Committee may recommend that the President lighten the sentence of the prisoner by commuting his sentence into a fixed prison term – after at least seven years have passed from the time the prisoner began serving his sentence, and provided that the period recommended by the Committee is not less than 30 years. The section further specifies the considerations that the Committee may weigh in making its recommendation and provides that in the case of a prisoner serving a life sentence, the Committee may, at any time, at the request of the President of the State or of the Minister of Justice, recommend that the power to pardon be exercised.

The importance of the above-mentioned s. 29 for the interpretation of the power to pardon emerges in light of the situation that existed before its enactment. Section 29 of the Law was enacted because of the refusal of then-President Ezer Weizmann to limit the sentences of those serving life sentences. Although no one disputes that the power to pardon also includes the power to refuse to pardon – and in this case, to refrain from limiting a sentence – the legislature decided to promote greater uniformity in the operation of the sentence-limitation mechanism, which is a part of the pardoning power, by establishing the Special Parole Committee. Moreover, the Law also provides that the Special Parole Committee may not recommend the reducing a sentence to a period of less than thirty years. To a certain degree, the attempt to bring about greater uniformity in the limitation of sentences resulted from the fact that the limitation of a sentence and the use of an application for a pardon have become almost routine; both have become elements that are part of the manner in which the power of pardon is exercised in our legal system.

The significance of s. 29 of the Law is, therefore, twofold. First, the Law establishes an additional review mechanism, beyond the President’s power to pardon. When the President of the State decided, in sweeping fashion, not to use his power – as happened during President Ezer Weizmann’s term of office – the legislature created a qualification, albeit one that was limited in scope. Second, before s. 29 was enacted, the President of the State could choose whether to limit a sentence, and if he chose to limit a sentence, he could choose the length of time to which it would be limited. In the present statutory situation, it appears that in view of the recommendation of the Parole Committee, acting by virtue of the Law, the sentence cannot be limited to a period of less than 30 years. As a side point, we do not see the need to adopt a position regarding the significance of a President’s decision to limit the sentence of a prisoner serving a life sentence other than in accordance with the recommendation of the Special Parole Committee or the provisions of the Parole Law, as no arguments regarding this matter have been raised before us (see, in this context, the position adopted by Justice Levy in HCJ 9631/07 Katz v. President of the State [7]).

Concern for the politicization of pardons

36.  One of the key factors underlying my colleague Justice Levy’s conclusion that the Minister of Justice has no discretion regarding the countersignature is the concern that political considerations will become a factor in decisions regarding pardons. According to Justice Levy’s position, granting discretion to the Minister of Justice is likely to “[detract] from the purpose in light of which this legal institution was developed” and could adversely affect the institution of the presidency to the point that it would “uproot its unique character” (paras. 14 and 16 of Justice Levy’s opinion). Justice Levy also held that in light of the fact that pardon decisions will have the effect of changing determinations that have been made by the judicial branch, there is a concern that political pressure will be brought to bear upon the President of the State, which could lead to contempt for the legal process and to a miscarriage of justice.

In my view, there is no real danger that Justice Levy’s harsh prediction would be realized. The apparent danger of intervention in decisions in the judiciary branch is relevant only when a court’s final decision is modified. Such a change will take place only when the President approves an application for a pardon – that is, when there is agreement between the President of the State and the Minister of Justice regarding the pardon. This is so because even if the Minister of Justice recommends that an application for a pardon should be granted, if the President chooses to deny the application, the Minister of Justice cannot force the President to accept his recommendation. Once the Minister’s recommendation is transmitted from the Ministry of Justice to the President’s residence, the President can, of course, accept the recommendation or reject it. The first to sign the letter of pardon or the document approving the lesser sentence is the President. When the President refuses to sign, the pardon does not ensue. The operative significance is that the decision of the judiciary remains in force. If the President decides to grant the application for a pardon, the concern with respect to political intervention has no real significance since it is the President who has chosen to make the decision to pardon.

Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that the Minister of Justice is a political figure. The very fact of the Minister of Justice’s involvement in the pardon process signifies that political considerations are likely to become part of that process. It is precisely because of this that the importance of the countersignature as a means of parliamentary and judicial review over the Minister’s considerations – if those considerations are irrelevant or improper – becomes clear. In this review process, the actions of the Minister of Justice relating to the pardon power can be examined with respect to the question of whether they deviate from the realm of what is legal or whether they involve the application of improper pressure on the President of the State. The review can be carried out by the government and the Knesset. It can also take the form of direct review by the court. In the latter context, the court can apply the rules of administrative and constitutional law to the Minister’s actions. These rules require, inter alia, that the Minister make a decision based on an adequate factual infrastructure; weigh only relevant considerations; consider the recommendations of the various entities that examine the applications for pardons; and give proper weight to each piece of information submitted to him, including details relating to the applicant’s record of convictions and to his behavior during his incarceration. These rules and the professional mechanism in the context of which the Minister of Justice acts have the capacity to significantly reduce the risk that the Minister will introduce political considerations; his exercise of discretion will be subject to review.

An aside: a comparative law view

37.  We began our discussion of the case before us with the basic principle concerning the Israeli pardoning power, recognized in our case law over the years and which my colleague, Justice Levy, also accepts – the fact that the power is “an original Israeli creation”. This principle, which runs through the Israeli case law, not only affects the interpretation of the pardoning power; it also affects our ability to learn from pardon arrangements followed in other states.

My colleague Justice Levy provided a broad and impressive description of the pardon arrangements followed in a long list of states throughout the world. The survey that appears in my colleague’s opinion indicates that different states use a variety of mechanisms regarding the exercise of the pardon power. Various arrangements also exist with respect to the involvement of parties within the executive branch in the pardon process, including with respect to the possible need for a countersignature.

The question of whether we can look to the arrangements followed in other countries in construing the pardoning power was dealt with at length in the judgments of this Court that examined that power. As stated, the early judgments dealing with the issue rejected the view that we are required to interpret the power to pardon in the spirit of the power of the English monarch. This Court highlighted the importance of interpreting the pardoning power against the background of the basic principles of Israeli democracy. The basis of this approach is the perception that the power to pardon, like other sovereign powers, is based on unique characteristics of the Israeli democratic regime. It has previously been held, therefore, that information obtained from the study of comparative law can be used only with extreme caution, although such information can teach us about the various possibilities with regard to the exercise and interpretation of the pardoning power. I therefore share the view that only qualified importance may be attributed to the pardon arrangements established in other countries, in which the structure of governmental powers is significantly different from the structure of powers in the State of Israel. Thus, “however similar the scope of the powers held by similar officials in other countries,” stated Justice A. Barak in Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], “we must in the final analysis construe the President’s own power against the domestic constitutional background, and in the end we can gain but limited interpretative guidance from the situation in other countries” (ibid. [2], at p. 596).

38.  The pardoning power, as stated, takes different and various forms in different legal systems. My colleague Justice Levy elaborated on this point. There are states in which the pardoning power is granted to the head of state (the king, president or governor-general), while in other states the pardoning power is conferred only upon the parliament or the judicial authority. There are states in which the pardon process involves an advisory committee, while in other states exclusive power is granted to a single government body. In some states pardons can be granted only after a conviction, while other states allow pardons before convictions as well. In some states only the penalty can be affected, while in other states the pardon strikes out the conviction itself. In certain states a pardon is given only in extreme, unique and exceptional circumstances in which there is a concern that a fair trial was not conducted, while in other states pardons are used relatively frequently. In some states a pardon decision can be attacked either directly or indirectly in court, while in other states there is no right to appeal to the court regarding such decisions. Certain states have established a requirement that the government or a government minister must countersign, and some states have given up this requirement; among those states in which there is a countersignature requirement, different and various explanations are given for its significance and scope (see, among many others: L. Sebba, “The Pardoning Power – A World Survey”, 68(1) J. Crim. L. & Criminology 83 (1977); see also the examples cited in the opinion of President M. Shamgar in Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], at pp. 549-551). Indeed, there is no single universal pardoning model. Because the power to pardon is rooted in the fundamental principles of the system of government, “virtually every legal system has fashioned its own peculiar perspective on the subject, in harmony with its other governmental institutions” (ibid. [2], at p. 550, per Justice Shamgar). For this reason, even if the arrangements in other countries are examined, they should be treated with extreme caution. Thus, for example, it is doubtful that we can learn from a judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court, regarding which Justice Levy notes that “this is the normative environment in which the pardon exists in our legal system as well” (para. 13 of the judgment). Although the Italian judgment deals with a question that is similar to the one discussed in this further hearing, the differences between the status of the President of the State there and here, the different functions given to the President of Italy by the Italian constitution that are not given to the President of the State of Israel, and the distinctions involved in the exercise of the power to pardon as such are indicated by the judgment of the Italian court, including the possibility of the Italian President applying to the constitutional court, make it difficult to draw an analogy between the rules established there and our law.

Conclusion

39.  For the reasons above, I believe that the position adopted in the judgment in the original petition, whereby the countersignature is intended only to confirm that all the processes that are preliminary to the pardon decision made by the President of the State have been carried out in full and nothing more, greatly restricts the Minister of Justice’s discretion in a manner that is inconsistent with the basic principles of the Israeli system of government, the statutory language, and the case law interpreting the power to pardon. In my view, we must not abandon the principle that there is no governmental power that is not subject to review, including those powers given to the President of the State. This principle requires that the Minister of Justice be given discretion with respect to affixing a countersignature to a President’s decision to pardon or to lighten a sentence, in a manner which allows for parliamentary and judicial review of the exercise of the pardoning power. This review, as noted above, should be exercised moderately and after taking into consideration the nature of the pardoning power and the exalted status of the President of the State who holds it. Therefore, if my view is accepted, I would uphold the position of the Minister of Justice with regard to the essence of the appeal.

Regarding the specific matter before us, as time has passed and personnel changes have taken place at the President’s residence and at the Ministry of Justice since the respondent applied for a limitation of his sentence, I propose to my colleagues that we rule that his matter be returned to the Special Parole Committee and to the current President of the State and Minister of Justice, who will exercise their powers taking into consideration this Court’s holdings in this further hearing.

 

Justice M. Naor

I share the view of the President that an examination of the normative framework of the pardoning power in Israel leads to the conclusion that the basic principles of the Israeli system of government require processes for review of the exercise of the President’s pardoning power – processes which are expressed in the countersignature of the Minister of Justice. These review processes do not make the Minister of Justice an authority whose power is equal to that of the President of the State. Rather, his status is that of an ancillary authority to the President, an authority which has the power, in exceptional, special and unusual cases, to prevent the implementation of a pardon. The Minister of Justice himself is subject to public criticism and review by this Court. Therefore, as President Beinisch has proposed, the position of the Minister of Justice should be accepted.

I also concur in President Beinisch’s recommendation that the respondent’s case be returned to the Special Parole Committee and to the current President of the State and the Minister of Justice.

 

Deputy President E. Rivlin

 I concur with President Beinisch’s decision. For all the reasons provided by the President, I agree that the Justice Minister may independently decide whether to add his or her signature to that of the State President on a clemency order. As noted, this approach is consistent with the previous decisions of this Court. See, Reuven v. Chairman and Members of the Law Committee [3], at 755 - 56 (Agranat, J.); Attorney General v. Matana [1], at 472, (Berinson, J.); Id. at 454, (Agranat, Acting President); Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2], at 581, (Ben-Porat, Deputy President); and Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [5], at 412, (Cheshin, J.). This view is also consistent with the legal guidelines provided by the Attorney General and reflects the position of most legal scholars who have addressed the issue. (See the sources cited in paragraph 18 of my colleague’s opinion.)

The basic principles of a democratic regime, which are based on mechanisms of checks and balances, do not allow for any absolute power to remain in the hands of the State President with no oversight or review. Nevertheless, and as my colleague emphasized, the authority given to the Minister of Justice to refuse to affix his signature to a clemency order should be limited only to the most exceptional and unusual cases. The fact that this is the first time a Minister of Justice has refused to sign a clemency order demonstrates that this case is an exceptional case in which the Minister of Justice may utilize her discretion.

 

Justice E. Arbel

There is no dispute as to the exalted status of the President of the State. Nor is there any disagreement regarding the fact that he has a unique and special power to pardon offenders and to lighten their sentences. This power is accompanied by a requirement for the countersignature of the Prime Minister or that of another minister – the Minister of Justice. Regarding the nature of the countersignature, and the scope of the discretion given to the Minister of Justice, I am in full agreement with my colleague, President Beinisch. I concur in her findings and in the reasoning elucidated in her opinion. This issue is a very important one and raises serious constitutional questions.

The grant of discretion to the Minister of Justice, which allows him/her to refrain from providing a countersignature, is necessary and unavoidable. At the same time, he or she may exercise this discretion only cautiously, in exceptional circumstances. My colleague, President Beinisch, believes that the Minister of Justice’s involvement should be limited to cases in which he or she is “persuaded that the President’s decision is tainted by an extreme degree of unreasonableness or is motivated by irrelevant considerations.” I agree with this position, although it is clear that even in such a case, a significant degree of discipline and restraint will be required.

In light of the rarity of the cases in which the Minister of Justice will intervene in the decision of the President of the State to grant a pardon – which can be inferred from past experience and the principles proposed in the President’s opinion – I do not share the concern that the grant of discretion to the Minister of Justice, or of a veto right, as my colleague Justice Levy termed it, will harm the status of the institution of the presidency or take away its unique nature. I do not believe that it will lead to the application of political pressure. This is the minimum review and oversight required by the basic principles of Israel’s democratic system of government in order to maintain the basic principle of “checks and balances” among the various authorities.

 

Justice E. Hayut

I concur in the judgment of my colleague, the President, and with the reasoning and reasons set out in it. Indeed, the interpretation she followed with respect to the significance of the pardoning power granted to the President of the State and the nature of the countersignature of the Minister of Justice on pardon and sentence-lightening documents, as a signature involving a certain degree of discretion is, in my view, consistent with the basic principles of a democratic regime, as reflected in Israel’s legal system.

 

Justice S. Joubran

I concur in the instructive and comprehensive opinion of my colleague, President Beinisch, according to which the basic principles of Israel’s system of government, primarily the principle of the separation of powers among the branches, require that there be processes for review of the exercise of the pardoning power of the President of the State, as expressed in the Minister of Justice’s countersignature. This conclusion is based on the relevant legislative history, on the Attorney General’s Guidelines and on the decisions of this Court, as described at length in my colleague’s opinion. I also concur with President Beinisch’s position that the Minister of Justice should be authorized to refuse to affix a countersignature to the President’s decision only in exceptional and unusual circumstances, in which the Minister has difficulty supporting the pardon and has been unable to change the President’s mind.

President Beinisch discussed the issues that arose in the further hearing before us, including –I would stress – the concern about involvement of irrelevant political considerations in the pardon decisions, in detail. First, there is a presumption that the Minister of Justice will exercise his discretion in this context in an apolitical manner which is free of irrelevant considerations. Of course, if a suspicion should arise that the Minister of Justice has not acted in this manner, the doors of this Court are open and it has the power to review the Minister of Justice’s decision in this matter, as it can review any other administrative decision. Secondly, I sincerely hope that when providing a countersignature for pardon matters, the Minister of Justice will recall that although he is a political personality, with regard to a pardon – which has an apolitical character – he must see himself first and foremost as executing an official matter of state and will act accordingly.

I also concur in President Beinisch’s recommendation that the respondent’s case be sent to the relevant parties for re-examination.

 

Justice E. Rubinstein

1.    I have not changed my view, as it was stated in the judgment forming the subject of this proceeding (hereinafter: “the original judgment”), and which is now the majority view, as stated by the President. The following principles formed the core of my opinion:

‘The idealistic perception of a decision which has nothing behind it and which looks forward only, as in the approaches mentioned by my colleague and as in the approach of my colleague himself, is, I believe, suitable only for those who dwell in the heavens and not for human beings. It is true that the President’s decisions cannot be appealed, but it is for this reason specifically that there is a need for review, for those occasions on which it is required, and for preventing the misuse – heaven forbid – of the power. The Minister’s countersignature must serve as a sort of “gatekeeper” for the President of the State. Let me be clear: the countersignature does not negate discretion – it negates only discretion that deviates from the law in that it is defective.’ (Compare also the remarks of Justice Berinson in Matana v. Attorney General [4]; A. Klagsbald, “A Note on the Scope of the Immunity of the President of the President of the State”, 7 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) 238 (1979), at pp. 243-244.)

One may ask whether the Minister, who is a political personality, is fit to serve as the “review unit” vis-à-vis the President? . . . The answer is that although the matter is not problem-free, there are nevertheless quite a few mechanisms surrounding the Minister, as noted by my colleague, and when these mechanisms are in place, the chance that the Minister will act improperly is greatly reduced. Moreover, the Minister is subject to the direct review of this Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, something which is certainly undisputed. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the complexity (or the strangeness, in the words of Klagsbard, supra, at p. 240), of the indirect attack mechanism, should the Minister of Justice be prevented, from the outset, from exercising discretion in the course of the act of pardoning, while the exercise of discretion is required of administrative bodies, who in like matters generally do not have discretion (paras. 10, 12).

I also discussed (in paras. 14-17) the nature of the pardon from the Jewish perspective, as one of God’s attributes, which according to at least one approach, “is not detached from the strict legal perspective . . . as in the words of the prophet, ‘I will espouse you with righteousness and justice and with goodness and mercy.’ (Hosea 2:21) (para. 17).” I will not repeat all my comments, which can be found where they were originally written.

2.    For this reason, I concur in the opinion of my colleague, President Beinisch, and with the remedy she proposed (para. 39). She refers to the differences between the English monarch and the President of the State of Israel with respect to their being subject to review (paras. 20-21). I wish to stress that in the Jewish tradition, the king’s actions are also subject to review. The Mishnah indeed states that the “king does not judge and he is not judged” (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 2b), but alongside this Mishnah, the Babylonian Amora, Rav Yosef also cites a tradition:

‘They spoke only of the kings of Israel, but kings from the House of David – they judge and are judged . . . why not the kings of Israel? Because of an event that occurred . . . . (Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 19a).

And in modern Hebrew: The Mishnah spoke only of the kings of Israel [the kings of the biblical Israelite kingdom], but the kings of the House of David [of the united kingdom and of the biblical kingdom of Judea] – they judge and are judged . . . . And what was the reason that they said that the kings of Israel do not [judge and are not judged]? Because of an event that occurred.’  

This means that as a rule, the king, too, “judges and is judged,” but with respect to the kings of Israel – who, in the words of Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah there, “ruled evilly and did not attribute importance to humility and modesty and did not tolerate the truth” – it was established that they cannot be judged “because of an event that occurred.” And what was the event? An event involving King Yannai, one of the kings of the house of the Hasmoneans, who instilled fear in his judges, until “[the angel – E.R.] Gabriel came and struck them to the ground and they died” (Babylonian Talmud, ibid.). Although Rav Yosef’s interpretation is inconsistent with the sweeping language in the Mishnah or other binding sources (see, for an example, Tosafot’s commentary there, s.v. “but the kings of the house of David”), the Jewish sages viewed the situation of a government entity that is not subject to review as even more problematic. (I do not deal here with the question of which specific legal matters are referred to in this Mishnah; the presentation of the principle is sufficient for our purposes.)

3.    As a marginal point, I add that the question confronting me as I wrote my original opinion and which confronts me again now, is whether it is possible or desirable to distinguish between different countersignatures. In particular, I looked at s. 11(a) of the Basic Law: President of the State. Do we say that the same discretion exercised by the Minister of Justice when countersigning a presidential pardon can be (and perhaps should be) exercised by the President of the State when he signs laws passed by the Knesset or “treaties with foreign countries that have been ratified by the Knesset”? Further, is it correct to make a distinction between the Minister of Justice’s discretion regarding a countersignature on a letter of pardon and the discretion that ministers must exercise when they countersign other documents coming from the President?

4. This question need not be resolved for the purpose of deciding the matter that is before us and is not dealt with expressly in the original judgment (nor in a comprehensive and interesting article published following that judgment, Y. Nehushtan, “The Status of the Countersignature in the Framework of the Pardon Process: After HCJ 10021/06 Zohar v. Minister of Justice”, 2 Mishpatim Al Atar 25 (2010), which supports the position now taken by the majority). A possible answer may be found in the distinction made by President Beinisch “between the functions given to the President and the power granted to him to pardon offenders” (para. 15; emphasis in the original), and possibly in her remarks regarding the formulation of a “constitutional convention”. There are also other reasons for distinguishing between the “countersignature” in s. 12 of the Basic Law: President of the State and other types of signatures (and between a letter of pardon and other “presidential” documents). These possible lines of thought contain solutions to some of the questions that remain before me in light of the position that I proposed in the original judgment, which has now been accepted as the majority opinion.

5.    In conclusion, I am very much in favor of the doctrine of the constitutional convention described by President Beinisch. In my view, over and above the criteria that she mentioned, recognition of the institution of a constitutional convention has educational and moral importance. It radiates stability and continuity in the normative system and makes it possible – even in a state in which the work of establishing a constitution has not been completed and whose constitutional institutions are not fully rooted in a constitution which is written like the rest of its law – to instill a sense of a constitutional tradition that passes from generation to generation. In my view, this is a matter of invaluable importance.

 

Justice E.E. Levy

1.    I have read the comprehensive opinion of my colleague the President as well as the opinions of my other honorable colleagues. I also read Dr. Yossi Nehushtan’s above-mentioned incisive article, which was written following our original judgment. Although I still take the view that this is a new path and not just a step along the route of an existing constitutional convention, I am prepared to go further along this path with my colleagues than I did in my initial opinion.

I too, “since the handing down of the judgment – and against the background of the further hearing itself – … have not stopped questioning myself as to whether my approach was properly based in the law,” (CrimFH 7048/97 Anonymous Parties v. Minister of Defense [8] at p. 744, per President Barak), and therefore, after giving much thought to the matter, I accept that there is an advantage in implementing a mechanism that ensures the legitimacy of the President’s determinations in pardon cases. This is because of the sensitivity of the issue and because of the special status of the President of the State, who, it has been held, is not subject to direct judicial review. I would, however, emphasize that this mechanism should be available only with respect to those decisions which, were they tested according to administrative law, would be deemed utterly void – i.e., decisions made on the basis of irrelevant considerations, or which have been made other than in good faith or which are ultra vires. I do not believe that the Minister of Justice should be given any role to play in the assessment of the reasonableness of the President’s decisions. In my view, a defect in terms of reasonableness should not by itself serve as a ground for a refusal to countersign. Nevertheless, such a defect is able to indicate the presence of one of the grounds that I have mentioned above.

2.    My original view was, and still is, concerned with the intervention of the executive branch in the act of the pardon, lest the executive become a partner in the exercise of presidential discretion. Such intervention would not only detract from a presidential prerogative that has an established status in our legal system and threaten to involve the executive branch in the decisions of the courts, in violation of the principle of balancing between the branches of government, but as a matter of substance, is likely to bring about the involvement of irrelevant considerations in the act of the pardon. In truth, if there was initially a concern that the President of the State would become dependent – in practice, if not in theory – on the preliminary recommendations of the Ministry of Justice, this concern becomes much greater if it is necessary to obtain the Minister’s later consent to the presidential decree. Not only is this liable to give the Ministry of Justice and the Minister who heads it, at least, an equal status regarding pardon matters; it is also evident that it could create a bargaining system, “along the lines of ‘support my candidacy, and I will support your candidate’” (HCJ 1637/06 Armon v. Minister of Finance [9], at para. 11, per Justice Levy). The serious concern is that such a “negotiation” could be hidden since it will have aspects which by their nature will not reach the awareness of external parties – either those applying for pardons, or the public, or the courts in which the judicial review takes place. Such negotiations, which naturally accompany a joint exercise of discretion, do not and cannot limit the Minister of Justice’s impact to “exceptional and extreme circumstances” – in the language used above.

My original opinion entered into uncharted territory, in which a number of doctrines with completely different perspectives on the nature of the countersignature presented themselves. The main part of what I wrote then was directed at the rejection of the doctrine concerning the “parallel power” (Nehushtan, “Status of the Countersignature”, supra, at p. 33). The scholars whom I cited were vigorously opposed to this idea and none of my colleagues dispute my position rejecting this view (and any view similar to it) entirely. Other legal systems which, in my view, have more in common than not with the Israeli system in this regard, have also reached this conclusion. This is so because the negative impact that interests connected to governmental survival and party politics will have on matters in which no such considerations should be allowed is not tied specifically to the institution of British royalty or to the president of the Italian republic in particular. These are fundamental questions that arise in any democratic legal system, in which one of the government institutions is given the power to change a final determination made by the courts.

It is therefore appropriate to limit the power of the Minister of Justice to an area with well-defined boundaries, within which he will not be given any role in shaping the content of the determination that has been made, or in evaluating its substance. For this reason, I am completely unable to accept the position expressed in Ronen v. Minister of Education and Culture [5], at p. 412, whereby “the act of pardon or of lightening of a sentence is a joining of one view to another view: the joining of the Minister’s view to that of the President of the State.” In my view, the Minister’s signature cannot serve as anything other than a stamp of confirmation with regard to the fact that the decision that was made complies with the basic requirements of a governmental action, meaning that it was made by the authorized party, that all the required information was placed before the President of the State – as stated in my original judgment – and weighed on its own merit, and that the decision is not the result of any improper motivation or arbitrariness. That, and no more.

3.    Since I have found support for the position that most of the cases in which the question under discussion arises are not of the type dealt with in the above-mentioned judgments – Attorney General v. Matana [1] and Barzilai v. Government of Israel [2] (per President Beinisch, at para.30; Nehushtan, “Status of the Countersignature”, supra, at p. 43) - it appears that the outline of the review which is being proposed here (and in my view its function is to ensure judicial review more than parliamentary or public review, see Nehushtan, supra, at p. 31) is a good balance between the independence of the President of the State’s discretion and the concern of which my colleague, President Beinisch, wrote in para. 23 of her opinion, regarding the existence of a power that is not subject to any review.

4.    Thus, I am prepared to accept the position that the requirement of a countersignature on pardon matters provides a means for overseeing decisions regarding which there is a concern that their origin is improper, which cannot be challenged in any other way. In my view, the issue of reasonableness should be left in the hands of the President of the State.

 

Justice Y. Danziger

1.    After reviewing President D. Beinisch’s comprehensive and learned opinion, I have reached the conclusion that I cannot concur in her position. My opinion remains as it was. Once the President of the State has signed a letter of pardon, the Minister of Justice is also required to attach his countersignature, and he may not exercise any discretion, nor can he “veto” the President’s decision – because the President’s power to pardon offenders is a unique power of the pardoning authority, and it is intended to grant to the President of the State, in this area, full freedom to act as he wishes and in accordance with his best understanding.

2.    As will be recalled, in the original judgment, I concurred in the opinion of my colleague, Justice E. Levy. Today as well, my position is supported by Justice Levy’s comprehensive and in-depth reasoning in that judgment, which I see no need to describe again here. I will mention that in my opinion in the original petition, I reasoned, like Justice Levy, that the President’s power to pardon does not fall within the definition of an executive act: it is a presidential prerogative which grants the President of the State full freedom to decide the petitions for pardon as he sees fit. I further emphasized in my opinion in the original judgment that the countersignature is not intended to give to the government’s representative the status of a partner in a decision regarding pardon matters, and certainly not the power to decide them. I reasoned then, and I still believe now, that the entire purpose of the countersignature is to ensure that all of the information that is relevant to the President’s decision has been submitted to him for his review, and that no mistakes whatsoever have occurred. Unlike my colleague Justice Rubinstein, I believed and still believe today that once the relevant material has been placed before the President of the State and once he has decided to pardon a particular person, then even if the Minister of Justice does not agree with the President’s decision, he is required to affix his countersignature, because if this is not the case, the representative of the executive branch will be given a sort of “veto” right regarding the President’s decisions in an area in which the President alone has been given discretion to make such decisions.

3.    I wish to add a number of comments regarding President Beinisch’s opinion in the further hearing. Like my colleague Justice Levy, I also believe that President Beinisch’s position does not refer to an “existing constitutional convention”; rather, we are dealing with a “new path” that does not necessarily conform to the constitutional history of the State of Israel with respect to the characteristics of the functions of the President of the State in general, and in particular with respect to his power as the pardoning authority, as Justice Levy stressed extensively in the framework of the judgment in the original petition, while describing at length the nature and sources of the President’s pardoning power.

4.    President Beinisch’s central criticism of the position presented by the majority judges in the original judgment – a position that I still hold – was that it is unreasonable that the President of the State would not be subject to any oversight or review, in contrast to the other branches of the constitutional regime in the State of Israel, and in violation of the principle requiring a system of “checks and balances”, which is one of the basic principles of a democratic system.

However, I believe that the majority opinion in the original petition provided a proper response to President Beinisch’s concern. Remarks made in the opinion serve to clarify that the President of the State is not placed above the law and even he is subject to control and oversight, in a manner consistent with the principle that requires a system of checks and balances. Thus, para. 23 of Justice Levy’s original judgment outlines the manner in which judicial review over the President of the State’s pardoning power is exercised. Although this is indirect review, it nevertheless leads, in the end, to the same result as the direct review preferred by President Beinisch in her opinion in the further hearing. As Justice Levy held:

‘ . . . Indeed, once a decision has been made regarding the grant of a pardon – and in any event it is only then that there is a matter which can be upheld – the implementation of the decision requires the actions of various administrative bodies. These are subjected, without difficulty, to review which is based on rules of public law. The (direct) review of their actions is the springboard for the (indirect) review of the President’s decision. As Justice Berinson wrote: “There is no need to disqualify the [President’s] act itself. It is sufficient for us that we refrain from validating it and provide no assistance for its execution”’ (Matana v. Attorney General [4], at p. 979).

Consequently, I cannot understand the claim that the majority opinion in the judgment in the original petition is inconsistent with the principle requiring a system of checks and balances.

5.    In light of the existence of an indirect mechanism for review and supervision of the pardoning power of the President of the State, it is not at all clear to me why a system of direct review is prima facie preferable, when such is inconsistent with the nature and functions of the President in general and with the unique characteristics of the institution of pardon in particular. Moreover, I believe that the practical significance of President Beinisch’s opinion is to give the Minister of Justice a right to “veto” the decision of the President of the State to pardon a particular person, and it is specifically in this way that I believe that harm is done to the principle of checks and balances on which President Beinisch bases her opinion. Since this harm to the principle of checks and balances can be avoided by opting for the indirect review mechanism, I believe that this route should be preferred over direct review, which serves to erode the nature and uniqueness of the pardoning power.

6.    The additional reason for preferring the indirect review mechanism is that a political figure should not be given a “veto” right over the decisions of the pardoning authority – as my colleague, Justice Levy, noted in the judgment in the original petition. The reason for this is that a political figure is likely to weigh irrelevant considerations that are not among those that the President of the State should generally take into consideration in deciding to pardon a particular person – such as sectoral considerations that reflect the “voter’s interest”, or the interest of a particular group that the political figure champions. The institution of the pardon, as my colleague, Justice Levy, explained, does constitute an intervention in a judicial decision, and for this reason, the public interest requires that the decision to pardon a particular person must not be influenced by political considerations. As Justice Levy wrote in the judgment in the original petition, the prohibition against introducing political considerations into the framework of an act of pardon flows from the characteristics of that institution in the Israeli legal system, and the unique outlines of its character, which clearly separate it from the executive branch’s area of jurisdiction.

 7.   President Beinisch writes that there is no real concern regarding the effect of political pressures on the decision of the President of the State to pardon a particular person. President Beinisch further notes, as do my other colleagues in the panel, that the cases in which the Minister of Justice can intervene in the President’s decision are rare and unusual. However, even if no direct political pressures are exerted on the President, and even if such intervention would be possible only in rare and unusual cases – the fact of the possibility of the Minister of Justice’s intervention will always be in the background, and the President will always be aware of it; for this reason, when he comes to pardon a particular person, the President could, heaven forbid, act so as to reach prior agreements and understandings with the Minister of Justice. This is something that needs to be avoided, for the sake of the public interest in the “clean nature” and purity of the institution of the pardon, and in order to prevent any adverse effect on the public’s faith in the institution of the presidency in general, and in the pardoning authority in particular.

8.    In conclusion, I note that I cannot concur in the current position taken by Justice Levy, according to which the Minister of Justice may refuse to affix his countersignature when he believes that the President’s decision was made due to irrelevant considerations. The reason for this is that if indeed the President relied on irrelevant considerations, the way to exercise review and supervision over such cases is through the indirect judicial review mechanism, as I have noted above, and as explained by Justice Levy in his judgment in the original petition. Since the indirect judicial review mechanism is, in my view the preferred review mechanism, in light of the unique nature of the pardoning authority, this is the mechanism that should be used, even when the matter involved is a concern that the President has made a decision based on irrelevant considerations.

9.    Finally, I retain my view as expressed in my opinion in the original judgment, and I do not believe, even after reviewing President Beinisch’s learned opinion, that there is any reason to change it.

 

Decided as per President Beinisch’s opinion, with which Deputy President Rivlin, and Justices Naor, Arbel, Rubinstein, Joubran and Hayut concurred and with which Justice Levy concurred in part, and against the dissenting opinion of Justice Danziger.

 

22 Kislev 5771.

29 November 2010.

Avneri v. The Knesset (summary)

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5239/11
Date Decided: 
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

This was a petition to strike down the Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott (“Boycott Law”). This 2001 law establishes tort liability for, and sets administrative restrictions on, knowingly and publicly publishing calls for a boycott on Israel. The petitioners claimed that the Boycott Law infringes on various constitutional rights, including free expression, equality, and freedom of occupation, and because it does not pass the tests articulated in the limitations clauses of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  A divided Court upheld most of the law's provisions.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

HCJ 5239/11

HCJ 5392/11

HCJ 5549/11

HCJ 2072/12

 

Avneri v. The Knesset

 

The Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice

[15 April 2015]

 

Before President (Emeritus) A. Grunis, President M. Naor, Deputy President A. Rubinstein, and Justices S. Joubran, H. Melcer, Y. Danziger, N. Hendel, U. Fogelman, and Y. Amit

Summary

Translated by Orly Rachmilovitz

This was a petition to strike down the Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott, 2001 (“Boycott Law”, “law”). The law establishes tort liability and sets administrative restrictions on anyone who knowingly and publicly publishes calls for a boycott on Israel. The petitioners claimed that the Boycott Law is unconstitutional because it infringes on various constitutional rights, including free expression, equality and freedom of occupation, and because it does not pass the tests articulated in the limitations clauses of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

The High Court of Justice upheld most of the provisions in the law both in terms of the civil tort and the administrative sanction. Regarding the civil tort, the majority decided to dismiss the petitions targeting sections 2(a) and 2(b) while adopting the narrow interpretive position articulated by Justice Melcer. In an extended panel of nine, the Court ruled unanimously to strike down section 2(c) of the Boycott Law, which addresses compensation without proof of damage, for being disproportional, but to dismiss the petitions as far as sections 3 and 4. The majority (written by Justice Melcer, with former President Grunis, current President Naor, Deputy President Rubinstein and Justice Amit joining) decided to dismiss the petitions in terms of sections 2(a) and 2(b), against the dissents by Justice Danziger (with Justice Joubran concurring), by Justice Hendel and by Justice Vogelman.

Justice Melcer found that according to the language of the law, knowingly publishing calls for boycott on Israel could be considered a tort. Additionally, the State may limit participation in tenders by people publishing calls for boycott, and may prevent publishers from receiving different financial benefits, such as government grants, tax exemptions and the like. Therefore most of the sanctions under the Boycott Law target the time of speech and thus the statute infringes upon free expression and is inconsistent with the constitutional right to human dignity. That said, though political speech is at stake, Justice Melcer does not believe this infringement reaches the core of the right to free expression because the limit is relatively narrow and applies only to calls for boycotts against Israel, as defined in the statute, or to anyone who has committed to participate in such a boycott, which is legal action that goes beyond speech.

Additionally, this constitutional right, like other constitutional rights in Israel, is not absolute and may be limited if the infringement passes the tests of the limitation clause. The limitation clause includes four prongs: (1) that limits on constitutional rights are made in statutes or according to statutes; (2) that the limitation fits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; (3) that the limitation is for a worthy propose; and (4) that the limitation is the least restrictive means necessary. The last prong includes three sub-prongs, which are the rational connection test, the least restrictive means test, and a “narrow” proportionality test. For his analysis here, Justice Melcer relies, among others, on comparative law.

In terms of the first prong, there is no doubt it is met. As for the others, Justice Melcer found that the statute is designed to prevent harm to Israel through economic, cultural or academic boycotts on Israel, anyone else vis-à-vis their relationship to Israel, an agency or institute of the State, or a territory controlled by it. Thus the Boycott Law falls under the “defensive state” doctrine and promotes preservation of the State and its values including equality and liberty. The law then has a worthy purpose and fits the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Justice Melcer wrote that “calls for a boycott on Israel, as defined in the Boycott Law, do not fall under the classic purposes of free speech.” This approach stems from Justice Melcer’s distinction between speech that is meant to be persuasive and speech that works as a compelling force. In his view, a call for boycott is compelling speech, and therefore should be less protected than other political speech.

However, in terms of the Boycott Law’s proportionality, and applying a narrow interpretive approach, Justice Melcer concluded that sections 2(a), 2(b), 3 and 4 pass the proportionality test. Section 2(c), however, does not because it does not employ the least restrictive means. In this context, Justice Melcer considered the chilling effect doctrine, and suggested reducing the chilling effect through narrow interpretation of what constitutes a tort under section 2(a). Justice Melcer proposed that this “boycott tort” be contingent upon existence of harm and causation between the tort and the harm. Still, merely a potential causation would be insufficient. Awareness of the reasonable probability that the contents of the call and the circumstances of its publication will cause the boycott should be necessary. A further requirement should be that only one directly harmed by the tort may have standing to sue.

This interpretation cures section 2(b) as well. Here, the Court ruled that anyone interested in recovering compensation under section 2(b) would be required to prove – in addition to the element of calling for a boycott – the elements of causing a breach under section 62(A) of the Torts Ordinance, a breach, causation between the call for boycott and the breach, awareness, and monetary harm.

On the other hand, Justice Melcer does not find section 2(c), which deals with compensation that is not contingent upon harm (“punitive damages”) and is not limited in amount, to pass the second sub-test of a least restrictive means. It should therefore be struck down. Under this approach, even if the caller for a boycott has been found liable in torts, the compensation awarded would not exceed the actual harm caused.

As for sections 3-4, Justice Melcer finds that the administrative sanction – limiting participation in tenders and limiting benefits – is only a secondary infringement of free speech. He views these sanctions to be proportional, this in light of the procedure required to place these sanctions and considering the State’s power to withhold benefits from those who use them against it. Justice Melcer equated a boycott on the State and a boycott on a territory. He left the discussion on the constitutionality of sections 3 and 4 and wait until specific petitions against a concrete decision by the Minister of the Treasury based on a concrete set of facts.

Finally, Justice Melcer presents additional approaches supporting his proposal: (1) that an interpretation that maintains a statute’s constitutionality is preferable to striking the statute down; (2) that the Court should show deference to the legislature; (3) the margin of appreciation doctrine; (4) that under a theory of ripeness, arguments by potential parties must be examined beyond the striking down of sections 2(c).

Former President Grunis, President Naor, Deputy President Rubinstein and Justice Amit join Justice Melcer and offer comments.

In his dissent, Justice Danziger found the Boycott Law to materially violate free speech. It is a violation of political speech, which is at the core of the constitutional right to free expression, encompassed in the constitutional right to human dignity. This violation, in his view, does not pass the tests of the limitations clause in section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In his view, the Boycott Law does not pass the third sub-prong of the proportionality test, the “narrow” proportionality prong, because calls for boycotts are clearly within legitimate democratic discourse. He opposes Justice Melcer’s proposal for narrow interpretation as insufficient.

Despite his conclusion, Justice Danziger believes the harsh outcome of striking down the law as unconstitutional may be avoided through interpretation, thus significantly reducing the extent of the Boycott Law’s infringement upon rights and allowing it to pass constitutional muster. He suggest interpreting section 1, which is the gateway to the law, to mean that only a boycott on an “institution” or an “area” vis-à-vis their association with the State and that effectively constitutes a boycott on Israel as a whole would be considered a boycott for the purposes of the statute.

Justice Hendel accepted Justice Melcer’s proposal as legitimate interpretation. However, to him section 2 as a whole should be struck down. Section 2(a) as a tort and section 2(b) in terms of a sufficient justification for causing a breach of contract and section 2(c) in terms of compensation without proof of damage do not pass the third sub-prong of the proportionality test. Therefore, Justice Hendel would strike down the entire section for being disproportional, but for the time being he supports curing sections 3 and 4.

Justice Vogelman joins the interpretation by Justice Danziger, but believes redrafting is more suited relief in this case, and therefore proposes to delete the phrase “an area in its control” from section 1. Still, he believes section 2(c) should be struck down and sections 3 and 4 should be upheld. Additionally, in his view, maintaining the Boycott Law’s validity requires interpreting it to apply only in cases where the singly justification to call for “refraining purposefully from economic, cultural or academic connections with a person or other entity” is that person or entity’s relationship to the State of Israel or any of its institutions.

Justice Joubran finds that section 2(c) should be struck down and that section 1 should be interpreted according to Justice Danziger’s proposal regarding the areas in the State’s control. Additionally, he joins Justices Danziger and Vogelman in distinguishing a call for boycott on a person because of their relationship to the State of Israel or one of its institutions and a call for boycott on a person because of their relationship to an area controlled by the State.

United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village

Case/docket number: 
CA 6821/93
Date Decided: 
Thursday, November 9, 1995
Decision Type: 
Appellate
Abstract: 

The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law was adopted by the Knesset in 1992, as part of an attempt to rehabilitate Israel’s agricultural sector following a severe economic crises. To that end, the law established a body called the “rehabilitator,” which was granted broad authority to settle, restructure and cancel debts that had been created up to the end of 1987. In 1993, the Knesset found it necessary to intervene again, and amended the law. Among other changes, the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993, redefined the debts subject to the law, and extended the applicable time period so that debts incurred until the end of 1991 also fell within the scope of the law and the authority of the rehabilitator.

 

Following the adoption of the Primary Law, but prior to the adoption of the Amending Law, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Section 10 of the Basic Law stated that the Basic Law “shall not affect the validity of any Law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

CA 6821/93 concerned a suit brought by the appellant in the District Court against the respondents who had guaranteed the debt of the Cooperative Agricultural Fund Ltd. The respondents requested that the matter be transferred to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator, in accordance with the Amending Law. The Court granted the request. The appellants argued on appeal that the Amending Law violated their property rights under s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and was contrary to s. 8 of that Basic Law, which establishes that there shall be no violation of rights under the Basic Law except “by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by the virtue of express authorisation of such Law.”

 

LCA 1908/94 concerned debts incurred by the appellants for the rental of agricultural equipment. The District Court held that the provisions of the Amending Law that extended the period of debts were incompatible with s. 8 of the Basic Law and were void. While the Amending Law served a proper purpose, the Court found that it applied selectively to a part of the public and was therefore incompatible with the values of the State of Israel.

 

LCA 3364/94 addressed the District Court’s decision to reject the request of the appellants to transfer their matter to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator. The Court found that the debt had been incurred in 1988 and thus did not fall within the scope of the Primary Law. The stay of proceedings and the transfer of the debt to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator were a result of the Amending Law. The Court held that the Amending Law infringed creditors’ rights beyond what was established in the Primary Law. While the Primary Law was immune to review under the provisions of s. 10 of the Basic Law, those provisions did not apply to the Amending Law, which was, therefore, subject to review under s. 8.

 

The three cases represented the first instances in which Israeli courts annulled a law passed by the Knesset on the grounds of unconstitutionality due to a violation of fundamental rights established in a Basic Law. Inasmuch as the three cases raised the same fundamental questions of constitutional law, the appeals were heard together before an expanded bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court.

 

In deciding the appeals, the Supreme Court was called upon to address the questions of whether or not the Knesset possessed constituent authority to frame a constitution and limit its own legislative authority thereby, and whether Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset enjoy supra-legislative status. After establishing the place of Basic Laws in the legislative hierarchy and the ramifications of a conflict between regular legislation and Basic Laws, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the Amending Law violated rights established under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and whether the violation was incompatible with s. 8 of that law, and the consequences of such a violation.

 

Each of the nine judges wrote a separate opinion. The primary approach of the Court is set out in the opinion of President Barak. According to President Barak, the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution derives from the doctrine of constituent authority. The Knesset derives its constituent authority from the First Knesset by means of constitutional continuity. This view of the Knesset’s constituent authority best reflects the national consciousness and legislative history of the State of Israel. The Knesset, therefore, acts in two capacities. It enacts laws as a regular legislature, and it adopts Basic Laws in its capacity as constituent assembly. Basic Laws so enacted enjoy supra-legislative, constitutional status. Judges Bach, Goldberg, Levin, Mazza, Tal, and Zamir concurred in their separate opinions.

 

Former President Shamgar based the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution upon constituent authority deriving from the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. It is the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty that underlies its authority to frame a supra-legislative constitution that can limit the legislative power of future Knessets.

 

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cheshin agreed that the First Knesset was granted the power to frame a constitution, but argued that the First Knesset’s constituent authority was not transferable, and it was not transferred to subsequent Knessets. Moreover, According to Cheshin, J., constituent authority must be unequivocal, yet Court precedent and Israel’s legislative history do not reflect such a clear view of the Knesset’s authority, and the legislative history of the Basic Laws does not support a conclusion that the Knesset believed it was adopting legislation of a constitutional nature in enacting them.

 

The Court unanimously held that although the Amending Law violated the property rights of creditors, the provisions of the Amending Law were consistent with the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The appeal in CA 6821/93 was therefore dismissed, and the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and CLA 3363/94 were upheld and the decisions of the District Court were set aside.

 

(Per Shamgar, P.) The Basic Law did not infringe pre-existing laws, but applies only to laws adopted following its entry into force. The Amending Law was adopted following the entry into force of the Basic Law.

 

Two primary theories explain the Knesset’s power to enact legislation of a constitutional nature: The theory of unlimited sovereignty and the theory of constituent authority. Of theses two theories, that of unlimited sovereignty more accurately expresses Israel’s legislative history, its accepted legal concepts, and the case law of the Supreme Court.

 

The Knesset has the power to enact laws of every type and content, and can formally or substantively entrench the fundamental values of the State of Israel, and thereby limit its own power and that of subsequent Knessets. The extent of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a question of constitutional policy. Both the theory of unlimited sovereignty and that of constituent authority recognize the Knesset’s power to limit itself.

 

In terms of preferred law, a Basic Law should be changed only by another Basic Law. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between changing a right as opposed to infringing it. An infringement does not change the basic right.

 

(Per Barak, P.) The Knesset’s power to adopt a constitution derives from its constituent power. The source of the Knesset’s constituent power is the sovereign, that is, the people. This approach can be grounded upon three models: 1) constitutional continuity, 2) the recognition rule, 3) the best explanation for the socio-historical and legal history of the system.

 

Regardless of the legal situation that existed following the dissolution of the First Knesset, and even if there never was a Constituent Assembly, Israeli law currently recognizes the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution. This is supported by the Knesset’s understanding of its role, the platforms of the various political parties, the consensus of opinion of jurists and legal scholars, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the Knesset’s reaction to those decisions.

 

Due to the fact that a Basic Law is of a higher normative level, it can only be changed by another Basic Law.

 

In wielding its constituent power, the Knesset can limit its authority to change Basic laws, and thus create “rigidity” of constitutional provisions. The Knesset’s power to limit itself and thus entrench the provisions of a Basic Law derives from its authority to adopt a formal constitution.

 

The theory of constituent power addresses the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit its own power when wielding constituent power, but it does not provide an answer to the question of whether the Knesset can limit itself when it employs its normal legislative power. This question can be left for further review. We can also leave for further review the question of whether there is a substantive difference between the entrenchment of a regular law that requires an absolute majority, as opposed to a provision requiring some greater majority.

 

True democracy recognizes the constitutional power to entrench basic human rights against the power of the majority. This limit upon majority rule does not infringe democracy, but rather realizes it. Granting the majority the power to harm the rights of the minority is undemocratic. Protecting the individual, the minority, and the fundamental values of the legal system against the power of the majority is the democratic act.

 

A democracy of the majority alone that is not accompanied by a democracy of values is but a formal, statistical democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect society’s values.

 

The human rights defined in the Basic Laws in absolute terms are relative rights. Human dignity, liberty, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights, but can be infringed in order to preserve the social framework. The constitutionality of the infringement does not diminish the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of an infringement means that a regular law that meets the conditions established by the constitution can infringe a constitutionally protected human right.

 

When the Basic Laws do not state the remedy for the infringement of a constitutional right, legal tradition provides the conclusion that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is abrogation by the courts.

 

A law is presumed to be constitutional, and a party seeking to challenge that presumption bears the burden of proof. As for the constitutionality of an infringement, the burden falls to the party arguing that the infringement is constitutional. This is the appropriate approach, as it places the burden upon the party best suited to bear it, viz. the state. However, inasmuch as the issue does not arise in the case before the Court, it can be left for further review.

 

(Per Cheshin, J.) In addressing the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent power, a distinction must be drawn between the power to adopt a formal constitution and the power to adopt entrenched laws. The power to adopt entrenched laws does not, in and of itself, imply constituent power.

 

When the Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – completed its term without adopting a constitution, the Knesset’s right to adopt a constitution in accordance with the Declaration of Independence ceased. The only continuity that was preserved was in regard to legislation, not constitutional issues. The Constituent Assembly’s authority to adopt a constitution was a one-time, non-transferable power.

 

The Knesset does not have constituent authority, nor does it enjoy unlimited sovereignty. The Knesset is the Knesset, and it possesses only legislative authority.

 

Insofar as the Knesset’s power to limit itself, a distinction must be drawn between procedural limitation by requiring a special majority, and substantive limitation.

 

Once the Knesset has established legislative procedures, it must follow those procedures until it expressly repeals them and replaces them with new procedures. The establishing of new procedures must be carried out in accordance with the old procedures. In other words, the Knesset is limited by the procedures that it establishes in regard to legislative procedure.

 

The question of quorum and that of voting are matters of organizational procedure. The voting rules are established in Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes that the Knesset decides in accordance with the democratic principle of majority and minority, and that the votes of absent and abstaining members are not counted. In the absence of a constitution that establishes otherwise, the Knesset can decide upon any combination of the variables of quorum, absentees and abstainers, and any combination will be legitimate and legal. The one limitation is that of the principle of democracy. The basic democratic principle of “majority” must be preserved.

 

A requirement of an absolute majority of sixty-one votes is not only consistent with the majority principle it is the principle itself. An absolute majority is not a special or privileged majority, but rather it is the true majority derived from the democratic theory of majority. A requirement of an absolute majority is not an instance of self-limitation. Such a requirement limits the possibility of abstention or setting off, but the ability to abstain or to arrange a set off is not one of the elected representative’s rights.

 

In the current legal regime, and in the absence of the power to adopt a constitution, a provision requiring a majority greater than sixty-one votes is manifestly undemocratic. A sixty-one vote majority is the upper limit, and in establishing anything beyond that the Knesset deviates from its authority.

 

The power to abrogate Knesset legislation should be reserved exclusively to the High Court of Justice. The doctrine that applies to secondary legislation is not appropriate to primary legislation.

 

Once it has been shown that a law infringes a basic right, the burden of proof falls to the party claiming that the law is constitutional. The presumption that the law is constitutional applies to the secondary evidentiary burden, as opposed to the burden of proof that must be born by the governmental authorities.

 

(Per D. Levin, J.) The Basic Laws constitute chapters of the Israeli constitution. The framers of Israel’s Declaration of Independence intended that legislation be effected on two parallel levels: A constitution to be adopted by the constituent authority, which would express the fundamental human rights on the basis of the vision of Israel’s prophets, and the regular, day-to-day legislation to be conducted by the legislature.

 

The Declaration of Independence indicates that the source of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution is its constituent power. The fact that there have been delays in the process of adopting a constitution since the election of the Constituent Assembly does not change or influence the source of the legislature’s authority in advancing constitutional legislation. Constituent power continues to exist until the task of adopting a constitution is completed.

 

The party claiming the infringement of a basic right or who challenges the lawfulness of a law due to such infringement bears the burden of showing that a constitutionally protected basic right was infringed. If that burden is met, then the burden of showing that the law meets the justifying conditions passes to the party seeking to uphold the law.

 

(Per Zamir, J.) The Knesset’s power to limit itself, both formally and substantively, derives from its status as a constituent assembly. The theory of constituent power provides an adequate theoretical explanation and a practical tool for the Knesset and the Court to address constitutional issues, and is the preferable theory.

 

(Per Bach, J.) In principle, there is no difference between a requirement of a sixty-one-vote majority to amend or repeal a law and a more extreme requirement. A law is adopted by a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. If the Knesset is not empowered to adopt constitutional legislation, and if a subsequent Knesset can repeal any law by the normal means, then it is difficult to understand why a law requiring a sixty-one-vote majority would be an exception.

 

The fear of negative phenomena that may materialize in the future by recognition of the Knesset’s unlimited power to employ Basic Laws to limit the power of subsequent Knessets to change or amend Basic Laws is more theoretical than real. It may be assumed that in a proper democracy, certain things will not occur.

 

The question of who bears the burden of proof is very relevant to the question of whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should be addressed. Once established that the law infringes the right to property, it is necessary to ask who must bear the burden of showing that the law meets the requirements of the Basic Law.

 

A law that infringes liberty or property or some other basic right is not presumed, a priori, to be void, and it will not be deemed void unless proven otherwise. The presumption must be that a law has been duly enacted, unless it is shown that it infringes a basic right and does not meet the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law. Anyone claiming that a law should be declared void must convince the court of the facts of the infringement and show that the law does not meet the conditions set out in the Basic Law.

 

(Per Tal, J.) The case before the Court does not require that the Court decide upon the fundamental questions regarding the powers of the legislature and its status, and they may be left for the appropriate time. For the purpose of the matter before the Court, it is sufficient to establish the normatively superior status of the Basic Laws by which the Knesset’s regular legislation is reviewed.

 

(Per Goldberg, J.) Harmony amongst the branches of government requires drawing a “red line” between judicial review of legislation and involvement in legislation. The court must be careful not to cross the line. The court is not a substitute for the legislature, and it does not supplant the legislature’s discretion with its own. Therefore, only a finding that the legislature did not meet the conditions of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that a law be declared unconstitutional. Any other intervention by the court would blur the borders required by the separation of powers.

 

In examining the constitutionality of a law, the presumption is that the law is constitutional, and any doubt must weigh in favor of upholding the law rather than voiding it. Therefore, the party arguing against the law must bear the burden of proof that the law is unconstitutional. That party must show that the law extremely deviates from the scope of a reasonable infringement intended for a proper purpose. The burden also includes the secondary evidentiary burden of showing that there is a specific alternative that would realize the proper purpose while inflicting substantially lesser harm to the protected right.

 

(Per Mazza, J.) In terms of the burden of proof, the state bears the burden of convincing the court that the infringement is intended for a proper purpose, and that the means chosen are appropriate to achieving that purpose. The party claiming that the infringement is unconstitutional bears the burden of showing that the government should have chosen a less harmful alternative. However, it is not clear that this must always be the case. It may be that this is the correct approach only in regard to economic harm, whereas the infringement of other basic rights may justify placing the entire burden upon the state.

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 
CA 6821/93

LCA 1908/94

LCA 3363/94

 

United Mizrahi Bank Ltd.

 

v.

1.         Migdal Cooperative Village

2.         Bostan HaGalil Cooperative Village

3.         Hadar Am Cooperative Village Ltd

4.         El-Al Agricultural Association Ltd.                                                 CA 6821/93

 

1.         Givat Yoav Workers Village for Cooperative Agricultural Settlement Ltd

2.         Ehud Aharonov

3.         Aryeh Ohad

4.         Avraham Gur

5.         Amiram Yifhar

6.         Zvi Yitzchaki

7.         Simana Amram

8.         Ilan Sela

9.         Ron Razon

10.       David Mini                                                                            

 

v.

 

1.         Commercial Credit Services (Israel) Ltd

2.         The Attorney General                                                                      LCA 1908/94

 

1.         Dalia Nahmias

2.         Menachem Nahmias

 

v.

 

Kfar Bialik Cooperative Village Ltd                                                           LCA 3363/94

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals

[November 9, 1995]

Before: Former Court President M. Shamgar, Court President A. Barak, Justices D. Levine, G. Bach, A. Goldberg, E. Mazza, M. Cheshin, Y. Zamir, Tz. E Tal

Appeal before the Supreme Court sitting as the Court of Civil Appeals

 

Appeal against decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) on 1.11.93 in application 3459/92,3655, 4071, 1630/93 (C.F 1744/91) and applications for leave for appeal against the decision of the Tel-Aviv District Court (Registrar H. Shtein) dated 6.3.94 in application 5025/92 (C.F. 2252/91), and against the decision of the Haifa District Court (Judge S. Gobraan), dated 30.5.94 in application for leave for appeal 18/94, in which the appeal against the decision of the Head of the Execution Office in Haifa was rejected in Ex.File 14337-97-8-02. The applications were adjudicated as appeals.

The appeal in CA. 6821/93 was rejected. The appeals in LCA 1908/94 and 3363/94 were accepted, and the files were returned to the District Courts to continue adjudication.

 

 

Editor’s Synopsis

 

The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law was adopted by the Knesset in 1992, as part of an attempt to rehabilitate Israel’s agricultural sector following a severe economic crises. To that end, the law established a body called the “rehabilitator,” which was granted broad authority to settle, restructure and cancel debts that had been created up to the end of 1987. In 1993, the Knesset found it necessary to intervene again, and amended the law. Among other changes, the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993, redefined the debts subject to the law, and extended the applicable time period so that debts incurred until the end of 1991 also fell within the scope of the law and the authority of the rehabilitator.

 

Following the adoption of the Primary Law, but prior to the adoption of the Amending Law, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Section 10 of the Basic Law stated that the Basic Law “shall not affect the validity of any Law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

CA 6821/93 concerned a suit brought by the appellant in the District Court against the respondents who had guaranteed the debt of the Cooperative Agricultural Fund Ltd. The respondents requested that the matter be transferred to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator, in accordance with the Amending Law. The Court granted the request. The appellants argued on appeal that the Amending Law violated their property rights under s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and was contrary to s. 8 of that Basic Law, which establishes that there shall be no violation of rights under the Basic Law except “by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required, or by regulation enacted by the virtue of express authorisation of such Law.”

 

LCA 1908/94 concerned debts incurred by the appellants for the rental of agricultural equipment. The District Court held that the provisions of the Amending Law that extended the period of debts were incompatible with s. 8 of the Basic Law and were void. While the Amending Law served a proper purpose, the Court found that it applied selectively to a part of the public and was therefore incompatible with the values of the State of Israel.

 

LCA 3364/94 addressed the District Court’s decision to reject the request of the appellants to transfer their matter to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator. The Court found that the debt had been incurred in 1988 and thus did not fall within the scope of the Primary Law. The stay of proceedings and the transfer of the debt to the jurisdiction of the rehabilitator were a result of the Amending Law. The Court held that the Amending Law infringed creditors’ rights beyond what was established in the Primary Law. While the Primary Law was immune to review under the provisions of s. 10 of the Basic Law, those provisions did not apply to the Amending Law, which was, therefore, subject to review under s. 8.

 

The three cases represented the first instances in which Israeli courts annulled a law passed by the Knesset on the grounds of unconstitutionality due to a violation of fundamental rights established in a Basic Law. Inasmuch as the three cases raised the same fundamental questions of constitutional law, the appeals were heard together before an expanded bench of nine judges of the Supreme Court.

 

In deciding the appeals, the Supreme Court was called upon to address the questions of whether or not the Knesset possessed constituent authority to frame a constitution and limit its own legislative authority thereby, and whether Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset enjoy supra-legislative status. After establishing the place of Basic Laws in the legislative hierarchy and the ramifications of a conflict between regular legislation and Basic Laws, the Court addressed the specific issue of whether the Amending Law violated rights established under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and whether the violation was incompatible with s. 8 of that law, and the consequences of such a violation.

 

Each of the nine judges wrote a separate opinion. The primary approach of the Court is set out in the opinion of President Barak. According to President Barak, the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution derives from the doctrine of constituent authority. The Knesset derives its constituent authority from the First Knesset by means of constitutional continuity. This view of the Knesset’s constituent authority best reflects the national consciousness and legislative history of the State of Israel. The Knesset, therefore, acts in two capacities. It enacts laws as a regular legislature, and it adopts Basic Laws in its capacity as constituent assembly. Basic Laws so enacted enjoy supra-legislative, constitutional status. Judges Bach, Goldberg, Levin, Mazza, Tal, and Zamir concurred in their separate opinions.

 

Former President Shamgar based the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution upon constituent authority deriving from the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. It is the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty that underlies its authority to frame a supra-legislative constitution that can limit the legislative power of future Knessets.

 

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cheshin agreed that the First Knesset was granted the power to frame a constitution, but argued that the First Knesset’s constituent authority was not transferable, and it was not transferred to subsequent Knessets. Moreover, According to Cheshin, J., constituent authority must be unequivocal, yet Court precedent and Israel’s legislative history do not reflect such a clear view of the Knesset’s authority, and the legislative history of the Basic Laws does not support a conclusion that the Knesset believed it was adopting legislation of a constitutional nature in enacting them.

 

The Court unanimously held that although the Amending Law violated the property rights of creditors, the provisions of the Amending Law were consistent with the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The appeal in CA 6821/93 was therefore dismissed, and the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and CLA 3363/94 were upheld and the decisions of the District Court were set aside.

 

 

(Per Shamgar, P.) The Basic Law did not infringe pre-existing laws, but applies only to laws adopted following its entry into force. The Amending Law was adopted following the entry into force of the Basic Law.

 

Two primary theories explain the Knesset’s power to enact legislation of a constitutional nature: The theory of unlimited sovereignty and the theory of constituent authority. Of theses two theories, that of unlimited sovereignty more accurately expresses Israel’s legislative history, its accepted legal concepts, and the case law of the Supreme Court.

 

The Knesset has the power to enact laws of every type and content, and can formally or substantively entrench the fundamental values of the State of Israel, and thereby limit its own power and that of subsequent Knessets. The extent of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a question of constitutional policy. Both the theory of unlimited sovereignty and that of constituent authority recognize the Knesset’s power to limit itself.

 

In terms of preferred law, a Basic Law should be changed only by another Basic Law. In this regard, a distinction must be drawn between changing a right as opposed to infringing it. An infringement does not change the basic right.

 

(Per Barak, P.) The Knesset’s power to adopt a constitution derives from its constituent power. The source of the Knesset’s constituent power is the sovereign, that is, the people. This approach can be grounded upon three models: 1) constitutional continuity, 2) the recognition rule, 3) the best explanation for the socio-historical and legal history of the system.

 

Regardless of the legal situation that existed following the dissolution of the First Knesset, and even if there never was a Constituent Assembly, Israeli law currently recognizes the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution. This is supported by the Knesset’s understanding of its role, the platforms of the various political parties, the consensus of opinion of jurists and legal scholars, the decisions of the Supreme Court, and the Knesset’s reaction to those decisions.

 

Due to the fact that a Basic Law is of a higher normative level, it can only be changed by another Basic Law.

 

In wielding its constituent power, the Knesset can limit its authority to change Basic laws, and thus create “rigidity” of constitutional provisions. The Knesset’s power to limit itself and thus entrench the provisions of a Basic Law derives from its authority to adopt a formal constitution.

 

The theory of constituent power addresses the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit its own power when wielding constituent power, but it does not provide an answer to the question of whether the Knesset can limit itself when it employs its normal legislative power. This question can be left for further review. We can also leave for further review the question of whether there is a substantive difference between the entrenchment of a regular law that requires an absolute majority, as opposed to a provision requiring some greater majority.

 

True democracy recognizes the constitutional power to entrench basic human rights against the power of the majority. This limit upon majority rule does not infringe democracy, but rather realizes it. Granting the majority the power to harm the rights of the minority is undemocratic. Protecting the individual, the minority, and the fundamental values of the legal system against the power of the majority is the democratic act.

 

A democracy of the majority alone that is not accompanied by a democracy of values is but a formal, statistical democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect society’s values.

 

The human rights defined in the Basic Laws in absolute terms are relative rights. Human dignity, liberty, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights, but can be infringed in order to preserve the social framework. The constitutionality of the infringement does not diminish the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of an infringement means that a regular law that meets the conditions established by the constitution can infringe a constitutionally protected human right.

 

When the Basic Laws do not state the remedy for the infringement of a constitutional right, legal tradition provides the conclusion that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is abrogation by the courts.

 

A law is presumed to be constitutional, and a party seeking to challenge that presumption bears the burden of proof. As for the constitutionality of an infringement, the burden falls to the party arguing that the infringement is constitutional. This is the appropriate approach, as it places the burden upon the party best suited to bear it, viz. the state. However, inasmuch as the issue does not arise in the case before the Court, it can be left for further review.

 

 

(Per Cheshin, J.) In addressing the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent power, a distinction must be drawn between the power to adopt a formal constitution and the power to adopt entrenched laws. The power to adopt entrenched laws does not, in and of itself, imply constituent power.

 

When the Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – completed its term without adopting a constitution, the Knesset’s right to adopt a constitution in accordance with the Declaration of Independence ceased. The only continuity that was preserved was in regard to legislation, not constitutional issues. The Constituent Assembly’s authority to adopt a constitution was a one-time, non-transferable power.

 

The Knesset does not have constituent authority, nor does it enjoy unlimited sovereignty. The Knesset is the Knesset, and it possesses only legislative authority.

 

Insofar as the Knesset’s power to limit itself, a distinction must be drawn between procedural limitation by requiring a special majority, and substantive limitation.

 

Once the Knesset has established legislative procedures, it must follow those procedures until it expressly repeals them and replaces them with new procedures. The establishing of new procedures must be carried out in accordance with the old procedures. In other words, the Knesset is limited by the procedures that it establishes in regard to legislative procedure.

 

The question of quorum and that of voting are matters of organizational procedure. The voting rules are established in Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes that the Knesset decides in accordance with the democratic principle of majority and minority, and that the votes of absent and abstaining members are not counted. In the absence of a constitution that establishes otherwise, the Knesset can decide upon any combination of the variables of quorum, absentees and abstainers, and any combination will be legitimate and legal. The one limitation is that of the principle of democracy. The basic democratic principle of “majority” must be preserved.

 

A requirement of an absolute majority of sixty-one votes is not only consistent with the majority principle it is the principle itself. An absolute majority is not a special or privileged majority, but rather it is the true majority derived from the democratic theory of majority. A requirement of an absolute majority is not an instance of self-limitation. Such a requirement limits the possibility of abstention or setting off, but the ability to abstain or to arrange a set off is not one of the elected representative’s rights.

 

In the current legal regime, and in the absence of the power to adopt a constitution, a provision requiring a majority greater than sixty-one votes is manifestly undemocratic. A sixty-one vote majority is the upper limit, and in establishing anything beyond that the Knesset deviates from its authority.

 

The power to abrogate Knesset legislation should be reserved exclusively to the High Court of Justice. The doctrine that applies to secondary legislation is not appropriate to primary legislation.

 

Once it has been shown that a law infringes a basic right, the burden of proof falls to the party claiming that the law is constitutional. The presumption that the law is constitutional applies to the secondary evidentiary burden, as opposed to the burden of proof that must be born by the governmental authorities.

 

(Per D. Levin, J.) The Basic Laws constitute chapters of the Israeli constitution. The framers of Israel’s Declaration of Independence intended that legislation be effected on two parallel levels: A constitution to be adopted by the constituent authority, which would express the fundamental human rights on the basis of the vision of Israel’s prophets, and the regular, day-to-day legislation to be conducted by the legislature.

 

The Declaration of Independence indicates that the source of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution is its constituent power. The fact that there have been delays in the process of adopting a constitution since the election of the Constituent Assembly does not change or influence the source of the legislature’s authority in advancing constitutional legislation. Constituent power continues to exist until the task of adopting a constitution is completed.

 

The party claiming the infringement of a basic right or who challenges the lawfulness of a law due to such infringement bears the burden of showing that a constitutionally protected basic right was infringed. If that burden is met, then the burden of showing that the law meets the justifying conditions passes to the party seeking to uphold the law.

 

 

(Per Zamir, J.) The Knesset’s power to limit itself, both formally and substantively, derives from its status as a constituent assembly. The theory of constituent power provides an adequate theoretical explanation and a practical tool for the Knesset and the Court to address constitutional issues, and is the preferable theory.

 

 

(Per Bach, J.) In principle, there is no difference between a requirement of a sixty-one-vote majority to amend or repeal a law and a more extreme requirement. A law is adopted by a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. If the Knesset is not empowered to adopt constitutional legislation, and if a subsequent Knesset can repeal any law by the normal means, then it is difficult to understand why a law requiring a sixty-one-vote majority would be an exception.

 

The fear of negative phenomena that may materialize in the future by recognition of the Knesset’s unlimited power to employ Basic Laws to limit the power of subsequent Knessets to change or amend Basic Laws is more theoretical than real. It may be assumed that in a proper democracy, certain things will not occur.

 

The question of who bears the burden of proof is very relevant to the question of whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should be addressed. Once established that the law infringes the right to property, it is necessary to ask who must bear the burden of showing that the law meets the requirements of the Basic Law.

 

A law that infringes liberty or property or some other basic right is not presumed, a priori, to be void, and it will not be deemed void unless proven otherwise. The presumption must be that a law has been duly enacted, unless it is shown that it infringes a basic right and does not meet the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law. Anyone claiming that a law should be declared void must convince the court of the facts of the infringement and show that the law does not meet the conditions set out in the Basic Law.

 

 

(Per Tal, J.) The case before the Court does not require that the Court decide upon the fundamental questions regarding the powers of the legislature and its status, and they may be left for the appropriate time. For the purpose of the matter before the Court, it is sufficient to establish the normatively superior status of the Basic Laws by which the Knesset’s regular legislation is reviewed.

 

 

(Per Goldberg, J.) Harmony amongst the branches of government requires drawing a “red line” between judicial review of legislation and involvement in legislation. The court must be careful not to cross the line. The court is not a substitute for the legislature, and it does not supplant the legislature’s discretion with its own. Therefore, only a finding that the legislature did not meet the conditions of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that a law be declared unconstitutional. Any other intervention by the court would blur the borders required by the separation of powers.

 

In examining the constitutionality of a law, the presumption is that the law is constitutional, and any doubt must weigh in favor of upholding the law rather than voiding it. Therefore, the party arguing against the law must bear the burden of proof that the law is unconstitutional. That party must show that the law extremely deviates from the scope of a reasonable infringement intended for a proper purpose. The burden also includes the secondary evidentiary burden of showing that there is a specific alternative that would realize the proper purpose while inflicting substantially lesser harm to the protected right.

 

(Per Mazza, J.) In terms of the burden of proof, the state bears the burden of convincing the court that the infringement is intended for a proper purpose, and that the means chosen are appropriate to achieving that purpose. The party claiming that the infringement is unconstitutional bears the burden of showing that the government should have chosen a less harmful alternative. However, it is not clear that this must always be the case. It may be that this is the correct approach only in regard to economic harm, whereas the infringement of other basic rights may justify placing the entire burden upon the state.

 

Basic Laws Cited:

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ss. 1, 1A, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11,12

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992)

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994), ss. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11

Basic Law: The Knesset, ss. 4, 8, 9A, 9A(A), 19, 21 (c), 24, 25, 34, 44, 45, 45A

Basic Law: The Judiciary: ss. 10, 17, 22

Basic Law: The Government: ss. 42, 50 (c ), 50 (d), 56, 56 (d), 59

Basic Law: The Army

Basic Law: The President of the State: s. 25

Basic Law: The State Economy: ss. 3, 7

Basic Law: Israel Lands

Basic Law: The State Comptroller

Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 3)

Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel

 

Legislation Cited

 

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1993.

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1992,
ss. 7(b)(1),11,12,15, 16, 17, 19 (a), 20, 20 (b)(3)(a), 21, 22.

First Schedule, Second Sc hedule, Third Schedule.

Interpretation Ordinance [New Version] ss. 16 (4), 37.

Rules of the Knesset.

Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 1969, s. 1.

Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, ss, 2(b), 7 (a), 9, 9 (b), 10 (a), 11.  

Transition Law, 1949, ss. 1, 2 (a), 2 (d).   

1990 Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law.

Transition Law, 5709-1949.

The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994.

Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 1969, s. 86 (e).

Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 1984, ss. 64, 108.

Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law.

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 1949, ss. 1, 3.

Law of Return, 1950.

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951.

Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1948, ss. 1,2,(d), 3.

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, ss. 1, 2(d), 3.

Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951, ss. 1, 5, 6, 9, 10.

Elections Financing Law, 1973.

Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 1969.

Standards Law, 1953.

Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets, 1984, s. 3.

Companies Ordinance (New Version) 1983.

Bankruptcy Ordinance, 1980.

Agency Law, 1965, s. 16.

Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution) 1948.

Interpretation Law, 1981, ss. 15, 17 (a), 20.

Planning and Building Law, 1965.

Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version], s. 41.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

  1. LCA 1759/93 Cohen v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 143.
  2. HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Committee of the Knesset [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 118.
  3. HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80.
  4. HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90.
  5. HCJ 75/76 ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit Board)  [1976] IsrSC 30(3) 645.
  6. CA 723/74 HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226.
  7. HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.
  8. EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83.
  9. HCJ 428/86; HCJApp 320/86; Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1.
  10. HCJ 89/83 Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 488.
  11. HCJ 256/88 Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of Health [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 19.
  12. HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd [1974] IsrSC 28(1) 640.
  13. HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794.
  14. HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset  [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 556.
  15. HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13.
  16. FH 9/77 Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295.
  17. CF 27/76 Stein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.
  18. CA 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [1963] IsrSC 17 2541.
  19. HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4)1; IsrSJ 8 21.
  20. HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60.
  21. HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 259.
  22. HCJ 669/85 Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 393.
  23. HCJ 119/80, OM 224/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 281.
  24. HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1994] IsrSC 48(5).
  25. FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112.
  26. EA 1/88 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.
  27. CrimA 282/61 Yihye v. Attorney-General [1962] IsrSC 16 633.
  28. HCJ 4031/94 ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [1994] IsrSC    48(5) 1.
  29. HCJ 131/65 Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 369.
  30. LCA 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 550.
  31. FH 4/69 Noiman v. Cohen [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 229.
  32. HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186.
  33. HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 41(4) 169.
  34. LCA 3466/92 Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 573.
  35. HCJ 852/86; HCJApp 483/86; 1/87 Aloni v Minister of Justice [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 1.
  36. HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 365.
  37. HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 441.
  38. CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 355.
  39. HCJ 243/67 Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.
  40. HCJ 163/57 Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 1041.
  41. HCJ 120/73 Tobis v. Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 757.
  42. HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [1953] IsrSC 2 5.
  43. HCJ 10/48 Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85; IsrSJ 1 68.
  44. CA 239/92 Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 66.
  45. HCJ 1225/94 ‘Bezeq’ – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 661.
  46. CrimApp 6654/93 Binkin v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 290.
  47. HCJ 5394/92 Huppert v. Yad VaShem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.
  48. EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 365.
  49. HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141.
  50. HCJ 5364/94 Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 758.
  51. HCJ 693/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 749.
  52. HCJ 6163/92 Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229.
  53. HCJ 732/84 Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 141.
  54. HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 337.
  55. HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324.
  56. HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 217.
  57. HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 412.
  58. HCJ 3477/95 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC 49(5) 1.
  59. EA 2/88 Ben-Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 221.
  60. CA 673/87 Salah v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments Co. Ltd (in Liquidation) [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 57.
  61. CrimA 74/58 Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71.
  62. CA 549/75 A v. Attorney-General [1976] IsrSC 30(1) 459.
  63. HCJ 761/86 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 868.
  64. CA 450/70 Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] IsrSC 26(1) 129.
  65. HCJ 889/86 Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 540.
  66. HCJ 7/55 Yanowitz v. Ohr [1953] IsrSC 9 1252.
  67. CA 219/80 Beit Hikiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Arrangement Ltd v. Efrati [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 516.
  68. CA 87/50 Liebman v. Lifshitz [1952] IsrSC 6 57.
  69. HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75.
  70. HCJ 180/52 Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 908.
  71. HCJ 6290/93 Zilka v. General Manager of Ministry of Health [1994] IsrSC 48(4) 631.
  72. HCJ 491/86 Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 41(1) 757.
  73. HCJ 356/83 Lidor, Association for the Protection of Homeowners, Apartments and Private Property in Israel v. Minister of Construction and Housing [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 602.
  74. HCJ 108/70 Manor v. Minister of Finance [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 442.
  75. CA 511/88 Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon LeTzion [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 522.
  76. HCJ 311/60 Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [1961] IsrSC 15 1989.
  77. HCJ 49/83 Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [1983] IsrSC 37(4) 516.

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

  1. OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 – unreported.
  2. OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 – unreported.
  3. OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 – unreported.
  4. OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 – unreported.

 

Australian cases cited:

  1. Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214.
  2. Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29.
  3. Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel (1943-44) 68 C.L.R. 261.

 

United States cases cited:

  1. Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
  2. Louisville Bank v. Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
  3. Wright v. Vinton Branch 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
  4. Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
  5. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
  6. Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
  7. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
  8. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
  9. United States v. Baellin 12 S. Ct. 505 (1891).
  10. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
  11. United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
  12. McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
  13. Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
  14. New York Trust Co. v. Fisher 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
  15. Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
  16. Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County 834 P. 2D 166 (1992).
  17. Illinois Elections B.D. v. Socialist Workers Party 440 U.S. 173 (1979).

 

English cases cited:

  1. Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1991] ALL ER 70  (C.J.E.C. and H.L. 1).
  2. MaCarthy Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 180 (C.J.E.C.).
  3. Bribery Comr. v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172 (P.C.).
  4. Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [1969] ALL ER 384 (P.C.). 
  5. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319.

 

International cases cited:

  1. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.R.R.
  2. Costa v. Enel (1964) E.C.R. 585.

.

German cases cited:

  1. 6 BverfGE 32 (1957).
  2. 7 BverfGE 377 (1958).

 

South African cases cited:

  1. Harris v. Minister of Interior (1952) 4 S.A.L.R. 428.
  2. S. v. Mekwanyana (1955) 6 B.C.L.R. 665.

 

Indian cases cited:

  1. Kesavande v. State of Kerala [1973] A.I.R. 146.

 

Canadian cases cited:

  1. R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
  2. R v. Big M. Drug Mart. Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

 

  1. Jones v. The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.

 

Jewish law sources cited:

 

  1. Leviticus 26, 10.
  2. Genesis 1, 27; 24, 27.
  3. Deuteronomy 15, 1-11; 27, 9.
  4. Exodus 1, 22; 19, 10-11, 14-20; 16.
  5. Shemot Rabba (on Exodus), 29.
  6. Isaiah 10, 15; 30, 15.
  7. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia (Damages, second part) 106b.

 

.

 

For the appellant in HCJ 6821/93 — M. Asif.

For respondent 1 in LCA 6821/93 — A. Vinder, Z. Slilat.

For respondent 2 in LCA 6821/93 — Z. Moshe.

 

For respondent 3 in LCA 6821/93 — M. Cohen.

For respondent 4 in CA 6821/93 — Y. Amitai.

For petitioners in LCA 1968/94 — D. Dinai, M. Dinai.

For respondent 1 in LCA 1908/94 — A. Posner, E. Golan.

 

JUDGMENT

President (Ret) M. Shamgar

1.    The provisions of the Principal Law.

The central question in each of the appeals before this court is identical: Does the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993 (hereinafter – the Amending Law) violate the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and should it therefore be regarded as void. Consequently, we have consolidated our hearing of the three appeals.

2.  As indicated by its title, the Amending Law amends the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, 5752-1992 (hereinafter – the Principal Law), which came into force on August 13, 1993.

 

As stated in the Explanatory Note cited in the draft law of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, 5752-1991, the Principal Law purported to forge a new framework for alleviating the deep crisis that had already beset the agricultural sector a number of years earlier. Generally, its thrust was, on the one hand, to facilitate the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, being premised on the preference of rehabilitation over liquidation, and on the other hand, it avoids the channeling of public funds for purposes of rehabilitation.

 

Legislative intervention in formulating arrangements for the agricultural sector is apparently unavoidable, given the failure of the various arrangements that preceded it.  Its proponents contend that “they left the agricultural sector in a deep crisis and at times even exacerbated the situation” (draft law of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law, p. 92).

 

(b)   The provisions of the Principal Law stipulate that a ‘rehabilitator’ may be appointed for ‘an agricultural organization,’ for agricultural corporations connected thereto, or for ‘agricultural associations’ included in the organization and its members, or for what the law refers to as ‘a rehabilitation zone.’ The ‘rehabilitator’ does precisely that. He is charged with compiling the data pertaining to the debts, ascertaining resources, and settling debts. An ‘agricultural association’ is a cooperative association classified as a moshav ovdim (=workers arrangement), a moshav shitufi (=cooperative arrangement) or a kfar shitufi (=cooperative village). The law further relates to all of the kibbutzim (=collective arrangements) in the Golan, the Jordan Valley, and in the other locations specified in the First Schedule, and the corporations specified in the Second Schedule. An ‘agricultural organization’ is a cooperative association whose members include agricultural associations, as specified in the Third Schedule of the Law.

 

(c )  The Principal Law provided that a proceeding dealing with a basic debt or the guarantee of a basic debt could neither be initiated nor continued save in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned law (s. 7 of the Law). The rehabilitator was to determine both the basic debt and the total sum owed by each agricultural unit, in accordance with the all the information at his disposal. The terms ‘debt’ and ‘basic debt’ were defined in s. 1 of the Principal Law, as follows:

“‘debt’ – principal, linkage differentials, interest, compounded interest, commission and expenses’;

 basic debt – a debt incurred during the period that terminated on the determining date, or a debt incurred in order to pay a debt as stated, or a debt as stated, determined in a judgment, even if given after the determining date, and which is one of the following: (1) a debt of an agricultural association; (2) the debt of an agricultural organization; (3) the debt of an agricultural unit, apart from an agricultural association and an agricultural organization, which stems from his business as an agriculturalist”  emphasis mine – M.S.)

“the determining date” is the 10th Tevet 5748 - 31 December 1987. This means that, in essence, the Law dealt with debts incurred until that date.

 

(d) Where a proceeding was transferred to the rehabilitator as stated, other proceedings being conducted against the same debtor relating to the basic debt will also be transferred to the rehabilitator.

 

(e)   A creditor or debtor in a proceeding for collection of the basic debt or a guarantee for the basic debt may notify the person conducting the proceeding that the provisions of the aforementioned law are applicable to him. If such notice is given, the person conducting the proceeding will order the discontinuation of the proceeding and its transfer to the rehabilitator, if satisfied that the conditions for its discontinuation have been satisfied Where the debtor is an agriculturalist, or member of an agricultural association, he may inform the person conducting the proceeding that he does not desire the application of the provisions of the law.

 

3.    Section 15 of the Principal Law prescribes that if the rehabilitator determines the value of the basic debt of the agricultural unit, he shall deduct a sum equal to twenty percent of the debt. Should the rehabilitator determine in a reasoned decision that special, justifying circumstances obtain, he may reduce an additional sum which may not exceed ten percent of the debt.

 

Section 21 of the Principal Law both adds to and broadens the authority for cancellation of debts:

 

‘“21. Cancellation of Debts:  Where the rehabilitator deems that the debtor is unable to repay his debt even after the realization of his assets under section 20, he is authorized to cancel the additional debts, at a rate that does not exceed forty percent of the debt in arrangement. Where the debtor was an agricultural association which is a border arrangement, a member of the said association, or an agriculturalist resident on the border, the rehabilitator shall cancel the balance of the debt that the debtor is unable to repay.”

 

Regarding the handling of debts, s. 11 of the Principal Law completes the picture, providing the following determinations which the rehabilitator may make for each agricultural unit, in accordance with the provisions of the law: (1) the sum of his debts to the various creditors; (2) his repayment capacity; (3) the sum of the debt that will be paid, either in cash or installments; (4) the sum of the debt by reason of the replacement of the guarantee under section 16 of the Principal Law; (5) the sums of the reductions under the aforementioned s. 15; (6) whether assets are to be realized for payment of the debt; (7) whether part of the debt should be cancelled, and if so, at what rate; (8) the manner in which the debt is allocated between the various creditors, and the manner of allocating the consideration received from realization of assets.

 

Where the rehabilitator determines all of the above, it will be regarded as the arrangement of the agricultural unit’s debt, and the rehabilitator will notify the creditors and the debtors of the balance, to which they may object within thirty days after notice has been given. Where special circumstances obtain, the rehabilitator is permitted to extend the period.  Where an objection is filed, the rehabilitator rules on the debts and rights following a hearing, after which he informs the parties of his decision.

 

Provisions of the Law – The Amending Law

4.The explanatory note to the Amending Law of 5753 (Explanatory Note to Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993), which preceded the Amending Law, summarily states that “in the wake of judgments pertaining to the debt, it became necessary to clarify a number of matters that were stipulated in the proposal….” (ibid p.292)

 

Section 1 of the Amending Law prescribes new definitions for the terms “debt,” “tax debts,” and “total debt” (which in the wake of the amendment were included in section 1 [of the Principal Law], as follows:

“debt” – a financial obligation irrespective of whether its date of payment has arrived or not, including the principal, linkage differentials, interest, compound interest, commission, and expenses, including tax debts; “tax debt” – any sum owed by a person pursuant to any legislation concerning the imposition of tax or compulsory payment that the Finance Minister charged with implementation of collection thereof; “total debt” – the debt of a financial unit as of the 24th Tevet 5752 (31 December 1991) and with respect to an agriculturalist and a member of an agricultural association – any debt as stated, provided that it stem from his occupation as an agriculturalist, provided that regarding a debt owed by a member of an agricultural association to the agricultural association of which he is a member, any debt as stated, unless the agricultural association proves that a particular debt did not stem from his occupation as an agriculturalist

 

In the definition of the “basic debt” the concluding section was amended, and it now states that the aforementioned term includes “a debt that was incurred after the determining date for payment of the debt (in accordance with its definition in the opening part of the said definition – M.S), including as a result of an arrangement or the recycling of the debt.”

 

As mentioned above, s. 7 of the Principal Law deals with the freezing of proceedings, and by force of the Amending Law, it deals with the “total debt” – a term which as stated, was defined anew.  Instead of referring to the basic debt as referred to in the Principal Law, the components of the debt for arrangement were enumerated anew in section 17, as they were amended in the Amending Law, as follows:

 

“The debt for Arrangement:              17 (a)      the rehabilitator will fix the arrangement debt in accordance with the total debt, after having deducted, for purposes of the arrangement, the reductions stipulated in section 15, and having added the guarantee substitute pursuant to section 16, all of the above to be re-valued as of 24th Tevet, 5752 (31 December 1991) (hereinafter – “arrangement debt”).

 

(b)        The reduction will be re-valued in accordance with the consumer price index and the addition of 7% linked annual interest.

 

(c)        The arrangement debt will be re-evaluated until the arrangement date by being linked to the consumer price index, according to the rate of the increase in the index as known on the arrangement date, as opposed to the index for the month of November 1991, and the addition of linked interest as stated, at the rate of 5% per annum.

 

(d)       Where a arrangement debt was re-evaluated pursuant to sub-section (c), all other debts owed by reason of that debt, beginning as of 29 Tevet 5752 (31 December 1991), due to interest, linkage differentials, exchange rate differentials, commissions, and obligations for which any creditor customarily charges all of his debtors, apart from commission for issuing a credit line with those creditors who normally charge such commission – shall be void.”

 

The law also introduced many other additional adjustments that need not be enumerated here.

 

The thrust of the Amending Law is thus expressed in the extension of the period during which the debts incurred are to be handled by the rehabilitator - hence the date 31 December1997 was replaced by 31 December 1991.  It further provided for the reevaluation of debts as stated in the aforementioned definition of “the arrangement debt,” and it introduced additional changes that are not merely technical.

This brings us to the appeal at hand.

 

The Judgment of the Lower Court

5.    In LCA 1908/94, which we treated as if leave for appeal had been granted, application for leave for appeal was filed against the decision of the Tel-Aviv Jaffa District Court (CF 252/92; Motion 5025/92*). The appellants contest the lower court’s determinations as they relate to the provisions of the Amending Law, to the extent that they broaden the rehabilitator’s authority to clarify the debts defined as a “basic debt” and to settle them, while concurrently denying that authority to the court.  The claim is that these determinations do not satisfy the requirements of the limitation clause of section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and are therefore void; and that the appellants’ rental debts for which payment is due after the 31 December 1987 cannot be considered as a basic debt.

 

The proceedings began when the respondent (hereinafter – “Credit Services”) filed a monetary action against the appellants (the moshav and nine of its members), for a debt incurred for the renting of equipment, and a further request for the return of the equipment. The appellants filed an application for a stay of the proceedings and their transfer to the rehabilitator, pursuant to provision 7 (b)(1) of the Principal Law, as per its wording at the time, namely that a basic debt is a debt of an agricultural entity incurred during the period that terminated on 31 December 1987.

 

Credit Services opposed the request, arguing that the claim related to the balance of the debt as of 15 December 1991, as a result of which it could be not be considered as a “basic debt.” The Amending Law was published on 13 August 1993. The Amending Law broadened the provisions of s. 7 so that a stay of proceedings could be sought in respect of a debt that wholly or partly constituted a total debt or a guarantee for a total debt. As mentioned, a total debt is a debt of an agricultural entity as of 21 December 1991. In other words, the requirement to grant an application to transfer proceedings to the rehabilitator extends for an additional four years after time of the amendment. The claim in the case at hand relates to a debt dated 15 November 1991, hence it falls within the period to which the Amending Law applies. Credit Services argued that the provisions of the Amending Law were invalid, and that the court was not obliged to stay proceedings pertaining to the overall debt. Moreover, it was argued that the distinction between a basic debt and a non-basic debt was still valid and relevant for purposes of ruling on the application for a stay of proceedings.

 

Credit Services argued in the lower court and before this court that the Amending Law infringes a right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and does not satisfy the requirements stipulated in s. 8 which provides that

 

‘There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.’

As stated, the violated right is the right conferred by s. 3 of the Basic Law, which provides that there shall be no violation of a person’s property. In the instant case, the violation affects the creditors, including the Credit Services.

 

Section 10 of the Basic Law provides that the Basic Law will not affect the validity of any law (din) in effect prior to the commencement of the Basic Law, i.e. on 20 Adar Beth 5752 (25 March 1992). The preliminary question addressed by the lower court was, therefore, whether s. 10 also applied to amendments of a law already in effect before 25 March1992, if they came into force after the commencement of the Basic Law. The lower court opined that the legislation of new provisions for existing laws, following the commencement of the Basic Law, is subject to review in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law; this was the legislative intention as evidenced in Basic Law. In this context, the court distinguished between provisions without which the existing law (protected by s. 10) could not be applied, and provisions that constituted a new arrangement, not essential for the continued activity under the existing law. 

 

The court noted that it was inconceivable that the Basic Law protected rights infringed by laws enacted after the Basic Law, but did not offer such protection if the later infringing law was enacted as an amendment of an existing law, and was not essential for the implementation of the existing law. Any other interpretation would render meaningless all the provisions of Basic Laws which restrict the scope for violating a Basic Law, such as s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. According to this test, the Principal Law would be protected by force of s. 10, but that protection would not extend to the aforementioned amendment of 5753 [1993], which actually broadened the infringement of property rights.

 

The District Court further commented that the aforementioned s. 8 is not an entrenched provision of a Basic Law, but nonetheless, a Basic Law by definition enjoys normative supremacy, and all subsequent legislation must adapt itself to the provisions of the Basic Law, in accordance with its limitation clause. This premise yields the conclusion that the court is authorized to examine the consistency of the later law with the Basic Law, and to draw conclusions from its inconsistency with the provisions of the Basic Law. The Amending Law was enacted after the enactment of the Basic Law, and as such, the court is empowered to examine whether its provisions violate a right protected under the Basic Law. Should the answer be in the affirmative, it continues to examine whether the provisions of the Amending Law satisfy the requirements enumerated in s. 8 of the Basic Law. In accordance with that examination the court can determine the constitutionality of the Amending Law.

 

The lower court dismissed the argument of the appellant’s learned attorney, that the Amending Law did not infringe the right of property. He pointed out that the Amending Law broadened the range of creditors included in the purview of the law under discussion, and even broadened the scope of infringed property rights. In doing so, it abrogated the court’s authority to preside over proceedings concerning debts created during four years additional to those stipulated in the Principal Law, ordering instead that they be transferred to the rehabilitator.

 

According to the lower court, just as the Principal Law included far reaching provisions that infringe the property rights of creditors with respect to the basic debt by preventing them from litigating before the court and subordinating them to the rehabilitator’s authority, so too, the Amending Law contains similar, far reaching provisions that infringe the property rights of those creditors included within its purview, for debts created during the four years added on to the years stipulated in the Principal Law. In doing so, the Amending Law negated the right of these creditors to litigate with respect to their property rights in these debts, subordinating them to the rehabilitator’s authority. This is a violation of the creditor’s property rights (LCA 1759/93 Cohen v. Hapoalim Bank Ltd, [1])

 

The lower court held that the infringement of the creditor’s property rights in a debt other than a basic debt finds expression in the duty to transfer the debt for treatment by the rehabilitator, and denying him the option of having it adjudicated in court and of enforcing it in the Execution Office. The infringement is the result of the conferral of authority upon the rehabilitator to spread debt payments and to give instructions to foreclose on the debtor’s assets, thereby limiting the creditor’s right to foreclose on the asset, as he could have done in the Execution Office. The rehabilitator is also authorized to cancel part of the debtor’s debt.

 

This led the court to examine the provisions of s. 8 in order to examine whether the violation of the property right in the Amending Law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause under s. 8. In doing so, the court erred in its description of the background facts. The District Court mistakenly thought that the Principal Law was not applicable to the entire kibbutz sector. It also deviated from examining the provisions of the Amending Law only, and instead examined the conformity of the Principal Law to the conditions of s. 8 of the Basic Law. The court concluded that comparison of the statute’s provisions to its declared purpose in the Explanatory Note reveals an unexplained and imbalanced preference for that part of the agricultural sector that is governed by the provisions of the Principal Law and the Amending Law, and discrimination against the sector to whom the provisions do not apply. The court ruled that, against the background of the Explanatory Note that presents the law as a panacea for the entire sector, the unexplained preference for a certain sector is inconsistent with the democratic principles of the State of Israel.

 

Instead of ensuring that the financial burden flowing from the provisions of the Principal Law and the Amending Law would be born by the entire public, it was only imposed on part of the public (i.e. on the creditors of debtors belonging to the agricultural sector, to whom the law applies). Placing the burden on only a part of the public creates inequality. The lower court contended that the derogation from contractual undertakings and the duty of keeping promises is anathema to an appropriate societal-value based arrangement. Legislation of this kind is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel.

 

The legislature’s attempt to rescue and rehabilitate the agricultural sector is a commendable goal, but imposing this goal on just a part of the public amounts to the realization of that goal in a manner that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. Regarding the question of whether the Amending Law serves an appropriate purpose, the lower court noted that there was nothing to indicate that broadening the violation of property rights by way of the Amending Law was done for an appropriate purpose, i.e. an objective that could not have been attained by way of the Principal Law.

 

No indication was given of the consideration of other alternatives for achieving that objective, apart from the arbitrary violation of private property. Consequently, it has been neither explained nor proved that the infringement of the Amending Law is to an extent that does not exceed that which is necessary. In the lower court’s view, the absence of balances in the Amending Law and the critical mass of violations of rights, warrant the conclusion that the law is inconsistent with the values of the State and that its infringement exceeds that which is necessary.  

 

Under the above analysis, the provisions of the Amending Law, to the extent that they broaden the rehabilitator’s exclusive authority to examine arrangement debts that are not considered as basic debts, do not fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Accordingly, these provisions are void. In view of this, the court ordered the respondents to present evidence showing that the debt at issue was a basic debt, as defined in the Principal Law (i.e. prior to the commencement of the Amending Law).

 

6.    In CA 6821/93, the lower court adjudicated an action against nine defendants, based on their guarantee to the bank for a debt of the Collective Agricultural Fund Ltd in liquidation). The five respondents filed notice regarding the discontinuation of the action and its transfer to the rehabilitator, in reliance on s. 7 of the Principal Law. In view of the section’s amendment and its coming into force on 13 August 1993, they argued that it would be improper to continue proceedings concerning the debt guarantee, save in accordance with the Amending Law, given that if it was proven to the court’s satisfaction that part of the debt was a guarantee for the total debt, then it would be bound to discontinue the proceedings regarding the guarantee and transfer them to the rehabilitator.

 

The court noted that whereas the debts of the farmers and the members of the agricultural association included in the purview of a total debt are only those which stemmed from the debtors’ work as farmers, this restriction did not apply to an agricultural entity not defined as a farmer and a member of an agricultural association. Any debt of an agricultural entity, which is not a farmer and member of an agricultural association, is a total debt, irrespective of its source and how it was created, provided that it existed on 31 December 1991.

 

It is not disputed that the respondents incurred their debt, the subject of the action, by force of their guarantee to a private company, which was not an agricultural company, and hence its debt was not a total debt. The question requiring our decision is whether the debt of an agricultural entity as of 31 December 1991, which arose from a guarantee for a debt that was not a total debt, is nonetheless a “total debt” for the purposes of the law. According to the definition of the term “total debt” in Amending Law, the answer is in the affirmative. As explained above, a total debt is any debt of an agricultural entity, apart from that of a farmer and a member of an agricultural association of 31 December 1991, regardless of its source.

 

What emerges is that the court’s view was that the statement of claim indicated that the proceeding related to the respondents’ total debt. The proceeding should therefore be discontinued and referred to the rehabilitator. This was the grounds of the appeal before us. It was only upon appeal that the appellant claimed that the Amending Law contravened the provisions of s. 8 of the Basic Law, and that this was grounds for invalidating it.  We therefore joined this appeal to the current litigation.

 

7.    In LCA 3363/94, an application for leave of appeal was filed against the District Court’s decision (LCA 18/94), in which the application for leave of appeal against the decision in Execution File (Haifa) 02-14337-978 was adjudicated as the appeal itself. We adjudicated the application as if it were the appeal itself.

 

In the lower court’s aforementioned decision, it decided not to stay the proceedings against the appellants, not to transfer them to the rehabilitator, and to overturn the decision of the Head of the Execution Office. The court held that the litigation related to a debt that was incurred in 1988. The need to establish a date resulted from the fact that the total debt in the main file was, in the lower court’s view, only vaguely defined. It will be recalled that it referred to “(1) the debt on a particular date, as determined by the rehabilitator…”; and in sub-section (2) “regarding an agricultural corporation – the debt on a particular date as established by the rehabilitator…”. In the lower court’s opinion this definition yielded an unsatisfactory result, because it would in fact lead to discrimination between different categories of debtors (as well as between the different creditors) inasmuch as one standard date was not fixed for all of them. The Amending Law accordingly fixed a standard date for all of the debtors.

 

The court noted that the actual fixing of the date on 31 December1991 in the definition of the total amended debt did not infringe the creditors’ property rights. The basis of the infringement derived from the fact that fixing this date forced the creditors to terminate the proceedings (or not to commence them) with respect to the debt, if it was proven to the satisfaction of the court, the head of the Execution Office, the Registrar or the arbitrator, that the debt under adjudication was either partially or entirely a total debt or a guarantee for a total debt. Under the Principal Law, the proceedings would only be frozen if it were proven that the basic debt was incurred after the period ending on 31 December1987.

 

The court mentioned that from the moment that the proceedings were frozen and transferred to the rehabilitator, the latter was authorized to do the following:

 

1) to rule that the debt would be spread out for payment over a period that would not exceed seventeen years and six months from the date of the arrangement (s. 19 (a) of the Principal Law after its amendment by the Amending Law). The court regarded this as infringing the creditors right to foreclose on their property during the period of debt installments because, had the adjudication not been transferred to the rehabilitator (under the Principal Law), the duration of the installments period would not have been fixed. 

 

(2) Under s. 20 of the Principal Law after its amendment by the Amending Law, the rehabilitator was entitled to order foreclosure on the non-agricultural assets of the debtor, apart from on his residential dwelling, providential funds, and assets for production as specified in ss. (b)(3)(a). The provisions of this section similarly infringe the creditor’s property when they are not consistent with the other rules governing foreclosure, receiving or execution proceedings.

 

There was a similar broadening of the authority to strike out debts at a rate that did not exceed forty percent of the settled debt, and there was a concurrent broadening of the basis for the debts to be settled, which also related to the total debt and not just to the basic debt. It therefore follows that the Amending Law infringes the creditors’ property, above and beyond the provisions of the Principal Law.

 

The commencement date of the Principal Law preceded that of the Basic Law. However, s. 10 of the Basic Law does not relate to legislative amendments enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, and does not exclude them from the category of provisions that require examination and assessment in accordance with s. 8 of the Basic Law. The normative entrenchment appears in the “limitation clause” of the Basic Law, which restricts the legislature’s authority in accordance with the provisions established therein. Relying on the limitation clause, the court considered itself authorized to declare the invalidity of the law that postdated the Basic Law, and which in the court’s view did not satisfy the conditions stipulated in the limitation clause. In view of the invalidity of the Amending Law, the court ruled that the new final date should be ignored, i.e. 31 December1991, and that the provision in the Principal Law that allowed the rehabilitator to determine a specific date for each single debtor should be restored, (s. 12 of the Principal Law). Consequently, the lower court cancelled the decision of the Head of the Execution Office, and returned the file to the Execution Office instead of transferring it to the rehabilitator. This gave rise to the current appeal.

 

8.    In conclusion, each the three files, briefly summarized above, raise an identical question, namely: What is the legal validity of the Amending Law in view of the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and is the infringement of property therein constitutional?

 

9.    Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

(a) The examination of the three files forming the subject of our deliberations will proceed in the following order:

 

(1) Section 10 of the Basic Law provides that nothing in the Basic Law shall detract from the validity of the law that was in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law. Accordingly, we will first examine the application of the Basic Law to an amendment of the existing law, in so far as the Basic Law is not applicable to the existing law itself. Should we conclude that s. 10 of the Basic Law applies to an amendment, it terminates our discussion of the question of constitutionality, because the import of such a conclusion would be that the Amending Law is protected by s. 10, and the substantive provisions of the Basic Law are not applicable to it. Should we conclude that the Amending Law does not fall within the purview of s. 10 then we will proceed to the following stages of examination:

 

(2) At the second stage we will examine the principles guiding constitutional legislation.

 

(3) At the third stage we will examine the application of s. 3 of the Basic Law (protection of property) to the Amending Law.

 

(4) Should we conclude that s. 3 of the Basic Law is applicable to the instant case in the sense that the Amending Law infringes the right of property, we will proceed to the final stage of the examination: We will have to decide whether the Amending Law satisfies the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which bears the title “Infringement of Rights,” and which enumerates the conditions for the validity of a law, notwithstanding its infringement of basic rights as evidenced by its provisions.

 

(b)   For clarification of the data, we reiterate that our concern is with an amendment to the Principal Law.

 

The Principal Law came into force on the 12 March 1992. The Basic Law came into force on 25 March 1992, and the Amending Law came into force on the 13 August 1993.

 

In other words, the Principal Law came into force prior to the Basic Law, but the Amending Law was enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law. Our first question will therefore be the question of the application of the Basic Law to the Amending Law.

 

The Application of the Basic Law to the Amendment of the Existing Law

 

(a) Section 10 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

 

     

Validity of Laws          This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.

 

Regarding the applicable law before the effective date of the Basic Law, i.e. 25 March 1992, no question arises in the present context. The Principal Law came into effect on 12 March 1992, admittedly, just a few days before the commencement date of the Basic Law. Nonetheless, the unequivocal wording of s. 10 removes the Principal Law from the category of laws that might be influenced, for good and for bad, by the Basic Law’s provisions. 

 

The question that must occupy us concerns the implications and the influence of the Basic Law on the Amending Law in this case. In terms of the pertinent dates, the picture is simple. The Amendment came into force on the 13 August 1993, i.e. a date following the commencement of the Basic Law. Plainly, therefore, the Amendment is governed by the Basic Law. The Basic Law does not affect the validity of the law in existence prior to its own commencement, from which one can infer that it does apply to all legislation enacted after its commencement, and may even derogate therefrom. The Amending Law did not exist before the commencement of the Basic Law, and so, by the wording of s. 10, the Basic Law is applicable to the Amending Law. Needless to say, this still does not affect the validity of the Amending Law, for even if subject to the Basic Law, it is still necessary to conduct the examination in accordance with sections 3 or 8 of the Basic Law, or both of them.

 

(b)   Firstly, however we will dispose of the more far-reaching arguments, which attempt to support the respondents’ claim that the Amending Law is not governed by the Basic Law despite the fact that it was enacted after it. They claim that a legislative amendment follows the principal law; it relates to its provisions and does not deviate from the principles established therein, irrespective of whether its adjustments and changes are of a practical nature, or on the level of law or principle. The ancillary follows the principal, and an amendment should therefore be regarded as part of the principal law. Just as the principal law is not subject to the Basic Law, so too the amendment at issue before us should be exempt. 

 

Alternatively, it was claimed that there may be cases in which an amendment constitutes a substantive change and innovation in the law, and should be regarded independently. Thus, every amendment must be examined in accordance with its substance. The argument in our case is that the amendment is not a substantive one, and that the Amending Law treats of the same subjects as the Principal Law, of which it forms a part.

 

11.  From a legal standpoint, I cannot accept the arguments treating of the application of s. 10 to the Amending Law as cited above, that are intended to persuade us that the Basic Law does not apply to the Amending Law. Furthermore, the proposed hypothesis also raises numerous practical difficulties.

 

The innovation of the Basic Law was its establishment of criteria for the examination of the constitutionality and validity of a law. It created new, substantive criteria, unprecedented, apart from the beginning of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. It established norms for the examination of the contents of a law, and subjected all governmental agencies to the duty of abiding by those norms. Needless to say, the court, too, is a governmental agency, serving as the judicial branch, which is one of the three branches of government under our constitutional structure (HCJ Flatto Sharon v. Knesset Committee, (hereinafter the Flatto Sharon case, [2], at p. 141).

 

The legislature drafted s. 10 because it was aware that laws enacted prior to the Basic Law contradicted it. The legislature did not wish a sudden upheaval of the existing law, preferring legal stability. In its view, the existing law required systematic, cautious examination, assessment and screening, prior to subjecting it to the norms of the Basic Law. This process is not required with respect to a statutory amendment, just as it is not required with respect to a new law. The legislative stage is the appropriate stage for the examination and assessment of new legislation or statutory amendment, in terms of consistency with the protection of human rights afforded by the Basic Law, as is the legislature’s custom with draft laws. 

 

A principal law and a statutory amendment exist in their own right. The legislative authority deliberates over any statutory amendment from the time of its inception, just as it examines all primary legislation. Indeed, each of its provisions operates as primary legislation irrespective of its substantive connection to the provisions of the existing law. Adoption of a statutory amendment that refers to existing legislation, instead of enacting separate and independent legislation lacking a substantive connection to the existing legislation, results from the desire to organize the law in a rational, organized manner, concentrating all of the provisions treating of a particular matter in consolidated legislative frameworks, and preventing contradictions between them. The old and the new are connected both nominally by their title, and substantively, in terms of their content, but in terms of their validity, the law presenting the amendment is valid in its own right, as a separate, independent legislative act, deriving its power directly from the legislature’s act. The attachment of the amending statute to the amended statute is expressed primarily by the statute’s title, but does not reflect the essence of the amendment. An amendment may be technical or formal, effecting no substantive change, or it may amend – and change – the existing law. In other words, the title of the amendment does not attest to its content, but rather to the desire to create organized legislative frameworks, all dealing with a defined issue under the same rubric.

 

Establishing distinctions and differences in accordance with the contents of an amending law generally creates dilemmas and anomalies. Needless to say, even a seemingly technical, formal amendment may have far reaching consequences in terms of its substantive results. Consider, for example, emergency economic measures enacted for a period of three months, that have been extended by an amending law for a period of five years. There can be no doubt regarding the change in the meaning and implications of the amendment in comparison with the principal law, despite the fact that the change was ostensibly just an extension of validity of an existing provision.

 

13. Summing up: The above leads to a double conclusion that derives from the wording, the essence and purpose of the Basic Law: (a) In terms of its wording, we observed that the Basic Law states that its provisions do not affect the validity of the law in force prior to its coming into effect. This means that a law that was not in force prior to the coming into force of the Basic Law, but only thereafter, will not be subject to the reservation regarding the inapplicability of the Basic Law. If s. 10 does not apply, it means that the legislature’s plain and simple intention is that the criteria of the Basic Law, and the human rights safeguards therein, must be complied with..

 

(b)   In terms of its purpose, the Basic Law attempted to maintain the existing law, at this stage, but did not extend its aegis to new law, by which it would have divested itself of its content and purpose. Adoption of a rule that the application of s. 10 to new law would be assessed in accordance with the law that existed prior to the Basic Law would mean that the adornment of any new law with the title of a statutory amendment would suffice to exempt it from the application of the Basic Law. Needless to say, on a practical level, this would present no problem. The totality of laws is sufficiently broad to accommodate the placement of all new legislation in the formal framework of the existing law. However, this approach would be inconsistent with both intention and the act of the legislature, which created the Basic Law to be complied with, and not to be divested of content. The presumption is that the legislature does not waste words, nor enact a law, especially not a Basic Law, in vain.

 

The bottom line is that a statutory amendment, like any other statutory provision, is a separate, new legislative act, to which the non-application clause of s. 10 of the Basic Law does not apply.

 

14.  As a matter of practice too, we must establish clear demarcation lines, rather than be drawn into vague distinctions. An attempt to determine the degree of substantive innovation in a statutory amendment, and its new implications for the entire legal system would give rise to unending litigation and interpretation. Instead, a simple and unequivocal boundary must be established, based on the date of the amendment. The water-shed date is the date of adoption of the Basic Law.

 

In other words, as explained above, it would be a particularly onerous undertaking to conduct a separate substantive examination of the contents of each provision of each and every statutory amendment, and even of the component parts of each provision (because, conceivably, an innovation may derive from part of the provision). On a practical level, such a proposal would trigger endless legal debate and prevent establishing clear, sharp legal distinctions. It would contribute to legal uncertainty, rather than achieve the desired opposite result..

 

The import of legislation must be clear and readily intelligible in terms of its content and implications, and should not be complicated by leaving it open to a debate – which would be imperative in each and every case – upon the applicability of the normative limitations in the Basic Law.

 

15.  In view of this I think that the Amending Law is subject to the provisions of the Basic Law.

 

16.  Having ruled that the Basic Law applies to the Amendment, the first imperative is an examination of the classificatory principles governing the various forms of legislation. Inter alia, this involves discussion of the status of the Basic Law in our legal system, and the status of regular legislation in the light of the various forms of constitutional legislation. We will now proceed to examine the guiding principles that determine the various legislative formats and the distinctions among them.

 

The Connection Between a Regular Law and a Basic Law

17.  The need to examine legislative principles stems from our conclusion that the Amending Law – being a regular law rather than a Basic Law – is not exempt from the scope of application of the Basic Law. We must examine the question of the standing of a regular statute enacted after the Basic Law came into force, if its provisions appear to infringe rights protected under the Basic Law. As stated, our concern is with a statutory amendment that is a regular law, and not a Basic Law, and that does not specifically state that it violates a protected right.

 

Our examination will proceed from the general to the specific. In other words, the subject will first be addressed on a theoretical level, beginning with a discussion of the fundamental legislative structure. For the moment, I will avoid expressing an opinion on whether the specific statutory amendment under discussion contravenes the Basic Law.

 

Following this, we will proceed to the second stage, and examine the status and significance of the Basic Law applicable in the instant case – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

At the third stage we will apply our conclusions and examine the Amending Law in terms of its relationship to the provisions of the Basic Law.

18.  The two Basic Laws enacted about three years ago – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – were intended to constitute an integral part of the Israeli bill of rights. Prior to the commencement of the Basic Laws, these basic rights were anchored in precedent that has formed part of positive Israeli law since the establishment of the State.  In the framework of statutory interpretation, the case law has repeatedly emphasized that the various basic rights included in our positive law enjoyed a unique status as criteria guiding the crystallization of the law’s political and legal conceptions, as the guiding light in the formulation of the law and as guidelines for judicial review of the acts of courts, secondary legislation, and the various agencies of the executive branch (see HCJ 1/49 HCJ 1/49 Bejerano v. Minister of Police [3]; HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4] ; HCJ 75/76 ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit Board) [5], at p. 653 opposite letter E; CA 723/74 HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [6]. at p. 295 opposite letter E; HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [7]; EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8]. Today, some of these rights, belong to the constitutional section of our statutory law, by force of their inclusion in Basic Laws: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the determination of substantive criteria for primary legislation they were preceded by s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. The two new Basic Laws took a broader approach in aiming to define basic rights in creating a statutory bill of human rights for Israel. Just as s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset established substantive conditions for future legislation in the matters regulated by s. 4, the two new Basic Laws establish guidelines for all regular legislation pertaining to the rights in their scope. Judicial review has thus been extended. It is now possible to review the lawfulness of primary legislation enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, in accordance with the criteria established in the aforementioned Basic Laws.

This means that not only were basic rights defined as such in primary legislation, being upgraded from common to statutory law, but they were also endowed with supra-normative status, in relationship to both primary and secondary legislation, in the manner and to degree stipulated by the provisions of the Basic Law. The realization of the decision adopted by the First Knesset – the Harrari Decision – to which we shall shortly return, has thus proceeded from the stage of defining the sovereign authorities, their powers and their functions, to the formulation of a bill of rights.

For the first time, basic civil rights have been clearly and directly expressed in constitutional legislation.

Though there is still no complete, comprehensive bill of rights encompassing all basic rights, two initial, important chapters have now attained statutory status. An important part of the definition of liberty has been firmly established in the law in written constitutional form.

A fundamentally important conclusion is that it is now possible to judicially review the constitutionality of primary legislation in light of statutorily established constitutional norms, by examining the constitutionality of the legislation under the criteria of the Basic Laws.

The Normative Hierarchy: Basic Law, Statute, Secondary Legislation

19.  An understanding of the new Basic Laws requires reference to the principles for interpreting the relationships among various legislative acts. We will examine the relationship between statutes, between regulations and between regulations and statutes. The typical case is that in which the regular law establishes a provision that may protect a particular right. Let us imagine that a subsequent law stipulates that there is no protection for that right. In other words, it removes the protection or derogates from its scope or depth. The later law may absolutely negate the right or divest it of its content (i.e. a “variation” including the “annulment” of the right); Alternatively, the later law may restrict the protection conferred to the right without varying or annulling it (i.e. an “infringement” of the right). Incidentally, later on in our comments we will expand on the concepts of “variation” and “infringement” and the distinctions between them.

In both cases (“variation” and “infringement”) the later law may either vary or infringe the right protected in the earlier law. The earlier law recedes in the face of the later law, in the words of the dictum lex posterior derogat priori (“and bring forth the old because of the new”; Leviticus, 26:10) [117]. The most recent legislative pronouncement is usually the decisive one.

The analytical starting point is that when the legislature wishes to vary or infringe a protected right it does so either explicitly, or by way of a clearly contradictory stipulation in the wording of the new provisions, which is inconsistent with its predecessor. In any case, an attempt should be made to uphold laws dealing with the same subject matter and to reconcile them. Thus, the interpretative presumption is that a right protected by a regular law is not changed or infringed by later regular legislation, unless otherwise stated or implied (see HCJ 428/86; HCJ App 320/86; Barzilai v. Government of Israel, [9] at p.542). In other words, the interpretative presumption is that the two laws, one later and one earlier, are consistent with each other. The wording of the later law may refute this presumption, but if the presumption is refuted, the valid positive law is the law determined in the later law. The presumption is that the later law is the most up-to-date expression of the legislative intention and reflects the current objective of the legislative system. In other words, the prima facie rule is that statutes do not contradict each other (one statute versus another statute) but if that rule is contravened, either explicitly or implicitly, the later statute has the upper hand.

The aforementioned rule is qualified by an exception: If the earlier law is a specific law as opposed to a later more general one in terms of the issue at hand, then the specific law takes precedence over the general one: lex specialis derogat generali. This rule applies when dealing with two regular laws containing conflicting normative provisions, and the difference between them is expressed by the degree of specificity of their provisions. 

The rules described above are guidelines that elucidate the relationship between two legislative acts, but they are not exhaustive. Another presumption with roots in our system is that the legislature protects and promotes basic rights, and this is a guiding presumption in legislative construction (see e.g. HCJ 75/76 [5] supra, and CA 723/74 [6] supra). Together with that presumption, we are also assisted by the aforementioned doctrinal rules governing the relationships between statutes: an earlier statute versus a later statute, a specific statue versus a general statute.

20.  A conflict similar to the one described above may also arise between two provisions of secondary legislation, in the form of regulations enacted by administrative or other agencies competent to enact regulations. The presumption is that the regulation is legitimate from an administrative perspective. The question is what happens when two regulations conflict. The theoretical construct governing the decision in the case of contradictory regulations is identical to that of contradictory statutes. An effort must be made to reconcile them or to reach a conclusion as to their validity or invalidity, having reference to the particular laws by force of which the regulations were enacted. The rules outlined above are similarly applicable to secondary legislation: hence a later regulation supersedes an earlier regulation; a specific regulation supersedes a general regulation.

21.  Another, distinct question is what the law is when a regulation contradicts the provisions of a statute. The question becomes even more acute when dealing with the question of the law of a special and later regulation that contradicts a general law that preceded it. Prima facie, a simple application of the interpretative principles adumbrated above leads to the conclusion that the special provision should override the general provision. Moreover, later legislation should override earlier legislation. Reasoning a fortiori, a later, specific provision should therefore prevail over an earlier, general one. The conclusion is that any later, specific provision would unequivocally prevail over any earlier, general provision. However, this conclusion does not apply to circumstances in which a regulation contravenes statute, for a statute is always of superior normative status. A derivative question is what the rule is where a special or later regulation is in conflict with a statute. The answer is that the regulation is of inferior status. The rules pertaining to the primacy of later legislation over earlier legislation or the primacy of a special provision over a general one only apply within the same legislative framework, in other words, statute versus statute or regulation versus regulation.

The reason for this is that our legal system, like any system of law, is based on a normative hierarchy. The normative hierarchy results from and reflects various forms of power. We will proceed to clarify this point.

The legal structure is based on the axiomatic assumption of a stratified system of norms; each strata or level derives its validity from the power that engendered the norm, as in the case of primary and secondary legislation (i.e. regulation). A statute is positioned on a higher normative level than a regulation, and hence it need not surprise us that when in conflict, the statute prevails. Absent specific authorization in the primary law, secondary legislation can neither vary nor infringe statutory provisions. In this context it is irrelevant whether the regulation preceded the law or post dated it. It is similarly irrelevant if the regulation is specific or general with respect to the matter regulated therein. In any case, a regulation is normatively subordinate to a statute and therefore a regulation that contradicts a statute is subject to the remedies of administrative law, which provide for full or partial annulment. Logically, the regulation’s subordination to the statute, derives from the formal, fundamental conception of normative hierarchy in any legal system. To the extent that it relates to the connection between a regulation and a statute, the normative hierarchy is formally expressed in section 16 (4) of the Interpretation Ordinance [New Version], which provides that:

Enactment of Regulations:    “16: Where the law confers on the authority the power to enact regulations, the regulations enumerated in the following provisions shall apply to the enactment and the effect of such regulations unless another intention is implied:

…..     

    (4)    A regulation shall not contradict the provisions of any law.

The reference here is to “any law” (my emphasis M.S) and not just the law conferring the power to enact specific, conflicting regulations, the legal validity of which are being assessed. This is an additional expression of the general distinctions made under the legislative hierarchy.

In this context it bears special mention that even absent the provision in s. 16(4), a regulation purporting to vary or infringe a statute would be subject to the hierarchical principles explained above, which are the guiding principles in the examination of the validity of a law.

What is the source of the principle of the normative hierarchy of legal norms? As mentioned, the answer lies in the types of powers that confer authority to legislate or promulgate regulations, respectively. The legal system endows various authorities with the power to establish legal norms, in other words, legally binding rules of conduct. These powers are systematically organized, deriving their force from the essence of the empowerment. The power to enact primary legislation is not analogous to the power to promulgate secondary legislation, which can only stem from a specific empowering provision included in the primary legislation. The legislative branch – the Knesset – has the power to legislate laws of all kinds; the executive branch generally has the power to enact secondary legislation, by force of its empowerment in primary legislation. However, the Knesset, too, is empowered to enact secondary legislation, e.g. the Knesset Regulations (s. 19 of Basic Law: The Knesset) or decisions pertaining to pensions of office holders, which constitute secondary legislation (see HCJ 89/83 Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee,[10]). In other words, there are cases in which the same authority is empowered to establish different legislative norms, belonging to different normative hierarchies. This means that the same institutional source is empowered to pass legislative acts of varying obligatory power, and it also establishes the connection between them and their subordination to one another

In view of the network of powers described, with all due respect, there is no foundation for the doctrine of the institutional pyramid developed during the sixties (Prof B. Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments at p.40) whereby each normative level of legislative authority has a sole and exclusive institutional coordinate, meaning that every stage on the normative hierarchy of legislation has a unique counterpart on the institutional ladder, and that in principle, different stages on the normative hierarchy can never flow the same level of the institutional hierarchy. As observed above, the same institution may be empowered to establish norms on different levels. Hence the Knesset’s power to enact secondary legislation, as mentioned above, is universally accepted. The existence of a mutually exclusive connection between each stage of the normative hierarchy and the institutional ladder empowered to create legislation, is a doctrine that is alien to our legal system, and is inconsonant with the allocation of powers among law- making institutions. The normative legislative hierarchy finds expression in the subordination of each level to the level above it, and not by reference to its correlate on the ladder of institutional sources. The same institution may establish both the supreme norm and the lower norm. Any theoretical doctrine that analyzes a functioning legal relationship must anchor itself in the legal reality; it cannot exist in a vacuum, but must have reference to the existing legal structure, which is an inescapable given. It cannot sever itself from the subject it seeks to analyze, and any thesis that ignores it is unrealistic. From this we can only conclude that the pyramid theory described by Professor Akzin, is contradicted here (and not only here) by the existing structure of the power network.

22.(a) The authority to enact secondary legislation is included in the primary legislation of the legislature. A minister cannot enact legislation in the absence of statutory empowerment; an authority cannot enact bylaws in the absence of statutory empowerment, and the Knesset is not authorized to make decisions pertaining to salary or pensions without an empowering clause such as s. 10 of Basic Law: Judiciary, s. 1 of the Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 5729-1969 or similar laws.

Secondary legislation is the product of empowerment in primary legislation. A law enacted by the legislative authority is superior to a regulation of the Knesset itself, or of any other statutory or executive authority, because the regulation can only be enacted by force of the power conferred in the primary legislation. In other words, the conferral of differentiated legislative functions to the same institution does not create a situation in which all of the powers coexist, side by side, ostensibly on the same level. Conferral of a number of functions to the same institution leaves intact the need to establish a hierarchy that defines the legal or constitutional status of those powers above one another. The normative legislative hierarchy is the soul of an appropriate constitutional structure.

(b) As we noted, secondary legislation can neither vary nor infringe a statutory provision. To complete the picture we will add that the assertion pertaining to the hierarchical relations between a law and a regulation is prima facie contradicted by the existence of another form of regulations that can infringe a law, namely – emergency regulations. As stated in the law conferring the power to enact them, “An emergency regulation may alter any law, suspend its effect or modify it…” (s. 9 (b) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948). (An “ordinance” is a law passed by the Provisional Council of State, see s. 7 (a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance; and see also s. 2 (a) of the Transition Law, 5709-1949, and compare with what is now s. 50 of the new Basic Law: The Government, enacted in 1992). What this means is that the Minister’s authority to invalidate a law by force of emergency regulations is exceptional, but it too is explicitly conferred in primary legislation and qualified by the restrictions delineated therein. This power of secondary regulation to alter a law does not derive from the secondary legislation itself, but rather from the law that empowered the government or a minister to enact it. In the absence of explicit statutory empowerment to enact secondary legislation that infringes the law, secondary legislation cannot alter or infringe a law (in this context see the Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law, 5750-1990, following our judgment in HCJ 256/88 Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of Health [11]. If it varies or infringes it, it will be subjected to the remedies granted by the judicial forum regarding secondary legislation that deviates from its defined boundaries.

23.  Summing up: The subordination of secondary legislation to the law flows from the secondary legislator’s subordination to the conditions of empowerment explicated by the primary legislative authority, i.e. the sovereign legislature – the Knesset. Incidentally, in using the term “sovereign” my intention is not to interpretations taken from public international law. In our conception, the sovereign is the people. In my understanding, the Knesset is “sovereign” i.e. independent and supreme, in the sense that no other authority, legislative or otherwise, prevails over it in its power and its authorities. The reason lies in the source of its power: It was elected by the people, which as stated, is the sovereign.

The hierarchy of norms thus derives from the nature of the powers. The normative system is not one-dimensional, but rather hierarchical – a ladder with different levels. Primary legislation is on a higher normative level than secondary legislation (i.e. “regulation,” “bylaw,” “order” and the like).

The Position of Constitutional Legislation

24.  On a normative scale, the constitutional act is on a higher level than the regular law. By its essence and purpose, it is designated to operate at a supreme normative level. In terms of constitutional theory, in a possible conflict between the constitution and a law, the constitution has the upper hand. It is inappropriate for a regular law to override a constitutional provision. A regular law cannot override a constitutional provision other than by way of an explicit constitutional provision included therein, or by way of a constitutional provision (constitution or Basic Law) that generally defines – not necessarily in relation to a specific constitutional provision – the possible forms of infringement. See for example, s. 12 of the proposal for Basic Law: The Judiciary (27 Hapraklit (5731) 140,141), which discusses “a claim against the validity of a law.” And see also s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, of 1994, which states the following:

Effect of nonconforming law   8.    A provision of a law that infringes the freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it was included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, and which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein

This means that the general constitutional principle laid down in the Basic Law, Freedom of Occupation can be infringed by regular legislation, provided that it is done in the manner set forth in the aforementioned section 8. Section 8 is not only prescriptive – it is also proscriptive, in the sense of invalidating regular legislation that infringes freedom of occupation, if it does not satisfy the conditions of section 8. This is the import of the wording of s. 8, and this is the rule for a law that does not conform to its provisions. Subject to such changes as are necessitated by the transition from one specific subject to another, our comments here regarding Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation apply to the relationship between any regular law and a constitutional provision currently included in a Basic Law, which contains qualifying provisions regarding its variation or infringement, and regular legislation.

Summing up this point: Some Basic Laws lack qualifying provisions regarding regular legislation that changes or infringes their conditions. These laws do not fully express their supreme normative status vis-à-vis variation or infringement, and an entrenched or privileged status represents an appropriate and desirable ideal. Other Basic Laws, such as the two Basic Laws enacted in 1992, which include restrictions that entrench their normative hierarchy, are already a reality.

The Constitutional Norm – Structure and Form

25. (a) The basic assumption of our approach is that the primary legislator is the supreme source of authority in the legislative realm, by virtue of which he is authorized to enact laws of differential normative authority on the hierarchical scale. He is authorized to enact constitutional legislation and authorized to enact regular legislation. He is the direct source of all primary legislation, and in a small number of cases, as noted, he is also the source of secondary legislation; indirectly – he is the source of all secondary legislation.

(b)   As mentioned above, constitutional legal theory recognizes the existence of a normative legal level above that of the regular law, referred to variously as “constitution” or “Basic Law.” The Harrari Decision of 1950, to which we shall return, distinguished between a Basic Law and a constitution. In our comments below, for simplification, we will, as far as possible, use the word “constitution”

The people have the power to frame a constitution. This assertion derives from the accepted conception that sovereignty resides with the people. Constitutional legislation is the product of the people’s decision by way of its elected representative – the sovereign Knesset.

Incidentally, according to German constitutional interpretation, which naturally relates to the constitutional structure there, the absence of a direct, unmediated decision by the people to adopt a constitution by way of a referendum does not diminish the validity of a constitution enacted by way of legislation, and to that end it is sufficient that the constitution be enacted by the representative parliamentary body (see Von Muench/ Kunig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Band 1., 4, Verlag Beck (Muenchen, 1992) 11, but cf. V. Mangoldt, Klein, Starck, Das Bonner Grundgesetz, 3 Aufl. Band 1 Anm. Vl 11). Naturally, the approaches to this subject are not uniform and different countries have adopted a variety of approaches.

26. (a) All of our comments above regarding the nature of the normative hierarchy apply mutatis mutandis to the relationship between a regular law and the constitution. The power of regular law to alter or infringe constitutional provisions may be conferred by force of the constitutional provision itself, as for example, s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, cited above. Arguably, the absence of any such provision may indicate that the legislature chose not to complement the creation of a supreme normative level with a provision qualifying the validity of any contradictory regular legislation. This was the case with the legislative proceedings of Basic Law: The Knesset, which designated the provisions limiting conflicting legislation to a small number of its sections only, leaving the majority of its sections with no substantive position on the validity of conflicting regular legislation. The same conclusion similarly arises from the wording of most of the other Basic Laws, which treat of the institutions of government and their branches, as well as with the judiciary.

As a result, the Knesset amended provisions in Basic Laws by way of a regular law (see e.g. The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994, which repealed s. 21 (c ) of Basic Law: The Knesset; s. 86 (e) of the Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 5729-1969 which contradicts s. 17 of Basic Law: The Judiciary. This same is true for s. 64 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 5744-1984. This court has also ruled on a number of occasions in the past that nothing prevents the amendment of a Basic Law by means of a regular law (see e.g. HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd (hereinafter – the Negev case) [12]) (Justices Berinson, Witkon, H. Cohn); In HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice, (hereinafter – the Kaniel case) [13]), President Agranat, Justices Landau and Kister, addressing this point, stated: “We find no support in the language of the Basic Law… that an implied change under the concluding section of s. 46 (of Basic Law: The Knesset – M.S.) must be accomplished by means of a Basic Law or a special law” (ibid, at p. 796). In my view, this ruling should be seen in the context of its period, and as an interpretation that did not anticipate the legislative constitutional developments and the emergence of a comprehensive constitutional doctrine.

However, as we will presently see, the two new Basic Laws of 1992 provide a fuller expression of the normative constitutional hierarchy, as indicated by the Knesset’s general tendency in the legislation of the Basic Laws. Following the change in the Knesset’s legislative policy, as expressed in both of the Basic Laws, and which anchored a new, appropriate conception of the normative hierarchy, it is now possible to apply a standard legislative criterion by which there can no longer be any variation of any Basic Law other than by another Basic Law.

There are grounds for presuming that with the enactment of Basic Law: Legislation, this subject will be regulated comprehensively with respect to all of the Basic Laws. In view of the Knesset’s legislative policy as expressed in the two aforementioned Basic Laws, nothing prevents us from already laying down the appropriate legislative procedure, and in doing so to delineate the principles required to give commensurate expression to the legislative hierarchy manifested in the enactment of the constitutional provisions. Further on we will devote some attention to the import of the new Basic Laws, in terms of legislative policy and the basic constitutional conception of the Knesset.

(b)   Freedom of occupation has merited protection in our statute law insofar as it has been imbued with constitutional status in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In the absence of a standard constitutional provision applicable to all Basic Laws, this Basic Law established certain provisions pertaining to a change or infringement of its provisions. The structure of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (which is the appropriate constitutional structure, that should be followed in all Basic Laws) prevents the possibility of an ordinary law changing or infringing a right that was established in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The constitutional strictures were established in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, providing as follows:

‘There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law’

The wording of s. 8, treating of the validity of a law deviating from the aforementioned provisions, was cited above.

The import of this is that the validity of a regular law that infringes the freedom of occupation is conditional upon its fulfillment of the conditions enumerated in the aforementioned s. 8, and failure to fulfill those conditions renders the regular law invalid. Only where the regular law satisfies the necessary conditions (the required majority for the adoption of the law; an explicit qualification) can it suspend, for a fixed period, the validity of a constitutional provision with respect to the area of application of that law. Needless to say, the conclusion emerging from the aforementioned is that the Knesset recognized the existence of a normative hierarchy by the very adoption of sections 4 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. These two sections of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation enable the “infringement” of a protected right, subject to the conditions enumerated by the Basic Law, and therefore deny the validity of an infringement that fails to satisfy the conditions established by the Basic Law.

As opposed to this, a “variation” of a Basic Law – as opposed to an “infringement” of one of its provisions – requires the application of the proceeding under s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

   Entrenchment          7. (a) This Basic Law shall not shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

With respect to a variation, the normative hierarchy is expressly stated in the entrenchment of the provisions of the Basic Law.

The basic constitutional distinction between a “variation” and “infringement” is worthy of further in-depth examination, and we shall address it further on.

“Variation” versus “Infringement”

27. (a) In examining the arrangements of the supreme normative hierarchy, a distinction must be made between the “variation” of a protected right, and its “infringement.” Our concern is with a right protected in a Basic Law. Any variation of the right (restriction or expansion, supplementation or annulment) requires legislative action on the Basic Laws level. The requirement that a change or variation be effected in or by way of a Basic Law stems from the analytical basis of the legislation of Basic Laws in our legal system. By force of the normative legislative hierarchy, any variation of an act on a particular (normative) level must be effected by an act on the same or a higher normative level. Secondary legislation cannot change a law. Regular legislation cannot change a Basic Law, which is located at the apex of the normative scale.

The Basic Laws are the cornerstone of the Israeli Constitution. This was also the Knesset’s explicit position in its decision on 13 June 1950 (the Harrari Decision). As such, a distinction ought to be made, for purposes of constitutional and legislative clarity, between basic legislation, which provides the constitutional foundation, and regular legislation. This concludes our discussion in regard to “variation.” I am aware of the statements of this Court (Justice Berinson, Witkon, and H. Cohn) in the Negev case [12], the Kaniel case [13] (Justices Agranat, Landau, and Kister) and HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset (hereinafter – Ressler case [14]) (Justices Etzioni, Y. Cahn, and Asher), according to which Basic Law: The Knesset provided no grounds for the assertion that a (implied) change of a Basic Law must perforce be effected by the enactment of a Basic Law, and that it could also be effected in the form of regular Knesset legislation. They were expressing the existing situation in which many of the Basic Laws were not formally entrenched.

(b)   As the development of the constitution progresses, and with it the imperative of establishing an analytical basis for the adoption of constitutional legislation, it is appropriate, as emphasized above, that we adopt a new direction that expresses the existence of a normative legislative hierarchy. In other words, against the background of the two new Basic Laws that directly deal with the protection of fundamental rights, this expanded bench now has the opportunity to establish an entire system, adjusted to our present constitutional umbrella, as this Court did in a different context in HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance (hereinafter “the Bergman case”) [15]). From now on, all Basic Laws should be governed by a legislative policy that expresses the doctrine of normative hierarchy, by which a Basic Law can be varied only by another Basic Law.

(c)   This brings us to the term “infringement.” An infringement does not purport to alter the scope of the right itself. The thrust of the infringement is that it ‘enables the normative existence of a legislative act that infringes the arrangements provided by the Basic Law’ (as per my honorable colleague, the President: A Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.3, Constitutional Interpretation (Nevo, 5754) 48). By its very nature, an infringement is special and defined, i.e. localized.

According to this fundamental distinction between “variation” and “infringement,” the first Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law, 5729-1969, which was the subject of the Bergman case, included an “infringement” of the principle of equality entrenched in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which states:

 Section 4: System of Elections: The Knesset shall be elected by general, national, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not be amended, save by a majority of the members of the Knesset’ [emphasis mine– M.S.]

The Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) Law did not purport to vary the aforementioned section 4. The purpose of the financing law was not to establish that there would no longer be equality in the electoral system. It infringed the principle of equality in a specific, clearly delineated area. In other words, the result of the Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law was an infringement of the principle of equality set forth in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. 

In the Bergman case [15], the Supreme Court gave a broad construction to the requirement of a special majority in Basic Law: The Knesset. Firstly, the Court’s unanimous view was that the requirement in the concluding part of s. 4 places a hurdle before any “variation” of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset in the form of the requirement for a special majority. Accordingly, the principle of equality in elections cannot be annulled other than by a majority of the members of the Knesset, meaning that the election system can only be changed by force of special majority. Secondly, by implication the court inferred that the requirement of s. 4 also presents an obstacle to any “infringement” of the protected value in the Basic Law. In other words, s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset includes a quasi “override clause” with respect to a variation. Its essence is formal, and its form is the requirement of a special majority pursuant to s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. This clause is anchored in the constitutional provision and inherently creates the constitutional tool governing cases of possible infringement of the principle from among those stipulated in the aforementioned s. 4. The override clause in the concluding part of s. 4 enables an infringement of the protected value, provided that it be effected by way of a special majority. Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, as opposed to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, of 1998, and similar to s. 4 thereof, does not posit a requirement of specificity, as one of its conditions for the validity of an infringement of a protected value. The infringement will be valid even without explicitly derogating from the Basic Law (i.e. it may be done “implicitly,” provided that it is adopted by a special majority).

Summing up, theoretically speaking, a variation is distinct from an infringement. However, in the Bergman case [15], the Court also applied the limitations regarding the variation of a Basic Law to legislative provisions that contradicted the principle of equality in the Basic Law, in other words, that only infringed it. This point is of particular interest because in the context of retrospective constitutional critique it has often been argued that in the Bergman ruling [15] the Supreme Court attempted to curtail the scope of judicial intervention dictated by the normative constitutional hierarchy. However, the decision itself indicates that in viewing the Local Authorities (Elections) (Financing, Restriction of Expenses and Auditing) Law as invalid by reason of not having been adopted by the requisite majority, the Court not only adopted an innovative, broad approach, without any explicit authorization, but also broadened the scope of the aforementioned section 4, and included regard of any “infringement” as a “variation” referred to in the Basic Law. Needless to say, in my view, the Court acted lawfully and within the scope of its powers.

The Knesset was aware of the distinction between a variation and an infringement, which explains why Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation uses the term “there shall be no infringement” in its limitation clause. The purpose of the provision in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is to establish criteria for reviewing legislation that infringes the provisions of the Basic Law, in an attempt to circumvent the principles established in the Basic Law. The provision does not establish criteria for the variation or abrogation of a Basic Law. The variation of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is explicitly governed by s. 7.

What has been said thus far in regard to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation demonstrates the general theses. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and its variation or infringement will be treated below, at the appropriate juncture.  

28. (a) The thesis presented regarding the normative legislative hierarchy indicates that the appropriate legal approach is that from now on, a regular law can neither vary nor infringe a constitutional provision, in the absence of explicit authorization in a constitutional provision. If the statutory provision varies or infringes a constitutional provision then the conflicting statutory provision will be subject to the counter remedies originating in constitutional law. Such a remedy may be the annulment of the conflicting statute. It may be a more restricted remedy than the extreme remedy of annulment, such as partial annulment (application of the “blue pencil” rule), where such a remedy is available, having consideration for the overall constitutional context. The remedy may also be of a relative character in terms of the time dimension (of retroactive, or prospective application), in terms of application, etc. At all events, we deem it settled law that where a normative provision of a lower status deviates from a higher normative provision, the court seized of the matter is authorized to conduct a procedure of judicial review, and to provide a constitutional remedy.

(b)   The judiciary shoulders the burden of upholding the rule of law, if a matter is submitted for its decision in the statutorily prescribed ways. Implementing the rule of law includes maintaining the sources of authority and the hierarchy of norms. It follows that if secondary legislation contradicts the law, the court is authorized to grant a remedy. Similarly, if a law contradicts a constitutional provision, the court is authorized to grant a remedy. As we mentioned, what was once the ideal situation with respect to constitutional legislation in general has largely become the real position with respect to the two Basic Laws enacted by the Knesset in 1992, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

29. We elaborated on the description of the appropriate constitutional structure, and it should be added that our concern is not merely with the demarcation of formal legal structures. A structure is designed for its contents. Division into normative hierarchies does not just express the distinction between a substantive legal rule (a law) and the methods of implementation and legal procedures (secondary legislation). The apex of the normative pyramid (the Basic Law) is the statutory expression of the institutional values of our fundamental political and social views. It is the repository not only of the definitions and power divisions among the central branches of government, but also for the bill of human rights. It proclaims and protects those rights that make us into a society premised on liberty, human dignity, and equality, and expresses the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. As such, the enactment of two new Basic Laws is an important stage in the development of a constitution, and in the transformation of values that constitute part of our common law, as an expression of precedent, into statutory law of privileged and unique status. In my minority opinion about twenty years ago in CA 723/74 [6], I addressed the issue of the meaning and interpretation of the basic rights that form part of our common law. As written there (ibid: ­294-295):

The absence in Israel of a unique piece of legislation of preferential legal status that embodies its constitutional principles does not mean that we have no statutes with constitutional content, or that constitutional legal principles defining the basic rights of man and the citizen are absent from our system of law. The law in Israel embraces, according to our understanding and concepts, basic rules concerning the existence and protection of the liberties of the individual, even before the proposed Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights is enacted.

The new draft Basic Law is intended to formulate principles and to designate their boundary lines. Its central task is to fix them firmly in statute so as to ensure their protection against the ravages of time. Its purpose is to express the values by which the ordinary citizen should be educated and to stand in the way of those who would seek to trespass on his rights. But even now, basic rights are protected in our basic legal conception, and form a substantive part of Israeli law. First and foremost among these is freedom of expression. It is no secret that the integration of these rights into our law derives from the system of government that we covet (H.C. 73/53, 87/53, Kol Ha’Am Co. v. The Minister of the Interior [3], at p. 876), but the obligation to honor them in practice is not merely an expression of political or social morality, but has legal status.

Any limitation of the boundaries of such a right and of its scope, which arises from legislation, will be narrowly construed so as to give the aforesaid right maximum effect and not to restrict it in the slightest beyond what is clearly and expressly required by the legislature’s words (HCJ. 75/76, “Hilron” v. The Fruit Production and Marketing Board, at p. 653). Freedom of expression and a provision of law that limits it do not enjoy equal, identical status, but rather, to the extent consistent with the written law, one should always prefer the maintaining of the right over a provision of law that tends to limit it. In sum, the standard for protecting freedom of expression as the primary consideration when it clashes with another right should be given full expression not only when the legislature enacts the law’s provisions, but also in the interpretation of the law and the application of its provisions in circumstances in which its substance and effect are tested in practice.

See also FH 9/77 Israel Electric Corporation, Ltd., et al v. “Ha’aretz” Daily Newspaper Ltd, [16], following the earlier minority opinion in HCJ 75/76 [5] and in FH 27/76 Hilron” v. The Fruit Production and Marketing Board [17], which discussed a basic right similar to the subject under discussion – freedom of occupation.

 

The Source of Constituent Authority

30. (a) The question deriving from our comments above, and which now requires our attention is whether Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and similarly – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, are located at the apex of the normative hierarchy, commanding the power to define what is permitted and what is forbidden in regular primary legislation.

(b)   Methodologically, it would be appropriate to begin with a preliminary question of general application beyond these two specific Basic Laws, and that is fundamental to the entire doctrine of a normative hierarchy. The question asks what is the source of the Knesset’s authority to create acts of supra-legal standing, and to enact laws that limit the scope of the Knesset’s authority to enact regular laws in the future, or Basic Laws of specific content or significance. The principle of legality states that in the absence of the authority to enact a normative act of defined content, a body is powerless to create it. An administrative agency cannot enact a law. Were it to draft a normative act, which it calls a “law,” such an act would lack the normative effect of a law. The reason is that the administrative agency lacks the authority to enact laws. The Knesset alone is the legislative branch, and it enacts the laws. This brings us back to the original question: What is the source of the Knesset’s authority to create legislative acts of differing hierarchical levels, in other words, secondary legislation, primary legislation, and constitutional legislation. Is there any basis for the analytical thesis that the Knesset lacks the legal power to frame a constitution, or any other supra-legal legislation that is normatively superior to regular legislation? 

(c) The second question pertaining to the examination of the Knesset’s constitutional authority is whether the Knesset has the authority to limit its own authority and that of subsequent Knessets by passing legislation of a supra-legal character, applicable to constitutional and regular legislation of the Knesset, and thereby limit the Knesset’s legislative authority in the future.

(d) An examination of these issues requires at least a cursory review of our constitutional history, to which the following comments are devoted.

31. (a) The Declaration of Independence

The declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel on 5 Iyar 5708 (14 May1948) – the Declaration of Independence – was a political act of legal import, under both public international and municipal law. It was promulgated by the People’s Council that convened on the eve of the State’s establishment. The Declaration of Independence related to the establishment of initial governmental authorities, and stated, inter alia, that:

‘WE DECLARE [emphasis in source – M.S] that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, (emphasis mine – M.S ). The People’s Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People’s Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called Israel

The People’s Council became the Provisional Council of State and the People’s Administration became the Government until the establishment of elected bodies pursuant to the constitution which was to be adopted by the elected Constituent Assembly.

The Provisional Council of State became the first parliament of the independent state, and the Government was responsible to it (under s. 2 of the concluding section of the Law and Administration Ordinance). The Provisional Council of State was the supreme body, with unlimited authority. In the words of Prof. H. Klinghoffer “The Establishment of the State of Israel: Historical – Constitutional Survey” Klinghoffer Volume on Public Law, Y. Zamir, ed.(Harry and Mishael Sacher Institute for Legislative Research and Comparative Law, 1993) (hereinafter – Klinghoffer Volume), 53, 74-75:

‘The absence of any statement of its powers is evidence that those powers were not intended to be limited. From this we may conclude that the basic norm of the State of Israel can be found in this statement, which transforms the People’s Council into the Provisional Council of State.’  

Professor Klinghoffer noted (ibid, at p. 75) that a literal construction of the Declaration of Independence would lead to the simultaneous existence of the Provisional Council of State and the Constituent Assembly. In the author’s view this structure was the result of an oversight on the drafter’s part. In any event, the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 5709-1949 clearly stipulates that the Provisional Council of State was to dissolve immediately upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly. The result was that the Constituent Assembly remained as the exclusive body that was also responsible for regular legislation. Had the constitutional structure continued to exist in the format established in 1949, then the same institution, i.e. the Constituent Assembly, would have been charged with both constitutional legislation and regular legislation.

As it turned out, the First Knesset enacted all of the regular laws as well as laws which were constitutional in terms of content and substance (such as the Law of Return, 5710-1950, or Women’s Equal Rights Law, 5710-1951).

  1. The Constituent Assembly

The provisions of the Declaration of Independence regarding the establishment of a constituent assembly, pursuant to the United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947, lead to the enactment of the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 5709-1949. The Provisional Council of State correctly regarded itself as authorized to initiate constitutional deliberations, and even appointed a committee for that purpose.

The elections to the Constituent Assembly were not held on the date scheduled by the Declaration of Independence, and the date was deferred by the Provisional Council of State (s. 1 of the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 5709-1949). The elections were held at the beginning of 1949 and as mentioned, by force of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, the Provisional Council of State was dissolved.  

The Constituent Assembly immediately changed its name, and in the first law that it adopted – The Transition Law – it determined that the parliament of the State of Israel would be called the “Knesset” and that the Constituent Assembly would be called the “First Knesset.” From this statutory provision as well as from statements of Knesset members it can be inferred that a single legislative body was created, to which the authorities of the Constituent Assembly were also transferred.

What this means is that there was a single parliament that adopted the role imposed upon the Constituent Assembly in the Declaration of Independence, assumed all of its powers and authorities, which were never actually defined beyond what was stated in the Declaration of Independence and in s. 3 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance (‘The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional  Council of State’), and which simultaneously continued to carry out its regular legislative functions.

As Professor Klinghoffer describes in the aforementioned article, at p. 75-76.

…This deviation from the Declaration of Independence was effected by force of a special law enacted by the Provisional Council of State, in other words: by legally changing the arrangement set forth in the Declaration of Independence.  And finally, the most important question: Did the Constituent Assembly comply with the directive of enacting a constitution, and if not – did it abandon the conception of legal continuity that was grounded in the Declaration of Independence.  The Constituent Assembly, which after convening changed its name to the “First Knesset,” complied with that requirement at the very most by its adoption of laws with constitutional content, the legal status of which was not superior to that of regular laws…the Declaration of Independence did not specify a period of time within which the constitution must be enacted, and the transfer of the powers of the Constituent Assembly to the Second Knesset and every subsequent Knesset was authorized by a special legal arrangement. This is a sort of continuing transfer, which, so long as it remains in place, confers upon the Israeli legislature, as a perpetual inheritance, the authority to enact a constitution (emphasis mine – M.S)

Professor Klinghoffer was clearly expressing the idea of a continuing, direct chain of authority, by which the authority of the Constituent Assembly in its entirety was transferred to the Israeli parliament, i.e. the Knesset as such, endowing it with the authority to enact constitutional legislation, in addition to its authority to enact regular legislation.  As such, the Knesset was vested with the authority to enact a constitution.

(c)   The Transition Law and the Harrari Decision

Needless to say, the Transition Law itself, which was the only legislative act of the Constituent Assembly in that capacity, did not bear the title of “Basic Law,” being no different at all from regular legislation in terms of its name, its method of adoption, or any other relevant aspect.  Nonetheless, its contents are constitutional. Hence, having discarded the title expressing its constitutional nature and creating constitutional continuity, the legislative authority at that time failed to establish any clear expression indicating the distinction between regular and constitutional legislation.

(d)  At no stage did the Knesset abandon the task of enacting a constitution for the State. The preeminent expression of the Knesset’s power, and its aforementioned task is the Harrari Decision of 13 June 1950, which provided:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter comprising a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743 (emphasis mine –M.S.).’

 

It is unlikely that the Knesset members assumed that all the chapters would be prepared during the tenure of the First Knesset. Presumably they understood that this was an ongoing enterprise. Returning to the legislative history as expressed in the Knesset protocols, there are grounds for assuming that most of them were interested in that continuity. This found expression in the provisions of s. 5 of the Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 5711-1951, that provided that the Second Knesset and its members were to have all the powers, rights, and duties which the First Knesset and its members had. This provision was supplemented by s. 10, which provided that the Transition Law would apply mutatis mutandis to the transition to the Third and any subsequent Knesset for as long as the Knesset does not adopt “another law” concerning the matters dealt with by the Transition Law. The question of whether Basic Law: The Knesset fits the definition of “another law” for purposes of the aforementioned s. 10 is disputed.

Since then, the Knesset has adopted eleven Basic Laws. It functioned as a legislative system with integrated goals, authorities and powers that enabled it to concurrently exercise legislative powers for constitutional and regular legislation. The legislative authority is also the constituent authority and the latter is also the legislative authority. The conception of an integrated legislative system wherein one institution operates both as a regular legislative authority, and a constitutional authority, is mentioned by Professor Kelsen.

Professor Kelsen wrote: (H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (Berkley, 1967) 223): 

It is possible that the organ specifically and formally authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes having the character of a constitution is different from the organ authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes. For example, the former function may be rendered by an organ different from the latter organ in composition and electoral procedure, such as a constituent national assembly. But usually both functions are performed by the same organ. [Emphasis mine - M.S]

In other words, according to Kelsen, the same institution is capable of fulfilling two distinct functions (regular and constituent). This view is also taken by Prof Uri Yadin, the first head of the legislation department of the Ministry of Justice, and thereafter  head of legislative planning, in a lecture given on 6 March 1949 (See “On the Transition Law,” Uri Yadin Volume:, The Man and His Work, vol. I, A. Barak and T. Shpanitz, eds.  (Bursi, 1990) (hereinafter – Uri Yadin Volume, at p. 93-94):

We now proceed to the sections of the Transition Law dealing with the rules governing the Knesset. The first section provides that the parliament of the State of Israel will be called the “Knesset” and that the constituent assembly will be referred to as the “First Knesset.”  While it would seem that these sections deal only with issues of language, in fact their import extends beyond conferring appellations. The Constituent Assembly, elected as a single-task institution, was given the same name as the parliament, which was a permanent institution to be elected on a periodic basis.  This largely divested the Constituent Assembly of its temporary character, and it was incorporated as the first link of the chain of parliaments that would operate as the legislative branch of the State [emphasis mine M.S.

In other words, the powers of the Constituent Assembly were subsumed within the powers of the legislative authority. In view of this, I unreservedly recognize the Knesset’s continuing authority to enact constitutional legislation.

The Doctrine of the Knesset’s Unlimited Sovereignty and the Doctrine of the Constituent Authority

32. (a) We now return to the question presented above: What was the source of Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation? I will preface my remarks by mentioning that there are those who altogether deny the Knesset any authority to enact constitutional legislation. The unique element of a constitution is that it establishes the formats and the rules for what is permitted and forbidden in future legislation. According to this approach, the Knesset lacks the authority to establish limitations that are prospective, or even limitations that require the votes of more than a majority of the Knesset members.  I do not accept this approach.

I have read the opinion of my honorable colleague, Justice Cheshin, who attempts to establish a theoretical basis for his thesis that the Knesset lacks constituent authority, and that as a result, it is similarly powerless to enact statutory provisions that curtail the legislative branch with respect to its future legislation, as detailed and elaborated in his opinion. I cannot accept his approach.  Forty five years have elapsed since the aforementioned Harrari Decision, in which the Knesset charged its Constitution, Law and Justice Committee to prepare, in its own words, a proposed constitution for the State, which would be composed chapter by chapter. During the intervening years, the Knesset has enacted eleven Basic Laws in the framework of fulfilling its constitutional mission. To cast doubt today on the Knesset’s legislative-constitutional authority contradicts, in my view, the most reasonable legal interpretation of the State’s parliamentary development and the law that has developed in the interim. Furthermore, the view that all constitutions are formed in accordance with same, standard format, dictated exclusively by the nature of the subject at hand, cannot be reconciled with the facts of diverse constitutions emerging in each state as the product of its own discretion, considerations and specific circumstances. There are no standard formats in this matter.

 (a) The Knesset defines its own powers and capacities, in accordance with the mandate granted to it by the nation, a mandate renewed in periodic general elections, conducted in accordance with constitutional legislation. The demarcation of the powers and capacities of the Knesset is anchored in the life of the State and the law. The Knesset does not derive its power from any external supra-statutory legislation (cf. e.g. A.V. Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London, 1924) 106.  It is the Knesset that establishes the various categories and fields of legislative provisions from beginning to end. The critical views of Knesset members regarding the course and mode of the framing of Israel’s constitution, cited by my honorable colleague should be viewed against the background and in the context of the time and place in which they were expressed. One must not forget that the majority of Knesset members who were critical at the time of the slow pace of the framing of the complete constitution, or even of the failure to execute a single, immediate constitutional act, subsequently gave their full support to the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset and the other Basic Laws, as chapters in the gradually emerging constitution, in their belief in the Knesset’s power to enact constitu­tional legislation, according to its choice and decisions.

 

To my mind there is, at the present stage, no legal justification to support either the diminution of the Knesset’s powers, or the assertion regarding any inherent limitation of their scope:

 

(b) On the other hand, there are approaches that view the Knesset as authorized to enact constitutional legislation. The constitu­ent authority of the Israeli legislature stems from the power consolidated in its hands during the course of its legislative history, from the basic norm that emerged in the early stages of the State’s existence, and from legislation that charted Israel’s constitu­tional path in framing a constitution, first as a single act and thereafter as a task to be executed in stages.

 

(c) Two principle doctrines acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation. The first is the doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty. The second is the doctrine of constituent authority. The two doctrines are not exclusive. There are others, some variations of one of them, and some separate doctrines that stand alone. I will devote a few words to each of the two aforementioned theories.

 

(d) The doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty proceeds from the assumption that the Knesset is the supreme legislative authority and that its powers are unrestricted, barring such limitations as it may estab­lish for itself. No legislative body is superior to the Knesset, and it is empowered to enact any law, whether constitutional or regular. Its authority also comprises and integrates the authority to enact constitutional legislation that was not exhausted from the establishment of the State and subsequent to the elections for a Con­stituent Assembly.

 

In other words, the Knesset, as such, consolidates and merges all the powers of the Provisional Council of State, the Constituent Assembly, the legislature estab­lished according to the Transition Law, of the Second Knesset (Transition) Law, and of Basic Law: The Knesset. All of these were transferred to each and every Knesset and thus exist and are maintained.

 

Inter alia, all the powers of the constitutional legislature were transferred to the Knesset. Its legislation creates the various normative hierarchies. The Knesset operates in that capacity without any internal allocation or division into different institutions based on one body’s supremacy over another. The Knesset has discretion to decide whether its legislative product will belong to the supreme constitutive level or the regular legislative level, and in enacting constitutional legislation, by virtue of its unlimited powers, it also establishes the supremacy of the constitutional law over the regular law, and is authorized to determine conditions applicable to regular legislation for the purposes of adjusting it to the norms determined in the constitutional legislation.

 

All legislative acts are performed by the Knesset in that capacity. It is the supreme and all-powerful legislative authority of the State. This is the monistic conception of the Knesset’s powers, as a monolithic body capable of performing various categories of acts, at its own discretion.

 

The Knesset’s powers are not truncated and disjointed from constitutional developments, but have always faithfully represented and reflected them. Its great, multifaceted powers are the result of its unifying the entirety of the powers transferred to it in the course of our constitutional history. It is not required to divide itself up, or change its image, form or legal status in order to exercise its broad powers.

 

Justice Berenson’s description is most appropriate: 

 

‘There can be no doubt that under this state’s constitutional regime, the Knesset is sovereign. It is empowered to pass any law, and to determine its contents as it sees fit.’ (CA 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [18], at p.2547.

 

Incidentally, Justice Berenson’s demurer in that judgment with respect to the Knesset’s authority to invalidate a law, did not relate to an entrenched statutory provision, such as s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. See the Bergman case [15], decided by a panel of which Justice Berenson was a member. 

 

Consequently, the Knesset is authorized to enact laws on two legislative levels, both on the constitutional level (a complete constitution or Basic Laws) and on the regular legislative level. As noted above, it also assumed the authority to enact certain forms of secondary legislation. In the framework of its unlimited authority, the Knesset is at liberty to determine conditions and qualifications that are applicable to future legislation, whether constitutional or regular.  This is our “constitutional arrangement” as anchored in Israel’s constitutional history, in its actual legislative development, and in the case law of this Court. Constitutional continuity has never been interrupted, and the Knesset has the authority to continue to complete the task of the Constituent Assembly which was nipped in the bud, and which by force of the Harrari Decision became the continuing and ongoing mission of the Knesset.

 

In summary, in my view the Knesset has the authority to enact not only Basic Laws, but even a complete constitution.

 

I also think that it is appropriate for it to do so, and fervently support it. In the framework of a symposium debate on the subject with Lord Diplock (M. Shamgar “On the Written Constitution” 9 Israel Law Review (1974) 467 at p.471) I wrote the following:

 

 ‘…the consolidation of the position of the Knesset as a supreme law-giver and the merger of the Constituent Assembly and the Knesset, decided on by the First Knesset, enhanced the supremacy of the Knesset.’

(e) The doctrine of constituent authority asserts that the powers of the Constituent Assembly were transferred to the Knesset that, it follows, alternatively wears “two hats” or “two crowns.” There are times when it acts as a constituent authority, superior in terms of normative status to the Knesset as a regular legislative authority. As a constituent authority the Knesset is competent to enact constitutional legislation. There are times when it acts as a regular legislative body, and as such it is – in the hierarchy of authority – on a lower level than the Knesset when acting as a constituent authority [see e.g.: C. Klein “The Constituent Authority in the State of Israel” 2 Mishpatim, (1970) 51; C. Klein, “A New Era in Israel’s Constitutional Law,” 6 Israel Law Review (1971) 376; C. Klein, “Special Majority and Implied Change,” 28 Ha-Praklit, (1972-73) 563; C. Klein, “Semantics and the Rule of Law – Reflections and Appeals on HCJ 66/77 Y. Rassler v. Chairman of Central Knesset Elections Committee,   9 Mishpatim (1978) 79; C. Klein, “Human Dignity and Liberty – Initial Normative Assessment” 1 Hamishpat (1993) 123).]

 

The constituent assembly doctrine finds expression in academic literature in two forms, or perhaps with two point of emphasis: In other words, it is a single doctrine, with different versions that give primacy to different aspects. Among its proponents there are those who view the separation between the constituent authority and the legislative authority not just as a functional separation but also as an institutional separation. On the other hand, there are those for whom the doctrine is based on a functional separation, creating different levels on the normative hierarchy.

 

The conception of institutional division was first expressed in the writing of M. Sternberg, in his essay, “An Additional Law or a Supreme Normative Layer, 16 Molad (1958) 284, 287), where he wrote:

 

Consequently, the collective of persons known as the Knesset also functions as a body known as the constituent body, functioning parallel to the Knesset itself, its fundamental objective being to frame a constitution’ [emphasis mine – M.S].

 

Apparently, Professor Akzin took a similar view in the aforementioned book, at p.40 where he writes:

 

…When the same group of people fulfils these two roles, they should be viewed as operating as two separate institutions….if we are unwilling to adopt such a “formalistic” view of this process, the singular character of the constitution as opposed to the laws may lose its significance.

 

I used the term “apparently” because the examples that the learned author later provides for his thesis might give the impression that the abovementioned description is more sharply defined than the factual foundation on which it rests. At all events, Professor Akzin’s aforementioned description relies on his theory of the correlation between the scale of legislative authorities and the institutional scale. In other words, each authority has an exclusive institutional correlate authorized to exercise that authority.  As explained above, I reject that approach.

 

According to the thesis presented by Sternberg and Akzin, the two institutions exist in tandem, or one as part of the other, and operate alternately as legislative authorities. In terms of its essence and normative classification, a legislative act is classified in accordance with the cloak (or “hat”) worn by the legislative authority at that time. What this means is that from time to time there is an institutional metamorphosis, dictated by the nature of the legislative material being dealt with by the legislature.

 

As opposed to the conception premised upon institutional division, there is another approach, according to which there is no institutional division, but rather a functional legislative division, which affects the position of the legislation on the normative legislative hierarchy. Under the alternative conception of the analytical foundations of constituent authority, the Knesset is a single institution that provides the anchor for both constituent authority and regular legislative authority. By virtue of the Knesset’s standing as a constituent authority, the Basic Laws were enacted. Consequently, they constitute the supreme norm in the light of which the constitutionality of a regular law is examined. The normative level reflects the nature of the function performed by the Knesset when it enacts the relevant legislative provision.

 

(f)   Of these two principle doctrines - the doctrine of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset and the doctrine of constituent assembly - I definitely prefer the first, namely, the doctrine of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset. To my mind, it more accurately reflects the legislative history, the accepted, recognized legal approaches and this Court’s case-law (see M.Shamgar, “The Knesset’s Authority in the Constitutional Realm, 26 Mishpatim (1995) 3).

 

I considered whether it would be appropriate in this opinion to cite the reasons, and by implication also the arguments for and against each of these two doctrines. I decided in the end that such a discussion is unnecessary in the present circumstances, because it is not necessary in order to examine the conformity of the amending statute to the provisions of the Basic Law. The main point is that, in my opinion, each of the two doctrines answers the question that I posed above, namely, whence the authority of the Knesset to produce legislative acts of constitutional standing. Therefore I leave this matter to be dealt with at the appropriate place and time.

 Self-Limitation of the Knesset

33. This brings us to a second, separate question, namely, whether the Knesset is competent to enact legislative provisions that limit its own future legislative powers. In my opinion, the Knesset holds every authority including the authority to limit itself by means of legislation. This is essential for the creation of a sound constitutional framework. In order to confer entrenched, elevated status upon fundamental rights there is a need to limit the future regular legislative authority and-to subordinate its legislation to the normative values that constitute the various fundamental rights. In the absence of the power of limitation, constitu­tional provisions that define fundamental rights are left with no stable protection for the future. At least since the Bergman case [15], we have acknowledged that this Court is competent to decide on the validity of legislation that contradicts or violates a Basic Law

The question of whether parliament can bind itself by entrenching laws in either a procedural or a substantive manner derives primarily from the classic English constitutional doctrine, which at the time rejected the theory that Parliament could bind itself or any subsequent parlia­ment. The clear enunciation of the theory that Parliament cannot limit its own legislative authority is often demonstrated by citing from the comments made by Lord Bryce, one of the ministers in the Gladstone government in England, who explained in an address to Parliament in 1886:

There is no principle more universally admitted by constitutional jurists than the absolute omnipotence of parliament. This omnipotence exists because there is nothing beyond parliament, or behind parliament… There is one limitation and only one upon our omnipotence and that is that we cannot bind our successors. If we pass a statute purporting to extinguish our right to legislate on any given subject, or over any given district, it may be repudiated and repealed by any following parliament – aye even by this present parliament on any later day’  [emphasis mine – M.S.].

 

These comments from Parl. Deb. (4th Ser.) 1218-1219 (1886 305) were cited for example by Prof. B. Nimmer in his study “The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel’s Quest for a Constitution” 70 Colum.L.Rev (1970) 1217, 1227-1228, and remained a firmly entrenched tenet of English jurisprudence until the last two decades. They are the foremost hallmark of the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy in accordance with the Dicey school (see for example, in the tenth edition Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed. London (1959) by E.C. Wade; G. Phillips “Constitution and Constitutional Law, 7th ed. 1963 London) and many others.

Echoes of this approach in Israeli academic writing can be found in the article of A. Likovski, “The Court and the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset,” 3 Isr.L.Rev. (1968) 345, 364; See also: A. Likovski, Can the Knesset Adopt a Constitution which will be the Supreme Law of the Land, 4 Isr.L.Rev. (1969) 61; Prof. A. Rubinstein, “Israel’s Piecemeal Constitution” 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana (1966) p.201; Prof. B. Akzin, “Problems of Constitutional and Administrative Law,” International Lawyers Convention in Israel  (Jerusalem 1959) 163;

My answer to this problem is anchored in the Knesset’s power – as the sovereign assembly – to enact all manner of legislation, of any content, including legislative entrenchment (procedurally or substantive) of fundamental values of the State of Israel, and in so doing, to bind itself and any subsequent Knesset, subject to the power to amend or revoke that limitation in the manner stipulated by the Knesset. The distinguishing characteristic of these values is a broad social consensus. On the face of it, this theory entails the diminution of the absolute legislative power of the Knesset, since by a single constitutional act one Knesset can limit both its own legislative power, and that of another Knesset. How­ever this is the classic constitutional paradox of the sovereignty of the legislature: assuming that the Knesset is sovereign, it is permitted to perform any act, including the imposition of limitations on the Knesset. In other words, the limitation of the Knesset detracts from the sovereignty of the Knesset. However, this effect is the result of the actions of the Knesset itself. It is the Knesset that legislates and in so doing it imposes limitations, and it is the Knesset that is authorized to remove the limitations on its power by means that it has established for itself.

From a logical perspective, the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a possible and logical solution (Prof. Y. Englard, Introduction to Jurisprudence (Yahalom, 1991) at p. 110)  In fact :

Nothing prevents a legal norm from relating not only to particular forms of conduct of people but also to its own validity and the manner of its change. Just as the legislature can determine the limits of applicability of a norm in terms of time and place, it can determine that a particular norm cannot be repealed or changed, whether by itself or by any other entity (ibid, at p. 110-111).

The issue was also addressed by Professor Hart in his book The Concept of Law (2nd ed. Oxford, 1994) at p.149, where he states:  

Under the in­fluence of the Austinian doctrine that law is essentially the product of a legally untrammelled will, older constitutional theorists wrote as if it was a logical necesssity that there should be a legislature which was sovereign, in the sense that it is free, at every moment of its existence as a continuing body, not only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but also from its own prior legislation. That Parliament is sovereign in this sense may now be regarded as established, and the principle that no earlier Parliament can preclude its “successors” from repealing its legislation constitutes part of the ultimate rule of recognition used by the courts in identifying valid rules of law.

 

It is, how­ever, important to see that no necessity of logic, still less of nature, dictates that there should be such a Parliament; it is only one arrangement among others, equally conceivable, which has come to be accepted with us as the criterion of legal validity. Among these others is another principle which might equally well, perhaps better, deserve the name of ‘sovereignty’ This is the principle that Parliament should not be incapable of limiting irrevocably the legislative competence of its successors but, on the contrary, should have this wider self-limiting power. Parliament would then at least once in its history be capable of exercising an even larger sphere of legislative com­petence than the accepted established doctrine allows to it. The requirement should be that from the moment of its existence Parliament should be free from legal limitations including even those imposed by itself, is, after all, only one interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence. (emphasis mine – M.S.)

According to Professor Hart a system in which the parliament is authorized to limit itself is an even better reflection of the concept of “sovereignty,” which is the adjective he uses when relating to the [English] Parliament. In other words, according to Professor Hart, a parliament that is also authorized to limit its power by force of its own legislation gives expression thereby to its unlimited power and authorities, which stem from and within itself, and not by force of any other external abstract hierarchy.  According to Professor Hart, the Knesset’s power to limit itself need not flow from another body, of a higher institutional status, but rather can stem from the same institutional source, i.e. from the parliament as such.

 

The border line of the Knesset’s power to limit itself is a function of constitutional policy. The solution presented here is that the Knesset is permitted to limit itself in accordance with its own discretion. It can restrict both the form of the legislation and the content of legislation. The judicial branch has given legal effect to the Knesset’s desire to restrict its power.

 

Furthermore, Dicey’s classical doctrine that parliament cannot limit itself has lost ground even in the country of its conception (see P. Craig, “Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law,” 106 L.Q.Rev. (1990) 105). In other words, the English system – a constitutional system from which we have drawn extensively – imposed restrictions on the legislative power of the legislature. These restrictions were imposed in the framework of the United Kingdom ratifying the European Communities Act, 1972 and especially by reason of sections 3 (1) and 4 (2).  In case law, see: Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2 (1991) [102], at 108; MaCarthy Ltd. v. Smith (1981) [103], at 200. English academic writing on the English law on this point is rich: see e.g.: G. Winterton, “The British Grundnorm. The Parliamentary Supremacy Re-Examined” 92 L.Q.Rev. (1976) 591.  Professor Akehurst provided the following summary of the legal position in England (“Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Supremacy of Community Law,” The British Yearbook of International Law – 1989 (Oxford, 1990) 351, 357, in the following words:

 

English courts will apply an act of Parliament which expressly states that it is intended to violate or repudiate a rule of community law, or to repeal, amend or limit the application of the European Communities Act; but in all other cases they will recognize the supremacy of community law over the sovereignty of the British Parliament. (emphasis mine – M.S.)

As stated, the subordination of the English legislature to normative provisions that curtail its legislative power was done by force of the Parliament’s own legislation. English law recognizes a provision of superior normative standing, its supremacy having been conferred by the legislature in the wake of England’s joining the European Community.  All the same, the supremacy is relative in the sense that the legislature can override it by force of explicit legislation.  Similarly, the Knesset, too, can override the standing and the content of a constitutional provision by force of later constitutional legislation, or legislation enacted by force thereof, that complies with the conditions and qualifications specified in the constitutional legislation. Naturally, the English constitutional arrangements are not the same as ours. Nonetheless, in this context I would like to draw attention to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.  Here, too, we find a situation in which if the language of the later legislation is explicit, the self-limitation of the legislation does not create a constitutional barrier. 

 

The source of the Knesset’s competence to submit its own legislative power to substantive limitations may be derived from the doctrine of the constituent assembly or it may be derived from the doctrine of the inherent unlimited authority of the legislature to enact any law, including a law whereby it limits itself. Both doctrines lead to the conclusion that our House of Representatives has authority in the constitutional realm, that is: in principle, it is within the Knesset’s power to frame a constitution and even to demarcate the contents of future legislation, and this circumscription complies with the principle of legality.

 

      I made my comments above to show that the doctrine by which the Knesset is unable to limit itself, for example by way of a requirement of an entrenched majority, also had its supporters in our own legislature and scholarly literature. The scholarly sources of the opponents of the Knesset’s power of self-limitation derive from the English legal tradition, which has itself changed in the interim in its own way..

 

Self – Limitation in Case Law

34.(a) Our constitutional tradition supports the proposition that the Knesset is empowered to limit itself with respect to fundamental issues. It can limit itself on a formal level in terms of the method of adopting a new law (such as a requirement of a special majority – s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, and sections 9 (a) and 34 of Basic Law: The State Economy; s. 54 of Basic Law:  The Government of 1992; sections 44 and 45 of Basic Law: The Knesset; s. 42 of Basic Law: The Government of 1968, and s. 56 of Basic Law: The Government of 1992; s. 25 of Basic Law: The President of the State; s. 22 of Basic Law: The Judiciary). The limitation may occur on a substantive level (for example, s. 4 (opening words) of Basic Law: The Knesset or s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation).

(b)   Case-law has not challenged the proposition that the Knesset has the power to issue normative acts with supra-legal status.  This Court adjudicated the subject of the entrenched provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset in the Bergman case [15], and the subject arose again in HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority (hereinafter – the Derech Eretz case) [19]. Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset came to the fore once again in HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker (hereinafter – Rubinstein  [20]. In HCJ 142/89. Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker,  on page 571 Deputy President Elon stated that by force of its constitutional sovereignty, the Knesset had the authority to pass any legislation that it deemed appropriate, and we have no license to question the legislative act.

In the Laor case [21], my distinguished colleague President Barak noted that the entrenchment bestowed on the provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset ‘is binding in our legal system, because we acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to act as a constituent authority and to prepare Basic Laws that will become the various chapters of the State Constitution’ (ibid,  at p. 539). Nothing in that paragraph contests the Knesset’s authority to establish entrenched provisions in the constitutional realm, or the Supreme Court’s power to invalidate a law that contravenes an entrenched provision (see my comments in HCJ 669/85 Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [22]). 

35.  In my view, based on all of the above we can conclude that our constitutional tradition has in fact endorsed the Knesset’s power to limit itself, and in fact the Knesset’s self-limitation has merited sovereign approval, in the first stage by formal self-limitation and at the second stage by substantive limitation.  With respect to formal self-limitation, the first guiding rule is the Bergman [15] rule. A law presuming to violate the principle of equality that was not adopted by the required majority is defective, and subject to a constitutional remedy. The legislative authority – the Knesset – accepted this Court’s ruling in Bergman[15]. It removed the inequality that affected the new lists participating in the elections, and passed the Elections Financing Law, 5733-1973, together with the Elections to the Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 5729-1969. In the course of the years, a constitutional custom and understanding has been established that the Knesset is endowed with the power of self-limitation with respect to formal aspects. This constitutional custom has the merited seal of approval of all of Israel’s branches of government – the legislative branch, the executive branch and the judicial branch (Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], Laor [21]. 

The recognition of the Knesset’s ability to limit itself on the formal level led to the conclusion regarding the power of the Knesset to limit itself on the substantive level. Indeed, rationally, there is no room to distinguish between formal and substantive limitations. As Prof. Nimmer correctly pointed out in the article cited above, at p. 1231:

 

            Logically, there can be no ground for distinguishing between the powers to fetter future parliaments substantively and procedurally, either there is power to do both or there is power to do neither (emphasis mine – M.S.).

 

At the same time, the limitation is not unrestricted. Patently, boundaries must be imposed on the extent to which the legislature may be fettered. It is not necessary to delineate these boundaries here, as there is consensus that in relation to basic rights such as those found in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – no difficulty is posed by the fundamental recognition of substantive or content-related limitation. In other words, we do not need to delineate these boundaries for the purpose of the discussion before us, and we may leave this issue open. In any event, on one hand, it is possible to take into account fundamental principles of our system as a Jewish and democratic state. On the other hand, tension exists between the principle of protection and the stability of fundamental principles and the need for flexibility. These and other arguments are serious and persuasive. Thus, for example, there is a view which holds that broad and substantive fettering of the Knesset may violate the principle of majority rule to an inappropriate extent (for details see R. Gavison, “Controversy over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Isr. Y. H. R. (1985) 113, 127).

 

Summing up this point, there is no logical obstacle to the Knesset limiting itself procedurally or substantively. Likewise, in so far as concerns fundamental rights and the principles of our constitutional regime, there is currently no legal or substantive hindrance or indeed obstacle of a legal policy or constitutional nature precluding the Knesset from limiting itself procedurally or substantively.

 

Summary regarding constitutional legislation

 

36. In summary, the phenomenon of Basic Laws in our legal system, viewed precisely discloses the following: the Knesset pursues a constitutional program. This program is being executed on a chapter by chapter basis. The Basic Laws form the constitutional infrastructure of the State of Israel. Today, most of their provisions do not possess normative supremacy by virtue of their own status, albeit they are “constitutional laws” by nature and description. The Knesset may decide, even at present, that some of these Laws or parts of them will possess normative supremacy. It did so, for example, in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It was also entitled to do so in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is the twin brother of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and some of the provisions of which (Section 1 and the amendment to Section 8) were adopted on 20th Adar 5724 (9.3.94) as part of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation of 1994.

 

The methodology of constitutional legislation

 

 

 

 

37.  (a) Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were born together, and it is possible to learn about one from the other, both in terms of similarities and in terms of disparities.

(b)   Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a simple and direct entrenchment provision such as that found in s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In order to classify Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty we must consider the general interpretive sources that are ordinarily available to us. First, it is titled “Basic Law,” and as such it is directly connected to the Harrari decision. This per se is sufficient to categorize it.

Following the Harrari decision, legislation was formulated in this country bearing the title “Basic Law.” This heading clarifies the status of the law. In the absence of such a sign of recognition, is it possible to turn to an examination of the specific law in order to try and learn about its constitutional nature from its language and its contents, including from its status, purpose and objectives? Is it perhaps the case that there can be no constitutional provision save one that bears the title “Basic Law”? According to every legal and historical thesis, the Transition Law was enacted by the Constitutive Assembly. It does not bear the title “Basic Law.” Is it a constitutional provision?

What is the status of the Law of Return and the Women’s Equal Rights Law that were enacted by the First Knesset, which directly and expressly wielded the powers of the Constituent Assembly? Both are of a manifestly constitutional nature; however, do they form part of our constitutional legislation?

These are difficult questions, but I shall leave them aside as not pertinent to the present case. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to set out a number of guidelines for future constitutional legislation, as even if we assign the enactment of a constitution to a constituent authority, we are still left with the question of the line which that authority must follow when identifying appropriate issues for inclusion in a constitution and the method of legislation and substantive classification that it must adopt.

38.  (a) First, there are a number of principal characteristics which distinguish a constitution from an ordinary law. A constitution deals with fundamental principles. It seeks to accord the principles a guiding status in so far as concerns other legislation and the acts of the state authorities in general. This principle is known in German constitutional theory as Vorbehalt Des Gesetzes (see Sections 1(3), 20(3) and 79(3) of the German Basic Law; New Challenges to the German Basic Law, C. Starck, ed. (Nomos,   1991) 162; R. Herzog, Staat und Recht im Wandel (Keip, 1993) 150. The constitution is the outcome of the will of the nation, and accordingly it is generally adopted, in other legal systems, in a unique one-time process. A constitution is occasionally characterized by relative inflexibility in relation to ways of amending it. A constitution is occasionally characterized by limitations on the possibility of infringing rights protected by it (and on occasion even by the absence of any possibility of “infringement”). Nonetheless, there are systems, such as that of New Zealand, in which the bill of rights does not have special status compared to ordinary legislation.

Second, the language of a Basic Law itself should indicate that it has a special normative status. For example, if a law states unequivocally that it has special or entrenched constitutional status, then we are dealing with a law possessing formal constitutional status (i.e., possessing normative superiority relative to ordinary legislation). This is also true if the law establishes exact conditions for the validity of a law which seeks to infringe a protected right. In other words, a Basic Law’s attitude, revealed in its contents, regarding its own status carries paramount weight in determining the normative classification of the Basic Law.

Put differently, a constitution possesses certain substantive aspects (the structure of the regime, fundamental rights and principles) and certain fundamental aspects (such as the manner of adoption and amendment of the constitution, the name of the law, its language, style, formulation, concepts). A constitution is characterized by the conciseness of its formulation. A constitution is characterized by abstractness.

Third, it is possible to examine the manner in which the law is integrated into the constitutional structure of the system. Constitutional structure is examined in the light of the constitutional history. It is examined through the constitutional acts performed by the Knesset. A constitutional law serves a certain purpose – it is designed to alter a certain normative reality. Understanding the law requires that we examine the legal situation that the law is intended to change. We must aspire to realize its purpose. If it is a Basic Law, understanding it requires that it be situated logically and harmoniously within three primary circles. The broad, external circle is that of the fundamental principles of our system. The second circle is that of constitutional legislation – the “Basic Laws.” Our narrow specific circle is, in the present case, the integration of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty with its twin – Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – within our constitutional system.

These two Basic Laws are the first in the bill of rights (as distinct from the institutional Basic Laws). They entered our legal world in close proximity in terms of time and circumstances, and they were even amended concurrently. To a large extent, therefore, they coexist. It is particularly important that they be interpreted harmoniously.

Fourth, an understanding of the substance and purpose of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty requires that appropriate weight be given to the legislative intent and the constitutional history of the Basic Law. The constitutional history and legislative intent are discerned from the legislative history and incarnations of the bill, from hearings in the Knesset, from the changes introduced into the Basic Law during the second and third readings in the Knesset, and from the law’s record after its enactment. Special importance must be attached to the legislative intent in the present circumstances. These remarks are not directed at the literal interpretation of any particular idea but to the overall concept.

The legislative will, in so far as it can be ascertained, should provide the starting point. The difficulties in ascertaining it are indeed many, but we should not be tempted to exaggerate them. In most cases, it is at least clear what the legislature did not want. (Prof. A. Levontin, “Interpretation: Climes and Synthesis,” Klinghoffer Volume, at pp. 269, 277-278).

From a determination of the characteristics of the legislation we now turn to the tests applicable to the Basic Law before us. Does it establish statutory arrangements that reflect its place on the normative hierarchy, or will its protections of fundamental rights sway in every wind in so far as variation or infringement of its provisions? Is it similar, in this sense, to the provisions of most of the Basic Laws that preceded it, which lack entrenchment clauses?

Basic Laws: Variation and Infringement

39. (a) The Basic Laws form the constitutional infrastructure of the State of Israel in the spirit of the Harrari decision and its realization. Had the issue of “variation” arisen in the present case, i.e., had the Amending Law been intended to change the Basic Law, I would immediately have presented the principle whereby, according to correct constitutional theory, variation of a Basic Law must always be effected by a Basic Law. The concept of a normative constitutional hierarchy presented above leads to the conclusion that a more highly positioned statute cannot be varied in form or content by legislation lower in the constitutional hierarchy. This is not true of the converse position. In other words, legislation higher in the constitutional hierarchy can amend a statutory provision lower in the constitutional hierarchy. In this context, the issue of “implied amendment” may arise. However, I shall not address that issue, and will leave it for the appropriate opportunity. The same conclusion emerges from the practice of the Knesset. In this regard, note should be taken of the amendment to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty that was effected in 1994 by means of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

As mentioned, we are not concerned here with a “variation.” The question arising concerns an “infringement.” Each of the Basic Laws sets out express provisions in regard to possible infringement of a fundamental right: Sections 4 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. First, it is necessary to examine whether there is an infringement of a fundamental right. If the answer is affirmative, then did the law comply with the conditions of the limitation clause or not? What is the outcome where there is an infringement that is incompatible with the requirements of the relevant limitation clause, which establishes the limitations and conditions for valid legislation notwithstanding its infringement of a fundamental right?

(b) The issue of “infringement” is a complex one. There are numerous alternative theories regarding the distinction between an infringement that is contrary to law and one that complies with the requirements of the law. I shall present them and indicate the one that I believe should be preferred.

The first theory holds that every ordinary law of the Knesset may infringe a right protected by a Basic Law. According to this view, the relationship between a Basic Law and every ordinary law is no different than the relationship between any two ordinary pieces of legislation of the Knesset. This first possibility is based on the Negev case [12] (at p. 642, opposite letter G). It follows from the Negev case [12] that an ordinary law (Standards Law, 5713-1953) may infringe a principle established by a Basic Law (Basic Law: the Government), when the relationship between the two is a regular interpretive relationship between two pieces of legislation (such as a special law vis-à-vis a general law). As Justice Berenson stated there: “the fact that the Standards Law is a special law compared to Basic Law: the Government which is a general law, accords the special law priority over the general law” (see also the Kaniel case [13] and the Ressler case [14]).

Judgment was reserved concerning the Negev case [12] in later case-law: in HCJ 119/80 OM 224/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23] at p. 283, the question of the possibility of a provision of a Basic Law infringing a later ordinary law was left open (ibid, at p. 283). In my view, the Negev judgment [12] was not intended to refer to normative constitutional hierarchy but to the status of a specialized statutory provision versus the provision of a general law, and no more. Further, the judgment referred to a Basic Law that was not accorded any entrenched status whatsoever, either directly or impliedly by virtue of its provisions.

To summarize, the first possibility holds that, in the absence of a qualifying provision, there is no normative difference between an ordinary law that seeks to infringe a Basic Law and a Basic Law that seeks to do the same.

The second thesis holds that a Basic Law enjoys limited normative priority. According to this view, an ordinary law may infringe a Basic Law, however, this should properly be done by the Knesset in an express manner. An infringement of a law that is not expressly made has no legal force. A law that infringes a right protected by a Basic Law, without an express statement to that effect, does not have the legal force to do so. Such a law is subject to constitutional remedies by virtue of its unconstitutionality. This thesis has been accepted by a number of scholars. It has been approved by former Deputy President Elon, who stated that “reason dictates that a statute that seeks to vary a provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty should state that it is made notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law, or some similar expression, but no more” (M. Elon, “The Way of Law in the Constitution: The Values of the Jewish and Democratic State in Light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” 17 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1993) 659, 662). This view has been accepted by Ms. J. Karp, (J. Karp, “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), 323, 332). She writes that the supremacy of the Basic Law is merely relative:

This does not mean complete negation of the legislature’s power to override a Basic Law and dismantle it. In the same way as formal entrenchment does not restrict the legislature in relation to the content of its legislation, but only in relation to the process of variation (the requirement of a special majority), so too implied entrenchment is capable of restricting the legislature only in relation to the procedure of the variation, i.e., on condition that there is an express statement by the legislature regarding its desire to override the Basic Law (ibid, at p. 324; emphasis mine – M.S.).

In her opinion:

The Basic Law embodies a compromise: the court is indeed accorded the power to adjudicate regarding the invalidity of the law. However, this power is limited and ends in the face of an express statement by the legislature regarding its desire to deviate from the Basic Law… (ibid).

These comments are prima facie also applicable to the case of “infringement” only. Prof. Weisman too, accepts the second possibility as the correct interpretation of the validity of the infringement enacted in a Basic Law: “as the provision in Section 8 (of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – M.S.) is not entrenched (in the same way as the other sections in this Basic Law were not entrenched) it follows that the Knesset is not precluded from enacting statutes in the future, the contents of which cannot be reconciled with the limitations established in Section 8 of the Basic Law, provided that this is done expressly and clarification of this intention is given” (Y. Weisman, Property Law The Institute (Sacker Institute for Legislative Research & Comparative Law, 1993) 38; emphasis mine – M.S.).

The third possibility acknowledges the supremacy of a Basic Law per se and strengthens it. According to this view, a lawful “infringement” of the Israeli bill of rights is possible only if it meets the requirements consistent with the theory of a normative hierarchy. This thesis is premised on the unitary nature of the bill of fundamental rights, i.e., of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and other Basic Laws that may be enacted by the Knesset in the future in regard to basic rights. These Basic Laws will form a unified whole. The Knesset expressed its desire regarding the normative classification of the Israeli bill of rights. Following the Harrari decision, it presented these rights in the form of Basic Laws. In so doing, it assigned them to a constitutional normative hierarchy. A variation or infringement outside the framework of the limitation clause, which too forms part of the Basic Law, may only be carried out by a law of equal status, i.e., by means of a Basic Law or on the basis of an authorization in a Basic Law (see s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation of 1994, which not only illustrates this interpretive approach but also shows that the Knesset adopted it in practice).

These are the three principal options relating to the normative classification of a Basic Law in relation to the possibility of an “infringement” of a protected right that does not satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause.

My choice is the third option. I have already mentioned above that in view of the constitutional policy of the Knesset, as expressed in the two new Basic Laws, it is appropriate from now on to hold that no variation of any Basic Law may be carried out save by a Basic Law, and it would be right to hold that no “infringement” of a Basic Law may be carried out save by a Basic Law or by virtue of an authorizing provision therein.

We must now turn from presenting the general approaches to an examination of the question before us regarding the application of the specific Basic Law with which we are presently concerned to the Amending Law. For this purpose, we shall examine a number of provisions in the Basic Law.

The Basic Law versus the Amending Law

The Supremacy Clause

40.  (a) Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause, nor does Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not even contain an entrenchment clause, like s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides that:

This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.

The absence of a clear supremacy clause does not compel the conclusion that the status of a Basic Law is equivalent to that of an ordinary statute.

A supremacy clause, had one existed, would certainly have been persuasive of the fact that the law possesses supreme status. The Canadian Constitution stated that it was ‘the supreme law of Canada.’ Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, declares unequivocally: ‘The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada.’ This normative supremacy engenders the constitutional remedy whereby: ‘any law that is inconsistent with the clauses of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect’ (Section 52(1) – final clause of the Constitution Act). The Canadian Constitution was taken into consideration by the drafters of the Basic Law (Karp, in the article cited above, at p. 331).

The German Basic Law (the Grundgesetz) provides in Section 20(3) –

‘Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.’

Translated:

The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.

By the way, the German legal commentary is aware of the tautology expressed in the words “law and justice.”

Section 1(3) of the German Basic Law, which is similar to Section 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Section 5 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, provides:

Die nachfolgenden Grundrechte binden Gesetzgebung, vollziehende Gewalt und Rechtsprechung als unmittelbar geltendes Recht.

Translated:

The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.

The German constitution subjects the activities of the legislature, executive and judiciary directly to the provisions of the constitution. It is undisputed that the German Basic Law manifestly embodies the notion of supremacy.

It is possible to adduce numerous additional examples (for example, s. 140 of the Austrian constitution of 1920 – the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG)).

(b)   As noted, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause. The Basic Law does not incorporate a provision to the effect that it is a supreme law in the State of Israel.  The draft bill Basic Law: Legislation, as may be seen from its history since it was first published in 1971 (see (1971), 27 HaPraklit 140; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1976; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1978; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1992; the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1993) was intended to establish the subservience of ordinary legislation to basic legislation, however, the proposal has not yet developed into law.

(c)   The Basic Law that we are examining also does not contain a provision, as proposed, to the effect that “a law will not contravene a Basic Law save if passed in the Knesset plenum by the votes of two-thirds of the members of the Knesset and unless it expressly states that it is valid notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law” (s. 5(d) of the draft Basic Law: Legislation of 1992).

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation states that a statutory provision that infringes freedom of occupation will be valid in certain circumstances, even if it is incompatible with s. 4 (i.e., even if it does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause). The explicit affirmative also implies its negative, namely that ab initio, a statutory provision that is repugnant to sections 4 or 8 of the Basic Law is invalid. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation therefore addresses the question of the validity of laws that infringe a provision in a Basic Law (similar to the European Union Convention, Article. 177(B), Costa v. Enel (1964) [108] at 590). As we shall see below, a similar conclusion follows from the provisions of sections 8, 10 and 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

To summarize this point, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation does not contain a supremacy clause, albeit it refers to the manner of its variation and the validity of infringing legislation. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not contain a supremacy clause, but it refers expressly to the validity of infringing legislation and thereby designates a mandatory route and binding standards. In s. 8, this Basic Law defines the boundaries of possible infringement and thereby impliedly establishes its supremacy relative to infringing legislation.

Rigidity

41. (a) Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not enjoy rigidity. There is no express provision that a special majority is needed to vary the Basic Law. The variation is a statutory act by virtue of which the scope of protection accorded to certain rights varies for good or for bad. Indeed, we have already repeatedly clarified that the “variation” is distinct from the “infringement.” Variation undermines the right itself. “Infringement” does not vary the protected right. It merely enables the infringing statute to circumvent the constitutional remedy in given circumstances.

As noted above, in consequence of the ‘variation’ it is conceivable that the protection accorded to a right will be more restricted; for example, by amending the Basic Law by restricting its scope, repealing a particular provision in it or repealing the entire Basic Law. On the other hand, the protection can also become broader by reason of the variation, for example, by the addition of protected rights or by elevating the normative supremacy of the protected values.

(b) We have seen that there is no requirement for a special majority or for a special process to vary the Basic Law before us.

Subject to future legislation (such as Basic Law: Legislation), the process for changing a Basic Law follows the same stages of legislation as an ordinary law, i.e., a draft Basic Law is published in the same way as an ordinary bill. The draft Basic Law is enacted in three readings. Every Knesset member may table a Basic Law through a private member’s bill, in the same way as every Knesset member may table any ordinary private bill. The Knesset Regulations apply to the enactment of a Basic Law, just as to the enactment of an ordinary statute. Indeed, this is “the unbearable lightness of legislating and amending Basic Laws” (Dr A. Bendor, “Flaws in Enacting Basic Laws” 2 Mishpat uMimshal (1994), 443, 444). The absence of any element of rigidity is of interpretive significance. My distinguished colleague the President referred to the inherent importance of rigidity as a distinctive feature of a constitution. The rigidity of a constitution demonstrates its supremacy over an ordinary law, “so that in the event of a contradiction between the provisions of a constitution and the provisions of an ordinary law, the constitution will prevail (A. Barak, Judicial Discretion (Papyrus, 1987) 319).

For an illustration of the frequency of rigid provisions in a constitution it is possible to turn, for example, to the Constitution of the United States (Article V); the Constitution of Canada (Art. 52(3) of the Constitution Act, and Part Five of that Act); the Constitution of Australia (Art. 128 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act); the German Constitution (Art. 79 of the Grundgesatz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which creates absolute rigidity in regard to its provisions ); the Constitution of Ireland (Art. 48). Were it not for considerations of space, it would be possible to list a number of articles in each of the existing constitutions in order to demonstrate the approach to rigidity that each employs, whether by way of entrenchment or some other approach.

d) Rigidity as a Recognized Constitutional Characteristic in Case Law

With the establishment of the right to freedom of occupation in a Basic Law, it has achieved supra-legislative status. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this special status ... is the relative entrenchment of that right even against the mighty hand of the legislature (HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [24] at p. 259).

Indeed, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is a typical constitutional creation, as stated s.  7 of that law states: “This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.” No similar provision exists in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

42.  The relative weight of the absence of rigidity generated either by formal entrenchment or otherwise, is strengthened in the light of three arguments:

 a) First, the absence of entrenchment was not an error on the part of the legislature. The absence of entrenchment is conscious and deliberate. The draft Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty included a provision regarding formal entrenchment. This provision was not approved. It failed by a single vote during the process of voting on reservations preceding the final adoption of the Basic Law. In contrast, as noted, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation incorporates a formal entrenchment provision. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are closely related. This relationship is substantive and chronological. “Substantive” – because these two normative creations deal for the first time with protected basic rights. “Chronological” – because these two creations evolved within the framework of the first specific process of legislation of a charter of human rights in our legal system (what Karp termed the “atomization” of basic rights, in her article cited above at p. 338). These Basic Laws were debated in the Knesset at around the same time, and were subsequently addressed in the same legislative process in 1994. The normative reality is that the Knesset chose to reject the proposed entrenchment of the Basic Law. This is a fact – the situation was not one of an oblivious legislature. Nonetheless, as noted, the law does contain additional provisions that are of significance in regard to the effect of other legislation that infringes its provisions.

b) Second, we explained that “variation” of the protected right (including its repeal or nullification) is a graver and more serious act in terms of its significance than “infringement” of that right. This is undisputed. Reason dictates that the actions required to “vary” the protected right are of greater significance than the actions required to locally “infringe” that right. On the assumption that the legislature is consistent and logical, it is difficult to believe that the converse will become true, so that the grave (the variation) will become simple (ordinary majority) and the simple (infringement) will become grave (special majority and express). In other words, the absence of rigidity in relation to variation has ramifications for the absence of rigidity in relation to infringement.

This point is worthy of elaboration. We have considered the requirement for a clear distinction between “variation” of the right and the possibility of “infringing” it. The logical constitutional structure is that the process of “variation” be more complex and intricate. This is the most profound infringement of fundamental principles and the structure of the system. In contrast, the logical constitutional structure requires that the process of “infringement” of a protected constitutional right be simpler than that of “variation.” It is difficult to accept the interpretive solution that “infringement” requires more severe conditions than “variation.” In contrast, a proposition to the effect that identical conditions are required for “variation” and “infringement” may be reconciled with a coherent constitutional theory (see the Bergman case [15]). However, the higher the hurdle facing an “infringement” compared to that of a “variation,” the weaker the logic of the interpretive solution. In other words, the more severe the legal requirements for an “infringement” compared to those applicable to a “variation” – the more the interpretive approach loses internal strength.

Third, a possible conclusion regarding the absence of rigidity is tied to our constitutional tradition prior to the enactment of the Basic Laws in 1992. To my regret, our constitutional approach has not yet adopted the thesis that the very labelling of an act as a “Basic Law” vests it, per se, with normative supremacy. Our system takes the view that a Basic Law that is not formally entrenched is almost indistinguishable – in terms of its formal normative status – from an ordinary law. I used the word “almost” because the Knesset has seldom varied a Basic Law by means of an ordinary law. Nonetheless, we gave examples above of how it enacted provisions in an ordinary law that conflicted with a Basic Law. Moreover, from our current and developing constitutional perspective, it cannot be said that the fate of a non-entrenched Basic Law is identical to that of an ordinary law for all intents and purposes. On the contrary, our Basic Laws form the basis of the constitution of the State of Israel. The Basic Laws treat of the structure of the state regime and its powers. Following the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, the Basic Laws also treat of fundamental human rights in Israel. Consequently, I take the view that ‘in our interpretive approach, we must refer to the Basic Laws as “constitutional laws”‘ (Barak, in his book cited above, Judicial Discretion, at p. 520). The “constitutional plan” of the State of Israel, as I termed the realization of the ideal of constitutionalization, is the consolidation of the Basic Laws into a general, uniform treatise – ‘all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution of the State’ (the Harrari decision, at p. 1743). On the path towards this consolidation, Basic Law: Legislation will be enacted, and this will “immediately vest preferred status upon all the constitutional provisions in the Basic Law relative to any other legislation and protected or entrenched status from the point of view of the constitutional possibility of varying them or indirectly curbing the scope of their application” (M. Shamgar, “Legislation, Adjudication and Civil Rights,” 37 HaPraklit (1987) 5, 6).

However, in the present situation, in the absence of a statutory provision, the Basic Law, ipso facto, has no entrenched status. It enjoys no formal or inherent rigidity or supremacy. In the absence of statutory entrenchment, the prevailing perception has been that a statutory provision does not possess special, privileged status merely because of its inclusion in a Basic Law. Provisions that enjoyed supremacy were characterized by rigidity. The classic example in shaping our constitutional thinking was Section 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

43.  To summarize, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty lacks the typical feature that accords supremacy, namely, an express statutory provision, whether as a provision in the Basic Law itself or a general provision in a Basic Law of general application, such as Basic Law: Legislation, which is in preparation. A constitution reflects fundamental principles. Fundamental principles are guiding rules of policy. Accordingly, they are characterized by stability and do not lapse and vary. The constitution is characterized by being entrenched against the winds of change. The interpretive outcome whereby we have before us a constitution that is open to modification by any majority is disappointing, as it does not appropriately express the constitutional logic and purpose that it should comprise. In other words, there is no doubt that the Basic Law is a constitutional act that is a chapter in the constitution being developed according to the Harrari decision, however, this alone is insufficient to decide that it is possible to invalidate any law repugnant to its provisions.

Nonetheless, as we have shown and shall see, there are other provisions in the Basic Law before us that grant it privileged, special status, and that compensate for the absence of other constitutional traits, as described above. We shall now turn to a discussion of these.

 

The Limitation Clause

44.Section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (“violation of rights”) provides that:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by such a law enacted with explicit authorization therein.

Section 8 of the Basic Law before us is a principal provision that treats of the normative status of the Basic Law

It is undisputed that this provision is of great importance insofar as concerns preventing possible attempts to infringe a protected right by secondary legislation. Until the adoption of the Basic Law, fundamental rights were protected against infringement by secondary legislation, by means of the case law alone. In the Mitrani case [7] I stated that ‘the fundamental objective is clear, namely that it is right and appropriate, from the point of view of the existence of the right to freedom of occupation, that only the words of the primary legislature may restrict it’ (ibid, at p. 352). If this is true in relation to freedom of occupation, it applies a fortiori to human rights. No restrictions may be imposed upon a fundamental right that derives from our being a “free society” ‘except under an express provision of statute’ (ibid, at p. 353). This principle has become rooted in our legal approach. The Basic Law anchored it in a “constitutional” law – a Basic Law; ‘there shall be no violation’ except by law.

However, the dispute does not revolve around the significance of the limitation clause in connection with secondary legislation. Possible disputes may arise in connection with the significance of the limitation clause in relation to primary legislation. Primary legislation that meets the conditions of the limitation clause does not, of course, pose a problem. The potential difficulty, and the source of the dispute that I seek to address revolves around a law that does not comply with the limitation clause. In other words, what is the fate of a statute that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? Take a statute which is compatible with the values of the State of Israel, but the goal of which is to advance an improper purpose – what is its fate? Take a statute that is compatible with the values of the State of Israel and the purpose of which is proper, but at the same time is not “proportional” – it violates a protected right ‘to an extent greater than is required’ – what is it’s fate?

 The answer is unequivocal. A literal reading shows that a statute incompatible with the conditions of the limitation clause does not have the power to infringe a protected right. Accordingly, it should not be accorded operative significance, and its validity should not be recognized if it purports to infringe a protected right. This interpretation follows the “plain meaning.” From the “affirmative” (the possibility of a infringement if the statute complies with the conditions of the limitation clause), it infers the “negative” (the absence of the possibility of infringement if the limitation clause is not complied with). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – the set of “affirmatives” comprises all the cases in which it is possible to infringe a protected right. The “negative” constitutes all those cases in which it is not possible to infringe a protected right.

The very enactment of the provisions of s. 8 elevates the Basic Law to a higher status, from which we may critically observe and examine other, non-Basic legislation that treats of issues addressed by the aforesaid Basic Law. The aforesaid interpretive rule grants the Basic Law its vitality. This is particularly true when we seek to utilize the interpretive rule to achieve the far-reaching result whereby an “ordinary” law – enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law, and which does not meet the conditions of the “limitation clause” – is of no effect. In view of the language of s. 8, it is immaterial in this regard if this “ordinary” law was enacted with an “ordinary” majority or a “special” one. Likewise, it is immaterial whether or not this ordinary law states expressly that it was enacted “notwithstanding the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.”

The following is unequivocal: Whatever the language of a later ordinary law may be, if the law does not satisfy the “validity condition” (“limitation clause”) of the Basic Law, or it is not legislation of the appropriate normative level, i.e., a Basic Law – it has no force. The creation of the aforesaid normative barrier to legislative variation reflects the adoption of a broad substantive interpretation of constitutional legislation. We are acquainted with the comments of the late President Agranat that, ‘when the issue relates to a document that determines the framework of the state regime, the court must take a “spacious view” of the powers that the document enunciates’ (FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [25] at p. 442). A constitutional text must be interpreted from a spacious view and with the intention of giving force to the constitutional imperative embodied in it. Its construction should not be narrow, technical or formalistic, but  as broad as the horizon. The view must embrace the substance, which is reflected in the human rights that are at the heart of our constitutional principles.

45.  According to the plain meaning, the aforesaid s. 8 carries great weight. It says ‘there shall be no violation.’ We are trying to specify the normative character of the Basic Law. On our scales, the section weighs heavily in countering the absence of rigidity in the Basic Law.

The Validity of Laws Provision

46. Section 10 of the Basic Law is the only provision in the Basic Law that employs the language “validity of any law.” It provides that ‘This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law (din) in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). The negative implies the affirmative. It follows that s. 10 impliedly provides that this Basic Law can affect the validity of any law (din) enacted subsequently to the entry into force of the Basic Law. This means that the Basic Law has the power to affect the validity of a law enacted after the commencement of the Basic Law. The very existence of this provision shows that the Basic Law is capable of influencing the “validity of a law,” as were it not for the fact that the Basic Law could influence the validity of a law there would be no need whatsoever for a provision preserving the validity of certain laws. In other words, it is only the power of the Basic Law – by its nature and related consequences – that compelled the establishment of a qualifying provision regarding earlier laws, such as that contained in the aforesaid s. 10.

The provision in s. 10 informs us that the validity of a “law” which is enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law is subject to judicial review according to the standards set out in the Basic Law. If a person were to argue that the intention to preserve exiting law underlying s. 10 is more restrictive and the section is directed solely at the interpretive rule whereby “an earlier law retreats before a later law,”  the answer would be that it cannot possibly be the legislative purpose. First, there is no evidence of this in the legislative record (e.g.  the Knesset Proceedings). Second, it is difficult to assume that this is the objective purpose of the Basic Law, for if it were, the law would appear valueless. According to this reasoning, a law enacted prior to the Basic Law preserves its validity, under s. 10, notwithstanding any provision in the Basic Law, whereas a law subsequent to the Basic Law supersedes the Basic Law, according to this view, because it is later. What, then, did the Basic Law add by its enactment? In my view, the provision in s. 10 informs us that the Basic Law possesses normative supremacy, as it can affect the validity of a law. It does not define the scope of the supremacy and its degree; this is dealt with by another provision of the Basic Law. Section 10 does not delineate the boundaries of the possibility of violation that ensues from this supremacy, but it is difficult for a faithful interpreter to dispute that it indicates normative supremacy.

The Principal Law is shielded from judicial review by virtue of the Basic Law. The Amending Law, i.e., the amendment to the Principal Law, which is the subject of our review, is subject to review by virtue of the Basic Law, i.e., the Basic Law has the power to violate the Amending Law, which was enacted after the Basic Law.

A further lesson may be learned from the “validity of laws” provision: the application of the Basic Law is immediate. The law is not directed entirely at the distant future, i.e., the date of consolidation of all the Basic Laws into a single, complete constitution. It is not an interpretive pillar-of-fire. The Basic Law has immediate operative effect. This is the rule in our legal system: upon publication in the Official Gazette, the law enters into force, if not otherwise stated in the law itself. The validity of laws provision reinforces this clear, inevitable conclusion. The Basic Law has immediate effect. It is not merely declarative.

The Respect Clause

47. Section 11 of the Basic Law provides that: “All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law” (cf. s. 1(3) of the German Basic Law quoted above). The Basic Law refers to this provision by the marginal title “Application,” i.e., it defines the scope of application of the law. This provision is commonly referred to as “the respect clause.”

There are three “branches of government” – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In principle, the directives of the legislature will naturally fetter the executive and the judiciary. The application clause is unnecessary in order to achieve that result. The application clause is needed – apart from its didactic aspect – in order to clarify that the legislature, too, is subject to the provisions of the Basic Law in regard to ‘the rights under this Basic Law.’ It guides the legislature and in a way limits it.  The legislature cannot disregard the Basic Law, as it too is obliged to respect it.

This provision indeed requires that respect be accorded by ‘each of the governmental authorities,’ even if it is not as unequivocal and clear in terms of its wording as its counterparts in the German and Canadian constitutions. It does not refer expressly and in detail to the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. It does not state that the legislature is subordinate to it (in contrast to s. 32(1) of the Canadian constitution).

Respect requires, first and foremost, reference to the Basic Law and the rights protected in it. This obligation is embodied in the very duty to respect. This provision does not negate the power of the supreme legislature to enact laws, but it provides the conceptual and positive basis for the requirement that a violation of the provisions of the Basic Law must take a unique form. It is not possible to enact a law repugnant to the respect provision. Indeed, this could have been expressly stated, and in this regard see s.  8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

To remove all doubt, I would add that the inferior drafting, in comparison to foreign legislation, does not detract from the weight that should be accorded to the statutory provision of s. 11.

48.  To summarize this point, the respect provisions set out in s. 1 (‘these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’) and in s. 11 of the Basic Law with which we are concerned, guide the legislature to enact laws in the light of the rights protected in the Basic Law. This legislation should, appropriately, be conscious  and deliberate, express and not implied.

The Ceremonial Element – Basic Principles and Purpose

49.  A constitution is a ceremonial act. The Constitution of the United States begins with a ceremonial Preamble. This is true of most of the principal constitutions that can provide a basis for comparison. The ceremonial preamble of the constitution of the Fifth Republic of France is famous. The same is true of the constitutions of India, Germany and others.

       Section 1 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides, in ceremonial, historic language, that:

Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, and the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

Section 1A is supplements the above, setting out the purpose of the Basic Law, stating:

The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

This preamble is characteristic of a constitutional act that inherently determines not only the place of the law in the normative hierarchy, but also its internal force and the spirit in which other laws will be reviewed. An ordinary legislative act does not open with a general, ceremonial declaration. Section 1 instructs us to respect basic rights ‘in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel., Before us is a constitutional act, both by reason of the festive, historical language of s. 1, and because of the referral to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. This declaration is our “Declaration of Independence,” which is both the birth certificate and the identification card of the state as an independent, political, sovereign entity.

In this context, it is proper to recall that the Declaration of the Establishment of the State also included a reference to the intention to adopt a constitution. In other words, the principle of constitutionality was born with the establishment of the State, and the reference to the entire complex – i.e., the Declaration – in the final clause of s. 1 of the Basic Law also expresses the historical constitutional link to the details in the Declaration, and the intention to adopt a constitution.

50.  In conclusion: Section 1 of the Basic Law presents – in a substantive manner – the constitutional supra-statutory aspect of the Basic Law in two ways. First, s. 1 of the Basic Law is, by its title and content, a section of “basic principles.” It serves as a guide to the details of the constitutional act. It is clear that an ordinary law, possessing ordinary normative status, does not open with a ceremonial declaration of the basic principles of the State of Israel. There is no law or Basic Law that adopted this language apart from Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Indeed, there is consensus that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, too, possesses normative supremacy, and the legislation of the Knesset in 1994 emphasized this: The interpretive connection between these two Basic Laws is strengthened in the light of the incorporation of amendments to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty within the enactment of the new version of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. It may conceivably be argued that the provisions that were added to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in s. 11 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the new s. 1 and the final clause of s. 8) are subject to s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which provides for rigidity in relation to variation of the Basic Law. However, this question, too, may be left open.

In any event, an act comprising a provision treating of the basic principles of the legal system possesses unequivocal constitutional ramifications. Second, it displays a clear, commonly accepted characteristic of every constitution around the world, i.e., the name and ceremonial preamble that presents the basic values of the State of Israel. Third, the reference to the Declaration of Independence provides an indication of the constitutional task imposed on the Knesset. As we have seen, we do not need further identification of the Basic Law as such, as its name testifies to its character. However, we are searching for provisions by which to discern that its force is superior to other primary legislation, and the declarative provisions at its beginning strengthen the ratio legis of these provisions, which we find in ss. 8, 10 and 11 of this Basic Law. To allay any misunderstanding: we are not seeking ratification of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law, but rather of its superior force.

51.  As earlier noted, alongside the section treating of basic principles (s. 1 of the Basic Law), we find the provisions of s. 1A,  which address the purpose of the law. Section 1A represents a shift from the general to the particular. The purpose of the Basic Law is to anchor “human dignity and liberty.” “Anchor” means establish, strengthen and create. The concept “human dignity and liberty” must be construed together with the name of the Basic Law (“Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty”). In other words, the protection is accorded to the basic principle of human dignity and liberty. This principle is divided into its components, i.e., into the basic rights themselves. The purpose provision – which is a general provision – must not be interpreted as if it merely applies to some of the provisions of the Basic Law, i.e., the last clause of s. 2 (“preservation of life, person and dignity”) and s. 5 (“personal freedom”). The protection of “human dignity and liberty” is understood in light of the title and substance of the law – as protection of the entire fabric of rights set out therein. The anchoring is not established in an ordinary law. It is carried out by means of the mechanism of a Basic Law (‘in order to anchor in a Basic Law’). The purpose provision – like its older sibling (the basic principles provision) – goes to the very foundations of our legal system: ‘the principles of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’. The principles of our system are a synthesis between the State of Israel being a “Jewish state” and the State of Israel being a “democratic state” (see Elon, in the article cited above). The State of Israel is a Jewish state. The State of Israel is a democratic state. I will recall here what I said in a similar case, Election Appeal 1/88 Neiman et al v. Chairman of the Election Committee to the Twelfth Knesset [26] at p. 189, in connection with the integration of these two values:

‘There is no truth in the argument regarding an imagined contradiction between the different clauses of s. 7A.  The existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people does not negate its democratic nature, just as the French character of France does not negate its democratic nature. The great principle expressed in clause (1) does not negate the one in clause (2) and the two can coexist in perfect harmony.’

The absence of any contradiction, as claimed, was already emphasized in President Agranat’s remarks in the above Election Appeal 1/65 at p. 385:

There can be no doubt – as is clearly shown by the statements made in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State at the time  that not only is Israel a sovereign, independent nation that aspires to freedom, and  is characterized by the rule of the people, but that it has also been established as a Jewish state in the land of Israel, because the act of establishment was carried out, primarily, by virtue of the natural and historical right of the Jewish people to live like any other people, in its own right in its sovereign state, and this act represented a realization of the aspiration of generations for the redemption of Israel.

My esteemed colleague Deputy President Elon also referred to this in the above Election Appeal 2, 3/84, at p. 297:

The democratic nature of the State of Israel was expressed in the Declaration of Independence, which speaks of the complete equality of social and political rights for all citizens, without distinction of religion, race or sex, and guarantees freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. These principles are our guiding light. The Jewish nature of the State of Israel was expressed in the Declaration of Independence by the very definition of the state as a Jewish state, and not merely a state of Jews, by opening its gates to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of the exiles (as manifested itself later in the Law of Return, 5710-1950, etc.). These principles too are guiding lights for us. The totality of these rights is the crucible in which the special image of the Jewish state was forged. The leading thinkers of Zionist philosophy, its movements and streams, Jews holding different points of view, citizens of the State of Israel, members of different ethnic groups and religions, all debated and continue to debate the significance and application of the totality of principles found in the Declaration of Independence to the practical life of the Jewish State.

Judaism’s perception of human dignity ensues from what is said in Genesis 1:27 [B], according to which man is created in the image of God, every human being is created in the Divine image, all are equal, and all are worthy of human dignity.

52. The provisions introducing the Basic Law embody, as aforesaid, a clear constitutional message. In this context, two points must be emphasized: the ceremonial opening is common to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Both contain a basic-principle provision and both contain the purpose provision. The language of the respective provisions is identical. This is clear, objective evidence of the conceptual similarity between the two Basic Laws. These two laws are cut from the same cloth. They are different organs of the same body. Thus, we must aspire to harmony between them, subject to variations clearly ensuing from the purpose – objective and subjective – of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The second point concerns the nature of a constitution as a didactic document. A constitution possesses educational value. ‘A significant matter, – writes Deputy President Elon, referring to the provisions of the Basic Law, ‘for education and learning, educators and students, young and old’ (Elon in the article cited above, at p. 682). True, I wrote that ‘the proper protection of a certain freedom is not achieved solely by declaring its existence,’ however, I added that ‘we should not underestimate the didactic value of the declarative statement…’ (Miterani case [7], at p. 355). One of the principles of a constitution is its inherent educational value.

Protection Against Emergency Legislation

53.  The provision regarding the stability of the law (s. 12 of the Basic Law) states : -

This Basic Law cannot be varied, suspended or made subject to conditions by emergency regulations; notwithstanding, when a state of emergency exists, by virtue of a declaration under section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, emergency regulations may be enacted by virtue of said section to deny or restrict rights under this Basic Law, provided the denial or restriction shall be for a proper purpose and for a period and extent no greater than required.

The entrenching provision against emergency regulations is vital to a constitutional act. The constitutional act deals with the fundamental principles of each system. Emergency legislation (“emergency regulations”) may supersede protected rights if it is limited in terms of time, purpose and proportionality (relativity). The protection against emergency regulations is found in other provisions in our law (such as s. 42 of Basic Law: the Government of 1968, s. 44 of Basic Law: the Knesset, s. 25 of Basic Law: the President of the State. A constitutional provision is characterized by the fact that it also incorporates special protection against emergency legislation.

The aforesaid s. 12 must be read together with s. 50(d) of Basic Law: the Government of 1992, which regulates the promulgation of emergency legislation, repealing s. 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance (s. 59 of Basic Law: the Government of 1992). Section 50(d) provides that: ‘(d) Emergency regulations may not prevent recourse to legal action, or prescribe retroactive punishment or allow infringement upon human dignity’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). In other words, following the entry into force of the new Basic Law, there is no possibility of violating “human dignity” by way of emergency legislation. The aforesaid s. 50(d) meshes in substance with the s. 12 before us. Clearly, the aforesaid s. 50(d) is intended to add to s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and not to detract from it.

The Mission of the Basic Law

54.  A constitution is characterized by abstract, short, laconic provisions. A constitution does not treat of technical details. It is not tax legislation.

The normal legal structure of every system is characterized by the fact that the higher one climbs on the normative ladder, the more abstract and general the provisions, the lower one descends on the normative ladder, the more detailed and concrete the provisions (Englard, in the book cited above,  p. 13 et seq.). An ordinary law is of a less abstract character than a constitution. Secondary legislation (regulations) is less abstract than a law.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is an example of a typical constitutional act in the declarative language of the Basic Law; the concise drafting of its provisions, and the degree of abstractness. The Basic Law indeed lacks some of the identifying characteristics included in its twin Basic Law, i.e., Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. However, this does not detract from the fact that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is quintessentially constitutional: it concerns protected fundamental rights; it treats of the protection of the most basic values of our society. These values are of those of human dignity.

The values that the Basic Law protects are the basic value of the State of Israel as ‘a Jewish and democratic state.’

55.  A distinction must be drawn between hierarchical supremacy and a determination of the tools for implementing that supremacy. The supremacy of a Basic Law over ordinary legislation ensues from the status of this law in the normative hierarchy. However, its power to annul the validity of another law is effected by virtue of the provisions contained in it: the limitation provision (s. 8), the validity of laws provision (s. 10), and the respect provision (s. 11). These three are the principle cornerstones by virtue of which the principle of supremacy progresses from theory to practice. All have the power to show – on the level of objective interpretation – that notwithstanding the absence of formal rigidity, we are not confronting a legislative act that is similar to most of the provisions of the other Basic Laws. We are facing a new juridical phenomenon: a legal document that not only possesses hierarchical supremacy and priority in the normative hierarchy, but also contains mechanisms upon which the standards for implementing that supremacy are shaped. 

Legislative Intent

56.  The legislative intent can be learned from the language of the law, which includes an expression of the purpose established by the legislature. From inception and entry into legal force, the law – in its content, structure, place in the legal system, and relationship and approach to other laws – faithfully reflects the intention of the legislature. The purpose arises from the law and not from an external source. ‘What is important,’ in the words of the late Justice Silberg, ‘“is not what the legislature wanted to say but what it said’ (CrimA 282/61 Yihye v. Attorney-General [27] at p. 636). At the same time, it is possible to discover trends and reservations by reference to preparatory work or Knesset deliberations. In this regard, I wrote in HCJ 4031/94 ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [28] at pp. 11-12:

5. (a) The contents of the deliberations in the Knesset provide a backdrop to the trends and doubts of the members of parliament. As will be recalled, the law must be interpreted in accordance with its language as adopted by the Knesset, however, the travaux preparatoires or the deliberations in the legislative chamber that preceded legislation, often provide aids to further understanding of the processes and trends driving the wheels of the legislation. (Civil Appeal 486/85 Manager of Purchase Tax and Compensation, Haifa v. Ethiopian Commerce Co. Ltd. et al, at p. 407; HCJ 151/82 Bar Ilan et al v. Manager of Land Betterment Tax, Netanya, at p. 659).

Legislation does not occur in a vacuum. (HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior et al, at p. 513; A. Barak, Interpretation in Law, Vol. B, Interpretation of Legislation (Nevo, 1993) 351). It grows and emerges from within the political, social or legal reality, or is designed to serve their needs. ‘The exigencies of the reality within  which legislation is enacted is important for the interpretation of the legislation’ (Barak, ibid.; see also HCJ 547/84 Ha’emek Poultry, Cooperative Agricultural Society v. Ramat Yishai Local Council et al, at p. 143). But note that when we turn to the legislative history, including the deliberations at the preparatory stage, we do not consider the personal interpretation of any particular member of Knesset regarding certain expressions contained in the law. The public utterances of the members of Knesset cannot replace the interpretive act of the court, which relies on the language of the law and its purpose. A review of the comments of a member of Knesset may illuminate the general purpose of the legislation. However, it is of less value than the meaning of the law as adopted at the conclusion of the legislative process (see also HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker, at p. 544).

The authoritative interpretation is not to be found in the comments of members of the Knesset but in the statements of the court, and relies first and foremost on the language of the law as enacted by the Knesset upon the conclusion of the deliberations and legislative process (FH 36/84 Y. Teichner et al v. Air France Airways, at p. 619).

Accordingly we said:

The ultimate, decisive construction of a law at  any given time is in the hands of the court…’ (HCJ 306/81 Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset House Committee at p. 141 opposite letter E)

57.  The legislative history is important. Yet, ‘from what was said (in the instant case – M.S.) in the Knesset it is difficult to reach any conclusions regarding the thought processes, agreements or consensus concerning the normative status of the Basic Law….’ (Karp, in the article cited above at p. 365). It is absolutely clear that the language of the Basic Law is the product of compromise. One of the architects of the Basic Law was the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, MK U. Lynn. He noted that: ‘this law was prepared in the understanding that we must reach a consensus among all the parties in the house’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125 (1992) at p. 3782). The message of compromise appears throughout the deliberations of the Knesset: ‘There were far reaching concessions compared to every other constitution in the world, because we wished to reach that general agreement that we indeed attained’ (ibid., at p. 3783). During the First Reading, the members of the Knesset voted on the status of the Basic Law as a constitution. However, this perception relied upon the rigidity provision that appeared in the draft law and was ultimately omitted from the Basic Law as enacted. MK E. Haetzni said: ‘actually we are starting a process of a written constitution. This is not a simple matter, and we must know what we are doing here’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124 (1992) at p. 1528). The Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor, insisted during the First Reading that the proposed Basic Law ‘establishes protection against the arbitrariness of a law that is enacted and contravenes and violates human rights…’ (ibid., at p. 1531). The principal deliberations took place during the Second Reading. I have already mentioned that the Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee opened by stating that the Basic Law was prepared over the course of many sessions of the Constitution Committee: ‘and I emphasize: the Constitution, Committee, that is the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee by virtue of its being the Constitution Committee of the Knesset of Israel’ (ibid., 125, at p. 3782). Prima facie, this is an unequivocal statement. However, later the Chairman of the Committee states:

We are not transferring the weight to the Supreme Court. We are not doing what was once proposed in Basic Law: the Legislature or in Basic Law: Human Dignity. We are not establishing a Constitutional Court, or a court with the power to invalidate laws (ibid., at p. 3783).

MKs Eitan and Haetzni question the Chairman of the Constitution Committee regarding the organ that would determine the compatibility of ordinary legislation to the Basic Law (s. 8 of the Basic Law). The Chairman of the Committee responds: “the legislature decides and the court decides.’ However, he immediately adds: ‘this is the system existing today and there is no other’ – ‘even today the court can interpret laws.’ To the question posed by MK Eitan regarding the invalidation of laws, the Chairman of the Constitution Committee responds:

There is no need to invalidate laws. One does not invalidate a law. The law must be made for a proper purpose, not merely an arbitrary law.

The question returns: What is the fate of an “arbitrary law”? MK Lynn concluded that:

The power has not been transferred to the court system.  The power remains in this House; and if, heaven forbid, it appears from our experience with this law that we made a mistake, and the interpretation given to the law does not coincide with the true intention of the legislature, the Knesset has the power to change the law (ibid., at p. 3788).

Minister of Justice Dan Meridor took a different stance, expressly asserting the normative supremacy of the Basic Law: ‘The power of the Knesset to legislate is not unrestricted because in every democratic regime there are limits on what it is permissible for the majority to do’ (ibid., at p. 3788). The bill – the Minister of Justice stated – ‘is very important because it establishes a balance among the branches in Israel, and it certainly establishes an area or boundary beyond which human rights cannot be violated’ (ibid.).

From the above it follows that the Basic Law was intended to be a compromise. Its contents do not reflect the optimum that it could have comprised. It was intended to be a more moderate act than the proposed Basic Law: The Legislature. That is the reason why the Knesset did not adopt the rigidity provision.

58.  In consequence of the comments made during the deliberations in the Knesset, I would add that clearly the creation of a constitution is not equal in theoretical significance to the transfer of competence to engage in judicial review to the Supreme Court. However, patently, a provision regarding the normative hierarchy which enables a decision to be made concerning the lack of validity of a law accords immediate jurisdiction to the court. The judicial branch is an important device for the practical existence of a constitution. It ensures that the constitution is not a purely declarative political document, as well as that the review of constitutionality will not be confined to self-review by the Knesset (autocontrole in the terminology of Prof. Nikilitz in L. Favoreu & J. A. Jolowicz, Le Controle Jurisdictionnel Des Lois ((Paris & Aix-en-Provence, 1986) 79). In view of the provisions of Basic Law: The Judiciary and in the absence of any other provision, there is no other entity – apart from the court (general or special) – which can decide upon the constitutionality of a law, i.e., its compatibility with norms and conditions set out in the Basic Law. I said in the Flatto-Sharon case [2] at p. 141:

Each of the branches of government is required, on occasion, to interpret a statute, because the implementation of primary legislation frequently – and in practice always – involves a position being taken on its substance and content. However, the final, conclusive interpretive decision regarding the law, like its validity at any given time, is within the province of the court, and regarding issues brought for examination within the court system, it is within the province of the supreme judicial instance.

The Supreme Court is the competent interpreter of the language of the law, as well as its condition at any given time.

The enactment of a constitution means the transfer of power to society, to its values and to its principles. The Supreme Court in a constitutional regime is a tool for enforcing the will of the legislature, which is the elected representative of the people, upon all those who continue to enact laws or perform governmental acts, including the primary legislature itself.

The distinction between the primary legislature and the other entities lies in the fact that the primary legislature is also empowered to determine ways for removing the fetters by which it chains itself. The court only places before the legislature a tablet upon which the legislature’s own words are engraved, accompanied by a competent interpretation. It is the function and competence of the court to indicate what is within the realm of the permissible and what is completely prohibited. As a judicial authority, the court is the faithful, competent construer of the words of the legislature.

In so doing, the court does not subordinate the legislature to values and principles that are separate from its own, since the values and principles of the court are the very ones that express the concepts of the state and society. These are in essence the values formulated by the legislature itself, or are formulated in the law since the establishment of the state in the Declaration of Independence and by virtue of s. 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance. The court subordinates the legislation to the values and principles of the constitution, the one that has been written and the one that is essentially part of our positive law. The court is the principal tool for ensuring the existence and respect of the constitution.

59.  The draft bill Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty opens with an Explanatory Note, stating at p. 60: ‘This bill is intended to provide constitutional protection to the basic human right to life, freedom, integrity of the person and human dignity’ (ibid., at p. 60; emphasis mine – M.S.). I assume that the Knesset members were cognizant of the full significance of the explanatory remarks and of the Basic Law itself. Indeed, as is customary, from a procedural point of view, the Basic Law was adopted in accordance with the ordinary regulations of the Knesset. The Basic Law was not passed by a vote of the majority of the members of the Knesset but only by the vote of the majority of those participating. No public debate preceded the vote. In this, the Basic Law is distinct from other constitutions. Most constitutions are created upon the establishment of the state or in an open, public process following profound ideological debate. A constitution is formed in moments of “constitutional enlightenment.” A constitution is formed, generally, following an event of historic importance (independence and sovereignty; revolution, political change).

Some of the members of Knesset sought to accord the Basic Law formal constitutional status (like the sponsor of the Basic Law, MK Amnon Rubinstein, and the then Minister of Justice Dan Meridor). Some perhaps were not aware – at the time – of all the legal ramifications of the Basic Law that immediately arose from its provisions. It will never be possible to establish all the individual intentions of the members of Knesset so as to shape the collective will of the legislature from them. In practice, there is always a range of subjective desires in a democracy. Many are the thoughts in the mind of man [Proverbs 19:21]. Any subjective purpose does not negate the conclusion regarding the objective legislative purpose arising from and within the Basic Law, as explained above.

Integrating Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in the Constitutional Structure

60. Fundamental human rights in Israel were entrenched in the case law of the Supreme Court from the dawn of the State of Israel, as is well known. The ordinary position is that the legislature drives the wheels of legislation in order to accomplish a particular social goal. This presumption provides the foundation for the supremacy of the Basic Law, even when it merely seeks to provide statutory approval to a normative reality. The change achieved by means of a Basic Law is the addition of a tier to the protection of human rights in the State of Israel. This is the protection against legislation. We have recognized human rights since the establishment of the state before the Basic Law. They were afforded broad interpretation before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Their protection led to the invalidation of secondary legislation and administrative acts without the Basic Law. Prior to the Basic Law, their protection did not lead to any invalidation of primary legislation. This is a new possibility contributed by the Basic Law. Removing this contribution from it deprives it of its added value relative to the situation that preceded Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In other words, the immediate question that would arise is what does the Basic Law provide which did not exist prior to and without it.

61.  Recognition of the normative supremacy of the Basic Law is consistent with the affiliation of the State of Israel to the countries of the free world. The vast majority of the countries of the free world possess a constitutional structure, i.e., possess a supreme normative structure that regulates the basis of the regime and the fundamental rights of the citizen. Even Great Britain is now subject to a system of constitution review system within the European framework.

The State of Israel’s membership in this family of nations contributes to the conclusion that this time our legislature sought to realize the granting of supremacy to the Basic Law.

62.  A very important point for the interpretation and understanding of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, is to see it in the light of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This view is anchored in the perception of the two Basic Laws as a single complex. Technically, we have before us two pieces of legislation. Substantively, we have before us a single act. Accordingly, these two pieces of legislation must be treated as statutory twins. The entrenchment provision (s. 7) in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation grants a stable, well-protected status to the rights ensured by that Basic Law. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is a clear constitutional act. It is difficult to understand the rationale for the absence of a provision similar to the aforesaid s. 7 in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The aspiration for statutory and constitutional harmony is an institutional cornerstone of our legal theory. This concept captivates us. It is right that there be appropriate constitutional harmony between these two Basic Laws. These two acts are two branches emerging from the same trunk. Their basic principles are identical; their purpose is identical; their language is almost identical; their application is identical; their substance is identical. Against this background, the inclusion of ss. 4 and 7 in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is logical. It enables moderate, temporary and limited violation of a protected right without the need to take the step of changing the Basic Law itself. Engaging in frequently repeated changes to the Basic Laws is an undesirable phenomenon. A developed state does not amend its fundamental normative frameworks on a daily basis. This possibility provides the appropriate breathing space to the Knesset.

The Basic Law before us does not contain a provision similar to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which deals with a nonconforming law. It follows that no law may be enacted which violates rights in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty that does not meet the conditions and limitations contained in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, save by means of varying the Basic Law. A Basic Law is varied by means of a Basic Law.

The Status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty - Summary

63.  The detailed examination set out above shows that in terms of its structure and character, the name, content and form of the Basic Law present a set of characteristics that accord it a special constitutional status as compared to the institutional Basic Laws. It is also clear that there is no basis for the thesis that the Basic Law does not belong to the supreme normative tier because it lacks the additional markers declaring supremacy or entrenchment. This also follows from a consideration of the legislative purpose within the customary legal meaning of that term (i.e., what follows from the language and purpose of the law, as distinct from the subjective motives of any particular member of the legislative branch).

I have pointed out that determining the status of the Basic Law as opposed to other legislation should properly be carried out by granting appropriate weight to the legislative purpose. I mentioned that the legislative purpose that was formulated by the legislature: ‘The public and the courts owe loyalty to “the legislative intent” as it appears in the statute books, and an intention that cannot be found expressed in the statute itself is not law’ (HCJ 131/65 Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [29] at p. 378). Interpretation in accordance with the purpose of the law is carried out with loyalty to the intention of the legislature. Indeed, we are not entitled to grant a constitution the status of complete normative supremacy without this being anchored in the will of the Knesset. However, the same reverse is also true. We cannot deprive a constitution of its status in the normative hierarchy because this contravenes the will of the Knesset, as reflected in the Basic Law, its language and content. Loyalty to the will of the Knesset binds us, whether we believe the law to be good or bad. This is the empathic aspect of adjudication (Levontin, in the article cited above, Klinghoffer Volume, at p. 290).

Before us is a tier of the Israeli constitutional structure, whose place in the constitutional normative hierarchy finds concrete expression in the limitation that it imposes on other legislation.

Variation of a Basic Law: Summary

64. (a)         The time has come to summarize our view regarding both the manner of enacting constitutional legislation in general, and the manner of lawfully changing the two Basic Laws treating of human rights or infringing their provisions.

(b)   There are two aspects to the issue of the amendment of a basic right included in a Basic Law: the substantive theoretical aspect and the formal constitutional aspect. There can be no doubt that the substantive aspect has ramifications for the formal constitutional aspect, and that the two are intertwined. With regard to the substantive aspect, I said in the Mitrani case [7] (at p. 355, opposite letter C):

Establishing defined, special ways for amending a basic right is, to a great extent, the principle means, guaranteeing that the matter be examined properly from a substantive point of view. A right should not be restricted other than after careful consideration and debate, because curtailing the scope of the right may lead, as a consequence, to a degree of distortion of the character of the social or political regime. We have said that the place of a basic right in a given legal system mirrors the degree to which the substantive rule of law exists, and amending the scope of the right will inevitably affect the continued existence of the rule of law. From this ensues the importance of establishing defined statutory ways, through which alone it is possible to change the application and scope of the basic right.

From here we move to the constitutional rules. The starting point is that legislation entails a normative hierarchy. The hierarchy is built on three principle rungs, according to the order of their importance on the ladder of legislative values: secondary legislation, ordinary primary legislation, constitutional primary legislation (i.e., a Constitution or Basic Laws). Changes in legislation, from the point of view of content and form, may only be accomplished by means of statutory activity on the same or a higher normative rung. This means that a Basic Law cannot be changed by the enactment of an ordinary law; ordinary, primary law can be changed solely by ordinary, primary legislation or by a Basic Law (which, as noted, is at a higher normative rung in the normative constitutional hierarchy). “Change” for this purpose, includes repeal, amendment, addition or derogation.

(c)   Change generally refers directly to a provision that is to be changed. However, it is conceivable that a provision will be enacted in a Basic Law that contradicts an existing Basic Law or violates it, but is not expressed in the form of a direct amendment of the existing Basic Law (such as a provision in one Basic Law that effects changes in the Knesset electoral system, without providing for compatibility of language in s. 4 of Basic Law: the Knesset). Indeed it is preferable to have an express statement that the new contradictory provision changes the existing provision, however, this should not be seen as a legal requirement, inasmuch as the solution to the contradiction can be attained, in any event, and as is customary, by way of legal interpretation, for example, by adopting the guideline whereby later legislation is preferable to earlier legislation, and special legislation is preferable to general legislation, or by way of the rules governing implied repeal, or by other rules of construction that seek to examine the question whether the new can be reconciled with the old, and if not, what is the conclusion that must inevitably be derived from this. The remarks here concerning change apply to infringement of a provision in one Basic Law, by means of a provision in another Basic Law. There is no legal obstacle to the creation of circumstances of infringement, and the solution to a question such as this will be achieved by the customary modes of interpretation, as mentioned above.

(d) There is no need for a special majority of members of Knesset in order to vary a Basic Law, save if this is expressly required, as a precondition, in the Basic Law being amended or in another Basic Law that sets out general provisions regarding the variation of Basic Laws (such as Basic Law: Legislation, the enactment of which is now being considered). Limitations on the manner of varying a Basic Law can only ensue by virtue of legislation in a Basic Law.

So far we have considered the connection between one Basic Law and another. We now turn to the question of the relationship between an ordinary law and a Basic Law.

Violation of a Basic Law by an Ordinary Law Summary

65. (a)         We have made it clear that the adoption of the theory of the normative hierarchy leads to the conclusion that it is not possible to vary a Basic Law by means of ordinary primary legislation, i.e., by an ordinary law, but only by a Basic Law. Is it possible to infringe the provisions of a Basic Law by means of regular primary legislation?

(b) An infringement of a Basic Law can be the indirect outcome of the language of the Basic Law, and principally of its abstract character, expressed in general, broad language, that often require reconciling, and consideration of practical daily life and the concrete needs of the public and the individual. Let us take the example of arrests: every arrest contravenes the clear, unequivocal provision of s. 5 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, whereby:

There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or by any other manner.

The meaning of this statement is clear – there is no arrest. Can an organized political framework exist without arrests in certain circumstances, even if these are of the most limited and narrow nature? The answer to this is – no. A statutory provision is required that enables arrests. However, a provision that enables arrests, which is not shaped in the form of a Basic Law, violates the provision of the said Basic Law. It violates the basic right defined in s. 5 of the Basic Law. The way to reconcile the general, broad provision of the Basic Law and the needs of state and society is to permit the violation of the principle set out in the Basic Law, in defined, contingent circumstances.

(c)   It follows from the above that, notwithstanding the existence of basic rights, in particular rights that are broadly defined, it is essential to preserve the possibility to enact laws in defined cases, while deviating from the important principle expressed in the definition of the basic right in the Basic Law. It is right to ensure that the violation of the Basic Law that is deemed to be lawful and permissible, will be cautious and circumspect in terms of the extent to which it infringes the great principle of protection of the basic right found in the Basic Law.

(d)   Creating the possibility for deviation from full, unqualified protection that ensues from the inclusion of a basic right in a Basic Law, can assume various forms. A violation of a basic right is only possible by virtue of law (see the Mitrani case [7] at p. 360 opposite letter A). There are constitutions that create basic rights together with  accompanying provisions whereby a law may determine otherwise. Thus, for example, s. 49 of the draft proposal of Basic Law: Bill of Human Rights, states that: ‘Every person is entitled to enter into a contract; this right shall not be violated save by law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.). The significance of this is that every law can vary or limit the scope of the basic right.

There are those who criticize the described, insufficiently restricted system, that attaches a provision to a basic right whereby every law can set out a different provision (see Dr P. Lahav and Dr D. Krezmer, “The Bill of Human and Civil Rights in Israel: A Constitutional Achievement or a Sham,” 7 Mishpatim (1976) 154; Dr Shiloh’s reply, “On ‘Absolute Rights’ in the Proposed Basic Law: Bill of Human and Civil Rights,” at p. 539, and the authors’ reply, “Who’s Afraid of ‘Absolute’ Rights?” at p. 541).

(e)   Another method – and I do not intend here to exhaust the alternatives – sets out detailed guidelines regarding the substance of the statutory provision in which, and by virtue of which, there may be a violation of a basic right contained in the Basic Law, which will be constitutional notwithstanding its violation of the Basic Law. An example of this is s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

An identical provision may be found in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In other words, it is not sufficient that the violation of the basic right be carried out in a statute or by virtue of explicit authorization therein, there is an additional substantive condition that the content of the law meet the additional conditions set out in s. 8 or s. 4 above, as appropriate.

(f)   Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation added an additional array of circumstances in which an ordinary law can violate a basic right and still be regarded as constitutional. Section 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, titled “Effect of Nonconforming Law,” states:

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein.

The two identical provisions – s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – and s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (which does not have an equivalent in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), are provisions that permit violations of a basic right. One (identical ss. 4 and 8, respectively) sets out substantive conditions for permitting the violation. The second (s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) sets out conditions of form and length of duration of the nonconforming law.

(g)     A violation of a basic right which has been defined in a Basic Law is possible, therefore, according to conditions contained in the Basic Law and subject thereto.

Is it conceivable to have a violation in a manner not delineated in advance in a Basic Law? In other words, can an ordinary law violate a basic right defined in a Basic Law without meeting the conditions detailed, for example, in s. 4 and s. 8 above, or s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, all of which deal with violations of rights in the Basic Law? The answer to this is no, as we shall explain.

The answer to this question follows from our previous remarks concerning the normative hierarchy, and indeed is inescapable – impliedly – by reason of the 1992 legislation. When the Knesset sought to add a statutory provision enabling a deviation from the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and a deviation as noted goes beyond what is permitted according to the existing provisions of the said Basic Law, it believed that it had to amend the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and, by means of a new Basic Law, add an additional provision that would enable a deviation from the provisions contained in the initial version of the Basic Law of 1992. In other words, an amendment to the Basic Law is possible only by means of a Basic Law, and a deviation from the principles of a Basic Law requires the existence of provisions in the Basic Law enabling it. Accordingly, in 1994, the Knesset added the aforesaid s. 8 to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The Knesset delineated the additional exclusive means by which it is possible to violate a basic right contained in a Basic Law, beyond what is stated in the aforesaid sections concerning violation already contained in the Basic Laws; this and no more. The Knesset does not lack competence to vary the Basic Laws, to add to them or detract from them, or, as we have seen, even to enact a provision (such as the one known in legal terminology as the “notwithstanding clause” in the Canadian constitution), whereby it is possible to violate a basic right even without meeting the requirements of ss. 4 and 8, respectively, in the two Basic Laws. However, such legislation is in the nature of a variation of the Basic Law, and requires the enactment of an authorizing provision in the Basic Law. An authorizing provision as aforesaid may be unique to a particular Basic Law or general for all the Basic Laws, and may enable the enactment of laws without limitation of number, provided only that they are enacted in the manner established by the authorizing provision and for the period set out therein (if such conditions are provided). It is also possible that the amendment to the law will authorize the Knesset to legislate on a specific matter while violating the Basic Law. However, amendments to the Basic Law must always be carried out by a Basic Law.

In conclusion, the violation of a basic right may only arise from a provision which authorizes such an enactment, set out in a Basic Law, and after the conditions set out by the Knesset in the Basic Law have been met. This means, expanding the possible types of violation of a basic right defined in a Basic Law, requires a variation of the Basic Law, and a variation of a Basic Law can only be carried out by a Basic Law. An ordinary law that does not meet the criteria of the limitation clause cannot violate a protected basic right, even if it is expressly states that it is doing so, if there is no express provision in a Basic Law permitting this method to be adopted.

(h)   The conditions set out in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation point to the extent to which the Knesset is stringent when establishing additional conditions for deviating from a basic right defined in a Basic Law. It requires both a special majority and an express statement, and even limits the validity of the law to four years from the date of commencement.

So far we have referred to the general guidelines regarding variation of a Basic Law or violation of its provisions. We shall now turn to the two Basic Laws with which we are here concerned.

Application of the Rules to the Two Basic Laws

66. (a)         Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are in the nature of constitutional legislation. These are laws that are titled Basic Laws. That is to say, these Basic Laws are directly connected to the constitutional mission of the Knesset according to the Harrari decision, and as such, join the array of Basic Laws adopted by the Knesset since then. This should be seen as integration into our constitutional system, i.e., legislation that has been enacted in accordance with the approach that has developed in our constitutional tradition. It is possible to learn from this that these Basic Laws constitute a link in a chain of constitutional acts on the way to the formulation of the complete constitution. From the point of view of their formal status, there is general agreement that these are Basic Laws that constitute chapters in what, in accordance with the Harrari decision, will ultimately form a single, complete constitution.

(b)   As opposed to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is not entrenched, and is similar to the majority of the Basic Laws and the majority of provisions contained therein. This does not detract from the formal, normative status of the Basic Laws per se, as were it we to say so – we would be disregarding the clear, manifest, declared activity of the Knesset since the Harrari decision.

(c)   We have already mentioned that consideration must be given, inter alia, to the constitutional coupling between Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law before us. Both herald the transformation of basic rights into enacted constitutional norms. We have seen this, if such be necessary, as support for the normative status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

On the other hand, it would be wrong to disregard the express difference in the provisions of the two aforesaid Basic Laws at the point that is most relevant to our examination. Whereas one Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, establishes an entrenchment provision in relation to the variation of its provisions (s. 7) and separately in its s. 8 regarding provisions that violate its provisions beyond what is stated in s. 4, the second refrains from doing so. This was because of the approval of a reservation at the time of voting on the Second Reading in the Knesset, which removed the entrenchment provision that had been included in the bill.

The coupling described at the time of original enactment and at the time of the amendment in 1994, thus, preserved a difference at a point material for our purposes. This does not alter the determination that a Basic Law cannot be varied save by a Basic Law and that its provisions cannot be violated save by virtue of a provision in a Basic Law delineating methods for doing so.

(d)   The constitutional nature that is emphasized – from the point of view of the content of the Basic Law before us – finds methodical expression, inter alia, in the chain of provisions that singles out the connection between the Basic Law and other statutory acts and grants special status to all the provisions contained in it. I am referring here to s. 8 (Violation of Rights), s. 10 (Validity of Laws), and s. 11 (Application) of the Basic Law. This series of provisions in the Basic Law (ss. 8, 10 and 11) shows that the law established provisions that directly impact upon the manner of legislation permitted in the future.

(e)   The very legislation of the Basic Law led to a change in the normative reality. As we have already noted, even before Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the freedoms it enumerates were part of our positive law, however, it was not possible, according to the decisions we had handed down until then, to engage in judicial review that would subject a statute (in contrast to secondary legislation or administrative acts) to judicial examination of its constitutionality, save if it contained an entrenchment provision that allowed an examination of the extent to which it was being formally respected in the concrete case before the court. Since the Bergman case [15] an examination of the legality or constitutionality of a statute is carried out by means of judicial review. Adoption of this process over many years, on repeated occasions, without objection, creates an accepted pattern of constitutional action.

(f) What conclusion must be drawn from the contents of the aforesaid ss. 8, 10 and 11 in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty?

 Section 8 – to which we referred above in detail – limits legislation that violates a right protected in a Basic Law. This is a central provision in relation to the normative status of the Basic Law. It follows from it that a statute that violates a basic right among those enumerated in the Basic Law, and that does not meet the conditions set out in s. 8, is invalid. This conclusion is strengthened in light of the statement in s. 10, whereby the Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law. The significance of this is that the Basic Law can affect the validity of a law enacted subsequent to the commencement of the Basic Law. What can impugn the validity of a law? Failing to meet the provisions of the Basic Law. This conclusion is strengthened in light of the provisions of s. 11, whereby all the government branches, including the legislature, are required to respect the rights under this law. Respect for rights also includes refraining from violating them, save to the extent permitted under s. 8.

If we were to say that such an aforesaid law, which violates a basic right, can be valid without relying upon statutory authorization or a special pronouncement of the legislature, even if it does not meet the demands of the said s. 8, it would be as if we were to say that the aforesaid s. 8 is of a purely declarative nature. In other words, it is as if we were to hold that s. 8 is a statement that cannot be legally enforced or that it is, in practice, devoid of meaning. This conclusion contravenes the clear intention of the Knesset and contradicts the manifest statutory purpose. Such an interpretation is also contrary to the rules that apply in such cases. According to these rules, the utterances of the legislature must be upheld and given effect, and an attempt must even be made to reconcile provisions that prima facie contradict each other (ut res magis valeat quam pereat).

Accordingly, the aforesaid s. 8 may be seen as an effective restriction on legislation that seeks to violate those basic rights set out in the Basic Law before us. This restriction has legal ramifications, i.e., it has power to affect the validity of a law. The aforesaid s. 8 is a provision within the Basic Law. In other words, s. 8 is a provision that belongs to the constitutional normative tier. Accordingly, it cannot be repealed or varied save in the appropriate constitutional way, i.e., by means of a Basic Law.

(g)   It is not necessary to have a special majority in order to vary Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and no other procedural or substantive provisions dictate the manner of legislation, apart from the rule relating to legislation in accordance with the constitutional hierarchy mentioned above.

(h)   Can the Knesset enact a law that violates a basic right contained in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? The answer to this is affirmative, but subject to conditions, as will be explained below:

(1)The Knesset is competent to enact a Basic Law that violates a basic right: the question of a violation by a subsequent Basic Law will then be clarified through the customary means of interpretation applicable to the interpretation of two pieces of legislation at the same constitution level, or, in the alternative –

(2)The Knesset can enact ordinary legislation that violates a basic right, within the boundaries authorized by the Basic Law, enumerated in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, or s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, as appropriate. The Basic Law sets out the conditions for the validity of ordinary legislation as aforesaid.

A question that remains open is the extent to which the Knesset is entitled, either as a constituent assembly or as a monolithic legislative branch, to violate a fundamental right, even by way of a Basic Law, and the scope of judicial review over the same. We shall leave this question open.

The Basic Law and the Amending Law

67.  The Amending Law with which we are dealing in this judgment is not an amendment to the Basic Law. The Basic Law before us also does not contain a provision similar to s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

The significance of this is that the Amending Law will only be valid if it does not violate ab initio one of the basic rights protected in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In the event that it does violate a right as aforesaid, it will only be valid if it meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Accordingly, we must now examine, first, whether the Amending Law violates the property of a person. If our conclusion is negative, then there was no room for the conclusions of the court of first instance in two of the cases being considered here jointly, and in the arguments of the appeal in the third case, the hearing of which we joined with the two applications for leave to appeal, in which we were asked to declare the invalidity of the Amending Law. If our conclusion is affirmative, i.e., that the Amending Law does infringe a protected basic right, we will be compelled to move to the next stage of the examination, in which we shall examine whether the Amending Law meets the conditions set out in s. 8 of the Basic Law, i.e., whether it should be regarded as valid and enforced, notwithstanding the violation of the property of a person stemming from it.

 

Protection of Property – Section 3 of the Basic Law

68.  Section 3 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

Protection of property    There shall be no violation of the property of a person.

Two questions arise in connection with this section. The first is general and concerns the nature of a violation of property; the second is particular, namely, whether the specific law before us, i.e., the Amending Law, violates the right to property. The question who is a “person” for the purpose of s. 3 does not arise in the case before us.

69.  Accordingly, we shall turn to the question of the violation of the right to property.

(a)   What is property for the purpose of the said s. 3? This question is prima facie difficult, because the Basic Law, consistent with its concise language, does not set out a definition of the term “property.” This concept has many facets, and one scholar has even drawn an analogy between the concept of “property” and an iceberg in which the invisible part exceeds the portion open to view (K. M. Minogue, “The Concept of Property and its Contemporary Significance,” XII (1980) Nomos 10). Thus, it is appropriate to interpret this concept in every case on the basis of the relevant purpose and context.

In order to establish the correct boundaries of the term we must balance its fundamental purposes:

On one hand, we are concerned with a constitutional provision. It is intended to protect private property and the individual’s right to property. It is significant in terms of the social concept upon which it is based. The right is one of the expressions of liberty. It is a type of guarantee of the right of ownership. The character of the protection of property, as an act guaranteeing human liberty is what connects this right with the right to human dignity, as a guiding principle in our worldview in general and in the Basic Law in particular: freedom to act in the area of property guarantees the right to self determination and prevents the individual from being transformed into a mere object (Muench/Kunig, Grundgesetz, supra, at 824). It is intended to prevent the deprival or dilution of the individual’s to property. It must be afforded effective protection. As a constitutional provision, it must be interpreted in a broad and general way.

Accordingly, the term “property” for the purpose of the issue before us, applies prima facie both to a right in rem and to a right in personam. For the purpose of preventing the deprival of an individual’s property right it is irrelevant whether one is a depriving a right in real property or in another appropriate right, whether one is negating a right in rem or whether one is suspending the right of a person against a defined debtor only. As my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin stated in LCA 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [30], “property” in the Basic Law also applies to rights that are not property rights in the classic sense (see the comprehensive and instructive article by Prof. Y. Weisman, “Constitutional Protection of Property,” 42 HaPraklit (1995) 258, 267).

The emphasis is, as noted, on the purpose, and focuses principally on preventing the deprivation of a person’s possessions. This is the violation that the Basic Law seeks to prevent. Accordingly, for the purpose of constitutional protection, the term “property” goes beyond the definition used in other areas of property law (see Prof. Y. Weisman, 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1990) 53). In my view, it also includes the denial of obligatory rights.

       (b)        As we are concerned with the first proceedings in this court in connection with s. 3 of the said law, I will make a number of general comments regarding the approach taken to this issue in other countries. When the term “violation” is used, the intention in this context is generally to the consequences of the economic and fiscal activities of the state that play a significant role in the implementation of the needs of the state. In this area, i.e., violation of property, it is customary, for example in the United States, to follow the guiding policy that has been adopted in recent years in the interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Under this interpretative approach, at the stage of judicial review, great weight is given to the policy underlying the words of the legislature, provided that it is possible to show due process of law and a rational connection to the legislative purpose. Thus, for example, American case law generally restricts intervention in tax legislation (The Constitution of the U. S. of America, Analysis and Interpretation, Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (Washington, 1973) 1170, 1174; M. R. Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty,” 13 Cornell L. Q. Rev (1927-28) 8, 24; Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936) [85]). According to the approach pursued in the United States, the court should not be transformed into a body that will act as the supreme overseer of the economic and fiscal policy expressed in statute. Voice has even been given to the extreme view that the only matters subject to review are ‘deprivations of property that are arbitrary in the sense that they serve no legitimate governmental objective or that they are viciously motivated’ (Frank I. Michelman, “Property as a Constitutional Right,” Wash. and Lee L. Rev (1981) 1097, 1098).

German constitutional interpretation, too, expresses reservations regarding intervention in tax law, save if extreme irregularities are found – Uebermaessige (Konfiskatorische) Besteuerung, i.e., excessive taxation of a confiscatory nature (see the comments of Muench / Kunig, supra at 839; Herzog, supra at 282).

However, it is clear that the reference to other constitutions and their implementation is comparative only. In the protection it extends to the rights under its aegis, every constitution expresses its own unique hierarchy of social values and the conceptions of its society. It is unnecessary to add that there is also an entire range of political considerations that accompany the formulation of a constitution. Thus, for example, in Canada it was decided to refrain from including a prohibition on infringing property in the Charter of Rights.

The drafters of the Canadian constitution refrained, at the conclusion of the deliberations, from including an express statement regarding the protection of the right to property in the Charter, because of the fear of the consequences of allowing judicial review over the substance of economic legislation.

The range of considerations that come before the courts in this context has been discussed in the foreign legal literature. Thus Allen stated:

Clearly, an extremely generous view of the constitutional provisions would severely hamper the ability of the legislature to govern. Property cannot extend to every right or interest, even of an economic nature; neither can every act which affects property be considered a deprivation of property. Nevertheless, the courts have generally advocated giving property a wide scope. Those limitations of the guarantees which have arisen are found in the interpretations of “deprivation” or “acquisition”‘ (T. Allen, “Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right Not to Be Deprived of Property” 42 Int. & Comp. L. Q. (1993) 523, 527 (emphasis mine – M.S.), and see also N. K. Komesar, “A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society,” 86 Mich L. Rev. (1987-88) 657, 662).

Professor Hogg (Canada) states his view in the same spirit:

The reason that generosity should give way, rather than the stringent standard of justification, concerns the policy-making role of the courts. If the scope of the guaranteed right is wide, and the standard of justification is relaxed, then a large number of Charter Challenges will come before the courts and will fall to be determined under section 1. Since section 1 requires that the policy of the legislation be balanced against the policy of the Charter, and since it is difficult to devise meaningful standards to constrain the balancing process, judicial review will become even more pervasive, even more policy-laden, and even more unpredictable than it is now. While some judges will welcome such extensive powers, most judges will be concerned to stem the wasteful floods of litigation, to limit the occasions when they have to review the policy choices of legislative bodies, and to introduce meaningful rules to the process of Charter review. These purposes can be accomplished only by restricting the scope of Charter rights (P.W. Hogg, “Interpreting the Charter of Rights: Generosity and Justification,’ 28 Osgoode Hall L. J. (1990) 817, 819-820; emphasis mine - M.S.).

          German constitutional interpretation comments in connection with the legislature’s decisions regarding economic, social and welfare matters:

In Bezug auf Prognosenentscheidungen des Gesetzgebers belaesst das BVerfG dem Gesetzgeber im wirtschafts, sozial-und gesellschaftspolit. Bereich einen weiten (Prognose-) Spielraum: “Die Verfassung billigt dem Gesetzgeber bei der Einschaetzung der fuer die Allgemeinheit drohenden Gefahren einen Beurteilungsspielraum zu; er ueberschreitet ihn nur dann, wenn seine Erwaegungen so offensichtlich fehlsam sind, dass sie vernuenftigerweise keine Grundlage fuer gesetzgeberische Massnahmen abgeben koennen” (BVerfGE 38, 61)’ (Muench / Kunig, supra at 60).’

And in translation:

With regard to the decisions that include future assessments by the legislature, the Basic Law leaves the legislature broad room to maneuver, in relation to the economic, welfare and social areas: “The constitution grants the legislature wide room, in so far as relates to assessment of the anticipated risk to the public. It (the legislature) only exceeds its boundaries if its considerations are so clearly and visibly erroneous, that they cannot provide reasonable grounds for taking legislative steps” (judgment of the Constitutional Court 38, 61).

In other words, the court will intervene if the considerations of the legislation are so clearly and visibly erroneous that they cannot be regarded as providing a reasonable basis for statutory intervention.

So far we have referred to the views in a number of other countries that, in similar circumstances to ours, call for caution and restraint and for preserving the areas that are intended for judicial review as an outcome of the Basic Law.

(c)   On the issue of taxes here, see the different views as expressed in the articles of Prof. A. Yoran, “The Constitutional Revolution in Taxation in Israel,” 23 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 55, 60 (1992) and of Prof. Y. M. Edrey, “Constitutional and Normative Obstacles for the New Tax Legislation,” 8 Taxes Vol. 6 (1994) p. a20.

(d)   The form of examination acceptable here is one which marches one step at a time along the route delineated in ss. 3 and 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. However, the application of the powers vested in the court should properly be exercised in a way that refrains from turning the court into a body that actively shapes the economic policy that it deems to be more correct or preferable.       

The court does not invalidate economic or other legislation by reason of the fact that it is incorrect in its view, or that its provisions seem to the court to have undesirable economic ramifications. The court examines the constitutional aspect, i.e., the aspect of human rights as translated into the conditions of ss. 3 and 8 of the Basic Law. I also accept the view taken by the interpreters of the German constitution whereby there will be no intervention save if the approach is so clearly and visibly erroneous that it is not possible to regard it as a reasonable basis for legislative intervention.

The main focus of the great rule in s. 3 is actually not the definition of the term “property” but the link between the object of the legislation and the activity applicable to it. In other words, the subject of the provision in s. 3 is “violation of property.” Violation of property for our purpose was illustrated by reference to constitutional acts possessing substantive personal repercussions, for example, those by virtue of which the property of a person is confiscated, without proper compensation, in an arbitrary or other substantive breach of his rights. It is not intended that the court will exercise its constitutional rights in respect of the imposition of every fee or stamp tax that is not onerous, merely because, in the nature of things, it imposes a duty to make some payment. If every marginal issue such as this were to be made the subject of examination under s. 8, the courts would become engaged in long, tiring debates in every case of insignificant changes of tax rates, the State would be required to adduce evidence justifying the tax, and the courts would, in practice, become seals of approval or disapproval for every fiscal act. Such a development is undesirable.

The implementation of the powers of the court should properly be carried out while preserving the balance between the principle of the separation of powers, on one hand, and the duty of the court to review constitutionality, on the other hand. Vesting of power to engage in judicial review must be exercised without any tendency to decide about all matters, lock, stock and barrel. On one hand, caution is necessary in order not to paralyze the wheels of the economy, and on the other hand openness is required to hear the cry of the injured individual. This requires professionalism and wisdom. The core of judicial review in relation to property is human rights, and not the reshaping of economic policy.

In conclusion, in my view, the tendency of constitutional legislation in the area of property is not for the court to turn into the supreme reviser of the economy and financial system and examiner of the wisdom of the economic policy. It is not intended that within the framework of constitutional supervision the court will reorganize the economic order in a manner that it deems more just or more sensible.

70.  We will now turn to questions that arise in relation to the Amending Law that is before the Court. As learned counsel for the state argued, the Amending Law was born in order to correct flaws and operating difficulties in the Principal Law:

The interpretation of the courts and the flawed language of the Principal Law created a complex, inefficient process, leading to duplicate proceedings, superfluous expenses, legal and economic uncertainty and the deferral of the issue of a final “rehabilitative judgment,” which is the goal of the Principal Law: comprehensive and swift ordering of the debts of the agricultural unit.

According to the argument of the State, the Amending Law was designed to remove the lack of clarity, in order to cast off the difficulties created by contradictory judgments of the courts and doubts regarding the proper interpretation of different definitions in the Principal Law. As described in the beginning of our comments, the definition of “basic debt” was expanded; inter alia the definition of the term “debt” was changed; it was clarified that no distinction should be drawn between “debt” and “obligation”; the definition of “total debt” was changed by expanding it and applying it to debts existing on 24 Tevet 5752 – 31 December 1991; a reformulation was enacted of s. 7 of the Principal Law which clarified the provisions regarding the cessation of any proceedings concerning a debt or guarantee.

Naturally, reference is not only to the elimination of uncertainties. The essence of the matter is not the language of the amendments but their substance and significance. They contain an expansion – both for the purpose of clarification and also primarily in consequence of lessons learned – of the arrangements in the agricultural sector to which the law applies, and discontinuation of every process to collect debts ordinarily applied in our system. The purpose is to replace the ordinary legal process with a statutory arrangement that includes the possibility of wiping out debts. According to the Amending Law, the latter possibility is broader than that established in the Principal Law. The right of a creditor may be cancelled completely or to a considerable extent.

In this regard it is unimportant that similar arrangements were in place prior to the Principal Law or prior to the Amending Law. We have clarified that the Amending Law stands on its own feet, for our purposes, because it was enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law. The establishment of an absolute duty to transfer processes regarding debts to the Rehabilitator, and the possibility of engaging in a wider elimination of debts than was previously available, comprises a violation of property. It is sufficient for this purpose to turn to the provisions of ss. 21 and 22 of the Principal Law, as amended by the Amending Law.

In this context, I said in LCA 1759/93 [1], at pp. 150-151:

In reducing and spreading the debt there is, of course, a violation of the property of a third party to whom the agriculturalist owes his debt, and this constitutes a change of the arrangement originally established between the parties. This violation is post-contractual and therefore is doubly serious. In this connection it is important to recall that a third party is not necessarily a bank or other financial body (as was intended in the beginning, as stated in the Explanatory Note: “a debt originating in credit given to an agricultural unit by a bank…” – M.S.) but may also be a private person who lent money to that agricultural unit for the purpose of his business as an agriculturalist or granted him any service, and now the amount of the debt to which he is entitled is being reduced: for example, a private person who performed any work for that agriculturalist or supplied him with commodities, such as transport or seed supplies, carried out for the purpose of the agricultural activities of the debtor – will receive only part of the consideration.

My opinion was a dissent. However, this was not the case in so far as concerned the above characterization of the Principal Law, or any other similar provision that amends and expands it. See also in this context Louisville Bank v. Radford (1935) [86] (hereinafter: the Radford case [86]) and cf. Wright v. Vinton Branch (1937) [87], there Justice Brandeis stated at pp. 456-457, summarizing the Radford case [86] (in which he also gave judgment):

‘The decision in the Radford case did not question the power of Congress to offer to distressed farmers the aid of a means of rehabilitation under the bankruptcy clause. The original Frazier-Lemke Act was there held invalid solely on the ground that the bankruptcy power of Congress, like its other great powers, is subject to the Fifth Amendment; and that, as applied to mortgages given before its enactment, the statute violated that Amendment since it effected a substantial impairment of the mortgagee’s security. The opinion enumerates five important substantive rights in specific property which had been taken. It was not held that the deprivation of any one of these rights would have rendered the act invalid, but that the effect of the statute in its entirety was to deprive the mortgagee of his property without due process of law’ (emphasis mine – M.S.).

The nature of the Amending Law as one similar to bankruptcy law does not detract from the conclusion stated above. The existing bankruptcy laws are protected by s. 10 of the Basic Law. Their nature as provisions enabling the debts to be wiped out, i.e., violation of the right to property, would have been the subject of examination had they been enacted following the commencement of the Basic Law. Naturally, this does not affect the examination under s. 8 of the Basic Law, an examination which is the outcome of our conclusion according to s. 3 of the Basic Law.

71.  A legal arrangement regarding the cancellation of debts of significant scope amounts to a taking of property from the holder of a debt and accordingly possesses the character of a violation of property. For this purpose, it is immaterial that even in the absence of this arrangement, the creditor would have had other legal measures available to him for collection that also would conceivably have included the possibility of a certain cancellation of debts – such as bankruptcy proceedings.

What is decisive in relation to s. 3 is the character and consequences of the legislation under examination, and not the question of the existence of similar legal alternatives. This is not the case in relation to s. 8 of the Basic Law, to which we shall return.

72.  The burden of persuasion regarding the existence of a violation of property is on the party claiming it, and he must prove his version of events on the balance of probabilities (FH 4/69 Noiman v. Cohen [31], at p. 290) and not beyond any reasonable doubt as is customary in criminal proceedings.

73.  The conclusion that follows from the aforesaid is that the Amending Law violates the right to property. As explained, the determination that particular legislation contains a violation of property is not the end of the story from the point of view of the constitutionality of the legislation. The door is still open to prove that notwithstanding the violation, the Amending Law falls within the range of cases in respect of which s. 8 of the Basic Law provides that the violation does not lead to the invalidation of the legislation. We shall therefore turn to the said s. 8.

Violation of Rights – Section 8 of the Basic Law

74.  Section 8 of the Basic Law provides as follows:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

These are the cumulative elements of the aforesaid constitutional provision:

(a)The violation is carried out by means of a law or under a law by virtue of express authorization in it;

(b)The law fits the values of the State of Israel;

(c)The law is designed for a proper purpose;

(d)The violation is to an extent no greater than required.

75.  Section 8 reflects a balance between the constitutional interests and the interests reflected in the legislation that is subject to constitutional review. The determination regarding the existence of the right in the Basic Law and the duty to safeguard and respect it does not create absolute conclusive protection, which one cannot exclude and to which there are no exceptions. Rights are not absolute. They are constructed on a reality of a balance between the rights and the needs of all the individuals making up society, and the right of the state and society in general to exist.

The significance of this is that in every discussion regarding a constitutional right, a balanced view is required that takes into account not only the right of the person complaining of the violation, but also the rights of others who might be harmed by the unique, unbalanced grant of the right. This does not mean that rights are always equal and that it is not possible to determine preferences and priorities among them. The cry to save human life has priority over the right of a person to enjoy his afternoon rest. There are circumstances in which freedom of speech supersedes the right of a person to his good name. The solution is obtained, as noted, by means of balances that play a substantive role in every constitutional theory. Section 8 presents the substantive and principal balance required for recognition of rights under the Basic Law before us.

Deputy President Elon referred to the relativity of a basic right in HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [32], at p. 242, stating:

… It is an important rule that a basic right is not absolute but relative, and its existence and preservation are maintained by finding the suitable balance between the various legitimate interests of the two individuals or of the individual and the public, interests that are all anchored and protected by law.

My esteemed colleague President Barak writes:

Human rights are not absolute. These are relative rights that are dependent on the existence of a social framework that maintains them. The limitation clause expresses the social character of human rights set out in the Basic Law. These rights do not look at the individual as an isolated island; they do not deal with the individual’s relationship with himself. Human rights set out in the Basic Law look at the individual as part of society. They deal with the individual and his relationship with others. They assume the existence of close connections between individuals. According to the view of the limitation clause, the individual is a social creature. Indeed, the very existence of human rights assumes the existence of human society, in which mutual relations exist among the individuals in it. However, the limitation clause goes a step further. It also assumes the existence of a state that needs to realize national goals. It is based on the existence of government, which is designed to promote national purposes. Its premise is that the power of government given to the state is essential to its existence and to the existence of human rights themselves. The limitation clause reflects a national compromise between the power of the state and the right of the individual (Barak, in the work cited above, Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3., at p. 745).

This is the reason why the aforesaid s. 8, which sets out conditions limiting the validity of legislation that violates a right set out in the said Basic Law, also limits thereby the protection afforded by the Basic Law, as it sanctions a violating provision and leaves it valid. In other words, it is possible to have a violation of a basic right that will be regarded as valid because it satisfies the conditions of s. 8.

Section 8 governs cases where there is a violation of a right – such as in the instant case where we have concluded from the substance of the law that it contravenes the provisions of s. 3 of the Basic Law. Section 8 prevents the invalidation of the law on constitutional grounds, if it meets the requirements of balance that it enumerates. Section 8 therefore contains a provision possessing a dual load: one negative and the other positive.

The limitation clause, in the words of my esteemed colleague President Barak, ‘assumes the violation of a human right that is intended to protect a human right’ (ibid., at p. 476). The components of the limitation clause must be interpreted in this spirit: the significance and purpose of the conditions that are intended to create a balance between contradictory legitimate rights and create a hierarchy of preferences among various interests, all of which are designed to safeguard the essential values needed to maintain human dignity and liberty. A legitimate social interest may also be included in this zone, because – as noted – there may be circumstances where the violation of the right of a person is an act that is essential to save or succor many others. By the way, from this point of view, the legal structure described has a certain similarity to the standards applicable to the defense of “necessity strictu senso” in criminal law.

Breach of Law or by Law

76.  A provision that seeks to restrict a basic right must rely on an express statement in a law or ensue from an act that relies on an express authorization in a law (see also the Mitrani case [7]). The reliance on a statutory provision or on a provision relying on an express statement in a law is intended to formally anchor the provision in the written words of the primary law in Israel, in contrast to the abstract legal rule learned from the law. This is a qualification as to form that envelops a trend relating to content. The issue of form embodies – by virtue of its nature – the formality that relies on legality, and strengthens it.

With regard to the law that we are examining here, i.e., the Amending Law, the answer to the above requirement is clearly visible: The Amending Law is a law of the Knesset, and as such it meets, without any shadow of a doubt, the first condition of s. 8.

A Law Befitting the Values of the State of Israel

77.  No rights under the Basic Law before us may be violated save by a law ‘befitting the values of the State of Israel.’ We learn of the values of the State of Israel for our purposes from ss. 1 and 1A of the Basic Law, which state:

Section 1 Basic Principles:             Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be respected in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

Section 1A Purpose:                       The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’

The values of the State of Israel are the values of a Jewish and democratic state. A reminder of the principles underlying these values is set out in s. 1A, which is quoted above. Thus, the requirement that a violation of a basic right – in order for it to be regarded as a lawful violation – will rely on statute that is not general and vague. Not every law contains a limitation that exempts a violation of a basic right from its constitutional ramifications. Only a law that, from the point of view of its character and substance, meets the criteria embodied in s. 8 will satisfy the conditions of the aforesaid component of the statutory provision with which we are dealing.

   78. In my view, the Amending Law – like its predecessor the Principal Law – befits the values of the State of Israel. Everyone acknowledges that a very grave crisis has befallen the agricultural sector, a crisis that has already lasted a number of years. Faced with the possible collapse of thousands of agricultural household units, the human suffering entailed in this, many agriculturalists’ loss of property and future – and consequently also the potentially substantial harm to the entire agricultural sector – the legislature chose to implement the option of an arrangement accompanied by rehabilitation, which it regarded as preferable to mere bankruptcy. In creating the idea of an arrangement with creditors that involves injury to creditors and their property, the law is not innovative. This possibility already exists under the laws of bankruptcy and corporate liquidations. However, the existence of a similar earlier model is not sufficient per se to deprive the new legal measure of its character as violating property. The new, innovative elements in the Principal Law and in the Amending Law are those that deny the status of the court and establish the form of the rehabilitation arrangements. As an aside it may be said that the idea of rehabilitation also gradually entered the field of bankruptcy and liquidation law (in the meantime through practical court guidance and not through comprehensive legislation).

Legislative action to save an economic sector has also been undertaken in other democratic countries, so that here too, the law before us does not represent anything new, see for example, the American Bankruptcy Judges, U. S. Trustees and Family Farmer Act, 1986. The intervention of the legislature, in the words of the bill which preceded the Principal Law (Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Draft Bill), in order to find arrangements for the agricultural sector became even more vital after earlier arrangements failed to prove themselves, and left the agricultural sector in a deep crisis, that, it has been argued, even aggravated that crisis.

The legislation before us reflects the values of a society that believes in the responsibility of the state for the fate of its citizens, and that nurtures the sense that the citizens of the state are also responsible for each other. Paying attention to the fate of the working person is a worthy and even essential attribute of a regime possessing humane values, which recognizes the equality of human beings and is willing to provide the legal tools needed to provide possible solutions to their problems. Clearly, a debt arrangement is often dependent upon the cancellation of some debts or putting in place a moratorium of a similar character, and these violate the rights of the creditors.

79.  It seems to me that the courts whose decisions stand before us within the framework of CLA 1908/94 and 3363/94 expanded the court’s role to a degree greater  than was necessary in  inquiring into the question whether the legislation befits the values of the State of Israel. The court does not sit in judgment in order to administer the State economy. It does not rewrite the law. It does not transform secondary into primary in order to determine that legislation that it deems defective or otherwise wanting is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The court is not called upon to declare what, in its opinion, would be a more fitting or enlightened legislative solution. The court is called upon to determine, in the context of s. 8, whether the subject statute, according to its general purpose, grosso mondo, is consistent with a Jewish and democratic state. Justice Black of the Supreme Court of the United States said in this regard:

‘Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is up to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is unwise or incompatible with some particular economic or social philosophy…’

The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns and like cases – that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely – has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. As this Court stated in a unanimous opinion in 1941, “We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.” Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic problems, and this Court does not sit to “subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure” (Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963) [88], at 729-730 (per Black, J., for unanimous Court) (The case references have been omitted – M.S.).

I am aware of the fact that the approach to the argument regarding the violation of property rights is not uniform in every country, and that the various constitutional systems reveal a range of approaches, beginning with Canada’s complete avoidance of the constitutional debate on this issue, through the determination of a low level of willingness to intervene in matters of violation of property in the Supreme Court of the United States, and ending in courts that are active and intervene more in the review of political economic measures.

The approach whereby there is room to expand the scope of intervention, by entrusting the court with the task of an economic and material examination of every detail, condition and qualification in a law, in contrast to a substantive examination of the law will, in my opinion, grant the court powers that should be reserved to other branches, i.e., it will place the court in the position of a quasi-supreme legislative chamber which conducts supreme supervision for the sake of it, and holds the power of veto over policy (as distinct from constitutionality) expressed in the law being considered by it.

   An example of the approach that I find unacceptable is the determination by one of the courts in the matter before us, that the Amending Law does not befit the values of the State of Israel by reason of the fact that it only applies to the moshavim (arrangements) (and not to the kibbutzim (collective arrangements)). This determination – which, by the way, is also imprecise factually – is an example of a misguided basic approach, according to which only if the scope of the general application of the law meets the court’s satisfaction, can it be concluded that it is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. Economic legislation resulting from economic policy determines the scope of its application in light of the legislature’s discretion and in light of various economic factors that are not within the court’s knowledge or expertise. It is not for this that the power to engage in constitutional review was granted to the court, whether in Israel or in any other place where constitutional review of this type is conducted. In this context we should recall the decision of the Canadian legislature not to include the subject of infringement of property in the Charter.

80.  Let us now turn from the general to the particular. The courts of first instance found a series of flaws in the law, which led them to conclude that it does not befit the values of a Jewish and democratic state:

(a)As noted, the law only regulates the problem of a part of the agricultural sector, i.e., the moshavim, and in the opinion of the court, this is a violation of equality.

(b)The burden is imposed only on what the court termed a “random” and “unidentified” section of the public, i.e., on the creditors of the agriculturists who participate in the arrangement, as distinct from the imposition of the burden on the public as a whole. According to the court, this too amounts to a violation of equality.

There is no substance to the view taken by the lower court in CLA 1908/94 to the effect that the operation of the program which the law seeks to serve, by the imposition of debts on the creditors alone, amounts to a process that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The belief that the values of the State of Israel require that the entire tax-paying public bear the burden of covering the insolvency of defined public sectors has no basis. Had the Principal Law and the Amending Law not been enacted, the execution laws or the bankruptcy laws or both would have applied to the collection of the debts and the attempts to reach an arrangement. Would the financial loss ensuing from partial or non-existent collection of the debts of those unable to pay what they owed been imposed under these laws upon the public as a whole? Clearly, the answer to this is – no; and no one has ever suggested that this be done.

The same is true in relation to the argument, which is factually wrong, concerning the failure to cover the debts of the kibbutzim. As mentioned, the law applies to the debts of a certain number of named kibbutzim. Moreover, other measures have been taken to deal with the debts of the kibbutzim, then and now. However, even if the issue of the debts of the kibbutzim had not been included in the arrangement before us, this would not have deprived the law of its character as a law befitting the values of the State of Israel. The question facing the court was whether the law, which sought to settle the debts of thousands of households within the agricultural sector, was compatible, in terms of purpose and substance, with a democratic and Jewish state. The answer to this is affirmative, because the arrangement of debts in a broad economic sector is a worthy activity, both here and in other democratic countries in which farmers encounter similar difficulties. The legislature saw fit to choose, from among the alternatives, a solution that is not applied to all the citizens who have encountered economic hardship. This does not lead to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional.

With regard to the covering of debts by way of partial cancellation or the covering of debts using public funds, a law may establish an arrangement with creditors on the basis of cancelling debts and violating property without this being regarded as a conclusion that does not befit the values of the State of Israel or of any other state in the free world. For example, Jewish law in relation to the cancellation of debts (Deuteronomy, 15, 1-11 [A]) of course harms only creditors and not the entire public. The same is true of the modern laws of bankruptcy throughout the world. This is an economic necessity.  Achieving rehabilitation by means of arrangement of debts, even if this involves cancelling some of those debts, is on occasion the only way out, but this still does not mean that all the tax payers, as distinct from those who maintained connections with the debtor as part of their livelihood, are required to cover the debts and be responsible for their arrangement.

In conclusion, the court was mistaken in its belief that only a law that settles the debts by imposing the burden on the entire public, and which encompasses in its provisions all types of agricultural debtors (and why only agricultural?), is a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, and that every other law is deprived of this attribute and so-to-speak violates equality. As mentioned, the approach of the court reveals, to a large extent, an incorrect assessment of the function of the court and its discretion in relation to the issue under discussion. Instead of a relevant and realistic assessment of the law that was enacted, the court decided that constitutionality attaches only to modes of enactment that are optimal in terms of their wisdom or justice, according to the court’s view; in so doing, the court did not act within the scope of s. 8, but beyond and outside it.

In this context I accept the comments of Prof. F. Raday (“Privatizing Human Rights and the Abuse of Power,” 23 Mishpatim (1994) 21, 52) as also cited in the Attorney General’s response:

… In the choice between the various concepts of justice in the privatization of human rights, different pictures are seen by the court and the legislature. This fact leads them to choose different versions of justice: the legislature – the macro-socio-economic version of justice and collective justice; and the court – the legal-formalistic and individualistic version of justice. According to the principles of constitutional democracy in Israel, when there is a clash between these versions, the court must respect the policy of justice chosen by the legislature, being the version of justice that cannot be accused of not being for a proper purpose or of being inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel.

See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) [89], 489, where it was held:

The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind…  The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others... The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination…

And at pages 487-488:

… the law needs not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.

To summarize this point: a reasonable, non-arbitrary solution expressed in a law can befit the values of the state, even if the court would have chosen a solution that would have been more just or sensible, in its opinion, had it been given the choice. The error of the court in cases such as the one before us lies in the search for a single solution, which it views as optimal, and only in which, it identifies the law that befits the values of the State of Israel. The court must be cognizant of the fact that there may be a wide variety, in the nature of a zone or area, of possible alternative solutions, and that every type of provision contained therein may fit the values of the state. Only a law that completely exceeds the array of legal alternatives will be rejected as lacking the attribute of compatibility.

Intended for a Proper Purpose

81.  The words “proper purpose” describe a purpose that is positive from the point of view of human rights and the values of society, including the purpose of establishing a reasonable and fair balance between the rights of different people who hold interests that are sometimes inconsistent with each other. A proper purpose is one that creates a foundation for living together, even if entails a compromise in the area of granting optimal rights to each and every individual, or if it serves interests that are essential to the preservation of the state and society. In the event that the law possesses a number of intertwined purposes, great, albeit not decisive, weight will be accorded to its dominant nature. At the same time, the secondary purposes should not be disregarded and their ramifications for human rights should be examined.

Thus, in order to satisfy the condition of s. 8, it is necessary to examine whether the legislation that violates the basic right – and which is examined under s. 8 – is of sufficient importance and weight to justify the violation of the right. It is not possible to ascribe importance and weight to a trivial purpose, whose constructive value is negligible, if the outcome is a substantive violation of a basic right. In order to justify a violation of a right, appropriate importance and weight must attach to the sought for purpose. In other words, the desired purpose must be important and essential in order to justify a violation of a right (see also the Canadian judgment R. v. Oakes (1986) [114]).

The purpose that emerges from the law may become visible between its lines upon perusal and examination only; however, it must be discernable, even if it is not declared, in order for it to be weighed against the violation and its significance. As mentioned, the persuasive burden rests upon the party claiming the existence of a proper purpose.

Moreover, the proper purpose must emerge upon examination by the court. For this purpose, the court is not bound exclusively by purposes borne in mind by the legislature. Certainly, there is a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith, and in any event we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ (see HCJ 620/85 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [33], at p. 187). The court examines the purpose that guided the legislature, as expressed in the reasoning of the person who proposed the law and in the majority opinion as formulated. At the same time, it may also become apparent at the time of examination of the final draft of the law and its ramifications.

82. (a)         In CLA 1908/94 the court held that the purpose of the Amending Law is not proper. According to the court, there was no indication of the fact that broadening the violation of the property rights of the creditors by the Amending Law was done for a proper purpose that could not have been achieved and realized by the Principal Law. The court stated that the Explanatory Note to the bill did not contain any details regarding the reasons for the amendment, and also at the time of the presentation of the issue in the Knesset, no relevant details were given regarding the difficulties of operating the Principal Law.

In the words of the court:*

… there is no explanation in the Amending Law why, in order to save the agricultural sector, it is necessary to broaden the violation of the fundamental principles of our society and the basic rights of its citizens…

In consequence of this, the court concluded that, in addition to the above, it also had not been proved that the violation was “to the required extent,” an issue that we will address separately.

(b)   I find the argument that the purpose of the Amending Law is the same as the purpose of the Principal Law to be reasonable. Both treat of the same issue, i.e., the effort to resolve the crisis in the agricultural moshav sector. This purpose is not ‘a violation of the basic principles of our society.’ The Amending Law did not introduce anything new to the basic purpose, but sought to reconcile difference, remove doubts, perfect methods and make modes of operation more efficient, in the light of the lessons of the past. As we have explained, the non-application of the Basic Law to the Principal Law does not deprive the court of its ability to examine the compatibility of the Amending Law to the principles of the Basic Law, so as to determine whether the Amending Law has a different purpose than that espoused by the Principal Law, in respect of which the explanations were fuller and more detailed.

Indeed, provisions that are not invalidated in the Principal Law, by reason of the provision in s. 10 of the Basic Law, may be invalidated in the Amending Law, which does not enjoy a similar provision regarding non-application. However, a close examination of the provisions of the Amending Law does not lead to the conclusion in the present case that the purpose, i.e., the solution to the crisis in the agricultural sector, is unworthy or that the purpose which is worthy per se is nonetheless flawed by reason of the fact that no details are given of the problems and difficulties ensuing from the operation of the Principal Law that required it to be amended. It should be clarified – as guidance for the future – that it would have been appropriate to inform the court of the cases in which the various courts had handed down decisions that were not uniform or were restrictive and which made it difficult to implement the provisions of the law. In the hearing before us, the following decisions, inter alia, were mentioned: OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 [78]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 [79]; LCA 3466/92 Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [34]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 [80]; OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 [81].

The term “basic debt” was interpreted in different ways, the question of the interest led to dispute, there were decisions regarding the severance of the hearing between the court and the Rehabilitator and further derivative matters, which required a clearer and more precise statement of the solution to the disputes raised before the court, in order to allow the attainment of the purpose set out by the legislature in the Principal Law.

As noted, it would have been correct, from the point of view of the State, to have presented in greater detail to the lower court the vast case-law which, so it was claimed before us, was contradictory and problematic. However, even if, regrettably, this was not done (and in the future it would be appropriate to follow this course) this, on its own, does not render the single and unequivocal purpose invisible and outside the judicial knowledge of the court. Indeed, in this case the court itself had dealt with some of the previous disputes that turned the legislative wheels and led to the enactment of the Amending Law.

To summarize this point: the purpose that faced the legislature was proper. There was no room for the conclusion that the delineation of the measures chosen to deal with the purpose confronting the legislature was unreasonable or fell outside the “zone” of proper purposes and measures. A decision regarding non-intervention by the court need not rely on the ratification of the one-and-only optimal solution. There may be a number of solutions, each of which serves a proper purpose.

Violation to an Extent No Greater than is Required

83.  This component of s. 8 addresses proportionality. It examines if the degree of the violation of a right is reasonably proportional to the purpose ensuing from the legislation (see also Prof. Z. Segal, “The Grounds for Disproportionality in Administrative Law,” 39 Hapraklit (5760) 507).

The purpose deals with the idea, the basic policy and the violation per se; in contrast, the ‘extent no greater than is required’ deals with the scope of the violation, measures and modes. It should be recalled that s. 8 treats of cumulative conditions: the conclusion that the purpose is proper is not enough. In addition, the means adopted must be within the realm of proportionality.

What is examined is whether the means adopted are essential and required in order to achieve the purpose, and whether they are in reasonable proportion to the purpose. A number of alternative measures may be possible to achieve a certain purpose, each of which meets the conditions of being essential and required. The court will invalidate a means that exceeds what is required or is not suitable to achieve the desired purpose.

In this connection, Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States put forward the following premise in the case of Vance v. Bradley (1979) [90] at 97:

The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted. Thus, we will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.

The German constitutional system describes the essential points of proportionality (Verhaeltnismaeszigkeit) in four stages:

1.         Der Eingriff darf nur im Interesse des Gemeinwohls und nicht zu sachfremden Zwecken erfolgen (Gemeinwohl);  2. Die im Gesetz angeordnete Masznahme musz ein brauchbares Mittel zur Erreichung des vom Gesetz angestrebten Zweckes sein (Eignung); 3. die im Gesetz angeordnete Masznahme darf sich durch keinen milderen Eingriff ereichen lassen, d.h. die Masznahme musz das schonendste Mittel zur Erreichung des Gesetzeszweckes sein (Erforderlichkeit); 4. Mittel und Zweck muesen in einem angemessenen Verhaeltnis zueinander stehen (Zumutbarkeit; Verhaeltnismaeszigkeit im engeren Sinne) (Muench / Kunig, supra, at 54).

 

And in translation:

1.         Intervention may only be carried out for the benefit of the public and not for extraneous purposes (the benefit of the public).

2.         Performing the step ordered by the law must be an efficient measure (efficacious, performable) in order to achieve the purpose to which the law aspires (compatibility).

3.         The step ordered by the law is not achievable by utilizing a less serious measure. In other words, the step must be the less harmful measure needed to achieve the purpose of the law (necessity).

4.         The measure and the purpose must have a suitable relationship to each other (compatibility, proportionality in the narrower sense).

In other words, the following conditions are required:

1.The legal measure adopted must be for the benefit of the public;

2.It must be a usable and suitable measure to achieve the purpose of the law;

3.It must be the least harmful measure to achieve the statutory purpose;

4.The measure and the purpose must be reasonably related to each other.

84.  In the above-cited work on Interpretation, my esteemed colleague President Barak suggested three sub-tests for examining proportionality (Interpretation in Law, Vol. 3, at p. 536). I shall set out their gist below:

(a)Is the measure suitable or unsuitable to achieve the purpose? A connection of suitability is required between the purpose and the measure.

(b)Is it possible to achieve the same purpose using other measures that are less harmful to the protected human right?

(c)Is the violation of the right so serious that we should relinquish the achievement of the full, proper purpose and adopt measures that are significantly less harmful to the protected human right (even though the full purpose will not be achieved)?

 Test (c) above is, in my view, more a conclusion than a standard. In any event, in my view, it raises difficult questions in the area of judicial review of economic legislation: Will the court decide, for example, that the proposed taxation is too high in order to achieve a particular purpose that is found to be proper, and cancel it completely? Or perhaps it will set a lower tax ceiling? Will it decide, for example, that a moratorium will only apply to 25% of the debts and not to 40% of them? The court faces a proper purpose. The measure is suitable to achieve it. There is no reasonable measure that is less harmful to achieve the proper purpose. Is it conceivable that, in such circumstances, the court will order a retreat from the proper purpose that has been adopted as the economic policy of the legislature, i.e., order that the achievement of the proper economic purpose be renounced in whole or in part?

 In my opinion, the court should examine whether the measure is  substantially related to the proper purpose and whether the measure adopted is rationally related to the proper purpose. The substantive test corresponds to subsection (b) above. The logical test corresponds to test (a) above. The court examines whether the measure chosen is related substantially and rationally to the proper purpose.

Put differently, in my opinion it is necessary to establish as a cumulative test by which a measure will be regarded as being of appropriate proportionality if it:

 (a) is related substantially to the purpose, i.e., the test of compatibility; and that

 (b) it is rationally related to the purpose; and

 (c) among the array of measures to achieve the purpose, there is no similar or close measure, which is included in the zone of reasonable possibilities, that can achieve that purpose.

85.  With regard to the aforesaid test (c) which is the product of the theory of stages (Stufentheorie) it should be added and clarified that we are referring to a search for a less harmful measure within a range or zone of similar or close possibilities, and it is not necessarily possible to stay at the bottom of the ladder, i.e., apply the most lenient option. Moreover, in order to search for the measure that is least harmful, the court does not redraft the purpose and does not redraft the program. Facing it is a purpose and measures as formulated by the legislature, and it examines them in terms of their substance, consequences and ramifications. If the purpose is proper, and if the measure is suitable to achieve the purpose and is substantially related to it, and if the measure is rationally related to the purpose, and if there is no measure less severe that falls outside the zone of admissible alternatives, then the court is entitled to regard it as a measure that does not exceed what is required.

This is the place to add a clarification regarding the burden of persuasion in connection with the “appropriate extent.” The sweeping duty to show the application of s. 8 rests on the party claiming its existence. However, within the framework of the specific examination of the element of the “appropriate extent” the evidentiary burden shifts to the party claiming the existence of a violation. What does this mean? The state adduced evidence regarding the existence of the other elements, namely, that the violation was carried out by means of a law or under a law; the law befits the values of the State and the law is intended for a proper purpose. The party claiming the existence of less severe alternatives beyond the zone of possibilities adopted by the legislation bears the burden of bringing the evidence. In other words, the State presents the path chosen by it, and of course the set of factors underlying that choice. However, it does not have to, and cannot, of its own initiative, lay out the entire range of endless other possibilities that could have been pursued to achieve the same objective. This is something that is completely unfeasible. The party asserting the existence of another course of action, which is less grave, fairer, more reasonable, and which can justify the intervention of the court to invalidate the conditions authorizing the legislation, as these arise from s. 8, bears the burden of bringing evidence, and if he does not show the existence of such alternatives, we will be compelled to conclude that the path chosen by the legislature does not exceed the appropriate degree.

To summarize the discussion of this element of s. 8, I would emphasize again that the court must not take upon itself the general function of reshaping purposes and economic or fiscal policies, respectively. This is not justified in a healthy constitutional relationship between the branches. The legislature determines the policy, and on that basis delineates the purposes and measures. In the words of my esteemed colleague the President, ibid., at p. 553, the question that the judge must ask himself is not what is the law that draws a proper balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of the whole which ‘I would have enacted had I possessed the power.’ The question that the judge must ask himself is: ‘does the law that was in fact enacted draw a balance between the needs of the individual and the needs of the whole in a manner that satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause.’ If the answer to this question is positive, the judge must acknowledge the validity of the law and its power to legally violate a protected human right, even if the choice of purpose or means does not seem desirable to the judge and he would have chosen a different mode of action. As already mentioned, the judge is not responsible for examining the wisdom of particular legislation but only for examining its constitutionality.

86.  We shall also consider the measures before us in accordance with these tests. I am not persuaded by the contention that the measure exceeds the degree necessary and required, is greater than required and that it is possible to achieve the required solution by another means. Every state arrangement of debts entails a search for exhaustive means of paying the debts, while attempting, in so far as possible, to preserve the economic unit to which the arrangement applies. Arrangement of debts often entails the relinquishment of some of the debts or suspension of collection. This is the general framework that was adopted here. It serves the purpose. It is consistent with the purpose that has been found to be proper, and there are no grounds for invalidating it.

87.  To summarize: The Amending Law satisfies the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, and therefore the violation of property ensuing from the Amending Law must be regarded as a constitutional violation. Accordingly, in my view, there was no room for the declaration of the invalidity of the Amending Law.

88.  We have written at length. The primary reason for this is the need to try to present the guidelines that will serve us in the future when examining the constitutionality of laws under Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

In this context, it is proper to recall that in countries possessing a constitutional tradition longer than our own, it is customary to examine claims of unconstitutionality with caution and restraint. Unique rules have been shaped to serve the courts that are asked to decide upon the invalidity of legislation on constitutional grounds. Justice Brandeis dealt with this issue extensively in his judgment in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) [91].

The Ashwander case [91] concerned the purchase of facilities, land and stored energy by the Tennessee Valley Authority from the Alabama Power Company. Some of the stockholders in the Alabama Company brought an action for the invalidation of the contractual transaction, inter alia, on the grounds that it exceeded the constitutional powers of the Federal Government.

Justice Brandeis reiterated the rules requiring restraint when engaging in an examination of constitutionality, stating:

Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.  Blair v. United States 250 U.S. 273, 279.

The Court has frequently called attention to the “great gravity and delicacy” of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress’ (ibid., at 341, 345).

He added a series of guidelines (ibid., at pp. 345-346), which were based on previous extensive case law, and which can also provide us with material for thought, after independent sifting and harmonization.

89.  These are the guidelines set out by Justice Brandeis:

(a)The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in nonadversary proceedings, because deciding such a question is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. Inter alia, the judge noted that a party beaten in the legislature could not transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.

(b)The court will not customarily decide questions of a constitutional nature unless it is absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.

(c)The court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the concrete facts before it to which it is to be applied.

(d)The court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented, if there is some other ground upon which the case may be disposed. If a dispute can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question based on statutory construction or general principles, the court will decide only on the basis of the ground of the second type.

(e)The court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.

(f)The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute upon complaint of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

(g)When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that the court first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.

With regard to the fifth rule above, both here and in England and in the United States, the right of standing has been expanded in contemporary times, and it has also been granted in defined circumstances to persons who have not been directly injured by the action of the authority (see here: HCJ 852, 869/86; HCJApp 483, 486, 487, 502, 507, 512-515, 518, 521, 523, 543/86, 1, 33/87 Aloni v Minister of Justice [35]; HCJ 1/81 Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [36]; HCJ 428, 429, 431, 446, 448, 463/86; HCJApp 320/86, [9]; and see also H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (Oxford, 5th ed., 1982) 583; Dr Z. Segal, Right of Standing in the High Court of Justice (Papyrus, 2nd ed., 1994).

90.  As noted, the fundamental approach expressed in the rules, and the spirit emerging from them are worthy of attention and thought, because the experience gathered in other places in the area under discussion here can assist us. We do not reject comparative study and research in any field of law, and generally it proves valuable.

91.  In CA 6821/93, the appellant raised an alternative argument whereby ‘even if the court decides that the amendment is valid and applies to these proceedings, under the law in its amended format the provisions of the Gal law should not be applied to the respondents.’ According to the appellant ‘the decisive question in this case is the identity of the principal debtor, and the fact that the guarantor is obliged to pay the debt by virtue of his guarantee does not turn the debt into the debt of the guarantor and thereby lose its connection to the principal debtor.’ The appellant adds that the construction whereby the debt of the guarantor who is an agricultural unit is deemed to be a “total debt,” contravenes the restrictive policy that the Supreme Court ascribes to the provisions of the law.

The appellant’s contentions must be dismissed. The purpose of the law, i.e., the attempt to resolve the severe crisis affecting the agricultural sector by way of creating a new framework that would enable the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, and the clear language of the law (see the definition of “debt” and “total debt” in s. 1 of the Principal Law), show that whereas the debts of an agriculturalist and a member of an agricultural association, which are included within the definition of a “total debt,” are limited to those that stem from the business of these debtors as agriculturalists, no such restriction is placed in relation to an agricultural unit, that is not an agriculturalist and member of an agricultural association. Every debt of an agricultural unit, that is not an agriculturalist and member of an agricultural association, is a total debt, without distinction as to the source from which it stems and how it accrued, provided, however, that it existed on 31 December 1991.

Conclusion

92.  The principle findings in my judgment are as follows:

(1)Legislation in Israel is constructed on the basis of a normative hierarchy.

(2)At the top tier of the normative hierarchy stands constitutional legislation.

(3)Our constitutional legislation is expressed today in the Basic Laws. These will eventually be combined in a single, complete, unified constitution.

(4)Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are constitutional legislation.

(5)The supreme sovereign legislature is the Knesset: it is the Knesset that is empowered to enact constitutional legislation and to enact ordinary legislation. It is also empowered to promulgate regulations if it so determines in law.

(6)No provision contained in one of the said Basic Laws may be varied or repealed, save in a Basic Law or by virtue of it. It is right to adopt this principle in relation to all the Basic Laws.

(7)A provision contained in one of the said Basic Laws cannot be violated save by a Basic Law or by virtue of it. It is right to adopt this principle in relation to all the Basic Laws.

(8)The Knesset is empowered, through its legislation, to place restrictions on future legislation whether that legislation be constitutional or ordinary. The self-limitation may be formal or substantive.

(9)An amendment to an existing law that was enacted after the commencement of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is subject to the provisions of the said Basic Law.

(10)The court is competent to engage in judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.

(11)The Amending Law being considered in these appeals violates property; however, it meets the requirements of s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and accordingly is valid.

93.  The Basic Laws are the defensive shield of the citizen’s rights. Their interpretation within the framework of this judgment will clarify and strengthen, preserve and entrench them. This was the intention of the legislature when enacting the Basic Law, and this is the purpose of the interpretation undertaken by the court.

94.  Accordingly, I would uphold the appeals in CLA 1908/94 and 3363/94 and set aside the judgment of the lower court and dismiss the appeal in CA 6821/93.

There is no order as to costs.

 

President A. Barak

In March 1992, the Knesset enacted Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The enactment of these two Basic Laws effected a substantive change in the status of human rights under Israeli law. Such rights became constitutionally protected and were accorded supra-legislative constitutional status. They cannot be changed by ‘regular’ legislation. A regular law cannot infringe a protected human right unless the constitutional requirements set forth in the Basic Law have been met. The failure of a regular law to meet those requirements renders it unconstitutional. Such a law is constitutionally flawed and the Court may declare it void.

 

Israel is a constitutional democracy. We have now joined the community of democratic countries (among them the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy and South Africa) with constitutional bills of rights. We have become part of the human rights revolution that characterizes the second half of the twentieth century. The lessons of the Second World War, and at their center the Holocaust of the Jewish people, as well as the suppression of human rights in totalitarian states, have raised the issue of human rights to the top of the world agenda. International accords on human rights have been reached. Israel has acceded to them. International tribunals have been established to address issues of human rights. The new constitutions include extensive sections treating of human rights – particularly at the head of those constitutions and in their unique entrenchment provisions. Judicial review of the constitutionality of laws infringing human rights has become the norm in most countries. This revolution has not passed us by. We joined it in March 1992.

 

A. The constitutional revolution in human rights

 

1. The constitutional revolution occurred in the Knesset in March 1992. The Knesset endowed the State of Israel with a constitutional bill of rights. This revolution was many years in the making and was the result of a multi-dimensional legislative process. At its foundation rests the recognition that the Knesset is the body that has the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset is not only empowered to adopt ‘regular’ legislation; it is also empowered to adopt a constitution. The Knesset exercised this authority in enacting two Basic Laws on human rights. In so doing it created a supreme, supra-legislative constitutional norm. In the normative hierarchy that was thereby created, the two Basic Laws treating of human rights stand above regular legislation. A conflict between a provision of one of these two Basic Laws and a provision of a regular statute leads to the invalidation of the offending statute.

 

2. When it enacted the Basic Laws pertaining to human rights, the Knesset expressed its position with regard to the supreme legal-constitutional status of those laws. Today the Supreme Court expresses its legal position confirming that supreme status. Thus the legislative branch is in accordance with the judicial branch. The constituent authority coincides with the judicial authority. An order has been established regarding the constitution in general and regarding the human rights set forth in the Basic Laws in particular. The Knesset did not create the Basic Laws ex nihilo. Rather, the Knesset enacted the two Basic Laws in accordance with its constituent authority. This authority is granted to the Knesset, as is evident against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, and the ten Basic Laws that the Knesset has enacted from 1958 until the enactment of the Basic Laws dealing with human rights (Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: Israel Lands; Basic Law: The President of the State; Basic Law: The Government (old and new); Basic Law: The State Economy; Basic Law: The Army; Basic Law: Jerusalem Capital of Israel; Basic Law: The Judiciary ; Basic Law: The State Comptroller). The Supreme Court did not create something ex nihilo. Our decision today is consistent with established precedent, beginning with the Bergman case (HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15]). As recently as last year, we recognized the Knesset’s authority in this regard (see HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37]). Today we continue on the same path.

 

3. The constitutional revolution in the field of human rights is built upon the foundation of judicial precedent. The Knesset has used its constituent authority to endow a number of legally protected human rights with constitutional supra-legislative status. Without the established legal underpinning, the constitutional change could not have been effected. ‘We would not have arrived at the secure position that human rights occupy today without the strong foundation established by the judges who preceded us’ (CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], at p. 414). It would not have been possible to construct a constitutional framework in the area of human rights had not the established judicial precedent been in place. Without judicially protected human rights, constitutionally protected human rights would be unknown to us. Without Israel’s democratic past there is no basis for Israeli constitutional democracy in the present or the future. The constitutional revolution in the area of human rights is the product of the jurisprudential developments in the protection of human rights. This constitutional structure is built upon a foundation of legal precedent. In this way, clear expression is given to the ‘ongoing cooperation’ between the Court and the Knesset (Justice Agranat, The Contribution of the Judiciary to the Legislative Enterprise, 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 233). Moreover, the new constitutional law must be interpreted against the backdrop of the general national experience. Constitutionally protected human rights must be understood in the context of established judicial precedent. This precedent does not diminish in power. It continues to be a source of interpretive insight in construing constitutionally protected human rights.

 

4. The constitutional revolution is not manifested by the simple recognition of human rights. This recognition has long been established in Israeli judicial precedent. Rather, the constitutional revolution is seen in the changed constitutional status of human rights; the constitutional revolution is seen in the establishment of constitutional status for ‘basic principles’ according to which ‘fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon a recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life and the principle that all persons are free...’ The constitutional revolution is expressed in the determination that human rights ‘will be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel’ (s. 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; s. 1 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). The constitutional revolution is expressed in the granting of constitutional status to the clause that a person’s honor and freedom must be protected ‘in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty; see also s. 2 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). Accordingly, the legal rights of a person in Israel are no longer unwritten (Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [39] at p. 2415). They have become constitutional rights, engraved upon the pages of the constitution and enjoying normative supremacy. A regular law that infringes a constitutional right in a manner that is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, that does not serve a proper purpose, and that violates the right to an extent greater than is required is an unconstitutional law and may be declared void. When a regular law infringes a constitutional right protected in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause and provides – expressly or implicitly – that it is intended to infringe a human right, such a law is unconstitutional and the Court may declare it void. This is the essence of the constitutional change. This is unprecedented. Until now the prevailing view in Israel was that ‘the all-powerful legislature may permit harm to citizens without any legal or judicial limits.’ (Justice Sussmann in HCJ 163/57 Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [40], at p. 1079; ‘This is the decree of the legislature; if it leads to discrimination, such discrimination is sanctioned by legislation and is therefore lawful and not invalid’ (Justice H.H. Cohn in HCJ 120/73 Tobis v. State of Israel [41], at p. 359). Justice Berinson has summarized this as follows:

 

It is beyond doubt that according to the prevailing constitutional rule of the State, the Knesset reigns supreme and it is within its power to enact any law and fill it with content at its whim. One may not consider the possibility that the clauses of a legally enacted law might be declared invalid for one reason or another. (HCJ 228/63 Azuz v. Ezer [18], at p. 2547).

 

This constitutional outlook has now changed. The Knesset is no longer all-powerful in exercising its legislative authority. In the area of human rights, the Knesset has limited its legislative powers by exercising its constituent authority. This is the basic constitutional change. For the first time, in March 1992, the Knesset established a range of constitutional human rights that limit the legislative power of the Knesset and that condition their infringement upon the realization of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. For the first time the Supreme Court affirms the constitutional supra-legislative effect of the Knesset’s action. In light of the novelty of this issue, because of the different opinions on this matter and against the background of the comprehensive decision of my colleague President Shamgar, it is fitting that I address various questions that arose before us in an attempt to answer them.

 

In the first part of this decision I discuss the constitutional framework. In this section, I address the question of whether the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. I will answer this question in the affirmative, for the Knesset has not only legislative power, but also the power to enact a constitution for Israel; in other words, it is endowed with constituent authority. In the context of this section I address the question of how the Knesset makes use of its constituent authority and whether, in fact, it did so properly in enacting the two Basic Laws treating of human rights. I answer this question affirmatively as well. I examine the normative status of the two Basic laws and their relation to regular legislation. I then conclude the examination of the legislative framework with the question of whether, in light of the two Basic Laws, judicial review can lie of the constitutionality of regular legislation. The answer to this question is also affirmative.

 

In the second section I concentrate on the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. I begin with an examination of its constitutional implications. I briefly discuss the scope of the protected rights, and will concentrate primarily on the nature of the right of property, which the Appellants claim has been violated. I consider the Knesset’s power to infringe protected rights by analyzing the limitation clause.

 

In the third and final section of my decision I consider whether the provisions of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law infringe constitutionally protected rights. I answer this question in the affirmative. Against this background I consider whether the law, which infringes those rights, meets the requirements of the limitation clause. I answer this question affirmatively, as well.

 

B. The constitutional framework

 

I) The source of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel

 

a) The doctrine of constituent authority

 

5. The opening question is, of course, whether the Knesset is endowed with the authority to enact a constitution for Israel (‘constituent authority’) and, if so, what is the source of this authority. President Shamgar has proposed several views on this matter. Choosing between them is not necessary in order to decide the issue before us in this appeal. I will therefore present my opinion in this matter.

 

It seems to me that that most appropriate view is that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. This power derives from the central constitutional fact that Knesset was given the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset does not create this authority for itself. It is not granted to the Knesset by a Basic Law or by any other law enacted by the Knesset. In order to frame a constitution, which will be placed above the law in the normative hierarchy, there must be an Archimedean foothold located outside the constitution or the law, which provides the Knesset with the authority to adopt a constitution. The constitution cannot create the authority by which it will be created. Statute cannot create a constitution to which statutes will be subject. Nor can legislation create the authority by which it will be created. The enactment of a constitution always requires a foothold outside the legislative body. This foothold must come from the people, whose will is supreme. Thus, the doctrine of the Knesset’s constituent authority is based upon the principle that this authority derives from the sovereign, i.e. the people. Constituent authority endows the Knesset with the power to enact a constitution for Israel (as embodied in the Basic Laws). This authority endows the Knesset with the power to enact regular laws as well as to act in other ways (for example, to supervise the government). Indeed, the Knesset wears a number of ‘hats’ or ‘crowns,’ among them the crown of constituent authority – under which the constitution is adopted (by enactment of the Basic Laws) –  and the crown of legislative authority,   under which legislation is adopted. Three legal models may illustrate this view. Each model stands alone as a basis for the doctrine of constituent authority. That all lead to the same conclusion lends that conclusion greater weight. I will begin with a brief introduction to each of the three models. I will then present the constitutional facts that sustain the models.

 

b) Presentation of the three models

(i) Constituent authority is derived from the basic norm

 

6. The first model is based upon the importance of constitutional continuity. Under this model, the basic norm for Israel (the Grundnorm, according to Kelsen, see H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Knight trans. 1967), at p. 193) is that the Provisional Council of State is the supreme authority of the State of Israel (see I.H. Klinghoffer, “The Establishment of the State of Israel: Constitutional History,” Klinghoffer Book on Public Law, (ed. I. Zamir, 1993), at p. 74). The Provisional Council of State declared in the Declaration of Independence that a constitution would be drawn up ‘by the elected Constituent Assembly’ In addition, the Provisional Council of State declared itself the legislative body (in the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948).

 

The Constituent Assembly was elected (on January 25, 1949), and with its establishment the Provisional Council of State was dissolved. Its powers passed to the Constituent Assembly (Transition Law, 5709-1949). The Constituent Assembly therefore had two main powers: constituent authority and legislative authority. The same entity was given two functions, two ‘crowns’ or ‘hats’ as it were: one constituent (to adopt a constitution), and the other legislative (to enact ‘regular’ legislation). This arrangement, in which constituent and legislative authority are granted to the same entity, is widely accepted (see Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 2  (1966), at p. 35; Klein, ‘Constituent Authority in the State of Israel,’ II Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 52 (1970)). The Constituent Assembly provided (in the Transition Law) that ‘the legislature of the State of Israel will be known as the “Knesset.” The Constituent Assembly will be known as the “First Knesset.” The delegates will be known as “Members of Knesset.”’
(s. 1). The First Knesset (i.e. the Constituent Assembly) devoted considerable time to debating the matter of the constitution. These debates concluded with a compromise decision (the “Harrari Decision”), according to which:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter comprising a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743).

 

Before it dispersed, the First Knesset provided that all of its powers would pass to subsequent Knessets (Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 5711-1951). To avoid doubt, it was emphasized that this transfer would also include all powers of the Constituent Assembly (see s. 9). The Second Knesset dealt with the preparation of Basic Law: The Knesset but did not succeed in adopting that law. Only the Third Knesset succeeded in adopting the first Basic Law: Basic Law: The Knesset. Since then, Basic Laws have been enacted by the various Knessets. From this brief survey, the first model concludes that the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly has rested continuously in the hands of the Knesset.

 

(ii) Constituent authority is derived from the rule of recognition

7. The second model supporting the Knesset’s constituent authority is not based upon constitutional continuity. Rather, this model examines the constitutional structure as it exists at any given time. It is based upon the thesis of Professor Hart. Professor Hart distinguishes between primary and secondary norms. Secondary norms determine how the primary norms are created, how they may be changed and how disputes concerning them may be resolved. Among the secondary norms the “rule of recognition” occupies a preeminent position (see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (second edition, 1994), at p. 100). This rule determines how primary norms are created as well as their relative status – which is a superior norm and which is subordinate. The rule of recognition is determined by the Court, which does not make this determination at its own whim. Rather, it reflects the views of the community as to the way in which norms (including constitutional norms) are created. Under this model, one may determine that the rule of recognition of the State of Israel is that the Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. This determination does not reflect a subjective judicial position. It reflects an objective position as to the “system of national life” of the State of Israel (Justice Agranat in HCJ 87/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], at p. 884). The basic understanding of today’s Israeli community – expressing our entire national experience – is our national consciousness that the Knesset is the body authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. This consciousness originated before the establishment of the State, and in the preparations for the framing of a constitution. This consciousness was crystallized in the Declaration of Independence. It took on real form in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It was consolidated in the socio-legal understanding that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. It became part of our political culture. Based on these factors the Justices of the Supreme Court determine today that according to the rule of recognition of the State of Israel, the Knesset was given constituent and legislative authority; that the Knesset is authorized, in using its constituent authority, to limit its regular legislative authority; and that the constituent acts of the Knesset stand above its legislative acts. The historic journey – upon which the first model is based – is an important factor in the second model as well. Constitutionality and the constitution are not merely formal instruments. They are not mere law. They are the product of the national experience, of society, education and culture. They reflect the national experience. Our national experience, in today’s comprehensive view, leads to the conclusion that the Knesset has the authority to enact the constitution.

 

(iii) Constituent authority is the best interpretation of social and legal history

 

8. The third model for the constituent authority of the Knesset is also an empirical model. It seeks the best interpretation of the entire social and legal history of a given system at a given time. This is Professor Dworkin’s model (see R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (Cambridge, 1986); R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London, 1990)). Under this model one may conclude that a given body (such as the parliament) is empowered to enact the constitution for a country if that conclusion is the best interpretation of the body of social and legal history of that country. In applying this model to Israel, it appears that the interpretation that best fits the entirety of Israel’s social and legal history since its establishment is that the Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. This conclusion is based upon the same factors as those underlying the first and second models. Thus the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that the Knesset wasted its time by spending over forty years preparing a constitution; the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that some of the entrenched provisions of the Basic Laws are unenforceable; the best interpretation of our constitutional history is not that the various judicial decisions dealing with the Basic Laws miss their mark. On the contrary: in interpreting our legal and social history, its ways and its traditions, as that history presents itself today – against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, the election campaigns in which the stated goal of the parties was the adoption of a constitution, the enactment of twelve Basic Laws that include entrenchment and limitation clauses, judicial precedent and the reaction of the Knesset thereto, and the position of the legal community – the inescapable conclusion is  that the most fitting interpretation of our history is that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. This is the most fitting explanation for the Knesset’s power to establish that a Basic Law may only be changed by another Basic Law, that the regime anchored in a Basic Law may be amended only by a law passed by a specified majority (a majority of the Members of Knesset or other greater majority) or by a law that meets substantive requirements, that the Knesset is empowered with constituent authority such that it may create a constitutional norm that limits the ways in which it may be changed and entrenches itself against regular legislation. Indeed, the most fitting interpretation of the entirety of the socio-legal history of the State of Israel is that deeply ingrained in the social and legal consciousness of the Israeli community is the perception that the Knesset is empowered to adopt a constitution for Israel. This is part of our political culture. This is the most fitting interpretation of our social and legal history from the establishment of the State until today.

 

c) The constitutional data underlying the three models

(i) Survey of the constitutional data

 

9. The three models do not derive from the judge’s subjective perception. They do not arise from his personal desire to recognize or refuse to recognize a constitution for Israel. They are the result of an objective analysis of the constitutional history of the State of Israel. They result from the constitutional recognition of the Israeli community against the background of our short legal history. They result from an understanding of the social facts upon which the Israeli system is built. These are the constitutional facts from which the three models derive, each from its own perspective. I will now present these factors. I open with those factors that evidence constitutional continuity (paragraphs 10-18). These factors are particularly important in the context of the first model, which sees constituent authority as derived from the basic norm. Of course they serve the other two models as well. I then move to the Knesset’s perception of itself (paragraphs 19-31). This is also an empirical factor that provides the basis for the Court’s conclusion according to each of the three models. From there I will focus on the understanding of scholars and commentators (paragraphs 32-34). This factor is an important one, for it presents the view of the Israeli legal community as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel. This is important in all three models, particularly the second and third. Finally I will discuss the judicial caselaw of the Supreme Court (paragraphs 35-37). Two Supreme Court decisions have adopted the doctrine of constituent authority in its entirety. In the context of these constitutional factors, I will discuss the body of judicial precedent, which implicitly recognizes the normative supremacy of the Basic Laws. I will complete this analysis with a number of conclusions that are common to all three models and which arise from this objective data.

 

(ii) Constitutional continuity

 

10. May 15, 1948 is the point of departure for the view that the Knesset has constituent authority. On that day the State of Israel was established. The basic norm of the State – its superior norm, which is not itself part of the body of positive law, but provides a basis for the other legal norms of the state – is that the Provisional Council of State is the supreme legislative institution of the State (see Stemberg, “The Basic Norm of the Law In Israel,” 9 HaPraklit (1952) 129. Professor Klinghoffer suggested this in stating that:

 

In order to claim constitutional continuity in Israel’s present legal system, one may look at how authority was transmitted in the past. The Declaration of Independence does not refer to the powers of the Provisional Council of State until the statement in which the National Council declares itself the Provisional Council of State. There is, however, no doubt that the Provisional Council of State was seen as the supreme authority of the new state. The absence of any statement of its powers is evidence that those powers were not intended to be limited. From this we may conclude that the basic norm of the State of Israel can be found in this statement, which transforms the National Council into the Provisional Council of State’ (Klinghoffer, ibid., at p. 74).

In a similar vein, Professor Rubinstein states:

 

The Council’s authority to delegate to itself this power in the Declaration is without precedent. This is the beginning of the process of original creation that characterizes the inauguration of a new governmental regime which does not derive its existence from any previous or other regime’ (A. Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, (expanded fourth ed., vol. 1 (1991)), at p. 42).

 

The Provisional Council of State decreed in the Declaration of Independence that a constitution would be enacted by the Constituent Assembly, which in turn would be elected no later than October 1, 1948. It thus gave expression to the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 28 November 1947, according to which ‘the constituent assembly of each State will enact a democratic constitution for its respective State.’ As stated in Israel’s Declaration of Independence:

 

We hereby declare that as of the termination of the Mandate at midnight, this night of the 14th and 15th May, 1948, and until the setting up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly not later than the first day of October, 1948, the present National Council shall act as the provisional administration, and shall constitute the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, which shall be known as “Israel.”

 

The Provisional Council of State published the proclamation and enacted the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948. This statute provided, inter alia, that ‘the Provisional Council of State is the legislative authority’ (s. 7(a)). The Provisional Council of State similarly enacted the Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance. In the course of its activity, it appointed a special committee on the constitution headed by Mr Z. Warhaftig. ‘The committee’s function was to collect, clarify and organize proposals and material and to prepare a draft constitution that would be submitted with comments and criticism by the minority of the committee for the use of the Constituent Assembly’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 44). Indeed, the accepted view then was that the Assembly would prepare and draft a constitution for Israel. The Supreme Court expressed this view in the Al-Carbotelli case [42], in the context of a review of existing precedent as to the status of the Declaration of Independence (HCJ 10/48 Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [43], at p. 85). It stated that ‘the Court did not accept the claim that the Declaration of Independence is a constitution, against which the validity of legislation will be measured until the Constituent Assembly enacts a constitution as provided in the Declaration’ (HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [42], at p. 13).

 

11. The Constituent Assembly was elected on January 25, 1949. As stated in the Declaration of Independence, its role was to draft a new constitution for the State. According to the original plan, and as envisioned by the Declaration, upon its election the Constituent Assembly was to have existed simultaneously with the Provisional Council of State. These two were to have been separate entities, each with its own composition and its own function. The Provisional Council of State was to have continued to exist in its role as legislative body. Its role was to enact the laws of the new State as they were needed. As evidenced by its name, this was to have been a provisional entity, which was to have been replaced by the ‘duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution’ (Israel’s Declaration of Independence). The Constituent Assembly, whose only role was to enact a constitution for the State, was meant to operate alongside the Provisional Council. The Provisional Council of State was not elected by all the citizens and its composition was set by the Law and Administration Ordinance. The Constituent Assembly was chosen by a general election in which all the members of the Israeli community participated. In fact, the parallel existence of both of these bodies was not long lasting, for with the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State was dissolved. This dissolution was not an unexpected step. It was planned in advance. It was clear to all that the Constituent Assembly would be engaged in both legislative and constituent activities. This was reflected in the campaigns and proposals of the candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly, which related to all the issues on the national agenda and not constitutional matters alone.

 

12. The next link in the chain of constitutional continuity was the decision of the Provisional Council of State to dissolve itself. Professor Yadin has discussed the factors on which this decision was based:

 

According to the Declaration, the tenure of the Council of State was to have ended on October 1, 1948. From that day, at the latest, the activities of the elected and regular authorities were to have commenced in accordance with the Constitution, which was to have been adopted in the meantime by the Constituent Assembly. However, the specified date passed without the adoption of a Constitution and without the establishment of regular, elected governmental bodies. According to the Declaration of Independence, the Provisional Council of State and the Provisional Government were to have continued to function not only until the election of the Constituent Assembly, but until the establishment of new governmental bodies in accordance with the new Constitution. The role of the Constituent Assembly was limited to the preparation and adoption of the Constitution, and the task of regular legislation was to have remained in the hands of the Provisional Council of State until after the Constituent Assembly completed its work. Until that time, the two entities were to have existed in tandem and the Provisional Government was to have continued to function until after the election of a parliament in accordance with the new Constitution. This plan was tied to the cut-off date of 1 October1948; all phases were intended to have been implemented within only four months (between 15 May 1948 and 1 October1948). The drafters of the Declaration cannot be criticized for this plan. They signed the Declaration before enemy aircraft appeared in the skies over Tel Aviv (albeit only one day earlier), before seven nations invaded the State, and they could not have foreseen the events of the next few months. In retrospect, in light of the events that took place following the establishment of the State, it is clear that the original plan could not have been implemented. The existence of the Provisional Council of State could no longer be reconciled with the simultaneous existence of the Constituent Assembly. It was therefore necessary to impose upon the Constituent Assembly all of the functions of the Council of State’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, Barak and Shefnitz, eds. (1990), at p. 80).

 

Together with its decision to dissolve, the Provisional Council of State decided that all of its powers would pass to the Constituent Assembly. This transfer was effected by the legislative action of the Provisional Council of State, in the form of the Constituent Assembly Transition Law, 5709-1949. This law provided that ‘the Provisional Council of State shall continue in office until the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel; upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly the Provisional Council of State shall dissolve and cease to exist’ (s. 1). It was further provided that the Constituent Assembly ‘shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise declare, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional Council of State’ (s. 3). Similarly it was provided that the Constituent Assembly would act ‘in accordance with the rules governing the meetings of the Provisional Council of State, with the necessary changes, as long as the Constituent Assembly has not otherwise decided’ (s. 2(d)). The Provisional Council of State debated whether or not to provide in advance that the Constituent Assembly was required to prepare a constitution and whether to prescribe the period within which such a constitution should be adopted. It was suggested that the law provide that ‘the Constituent Assembly will adopt a basic constitution for the State and, during the period of its operation, will be the legislative body of the State.’ A majority decided, however, not to issue any directives in this regard. ‘We will therefore leave the Constituent Assembly absolutely free as to both its function and its term’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, ibid., at p. 81). It should be emphasized that the decision regarding the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State and the passing of its authority to the Constituent Assembly was taken during the term of the Provisional Council of State. The members of the Provisional Council of State – and accordingly all Israeli citizens who voted in the elections for the Constituent Assembly – were aware that they were electing a body that would have both legislative and constituent authority, and would be authorized to oversee the government as well.

 

13. With the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State and the transfer of its powers to the Constituent Assembly, the latter was endowed with dual authority – legislative and constituent. Again, the original scheme of two entities with different powers was not realized. Henceforth, the constitutional basis would lie in a single entity – the Knesset – that acted with various powers (legislative and constituent, as well as others). The same body (the Knesset) therefore has two roles, or two main functions (‘two hats’). It is authorized to enact a constitution and it has the powers that were given to the Provisional Council of State. ‘Thus the Constituent Assembly, which was endowed by the Declaration with only one function – drafting the Constitution – took on the additional role of legislative authority’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 43). ‘It was the Provisional Council of State that, upon its dissolution, presented the Constituent Assembly with an established fact: the unification of both functions within one framework’ (Rubinstein, at p. 448). There is no doubt that the Constituent Assembly (which has both constituent authority and regular legislative authority) was authorized to enact a Constitution. The fact that, with the dissolution of the Provisional Council of State, the Constituent Authority also became endowed with regular legislative authority does not negate its authority to enact a constitution. It should be noted that it is a common practice the world over for the Constituent Assembly to serve as a legislative authority as well (see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 448). Professor Kelsen discussed this as follows:

 

It is possible that the organ specifically and formally authorized to create, abolish or amend statutes having the character of a constitution is different from the organ authorized to create, abolish or amend ordinary statutes. For example, the former function may be rendered by an organ different from the latter organ in composition and electoral procedure, such as a constituent national assembly. But usually both functions are performed by the same organ’ (H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (1967), at p. 223).

 

As Professor Akzin has stated:

 

Under the democratic model, even if a proposed constitution is destined to be approved by referendum, it is prepared by the constituent assembly, which is chosen by electoral procedures similar to those by which the members of the legislative body will be chosen, or – in the case of a revolution – according to the system preferred by the provisional authority. In such cases the constituent assembly acts as both the entity that prepares the constitution and, if the state is governed by a parliamentary system, as the legislative body and overseer of the government as well’ (Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 2 (1966), at p. 35).

 

In a similar vein Professor Klein has noted:

 

The constituent body may continue to function for an extended period; during this period the constituent body functions as a legislative body as well. This may be described as a transitional period. The constituent body is not required to adopt the constitution as one document, and it may adopt a number of separate constitutional laws’ (Klein, ‘Constituent Authority in the State of Israel,’ II Hebrew Uni. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 52).

 

Recently Professor Ackerman has reiterated:

 

There is nothing sacrosanct about a special constitutional convention. Although such a convention is likely to take the task of constitutional formulation seriously, many plausible texts have also been produced by constituent assemblies that have exercised plenary power on normal legislative matters as well’ (B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, (1992), at p. 59).

 

Thus the federal constitutional model of the United States, in which there are two separate institutions – a constitutional convention that adopts the constitution, and a regular legislature (Congress and the state legislatures) that enacts regular laws – is not the only way in which a constitution may be adopted. Even in the United States, state constitutions (as opposed to the federal constitution) have been adopted by constituent authorities that functioned as legislative authorities as well (see III Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (1953), at p. 245). It is interesting to note that in more than one Eastern European state that has recently undergone constitutional changes, constituent and regular legislative activities have been carried out by the same body. In most cases it was the regular parliament that was endowed with constituent authority. In Israel the Constituent Assembly was given the additional authority of regular legislation, as well as all the powers of the Provisional Council of State.

 

14. The next stage in constitutional continuity was the enactment of the Transition Law, 5709-1949. This was the most important piece of legislation enacted by the Knesset (now acting as both the constituent and legislative authority). This statute provided that ‘the legislative body of the State of Israel will be known as the “Knesset.” The Constituent Assembly will be known as the “First Knesset.” A delegate to the Constituent Assembly will be known as a “Member of Knesset”’ (s. 1). It also provided that an enactment by the Knesset would be denoted “law” (s. 2). The Transition Law 1949 did not affect the dual authority of the Constituent Assembly (now the “First Knesset”). Indeed the First Knesset engaged in lengthy debates on the subject of the Constitution (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 714). No claim was made that the First Knesset was not empowered to do so. All agreed that the Knesset, as the constituent assembly, was authorized to enact a constitution for the State. The ensuing debate dealt with whether the Knesset was required to enact a constitution, and with the proposed content of the constitution. This debate continued for several months. It took place both in the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee and in the First Knesset plenum (for a report of these debates see The State Constitution – Report of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in the Matter of the Constitution for the State and the Debate in the First Knesset Plenum, published by the Knesset in 1952). It is common knowledge that the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, opposed a constitution. Nonetheless, he did not deny the Knesset’s authority to enact one, stating as follows:

 

No one could, and even today no one can say that there will be no constitution. The matter depends upon the Knesset’s decision. If the Knesset decides that there will be a constitution – there will be a constitution. If the Knesset decides that for now there will be no constitution – there will be none’ (supra).

 

The First Knesset (i.e. the Constituent Assembly) concluded this debate with a compromise decision adopted on June 13, 1950. This decision was initiated by MK Harrari and is therefore called the Harrari Decision, which provides as follows:

The First Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee with the preparation of a proposed constitution for the State. The constitution will be composed of chapters, with each chapter constituting a Basic Law unto itself. The chapters will be brought before the Knesset if and when the Committee completes its work and all the chapters together will constitute the Constitution for the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 5, at p. 1743).

 

This was a compromise decision. It left several options open. On the one hand, it accepted the principle that there would be a formal constitution and that the idea of a constitution would not be abandoned. On the other hand, it accepted the principle that the constitution would not be enacted immediately as one discrete document, but rather chapter by chapter, over the course of time, which would certainly extend beyond the term of the First Knesset. Nevertheless, after this decision no one disputed the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel. The Harrari Decision was not intended to negate the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution and, as a “decision” of the Knesset, it could not negate this authority. Thus, the significance of the Harrari Decision was, as it stated, that the Constitutional Committee would prepare a constitution for the state in “installments.” It was clear to all that this would not be an immediate procedure. It was clear to all that it would not be completed by the First Knesset. Professor Rubinstein has rightly noted that:

 

There can be no doubt as to the First Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution or laws of a constitutional character that stand above regular legislation. The change in the name of the Constituent Assembly certainly did not constitute a change in its nature. Even the consolidation of its functions – legislative and constituent – did not change anything’ (Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 448).

 

The First Knesset dispersed without the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee having prepared a proposed constitution, and without any part of a constitution having been brought before the Knesset plenum.

 

15. During the term of the First Knesset – i.e. the Constituent Assembly – no constituent action was undertaken. The Knesset had to enact a special law to decide upon its dissolution. In so doing, the Knesset was aware that it had not only regular legislative powers, but also constituent powers. It sought to ensure that all powers with which it was invested would pass to subsequent Knessets as well. This act seems superfluous to me. The powers given to the Knesset were given to every Knesset. As the central organ of the State, the Knesset endures forever. There is no need for special provisions as to the Knesset’s continuity other than those dealing with issues of secondary character (such as the continuity of draft laws). The reference to the “First” and “Second” Knessets and so on is only theoretical and reflects the first steps of the Israeli parliamentary system. In principle, a change in the composition of the Knesset cannot be considered a change in the Knesset. The Knesset is one body; elections and changes in the members of the Knesset do not require a formal passing of authority from one body to the next. Apparently this matter had not yet been clarified in the early days of the State and therefore – purely for caution’s sake – the Second Knesset Transition Law was enacted in 1951. That law provided for continuity between the end of the First Knesset’s term and the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term (s. 1). Thus, ‘the Second Knesset and its members will have all the powers, rights and obligations as the First Knesset and its members’ (s. 5). It provided further that the Second Knesset would act in accordance with the charter, decisions, precedent and procedures of the First Knesset (s. 6). Moreover, it provided explicitly in s. 9 that:

 

Wherever in any law reference is made to the Constituent Assembly or the First Knesset, such reference shall, from the day of the convening of the Second Knesset, be deemed to refer to the Second Knesset, unless the context requires a different meaning.

 

Thus it was provided that ‘this law will also apply, with the necessary changes, to the Third and any subsequent Knesset, so long as the Knesset does not adopt a contrary law dealing with this matter’ (s. 10). It is interesting to note that a number of Members of Knesset suggested that the law expressly provide that the ‘role of the Second Knesset is to enact a basic constitution for Israel’ (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 8, at p. 1576). MK Bar-Rav-Hai, in the name of the majority of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, opposed such a provision. He noted that ‘the suggested change is an empty declaration without any practical purpose. The legislative inheritance of the First Knesset is located in the records of the Knesset and is automatically transferred. The Second Knesset is sovereign. It will attend to matters at its own will ... Because there is no practical value to this change, and because the Second Knesset itself will decide whether to continue to enact Basic Laws where the First Knesset left off, or to begin this chapter anew – there is no place and no need to provide for this matter in the Transition Law’ (ibid., at p. 1579).

 

16. The First Knesset – which was also the Constituent Assembly elected for the express purpose of drafting the constitution – was dissolved. The Second Knesset was elected. Was the Second Knessset also invested with constituent authority, empowering it to enact a constitution for Israel? This is not a simple question. Had it been brought before the Supreme Court at the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term, the matter could have been decided either way. On the one hand it could have been argued that constituent authority was given to the Knesset, to every Knesset, regardless of its composition. The Constituent Assembly itself provided in the Second Knesset Transition Law that each Knesset is empowered with constituent authority. This edict of the Constituent Assembly must be heeded. It is not appropriate for the Court to declare that the Constituent Assembly itself deviated from its own authority in such a central matter. Similarly, it could have been claimed that the Harrari Decision – which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly – determined that the constitution was to have been enacted chapter by chapter; clearly this process would not have been completed during the term of the First Knesset. Constitutional continuity must be recognized in order to give effect to this decision of the Knesset. On the other hand it could have been contended that the Constituent Assembly derived its authority from the people – and therefore with the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly it was necessary to turn again to the people for its reelection. The Constituent Assembly was not “authorized” to transfer its authority. Thus it might have been argued that the Harrari Decision required that the powers of the First Knesset could only have been transferred to the Second Knesset by Basic Law and not by regular law.

 

Had I been asked to decide this constitutional question at the beginning of the Second Knesset’s term, I would have asked the following question: what are the underlying beliefs of the Israeli community at this time as to the enactment of a constitution and the power of the Knesset to adopt a constitution for Israel? I would have inquired as to the best interpretation of the legal and social history in the matter of the constitutional undertaking with the convening of the Second Knesset. In this context I would have examined the flow of constitutional continuity from the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, I would have asked whether the party platforms in the elections for the Second Knesset dealt with the continuation of the constitutional undertaking and with the continuation of the Knesset’s activities in endowing Israel with a constitution. An affirmative answer to these questions would have enabled me to determine even then that, despite strong assertions to the contrary, the Second Knesset was endowed with constituent authority, whether because of constitutional continuity (under Kelsen’s model), or because it had become generally recognized that the Knesset was invested with constituent authority (Hart’s model), or because that was the best interpretation of the legal practices of the Israeli community at that time (Dworkin’s model).

 

I have now undertaken this examination. Thus, for example, I have studied the election platforms of all the political parties that participated in the elections for the Second Knesset. Most of the platforms include statements regarding the constitution and its implementation. Often this is a central issue. The platform of the Workers of Israel Party (“Mapai”) stated that ‘the Second Knesset must see the completion of the enactment of the Basic Laws as one of its first objectives.’ This was followed by a long list of proposed constitutional arrangements, such as the division of powers among governmental bodies and various human rights. The platform of the Organization of General Zionists, the Centrist Party (“Z”), stated that ‘adoption of the Basic Laws for the State is an absolute necessity for the protection of the fundamental rights of every citizen.’ The platform of the United Labour Party (“Mapam”) provided that ‘the Second Knesset must correct what the First Knesset distorted and enact a Basic Law for the State, so as to ensure, inter alia…’ – and here follows a comprehensive list of matters that must be provided for in the constitution. The platform of the Herut Party (“H”) asserted that ‘Mapai and its supporters intentionally prevented the Constituent Assembly from fulfilling its first function: providing a basic constitution for the State. The Second Knesset must correct this dereliction.’ The platform then sets forth the content of the ‘basic constitution.’ The Progressive Party (“P”) platform stated that ‘in order to protect the democratic and popular nature of our State, a constitution must be enacted. The Progressive Party regretfully notes that the First Knesset did not complete this task. Even the First Knesset’s decision, as proposed by the Progressive Party representative, that the basic constitution would be constructed chapter by chapter, was not realized. The Progressive Party will fight in the Second Knesset for a constitution of deep social content, which will strengthen the rule of law in the State.’

 

The Platform of Agudath Yisrael provided that ‘as long as a majority of the representatives of the legislative institutions do not recognize the authority of the Torah as the supreme law, which may not be contravened, Haredi Judaism will oppose the adoption of a formalized basic constitution for the State.’ The platform of Mizrahi and the Nonaligned Religious Party (“B”) did not mention the issue of the constitution. The platform of the Israeli Communist Party (“C”) stated that ‘since the establishment of the State we have fought for a republican, democratic and secular constitution.’ The list of HaPoel Mizrahi (Torah Ve’Avoda) (“V”) provided that ‘HaPoel Mizrahi sees as the job of the Second Knesset the completion of the Basic Laws for the procedures of the government and its powers, the rights and obligations of the individual, the order of justice and the social foundations of the State. HaPoel Mizrahi will fight so that these laws will be an expression of a true democratic way of life in the spirit of the Torah of Israel.’ The list of the Sepharadim Ve’Edot HaMizrah (“SD”) stated that they supported the policy line of the Organization of General Zionists, the Centrist Party. The platform of Association of Yemenites for Israel (“L”) did not refer to the constitution.

 

17. It follows that there can be no doubt that the issues of the constitution and the Basic Laws were on the national agenda, were discussed in the elections, and were the subject of clear positions taken by the various parties. It is true that the matter of the constitution and the Basic Laws was not the only subject on the national agenda. But that is of no account. It is enough that the question was brought to the attention of the voter, who gave his opinion on the question of the constitution. If in the next Knesset election a constitution for the State were presented, and the people demanded, by electing the various parties, in light of their various platforms, to either approve or disapprove the constitution – would anyone contend that the people did not thereby express its will as to the constitution? The determining factor is clearly the understanding of the community and, consequently, the understanding of the Court. Such an understanding existed in the elections for the Second and subsequent Knessets. There is therefore no reason to negate constitutional continuity, and to deny the Second Knesset – on the basis of the arguments that we have brought – the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. Accordingly, with the convening of the Second Knesset (on December 22, 1952), the new government presented its outline plan. The first clause of the outline – before any other clause, including the clause referring to ‘the concern for the security of the state and the ingathering of exiles’ – provides that ‘with the series of the Basic Laws that will form the basic constitution of Israel, the democratic government of the State will be strengthened and secured.’ This is followed by a long list of subparagraphs, constituting approximately half of the outline, as to the content of the future constitution.

 

18. The question of the constitutional continuity of the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution did not come before the Supreme Court in 1951, with the convening of the Second Knesset. We do not have a judicial determination of this matter. The constitutional question arises before us today, in 1995 during the term of the Thirteenth Knesset. I have no doubt that our decision today must be unequivocal: constitutional continuity was not interrupted. The Second Knesset was given the powers of the Constituent Assembly. Any other conclusion is inconsistent with our national experience. Forty-four years have passed since the Second Knesset was convened. The matter of the constitution has appeared on the agenda and has been included in all the campaigns for each of the many elections that have been held since then. During all those years the Knesset continued in the constitutional undertaking and has enacted eleven Basic Laws; it has continued to see itself as authorized to enact a constitution for Israel; it has continued to entrench the clauses of the Basic Laws against infringement by regular legislation. During all those years teachers and scholars of law have continued to see the Knesset as the authority empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. They have raised generations of students and teachers of law who, in their turn, see the Knesset as empowered with both constituent and legislative authority.

 

In the intervening years the Supreme Court has ruled that the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Laws have constitutional power and may invalidate contrary provisions of regular legislation. In my opinion, these facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that constitutional continuity persists. By general recognition, the Knesset – the Second Knesset and each subsequent Knesset – is authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. Today’s Knesset has constituent authority. The Knesset has “two hats”: the hat of constituent authority and the hat of legislative authority.

 

My position relies, therefore, on all of the factors that attest to a continuous constitutional history, beginning with the convening of the Second Knesset. I will continue with a description of that constitutional continuity, the constitutional understanding of the legal community, and the position of the Supreme Court up until now. I am doing so for two reasons: first, because constitutional continuity links the constituent authority of today’s Knesset with that of the First Knesset (the Constituent Assembly); and second, because these objective normative facts support my conclusion that according to the rule of recognition of the Israeli legal system, our Knesset – every Knesset – is endowed with constituent authority. That is the best interpretation of the entirety of our legal and social history.

 

(iii) The Knesset’s understanding of itself as invested with constituent authority

 

19. As discussed above, the Knesset’s constituent authority is based upon the objective fact of constitutional continuity. This is not only the reasoned conclusion of the disinterested observer; it is the understanding of the Knesset itself. My claim is not, however, that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority solely because it sees itself as so endowed. The Knesset may not empower itself with constituent authority by its own decision. My claim is that the Knesset’s – every Knesset’s – perception of itself is itself an objective factor that, in the context of the entirety of the evidence, supports the foundation on which the Court builds its legal structure. This construction is a judicial function, which is undertaken by the judge – and the judge alone. This is the great significance of the Knesset’s understanding of itself. I do not claim that there is a legal obligation to enact a rigid constitution. My only claim is that the Knesset saw itself as empowered to enact a rigid constitution. Of course, the Knesset was also entitled to refrain from using this authority and enact a non-rigid constitution or no constitution at all. Thus, the Second Knesset and each subsequent Knesset saw itself as empowered to enact a constitution. They based this authority primarily on the idea of the Constituent Assembly, on the Harrari Decision, and on the status of each Knesset as a body utilizing its constituent authority. I will begin with the Second Knesset, which, as mentioned, is the more problematic.

 

20. The Second Knesset dealt with the preparation of the first chapter of the Constitution of the State, Basic Law: The Knesset. The proposed law was published on October 23, 1953 by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Second Knesset. The proposal was debated by the Second Knesset plenum. In presenting the draft law for a first reading, the Chairman of the Subcommittee for Basic Laws, MK Bar Yehuda, referred to the Harrari Decision and the dissolution of the First Knesset and continued as follows:

 

But a relatively short time thereafter, in April 1951, came the decision to elect the Second Knesset. The Second Knesset began its work at the end of August 1951. More than two years have passed since then, while the gristmill of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee ground the proposals sufficiently to enable presentation of the first in the series of the Basic Laws. During this period we have passed a number of laws that are clearly Basic Laws by their nature, even if not in form; I refer for example to the Law of Return and the Judges Law. But these laws were put forth by the government, and the work was done in the course of the Knesset’s regular routine and in the regular manner. From the point of view of fulfilling the obligation  that was imposed at the time on the First Knesset in its role as the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, and which was passed on to the Knesset together with the latter’s regular legislative work, this law is the first section of the Constitution of the State to be presented before the Knesset. It is now presented for a first reading and unfortunately I cannot know how long it will take until we reach a second reading – in other words, debate on the revised proposal – after which there will be a binding decision’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 15, at p. 57).

 

A review of the other speeches reveals that the speakers considered themselves – as members of a body endowed with constituent authority – empowered to enact a constitution. Basic Law: The Knesset was not enacted by the Second Knesset because the political will to do so was lacking. No one contended that the Knesset lacked the legal authority to enact such a law. All participants in the ‘political game’ of that period were aware that they were empowered to enact a constitution.

 

21. The Second Knesset finished the debate with a first reading of the proposed Basic Law. The proposal was passed to the Committee and the Second Knesset thereby finished its term without adopting any Basic Law. The debate on the proposed Basic Law: The Knesset was renewed in the Third Knesset. The proposed Basic Law: The Knesset was published anew and it was thoroughly debated. No one contended that the Third Knesset was not empowered to adopt a constitution. The Third Knesset’s debates were seen by all as fulfilling the Knesset’s role according to the Harrari Decision, which was the decision of the Constituent Assembly (the First Knesset) to adopt a constitution for Israel. MK Harrari himself reiterated this (on October 8, 1956) when he stated that:

 

In accordance with the decision of the First Knesset, we are not now dealing with individual laws, but rather with the chapters of the constitution of the State of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 21, at p. 4).

 

MK Harrari read the Harrari Decision before the Knesset plenum and added that ‘[we] are therefore debating today one of the chapters of the proposed constitution for the State – the chapter that deals with the Knesset’ (ibid., at p. 6). MK Harrari concluded his remarks by stating as follows:

 

I hope that despite the slow pace of the Knesset’s work, we will succeed in completing at least two articles of the constitution for the State in this, the Third Knesset. We must not forget that when the Knesset accepted the proposal to prepare a constitution for the State it was aware of the fact that other states worked for many years in preparing their constitutions. Eleven years passed before the complete adoption of the United States constitution, which has existed for so many years; preparation of the Soviet Russian constitution lasted for thirteen years. There is therefore no reason for us to despair or to feel that the extended period of preparation has diminished our chances for an organized, orderly constitution that will be the glory of the State of Israel’ (ibid., at p. 6).

 

Thus it is clear that the Knesset saw itself as authorized to enact a constitution, and that it considered the Basic Laws to be part of the constitution. Upon completion of the first reading debate, the proposal passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The proposal was presented for a second reading on February 11, 1958. MK Nir-Refalkes presented the proposal in the name of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, noting that:

 

The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee takes particular satisfaction in presenting to the Knesset for a second reading Basic Law: The Knesset, which will be a chapter of our basic constitution, in accordance with the June 1950 decision of the First Knesset.’

 

In the course of the second reading the comments of several members of Knesset were adopted and a number of formal entrenchment provisions were inserted into the Basic Law. It was provided that section 4, which sets forth election procedures, ‘shall not be altered save by a majority of the members of the Knesset.’ Section 44 entrenched the Basic Law against the effect of emergency regulations. Section 45 provided that ‘Section 44, or this section, shall not be altered except by a majority of eighty members of the Knesset.’ During the debate on these entrenchment provisions, several opinions were expressed as to their meaning. No contention was made that the Knesset was not empowered to entrench provisions of a Basic Law. It must be noted that more than a year after the adoption of the Basic Law: The Knesset, on February 12, 1958, the Knesset debated Amendment (No. 3) to the Law. The purpose of this amendment was to provide that ‘The majority required by this Law to for a variation of section. 4, 44 or 45 shall be required for decisions of the Knesset plenary at every stage of law-making.’ This amendment was adopted. During the course of the debate, MK Zadok opposed the proposed amendment, arguing that the Knesset was not authorized to limit itself (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, at p. 2961). As mentioned above, the proposed amendment was adopted.

 

22. The Fourth Knesset did not enact any Basic Law. This concerned several Members of Knesset. MK Nir-Refalkes tabled a motion in this matter. He asked that the process of enacting a constitution be accelerated and referred to the Harrari Decision of the Constituent Assembly. He noted that ‘meanwhile ten years have passed, during which period the Committees on the Constitution, Law and Justice of the First, Second and Third Knessets have enacted only one Basic Law – Basic Law: The Knesset, which was enacted in 1958. Our experience proves that this method of enacting a constitution has led to an anomalous situation. Twelve years have passed since the establishment of the State and not only do we have no constitution, but there is no chance that we will have one in the next fifty years’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 28, at p. 585).

 

MK Nir-Refalkes noted that the government manifesto provided that ‘the Fourth Knesset should complete the enactment of the Basic Law, which will be consolidated to form the basic constitution of the State.’ He added that all factions of the house were united in this view and he requested that the preparation of the constitution be accelerated. The government response was given by the Minister of Justice, Mr Pinhas Rosen. The Minister also mentioned the Harrari Decision and the government platform. He expressed the hope that the Fourth Knesset would indeed complete the work of preparing the constitution. The debate passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. However, the Minister of Justice’s hopes were not realized. The Fourth Knesset enacted only the Basic Law: Israel Lands. The Fifth Knesset enacted Basic Law: The President of the State. In the Sixth Knesset, the focus on the enactment of Basic Laws was intensified. On November 23, 1965 the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee established a subcommittee that dealt solely with the constitution. This subcommittee was headed by MK Zadok and succeeded in preparing one Basic Law, Basic Law: The Government, which was passed by the Seventh Knesset.

23. Between the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset in 1958 and the enactment of the two Basic Laws dealing with human rights, the Knesset passed another nine Basic Laws. Some of them included provisions (albeit minor) that formally entrenched certain provisions of the Basic Laws. The enactment of these provisions presented the Knesset with no legislative difficulty. When the Eighth Knesset was presented with a first reading of the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, 5736-1976 – the proposal that entrenched all of the Basic Laws and provided for judicial review of the constitutionality of regular legislation – it had no practical difficulty with this entrenchment. Aside from a few isolated Members of Knesset, all factions of the house were in agreement as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution for Israel and its power to entrench provisions of the constitution. Many of the speakers expressly noted that the Knesset was thereby acting in accordance with the Harrari Decision (see Knesset Proceedings, vol. 76, at p. 1704; Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, at p. 954). This was the case when the draft Basic Law: Legislation was presented to the Ninth Knesset for a first reading (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 83, at p. 3975). The third proposal of the Basic Law: Legislation was debated in a first reading in the Thirteenth Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, second session, at p. 4302; third session, at p. 936). Aside from several isolated members of Knesset, no objection was raised as to the entrenchment of the Basic Laws. There was a debate, of course, as to the strength of the entrenchment, but the common position of most members of the Knesset was that this was a political and not a legal question, since the Knesset was empowered to entrench the Basic Law if it so desired.

 

24. I will now address the question of continuity and the constituent authority of the Knesset as to the Basic Laws dealing with human rights. Proposals dealing with human rights were already included in draft laws presented to the Committee on the Constitution of the Provisional Council of State. However, legislation in this area did not proceed. With the completion of Basic Law: The Knesset, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee announced that the next Basic Law would deal with human rights. This did not occur. Against this background, on January 15, 1964 MK Klinghoffer presented to the Fifth Knesset the proposed Basic Law: Charter of Basic Human Rights, 5724-1963. This was a comprehensive, impressive proposal for a constitutional settlement with regard to human rights in Israel. The proposal provided for substantive and formal entrenchment. It provided that ‘this law may be amended only by a majority of two thirds of all members of Knesset’ (s. 73). It provided for the possibility that human rights could be infringed by regular legislation, but only if that legislation met substantive standards. In the comments to the proposal that were submitted to the Knesset, MK Klinghoffer referred specifically to the Knesset’s constituent authority to enact a constitution for Israel:

 

In the matter of the authority to adopt a fixed constitutional law, it must be noted that this authority passed from the First Knesset (which was elected as the Constituent Assembly) to the Second Knesset, and thereafter from Knesset to Knesset’ (Second Knesset Transition Law, ss. 5 and 10) (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 801).

 

The government opposed this initiative. The Minister of Justice, Mr Dov Yosef, argued forcefully against MK Klinghoffer’s initiative. He noted, inter alia, that ‘I do not think that there is a law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit its right to legislate, and if there is such a provision in a law, the Knesset is entitled, in my opinion, to cancel the clause that ostensibly limits its rights’ (ibid., at p. 789). The Justice Minister added that it would be otherwise if we had a constituent assembly. MK Begin retorted that ‘We have a Constituent Assembly as well.’ (ibid., at p. 789).

MK Klinghoffer also responded to the Justice Minister as follows:

 

The Knesset is the heir to the Constituent Assembly. The Fifth Knesset is empowered with the authority of the Constituent Assembly to enact a constitution, and this is in accordance with the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance and the Second Knesset Transition Law’ (ibid., at p. 793).

MK Klinghoffer’s proposal failed (on January 15, 1964).

 

25. A number of years passed. The public climate changed (see Lahav and Kretzmer, “The Charter of Human and Citizen’s Rights in Israel: A Constitutional Achievement or Hocus-Pocus,” 7 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 154). The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Seventh Knesset continued with the work of the Subcommittee on Basic Laws. The Committee was headed by MK B. Levy. The Committee held comprehensive debates. The draft Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights was published by the Committee. The proposed law set forth certain human rights and limited the power of statue to infringe those rights except under certain conditions. It included provisions according to which ‘contradictory statutory provisions that are adopted after the effective date of this Basic Law – are void’ (s. 20(a)). At the same time, the Basic Law did not contain entrenchment provisions. The proposal was not substantively debated in the Seventh Knesset. With the convening of the Eighth Knesset the debate on the proposal continued in the Subcommittee for Basic Laws headed by MK B. Levy. It was submitted on June 4, 1974 for a first reading. In presenting the proposed Basic Law for a first reading, MK B. Levy referred to the Harrari Decision and noted that, in enacting the Basic Law, the Knesset was acting within its constituent authority:

 

Constituent authority, i.e. the authority to enact a constitution for the State, was transferred from the Constituent Assembly, i.e. the First Knesset, to the Second Knesset and every Knesset thereafter, including the Eighth Knesset. As the Second Knesset Transition Law provides ... In enacting the Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights we are therefore acting in accordance with the constituent authority of the Knesset’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 70, at p. 1566). 

 

An extended debate on the draft law ensued. The Minister of Justice, MK Zadok, participated in the debate. He expressed his opinion that the Basic Law should be entrenched in order to prevent infringement of basic rights by regular legislation. MK Zadok noted that:

… I agree that the Knesset must be given broad latitude and room to maneuver in its legislative work, but this sovereignty should not be interpreted to permit arbitrariness as to basic principles. It seems to me that the doctrine of the rule of law, which we all espouse, means that everyone is subject to the law – the government, the administration, the President, the State Comptroller – and the Knesset as well. Just as the other state institutions are endowed with a limited array of authorities, so should the Knesset’s legislative powers be similarly limited, albeit with greater flexibility. The primary form taken by this limitation is the Citizen’s Rights Law, in which are anchored and expressed those basic principles that form the basis for government itself

(Knesset Proceedings, vol. 70, at p. 2485).

 

MK Zadok further insisted that the proposed law was intended to ‘raise the Basic Law on citizens’ rights to the level of a preferred norm against which the validity of regular laws will be tested’ and therefore it must be treated with great care (ibid., at p. 2485). As to entrenchment of the Basic Law against regular legislation that does not meet its requirements, MK Zadok noted that:

 

The laws that have been enacted before this Law takes effect have been enacted by the sovereign Knesset under its unlimited legislative power. They are the statutory regime under which we live and they cannot be called into question. This is not so as to laws that will be enacted by the Knesset in the future, after the establishment of the norms set forth in the Basic Law on Citizens’ Rights, with the Knesset aware of and restricted by those norms the validity of those future laws will be tested against the Basic Law.

 

The debate in the Knesset was comprehensive. The Knesset debated the question of whether to entrench the Basic Law – in the same way that s. 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset was entrenched – so that the Law could be amended only by a special majority. The various rights were discussed as well. The draft law passed the first reading and was handed over to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The debate in the Committee concentrated primarily on the question of whether to entrench the Basic Law. It was decided to defer the debate on this question until a decision was reached as to the fate of the Basic Law: Legislation – which was being studied by the Committee at the same time – and which included general entrenchment provisions. What is clear is that the Members of Knesset – the plenum as well as the committee – had no doubt as to the power of the Knesset to entrench the clauses of the Basic Law: Human and Citizens’ Rights. Many of the Members of Knesset referred to the Declaration of Independence, the Harrari Decision and the constitutional undertaking, and pointed to constitutional continuity. It occurred to none that the constitutional continuity was interrupted. No one contended that the Knesset was not entitled to entrench its instructions. The primary debate centered on the question of entrenchment as one of political policy  (was it desirable?), and not as a legal problem (was it possible?) (see Lahav and Kretzmer; see also B. Bracha, “The Protection of Human Rights in Israel,” 12 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1982) 110); R. Gavison, “The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1985) 113).

 

26. The Eighth Knesset continued to debate the proposed Basic Law: Human and Citizens’ Rights. MK Aridor headed the subcommittee. The proposal prepared by the Committee provided that previously enacted statutes repugnant to the Basic Law would be invalidated. The proposal did not advance in the legislative process.

 

27. In the Tenth Knesset, MK Professor Rubinstein renewed Professor Klinghoffer’s proposal. It was put forth (on June 2, 1982) as a private draft law (Proposed Basic Law: Bill of Human Rights, 1982). In his comments on the proposal Professor Rubinstein wrote that:

 

Since (the dismissal of Professor Klinghoffer’s proposal – A.B.), it has become clear to various sectors of the community that there is a need for the enactment of a Basic Law dealing with human rights, for it is fitting that these substantive issues be entrenched in a Basic Law that stands above regular legislation.

 

In his speech before the Knesset plenum MK Rubinstein added that:

 

This draft law is intended to restrain the legislature. It is also intended to protect the citizen from legislation that infringes his basic rights, for this is the implicit meaning of the word constitution. The very word constitution means restraint of the omnipotence and sovereignty of the Knesset as a legislative body’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 94, at p. 2682).

 

Minister of Justice, MK Nissim – unlike his predecessor of eighteen years earlier, Minister Dov Yosef – agreed to pass the proposal to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. In his reply, Minister Nissim noted that:

 

Today, I too say that it is right for a constitution to be fixed and entrenched. There is no value whatsoever in laws, even those denoted Basic Laws, that are not fixed both as to their adoption and as to their amendment ... Since we are discussing a group of Basic Laws that will together form a constitution, they must be fixed and entrenched’ (ibid., at p. 2682).

 

The proposal passed to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee. The subcommittee on Basic Laws that examined the proposal was headed by MK S. Aloni. The subcommittee held extensive debates. It examined the previous proposals that were debated by previous Knessets. It studied the European Convention on Human Rights. It examined the German Basic Law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It heard from Professors Klinghoffer, Klein and Akzin. The Committee’s debates were published (Debates of the Committee on the Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset). An examination of the Committee’s debates reveals that the participants shared the view that the Knesset is empowered and entitled to entrench human rights as constitutional supra-legislative rights. At the conclusion of the debates it was decided to present the proposal for a first reading. The proposed Basic Law: Bill of Basic Human Rights was tabled for a first reading (on March 1, 1983). The comments noted that ‘there is a need for the enactment of a Basic Law on the subject of human rights, for these substantive issues should be entrenched in a Basic Law that stands above regular legislation’ (ibid., at p. 111). In his words of introduction, MK Rubinstein emphasized that:

This proposed law is based upon the principle of entrenchment of basic human and civil rights. It also sets forth a program that, in conjunction with the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, will enable judicial review of violations of this entrenchment, of harm to the idea that human and civil rights stand above the desires of the majority and above regular and routine legislation.

 

At the conclusion of his comments, MK Rubinstein noted that the debate on this proposed Basic Law continues the constitutional undertaking:

 

This proposed law, if adopted, will come close to completing the task of adopting a constitution, which the Declaration of Independence imposed upon the Constituent Assembly, later the First Knesset. As we recall, Members of Knesset, the Constituent Assembly did not complete this important task. Instead of fulfilling its assignment the Constituent Assembly provided that the constitution would be given chapter by chapter by means of the Basic Laws that would be combined to form one constitution. It seems to me that when the Knesset adopts... this proposed law and the proposed Basic Law: Legislation, it will complete the work of composing the constitution. If this happens, our Knesset, the Tenth Knesset, will be remembered as the body that finally fulfilled the important task of enacting a constitution for the State of Israel, and this will be its honor and its glory, that it completed what the other Knessets did not’ (ibid., at p. 1514).

 

MK Aloni – the Chair of the Subcommittee – supported the proposed law. In her comments she referred to the Constituent Assembly (ibid., at p. 1515). MK Shahal also supported the proposed law. He emphasized that ‘the most important thing is the control exerted by these basic principles over the regular legislation of the Knesset ... The safeguarding of human rights in a Basic Law implies a normative preference for these principles over the clauses of a regular law of the Knesset’ (ibid., at p. 1518).

 

With the conclusion of the debate the proposal passed to the Committee on Constitution, Law and Justice to be prepared for second and third readings. The renewed debate before the Committee was comprehensive and fundamental (see Debates of the Committee on Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset). The entire debate proceeded, of course, on the basic assumption – which was expressly repeated more than once – that in the context of the constitution in general, and in the case of human rights in particular, the Knesset is empowered to entrench the clauses of the constitution, whether by formal or substantive entrenchment. The proposal was not presented for second or third readings because early elections were called.

 

28. The debate on Rubinstein’s proposal continued in the Eleventh Knesset, following the applicable continuity rules. Nonetheless, the debate on the proposal did not conclude with the enactment of the law (for an analysis of the reasons, see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 706). A significant change occurred in the Twelfth Knesset. The new Justice Minister, MK Dan Meridor, presented to the government the draft Basic Law: Human Rights. This proposal did not advance. Against this background, Members of Knesset Rubinstein and Aloni presented proposals of their own. MK Aloni presented the proposal of the subcommittee that she chaired, which had not reached the stage of second and third readings in the Tenth Knesset. In presenting her proposal, MK Aloni commented that:

 

In the Declaration of Independence we provided that there would be a constitution. The First Knesset decided to defer this issue chapter by chapter – and in the meantime, so that there would not be a vacuum, we adopted the laws that were previously in effect… and step by step we began to prepare the constitution of the State of Israel. However, the Basic Law: Human Rights was rejected. Still, with the passage of time, the need to adopt this law has grown’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 115, at p. 401).

 

MK Rubinstein adopted the Justice Minister’s proposal. This proposal provided for both formal and substantive entrenchment. The proposal provided for judicial review of the constitutionality of laws that improperly infringe protected human rights. The Justice Minister sought to set aside MK Aloni’s proposal. He announced that the government would permit discretionary voting for MK Rubinstein’s proposal. He himself – who had by his efforts advanced the Basic Laws as to human rights – explained the key points of his proposal and sought to unite the Members of the entire house in supporting it. MK Aloni’s proposal was set aside. MK Rubinstein’s proposal – which was also the Justice Minister’s proposal – passed to the Committee. The Committee did not submit the proposed law for second and third readings.

 

29. Towards the end of the term of the Twelfth Knesset, MK Rubinstein, who must be credited with advancing the efforts for constitutional human rights, took a new step. He “deleted” from Minister Meridor’s proposal – which had been debated by the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee – a number of rights, and submitted them for a preliminary reading as a separate Basic Law. He placed upon the Knesset table, inter alia, the draft Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the draft Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. At the end of the Twelfth Knesset these two laws completed the legislative process. Thus were enacted the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (see the debates on the first reading in Knesset Proceedings, fourth session, at pp. 1235, 1527; on the second and third readings, ibid., at p. 3781) and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (see the debates on the first reading in Knesset Proceedings, fourth session, at p. 2595; on the second and third readings, fourth session, at p. 3390); for an analysis of the Knesset debates, see Karp, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), 323). In presenting Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty for second and third readings, the Chairman of the Constitution Law and Justice Committee, MK A. Lin – who contributed greatly to the enactment of the Basic Laws in the Twelfth Knesset – emphasized that the Basic Law is part of the State constitution, noting that:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was prepared in, the course of many meetings of the Committee on the Constitution, and I emphasize this: the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee in its capacity as the committee on the constitution for the Knesset of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125, at p. 3782).

 

30. In March 1994 the Knesset voided the original Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and enacted in its stead a new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This Basic Law also revised several provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In presenting draft Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation for second and third readings MK Zucker noted that the debate on the Basic Law took place in the context of the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly, stating that:

I would like to remind you that today’s debate is taking place while we sit as a constituent assembly. We thereby continue the long tradition of debates held in this house in its role as Constituent Assembly. We are thus continuing to fulfill the Harrari Decision, which states: we will complete the constitution of the State of Israel chapter by chapter, by means of the Basic Laws.... Since 1948 the Knesset has essentially neglected part of its duties by failing to complete the enactment of a constitution for Israel, an assignment that it undertook both in its role as Constituent Assembly and in its role as the body charged with fulfillment of the Harrari Decision. It is true that this Knesset has almost completed the institutional portion of the Israeli constitution – those Basic Laws that deal with the government and the Knesset, the army, the Israel Lands Administration, the State Comptroller, the President of the State, etc. Even though these laws are not yet entrenched and have no preferred status over regular laws, nonetheless, the Knesset, as Constituent Assembly, has taken significant strides forward in this area ... The greatest failing of the Knesset has been in the field of human rights. Only two years ago did the Knesset begin the work that was supposed to have been undertaken in 1949, the enactment of a bill of rights for the Israeli citizen. Two years ago, this Knesset, in a significant and revolutionary step forward, enacted two Basic Laws, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. This step has aptly been called a constitutional revolution, which is only now beginning’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 136, at p. 5362).

 

MK Y. Katz attacked the Knesset’s work in its role as Constituent Assembly. He insisted that:

 

Every first year law student is told that we are a constituent assembly, from the First Knesset through all of the Knessets until today. We are a constituent assembly because we have the authority to enact a constitution and the Basic Laws are part of the same future constitution’ (ibid., at p. 5426).

 

In the course of the entire debate it was clear to the members of Knesset that the Knesset was exercising its constituent authority; that they were enacting a portion of the constitution, and that they were empowered to entrench it (with formal or substantive entrenchment). They debated whether it was desirable to enable a majority of the Knesset to change the Basic Law. MK Meridor suggested that the required majority be eighty members of Knesset (ibid., at p. 5426). His suggestion was rejected. No contention was made that the Knesset was not empowered to provide for such entrenchment.

 

31. Before completing this analysis of the Knesset’s understanding of its constituent authority, I will mention five points. First, in every Knesset election the matter of the constitution was included as part of the party platforms. I verified this as to the passage from First to Second Knesset. In their article, Lahav and Kretzmer note that in the elections for the Eighth Knesset most of the parties promised to work towards enactment of a Constitution or Basic Laws as to human rights (see Lahav and Kretzmer, ibid., at p. 153). I did not check the party platforms for other Knesset elections. It seems that this is a well-founded assumption, inasmuch as  the matter of the constitution in general, and human rights in particular, found a central place in the party platforms. This is very significant. It indicates that recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority was an item on the national agenda, was debated in the political forum, and was determined by means of election results. When the Knesset dealt with the matter of the constitution and enacted the various Basic Laws, it drew its power from the people. The Basic Laws were not enacted without the people’s knowledge.

 

Second, in four instances the Supreme Court invalidated regular legislation that conflicted with entrenched provisions of the Basic Law: The Knesset (see paragraph 35, infra). In accordance with those decisions the Knesset subsequently revised its regular legislation to conform to the entrenched provisions of the Basic Law. We are therefore presented with a new aspect of the Knesset’s understanding of the matter. The Knesset, in exercising its legislative authority, understood well that it was bound by limitations it had imposed in accordance with its constituent authority.

 

Third, all of the entrenchment provisions were enacted within the framework of the Basic Laws, in the context of the constitutional process. Only in one case has a formal entrenchment provision been included in a regular law. This is in s. 3 of the  Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984. That section provides that ‘this law may not be changed nor may the appendix be revised unless by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ It should be noted that during the debate on the first reading of this proposed law a number of Members of Knesset expressed the view that this self-limitation was not binding since it was not included in a Basic Law. MK Rubinstein took this position, noting that:

 

Previous Knessets have discussed the question of whether the Knesset can entrench laws against changes by simple majority, and the position has been more or less accepted – although it is still disputed – that when we are talking about the Knesset as a constituent authority,  i.e. when it is acting as the framer of the constitution, when it is enacting a section of the constitution, then it can deem a particular law of superior status. If we enact, for example, a law as to human rights ... then in such a law, which is a Basic Law in the constitution, it is appropriate to provide that the constitution stands above other laws. This is recognized by jurists. This has been implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. However, is it possible that a regular financial law be accorded such status? How can it be provided that a financial law will stand above regular legislation in future Knessets? If so, then tomorrow or next week – at some date closer to elections – the Knesset may enact a law that will forbid any change to the State budget or salaries or investments or allotments to religious institutions or allotments to settlements, unless by a majority of eighty or ninety or one hundred and twenty Members of Knesset. Why not? After all, on the eve of elections “anything goes”; this is popular and may not be opposed. Does anyone believe that this will be upheld in court? Does anyone believe that such a law will be considered a constitutional Basic Law? Does anyone believe that this is serious? This section is not worth the paper on which it is written’ (Knesset Proceedings, at p. 2790).

 

The second and third readings took place on the same day. MK Rubinstein’s questions remained unanswered. They evidence an attitude that was well accepted in the Knesset, which distinguished between Basic Laws (fruit of the Knesset’s constituent authority) and regular laws (fruit of the Knesset’s legislative authority). I will note also – incidentally – that in the words of introduction of Members of Knesset S. Aloni (Chair of the Subcommittee on Basic Laws) and A. Kulas (Chair of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee) to the pamphlet on the Debates of the Committee on Basic Laws of the Tenth Knesset (1984), the two noted that:

The Constituent Assembly elected in 1949 in accordance with the “Declaration of Independence” decided not to enact a constitution and not to dissolve itself. It declared itself the First Knesset, and the task of preparing the constitution was passed to it and to subsequent Knessets, which would prepare “Basic Laws” chapter by chapter. The Basic Laws would, upon their completion, be consolidated to form the constitution of the State. This decision gave the Knesset the status of the Constituent Assembly, and in this way the enactment of “Basic Laws” and their consolidation to form the constitution became subject to the initiative of the Members of Knesset and to the initiative of the government, or at least to its readiness to cooperate with the appropriate Knesset committee, the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee and the Committee on “Basic Laws.”’

 

All this is evidence for the widely held understanding of the Knesset that it is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority, and that the enactment of a constitution is the realization of the Knesset’s constituent authority. In the context of this authority a supra-legislative constitutional norm may be created.

 

Fourth, in the first years after establishment of the State there were many references to the Constituent Assembly, the Declaration of Independence, and the “Harrari Decision.” With the passage of time – and changes in the composition of the Knesset – the rhetoric changed. This is natural. A generation goes, and a generation comes, but the national memory did not change. The connection to the past was not severed. The Knesset continued to see itself as the heir of the Constituent Assembly, and as endowed with constituent authority.

 

Fifth, it is clear from the Declaration of Independence that the role (and authority) of the Constituent Assembly was to enact a constitution (‘in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly’). The intention underlying this provision was that a “formal constitution” would be adopted, in other words, that ‘the form of these norms would differ from that of other norms, particularly that of “regular” laws. This difference in form is expressed as a difference in the identity of the institution creating the norm (“constituent institution” as opposed to “legislature”) or at least in the process of its creation. Its goal is to emphasize the normative preference for the constitution over the other norms in the State’s system of positive law’ (Akzin, ibid., at p. 230). As to his understanding of the term “constitution” in the Declaration of Independence, Professor Akzin writes:

 

It is well known that the great majority of the founders of the State were convinced that at the apex of the legal system of Israel would stand a formal constitution that would provide a binding framework for the statutes and other legal norms of the State. This understanding was vividly expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and a first step in its implementation was taken by the Provisional Council of State, which on 1 Tamuz 5708 (July 8, 1948) established the Constitution Committee’ (Akzin, ibid., at p. 231).
 

In a similar vein, Professor Rubinstein notes that ‘the framers of the Declaration intended a formal constitution. We must also remember their clear objective that the Declaration accord with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations’ (ibid., at p. 44). Professor Uri Yadin described this well in an article that appeared the day before elections took place for the Constituent Assembly:

 

Tomorrow, there will be elections for the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, the first elections since the State was established, and the most important for a long time to come. We are not about to elect a regular parliament, one of the many that will subsequently be elected to enact laws dealing with the many routine issues of our daily lives, but a special parliament, unique in its importance, which will be charged with endowing the State with one preeminent law that will stand as a cornerstone throughout the democratic life of the State – the Basic Law, the Constitution’ (Sefer Uri Yadin, ibid., at p. 82).

 

Thus the authority of the Constituent Assembly was not defined, but its task was clear: the enactment of a (formal) constitution for the State, i.e. the creation of a supra-legislative constitutional framework. At the same time, it seems to me that the Knesset was entitled not to enact any constitution, or to enact only a “substantive” constitution. This is a political question that is not determined by law.

(iv) The understanding of writers and commentators

 

32. I will now discuss the views of writers and commentators. I do so first and foremost because of the great importance that every legal system attributes to its scholars. Of course, the Court provides definitive interpretation. But it is natural for the judge to draw inspiration from the words of scholars. There is also a second and more compelling reason to turn to these views. From the understanding of writers and commentators one may learn about the basic approach of the Israeli legal community to constituent authority. Clearly this does not constitute decisive proof. Nonetheless, it is important evidence which, when seen together with other factors – the objective facts as to constitutional continuity, the political debates before the elections, the Knesset’s understanding of itself, the legal precedent and the Knesset’s reaction thereto – grounds the foundation upon which the Court may and should determine that the Knesset – every Knesset – is endowed with constituent authority; that by the principles of Israeli law, the Knesset – every Knesset – is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel; that this is the most appropriate interpretation of the social and political history of Israel.

 

33. Most of Israel’s scholars have viewed and continue to view the Knesset as endowed with constituent authority and therefore authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. It is true that in the past some disputed this position (see Nimmer, “The Use of Judicial Review in Israel’s Quest for a Constitution,” 70 Col. L. Rev. (1970) 1217. It is particularly fitting to mention Dr Likhovsky, who maintained that the Knesset – like the British Parliament – was not entitled to limit itself (see Likhovsky, “Can the Knesset Adopt a Constitution which will be the Supreme Law of the Land,” 4 Isr. L. Rev. (1969) 61; see also Hornstein, “Entrenchment of the Basic Laws,” 25 HaPraklit (1969) 648; Scheftler, “Reflections on Constitutional Questions,” 26 HaPraklit (1971) 6). These views were debated, analyzed and rejected. They remain the minority position. Since the end of the nineteen-fifties (with the enactment of the Basic Law: The Knesset) and the end of the nineteen-sixties (with the decision in the Bergman case [15]) the recurrent theme in Israeli constitutional literature has been that the Knesset has constituent authority, and that it is therefore authorized to adopt a constitution that will limit the Knesset in its role as legislature. Generations of law students have been inculcated with this view since the nineteen-sixties. First credit should be attributed to M. Sternberg (M. Sternberg, “A New Law or a Supreme Judicial Course,” 16 Molad (1958) 284). Sternberg’s essay was written shortly after the enactment of the Basic Law: The Knesset. The author wrote:

 

In approving the Basic Law, the Knesset functioned not merely as a legislative authority, but as a constituent assembly charged by the Declaration of Independence with adopting a constitution for the State. The Knesset always saw itself as a supreme institution as well, authorized to fulfill the function of enacting a constitution, and on several occasions expressly declared this to be so. In section 1 of the Transition Law the Knesset provided that the Constituent Assembly would be known as the “First Knesset” and that a delegate to the Assembly would be known as a “Member of Knesset.” This shows that the Knesset saw as its primary task the enactment of the constitution, and, it would seem, as its secondary task, the enactment of laws. The Second Knesset Transition Law provided that “wherever the law refers to the Constituent Assembly or the First Knesset it as if it referred to the Second Knesset.” Section 10 of that law provides that “this law will apply, with the necessary changes, to the Third Knesset and every subsequent Knesset.” Thus the group of people known as the Knesset constitutes another body as well, known as the Constituent Assembly, and it coexists, parallel to the Knesset itself, as a body whose purpose is construction of the constitution’ (p. 286).

 

A number of years afterward, with the enactment of the first two Basic Laws, Professor Akzin expressed his opinion on the matter before us (Akzin, “Basic Laws and Entrenched Laws in Israel,” 17 HaPraklit (1961) 230). Professor Akzin noted that in his opinion the Knesset exercises its constituent and legislative authority simultaneously. In his view, the Basic Laws are of a constitutional nature, in accordance with the Harrari Decision. Professor Akzin writes:

 

We do not maintain, as has been claimed from time to time in the Knesset and the press, that even if the Basic Law provided for preferential status it could not thereby tie the hands of a future Knesset: such a claim is pure sophistry and conceptual nihilism. While this claim may be true as to England, there it is consistent with the English rejection of a formal constitution superior to the regular legislature. It has already been decided that this claim cannot stand in a country where the idea of a formal constitution has gained currency. We are referring to South Africa, whose public law is based upon English law. The public law of the State of Israel has been based, since the Declaration of Independence, upon the proposition that a constitution may be established beside the regular laws. This proposition has never been rescinded; rather, it has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the decisions of the Knesset since 1950. If there is any significance to the term “constitution,” it is that the constitution itself authoritatively determines the relations between it and the other norms of the State’ (ibid., at p. 236).

 

In 1969, the first edition of A. Rubinstein’s seminal work The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel was published. In this book, Dr Rubinstein elaborates on the constituent and legislative authority of the Knesset and on its power, in exercising its constituent authority, to enact a constitution that will limit the regular legislation of the Knesset. The author writes:

 

The Constituent Assembly, after it changed its name to the “First Knesset,” extensively debated the question of the constitution. No doubt was cast on the fact that it was indeed authorized to enact a written, formal constitution. The great dispute revolved around the question of whether it was required to do so... There can therefore be no doubt as to the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution or laws of a constitutional character that stand above regular legislation… The First Knesset dissolved before its time, without adopting a single chapter of the constitution of the State in accordance with the Harrari Decision. The First Knesset’s powers passed to the Second Knesset ... From this it is clear that the powers of the Constituent Assembly passed from the First Knesset to the present Knesset and to every future Knesset... No defect in this continuity can be shown, nor has the power to enact a constitution disappeared; rather it is conferred upon every Knesset’ (ibid., pp. 167-168).

 

The author reiterated this position in all four editions of his work, and the young jurists of the State of Israel were inculcated with this view.

 

34. A significant contribution in the area of Israel’s constitution, the constituent authority of the Knesset and its parliamentary status, was made by Professor Klein (see, inter alia, Klein, “The Constituent Authority in Israel,” 2 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 51; Klein, “On the Legal Definition of the Parliamentary Government and Israeli Parliamentarism,” 5 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 308; Klein, “A New Era In Israel’s Constitutional Law,” 6 Isr. L. Rev. (1971) 373). The author wrote in 1970:

 

The concept of constituent authority undoubtedly exists in the constitutional law of Israel. Constituent authority was conferred upon the Constituent Assembly, i.e. the First Knesset. The First Knesset did not relinquish this authority, but transferred it to the Second and every subsequent Knesset’ (Klein, “The Constituent Authority in Israel,” II Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1970) 51, 53).

 

Professor Klinghoffer has expressed a similar view. We have discussed his position, as he expressed it in the Knesset. He reiterated this position in his above-mentioned article as well:

 

The Declaration of Independence did not specify a period of time within which the constitution must be enacted, and the transfer of the powers of the Constituent Assembly to the Second Knesset and every subsequent Knesset was authorized by a special legal arrangement. This is a sort of continuing transfer, which, so long as it remains in place, confers upon the Israeli legislature, as a perpetual inheritance, the authority to enact a constitution’ (Klinghoffer Book on Public Law, Y. Zamir, ed., (1993) at p. 763); the article itself was first published in 1961)).

 

This is also the position of Professor Gavison. In an article devoted to the dispute on the Basic Law: Human Rights, Professor Gavison writes as follows:

 

I accept the analysis suggested by both Klein and Rubinstein that even if the Knesset is not under such a duty, it maintains parallel powers – legislative and constituent – and that it may limit its own legislative powers while exercising its constituent powers. This analysis seems to be the most appropriate one, despite the undesirability of the length of the period for which these two kinds of distinct powers exist, and the fact that the Knesset itself is not keen on distinguishing between the kinds of power which it exercises’ (Gavison, “The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights,” 15 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (1985) 118).

 

In a similar spirit, Dr Maoz noted that the Knesset enacted the Basic Laws as to human rights as an exercise of its constituent powers, and thence stems their primary normative status (see Maoz, “Constitutional Law,” Yearbook on Israeli Law, 1992-1993, A. Rosen-Tzvi, ed. (1994) 143). A similar position is expressed in numerous books and articles on this subject (see, e.g. Lahav and Kretzmer; ibid., at p. 158); it undoubtedly reflects the position of the legal community in Israel. It is sufficient to mention that the academic faculty of the Tel Aviv University Law Faculty proposed a draft “Constitution for Israel” to the Knesset. This proposal had great influence on the advancement of the constitutional undertaking in recent years. The proposed “Constitution for Israel” was based on the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution, entrench it and thereby limit the powers of the regular legislature. Note, however, that there were those who believed that there was no room for a fixed constitution. There were those who believed that it was not desirable for the constitution to include a chapter on human rights. President Landau’s position in this regard is well known (Landau, “A Constitution as the Primary Law for the State of Israel,” 27 HaPraklit (1971) 30). But even those voices did not base themselves upon a contention that the Knesset lacked the authority to enact a constitution. Rather, they were of the opinion that it was not wise to invest the Knesset with such power. Again, this short survey is not sufficient to show that only one conclusive position exists. I am aware that the judicial task is an independent one, which derives sustenance from the wisdom of others, but recognizes the personal responsibility of the judge to decide legal questions. The purpose of this survey is to show that the judicial determination, which recognizes the position that the Knesset is endowed with constituent powers, is not arbitrary, deriving from the subjective outlook of the judge, but rather is a reasonable conclusion, premised upon an objective outlook that reflects the basic opinions of the (legal) community in Israel. Another layer is therefore added to our ultimate conclusion that recognition of the constituent authority of the Knesset is the best, most fitting interpretation of Israel’s legal history.

 

(v) Judicial precedent of the Supreme Court

 

35. The Supreme Court recognized the power of the Knesset to entrench the clauses of a Basic Law against regular legislation, as set forth in four decisions rendered before the March 1992 enactment of the Basic Laws as to human rights (see HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15], at p. 693; HCJ 246/81 Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [19], at p. 7; HCJ 141/82 Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [20], at p. 141; HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [21], at p. 529). At first, the matter was left for further review, but with time it was addressed clearly and explicitly. In the Laor Movement case [21], I noted as follows:

 

A law of the Knesset – whether a “regular” law or a Basic Law – that seeks to change an “entrenched” provision without having been adopted by the necessary majority contradicts the entrenchment provision of the Basic Law. In light of its legal effect, the “entrenchment” provision takes precedence. In this clash between the entrenchment provision and the clause that seeks to change it without meeting the necessary majority requirement, we do not apply the standard rules of construction, according to which a later enacted law invalidates an earlier enacted law. In this clash we apply the principle that gives normative precedence to the entrenched Basic Law’ (HCJ 142/89 [21], supra, at p. 539).

 

Thus the Court has recognized the Knesset’s power to ‘entrench’ the Basic Laws against change or infringement. Otherwise, we cannot explain the invalidation of four “regular” laws for violating the principle of election parity set forth in the Basic Law: The Knesset, when these invalidations stemmed from the failure of those laws to meet a formal requirement (the special majority) set forth in s. 4 of the Basic Law. It is true that in these decisions (except for the Laor Movement case [21]) the Court did not employ the rhetoric of constituent authority. We cannot conclude from these decisions that this specific doctrine was before the Court at that time. However, it is clear that the Court recognized the normative primacy of the entrenched Basic Laws. This primacy is certainly consistent – and as I will explain, only consistent – with the constituent authority of a Knesset empowered to enact a constitution for the State. In the fourth case in this series, I discussed the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority, noting as follows:

 

This “entrenchment” applies in our system, for we recognize the Knesset’s power to function as a constituent authority and to prepare Basic Laws that will constitute the various chapters of the State constitution. It is in this context that  we recognize the power of the Knesset,  acting as a constituent authority, to entrench provisions of a Basic Law against changes – whether by “regular” or Basic Law – that are adopted by a “regular” majority…’ (Laor Movement case [21], at p. 539).

 

36. Since the enactment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the question of the normative status of these Basic Laws has arisen in an incidental manner in the decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has taken the position that these two Basic Laws enjoy constitutional supra-legislative status. Justice D. Levin concluded that this was so in the first decision to address the constitutionality of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Justice Levin wrote:

 

In March 1992 a significant change occurred in Israeli law. Two Basic Laws were adopted and came into force that define and raise to a constitutional level basic civil rights .... These two Basic Laws were debated in the Knesset of Israel, as a constituent authority, and consequently, the revised version of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and a revision to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were enacted, and came into force on March 9, 1994 ... When these two Basic Laws came into being they erected, by their own force and in conjunction with various basic rights that had been scattered here and there throughout our case law, the foundations and walls of the Israeli constitutional edifice. This construction has not, however, been completed, and there remains more to be drafted and enacted so that the constitution may stand in its full glory, radiating its light on the institutions of government and law in Israel. Nonetheless, the work that has been done is the construction of a stable constitutional structure, protected under the aegis of the principle and values anchored in the Declaration of Independence’ (HCJ 726/94 Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37], at pp. 463-464).

 

Thus, in the first decision to deal with the status of the Basic Laws, the Supreme Court decided – and in this regard the decision was unanimous (by Justices Levin, Strasberg-Cohen and Tal) – that the two Basic Laws on human rights were adopted by the Knesset in the exercise of its constituent authority, and they therefore enjoy constitutional supra-legislative status. In a similar vein, the Justices of this Court stated obiter dicta their position as to the constitutional supra-legislative status of the two new Basic Laws. My colleague Justice D. Levin so opined as to Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the right to freedom of occupation when he stated, in another case, as follows:

 

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation ... endowed this right with formal constitutional recognition and supra-legislative status. It is transformed into a protected basic right and placed on a higher normative level than “regular” legislation or “Israeli” common law…’ (HCJ 239/92 Egged Israeli Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [44], at p. 71).

 

In a similar spirit, my colleague Justice Mazza stated as follows in another case dealing with the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation:

 

The safeguarding of the right to freedom of occupation in a Basic Law has conferred upon that right supra-legislative status. One of the distinguishing characteristics of this illustrious status ... is in the entrenchment of that right even against the mighty hand of the legislature. Again, it is not enough that a law that limits the right be explicit and unequivocal; rather, in order to effectively limit the freedom of occupation, the law must also meet the requirements of the last part of section 1, that is,. the limitation must be required for a “proper purpose and for the general good”...’ (HCJ 3385/93, 4746/92, G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [24], at p. 259).

 

In another case, Justice Strasberg-Cohen decided as follows:

 

These laws changed the normative status of freedom of occupation in Israel. There were two primary changes: first, the possibility of invalidating a law that does not meet the criteria of the Basic Law, a possibility that did not previously exist; and second, a change in the relative status of the law, on the one hand, and the basic right on the other. If, prior to the Basic Law, it was possible to limit the basic right by means of a law that did so clearly and explicitly, and if, prior to the Basic Law, the basic right and its limitation were tested in light of the law limiting that right, now the right (for our purposes, freedom of occupation) has been given preferred status above the law that limits it, and requires an analysis into whether the limitation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, was enacted to serve a proper purpose, and is not more restrictive than necessary’ (HCJ 1225/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [45], at p. 679).

 

37. The Justices of the Supreme Court took a similar approach, obiter dicta, as to the constitutional supra-legislative status of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In one of the cases, which dealt with the freedom of movement (protected by s. 6 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty) I noted as follows:

 

This right is invested with constitutional supra-legislative status. A regular law enacted after the effective date of the Basic Law that infringes the basic right and does not meet the requirements of the “limitation clause” (s. 8 of the Basic Law) is an unconstitutional law. The Court is entitled to apply the appropriate remedies. One of those remedies is to declare the law void, and set forth the effective date of the invalidity (retroactive, active or prospective)’ (CrimApp 6654/93 Binkin v. State of Israel [46], at p. 293).

 

In another case I noted:

 

With the enactment of the Basic Law, a significant change occurred in Israel. The normative status of a number of basic human rights has changed. They have become part of the State constitution. They have been accorded constitutional supra-legislative status’ (CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], at p. 410).

 

In one of the cases, Justice Or analyzed the principle of equality. He determined that this principle may be safeguarded by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Therefore, in his opinion, the following conclusion is required:

Such a safeguard signifies the elevation of the principle of equality to a normative constitutional supra-legislative level’ (HCJ 5394/92 Huppert v. Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial Authority [47], at p. 362).

 

It must be emphasized that most of the decisions discuss the constitutional supra-legislative status of the Basic Laws. There is no express reference to the Knesset’s constituent power. There was no need for such an express reference, since this question was not at issue. I do not contend, therefore, that one may conclude from these decisions that the Court explicitly adopted the doctrine of constituent authority (aside from the decision in the Laor Movement case [21], and the unanimous decision in the case of Clal Insurance Co. Ltd [37]). My contention is that the Court recognized the normative supremacy of the Basic Laws, and their constitutional supra-legislative status. In so doing, the Court did not adopt those constructions that see the Basic Laws as occupying the same normative level as regular legislation.

 

(vi) The Knesset’s constituent authority: conclusions

 

38. The socio-historical journey is at an end. This journey was vital. Constitutionality and the constitution are not merely formal documents. They are not mere law. They are the product of the national experience. They are society and culture. A constitution is indeed a reflection of the national experience. The words of Justice Agranat still resonate:

 

For it is a well known axiom that a nation’s law must be viewed through the lens of its national experience’ (HCJ 73/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], supra, at p. 884).

 

Our system of national life, our national experience, from the establishment of the State until today, is that the Knesset is perceived by our national consciousness as the body authorized to enact a constitution for Israel. That consciousness originated before the establishment of the State and the preparations for framing a constitution. That consciousness was crystallized in the Declaration of Independence. It took on real form in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. It was consolidated in the social-legal understanding that the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority and is empowered to enact a constitution for Israel. The rhetoric of constituent authority and constituent power was particularly strong during the first years following the establishment of the State. This rhetoric weakened with the passage of time. That is natural. Nonetheless, the basic understanding that the Knesset is endowed not only with regular legislative authority but also with constituent authority accompanied the Knesset from its inception. This is evidenced by the repeated references to the Harrari Decision. The renewed rhetorical reference to the Knesset as endowed with constituent authority in the context of the enactment of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in 1994 shows this as well. Indeed, the view that the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution is deeply embedded in the social and legal consciousness of Israeli society. This is part of our political culture. On the basis of this view, we, the judges of Israel are entitled to declare today that according to the rule of recognition of the State of Israel, the Knesset is endowed with legislative and constituent authority, and that the Knesset may, in exercising its constituent authority, limit the exercise of its legislative authority.

 

In truth, the rule of recognition at the outset of the Second Knesset might have been different had the Supreme Court determined that constitutional continuity had been severed. But this did not happen. In my opinion this would not have happened even had the question arisen before the Court at that time. In any event, today’s socio-legal reality enables the Supreme Court – in whose hands rests consolidation of the rule of recognition (see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, at pp. 147-154 (2nd ed., 1994)) – to identify and declare that our Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority; that it wears ‘two hats’; that in enacting the constitution it may limit its regular legislative power; that its constituent actions stand above its legislative actions. Of course, while the Knesset’s lawmaking power (its “legislative hat”) is continuous and everlasting, its power to enact a constitution (its “constituent hat”) is temporary and will terminate when the Knesset, as a constituent authority, determines that the constitutional undertaking has been completed. The constitution itself will set forth the means by which it may be revised and amended. This conclusion – the product of the rule of recognition – is also the best interpretation of our socio-legal history from the establishment of the State until today.

 

39. The common denominator of these three models is that the constituent authority of the Knesset always rests with the people. A constitution is not a government act that bestows a constitution upon the people. A constitution is an act by the people that creates government. It is the people that determines – according to the social philosophy developed over the course of its history – who exercises the highest authority of the State, and its rule of recognition. The Court gives expression to this social determination. The Court is the faithful interpreter of the people’s will as expressed in the constitution. The Court attempts to give the best possible interpretation of the totality of the national experience. The existence of a constitution is not a logical matter but a social phenomenon. The Court interprets the ‘social facts’ and infers from them the constituent power of the Knesset. This interpretation is not the product of intellectual construction. It is an expression of the social reality. It reflects actual experience. It is an expression of the moral and political foundation upon which the system is based. It is the product of the historical, political, social and legal history of the system. It is the consequence of the social contract based upon the communal consensus in Israel (the Laor Movement case [21], supra, at p. 554). The Court attempts to give the best interpretation of the totality of the national experience. At times, the constituent authority remains in the hands of the people itself, which then acts directly and enacts a constitution by referendum. In most cases the nation delegates constituent authority to a governing body. At times this is a special governing body. Generally it is an existing governing body, which is also the body authorized to enact laws. That is the case in Israel.

 

 

d) Review and critique of Justice Cheshin’s position

 

40. My colleague Justice Cheshin rejects the Knesset’s constituent authority. In his view, a Basic Law is “regular” legislation to which the label “Basic Law” has been appended. The Knesset may not limit itself. The Knesset is not omnipotent, inasmuch as it is subject, inter alia, to the will of the majority. A statutory clause (including that set forth in a Basic Law) providing for a formal majority “limitation” is not binding, unless the required majority is 61 members of Knesset (which is not a true limitation). A statutory clause providing for a substantive limitation in regard to the content of the provision (such as that appearing in the limitation clause) may be changed by later legislation despite noncompliance with the limitation requirement, as long as the subsequent law expressly provides for the change. Essentially, this is the classic English position, which represents the accepted view of the Westminsterian model as it is understood today in England. The legal construction that my colleague proposes in requiring an express change was raised many years ago by Professor Klein, and I referred to it myself years ago. My colleague’s position that, in principle, limitation is not possible is the antithesis of the view held by my colleague President Shamgar, according to whom limitation is possible. My view – based upon the Knesset’s constituent authority – falls in the “middle.” It is opposed to Justice Cheshin’s position on entrenchment and self-limitation in the Basic Laws. We do share basic principles – which I would like to reserve for future review – as to the effect of limitation clauses in regular laws, but that is not now the issue before us.

 

41. I will state at the outset that I disagree with the position held by my colleague Justice Cheshin. I agree with the view of my colleague Justice Shamgar in this matter. Indeed, consider the result: there is no constitution and the Basic Laws are but regular laws; the constitutional undertaking of more than forty years has been, so far, an unsuccessful experiment; the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset, according to which the Knesset may extend its term only by a law enacted by a majority of eighty members of Knesset, are invalid; the provisions of s. 45 of Basic Law: The Knesset (according to which ss. 9A, 44 and 45 may be amended only by a majority of eighty members of Knesset), are invalid; the limiting provisions included in all drafts of Basic Law: Legislation based upon the principle that a Basic Law may not be enacted or amended unless by a majority of two-thirds of the Knesset, will not be constitutional if adopted; the clauses set forth in the Basic Laws requiring a Knesset majority – which, in the view of my colleague Justice Cheshin, are lawful – are imperiled, for it seems to me according to his underlying premise they should be invalidated. If we wish to enact a constitution and Basic Laws, we will have to start again from the beginning. And, apparently, even such a beginning is not at all simple. Certainly we will not aspire to ‘blood and fire and pillars of smoke’ [Joel 3:3]. If we wish to adopt a constitution by non-violent means, we are faced with considerable difficulty. The Knesset would not be empowered to enact a law establishing a constituent assembly. Even presenting a proposed constitution to be adopted by the Knesset (or a body established by it) for a national referendum would pose problems that could not be easily surmounted. Indeed, my colleague places us in the same position in which England is found today – without our being part of the European community and without our being subject to the European Convention on Human Rights – and he places before our legal system the same difficulties facing England today. In my opinion all this is unnecessary, for our history is unlike England’s. Our Knesset has constituent authority, by means of which it may achieve constitutional arrangements not easily realizable in England. I say this not because I desire a constitution, just as my colleague does not take his position because he desires that we not have a constitution. I take this position because it accords with my best professional understanding; it is based upon my best efforts to be objective in light of the constitutional structure and contemporary constitutional understanding. Indeed, I would consider a Knesset decision to discontinue the constitutional undertaking as legitimate, imbued with the same force as a decision to continue the enterprise. However, as long as the Knesset has not decided to abandon the constitutional undertaking, the Court must give constitutional force to that enterprise without regard to the judge’s personal opinion.

 

42. Accordingly, the most important question remains whether the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. My colleague’s claim rests upon the view that the Constituent Assembly’s constituent authority expired with the dissolution of the First Knesset. Most of his contentions have been made before. Professor Nemer, Dr Likhovsky, Mr Shefter and Mr Hornstein raised these arguments in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. My colleague returns to them. Some of these claims are stronger, some less so. As I mentioned in my opinion, had these questions arisen at the time that the Second Knesset convened (in 1951) they would have posed a problem that was “by no means simple.” I added that even then these problems could have been surmounted. Certainly these claims have weakened over the years. With the current reinforcement of the constitutional enterprise they lack real force.

 

43. I have addressed most of my colleague’s claims in the course of my opinion. I will therefore not repeat my answers but will address a number of points that merit further discussion.

(a) My colleague stresses that the First Knesset – which everyone agrees was empowered to adopt a constitution for Israel – was not authorized to transfer that power to the Second Knesset, and even if the First Knesset was so empowered, it did not intend to effect such a transfer. My simple answer is that the principle of transfer or agency, according to which an agent is not a principal does not apply here. The Knesset was given the power to enact a constitution by means of the basic norm and according to the basic understanding of the Israeli community. This power was given to every Knesset. The First Knesset did not pass powers to the Second Knesset, just as the Twelfth Knesset did not pass legislative power to the Thirteenth Knesset. A later Knesset is not the agent of an earlier Knesset. The Knesset is the central organ of the State, and according to our constitutional structure it is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. In any event, even according to my colleague’s line of thinking, I have sought to show that the First Knesset intended (subjectively) to see the Second Knesset as its heir, and that intention was successfully implemented.

 

(b) My colleague has returned again to the old claims that the passage of constituent authority from the First to the Second Knesset was effected by regular laws and not by Basic Laws. This question does not arise as to the Transition Law, 5709-1949, which was enacted before the Harrari Decision. Personally, I see in this a constitutional provision, as it was indeed dubbed (“minor constitution”). Professor Yadin noted that the Transition Law was an ‘act of basic legislation in the sphere of the national constitution’ (Sefer Yadin, at p. 90). As to the Transition to the Second Knesset Law, it was enacted after the Harrari Decision, and should have been enacted as a Basic Law. It is unfortunate that this was not done. Does the entire constitutional structure therefore collapse? I have already noted that in my opinion this law was unnecessary; it was declarative in nature, emphasizing the passage from transitional to permanent status.

 

(c) My colleague Justice Cheshin cites as a weakness of the doctrine of constituent authority that it must distinguish between constituent and legislative acts, and that it is likely to require a determination as to whether certain provisions set forth in the Basic Law deviate from constituent authority. My answer is threefold. First, according to the doctrine of constituent authority the distinction between constituent and legislative acts is straightforward and clear, and is subject to a simple formal test. In this my position is similar to Justice Cheshin’s position, which is also subject to a simple test calling for a majority of 61 members of Knesset and no more than that. Second, indeed it may be necessary to test the constitutionality of the use of the term ‘Basic Law.’ I sought to leave this matter for further consideration and I maintain this position. I will note, however, that it is well accepted for courts to test the constitutionality of amendments. More than one such amendment has been invalidated as unconstitutional, and this has been not only for ‘formal’ reasons (such as a failure to meet majority requirements) but for substantive reasons as well (see the opinion of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Kesavande v. State of Kerala [113]). Consider, in this regard, the following words of the Constitutional Court of Germany:

 

Laws are not constitutional merely because they have been passed in conformity with procedural provisions... They must be substantively compatible with the highest values of a free and democratic order, i.e. the constitutional order of values, and must also conform to unwritten fundamental constitutional principles as well as the fundamental decisions of the Basic Law’ (6 BverfGE 32 [109]).

 

The literature on this matter is plentiful (see Barak, Parshanut BeMishpat, vol. 3, (1994), at p. 566, and also infra). Third, the need for judicial review under these circumstances is not unusual. It seems to me that even my colleague Justice Cheshin applies judicial review in similar circumstances. Thus, for example, in his view, the Constituent Assembly (the First Knesset) was unsuccessful in its attempt to transfer authority to the Second Knesset. Is this not an example of the Court setting constitutional limits? My colleague Justice Cheshin determines that the Knesset’s enactment of a law (even a Basic Law) extending its term beyond four years would be unconstitutional. Is this not a case in which the Court determines the boundaries of constituent authority? It is worth noting as well the words of my colleague President Shamgar, who noted that ‘there should be no doubt as to the existence of judicial review’ even as to the constitutionality of the constitutional legislation itself (see paragraph 46 of his opinion).

 

44. My conclusion is therefore that my colleague Justice Cheshin has presented the old arguments (some better, some less so) that were raised in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. All these contentions have been answered. The answers were sufficient when they were made. They are certainly sufficient today. As I have attempted to show, the Knesset’s constituent authority does not come to it merely by inheritance from the original Constituent Assembly (according to Kelsen’s view). I have reiterated that the recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority reflects the general rule of recognition of Israeli law today (according to Hart’s view). This is the best interpretation of the entirety of the legal and national history of Israel, as it is understood today (according to Dworkin’s view). Indeed, regardless of the legal climate at the time the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, even had there been no Constituent Assembly at all, the question remains – what is the rule of recognition of Israeli law today? Does today’s Israeli law recognize the Knesset’s authority to endow Israel with a constitution? I have answered this question affirmatively. To support my position, I have presented the Knesset’s understanding of itself; the party platforms from various elections, which manifest the subjects on which the nation gave its opinion in those elections; the words of scholars and academics reflecting the professional consensus; the opinions of the Supreme Court; and the Knesset’s response to them. All these together – with no possibility of viewing any individual element as providing the answer – provide a “factual basis” for my legal conclusion that today, as in the past, the Knesset’s power to endow Israel with a constitution is recognized. My conclusion as to the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution is based upon a broad “factual basis.” It is the result of the constitutional history, the Knesset’s understanding of itself, the basic understanding of scholars and authors, the understanding of the electorate that voted in the various elections, the decisions and dicta of the judges and the response of the Knesset. This is where my criticism of Justice Cheshin’s position lies. His position does not accord with the understanding of today’s Israeli community. It is not the best explanation for the entirety of the social and legal history of the State of Israel. It does not grapple with the constitutional problem.

 

45. Professor Dworkin’s position is germane. He addresses the question of whether the British Parliament is empowered to adopt a bill of human rights that would limit the Parliament’s legislative power and prohibit Parliamentary amendment of the bill of rights, except by special majority. Professor Dworkin considers whether the Parliament’s decision is in itself sufficient to create entrenchment and self-limitation, and he concludes that the answer to this question is no. He notes that the principle of parliamentary supremacy:

[D]oes not owe its authority to any parliamentary decision, because it would beg the question for Parliament to decide that its own powers are unlimited.’

 

He continues:

 

British lawyers say that Parliament is an absolute sovereign because that seems (for most of them intuitively and unreflectively) the best interpretation of British legal history, practice and tradition. But legal history and practice can change with great speed’ (R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990), at pp. 26-27).

 

And I ask: when a Justice of the Supreme Court regards our legal history, its ways and traditions, as it appears before us today – against the background of the Declaration of Independence, the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the Harrari Decision, the election campaigns in which the parties reiterated their aim to enact a constitution for Israel, the enactment of twelve Basic Laws including entrenchment and limitation clauses, the case law and the Knesset’s response thereto, and the position of the legal community – does this not demand a determination that today the Knesset is endowed with constituent authority; that today, alongside its legislative authority, lies the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution? Is this not the best interpretation of our national history? Is this not the best explanation for our “system of national life” (in the words of Justice Agranat in HCJ 87/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4], supra, at p. 884)?

 

46. We will now consider the question of the Knesset’s power to limit its authority to amend the Basic Laws – whether the best explanation for this arrangement, against the background of our entire constitutional history is my colleague’s explanation as to the nature of majority and the method of counting abstentions, or my explanation that this power is the expression of the Knesset’s constituent authority. My colleague seeks to address this question from within the Knesset’s enactments and its internal rules. In my view we cannot solve this problem without looking outside the Knesset. This problem may be solved according to our present understanding of the entirety of Israel’s legal history. The best explanation for this understanding is that the Knesset sought to limit its legislative power as to constitutional matters; that it saw itself as functioning within the scope of the constitutional undertaking; that it saw itself as preparing a constitution for Israel. We will consider as well the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Law: The Knesset. In light of our legal and social history, is the best explanation for this requirement that the Knesset was thereby attempting to count abstentions and non-participating votes as “votes against,” out of a desire to provide for a “regular” majority? Perhaps the better explanation is that this was an attempt to create a constitutional supra-legislative norm, intended to ensure the stability of the system. Consider Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Is the best explanation for this Basic Law that the Knesset sought to prevent infringement of those basic rights by a later Knesset without consciously and expressly setting out its intention to do so (according to the position of my colleague Justice Cheshin)? Perhaps the better explanation is that the Knesset sought to prevent infringement of those basic rights by a later Knesset not fulfilling the requirements of the entrenchment provision, thereby preventing a later Knesset – one that explicitly announces its intention to deviate from the Basic Law – from achieving its goal? Is not this explanation – my explanation – the only one that reconciles the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty with the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which includes an express instruction – intended to achieve my colleague’s interpretation in the context of this law – regarding the override clause, when such a provision is absent from the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? Is the best explanation for our legal history that the use of the term “Basic Law” is merely formal, without any underlying significance? Or is the best explanation for use of the term ‘Basic Law’ that the matter is substantive in character, and reflects the preeminent normative status of the Basic Law? Consider s. 1A of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides that ‘this Basic Law’ – this and not an item of regular legislation – ‘is intended to protect Human Dignity and Liberty, in order to safeguard in a Basic Law’ – in a Basic Law and not in regular legislation – ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’ Is it not artificial to consider the term ‘Basic Law’ in this section as merely formal? Should it not be seen as the expression of a more profound legal and social outlook under which the Knesset is engaged in preparation of a constitution, in the context of which it seeks to protect human rights in order to safeguard the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? It should be noted that I do not claim that the issue is “black-and-white.” I am well aware of the contentions of the various Members of Knesset that were raised against the constitutional enterprise; I am aware of the authors who argued against it. But when a judge must ask himself – while taking into account the entire picture – what is the outlook of Israeli society today, against the background of the multi-faceted constitutional enterprise undertaken since the establishment of the State, and in light of the two latest Basic Laws and the reactions to them, my answer is that the Israeli Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. Indeed the judge’s task is to give our legal and social history the explanation that best accords with the legal and social data.

 

47. Running through Justice Cheshin’s opinion is his determination that recognizing the Knesset’s constituent authority violates Israeli democracy. In his view, ‘it is unthinkable that the representatives of a majority of the nation would take a position, but be prevented from achieving their aim of amending a Basic Law by our having erected a legal construct of dual authorities’ (paragraph 69). ‘It seems to me that obstructing the majority is a patently anti-democratic procedure’ (paragraph 69). “True” democracy, in the view of my colleague, Justice Cheshin, is democracy in which all decisions are adopted by a majority (an absolute majority) of the Members of Knesset. ‘A determination that a statute cannot be voided, amended or infringed except by a majority of more than 61 votes ... is a patently anti-democratic determination’ (paragraph 97). ‘When majority rule is removed, the spirit of democracy is extinguished’ (paragraph 101). ‘A statute enacted by the Knesset is the law of Israel, as long as it does not injure the heart of democracy, the principle of majority rule’ (ibid.). In my opinion this is a one-sided and fragmented approach to democracy. I discuss this at greater length in that section of my opinion dealing with the basis for the judicial review of constitutionality. My basic position is that the Knesset’s legislative authority to amend its laws should not prima facie be limited. Such limitation violates the principle of majority rule, without which there is no democracy. Such limitation enables the past to reign over the present on day-to-day matters. Such limitation enables the present majority, which chose today’s Knesset, to limit a future majority, which will choose the future Knesset. One generation may thereby dictate the day-to-day behavior of another generation. In the absence of a social agreement expressed in the implicit rules of the system, such a result should not be allowed. Up to this point, Justice Cheshin and I are of the same opinion. But, at the same time, my position is that “true” democracy recognizes the power of the constitution – fruit of the constituent authority – to entrench the fundamental human rights and the basic values of the system against the power of the majority. Such a limitation of majority rule does not violate democracy but constitutes its full realization (as discussed above). In this I join my colleague President Shamgar, and with him disagree with the opinion of my colleague Justice Cheshin. Indeed we are adjudicating the matter of the constitution as well as constitutional human rights. In this context, endowing the majority with the power to infringe the rights of the minority is an undemocratic act. Protecting individual rights, minority rights and the fundamental values of the legal structure against the power of the majority is a democratic act. Justice Jackson noted this as follows:

 

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections’ (West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette [92], at p. 638).
 

Indeed, “true” democracy cannot exist without limitation of the power of the majority so as to protect the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and so as to protect the fundamental values, of which human rights are primary. Democracy of the majority alone, unaccompanied by a democracy of values is formal, “statistical” democracy. True democracy limits the power of the majority in order to protect the values of society, ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state,’ and the ‘recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free’ (s. 1 of the Basic Law). Of course, it is possible to think otherwise. It is possible to be satisfied with “formal” democracy. But the State of Israel chose differently. Since the Declaration of Independence and up to the present day we have chosen the constitutional path. We sought to endow ourselves with a constitution that would limit the power of the majority in order to fulfill the fundamental values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. This choice was not made by judges. It was made by the nation. Once this choice is made, the judges are required to uphold it regardless of their own personal opinions (see B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 272 (1991); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 228 (1983)). The fundamental values and basic human rights are so deep and so important that the courts of various countries are prepared – without any constitutional text – to negate parliamentary power to infringe those values. Indeed, in a number of common-law legal systems the recognition is slowly developing that certain fundamental values cannot be infringed by the legislature, even in the absence of a written constitution. The bitter experience of Nazi Germany, inter alia, has contributed to the understanding of this issue (see my opinion in the Laor Movement case [21]; Tal, “The All-Powerful Legislature: Indeed?” 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 361; Woolf, Droit Public - English Style Public Law (1995), at p. 57; and P. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993), at pp. 444, 454). The matter has progressed so far that, at times, courts are prepared to negate the effect of a baseless constitution (see H.H. Cohn, “Faithful Interpretation – A Third Conclusion,” 7 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1976) 5; EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset [48]). We need not go so far. We have a constitutional text. We have a national history of recognizing fundamental values that stand above regular legislation. All that is left is judicial recognition that the law is constitutional. We grant this recognition today.

 

48. My colleague Justice Cheshin reiterates that the nation was not consulted, ‘and we did not ask the nation’ (paragraph 67). My colleague asks again, ‘And where was the nation? Is it not fitting that we seek its opinion? On the contrary, we should turn to the nation and ask its opinion’ (paragraph 63). Indeed, in a democratic state sovereignty rests in the hands of the people. The Knesset does not have sovereignty; neither does the government, nor the courts. The nation has sovereignty. The entire social and legal structure is based upon this principle. The constitution and the Basic Laws arise from the nation and depend upon the nation, and the nation may change them. The Knesset’s constituent authority stems from the nation, and is recognized by the nation; the Knesset does not exercise this authority behind the back of the nation. My opinion is but an attempt to declare that the idea of the constitution and its implementation are not the province of ‘jurists and a few other high-brows – two or three at most’ (paragraph 71), but rather that this idea is a reflection of the national consciousness; that the idea of the constitution and its preparation began with the Declaration of Independence, which was borne on the nation’s shoulders; that it took form with the elections for the Constituent Assembly; that the idea of the constitution and its preparation did not evaporate with the dissolution of the original Constituent Assembly, but continued on in the Second Knesset. The party platforms, on the basis of which the people voted in all of the elections, attest that the idea of the constitution and its preparation continued and developed in every Knesset, and that in accordance with this idea, the Knesset enacted twelve Basic Laws; that in the various elections the nation was told that the parties sought a constitution for Israel; that based upon these declarations the nation went to the polls; that there were debates in the Knesset and among the public as to the content of the constitution and the need to continue its preparation. All these together enable the Court to declare today that in Israel the nation’s basic understanding is that the Knesset is endowed with the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. Indeed, many do not know what the ‘Constituent Assembly’ is, nor are they aware of the significance of constituent authority. But the vast majority of the members of the public know that our Knesset is the institution from which the constitution will derive and from which it has derived.

 

49. It is true that no special appeal was made to the public to approve the text of the Basic Laws, as it developed in the course of the Knesset debates over the years. But such an appeal was not necessary. It may be desirable, but it is not indispensable. Direct appeal to the nation is one method of adopting a constitution, and perhaps the most desirable. But this is not the only method and it involves considerable difficulty. The constitutional history of many nations recognizes constitutions that derived authority from the nation but were not presented for direct national approval. Every nation has its history; every nation has its constitutional development. Our political and legal culture is not based upon a special appeal to the nation by means of a referendum. No referendum has taken place in the past. Our political and legal culture is not built upon “direct” democracy, but upon “representative” democracy.

Our political and legal culture also maintains that the appeal to the nation takes place in the context of the elections for the Knesset. Such elections took place in Israel, and the issues of the constitution and the Basic Laws were on the agenda. The nation was asked; nothing was done without its knowledge. Indeed, this did occur in the elections for the First Knesset – the Constituent Assembly. Preparation of the constitution was but one of the many subjects addressed in those elections. This does not negate the First Knesset’s constituent authority. The nation went to the polls many times. Every time the issue of the constitution and the Basic Laws appeared on the national agenda. The nation had its say in all of the elections, with different levels of intensity, according to the subjects that were then on the national agenda. Never was the constitutional ember extinguished. I do not see a substantive difference – from the perspective of the rule of recognition of today’s Israeli legal system – between the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and all other elections. In the elections for the Constituent Assembly it was clear that the subject was election of an entity with dual authority, legislative and constituent. This was the case in the other elections as well. I agree, of course, that in the first elections constituent authority was emphasized. This is appropriate, and in this regard, there is, of course, a difference between the first and subsequent elections. But I do not think that this difference is so significant as to conclude that the first elections bestowed constituent authority upon the body elected while subsequent elections did not.

 

Consider the matter of the Basic Laws on human rights. Can it seriously be claimed that they were adopted without the nation’s participation? The Knesset has concerned itself with the question of human rights for more than thirty years. Beginning with Professor Klinghoffer’s 1962 proposal, the Knesset and the Israeli public have reckoned with the question of human rights. Problems of religion and state have been debated at length. The status of Israel as a Jewish state and as a democratic state have been debated and tested. The Twelfth Knesset adopted Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Thereafter, elections for the Thirteenth Knesset took place. The issue of the Basic Laws was raised in the party platforms. The Thirteenth Knesset was elected and enacted a new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

Indeed, the public debates did not take place only in the Knesset. Broad segments of the public expressed their opinions as to the “constitutional revolution.” The issue was discussed in primary schools and high schools. The issue penetrated the public consciousness. All of these factors have constitutional significance. A constitution is not merely a legal document. A constitution expresses the national experience. A special appeal to the nation is only one of the many ways in which such a program for national life can be developed. The nation was asked and the nation answered that it desires a constitution, and that it desires constitutional human rights. Indeed, the primary dispute in the nation – and such a dispute exists – is not as to constituent authority but as to the content of the constitution. Of course this matter requires national consensus. This agreement is expressed in the enactment of the Basic Laws. The Court must give effect to this agreement. Again, I do not claim that constitutional development in Israel is ideal. The constitutional enterprise could have been arranged differently. A “national seminar” on the content and details of the constitution would have been appropriate. Increased public awareness of the public debate would have been appropriate as well. But that is not the question before us. Our task today is not to plan the constitutional enterprise in advance. We are dealing with an analysis of the constitutional enterprise in retrospect. It cannot be said that the nation did not participate in the constitutional enterprise, and that the Members of Knesset acted behind the nation’s back. Everything was done openly, in the public eye. The public expressed its opinion in the elections, and chose the parties that it desired, according to many factors, including party positions on the constitution. Now, the Court must give constitutional effect to the constitution. That is what we are doing today.

 

e) The Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution – Summary

 

50. I have come to the conclusion that the Knesset is authorized to provide Israel with a constitution; that it is empowered to ‘entrench’ the clauses of the constitution (whether by substantive or formal entrenchment). This authority is granted to the Knesset because it is vested with constituent as well as legislative authority. I have noted the many difficulties that stand in the way of any other construction. Fortunately, there is no need to deal with these other constructions in light of the explanation that the Knesset is endowed with both constituent and legislative authority. Indeed it may be said of constituent authority that if it had not been established as a constitutional fact it would have had to be invented, as a constitutional construct, since it provides the best explanation for the legal history of Israel. However, in our case, this doctrine is established and it is reflected in our constitutional history. There is no need to invent it. It expresses our social contract since the establishment of the State until today. Without it, constitutional continuity would be severed, and the effect of all the entrenched Basic Laws creating superior norms would be called into question. Their legal status would be diminished and the constitutional enterprise would lose its operative significance. Human rights in Israel would not be elevated to constitutional supra-legislative status. The expectations of generations for a constitution and supra-legislative human rights would be frustrated. All hope for a constitution would be lost. I am aware of the difficulties that underlie the doctrine of constituent authority. Nonetheless, these difficulties are not so insurmountable as to overturn the doctrine.

 

51. The doctrine of constituent authority affords significant advantages. First and foremost, it reflects the governmental history, the social contract and the basic viewpoints of the Israeli community. Second, it provides an appropriate instrument for accomplishing the task. The doctrine does not deal with the Knesset’s general power to limit itself. It does not take a position as to the Knesset’s ability to limit itself as to matters that are not constitutional. It treats only of the process of creating a constitution and this process alone, and it provides an answer that justifies this activity. It provides an Archimedean foothold, outside of the constitution that enables its enactment.  It makes it possible to turn to the people – if such is their will – in order to strengthen the ties between the people and its constitution that have weakened in past years. Third, it accords with the constitutional experience of most countries throughout the world, which have followed a similar path in preparing their constitutions. It does not transform a “regular” law into a “special” or “elevated” or “important” or “extraordinary” or “exalted” law. It does not deal with fine distinctions as to the scope of the limitation, the essence of the ‘regular’ or ‘special’ majority, or the status of abstentions. It takes the high road in determining that a Basic Law is not a “law” at all but rather a constitution. As a result, the way is paved for a systematic and orderly development of the body of constitutional rules connected with the constitution. It facilitates Israel’s entry into the democratic constitutional community. Finally, it expresses the centrality of the Knesset in the fabric of Israeli democracy. The Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. It is true that in exercising its legislative authority the Knesset is subject to limitations that arise from the basic perceptions of the community as safeguarded in the constitution and the Basic Laws, which represent our national will. Nonetheless, when the Knesset exercises its constituent authority, it is free to enact a constitution for Israel. The Knesset, endowed with constituent authority, was entrusted by the Israeli community with the fate of the constitution.

 

II) Basic Laws and regular legislation

a) Continuation of the constitutional enterprise and its problems

 

52. The Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution. This authority was granted to the Knesset with the establishment of the State. At that time it accompanied a revolutionary process of national emancipation. The original authority did not immediately come into effect. It was already clear to the Provisional Council of State that preparation of the constitution would be protracted. The Harrari Decision provided that the constitution would be adopted in stages. Because of the political situation, the constitution was at times enacted not only ‘chapter by chapter’ but ‘atom by atom’ (see Karp, “The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – A Biography of Power Struggles,” I Mishpat uMimshal (1993), at p. 323). As a result, the constitution was adopted without any connection to a particular event. As in many countries – such as Canada, Sweden, and Spain – our constitution is the product of natural social development. It results from a continuing ‘evolution,’ not a one-time ‘revolution’ (see B. Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (1992), at p. 47; E. McWhinney, Constitution Making (1981), at p. 13; R.R. Ludwikowski and W.R. Fox, The Beginning of the Constitutional Era: A Bicentennial Comparative Analysis of the First Modem Constitutions (1993), at p. 194). Moreover, preparation of the Israeli constitution took place over an extended period without parallel in the constitutional history of other countries. Constitutional preparation commonly continues for many years. It is unusual for the constitutional enterprise to continue for more than forty years. For a variety of political and social reasons this has occurred in Israel. At times, the political will to establish the constitutional authority was lacking. At other times, the matter was prevented by circumstances. Indeed, we are different from other nations, even in the enactment of our constitution.

53. This prolonged constitutional enterprise is accompanied by a number of difficult problems. The various Basic Laws differ in the generality of their language. A small number of them contain ‘limitation’ provisions, limiting the process by which the laws may be amended; most are silent as to amendment procedures. Some Basic Laws include ‘entrenchment’ provisions, dealing with the power of subsequent laws to infringe the arrangements set out in the Basic Laws. Most are silent on this matter as well. This normative reality gives rise to difficulties of interpretation and to a lack of clarity as to the constitutional scheme. There is no alternative, therefore, but to clarify the constitutional picture. Without such elucidation, we cannot understand the status and scope of the Basic Laws in general, and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty in particular.

 

b) The normative order

 

54. The Knesset is endowed with constituent authority. By that authority the Knesset enacted a constitution for Israel. It did so chapter by chapter in accordance with the Harrari Decision. Each of the Basic Laws constitutes a chapter in the constitution of the State of Israel. Each chapter stands at the head of the normative pyramid (cf. B. Akzin, The Doctrine of Governments, vol. 1 (1963), at p. 120). Thus, the State of Israel has a constitution – the Basic Laws. Below the constitution stand our statutes, the product of the Knesset’s legislative authority. Beneath the statutes stands secondary legislation, the product of authority conferred by statute. The status of each norm in the normative pyramid is determined by the nature of the authority by which it is created, which, in turn, is grounded in the pyramid of institutions. Limitation does not create normative supremacy. Even when a statute can limit itself it cannot elevate itself (see Salmon, Jurisprudence, 12th ed. (1966), at pp. 85, 87). Normative supremacy reflecting the constitutional nature of the norm derives only from the existence of constituent authority. A constitutional democracy is, by its nature, ‘dualistic’: the constitution is created by the nation, whether directly (such as by referendum) or indirectly, by granting constituent authority to a governmental body (such as a special constituent assembly or an established legislative body). Statute is created by the nation, acting through the legislative authority. Constituent authority is supreme and ranks above legislative authority. It does not constitute mere self-limitation of the legislative authority (Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), at p. 223). In Israel, constituent authority is given to the Knesset. This authority exists alongside the Knesset’s legislative authority. This dual authority in the hands of the same body raises a number of questions that must be answered.

 

c) The use of constituent authority is effected by means of the Basic Laws

 

55. The Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution for the State. How does it do this? When does the norm created by the Knesset have constitutional status and when can it be said that the norm is a ‘regular’ law? In my opinion the answer is that the Knesset uses its constituent authority (committing a “constitutional act,” in the language of Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 451) when it gives external expression in the name of the norm, denoting it a “Basic Law” (without specifying the year of enactment). This formal standard is consistent with the parliamentary experience. The Knesset did not denote as “Basic Laws” legislative enactments that were not of a constitutional nature. The Knesset was careful in the past to limit the term “Basic Law” to the chapters of the constitution, in accordance with the Harrari Decision. The Knesset attributes great importance to the use of the term “Basic Law.” Thus, for example, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty expressly states:  ‘The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic State’ (s. 1A). The double emphasis of the Law is not coincidental, and it reflects the uniqueness of the Basic Law. The parliamentary reality underscores this singularity as well. A committee was established – the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee – to deal with the enactment of the Basic Laws. At times a subcommittee on the constitution was established as well.

56. Moreover, every time that a Basic Law is submitted for a preliminary or first reading before the Knesset plenum, it is emphasized that another chapter in the constitution of the State is being brought before the Knesset.

Some examples follow:

(a) In submitting the proposed Basic Law: The Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 15 (1953) at p. 57), MK Bar-Yehuda noted as follows:

 

In other circumstances I might see this moment as worthy of particular note in the annals of Israeli legislation. You, Members of Knesset, even those of you who were not members of the First Knesset, certainly recall the very long debate between the supporters of the Basic Constitution and the Basic Laws as to the relative value of those two, as to their unique means of protection and the need to distinguish between Basic Constitution or Basic Laws and ordinary laws.’

 

MK Bar-Yehuda analyzed the history of the Harrari Decision and presented the first Basic Law.

(b) The second Basic Law was adopted in the Third Knesset. This was Basic Law: Israel Lands. In presenting the proposed law for a first reading, the Minister of Finance, Mr Levi Eshkol, noted as follows

 

It is not without deep feelings of respect that I make use of the privilege and obligation bestowed upon me to present before you and explain these laws connected with Basic Law: Lands of the Nation. I feel that with my words and participation, I stand as though beside a well from which we have drawn for generations, a well “which the nobles of the people delved” [Numbers 21:18].  And now at the close of the first decade and the beginning of the second decade of the State, we approach that well to deepen it, broaden it and fit it to the new conditions that have arisen with the establishment and existence of the State of Israel’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, at p. 2839).

 

(c) In presenting the proposed the Basic Law: The President of the State – the third Basic Law – for a first reading, Minister of Justice Dov Yosef noted as follows:

 

Today I am honored to bring before the Knesset the proposal for a law that will constitute another layer in the construction of the Basic Constitution of the State’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36, at p. 963).

 

(d) The fourth Basic Law is the Basic Law: The Government. It was adopted by the Sixth Knesset. At that time the Knesset moved to new premises. The first ceremonial session in the new premises was devoted to a first reading of the Basic Law: The Government. In presenting the law, the Prime Minister, Mr Levi Eshkol, stated as follows:

This festive day, on which the Knesset inaugurates its new home, should be noted in a distinguished piece of legislation, which deals with the rules of law and governance in the State. Basic Law: The Government is a distinguished chapter in the future Israeli constitution. The constitution that the Knesset obligated itself to enact by a fundamental decision made in June 1950... The government’s view is that the time has come for the Knesset to devote a considerable part of its legislative work to completing the missing chapters of the Constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 46, at p. 2504).

 

(e) The sixth Basic Law is Basic Law: The Army, which was adopted in the Eighth Knesset. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: The Army for a first reading, Minister of Justice Mr Zadok emphasized that:

The government has toiled for a number of years to conclude the preparation of a system of Basic Laws that will be combined to form a complete constitution. It is therefore natural that the subject of the army, which is addressed in every written constitution, be dealt with in Israel in a Basic Law, which, as mentioned, will constitute one of the chapters of the Constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 74, at p. 4002).

 

(f) The ninth Basic Law is Basic Law: The Judiciary, which was adopted by the Ninth Knesset. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: The Courts for a first reading, the Minister of Justice, Mr Tamir, noted that:

I am honored to bring before the Knesset the proposed Basic Law: The Courts, a law that is intended to define the constitutional principles by which the judicial authority will function in Israel… Recently the Ministerial Committee for Legislation completed Basic Law: Legislation, including the entire issue of the Constitutional Court. In addition, in the coming week we will renew the debates on the Basic Law: Human and Citizen’s Rights. Thus we have proceeded with important and expeditious steps toward the great objective of endowing the State of Israel with a constitution’ (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 83, at p. 3216).

 

57. Moreover, the Knesset debates on the Basic Laws were of a singular nature. The Knesset was aware that it was preparing an additional chapter for the State constitution. The members of Knesset were aware that they were not enacting regular legislation, but constitutional legislation, with far-reaching, long-term consequences as to the law and the character of the State. The debate was ceremonial. When the Basic Laws were enacted all were aware of the importance of the moment. The unique nature of the legislation was formally expressed by the designation of the proposal and law as “Basic Law.” This designation constituted an agreed-upon sign that the matter was constitutional; that constitutional continuity extended from the days of the Constituent Assembly and the Harrari Decision; that this legislation was not like all others; that the moment was unique. The designation of legislation as a “Basic Law” is not a formal technical matter. It is the substantive expression of the process by which the constitution was enacted.

 

58. Of course, all this has no formal expression, beyond the requirement that the legislation be designated as “Basic Law” without a specified year of enactment. But this is not significant. The constitutional answer often derives from the constitutional system and constitutional precedent even if they have no formal anchor. Moreover, our constitutional legislation is formally anchored. This formal test – the use of the term “Basic Law” – is simple. It provides security and certainty. This test raises two questions that I would like to set aside for further consideration. The first question is what is the constitutional status of legislation that preceded the Harrari Decision and that is not designated as “Basic Law”? Primarily, should not the Transition Law of 1949 be considered part of the State constitution? I am inclined to the view that there is constitutional legislation – the result of constituent authority – before the Harrari Decision as well. That said, this question may be reserved for further consideration. The second question concerns the role of future Knesset legislation that might abuse the term “Basic Law” by designating as such regular legislation with no constitutional content. This question is by no means simple; its answer extends to the very root of the relationship between the constituent authority (of the Knesset) and the judicial authority (of the courts). This question, as well, I would like to set aside for further consideration.

 

d) Amendment of one Basic Law by another Basic Law

 

59. A Basic Law is a chapter in the State constitution. It derives from the Knesset’s constituent authority. In establishing a Basic Law, we find ourselves at the highest normative level. It therefore follows that a Basic Law, or any of its provisions, can be amended only by a Basic Law. A Basic Law may be amended by regular law only if the Basic Law contains an express provision to that effect. It is, nevertheless, true that the Supreme Court has held in the past that a Basic Law may be amended by regular law (HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14]). That decision aroused criticism (see Klein, ‘On Semantics and the Rule of Law – Reflections and Appeals of HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of the Knesset Central Elections Committee’ 9 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) (1978) 79). Later decisions left this entire question as requiring further consideration (see HCJ 119/80 HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23]).

60. In my opinion, one Basic Law may be changed only by another Basic Law. This is also the position of my colleague Justice Shamgar. Professor Akzin correctly noted that:

 

A law that has been formally designated as a Basic Law cannot be changed, except by a law that has also been formally designated as a Basic Law (Akzin, ibid., at p. 237).

 

Professor Klein also took this position, emphasizing that:

 

Supremacy does not derive from the majority requirement but from the authority creating the norm. Accordingly, even unentrenched Basic Laws are superior to regular legislation and, if it wishes to amend them, the Knesset must do so by means of the appropriate amendment procedures, and not by means of enacting a different, later law.

 

Indeed, if the Knesset wishes to amend the clauses of a Basic Law – for example, changing the system by which the Knesset or the Prime Minister is elected – it must do so in a Basic Law. The only case in which this is not so is when the Basic Law itself provides for a different amendment procedure. Amendment of a Basic Law by another Basic Law may be explicit or implied. Indeed, two Basic Laws occupy the same normative level and therefore must be construed according to the principles governing two norms of equal status.

 

61. As I mentioned above, the prevailing view in the past was that a Basic Law could be amended by a regular law. In an opinion that I handed down more than fifteen years ago, I raised doubts as to that approach (see HCJ 119/80, OM 224/80, HaCohen v. Government of Israel [23], supra). As set forth in that opinion, a Basic Law may not be amended except by another Basic Law. Therefore, the provisions of s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which establishes the electoral system, may be changed only by Basic Law. It is true that the clause itself provides that ‘this section shall not be varied, save by a majority of the members of Knesset.’ I suggest that we determine that this provision relates to infringement of the electoral system – similar to infringement of the principle of equality in the Bergman case [15] and its offshoots – and not to changing the electoral system itself. It is clear that if the subject were a change in the electoral system – such as a change from proportional representation to regional elections – then not only would a Basic Law be required, but also a ‘majority of the members of Knesset’ as set forth in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset.

 

I am aware that in the past Basic Laws were amended by regular legislation. I do not seek to challenge the force of such amendments, which were supported by the decisions of this Court. Thus, what was done in the past will remain in force. But henceforth, a Basic Law may be changed only by another Basic Law. In order to permit amendment of a Basic Law by regular legislation, the Basic Law must include an express provision to that effect, which must explicitly provide that it deals not only with infringement of the arrangement set forth in the Basic Law – as I will discuss later – but also with amendment of the Basic Law.

 

e) Limitation of the Knesset’s power to amend one Basic Law through another Basic Law (“the problem of rigidity”)

 

62. When the Knesset exercises its constituent authority, is it empowered to limit its constituent authority to amend the Basic Law in the future, thereby ‘fixing’ its constitutional enactment? Thus, for example, is the provision of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, by which ‘[t]his Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset’ (s. 7), constitutional and binding? Is the clause of s. 45 of the Basic Law: The Knesset (according to which ss. 9A, 44 and 45 of the Basic Law may not be revised except by a majority of eighty Members of Knesset) binding? Is the Knesset authorized to provide in Basic Law: Legislation that a Basic Law may not be adopted or amended except by a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Knesset? In my opinion, the answer is yes. In exercising its constituent authority the Knesset may limit the future use of its constituent power. This derives from the very essence of the constituent function. This function aims to create a document that entrenches norms that may be altered only in a special way. The constituent function is intended by its very nature to create a formal constitution, the inherent significance of which is the establishment of provisions as to the means by which the constitution may be amended, and which may themselves be amended in accordance with these provisions, failing which the amendment is unconstitutional (the “unconstitutional constitutional amendment’). Indeed, the power of the Knesset – when it exercises its constituent authority – to limit itself, and thereby “entrench” its provisions, derives from the very grant of its authority to enact a formal constitution.

 

63. Most Basic Laws do not include limitation clauses. The “rigidity” of Basic Laws is expressed in only a few of the Basic Laws. We may conclude that in the absence of a “rigidity” provision, a Basic Law may be amended by a Basic Law adopted by a regular majority. Thus, for example, Basic Law: The Judiciary  or Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty may be amended by another Basic Law adopted by a regular majority. Note that the absence of a limitation clause does not detract from the normative status of the Basic Law as a superior norm in the Israeli legal system. The absence of a limitation clause negates the rigidity of the Basic Law in relation to other Basic Laws, and permits its amendment or infringement by a Basic Law enacted later by a regular majority. The absence of a limitation clause does not lower the status of the Basic Law to the level of regular law. A non-rigid Basic Law is still a Basic Law. It is not a “regular” law and it cannot be amended by regular legislation.

 

f) Basic Law and regular law

 

64. A Basic Law is a chapter in the constitution. It stands “above” regular legislation. As we have seen, a regular law cannot amend a Basic Law. Can a regular law affect the arrangements set forth in the Basic Law? The apparent answer is that the regular law cannot do so unless the Basic Law so permits. This conclusion follows from the supremacy of the Basic Law. Such supremacy prevents a regular law from affecting the arrangements of the Basic Law. At the same time, this supremacy itself leads to the conclusion that a Basic Law may provide for conditions and circumstances under which regular legislation may infringe the arrangements set forth in the Basic Law. The hand that gave is the hand that hath taken away. The presumption is therefore that regular legislation may not impinge upon the arrangements set forth in a Basic Law unless the Basic Law expressly provides otherwise. However, the case law of the Supreme Court has upset this presumption. The Court has decided that in the absence of an ‘entrenchment’ provision – i.e. a provision entrenching the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation – the latter may encroach upon the arrangements set forth in the former (see HCJ 148/73 Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [13]; HCJ 60/77 Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14], supra; HCJ 107/73 ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel [12]. This precedent has developed from the directive contained in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. Under that section, the election system provided for in the statute may not be changed ‘except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ This is an instance of “formal entrenchment” that protects the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation, but permits possible infringement by legislation enacted by the special majority set forth in the Basic Law. In light of the entrenchment provision set forth in s. 4, the Court concluded that regular legislation may infringe other arrangements set forth in a Basic Law when the Basic Law does not provide for entrenchment. If this were not the case, the clauses of a Basic Law that are silent as to entrenchment would be more strongly safeguarded against infringement by regular legislation than the clauses of a Basic Law protected by a special entrenchment arrangement that was certainly intended to strengthen rather than weaken the safeguard. While this conclusion is possible, it is not mandatory. The Court could have concluded that in the absence of an entrenchment provision, the provisions of a Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation, but only where that infringement is explicit. It would therefore have been possible to continue to emphasize the superior normative status of the Basic Law, while at the same time maintaining the appropriate distinction between a Basic Law providing for entrenchment and a Basic Law that is silent in this regard. I would like to reserve this issue for further consideration, since Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty contains an entrenchment provision. The entrenchment called for in the Basic Law is not formal, requiring a particular majority in order to pass the infringing law. Rather, the entrenchment is substantive, permitting infringement by means of regular legislation only if the regular legislation meets the substantive requirements. The limitation clause set forth in section 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and section 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides for substantive entrenchment. Under that provision, regular legislation may not infringe the human rights protected by the Basic Law unless it fulfill the substantive requirements of content. This entrenchment provision is binding. It is legal. It negates the power of non-complying regular legislation to infringe the human rights safeguarded by the Basic Law.

 

g) Substantive entrenchment provisions in the Basic Law and express infringement in regular legislation

 

65. A Basic Law provides that no legislation may infringe its provisions unless certain substantive requirements are met (substantive entrenchment). A regular law expressly infringes the clauses of the Basic Law without meeting the required substantive requirement. What is the fate of the regular law? In my opinion this regular law is unconstitutional. It may be declared void.

 

Indeed, just as a regular law may not implicitly infringe the clauses of an entrenched Basic Law – because it is on a lower normative level than the entrenched Basic Law – so it may not explicitly encroach upon those provisions. The express provision of the regular law emphasizes its constitutional position, enabling the judicial conclusion that the law indeed infringes the arrangement set forth in the Basic Law. Of course, this conclusion does not apply when the Basic Law expressly provides that despite non-compliance with the substantive entrenchment provision, the Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation meeting certain formal conditions. Such a provision may be found in the override clause set forth in section 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Thus, in order for regular legislation that infringes a Basic Law to be constitutionally valid, the Basic Law must contain an express provision to that effect. The fact that the Basic Law is silent in this regard precludes such infringement. The constitutional difference between an entrenched Basic Law and non-entrenched Basic Law is therefore made manifest. Both are Basic Laws. Both occupy the primary normative level. Nonetheless, they are different. The arrangements of an entrenched Basic Law cannot be infringed by regular legislation unless the entrenchment requirements are met. In contrast, the arrangements of a non-entrenched (or silent) Basic Law may be infringed by regular legislation. This distinction between the different Basic Laws will, of course, disappear with the entrenchment of all the Basic Laws, as recommended in the draft of  Basic Law: Legislation.

 

h) Limitation in regular legislation

 

66. What is the rule in regard to a limitation clause included in a “regular” law, under which such law may not be amended or infringed except by regular legislation meeting specified requirements (as to form or content)? For example, what is the rule in regard to s. 3 of the Law for Protection of Public Investment in Israel in Financial Property, 5744-1984? This section provides that ‘this law may not be amended nor may the appendix be revised except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.’ Is there a difference in this context between a limitation that calls for ‘a majority of the Members of Knesset’ and one that calls for ‘a majority of two-thirds of the Members of Knesset’ or of eighty Members of Knesset? The answer to this question highlights the substantive difference between the doctrine of unlimited Knesset supremacy and the doctrine of constituent authority. According to the former doctrine, the Knesset may exercise its unlimited supremacy in order to limit its own legislative authority. In contrast, the doctrine of constituent authority recognizes the Knesset’s power to exercise its constituent authority in order to limit its power.

 

The doctrine of constituent authority does not address the question of whether the Knesset is empowered to exercise its legislative authority in order to limit its future use of this authority. Because this question does not arise in the appeal before us I would like to reserve it for further consideration. I will note only that recognizing that the Knesset may effect such a limitation by means of its constituent authority does not, in and of itself, lead to the conclusion that the Knesset may effect such a limitation by means of its legislative authority. As we have seen, the constitutional limitation prevents today’s majority from changing arrangements adopted in the past. This is justified by the nature of the constitution and the rationale upon which it is based. The constitution deals with the basic issues of governmental structure and human rights. It seeks to prevent their infringement by regular legislation. It treats of the constitutional institutions – the Knesset, government and courts – whose stability must be ensured. It treats of the basic values that society endeavors to secure. A society that seeks a constitution, seeks by means of the constitution to remove certain values from the reach of the “regular” majority (see J. Rawls, Theory of Justice (1983), at p. 228; B. Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (1991), at p. 272). In contrast, recognizing the power of regular legislation to limit itself prevents today’s majority from changing the day-to-day arrangements adopted in the past. Such recognition would require that we consider why one generation should be granted the power to dictate the day-to-day behavior of another generation. Indeed, recognizing the Knesset’s power as a legislative authority to limit its legislative power requires a supporting constitutional doctrine. Because this question has not arisen before us, I would like to reserve it for further consideration.

 

67. In this regard, I would also like to reserve for further consideration the question of whether there is a substantive difference between a limitation requiring a “majority of the Members of Knesset” (an “absolute majority”) and a limitation requiring a greater majority. This distinction stands at the base of my colleague Justice Cheshin’s approach. For myself, I harbor grave doubts that an “absolute majority” requirement is the simple result of a democratic arrangement. According to such a requirement, an abstaining MK is seen as voting no. This abrogates the right to abstain of the MK who is truly not prepared to vote yes or no. This is a most serious abrogation. I question whether it falls within the rubric of the democratic outlook. The MK’s “right” of non-participation is similarly denied, for every non-participation is construed as a vote against. The possibility of a ‘setoff’ between votes for and against is also denied, for the significance of every such setoff arrangement is that both are seen as votes against. All these raise most serious questions. On the surface, the “democratic majority” is a majority of the Members of Knesset actively voting. This is the case in the various parliaments around the world (see Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Methods of Voting,” 32 Constitutional and Parliamentary Information (1982) 179, 203). A change in the voting system requiring a majority of all Members of Knesset (and six Members) on its face calls for justification by a constitutional doctrine. It is not derived from the “voting rules” themselves (see United States v. Baellin [93], at pp. 507, 509). We need not decide this question in this appeal. Our issue is the entrenchment provision of a Basic Law, not the limitation clause of a regular law. I therefore wish to reserve this question for further consideration.

 

i) The Basic Law regarding human rights and regular legislation

 

68. Until this point, I have examined the status of the Basic Laws as such. I will now turn to the two Basic Laws on human rights. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were – as their names signify – were enacted by the Knesset under its constituent authority. They therefore occupy the highest normative level. They cannot be amended by regular legislation (either explicitly or implicitly). Can regular legislation infringe the provisions in those laws? The answer is that these two Basic Laws are not silent Basic Laws. They include entrenchment provisions. They provide for an express, detailed scheme as to the power of regular legislation to infringe the arrangement safeguarded by the Basic Laws. This scheme is constitutionally valid, and must be given effect. It is not subject to change or infringement except by Basic Law. This unique scheme is given expression in the two central provisions common to both Basic Laws, the application clause and the limitation clause. The scheme is also expressed in a third provision, the override clause, which appears only in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

69. The application clause of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides as follows:

 

All governmental authorities are bound to respect the freedom of occupation of all Israeli nationals and residents’ (s. 5).

 

The parallel provision in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty provides:

 

All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law’ (s. 11).

 

Similar provisions appear in other constitutions (see s. 1(3) of the German Basic Law and s. 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). The application clause applies to all government authorities. It applies to the legislative authority, the executive and the judiciary. It applies to the central and local authorities. It applies to every authority granted power by law. This is a central provision. It declares the direct legal effect of the Basic Laws upon the governmental authorities. It weaves the basic rights into the fabric of all governmental decisions. Above all, it obligates the legislature – one of the governmental authorities – to honor human rights. The “regular” laws are therefore subject to human rights. The regular legislature is not all-powerful. The legislative power given to the legislature is subordinate to its obligation to honor human rights. The application clause breaches the silence of the two Basic Laws as to human rights. It substantively entrenches the clauses of the Basic Law against infringement by regular legislation. It thereby expressly declares that regular legislation must honor human rights, and certainly may not infringe them, except as provided in the Basic Laws themselves. The application clause is not merely declarative. It is a substantive provision that constitutes an important axis upon which the constitutional structure depends. It is similarly expressed in other legal systems (such as Canada and Germany), in which comparable provisions are found.

 

70. The “limitation clause” of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation provides as follows:

 

There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law (s. 4).

 

A parallel provision appears in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, as follows:

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required (s. 8).

 

These are the key provisions in both Basic Laws. The limitation clause – as its name indicates – limits both the legislature and human rights. This is a substantive entrenchment provision. Its purpose is twofold: the constitutional protection of human rights while providing the constitutional criteria that permit infringement of human rights. These criteria – set forth in a preeminent constitutional document – provide the means by which the legislature may legally infringe human rights. Expression is thereby given to the normative relationship between Basic Laws and regular legislation. Regular legislation cannot – explicitly or implicitly – infringe the human rights safeguarded by these Basic Laws unless it meets the requirements of the limiting clause. In his analysis of the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Dr Maoz notes that this provision takes precedence over all legislation. He adds:

This preference derives not from the legislature’s intention not to infringe the limitation clause, but from the entrenchment – or limitation – in which the constituent authority garbed the limitation clause. In forbidding the legislature to enact a provision infringing the human rights safeguarded by the Basic Law, except in accordance with the conditions set out in the limitation clause, the constituent authority obviously nullified the legislature’s power to do so, be the legislature’s intent what it may (Maoz, ibid., at p. 149)

 

71. The third provision that provides constitutional arrangements as to the relationship between the two Basic Laws and regular legislation is the override clause, which is found only in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and provides as follows:

 

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement, unless a shorter duration has been stated therein (s. 8).

 

This provision is unique. It expresses formal entrenchment. It was influenced by a similar provision in the Canadian Charter (s. 33) but includes several important changes. It permits the regular legislature – under certain conditions – to enact a (regular) law infringing the freedom of occupation even if the law does not fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. The two conditions are as follows: first, the regular law must expressly provide that it has effect notwithstanding the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation; and second, the regular law must be enacted by a majority of the Members of Knesset. When these two conditions are met, constitutional validity will be granted to a law that infringes the Basic Law for a period of four years. At the end of that period the law expires. Thus another route is opened – parallel to that provided in the limitation clause – to permit the infringement of a basic right (freedom of occupation). In using its constituent authority, the Knesset thus expressed its view that regular legislation – which does not meet the requirements of the limitation or override clause – may not infringe the freedom of occupation. No similar provision appears in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In this respect, the human rights set forth in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are more strongly protected against the effects of regular legislation than the freedom of occupation.

 

j) Legislation that lawfully infringes a protected human right

 

72. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation therefore set out the legal status of regular legislation that infringes the human rights safeguarded in the Basic Laws. If a regular law fulfills the entrenchment requirements (formal and substantive) set out in the Basic Law, the regular law is constitutional. This expresses the central idea that human rights – set forth in the Basic Laws in absolute terms – are relative rights. Human dignity, freedom, property, movement, privacy and freedom of occupation are not absolute rights. They are subject to infringement in order to protect the social framework. It should be noted that the constitutionality of the infringement does not make the infringing law part of the constitution. The constitutionality of the infringement does not lower the constitutional status of human rights. The constitutionality of the infringement means that the constitutional human right is subject to infringement by regular legislation if such legislation meets the criteria set forth in the constitution. There is a substantive difference between amendment of the constitutional human right and its infringement. Amendment of the human right constitutes amendment of the constitution, and requires legislation at the same normative level, i.e. by means of a Basic Law. Infringement of a constitutional human right may be accomplished by means of regular legislation that meets the requirements of the constitution. There is no need for a constitutional edict, since the constitutional right itself does not change. Regular legislation is sufficient, as long as it fulfills the parameters set forth in the Basic Law itself.

 

73. The status of regular legislation that infringes a protected human right is therefore different according to each of the two Basic Laws. The right protected in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is subject to infringement by two alternative means. First, if the infringing legislation accords with the limitation clause; second, if it is enacted in accordance with the override clause. Regular legislation that does not meet either of these alternatives is unconstitutional and therefore void. Accordingly, regular legislation adopted by a regular majority that infringes freedom of occupation and does not fulfill the requirement of the limitation clause is unconstitutional, even if such a law expressly states that it infringes freedom of occupation. The rights safeguarded in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty are subject to infringement only by means of the limitation clause. The Basic Law does not provide a second path in the form of an override clause. There is also no possibility of creating a judicial override clause, nor any need to. Therefore, regular legislation – by whatever majority it is enacted – that infringes a human right protected by this Basic Law, that expressly provides that it is adopted ‘notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law’ or that it is expressly intended to impinge upon its arrangements, will not be constitutional if it does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause. In the absence of an override clause, there is no means by which this express provision can save the regular law from unconstitutionality. On the contrary, an express provision such as this points up what is in fact the constitutional status of the law, facilitating the judicial determination that the law indeed violates a protected human right.

 

The result, therefore, is that the human rights safeguarded in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enjoy more comprehensive protection than that afforded freedom of occupation, insofar as the matter concerns infringement by regular legislation. The picture changes when the infringement (or amendment) is based upon a Basic Law. A special majority (‘a majority of the members of the Knesset’) is required in order to amend Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (s. 7). A regular majority is sufficient to amend the human rights safeguarded in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. This is, without doubt, anomalous. This may be corrected by Basic Law: Legislation, which will make all of the Basic Laws, and the arrangements safeguarded therein, subject to identical requirements as to amendment or infringement.

 

III) Judicial review of constitutionality

a) Constitutional supremacy and judicial review

 

74. The constitution is the superior norm of the legal system. A regular law may be permitted to conflict with the clauses of the constitution only if it meets the criteria provided in the constitution itself. What is the fate of a law that does not meet these criteria? What is the remedy for an unconstitutional law? (For a discussion of these questions see A. Shapira and B. Bracha, “The Constitutional Status of the Rights of the Individual,” 5 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1972) 20, 42). The answer to these questions depends first and foremost upon the provisions of the constitution itself. Often the constitution establishes – and is empowered to establish – the legal sanctions imposed upon an unconstitutional law. Thus, for example, the “Supremacy Clause” of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s.(1)52) invalidates conflicting legislation that does not meet the requirements of the Constitution, as follows:

 

The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the clauses of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.

 

Similar provisions are found in many modem constitutions, particularly those of European countries after the First World War. Such provisions proliferated in the constitutions of European countries after the Second World War and the victory over the Nazis. One of the lessons of the Second World War was that constitutional supremacy and judicial review of constitutionality are potent weapons against the enemies of democracy (see E. McWhinney, Judicial Review (1960); M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary World (1971); M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (1989); A. Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (1983)).

 

But what is the rule when the constitution is silent in this matter? The answer to this question depends upon the culture and tradition of the legal system. It is determined by the adjudication rule of the particular legal system (see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ibid., at p. 96). Thus, for example, it may be recognized – as was the tradition in nineteenth century Europe – that the constitution binds the institutions of the government. However, noncompliance with a constitutional directive does not lead to invalidation of the law, and the Court is not empowered to impose the sanction of voiding such legislation. According to this view, the obligation to ensure compliance with the constitution rests with the government institutions themselves, and if they violate this obligation, the sanctions are in the hands of the public on election day (see Akzin, II The Doctrine of Governments, ibid., at p. 9). But this is not the only view, nor is it the most widely held. Today this is the minority view. Indeed, a particular legal tradition and culture are likely to lead to the conclusion that constitutional silence in this matter should be interpreted as calling for the invalidation of conflicting legislation and to the concomitant conclusion that the determination of whether such a conflict exists rests not with the legislature but with the court. Under this view, constitutional silence requires judicial review and authorizes the court to declare unconstitutional legislation void. We will now examine this tradition.

 

b) The case of Marbury v. Madison

 

75. The American legal tradition – since the 1803 decision in Marbury v. Madison [94] – is that a statute that conflicts with the clauses of the constitution is void, and any court is empowered so to declare. The United States Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite the absence of an express provision to that effect in the Constitution of the United States. Justice Marshall wrote:

 

The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

 

Indeed, the constitution is intended to limit the legislature. This limitation is meaningful only if a regular law cannot prevail over the constitution. There is no middle ground: either the constitution is supreme and may not be amended by regular means, or it has the same status as a regular law, which the legislature may change at its whim. Justice Marshall added:

 

If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? ... It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

 

Since that decision, it is beyond doubt in the United States that legislation conflicting with the Constitution is void, and it is the role of the court – in interpreting the Constitution and the law – to determine the existence of a conflict, as well as its consequences. Thus arises the doctrine of the judicial review of constitutionality. This doctrine is a cornerstone of the American constitutional system. Remove it and the entire structure collapses.

 

c) Judicial review of constitutionality – the modern experience

 

76. The American experience with judicial review of constitutionality has spread well beyond that country. That experience has influenced constitutional thinking throughout the entire world. It has dominated the various constitutional systems established since the Second World War. It has been accepted as the guideline in all of the Eastern Bloc states since the liberation from Soviet control (see Schwartz, “The New East European Constitutional Courts,” 13 Mich. J. Int. L. (1992) 741). This may be the central contribution of American constitutional thought to constitutional thinking throughout the world.

 

As we have seen, express provisions in this regard appear in the constitutions that have been adopted by many states after the Second World War (see, e.g., the constitutions of Germany, Japan, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Cyprus, India, and Turkey). Even in states whose constitutions do not include express provisions in this regard – and that are part of the common law legal culture – the view has become accepted that an unconstitutional law is invalid, and the court is empowered so to decree (see, e.g., Cowen, “Legislature and Judiciary,” 15 Mod. L. Rev. (1952) 282; 16 Mod. L. Rev. (1953) 273). An increasing number of states have recognized the judicial review of constitutionality. Justice Frankfurter justly noted that the conclusion reached by the American Supreme Court in the Marbury case [94]:

 

[H]as been deemed by great English speaking courts an indispensable, implied characteristic of a written Constitution’ (F. Frankfurter, “John Marshall and the Judicial Function,” 69 Harv. L. Rev. (1955) 217, 219).

 

Indeed, a long list of judicial decisions throughout the common-law world has recognized – in the absence of an express constitutional provision – judicial review of constitutionality (see, e.g., Harris v. Minister of Interior [111]; Clayton v. Heffron [82]; Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe [104]; Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [105]. See Rubinstein, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (annotated second edition, 1974), at p. 281).

 

d) Judicial review of constitutionality in Israel

 

77. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty do not explicitly address the consequences of a law that infringes a constitutionally protected right and does not comply with the requirements of the Basic Laws. The proposed Basic Law: Legislation includes general provisions in this regard. That proposal, however, has not yet completed the legislative process in the Knesset. The two Basic Laws contain no ‘supremacy clause.’ What is the law in such a situation? It seems to me that our legal tradition requires us to conclude that the remedy for an unconstitutional law is its invalidation, and that the courts have been endowed with the authority to declare it invalid. Just as a regulation that conflicts with statute is void and may be declared as such by the court, so too should be the case when a regular law conflicts with a Basic Law; the law is void and the court is empowered to declare it so.

 

Important judicial developments have led to the recognition of this conclusion in Israel. The question arose first in the case of Bergman v. Minister of Finance [15]. The court noted that it would leave for future consideration the determination of whether or not the relationship between an entrenched Basic Law and a conflicting regular law that did not meet the entrenchment requirements was a justiciable question. Over the years a number of decisions were handed down, the majority of which effectively voided regular laws that did not meet the entrenchment provisions of a Basic Law. As time passed, this tradition became established (see Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [19]; Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [20]). In the Rubinstein case [20], Justice S. Levin noted:

As the number of instances increases in which the court is asked to decide issues of constitutional significance of this nature, so does the likelihood decrease that the court will stay its hand from deciding them, particularly when the Attorney-General will in the future raise similar questions (p. 148).

 

As I noted in a previous case:

In seeking to amend an “entrenched” provision without having been adopted by the necessary majority of Members of Knesset, a law of the Knesset – whether a “regular” law or a Basic Law – contradicts the entrenchment provisions of the Basic Law. In view of its legal force the “entrenchment” provision will prevail. In a clash between the entrenchment provision and the clause that purports to amend it without meeting the necessary majority requirements, we do not apply the usual principles, according to which a later-enacted statute invalidates an earlier statute. In this conflict we apply the principle that grants normative supremacy to the entrenched Basic Law. We find that legislation that seeks to change an entrenched Basic Law without meeting the necessary majority is null and void. The court is empowered to declare such nullity. Indeed, the very inclusion of an entrenchment provision calls for the court, as an independent institution, to review the legal validity of legislation that purports to amend an entrenchment provision without meeting the special majority requirement… The existence of an entrenchment provision implies that there will be judicial review, and that the court is therefore empowered to determine that a statutory provision – whether set forth in a “regular” or a Basic Law – when enacted by a “regular” majority and not that set forth in the entrenchment provision, is null and void. The court has decided according to this view in the past’ (Laor Movement case [21], at pp. 539-540).

 

This approach accords with our tradition. It is consistent with our general legal culture. It is accepted in the Israeli community (see Rubinstein, ibid., at p. 461; see also Burt, ‘Inventing Judicial Review: Israel and America,’ 10 Cardozo L. Rev. (1989) 2013). It is required by the application clause included in both Basic Laws. Indeed, if the Knesset is ‘required to respect the rights under this Basic Law’ (as stated in s. 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), then this is not merely a ‘political’ obligation of the Knesset but also a ‘legal’ obligation. If this is so, then it is necessary that some body other than the Knesset – i.e. the Court – determine whether in fact the rights set forth in the Basic Law have been honored.

 

e) The rationale for judicial review of constitutionality

(i) Judicial review and the rule of law

 

78. The doctrine of judicial review of constitutionality is based upon the ‘rule of law,’ or, more correctly, the rule of the constitution or the law (see L. Sheleff, “The Two Meanings of ‘The Rule of Law’,” 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1991) 559). The central role of the court in a democratic society is ‘to protect the rule of law. This means, inter alia, that it must enforce the law in the institutions of the government, and it must ensure that the government acts according to the law’ (Ressler v. Chairman of Knesset Central Elections Committee [14], at p. 462). When a given legal system includes a constitution, the “rule of law” requires that the sovereignty of the constitution be protected. Thus the Knesset, in using its constituent authority, endowed the State with Basic Laws. In the normative hierarchy, the Basic Laws are paramount. In order to fulfill the Knesset’s directives, regular legislation that conflicts with a Basic Law must be invalidated, in the same way that a regulation that conflicts with law is invalidated. In presenting the proposed Basic Law: Legislation for a first reading, the Justice Minister, Mr Zadok, maintained as follows:

I agree that the Knesset must be given broad latitude and room to maneuver in its legislative work, but this sovereignty should not be interpreted to permit arbitrariness as to basic principles. It seems to me that the doctrine of the rule of law, which we all espouse, means that everyone is subject to the law: the Government, governmental agencies, the President, the State Comptroller, and the Knesset as well. Just as the other state institutions operate within a limited framework of authority, such a framework, albeit broader, must be established for the Knesset’s legislation (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 76, at p. 1705).

 

Thus, in declaring invalid a law that does not meet the requirements of the Basic Law, the court fulfills the Basic Law. The constitution and the Basic Law themselves legitimize the judicial review of constitutionality. As MK Menahem Begin described it during the debate on the constitution in the First Knesset:

One of the two: either it will be a constitution that is superior to all other law, or it will be a worthless piece of paper (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, at p. 737).

 

Thus, judicial review of the constitutionality of the law is the soul of the constitution itself. Strip the constitution of judicial review and you have removed its very life. The primacy of the constitution therefore requires judicial review. As Professor Kelsen has noted:

The application of the constitutional rules concerning legislation can be effectively guaranteed only if an organ other than the legislative body is entrusted with the task of testing whether a law is constitutional...(H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Wedberg, trans. (1961), at p. 157).

 

(ii) Judicial review and the separation of powers

 

79. Judicial review of the constitutionality of the law derives from the principle of separation of powers. The legislature’s authority is to enact laws. In order to do so it is authorized to interpret the constitution itself. When the resolution of a dispute between litigants requires interpretation of the constitution, such interpretation is in the hands of the Court. The Court’s interpretation is binding. Within the framework of the separation of powers, interpretation of the constitution is the responsibility of the Court (see Flatto-Sharon v. Knesset House Committee [2], at p. 141). As I noted in a different case:

 

In a democratic system, based upon the separation of powers, the authority to interpret all legislation – from Basic Laws to regulations and regulatory orders – is the province of the Court ... Any other approach violates the essence of judicial power and utterly distorts the principle of the separation of powers and the checks and balances between them’ (See Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [49], at p. 152).

 

Thus, judicial review of constitutionality both derives from and gives expression to the principle of separation of powers. As Chief Justice Burger noted:

 

In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution .... Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison ... That [it] is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is ... Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government (see United States v. Nixon [95], at pp. 703-704).
 

The Court’s constitutionally mandated role of interpreting the constitution leads to the adjudication of disputes according to the constitution. Adjudication according to the constitution, rather than according to the law, can incidentally lead to the invalidation of a law. This invalidation is not a violation of the separation of powers, but rather its realization. Indeed ‘separation of powers does not mean the absolutism of each power in its own area. Such absolutism violates freedom, the realization of which is the very basis for the separation of powers’ (HCJ 5364/94 Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [50], at p. 790). The creation of the constitution in accordance with constituent authority requires a concurrent grant of interpretive authority to the judicial branch. To judge means to interpret. Constitutional interpretation must naturally and inevitably result in the determination that a law in conflict with the constitution is invalid. This is the role of the judicial branch in a tripartite system.

 

(iii) Judicial review and democracy

 

80. But is judicial review democratic? Is it democratic that the court –whose judges do not stand for election by the people and do not present a social and political platform – be empowered to invalidate a law enacted by elected officials? (For a discussion of this question in the American literature, see Lahav, “The American Doctrine of Judicial Review: Themes and Variations,” 10 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1984) 491; Horowitz, “American Legal Thought After World War II – 1945-1960,” 16 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1991) 445, 452). The formal answer is simple. The court, in its judicial review of the constitutionality of law, gives effect to the constitution and the Basic Law. Hamilton addressed this point over two hundred years ago (in The Federalist No. 78) in discussing the judicial review of constitutionality in relation to the constitution itself:

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws rather than by those which are not fundamental (Hamilton and Madison et al., The Federalist Papers (1788; Mentor ed. 1961) 467-468).

 

In a similar spirit, Rawls stated the following:

 

A supreme court fits into this idea of dualist constitutional democracy as one of the institutional devices to protect the higher law. By applying public reason the court is to prevent that law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or more likely, by organized and well-situated narrow interests skilled at getting their way. If the court assumes this role and effectively carries it out, it is incorrect to say that it is straight-forwardly antidemocratic. It is indeed anti-majoritarian with respect to ordinary law, for a court with judicial review can hold such law unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the higher authority of the people supports that. The court is not anti-majoritarian with respect to higher law when its decisions reasonably accord with the constitution itself and with its amendments and politically mandated interpretations (J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (1993), supra, at p. 233).

 

However, a formal answer alone is not sufficient. There is a substantive answer as well. The substantive answer is that the judicial review of constitutionality is the very essence of democracy, for democracy does not only connote the rule of the majority. Democracy also means the rule of basic values and human rights as expressed in the constitution. Democracy strikes a delicate balance between majority rule and the basic values of society. Indeed democracy does not mean formal democracy alone, which is concerned with the electoral process in which the majority rules. Democracy also means substantive democracy, which is concerned with the defense of human rights in particular (see Y. Shapira, Democracy in Israel (1977), at p. 35). Professor A. Rubinstein has addressed this matter, noting:

 

The true meaning of democracy includes not only the principle of the will of the majority but also the limitation of the will of the majority. The constant tension between these two poles – the power of the majority and its limitations – is the axis of the democratic process. It may prefer a minority or the individual, as such, to the majority in granting certain rights.(A. Rubinstein, “Israeli Law in the Seventies,” 2 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1972) 271, 274).

 

In a similar vein, Professor Dworkin has noted:

 

True democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which anything a majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that reason, but communal democracy, in which majority decision is legitimate only if it is a majority within a community of equals. That means not only that everyone must be allowed to participate in politics as an equal, through the vote and through freedom of speech and protest, but that political decisions must treat everyone with equal concern and respect, that each individual person must be guaranteed fundamental civil and political rights no combination of other citizens can take away, no matter how numerous they are or how much they despise his or her race or morals or way of life (R. Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain, supra, at p. 35).

 

In fact when the majority strips the minority of its human rights, democracy is infringed (see J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review, (Cambridge 1980)). Judicial review of constitutionality therefore prevails over what is known as the ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma.’ One way to accomplish this is by emphasizing that when judges interpret the constitution and invalidate contradictory laws they give expression to the fundamental values of society that have developed over time. Thus the court safeguards constitutional democracy and maintains the delicate balance upon which it is based. Remove majority rule from constitutional democracy and its essence is harmed. Remove the sovereignty of fundamental values from constitutional democracy and its very existence is called into question. Judicial review of constitutionality enables a society to be true to itself and to honor its basic conceptions. This is the basis for the substantive legitimacy of judicial review. This is also the true basis for the principle of constitutionality itself. We are bound by the constitution that was enacted in the past because it expresses the fundamental outlook of modem society. It may therefore be said that each generation enacts the constitution anew. By means of judicial review we are loyal to the fundamental values that we took upon ourselves in the past, that reflect our essence in the present, and that will direct our national development as a society in the future.

 

It is therefore no wonder that judicial review has become more common. The majority of enlightened democratic states have judicial review. It is difficult to imagine the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, Spain, Italy, and many other nations without judicial review of constitutionality. The twentieth century is the century of judicial review. It imparts real meaning to the principle of constitutionality, to constitutional democracy and to the proper balance between majority rule and human rights, between the collective and the individual. It may be said that whoever argues that judicial review is undemocratic is in effect arguing that the constitution itself is undemocratic. To maintain that judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that safeguarding human rights is undemocratic. To maintain that judicial review is undemocratic is to maintain that defending the rights of the individual against the majority is undemocratic. The democratic nature of the state is not determined by the representative nature of each of its branches but rather by the democratic nature of the government as a whole. In examining the democratic aspect of judicial review, it must be noted that every constitution provides for methods by which it may be amended. As long as these methods are not rigid they allow today’s majority to realize its aspirations. The methods by which a constitution may be amended reflect the balance that the society wishes to maintain between past and present, between long-term values and short-term aspirations, between value and policy. These methods are set forth in the constitution itself and are shaped by political forces. To the extent that these methods are not unduly rigid, they allow today’s majority to express its perceptions and thereby blunt the argument that bases itself on the formal conception of democracy.

 

This argument is further weakened – in effect to its very core – in those legal systems (such as Canada and to a limited extent Israel) that include an override clause. Indeed the override clause (s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation) provides a constitutional means by which today’s political majority may lawfully infringe the constitution. This is not a constitutional amendment, for legislation that infringes the constitution does not change the latter’s provisions. Nevertheless, a constitutional apparatus is created that allows today’s majority to realize its aspirations in a constitutional manner even as it affects values and rights that the constitution wishes to protect (see L.E. Weinrib, “Learning to Live with the Override,” 35 McGill L. J. (1990) 541). Through the override clause, the legal system may prevail over the democratic argument which enables formal democracy to prevail in certain conditions over substantive democracy. Excessive use of this method will, of course, ultimately result in the frustration of the constitutional enterprise itself.

 

(iv) Judicial review and judicial objectivity

 

81. Judicial review expresses the values of the constitution. By means of judicial review the judge makes manifest the ideals of the society in which he lives. He expresses the fundamental conceptions of society as it moves through the shifting sands of history. The judge in particular, who does not face election and who benefits from judicial independence, is worthy of this task. It is precisely because the judge is not elected by the people and does not present them with a social and political platform that  qualifies him express society’s profoundest perceptions without being influenced by the needs of the moment. For this purpose he must operate with judicial objectivity. He must express the outlook of society even if it is not his personal outlook. As I have noted in a previous decision:

 

The judge must reflect the long-term beliefs of society. He must avoid imposing on society his private creed .... This requirement for objectivity places a heavy burden upon the judge. He must be able to distinguish between his personal view of the ideal and the present day reality of society. He must establish a clear division between his personal beliefs and his judicial perceptions. He must recognize that his personal beliefs may not be those of society at large. He must distinguish clearly between his personal credo and that of the nation. He must be self-critical and restrained in his views. He must respect the shackles that bind him as a judge (Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [51], at pp. 781-782).

 

Declaring a law unconstitutional is a serious matter. Such a declaration would seem to undermine the will of today’s majority. It may be justified by the supremacy of the constitution and its values. The justification applies when the judiciary gives expression to the values of society as they are understood by the culture and tradition of the people as it moves forward through history. This justification does not, however, operate when the judge expresses his subjective beliefs. Indeed, judicial objectivity is part and parcel of the basis of judicial review of constitutionality. In granting weight to different considerations, the judge aspires to the best of his ability to achieve judicial objectivity. He reflects neither his personal values nor his personal considerations. The judge reflects ‘the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [52]). Indeed, this extremely difficult task can be achieved only by the professional judge, who has absorbed through years of experience the need to guarantee judicial objectivity, and enjoys total independence. As I noted in a previous case:

 

A professional judge is qualified to shoulder this burden. His education, his experience, and the judicial culture of his time internalize the values of independence and the ability to distinguish between personal views and the requirements of his position. None more than the professional judge is mindful of the limitations placed on him in a democratic society. “Do you imagine that I offer you rulership? It is servitude that I have offered you”‘ (Talmud Horayoth 10a-b (Efrat, supra, at p. 782)).

 

This charge may be undertaken only by a judge, whose outlook is that ‘judging is not a task but a way of life’ (HCJ 732/84 Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [53], at p. 148). It may be undertaken only by a judge, whose entire education brings him to abstract thought, which is based upon reason and not power, the weight of the claim and not the identity of the claimant. Only a judge, who daily experiences the tension between abstract principle and its operation in the mundane life of the litigant before him, may accomplish this difficult task. All of these require an independent judiciary, which develops from the people and reflects the basic social consensus, but does not stand for election every few years, as do Members of Knesset (see M. Perry, Morality, Politics and Law, (1988), at p. 147). In a similar vein, Professor Bickel has stated:

 

When the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and emotions ride high enough [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view ... Not merely respect for the rule of established principles but the creative establishment and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules – that is what our legislators have proven themselves ill equipped to give us. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society ... [The court can] appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry (A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, (1962), at pp. 24-26).

 

Indeed the judge neither wields a sword not controls the purse strings. All he has is his independence. His daily bread is none other than the basic values, which he balances objectively. He does not seek power, nor does he crave to rule. He does not seek to impose his personal views on society. He wishes only to do justice in the case before him and to adjudicate each case justly.

 

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the High Court of Justice has stood – and with it the entire community of Israel – as the bastion of Israeli democracy. The words of Justice Berinson are well known: ‘the court is the most secure and objective refuge that the citizen has in his dispute with the establishment’ (HCJ 287/69 Miron v. Minister of Labour [54], at p. 362). This role was enhanced with the enactment of the Basic Laws regarding human rights. Additional bulwarks have been erected to protect these human rights. The court has been entrusted with the constitutional task of guarding the basic tenets and fundamental values of Israeli society as they are expressed in the Basic Laws (see Wellington, “Standards: Some Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Notes on Adjudication,” 83 Yale L. J. (1973-74) 221). It must balance between the basic values of Israeli society (as they are expressed in the Basic Laws) and the short-term needs of day-to-day life (as they are expressed in regular legislation). It is entrusted with the task of ‘exposing the basic values while rejecting the temporary and transient’ (Efrat, supra, at p. 780).

 

f) Judicial review of constitutionality – Summary

 

82. Neither Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation nor Basic Law: Human Dignity includes an express provision – in the guise of a supremacy clause – addressing the fate of a law that infringes a protected human right without fulfilling the requirements of the Basic Law. This silence – against the background of the recognition, limitation and override clauses – calls into play the basic principles of Israeli law as to the relationship between superior and subordinate norms. These principles include the tenet that the superior norm reigns (lex superior derogat inferior). The court is competent to declare the contradicting norm void. In this manner the court gives expression to the ideals of democracy and the separation of powers. Indeed if the constitution itself is democratic, then judicial review is democratic.

 

On this basis we can now proceed to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which serves as a superior norm, in light of which we will examine the provisions of the Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 5753-1993.

 

C. The Basic Law and the constitutional test derived therefrom

I)  Stages of the constitutional analysis

 

83. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty defines human rights and sets out the limitations imposed upon them. The rights are defined in absolute terms (‘There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity of any person’; ‘There shall be no violation of the property of a person’; ‘There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person’). The limitations imposed do not attach to the rights themselves, but rather are derived from the limitation clause. When a judge encounters a claim that legislation contravenes the directives of the Basic Law, he must conduct a three-phase examination: first, he must determine whether the law indeed infringes a protected human right. In order to do so, the judge must interpret the basic right on the one hand (constitutional interpretation), and the legislation on the other hand (statutory interpretation). The level of proof required is that required in a civil trial, i.e. a preponderance of the evidence or the balance of probability. If the judge concludes that the regular law indeed infringes the basic right, he must move on to the second stage of the examination. He must determine whether infringement of the basic right is lawful, i.e. whether the statute meets the requirements of the limitation clause. Here as well, the level of proof required is that required in a civil trial, i.e. a preponderance of the evidence or  the balance of probability (see R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 137). In order to meet this burden it is sometimes necessary to present a factual basis supporting constitutionality of the law. In some cases, common sense and life experience are sufficient in order to persuade the Court that the infringing law meets the requirements of the limitation clause. If the judge concludes that the infringing law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause, he must then proceed to the third stage of the examination. In this phase the court examines the constitutional remedy. It goes without saying that human rights not safeguarded by Basic Law enjoy the same status accorded them before enactment of the Basic Laws. That certain human rights are anchored in a Basic Law does not detract from the force of the other human rights.

 

II) Burden of proof

 

84. Who bears the burden of proof in the three phases of the constitutional examination? There is no dispute that in the first phase – on which infringement of the constitutional human right is based – the burden of proof is borne by the party claiming injury to a constitutional right. A law is presumed to be constitutional (see HCJ 98/69 Bergman v Minister of Finance, supra, at p. 699), and the party who seeks to rebut this presumption bears the burden of proof. The question arises as to the second phase, which examines the constitutionality of the injury to the constitutional human right. It is commonly accepted that in this phase the burden of proof rests upon the party claiming that the injury was constitutional. This is the rule in Canada (see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed., 1992)) and New Zealand (see P. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993) at p. 861). The first decision of the constitutional court of South Africa adopted this view as to the infringement of human rights safeguarded in the new constitution of South Africa (see S. v. Mekwanyana [112]). This approach was adopted in the opinion of Justice D. Levin in the Clal case (HCJ 726/94, Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [37], supra). On its face, this approach seems to me to be correct. It shifts the burden to the party that should and can bear it – the government. At the same time, this question does not arise in this appeal, and I am therefore prepared to reserve it for further consideration.

 

III) Constitutional examination and the old rule

 

85. The three phases of constitutional examination apply only to legislation enacted after the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The old law is protected under the validity of laws clause, according to which:

This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law (s. 10).

 

Although the effect of the old law has been preserved, it must be interpreted in the spirit of the provisions of the Basic Law (cf. Section 10 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation; see also CrimApp 537/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel [38], supra). The validity of laws clause does not preclude the violation of any constitutional right. Neither does it provide that infringement of the Basic Law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause. The clause does provide a constitutional umbrella for legislation that infringes the Basic Law without fulfilling the requirements of the limitation clause. This clause raises difficult questions. One of them is whether the clause applies to a new law (enacted after the Basic Law came into force) that amends an old law (in effect when the Basic Law came into force). This issue has been discussed extensively by my colleague President Shamgar and I agree with his analysis.

 

II) The first phase: the scope of the right and its infringement

a) The scope of the right

 

86. The scope of a right is determined by its interpretation. This is constitutional interpretation. It is sensitive to the unique character of the document under examination: indeed ‘it is a Constitution we are expounding’ (see McCulloch v. Maryland [96], at p. 407). ‘The interpretation of a regular provision is not the same as the interpretation of a basic constitutional provision’ (EA 2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8], at p. 306). The constitution is interpreted in accordance with the constitutional purpose. The constitutional interpretation must be made ‘from a “broad perspective”‘ (President Agranat in FH 13/60 Attorney-General v. Matana [25], at p. 442). The constitutional purpose may be discerned from language, history, culture and basic principles. A constitutional provision is not enacted in a vacuum and it does not develop in a constitutional incubator. It constitutes part of life itself. Justice Dickson noted as follows:

 

The purpose of the right of freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and, where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be ... a generous, rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and securing for the individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s protection. At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum, and must therefore ... be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd [115], at p. 344).

 

Interpretation from a broad perspective is flexible rather than technical; it is substantive and to the point, rather than legalistic or pedantic (see Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth [83], at p. 81; Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [106], at p. 329). In the following case I discussed interpretation of a human right when it is given constitutional protection in a Basic Law:

 

Now that is has been given a constitutionally enacted basis, it must be interpreted from a “broad perspective” ... “and with the understanding that we are dealing with a directive that dictates a way of life ... we are dealing with human experience, which must suit itself to a changing reality... Therefore the constitutional directive must be interpreted “from a broad perspective” and not in a technical manner ... Hence arises the approach – accepted in enlightened democratic states – that constitutional directives must be interpreted “generously” ... from a “substantive” rather than a “legalistic” approach ... through an approach that treats of the specific issue rather than by a “technical” or “pedantic” approach… (HCJ 2481/93 Dayan v. Wilk [55], at p. 470).

 

In a similar spirit, Justice Strasberg-Cohen noted as follows:

 

The interpretation of a constitutional text must be undertaken from a “broad perspective” and “generously.” The approach should not be technical, “legalistic” or “pedantic”‘ (HCJ 1255/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications  [45], supra).

 

Indeed, constitutional interpretation must be based upon constitutional unity, and not upon constitutional disharmony. It reflects the role of the constitutional text in the structure of government and society. It endows it with the meaning that enables it to fulfill its role in the present and future in the most suitable manner (see HCJ 428/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [9], at p. 595).

 

b) The right to property

 

87. It is in light of this view of interpretation that we must approach the analysis of the constitutional right to property. This right is set forth in s. 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which provides ‘[t]here shall be no violation of the property of a person.’

 

The right to property is thereby given constitutional status. This is an important right. ‘The right to property is the cornerstone of the liberal system. It occupies a central place in liberal ideology, as security for the existence of other rights’ (Lahav, “The Power and the Dominion: The Supreme Court in the First Decade of its Existence,” 14 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1989) 479, 498).

 

Nonetheless, the right to property – like the other rights set forth in the Basic Law – is not absolute. It may be infringed, so long as the infringing law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause. Indeed, property has a “role” in both the private and public spheres. The Basic Law does not define ‘property.’ It is incumbent upon the Court to interpret this right according to its purpose (see Weisman, “Constitutional Protection for Property,” (1995), 42 HaPraklit 8). The word “property” has different meanings, depending upon the context in which it appears. It seems that in the constitutional realm, the basis of the right is the protection of possessions. Property is every interest that has a financial value. Thus property refers not only to “property rights” (in the sense accorded to them under private law – for example, ownership, leasing and easements) but also obligations and rights with property values acquired by public law. ‘The property referred to in the Basic Law is interpreted to include rights that are not property rights in the classic sense’ (Justice M. Cheshin in HCJ 7112/93 Tzudler v. Yosef [30]). Indeed, the right to property guarantees the individual financial freedom. It enables interpersonal cooperation. It enables a person to exercise the autonomy of his personal will. Hence the connection between the protection of property and the protection of human dignity (see J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, (1993), at p. 298). It follows that, in general, expropriation infringes property rights. Just compensation does not remove the infringement but it is likely to be constitutional if it fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause. And I note: the constitutional prohibition applies to the infringement of property. Every infringement violates the prohibition, and shifts the constitutional review to the limitation clause. At the same time, when the infringement of property is incidental or minor – if it can be classified as de minimis – then it will not be regarded as an infringement and there is no need to embark upon the constitutional review of the second phase (cf. Jones v. The Queen [116]). Theoretically it can be said that the right to property is infringed when the property value of an interest is less than its value before the legislation. At the same time, the regular day-to-day activities of the government may influence the value of an individual’s property. Should such activities be viewed as an infringement of property rights, calling for constitutional review under the limitation clause, or should their categorization as an infringement be precluded? We will deal with these questions in the future. I would therefore like to leave for further consideration the “siting” of the discussion that my colleague President Shamgar conducts regarding the enactment of the tax, and whether it ought to be included in the definition of the term “infringement.”

 

88. Determining the scope of the freedom of property is an important task imposed upon the judicial authority. In fulfilling this task it is, of course, appropriate to turn to comparative law. In this matter, a threefold “warning notice” is required. First, the constitutional structures of the various countries differ from one another. The structure of a constitution influences its interpretation. Thus, for example, the constitution of the United States does not protect property in the same way as does our Basic Law. The constitutional structure of the right to property in the American constitution arises from the prohibition against taking without just compensation, and applies to various arrangements that are not related to taking. Similarly the American system lacks an express limitation clause. This makes development of full protection of property difficult in the United States and complicates the constitutional law (B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution, (1977), at pp. 3, 113, 189; Sax, “Takings and the Police Power,” 74 Yale L.J. (1964) 36). Second, the scope of the constitutional right is derived from society’s understanding of its importance. Thus, for example, in the United States – for a variety of historical reasons – constitutional protection of property has been given a relatively low status. Justice Frankfurter discussed this as follows:

 

Those Liberties of the individual which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements’ (Kovacs v. Cooper [97], at p. 95).

 

In contrast, the German system endows this right with primary status. It is viewed as a central right (see D.P. Currie, The Constitution of the Republic of Germany, (1944), at p. 290). In France, the constitutional right to property is safeguarded in the Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (s. 17). French constitutional rhetoric endows this right with great social value. In practice, however, significant infringements are permitted (see J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, (1992), at p. 176). Third, the status of the right, and the balance between the right and the general good is determined, inter alia, by society’s attitude toward the national interest and by the status of the State and the government. The American approach in this regard is unlike the French approach. And both the American and the French approaches differ from that of Israeli society. We see in the State the fulfillment of the dream of generations. Our attitude towards the State is not negative. We do not fear the State. Yet we must ensure that the State does not harm the individual. The balance between individual and community therefore reflects the unique outlook of Israeli society. Great caution is therefore required in considering comparative law in this particular area. However, comparative law is of great importance. It reveals the possibilities concealed in the text. It sheds light upon the arrangements accepted in constitutional democracies. It gives the judge confidence that his interpretation is accepted and functions well in other places. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to transform the servant into a master. We must not enslave ourselves to comparative law. Its strength is in its ability to inspire, and this power is limited. Indeed, we must bear in mind the social and cultural differences between the various communities. We must consider the unique history of the legal system and the different emphases given to particular issues. The words of Justice Holmes in this regard are apt: ‘A page of history is worth a volume of logic’ (New York Trust Co. v. Fisher [98], at p. 349). This is especially so when discussing protection of property, an issue that in most legal systems is immersed in history and social change. Thus, the uniqueness of the right of property in the Israeli constitutional fabric must be determined according to its place in the system of human rights in Israel.

 

 

III) The second phase: the limitation clause

a) The importance of the clause and the relativity of the human right

 

89. The limitation clause (s. 8) of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is a key ingredient in the protection of human rights. It delineates the limits of the right and the limitations upon the legislature. The role of the limitation is twofold. It protects human rights and licenses their infringement, at one and the same time. It expresses the notion of the relativity of human rights. It reflects the basic outlook that human rights exist in a social context that maintains them. It mirrors the underlying view that human rights do not view the individual as an island, but as part of a society with national goals. It is the product of the recognition that while basic human rights must be realized, the national framework must be protected as well. It is intended to permit infringement of human rights in order to maintain the social framework that itself protects human rights. Indeed, the constitutional right and its lawful infringement emanate from the same source (R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 135). Both the constitutional right and its limitation are subject to the same basic principle underlying Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom (s. 1) and its purposes (ss. 1A and 2). The limitation clause provides the foundation for the constitutional balance between private and public, individual and community. It reflects the viewpoint that alongside human rights there are human obligations; that the normative world is not only one of rights but also of obligations; that alongside each right of a human being stands his duty to the community.

 

b) The elements of the limitation clause

 

90. The limitation clause provides four cumulative tests that determine the constitutionality of a law that violates a constitutional human right. The four tests are as follows:

(a) the infringement is made by law or in accordance with law and by means of an express authorization;

(b) the infringing law must be consistent with the values of the State of Israel;

(c) the infringing law must be intended for a proper purpose;

(d) the law may infringe the human right to an extent no greater than is required.

 

In the future, the Supreme Court will be required to define each of these tests. Thus, for example, the requirement that the violation be by law or according to law reflects the principle of legality (see Garibaldi, “General Limitations on Human Rights: The Principle of Legality,” 17 Harv. Int. L. J. (1976) 503. This principle is not merely formal in nature (see Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [107], at pp. 245, 270). The second test refers to the values of Israel as a Jewish state (in the context of both Jewish tradition and Zionism) and as a democratic state. Indeed, we are different from other nations. We are not only a democratic state but also a Jewish state. The Basic Law comes to ‘establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A) (see Elon, “The Way of Law in the Constitution: The Values of the Jewish and Democratic State in Light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,” 17 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1993) 659). One of the important innovations of the Basic Law is its provision that ‘[t]he purpose of the Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1). Those values were thereby given constitutional supra-legislative status. The meaning of the values of the State as a Jewish and democratic state, and a solution to the clash between those values, will certainly occupy us greatly in the future.

 

‘A proper purpose’

 

91. The third element of the limitation clause requires that the purpose be fitting. This element, too, raises significant difficulties, which we may reserve for future consideration. In essence, a purpose is fitting if it serves an important social objective regarding human rights. Thus, legislation intended to protect human rights is certainly intended for a proper purpose. Legislation intended to serve general social goals, such as welfare policies or protection of the public interest is fitting as well. In American constitutional law, distinctions are drawn among the various human rights in determining whether a purpose is worthy. The courts there have created different levels of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, for example, when the injury is to freedom of movement, freedom of expression or racial equality, the highest level of scrutiny applies. In such cases, a purpose will be deemed fitting if it is intended to fulfill a compelling state interest or a pressing public necessity or a substantial state interest. When the harm is gender or age-based discrimination, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies. In such cases the purpose will be deemed fitting if it serves an important governmental objective. The third and lowest level of scrutiny applies when the injury is to economic rights. Here the true test is whether the objective is reasonable.

 

In contrast to the three levels of American law, Canada has developed a unified test. The purpose of the law is fitting if it is directed towards social needs of fundamental importance. It is premature to determine what the Israeli rule will be as to the limitation clause and whether our test should comprise a single level (as in Canada) or multiple levels (as in the United States). It seems to me that for the purposes of the matter before us it is sufficient to determine that the purpose is fitting if it is intended to fulfill important social goals for the establishment of a social framework that recognizes the constitutional importance of human rights and the need to protect them. The normative scope of this importance will be determined with time, in the decisions of the Supreme Court.

 

92. In analyzing the nature of the “proper purpose” my colleague President Shamgar notes that this purpose includes that which was apparent to the legislature (‘the Court examines the purpose that guided the legislature’) as well as that determined by the Court at the time of its opinion (‘it may also become apparent at the time of examination of the final draft of the law and its ramifications’). My colleague notes furthermore that as to determining the purpose that was apparent to the legislature ‘there is a presumption that the legislature acted in good faith, and in any event we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ’.’ Finally, my colleague notes that the purpose of the law is weighed ‘against the violation and its significance.’ This position raises a significant number of problems, which, in my opinion, may and should be reserved for further consideration. My colleague suggests that two ‘purposes’ be examined – that which was apparent to the legislature and that which is revealed to the Court. There are different positions as to this approach in the comparative literature. There are those who believe that, in determining the constitutionality of a law – as in determining the constitutionality of a regulation (when it is claimed that the regulation was adopted out of improper motives) – we must consider only the historic purpose that was before the legislature. Others believe that we must consider both the historic and the modem purposes. Furthermore, if we consider the subjective purpose, we are faced with the problem of examining the legislature’s motive. My colleague the President states that ‘we must not search for the concealed motives of individuals making up the legislative branch, in contrast to the purpose considered by the legislature as a collective legislative organ.’ We must, of course, agree with this. Should we, however, consider the expressed motives of the Members of Knesset? There are differences of opinion as to this issue in the comparative constitutional literature. How can it be proven that legislation was impelled by improper motives (such as discriminatory motives) if we do not permit examination of the motives? Of course, more difficult questions arise as to the means of proof. Finally, my colleague emphasizes the purpose and adds, obiter dictum, that the purpose is balanced ‘against the violation and its significance.’ Here as well, serious problems arise. Some believe that only the purpose is significant and the harm itself should not be considered. An invalid motive invalidates the legislation even if the result is positive. Others believe that the determinant is the effect of the legislation and not its purpose (With regard to all these issues, see Ely, “Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,” 79 Yale L.J. (1970) 1205; Brest, “Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,” Sup. Ct. Rev. (1971) 95; Alexander, “Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality,” 15 San Diego L. Rev. (1978) 925). As noted, these questions are difficult – some of the most difficult in constitutional law. We have no experience in dealing with them and I therefore suggest that they be reserved for further consideration.

 

‘To an extent no greater than is required’

 

93. The final element of the limitation clause is that the injury to the human right must be to an extent no greater than is required. If the previous factor examines the motives of the infringing legislation, this factor examines the means chosen by the legislature. This is a proportionality test. This test examines whether the means chosen by the legislature are appropriate for achieving its objectives (the proper purpose). In the past we have made use of the doctrine of proportionality in the field of administrative law (see HCJ 5510/92 Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [56], at p. 217; HCJ 987/94 Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications [57]; HCJ 3477 Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture & Sport [58]; HCJ 1255/94 “Bezeq” – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister of Communications [45], supra; see also Segal, “The Claim of Lack of Relativity in Administrative Law,” 39 HaPraklit (1991) 507). It has now been given constitutional status. The constitutionality of a statute will now be examined in light of the doctrine. In comparative law too, this test began its development as a test used in administrative law. It is most accepted in European administrative law (see J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992), at p. 677). The doctrine developed particularly in German administrative law (see Zamir, “Israeli Administrative Law in Comparison to German Administrative Law,” 2 Mishpat uMimshal (1994) 109, 130; and Sing, German Administrative Law (1985), at p. 88; Nolte, General Principles of German and European Administrative Law – A Comparison in Historical Perspective, 57 Mod. L. Rev. (1994) 191). From there it moved to the constitutional law of most of the countries of Europe, and elsewhere as well. It is the central test in Canada (see Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (3rd ed., 1992), at p. 875, as well as in South Africa under its new constitution (see S. v. Makwanyana [112], at p. 665)).

 

94. A law infringes a protected human right. The law accords with the values of the State of Israel. It is intended for a proper purpose. How must we decide whether the law infringes human rights ‘to an extent no greater than is required?’ When does a law that infringes a constitutional human right achieve the required proportionality? In comparative law an attempt was made to concretize the principle of proportionality. It seems to me that we should learn from this attempt, which is common to Canada, Germany, the European Community and the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg, for the principle of proportionality does not reflect a unique social history or particular constitutional position. Rather, it is a general analytical position according to which we may examine a law infringing constitutional human rights.

 

95. Comparative law indicates that the examination of the “extent necessary” is divided into three sub-tests. The first sub-test determines that a legislative means that infringes a constitutional human right is fitting if it is appropriate to achieving the purpose. This is the fitness test (geeignt), or the “rational relationship” test. There must be a suitable connection between the goal and the means. The means must be tailored to achieve the objective. The means must lead, in a rational manner, to fulfillment of the goal. The second sub-test establishes that the legislative means that infringe the constitutional human right are fitting only if the goal cannot be achieved by other means that would result in a lesser injury to the human right. This is the middle test of “minimal harm” It is sometimes described as the “principle of need.” The third sub-test requires a balancing of the public good against the private harm arising from the means. There must therefore be a suitable relationship between the means and the purpose (“proportionality in the strict sense”). These three sub-tests were nicely summarized in the leading Canadian case, as follows:

 

There are, in my view, three important components of a proportionality test; first the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should infringe “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question ... Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures, which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” (R. v. Oakes [114], at p. 138).

 

It must be noted that the second sub-test is the most important of the sub-tests for proportionality. That the protected right be infringed as little as possible is the very essence of the requirement that the means be to an extent no greater than is required. This requirement is also textually connected. Indeed, in many cases the purpose is fitting and there is a rational relationship between the purpose and the means chosen. The determining question centers upon the question of whether the legislature chose the means that would result in the most minimal injury. In this regard, the image of rungs on a ladder is commonly employed. The Court determines whether the legislature chose the lowest rung of the ladder. This is the “step theory” (stufentheorie) (see D. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, (1989), at p. 290). In the Pharmacy case [110] – dealing with a limitation of the freedom of occupation – the German constitutional court adopted the theory of steps or rungs. The court determined that infringement of the freedom of occupation can be permitted:

 

[O]nly to the extent that the protection cannot be accomplished by a lesser restriction of freedom of choice. In the event that an encroachment on freedom of occupational choice is unavoidable, lawmakers must always employ the regulative means least restrictive of the basic right’ (translation by Kommers, ibid., at p. 288).

 

Constitutional latitude

 

96. The limitation clause imposes upon the Court a difficult task. It requires sensitivity to the necessity of balancing between the rights of the individual and the public interest. It requires the judge to understand his constitutional role. The directives of the limitation clause may be fulfilled in various ways. A type of ‘limitation margin’ is created (similar to the margin of reasonableness) or ‘margin of harm.’ The Court must protect the boundaries of that margin. It must refrain from crossing the margin. The choice between the various possibilities that lie within the bounds of the margin rests in the hands of the legislature. The principle of the separation of powers places the task of choosing – the task of lawmaking within the margin – upon the legislative authority. The legislature is endowed with the power to choose between the various policy options that fulfill the directives of the limitation clause. The question that the judge must ask himself is not what law would he have enacted, had he been a member of the legislature, in order to properly balance private and public needs. The question that the judge must ask himself is whether or not the balance chosen falls within the limitation margin. The Court must determine the constitutionality of the law, not its wisdom. The question is not whether the law is good, efficient, or just. The question is whether the law is constitutional. A “socialist” lawmaker and a “capitalist” lawmaker may enact different and contradictory laws, all of which fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. The legislature must be accorded a “margin of appreciation” or “latitude for discretion” along the boundaries of the limitation zone. There must be reasonable room to maneuver, enabling the legislature to use its discretion in choosing between (a proper) purpose and means (that infringe to an extent no greater than is required). Every lawmaker has reasonable room to maneuver (see Hogg, ibid., at p. 882; Van Dijk and Van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, (1984), at p. 585). I discussed this in the matter of the administrative authority, as follows:

 

In applying the principle of proportionality – particularly in examining the means causing the least harm – we must recognize the latitude given to the governmental authority. There are a number of ways in which the proportionality requirement may be fulfilled. Often the matter is borderline. In such cases, the authority’s margin of appreciation must be recognized. This margin is similar to the executive authority’s margin of reasonableness.... This recognition of the governmental margin of discretion is based upon the institutional advantage that the governmental authority enjoys in examining the possible alternatives, and in fulfilling its national responsibility – a responsibility imposed by the principle of separation of powers – to implement the proper purpose (Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [58], supra).

 

These words apply with even greater force when the applicable governmental authority is the legislature. Indeed, the determination of social policy – on economic and other matters – is in the hands of the legislature, and the legislature must be given broad legislative latitude. The Court does not determine social policy. That is a matter for the legislature. But if the policy is not constitutional, that is a matter for the Court. Indeed, if the lawmaker deviates from the boundaries of the limitation, there is no recourse but to take a clear judicial stance. In criticizing the American approach to economic rights – which leaves it to the legislature, as the expert in this area, to determine the content of the law without the Court’s constitutional intervention – Tribe writes:

 

But such a belief would hardly justify wholesale abdication to the political process since there exists no type of legislation that can be guaranteed in advance to leave important constitutional principles unimpaired, and there is simply no way for courts to review legislation in terms of the constitutional without repeatedly making difficult substantive choices among competing values, and indeed among inevitably controverted political, social, and moral conceptions. Nor can it suffice to dismiss constitutional review of socioeconomic regulation as uniquely ‘political’; all significant constitutional judgments ... are inescapably political (L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineola, second edition, 1988), at pp. 583-584).

 

97. My colleague the President has cited Professor Hogg’s approach, according to which the various rights should be given a narrow interpretation in order to ensure a careful examination of the legislation in the context of the limitation clause. Professor Hogg reached this conclusion after the experience of some ten years in the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. On its face, it seems to me that this approach is unsuitable. It will ultimately lead to constriction of the right as well as to laxity in guarding against its infringement. At the same time, it seems to me too early at this point to reach any conclusion in the matter of our Basic Law. The case law should be allowed to develop without a priori declarations that certain provisions must be given a broad interpretation while other provisions must be interpreted narrowly. Each provision should be given the interpretation that will fulfill the objective upon which it is based.

 

98. In addressing the question of whether a piece of legislation violates a protected human right to an extent no greater than is required, it is sometimes necessary to examine alternative means. Thus, just as the proportionality test requires that the Court examine the various alternatives that present themselves to the administrative authority, so the Court must examine the various alternatives that were available to the legislature. This is not a task that is beyond the Court’s ability. Constitutional examinations of this nature are undertaken in many countries around the world. ‘Social facts’ and “legislative facts” are brought before the competent court as evidence of the various alternatives. In describing these facts, Hogg notes as follows:

 

Legislative facts are the facts of the social sciences, concerned with the causes and effects of social and economic phenomena. Legislative facts are rarely in issue in most kinds of litigation, but they are often in issue in constitutional litigation, where the constitutionality of a law may depend upon such diverse facts as the existence of an emergency, the effect of segregated schooling on minority children, the relationship between alcohol consumption and road accidents, the susceptibility to advertising of young children, or the effect of pornography on behavior (Hogg, op cit., at p. 1292).

 

Evidentiary foundations of this type are presented every day around the world to courts dealing with constitutional problems. Upon this foundation the Court decides, always cognizant that it is not the lawmaker, and that policy is determined by the lawmaker and that the lawmaker is given a wide latitude in which to maneuver. Anyone who reviews the opinions of courts treating of constitutional determinations has studied the wealth of evidentiary material brought before the courts, as well as the courts’ ability to grapple with such problems. In the United States, this practice has been recognized since the beginning of the century. It is known as the “Brandeis Brief,” after the author of the first systematic and scientific document to be submitted to the Court in reliance upon research tools from the field of social sciences. The Court expects the parties – particularly the party bearing the burden of proof – to present an evidentiary foundation that will enable the Court to decide whether the requirement that the legislation be only “to the extent necessary” has been fulfilled. There is substantial literature on this subject throughout the world (see Karst, “Legislative Facts in Constitutional Legislation,” Sup. Ct. Rev. (1960) 75; Baade, ‘Social Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany,’ J. Politics (1961) 421-423). Justice La Forest has discussed this, noting as follows:

 

I must underline as strongly as I can the importance of producing evidence ... One of the major challenges in a s. 1 analysis is to identify and weigh the rights or interests served by a provision impugned as violating a guaranteed right. Particularly in areas outside the ordinary ken of lawyers, evidence will be required to enable courts to deal with the issue at all (La Forest, “The Balancing of Interests Under the Charter,” II N.J.C.L. 133, 143).

 

In order to fulfill its obligation, the Court and the lawyers appearing before it must develop additional skills, which will enable them to grapple with the “social facts.” Antonio Lamer, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, discussed this, noting that the constitutional revolution in Canada in the field of human rights requires the Court and the lawyer to grapple with a new sort of evidentiary foundation:

 

These developments require lawyers and judges to have a whole new range of skills. We need to be able to look intelligently to questions of social policy, to identify the sorts of expertise that the particular problem requires, to deal with material from a wide range of disciplines and to interact effectively with persons who possess many sorts of expertise. In addition to the traditional technical skills of the lawyer, we need a deep understanding of the most fundamental principles of the law, an understanding which is broad enough to relate to a wide variety of other disciplines (Lamer, “Canada’s Legal Revolution: Judging in the Age of the Charter of Rights,” 28 Isr. L. Rev. (1994) 579, 581).

 

Chief Justice Lamer further notes that the courts of Canada developed judicial techniques in order to deal with social facts:

 

Courts now are routinely receiving a good deal of what can be referred to as social fact evidence. This sort of evidence is often directed to questions of what is the impact of legislation on society and what would be the impact of alternative ways of confronting the social problem. This kind of evidence is like that which is relevant in proceedings before a Parliamentary Committee when proposed legislation is being considered. Particularly where the question is whether certain laws are justified in a free and democratic society, debate in the Courts sometimes resembles proceedings before a House Committee in that the benefits and burdens of the legislation and its alternatives have to be weighed in light of the best available information about the needs of society and the nature of the problem addressed (ibid., at p. 582).
 

Just as the courts and lawyers in Canada can undertake such an investigation, so can we. Of course we must always remember that the legislature is endowed with legislative room to maneuver; that the question is not what is the ideal legislative arrangement, but what is the legislative arrangement that can be expected in the context of the Israeli constitutional regime as a whole; that the Court does not determine the constitutional paradigm that it deems best but examines the constitutionality of the legislative formula established by the legislature; that in marginal cases, the legislature must be given reasonable latitude in its legislative choice. The court must be convinced that among the available legislative options, the legislature chose that which least infringed the constitutional right. What is demanded is not an ideal choice.

 

D. The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993

I) Application of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty

 

99. The Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law 5753-1993 (hereinafter, the “Amended Sector Law”) was enacted after the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty came into effect. Accordingly, the validity of laws clause does not apply to this law. In this matter I agree with President Shamgar’s position. Of course, the original law – which was enacted before the adoption of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – is not subject to constitutional review. It enjoys the normative protection accorded to established law by s. 10 of the Basic Law.

II) The first phase: does the Amended Sector Law infringe a constitutional right?

 

The first constitutional question that arises is whether the Amended Sector Law infringes the right of property. In my opinion there can be no doubt that the answer to this question is affirmative. The Amended Sector Law infringes the ownership rights of creditors. It permits cancellation of unpaid debt, thereby infringing the property rights of the creditors. The infringement is not trivial – whether the debt is significant or insignificant, the creditor’s right is infringed. We must therefore determine whether the infringement of the property right is lawful, i.e. whether it fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

III) The second phase: whether the Amended Sector Law fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause

a) ‘The law’; ‘the values of the state of Israel’

 

101. Does the Amended Sector Law fulfill the conditions of the limitation clause? It has not been contended that infringement of the property right is not ‘by law.’ This condition has therefore been fulfilled. Is the Amended Sector Law consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state? The question is whether the new law, which provides for cancellation of debt – essentially, an extensive bankruptcy arrangement – in order to liberate the agricultural sector from potential ruin by imposing the burden upon the creditors, is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague answers this question affirmatively. I share his opinion, and for the same reasons.

 

102. My colleague the President criticizes the lower court (in LCA 1908/94 and 3363/94) for not having properly considered the court’s role in determining whether legislation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague writes as follows:

 

The court does not sit in judgment in order to administer the State economy. It does not rewrite the law. It does not transform secondary into primary in order to determine that legislation that it deems defective or otherwise wanting  is inconsistent with the values of the State of Israel. The court is not called upon to declare what, in its opinion, would be a more fitting or enlightened legislative solution. The court is called upon to determine, in the context of s. 8, whether the subject statute, according to its general purpose, is grosso modo consistent with a Jewish and democratic state.

 

It is certainly true that the court does not administer the State economy. But the court is required to determine whether the legislation by which the State economy is administered is consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Consider legislation controlling administration of the media, which, it is claimed, infringes freedom of expression. The court does not administer the media, but must determine whether legislation infringing freedom of expression is consistent with the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Or consider legislation providing for the manner of execution of judgments, which, it is claimed, infringes the debtor’s freedom or the creditor’s property rights. The court must examine such claims. In these cases, there is, of course, no call for the court to rewrite the law, or to transform the primary into the secondary or vice versa. Nor is the court asked to give its opinion on the wisdom or justice of the legislative solution. Nonetheless, the court is required – and cannot be freed of this requirement – to determine whether the legislation is consistent with the values of the State of Israel. My colleague President Shamgar quotes the opinion of Justice Black in the case of Ferguson v. Skrupa [88]. This opinion must be understood in the context of the historical development of Supreme Court’s approach to substantive due process and the case of Lochner v. New York [99] (see J. E. Nowak and R. D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law (4th ed. 1991), at p. 362). This history is foreign to us. The American distinction between basic rights (regarding which constitutional scrutiny is strictest) and the economic freedom of the state (regarding which constitutional scrutiny is most lenient) does not accord with our constitutional structure, in which freedom of occupation, one of the basic human rights, enjoys the same constitutional status as other human rights. The trauma experienced in America as a result of the Lochner case [99] must not bring Israeli law to a standstill. We must, over the course of the years to come, adopt a comprehensive constitutional philosophy, based upon the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. We must determine whether in the context of the limitation clause, different levels of scrutiny should be developed (as to the nature of the appropriate purpose and means) for the different rights, or whether we should adopt a uniform level of scrutiny.

 

103. My colleague President Shamgar criticizes the determination of one District Court that the Amended Sector Law is not consistent with the values of the State of Israel because it applies only to moshavim (and not to kibbutzim). In the President’s opinion, this determination is ‘an example of a misguided basic approach, according to which only if the scope of the general application of the law meets the court’s satisfaction, can it be concluded that it is consistent with the values of the State of Israel.’ My colleague notes further that ‘economic legislation resulting from economic policy determines the scope of its application in light of the legislature’s discretion and in light of various economic factors that are not within the court’s knowledge or expertise. This is not why the court was given the power of constitutional review.’ My colleague cites in this context ‘the decision of the Canadian legislature not to include in the constitution the subject of infringement of property.’ In my opinion, this criticism is too general and too sweeping. The key point is that in Israel, unlike Canada, the right to property is a constitutional right. The court is charged with protecting the right to property, just as it is charged with protecting other constitutional rights. We have not yet been presented with the question of whether all rights enjoy constitutional protection of the same magnitude or whether the level of protection varies according to the nature of the right. It is too early to take a stand on this important question. In principle, the District Courts acted properly in taking into consideration the principle of equality as one of the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and in examining the legislation before us in light of that principle. At the same time, I agree with my colleague the President that in the case before us – after extensive consideration – it cannot be said that the arrangements in one sector inherently discriminate against other sectors.

 

b) A proper purpose

 

104. A law infringing a constitutional human right protected by the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is constitutional only if it is intended for a proper purpose. My colleague the President has deemed as fitting the purpose for which the Amended Sector Law was enacted. I agree with this conclusion. Whether we take a subjective approach to this analysis (legislative intent) or whether our approach is objective (legislative purpose), the purpose is fitting according to both criteria. The purpose is to ensure the rehabilitation of certain debtors and to prevent the collapse of their life’s work. This is a sort of emergency legislation intended to protect the existence of the moshav members. This purpose was intended to fulfill an important social goal. It is similar to the legislation in regard to cancellation of debt in bankruptcy. It expresses the policy of the welfare state. It recognizes the constitutional importance of the protection of human rights, and the need to protect them (debtors and creditors). It seems to me that this proposition is sufficient for the appeals before us.

 

c) To the extent necessary

 

105. As we have seen, an examination as to whether the legislation infringes the constitutional right “to an extent no greater than is required” includes three sub-tests. The first test is of “fitness” or “rational relationship.” It is met in our case. The second sub-test is the test of “the 1east intrusive means” or the “needs” test. The law infringes the basic right to an extent no greater than is required if the legislature chose – from the array of means available – the means that infringed the protected human right to the least extent possible. The legislature must begin at the “rung” that does the least harm, and slowly ascend, until it reaches the rung at which the proper purpose can be achieved without infringing the human right more than necessary. In determining the appropriate level we must bear in mind that the legislature has been accorded reasonable legislative latitude. The court must demonstrate flexibility and must recognize the difficult choices faced by the legislature, the effect of its choice on the various sectors of society and the institutional advantage enjoyed by the legislature in examining these factors.

 

106. Does the Amended Sector Law infringe creditors’ rights more than to the extent necessary? Or does this law fall within the bounds of the wide latitude given to the lawmaker? The Attorney-General has described the dilemma that faced the legislature. This dilemma is expressed in the Explanatory Note to the proposed Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) Law (Hatzaot Hok (Draft Laws), 1992, at p. 92):

 

The proposed law is intended to create a new framework in order to solve the crisis that has loomed over the agricultural sector for quite some years. Its general purpose is to facilitate rehabilitation of the agricultural sector by favoring rehabilitation over dissolution, while at the same time stemming the outflow of money from public coffers. It now seems that circumstances require legislative intervention in presenting a settlement arrangement to the agricultural sector since the various other settlements did not prove to be effective, left the agricultural sector in deep crisis and, at times, exacerbated the situation.’

 

In this context, the 1987 settlement (the “Ravid Settlement”) has been cited, according to which an administration was established which was to determine an arrangement for settling the bank debt of each moshav. Participation was voluntary for debtors and those non-bank creditors who signed the agreement, which included “‘veto rights” for each party as to the administration’s determinations. We have been told that because of the voluntary participation clause and the veto rights, the Ravid Settlement did not succeed, and by its terms only some 30% of the debts of the agricultural sector were settled (approximately one and a half billion shekels). Against this background, there was no alternative to the legislative solution. This solution is based upon ‘radical treatment of the crisis facing the Israeli agricultural system’ (Attorney-General’s Response, at p. 13). Under this “radical treatment” a “receiver” was appointed in order to analyze the debt of the moshav and its members, and to formulate a rehabilitation plan taking into account the debtors’ repayment ability and the magnitude of remaining debt. Against this background – and in light of the experience of the original law – a number of legal questions arose, which the Amended Sector Law attempted to solve, and which my colleague President Shamgar noted in the introduction to his opinion. The Attorney-General contends that these amendments do not exceed the extent necessary, and that they fall within the bounds of legislative latitude. In this regard, the Attorney-General notes that ‘it is clear that the crisis continues’ and demands an expeditious solution. The Attorney-General notes, as well, that the harm does not exceed the extent necessary ‘when, in effect, we are dealing with a creditor arrangement that comes to replace other acceptable arrangements such as bankruptcy, liquidation and dissolution under which creditors’ rights can be infringed’ (ibid., at p. 61). Against this background the Attorney-General contends that ‘the infringement does not exceed the extent necessary, when the infringement itself is unclear, i.e. to what extent can the creditor collect its claim if it is not included within the scope of the law and, on the other hand, infringement of the legislative purpose without the amending law is certain’ (ibid., at p. 62). The Attorney-General emphasized that:

 

The legislature’s efforts to save the agricultural-moshav sector by permitting certain damage to creditors come after attempts to solve the crisis in various ways, both by means of assistance from State and Jewish Agency funding sources and by means of voluntary settlement arrangements. After all of these attempts failed, the legislature enacted the main law, the motive of which was finally to settle the debts of the agricultural sector. The main law is not before the Court today, nor are the clauses of section 15 as to automatic reduction, which is the primary infringement of the main law. Before the Court are the relevant provisions of the amending law, which do not cancel the creditors’ right to collect or sue for collection of the debt, but rather propose a different settlement, which may infringe the possibility of collecting part of the debt. In this situation, when the lawmaker’s intention and purpose are to rescue the agricultural sector and assist in its rehabilitation, the legislature’s choice was made in the context of its “broad legislative latitude.”

 

Alternatively, the Attorney-General requested that – if we are unconvinced that the means chosen do not exceed the extent necessary –

[T]he Court allow submission of a factual and legal foundation in order to prove that the conditions of the limiting clause have been proven, in light of the fact that we are dealing with the invalidation of legislation. The lower court’s decision should not be left in effect merely because the Court was not presented with enough evidence (ibid., at p. 66).

 

107. Against this background, the question before us is whether or not we are convinced that the legislature enacted measures that do not exceed the extent necessary, and, whether or not this instance falls within the bounds of the broad legislative discretion given to the legislature. I have given considerable thought to this question and contemplated the possibility of granting the Attorney-General’s alternative request to return the case to the District Court for renewed consideration. In the end, I am convinced that this is a borderline case that falls within that area permitting the lawmaker to design a legislative arrangement at its discretion, and that further analysis of the “social facts” is not justified. In light of the proper purpose which deals with solving the deep crisis into which the agricultural sector has fallen – it seems to me that the means chosen by the legislature in the Amended Sector Law does do harm to creditors, but that this harm does not exceed the extent necessary and, in any event, falls on the lawful side of the fence. In reaching this conclusion I considered the possibility of voluntary settlement and concluded that it is not a viable alternative (in light of the failed attempt). Similarly, I considered other legislative arrangements proposed by the parties, which must be rejected in the absence of any relevant supporting analysis. In the end, we are left with the legislative arrangement chosen by the Knesset after consideration and examination, and I have not found – after taking the relevant considerations into account – that it goes beyond the domain to be left within the discretion of the legislature in a democratic society. In this regard I have also given weight to the fact that we are dealing with the first instances to come before the courts, and that, in the absence of constitutional experience, the existing evidentiary potential was not realized, nor were all the social data in the hands of the State presented in order to prove its contentions.

For these reasons I concur with the conclusion of my colleague the President that the appeals in HCJ 1908/94 and HCJ 3363/94 should be granted and that the cases should be returned to the lower court for continued review as to the matter itself. Similarly, for these reasons I concur in denying the appeal in HCJ 6821/93. In light of my position, I propose that there be no order of costs.

 

Summary

 

108. I have therefore reached the following three conclusions: First, that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is accorded constitutional supra-legislative status; that this conclusion may be reached in a number of ways and that choosing among them is not necessary for this appeal, although the position that seems to me most fitting is that which recognizes the Knesset’s power to enact a constitution for Israel at the highest normative level (constituent authority); that this Basic Law constitutes a superior norm, in light of which we must examine the constitutionality of ‘regular’ legislation that infringes a constitutional human right protected by the Basic Law, and that the Basic Law may be amended only by Basic Law. Second, that a “regular” law adopted by the Knesset (by whatever majority) cannot infringe a human right protected by the Basic Law unless it fulfill the requirements of the limitation clause. If a “regular” law does not fulfill those requirements it is unconstitutional, whether it explicitly state its intention to infringe a human right protected by the Basic Law, or whether the infringement be implicit. Third, that the Court in Israel is endowed with the power of judicial review of the constitutionality of a law. It must examine (in the first stage) whether the “regular” law (adopted after the enactment of the Basic Law) infringes a protected human right. The Court must determine (at the second stage) whether the infringement fulfills the requirements set out in the limitation clause. If the Court reaches the conclusion that a basic right has been infringed, without the requirements of the limitation clause having been met, it is empowered to prescribe constitutional remedies, among them declaring the law (or part thereof) void. Fourth, that the provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty according to which ‘property rights shall not be infringed’ is to be interpreted to include obligatory rights, and therefore legislation that diminishes the right of a creditor to claim his debt violates his right to property. Fifth, that the limitation clause – in requiring that the law infringe a human right to an extent no greater than is required – imposes a test of proportionality, composed of three ancillary tests: rational relationship, need and proportionality (in its narrow meaning), while recognizing the legislature’s broad legislative discretion. Finally, that in the appeals before us, we are convinced that the infringement of the creditors’ property rights fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

Conclusion

 

109. The enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty brought about a constitutional revolution in the status of human rights in Israel. A number of rights were transformed into constitutional supra-legislative rights. The Israeli politic became, with regard to human rights, a constitutional politic. Israeli law was constitutionalized. Constitutional human rights affect all branches of the law (public and private) and influence their nature and substance. If in the past human rights were derived from the various branches of the law, from now on the various branches of law will be derived from human rights. Moreover, there has been a change in the constitutional discourse. If in the past the legal discourse focused on the question of jurisdiction, power and discretion (legislative, administrative and judicial), from now on the discourse will be one of rights and liberties. No longer will it be the administrative power that determines human rights, but rather human rights, in their correct balance, will determine the power of the administration. This constitutional change was effected by the Knesset, which imposed limitations upon itself as well as upon the other governmental authorities. All of these impose a heavy responsibility upon the governmental bodies, which are obligated to protect human rights. We are now in a difficult transitional period in which we must adapt to a new constitutional framework. There is much uncertainty and doubt. There are dangers, some of which have been pointed out by my colleague President Shamgar. Certainly, the judicial authority must exercise great restraint. It must properly understand its role in a democratic state. This role does not involve determining the social policy of the State. The judicial authority does not determine the national priorities. The judge’s role is to oversee the constitutionality of the policies set by the political bodies. The judge’s role is to zealously protect the delicate balance between majority rule and basic human rights and values. The judge’s role is to defend the constitution and safeguard human rights. It is true that a constitutional determination has political ramifications. Nonetheless, it is not made of political considerations. The judge’s considerations are legal-constitutional in nature. I am convinced that in time we will formulate for ourselves judicial criteria for exercising of our constitutional discretion. Uncertainty will diminish. Doubts will lessen. In consolidating our judicial experience we will act with objectivity, with humility and with the requisite judicial courage. We are not the first to face tests of this sort. Just as other countries have succeeded, it can be assumed that we too will face challenges and that in the end, Israeli democracy will emerge strengthened. Indeed, there is now the possibility that the constitutional change will be internalized; that human rights will become the ‘daily bread’ of every girl and boy; that the awareness of rights – rights of children, the disabled, the elderly, the ill, employees, minorities and women – will increase; and that we will become more sensitive to the rights of human beings as such. The prospect is that rule will be based on law, and not law on rule. The prospect is of increased awareness in the Knesset of its constitutional role, and reinforced recognition by the nation of its central status in framing Israel’s constitution. The prospect is of recognition of the Court’s role as guardian of the constitution, balancing the constitutional values established in the constitution and supervising the constitutionality of administrative activity. The prospect is of the ascent of the glory of human rights, and enhanced goodwill and fellowship among human beings, each born in the image of the Creator.

 

*               P.M. 1994 (3) 243, at p. 263.

full text (continued): 

Justice D. Levin

1. It was with great interest and attention that I reviewed the learned, profound, extensive and edifying opinions of President Shamgar and of President Barak, which deal thoroughly with all the important matters of principle before the Court in the present proceedings. It would appear that if I were to attempt a broad review of the factual background and the legal basis of the questions at hand, I would be ‘bringing coals to Newcastle,’ which would be pointless.

2. In the Clal case [37], I set forth a clear and detailed statement of my own established view of the supra-legislative status of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and their supra-legislative constitutional status as a central part of the Israeli constitution that is being drafted chapter by chapter. My colleagues, Justice Strasberg-Cohen and Justice Tal, concurred with my opinion on all the fundamental and value-related issues and my analysis of the constitutional aspect of the Basic Laws. They disagreed only with my conclusion with regard to the proportionality of the legislation in the circumstances of the said case.

I will now briefly address what was stated in my aforementioned opinion, in so far as is relevant to presenting my views on the issues before the Court.

3. I believe that it is both appropriate and necessary to address, at some length, a number of issues that are at the heart of the case before us, and to express my opinion regarding them. The following are the issues to which I will refer:

(a) The source of the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws on a supra-legislative constitutional level.

(b) The constitutional status of the aforementioned Basic Laws, the relationship between them, and the source of the values and principles that are realized by these laws, either expressly or implicitly.

(c) How should the basic human rights that are protected by these Laws be addressed, and what protection is given to the citizen against infringement of these rights?

(d) What infringement of these basic rights is permitted, and how may the legality of such an infringement be tested under the principles of the limitation clauses set out in each of those two Laws?

(e) How should the Court fulfill its role and exercise its authority in safeguarding the basic rights and values in the aforementioned Laws? What is their appropriate interpretation, and how and to what extent should the Court extend its protection to those enjoying protection under the law, so that their rights not be infringed beyond what is permissible and necessary?

(f) What is the purpose of the Principal Law, and what is the intention of the later, Amending Law? In this context it is necessary that we address the question of the extent to which these laws infringe Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, s. 3 of which states:

There shall be no violation of the property of a person.

 

And if there is such an infringement, to what extent may it be tolerated under the principles and criteria of the limitation clause (s. 8) in the aforementioned law?

(g) In light of all that we shall say, what determination is required in the matter at hand?

4. My two colleagues, former President Shamgar and the current President, reach in their opinions the identical conclusion that the Knesset enacted the two aforesaid Basic Laws at the supra-legislative constitutional normative level and established primary basic rights at the constitutional level, which may not easily be infringed. Let me simply and clearly state that my opinion is identical to theirs.

Alongside this essential agreement, there is a difference in their approaches in regard to the important question of the source of the Knesset’s authority to promulgate and grant the people legislation on the said normative level. President Shamgar prefers to define the Knesset’s authority in terms of what he defines as “the theory of Knesset sovereignty,” which, as he explains in his opinion and conclusion, is that the Knesset, as a legislative body in every sense, is empowered to establish different levels of legislation. President Barak prefers to determine that the authority lies in what President Shamgar defines as “the theory of constituent authority.” According to this theory, the Israeli Knesset, acting in its capacity as legislature, carries out its work wearing two hats: one, insofar as ordinary legislation is concerned, represents and signifies the source of its authority in its designated role as the legislative body that is responsible for ongoing legislation; while the other hat, insofar as constitutional or supra-constitutional legislation is concerned, represents its authority and status as a constituent authority that stands in the stead of the Constituent Assembly that was elected to establish a constitution for the state, yet passed from the world without realizing its goal.

Justice Cheshin completely disagrees with both of my aforesaid colleagues, for reasons of his own, which have received a full exposition. I do not agree with his opinion, nor do my colleagues, who disagreed with him for reasons that also express my opinion.

At first glance, one might ask what difference does it make which theory is chosen if both positions ultimately lead to the same conclusion that the Israeli Knesset is empowered to enact legislation on a constitutional level? But this is not the case. This is not a hypothetical debate. This is no mere academic disagreement. My colleagues are not arguing over a semantic question, but rather over a substantive, significant principle concerning values, which is of consequence now and in the future for the framing of a constitution.

5. In my opinion in the Clal case [37], I sided with the proponents of the view that the aforementioned Basic Laws, and all other legislation of a constitutional nature that emanates from the Knesset, are rooted in the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority. It may therefore be said that my opinion in this matter is that of President Barak. In his opinion, President Barak explains why he is of the opinion that the Knesset acts as a constituent authority with regard to constitutional legislation. His opinion relies upon a broad historical and factual foundation and upon the legal logic that derives from and is implied by this foundation. This legal conclusion is strengthened by viewing the issues through the comparative prism of the constitutions of other enlightened democracies.

I adopt his explanation and concur in it, but I am not content with that. I would like to clarify my aforestated position from another angle as well, one which I consider to be of fundamental importance, and worthy of emphasis.

6. The Basic Laws that have been enacted over the years, and which have been granted constitutional status, constitute chapters and blocks in the constitutional temple that will be established upon the foundations and cornerstone of the Declaration of Independence. Every decision in matters of principle and values handed down by this Court over the years that has established binding precedent in relation to protected fundamental rights, and that has aggressively extended their protection, originated in and was inspired by the Declaration of Independence.

Since gaining independence, it has always been our view that the Declaration of Independence provides the clearest expression of the national credo. It identifies Israel as a free nation and an enlightened democracy, founded upon the values that characterize a democratic regime, and upon the essential values of Judaism and its ethical heritage.

7. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence, with all of its ethical content, was never juridically recognized as being of constitutional force, nor ever regarded as binding law. Nonetheless, the Declaration of Independence has always been perceived in our consciousness as accurately reflecting and permanently establishing the fundamental principles and values that, in our view, serve as our guiding light, our Urim and Thummim, when we set out to establish a constitution.

Therefore, from the very start, this Court saw fit to look to the Declaration of Independence as a principal source in interpreting the law and, above and beyond this function, as a spotlight that lights our way in shaping the basic civil rights and their actual implementation in communal life (see in this regard the decision of Justice Agranat in HCJ 73/53, at p. 87 [4]; the opinion of Justice Landau in HCJ 243/62 [39]; and also EA 2/84, at p. 3 [8] and EA 2/88 Ben Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset [59]).

8. What values, principles, foundations and ideas were explicitly incorporated into the Declaration of Independence or implied by the spirit of the Declaration? I will note only those that I believe to be important in the present context, and not necessarily in the order of their substantive importance:

(a) A constitution shall be established, under which the elected officials and the institutions of the state shall be established and shall function;

(b) The State shall be properly established, in accordance with its constitution and on the basis of its national credo, on the foundations of ‘freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel’;

(c) The State of Israel shall be established on the basis of those democratic principles that shall properly be expressed in the constitution; it shall establish basic civil rights on an ethical footing and shall implement ‘complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture… and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’;

(d) The constitution shall be established by means of an elected Constituent Assembly on or before October 1, 1948, and in the meantime the regular legislation required shall be enacted by the People’s Council as a Provisional Council of State until the regular, elected institutions of the state are established in accordance with the constitution, including, appropriately, the legislative assembly which shall be responsible for the ongoing task of legislation.

It may be concluded from the foregoing that the architects of the Declaration of Independence intended that the task of legislation was to be carried out at two levels and along two parallel paths: a constitution by the constituent authority (the elected Constituent Assembly), in which fundamental human rights as envisaged by the prophets of Israel would receive their expression; while on the other hand the day-to-day legislation would be carried out by a legislature properly so-called (initially by the authority of the Provisional Council of State, and later on under the authority of the legislative body that would be established under the constitution). This is the intention that, in my opinion, arises from the Declaration [of Independence] regarding the matter at hand.

9. As shown in the surveys laid out in the opinions of my colleagues, this original intent was not realized: that is, that the Constituent Assembly, elected by the people, would succeed in establishing a constitution by October 1, 1948. In order to ensure continuity and the orderly functioning of the state institutions in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, the Constituent Assembly became, with the agreement of its members, the First Knesset and, by virtue of the Transition Law, it – and subsequent Knessets under similar legislative provisions – was invested at that time with the powers granted to the legislature, the aim of which was to ensure that, alongside the legislation necessary for day-to-day life, the Knesset would also deal with the framing of the constitution, chapter by chapter, in the form of Basic Laws (see the Harrari Decision, to which my colleagues refer). It may be stated that in fact the Knesset was equipped with two staffs. One was that of constituent authority, which came in place of the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the constitution; and the other was that of the regular legislature, for the enactment of the regular laws, for which purpose the Knesset replaced the Provisional Council of State.

In my view, the actions of the Knesset as a legislature, in the two aforementioned separate paths and at different levels, has existed in the past, exists in the present, and should continue to exist, not only on the basis of the authority granted it in the Transition Laws. Even following the enactment of Basic Law: The Knesset, which states nothing explicit in this regard, the authority of the Knesset as regards constitutional legislation derived from its status as a constituent authority. We have seen that the foundations of that view lie in the principles and in the approach that were set out in the Declaration of Independence. That Declaration, as stated, constitutes a principal source for interpretation of the law, including the Basic Laws.

Similarly, in respect to the explanation for the source of the Knesset’s authority to enact constitutional legislation, we are permitted and even required to be guided by the letter and spirit of the Declaration of Independence. There would appear to be no doubt that the Declaration of Independence attributed the utmost importance to the establishment of a constitution, since it was to be established by a constituent authority that was to dedicate itself seriously to drafting this creation and which was particularly endowed with the authority to enrich us with constitutional legislation.

It is right and proper that legislation at this level should be elevated above the work of ordinary legislation and those charged with its enactment.

 10. The establishing of supra-legislative constitutional norms, the creation of fundamental human rights and the crafting of a constitution which grounds the institutions of government and establishes their roles upon a foundation of democratic values are different from enacting everyday legislation on routine matters. The framing of a constitution (and the Basic Laws are none other than chapters in the future constitution) and conferring upon the people is cause for celebration in every enlightened, democratic regime. It is assumed that the task of establishing a constitution is the responsibility of a legislature that approaches its task with humility, trepidation, dedication, and seriousness, holding a staff engraved with the values and principles granted to it in its capacity as a constituent authority. This differs from the task of everyday and ongoing legislation, which should also be carried out faithfully and with the requisite level of care, but the staff of everyday legislation is smooth and normally free of constitutional principles and values.

It is customary, as stated above, to portray the Knesset as a legislative authority that wears two “hats,” one for constitutional matters and the other for ordinary legislation, and I maintain that it is more appropriate to symbolize the duality of the role of the legislature and its members by having them don the cloak of the constitutional legislator as against the ready-made suit of the regular legislator. This graphic description emphasizes the legislative hierarchy that was anticipated in the Declaration of Independence, which accords the constitutional enterprise a different, more radiant appearance, prestige and luster, than that accorded to legislation at the regular normative level. As stated, we are not dealing here with semantics, but with an important, clear distinction between the grayness of the regular law and the power, stability and authority that radiate from constitutional legislation – a distinction between the status of the legislative creator of the regular gray law and that of the legislator who creates eternal constitutional values for the nation.

11. It appears to me that this problematic nature, which was examined in detail by my colleagues, is a function of the extended period of time that has passed from the time that the Constituent Assembly was elected to establish a permanent constitution for the country, and the present. The statement in the Declaration of Independence that the constitution would be established no later than October 1, 1948 (in other words, within the space of a few months) was a worthy aspiration but not a realistic one, since the drafting of a constitution requires in-depth consultation, careful deliberation and profound seriousness regarding every subject and issue that is appropriate to a constitution; adaptation of principles and values to the national political entity just created and renewed; and above all the formation of a broad national consensus and general backing for the constitution. Such a weighty, distinguished legislative task cannot and should not seriously be undertaken in such a short space of time.

The Constituent Assembly reached this same conclusion, and as a result it was decided that the constitution would be adopted in stages, chapter by chapter, so that it would ultimately be combined into a comprehensive constitution. It was assumed that within a number of years the constitutional edifice would stand in all its glory, but unfortunately that was not the case. The delay in the process has ostensibly created a lack of clarity regarding constitutional questions of the highest order and a decline in the values and principles that have guided us since the earliest days of the State, in accordance with the content of the Declaration of Independence. It is therefore fitting to welcome the dramatic, important, albeit overdue, change brought by the enactment of the aforementioned Basic Laws. We can hope that the task of framing the constitution may be completed in the foreseeable future.

Yet the very fact that the completion of the chapters of the constitution has been delayed does not and should not alter or influence the source of authority of the legislature as it promulgates legislation at a constitutional level. As I have already stated, my opinion is that this task was given over to a constituent authority, and that this source exists and shall continue to exist until such time as the task of framing the constitution is completed as anticipated.

As they enacted these aforementioned laws and earlier Basic Laws, Members of Knesset saw themselves acting as a constituent authority; and they had a basis for so believing, as much as the appropriate interpretation of the source of their authority is derived from and inspired by the Declaration of Independence. As I have described, the Declaration envisioned that a constitution would be established by a specific constituent authority. The source of the authority should be interpreted in that spirit. This is what has been done, and this is how we ought to act.

12. The aforementioned Basic Laws stem back to March 1992, when they first came into force. Their enactment brought a substantive change in the status of human rights in Israel, which became basic “supra-legislative” constitutional rights, as President Barak justly noted at the beginning of his opinion. Indeed, there was an important change in Israel.

Yet this change, which was powerful and of immense value from the outset, had a significant follow up with the amendment of the two Basic Laws (primarily Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). These laws, in their updated, amended form, came into force on March 9, 1994; and introduced fundamental principles that were not previously included in these laws.

In s. 1 of each of the two laws, we now find this addition:

Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

 

This preamble, which is typical and even mandatory in a constitution that defines the citizen’s human rights, indeed faithfully expresses the most basic values that are implemented through these laws and realize what was declared in the Declaration of Independence. These basic principles are the motto that sheds its light on these Laws that establish the basic fundamental rights and protect them. Thus the legislature set these laws in a place of honor, power and prestige in the evolving constitution.

This declaration was not enacted as mere window dressing, but rather it expresses – not merely as a hope or abstract credo – binding fundamental constitutional principles and values. If in the past and in the early days the courts looked to the principles and values of the Declaration of Independence as a principal source for interpreting the law, and for support in anchoring basic rights protected by the case law, these Basic Laws brought about a dramatic change in the status of the Declaration of Independence and in the bright light that emanates from it. Now it can no longer be perceived merely as a faithful and appropriate source for the interpretation of the law, but rather its authority has been increased and it can now appropriately be deemed an independent source of human rights. We must assume that the Israeli legislature did not waste words or try to pull the wool over our eyes in adding the said declaration of principles to the Basic Laws, but rather intended to inform Israel’s citizens of the rights to which they are entitled, while emphasizing that the source of these rights lies in the Declaration of Independence which constitutes a normative source for legislation at the elevated constitutional level.

The governmental establishment, as well as the legal community, and equally the general public, must accustom themselves to this revolution that has taken place not only in our ways of thinking, but also in the structure of law in Israel, since:

Respect for basic human rights in the spirit of the principles embodied in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel has become a constitutional mandate. It is now the case that not only do the principles of the Declaration of Independence have legal force, but the requirement to honor basic rights in the spirit of the principles of the Declaration of Independence has become a constitutional requirement that a “regular” law cannot oppose. We are thus faced with a substantive change in the legal status of the Declaration of Independence’ (from Professor Barak’s above cited book, Legal Interpretation, vol. 3, at p. 305).

13. We may rightly assume and conclude that the Knesset, as a constituent authority, inserted this amendment into the Basic Laws because it believed that the time was ripe to give meaning and force to the principles and values of the Declaration of Independence. This is how I understand the Basic Laws in their present formulation. One may wonder – and the skeptic might ask – was this indeed the case? Did the Members of Knesset really intend such dramatic and far-reaching legislation? One might also hear reservations and murmurings as to whether the Knesset Members whose votes enacted these laws really appreciated and understood the far-reaching implications of the said Basic Laws. Such people may be answered in the following two ways:

(a) It may be assumed that the legislature, acting as a constituent authority, acts with the appropriate seriousness and responsibility while deliberating constitutional issues, which always exert far-reaching influence over the institutions of the state and its citizens. And if we may speak in symbols, we may say that the legislature does this whilst supported by the staff of the values and principles of the Declaration of Independence. Thus, it is not appropriate to relate to the task of legislation as if it were carried out in a haphazard and inappropriate manner.

True, the legislature is not all-powerful and is not a model of perfection. It is liable, even in its capacity as a constituent authority, to produce legislation that is imperfect or controversial. Yet this does not reduce the force or effect of the legislation. It is always possible to initiate a change and to amend the law, after careful and thorough examination, on the basis of cumulative experience in enforcing the law over time. In principle, it is also possible to amend a constitution and provisions of supra-legislative constitutional laws, as long as this is done in an appropriate manner and with the required majority. Yet amendments to the constitution must not be undertaken as a matter of course, lest the constitution and the constitutional values contained in it be altered and changed with every passing breeze. The stability of the law and, to an even greater degree, the stability of the constitution represent values in and of themselves. The legislature should reflect upon this prior to promulgating a law, and even more so, a constitution, since they establish norms and principles that are meant to guide the citizen over the course of the days and years to come.

(b) Once the task of enactment by the legislative branch has been completed, and the law has taken shape and been enacted with the proper majority, the law is severed from the legislature’s umbilical cord and becomes an independent creation, a living and dynamic entity that stands on its own two feet and develops independently, and becomes the property of the people and of society. The law serves the latter, and it will be interpreted over time not necessarily in accordance with the literal meaning of the words; and not necessarily in accordance with what may be gleaned regarding the thoughts of any particular Member of Knesset while he was dealing with the task of legislation; but rather in accordance with the social purpose that the law was meant to implement in conformity with the time, the place, and the needs of the community.

The Court, when it is asked to interpret such a law, does not ignore the law’s literal text. It will find in the legislative process helpful tools for understanding the significance and meaning of the law. But, first and foremost, the judge will examine the law from an objective and realistic standpoint, with the aim of realizing its normative purpose and values within existing reality. This will be undertaken not in accordance with the judge’s personal world view, but rather through a careful and thorough examination of those protected values expressed by the law – values intended to promote and realize the vision of the Declaration of Independence, according to its spirit and in view of its stated aims.

14. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation are part of the family of the basic rights of the citizen, not all of which have as yet been incorporated into law, although it can be assumed and hoped that they will be expanded over time. Yet since they derive from the same principles and values, they supplement one another and are inter-dependent, and it is thus possible to extrapolate from one to the other, and to use one to complete the principles and values of the other. Both of them together should be read alongside the values and the human rights that were set out in the Declaration of Independence.

In my opinion in the Clal judgment [37], I expanded upon this point and also referred to the words of Prof. Y. H. Klinghoffer in his article “Freedom of Occupation and the Licensing of Businesses” (3 Tel-Aviv University Law Review (Iyyunei Mishpat) (1983) 582, 605), in which he expressed his view in the following manner:

All basic human rights unite into a body of norms that ensure human freedom. They influence one another, and if we make light of one of them, it is liable to be the first step in the elimination other basic rights and may potentially undermine the delicate, complex structure of freedom as a whole.

 

It follows that when we review the Basic Laws and seek the values and principles expressed in the protected right, we should be guided by the meaning that can be inferred from the two Basic Laws taken together, and also by the interpretation that has already been given, if any, to the provisions of these laws.

15. In my opinion in the Clal judgment [37], I emphasized the commonality of the two laws with respect to the limitation clause that is included in each of them and what can be learned from them. In order to elucidate my point, I shall cite what I wrote there:

Both Basic Laws have in common an aspect that demonstrates that we are concerned with a single subject, and a single family of basic rights; that is, the section defined as the “limitation clause,” which is found in each of the two laws, and is worded as follows: “There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required” (s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom; s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation)…

One should learn from this limitation clause that the Basic Laws that define, safeguard and protect the basic rights of the citizen are not absolute, since it is indeed possible that one basic right may clash with another basic right that is no less important. Thus the right is, in fact, relative and it may need to retreat in the face of other civil liberties. A basic right such as the freedom of occupation may clash with another civil right, just as it may clash with a clear public interest of importance for the entire citizenry. Thus, in such cases the golden mean must be found that balances the competing rights, where in one case the scale will lean towards one basic right and in another case a prudent balance will tilt the scale towards a different one.

 

This balance should be carried out seriously and with great discretion, in accordance with the rules and criteria that have been provided by the legislature itself in the limitation clauses of the Basic Laws (ibid, at pp. 466-467).

 

16. The new approach in Israeli law, conceived in the aforementioned Basic Laws, explicitly or implicitly accords binding, supra-legislative constitutional status to the primary fundamental human rights, as every governmental authority is obligated to respect these rights in accordance with these Basic Laws (s. 5 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and s. 11 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, viz. the relevant application clauses). I am completely in agreement with the words of our colleague Professor Barak in his aforementioned book Interpretation in Law (vol. 3, at p. 447) regarding the meaning of the “application clauses.” He writes:

The application clause imposes upon the legislature the duty to respect human rights. “Regular” laws are subject to human rights. The “regular” legislature is no longer “all-powerful.” The legislative authority granted to the legislature is contingent upon its duty to respect human rights. From this we derive the principle of the supremacy of the Basic Laws. This supremacy – which is supported by other provisions in the Basic Laws, as well – can also be inferred from the application clause.

 

Nonetheless, as we have stated, although the basic right is formulated in unambiguous, declarative language, a degree of infringement of this right will be permitted when the need arises to balance between conflicting Basic Laws and between the declared human rights and the needs of the public. Even then, when the task of balancing is carried out, it must fulfill what is required by virtue of the basic right itself and from the “permission” granted in the Basic Law to “infringe” this right according to the conditions and the restrictions of the limitation clauses. If this balance has not been struck, the legislation is unlawful and may be struck down unless some other escape route can be found, whether by amendment of the Basic Law itself, with the required majority, or whether, in the case of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, in accordance with the provisions of s. 8 thereof (the override clause), which permits an exceptional infringement of the Basic Law by a regular law.

Therefore, when the Court is required to examine whether and to what extent a regular law that has been enacted contradicts the provisions of a constitutional law, and whether it may in fact be appropriate to declare a law that has been duly legislated in the Israeli Knesset void on account of such an infringement, the Court must examine, first and foremost, the substance of the said constitutional law: the particular basic right that it is intended to protect, the scope of the said right, and its practical expression.

17. Anyone who claims that a basic right has been infringed and who seeks to undermine the force of a regular law for the sake of such an infringement must shoulder the burden of persuading the Court that a protected, constitutional basic right has indeed been infringed. The Court will then examine this claim in the light of the facts of the case as laid out before it, and in accordance with the values that are contained within the protected basic right. If the Court finds that indeed a regular law that has been passed does infringe a safeguarded basic right, the burden of persuading the Court that in this specific case the justifications in the limitation clause exist for such an infringement passes over to the entity defending the validity of the law – usually a representative of the state.

By saying that the burden of persuading the Court passes from the person opposing the infringement of the basic right to the person arguing that the infringement is justified under the limitation clause, I do not mean that the latter must persuade the Court that the legal conclusion required in relation to a theoretical confrontation between a regular law and a constitutional law should fall one way or the other. This task is imposed upon the judge. Nevertheless, before the judge is required to formulate his legal position, the appropriate factual foundation should be laid out before him on the basis of which, the judicial decision will be made applying the law in this specific case according to its circumstances.

It follows that the burden of persuasion with which we are dealing is the burden regarding the required factual foundation, and it is the latter that ought to be laid before the Court.

Once the facts have been laid out, the task of comparing and evaluating the legality of the regular law in the light of the constitutional law requires a sustained intellectual process, step by step: at the first stage, with regard to the issue of the actual infringement of the safeguarded basic right; and at the second stage, with regard to the justification for the infringement according to the various elements of the limitation clause.

18. If at the initial stage no real infringement of a basic right anchored in a supra-legislative constitutional law is proven to have taken place, or if it becomes clear that the infringement is marginal, trivial or insignificant, then the examination is concluded and the petition to invalidate the allegedly infringing law will be rejected. On the other hand, if a real infringement of a basic right anchored in such a law is proven, the existence of the elements of justification in the limitation clause will then be examined on four levels. The party claiming that the infringement is permissible must bring before the Court a persuasive factual basis to show that all of the following exist:

1.The infringement of the basic right is anchored in law or has been established ‘in accordance with the law by a specific authorization made therein’;

2.The infringing legislation is ‘befitting the values of the State of Israel’;

3.The infringing legislation is intended for ‘a proper purpose’;

4.The legislation infringing a basic right does so ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’

The examination and analysis proceed step by step, one stage after another.

First of all, it must be shown that the infringement occurs in or by law. If it becomes clear that the infringement is not so anchored in law, but rather, for example, only in administrative directives or in secondary legislation that does not rely upon a specific authorization in law, then there is no need to continue the examination process, as the infringement is completely unlawful, whatever its underlying motives may have been.

If the infringement is found to be anchored in law, the next question will be whether the infringing provision befits the values of the State of Israel, because if the infringing provision does not befit the principles and the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, it should not remain in force. For instance, an infringement that promotes arbitrary goals of the government as against its citizens (discrimination, denial of rights, deprivation of property, etc.), even if under a color of a regular law, will not be recognized at the constitutional level, since it is those values expressed in the Basic Law that establish the appropriate behavioral norms of government and citizenry, and they may not be weakened or eroded by ordinary legislation.

Should it be found that the infringing provision does not conflict with the values of the State of Israel, and that it may even serve these values, only then may we proceed to the next level of analysis. That is to say, was the infringing legislation enacted for a proper purpose? If it becomes clear that the infringing legislation does not serve a worthy purpose, in that it does not promote national social objectives that benefit the public, or does not strike an appropriate balance between basic rights of equal value, then the infringement cannot be tolerated and is unacceptable.

If we find that the infringing legislation intends to do good, and that it has the potential to promote or preserve appropriate social values, inasmuch as it reflects an appropriate balance between conflicting basic rights, then we may conclude that, in principle, the infringing provision serves a proper purpose.

If that is the conclusion, then we can move on to an additional stage in the examination process. Indeed, a proper purpose is an important element, without which the infringing legislation cannot be tolerated. However, the existence of a proper purpose cannot redress the wrong if, in achieving that purpose, the infringing law permits a violation of the basic right that is severe or greater than required. Not all means are legitimate in the pursuit of a proper purpose. This element in the limitation clause is the final barrier – and perhaps the sturdiest – facing the waves of a law that seeks to erode and even infringe a basic civil right. Even if the infringing provision satisfies all of the other elements of the limitation clause, the legislature would still have to devote significant care and restraint to determining the extent, necessity, scope and depth of the infringing provision in the means adopted. A sweeping infringement of a protected basic right cannot be permitted, and the aim should be to restrict the infringement so that it be as moderate as possible; and in any event that it not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the proper purpose.

If the facts initially examined by the legislature in the course of the legislative process, and later examined by the Court, show that the same proper purpose is attainable in a number of alternative ways, some of which infringe a protected basic right to a greater extent and some to a lesser extent, then the legislature must choose the alternative that is best for the citizen and which least harms the protected right. If the legislature does not do so, or if the Court discovers that the legislature did not consider all of the alternatives, or chose an alternative that severely infringes the right when a less harmful alternative was available, the Court will find that the infringement is greater than required, and will not extend the protection of the limitation clause to that law. It follows that the Court will not be satisfied with an abstract description or a technical examination of the legislative process, but rather the entire factual basis that was examined or that should have been examined must be laid before the Court, so that it can state its opinion.

Some, myself included, view this element of the limitation clause as the core of the entire section.

One may assume that in the overwhelming majority of cases the infringement of the basic right will be approved or rejected on the basis of the degree of the infringement and its scope.

 I would like to believe that in the foreseeable future, the Israeli legislature, founded upon and operating in accordance with enlightened, democratic values and principles, will not enact any legislation that is not anchored in the values of the State of Israel, or that serves the sole purpose of inflicting harm to citizens and denying their protected basic rights without proper cause. Nonetheless, the legislature may unwittingly err unawares, and thus it is appropriate that, in any event, all of the elements of the limitation clause be examined with the requisite thoroughness.

However, with regard to the degree of the infringement, its scope and its necessity, the legislature may certainly err, both in the process and in the conclusion. In cases of such careless and ill-considered legislation, precedence will be given to the basic rights that we are enjoined to protect.

19. I have presented a detailed explanation of my position regarding the burden of proof in regard to the factual basis that must be presented before the Court, whether with respect to the actual infringement of a basic right protected by a Basic Law, or whether with respect to the issue of whether the infringement is tolerable insofar as it conforms to the principles of the limitation clause. I presented this at length because, in my opinion, if we do not act in this manner, but rather presume that the legislature always acts, prima facie, within the bounds of the constitutional law, then we will serve neither the interests of the law nor of the legislature. In our desire to enforce the protected basic rights found in the evolving constitution, we must make sure that, in drafting regular legislation, the legislature always keep the protected basic rights in mind; refrain, insofar as possible and insofar as is required, from any infringement of those rights, and if necessary, make the appropriate effort to ensure that the infringement meet the requirements of the limitation clause, inter alia, that its scope not exceed what is required. Such legislation requires, by its very nature, a careful examination of the various possible alternatives for achieving the purpose that must be proper. Thus, before the legislature has its say, it must examine the relevant factual basis provided by expert research and examination. On that basis, it can formulate a position consistent with the constitutional provision, and draft the law appropriately.

We make no such assumption regarding the actions of the legislature, nor do we assume that its preferences are always appropriate. It is the Court that will have to decide, on the basis of the relevant factual basis that was before the legislature, that – in terms of its strength, premises, and reasonableness – it complies with the conditions of the limitation clause.

If a conflicting set of facts is presented in opposition to those factual grounds by some person whose protected basic right has been infringed – and which indicates that the proper purpose, if any, could have been obtained in a less harmful way – then the burden of proof falls upon the legislature that infringed the right, through its representatives. Of course, the Court does not, nor does it intend to place itself in lieu of the legislature. But it is the Court’s task and obligation to conduct a judicial review of whether the legislature did in fact satisfy the conditions of the limitation clause, whether it has not adopted the easy path, gone too far, or infringed the citizen’s protected basic right more than necessary. The Court, of course, respects the other branch of government operating within the scope of its authority, and will carefully consider, with due respect, any legislation enacted by the primary legislature. However, the Court is also required to ensure the citizen’s basic constitutional rights. Therefore, the citizen bears the burden of proving that his right has been infringed, while the legislature, through the offices of the State’s attorneys, bears the burden of proving that the infringement is tolerable, and that it satisfies all of the elements of the limitation clause. This burden should not be borne by the citizen who has been harmed.

I fear that if, in constitutional matters, we were to adopt the rule of administrative law that assumes that the governmental authority duly acts within the scope of its jurisdiction unless that assumption be proven wrong, we would become lax in regard to protected basic rights, and we would, God forbid, cause the blessing of the aforementioned Basic Laws to fade away. For these reasons, I cannot agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Goldberg regarding the burden of proof and regarding the intensity of the infringement required in order to determine that a regular law does not meet the conditions of the limitation clause.

20. In accordance with which criteria will the Court examine the matter of infringement of a basic right and interpret the various elements of the limitation clause? The grounds for a court’s intervention in the administrative decisions of governmental authorities are well known, but should judicial review be carried out in accordance with the same criteria, or must we adopt special rules? It would seem that the rule that should guide us in such a case is that, when examining whether there has been an infringement of a citizen’s basic right, the protected right should be afforded its full ethical and fundamental significance, in the express spirit of the Declaration of Independence and in accordance with the principles of democratic government, while the scope of possible infringement or erosion of such rights should be limited as much as possible. Once an infringement has been established, then, as I stated above, the party that seeks to justify the infringement must show that the infringement is permissible in terms of the principles of the limitation clause. This examination may be carried out in accordance with criteria similar to those employed for the review of the lawfulness of administrative provisions, viz. does the provision reflect actual discrimination, denial of rights, or (Heaven forefend) arbitrariness. But also beyond this, was the provision infringing the basic right promulgated dishonestly or in an irrelevant or unreasonable manner? With due respect for the legislative branch, it is appropriate that we assume that the legislative branch deemed its considerations and reasons for the infringing legislation to be material and honest, yet it is nevertheless incumbent upon the Court to review and examine whether a mistake has been made by the legislature that might endanger rights.

I would say that review of the infringement of the basic right needs to be thorough and firm; and yet when examining the justification of the infringement in accordance with the elements of the limitation clause, the Court can adopt an open, liberal approach toward the legislative process, taking into account the necessary balances regarding each of the elements of the limitation clause. Legislation that is discriminatory, denies rights, or is arbitrary will be rejected absolutely. But in other respects, the interpretation will be flexible with regard to the appropriateness of its purpose, its reasonableness, its integrity, the proportionality of its means, and its necessity. These criteria will guide me in my consideration of the Primary Law and the Amending Law.

21. Over the years, the family agricultural sector fell into an economic crisis of the most extreme proportions. The debts of agriculturalists skyrocketed, and many entered a state of insolvency; and in the absence of assistance, there was a very real danger that the branch would fail and Israel’s agricultural sector would collapse. The State requested, and the legislature agreed, to establish legal arrangements that would prevent, or at least mitigate the catastrophe, so that it would be possible to continue to maintain farms while imposing a legal arrangement for the farmers’ debts. The Primary Law, which came into force on March 12, 1992, restricted itself to arrangements that would resolve primarily the problem of debts due to be repaid on December 31, 1987. Of the many complex provisions of the law, the two that are most important to the matter before us are the following:

(a) Rehabilitators will be appointed in accordance with the Law, who will be granted the legal authority and power to dispose of the agriculturalists’ debts, and discretionary authority to arrange for the repayment of the debts, in accordance with the nature and scope of their authority as determined by the Law.

(b) Regarding those debts to which the Law applies, the jurisdiction of the courts and of the execution offices to consider the debt or execute judgments is revoked. Pending legal proceedings will be halted, and the entire matter will be transferred to be heard and decided by a rehabilitator. 

The rehabilitator shall determine the size of the debt, the ability to repay it, the amount of the debt that shall be repaid and the payment schedule, the realization of assets as payment for the debt, cancellation of debts and other similar provisions that erode the right of the creditor to collect the entire sum of debt owed to him.

22. In reading the law, it is absolutely clear that there is a real infringement of the basic rights of the creditors in their property in two primary aspects: First, they are barred from of the gates of the courts and the execution offices, where they have a right to claim what is owed them by these debtors, as from any other debtor. Secondly, an arrangement has been imposed upon them that may deprive them of rights, in the sense that part of the debt is liable to be cancelled, and part of the debt may be repaid in installments spread out over many years, so that when whatever part of the debt is paid will represent only very partial repayment hardly in accordance with their expectations, needs and rights, and this without any of the recourse to the enforcement authorities that they enjoyed prior to the law.

Thus, we may conclude that the provisions of this law constitute a real infringement of the creditors’ property.

23. Until the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on March 25, 1992, a person’s property was not recognized as a protected basic right. The protection of this right at the constitutional level was recognized in s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty which states: ‘There shall be no violation of the property of a person.’ This protection is not available to a citizen in the context of the aforementioned law, due to the section on validity of laws in the Basic Law, which states (s. 10): ‘This Basic Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement of the Basic Law.’

Nevertheless, and bearing in mind the general principles of the Basic Laws as a whole, it is appropriate that in treating of matters concerning basic human rights in a law that was in force prior to the Basic Law, the Court construe the law in a manner consistent with the spirit of the Basic Laws. This rule is established under s. 10 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and there is nothing similar to it in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Yet, in my opinion, this approach is also appropriate in our case. In terms of values, as earlier stated, the two laws should be treated equally – especially as from the very outset we have adopted the values and the principles of the Declaration of Independence as our guide, and they also shed light upon the present matter – in construing the law that applies to the citizens of this country. We have done this in the past in establishing and defending basic civil rights, and we should do so in this context.

24. The situation is different regarding the Amending Law, which was passed in the Knesset on August 4, 1993. This law was enacted after Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and it is therefore subject to the provision that prohibits infringement of a person’s property rights. The Amending Law not only infringes the creditors’ rights to the extent that they are infringed by the original law, as explained above, but it is even more extreme. First of all, the Amending Law also imposes the arrangement upon debts that accumulated up until December 31, 1991. In addition, the Amending Law extends the power and authority of the rehabilitator to cancel and reschedule debts. Moreover, according to the Amending Law, a tax debt that is defined as ‘any amount that a person owes according to legislation regarding the imposition of a tax or a mandatory payment that the Minister of Finance is charged with imposing or collecting’ is not included among the debts subject to the aforementioned law.

In other words, while an ordinary citizen is bound by the law’s provisions, and thus his ability to collect the debt is harmed, the State as a creditor is not bound by the law, and is free to continue to collect the debts owed to it. Therefore, I concur with the view of my colleagues, President Shamgar and President Barak, that the Amending Law infringes the right to property of creditors in the proceedings that are the subject of this case.

25. The State argues that the amendment to the law is nothing more than a clarification of the provisions in the Primary Law, and therefore the Amending Law should be treated in the same way as the Primary Law, which is not subject to the Basic Law. This argument was rejected by the President, and I concur in his opinion and his reasoning. I will however add this: Every law, even an amending law, is subject to the rules of the aforementioned Basic Law according to the date of its enactment.

Provisions regarding the maintenance of the status quo were intended to serve only one purpose: to prevent severe harm to the stability of the existing law and radical disruption of the system in force before the Basic Laws came into force. This does not lead to the conclusion that if we find clear that a pre-existing law infringes a basic human right, that law is worthy of continuing for posterity. As stated, even in the case of such a law, it should, as far as possible, be interpreted in the spirit of the principles of the Basic Law. In my opinion, the arrangement in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation that sets limits on the continued application of infringing laws that preceded the Basic Law is preferable. But this is the legislature’s problem, and we cannot, by virtue of our authority, change what the law has expressly established. The conceptual basis for preserving the status quo is absent when we are faced with new legislation.

When the legislature amends an existing law, it must consider the principles and values enunciated in the Basic Laws, and abstain from their unlawful infringement.

26. Having established that the Amending Law infringes the provisions of section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, we must consider whether this infringement is tolerable and permissible under the aegis of the limitation clause.

27. The instant case presents no problem with regard to the first stage of the examination as to whether the infringement was carried out in accordance with the law, inasmuch as the Amending Law was enacted by the Knesset, and the infringing provisions are a part of that law. As for the second stage of the examination – whether the law is consistent with the values of the State of Israel – we can say without hesitation that enlightened democratic states, as well as in Jewish tradition, value the idea of mutual assistance, support of the weak who require assistance by those with means, shouldering the burden of the needs of the state in a progressive manner in accordance with one’s capacity to do so, and imposing tasks upon one part of society in order to relieve another sector of the public, so that we may achieve an enlightened, just society that provides for the needs of society as a whole and for the quality of communal life (I have addressed the subject of nature of value-based democracy, in general and in Jewish tradition, in the different, but relevant context of the Clal case [37], on pp. 474-477. I believe that it is appropriate to refer to the detailed opinion and the sources quoted in detail in that decision).

This is not the first time that the public or some part of the public of a democratic society has been called to the rescue of an economic sector facing collapse. Jewish tradition provides examples of edicts, rules and customs that share the characteristic of extending help to the stranger, the orphan, the widow, the sojourner, the poor, the unfortunate and the despondent. The President has addressed this at length in his opinion and I can only concur in all that he has stated.

Does the infringing law serve a proper purpose? The explanatory note to the draft bill of the Primary Law state, on p. 92, that the bill ‘is intended to create a new framework for resolution of the most difficult crisis to have struck the entire agricultural sector over several years.’ The note also states:

The overall aim [of the bill – D.L.] is to facilitate the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector, by giving preference to rehabilitation over liquidation, on the one hand, and the need to prevent a flow of funds from the public purse on the other. The involvement of the legislature in providing arrangements for the agricultural sector appears a necessity at this time, after other arrangements proved ineffective, and left the agricultural sector in deep crisis and sometimes even made things worse.

 

Indeed, the appropriate policy for dealing with commercial enterprises or businessmen in serious economic crisis is not necessarily liquidation of the company or a declaration of bankruptcy, but rather the rehabilitation of the business to the extent possible. In CA 673/87 Y. Salah et al v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments Co. Ltd. (in liquidation) [60] at p. 68, I stated as follows:

In my opinion, there is no need for haste (in regard to the liquidation of a business or bankruptcy – D.L.). As long as it is possible to save a business from collapse, we should carefully and responsibly try to do so with daring and resourcefulness. To the extent that the liquidator, trustee or receiver acts under the supervision and guidance of the court to effect the necessary liquidation of a business as an active, vibrant concern, so much the better for the creditors, for the parties to the company, and for the bankrupt as an individual.

Through such action, the purpose of the law is realized. By such an approach, insofar as it is applicable to the circumstances of the case, we promote a just result.
 

 Both the Companies Ordinance [New Version], 5743-1983, and the Bankruptcy Ordinance [New Version], 5740-1980, encourage and promote resolution by an arrangement by which creditors waive part of their claims in order to save the company or the business proprietor from total collapse. One will benefit a little, while the other will give up a little, yet at the end of the day both will be saved.

By way of analogy, we proceed to the matter before us. The collapse of the agricultural sector could have caused untold damage to the national economy, and could have brought many good citizens – who had invested all of their resources, strength and energy in the construction of Israel’s magnificent agricultural sector – to their last crust of bread. They must not be abandoned in their hour of need. Those who, first and foremost, can contribute to recovery and the prevention of collapse are the creditors who have carried out business with the agriculturalists and enjoyed no small profit over the years.

The duty of rescue should not be imposed upon all citizens, but rather on those who have some connection to the matter. The law is intended to promote a proper purpose – to address the social needs of a meritorious community, to achieve social justice, and to enable the state to overcome a dangerous situation that, if not resolved, will seriously harm the national economy.

In this instance, the importance of the aforementioned purpose should not be underestimated because it is not applied equitably across different sectors of the economy. The values of the State of Israel do not require such equality in a case such as this, and such inequality, insofar as it exists, in extending assistance to sectors in distress, or in imposing a burden on a part of the public, is not sufficient to taint that purpose.

28. The question that remains to be answered in the final stage of examination is whether the proffered solution infringes the basic rights of citizens beyond what is absolutely necessary in the circumstances of the case. I harbored some hesitations and second thoughts regarding the proportionality of the infringement.

First of all, I asked myself whether it was appropriate that the Amending Law removes the State from the general group of creditors that will have to bear the burden, considering that the State also enjoyed income from the agricultural sector, and should perhaps contribute from its own resources to rescue the agriculturalists in their time of need.

Should we not regard the imposition of the burden on the other creditors alone as a severe alternative for the creditors as a whole, when a less injurious alternative could have been presented? I have refrained from drawing a conclusion regarding this infringement, since this issue was not addressed in any meaningful way by the parties to the case, and it would be inappropriate for the Court, on its own initiative, to draw far-reaching conclusions, and even question the constitutionality of a law, where the parties had not presented factual and legal arguments before the trial court.

I also asked myself whether the legislature examined different alternatives for resolving the crisis of the agricultural sector and concluded that the aforementioned alternative was the least harmful and the most just.

 Such examination and analysis are necessary, in my view, and if these are not undertaken by the legislature in the legislative process, then it is appropriate that they be undertaken by the Court when it is asked to invalidate the infringing law. However, when all is said and done, it seems to me that, in this matter as well, the infringement does not appear to go beyond what is necessary in the this case. Examination of the original draft bill to which I referred above, examination of the draft bill of the Amending Law and its provisions, and weighing the arguments and explanations advanced by the parties in this regard, especially those of the Attorney-General’s representative, satisfy me that before formulating its infringing provisions the legislature did consider various alternatives.

 

 

The Primary Law only came into being after other alternatives, which did not so severely infringe basic rights of citizens, were tried and failed. The Primary Law attempted a solution similar to existing solutions in the field of private law field (viz. liquidation of companies and bankruptcy, as explained above). The experience accumulated in the application of the original law shows that the arrangements established by the Primary Law, inter alia those establishing that the debt be handled in the manner prescribed by the law as the basic debt that existed on December 31, 1987, do not achieve the desired results, and the powers that were granted to the rehabilitator were insufficient. Thus, the Amending Law arrived only at a later stage, and introduced a more severe infringement of basic rights that apparently became necessary in order to achieve the purpose. Thus, the overall picture supports the conclusion that the infringement, while significant, is nonetheless required in the face of a sad reality, and thus is not excessive.

29. I therefore concur with the opinion of my colleagues that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and the appeal in CA 6821/93 should be denied. Inasmuch as disagreements arose among the members of the bench regarding a number of the important issues, and in light of the opinions and positions that I expressed above, I stand in this case behind the conclusion of President Barak in paragraph 108 of his opinion. 

 

 

Justice I. Zamir

1. The constitutional revolution did not begin now, with the enactment of the Basic Laws on human rights. It began a generation ago, with the Bergman decision [15]. As is well known, the Bergman decision first established that the Knesset can bind itself by means of an entrenched provision in a Basic Law, and that the Court is authorized to annul an ordinary law that is repugnant to such a provision. Justice Landau’s opinion in that decision began a revolution, because it came to the legal community as a complete surprise and introduced a fundamental change: it reversed what had until then constituted the axiomatic view of the status of the Knesset, the status of the Court, and the relationship between them. The Court did not resort to theory in order to bring about this revolution. On the contrary, it intentionally refrained from addressing ‘very weighty preliminary constitutional questions regarding the status of the Basic Laws and the justiciability before this Court of the question of whether the Knesset did in fact comply with a limitation that it imposed upon itself...’ (ibid. at p. 696). Nevertheless, the revolution succeeded. It succeeded, as revolutions do, because it occurred at the right time, under the pressure of the eve of elections; because it was implemented through wise tactics that left the government with the means for achieving its ends despite the annulment of the law), either by amending the law or by re-enacting it with a special majority; and perhaps also because it refrained from a debate upon the weighty constitutional questions. In these respects, it is reminiscent of the successful revolution that took place in the United States approximately 200 years ago, also in the area of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature, in the Marbury case [94]. Indeed, the Bergman decision [15] provides additional proof of the famous statement of Justice Holmes that a page of history is worth a volume of logic. 

 

2. The constitutional revolution of the Bergman decision [15] was, like all successful revolutions, only the first stage in a long, complex process. It paved the way for the second stage of the revolution, which commenced approximately three years ago, with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Although the practical importance of this stage inestimably surpasses the importance of the first stage, it does not represent a theoretical breakthrough. The new Basic Laws do not create human rights, inasmuch as they have long been recognized by the case law. They do not even create a new rule of interpretation, inasmuch as the case law has already established that all laws must be construed in the light of human rights. So what do they accomplish? The laws expand the principle that was established in the Bergman decision [15], and that has since become generally accepted, that the Knesset can limit itself through a Basic Law. Indeed, in the Bergman decision [15] the Court only established the principle of formal self-limitation, that is, self-limitation requiring a special majority of Members of the Knesset. In the case at hand, we are dealing with substantive self-limitation, that is to say, limitation that requires the conformity of an ordinary law to the values and principles that have been established in the new Basic Laws.

 

At this stage, the transition, within the framework of that principle, from formal self-limitation to substantive self-limitation, is simple and straightforward. It is a natural development. Indeed, the idea that the Knesset can substantively bind itself by means of a Basic Law has achieved nearly universal acceptance. This approach finds expression in scholarly literature and in obiter dicta of this Court. Now, in the instant case, it achieves the status of established law. In the words of President Shamgar (supra, at paragraph 35), ‘Logically, there can be no ground for distinguishing between the powers to fetter future parliaments substantively and procedurally.’ That is the whole law stans pede in uno, to be elaborated in future decisions as may be required.

 

3. Nonetheless, the theoretical basis for this approach is contested. What is the source of the Knesset’s power to limit itself? The controversy, which was left unresolved in the Bergman decision [15], has been simmering beneath the surface for many years. It would seem both possible and appropriate to allow it to continue to develop in academic debate until such time as the Court will be required to decide, inasmuch as no determination is necessary to decide the instant case. The fact remains that at the conclusion of the present discussion, the issue remains unresolved.

 

This is true regarding the aforementioned issue, as well as in regard to other important, complex issues that have been addressed at length in this case. In matters of constitutional law, the Court must tread with extreme care lest it stumble. In this area, more than in other areas of law, the Court is establishing societal norms. Often its decisions are not merely guideposts, but pave new roads. This process requires a thorough examination of the terrain and a long-term perspective. Progress should be made inch by inch. A sudden leap may undermine the stability that is essential to progress.

 

The uniqueness of the field of constitutional law also requires that the Court adopt a unique approach. Hence the clearly great importance of the rules proposed by President Shamgar, following Justice Brandeis, when discussing constitutional questions. President Shamgar states (in paragraph 89), inter alia, that ‘The Court will not customarily decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case,’ and ‘The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the concrete facts before it to which it is to be applied.’ I concur. In this spirit, I prefer to leave open various questions that have been discussed in this case, including seminal questions of constitutional law, until the time is ripe.

 

4. Nonetheless, I cannot ignore the fact that the controversy has indeed surfaced, and this decision presents various opinions on basic questions of constitutional law. These opinions, even those that are only obiter dicta, are likely to influence the development of the law. In such a situation, importance is attributed to the relative support expressed for one position or another. Therefore, I think it appropriate that I very briefly express my views regarding two issues.

 

First of all, regarding the question of the source of the Knesset’s power to limit itself, both from the formal and the substantive points of view, I believe that this power emanates from the Knesset’s status as a constituent assembly. The theory regarding constituent assemblies is accepted in many countries and is widely held in Israel. It proposes a theoretical explanation and supplies a practical tool, both for the Knesset and the Court, for the appropriate treatment of constitutional issues. It is, in my view, the preferable approach.

 

Secondly, regarding the issue of proportionality, which was established as the test by the limitation clause in the Basic Law, I believe that it is appropriate to adopt a three-pronged test: conformity, need, and proportionality. This test is accepted in various countries and in international law, as well. It has also penetrated Israeli law, and has become settled law in administrative law. See HCJ 987/94 [57]; HCJ 3477/95 [58]. It is neither reasonable nor desirable to establish a different rule in the field of constitutional law. This is the case because, first of all, there is no sharp boundary dividing constitutional law and administrative law. It is also the case because this Court crossed the line in stating that the requirement of proportionality established in the Basic Law also applies to administrative authorities. See HCJ 987/94 [57]. In other words, the legal rule in this regard is identical in both constitutional and administrative law. Moreover, the law that grounds proportionality on the aforementioned three elements represents, in my opinion, the proper approach. It provides the Court with a sophisticated, efficient tool, based on the experience of other countries and of international tribunals, for the judicial review of laws, secondary legislation and the various types of administrative decisions. 

 

Thus, regarding these two issues, I concur with President Barak.

 

However, I would advise great caution against establishing any hard and fast rules regarding the definition of property and what constitutes an infringement of property rights. Does the Basic Law provide a defense against any new law that may, even indirectly, affect the value of property or pecuniary income? For example, does the protection of property extend to limitations that the law imposes upon labor contracts, such as a provision regarding minimum wage, or requirements concerning property relations between spouses, such as a provision requiring maintenance?

 

 

If every infringement of the value of a person’s property, including infringements of various financial obligations, were deemed an infringement of property rights, then we will discover innumerable laws infringing property. The Court would likely find itself up to its neck in reviewing the legality of every such law, for fear, inter alia, that it infringes property rights beyond what is necessary, and it would be difficult for the legislature to fulfill its role adequately. The broader the scope of the right to property as a constitutional right, the weaker its protection. In this regard, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Therefore, in the matter at hand, it is sufficient that I assume that the Amending Law infringes property rights. Even on the basis of this assumption, I see no need to annul the Amending Law, since the facts and the arguments presented to this Court do not provide a basis for a determination that the Law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause.

 

5. President Barak sums up the law, insofar as is relevant for a determination in the present case, in paragraph 108 of his opinion. I concur with that summary. I therefore also concur with the result reached by President Shamgar, President Barak and my other colleagues on this bench.

 

 

 

Justice M. Cheshin

1.    I concur with my colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak. Indeed, the Amending Law succeeded in overcoming the hurdles erected  by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and there is no need to  further address the legality or constitutionality of that law.

2.    My colleagues, President Shamgar and President Barak, wielded scythe and the sickle in the field of the Basic Laws, not laying them down until nightfall. But they left  a few stalks standing, and I resolved   to gather a few ears myself, which I will grind and bake into a loaf of my own bread.

One of the fundamental issues that my colleagues addressed at length –and upon which they disagreed – concerns the Knesset’s authority to frame a (rigid) constitution for the State. If you like: the question of the Knesset’s power to “limit” its future authority to legislate in the future by way of the “entrenchment” of laws (formal or substantive entrenchment). Both of my colleagues reached the conclusion that the Knesset has the authority to entrench the laws that it enacts, i.e. to limit its authority to legislate in the future. . However, they follow different paths to that conclusion, and to the extent that their paths differ, my colleagues do not even agree on the question of the scope of the Knesset’s power to entrench laws.

3.    I will begin by stating that in my opinion the Knesset lacks the constituent power to frame a constitution, in the sense that the concept of “constituent power” and the concept of “constitution” appear in the opinions of my colleagues. Moreover, I have grave doubts as to whether a theory that accords the Knesset authority to frame a constitution is appropriate for us, here and now.  Indeed, I believe that the Knesset has the authority to impose on itself limitations upon  future legislation – within limits and bounds that I shall specify and explain – and in this sense, I concur with my colleagues’ views. However because my starting point differs from that of my colleagues,  I find myself arriving  at a  different destination.

4.    The differences of opinion among us in relation to the issue of the constituent authority of the Knesset and the question of Knesset “sovereignty” all constitute obiter dicta. In the matter before the Court, we are of one mind. What was it then that compelled me to burden the public by adding my own (lengthy) obiter dictum to those of my colleagues? I will, therefore, begin with an explanation.

 

5.    First of all, in my view the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit itself (by constitution or law) is the most important  question arising  before the Court in the present case, and its importance far exceeds that of the other matters confronting us.  In comparing them, I would say that say this is one of the giants while those are Lilliputians.

Furthermore, I dare say that since Israel has had a Supreme Court – from its inception  to this very day – no greater or more important question has come before it than the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority to frame a constitution for Israel, the question of whether Israel has  a constitution, even if adopted incrementally In fact, the present case does not require that we decide this question on its merits, and we all concur that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation were enacted lawfully and with the requisite authority.

 

Yet this one question towers over all the other questions before us, and even if only incidental, it is a colossus. The question of the constitution and the question of who possesses the authority to frame a constitution are questions that come exceedingly close to  the grundnorm of the Israeli legal system. Thus, our concern is with a question lying at the bedrock of the Israeli legal system.. And, facing such a preeminent question, we would be hard put not to make some remarks.

 

6. Secondly, and this goes to the heart of the matter: One day the Knesset will pass a law or a Basic Law on a constitutional matter, and that law or Basic Law will provide that it can only be changed  by a majority of seventy or eighty Knesset members (or ninety or a hundred). What legal standing would such a provision have? Would it be valid and binding to the extent that the Knesset could not amend the law (or Basic Law) except by the special majority stipulated in the law? Or might we say that such a provision, which curtails the Knesset’s legislative power, indefinitely is like a broken potsherd, lifeless by reason of its presumption to limit the Knesset’s  legislative power for all time??  According to my colleague President Barak, the limitation would be fully and unreservedly effective (valid?)  provided that it bore the form of a Basic Law, for that legislative act would be within the Knesset’s constituent authority.  Such a law (or constitution) is a “Basic Law,” and its contents comprise all of the constitutional subjects (fundamental principles of the state, governmental structure, the relations among the branches of government, and individual rights). This is also the view of my colleague President Shamgar, although his opinion also hints at a certain limitation of the Knesset’s authority (see par. 35 of his judgment). My view is that a provision for a special majority (the kind of majority provisions we mentioned above) purporting to limit the Knesset’s power to change a law would be invalid ab initio, because the Knesset lacks the authority to pass it.  In my view this kind of statutory provision would be absolutely anti-democratic; this statutory provision places the minority in control of the majority, and as such is a law that the nation never authorized its representatives to enact. In my view, in the absence of a true constitution, this kind of provision presents a clear and present danger to Israeli democracy, both in law and in practice, and I oppose it with every means at my disposal.

 

7. We will further discuss all of these matters below, whereas in this context we wish only to explain why we view the issue of the Knesset’s authority to enact a (rigid) constitution, in other words  the Knesset’s authority to legislate entrenched laws – as an issue that overshadows the other subjects being adjudicated before us. These are the few ears that I have chosen to grind.

 

8.    Our discussion takes the following path: Firstly, we will examine the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority, i.e. the subject of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution. In this chapter we explain why, in our view, the Knesset lacks constituent authority, and why it is powerless to enact a (rigid) constitution for the State of Israel   In that context we will further dwell on the inherent dangers of giving legal approbation to the Knesset’s constituent authority or its unlimited sovereignty without the issue having been placed before the people for its decision and a consideration of the opinions regarding  the advantages and disadvantages attendant to the authority to establish a constitution.  Having reached this conclusion, we further ask ourselves: In the absence of constituent authority, does the Knesset have, as a matter of law, the authority to enact “entrenched” laws? At this junction we will set out our approach, and explain why, in our view, the Knesset does indeed possess that authority and we will delineate its limitations.   We thus begin with the subject of the Knesset’s constituent authority

 

The Constituent Authority – Was it you or was I dreaming?

  1. How does one identify the authority to adopt a constitution? How should we know whether constituent authority was conferred, and if the authority was conferred, who possesses the authority?  How shall we know if a constitution was established, and whether a particular norm is a constitutional norm?  The question of identifying the body with the authority to frame a constitution, and the question of whether a certain norm is a constitutional norm are intertwined, inseparably linked, and are, in fact, one and the same.  The body authorized to frame a constitution frames the constitution, and a norm enacted by the authorized body with the intention of it being a constitutional norm, is a constitutional norm.

Since we know that the constitution comprises the supreme norms of the State, before which even the legislature bows its head in deference, the ineluctable conclusion must be that with respect to the existence of the authority to frame a constitution, and the identity of the body authorized to frame the constitution, there can be no doubt regarding the existence of the authority or the identity of the authorized body. Both are self-evident and any explanation is superfluous.

 

Thus the Jewish people became obligated to its first constitution. The people were first commanded to purify themselves in anticipation of receiving the constitution:

 

And the LORD said unto Moses, Go unto the people, and sanctify them today and tomorrow, and let them wash their clothes. And be prepared for the third day. For in the third day the LORD shall descend upon Mount Sinai for all the people to see. And Moses went down from the mount unto the people, and sanctified the people; and they washed their clothes.  And he said unto the people, Be ready against the third day: come not at your wives (Exod. 19:10-11;14 [120]).

 

For three days (no more and no less) the people waited to receive the constitution, and on the third day the ceremony began in awesome grandeur: 

 

And it came to pass on the third day in the morning, that there was thunder and lightning, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud; so that all the people that were in the camp trembled.  And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God; and they stood at the nether part of the mount.  And Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the LORD descended upon it in fire: and the smoke thereof ascended as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly. And when the voice of the trumpet sounded long, and waxed louder and louder, Moses spoke, and God answered him by a voice. And the LORD came down upon mount Sinai, on the top of the mount: and the LORD called Moses up to the top of the mount; and Moses went up (Exod. 19:15-20 [120]).

 

Thunder and lightning and thick clouds; the mighty sound of the trumpet. The Almighty descends on the mountain in fire and Mount Sinai is engulfed in smoke, smoke like the smoke of a kiln, and the sound of the trumpet grows louder and louder: “Moses spoke, and God answered him in thunder.” And after all that comes the constitution: “I am the Lord your God.” This is the Sinaitic theophany, the awesome grandeur of receiving the Law; the ceremony of bestowing a constitution upon Israel. There is no doubt as to who grants the constitution; there is no doubt as to the authority of the giver of the constitution; there is no doubt as to the language of the constitution, and there is no doubt that a constitution has been given.  The authority is not disputed, its language is not disputed, and the giving of the Torah is not disputed.

The same idea has also been presented in different terms: 

R. Abahu said in the name of R. Yohanan: When the Holy One Blessed be He gave the Torah no bird chirped, no fowl took wing, no ox lowed, the wheels [of the celestial chariot] did not rise, the seraphim did not say Holy, the sea did not rock, no creature spoke, but the world was quiet and silent, and there was a voice: “I am the Lord your God” (Shemot Rabba 29  [121]).

This is the Torah of thunder and lightning, of thick cloud and the mighty sound of the trumpet, and this is the Torah of the still small voice.

Indeed, this is the hallmark of a constitution, and to the best of my knowledge it has been the hallmark of constitutions throughout human history. As the Bible states regarding the first tablets: (Exod. 32:16) [119]):

The tablets were the work of God, and the writing was the writing of God, engraved upon the tablets.

In the past, it was God’s finger that engraved the constitution in stone. In our day it is man’s hand that writes, and the text is in blood and fire and columns of smoke, and if not so, then in fire and columns of smoke, and if not that, then in columns of smoke.

10.  The day of giving a constitution is a day of pomp and circumstance.  Everyone knows that the authorized body is about to enact a constitution, for behold a constitution is about to be given, and behold a constitution is now given. “A constitution is given with full awareness,” with the nation willing to assume the yoke of the constitution, even if by way of “holding the mountain over their heads” [Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat (Sabbath) 88a – ed.].

Today we may require a referendum, a constituent assembly specifically designated for that purpose and charged with the task of framing a constitution, or perhaps some other approach.  Most importantly, we must have a clear knowledge of what lies ahead. The question of the authority to grant a constitution is not “just another legal question” demanding a solution. It is the ultimate question, for in relation to bestowing a constitution it is said : “this day you have become a people”(Deut. 27:9 [119]). More prosaically we might say: today you have been privileged to receive a norm that is elevated above all other norms, a norm so majestic that only the grundnorm stands above it. Is it conceivable that a legal requirement  would arise to cite historical and legal circumstances to prove that a particular body had acquired the authority to bestow  a constitution upon a nation  or had so bestowed a constitution? We are familiar with the issue of constitutional interpretation; and with the issue of the court’s authority, or lack thereof, to invalidate statutes that contradict the constitution. Perhaps our perspective is limited, but to date we have yet to hear of a dispute over whether a particular body has the (historical and legal) authority to grant a constitution to the nation. And we certainly have not heard of this question arising as a legal issue given to judicial resolution.  We have enough – more than enough – questions pertaining to the interpretation of the law and the interpretation of the constitution. We would at least have expected there to be no dispute over the actual authority to enact a constitution. The very existence of disputes on this question indicates the tenuousness of the conclusion that the current Knesset possesses constituent authority.

11.  My colleague President Shamgar, and my colleague President Barak, each in his own way, recognize the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution.  President Shamgar premises the Knesset’s authority on the principle he refers to as the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset.  President Barak, on the other hand, builds the Knesset’s constituent authority on three pillars (models). The first is constitutional continuity from??  the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset. The second is the rule of recognition and the fundamental conceptions of the Israeli legal community. The third is the model of the “best interpretation of the entirety of the social and legal history of the Israeli legal system.”  President Shamgar’s approach differs from that of President Barak, and Barak’s approach is divided into three secondary models, each different from the others with its own unique contours. However, close examination of both approaches indicates unequivocally that in each of their individual odysseys my colleagues rely on the doctrine of constitutional continuity from the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset, which is the foundation of their conclusions. In other words, both of the edifices constructed by my colleagues, upon which they base the current Knesset’s constituent authority, originate in the First Knesset’s constituent authority and a constitutional continuity from the Constituent Assembly of the First Knesset until the current Knesset. Accordingly, if this is the basic principle – and it is – it is quite natural for our own journey  to begin from there.

We will therefore pose the following questions: Firstly, did the Constituent Assembly of the first Knesset have the authority to frame a constitution for Israel, and secondly, assuming that it had such power, was this power transferred to all subsequent Knessets?

Regarding the establishment of the “Constituent Assembly”

 

12. The establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel - the State of Israel - was declared on the fifth of Iyar 5708, May 14, .1948.   The operative part of the declaration is in the middle, and it comprises two sub-sections, the first of which reads as follows:

.    

Accordingly we, members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the basis of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

 

In this subsection we find the grundnorm of the State: recognition of the right of the “members of the People’s Council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and the Zionist Movement” to declare the establishment of the State and to determine binding norms for the people of Israel. The second subsection, which relates directly to the matter currently before us, provides as follows:

WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the elected Constituent Assembly no later than the 1st of October 1948, the People’s Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People’s Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called “Israel.”

This portion of the declaration informs us of a number of matters pertaining to the central institutions of the State, all of them at the pinnacle of the State’s norms. Our current concern is with the “elected constituent assembly,” mentioned in the Declaration. Taking a closer look, we discern that this was an interim, short lived entity, with a single purpose of framing a constitution that would include (among other things, apparently) instructions for the election and establishment of “elected, regular authorities of the State.”  The Provisional Council of State, and the Provisional Government (previously called: the People’s Council and the People’s Administration”) were to continue functioning as the central institutions of the State, and the Constituent Assembly was supposed to function parallel to them in the fulfillment of its one and only task: the establishment of a constitution, within a short period of time, measured in terms of just a few months. The constitution would be written (and the Constituent Assembly would disperse); elections for the “elected regular authorities” would be conducted thereunder, and the elected regular authorities would be established. Only then were the Council of State and the Provisional Government to stop functioning, and all powers would be vested in those elected regular authorities.

 

For our purposes, the following two issues are of primary significance: First, the exclusive devotion of the Constituent Assembly to its task, and second, the termination of the activities of the Constituent Assembly within the short, prescribed period. We shall now briefly comment on these two subjects.

 

13. As for the exclusive devotion of the Constituent Assembly to its task, the intention of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State is self evident:  The Constituent Assembly – as such – was not intended to be a permanent organ of the State, or one of its regular authorities. On the contrary, the Constituent Assembly was intended to function separately and distinctly from the other State authorities, and in parallel to them. The State authorities and councils and the Provisional Government were supposed to pursue their own paths, and carry out their respective functions, while concurrently, the Constituent Assembly was supposed to pursue its path and work towards the fulfillment of its own objective.  The purpose of the Constituent Assembly – its one and only mission – was the framing of the State’s constitution.

 

This, in fact, is how the matter was viewed at the time.  Elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on January 25, 1949. On January 24, 1949, the day before the elections, the head of the legislation department in the Ministry of Justice, Uri Yadin, delivered a lecture on the subject of the elections to be held on the following day.  In his lecture, Yadin said the following (Uri Yadin Volume, at p.82):

 

Tomorrow elections will be held for the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel, the first elections since the establishment of the State, and the most important ones for a long time. For we are not going to elect a regular parliament, one of many that will come one after another to enact laws in various areas of our day-to-day lives, but rather,  a unique parliament, of singular importance, charged with the task of endowing the State with one preeminent law, to endure for posterity, as the bedrock of  its existence as a democracy– its basic law – the Constitution.

Future parliaments will be elected in accordance with this basic constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The constitution will determine, once and for all, the foundations of the elections, including the active and passive right to vote, the electoral system, the calculation of their results, and the number of delegates, and it will establish a prearranged format for elections to be conducted from time to time, for as long as the constitution remains in force.

 

These brief comments are the essence of our comments above, and we have no need to add to them.

 

A number of additional conclusions can be derived from the above. For example, inasmuch as the Constituent Assembly was intended exclusively for the framing of the constitution, and nothing else – to draft and then to disappear – it follows that it was supposed to be free of any personal  interest in the content of the constitution (cf. Karp, in her aforementioned article, at p.328). Furthermore, having been limited for its particular task, the Constituent Assembly was supposed to have/acquire an appropriate perspective regarding/ the foundations that were to construct the constitution: independent, as it were, from the burden of everyday concerns, and equipped with a panoramic view, looking far ahead, and taking into consideration the long term interests of the State and the individual.

 

As for the short period designated for the Constituent Assembly to draft the constitution, a constitution, by definition, should be written over a relatively short time. While it need not be measured in days, weeks or months, by the same token we have never heard of a constitution being written over a period of fifty years. 

 

I imagine that had the members of the People’s Council been told that after forty-seven years the constitutional enterprise would still be awaiting completion, they would have waived their hands in denial, as if to say,  ‘How can that be? That was definitely not our intention’.  They might even have added: ‘We allocated four and a half months for writing the constitution (from May 14, 1948 until October 1, 1948). Under the circumstances as they transpired, another few months might be added, perhaps even a few years, but forty seven years definitely exceeds the limits of imagination’. Presumably, this would have been the response of the founders of the state, and this is also common practice when drafting a constitution. We must remember that a constitution is and should be written at a propitious hour, when the heavens open to hear our petitions, at a momentous turning point in the life of the nation. In the words of David Ben-Gurion in the Knesset (in the debate on the Constitution):

 

The events of Sinai do not occur every day. We had a grand, historical occasion, twenty-two months ago. In our history of four thousand years there have not been many other such occasions.

I don’t think that it is our last historical event. I believe that we can expect another grand event. It might lack the grandeur of Mount Sinai, or of the establishment of the State. This I cannot know. But I sense the possibility of another grand occasion; perhaps we may even hear the voice speaking out of the fire – ‘by prodigious acts, by signs and portents, by war, by a mighty and outstretched arm and awesome power,’ and again a new and glorious chapter of our history will begin.

Until then, we will toil from day to day in faith and in humility, persistently and without hesitation. We will see to security, immigration and settlement, and to all of the major and minor laws they require (Knesset Proceedings, (1950) at p. 820).

 

Indeed, a constitution is bestowed at the crossroads of a nation’s life. A crossroad that spreads over fifty years is no crossroad. The chasm that emerged between the initial intention and the actual implementation might lead us to say: inaction constitutes a deviation from authority that renders an act outside the scope of permissible activity. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

 

14.  Let us pause for a moment and survey our surroundings. Parallel to the Constituent Assembly, a Provisional Council of State was also supposed to operate in the newly established state. This was the People’s Council before it changed its name. The functions of the Provisional Council of State were not defined by the Declaration of Independence, but rather in the Proclamation, issued concurrently with the Declaration on May 14, 1948, and in the Law and Administration Ordinance, which was published on May 21, 1948, but was given retroactive effect from May, 15, 1948. Section 1 of the Proclamation stated that ‘The Provisional Council of State is the legislative authority,’ and the very same words were repeated in s. 7(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance

Thus, (normatively) two bodies were created: the Provisional Council of State as the legislative authority, and along with it, the Constituent Assembly, which had yet to be established – as the body meant to draft the State’s constitution. In the words of Professor Uri Yadin (in the Uri Yadin Volume, at pp. 80-81)

 

According to the Declaration of Independence, the Provisional Council of State and the Provisional Government were supposed to continue to function not only until the election of the Constituent Assembly, but also until the establishment of the new sovereign authorities in accordance with the new constitution. The role of the Constituent Assembly would be limited to the formulation and ratification of the constitution, and the tasks of ongoing legislation would remain in the hands of the Provisional Council of State until after the completion of the term of the Constituent Assembly.  Until that time, the two institutions were supposed to exist side by side, and the Provisional Government would serve its present composition until after the elections to the permanent parliament under the new constitution.

 

  1. We will now continue briefly recounting the events that occurred and the various legislative acts that were adopted, after which we will attempt to explain and interpret them. As noted, the Constituent Assembly, within its meaning in the Declaration, was intended as a collegial body charged with the sole task of writing a constitution. However, a constituent assembly as per the instructions and the definition of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State never actually materialized. On January 14, 1949, eleven days before the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State published the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, and in s. 3 of the Ordinance it enacted the following powers of the Constituent Assembly

“Powers of the Constituent Assembly

         The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional Council of State.”

 

As noted, the original intention of members of the People’s Council was that the Constituent Assembly would write a constitution, that the regular authorities of the State would be elected under that constitution, and that until the convening of the regular authorities, the Council of State would continue in office, fulfilling the legislative role. However, the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance introduced a change: The Constituent Assembly was no longer intended exclusively to frame the State constitution. From now on, it was also to hold the powers of the Provisional Council of State, i.e. it was to fulfill the legislative role. The Constituent Assembly was charged with two tasks: the task of writing a constitution for the State and the task of enacting laws – one body wearing two crowns.

 

16.  In this context we further note that upon the convening of the Constituent authority, the Provisional Council was supposed to disperse and disappear,  as provided in s. 1 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance:

 The Continuance in Office of the Provisional Council of State

   The Provisional Council of State shall continue in office until the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Israel; upon the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State shall dissolve and cease to exist.”

 

Yet, once the Constituent Assembly had acquired the legislative authority of the Provisional Council of State, in addition to its authorities as a “Constituent Assembly,” what need  could there be for  an additional body with parallel legislative powers? Hence the provision regarding the discontinuation of the Provisional Council of State.

 

17.  The Provisional Council of State enacted the Constituent Assembly (Elections) Ordinance, and elections were accordingly held, but the Constituent Assembly, at least under that name, was short-lived. On February 24, 1949 the Constituent Assembly convened for the first time, and two days later – on February 16, 1949 –the Transition Law was enacted. Section 1 of that Law spelt the end of the name “Constituent Assembly”:

 

Designation of the legislative body and of the members of the legislative body

       The legislative body of the State of Israel shall be called the Knesset. The Constituent Assembly shall be called “The First Knesset.” A delegate to the Constituent Assembly shall be called “a member of Knesset.”

 

And so it was that the Constituent Assembly disappeared, to be replaced by “The First Knesset.”

 

18.  The First Knesset – i.e. the “Constituent Assembly” as it was originally called – did not write a constitution for Israel.   Lively debates erupted over the questions of whether and what kind of constitution it would actually enact. Finally, a decision was adopted that was subsequently known as “the Harrari Resolution,” named after its proponent, Knesset Member Yizhar Harrari. We will comment further on this decision below, but for present purposes it will suffice to say that the Harrari Resolution deferred the adoption of a constitution to an unspecified date. The Harrari Resolution no longer speaks of a “constitution” but rather of “basic laws” as distinct from a constitution. And so it was until the termination of the First Knesset. Nor did anything change thereafter – not in the Second Knesset nor in the Third Knesset, nor in any of the subsequent Knessets – until this very day.

 

19.  This completes our survey of certain legislative milestones. We now proceed to their interpretation and analysis.

       The Knesset as Possessor of Constituent Authority; the Entrenchment of Statutes

 

20.  The issue currently concerning us is whether the current Knesset possesses constituent authority, i.e. the authority to frame a formal constitution for Israel. To that end, a distinction must be drawn between the question of the Knesset’s au­thority to exercise the powers of a constituent assembly, i.e. the power to enact a constitution, and the question of the Knesset’s authority to enact entrenched laws. These powers are not identical, and one power cannot necessarily be inferred from the other. In fact, constituent authority to enact a constitution may, in principle, include the power to enact entrenched constitutional laws, and quite possibly this is its essence. However, the same inference cannot be made in the other direction.. In other words, authority to enact en­trenched laws does not per se indicate the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority. The Knesset may acquire the authority to enact entrenched laws, but still be lacking in constituent au­thority. As we will explain below in detail, this in fact is our view. The Knesset is empowered to enact entrenched laws – within certain limits – but it lacks the power of a constituent authority.

 

Thus we must differentiate between the two, and we will maintain this distinction throughout. As mentioned, our current concern is not with the authority of the Knesset to enact entrenched laws. Our current concern is solely with the question of whether the Knesset was vested with constituent authority to enact a constitution.

 

Has a Continuity of the Authority of the “Constituent Assembly” been maintained from the First Knesset to the Knessets That Followed

 

21.  The central question concerning us is, as stated, whether the current Knesset possesses constituent authority – the authority vested in the original Constituent Assembly – together with its regular legislative authority. In my view, the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly lapsed long ago. We will now clarify this matter. 

 

22.  It was the Declaration of Independence that provided for the estab­lishment of an “elected Constituent Assembly” to frame a constitution for Israel. As we saw, shortly before the election of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Council of State decided that all its statutory powers would be exercised by the Constituent Assembly, as long as the latter did not decide otherwise (s. 3 of the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance). The Constituent Assembly thus acquired regular legislative powers – its legacy from the Provisional Council of State – while retaining its original power to frame a constitution for Israel, which remained unchanged. The Con­stituent Assembly came and went, and no one would disagree that from the outset it possessed both constituent power, i.e. the power to enact a formal constitution, and legislative power, side by side. The constituent power vested in the Constituent Assembly – here, too, we concur – was not diminished in the least by the fact that, immediately upon its convocation, it renamed itself “the First Knesset.”

 

Had the same Constituent Assembly-First Knesset framed a for­mal Constitution for Israel, I would concede that the deed was done and that its constitution was the Constitution. However this was not the case. The First Knesset dispersed without framing a formal constitution. The Second Knesset, too, failed to write a (formal) constitution, and so, too, all the subsequent Knessets from then until today. The question that inevitably arises is: does the current Knesset possess the original authority of the Constituent Assembly to draft a formal constitution? On this question opinions were divided, and this is the question before us.

 

23.  As noted, the theories of the current Knesset’s constituent authority rely on the following two factors: first, the Constituent Assembly’s authority to draft a constitution, and second, the continuity of that authority to frame a consti­tution from the Constituent Assembly –– that changed its name to the First Knesset –– to all the subsequent Knessets. It is undisputed that the Constituent Assembly (First Knesset) possessed the authority of a “constituent assembly,” namely, authority to frame a constitution. The question is whether it transferred that authority to the Second Knesset. Supporters of the theory of the (current) Knesset’s dual authority cite legislation that purportedly preserves that authority and transfers it, in its entirety and as it was, from one generation to the next: from the Constituent Assembly (First Knesset) to the Second Knesset, from the Second Knesset to the Third Knesset, and so forth, until today (see Rubinstein in his book, ibid,  (4th ed) at p. 447ff; Klein, ibid., 2 Mishpatim; Klein, ibid., 1 Hamishpat; Barak, ibid., Interpretation in Law, vol. 3, at p. 43

 

These are the legislative provisions. Initially there was the Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, s. 3 of which provided as follows:

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance

The Powers of the Constituent Assembly

          3. The Constituent Assembly shall, so long as it does not itself otherwise decide, have all the powers vested by law in the Provisional  Council of State

 

The Constituent Assembly thus acquired the legislative powers of the Provisional Council of State alongside its power to draft a constitution for Israel.

 

The “Constituent Assembly” changed its name to the First Knesset (as per s. 1 of the Transition Law, and towards the end of its term it enacted the Transition (Second Knesset) Law.  Section 5 of the latter provided as follows: 

The Powers etc. of the Second Knesset and its Members

            5. The Second Knesset and its members shall have all the powers, rights and duties which the First Knesset and its members had

 

Section 9 of the law further provided as follows:

Adaptation of Laws

             9. Wherever in any law reference is made to the constituent assembly or the First Knesset, such reference shall, from the day of the convening of the Second Knesset, unless the context otherwise requires, be read as a reference to the Second Knesset.

 

And whereas the provisions of this law referred exclusively to the transfer of authority from the First Knesset to the Second Knesset, s. 10 of the same law established a general norm with respect to transfer of powers:

Application

            10. This Law shall also apply mutatis mutandis to the transition to the Third and any subsequent Knesset, so long as the Knesset does not pass any other Law concerning the matters dealt with by this Law.

 

Supporters of the two-crown doctrine claim as follows:  The  Constituent Assembly was vested with authority to frame a formal constitution for Israel, and that is not disputed. Following that, these statutory provisions were adopted, each at its own time and place, which transferred that authority from one Knesset to the next, until the current Knesset. The legislative crown, and with it the constituent crown, were passed down, as if from father to son, so that today’s Knesset wears the legislative crown together with the crown worn by the constituent authority about 50 years ago. Is that indeed the case?

24. This argument suffers from perplexing doubts. The question of whether authority passed from person to person or from body to body – by the will of the transferors of the authority – is divided into two separate questions. The first question is whether the person or the body that trans­ferred the authority intended to transfer that authority to another, and the second question is whether that authority could, by its nature, be transferred. In other words, was the transferor permitted and authorized to transfer that authority to another. Only if both of these conditions are met may we say that authority was transferred from one to another. In our case, we must answer the following two separate questions: first, did the First Knesset intend to transfer its authority to enact a constitution to the Knesset following it, and second, was the First Knesset permitted and authorized to transfer that authority to the Knesset that followed it, that is to say, did the First Knesset possess the power to transfer its authority? Was its constituent authority transferable, in principle? A closer look at these issues reveals that it is doubtful that these two elements of transfer of authority were present in the case of the Constituent Assembly. However, our concern for now is with the second element, that of the power of the Constituent Assembly to transfer constitu­ent authority to the Knessets following it.

25. Even if we say that, prima facie, the statutory provisions sought to transfer certain powers – as they were – from Knesset to Knesset, the question remains: Which powers could the Constituent Assembly and all the past and future Knessets transfer to one another? After all, we all agree that a person can transfer only such authority that he is permitted and authorized to transfer; and if the “transferor” is not permitted and authorized to transfer, then his intention to transfer is simply of no consequence.

 

Indeed, in my view, when the Constituent Assembly – which was the First Knesset – dispersed  without having framed a constitu­tion for Israel, the Knesset’s right to draft a constitution as established by the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, expired. The continuity that was maintained by the transition provisions quoted above relates solely to matters of legislation, and not to constitutional issues.

 

26.  Today, the 13th Knesset is serving. Israeli Knessets follow one after the other, each one the image of its predecessor. The Constituent Assembly – the First Knesset – was singular and unique. Today’s Knesset, the Thirteenth Knesset, derives its authority from yesterday’s Knesset, the Twelfth Knesset. The authority of yesterday’s Knesset derived from the authority of the Knesset of the day before, and so our journey goes back until the first Knesset.  Here we pause. We draw the veil from the First Knesset and behold we are confronted with the “Constituent Assembly.” As we further retrace our steps we no longer maintain our pace, because unlike the other Knessets, the Constituent Assembly was a demigod, born not of its predecessors, but rather in the minds of the founders of the State. The People’s Council declared the establishment of the State, it decided upon the institutions to be created, and it conceived the Constituent Assembly and assigned it its first task, namely: to frame a constitution for the State of Israel. Recognition of the authority of the People’s Council to establish all of these goes beyond the scope of the Israeli legal system. It constitutes the grundnorm of our (legal) existence as a state.

 

27. We should recall that the same Constituent Assembly – as established by the People’s Council in the Declaration of Independence – was meant to complete its task of writing the constitution within a few months. It was to write it and then disperse. Hence, the Constituent Assembly was singular, exceptional and unique. Knowing this, we also know that the task of the Constituent Assembly to write a constitution was a specific, one-time mission. The authority of the Constituent Assembly to write a constitution could not be viewed as a property right, transferable at its owner’s will. It was a kind of trust that the People’s Council entrusted to the hands of the Constituent Authority, and a trust – as is known – is not transferable from person to person at the trustee’s behest. Indeed, in going to the polls to elect a “Constituent Assembly” – as dictated by the Constituent Assembly (Elections) Ordinance – the nation was meant to have elected a Constituent Assembly whose function it was to frame a constitution for Israel. Concededly, the Constituent Assembly was also supposed to possess regular legislative powers. However these powers existed independently, while its primary function remained as it was, in accordance with the decision of one whose very existence embodies the basic norm. On the face of it, it would seem therefore that the Constituent Assembly was not empowered to transfer its constituent authority to another (see and cf: Nimmer, supra at p 1239-1240). I agree with Professor Nimmer, and would like to add the following comments.

 

28.  A basic legal principle, rooted in common sense, is that agency cannot be transferred. An agent cannot appoint another agent. Delegatus non potest delegare (see e.g. CrimApp 74/58 Attorney General v. Hornstein, [61]). When I repose my trust in someone, such trust by its very essence, is not transferable.  In the absence of the principal’s authorization, an agent is not permitted to appoint another person to perform the agency (see s. 16 of the Agency Law, 5725-1965: “An agent shall not appoint an agent for the object of his agency, unless he has been expressly or implicitly authorized to do so …”). The performance of certain actions is specifically personal, and no person has the power or the authority to transfer them to another (cf: CA 549/75 A v. Attorney General, [64], at p. 465-466).  The “Constituent Assembly” was established by the  People’s Council, and by law it was supposed to be the nation’s agent for the writing of a constitution. Concededly, the people then designated the Constituent Assembly – by force of a law enacted by the Provisional Council of State – as its explicit agent for the writing of the Constitution. This was what the People’s Council legislated and this was what the people chose. However, neither the People’s Council nor the people authorized the Constituent Assembly to transfer its authority to another body. When a king bestows a title of nobility upon a particular person, that person will indeed become a peer, but the title cannot be transferred to another living person, nor be transferred by inheritance unless it was bestowed as a hereditary title.  A noble cannot transfer his title to another, because the title adheres to him and him only.  So it is with the nobility and so it was with the Constituent Assembly that could not transfer to the Second Knesset the authority that originated in the personal trust reposed in it by the electorate.  All of these matters are quite simple

 

29.  It is undisputed that in its capacity as a constituent authority the First Knesset was authorized only to enact a constitution, and nothing else. The Constituent Assembly was a lofty institution that was supposed to occupy itself with  lofty legislation, but this authority was conferred solely for the purpose of enacting a constitution.  The Constituent Assembly may have been all-powerful, but it was all-powerful as a constituent assembly, and could wield its power only within the defined realm of enacting a constitution.  Its omnipotence did not extend to other areas, including the area of transferring its authority to another. It was not granted the authority to transfer its authority, nor did it possess a “natural authority” to do so, nor was it authorized to “regulate itself” for purposes of transferring its authority.  That which is born unique remains unique. The Constituent Assembly is like a queen bee who sits on her in a place of honor, her life task and purpose being to lay eggs and to thus sustain the next generation of bees.  Survival by procreation is the natural objective of living things, and it is the destiny of the queen. Her task is singularly important, incomparably more important than the task of a worker bee, but this task is exclusively hers and she cannot transfer it to others.

 

As a constituent authority, the First Knesset had one and only one purpose – the writing of a constitution. That authority did not include the authority to extend its term, or to transfer  its authority. The Constituent Assembly (The First Knesset) was like the queen bee, but this title was exclusively its own, and it was not authorized to transfer it to any other body.

 

30.I ascribe tremendous importance to the election for the Constituent Assembly.  When the voters went to the polls to elect the Constituent Assembly, their purpose was  to   elect, by law, a body that would grant Israel its constitution. Even were we to say that the issue of a constitution was raised by political parties in various  Knesset elections,  nevertheless, the election for the Constituent Assembly was different from all of the later  elections for the Knesset, because only in that election was the constitutional question put to the voters by force of law. The Constituent Assembly was created for the express purpose of writing the Constitution, and voters therefore “knew” that they were electing a body that would be drafting a constitution. This feature distinguishes the Constituent Assembly, setting it aside from all subsequent Knessets. Indeed, only the election for the Constituent Assembly, as opposed to any future Knesset elections, were held for the election of a body that would draft a constitution Thus, when the Constituent Assembly failed to discharge its task, the opposition was infuriated and harshly criticized  the government. Members of the opposition who expressed themselves on the matter stressed the Declaration of Independence, the nature of the “constituent assembly,” and above all, the fact that the elections had been for a constituent assembly. They were  elections for the purpose of writing a constitution. For example, Knesset Member Menachem Begin had the following to say (all emphases are our own):

I need not rely on the Declaration of Independence. I rely upon the will of the people as it was expressed in the general elections. What did we elect?  A house of representatives? A regular parliament? A regular legislative body? We all went to elections for a Constituent Assembly, and the concept of a “constituent assembly” is a clearly defined, universally accepted juridical concept.

We may continue to debate this point. We went to the Asefa Mechonenet. This is the (perhaps inadequate) Hebrew rendition of the English term  “constituent assembly.” There have been constituent assemblies in all of the countries that have fought wars of independence.  In all of them it was understood that the constituent assemblies would adopt basic laws and then disperse. The legislature, the executive and the judiciary were established on the basis of that fundamental constitution, and orderly political life began.  Therefore, you were under a single obligation: to enact a constitution, and then to disperse and hold new elections.

The question of whether enacting the constitution will take a year or two years is not decisive, being simply a question of what constitutes a reasonable period. But you? What have you done?  You promised the people to discharge the mandate that you received from it, and without asking the people, by force of an automatic majority of the members of the Constituent Assembly, you decided not to enact a constitution and to maintain a situation in which the ministers are free to run rampant.

Should you choose to alter this situation you may do so, but on one condition, that you ask the people.  The people elected a Constituent Assembly, in other words, it charged all of us with framing a constitution for the State of Israel.  You are unwilling to frame a constitution, perhaps on an impulse, or perhaps for some calculated consideration. Let us stand before the people and tell them: We do not require a constitution, we lack the inspiration, we don’t want to bind the coming generations, and so on, and let the people decide…. All of you, without exception, went to the election for the constituent assembly, and none of you informed the people that there will be no constitution.

We therefore demand that you do one of the following:  Either fulfill the duty that the nation imposed upon you to enact a constitution, or conduct a referendum in which all of the Israeli voters will participate, and they will decide again upon the question of the constitution, because your first obligation is to enact a constitution, and that is your  duty. You are not entitled to alter your mandate (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, pp. 739-740)

 

Similar statements were made by Knesset Member Joseph Serlin: 

 

We were elected as the Constituent Assembly, and the same house that changed its name from the Constituent Assembly to the Knesset was promised that the change of name was merely an expression of  respect due  the Hebrew language.  As a Constituent Assembly, we were charged with the single, fundamental task of adopting and granting the people a constitution. At the very moment when, by force of the majority of the parties that are members of the coalition, this Constituent Assembly, which calls itself “the Knesset” abandoned and evaded its duty to give the people a constitution, its term expired and its authority ended.

It is impossible to come back two years later and to propose that the very same Constituent Assembly serve as the Knesset for another two years.  At the moment at which the Constituent Assembly that became the Knesset failed to fulfill its mission and chose  not to grant the people a constitution, it has betrayed the people’s trust.  It is inconceivable that it should now be given a license to sit for another two years as the Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 7, p. 214).

 

In a similar vein, Knesset Member Meir Wilner stated:

 

This defiance of the people’s will is unacceptable.  During the elections for this Knesset, we all promised to prepare a constitution.  This Knesset was elected by the people as a constituent assembly – as the assembly that was to establish the State, its foundations, and its constitution. Concurrently, it sees to the ongoing affairs of State.  We are not a regular parliament; we are a constituent assembly.  You will recall that when we gave our assembly a name – calling it the “Knesset” – we immediately adopted a unanimous amendment that this would be the First Knesset. The aim was to stress the unique charter of this Knesset – the framing of the Constitution – and that its term would be shorter than that of a regular parliament.  We accepted this obligation prior to the elections. This is the concept of a constituent assembly. It was dictated by the change in the political situation and the change in the composition of the population. The adoption of a constitution within one year, and the conducting of new elections are a critical necessity for the State (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4,  p. 804).

 

And Knesset Member Jacob Kalibnov:

 

Let us recall just how many times in the space of an entire year declarations were made regarding the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution: [It was referred] to by the People’s Council, by the Provisional Council of State, and by the Provisional Government. It began with the Declaration of Independence, and the establishment of a committee to prepare a Constitution in the Provisional Council of State; it was followed by the Elections to the Constituent Assembly Law, the official notification of the results of the election, and then followed by the adoption of the Transition (Constituent Assembly) Ordinance. Can there be any doubt that all of these declarations and actions specifically referred to a constituent assembly and not a regular house of representatives, and that they viewed the Constituent Assembly’s principal task as being the preparation of the Constitution? It is also true that this House was established a year ago and it changed its name, ostensibly expressing its desire to redefine its purpose and role and to transform itself from being a constituent assembly into a regular parliament. Unfortunately we have no higher instance that is authorized to annul the decision of this House (ibid., p. 826).

 

We cited all of the above – and other examples abound – in order to stress that the Constituent Assembly was intended for a particular purpose. It, and only it, was established to frame a constitution,  whether by virtue of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, or  the election for the Constituent Assembly.  This trust placed by the people in the Constituent Assembly was not transferable to anyone else, inasmuch as the people did not authorize it to transfer its authority to anyone else.

 

31. Professor Amnon Rubinstein was one of the first people to write about the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority (see Rubinstein, 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana, supra, at p.201). Professor Rubinstein addressed the unique character of the Constituent Assembly in his aforementioned book  (4th ed.) at p.449:

 

Another argument relies on the constituent authority not being a right of the house of  representatives, but rather a right of the people that is entrusted to the constituent assembly. When it dispersed without adopting a constitution, its authority lapsed. In order to draft a constitution, an election must be held for a new constituent body, or the constitution must be submitted for approval by referendum.  This is a weighty argument. We also believe that a matter as serious as the adoption of a constitution should be confirmed by the voting public in a referendum, or by presenting the proposed constitution as an issue in the general election to the Knesset. However, from a binding legal perspective it is difficult to see a difference between the First Knesset (the Constituent Assembly) and the subsequent Knessets. All of them were characterized by the same functional duality. In enacting the Basic Laws, the Knesset officially confirmed its inheritance of the constituent authority.

 

This response must be read very closely. Personally, I am unable to find an answer to the claim that the Constituent Assembly – First Knesset was not authorized to transfer its constituent authority to the subsequent Knessets, this authority having been exclusively its own

 

32. Furthermore, the theory that places two crowns upon the Knesset (today) leads to a trap from which I see no escape.  The two-crown theory views the Knesset as possessing two kinds of authority: “constituent” authority – to draft a constitution; and legislative authority – to draft laws.  Depending on the matter at hand, the Knesset – as necessary and as it deems fit – acts as a constituent authority to enact laws of a constitutional nature, or acts in its legislative capacity to enact laws. According to this doctrine, constituent authority transcends legislative authority, and when the Knesset convenes as a constituent authority it is superior to the Knesset sitting as a legislative authority.

 

We will not concern ourselves now with the generally artificial nature of this formulation, we will just mention that it was via regular legislation – transition laws – that the Knesset purported to transfer its authority from one Knesset to the next. Laws qua laws are the product of the Knesset as a legislative authority, that is to say as an authority inferior to the constituent authority. Thus the question arises: How can an “inferior” legislative authority transfer the powers of a superior authority – the constituent authority – from one superior authority to another superior authority?  How can the “mundane” legislature bestow “sacred” constituent authority? Do we recognize the legislature’s power to deal with the powers of a constituent authority? Shall the saw magnify itself against him who wields it [Isaiah 10:15 – ed.]? Indeed, a mundane Knesset cannot establish a constituent assembly. It cannot enact a law that creates an authority higher than the Knesset itself. The saw cannot magnify itself against him who wields it. Just as a person cannot save himself from drowning by pulling himself up by his own hair, the Knesset cannot empower another body to establish a constitution to which the Knesset would be subordinate. And if the Knesset lacks the authority to establish a constituent assembly, does it not follow that it is similarly powerless to transfer the powers of a constituent assembly to itself or to any other body? After all, transferring the authority is tantamount to bestowing the authority to the body to which it is supposed to be transferred. We therefore know that the Knesset in its legislative capacity was not empowered to transfer its constituent authority from one Knesset to the next.

 

We should also bear in mind that the Second Knesset (Transition) Law was enacted only after the Harrari Resolution, i.e. after the Knesset elected to enact “Basic Laws” instead of a single constitution. The Harrari Resolution was adopted on June 13, 1950, and the Second Knesset (Transition) Law was published on April 12, 1951.  As such, why didn’t the Knesset see fit to transfer the authority of one Knesset-Constituent-Assembly to the next Knesset-Constituent-Assembly by way of a Basic Law, if only to signify that it was acting as a constituent authority? I cannot accept the answer that the Knesset was not sufficiently aware of the difference between the two kinds of legislation, and that it should not be called on a mere technicality. Indeed, the Knesset was not aware of this point because there was no need to be aware of something that did not exist. The Knesset was not authorized to transfer constituent authority, and it clearly did not intend to transfer its non-transferable authority. Needless to say, the intention to transfer as such – had it existed – would not have sufficed.

 

We therefore agree with Minister of Justice Dr Dov Yosef, who made the following statement from the Knesset podium:

 

Nor do I believe that there is any law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit the Knesset’s legislative power, and if there is such a provision in any law, then, I believe that a regular majority of the Knesset can repeal the provision that purports to limit its rights.

And a constituent assembly enjoys an exceptional and extraordinary status.

 However, after our legislature was established in the way it was established, and we did not establish such a constitution at the outset, I do not think that it is possible to deny the Knesset’s ability to decide upon any law as it sees fit. When we elected the First Knesset, we called it a “Constituent Assembly” in accordance  with the resolutions of the United Nations, but those resolutions were not implemented, and in fact, the first Knesset did not function as a Constituent Assembly at all. On the contrary, we functioned as a regular Knesset, and we dealt with all of the subjects that concern a regular Knesset . We did not function as a Constituent Assembly charged with framing a Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

33.  Our comments above are consistent with the conception of a legal system – any legal system – as a collection of norms, all of them collectively justified by a single “grundnorm,” in accordance with the doctrine of the great Kelsen. A constituent authority cannot establish itself. Its establishment requires a foundation point that is external to the positive legal system: that is the grundnorm. Insofar as the constituent authority cannot constitute itself, neither can it transfer its authority to any other body. Only the body that established it – for example, a referendum – has the authority to authorize the transfer of constituent authority to another body. This is proof, if further proof is required, of why the Constituent Assembly was neither permitted nor competent to transfer its constituent authority. Hence, with the dispersal of the First Knesset, which was elected as the constituent assembly, the constituent authority lapsed.

 

34.  As mentioned above, the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset was distinguished from all the subsequent Knessets, being the sole body with an express legal mandate (in the Declaration of Independence) to frame a constitution for Israel.  The people had chosen the constituent assembly ex lege to compose its constitution, and the Constituent Assembly thus had its roots in the people, from which it directly derived its authority. From this we learn that it was the real constituent assembly, the one and only one that had the authority to give the people a constitution for which purpose it had been chosen by the people. This could not be said of the other Knessets that followed the First Knesset (which had been named at birth “The Constituent Assembly”).

 

The issue of the constitution may indeed have arisen in the elections to the Second and Third Knessets, but then it was only one of a number of questions, and parties drafted their platforms in order to win the hearts of the voters, as has always been the practice, both in our country and all over the world.

 

We all know that in the elections to the Second Knesset and to all the subsequent Knessets, the universally discussed issues were peace and security, adopting an aggressive or moderate policy, the social gap and integration, social welfare and the standard of living. The issue of the constitution assumed modest and unassuming proportions, hovering on the peripheries of the operative programs, even if it featured prominently in the party platforms, and it is doubtful whether the voters seriously considered the issue.  As such, nothing can be inferred from the mandate ostensibly given by the people to the Second Knesset and to those following it to enact a constitution. While that is true in general,  it is even more so the case considering that certain parties totally omitted the constitutional issue from their platforms, and others expressed their opposition to a constitution for Israel.  The division of opinions was so great that it is almost impossible to draw a conclusion that the Knesset elections following the First Knesset were for the purpose of framing a constitution – quite the contrary.  Building a constitution upon party platforms, to the extent that they existed, would be quite a leap.

 

35.  Our comments above indicate that the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset did not transfer its power to the Second Knesset and to the following Knessets. The Constituent Assembly was not authorized to transfer its authority  to others, and the Knesset, as a legislative authority inferior to the constituent authority, was not empowered to transfer its superior constituent authority.  With the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset, the original authority to frame a constitution for Israel lapsed and ceased to exist 

 

This account of the lapsing of constituent authority is strongly reflected in the comments of Knesset members. For example, one member of the Provisional Council of State, Z Warhaftig (Chairman of the Constitutional Committee) asserted that the Constituent Assembly (which at that time had yet to be elected), was unique, and that it would draw its authority directly from the nation. From his statements we learn that the Constituent Assembly would not be able to transfer its authority to another body. This is what he said (the emphases are all our own):

 

The source of the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly is the people, the people’s will. Its sovereignty does not issue from the Council of State. The Council of State can only transfer to the Constituent Assembly what it has, and no more. It is an accepted legal norm that one institution cannot transfer to another institution more rights than it already has, meaning that we can only transfer rights that we have, and we are unable to grant the Constituent Assembly authority that we do not possess. Any other rights will be derived by the Constituent Assembly from the people in elections, in accordance with our decision and notification regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly, by which we placed everything in the hands of the public, and the Constituent Assembly derives its sovereignty from the public. We must remember: “Any addition is a deficiency” (Proceedings of the Provisional Council of State, January 13, 1949, p. 10)

 

MK Joseph Serlin was of the opinion that the Second Knesset and its successors did not and would not have constituent authority. He stated:

 

We were elected as the Constituent Assembly, and the same house that changed its name from the Constituent Assembly to the Knesset was promised that the change of name was merely an expression of the respect due to the Hebrew language.  As a Constituent Assembly, we were charged with the single, fundamental task of adopting and granting the people a constitution. At the very moment when, by force of the majority of the parties that are members of the coalition, this Constituent Assembly, which calls itself “the Knesset” abandoned and evaded its duty to give the people a constitution, its term expired and its authority lapsed.

It is impossible to come back two years later and to propose that the very same Constituent Assembly serve as the Knesset for another two years.  At the moment at which the Constituent Assembly that became the Knesset failed to fulfill its mission and chose  not to grant the people a constitution, it has betrayed the people’s trust.  It is inconceivable that it should now be given a license to sit for another two years as the Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 7, p. 214).

 

The opinion of Knesset Member Menachem Begin, is indicated in the following:

 

I am convinced – and in concluding my comments I wish to express my belief – that the day will come when the people will vote for a government that will fulfill the first promise made to the people upon the establishment of the State, to elect a Constituent Assembly whose central task in any nation that has come into being, is to give the people a constitution, and to adopt the legislative guarantees that ensure the freedom of its citizens and the entire nation (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 20, at p. 2220

 

     MK Osnia also maintained that the Knesset did not have constituent authority, and stated as follows (on behalf of the majority in the Constitution Committee):

 

Let us assume that the Knesset now decides upon such a section, that we will call s. 43A or 44, and then someone – not by chance – follows the same long or short procedure to table a motion suggesting that we revoke the provision that requires a two-thirds majority of 80 votes. Now we are not a “constituent body,” and if we were, in fact, a constituent assembly, we would have to adopt that decision by a majority of two thirds. And so, do you really think that there is any kind of ratio legis whereby through a vote of 54 against 52, or 54 versus 40, we can decide something that in the future would require a decision by a majority of 80? 54 against 40 cannot dictate that only a majority of 80 can change the section.  The members of Knesset could subsequently convene and revoke the section by  a regular majority. This is not a constitutional law in the sense that any of its sections cannot lawfully be changed by another law (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 23 at p. 926).

 

Minister of Justice Dov Yosef, took a similar view:

 

Nor do I believe that there is any law that stands “above the regular legislature.” We do not have two legislatures. We have only the Knesset, and in my opinion, a law of the Knesset cannot limit the Knesset’s legislative power, and if there is such a provision in any law, then, I believe that a regular majority of the Knesset can repeal the provision that purports to limit its rights.

 

Jurists conversant in constitutional law claim that the legislature can be limited by a constitution adopted by a constituent assembly prior to the establishment of the legislature. The constituent assembly establishes the rules that determine how the state will be established and manage its affairs, and the essential content of its laws. The decision of such a body can be viewed as being binding upon the legislature because that is the intention of the people in establishing such a constituent assembly.

…                                                                         

And a constituent assembly enjoys an exceptional and extraordinary status.

 However, after our legislature was established in the way it was established, and we did not establish such a constitution at the outset, I do not think that it is possible to deny the Knesset’s ability to decide upon any law at it sees fit. When we elected the First Knesset, we called it a “Constituent Assembly” in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations, but those resolutions were not implemented, and in fact, the first Knesset did not function as a constituent assembly at all. On the contrary, we functioned as a regular Knesset, and we dealt with all of the subjects that concern a regular Knesset. We did not function as a constituent assembly charged with framing a Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

This was also the view of MK Benjamin Halevi:

 

It as though we are adding to all of the Basic Laws – Basic Law: The Knesset; Basic Law: President of the State; Basic Law: Israel Lands; and Basic Law: The State Economy, etc. –  an additional provision that states that this Basic Law that was adopted in the past cannot be amended or contravened or changed except  by a majority of 61 Knesset members. How are we making that addition? Not by a 61 member majority but by a smaller majority. The contradiction here is patent, perhaps not in the legal-technical sense, but certainly in the moral sense. Who gave it legitimacy? We are not a constituent assembly, and we are not composing a constitution. At this point in time there are less than two dozen members sitting in the Knesset. In the presence of two dozen or fewer  Knesset members we presume to curtail the Ninth Knesset, the Tenth Knesset and any other subsequent Knesset so that they can only make changes  by virtue of a special majority. I do not think that this is legitimate. It is not practical. This is not the time to do it. There are serious legal doubts as to whether any Knesset is empowered to act in this fashion (Knesset Proceedings, vol.  78, p. 955).

 

The comments of MK Amnon Rubinstein, one of the outstanding proponents of the two-crown theory, are particularly interesting. This is what MK Rubinstein said in the Knesset:

 

…There was debate in previous Knessets as to whether the Knesset can entrench laws against their amendment by force of a regular majority, and the view that more or less prevailed, though still disputed, was that where it concerns the Knesset’s role as a constituent assembly, that is, when it acts as the drafter of a constitution, when it enacts a chapter of the constitution, it is empowered to establish the superior status of a particular law (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 99, p. 2790)

 

MK Rubinstein admits quite candidly: When sitting as a constituent authority, the Knesset can, in my view, enact a supra-legal statute, but this view, is “still being disputed.” Now if this was the view of MK Rubinstein – who is none other than Professor Rubinstein – is this not sufficient proof for all that the Knesset is not unanimous in regard to the two-crown doctrine, that the Knesset’s opinion wavers on this point and certainly is not firmly anchored?  

 

We have not said, nor will we say that the unanimous view  is and has always been that the constituent authority was not transferred from the Constituent Assembly to the ensuing Knessets. There were those who supported this view, and others who rejected it, and others who were silent on the matter.  The overall picture is, however, that we are a long way from the conclusion that the members of the Knesset have consistently held that the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly passed down by  inheritance to all of the subsequent Knessets, until the current Knesset.

 

36.  The question of the constitutional continuity of the constituent authority is in fact part of a much larger question: Does today’s Knesset – and in fact any of the Knessets after the First Knesset – have the authority to frame a constitution?  In presenting this question – which is the heart of our discussion – and in reviewing the comments of the Knesset members, it clearly emerges that the position adopted by Knesset members over the generations was far from unequivocal  on  the question of whether the Knesset possesses constituent authority, whether as the heir and successor of the Constituent Assembly, or otherwise, and on the question of the Knesset’s status as a constituent authority with regard to the adoption of a constitution, with regard to the Knesset’s power to limit itself by way of the entrenchment of laws, and with regard to the ancillary and derivative questions flowing from these questions. Regarding each proposition on these matters there are a number of opinions – East, West, North and South – that do not all lead to the same valley. The necessary conclusion from our survey of the material is that the Knesset never took a single, exclusive view of its authority as a constituent assembly. Anyone seeking the “Knesset’s” opinion will receive  a number of responses, as is the Jewish way. So it was in the First Knesset, and so it continues to be.

 

Furthermore, in reading the speeches of the Knesset members we do not know whether their views are “legal” interpretation or whether they are the views of statesmen and politicians (though presumably the political factor is the decisive  one). Against this background, we can understand why Government supporters expressed one view, whereas opposition members expressed another view, and the religiously observant Knesset members had their own view. Indeed, a number of Knesset members who were jurists based their views on legal rationales, but they were few, and we should remember that they too sat in the Knesset as representatives of parties and not as men of law.

 

Lastly, from reading statements made by Knesset members we learn that the question of the Knesset’s constituent authority is inseparably linked to the question of the Knesset’s authority to limit itself by way of entrenchment of laws. In other words, Knesset members alternately refer to the Knesset’s constituent authority and to its power to entrench laws treating of rights, as if the two were identical. Needless to say, this confusion of two dissimilar terms weakens the assertion that the Knesset members themselves supported the notion of the Knesset’s constituent power, when in fact they were referring to the Knesset’s power of self-limitation.

 

37. We will cite some of the statements made by Knesset members on point (emphases are our own):

 

The following statements were made by MK Haim Zadok, a brilliant jurist and later the Minister of Justice:

 

As to the concluding part of s. 4, stating that “this section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members of the Knesset,” i.e. not by a regular majority of those voting but a special majority, we reject this provision, not just because we reject the existing electoral system, but also for a fundamental, constitutionally based reason,  namely that  any  attempt to limit  the Knesset’s authority to change the laws of the state by way of regular legislation is not consistent with the constitutional structure of the State of Israel and the Knesset’s sovereignty.

 

We live in a regime in which the Knesset is sovereign, in other words with a legislature which despite its physical, political, public and moral limitations, is nonetheless all-powerful and unlimited in the constitutional-legal dimension. Arguably, there is only one constitutional limitation to the omnipotence of the sovereign Knesset, deriving from its basic nature as a sovereign parliament – that it is unable to limit the power of subsequent sovereign parliaments.

 

For this reason we utterly reject the provision pertaining to a special majority in s. 4, and for the same reason we reject the provision in s. 45, which stipulates that s. 4 and s. 45 can only be varied by a majority of 80 Knesset members.

 

In addition to the constitutional consideration, I must further add that the qualification appearing in s. 44 requiring a majority of 61 was adopted at the time by a majority of 56 votes versus 54, and the qualification of s. 45, mandating a majority of 80 Knesset members, was adopted by a majority of 43 versus 40. Our opinion was and remains that a regular Knesset majority has no public or moral right to erect a protective wall of a special or weighted majority with respect to a statutory provision adopted by a regular majority.

 

We reject the law in its entirety, and our principled position is that one Knesset cannot tie the hands of the Knesset that follows it, and this position naturally applies to the new provision appearing in the Articles (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 27, p. 2961)

 

This was also the opinion of Knesset Member Akiva Guvrin:

 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. The party faction of Poalei Eretz Yisrael disputed and continues to dispute, both from a public and a moral perspective, the provision adopted by the Knesset with respect to a special majority, that was adopted by a regular, non-special majority. …

           

It is our opinion that the Third Knesset adopted this law – this faulty arrangement – in reliance on its claim – which it correctly makes in this regard – that it was continuing the work of the First and Second Knesset.

 

As such, the Fourth Knesset will have the statutory, moral and public right  to repeal by regular majority, at the nation’s behest, a provision that in our view was neither moral nor publicly justified - the provision concerning a special majority and the existing electoral system.

 

The various factions, which adopted the provision regarding a special majority by force of a regular majority, are apparently aware of what the public sentiment is, how many members, even within their own factions, recognize  the seriousness of the harm inherent in the current electoral system, and so they attempted and continue to attempt to employ another law in order to prevent any examination of the matter (ibid,  at p. 2962)

 

The following statement was made by Knesset Member  Bar Rav-Hai:

 

If they introduced this limitation... there is no power in the State of Israel that will succeed in limiting the will of this House. There is no power in the world that can dictate to this house the position of the majority views of the Sixth and Seventh Knesset… I categorically reject this authority.  We live at a time in which things change far faster than we imagine, and it is impossible  to determine today a format for living  in the next generation, and to compel it to live in accordance with that format established by the wise men of this generation, myself included (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36, p. 1044).

 

Knesset Member Osnia, for example, contended that the Knesset lacked the authority to entrench laws and, in that manner curtail its own discretion, and he had the following to say regarding Basic Law: President of the State:

 

I would now like to address some of the questions arising in regard  to the proposed law. 

Permit me to say, without going into details of the matter, that the proposal made here to entrench certain sections by requiring a special majority in order to change them is meaningless in the absence of a constitution that, by force of its adoption by a special majority, establishes the principle of a special majority without which it cannot be changed. It is meaningless in respect of any law.  I think that when a law – even a Basic Law – states that there is a requirement for a special majority, another law can propose changing that requirement by way of amendment, and I see no basis for inferring that the adoption of such an amendment would require a special majority. In other words, my intention is that one cannot obtain rigidity of  Basic Laws via the window without first going through the door of attaining a rigid constitution. Absent such rigidity, according to the constitutional conception prevailing in the State of Israel, no attempt to entrench any law will be of any avail (ibid,  at p. 970)

 

Knesset Member Yisrael Yeshayahu-Sharabi took a similar view:

 

We are a state under the rule of law. Israeli law is fully operative, and of that there can be no doubt.

But it is doubtful whether anybody authorized us to shackle the hands and the will of the nation’s chosen representatives by a rigid, entrenched and privileged  constitution, which would deny them the benefit of the same right that we ourselves enjoy, to decide what appears to them as right and just by a simple majority… What makes us more special than them and why should their rights be inferior to ours?

 

In other words, it is not only that we lack the time, and cannot say to the Knesset “Sun, stand thou still at Gibeon” to accommodate a one-time effort to formulate a consolidated and privileged constitution, as proposed by Knesset Member Klinghoffer; we also cannot arrogate to ourselves such far reaching authority. Anyone seeking such authority, must request it from the source of the authority – the people itself (ibid.,  p. 1037).

 

And Knesset Member Bar Rav Hai stated:

 

What I absolutely reject is the possibility of a particular law chaining the hands of the next generation… (ibid, p.  1043)

 

Minister of Justice Dr Dov Yosef adamantly insisted that the Knesset lacked the power to limit itself, and on one occasion made the following statement:

 

Nor am I clear as to the basis for Knesset Member Klinghoffer’s assumption that he can propose that this draft proposal be adopted only if voted for by two thirds of all the Knesset members. The Knesset articles, as of today at least, recognize no limitation on the Knesset’s power to decide by a majority of those participating in the vote. Knesset Member Klinghoffer cannot change this by including a provision for that purpose in his draft proposal. In any event, for as long as the proposal has not been adopted, it certainly is not the law, and its contents are not binding upon the Knesset. In other words, even were a regular majority of voters to support his proposal, it would have the force of law.  Where is the justice in enabling  twenty out of thirty members voting for his proposal to shackle the hands of the Knesset that may sit and deliberate over the same law in another fifteen years?  . The result would be that even a majority of the Knesset at that time, which would be three times more than twenty, would be powerless to change what was determined in his draft proposal. Legislation can be adopted, and as I mentioned, many of our laws have been adopted, by the votes of 15, 18, 20, and 22 Knesset members. What possible logic and moral foundation can there be for coming to the Knesset and saying: limit yourselves? Something that was done  by 15 Knesset members when legislating that law, will be eternally valid, and even 61 Knesset members will be unable to repeal it. According to what kind of justice? What kind of morality? (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, at p. 789).

 

The Head of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, Knesset Member Moshe Unna, expressed an original view, taking the same path:

 

            Honored speaker and Knesset: The question of the rigidity of constitutional provisions raised by Knesset Members Klinghoffer and Kushnir may possibly be of importance with respect to particular statutes, and I will not deny that I favor rigidity for certain laws. But in what context? When there is a special, substantive reason in the particular provision, such as Basic Law: The Knesset, in which we establish the electoral system and wish to ensure that it not easily be amended.  It must, however, be clear that even in that case the effectiveness of such a provision is inevitably quite limited, because even that kind of provision can be changed by a regular Knesset vote. Nonetheless, it gives expression to the fact that the Knesset deemed this particular provision to be of special importance (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 40, at p. 2025)

 

Justice Minister Dov Yosef responded by saying:

 

Until today, and apart from one case, the rule in the Knesset has been that the Knesset always decides by a majority of votes. In my humble opinion, this rule is vital and must be maintained. Even regarding the particular instance in which the Knesset decided otherwise, as already noted by the Committee chairman, the validity of that particular statutory provision is highly questionable (ibid. p 2025).

 

In another place Knesset Member Ari Ankorin stated as follows:

 

Honorable Speaker, I consider the British system preferable, under which all laws are of equal value and a regular majority is sufficient to change any law, even a law referred to as constitutional…

 

…At the very most – in our debate over the nature of the preference to be given to this Basic Law or any other Basic Law – I would demand that in considering a change in a Basic Law, the Knesset should be required to take note of that fact. In other words, when passing a law that is liable to violate a particular provision of this Basic Law, it should expressly state,  “notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law, it will be so and so.” That is to say that the Knesset should do whatever it does with the knowledge that it is changing something in the existing Basic Law.  But I would not in any other sense limit the right of this Knesset or of any Knesset to legislate. In other words, I support flexibility as opposed to rigidity.

I have already stated and I accept that it would be good  to have a bill of rights, but it should be exactly the same as with the English. Whatever is written in the Magna Carta, in the charter of rights, can be amended by any parliament. It is a separate question whether or not it actually makes any changes, but it is capable of doing so, and any other option is inconceivable.

I think that we ought to follow this example  and avoid casting doubt upon the work of a parliament – of any parliament or of any Knesset (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 71, p. 2494-2495).

 

This was also the view adopted by Knesset Member Binyamin Halevi:

 

I have found two statements in Jewish law that are germane to this subject. The first is “A prisoner does not release himself from prison.”  If we limit ourselves we place ourselves in the category of incarcerated prisoners, and we will be incapable of  freeing ourselves unless the court comes along and says that the limitations are not valid. Another principle in Jewish law is “the mouth that prohibits is the mouth that permits.” If the Knesset by  a regular majority  prohibited  itself from amending a Basic Law, the same Knesset can release  itself from those bonds  by force of a regular law. This draft law apparently contradicts these principles, and it would be injudicious to enclose  ourselves in these shackles (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, p. 956)

 

This was also the view adopted by Knesset Member David-Zvi Pinkas:

 

Some think that the constitution should be a privileged law, one that cannot be changed or - can be changed only with difficulty. We received explanations regarding the accepted practice among other nations regarding rigid and flexible constitutions. I cannot imagine that we will be able to accept any of these concepts. Regarding a rigid constitution and a constitution enjoying privileged  status, I need only  something we all know about a constitution that was adopted by a stupid king – King Ahasuerus, who ruled over one hundred and twenty seven provinces, from India to Ethiopia. His constitution stated “an edict written in the name of the king and sealed with the king’s ring cannot be revoked.” Shall we adopt a “successful” constitution such as that?

 

Is it conceivable that this House would prevent itself, or subsequent Houses, from deciding and doing whatever may be required at the proper time? (Knesset Proceedings, vol.5 p. 1263).

 

We have cited the comments of Knesset members at length if only to show clearly that the members of successive Knessets have never shared a single view. There have indeed been many who asserted that the Knesset lacked constituent authority, and we cannot ignore this view when deciding on the question of whether the current Knesset has constituent authority.

 

 

The Harrari Resolution

  1. My colleagues view the “Harrari Resolution” as one of the important links in what they view as an unbroken chain that began with the authority of the Constituent Assembly to enact a constitution, and ends (for the time being) with the  authority of the current Knesset to enact a constitution.  I cannot accept their view. Firstly, it should be remembered that the “Harrari Resolution” was only a resolution, and we find it difficult to anchor the authority to frame a constitution in nothing more than a Knesset resolution. Secondly, reading the Knesset Proceedings teaches us that the Harrari Resolution is open to a variety of interpretations, and that each Knesset member relied on it to prove the argument that he found most politically convenient.  The situation was aptly described by Knesset Member Nahum Nir-Refalkes: 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. Knesset Member Yeshayahu found it necessary to return to the debate conducted in the First Knesset over a period of four months, from the beginning of February 1950 until June 13th of that year. If our intention is to renew the debate over whether or not the State of Israel requires a constitution, then I think that after such a long hiatus, we should at least adduce new reasons, such as were not heard thirteen years ago. The only reason we have now heard from Knesset Member Yeshayahu is the same one that was suggested ten or twenty times by the Prime Minister at the time, to the effect that it is  wrong to bind the coming generations by the enactment of a constitution. Meanwhile one generation has passed and a second generation is also passing, and it will never be possible to limit the coming generations, and so we will never have a constitution.

 

Our concern at the time, as it is today, is that nothing compels us to adopt a rigid constitution in the first place. Different states have adopted different paths, such as the possibility of revision of the constitution with every new generation, or every twenty years, so as not to bind the coming generation. The debate terminated with the adoption of that miserable resolution on the 13th of June (the Harrari Resolution – M.C.), which was a compromise decision.

 

The story is told of a wife who consulted with her husband over what kind of shoes to buy – high heels or low heels. The husband told her to buy shoes with high heels, to which she responded: If I buy high heeled shoes I could fall and break a leg. The husband then said: Buy low heels, to which she replied,  they’re not stylish. Then he suggested that she buy a pair of shoes, one with a high heel and the other a low heel. She answered: “Then I’ll limp.” Her husband then explained that nothing could be done about that. It is a compromise, and every compromise  limps.

This was the compromise of Knesset Member Harrari, who, like his colleague Knesset Member Rosen – then serving as Minister of Justice – favored a constitution, and felt that the best decision was one  low heel and one high heel (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 36 p. 1039).

 

Thus, for example, Knesset Member Yeshayahu Forder made the following statement:

 

The debate ended in a compromise. The Constitution, Law and Justice Committee was charged with the preparation of proposals for the Basic Laws that would be submitted to the Knesset one by one. The clear intention was to fill the empty framework, and instead of a rigid constitution, to at least grant Basic Laws with all possible speed (Knesset Proceedings, vol.15, p. 73).

 

In other words, the “Harrari Resolution” put the last nail in the Constitution’s coffin, and replaced it with Basic Laws, in other words, with laws that are not a constitution.

 

This, indeed, was the view taken by Knesset Member Hanan Rubin:

 

Honored Knesset, when dealing with the first of the Basic Laws, I cannot begin my comments without mentioning the fact that we do not have a constitution, and I fear that there is no chance of a constitution being adopted in the near future. As for the entire artificial structure of laws that at the end of days will be “combined” or “incorporated” into a constitution – it goes without saying that this totally contrived theory only serves to camouflage the grave reality that there is no constitution nor is there any desire for a constitution. Three reasons underlie the unwillingness to have a constitution.

 

The first reason is that it suits any incidental majority in the Government and the Knesset for there not to  be any law bearing the title of constitution, a law which fundamentally regulates the workings of the State institutions, and which defines its social regime. It is convenient for it to be able to occasionally change these matters by a simple majority in accordance with its momentary  needs (ibid. at p. 119).

 

Knesset Member Harrari himself contended that the “Harrari Resolution” did not purport to decide whether Israel would have a material constitution or whether it would have a formal (entrenched) constitution. In his own words:

 

In the momentous debate conducted during the first Knesset whether the enactment of a constitution was necessary or not, it was decided that the State of Israel would have a constitution but no decision was made regarding the nature of that constitution, and regarding its priority over any other law. Accordingly, it seems to me somewhat premature to speak today as if it has already been decided that there will be no relative majority.

Admittedly, I am opposed to a special majority and from that perspective I accept all the reasons cited by the Prime Minister against a special majority, but this does not mean that if we fail to decide on a special majority we are abandoning the concept of constitutional supremacy. Conceivably, a regular majority is compatible with the requirement that the law be passed twice or three times within a particular period.  A regular majority can be subjected to certain restrictions in terms of duration, and the like, or similar to our decision regarding the President of the State, that at the same session  no other matter may be discussed, or that notice must be given as to when the discussion of that issue will begin etc. (ibid, at p. 130).

 

Knesset Member Osnia made the following statement:

 

I will sum up as follows: We should expedite the enactment of the Basic Laws. This legislation should rest on three principles: (a) The constitution must be flexible with no requirement of a special majority in order to change it; [it should be] sensitive to the organic development of our democracy, in a manner that accommodates the inclusion of new developments in  the constitutional reality without  obstacles stemming from a  special majority; (b) the constitution must include the accepted  principles pertaining to law and administration in Israel, while conferring  decisions on controversial issues for discussion within the ambit of laws dealing with the disputed matters. Thirdly, Basic Laws must be drafted so that eventually they will make up a single legislative unit (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 21 at p.9).

 

And Knesset Member Benjamin Ha-Levi said the following:

 

In conclusion, I suggest that that our generation is not yet ready to confer supreme status to Basic Laws. I would advise waiting until the consolidation of all of the Basic Laws into a complete State Constitution, at which time the State Constitution would be adopted by a large, special majority, presumably of more than 61 votes but taking a gradual approach, which as I understand it, is the path taken by the Minister of Justice ­with the aim of reaching a complete legislative arrangement – in my view this path is strewn with difficulty and liable to lead to failure. It is preferable to continue as we have been since the Harrari committee and until today, until the work is completed: all the Basic Laws should be examined, winnowed, amended, and then the full constitution would be adopted.  Only then  would they be conferred with status (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 78, at p. 958).

 

Similar comments were made by Knesset Member Nir-Rafalkes (Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee):

 

This resolution was a sort of compromise between the supporters of the constitution and its opponents, and like any compromise, it satisfied no one, and the result of this decision was  that each party explains the decision as if it were adopted to its full satisfaction (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 20 at p. 2216).

 

And in another context:

 

…all of this is the result of the “Original Sin,” the resolution adopted in accordance with the proposal of Knesset Member Harrari, a resolution supported simultaneously by supporters of the constitution and supporters of  no-constitution. The former group relies on the first part, which states that a constitution must be given to the State of Israel, and the others rely on the part that states that it should be given chapter by chapter. And chapter by chapter means that it will take generations (Knesset Proceedings, vol.21, at p. 29).

 

Knesset Member Nir-Rafalkes also stated the following on behalf of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee:

 

Honored Speaker and Knesset. In general, all over the world  there are rigid constitutions and flexible ones. There is no fixed rule that a constitution must be rigid.  There are reasons favoring each position.

 

First of all, we are not adopting a constitution. We are only adopting one Basic Law, which will constitute one chapter of the constitution… We cannot, therefore, statutorily entrench all of the provisions of the law by a two thirds majority. There are general arguments against a rigid constitution, and claims that the adoption of a rigid constitution effectively confers a privilege upon the minority. If we say that it can only be changed by 80 votes, presuming that 78 Knesset members wish to change and 42 do not, then we are giving a certain degree of privilege to the minority. For this reason there is opposition to a rigid constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.23 at p. 89).

 

This was also the opinion of Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen:

 

I have not despaired of the possibility that  during the term of this Knesset we may arrive at those Basic Laws that will ultimately be incorporated into a constitution, pursuant to the 1950 resolution.

 

 Obviously, even when we undertake this task and even when we arrive at the stage of combining the chapters into one constitution, we will still have to decide the crucial question, over which this house is perhaps divided: whether the constitution will be rigid or flexible. As I am now speaking on behalf of the government, I will not express a personal view,  though my personal view is more or less known (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 38, p. 586)

 

    We will conclude with statements made by then Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion: (in the debate concerning the Constitution that ended in the Harari Resolution)

 

Our debate is over whether to have a constitution or laws, a fundamental, supreme and comprehensive constitution, or basic laws that, like other laws, establish the character and practices of the regime, and define the rights and obligations of the citizens (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 4, p. 812).

 

    In short, we absolutely cannot say that the Harrari Resolution was but a link in the uninterrupted chain of constituent authority, passed on from the Constituent Assembly to  the current Knesset.  Quite the opposite is the case. The Harrari Resolution was a type of compromise, and like all compromises, each party saw in it that they wanted to see. The most that can be inferred from the Harrari Resolution is that in place of one integrated constitution, the Knesset would be enacting basic laws, and that when the time comes, all of the basic laws would be consolidated under one roof.  As to when and how this would be done, or what the formal status of the basic laws would be, these and other related questions were left in limbo, unanswered, and not surprisingly so..  The main thrust of the Harrari Resolution was to halt the race towards a formal rigid constitution. It was not intended to lay down the procedures for adopting a constitution. It should come as no surprise that it did not resolve the question of the formal status of the Basic Laws. . The failure to resolve this question was intentional (and see Karp, ibid., at p. 237).

 

Interpretation of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State: What are a Constituent Assembly and a “Constitution”?

Formal Constitutions and Material Constitutions: Does Israel have a Constitution?.

 

39.  In addition to the arguments and evidence presented above,  there is additional  support for our contention that today’s Knesset does not possess constituent authority. We will now briefly examine some of the arguments made in this context.

 

40. Firstly, we will mention  the question of interpreting the Declaration of the Establishment of the State. The Declaration instructed us regarding the “elected constituent assembly” that  would enact a “constitution” for the State.  Thus far we have assumed that the term “elected constituent assembly,” when linked to the term “constitution,” should be understood as referring to an elected body charged with the establishing of the organs of the state in a uniform, formally rigid “constitution.” It is no secret that, to date, such a constitution has not been adopted, and the question before us is merely whether the current Knesset possesses the authority to adopt the kind of constitution that was envisaged.

 

41. There are grounds for contending  that the Declaration’s original intention was to establish a formal, rigid constitution. Under the Declaration of the Establishment of the State, the People’s Council presumed to base itself not only on “our natural and historic right,” but also upon the “resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.”  An examination of that resolution indicates (according to some scholars) that the United Nations had a rigid and formal constitution in mind (see, e.g., Rubinstein, ibid.,  (4th ed.) at p. 44).  While that may have been the original intention, it was not long before the high road had divided into  numerous and varied secondary roads. It seems that  every possible thesis has  its supporters and its opponents.  The proliferation of opinions is extensive to the point of confusion. Perforce we should stop and wonder aloud whether we can rule with any certainty, and without a quivering hand, that the Knesset is authorized by force of documents formulated some  fifty years ago, to enact a rigid constitution - a constitution under which laws can be invalidated as if they were regulations adopted ultra vires. It appears to me that we must agree  that only an unequivocal legal provision would have the power to confer upon the Knesset authority to enact a constitution to which regular laws would bow down. A Knesset statute is not comparable to an order issued by local authority on the subject of  cleaning yards (our concern here is with the Knesset exceeding its authority, and not with a court’s authority to invalidate laws enacted in deviation from authority. The latter derives inexorably from the role of the judicial branch and the principal of separation of powers). Given the diversity of views, can we so rule? We highly doubt it. In this context we will further examine the citations of  statements of Knesset members.  Those who examine them closely will know and understand.

 

42. Regarding the “Constitution” itself, it may reasonably be presumed that the Declaration of the Establishment of the State envisaged the enactment of a formal, rigid constitution. However, it was not long before other opinions were voiced. Hence, it was asserted that a state’s constitution primarily means a compilation of laws concerning the central institutions of the State and the relations between them. The term “Constitution” should not be interpreted in accordance with the meaning given to it today, i.e. a formal, rigid constitution, but rather a collection of laws treating of a particular subject. Thus, it may be recalled that “The Constitution of Military Jurisdiction” was none other than emergency regulations, the validity of which was extended, but  which was nonetheless referred to as a “constitution” (see:  Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution 1948).  These regulations were extended from time to time by order of the Provisional Council of State, and by Knesset legislation. Even the very first law enacted by the Constituent Assembly-First Knesset, namely the Transition Law, was referred to as the Transition Constitution. 

 

Thus, for example, after the Transition Law passed its first reading, the Speaker of the Knesset, Knesset Member Sprinzak made the following statements to the Knesset: 

 

… I hereby determine that we have discharged the duty of conducting a first reading of the Transition Constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.1, p.16).

 

     Even Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, referred to the Transition Law as the “Transition Constitution” (see below). The Chairman of the Elections Committee, Knesset Member Bar Rav Hai likewise referred to The Elections Ordinance to the Constituent Assembly as “The Elections Constitution for the Constituent Assembly,” and so did the Minister of the Interior, Knesset Member Greenbaum (see Proceedings of the Temporary Council of State, October 28, 1948, p. 22). The Minister of the Interior further added:

 

I believe that I am entitled to say that this constitution is not inferior to election constitutions in other States. This constitution ensures orderly elections…

 

There are countless citations, and we will make do with the examples already mentioned. Thus,  at the time, a constitution did not mean only a formal constitution, but was also a term for a collection of laws concerning a particular subject, and primarily, laws of a constitutional nature. (Here we should point out, particularly for contemporary purposes, that in speaking of a “constituent assembly,” it would seem that the Declaration was only referring to the establishment of the central institutions of state and their mutual relations. These subjects were the central focus of the Knesset debates. This point is particularly salient because the focus today has shifted, and when speaking of a “constitution” today, we are primarily concerned with the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual).

 

  1. Of course, that is important is neither  nomenclature, nor  terminology. The main point is that the blurring of the distinction between a formal rigid constitution and a flexible, material constitution led Knesset Members to claim that the term “constitution” referred to in the declaration of the establishment of the State also applies to an unentrenched constitution. In fact, an examination of the comments of the Knesset members clearly shows that many of the Knesset members felt that the word “constitution” also carries the connotation of a material constitution, which is not entrenched. The citations showing this are too many to count, and we will not take the trouble to cite them.

In the same  context, the Knesset members, among them the Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared that not only does the word “constitution” in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State mean a material constitution, but also that the Knesset did in fact discharge its duty of providing the nation with a constitution. Having fulfilled its duty, the Constituent Assembly had no legacy to bequeath to the subsequent Knessets. In the words of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion:

 

As for the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration provides  that the People’s Council will operate as the Provisional Council of State, and the People’s Administration as the Provisional Government, until the establishment of the elected, regular institutions of State in accordance with the constitution enacted by the elected Constituent Assembly, no later than the first of October 1948. The elections for the Constituent Assembly were conducted on the 25th of January 1949.On the 16th of February, the Transition Constitution was adopted, and in accordance with that constitution, which was, however, adopted somewhat after the first of October, the elected and regular institutions of the State were established. On the10th of March 1949, the first regular government was approved by the Knesset in accordance with the constitution (Knesset Proceedings, vol.4, p.813.

 

   See further: H. Zadok, “The Structure of Government in Israel in Light of Constitutional Law,” Law and Government in Israel (Government Press, Z. Zilbiger, ed., 1954), at 39, 46; Likhovski, supra, 4 Is.L.Rev. at pp. 64-65).

 

Knesset Member Warhaftig spoke in a similar vein:

 

Forgive me if I cite the response of Shalom Aleichem: First of all, we never obligated ourselves [to enact a constitution – M.C.], and secondly, if we did assume such an obligation, then we have already discharged it; and furthermore, if we gave an undertaking in the framework of this Declaration (of the Establishment of the State – M.C.) to grant a constitution – then we rescinded our undertaking by virtue of subsequent decisions…

As to the second question – do we already have a constitution? I think that we have a constitution in accordance with the undertaking given in the Declaration of Independence. That undertaking was not given to the United Nations. We assumed such  a responsibility without any relation to the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and we are under no obligation to ensure conditions that are not subject to change by a regular majority, or that cannot be changed at all. We already have such a constitution, by virtue of our adoption of the Law and Administration Ordinance, the Transition Law, and the Knesset Elections Ordinance, in accordance with which the election was held.  A constitution is a system of laws that regulates matters of law and administration in the State.  We have a system of laws that answers that definition.  Hence we have a constitution.

 

For those who understand the distinction between a written constitution and an unwritten constitution, it might be argued that we do not have a written constitution. But when speaking of a “constitution” in the generic sense, it includes both a written and an unwritten constitution. Constitutional theory  differentiates between a number of categories of constitutions, among them, between a “written constitution” and an “unwritten constitution,” although both of them are referred to by the term “constitution.” If the Declaration of Independence states that we must adopt a constitution, it means that we must make the arrangements required to enable regular and orderly government in the State. This we have done. Concededly, we did not do it by the 1st of October, because the elections to the Knesset were only held in January, but the State does have a regular government, even if it can and should be  improved.  But it cannot be said that we do not have a constitution (ibid, at p. 729-730).

 

  1. We elaborated somewhat in adducing the statements made by the Knesset Members. We have not said - nor will we say - that we concur with their statements. Just as we have not said – nor will we say – that we disagree with their statements. Our sole intention is to assert that there is a multiplicity of views in the Knesset. With respect to what was said in the Knesset, we could say “Turn it and turn it again for everything is in it.” The Knesset is not of one mind, and it will not rescue us in our attempt to interpret the law. Looking into the mirror, the Knesset sees the reflection of a  myriad of  faces.  How can we know which of those many faces to choose?

Interim Summary

45.  Summing up we can say that from the State’s inception, the Constituent Assembly acquired “personal” authority to frame a constitution for the state, and had it fulfilled its mandate we would have  a constitution. However, the Constituent Assembly did not frame a constitution, and after it ceased to exist – with the dispersal of the First Knesset – so too the authority to frame a constitution lapsed and disappeared. The Knessets that followed the First Knesset did not inherit the authority of the Constituent Assembly. Even the Harari Resolution did not and does not substantiate the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution. We also saw that over the years, many Knesset members have expressed the view that the Knesset lacks the authority to frame a constitution.

 

Does the Knesset have the Authority to Frame a Constitution other than as  the Legacy   of the Constituent Assembly?

 

    46.   As I observed at the beginning of my comments, my colleagues have premised the Knesset’s authority to frame a state constitution on a number of pillars. I further noted that careful examination reveals that each one of these pillars relies to a great or very great extent upon the constituent authority of the Constituent Assembly, and upon the continuity of that authority from the Constituent Assembly to the present Knesset.  Now, having concluded that the authority that was vested in the Constituent Assembly did not pass to the Knessets following the First Knesset, the ineluctable conclusion is that the Knesset lacks the authority to frame a constitution.

 

47.  There is however another possibility. My colleagues speak of the unlimited sovereignty of the Knesset, the rule of recognition of the system, and the best explanation of Israel’s constitutional history in its entirety. Personally, I have difficulty in relying on general, abstract and vague theories to establish the operative authority of the Knesset to enact a constitution for the State of Israel. In my view, the proofs adduced by  my colleagues are inadequate and lack the requisite power to vest the Knesset with such far-reaching authority as that of the enactment of a constitution. I do not know where the Knesset acquired its unlimited sovereignty. I have found no conclusive, or even sufficient proof that our societal conceptions and social consensus confer upon the Knesset the power to frame  a constitution.  On the contrary, I have searched but have not found any evidence of a contract between the people and the Knesset in which the people intended to bestow upon the Knesset the authority to adopt a rigid constitution. Moreover, as I shall explain below, I do not think that the best explanation of the Knesset’s acts to date necessarily leads to a recognition of the Knesset’s  authority to adopt a constitution.

 

Incidentally, the fact is that in the past the Knesset has changed Basic Laws by means of regular legislation. In other words, the Knesset did not see the Basic Laws as possessing  unique status as constitutional laws, changeable only by force of other constitutional laws.  The same applies to the rulings of the Supreme Court, which have not, in this regard, distinguished between Basic Laws and regular laws (see references in paragraph 131 below). Does not this fact alone indicate that under the rules of recognition of state law there is no conclusive legal distinction between Basic Laws and regular laws? And this is because the best explanation of Israel’s legal history is that Basic Laws and regular laws are all located on the same normative level.

 

In addition to all this, to the extent that my colleagues purport to premise the Knesset’s constituent power on a basis other than the constitutional continuity extending from the Constituent Assembly, they divorce themselves from all of the writers and scholars, from the fundamental conceptions of the Knesset members, and from all the other sources upon which constituent authority might potentially be based.  All of the writers  and scholars, and all of the Knesset members who spoke of  the Knesset  possessing constituent authority, based themselves on constitutional continuity from the – one and only – Constituent Assembly until the currently serving Knesset. My colleagues on the other hand, have divorced themselves from that constitutional continuum, and if this is the case, then my colleagues can no longer rely on the writers  and scholars, or on the comments of Knesset members, or on any other legal or jurisprudential source.

 

48.  My colleague, President Barak purports to buttress the doctrine conferring constituent authority upon the Knesset by relying on the writings of writers  and scholars, and by asserting that the vast majority of the Israeli legal community shares this view. I do not think that this claim substantiates the doctrine of constituent authority.

 

49.  First of all, not all of the writers and scholars are of the same view. Not all of them concur with the two-crown theory. In addition to Professor Nimmer and Dr Likhovski, we should also mention the names of other important authors, judges, and writers who reject the two-crown theory. By way of example, we  cite the view of Prof. I. Englard, who wrote the following in his abovementioned book, at pp.108-110.

 

The Supreme Court recognized …the Knesset’s power to limit itself. What is the theoretical basis of this self-limitation? According to one theory, self-limitation is rooted in the Knesset’s authority to serve not only as a legislature, but also as a Constituent Assembly.

 

Although this explanation was recently relied upon by Justice Barak, in our view it is contrived and does not stand up to critical examination (emphasis added - M.C.). Creation of a higher normative plane by adopting the presumption that Basic Laws have constitutional status does not actually solve the problem of the entrenchment of Basic Laws. If the Knesset also fulfills the role of a Constituent Assembly, then why can’t it change an entrenched Basic Law by a regular majority at any time, simply by declaring that it is functioning in its capacity as a Constituent Assembly?  After all, when acting as a constituent assembly the Knesset’s legislation is enacted on the constitutional plane. The answer given is that with the enactment of the first Basic Law concerning the Knesset – the one that established entrenchment provisions – the Knesset exhausted its constituent capacity. It follows, therefore, that the Knesset is no longer entitled to function as a Constituent Assembly, rather,  its task is that of a regular legislature on a lower normative plane. This answer, however, is not adequate, because it, too, assumes that a supreme body can limit itself. In other words, the notion of a constituent body exhausting its capacity by force of a particular act of legislation means nothing other than acceptance of the principle of  self-limitation, this time in  absolute form.

As it turns out this was also the view of the learned professors Shapira and Bracha in their aforementioned articles. It was similarly the opinion of Sheftler in his article, and of Hornstein in his. It would appear that President Landau adopted this view in his article, as well. Secondly, in examining academic  writings, one clearly finds that most  were content to repeat what had been stated by their predecessors, with no further explanation or reasoning, as if it were revealed law granted to us for safekeeping.  Has the Supreme Court ever decided a constitutional or any other matter in this way?

 

In view of all this, let us discuss the reasons adduced by the scholars and writers  rather than their names, the merits of the reasons rather than the merits of their reputations, and the weight of the arguments rather than the weight of their  numbers. .

 

So I have done.   I carefully examined the works of all the scholars, reading them through and through, and I can genuinely say that none of them provide answers to my questions. Some of the scholars – the majority – fail even to address the questions that I have raised. There are others whose answers are unsatisfactory.  At any event, all of them premise their views on what they perceive as the constitutional continuity existing from the Constituent Assembly to the current Knesset. Given our conclusion that such continuity does not exist, the opinions of those scholars are of little help.

 

50.  Furthermore, it is hard to avoid the impression that supporters of the two-crown doctrine, or at least some of them, have confused matters of legal agenda with matters of law, and the ideal law with the real law. And so, in their desire for an Israeli constitution that will protect the individual against governmental power, they seek ways of anchoring such a constitution in the existing law. My heart is with them. I too would like to see an Israeli constitution that treats of the rights of the individual, and the sooner the better.  But I think that first and foremost it is necessary to find a true, certain  anchor for such a constitution in the existing law. We must remember that a constitution means the invalidation of Knesset statutes that violate from the constitution. Before I can agree to nullify Knesset legislation by reason of its deviation from fundamental principles that are also established in Knesset legislation, I require firm grounds for such far-reaching authority.

 

Finally, it is no trifling matter for us to rule today, at the stroke of a pen, that fifty years after the establishment of the State the Knesset is empowered to enact a constitution, and that as a result, the Court is authorized to invalidate Knesset statutes that violate  the basic rights entrenched by the Constitution.  Actually, I view the Court’s authority to invalidate Knesset legislation to be part and parcel with the authority to enact supra-legislation. The question is only whether the Knesset possesses the authority to enact a constitution.

 

51.  Among the other references, Professor Benjamin Akzin is cited as authority for the two-crown doctrine.  I read Professor Akzin’s article, and I found that it supported both the two-crown doctrine and the doctrine of the Knesset’s unlimited sovereignty . Professor Akzin does not regard the two doctrines as contradictory, but rather treats both respectfully. .  Can we rely on Professor Akzin’s view in favor of both doctrines? But this is not the issue. 

 

52.  We would all agree that the question of the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution for Israel, i.e. the Knesset’s authority to limit itself by force of entrenched laws, whether as a constituent assembly or otherwise, is one of the most momentous questions. Indeed, as I have pointed out, this is the most important question to have confronted an Israeli Court since its inception. It is so important that any teacher of constitutional law, or of government, should devote one of his first lectures to it. I was Professor Akzin’s student for two years.  In the 1954 term I took his course titled “Theories of Government,” and in 1955 I studied constitutional law with him. In neither of these courses did Professor Akzin teach us anything at all about the Knesset’s authority to adopt a constitution, whether as a constituent assembly or otherwise. Does this not show that, at that time, Professor Akzin did not regard the Knesset as possessing constituent authority to adopt a constitution?

 

53.  The same applies to comments made by Knesset Member Hans Klinghoffer. Professor Klinghoffer, too, was my teacher, and in 1958 and 1959 I was his teaching assistant in Constitutional Law. Professor Klinghoffer also taught nothing that related to the Knesset’s constituent authority to frame a formal constitution (this was also the case in his class on Administrative Law, in which he similarly made no mention of the Knesset’s constituent authority).  Those years – the fifties – were closer to the time of the Constituent Assembly and the First Knesset, and the historical memory of the events was fresher and better.  Nonetheless, the teachers of theories of government and of constitutional law – teachers with a capital “T”  did not imagine that the Knesset held constituent authority. They also had not heard of the two-crown doctrine, nor did we hear of it from them.

 

54.  I am not trying to say that a person is not entitled to change his mind. I have not, and would not say that.  Nor would I say that a person is not continually learning new things and broadening his horizons. If Professors Akzin and Klinghoffer changed their opinions, or broadened their views, that would certainly be praiseworthy.  However, the fact that so many years elapsed between the First Knesset and the introduction of the two-crowns doctrine attests to its being a hypothesis and nothing more. We have demonstrated the internal contradictions inherent in this hypothesis, and we stated that in our view it should not be adopted. Personally, I find it difficult to understand how this hypothesis can, in and of itself, provide the authority to enact a constitution, and to invalidate  laws enacted by the Knesset that violate  the constitution. This is not how one builds a constitution. This is not the way a court acquires the power to invalidate laws. Aside from a general remark of Mr Sternberg in his aforementioned article in 1958 (in the Molad journal), the two-crown doctrine did not appear until the sixties (in the aforementioned article of Dr Rubinstein), and in the seventies, in the aforementioned article of Dr Klein, and in other places.  And it is only during the last few yeas that the doctrine has attained currency among scholars. We should further recall that even in the Knesset itself, different opinions were voiced regarding the Knesset’s authority as a constituent assembly.

 

55.  It emerges, therefore, that about twenty years after the establishment of the State, the authority for enacting a constitution was suddenly “discovered.” Once revealed, there were those who pounced upon it as if it were a vast treasure.  But is this how one enacts a constitution? Isn’t the very doubt sufficient to dissuade us from endorsing the two-crown doctrine? Is it conceivable that having slept for twenty years a person can wake  one bright  morning to discover that the Israeli Knesset possesses the authority to enact a constitution? This was no forgotten Ottoman Law that we discovered in Young [George Young, Corps de droit Ottoman (1905) – ed.], we discovered the Israeli Constitution! Is that possible?

 

56.  Moreover, a law professor is free to come up with whatever legal theories he desires, and teach his students as he sees fit.  Academic freedom is the air that academics breathe, and no one would tell them what to do.  This is how a teacher speaks to his students: I am presenting you with a theory-hypothesis that I regard as appropriate. In my view, this is the interpretation of the law, and the law should be understood accordingly. The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and hence it has not considered the matter. I hope that one day the Supreme Court will adopt this hypothesis as the law of the land, because it is appropriate for the State and for us. However, for the meantime, this is my opinion.  This is how a university instructor presents a legal theory  to his students, and if he does so, his students will know their path. And I honor those who honor me.

 

57. Neither have I found any basis for the Knesset’s constituent authority in the case law of the Supreme Court.  In fact, the Court acknowledged the Knesset’s authority to entrench laws against change, as well as the Court’s authority to invalidate laws that violate  the provisions of an entrenched law. That was the case in Bergman [15], Agudat Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], and Laor¸[21]. Initially, in Bergman[15], the acknowledgment was made without questioning, in  the form of “We will do and we will obey” [Exodus 24:7 – ed.]., however, over time we came to realize that this was indeed the rule, and today no one would contest either the Knesset’s authority to entrench a law by the requirement of a special majority of 61 Knesset members for its change, or the court’s authority to declare the invalidity of a law which substantively contradicts the provisions of an entrenched law, and which was not adopted by 61 Knesset members (cf. Rubinstein, [20] at pp. 147-148, per Justice Levine). I too will not separate myself from the consensus. . I wholeheartedly concur with the Court’s ruling, and in the second part of my judgment I have attempted to provide it with a legal foundation.

 

However, needless to say, nothing in this case law compels recognition of the Knesset’s constituent authority. On the contrary, apart from an obiter dictum of my colleague Justice Barak (Laor, [21]; and cf. HCJ 761/86 Miari v. Knesset Speaker [63] at p. 873 opposite the letter “g”), the Supreme Court did not even hint at constituent authority as the basis for its decisions in any of those cases.

 

As for the decision in the Clal [37] case, our colleague Justice D. Levine did indeed refer to the Knesset as a “constituent authority,” but this statement was made without any explanation, and was not in dispute. The other two justices on the bench expressed no opinion on the two-crown doctrine. This is true a fortiori in regard to the other decisions cited by my colleague President Barak.

 

It is, therefore, difficult to maintain that the Supreme Court recognized the existence of constituent power: The question has remained open, and will continue to remain open even after this decision.

 

We should  bear in mind further that a clear distinction must be drawn between the Knesset’s constituent authority to adopt a constitution for the State, and its authority to entrench laws. They are not one and the same. We, too, believe that the Knesset possesses the power to entrench laws (subject to certain limitations), but concurrently, we think that the Knesset lacks constituent authority. The two issues should not be confused, and a constitution cannot be inferred from entrenchment.

 

58.  Lastly, I do not find that the Basic Laws already enacted by the Knesset provide any support for the doctrines of constituent authority or of unlimited sovereignty. The Basic Laws were, of course, products of the Harrari Resolution, the primary  purpose of which  was to avoid the enactment of a constitution. Moreover, the Knesset members themselves were divided in regard to the effect of the Harrari Resolution. As noted, many of them felt that the decision did not contemplate the enactment of a formal constitution. Thus, I cannot see how this resolution can be regarded as the basis for adopting a rigid constitution. The Harrari Resolution, and all that followed it are nothing more than a “broken reed of a staff” for the establishment of the authority to enact a constitution, and this is certainly the case after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.

 

As for the exiguous number of entrenchment provisions in some of the Basic Laws (such as Basic Law: The Knesset), these can hardly serve as the basis for specifically inferring the existence of constituent authority. On the contrary, the fact is that the overwhelming majority of provisions in the Basic Laws were not entrenched at all, and this fact per se invites the conclusion that successive Knessets did not view the Harrari Resolution as the basis for the immediate enactment of a rigid constitution (as distinct from a rigid constitution that may or may not be enacted upon the termination of the Basic Law project). As for the few entrenched provisions that were actually enacted, I have not found that they necessarily originate in the authority to adopt a constitution. Moreover, while this Court actually recognized the Knesset’s authority to entrench s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (in Bergman [15], Agudat Derech Eretz [19], Rubinstein [20], Laor¸[21]), I have not found that its rulings were premised specifically on the Knesset’s constituent power. The Knesset, and likewise  the Supreme Court, presumably felt that in its current capacity it had the authority to entrench laws, but this view was not premised upon constituent authority.

 

Either way, I have difficulty  understanding an argument  whereby the very existence of Basic Laws or of entrenchment provisions in Basic Laws, is proof per se of the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws (i.e. to enact a constitution that is supposedly the equivalent of Basic Laws), or for the establishment of entrenchment provisions in the Basic Laws. This kind of proof involves a circular argument, because the proof assumes that which it attempts to prove.  In our view, as we will elaborate below, there are firm legal grounds for asserting that the Knesset is permitted to limit its authority within certain boundaries, but this is unrelated to the issue of constituent authority. We will continue to address the Basic Laws below.

 

Additional Questions on the Two-Crown Doctrine (and on the Unlimited Sovereignty Doctrine, as well)

 

59.  The two-crown doctrine inherently raises a number of (additional) questions that defy simple solution. These questions would not have arisen had the Constituent Assembly enacted a constitution for the State of Israel, as envisioned  by the Declaration of Independence of the State. However, in view of the protracted nature of the process, which has continued up until these very days, the questions are pressing and we have found no unequivocal solution.

 

60.  For example, my colleague President Barak asserts that the Knesset is authorized to enact a formal, entrenched constitution, and that until the enactment of an integrated constitution, the Knesset is authorized to enact entrenched constitutional laws (as Basic Laws). Simultaneously, my colleague acknowledges the difficulty pertaining to the Knesset’s authority to enact entrenched laws that are not Basic Laws, as with the Knesset’s authority to enact Basic Laws dealing with subjects that are not “constitutional.” An example of this is the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984, and its provision that it can be only amended by a majority of the Knesset members.  We discussed this subject elsewhere, and for now we will just address the distinction between a “constitutional subject” and non-constitutional subjects and the theory that the former may be the subject of Basic Laws, whereas regarding the latter, it is claimed, that there is no authority for enactment of Basic Laws.

 

Had the Constituent Assembly endowed Israel with a constitution, our examination of the document itself would enable us to know what the constitution is. In its absence, however, how are we to know which subjects are “appropriate” for inclusion in the constitution and which subjects are inappropriate to a constitution (such that their inclusion in a constitution or basic law would amount to an “abuse” of authority)?  This question’s resolution is of primary importance, because if the Knesset purports to entrench a law that is not a constitutional law, or chooses to append the title “Basic Law” to a law that is not “appropriate “ thereof, then according to the argument above, such an act might exceed the bounds of its authority, and the court would be entitled to declare the invalidity, ab initio, of that act.  On the other hand, is it conceivable that the court itself should define the parameters  of “an appropriate constitution,” and according to those contours rule on the lawfulness of an act of entrenchment?

 

Let us take the example of the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984. In terms of its substance, it would not generally be included in a constitution.  However, is it for the court to determine what is or is not appropriate for inclusion in the constitutions, and to the extent that the Investments by Public in Financial Assets in Israel (Protection) Law, 5744-1984 is inappropriate, is it the court’s role to rule that its entrenchment is unlawful and exceeds the Knesset’s authority for that reason alone?   The prohibition on drinking alcohol (“Prohibition”) was included in an amendment to the United States Constitution. That was what the “framer of the Constitution” desired, and that is what it did. No one would dispute that this is not a law that belongs to the family of constitutional laws. But does this mean that the amenders of the constitution exceeded the bounds of their authority? Can it be said,  at this time and place, that the protection of public assets belongs outside the constitution? In any case, should the court be the body to determine the boundaries of the constitution?  Indeed, it is asserted that for purposes of enacting a constitution, the Knesset’s authority is limited to “constitutional subjects,” and therefore, the court will determine which laws may enter the constitutional garden, which laws will knock but find the gates locked, and which will be expelled should they enter. This assertion itself attests not to the limited authority of the Knesset, but rather to the weakness of the two-crown doctrine.

 

Another example: The two-crown doctrine teaches us that the Knesset possesses two forms of authority, and that the Knesset’s legislative authority may not deviate from the norms established by the Knesset as a constituent authority. A statutory norm and a constitutional norm are located on different levels, and the “inferior” norm cannot exceed the boundaries of the “superior” norm.  The question thus arises: Let us assume that in its constituent capacity the Knesset enacts a Basic Law dealing with a constitutional subject, and then goes a step further and formally entrenches the law.  In other words, it determines that the law cannot be amended  other than by a majority of 61 members of Knesset.  Let us further assume that a later law (also a Basic Law) purports to vary that same entrenched law, but without having been adopted by 61 members of Knesset. Is the later law valid or not? Proponents  of the two-crown doctrine would tell us that the later law is invalid for the simple reason that the later law deviated from the boundaries laid down by the former law (cf. Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1,  The General Doctrine of Interpretation, (Nevo, 1999) 568; idem, vol. 3, at p.282).  We would ask: How can this be? The Knesset established the second law in its capacity as a constituent authority. When acting in that capacity, it is not bound by the Knesset that enacted the first law in its capacity as a constituent authority. The fundamental rule in this context is that  the hand that gives  is the hand  hath taken  away.  The entrenchment of a law is intended, by its very essence, to protect  it against the actions of the Knesset as a legislative authority.  Now that we know that when enacting the second law the Knesset was acting in its constituent capacity, we also know that it acted with the requisite authority. This being the case, aren’t we just playing with words and with abstract legal constructs? (See further on this point, and cf: Nimer, in his aforementioned article; and see Englard, in his aforementioned book (par. 49 above); Likhovski, supra,  3 Is.L.Rev.  at p. 358).

 

Professors Klein and Rubinstein would respond that having enacted the first law, the Constituent Assembly “exhausted” its authority on that subject, and that from that time onwards it, too, became subject to the entrenchment provision (see e.g. Klein, in the aforementioned article, 2 Mishpatim; Rubinstein, in aforementioned book (4th ed.) at p. 450 fn. 13). From where did Professors Klein and Rubinstein take this doctrine (the doctrine of “derivative authority”)? Doesn’t it assume the answer?  This entire doctrine is nothing more than scholarly conjecture.  The question that insistently pounds at our door without let up is whether this is the doctrine by which the Knesset acquired the authority to frame a constitution? My answer is a resounding no.

 

My colleague President Barak also addressed this question, and wrote the following:

 

In exercising its constituent authority the Knesset may limit the future use of its constituent power. This derives from the very essence of the constituent function. This function aims to create a document that entrenches norms that may be altered only in a special way. The constituent function is intended by its very nature to create a formal constitution, the inherent meaning  of which is the establishment of provisions as to the manner by which the constitution may be amended  themselves be amended in accordance with these provisions, failing which the amendment is unconstitutional (the ‘unconstitutional constitutional amendment’). Indeed, the power of the Knesset – when it exercises its constituent authority – to limit itself, and thereby ‘entrench’ its provisions, derives from the authorization to enact a formal constitution itself.

 

All of these are ex cathedra statements presented as incontrovertible axioms.  Furthermore, closer examination demonstrates that all of them are circular arguments that assume that which must be proved, and in their present form they define idem per idem. Indeed, we acknowledge that a constituent authority has the power to limit the legislative authority, but what is the basis for the claim that a constituent authority has the power to limit a constituent authority? This is, and remains a question.

 

In fact, built into the two-crown doctrine  is the requirement that  the Knesset, in its constituent authority, be   able and authorized to limit its constituent authority. This built-in requirement is a result of the  anomaly that gave rise to the two-crown doctrine. The anomaly lies in the fact that the constituent authority has continued to exist for some  50 years, and no one knows the date of its demise. The term  of a normal  constituent authority is fixed. During that period it drafts the constitution, and then  the constitution is presented for ratification in the prescribed manner. This is the case regarding a constitution written as one document, and the same applies to a constitution comprising a collection of written documents. The question of self-limitation either does not arise at all, because of the nature of the constitutional structure created for the drafting of a constitution, or it arises only for the  short, restricted period during which the constituent authority exists and operates (assuming that the constituent assembly and the legislative authority are one and the same).  The anomaly of the two-crown doctrine originates in the reality of there being one king wearing two crowns, but is primarily the result of the unfixed and unlimited reign of that  king.

 

The anomaly did not descend from Heaven. The two-crown doctrine, along with the unlimited sovereignty doctrine, have created and maintained it. Had the original intentions of those who declared the establishment of the State been realized, the problem of self-limitation would never have arisen, at least not for such a protracted period. Initially, the Constituent Assembly existed alone. Its sole purpose was to frame a constitution, and self-limitation was not on the national agenda. This was also the case in regard to the establishment of the First Knesset-Constituent Assembly, the term  of which was, by definition, intended to be fixed and measured. The anomaly emerged together with the unlimited “extension” of the life of the Constituent Assembly. This anomaly inevitably generated the need to establish a rule concerning self-limitation, and hence the doctrine of derivative authority which recognizes the power of the constituent authority to limit its power in the future.  However, as stated, these doctrines are all ex cathedra, to be taken at face value, and instead of seeing the very existence of an anomaly as sufficient reason for rejecting the two-crown doctrine and the unlimited authority doctrine, we see a need to invent another rule, which we deem to be the offspring of the basic norm.

 

62.  In the same context: What prevented the First Knesset from enacting a constitution, the result of which is that until this very day Israel lacks a constitution?  Perusal of the Knesset Proceedings teaches us that the real reason for the failure to adopt the constitution was the refusal of the coalition parties to adopt a constitution, each for its own reasons. This happened with the Constituent Assembly, with the First Knesset and with all the subsequent Knessets.  The obvious question is, therefore, whether the Knesset’s failure to  enact a constitution, or perhaps we should say its stubborn refusal to enact a constitution, is instructive for our purposes?

 

63.  Like my colleagues, I too believe that we deserve a constitution and that a constitution would befit us.  But there are many, eminent people who think otherwise, and in my view their reasons warrant serious consideration, especially since the enactment of a constitution, in certain respects, means taking the path of no return.  Indeed, even those supporting the adoption a constitution should tread carefully lets they fall into traps, be wary of obstacles, lest they be plagued by pitfalls, conspicuous and  concealed.  On the contrary! Let the act be done and let a constitution be adopted. But it should be performed in the way of all the nations. Let a constitution be drafted and submitted for a referendum. Let the constitution be adopted in a process of six readings spread out over the two Knessets. Let any act be done, provided that it involves a substantial deviation from regular legislative proceedings, and provided that the people are involved in the enactment of the constitution. All of these are legitimate acts, and we will acquiesce to them and cherish them.  But with all my might I will oppose our recognition of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution by force of a judicial ruling, via a legal analysis of a document dating back forty seven years, in reliance on disputed conceptions which have no  firm roots in Israeli society.  And where is  the people? Should we not ask its opinion?  On the contrary,  let us call  the people and consult them.  Our matriarch Rebecca was not given to Isaac until she had been asked for her opinion and consent: “We will call the maiden and ask her” (Genesis 24:57) [118].  If this was the case with Rebecca, should we not do the same for the entire nation of Israel?   If the people and its leaders desire a constitution, the means will be found for adopting one. And, if they don’t want one, then the constitution will not be enacted.  But I cannot agree to enacting a constitution without consulting the people.  In fact, what basis is there for asserting that the fundamental conceptions of Israeli society point to recognition of the Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution?  How do we know that the Israeli consensus is that the Knesset possesses constituent authority?  Has today’s nation conferred upon its Knesset representatives the power to limit the tomorrow’s, even if only on constitutional matters? And if they tell me: Yes indeed, forty-seven years ago, then I too will respond that our concern is with the people of today. Did it grant its delegates in the Knesset today the power to frame a constitution? When did the people give a mandate to its Knesset delegates to enact a rigid constitution for Israel?

 

64.In volume two of his aforementioned book, Professor Akzin treats of the subject of “The Adoption and the Changing of a Constitution” (p. 28 ff.) and the subject of “The Social Significance of Constitutions” (p.50 ff.). Anyone reading these texts will discover that a proper constitution should be enacted by those charged with drafting the constitution, and “whose authority exceeds that of the authorities charged with the establishment of other legal directives” (ibid, at p.28), or “an authority elevated above the realm of governance and law, done with a measure of pomp that emphasizes the unique status of the constitution” (ibid). This was the case of the Constituent Assembly established in 1949. Professor Akzin also taught us another possibility for adopting a constitution, namely with the cooperation of the people, in a referendum or otherwise. In his own words  (at p.34):

…There are many states in which the referendum procedure was maintained or reinstated as a mandatory procedure or as an elective one under certain circumstances pertaining to the establishment of particular norms. More than anything else, the tendency was to require a referendum for purposes of the framing and amending of a constitution. This tendency flows from the conception that the constitution, as a set of norms commanding the highest authority in the state, is more suited than any other set of norms to be established directly by the specific body that a state purporting to be democratic views as its sovereign, i.e. by way of the entire adult population.  When serving as the constituent body, the sovereign people assist in vesting the constitution with the status of a norm that is superior to all other norms, which were only created by the people’s representatives. Similarly, the relatively widespread use of the referendum in adopting a constitution bespeaks the hope that the people’s participation in its enactment will be a clear sign of the fundamental difference between it and all other norms, and will   ensure that the rulers and public office holders will treat it with special respect. From the perspective of the masses, universal participation in the constitutional process will induce a sense of identification with the constitution that they themselves authored, a special affinity to it, and the readiness to enlist in its protection when the need arises.. On the basis of these considerations, a number of constitutions were approved by referendum following their preparation by the appropriate body.

 

And further on (ibid, at p. 35):

 

In the democratic system, even when the constitution is to be presented for ratification by a referendum, the draft constitution is prepared by the constituent assembly. The latter is elected in accordance with the same basic electoral system used in that state for electing representatives to the legislature, or in the case of a far-reaching revolution, in accordance with the method deemed appropriate by those at the helm of the provisional government.

Under these circumstances, the constituent assembly serves both as the institution that prepares the constitution and – presuming that the state is run as a parliamentary system – as a legislative institution that supervises the government.  In the latter case, all the supreme sovereign powers are concentrated in the hands of the constituent assembly, with the exception that it does not see fit to finally adopt the constitution, but leaves that task in the hands of the nation.

 

Indeed, there are other ways of enacting a constitution, such as where the same authority is both the legislative and the constituent authority, but these formats are of an inferior level, and in the words of Professor Akzin (ibid, at p. 37):

 

Experience shows that these alternatives should be viewed with a certain skepticism.

 

And he adds:

 

And it is precisely here that the question arises: Why should one norm established by the legislative body have priority over other norms of precisely the same body? Or, as this problem was formulated at the time: How can the legislature bind itself or the other legislatures following it?  This formulation of the question obviously casts doubt on the very existence of a formal constitution as a distinct normative plane, suggesting that a constitution does not differ substantially from regular legislation.  To the extent that the State of Israel is progressing towards the enactment of a constitution as part of the customary duties of the Knesset – the legislative institution of the State – then it also confronts this problem.

 

This is what we have been saying:  From any perspective – legal, public, moral – in order to adopt a constitution today, forty seven years after the State’s establishment, we require far more than just a legal construction relating to the current Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution.

 

65.  My colleague President Barak gives a somewhat dramatic description of the Knesset debates over the new Basic Laws, and he says (at para. 57 of his opinion) that the Knesset debates were of a unique character:

 

The Knesset debates on the Basic Laws were of a singular nature. The Knesset knew that it was preparing an additional chapter of the State constitution. The Knesset members knew that they were not enacting regular legislation, but constitutional legislation, with far-reaching, long-term consequences as to the law and the character of the State. The debate was ceremonial. When the Basic Laws were enacted all were aware of the importance of the moment.

 

There is no denying that some Knesset members indeed felt a sense of mission. These were primarily the Knesset members who were involved in the drafting of the Basic Laws, and as such they were imbued with a sense of elation.

 

However there were no more than a few ­– a child could count them. Most of the Knesset members felt that they were engaged in their day-to -day routine. For them, the day of adopting the Basic Laws was just another day.  Accordingly, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, a law of immeasurably greater importance than any other law concerning human rights, including Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, was adopted in the Knesset by a majority of 32 against 21 with one abstention.  In other words, only 54 Knesset members bothered to be present in the Knesset during the vote, whereas 66 Knesset members didn’t bother to attend the vote.  I think that it is somewhat exaggerated to claim that the Knesset proceedings “were of a singular nature,” and that “all were aware of the importance of the moment,” and that “the “debate was festive” . I would be surprised if the 66 absent Knesset members shared those feelings.  And, we should remember that 66 Knesset members constitute more than an absolute majority of the Knesset (see further, Karp, in her aforementioned article, at pp. 326-328).

 

Knesset Member Shevach Weiss said the following at the first reading of the draft law of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

 

…If Knesset member Amnon Rubinstein succeeds, particle by particle, nucleus by nucleus, progressing to atoms, and from the atoms onto a more comprehensive system, and if it doesn’t create chaos and confusion, and there is a semblance of order, by semi-clandestine, semi-legitimate means to smuggle the Constitution into the agenda of the State of Israel, we will praise him for it (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124, at p. 2596) (emphasis added - M.C).

 

Knesset Member Shevach Weiss felt that we are worthy of a constitution, and that a constitution is appropriate for us, but we can hardly believe that he viewed the Knesset debate as a festive, historical and momentous debate, like the day of giving the Torah.

 

66.  If the two-crown doctrine or the unlimited sovereignty doctrine were a living doctrine, we could expect it to appear before us in all its glory, as if to say, “here I am, for you called me,” and all those who would see it would know and be enthralled. When confronted by a lion, do we need to gather evidence and construct doctrines to prove that it is a lion? If that is the case with a lion, should it not be the case with regard to the very existence of authority to frame a constitution? It should be self-evident. It is an inherent constitutional requirement that the authority acquired by a body to frame a constitution be uncontested, that the authority should present itself before us in all its splendor so that all who see it may know before whom they stand, without the need for explanations, interpretations, and doctrines, why, whence and wherefore the view that the Knesset possessed the authority to frame a constitution provides none of these.

 

Constituent Authority and our Democratic Journey

 

67.It appears that the two-crown doctrine, like the unlimited sovereignty doctrine, establishes a structure in  Israeli constitutional law unknown  in other countries. For almost  fifty years, and for an unknown period into the future, the same body purports to operate both as a regular legislature and as the framer of the constitution, without the need for any proceeding or body external to itself.  And the people was not consulted. Is this how we propose to build a constitution?  Is this how we vest the court with the authority to invalidate the Knesset’s laws? I can hardly imagine that these doctrines will be our crowning glory, that through them the Knesset will acquire the authority to limit its authority, and the court will be authorized to tumble the Knesset’s laws. Indeed, if the Knesset is to possess the authority to enact a constitution, we would expect that such authority be conferred upon it expressly, clearly, and unequivocally. The construction of a constitution today based on the authority acquired by the Constituent Assembly forty-seven years ago, and in the absence of constitutional continuity from beginning to end, is unacceptable, not least when dealing with the very same body – the same Knesset – that is supposed both to enact laws and to enact a constitution.

68.  I believe that I would not be mistaken if I said that those attempting to recognize  the current Knesset’s authority to enact a constitution amendable only by a special majority of over 61 members (and similarly for those who recognize  the Knesset’s authority to limit  future legislation  by the requirement of a special, weighted majority) contemplate legislation that entrenches individual rights and freedoms: freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom from arrest. As we survey all of these, our hearts abound with joy; how good and how pleasant. I rejoice at the promise of fortifying human rights. We will broaden individual liberties and curtail the powers of government. We will benefit the individual and the public and we will all profit. Happy is the man who trusts in the court, and whose hope is the court.  The court may be relied upon to find the “balances” between  individuals, between the private and public, and between the individual and society. Better to trust in the court than to trust in rulers.

 

Even if all of the above is correct, and we agree that they are all correct, we should bear in mind that a constitution is not only concerned with individual rights and human dignity. The constitution is substantially/significantly, perhaps even primarily concerned with the governmental institutions, the branches of government, and the powers and authorities allotted to each of the branches, which may even extend to relations of religion and state, and even to the delineation of state borders. For example, let us assume that a Basic Law established separate elections for the legislature and the executive; that the elections would be conducted in a certain manner; that the allocation of powers among the organs of the executive – the prime minister and the government – would take a particular form; that the state borders would be such and such, and that this Basic Law could only be changed by a majority of eighty Knesset members. With the distribution of power in the State of Israel, it might be impossible to change this law for many years, notwithstanding a desire for change on the part of a majority, perhaps even a substantial majority of the nation and of the Knesset.  Would we accept this?

 

69.  Since our independence we have known no rest, neither as a nation nor as a State. We are frequently confronted by difficult and painful decisions, the effects of which are evident in every day life, and only the future knows what is in store for us. We are constantly beset  by fateful questions concerning the individual and the community, and the nation harbors  a multiplicity of opinions and views.  Let us imagine a certain question that both troubles/ and divides the nation, and further assume that the government or the opposition succeeds in causing the Knesset to adopt a Basic Law concerning that subject, over the strident protests of its opponents, the protests of the Knesset, and protests of the street.  The subject is a constitutional one, and the Knesset further decides that the basic law can only be changed by a majority of eighty Knesset members.  Naturally, the law is passed by a regular majority, as is customary in the Knesset, for example by the majority by which Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted, a majority of 32 against 21 with one abstention, or the majority which adopted Basic Law: The Government (55 votes for, and 22 votes against).

 

And then the day comes – the day after the adoption of the law, perhaps a fortnight later, perhaps months, and maybe even a year or two. And the government or the opposition (as the case may be) desires to change the law, but is unable to do so, having the support of only 70 Knesset members, maybe even 75, or only 61. According to my colleagues, this law would stand because it is a constitutional law, part of the Israeli constitution.

And I say: Absolutely not!  It is inconceivable that the representatives of a majority of the nation should adopt a position, but be prevented from realizing their goal of amending a Basic Law due to our establishment of a legal construction of two crowns or of unlimited sovereignty. Is this a way of preventing the majority of the nation – even a massive majority – from changing the nation’s fate?  I believe that frustrating the majority is a patently anti-democratic procedure. I have stated this on a number of occasions, and will not tire of repeating the point: This is not how one enacts a constitution. If we desire to present the nation with a fait accompli without having asked its opinion this would, indeed, be the way.  But if we aspire to act with the nation’s approval, we should turn to it and consult it, as we did with the real Constituent Assembly of forty-seven years ago. Another kind of act could also be performed – an act which from a constitutional perspective is a radical departure from routine legislation – and we would love it, too. But please, let us not now establish, for the first time, a legal ruling based upon a law from 1951, and with our own hands establish the Knesset as a constituent authority for the enactment of a rigid state constitution.

70.  The matter however is graver still.  In the example cited above, the current Knesset not only purported to limit the discretion of the Knessets – the current one and its successors – but of the nation as well. Accordingly, the current electorate was not asked whether it empowered the Knesset to entrench a Basic Law to the extent of precluding its amendment other than by a majority of eighty.  And now, confronted with a fait accompli, we tell the people: If you wish to change the law – the very same law that you never empowered the Knesset to enact (with respect to the requirement of a special majority) – you must know that you bear the onus of acting. In the coming elections make sure that you direct your vote properly, and after the convening of the Knesset, assemble eighty Knesset members and go to battle. However, good advice to the voter is simplistic because even in the coming elections, the nation’s ability to change the law is limited.

 

Assume that a voter is a staunch opponent of the law, but when weighing all of the considerations he decides to vote for a particular party that actually supports the law.  Considerations of this kind are not unusual, because voters are not likely to vote for a particular party solely because of its intention to change that particular Basic Law. The nation has thus been confronted with a fait accompli, and the onus for changing it is unbearably heavy, with respect to the need to assemble eighty Knesset members sharing the same view, and with respect to the elections to the Knesset. If a system as complex as this is not a blow to democracy, then I don’t know what a blow to democracy is.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              

 

71.  Irrespective of the situation in countries that lie across the sea (and even those that are not across the sea), this scenario is a grave one, and I regard it as patently anti-democratic. I will loudly declare: When we go to the ballot box to vote for the Knesset, we request that the elected Knesset be the one to determine the norms by which we live., it  periodically enact the norms that regulate the life of the nation as well as the individual. When we go to the ballot box we do not authorize the Knesset to divest itself of the powers that we gave it, that it divest itself of its legislative powers and bind its hands with respect to future legislation.  Ask the voter and he will tell you – if he has even heard – of the Knesset’s authority to adopt a rigid state constitution, i.e. a constitution which requires more that 61 Knesset members to amend it. Enquire as to whether apart from a few jurists and a few other men of letters – “two or three berries at the top of the highest bough” [Isaiah 17:6 – ed.] – the man on Dizengoff Street was aware that fifty years ago the Knesset acquired the authority to enact a constitution, and that that authority persisted until this very day, and that now the Knesset desires to adopt a constitution.  Did I know this? Did you know this?  Did any of you know this? Is this how the authority to frame a constitution is created, as if ex nihilo?

 

I deem the fundamental democratic principle of majority rule – for our purposes 61 Knesset members – too important to be disregarded as though it were not there.  We may deviate from the principle consciously, intentionally, assuming responsibility, and acting with due deliberation, and by a procedure appropriate for adopting a constitution.  And even if there had been six hundred thousand who requested the constitution, - had we lived in 1948 – can we today realize that intention and desire, when we number five million. “Will the axe boast itself against the one that hews therewith? Will the saw magnify itself against he that moves it” (Isaiah, 10:15 [122]).  The axe will not boast and the saw will not magnify itself. The same applies to the Knesset: Being nothing more than the agent of its voters, it is prohibited from deviating  from the authority conferred upon it by us, the voters, and it has no permission to restrict  its legislative authority without having received a special and explicit license to do so. Such license has never been given.

 

Here we can add what should be self evident, that our concern is only with the issue of the majority required in a democratic system . We are all aware that majority rule as such does not guarantee a functioning democracy. The content and the nature of the regime, genuine elections conducted periodically, separation of powers and protection of individual rights: all of these, and others like them are essential limbs in the body of a proper democratic regime.  All that we are saying here is that the principle of the majority is a condition sine-qua-non for the basic existence of a democratic regime (in the absence of a constitution).

 

72. We speak of “national consensus,” of “basic conceptions” of Israeli society, and of the “social contract.”  In my view, no national Israeli consensus exists for recognition of the Knesset’s authority to limit its discretion in the form of entrenchment requiring over 61 Knesset members. The isolated cases in which this kind of entrenchment was enacted concern undisputed issues that represent the fundamental conceptions of Israeli democracy. No inference can be drawn from them, neither with respect to the Knesset’s authority as a constituent authority, nor with respect to other cases that may be the source of grave, acrimonious dispute.  A fortiori, this applies when dealing with questions that have yet to be examined, either legally or from any other perspective.

And I further ask: How are we to know the current views of Israeli society? Did we conduct a referendum? Did we ask the man on the street? Will we decide that no referendum will be conducted, and that we ourselves will determine that the Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution? Is this possible? Isn’t this a case of a self-fulfilling dream (albeit a worthy one)(worthy) wishes forcing their self-fulfillment?

 

    Now they may say to us, as they indeed have: Why do you require the “nation’s” permission to enact a constitution?  Since when is the “nation” engaged in questions of law and justice, and with the question of whether or not the Knesset acquired constituent authority? The real argument between the sectors of the public is about the content of the constitution, not other specific legal questions. National consensus is only required with respect to the content of the constitution, not the actual authority to enact it. Do not speak of the Knesset’s authority, but rather of the content of the constitution itself. This criticism is unacceptable for a simple reason. If we accept the doctrine of constituent authority or unlimited sovereignty, a minority of the nation would be able to adopt a law with “entrenchment by 80” in the absence of any “national consensus” on the content of that law. In this sense, it makes no difference whether we are treating of constituent authority or of the content of the constitution. They are essentially the same, and Basic Laws adopted by a minority of the nation, as is the case with the overwhelming majority of the Basic Laws, cannot be said to reflect national consensus (certainly not in advance).

  

   73.    It is difficult to escape the impression that the supporters of the two-crown theory and of the unlimited-sovereignty doctrine make the following claim:  The Knesset is authorized to enact a constitution because it is appropriate that it should have such authority (social consensus, etc). In other words, these doctrines are largely sustained by the powerful desire to introduce ideal law into existing law, to inject a doctrine (commendable in its own right) into the veins of the existing system of law. The longing and yearning for a formal, rigid constitution is so deep and powerful that a hypothesis originating in the heart’s desire has magically become existing law. Our desire transforms itself into a reality without strict supervision of the central powers and authorities of the State and the allocation of powers to each particular authority. Needless to say, an aspiration for a constitution, albeit a genuine one, is insufficient to establish the actual authority to adopt a constitution. And where shall we find the social consensus?  I do not know.

   

     I fully concur with what Shapira and Bracha wrote in 1972 in their aforementioned article, at pp. 21-22:

 

Even assuming that those who maintain that the Knesset has constituent authority are correct, it is doubtful whether it is desirable today to base the normative supremacy of a possible constitution on the continuing constituent authority of the Knesset, today, twenty-two years after the elections to the original Constituent Assembly. As mentioned, the social-moral basis for the supremacy of the constitution is grounded in the general public’s sense that the constitution is its own creation, being the direct outgrowth of its will. Is it even feasible today to persuade the public of the reasonableness of giving special normative force to a constitution adopted by the Seventh Knesset – a body elected as a regular legislature – solely because the power of the Constituent Assembly, a body elected a generation earlier, passed to the current Knesset by some formality or another?  We must also remember that there are legal doubts as to whether the current Knesset was vested with constituent authority, something that potentially blurs the distinction between the two capacities of the same Knesset (i.e. between its role as a legislative authority and its standing as a constituent authority). It appears to me that today, the Knesset’s act of accepting a constitution is not sufficient.  an act of adoption of a constitution by the Knesset itself would not be sufficient

 

     These statements were made in 1972. In the twenty-three years that have passed since then, their validity has only increased.

   

    74.   We began with the question: The Constituent Assembly – Was it you or was I dreaming? We respond: Forty seven years ago, it was you, but today you are but a sweet dream.

 

The Knesset’s Authority to Enact Entrenched Laws

 

75.Our view is that the Knesset lacks constituent authority to enact a formal, rigid constitution. Neither the two-crown theory nor the unlimited-sovereignty doctrine is rooted in the law of the land. The Knesset is simply the Knesset, with the authority to enact laws as in the past. And this invites the question: It is an undeniable fact that over the years the Knesset enacted a number of Basic Laws (and non-basic laws) that were “entrenched” or “protected” against a regular majority. The question therefore arises whether in doing so it did not exceed the bounds of its authority (making a clear distinction between the authority to enact a constitution and the entrenchment of laws).

The Knesset lacks “constituent” authority. Does it have the authority to legislate entrenched laws?  A law stating expressly that it can be neither varied nor violated except by a majority of the members of Knesset. Is such entrenchment valid? Is the Knesset really incapable of varying or violating the law unless it enlists a majority of the members of the Knesset in support of the variation or violation? And if the law provides that it can only be changed by a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members, is such entrenchment valid? We will now proceed to examine this question.

76.For convenience, we begin our discussion with the accepted presumption (accepted, but in my view incorrect, as I will presently explain) that the Israeli Knesset, similar to the British Parliament, is omnipotent and is empowered to pass any legislation, irrespective of its contents (see CA 450/70 Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] [64] at p.136; HCJ 120/73 [41], at p. 759; the Kaniel  case [13],  at p. 798; HCJ 889/86 Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare, at p. 546; the Laor case [21]; Rubinstein, in his book supra  (fourth vol.) at p.135 ff., 461 ff.). This all-inclusive authority is occasionally referred to as Knesset Sovereignty (or Parliamentary Supremacy). In this context, it has been said jokingly, that the parliament in Westminster is authorized to enact any law but to make a woman a man, and a man a woman:

“It is a fundamental principle with English Lawyers, “that Parliament can do everything but make a woman a man and a man a woman” (Dicey, supra at 41).

 

This statement is imprecise. Obviously, if the intention is only that Parliament is incapable of literally turning a man into a woman, and a woman into a man, it is certainly correct. However, such a reading empties the paragraph of meaning, because by the same token, Parliament is unable to move a pencil from one side of the table to the other because the Parliament as such does not occupy itself in any physical action, and is unable to generate any change in the surrounding physical world. Parliament occupies itself solely with norms and normative actions, and its power and authority lie in this field. If, therefore, the intention is that Parliament is “unable” – in the normative sense – to turn a man into a woman and a woman into a man, then it is quite simply incorrect. In the wonderful world of norms that is not perceived by our five senses, but which controls our lives, the Knesset is certainly “able” and authorized to transform a man into a woman and a woman into a man. A separate question is whether or not those to whom the norms are to apply will submit to them. Needless to say, that question is beyond our scope.

 

77.  The Knesset is therefore omnipotent and authorized to enact laws, regardless of their content and their scope. We therefore return to our first question. If indeed the Knesset is “all-authorized” (all-powerful), does that power and authority empower it  to enact entrenched laws, i.e. to limit its legislative power and authority? The question we ask as adults is the question we asked as children. If God is omnipotent, can He create a rock that He is unable to  lift? If he is able to create such a rock, then necessarily he is not omnipotent, because after the creation of such a rock, he will not be able to lift it. And if he is unable to create it, then he cannot, by definition, be said to be omnipotent.  Either way, it turns out that the God we perceived as being omnipotent, is not, actually, omnipotent. Resolution of this paradox requires that we abandon one of the two alternatives: the lifting of the rock or the creation of the rock. Our argument would proceed as follows: Either God has continuing omnipotence (in the language of Hart) except with respect to His own power, which He cannot limit; or that ultimately He is omnipotent and also has the ability to limit His own power (“self embracing omnipotence”), but having curtailed His power, He is no longer omnipotent (See and compare: Hart, “Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition,” supra at p. 147-154; Englard, ibid. at pp. 107-111).

 

78.  Going from the metaphor to its simple meaning: If the Knesset is “all-authorized,” which is our point of departure, is it authorized to limit (or negate) its authority to change the law? If authorized to limit (or negate) its authority, the conclusion must be that having exercised its authority of self-limitation, it is no longer all-authorized. If, on the other hand, it is not authorized to limit (or not to limit) its authority, then it was not all-authorized in the first place. Either way, we began with the assumption of the Knesset’s unlimited authority, but it turns out in the end that its authority is not unlimited.  We therefore face a paradox, and the question is whether it can be resolved.

 

79.  First of all, let us avoid speaking of the omnipotent God (or of any other “omnipotent” entity). God does what He does, and we do what we do. His acts are not ours. His power is not our power; His time is not our time. His affairs are not our affairs. The matter is quite simple. Insofar as God is omnipotent, as per our opening assumption, He is by definition not governed by the rules of logic that apply to us. The concept of “omnipotence” is a metaphysical one, because if God’s “omnipotence” is understood in the literal sense, then He can also exist and not exist; He can exist today, and simultaneously exist yesterday and tomorrow, and also not to exist at those times. He can be white and not white. He can have a body and image and be incorporeal. And in addition to all these, the “omnipotent” can also cause another to be and not to be at the same time.  And if indeed He can do all these, then why should He not be able to limit Himself and not limit Himself? Accordingly, we cannot speak of God as being “omnipotent,” and in the same breath proceed to subject Him to human law, to the laws of nature with which we are familiar, the laws of logic and the laws of democracy. As stated in the hymn Adon Olam (“Eternal Lord”):

 

“He was, He is, and He shall be; Without beginning, without end.” And in “Yigdal” (“Exalt”): “Transcending time and here eternally…A mystery of Oneness, measureless…Before Creation’s dawn He was the same; The first to be, though He never began.”         

“High up in the North in the land called Svithjod, there stands a rock. It is a thousand miles high and a thousand miles wide. Once every thousand years a little bird comes to this rock to sharpen its beak. When the rock has thus been worn away, then a single day of eternity will have gone by” (H.W. van Loon, The Story of Mankind (1921)). Can we presume to apply human laws and logic to that single day of eternity?

 

The heavens belong to the Lord, but the Knesset He has given to mortals

80.  The difficulty remains. Is the Knesset able to restrict (or limit) its future legislative authority? This would mean that in the wake of such a law limiting (or denying) authority, the Knesset would no longer have the unlimited authority that it had prior to its enactment.  To facilitate our discussion we will not apply the rock parable to the Knesset, in other words we will not use the example of a law that proscribes any possibility of its being amended, because that scenario is irrelevant (and in our view such a negation would not be valid). We will restrict our comments to a law that limits the Knesset’s authority in the future, or in Hart’s terminology, a “self-embracing” law, and to the two methods with which we are familiar: procedural entrenchment by force of a special majority (such as restricting the amendment of a Basic Law to the vote of a majority of the Knesset members, as in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, or an even larger majority), and substantive entrenchment, as is imposed by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which obligates the Knesset by force of the content of the legislation, even without formal entrenchment. In our comments below, we will distinguish between these two limitations, discussing each one separately. We will begin with the Knesset’s authority to restrict its legislative activities by the declaration that a particular law can only be varied by force of a special majority (a majority of the Knesset members, or some other kind of special majority).

 

Regarding Formal Entrenchment

 

81. Let us examine the issue from the beginning.   The first and foremost task of the Knesset (as with any other legislature) is the establishment of behavioral norms for people and bodies living and operating in Israeli society (along with its other tasks, such as the overseeing of the Government’s activities). Those who contend that the Knesset is all-powerful refer primarily to its (ostensibly) unlimited power – from a legal perspective – to establish a normative regime in Israel as it deems fit (within “acceptable” boundaries). As stated above, this is the point of departure for our discussion, from which we will proceed.

The Knesset’s “Preparation” for its Activity

 

82.  When establishing norms for Israeli society the Knesset “speaks” through its legislation, and its laws are the binding norms.  But how does the Knesset exercise its authority in “legislating laws”? In its capacity as a collegial body of one-hundred-and-twenty members, how shall it “legislate”? How shall the legislators assemble for a legislative session? On which days and at what time? What proceedings must be conducted for a draft proposal to become a “law”? And once legislated, how is it brought to the public’s attention? A “Knesset” is not merely one-hundred-and-twenty people elected as Knesset members. While the one-hundred-and-twenty elected representatives are, naturally, its principal component, they are surrounded by norms and rules that are designed to organize the Knesset’s work. These rules create and ground its work procedures, from the tabling of draft proposals before the one-hundred-and-twenty members, to bringing the “law” to the knowledge of the general public. From this we learn that before it legislates laws for people and bodies outside the Knesset, the Knesset must first organize its own internal work procedures.

 

The Knesset’s internal organization is a practical imperative and a necessary condition for its activities. “First adorn yourself, and then adorn others” (Bava Metzia 107b [123]). An echo of this rule appears in the provisions of s. 17 of the Interpretation Law, 5741-1981, concerning “Auxiliary powers”: “Any empowerment to do something or to deal with or decide a particular matter implies empowerment to prescribe work procedure and the order of deliberations insofar as these are not prescribed by legislation.”

 

Our comments here apply to any collegial body (and similarly to an individual authority, in a society in which the rule of law prevails, even if only in the formal sense).  For example, this is the law that applies to courts, and is also the reason for the application of lex fori  in regard to court procedure, even where the substantive matters are decided in accordance with rules deriving from foreign legal systems (see, e.g., A.V. Dicey and J.H.C. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (London, 12th Ed., L. Collins, 1993) Ch. 8, p. 169; and see Dr A Levontin, On Marriage and Divorce Conducted Abroad, (Mif’al HaShichpul, 1957) 68-69; and in the words of Professor Avigdor Levontin: “Any organism must be internally organized before it can organize its surroundings,” (“Draft proposal for Conflict of Laws: The Procedural Aspects,” Uri Yadin Volume, at p. 100). Professor Levontin expressed himself in a similar vein regarding the activities of the court (ibid):

 

…without the laws of procedure that apply to it and in it, no court is a court, and it cannot function in that capacity…when a court is requested to handle any matter, the court must be regarded as a living, functioning entity. Every organism must be internally organized before it is able to organize its environment. This is also true of the judicial mechanism.  Without its customary work procedures, the court cannot even be identified.  The rules of panels and appointment inform us as to the identity of the judges in a particular court, and which judges will compose a particular panel.  Other similarly “non-substantive” rules direct us as to where and when the court functions. There are other rules that tell us how to apply to the court, such as that an application to the court must be made in writing, the prescribed number of copies, that it must be filed in a particular office in a particular format, during particular hours, and that a conversation with a judge does not constitute the filing of an action.

 

These methods of acting and of activating, and certainly the panel rules of the court, are thus not something separate from the court “itself”; if they are not followed, no application is made.

 

These comments regarding the court – which for this purpose resembles any other body intended to dictate legal norms for others – also apply to the Knesset and to Knesset legislation, mutatis mutandis. The Knesset’s role is to “organize” Israeli society, and in accordance with the rule “first adorn yourself,” the Knesset must first “organize” itself. Only that kind of organization can change a static body into a dynamic one. A collection of representatives can become a group of people operating in accordance with predetermined rules and programs, and the amorphous collective attains the capability of performing the roles and tasks imposed upon it.  The “organization” of the body – the procedures it will adopt, the paths that it shall tread, and all that surrounds this – are all secondary and ancillary to the body’s principal role, but calling the body by the name “Knesset” necessarily comprises both the house of representatives and its prescribed procedures and organization.  The “legislating Knesset” cannot exist independently of legislative procedures, from beginning to end. Without clear, predetermined procedures, the Knesset cannot discharge its duties.

 

83.  The Knesset’s “organization” for purposes of legislation can be - and is in fact – fixed in different legislative acts. For example, s. 19 of Basic Law: The Knesset provides that “The Knesset shall itself prescribe its procedure” (emphasis added – M.C.) and continues: “insofar as such procedure has not been prescribed by law the Knesset shall prescribe it by the articles.” (This bears an interesting comparison to s. 108 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], by which the Minister of Justice acquired the power “by rules of procedure to regulate the procedure and practice before courts, registrars and execution offices insofar as they have not been prescribed by law…” (emphasis mine – M.C.). Procedures (as in rules of procedure and custom) appear partly in the primary legislation and partly in secondary legislation (in the Knesset Articles or in Civil Procedure Regulation), in accordance with their importance and weight. Hence, procedures of distinct importance will appear in the law, while those of (relatively) inferior status will be included in the articles.

 

The Knesset’s organization for the fulfillment of its tasks does not only include technical “procedures,” such as the procedural regulations by which the courts operate.  There are also arrangements that are at the heart of the substantive law, and which are nonetheless classified as part of the Knesset’s organization for the discharging of its functions. For example, the immunity of Knesset members’ and the immunity of the Knesset buildings, or the example of the publication of laws and the rule that the effective date of a law is the date of publication unless another effective date is determined by the law itself (as per s. 10 (a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance).  And so, festively attired, and light on its feet, the Knesset sets out on its mission of “organizing” its surrounding world, establishing legal norms for people and bodies meant to defer to the Knesset’s word

 

We will further state the obvious. Procedural restrictions within the scope of the Knesset’s “organization” for the discharging of its principal functions cannot be regarded as “self limitation.”  First of all, if the legislature proceeds on its intended path, there is no limitation of legislative authority in any realm in which it chooses to legislate.  Secondly, at any event, the legislature can at all times amend its prescribed procedures, and this releases it from any self-limitation, which was not self-limitation in the first place ( see and compare, Hart, supra at pp. 68-70).

 

Finally, we do not, nor will we claim that we will always be able to easily distinguish between procedure in the sense of “organization” for discharging of duties, and “substance.” The distinction between procedure and substance stands independently, and the problems it poses, as with any type of legal classification, will not be discussed in the present context (and see, for example, Hart ibid. at p. 71-72; R. Eliot, “Rethinking Manner and Form: From Parliamentary Sovereignty to Constitutional Values,” 29 Osgood Hall L.J. (1991) 215; Hogg, supra, Ch.12).

 

84.Incidentally, in English law, and in other national legal systems of states that originated in the British Empire, these legislative procedures are referred to as the “Manner and Form.” The expression originates in a British law known as the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, a law that, as its name indicates, deals with the Empire’s colonies.  According to s. 5 of that law, the legislative authorities of the colonies were granted the authority to enact their own constitutions, but the regulatory authority was subjected to one qualification, namely that the amendment be done:

In such manner and form as may from time to time be required by any Act of Parliament, letters patent, order in council or colonial law for the time being in force in the said colony.

 

This paragraph in the British law, and the “manner and form” expression in particular, was a primary focus both of the case law of those states, and the writings of scholars, and even Israeli academics have addressed it. Personally, I think it inappropriate for me to resort to expressions rooted in the legislation and law of other states, and certainly not in the mechanical sense. The purpose and the scope of the provision in British law do not necessarily conform to the purpose and scope of the “organization” of our Knesset, and for fear of error, we will do our best to stick to our own nomenclature, without availing ourselves of the expression “manner and form,” which in and of itself may be subject to qualifications that do not concern us. Our concern is with the “organization” of the Knesset, and the need for “organization” which, along with the fundamental tenets of our system, dictates the parameters of our discussion, as we will observe and elaborate below (for example, and merely hinting at the matter, it could be argued that the immunity granted by the Knesset members to themselves exceeds the Knesset’s “organizational” needs and violates fundamental principles of the legal system. Naturally, we will not draw any conclusions at this time).

 

Nonetheless, we can seek assistance from ideas raised by others, and which are germane to our discussion: See and compare, e.g., R.F.V. Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (London, 1961) p.1 ff (“Sovereignty”); Hart, supra, at 67-69, 149-151; A.W. Bradley, “The Sovereignty of Parliament – In Perpetuity?” in The Changing Constitution, ed. J. Jowell and D. Oliver, 3rd ed. (Oxford: 1994) 35 ff. (“Legislative Power” and “Sovereignty”); R. Elliot, supra; Hogg, supra, chap. 12, (“Parliamentary Sovereignty”) at 310 ff., esp. para. 12.3 (b) (“Manner and Form of Future Laws”); Nimmer, supra, 1217.

 

85. Having established its legislative procedures, including those for the publication of laws, the Knesset must proceed along its chosen path, unless it explicitly revokes those procedures and adopts new ones in their stead. It should be stressed that all of this – namely the revocation of old procedures and the adoption of new ones – is performed by the Knesset in accordance with its permanent work procedures, in other words, in accordance with the procedures that it intends to revoke. In other words, the Knesset is “bound” by its previously established legislative procedures. It is able and entitled to change those procedures, provided that such changes are effected in accordance with the predetermined method. None of the above is new. For example, s. 15 of the Interpretation Law provides as follows:

Any authorization to make regulations or to issue an administrative directive also implies authorization to amend, vary, suspend, or revoke them in the manner in which they were made or issued (emphasis added – M.C.)

An additional example of this is the publication of laws. The legal position today is that a law must be published in the Official Gazette, and that if not published it will not come into force (s. 10 of the Law and Administration Ordinance; s. 2(d) of the Transition Law). Let us now assume that the Knesset wishes to enact a law that will take effect even without being published in the Official Gazette. The Knesset cannot enact this kind of law unless it first publishes a law that empowers it to enact laws without publication. If it does not first enact and publish a law (allowing the enactment of laws without publication), the Knesset lacks the power to legislate without publication. A norm adopted by the Knesset by the usual procedures (three readings, etc.) that states that it will come into force even though it has not been published in the Official Gazette will not have legal force, and will not be deemed a law.  The reason is simple: The Knesset (according to the assumption) is all-powerful regarding the contents of any “law” and regarding the procedures for enacting a “law,” but that hypothetical norm is not a law according to the Knesset’s own definition of what constitutes a law. This conclusion is dictated by common sense, good order, and the internal logic of the matter.  While other alternatives are “possible,” the conclusion we presented is practically self-evident (see and compare, Professor Rubinstein, supra (4th ed), p. 472).

Imagine some principality governed by the rule of law (even if only formally). The prince’s bellman, astride his horse, appears in the city square every Monday and Thursday, at five o’clock in the afternoon, unrolls a parchment, and proclaims the new laws to the assembled citizens of the principality.  Should he choose to change the day, time, or place of publication, he must give advance notice to that effect, and will do so at the regular place of publication, on the usual days of publication, and at the predetermined times. If, without prior notice, the bellman appears in the city square on Sunday at eleven o’clock in the morning, his proclamation will not be a proclamation, the square may be vacant, and the law will not be a law. The Knesset’s mode of expression is by the “law,” and a law is only a law if it is published.  A norm purporting to have the validity of law despite its non-publication will not be considered a law according to the Knesset’s own definition of what constitutes a law. Any statement to the contrary would undermine the basic organizational principles of the society, resulting in chaos and confusion, scorn and provocation.

 

Another example: The Knesset Rules of Procedure provide that a law is not valid unless passed by the Knesset in three (or four) readings. A draft bill that passes only two readings remains a draft bill, and does not become a law, even if the draft bill states that it will become law after only two readings. Only an explicit prior amendment (in the Rules of Procedure or in the law, as required) permitting the adoption of a law after only two readings is capable of turning a draft bill into a “law” after only two readings.  The reasons stated regarding publication are similarly applicable here, and do not require repetition.

 

86.  The Knesset and its legislative procedures are comparable to a machine with an internal operating mechanism: A machine that dispenses soft drink bottles will not be able to issue parking tickets unless its internal mechanism is replaced. Needless to say, the transformation must be carried out in a special way in order to make the machine suitable to its new task. The most talented magician cannot open a drawer locked with the key inside, and even the swiftest of men cannot lock a drawer and simultaneously place the key inside it.  A drawer cannot be opened with a key that does not match the lock, but any child can open the same drawer if he has the right key, or if the lock is replaced to match the key. These changes must be performed first, and only afterwards can the drawer be opened.  So it is with drawers and machines, and so it is with the Knesset and legislative procedures (and see, for example, Hogg, ibid., at p.300ff; P.A. Joseph, “Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP Referendum,” 16 N.Z.U.  L. Rev (1994) at p. 67).

 

Knesset Voting; Special Majority

 

87. Let us now take a closer look at the subject of Knesset voting, which is the core of our concerns. We will begin with the issue of the quorum, and proceed to the subject of voting. Firstly, it bears mention that the issues of quorum and voting both concern the “organizational” procedures that the Knesset establishes in order to enable it to function, and the procedure by which it adorns itself before it adorns others.

 

88. The quorum rule is an optional one. In some cases, a quorum is mandatory in one of a variety of forms, and in other cases, there is no quorum requirement at all. Section 20 of the Interpretation Law (formerly s. 37 of the Interpretation Ordinance (New Version)) states that “an act required to be done by a number of persons shall be valid if performed by the majority of them.” This is the point of departure for assessing the actions of a collegial body (which is not a judicial or quasi-judicial body) (see, e.g., HC 7/55 Yanowitz v. Ohr, [66], at p.1255ff.).

 

Arguably, the Interpretation Law does not apply, by force of its own provisions, to Basic Law: The Knesset. Nonetheless, in the absence of a specific provision otherwise, the Knesset would presumably be subject to the rule laid down in the Interpretation Law, by force of the law’s internal logic and because it reflects the fundamental democratic principle of majority rule.  In any case, we need not resolve this question, inasmuch as s. 24 of Basic Law: The Knesset specifically provides that “The Knesset shall hold debates and pass decisions whatever the number of members present.” The rule stipulating the lack of a quorum requirement is binding as long as it is not changed. Should the Knesset Speaker refuse to submit a certain matter for a vote purely because of a “deficient quorum,” he would exceed his authority, and his decision would be invalid. Were a quorum requirement to be imposed, the Knesset would not be able to enact a “law” unless the quorum conditions were met (provided that the rule had not been changed in a separate, prior proceeding). Accordingly, the draft bill would not become a “law” even if it stipulated that it was not subject to the quorum requirement. That very same “law” would not be deemed a law, inasmuch as it was not passed by the required quorum. Baron Munchausen cannot lift himself up by his bootstraps, or save himself from drowning by pulling his own hair, and the Knesset (according to the hypothetical quorum rule) cannot pass a law without a quorum.

 

89.             Proceeding from the quorum to Knesset voting, the basic rule established in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset provides that:

 

Save as otherwise provided by Law, the Knesset shall pass its decisions by a majority of those participating in the voting –

those abstaining not being reckoned as participating – and the voting procedure shall be prescribed by the articles.

 

These are the voting rules followed in the Knesset by force of Basic Law: The Knesset. Knesset decisions are adopted on the basis of the democratic principle of majority rule, and Knesset members who were absent or abstained from voting are not included in the counting of the votes. Only those present at the vote, who voted for or against the law, will be included in the tally which is governed by the regular rules of majority. These rules have applied in the Knesset from the start. We would only add that this kind of provision stipulating that absentees or abstainers are not counted is common in Israeli legislation, and in other legal systems, as well.

However, nothing compels us to adopt this specific provision. For example, with respect to abstainers, the law could have included abstainers among those participating in the vote, and such a provision would ipso facto have meant counting the abstainers among the opponents of the law. And, needless to say, whichever approach the law adopted would decisively affect the manner of voting, both with respect to abstainers and with respect to absentees. The methods of obtaining a majority depend upon three variables: the requirement for a quorum; the treatment of both absentees and abstainers (in our comments below we address the specific issue of the special majority, which is the focus of our discussion). Thus the exclusion of absentees and abstainers in the tally of votes tends to strengthen the Government (assuming that it is the Government that initiates Knesset decisions). The opposite is also true: The inclusion of absentees and abstainers among those whose votes count, has the effect of strengthening the opposition (insofar as they did not vote “in favor,” they will be counted among the opponents) (see further, “Majority Rule,” in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: 1953), vol. 9 at p. 55; 59 Am.Jur.2d (Rochester and San Francisco) paras. 8, 9; and see CA 219/80 Beit Hilkiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Settlement Ltd v. Efrati, at p. 521-522).

 

In the absence of a constitution providing otherwise, the Knesset is free to choose any combination of these variables - quorum, absentees and abstainers - and any combination will be deemed legitimate (from a legal perspective). However, the Knesset’s authority is subject to one significant limit, namely the democratic principle. Regardless of the particular path adopted regarding quorum, absentees and abstainers, the principle of a democratic “majority” must be ensured, admitting of no deviation, right or left. In other words, the “majority” is the axis, the grounding principle around which all other rules and directives orbit. The majority – to paraphrase Hillel – is the “the entire Torah” and all the rest of the rules are “commentary” (we are not now addressing questions of individual rights).

 

90. Knowing that the majority principle forms the central axis – the beginning, the middle and end – facilitates the construction of various models for arriving at a majority decision within the permitted parameters. We can move among a range of models until we encounter the outer borders of democracy, which are inviolable. For example, the rule that abstainers will be considered among the participants in the vote (and therefore included amongst those voting “against”) would, in principle, be burdensome for the government, and require it to muster a larger number of supporters for its proposal. The same method could be applied to absentees. The higher up the ladder we go – in terms of including abstainers and absentees in the vote – the more difficult it becomes for the government, and the easier for the opposition. We climb the rungs of the ladder until we reach the top, where we would say that the Knesset will decide by force of majority, with both abstainers and absentees being counted among the participants in the vote. Such a provision is tantamount to proclaiming that the absentees and the abstainers are considered as having voted against the proposal (by force of not having voted for it). If we remove the veil from this construction, we see a provision stating that a proposal can only be accepted if it receives 61 votes, i.e. an absolute majority of the Knesset members. We further stress that this kind of statutory provision is almost self-evident, being a provision that does not deviate from the boundaries of regular Knesset activities. This would be the position irrespective of whether the 61 votes were implicitly required, as in our example, or explicitly, as contemplated by s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset. 

 

In comparison with the majority provision appearing in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset, the requirement of a 61 vote majority for the passage of a decision may be classified as a requirement for a “special,” or “privileged” majority. We certainly have no quarrel with the adjective “special” or “privileged,” and in everyday parlance the term “special” majority appropriately connotes a majority of 61. But at the same time we should know that even when the passage of a law requires a special majority, it is nonetheless a law that the Knesset is authorized and permitted to enact as part of its regular activity. This statutory provision falls within the accepted, legitimate constraints of democracy, and does not cross the boundaries of legitimate, routine Knesset activities. We simply view the Knesset session as a meeting with the participation of all the Knesset members, in which all of the participants vote either for or against. In that situation, a majority of 61 would be required in order to enact a law, and this would also be the rule in the other cases. Needless to say, a stringent statutory provision of this nature could take the form of a general statutory provision in place of the provision in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset, or could be restricted to a particular matter, in accordance with the concluding phrase of s. 25 (“Save as otherwise provided by Law”).

    91.   We could go even further and assert that not only is the majority requirement of 61 neither unusual nor unique – it actually represents the starting point of the entire democratic process.  A requirement of a majority of 61 (i.e., an absolute majority) is not only consistent with the fundamental democratic principle of majority, it constitutes the embodiment of the democratic principle.  In the world of democracy, an absolute majority is neither a “special majority,” nor a “privileged” majority; it is the “authentic” majority, deriving from the essence of the democratic principle of majority. When the Knesset passes a law, it binds the entire nation, and since we do not live in a utopia in which the entire nation assents as one to the adoption of laws, it is appropriate that, at the very least, the majority of the people, i.e. an absolute majority, should assent to them. The people expresses its opinion through its representatives, and we will therefore require that an absolute majority of the people’s representatives agree to imposing obligations on the people. Those in agreement will presumably make the effort to vote in favor, while those who fail to make the effort to vote – by abstaining or by absenting themselves from the vote – may be assumed to oppose the proposal. This accords with the rabbinic dicta: the “majority carries the same weight as the entirety”; “a majority is equivalent to the totality”; “a majority is like the totality.” But this only applies when the majority is taken from the totality, and the principal meaning of a majority from the totality is an absolute majority (and see: Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, supra, at p. 55).

 

   92.    This was the thrust of statements made in the Knesset by Knesset Members Raphael and Rosenberg (in the debate on Basic Law: The Knesset), and I think it appropriate to cite them. Knesset member Raphael made the following statement regarding the majority:

 

…just as I would not want an incidental majority to change our decision, which was a majority decision, I similarly would not want there to be a need for a privileged majority to change a decision. This also would be somewhat arbitrary and would be tantamount to a distortion of the majority position, in view of there being a substantial portion that is pushing for a change.

I do not agree with the proponents of a two-thirds majority or any other kind of privileged majority; my proposal is that it be a majority from the whole, which according to the Rashba [Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Aderet – ed.] and other authorities of Jewish law is the true definition of a majority. This means a majority of all the Knesset members, and accordingly only sixty-one can change it

(Interjection: That is also a privileged majority).

No, it is not a privileged majority. It is a real majority, rather than an accidental majority.

I propose that the Knesset add a stipulation stating that this section can be changed only by a majority of all the Knesset members (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 23 at p. 898)

And Knesset Member Rosenberg stated the following:

Madam Speaker, Knesset Members. I would like to further elaborate on the difference between my proposal, whereby this section can only be changed by a majority of Knesset members, and a proposal stating that the section can be changed only by force of a two-thirds majority. The problem is not that a two-thirds majority requires a larger majority, while a majority of Knesset members requires a smaller majority. It is a matter of principle. The Knesset adopted this law by force of a majority, a majority of the Knesset members, and it is both reasonable and just that what is adopted by force of a majority may only be changed by force of a majority. The Knesset did not adopt this law by a two-thirds majority, and I see no justification for a requirement of a two-thirds majority in order to change it.

I do not accept the approach whereby a constitutional law requires a two-thirds majority. There are states with constitutions containing special clauses prescribing how to amend it, and not necessarily by two thirds, but by all sorts of other means. In England, as in Israel, there is no constitution, but there are still constitutional laws which do not require a privileged majority if there is a desire to change them

I do however concur with what was said here, and this indeed is our approach, that it is forbidden for a matter of principle to be altered by force of an incidental majority. As a result, we are opposed in principle to the notion of a special majority, save with respect to one eventuality, which will be addressed at the end of the law, concerning emergency legislation. Here however, it is clear that we must ensure a Knesset majority, which means a majority of the state. In this context, I adhere to the accepted approach, namely, that in a system of proportional elections, a Knesset majority represents a majority of the people. Accordingly, if sixty-one Knesset members, i.e. a majority in the Knesset that represents the majority of the nation, wish to make a change, they can do so. If less than half of the people, i.e. less than sixty-one Knesset members, then should they wish to make a change, they will be unable to so. Since they do not represent a majority of the nation, they cannot make a change. Accordingly, we recommend the acceptance of our reservations (ibid., at p. 898).

    Knesset Member Amnon Rubinstein made similar comments at the first reading of the draft bill of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty:

…61 Knesset members do not constitute entrenchment, but rather are a tool utilized in many parliaments to prevent votes of chance. However, without s. 10, this law would be meaningless, and as such the section also represents a minimum. As opposed to the draft bill submitted by the Minister of Justice, it does not require a two-thirds majority, but only a majority of 61. This is a minimum requirement beyond which no compromise is possible, because a majority of 61 is intended to prevent any possibility of a legislative hijacking and amendments by a chance majority (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 123, at p. 1236).

  This is what Knesset Member. Rubinstein said in the Knesset session for the first reading of the draft bill of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation:

 

We propose that this law may only be changed by a majority of the Knesset members.  It is not an entrenched majority… There is no entrenchment here….the requirement for an absolute majority, which is not an entrenched majority, tells the Knesset one thing: This law cannot be adopted by a chance majority. You must adopt it by an absolute majority of all the members. I would like to emphasize that under the provisions that apply to many bodies, this is the basic quorum rule. A quorum means an absolute majority. This type of provision does not apply to the Knesset, and rightly so because otherwise it would encounter daily difficulties. But this requirement is absolutely modest, and minimal, not requiring entrenchment but rather an absolute majority (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 124 at p. 2596).

 

And Knesset Member Rubinstein made the following statement in the meeting of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee:

In all of the Parliaments of the world there is a difference between a special majority, which is a majority of two thirds, as proposed by the Minister of Justice, and an absolute majority. This provision is known as a quorum provision, and is not regarded as a special majority provision (meeting on 9.3.92, at p. 53).

This is “real” democracy, in all its glory and grandeur – the democracy of festivals and holydays. It is the starting point: A majority is an absolute majority of the members of the House. But since we all are aware that incidental demands, constraints and matters of convenience lead to the loss of that glory and grandeur, we inevitably find ourselves in the mundane, workaday democracy.

Should an example be necessary, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was adopted by a majority of 32 for and 21 against. Its twin, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first one) was adopted by a majority of 23 Knesset members, with no opponents or abstainers. This is weekday, routine democracy, and it would surprise me if even the Knesset members themselves regarded the Basic Laws as a “constitutional revolution,” or any other kind of revolution (see and compare Bendor, supra).

 

93. Every day constraints, the convenience of the members of the legislature, and other factors, too, have generated a reality of compromise, of derogation from the absolute majority – the majority that derives from the democratic principle. This was the background of the absentees and abstainers rule in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset. However, our diminution of the “pure” democratic principle should not blind us to the fact that the rule and the principle is that of the absolute majority – the absolute majority that is the beginning of all beginnings. All of this teaches us that the rule of a majority of 61 is the self-evident dictate of the democratic principle of the majority, and as such does not involve the imposition of any element of “self limitation” by the Knesset. When the Knesset prescribes that a particular statute can be repealed, changed or infringed only by a majority of 61 Knesset members, it does not limit its authority, nor does it “curtail” its legislative power. All that it does is give direct expression to the majority rule dictated by the democratic principle. The principle of the majority, quite simply, means 50% + 1 (n/2 +1). In a body comprising 120 members, a “majority” means 61 members (and cf. Hart, supra, p. 68).

 

Requiring a special majority of 61 obviously restricts the Knesset members’ ability to abstain or to mutually set off votes, in that abstention or mutual set off would be regarded as voting against. However, since I do not find that the ability to abstain or set off a vote is a basic right of a public representative, nor is it a right at all even if not a basic right, I do not think that the “rule of 61” violates or infringes any important democratic principle.

 

I would further add, incidentally, that the establishment of a special majority must be specifically anchored in law, primarily because of the statutory provision regarding the formation of a majority in s. 25 of Basic Law: The Knesset. For this reason, I cannot concur with my colleague President Barak, who writes: “It seems to me that the Knesset may – by way of changing the articles – determine that the adoption of a law be by special majority” (Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, at p. 569).

 

    94.   We have learnt thus far that the requirement of a majority of Knesset members for the annulment, change or infringement of any law may occur at any stage of the Knesset’s routine activities, and bears no legal uniqueness. Indeed, a majority of 61 is “special” when compared to the majority of 23 that voted for the adoption of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first version), however, this “distinction” does not involve any innovation from the perspective of the law’s constitutional standing. We are unaware of any legal obstacle to the Knesset’s adoption of any law with “entrenchment by 61,” and we see nothing legally unique in that kind of law.

    

     This is the case, for example, in s. 3 of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law, which provides that “this law may not be amended nor may the appendix be revised except by a majority of the Members of Knesset.” This statutory provision is legitimate in my opinion, and the Knesset was entitled to “limit” its authority by establishing this kind of entrenchment for the law (see and compare, Karp, supra).

 

This view is not unanimous. For example, my colleague President Barak is skeptical regarding the entrenchment of that law. In his view, apparently, entrenchment is valid only when done by means of a Basic Law, whereas the law for Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets is not a Basic Law (see, e.g. Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, pp. 568-569; vol. 3, pp.274-276). I am highly skeptical regarding my colleague’s view for two doctrinal reasons. Firstly, I do not know what my colleague regards as a “Basic Law” that could justify entrenchment such as in the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law. Had the title of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law included the two words “Basic Law,” would it have validated the entrenchment? Irrespective of whether the answer is positive or negative, neither of the answers would be satisfactory. (We might argue that the title “Basic Law” is sufficient, but we would then be accused of semantics. On the other hand, we might claim that the title “Basic Law” is insufficient, and that the entrenchment is invalid, having been enacted in excess of authority. But I think that would be going too far in conferring authority upon the court, in the absence of any explicit statutory authorization).

 

Regarding the content of the law, if Prohibition could find its way into a constitution, then it would seem that public investments could also represent a legitimate constitutional interest (and had such a protection been included in the Constitution in the first place, would we disqualify it?). In any case, where does the Court derive the authority to decide what should be included in a constitution, and furthermore, in order to overrule statutory provisions of the Knesset? Moreover, in my view, the Knesset may, in the regular course of its work, entrench a statute by means of an absolute majority of 61 members, and consequently, I am unable to find any fault in the entrenchment of the Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets Law.

95. Incidentally, I will add that for the same reasons I cannot concur with the view of my colleague Justice Zamir that the Bergman ruling represents a “revolution” in Israeli law. Naturally, I agree that the Bergman ruling was a milestone in the Supreme Court’s rulings. This was the first time that the Court struck down Knesset legislation, and in so doing the Court recognized the justiciability of the procedure and the Court’s authority to nullify Knesset legislation. However, in terms of overall constitutional doctrine, I think that the ruling can be understood as being required by the “internal” authority of the Knesset, in other words, it is derived from the Knesset’s authority to limit its authority, and to entrench a law against a majority of less than 61 Knesset members.

96. Is a majority of 61 Knesset members the upper limit to the entrenchment of a law in a democratic proceeding? For example, is the Knesset authorized to determine that a Basic Law can only be repealed, varied or violated by force of a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members (and if 70 or 80 Knesset members, then why not 90 or 100?)? Is the Knesset authorized to limit its authority by enacting that kind of entrenchment? My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak maintain that the Knesset is entitled to pass such legislation. In my opinion the Knesset does not have that kind of authority to entrench legislation, and were it to do so it would be exceeding the boundaries of its authority. No lengthy explanation is needed, as this derives from the same reasoning that brought us to the conclusion that the Knesset is entitled to establish a requirement of a majority of Knesset members in order to change a particular law. Establishing a requirement for a majority of Knesset members as a condition for changing a law is permitted as a matter of routine, but it also signifies the upper limit. The democratic process mandates this rule unconditionally, and it is a rule that cannot be violated. A requirement that the Knesset must achieve a majority of 62 to change a law would exceed the boundaries of what is permitted. The Knesset does not have the authority to exceed the limit of 61.

Incidentally, what is the status of a law that the Knesset determines can be changed only by a majority of 80 votes? For example, under the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset (a provision that was added in Basic Law: The Government in 1992), the Knesset can extend its incumbency only by force of a law adopted by a majority of eighty Knesset members, and the same applies to ss. 45 and 45A of Basic Law: The Knesset regarding the power of emergency regulations to change or temporarily suspend Basic Law: The Knesset, and regarding a change in the provisions of s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset. Arguably, the “rule of 61” vitiates these entrenchment provisions, because they all require a majority of more than 61. But this is not the case. We have not vitiated these statutory provisions and they should not be regarded as null and void. In my view (prima facie), the law should be regarded as being entrenched under a “61 entrenchment” even if only by force of the rule of ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In other words, we have not annulled those provisions but only diminished their force. I would further say that to date, “80 entrenchment” provisions have been established for matters that are entirely undisputed, and as such it may reasonably be presumed that they will never be subjected to judicial review. We hope that the day never comes. In any case, these provisions do not constitute proof of the Knesset’s constituent authority, if only because one cannot corroborate one’s own testimony.

 

97. In Israel’s current constitutional regime, and in the absence of the living, breathing authority to adopt a “constitution,” a determination that a statute cannot be cancelled, varied or infringed other than by a majority of more than 61 (>61) votes is patently anti-democratic. A functioning governmental organ in a democratic regime – and the Knesset fits that description – cannot have the legal authority to establish such an anti-democratic rule regarding its own activity. For as long as our regime is a democratic one, we are governed by the principle of majority rule (together with civil rights). As such, a requirement for the consent of 62 Knesset members (or more) to change a law essentially means minority rule and abrogation of the majority rule principle. The Knesset does not have that authority, and it is absolutely forbidden for us to recognize it as possessing that kind of authority. If we say that the Knesset is authorized to limit its ability to change a law – regardless of whether it refers to itself as a “constituent assembly” or otherwise; regardless of whether it refers to its authority as constituent authority or otherwise; and regardless of whether the law is titled “Basic Law” or any other name – we thereby acknowledge the Knesset’s authority to enact a law that it will be unable to repeal (as a practical matter). An examination of Israeli parliamentary history shows that very few laws were actually adopted by a majority of 70 or 80 Knesset members. If the Knesset were to entrench laws in that manner, what chance would there be of changing the law? The majority of the nation would stand agape, powerless to change the law. The apologists will explain to the people: you are helpless, and there is nothing you can do.

 

We should further note that according to those who disagree with us, the Knesset is authorized to curtail its legislative authority by determining that a particular law can only be changed by a majority, for example, of 80 Knesset members, even if the law establishing that rule is adopted by a negligible majority of Knesset members – see the examples of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (the first one), and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Can this be so? Section 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset – the statutory provision enjoying “80 entrenchment” – was added to Basic Law: The Knesset in Basic Law: The Government of 1992 (the Basic Law intended to replace the current version of Basic Law: The Government). That Basic Law itself was passed in the Knesset by a majority of 55 votes in favor and 32 against (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 125, at p. 3863). This inevitably raises the legal, moral and public question of whether we should recognize the authority of a majority of 55 Knesset members to enact an “80 entrenchment,” especially given our knowledge – in view of the Knesset’s composition since the establishment of the State – that very few laws could be adopted by a majority of 80. We have elaborated on this point, and there is no need to add to it.

 

Indeed, in my view no importance attaches to the number of members that may seek to limit the Knesset’s authority in the future. A regular majority has the authority to entrench a law so that it can be changed only by a majority of 61 Knesset members (“a majority carries the same weight as the entirety”). However, even a hefty majority cannot entrench a law to preclude its amendment other than by a majority of 62 (or more) Knesset members. In the latter case, even if the entire Knesset voted in favor of such a limitation, I would still maintain that the Knesset had exceeded its authority. Indeed, recognizing the Knesset’s authority to revoke its own power to change a law by a democratic majority (= a majority of 61 Knesset members) presents a dire picture.

 

98. The basic principle of majority rule can teach us the following: First, that inherent in the Knesset’s authority to enact laws is the natural power to legislatively establish that a particular law cannot be repealed, varied or violated unless the proposal receives the support of a majority of the Knesset members i.e. 61 Knesset members. There is no need for a source of law external to the Knesset itself in order to endow it with that power. It is inherent in the very nature of the Knesset as a supreme legislative authority, and is derived from Israel’s democratic character. The second conclusion is that the same principle of majority rule – and no other – further dictates that inherent in the Knesset’s legislative authority is the lack of power to establish in legislation that the repeal, the variation, or the violation of the scope of a particular law requires the support of more than 61 Knesset members. A majority of 61 is the upper limit, beyond which the Knesset exceeds its authority.

 

    99. This is but one example of the Knesset’s limited power to legislate in regard to itself, to define its own power and to establish its own authority. There is no shortage of additional examples. Here is one: 

A particular Knesset enacts a Basic Law that stipulates that its term will be extended for an additional four years beyond the four years prescribed in s. 8 of Basic Law: The Knesset (“The term of office of the Knesset shall be four years from the day on which it is elected”). In other words, a particular Knesset was elected for a period of 4 years and it now proposes to serve for eight full years. In my view, such a law would be manifestly illegal, even were it adopted by all one-hundred-and-twenty Knesset members who thus purported to extend their term of office. The people elected the Knesset for only four years. It did not grant the Knesset a power of attorney to extend its own term of office for an additional four years (obviously, we are not dealing with states of emergency and the extension of a term during a state of emergency) (see and compare s. 9A of Basic Law: The Knesset, which was added in Basic Law: The Government in1992. That provision will enter into force on the day that a Prime Minister elected by virtue of that Basic Law assumes office). In the words of David Ben-Gurion in the Knesset, prior to the elections to the Second Knesset:

 

The Knesset must stipulate the term of the Second Knesset’s office, and if we decide that the term will be for four years, the next Knesset will not be able to serve for more than four years, because the people elected it, from the outset, for four years (Knesset Proceedings, vol. 8, at p. 1581).

 

Another example: A particular Knesset wishes to enact a law that reduces the number of members of the House to ninety members. The law is due to go into effect immediately, and accordingly thirty members are to be removed, pro rata in accordance with their party affiliation. (In other words, there is no “discrimination” among the parties, and the minority does not control the majority. The situation is, therefore, one in which the people elected one hundred and twenty members, whoever they may be, and along comes the Knesset and rejects the mandate it received from the people. Were such a law to be enacted, it would exceed the power of the Knesset, and it would be as worthless as a broken potsherd. It would not be valid from a legal perspective.

 

The examples cited, and others like them, indicate the operation of “hidden” forces, embedded in the very existence of the Knesset, which restrict its purportedly unlimited power to enact legislation. It bears consideration that our concern is the Knesset’s legislating for itself, and not its legislating for others, which is its central role. We are not referring here to restrictions deriving from “natural law” that pertains to the Knesset’s authority to enact legislation for others (such as “every boy that is born to the Hebrews you shall throw into the Nile but you shall let every girl live”(Exodus 1:22 [120])), as this authority is not under discussion.

 

100.              Our views here are not universally accepted. For example, in his aforementioned book, at pp.110-111, Prof. Englard writes as follows:

 

       … “Can the primary legislature limit itself?” In our view the answer is affirmative, and no logical contradiction is involved. Nothing prevents a legal norm from addressing not only a specific kind of conduct of others but also its own validity and the methods for changing it. Just as the legislature can establish the scope of application of a particular norm in terms of time and place, it can likewise provide that a norm can be changed only by force of a particular procedure or by a particular body. Similarly, it can dictate that a particular norm may not be repealed or changed at all, neither by itself, nor by any other body. Such a norm is valid….

 

Professor Englard sees no difference between the Knesset’s authority to establish norms for the world outside the Knesset and its authority to establish norms for itself, and hence his conclusion that the primary legislature – being what it is – is authorized to limit itself. My view is different. In my understanding, the role of the primary legislature is to “organize” its surrounding world. Its authority to “organize” itself is only ancillary and secondary, and as such its goals are limited to those required for “organizing itself.” Even if we were to contend that in its “organization” of the world, the primary legislature could never be limited, this would not be the case regarding its authority to “organize” itself, because it was not created for that purpose. The primary legislature’s authority to organize itself extends exclusively to the specific area that enables it to establish norms for others, and nothing else. Needless to say, all of the above is subject to the provisions of a constitution that spreads its canopy over everything.

 

101.  The basic rule is this: By the very nature of the matter, when it legislates for itself – and in respect of itself – the Knesset does not wield unlimited power and authority. Meta-principles – or, if you prefer, foundational principles – are etched into the Knesset’s very existence. Certain character traits inhere in the genes of the Knesset, being what it is, and the Knesset is unable to free itself from those principles and features. Those characteristics are the Knesset.  One of those principles is the majority principle. This principle teaches us that the Knesset’s authority to limit its power to change laws extends to the requirement of 61 Knesset members, and no more. Hence the majority principle, both upwards and downwards, is a basic foundation in the rule of law and the existence of a democratic regime. Without it the people cast off restraint, and in its absence no kingdom can be established. Each of you to your tents, O Israel! [2 Chronicles 10:16 – ed.]. To uproot majority rule from the body of a regime is to remove the very soul of democracy. The majority principle governs the Knesset in the form of “the high official is watched by a higher” [Ecclesiastes 5:8 – ed.]. The rule of law also governs the legislature. A law enacted by the Knesset becomes part of Israeli law provided that it does not pierce the heart of democracy – the majority principle. All of this, naturally, subject to the provisions of a legally enacted constitution.

 

102.  Incidentally, we spoke of the inherent restriction in the Knesset’s authority that prevents it from enacting a law that cannot be changed other than by a majority of more than 61 Knesset members. We did not address the possibilities of other limitations, such as a law that requires a referendum in order to be changed, or other limitations that derive from the very nature of democracy and the basic values of Israeli society. These “limitations” raise independent problems. In the case of a referendum, for example, the Knesset turns to the people, the source of its own authority. But we will not treat these matters.

 

103.             In conclusion, the Supreme Court has thus far invalidated a number of Knesset statutes that deviated from previously entrenched provisions, but each and every one of those cases concerned a statutory provision that could be changed only by force of a majority (61) of Knesset members, namely a “61 majority.” I fully concur with all of those judgments, because they all conform with the restrictions of a democratic regime. The same applies to the restrictions now established in the new Basic Laws. My quarrel is only with statutory provisions that purport to condition any variation or violation of its provisions on the support of 62 or more Knesset members. Statutory provisions of this nature, regardless of their content, undermine the foundations of Israeli democracy, and cannot be taken at face value.

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation

 

104.             So far we have addressed the fundamental principles pertaining to the Knesset’s authority to frame a constitution and impose formal limitations upon its legislative activity. We will now take a closer look at the two Basic Laws concerning us here, and attempt to gain a deeper understanding.

 

105.             First, we must distinguish between a “variation” of a Basic Law and a “violation” of a Basic Law, if only because Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation distinguishes between “variation” and “violation” (and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty borrowed therefrom). A variation of a law means a change in the fundamental scope of the law. The law is subjected to “genetic engineering,” and when the law’s genetic code is changed, it is no longer the law that it was. On the other hand, a violation of a law or of a basic right does not fundamentally alter the law or the right. “Violating” the law is like bending a tree and within defined boundaries its power subsequent to the violation is not quite the same as its power prior to the violation. But this is as far as it goes. Nonetheless, it appears that when distinguishing between a variation and a violation, one must consider the degree of the “violation.” As a violation becomes more extensive, it increasingly bears the character of a variation. A variation can masquerade as a violation, hence while referred to as a violation in essence it is a variation. As mentioned, the Basic Laws themselves dictate the distinction between “variation” and “violation,” but the distinction does not appear in s. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset (from which it follows that the “variation” referred to in that section also includes a violation). In any case, we will take the path already paved by the legislature.

 

106.             Along with the distinction between “variation” and “violation,” we must also distinguish between a statutory provision in which the Knesset purports to restrict its ability to legislate by the formal entrenchment of the law, i.e. by determining that the law can only be varied or violated if certain formal conditions are satisfied (such as a special majority, referendum, etc., and a statutory provision in which the Knesset attempts to restrict its legislative powers by establishing certain substantive criteria, but without formally entrenching those substantive provisions. Formal entrenchment must be treated separately from substantive limitation, and hence we will discuss each of them separately.

 

These two classifications, “variation” and “violation” on the one hand, and “formal entrenchment” and “substantive limitation” on the other hand, generate four different possibilities. We will discuss them in our comments below, distinguishing between the two Basic Laws. We will begin with Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and then proceed to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 

 

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation

 

107.  Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation refers both to procedures for “variation” of the law and procedures for a “violation” thereof. Its provisions include both substantive and formal limitation. We will begin with the issue of variation, after which we will discuss the subject of violation.

 

Variation of a Basic Law: Formal Entrenchment and Substantive Limitation

 

108.  Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation establishes formal entrenchment of its provisions. According to s. 7:

This Basic Law shall not be varied except by a Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset          

 

     The section bears the title “entrenchment,” and prescribes two conditions for the variation of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The first is that a variation can only be made in a Basic Law, and the second is that it must be adopted by a majority of the Knesset members. A statute enacted by the Knesset that does not fulfill either one of the conditions cannot vary the Basic Law. Neither a Basic Law adopted by less than 61 Knesset members, nor a law adopted by 61 members that is not titled “Basic Law” can vary the Basic Law. A separate question is whether the law would be recognized as valid for all other matters that do not vary the Basic Law, but this question does not presently concern us.  

    

     Did the Knesset succeed in limiting its authority to vary Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation? In my view it was successful, and the limitation is valid. Regarding the majority requirement, we have already elaborated, perhaps excessively, on the issue of the majority, and for fear of being tedious, we make no further comment. Regarding the explicit provision that it can only be varied by another Basic Law, this too is a procedural condition, similar to the requirement of a majority. The Knesset’s authority to require a majority of 61 as a condition for varying a law belongs to the appropriate procedures governing the enactment of a law, which do not constitute an illegitimate restriction of the Knesset’s power.  The same rule is true for the explicit requirement that a Basic Law can only be varied by force of a Basic Law. This precondition for the enactment of an amending Basic Law is no different from the requirement of three readings for the adoption of a law. Just as a “law” that only passed two readings is not a law at all, and cannot change an existing law, confer or deny rights, or impose obligations, so too a law purporting to vary a Basic Law, that is not itself a Basic Law (or did not receive a majority of 61 Knesset members). Unless s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is changed, by the method prescribed for changing it, only a norm that satisfies both requirements of s. 7 can vary the Basic Law according to the procedure imposed by the Knesset upon itself. It is understood that a variation of s. 7 of the Basic Law, in the manner prescribed, i.e. by a majority of the Knesset members and in a Basic Law, would hence cause a variation in the method prescribed for changing the basic right of freedom of occupation.

 

109.  Up to this point we have addressed the formal entrenchment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation against variation. How does substantive limitation affect variation? It would appear that s. 5 of the Basic Law establishes a substantive limitation. The provision states “All governmental authorities are bound to respect the freedom of occupation of all nationals and residents.” Given that the Knesset is “one of the governmental authorities,” it follows that the Knesset – like other governmental authorities – must respect freedom of occupation. This obligation constitutes a substantive limitation. However, the provision of s. 5 reflects the binding law for as long as the Basic Law has not been varied (subject to fulfillment of the two requirements for a variation). From this it follows that the statute relates only indirectly to the issue of a variation. The substantive limitation is in fact concealed in the folds of formal entrenchment. The cloak of formal entrenchment conceals substantive limitation, and substantive limitation is in fact derived from the formal entrenchment, in which it hides.

 

Violation of a Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – Formal Entrenchment and Substantive Limitation

 

110.  As far as the violation of the basic right of freedom of occupation, our concern here is with ss. 4 and 8 of the Basic Law, which provide as follows:

           

Violation of freedom of occupation

There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law.

 

Effect of non­conforming law

A provision of a law that violates freedom of occupation shall be of effect, even though not in accordance with section 4, if it has been included in a law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law; such law shall expire four years from its commencement unless a shorter duration has been stated therein.

 

Section 4 of the Basic Law established various substantive conditions for the possible violation of freedom of occupation (substantive limitation). Section 8 adds to it by establishing procedures for the enactment of a law that violates the freedom of occupation and which does not comply with the provisions of s. 4, and establishes that the duration of such a law may not exceed four years. Two conditions must be fulfilled for the Knesset to acquire the authority to “violate” Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, in the event that it fails to comply with the conditions of section 4. The first is the enactment of a “regular law” by a majority of the Knesset members. The second is that it “expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.” Should one of these conditions not be satisfied, the law cannot violate freedom of occupation. These conditions are prescribed for the enactment of a law that purports to violate the freedom of occupation (a law that does not satisfy the conditions prescribed in s. 4 of the Basic Law), and until such time that the Knesset amends that procedure, this is the only way of enacting a law which is capable of impairing the freedom of occupation (if it does not satisfy the conditions enumerated in s. 4 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation). Regarding the argument that the later law should nonetheless be valid and be capable of violating freedom of occupation, even if it fails to satisfy one of the two conditions (for example, a law enacted by a majority of the Knesset, but which does not explicitly provide that it will be valid despite the provisions of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in accordance with the rule of lex posterior derogat legi priori. Our response would be that the later law is not even a “lex” in the first place, because it was not adopted in compliance with the procedures specified in advance by the Knesset for its adoption (like a law “adopted” after only two readings).

 

111.             Concerning the subject of a violation of freedom of occupation, the format of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is the same as the format for the subject of variation. Regarding violation, s. 4 of the Basic Law explicitly establishes a substantive limitation, by prohibiting any violation of freedom of occupation unless particular conditions are satisfied. But here, too, we find that the substantive limitation is in fact concealed within the folds of the formal entrenchment of s. 8 of the Basic Law. A law that violates the freedom of occupation and which satisfies the conditions of s. 4 will be valid, as per s. 4. A law that violates the freedom of occupation and does not satisfy the conditions of s. 4 will only be valid if it satisfies the entrenchment provisions enumerated in s. 8 of the Basic Law. The legislature took pains to establish explicit provisions in the body of the law for different situations.. The issue of entrenchment will, in any case, revolve around the procedural question and the formal entrenchment provision. Any issues of substantive entrenchment that may be raised by Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation will be addressed in our discussion of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

Basic Law: Freedom of OccupationConcerning the Conditions for Entrenchment

 

112.             The issue under discussion concerns the conditions set forth in ss. 7 and 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation regarding a variation or violation of the law. Notably, these conditions are exclusively procedural, and contain no substantive content at all: a special majority, the name of the law (regarding a variation), an explicit “notwithstanding” provision (regarding a violation). We have discussed the issue of majority at length, and need not add. The other two conditions may be viewed as procedural “incantations” for legislation, like the magic words that open a secret cave. The words have no intrinsic substance, but by legislative fiat they pave the way to legislation. Even if the magic formulae have no intrinsic substance, the very need to insert “Basic Law” (at the beginning of the variation) and the “notwithstanding” formula (in the middle of the violating law) is meant to trigger the legislature’s awareness of the importance of its actions, and the responsibility that it assumes when varying or violating the freedom of occupation. Let no Knesset member come along a day or two later, shouting: I didn’t know, I didn’t understand, it never occurred to me to vary or to violate the freedom of occupation. The adoption of a Basic Law (that violates freedom of occupation) is no routine matter, and the specific use of “Basic law” or “notwithstanding” makes it apparent to any one who bothers to look. This kind of law can only be adopted by virtue of the prescribed procedures. In other words, this kind of “law,” which has the power to vary or to violate the freedom of occupation, can only be produced by way of fixed procedures, and the meeting of various, specific conditions.

 

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty – Violation of Human Rights and Variation of Human Rights

 

113.  We thus far have addressed Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation in accordance with its various formulations. By contrast, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty presents us with a different method of limiting the Knesset in its legislation. Here, the Knesset is substantively limited without the accompanying formal entrenchment. In our comments below, we will address the two subjects of variation and violation of the Basic Law together.

 

114.After establishing its basic principles and purpose, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty enumerates various human rights (for some reason, some of the basic rights are not defined as substantive rights). After listing them, s. 8 of the Basic Law imposes the prohibition upon violating the enumerated rights, as follows: 

 

Violation of Rights

8. There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law

 

            Section 11 of the Basic Law adds:

 

Application

11. All governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.

 

We would all agree that the Knesset is one of the “governmental authorities” referred to in s. 11. In fact, it would seem that the section was drafted primarily in honor of the Knesset. Nonetheless, it goes without saying that the other “governmental authorities,” such as the courts, the government, and any other state agency also fall within the ambit of “governmental authorities.” Even in the absence of s. 11, they would be bound to uphold Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, simply by force of being bound by the rule of law, which is an intrinsic part of what we are. The provisions of s. 11 are thus intended to inform us in a formal and binding manner, that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom explicitly applies to the legislative authority, as well, giving expression to the legislature’s subordination to the rule of law. Actually, once s. 8 of the Basic Law provided that basic rights under the law could only be violated by a law that complies with prescribed conditions, the provisions of s. 11 became necessary to supplement the substantive determination of s. 8.

 

115.  The Knesset is thus bound to respect the basic rights enumerated in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty including, and we should add – perhaps primarily – in its legislative activities. Taking this path, we are confronted by the question of the nature and the scope of the Knesset’s act of self-limitation – its undertaking not to violate basic rights except if in compliance with the conditions enumerated in s. 8, referred to as “the limitation clause.” When the limitation clause is fortified by a formal entrenchment provision, as in the case of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, we know the answer. The entrenchment provision is determinative: it paves our way, and we will decide accordingly. However, in the absence of the aegis of entrenchment, as is the case with Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, what is it that protects the “limitation clause” from variation or violation?

 

Let us assume that after the passage of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset adopted a regular law, by regular majority, that – in practice – violates basic rights specifically established by the Basic Law, but does not satisfy the conditions established by s. 8 for recognition as a “legal” law. For example, it violates a right under the Basic Law to an extent greater than is required. Should we acknowledge the legal validity of such a law? Should we view it as being a “legal” law for all intents and purposes – as a law passed with requisite authority, and that successfully derogates from a basic right? Or perhaps we might say that such a law is not “legal,” and that ab initio it is not binding, insofar as it fails to comply with the Knesset’s provisions in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? In other words, when the Knesset subjects itself to a substantive limitation with respect to future legislation, what significance attaches to the limitation in the absence of a wall of protective entrenchment surrounding it (as is the case with Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation)? How should we construe the provision of the Basic Law, and what is the legal function of the Knesset’s purported self-limitation?

 

 The following four possible solutions present themselves: the provisions of s. 8 are absolute, and no deviation is possible; s. 8 is no more than a guideline for legislation, and hence a deviation from its provisions has no effect on legislation; the provisions of s. 8 can be deviated from in a later law, whether implicitly or explicitly; and, deviation from s. 8 is possible only by way of an explicit law (and perhaps only in the form of a Basic Law). We will now proceed to examine each of these solutions individually, one-by-one, both in terms of the legislative purpose (the level of intention), and in terms of the Knesset’s ability to achieve that purpose (the level of authority) (and see and compare: Karp, supra; Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 3 at p.266ff.).

 

116.  One way of interpreting s. 8 is that the legislative pronouncement is resolute and absolute, admitting of no deviation. Having become a law, no governmental authority is permitted to violate any of the human rights stipulated in the Basic Law, unless it satisfies a number of conditions, all of them stipulated in s. 8: It can do so by law, or by force of an express authorization therein; such a law must be consistent with the values of the State of Israel; it must be for an appropriate purpose; its violation of human rights must be to an extent no greater than is necessary. This provision of s. 8 is immutable. Though apparently attempting to create an immovable rock, this interpretation – prima facie – is soundly based, and in substantive terms it is consistent with the nature of a democratic-liberal regime, one that is appropriate for us and that we deserve. For example, every person in Israel has a basic right not to have his life or dignity violated, as per s. 2 of the Basic Law. The law further provides, according to this understanding, that having come into force, the law forbids the violation of a person’s life or dignity unless by force of a law intended for a proper purpose, etc. This prohibition is a rock, and our prohibitions are prohibitions, as written and as intended, as is right and proper.

 

If that is the law in terms of its content and purpose – as per the presumed legislative “intent” – then we look in vain for a source for the Knesset’s authority to limit its future legislative capacity. We have shown that the Knesset cannot shackle itself in its legislative capacity other than by the requirement of a majority of 61 Knesset members, and as we have seen, this particular procedure is in fact required for all legislation (as opposed to a limitation of authority, which in our opinion is forbidden). If the Knesset lacks the authority to limit itself in its legislative activities by positing a requirement for a majority of 62 or more votes, then a fortiori it is incapable of permanently limiting its legislative abilities according to this (possible) interpretation of the law. The nation did not authorize the Knesset to divest itself of its authority and release itself from the yoke of legislating, and this necessarily dictates the rejection of this interpretation of s. 8 of the law. The Knesset cannot create a rock that it cannot lift.

 

117.             A second interpretation, which substantively is the polar opposite of the first, is that the provisions of s. 8 (along with s. 11) of the Basic Law were intended exclusively for purposes of guidance, having no binding authority. Their purpose was to guide the legislature in the act of legislation, meaning that s. 8 is an instructive directive, as opposed to an imperative, mandatory directive (on the distinction between these two kinds of provisions, see CA 87/50 Liebman v. Lipshitz, [68]. According to this interpretation, the provisions of s. 8 are no more than good advice that the legislature has whispered in its own ear. It says: if you choose to take this path – well and good, but if you fail to take it, your acts are valid, and the law that you enact will be a law. This interpretation, while possible, in terms of the legislative intention, is nonetheless unreasonable. There are cases in which the legislative instruction is interpreted as being a guideline, but it is unheard of for the legislature to lay down statutory guidelines for its own legislation. We are unaware of any such proposition, and we do not consider it to be reasonable. That is true in general, and a fortiori it would appear to be the case with respect to the provision in s. 8, which clearly and unequivocally states that there can be no violation of the Basic Law other than by force of law (or by specific authorization therein). The wording of s. 8 is not that of a guideline, but rather that of an obligation, and I see no good reason for not interpreting the law in terms of its plain meaning.

 

118.  Having rejected the two extreme interpretations of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, we are left with the two intermediary interpretations. One interpretation is based upon the concept of implied repeal, while the other is based on that of express repeal. We will now address these two interpretative options, beginning with the subject of implicit repeal.

119.  The basic rule is that a new law overrides the law that preceded it. And you shall take out the old from before the new (Leviticus, 26:10) [1]. Where a later law contradicts or is inconsistent with an earlier law, the later law has the upper hand, and the earlier law is repealed to the extent of the contradiction or inconsistency. (lex posterior derogat priori: (pro tanto)).  The substantive rationale of this rule derives from the fundamental principle that an authorized agency – in our case, the people’s representatives in the House of Representatives – periodically establishes behavioral norms that are appropriate for the general population and the individual. If the legislature established a particular behavioral norm, obviously it intended that norm to be binding, and no other. If today’s norm contradicts yesterday’s norm, then quite obviously, today’s norm should override yesterday’s norm to the extent of the with scope of the new norm. In a democratic regime such as ours, this rule supplements the rule deriving from the very nature of the regime – that the opinion of the majority is decisive.

 

Indeed, when today’s norm explicitly repeals yesterday’s norm, no question arises (provided that the two norms are on the same normative plane, i.e. a law versus a law, a regulation versus a regulation, etc.). The question is what happens when the later norm does not expressly repeal the earlier norm. In this context we have two comments: Firstly, we would do our best to reconcile the two norms, making every effort, even if somewhat contrived, to harmonize them, and enable them to coexist under the same roof. We would push our limits to make peace between the apparent rivals.  We would tell ourselves that had today’s legislature desired to repeal yesterday’s norm, it could have informed us of that intention with a stroke of the pen. Not having done so, it is presumed to have intended that both norms apply concurrently.  If this, prima facie, was its intention, we will do our best to give effect to that intention by way of interpretation, even if in a contrived manner. However, when all possibilities have been exhausted, and even convoluted, tortuous solutions are of no avail, then we may say to ourselves, apparently the legislature overlooked the contradiction between the norms, and because we regard ourselves as bound by its current command, which is today’s norm, we may conclude by implication that its intention was to repeal yesterday’s norm (to the extent of the contradiction). Our comments here were worded in a subjective form, and we can also give them an objective formulation in terms of the relationship between one law and another and the manner in which they are integrated into an overall legislative context. So we have express repeal, implicit repeal and the relationship between them. (see further and compare: Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 1 at p. 566ff. and citations there).

 

   120.  We will repeat these comments in another form, and then proceed on our journey. The rule that a later law overrides an earlier law applies, first and foremost, to an explicit provision of repeal included in the later law. The legislature expressed its view and we will abide by it, for it is the legislature that is given the power to legislate. The same logic that applies to a specific repeal provision in the later law, would, prima facie, also apply in the absence of a formal repeal provision. In the later law the legislature established a particular regime, and where that regime is incompatible with the previous regime we can infer the legislature’s implicit intention (the legislative arrangement) for the later regime to replace the former. However, the express repeal of a previous law is binding by force of its content, deriving expressly from the nature of sovereignty; and in a democratic regime it derives expressly from the nature of the democracy. On the other hand, with respect to implied repeal we must rely on the presumed legislative intent (or if you prefer – the intention that we impute to the legislature), because it did not explicitly express that intent. It follows that while our duty to respect the express repeal provision derives (in this country) from the democratic social contract, the interpretation leading to implicit repeal requires an interpretative construction that attempts to reflect the legislative intention (i.e. the purpose of the law). From this we learn that implicit repeal differs from express repeal.  As such, in my view, explicit and implicit repeal must each be treated differently.

 

121.  Therefore, if a law were to establish – for example – that an explicit provision of repeal in a later law (where both laws are on the same normative level), will not be valid and will be incapable of repealing the previous law, that provision of the earlier law would be invalid ab initio, inasmuch as it contradicts the rule concerning the effect of a later law, or if you wish, the very essence of the democratic regime. This is the only possible conclusion. But we cannot say this with the same degree of certainty in regard to an implicit repeal, as for example, where the law states that only an explicit provision in a later law can invalidate (or narrow the scope) of the earlier law. In other words, a provision in a particular law stating that a later law would not be regarded as repealing all or part of that law, unless there was a specific provision to that effect in the later law. It is entirely unclear that such a provision in the earlier law would be void ab initio or would not be of legal effect. On the contrary, inasmuch as when we are concerned with the issue of implicit repeal we rely on the presumed legislative intention (or the intention imputed to the legislature), or if you prefer – the structure of the law and of the legal system in its entirety – the two provisions stand opposite one another, taunting one another. On one side there is a provision that entrenches itself against change, and on the other a regime which purports (implicitly) to repeal by implication. In this case it cannot be said, in general terms, that a later law repeals an earlier law. The reason is that the legislature “was aware” of the earlier law, and when planting the new law in the legislative garden, in which the earlier, entrenched law was already planted, the intention in the later law was, as in the earlier law, that the earlier law should prevail. This is proved by the fact that the legislature did not explicitly revoke the previous regime, despite having established the procedure for repeal of the earlier law. At all events, the legislator’s “intention” for today’s regime to replace yesterday’s arrangement, despite the entrenchment of yesterday’s arrangement, cannot be inferred as self-evident, as with other implicit repeals. The entrenchment provision has the effect of shaking the foundations of the principle of implied repeal. 

It might be compared to a person who promises not to do a particular act. Time passes, and the man forgets his promise, and despite his promise, he goes ahead and does that act. Upon being reminded of his promise, he slaps his forehead and says: Blessed is He who keeps his promise. I made a mistake. I certainly intend to keep the promises I make. Please disregard what I did. I hereby retract that action, and restore the situation to what it was initially. This is the case regarding a person’s personal promise, and the same applies to the legislature – this is the parable and this is its lesson. Hence, the rule regarding implicit repeal, as opposed to the rule of express repeal, may be agreed upon and may be changed. The only question is how we regard the subject of the implied repeal.

 

Incidentally, a hint that implied repeal is not a self-evident principle can be found, also by way of implication, in the explicit statutory provisions of s. 2(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance (Further Provisions), 5708-1948:

Construction of Laws

2. For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared:

    (a) Where any law enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State is repugnant to any law which was in force in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948), the earlier law shall be deemed to be repealed or amended even if the new law contains no express repeal or amendment of the earlier law.

 

    This statutory provision is intended to clarify and reinforce the provision of s. 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, regarding the relationship between laws enacted after the establishment of the State and pre-State legislation. (Pre-state legislation “retains its validity to the extent that it does not contradict the provisions of this Ordinance and other laws that may be enacted…”). We can all agree that the provisions of this law establish the obvious. This indeed is the way we see it today, but apparently they thought otherwise at the time. The very fact that our original legislators deemed it proper to enact this kind of legislation, in that formulation, is tantamount to the testimony of 100 witnesses that implied repeal is not the same as express repeal. Now that we know this, we also know that there is no a priori necessity for the rules applying to express repeal to apply to implied repeal.

 

     122.  This brings us to the matter at hand. Let us assume that following the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset adopted a regular law that, by implication, varied or violated a right or rights included in the Basic Law, without meeting the conditions specified in s. 8 of the Basic Law (a law which is consistent with the values of the State of Israel, etc.).  Would the “later-law” rule apply? In other words, would we regard the new law as being valid and the Basic Law as having been repealed to the extent of the contradiction or inconsistency? Or would we say that the Basic law was intended for a special purpose, and a later law would be powerless to implicitly vitiate the Basic Law? Prima facie, the “later-law” rule – which applies to implied repeal – would also apply here. But this is only prima facie, as we shall now explain.

   

     123.  As noted, s. 11 of the Basic Law provides that all governmental authorities, including the Knesset, are bound to respect the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The duty of respecting the law also applies to s. 8 of the Basic Law, the provision that prohibits the violation or variation of any right recognized by the Basic Law, except by way of a law that satisfies certain conditions. Furthermore, the first and foremost addressee of s. 11 is the Knesset itself, as though it stated “the Knesset is bound to respect the rights under this Basic Law.”  Now, if we assume that a later law can impliedly repeal this duty of the Knesset, then what is the particular import of s. 11 of the Basic Law (conjoined with s. 8 of the law)? The other governmental authorities are in any case obligated to respect all of the rights prescribed by the Basic Law by virtue of the principle of the rule of law. If the Knesset can repeal that self-imposed obligation even by implication, then what is the point of the pre-established obligation [of s. 11]? Why did the law specifically obligate the Knesset to respect the provisions of the Basic Law if the Knesset is simultaneously entitled (according to the proposed interpretation) to repeal that obligation even by implication? After all, the Knesset could have taken the same path even if the law hadn’t imposed an explicit obligation upon it?

In other words, an interpretation permitting an implied repeal of the specific obligation that the Knesset imposed on itself, effectively renders the express obligation superfluous. It is as though the legislature spoke in vain. Its words are like the whistling wind. Can we say that s. 11 of the Basic Law is nothing more than good advice? We have already rejected this interpretation, and we now reject it again. The same reasoning also applies to the interpretation of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which similarly imposes a burden on the Knesset. 

 

An attempt to infuse s. 11 (and by the same token, s. 8 of the Basic Law) with wisdom and logic leads inevitably to the conclusion that a law enacted after the Basic Law cannot repeal the provisions of the Basic Law by implication. Evidently, this was the original intention of the arrangement and I find nothing that precludes conferring legal status to that intention, neither in terms of the basic principles of democracy nor from any other perspective. Indeed, the “principle of the later law” regarding an implied repeal cannot be reasonably said to apply to the instant case. While application of the principle may be “possible,” it is neither reasonable nor logical. Where the law explicitly and specifically imposes an extraordinary obligation upon the Knesset, it is neither reasonable nor appropriate, in terms of the rule of law or by any other parameter, to be able to brush it aside incidentally. The principles of statutory interpretation dictate that such an explicit obligation can only be limited or revoked by express repeal.

 

124.This is the possible alternative explanation for the provisions of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The Knesset, in accordance with its own statement, may violate or vary any of the provisions of a Basic Law only if it does so expressly, and in no other way. The later law can utilize the formula of “notwithstanding” or any other equivalent formula. In other words, the wording must indicate that the Knesset is unequivocally and unreservedly aware that it is about to vary or violate basic rights, even if that (later) law does not satisfy the conditions imposed by the Knesset itself in s. 8. Inasmuch as Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty obligates the Knesset to respect the basic rights enumerated therein in accordance with the scope specified therein, including in accordance with s. 8, we would expect that a later law will specifically state that although the Knesset was originally obligated to respect certain basic rights, in accordance with a particular scope, and although the Knesset is only allowed to violate those rights if certain conditions are satisfied, namely the ones stipulated in s. 8, nevertheless it wishes to violate (or vary) those basic rights, even though the fundamental conditions originally established were not met. Indeed, a government representative should mount the Knesset podium and declare: I was obligated to respect it, but in my opinion it is not appropriate for me to respect it. That is knowledge and awareness, the assumption of responsibility. That is express repeal. I believe, and we all believe, that under such an interpretation of the Basic Law, ill-considered violations of basic rights will decrease, and perhaps will not occur at all.

As noted, s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation explicitly proscribes any violation of the freedom of occupation unless the violation is included in a law that states that it shall be of effect “notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not, concededly, include a parallel provision, but the existence of such a requirement may be inferred from the law itself, even without a specific provision to that effect (see further and compare, Elon, in his aforementioned article, at p. 662; Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol. 1, pp. 562-563).

 

125.  Our opinion is therefore that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty can only be violated or varied by force of an explicit provision to that effect in a later law; an implicit variation or implicit violation in the later law will not suffice. In the event of classic rules of interpretation being inadequate for reconciling a provision in the Basic Law with a later provision i.e. we find that the two provisions are indeed contradictory, and assuming that the later provision does not expressly repeal the provision of the Basic Law, we may conclude that despite it being the earlier provision, the Basic Law’s provision nonetheless shall prevail.

 

We think that this is the necessary interpretation of the law, and that it is self evident from the law itself. Although it is subject to certain objections, in our view it draws support from all directions. We will now discuss certain issues in this context.

 

126. For our purposes an analogy can be drawn from the rule that a later, general law does not derogate from an earlier, specific law: lex posterior generalis non derogat legi priori speciali. We know that a later law overrides an earlier law, but the aforementioned rule teaches us that a later law of broad scope, even if contradicting a law of narrow scope, will not be construed as implicitly repealing the earlier law. In our effort to reconcile the provisions of the two laws and to understand the rationale of the laws and the presumed legislative intent, we would say that in all likelihood the later law did not intend to repeal the earlier (specific) law. Had it intended to do so, we would expect the legislature to do so explicitly. Since the legislature did not do so, we would say that the specific law, which was earlier in time, would remain in force with respect to its (limited) area, whereas the later, broader law would apply to all areas that do not fall within the (limited) scope of the earlier law. We presume that the legislature did not intend to violate the earlier law, for had this been its (presumed) intention it would have expressly repealed it. This is the rule regarding a contradiction between a later, general law and an earlier, specific law (on the rules of interpretation in cases of a contradiction between a later law and a general law, see: Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.1, at p. 551ff, and p. 569 ff).

 

We will employ the same criterion in regard to the relationship between an earlier law that substantively entrenches itself against implied repeal and a subsequent law that allegedly repeals the prior law. Let us assume that a certain law includes a provision stating that its provisions remain in force unless a later law expressly repeals them, partially or completely. Along comes a law that, upon examination, contradicts the provisions of the earlier law, but does not expressly repeal them. In such a case, we would say that the legislature (in the later law) did not “intend” to violate the earlier law, because had it intended to so, it would have repealed it expressly. By analogy, the earlier law is like the specific law, and the rule that applies to a specific law would also apply to a law entrenched against implied repeal. In a sense, the entrenched law is more powerful than the specific law, because when we are concerned with a specific law we need only ascertain the intention of the later law in order to reach our conclusion. However, in the case of an earlier law that entrenches itself, we learn the legislative intent both from what is explicitly stated in the earlier law, and from what is implied in the later law. The “legislative intent” extends directly from the earlier law to the later law without encountering anything in the way. We concede that the analogy is not perfect. With respect to the specific law, the later law retains its scope in areas not covered by the earlier law, whereas for our purposes, the later law would be considered a nullity in its entirety. The inescapable conclusion is, therefore, that for our purposes we would seek to limit the scope of the implied repeal, and the analogy is imperfect.

 

127.  In distinguishing between express repeal and implied repeal, we do not reject any fundamental principle of the democratic system or any basic principle of the legal system. Nor do we in any way contradict basic principles of our jurisprudence. For example, if a particular provision of a law explicitly provides that where it contradicts any other provision of the same law, it will supersede that provision, we would, no doubt, honor in full that legislative provision. The same rule would apply to the concurrent adoption and publication of two laws, one of which includes the statutory provision mentioned above. Our case, however, appears to be different in that our assumption was that the Basic Law was adopted first, whereas the later law that purports to repeal parts of the Basic Law by implication was adopted later. However, this is only how it appears.

 

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is a, unique law. Whereas the Knesset adopts “regular laws” to “organize” its surroundings, to establish behavioral norms for people and bodies external to the Knesset, in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, the Knesset purports (inter alia) to “organize” itself. Being what it is, the Basic Law is a law that guides the Knesset and its legislation constantly, every day, and every hour. By its very nature, the Basic Law is implicit in every law, or if you like, it is appended to every law, (or is a preamble to every law). More precisely, we could say that each and every individual law is regarded as being planted in the soil of the Basic Law; its roots reach down to the Basic Law, which is the source of its nourishment and sustenance. By analogy, it resembles human rights, which are regarded as being an integral part of every law.

    

   Basic Laws are comparable to rules of interpretation that accompany each and every law: they are everywhere, all the time.  Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty functions as a “legal escort” that provides the infrastructure and foundation for each and every law. It is as if it is legislated every day anew with each new law, as He “who in his goodness renews the creation every day continually.” A person wakes up every morning (thanking God for returning his soul), and so it is with the Basic Law, which, in effect, is legislated anew each day. This is indicated by the fact that the title of a Basic Law does not include the year of its adoption. All other laws cite the year of their enactment, according to Gregorian and Hebrew calendar. A Basic Law does not cite the year of its adoption. It stands, as it were, above time. It tells us that it is timeless, having neither date nor hour. It is always with us, and its validity is timeless. These being the features of the Basic Law, it is easy to understand how they can be viewed as being enacted anew, in conjunction with the enactment of every specific law, including that rebellious law that purports to repeal it by implication.

    

     An analogy, and perhaps even more than an analogy, may be drawn from the rule whereby changing times may lead to changes in the law’s scope in accordance with current conditions of place and time (this applies a fortiori with respect to “framework concepts”). In the words of President Smoira in HCJ 65/51 Jabotinsky v. President of the State of Israel [69], at p. 811:

 

This is the power of statutory law that speaks normatively rather than casuistically, and by doing so creates vessels that are able to hold content that did not exist when the law was given.

           

Similar comments were made by Justice S.Z. Cheshin in HCJ 180/52 Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [70], at p. 911:

 

… This is the power of the law, that it is not designed for its time alone, or for the limited, immediate purpose that concerns the legislature at the time of its enactment.  And as long as the executive branch can achieve its intended purpose within the framework of the existing law – albeit an old law originally intended for other purposes – it cannot be criticized for applying the law to the conditions of a new reality.

 

(See further, Barak, Interpretation in Law, vol.2 at pp. 220-221, 267-270; vol. 3 at p. 528-530).

 

This is the basis for the obvious analogy to that special statutory provision that attests to its precedence over all of the other provisions in that law, as well as the analogy to the case of two laws enacted and published on the same day, one of which includes a provision that elevates it above all the other provisions. Just as “there is no earlier or later in the Torah” – as indicated by the essence of the Basic Law – the implied rule of repeal inevitably withers. In the absence of any other indication, and I have not found any, I see no good reason why we should not honor a specific limitation clause which requires express repeal, like the explicit limitation clause in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, and the entrenchment provision in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

128.  Having arrived at this point, we should further note that the limitation clause in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, like the entrenchment of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, is derived from procedure. The limitation applies to the procedure, and the law can be varied or violated irrespective of its contents. Our concern here – as in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation – is with the rules for “organizing” the Knesset prior to organizing the world outside the Knesset. In order to vary or violate Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, a special procedure must be followed – a “magic formula” like “notwithstanding” must be invoked – that informs us that the Knesset (in the later law) explicitly and deliberately sought to vary or violate the provisions of the Basic Law.

 

    In Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation a rigid formula is established for any violation of the freedom of occupation, like a series of tones that must be uttered for the stone to roll away from the entrance to the secret cave (“which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Basic Law”). As opposed to this, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty employs the concept of express repeal without recourse to a specific formula. Nonetheless, the ideational framework is the same and rests upon the same foundations. The analogy from Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation to our subject here carries with it all the same rationales cited to legitimize the Knesset’s actions in limiting itself in legislation. Indeed, just as only three readings can make a “law,” the same will apply to an express repeal.  It is as though the Knesset declares in advance that a particular law – for our purposes, the two Basic Laws, each in its own particular way, can neither be varied nor violated by a later law, unless done so explicitly. Establishing a requirement to state matters explicitly is a procedural requirement, just as is the requirement of three readings. It would seem that this was also the view of Karp in her aforementioned article, at pp 324, 379-80.

 

     129.  An interesting comparison can be made to the rule established by Jewish law for a similar, if not identical subject. The principle in Jewish law is that “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities” (hilkhata ke-batrai). Needless to say, this is the rule of lex posterior. Jewish law preferred the words of the later authorities to those of the earlier authorities, even if the stature and authority of the earlier authorities exceeded the stature and authority of the later authorities. The reason for this rule should be self- evident. This is how Jewish law adapted to the changing conditions of life. However, the rule was subject to an exception, which is that: (in the words of M. Elon, Jewish Law, History, Sources, Principles, 3rd ed. (Magnes, 1988), p. 238a:

 

The principle “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities” does not apply if the later authority reached his decision per incuriam (inadvertently) i.e. without being aware of the views of his predecessors. For this reason it became authoritatively established that the principle applies only if the later authority refers to and discusses the earlier opinion and shows by proof acceptable to his contemporaries that, although contrary to the position of the earlier authority, his own view is sound.

 

And further on:

 

Thus was established and accepted the fundamental principle of decision-making in Jewish law – “the law is in accordance with the views of the later authorities.” It should not be thought that this principle in any way diminished the respect that later generations accorded to the earlier generations. It was precisely this respect that induced the later authority responsible for declaring the law to consider r his own decision gravely, fearfully and humbly, because he was aware that he was dealing with a question already considered by earlier authorities. Nevertheless, when he finally reached his conclusion, his view, and not the view of the earlier authority, became the law.

   

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty resembles the “earlier authorities” (rishonim), while the later law is like the “later authorities” (aharonim). The rulings of the earlier authorities will not recede before those of the later authorities unless the later ones examined the words of the earlier ones, and expressly stated their reasons. The provisions of a Basic Law will not retreat before a later law unless it is clearly and expressly repealed. The same rules apply everywhere.

 

Variation or Violation – Only in a Basic Law?

 

     130.  We have said that a law enacted after Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is powerless to vary or violate rights under the Basic Law unless it specifically states, in one form or another, that its provisions are binding notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law, and that its express intention is to vary or violate those rights. This condition is established explicitly in s. 8 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In regard to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, on the other hand, we have deduced the need for such an explicit statement from within the law and its content. If a law subsequent to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty explicitly states that its provisions are intended to vary or violate the provisions of rights established under the Basic Law, must that later law be a Basic Law, or could we say that any law has the power to deviate from the provisions of a Basic Law?

    

     131.  The text of the Basic Law contains no provision regarding the method of its varying or violation – whether by a regular law or a Basic Law. The twin of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, stipulates in s. 7 that any variation thereof must be made by way of a Basic Law.  The question is whether one rule can be inferred from its opposite, i.e. would a regular law suffice in regard to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? Would such a conclusion gain support from the settled rule that any law can infringe another law (even if it is a Basic Law)? (see Kaniel [13], at p. 796; Ressler [14], at p. 560; Negev [12] at p. 642; Prof. Rubinstein, supra, 4th ed., at pp. 456-458; Prof. Englard, supra, at p. 111).

   

     My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak maintain – each in his own way and for his own reasons – that a Basic Law can neither be varied nor changed other than by way of another Basic Law, or by force of a Basic Law, and that this rule applies to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty despite its silence on this point. On the other hand, it may be argued that there is no inherent necessity for the variation or violation of a Basic Law to be effected specifically by force of a Basic Law – unless the legislature ordered otherwise, as indeed is the case in s. 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The legislature did not instruct us that any variation or violation of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty must be effected specifically in the form of a Basic Law, and one may therefore assert that we are not bound in that regard. Either way, the most important thing is the Knesset’s awareness of the change or violation that it is about to initiate in the rights established in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and hence the need for an explicit “notwithstanding” statement, in one form or another. Where it is clear that the Knesset was explicitly aware of its act, there is no systemic need that the variation or the violation be made by Basic Law.

 

    Incidentally, the requirement dictated by my colleagues’ decision that any violation of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty be effected exclusively by means of a Basic Law, meaning that a regular law violating the provisions of a Basic Law is invalid even if it states “notwithstanding,” and even if adopted by an extra-special majority, leads to a rather anomalous conclusion: When attempting to formally entrench Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation against violation, the legislature took the trouble of including an explicit provision by which the provisions of the Basic Law could be violated only if certain conditions were fulfilled, as per s. 8 of the Basic Law. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not contain this kind of provision.  A person comparing both Basic Laws might thus conclude that the entrenchment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is less than that of Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. We are now being told that a Basic Law cannot be violated other than in a Basic Law (and subject to specific provisions in the Basic Law itself). The surprising result therefore is that Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is actually more powerful than Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. In regard to the latter, which the legislature sought to entrench against violation, the legislature provided that a regular law can also violate it, provided that it satisfies the conditions of s. 8. On the other hand, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, though not meriting any entrenchment to protect it from violation, can nonetheless only be violated by force of a Basic Law. This conclusion is propounded despite the lack of any basis in the language of the law, being exclusively a product of legal interpretation. The doctrine derived from the law thus prevails over explicit statutory provisions – a strange result.

    

     132.  In my view, there is no doctrinal necessity that a variation or violation of a Basic Law be effected specifically by another Basic Law. Quite the opposite: Let us take the case of the Knesset adopting a law in accordance with the rules of procedure, and taking the trouble to specifically indicate that its intention is to vary or to “violate” a provision of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (whether by the “notwithstanding” formula, or any other formula), all in an orderly fashion and according to standard practice. However, the said law is a normal law and not a Basic Law. Knowing that the Knesset is the same Knesset, with the same members, can we say that the law never existed and that the Knesset did not succeed in changing Basic Law: Human Liberty and Liberty? Were this a matter concerning Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation the answer would be clear: Everyone knows and the Knesset was forewarned that the Basic Law could be changed only by another Basic Law adopted by a majority of the members of Knesset (s. 7 of the Basic Law). Having failed to comply with that statutory provision that the later law be dubbed a Basic Law, it is obvious that the change would be of no effect, just as a “law” only adopted in two readings would not be considered a “law.”  

    

     The question however concerns Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which does not specify that its variation or violation requires a Basic Law. Can we, the judiciary, import conditions from afar and plant them in the Basic Law? Indeed, holding that a Basic Law can be varied or violated only by another Basic Law has a persuasive ring. But I nevertheless ask myself whether we can add a requirement to the statute that was not expressly established by the statute itself. 

However, I do not regard this as a cardinal question.

 

The “Constitutional Revolution”

 

133.  In his decision, my colleague President Barak speaks of a “constitutional revolution” that took place in the Knesset in March 1992, when the Knesset granted the State of Israel a “Bill of Constitutional Human Rights,” i.e., human rights in Israel “were transformed into constitu­tional rights.” Israel joined “the community of democratic nations ... that possess a constitutional bill of rights”; “we have become part of the human rights revolution, that characterizes the second half of the twentieth century.” These words, and others, reflect exaltation and elation. However, no two prophets prophesy in the same manner, and personally, I would not describe the Basic Laws of 1992 thus.

 

134.  In regard to the Basic Laws of 1992, I have grave doubts whether the Knesset members themselves were aware of the “revolution” they were instigating. The fact is that Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation was passed by a majority of 23 members of Knesset (with no opposition or abstentions), whereas Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was passed by a majority of 32 for, 21 against, and one abstention (see above, par. 65).

 

Furthermore, the term “revolution” connotes a traumatic upheaval in the life of a person, and in the life of a nation, a change from one extreme to another, such as the revolution of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, the French Revolution, and the Bolshevik Revolution.  When one claims that in March 1992 there was a “constitutional revolution” in the realm of human rights, one is in effect saying that in that month a profound, radical change occurred in the field of human rights in Israel, as though human rights first saw the light of day, as though the Knesset had created something ab initio. “The human rights revolution that characterized the second half of the twentieth century” had reached us. And so, happy are we that now have merited constitutional human rights.

 

I take a different view because, as is well known, human rights existed in Israel before 1992, and I addressed this subject elsewhere as follows (CrimApp 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of Israel, at pp. 399-401):

 

The doctrine developed by my colleague the Deputy President centers on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, in its function as a Basic Law, the provisions of which are engraved in our statute book. Prior to the advent of Basic Laws according to my colleague, basic rights were nothing other than the product of case law, and now, not only have the basic rights found a home in the body of a statute but the legislature itself went even further, elevating them to the throne of monarchy and they now have the status of super rights… I would like to add what I see as the main point in this context of the existing law, Basic Law and basic rights. Personally, I view the main power and strength of the basic rights as inhering in their essence, in their being “nature’s children” – “natural” rights – self-evident rights that require no explanation or commentary: One saw them, heard about them, read about them, and knew they were with us. Disputes may arise regarding the periphery of these rights, the outer margins that are remote from the center, but there are no disputes among us in regard to their core. In the society in which we live, at this place and time, all those who encounter the rights recognize, understand and agree…

… the basic rights radiate warmth and power and they conceal an inner light. That is why we are willingly captivated by those expressions that attempt to elevate those rights to sublime heights.

   

     When we speak now – and in the future – of Basic Laws and basic rights, it is important that we remember all of these matters.  Humility and modesty are worthy virtues for a person, and a judge is a person. We must guard ourselves against hubris, lest we say to one another that our own power, our own wisdom and our own intelligence achieved this. The history of human rights did not begin with the Basic Laws. Generations of Israeli judges strode hand in hand with these rights, and they have been with us since our independence. They gave rise to the rulings in HCJ 1/49 Bijerno v. Minister of Police [3]; HCJ 144/50 Sheib v. Minister of Defense, 5 IsrSC 399; HCJ 87 79/53 Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [4]; HCJ 7/48 Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [42]; HCJ 337/81 Miterani v. Minister of Transport [7]; EA2/84 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [8], and many other fine rulings that accompany us along our path…and those same rulings were accorded the status of law. That is how they were seen by all, and this is how they were interpreted. Inasmuch as a Basic Law did not create basic rights, I think that it behooves us to conduct ourselves with humility and modesty in our treatment of the previous law, which is fully immersed in those rights.

       …

Indeed, in the future we will mention this Basic Law and rely upon it as a document that embodies basic rights. But we must always bear in mind, firstly, that these rights did not originate in the Basic Law, and that in essence, the Basic Law intended only to give statutory expression to the “natural” rights that already existed. Secondly, that basic rights do not draw their moral and social power from the Basic Law as such, but from within themselves, from their inherent light, intensity, and heat, for they are like the Burning Bush that continues to burn but is not consumed. The bush has been with us from antiquity. Others will say that basic rights are the product of our moral and societal worldviews, and that is the source of their power. Either way, the basic rights already had strength and power before the Basic Law, and even then, there was nothing that “compelled” the courts to rule as they ruled, or that prevented them from ruling otherwise. Essentially, nothing has changed in the wake of the Basic Law.

 

That was my view then, and it is my view this very day, but with greater conviction. 

 

135.  I find the label “revolution” to be problematic. Is it not enough to say that there has been a “change” in the legal system? And I say this because labels – in themselves – may sometimes blind us and make for self-fulfilling aspirations. Moreover, even if we have said that the Basic Laws could generate very important changes in the Israeli legal system – and this has been said – the concept of “constitutional revolution” embraces much more than the concept of change. Not only is it likely to lead to excessive enthusiasm, but by adding force and energy to one side of the equation, it simultaneously derogates from the power and energy of the other side, and vice versa. Is this how a constitution ought to be framed?

 

The law says what it says. I agree, of course, that following the adoption of the Basic Laws, the Court acquired the authority to review Knesset laws and to declare them invalid – completely or partially – in cases where they unlawfully violate fundamental rights or modify fundamental rights specified in the Basic Laws. However to what extent a “revolution” has transpired, only time will tell. The concept of the Industrial Revolution was devised many years after the revolu­tion had taken place, and the Christian calendar did not begin the count on the day that Jesus died but a few hundred years later, counting backwards to the estimated day of his birth (which was erroneously determined).

 

136.  Finally, the path of law is not the path of revolution, but is a “changing story” (as Professor Dworkin has described it). It is a marathon. Life is perpetually changing and with it the law. A law that fails to adapt itself to life is a law in retreat. The relationship between a legal system and life is like an actor on a moving, revolving stage. If the actor does not move he will disappear from the audience’s view, behind the stage. He must move at least as fast as the stage just to remain in the same place, a fortiori if he wishes to move forward. If the revolving stage suddenly speeds up, and the actor fails to increase his own speed, he may well loose his balance. If he moves too fast he is liable to disappear behind the stage. Our wisdom – the wisdom of the law – lies in knowing how to adjust our speed to that of the surrounding world. Indeed, as I said in the Ganimat case [38], at p. 401, “slowly we proceed, heal after toe, toe after heal, treading carefully, in returning and rest” as in the words of the prophet “In returning and rest you shall be saved, in quietness and trust shall be your strength” (Isaiah 30:15).

 

Two Additional Questions that we will briefly discuss

137.   At the beginning of our comments we said that we would only discuss some of the questions that may arise in the matter confronting us. We will now address two additional questions, but only briefly.

 

The Issue of the Authority of the Courts to Invalidate Laws of the Knesset

 

138.   My colleagues have laid a theoretical foundation for the authority of the court to invalidate laws of the Knesset, and I have added to them somewhat. But the question of who possesses this authority still dis­turbs us: will it be all the courts of Israel in all instances, or will this be authority be exclusively for the Supreme Court sitting in the capacity of the High Court of Justice? My colleagues did not raise the question, and we may deduce from their words, if implicitly, that all the courts of Israel – from the smallest to the largest – are competent to invalidate laws of the Knesset, and hence the action of the District Court in the present case. As the question was not raised before us, I will not state my opinion on it. I will merely say that there is a strong basis for the view that the competence to invalidate Knesset laws ought to be re­served solely to the High Court of Justice, and to it alone, excluding all other courts. Indeed, the legal tradition that we follow – the Common Law tradition – recognizes the authority of all courts to declare legislation void ab initio. However, heretofore this rule concerned secondary legislation (purportedly) adopted in accordance with a Knesset law.

 

Having now recognized for the first time – as a matter of law – the competence of the courts to invalidate a law of the Knesset, it would appear that we are also entitled to establish which court will possess the authority of review and invalidation. Indeed, the vessel provided to us by the Common Law tradition – the granting of competence of review to every court, in every instance – is too small to contain the authority to invalidate Knesset laws, as well. In any event, the doctrine that applies to the invalidation of secondary legislation ought not be applied to our case mechanically. It seems to me that significant arguments support singling out this authority for the High Court of Justice alone (while establishing appropriate procedural rules for the transfer of constitutional issues from other courts to the High Court of Justice). In this way even the High Court of Justice will be able to select the questions that it deems suitable for immediate discussion, while deferring other topics for the future. No doubt, many such occasions await us.

 

The Burden of Proof for the Invalidation of a Law

 

139.              Who bears the burden of proving that a particular law is invalid solely because it (allegedly) violates a basic right recognized by a Basic Law? My colleagues President Shamgar and President Barak shared the same view, and our colleague Justice D. Levin concurs. My colleagues distinguish between the following two stages: the first stage concerns the question of whether there was a violation of a basic right as defined in the Basic Law.  For example, whether there was a violation of the right of property as defined in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. At this stage of the proceedings, the party alleging the violation bears the burden of proving it. President Barak adds that at this stage of the proceedings there is a presumption of constitutionality, as held in the Bergman case [15] at p. 699.  Once the violation of the basic right has been proven, we proceed to the next stage, which examines whether the law remains valid despite the violation of a basic right, because the violation satisfies the requirements of the limitation clause. The burden at this stage is transferred to the other party, which must now prove the validity of the law. In this respect my colleagues apparently endorse the Canadian approach (see: Hogg, supra, ch. 35, p. 851ff (“Limitation of Rights”) [114]).

 

140.             In our view, the issue of the burden of persuasion does not require a decision, because all are agreed that the Amending Law skips over the hurdles erected by s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. When the time comes, the question of the burden of proof will require our decision, and our decision will be what it will be. My comments here relate exclusively to raising the considerations that should be considered when making that decision.

 

141.             My colleagues’ opinions regarding the burden of persuasion at the first and second stages of proceedings, being the same as the rule in Canadian law, appear to be based on the following two principles. Firstly, an analysis of the formal structure of the law and the particular manner in which the basic rights are defined. On the other hand, there is the permission granted by the legislature, subject to certain conditions, to violate those rights. The second principle is the substance of the basic right, qua basic right, and the nature of the violation of the basic right – in other words, the principle of form and alongside it the principle of substance.

 

We should note that our concern here is exclusively with the burden of persuasion, and not with interpretation of the Basic Law, the scope of the basic rights, nor the interpretation of the limitation clause and the conditions established therein for the validation of a law that violates a basic right. These matters may be self-evident, but we felt it necessary to mention them because all of these topics are discussed in the case law and legal literature as a single issue. Hence to the extent that each one of them is governed by a different set of rules, it seems proper in our view to distinguish between the issues that are mistakenly combined.

 

142.               Regarding the rules prescribed by my colleagues for the burden of persuasion, I must confess, that I gave the matter much thought and that I have reached the conclusion, that at this time these rules are proper both in their own right and in terms of their incorporation in the system of the laws of evidence, including the Basic Laws (see and compare: R. Cross, On Evidence, ed. C. Tapper, 7th ed., (London, Dublin, Edinburgh, 1990) 120 ff. (“Allocation of the Burden”)). However, in my view we should give consideration to the establishment of a caveat regarding the burden of persuasion at the second stage of the proceedings, in the context of the “Presumption of Regularity” and the “Presumption of Constitutionality.”

 

For current purposes, we accept that once the violation of the Basic Law is proved, and upon progressing to the second stage of proceedings, regarding the requirements of the limitation clause, the party claiming the constitutionality of the law bears the burden of proof. In other words, it must prove that the law satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. The caveat that we think should be considered is to rule that, at the second stage of proceedings, in considering the limitation clause, the law should be provided with a presumption of constitutionality. The import of this would be that prima facie, any law enacted by the Knesset is presumed to be constitutional. This presumption would naturally be operative in the framework of determining the burden of adducing proof (burden no.2) as distinct from the burden of persuasion (which falls on the sovereign authority). In this sense, my comments resemble those of my colleague President Shamgar, even if not totally identical (see the comments of my colleague President Shamgar, at par. 85 of his judgment). My colleague President Barak limits the presumption of constitutionality to the first stage only. I have two comments on this: firstly, at the first stage of the proceedings, the presumption of constitutionality is only of secondary importance, because the regular rules of evidence – that the claimant bears the burden of proof – would in any case impose the onus on the party claiming the violation of his right (compare to Hogg, ibid., at p. 857). Secondly, I see no reason for not applying the presumption of constitutionality at the second stage of proceedings. Indeed, in Canadian law the opinion was voiced that the presumption of constitutionality would not apply at the second stage of proceedings in cases pertaining to basic rights (see and compare, for example, ibid, at pp. 859, 860). However, before adopting this opinion, we should examine it on its merits. Perhaps the rule in Israel is different, and the presumption of constitutionality should, prima facie, apply at the second stage of proceedings, and in the words of Justice Landau in the Bergman case [15], at p. 699:

 

In our present consideration of the Financing Law, …we should say by way of introduction …. first of all, Knesset legislation should enjoy the presumption of validity, in the manner it was enacted. The initial tendency of the court should be towards upholding the law and not towards its disqualification, even when it allegedly violates an “entrenched” statutory provision.

      

     Actually, the question of whether this rule has direct, unqualified application in our case is far from simple: the claims go both ways, and we will not elaborate. We will only say that prior to our removal of the presumption of constitutionality from the second stage of proceedings, it is appropriate for us to give the matter deep consideration. I think that this was also the view of our colleague Justice Goldberg.

 

  143.   Furthermore, secondary legislation also benefits from the presumption of validity, and a fortiori, secondary legislation enacted by a Knesset committee or that was confirmed by a Knesset committee (see e.g. HCJ 6290/93 Zilka v. Manager General of Ministry of Health, [71], at pp. 637-639, and references there; HCJ 889/86 [65] at pp. 543-544; HCJ 491/86 Tel-Aviv Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of the Interior, [72] at pp. 495-496; HCJ 73/85 Lidor v. Association for Protection of Houseowners v. Minister of Building and Housing, [73] at p. 607; HCJ 108/70 Manor v. Minister of Finance, [74] at p.445.  

  If this is the case with secondary legislation, it should certainly apply to the Knesset legislation, for in essence, we choose our Knesset representatives so that they can both inform us of and determine the appropriate norms by which we should conduct our lives (vox populi vox dei), and the nation’s representatives are like the nation (see further, A Levontin, “Judaism and Democracy – Personal Observations,” Tel-Aviv Law Studies, 19 (1995) at p. 521). We will not adopt an extreme position that would say that since the voice of the Knesset is tantamount to the voice of the people, therefore the Court has no authority to annul Knesset legislation where it deviates from basic rights. Were we to say so, we would be holding an empty pitcher because we had ourselves poured out its contents. However, in performing the delicate task of balancing, which is our art and craft, I believe it possible to maintain the presumption of constitutionality at the second stage of proceedings as well. And we will act as our wisdom dictates.

  Furthermore, having consideration for the absolute and unqualified wording of the basic rights in the Basic Laws, it is easier for the person claiming a violation of a basic right to skip over the hurdle the obstacle at the first stage of proceedings. This phenomenon will repeat itself with respect to almost every law of the Knesset, because at this place and time almost every law, or at least many laws, likely violates one or another of the basic rights in some way. It thus turns out that in almost every proceeding we will go directly to the second stage, i.e. imposing the burden on those claiming that the law complies with the provisions of the limitation clause. Against this background, it may be appropriate for us to establish that every law should be seen as enjoying a presumption of constitutionality at the second stage too. And if the constitutionality presumption does not apply to the same degree in every case would it be appropriate to apply it selectively to a lesser degree? All of these questions are worthy of examination, and their resolution will come in the due course of time.

Final Word

     The conclusion of the matter is as stated at the outset: I concur with the decisions of my colleagues the Presidents: President Shamgar and President Barak, along with Justices D. Levin, Eliezer Golberg, and Zamir. And I will say the following:

     Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty is elevated above other laws, and a law that violates it without having satisfied the prescribed preliminary conditions will be considered not to have been enacted. The Supreme Court has the authority to rule that a particular law contravenes Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and to declare that such a law is null and void for that reason. Finally, the Amending Law entered the field of the limitation clause of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and emerged unscathed.

 

 

 

Justice E. Goldberg:

A Basic Law that anchors human rights is by its nature and substance no ordinary law. A Basic Law that proclaims human rights touches the very soul of the social experience of a democracy. A Basic Law that declares that ‘The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state’ (s. 1A of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty), brings dignity not only to people, but also to the state. Therefore, ‘the ordinary citizen’ who cherishes human rights naturally perceives such a law as a constitutional law in the most basic sense. From a legal perspective, the two Basic Laws – Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation –changed the norm that granted recognition to the human rights that they establish. These rights are no longer ‘natural’ rights; they are no longer the product only of judicial recognition; and the citizen no longer needs to fight in order to obtain legal recognition for any one of these rights. The legal source that now anchors these rights, their status as supra-legislative constitutional rights; their entrenchment (one way or another); and as a result – the power of judicial review that has been granted to the Court in the matter of legislation, and the constitutional remedies that the Court may grant, culminating in the annulment of a law – all of the above undoubtedly provide a basis for declaring that a major change occurred in Israel in March 1992.

 

The question regarding the source of the norm and its status is, in the present case, a theoretical one that does not require determination. I will therefore state only this: I am prepared to proceed on the assumption that none of the views expressed on this point lack solid theoretical, historical and interpretive basis. Yet it is precisely for this reason, precisely because each view represents a ‘legitimate’ legal option, that it is best to prefer the one that enhances the status of human rights, as is required by the values inherent to this subject. Any possible approach that weakens the status of this norm must of necessity lessen the status of the rights themselves, at a time when precisely the opposite tendency should guide us.

 

As a result, it is necessary that the rights that were granted by the Knesset in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty be given the status of constitutional rights – a status that is the ultimate normative status.

 

2. When we speak of the protection afforded to a person’s property by section 3 of the Basic Law, we must first clarify whether the right that we seek to protect is indeed ‘property’ within the meaning of section 3. If so, then the second question arises, viz. whether there was an ‘infringement’ of the property right as defined under section 3. A positive answer to the second question as well, raises the third question, which is whether the infringement fulfills the requirements of the limitation clause in section 8 of the Basic Law (see Prof. Weisman, in his above-mentioned article, HaPraklit 42, at p. 261).

 

3. Regarding the case before us, which is expressed in a law that infringes the contractual rights of creditors, I am also of the opinion that property rights include contractual rights within their scope. This does not indicate a blurring of the accepted distinction between contractual rights (in personam) and property rights (in rem), inasmuch as even obligatory rights are objects of ownership, since they have an economic value:

 

 

The assets that are the subject of proprietary rights may be of different types… thus, for example, one may create a property right… in an asset that is itself a personal right…in personam. We must thus therefore carefully distinguish between the nature of the asset that is the subject of the right (and there is nothing to prevent a personal right constituting the asset regarding which a property right exists…) and the nature of the right in the asset… (Weisman, in his above-mentioned book, at p. 50).

 

In CA 511/88 Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon LeTzion, et al. [75], at p. 527, President Shamgar states:

 

 

The interest of the protected tenant in the asset is worthy of protection like the interest of the renter or the leaseholder, because in this context it is not the purity of the proprietary nature of the right that is the determining factor, but rather the economic value that is damaged as a result of the plan (in The Planning and Building Law, 1965 – E.G.).

 

And see also Professor Weisman, in his aforementioned article, at p. 267.

 

Moreover, because the civil law recognizes the need to protect a person’s ownership of contractual rights against intentional infringement by a third party, such as in the tortious inducing of breach of contract, there is no reason to diminish the protection given to these assets in the framework of section 3 of the Basic Law (for similar results see: Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel [84], at p. 295; Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County [100], at p. 174; L. Kreynin, ‘Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can the Constitution Be a Form of Contract Law?’ 90 Colum. L. Rev. (1990)). It is also clear that in the matter before us an infringement of property rights has occurred, and that ‘infringement’ should be interpreted as a detraction form the economic property right that the property owner possessed.

 

4. In addition, I would like to address subjects that touch upon the application of section 8 of the Basic Law. In HCJ 428/86, HCJ 320/86 Barzilai v. Government of Israel [9], at p. 595, Justice Barak stated that:

 

… Constitutional legislation must be interpreted in light of the structure of the entire system…each constitutional law is nothing but a single brick in the whole building, placed on a given foundation of regime and law. Thus, the task of the judicial interpreter, when construing a constitutional law, is to bring it “into harmony with the foundations of the country’s existing constitutional regime” (M. Landau, ‘Law and Discretion in the Making of Law, 1 Hebrew Univ. L. Rev. (Mishpatim) 306).’

 

Thus must we be guided when we interpret s. 8 of the Basic Law, and its three sub-tests. In interpreting this section, the Court must bear in mind the constitutional structure of our system, which is based upon a separation of powers that ensures mutual checks and balances among the branches of government. As President Shamgar wrote in the Ressler case [14], at p. 518:

 

…Only in this manner, that is to say by avoiding overly concentrating power exclusively in the hands of one branch of government, is democracy guaranteed and the freedom of the individual and of the public safeguarded. In other words, the consistent and conceptual spreading of powers among the branches of government, through the imposition of constitutional principles regarding mutual supervision and control, and the establishment for this purpose of connections and bridges among the various branches of government, will create a basis comprising the combined elements that embrace all branches of government. This creates the parallelogram of forces that establishes and stabilizes the balance that is a condition for the existence of freedom and for the proper functioning of all the branches of government.

 

5. The harmony between branches of government therefore requires drawing a ‘red line’ between the exercise of the power of review over an act of legislation granted to the Court, and involvement in the legislative process. The Court must be careful not to blur the boundaries and cross into domains that are not its own. It must bear in mind that it has been entrusted only with the power of judicial review over whether or not the law is constitutional, and in exercising that authority the Court does not replace the legislature. The Court may not substitute its discretion for that of the legislature. The freedom to choose between alternative measures intended to balance the proper purpose and the infringement of a right is granted to the legislature and not to the Court. It is the legislature that is authorized to choose from among the possible means the one that it deems most appropriate for realizing the proper purpose of the law, and there is a presumption that it has indeed considered all of the relevant possibilities.

 

As a result, the constitutional legitimacy of the law under scrutiny is presumed. This approach is accepted, mutatis mutandis, for administrative review, and applies a fortiori to constitutional review. Only a conclusion that the legislature has not met the limitations upon infringement set out in s. 8 of the Basic Law requires that the Court declare a law to be unconstitutional, as if the legislator had acted ultra vires. Any other intervention by the Court would undermine those boundaries required by the separation of powers.

 

6. This is the manner in which we must also relate to the final test in the limitation clause of the Basic Law, viz. that the infringement of the offending law upon human rights be ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’ This test is the ‘degree test.’ The degree of the infringement must be such that it is no greater than required.

 

In order to arrive at the proper degree, there must be a process of winnowing through possible alternatives and of choosing the best. This process, by its nature, reflects the use of discretion in calculating the degree appropriate to realizing the (proper) purpose, while the point of departure is that for every alternative there is a ‘price’ that is expressed one way or another. We would also note that, when s. 8 speaks of ‘an extent no greater than is required,’ there are two meanings to the word ‘required.’ When two values collide, what is ‘required’ is the substantive criterion. When the collision is between two measurable concepts in a concrete system of data, what is ‘required’ is the quantitative criterion. The test referred to is relative and not absolute. The absolute size of the infringement is not what is being examined, but rather its size relative to what is required in order to achieve the proper purpose. While the language of s. 8 of the Basic Law implies that any infringement in excess of that required for the achievement of the proper purpose is forbidden, nevertheless, for reasons which we have examined, it is necessary, in my view, that the Court declare that a law has not met the ‘degree’ test only if it has reached the conclusion that the means chosen in the winnowing infringes to a degree that represents and exceptionally severe deviation from the range of reasonable infringement (in comparison with extreme unreasonableness). Otherwise, the Court will be replacing the legislature’s discretion with its own.

 

The risk is that, in the process of constitutional review, the tasks of the Court and the legislature will be reversed, and the need to fix the borders of intervention, as suggested above, are particularly clear in regard to tax laws and laws that set economic policy (to which the second meaning of ‘required’ that we discussed applies). If a test of legality of degree is carried out in this regard, by means of a careful examination of the possible alternatives, it will be difficult to find economic legislation that will stand up to the test of proportionality. In the words of Justice Blackmun:

 

A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less “drastic” or a little less “restrictive” in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down. (Illinois Elections BD. v. Socialist Workers Party [101], at pp. 188-189)

 

In tax laws and in economic laws there is the additional fact that the Court is not equipped with the tools to delve into the intricacies and the distinctions in the proportionality among the various alternatives (see HCJ 311/60 Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [76], at p. 1996). We must also not forget that an erroneous intervention in laws that deal with the subjects mentioned above may induce shock waves in the national economy. All of these things taken together only strengthen the view that the Court should declare a law unconstitutional for deviation from the test of degree, only if the means that the legislature chose reflects an exceptionally severe deviation from the range of reasonable infringement for the fulfillment of the proper purpose.

 

7. The necessary conclusion from the above is not that we require a different formula for judicial review of tax laws and economic laws, but rather that the ‘threshold’ of possible degree should be higher for them. This is similar to the approach of United States constitutional law that economic legislation is subjected to ‘minimal scrutiny’, and that it is sufficient that there be merely a rational basis for the infringing means employed by the law.

 

A broader framing of the allowable degree of infringement is required by the nature of the subject matter before us, inasmuch as the infringement of property rights of the individual by means of economic legislation in fact comprises three elements: At the first stage, the overall amount of means required for achieving the proper purpose is established. Establishing this overall amount is no more than an expression of priorities among the proper national objectives that the legislature has established. In general, the Court will refrain from intervening in legislation that sets or is based upon such general goals, As it merely expresses a balance between private property and the needs of the general public, and the Court will not intervene unless there is clearly an exceptional departure from the proper degree, such that private property rights will be deprived of appropriate room to exist . The second stage identifies those from whom the necessary means will be recruited in order to achieve the proper purpose. This determination is also subject to the review of the Court (such as in regard to discrimination), subject to the freedom to choose between alternative measures all of which attempt to balance between the proper purpose and the infringement of a right. This balancing, too, as already stated, is the role of the legislature rather than the Court. The third stage constitutes an arithmetical calculation of the degree of infringement.

 

As we see, this is a complex process that is based on both policy and upon the intricacies of complicated actuarial calculations, which are often the subject of disagreement among economists. It is thus understandable that the High Court of Justice tends not to intervene in the determination of economic policy (see, for example, HCJ 49/83 Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [77], at p. 523). It should be clear that the above is not intended to lead to a conclusion that economic legislation is exempt from judicial review, but rather in order to emphasize that the material under review requires that the Court widen the scope of the possible degrees of infringement so that the Court will not appear to be ruling upon the wisdom of legislative policy.

 

8. This brings us to the question of the burden of proof when a claim is brought that a law infringes one of the rights listed in the Basic Law, and that it does not serve a proper purpose or does not meet the requirement of proportionality. The burden of proof is of importance when the Court is asked to draw factual conclusions. In such a case, it is the burden of proof that determines between two contradictory and equally weighted arguments. When the Court is asked to make a value-based determination (e.g., striking a balance between conflicting values), there is no practical significance to the burden of proof. The Court must apply the tool of logical analysis, with which it is fully equipped. Thus, there is for the most part no significance to the burden of proof in determining whether an infringement of a protected right serves a proper purpose, and the determination is fundamentally one of values. The burden of proof is of significance in determining the proportionality of the infringement, where proportionality itself is not the result of a balancing of values. The material nature of property (i.e. the ability to quantify the value of a property right) is what requires the Court to make recourse to the facts in order to determine whether legislation that infringes a proprietary right meets the criterion of proportionality. If so, the burden of proof will have practical significance in such circumstances, in which the Court must decide between two sets of facts.

 

The task of the burden of proof is to make a determination in conditions of uncertainty when the scales are balanced. Several considerations apply to the division of this burden between the parties to a case. One consideration is that the existence of a fact or of a situation is more reasonable. In such a case, the tendency is to impose upon the person claiming the opposite of such a situation the burden of showing that the situation is different in the case under discussion. An additional consideration springs from the recognition that in conditions of uncertainty the burden of proof will be imposed in a manner that will narrow the risk that the decision will be erroneous. Thus for example, in criminal proceedings, in which a person’s freedom is at stake, the burden is imposed upon the state by means of the presumption of innocence set out in the criminal law. In civil proceedings the burden of proof is placed on the person who is making a claim against another, as he is arguing for a change in the status quo (see D. Bein in this regard, ‘The Burden of Proof and the Evidentiary Requirement in Tax Law’ (1995) III Mishpat uMimshal, at p. 285). In proceedings in which the legality of a law is being examined, the point of departure is that the law is assumed to be constitutional. Thus, any doubt must

 

operate in favor of the law’s legitimacy, and not against its validity. We thus conclude that a party who argues against the validity of a law must bear the burden of proof, even regarding the issue of whether the infringement constitutes an extreme deviation from the realm of a reasonable infringement for the sake of achieving a proper purpose. The evidentiary burden is auxiliary to the burden of proof. The party defending the law need not show that there are other alternatives that more severely infringe the right and that the less-infringing alternative was chosen, but rather the party arguing against the validity of a law must show that there exists a specific, clear alternative that fulfills the proper purpose, while infringing the protected right in a manner that is significantly less than the infringement of the law.

 

9. In the case before us, those assailing the constitutional validity of the law have not presented any alternatives of degree to the one chosen by the legislature for the fulfillment of the proper purpose (and I agree that the purpose is in fact proper).

 

Thus, I too concur with the opinions of my colleagues as to the results of this proceeding.

 

 

 

Justice E. Mazza:

I concur with the opinion of my colleague President Barak. I accept his rationale in general; and I also concur with the summary of his conclusions, which appears in paragraph 108 of his opinion. Given this situation, I will suffice in briefly addressing three of the important issues regarding which some of my esteemed colleagues have presented different positions and approaches. I will begin by emphasizing that the appeals before us do not require a decisive determination of any of these three issues. My brief comments are meant to emphasize my support for one of the possible approaches regarding each issue.

 

The first matter is the question of the source of the Knesset’s power to bind itself – whether by a formal entrenchment provision or by a substantive limitation – which is required in order to establish a constitutional norm that will be protected from the Knesset’s own power. Like my colleague, President Barak, I share the view that this power has been granted to the Knesset on the basis of its constituent authority. That the Knesset possesses constituent as well as legislative authority is strongly anchored in our constitutional history. Moreover, the approach that attributes the Knesset’s constitutional activity to its constituent authority appears substantively preferable to me to other possible approaches. Its main advantage is that it attributes the Knesset’s authority to establish a constitution to a source that is conceptually ‘external’ and distinct from the source of its sovereignty as a legislative authority. In so doing, it establishes a theoretical basis for a normative ladder that enables a practical distinction between the Knesset’s special activity in establishing a constitution and its ongoing activity in the legislative field.

 

The second matter I would like to address is the scope of the definition of ‘property’ and ‘infringement of property.’ I accept the view that, with regard to the effect of s. 3 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ‘property’ may include obligatory rights. Yet my colleague Justice Zamir rightly points out that ‘The broader the scope of the right to property as a constitutional right, the weaker its protection..’ I believe, as he does, that in order to make a decisive determination regarding the appeals before us, it is enough to assume that the Amending Law does in fact infringe property; and so long as we are not required to do so, we must be careful not to establish fixed conclusions as to the scope of the protected property right. It may be that, in the spirit of the approach of President Shamgar (in para. 69 of his opinion), the practical test for determining whether there is cause for examining the constitutionality of an infringement of property ought to be based not on the internal substance of this right, but rather on the seriousness of the infringement of the right and its identification, by some objective criterion, such as an infringement that substantially affects the position of the right-holder. It would appear that even President Barak, who, in principle, leans toward a broad definition of property and of infringement thereof, would agree that marginal damage to property may not give rise to a cause for constitutional review of the infringement. In any case, he left these questions open for further review, and I am satisfied with that.

 

My third comment relates to the burden of proof in the second stage of the constitutional analysis. There is a consensus that at the first stage of the review, a person claiming infringement of a basic right must assume the burden of proving the infringement. The question is, upon whom does this burden fall in the second stage, in which the question is whether the infringement of the right is constitutional, in the sense that it fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause.

 

 

My esteemed colleagues expressed several views regarding this issue. My colleague President Barak notes the accepted view of comparative constitutional law, according to which the burden of proving the constitutionality of the infringement falls upon the state. The President states that he deems this approach to be appropriate, yet since the issue does not arise in the case before us, he suggests leaving the issue of the burden of proof for further review. My colleague Justice D. Levin decisively expresses his opinion that the law does indeed require that the burden of proof be transferred to the shoulders of the state. The views of my colleagues Justices Bach and Goldberg are diametrically opposed to that. In their opinion, every law enjoys the presumption of its constitutionality, and even when it is proven that a law infringes upon a basic right, the presumption of constitutionality requires that we assume that the infringement satisfies the conditions of the limitation clause. Therefore the burden of contradicting that assumption falls upon the claimant. My colleague Justice Cheshin, who admits to having hesitations in this regard, tends to an intermediate position: the burden of proof that a law that infringes a basic right fulfills the conditions of the limitation clause does indeed fall upon the state. However, even a law that has been proven to be an infringing law, enjoys a prima facie assumption that it does not contradict the Basic Law; and one who claims otherwise must bring contradictory proof. This presumption that the state enjoys in meeting its burden of proof, transfers the evidentiary burden onto the claimant. If the claimant does not bring sufficient evidence to contradict this presumption, the state will be found to have borne the burden of proof, whereas, if the claimant manages to adduce contradictory evidence, the state will be required to show the Court that the infringing law does indeed meet the conditions of the limitation clause. Having stated in which direction his opinion leans, and in view of the difficulty of the questions posed in the matter of burden of proof, Justice Cheshin proposes leaving a decisive determination in this matter for the future.

 

I, too, do not have a clear opinion on this difficult matter. My tendency, prima facie, is that there is good reason for splitting the burden between the parties, so that the state will have to convince the Court that the infringement serves a proper purpose and that the means chosen are appropriate for achieving that purpose. The burden of convincing the Court that the government should choose a less harmful, alternative method, should be imposed upon the person alleging the unconstitutionality of the infringement. My colleague President Shamgar explained the appropriateness of his distinction (in para. 85 of his opinion) and, on the face of it, I concur with his approach. Nonetheless, I am not absolutely certain that it is fitting to act in this manner in every instance. It may be that such an approach is appropriate only for infringements of an economic nature, and that a different type of harm to basic rights justifies imposing the burden of proof on the state in regard to all of the conditions of the limitation clause. Subject to these comments, which were meant to indicate a possible direction without setting things in stone, and in the spirit of the proposals of my colleagues President Barak and Justice Cheshin, I would leave for further review the issue of determining the various aspects and levels of the burden of proof.

 

Justice G. Bach:

1. I concur with the view that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and that the relevant files should be returned to the court of first instance for continued deliberation. I also concur with the rejection of the appeal in CA 6821/93. I am also of the opinion that there should be no order for costs regarding these appeals.

 

2. It appears that due to the sense of the great importance of this event – from the point of view of the legal, constitutional and judicial history of the State of Israel, when this Court is asked for the first time to rule on the question of the validity of a law enacted by the Knesset, on the grounds that the law infringes upon Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and is thus unconstitutional – some of my colleagues have analyzed in great detail matters regarding which a decision is not necessary for deciding these appeals. Several of my colleagues have noted in their opinions that no binding decision is called for regarding these matters, and thus they are prepared to leave the matters for ‘further review.’ However, since they nonetheless clarified their positions in these matters, other colleagues expressed their opposing views in this regard. This aroused the natural desire of those judges who left the decisions for ‘further review’ to further clarify their principled positions.

 

Truth be told, we are dealing with fascinating topics, that appeal to the heart and the mind at the legal level generally, and at the constitutional level in particular; as well as at the national, public, general and philosophical levels. The temptation to analyze these topics in detail is accordingly great. Nonetheless, I have decided, for myself, to resist the temptation, and to limit my remarks to those topics that appear to me to be necessary for rendering our specific opinion in the matter of these appeals.

 

3. I concur with the commonly held proposition of my esteemed colleagues Presidents Barak and Shamgar, with which most of the other judges on this bench have concurred. According to this proposition, the Knesset is empowered to enact both ordinary legislation and special Basic Laws that constitute the constitution of Israel, and that in the latter type of laws, the Knesset may even limit its own authority and that of future Knessets to amend or infringe these same constitutional Basic Laws. This self-limitation can be procedural, viz. by means of a special majority for the annulment or amendment of these laws, and it can be material, by means of the setting of substantive conditions for amending those Basic Laws.

 

I see no need, for the purpose of these appeals, to take a stand on the inherently interesting and important question of constitutional history of whether, in enacting Basic Laws of a constitutional character, the Knesset wields inherent authority in its capacity as the state’s supreme legislative body, as President Shamgar believes; or whether the Knesset enacts Basic Laws by means of special, separate authority, under the ‘hat’ of constituent authority, as President Barak believes.

 

4. My position regarding this issue would be different, had the claim been raised before us that the aforementioned Basic Laws could only have been enacted by the Knesset in its capacity as a constituent assembly, but that a special procedure for so doing was required, such as a proclamation in the Knesset and of its committees that dealt with these laws, to the effect that the debate and the voting related to the enactment of constitutional laws, and that the Knesset was acting under its constituent authority, and that this fact had to require clear and definitive expression in the wording of the Basic Laws themselves. Such an argument would have implied that without having undertaken such a special procedure, and without a statement in the Basic Laws themselves that they were enacted on the basis of the Knesset’s constituent authority, there is in fact no constitutional effect to the two Basic Laws that we are addressing in these appeals, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.

 

However, since no one supports this extreme line of thinking, and since it is clear from the opinion of my esteemed colleague President Barak that the Knesset’s constituent authority is not contingent upon a procedure different from that used in enacting ordinary laws, and the fact of the constituent assembly’s special ‘hat’ need not be specifically noted in the wording of the aforesaid laws, I do not find any practical difference between the two approaches in the case before us. This situation may change should the Knesset adopt a Basic Law, whether entrenched in a procedural or material-substantive manner, regarding which it be claimed that the Knesset abused its constituent authority, and that the law did not justify the use of the said special authority of Knesset, by virtue of its contents or its national importance.

 

However, this cannot be said, and has not been argued in regard to the two laws before the Court. These two laws address the most basic of human rights. Both the content and the wording of these laws manifestly indicate the legislature’s intent to establish constitutional supra-norms for the protection of human rights. There can be no doubt that the provisions included in these Basic Laws could serve as a central pillar in any constitution worthy of its name in an enlightened democratic regime.

 

5. In his interesting, comprehensive opinion, my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin raises the question of whether we ought to be convinced that the legislature intended to create part of a constitution when it enacted these Basic Laws. He recalls in this context the theophany at Mount Sinai, in stating, inter alia, as follows:

 

This was the manner in which the Jewish people became obligated by its first constitution... For three days the people waited to receive the constitution … and on the third day the grand and awesome ceremony began… thunder and lightning, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud …

 

The implication is clear: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were not enacted with such festive displays. It is certainly true that these Basic Laws were not enacted with thunder and lightning and the sounding of trumpets. Such phenomena apparently no longer occur in our era. Yet in my opinion the festiveness and the constitutional character of these Basic Laws, and the desire to establish supra-constitutional norms, emerge from the text itself. To illustrate this point it is sufficient to take the main law with which we are dealing, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Sections 1 and 1A of the Basic Law state:

 

1. Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.

 

1A. The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.’

 

The sections following these establish provisions regarding the protection and preservation of life, physical integrity and the dignity of the person. Section 8, the limitation clause, then states:

 

There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required. 

 

Do not these words unequivocally express the legislative intent to establish constitutional norms for the people of Israel, and in a manner that is, in effect, no less than that of thunder, lightening and trumpets?

 

6. This sums up the matter of the Knesset’s intention to establish a constitution. Regarding the question of its authority to establish a constitution, I have already indicated above, that I concur with the positive views of President Shamgar and President Barak in this regard (and I clarified that I understand their position to be a shared one on this point). I reached this conclusion after reviewing the voluminous amount of material that was cited by my colleagues and the learned representatives of the parties, including the constitutional history of the State of Israel from the first day of its establishment, including the ‘Harrari Decision,’ the opinions expressed by members of the Knesset during the debates on the various Basic Laws as recorded in the Knesset Proceedings, and the opinions expressed by learned experts of constitutional law, the content of the Basic Laws that have been legislated by the Knesset prior to 1992, when Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty were enacted, and the manner in which these laws were passed, and finally the relevant case law on the subject that has been decided by this Court and the courts of other countries with a constitutional regime.

 

I carefully examined the doubts, reservations and misgivings expressed in this matter by my esteemed colleague Justice Cheshin. In my opinion, one cannot deny the weight of at least some of those points, which also draw support from the opinions of various scholars, as well as several of the Knesset members who took part in the debates upon the said Basic Laws and earlier Basic Laws. Yet, at the end of the day, I concur with the view that the Knesset was endowed with central and supreme legislative authority that includes the authority to enact a constitution for Israel. It seems to me that this view is accepted today, and was accepted in the past by the Israeli public. Were we to ask the supporters of a written constitution and those who oppose it for either practical or ideological reasons, we may reasonably assume that the overwhelming majority of the public would have no doubts as to the Knesset’s authority per se to enact Basic Laws that form a constitution. The public acceptance of the Basic Laws that have been enacted since the establishment of the state proves this.

 

7. I would raise an additional point in this context: Even my colleague Justice Cheshin, does not disagree that the Knesset is empowered to enact a law that comprises a provision that binds future Knessets, in the sense that it requires a majority of Knesset members, that is to say, a minimum majority of 61 Knesset members, in order to revoke or amend the law. My colleague agrees that such a provision does not contradict the fundamental conception of democracy.

 

It appears to me that there is no difference, in principle, between a limiting provision that requires a majority of 61 Knesset members for the law’s amendment or revocation, and a more far-reaching, constitutional limitation provision. A law is passed in the Knesset with a regular majority of those participating in the vote. Absence or abstention is the right of every Knesset member. Therefore, if my colleague is correct in his opinion that the Knesset is not empowered to enact a constitutional law because the next Knesset can revoke any law by ordinary means, then it is difficult to understand why a limiting law that requires a majority vote of 61 Knesset members would constitute an exception to that rule.

 

  It would appear that in order to be consistent my colleague needed to point out the invalidity of any law that prevents the future enactment of a law by ordinary means. Emphasizing that requiring a majority of 61 Knesset members is ‘kosher’ because it accords with our democratic sense may sound good, but I am not convinced that there is a difference of principle regarding the matter before us, between requiring a majority of 61 and requiring a majority of 62 Knesset members, or a greater majority.

 

8.  In his opinion, Justice Cheshin raises concerns, inter alia, regarding the negative phenomena that are liable to result in the future if indeed we recognize the unrestricted authority of the Knesset to limit in a Basic Law the authority of future Knessets to revoke such a law or to amend it. Thus my colleague asks what will happen if a Basic Law enacted in the future would require a vote of 90 or 100 or even more Members of Knesset in order to amend it? Indeed, such a thought raises concerns regarding our future democratic life, but it seems that this concern is more theoretical than practical. Israel is not the only country that has enacted laws of a constitutional nature that include entrenchment and limitation provisions regarding future legislation. Such laws require a majority of members of parliament for the amendment of a constitutional law, or even a majority of two-thirds of parliament or of those participating in the vote. We have never heard of a requirement of a 100% majority, i.e. unanimity, or even of a requirement of 90% or of 80% of the members of parliament.

 

The concern that has been expressed reminds me of the following questions that I have asked myself on more than one occasion: What would happen, if, when the commander of the Independence Day ceremony requests the permission of the Speaker of the Knesset to begin the ceremony, the request would be denied by the Speaker?! What would happen if the President, or the Prime Minister, or the relevant minister would refuse to sign a law enacted by the Knesset? And what if the President refuses to sign the appointment of a judge who has been selected by the Judicial Appointment Committee, when there is no defect in the appointment? The simple answer to questions such as these is that there are certain things that we may assume will simply never happen in a proper democratic regime. And if, heaven forbid, such unreasonable events were to occur, then a democratic regime will find judicial or other governmental solutions. This concern and other problems related to the enactment of future Basic Laws and their amendment, which will be solved in the course of time, cannot outweigh the considerations that lead to the conclusion that the Knesset, as the supreme legislative body, is indeed authorized both to enact ordinary laws and to legislate Basic Laws that provide Israel with a constitution.

 

9. Accordingly, I concur with the opinion of my colleagues, that the above-mentioned Basic Laws do in fact endow the Court with the authority to nullify laws that contradict these Basic Laws and do not meet the legality tests that they establish.

 

10. I agree that the Amending Law that is the subject of these appeals ‘infringes property rights’ within the meaning of s. 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. I concur with the conclusion and the reasoning of my esteemed colleague President Shamgar on this point, and I see no need to add anything.

 

It remains for us, therefore, to consider the central issue of the appeals before us, and that is whether the Amending Law meets the requirements of the ‘limitation clause.’ In other words, does the Amending Law fall within the scope of s. 8 of the Basic Law, which determines that the new law is not nullified in spite of its infringement of a basic right, because it meets the requirements stipulated in that section?

 

11. Several of my colleagues expressed their opinions upon the issue of which party ought to bear the burden of evidence or proof regarding the question of whether the law at hand meets the limitation requirements in s. 8 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (and to the same extent, of course, the parallel section to the aforementioned s. 8 in Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, viz. s. 4).

 

Some of my colleagues noted that there is no need to decide this question in the appeals before us, and it may thus be left for future consideration. As opposed to my position regarding several other questions that were addressed by my colleagues, I believe that this topic is indeed very relevant to the present matter, and that it is appropriate that we consider it. The moment that we reached a determination that the Amending Law does in fact infringe a property right, that is to say, a fundamental right protected by the Basic Law, we must then answer the question of whether the Amending Law meets all of the criteria in s. 8 of the Basic Law. It is only natural, and necessary, that we ask ourselves which party must convince us regarding these points. What if doubts arise regarding any or all of those? What happens if the scales remain evenly balanced in regard to any or all of those points?

 

Various opinions have been expressed regarding this question. According to one of them, to which my esteemed colleague Justice D. Levin gave most specific and decisive expression, the question of the burden of proof regarding the issues before us must be divided into two: the burden of proof regarding the very existence of an infringement of the basic right in the new law under examination; and, if an infringement of the basic right is indeed proven, then the question arises as to the burden of proof regarding the fulfillment of the requirements in the limitation clause, that is to say s. 8 of the Law, regarding which different rules apply, according to this same opinion.

 

Thus states Justice D. Levin, inter alia:

 

Anyone who claims that a basic right has been infringed and who seeks to undermine the force of a regular law for the sake of such an infringement, must shoulder the burden of persuading the Court that a protected, constitutional basic right has indeed been infringed. The Court then examines this claim in the light of the facts of the case as laid out before it and in accordance with the values that are contained in the protected basic right. If the Court finds that indeed a regular law that has been passed does infringe a safeguarded basic right, the burden of persuading the Court that in this specific case the justifications for such an infringement exist in the limitation clause passes over to the entity protecting the validity of the law – usually a representative of the state.

 

This proposition is accepted by some scholars and judges in Israel and elsewhere, and even the state’s representative did not disagree with it during the proceedings before us.

12. I, however, cannot agree with this view regarding the second part of the proposition, for the following reasons. There are indeed areas of law in which the burden of proving a defense in the face of an accusation or a certain claim falls upon the person who raises the defense. We encounter this phenomenon mainly in criminal law. When it is proven that a defendant, who has been accused of murder or assault, has indeed killed or assaulted another person, and the accused wishes to defend himself on the grounds of self-defense and to therefore claim that he ought not to be convicted, the burden of proof falls upon him to show the existence of a situation of self-defense.

 

The same is true regarding a defense of drunkenness or insanity. In tort law, as well, the burden of proof is sometimes transferred to the shoulders of the respondent. Under certain circumstances, noted in s. 41 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version] and which arouse a prima facie suspicion against the respondent for having been negligent towards the claimant, the conclusion of that same section determines:

 

…and it appears to the court that the happening of the occurrence that caused the damage is more consistent with the conclusion that the defendant did not exercise reasonable care than with the conclusion that he did exercise reasonable care – then the onus shall be upon the defendant to prove that there was no carelessness for which he is liable in connection with the occurrence which led to the damage.

 

In other words, in certain cases, in which the evidence indicates prima facie that a crime or a tort has occurred, and the defendant or the respondent wishes to raise certain defenses based upon facts that are a matter of their special knowledge, the burden of proof will transfer to them regarding these points.

 

Does a similar situation obtain in regard to the topic before us? I think not. In listing the fundamental human rights, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty makes a general, normative declaration. The legislature was well aware of the fact that very many situations would arise in which the law would permit infringements of these ‘rights,’ meaning that undoubtedly laws would be legislated that would meet the requirements of the limitation clause, s. 8 of the Basic Law. When s. 5 of the Basic Law states that ‘There shall be no deprivation or restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or otherwise.’ We can hardly imagine that the legislature was unaware of the probability that laws will be passed that will conflict with this ‘right.’ Is it not clear that every country requires the enactment of criminal laws that permit the arrest and incarceration of suspects and of convicted criminals? Is it not perfectly obvious that laws will be proposed and enacted to permit the extradition of criminals to other countries? We are also all aware that a person’s liberty may be ‘otherwise’ restricted, as for example, by means of conscription into the army. Should we assume that the legislature takes a negative view of all of these possibilities for the restriction of liberty?

 

It also seems to me that various tax laws are also laws that ‘infringe a person’s property,’ and that s. 3 of the Basic Law ostensibly applies to them. There are differences of opinion among experts regarding this point, but I am of the view that in tandem with the prohibition on arrests and detainments, where it is clear that the state must apply the criminal law, the term ‘infringement of property’ must also be interpreted broadly, with an understanding on the part of all those concerned that many laws, in this context as well, will be found wanting in terms of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

In other words, a law that prima facie infringes a basic right is not automatically absolutely and thoroughly suspect of being morally or democratically invalid. Each law will be objectively examined in light of the elements prescribed in the limitation clause. In my opinion, this analysis leads to the conclusion that there is no assumption or presumption that every law that infringes human liberty, property, or any other basic right enumerated in the Basic Law is invalid until proven otherwise. On the contrary, in my opinion, the assumption should be that a law was lawfully enacted, unless the Court is convinced that it is void for infringing a basic right and not meeting the requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

There is an assumption and a presumption that every civil servant who performs a task in the framework of his job acts in good faith and in accordance with the law, until the opposite is proven. This well-known rule, omnia praesumuntor rite esse acta, applies to every official act. The same holds for a policeman making an arrest, who is assumed to be acting legally and properly, until proven otherwise. Are we to act in accordance with the opposite assumption, in the case of the legislature, in the case of the members of the Knesset elected by the public? When the people’s elected representatives, following debates in the Knesset committees and plenum, enact a law, is there no assumption that the law was passed for a worthy end and that it conforms to the values of the State of Israel? Is there any justification whatsoever for the opposite assumption? This is precisely the meaning of imposing the burden of proof on the party that claims that the conditions of s. 8 have been fulfilled. If we so determine, it is as if we are saying to the legislators: ‘Since your law contains some infringement of liberty or property, our assumption is that you have acted in a manner that is inappropriate and does not befit the values of the State of Israel; or you have done something that is not intended for a proper purpose, unless you convince us of the opposite.’ 

 

In my view, such a conclusion is unacceptable, and the burden of proof at all stages must be imposed upon the party that argues that the law is void for contradicting a Basic Law. In other words, the person who argues against the validity of a law must convince the Court both as to the law’s infringement of a right protected by the Basic Law, as well as that the law does not meet the requirements of the limitation clause, s. 8 of the Basic Law (see also, in the same vein, para. 8 of the opinion of my esteemed colleague Justice Goldberg).

 

I would also add that we should not forget that the legislature – that is to say the Knesset members, the elected representatives of the people – is not generally represented as a party in this Court. It is said that the state’s representative, the representative of the Attorney General, will in general represent the position of the legislature. Yet this is not necessarily so. There may be situations in which an enacted law does not enjoy the support of the government or the Attorney General. This is another reason for concluding that the Court should not annul a law on the above-mentioned grounds, unless it is convinced by the evidence and the arguments brought before it that the law that infringes a basic right does not in fact meet the criteria of s. 8 of the Basic Law.

 

13. In the above explanation I mentioned the first two requirements of s. 8 of the Basic Law, viz. that the law must be ‘befitting [of] the values of the state of Israel’ and that the law must be ‘enacted for a proper purpose.’ But my approach is identical in regard to the third criterion of s. 8, which requires that the infringement of the basic right must be ‘to an extent no greater than is required.’ Here, too, the assumption must, in my opinion, tend to the direction of the legitimacy of the law, unless the opposite is clearly proven. If we impose upon the legislature, or upon whoever is attempting to defend the law, the burden of showing that there exists no alternative to the law as legislated by the Knesset that poses a lesser infringement of the basic right, we are liable to find ourselves in intolerable situations.

 

Let us return once again to the criminal law. There are those who are of the opinion that imprisonment does not deter and is not effective, and that we should employ other sanctions that do not infringe human freedom to the same extent. Others take the view that shorter terms of imprisonment achieve the same punitive result, and may even have better results. Still others believe that for specific offences, such as drug-related crimes or sex crimes, emphasis should be placed on medical treatment rather than on punishment. It is possible that even the judge presiding over the proceedings may hold such views. Additionally, there is extensive professional literature treating of these issues. The same is true regarding fiscal laws or commercial laws, such as the Amending Law that is currently before this Court. There can be no doubt that it is possible to propose alternative laws that, in the eyes of the proposer, appear preferable, more efficient, more just, and less injurious to the property right of the person seeking the annulment of the law.

 

Let us just imagine where we would end up if the Court were required to delve into such arguments, and if the party arguing in favor of the validity of the law would have to prove that there exists no alternative that infringes a given right to a lesser extent.

 

In conclusion, in this matter as well, the burden of proof must rest upon the person arguing that the law should be voided. We should also not accept an overly broad construction of the requirement itself. Only if the evidence and arguments make it clear to the Court that the law infringes the petitioner’s basic right in a manner that is disproportionate to the fulfillment of its desired aim, and that there is a real need for an alternative solution less injurious to the basic right, may the Court decide to void the law for the above-mentioned reason.

 

14. The outcome of all of the above is that only in rare and exceptional cases will the Court find justification for declaring a law void on the grounds that it contradicts the above-mentioned Basic Laws on human rights of 1992.

 

15. If we now apply these rules to the cases before us, the unavoidable conclusion is that there is no justification for voiding the Amending Law that is the subject of these appeals. As my esteemed colleague President Shamgar stated, the purpose of the Amending Law, like that of the Main Law, is an attempt to resolve the crisis in the agricultural sector. This is a proper purpose, and the law conforms to the values of the State of Israel. Moreover, the possible infringement of the property rights of the creditors under the provisions of the Amending Law is not disproportionate to the intended legislative purpose. This is especially so, after taking into consideration the alternatives that were available to those creditors in accordance with the existing laws of execution and bankruptcy.

 

 

I would probably have reached this same conclusion even if I were of the opinion that the burden of proof regarding the conformity of the law to the requirements of the limitation clause was to be borne by the person arguing for the law’s legality. This is so a fortiori given that my view, as explained above, is that the burden of proof rests with the party arguing that the law should be voided.

 

16. I would also like to note that I concur with the concluding remarks in para. 108 of the opinion of my esteemed colleague President Barak, and I refer to paras. 3 and 4 above, in which I clarified the reason for not taking a position regarding the question of whether the Knesset wields its inherent authority or its constituent authority in legislating a constitutional law. My colleague’s statements in those concluding remarks are, in fact, in agreement with my opinion, and they also do not conflict with my position regarding the burden of proof in this matter, which I set out in detail in paras. 11-14 above.

 

17. In light of all the above, I have reached the conclusion set out at the beginning of my opinion.

 

Justice Tz. E. Tal

 

There is a difference of opinion between President Shamgar and President Barak, and between the two of them and Justice Cheshin, regarding fundamental questions of the authority and status of the legislative branch. This difference of opinion is extremely important in terms of constitutional law.

 

Nonetheless, I do not believe that these questions need  be decided in order to resolve the matter before us. I will therefore refrain from entering into the debate between these eminent jurists, and leave these questions to be decided at the appropriate time.

 

In HCJ 878, 726/94, [37], I concurred with the opinion of my colleague Justice D. Levin (although not with his conclusions) in the matter of the superior normative status of the Basic Laws, in the light of which the Knesset’s ordinary legislation should be reviewed, and with that I rest content.

 

My colleagues were divided on the question of who should bear the onus of proving that the infringement of a right protected in a Basic Law did not exceed what was proper. In this matter, I agree with the approach of my colleague Justice Mazza.

 

I concur with the result that the appeal in CA 6821/93 should be denied, and that the appeals in LCA 1908/94 and LCA 3363/94 should be allowed, and that the matters should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

 

Decided as stated in the opinion of President Shamgar.

 

Handed down this day, 16 Heshvan 5755 (November 9, 1995)

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Legislation

 

Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel.............................................................. 6-7, 60-63, 103-106,

                .....................................................................................................................  114, 164 169, 171-2, 174-177,

                .......................................................................... 186, 198,  201-2, 207-209, 211-212, 214,217, 221,229,

                ..................................................................................................... 233-4, 310-317, 319, 328, 330,353, 357

                ................................................................................................................. 361, 364, 367, 371, 397-398, 408

 

Israeli Basic Laws Cited:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, ss. 1,1A,2,3,5,8,10,11,12......................................................... 2-4, 7-8,

                ..................................................................................................... 17, 23-25,28, 32;39, 56-7, 59,70, 80, 81,

                ................................................................................................. 82,85,87, -98;102-104;106, 108, 114-117,

                ........................................................................................................... 120-122, 124-128, 134, 135-41, 149,

                ........................................................................................  158;161-163 166-167;203-204, 217, 219-220,

                ................................................................................................. 230-231, 236, 239-241 248-250, 253-258,

                .............................................................................................................. 263, 265, 276, 278, 280, 284-285, ,

                ........................................................................................................ 296, 300, 304-305, 307-308, 323-324,

                ................................... 330, 332, 337, 341-342,417, 420, 429, 440,444-445, 450, 455-456, 460-463,

                ........................................................................................ 465,469, 470-472, 474, 476,478-482 486-487 ,

                ...................................................................................................... 490-492, 500, 502, 504-506, 509, 511, ,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994),

                ss. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11........................................................................................... 8-9,39, 48,50-52, 55-57, 59,

                .............................................................................................................. 78-79, ,81-82,84-85 88 -91, 93- 95,

                ....................................................................................................... 97, 101, 103, 106, 108, 116 , 122-125,,

                ...................................................................................... 128, 161, 163, 166, 203 -204,217-219, 221, 230,

                .............................................................. 236, 247,250, 253-258,263,272, 275, 278, 290-291, 307, 315,

                ..................................................................................................... 319-321, 330 – 331, 337, 342, 417-418,

                ............................................................................................................... 429, 444-446, 450, -455-461, 463,

                ......................................................................................................... 472, 476, 478-481,491, 504-506, 509,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

Basic Law: The Knesset, ss. 4,8, 9A, 9A(A), 19,21 (c),24,25, 34,44, 45, 45A................... 6, 34, 39, 44, 49-50,

                .............................................................................................. 52-4, 63, 66-8, 77, 94, 105, 116, 161, 166-7,

                ............................................................................................. 186-90, 193, 201, 205-6, 211, 218, 224, 236,

                ................................................................................................... 240-1, 243, 304, 366, 374, 397, 421, 427,

                ................................................................................................................ 428-31, 433-5, 437, 439-440, 444

Basic Law: The Judiciary: ss. 10, 17, 22....................................................................... 48,  50, 79, 113, 164,  248

Basic Law: The Government: ss. 42, 50 (c), 50 (d), 56, 56 (d), 59....................................................... 46, 79, 86,

                ................................................................................................................... 107,164,243,420,449,- 450, 452

Basic Law: The Army....................................................................................................................................... 164,243

Basic Law: The President of the State: s. 25............................................................... 79, 107, 164, 89, 242,  376

Basic Law: The State Economy: ss. 3, 7............................................................................................... 79, 164, 376

Basic Law: Israel Lands....................................................................................................... 164, 194, 204, 242, 376

Basic Law: The State Comptroller.............................................................................................................. 164,,204,,

 

 

161

Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No.3)....................................................................................................... 193

Basic Law: Jerusalem, The Capital of Israel........................................................................................................ 164

 

 

Foreign Constitutions Cited:

[Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]..................... 146,,200, 254, 256, 259, 279, 289, 290, 293, 295,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................

[German Basic Law], Sections 1(3), 20(3) and 79(3................................................... 82, 90, ,93,  101, 195, 254

Constitution of Australia............................................................................................................................................ 93

Constitution of Austria, 1920.................................................................................................................................... 90

Constitution of Austria............................................................................................................................................. 262

 

Constitution of Canada....................................................................................... 89, 93, 101, 123, 132,  259, 277,,

                .......................................................................................................................................................... , 286, 289,

Constitution of Cyprus............................................................................................................................................. 262

Constitution of Germany................................................................................................... 82, 90, 93,102, 163, 227,

                ......................................................................... 153-154, 163,195,227,254,262 271,283, 289, 290, 294,

Constitution of India....................................................................................................................................... 102, 262

Constitution of Ireland...................................................................................................................................... 93, 262

Constitution of Italy........................................................................................................................................ 163, 262

Constitution of Japan............................................................................................................................................... 262

Constitution of South Africa........................................................................................................... 95,163, 277, 289

Constitution of Soviet Russia.................................................................................................................................. 192

Constitution of Spain................................................................................................................................................ 239

Constitution of Sweden............................................................................................................................................ 239

Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France....................................................................................................... 102

Constitution of the United States.................................................................................... 93,102,131,141,153,163,,

                ................................................................................................................................................... ,262, 282, 410

Constitution of Turkey............................................................................................................................................. 262

 

International Treaties Cited:

Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 (s. 17)......................................................................... 304

European Communities Act, 1972........................................................................................................................... 77

European Convention on Human Rights.......................................................................................... 201, 225, 293,

European Union Convention, Article 177(B)......................................................................................................... 89

 

Israeli Statutes Cited:

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1993......... 2-4, 7, 17, 20-35, 38-39, 85, 89,

                .............................................................................................................................................................................                                   100, 128-9, 135, 136-138,

                ....................................................................................................................... 143, 145-6, 150-2, 157-8, 162

                ................................................................................................................. 168, 276, 296-7, 299, 300-4, 328,

                ............................................................................................................................... 330-2, 335-6, 340-1, 487,

                ............................................................................................................................... 490, 500, 509-10, 514-15

Family Agricultural Sector (Arrangements) (Amendment) Law, 1992,

ss. 7 (b)(1),11,12,15, 16, 17, 19 (a), 20, 20 (b)(3)(a), 21, 22                                             ..... 2, 17-21, 23, 25-28,

                ......................................................................................................... 30-31, 33-35, 100, 135-137, 143, 146,

                .............................................................................................................................................. 150-52, 160, 308

 

First Schedule, Second Schedule, Third Schedule.................................................................................................. 18

Interpretation Ordinance [New Version] ss. 16 (4), 37................................................................................. 44, 438

Knesset Rules of Procedure.................................................................................................................................. 437-8

Holders of Public Office (Benefits) Law, 1969, s. 1.............................................................................................. 46

Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, ss. 2(b), 7 (a), 9, 9 (b), 10 (a), 11................ 46, 61, 107, 114, 169,

                ............................................................................................................... 175-6, 353, 398, 433, 435, 468-69

Transition Law, 1949, ss. 1, 2 (a), 2 (d)....................................................... 46, 62-5, 68, 82, 170, 178, 181, 206,

                ................................................................................................ 220-1, 239, 304, 346, 350, 384-5, 387, 424

Supervision (Products and Services) (Amendment No.18) Law 1990............................................................... 47

The Knesset (Number of Members in Committees) Law 5754-1994................................................................ 50

Knesset Elections Law [Consolidated Version] 1969, s. 86 (e............................................................................. 50

Courts Law [Consolidated Version] 1984, ss. 64, 108................................................................................. 50, 433

Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of Expenses and Audit) Law.............................. 54

Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 1949, ss. 1, 2(d) 3........................................................ 61-3, 196,

                ................................................................................................................................................. 344-5, 357, 359

Law of Return, 1950.......................................................................................................................... 61, 82, 106, 190

Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951..................................................................................................................... 61,82

Constituent Assembly Elections Ordinance, 1948, ss. 1, 2(d), 3............................ 62, 175, 355, 362, 395, 398

Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951, ss. 1, 5, 6, 9, 10.................................................................... 64, 68, 170,

                ................................................................................................................................... 184-6, 196-7, 211, 369

Elections Financing Law, 1973................................................................................................................................. 80

Knesset (Confirmation of Validity of Laws), 1969............................................................................................... 80

Standards Law, 1953.................................................................................................................................................. 86

Protection of Investments by the Israeli Public in Financial Assets, 1984, s. 3........................ 206, 409, 447-8

Companies Ordinance {New Version] 1983......................................................................................................... 334

Bankruptcy Ordinance, 1980.................................................................................................................................. 334

Agency Law, 1965, s. 16.......................................................................................................................................... 362

Emergency Regulations (Jurisdiction Constitution) 1948.................................................................................. 395

Interpretation Law, 1981, ss. 15, 17 (a), 20........................................................................................ 431, 435, 438

Planning and Building Law, 1965.......................................................................................................................... 493

Civil Wrongs Ordinance [New Version], s. 41....................................................................................................... 511

 

 

 

Table of Cases

 

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

 

HCJ 4031/94        ‘Bezedek’ Organization v. Prime Minister of Israel [1994] IsrSC

                                48(5) 1................................................................................................................................. 109,523

HCJ 1225/94        ‘Bezeq’ – The Israeli Telecommunication Company Ltd v. Minister

                                of Communications [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 661...................................................... 219, 280, 288

HCJ 75/76            ‘Hilron’ Ltd v. Fruit Production and Marketing Board (Fruit

                                Board) [1976] IsrSC 30(3) 645................................................................................ 39, 42, 58-9

HCJ 107/73          ‘Negev’ – Automobile Service Stations Ltd v. State of Israel Ltd

                                [1974] IsrSC 28(1) 640................................................................................ 50, 53, 86, 249, 479

CA 549/75            A v. Attorney-General [1976] IsrSC 30(1) 459.................................................................... 362

HCJ 7/48               Al-Carbotelli v. Minister of Defense [1953] IsrSC 2 5.............................................. 176, 483

HCJ 852/86;

HCJApp 483/86;

1/87                        Aloni v Minister of Justice [1987] IsrSC 41(2)

                                1.................................................................................................................................................... 160

LCA 3466/92       Artrekt Bankrupts v. Bankruptcy Trustee [1993] IsrSC 47(2)

                                573............................................................................................................................................... 151

CrimA 74/58        Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71...................................... 362

FH 13/60               Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112............................ 99, 279

CA 228/63            Azuz v. Ezer [1963] IsrSC 17 2541.................................................................................. 69, 166

HCJ 428/86;

HCJApp 320/86; ........................................... Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6

                                1........................................................................................................................... 41, 160, 280, 493

CA 219/80            Beit Hikiya, Workers’ Village for Cooperative Arrangement Ltd v.

                                Efrati [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 516................................................................................................. 439

HCJ 1/49               Bejerano v. Minister of Police [1948] IsrSC 2 80........................................................ 39, 483

HCJ 3477/95        Ben-Atiya v. Minister of Education, Culture and Sport [1995] IsrSC

                                49(5) 1....................................................................................................................... 288, 292, 339

EA 2/88                 Ben-Shalom v. Central Elections Committee for Twelfth Knesset

                                [1989] IsrSC 43(4) 221............................................................................................................. 311

HCJ 98/69            Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8

                                13.............................................................................................. 54-5, 69, 73, 79-80, 95 126, 164,

                                ..................................................................................................... 210, 215, 246, 263, 277, 336-8,

                                .................................................................................................................. 406, 408, 436, 486, 488

CrimApp

6654/93                 Binkin v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 290................................................................. 219

HCJ 726/94          Clal Insurance Co. Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1994] IsrSC 48(5)

                                441......................................................................................................................................................   164, 217, 220, 277, 307, 309,  319, 332, 406, 516

LCA 1759/93       Cohen v. Bank Hapoalim Ltd [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 143................................................. 26, 136

HCJ 889/86          Cohen v. Minister of Trade and Welfare [1987] IsrSC 41(2)

                                540...................................................................................................................................... 426, 489

HCJ 49/83            Consolidated Dairies Ltd v. Israel Dairy Board [1983] IsrSC 37(4)

                                516............................................................................................................................................... 497

HCJ 2481/93        Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324............................................. 280

HCJ 246/81          Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC

                                35(4)1; IsrSJ 8 21............................................................................... 79-80, 215, 264, 406, 408

HCJ 180/52          Dor Heirs v. Minister of Finance [1952] IsrSC 6 908........................................................ 475

HCJ 693/91          Efrat v. Director of Population Register, Ministry of Interior [1993]

                                IsrSC 47(1) 749........................................................................................................ 273-275, 439

CA 239/92            Egged Israel Transport Cooperation Society v. Mashiah [1994]

                                IsrSC 48(2) 66............................................................................................................................ 218

HCJ 6163/92        Eisenberg v. Minister of Building and Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2)

                                229............................................................................................................................................... 273

HCJ 987/94          Euronet Golden Lines (1992) Ltd v. Minister of Communications

                                [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 412............................................................................................ 288,339-340

HCJ 306/81          Flatto-Sharon v. Committee of the Knesset [1981] IsrSC 35(4)

                                118....................................................................................................................... 35, 110, 113, 267

HCJ 3385/93,

4746/92                 G.P.S. Agro Exports Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1994] IsrSC

                                48(5)...................................................................................................................................... 93, 218

CrimApp

537/95                   Ganimat v. State of Israel [1995] IsrSC 49(3) 355.......................... 165, 220, 278, 482, 485

CA 723/74            HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC

                                31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226................................................................................................... 39, 42, 57

HCJ 119/80,

OM 224/80           HaCohen v. Government of Israel [1980] IsrSC 34(4) 281  ................................. 86, 245-46

HCJ 5394/92        Huppert v. Yad VaShem Holocaust Martyrs and Heroes Memorial

                                Authority [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 353.......................................................................................... 220

HCJ 243/62          Israel Broadcasting Studios Ltd v. Gary [1962] IsrSC 16 2407.............................. 166, 310

FH 9/77                 Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC

                                32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295................................................................................................................. 59

HCJ 65/51            Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75..................................... 475

HCJ 73/85            Kach Faction v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 141................................................ 267

HCJ 669/85          Kahana v. Knesset Speaker [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 393............................................................. 79

HCJ 148/73          Kaniel v. Minister of Justice [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 794................... 50, 53, 86, 249, 426, 479

HCJ 73/53            Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1

                                90..................................................................................................... 39, 58,171,221,229,310,483

HCJ 142/89          Laor Movement v. Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 259.......................................... 77-8,

                                ................................................................. 79,-80,110, 215-7, 220, 222, 233,265,406, 408 426

HCJ 89/83            Levi v. Chairman of Knesset Finance Committee [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 

                                488.................................................................................................................................................. 45

HCJ 356/83          Lidor, Association for the Protection of Homeowners, Apartments

                                and Private Property in Israel v. Minister of Construction and

                                Housing [1984] IsrSC 38(1) 602............................................................................................ 489

CA 87/50              Liebman v. Lifshitz [1952] IsrSC 6 57................................................................................... 465

HCJ 163/57          Lubin v. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 1041......................................... 162-3

CA 511/88            Mandelbaum v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Rishon

                                LeTzion [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 522                                                   .......................................... 492

HCJ 108/70          Manor v. Minister of Finance [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 442...................................................... 489

HCJ 256/88          Medianwest Medical Center Herzliya Ltd v. Director of Ministry of

                                Health [1990] IsrSC 44(1) 19.................................................................................................... 47

HCJ 620/85          Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC 41(4) 169............................................................... 150

HCJ 761/86          Miari v. Knesset Speaker [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 868............................................................... 406

HCJ 287/69          Miron v. Minister of Labour [1970] IsrSC 24(1) 337......................................................... 275

HCJ 337/81          Miterani v. Minister of Transport [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 337.......................................... 39, 97,

                                ........................................................................................................................... 107, 118, 140, 483

EA 1/88                 Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Twelfth

                                Knesset [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 177.............................................................................................. 105

EA 2/84                 Neiman v. Chairman of Elections for Eleventh Knesset; Avneri v.

                                Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Eleventh Knesset [1985]

                                IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83..................................................................... 39, 274,278, 311, 483

FH 4/69                 Noiman v. Cohen [1970] IsrSC 24(2) 229............................................................................ 138

HCJ 60/77            Ressler v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Knesset

                                [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 556........................................................... 53, 86, 245, 249, 265, 479, 494

CA 450/70            Rogozinsky v. State of Israel [1972] IsrSC 26(1) 129......................................................... 426

HCJ 141/82          Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60

                                ........................................................................................................................ 79-80, 215, 406, 408

CA 673/87            Salah v. Liquidator for Peretz and Issar Construction and Investments

                                Co. Ltd (in Liquidation) [1989] IsrSC 43(3) 57.................................................................... 333

HCJ 131/65          Sevitzky v. Minister of Finance [1965] IsrSC 19(2) 369.................................................... 117

HCJ 153/87          Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221;

                                IsrSJ 8 186.................................................................................................................................. 140

HCJ 1/81               Shiran v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 365............................................... 160

HCJ 491/86          Tel-Aviv-Jaffa Municipality v. Minister of Interior [1987] IsrSC 41(1)

                                757............................................................................................................................................... 489

HCJ 120/73          Tobis v. Government of Israel [1973] IsrSC 27(1) 757.............................................. 166, 426

HCJ 5510/92        Turkeman v. Minister of Defense [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 217................................................. 288

HCJ 732/84          Tzaban v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1986] IsrSC 40(4) 141...................................... 274

LCA 7112/93       Tzudler v. Yosef [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 550...................................................................... 130, 281

HCJ 5364/94        Welner v. Chairman of Israeli Labour Party [1995] IsrSC 49(1)

                                758............................................................................................................................................... 268

HCJ 311/60          Y. Miller, Engineer (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport

                                [1961] IsrSC 15 1989............................................................................................................... 496

HCJ 7/55               Yanowitz v. Ohr [1953] IsrSC 9 1252.................................................................................... 438

EA 1/65                 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth

                                Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 365.............................................................................................. 233

CrimA

282/61                   Yihye v. Attorney-General [1962] IsrSC 16 633.................................................................. 109

HCJ

6290/93                 Zilka v. General Manager of Ministry of Health [1994] IsrSC 48(4)

                                631............................................................................................................................................... 489

HCJ 10/48            Ziv v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85;

                                IsrSJ 1 68..................................................................................................................................... 176

 

Israeli District Court cases cited:

 

OM (Jerusalem) 1635/92 – unreported................................................................................................................. 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 1229/93 – unreported.................................................................................................................... 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 49299/88 – unreported................................................................................................................. 151

OM (Tel-Aviv) 1657/89 – unreported.................................................................................................................... 151

 

 

Australian cases cited:

 

Clayton v. Heffron (1960) 105 C.L.R. 214.......................................................................................................... 263

Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth (1945) 71 C.L.R. 29..................................... 279

Minister of State for the Army v. Dalziel (1943-44) 68 C.L.R. 261................................................................. 493

 

United States cases cited:

 

Grosjean v. American Press Co. 297 U.S. 233 (1936......................................................................................... 131

Louisville Bank v. Radford 295 U.S. 555 (1935.................................................................................................. 137

Wright v. Vinton Branch 300 U.S. 440 (1937)..................................................................................................... 137

Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963...................................................................................................... 145, 298

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 348 U.S. 483 (1955............................................................................................ 148

Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S. 93 (1979...................................................................................................................... 153

Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S.  288 (1936)..................................................................... 158

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).................................................... 232

United States v. Baellin 12 S. Ct. 505 (1891)...................................................................................................... 253

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)........................................................................................... 260-2, 267, 337

 

United States v. Nixon 418 U.S. 683 (1974)......................................................................................................... 267

McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819)........................................................................................................ 278

Kovacs v. Cooper 336 U.S. 77 (1949)................................................................................................................... 283

New York Trust Co. v. Fisher 256 U.S. 345 (1921)............................................................................................. 283

Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905)................................................................................................. 144, 298-9

Rio Rico Properties v. Santa Cruz County 834 P. 2D 166 (1992)................................................................... 493

Illinois Elections B.D. v. Socialist Workers Party 440 U.S. 173 (1979)......................................................... 496

 

English cases cited:

 

Factortame Ltd v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1991] ALL ER 70 (C.J.E.C. and H.L. 1)........ 77

MaCarthy Ltd v. Smith [1981] Q.B. 180 (C.J.E.C.)................................................................................................ 77

Bribery Comr. v. Ranasinghe [1965] A.C. 172 (P.C.)......................................................................................... 263

Akar v. Attorney-General of Sierra Leone [1969] ALL ER 384 (P.C.)............................................................ 256 

Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] A.C. 319........................................................................................... 279

 

International cases cited:

 

Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [1979] 2 E.H.R.R.......................................................................................... 285

Costa v. Enel (1964) E.C.R. 585............................................................................................................................... 91

.

South African cases cited:

 

Harris v. Minister of Interior (1952) 4 S.A.L.R. 428.......................................................................................... 263

S. v. Mekwanyana (1955) 6 B.C.L.R. 665.................................................................................................... 277, 289

 

Indian cases cited:

 

Kesavande v. State of Kerala [1973] A.I.R. 146................................................................................................. 227

 

Canadian cases cited:

 

R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.................................................................................................... 149, 276, 284, 290

R v. Big M. Drug Mart. Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.................................................................................................. 279

Jones v. The Queen [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284........................................................................................................... 281-2

 

Jewish law sources cited:

 

Leviticus 26:10..................................................................................................................................................... 41,465

Genesis 1, 27; 24, 27........................................................................................................................................ 106, 414

Deuteronomy 15, 1-11; 27, 9.......................................................................................................................... 147, 347

Exodus 1, 22; 19, 10-11, 14-20; 16.................................................................................................. 345-7, 406, 453

Shemot Rabba (on Exodus), 29.............................................................................................................................. 346

Isaiah 10, 15; 30, 15........................................................................................................................... 369, 422-3, 485

Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia (Damages, second part) 107b.................................................................... 431

 

 

 

Volumes of Cases published in English Translation

 

Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel:

 

Volume I (IsrSJ 1)                               1948-1953

Volume II (IsrSJ 2)                              1954-1958

Volume III (IsrSJ 3)                             1958-1960

Volume IV (IsrSJ 4)                             1961-1962

Volume V (IsrSJ 5)                              1963-1965

Volume VI (IsrSJ 6)                             1986

Volume VII (IsrSJ 7)                           1983-1987

Volume VIII (IsrSJ 8)                          1969-1988

Volume IX (IsrSJ 9)                             1977-1990

Volume X (IsrSJ 10)                            1988-1993

 

Israel Law Reports:

 

[1992-4] IsrLR                                                 1992-1994

[1995]     IsrLR                                                1995

[1995-6] IsrLR                                                 1995-1996

[1997]     IsrLR                                                1997

[1998-9] IsrLR                                                 1998-1999

[2002-3] IsrLR                                                 2002-2003

[2004]     IsrLR                                                2004

[2005] (1) IsrLR                                  2005

[2005] (2) IsrLR                                  2005

[2006] (1) IsrLR                                  2006

 

 

 

 

Table of Cases Published in English Translation

(in Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel and Israel Law Reports)

 

HCJ 4804/94                    A v. Attorney-General [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 160; [1997] IsrLR 115

CA 447/58                       A v. B [1959] IsrSC 13 903; IsrSJ 3 350

CA 3798/94                     A v. B [1996] IsrSC 50(3) 133; [1995-6] IsrLR 243

CA 5258/98                     A v. B [2004] IsrSC 58(6) 209; [2004] IsrLR 327

HCJ 199/53                      A.B. v. Minister of Interior [1954] IsrSC 8 243; IsrSJ 2 1

HCJ 113/57                      Abdu v. Mayor of Akko [1958] IsrSC 12 209; IsrSJ 3 1

HCJ 493/81                      Abu Aita v. Officer in Charge of Customs, Gaza Strip Region [1983] IsrSC 37(2) 197; IsrSJ 7 1

HCJ 493/81                      Abu-Dahar v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2005] IsrSC 59 (5) 368; [2005] (1) IsrLR 136

HCJ 210/60                      Abudi v. Minister of Religions [1960] IsrSC 14 2020; IsrSJ 3 110

HCJ 3799/02                    Adalah v. IDF Central Commander [2005] (2) 206

HCJ 7052/03                    Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel  v. Ministry of Interior [2006] (1) 443

CrimA 63/58                    Ajami v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 421; IsrSJ 3 198

HCJ 7015/02                    Ajuri v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(6) 352; [2002-3] IsrLR 83

HCJ 27/88                        Al Affo v. Commander of IDF Forces in West Bank [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 1; IsrSJ 8 255

HCJ 2722/92                    Alamarin v. IDF Commander in Gaza Strip [111992] IsrSC 46(3))) 693; [1992-4] IsrLR 1

HCJ 3451/02                    Almadani v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 30; [2002-3] IsrLR 47

CrimA 229/57                  Al-Nakib v. Attorney-General [1958] IsrSC 12 850; IsrSJ 3 183

LCA 444/87                     Alsoucha v. Estate of Dehan [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 397; IsrSJ 9 20

HCJ 125/49                      Amado v. Director of the Immigrants’ Camp, Pardes Hanna [1950] IsrSC 4 5; IsrSJ 1 299

CA 2034/98                     Amin v. Amin [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 69; [1998-9] IsrLR 611

CrimA 158/58                  Amiram v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 1965; IsrSJ 3 248

CA 427/58                       Ashuel v. Ashuel [1959] IsrSC 13 953; IsrSJ 3 309; IsrSJ 4 233

CA 308/57                       Assessing Officer, Tel Aviv North v. Menahem [1958] IsrSC 12 881; IsrSJ 3 322

HCJ 358/88                      Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Central District Commander [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 529; IsrSJ 9 1

HCJ 5973/92                    Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Defence [1993] IsrSC 47(1) 267; IsrSJ 10 168

HCJ 6778/97                    Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of Public Security [2004] IsrSC 58(2) 358; [2004] IsrLR 1

HCJ 265/68                      Association of Engineers and Architects in Israel v. Minister of Labour [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 132; IsrSJ 8 1

CA 176/53                       Atia v. Rosenbaum [1954] IsrSC 8 1135; IsrSJ 2 439

CrimA 275/58                  Attorney-General v. Ben-Ami [1959] IsrSC 13 69; IsrSJ 3 190

CA 360/59                       Attorney-General v. Berkovitz [1960] IsrSC 14 206; IsrSJ 3 459

RT 3/58                           Attorney-General v. David [1958] IsrSC 12 1341; IsrSJ 3 304

CrimA 74/58                    Attorney-General v. Hornstein [1960] IsrSC 14 365; IsrSJ 3 71

CA 311/57                       Attorney-General v. M. Diezengoff & Co. [Navigation] Ltd [1959] IsrSC 13 1026; IsrSJ 3 53

FH 13/60                         Attorney-General v. Matana [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 430; IsrSJ 4 112

CrimA 217/59                  Attorney-General v. Nabulsi [1960] IsrSC 14 1882; IsrSJ 3 256

HCJ 1074/93                    Attorney-General v. National Labour Court [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 485; [1995-6] IsrLR 149

CrimA 156/63                  Attorney-General v. Ostreicher [1963] IsrSC 17 2088; IsrSJ 5 19

FH 5/63                           Attorney-General v. Weigel [1963] IsrSC 17 2358; IsrSJ 5 171

HCJ 68701/93                  Bank Mizrachi v. Migdal Cooperative Village  [1995] IsrLR

HCJ 316/03                      Bakri v. Israel Film Council [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249; [2002-3]IsrLR 487

HCJ 3114/02                    Barakeh v. Minister of Defence [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 11; [2002-3] IsrLR 39

HCJ 4481/91                    Bargil v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 210; [1992-4] IsrLR 158

HCJ 187/54                      Barriya v. Kadi of Acre [1955] IsrSC 187/54; IsrSJ 2 429

HCJ 428/86                      Barzilai v. Government of Israel [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 505; IsrSJ 6 1

CA 370/63                       Basset v. Hapoel Compulsory Insurance Ltd [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 533; IsrSJ 5 294

HCJ 291/61                      Beit Arizah Rehovot Ltd v. Minister of Agriculture [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 20; IsrSJ 4 96

HCJ 2056/04                    Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC  58(5) 807; [2004] IsrLR 264

CA 161/59                       Belan v. Executors of Will of the late Raymond Litwinsky [1960] IsrSC 14 1905; IsrSJ 3 433

HCJ 129/57                      Ben Kosta v. Mayor of Tel Aviv-Jaffa [1958] IsrSC 12 209; IsrSJ 3 10

CrimA 77/64                    Berenblat v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(2) 70; IsrSJ 5 223

HCJ 98/69                        Bergman v. Minister of Finance [1969] IsrSC 23(1) 693; IsrSJ 8 13

HCJ 3/58                          Berman v. Minister of Interior [1958] IsrSC 12 1493; IsrSJ 3 29

CA 84/64                         Beth Hananya Workers’ Cooperative Settlement Ltd v. Friedman [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 20; IsrSJ 5 142

HCJ 1890/03                    Bethlehem Municipality  v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59 (4) 736; [2005] (1) IsrLR 98

HCJ 9135/03                    Bishara  v. Attorney General  [2006] (1) 43

CA 103/63                       Bohakov v. Mayor, Council and Inhabitants of Herzliya [1963] IsrSC 17 158; IsrSJ 5 1

HCJ 3278/02                    Centre for Defence of the Individual v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 385; [2002-3] IsrLR 123

CA 238/53                       Cohen v. Attorney-General [1954] IsrSC 8 4; IsrSJ 2 239

HCJ 29/62                        Cohen v. Minister of Defence [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1023; IsrSJ 4 160

HCJ 336/03                     Commitment to Peace and Social Jusice Society v. Minister of Finance [2005] (2) 335

HCJ 164/97                      Conterm Ltd v. Minister of Finance [1998] IsrSC 52(1) 289; [1998-9] IsrLR 1

AAA 9135/03                  Council for Higher Education v. Haaretz Newspaper Publishing [2006] (1) 1

CA 2781/93                     Daaka v. Carmel Hospital [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 526; [1998-9] IsrLR 409

CA 357/56                       Dan Bus Co-op. Soc. Ltd v. Yehiel [1958] IsrSC 12 517; IsrSJ 2 39

CA 545/59                       Dan Co-op Soc. Ltd v. Tel-Aviv District Assessing Officer [1960] IsrSC 14 2088; IsrSJ 3 339

HCJ 2481/93                    Dayan v. Wilk [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 456; [1992-4] IsrLR 324

CA 3616/92                     Dekel v. Cheshev [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 337; [1997] IsrLR 533

HCJ 246/81                      Derech Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 1; IsrSJ 8 21

LCA 5103/95                   Deshet v. Eliyahu [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 97; [1998-9] IsrLR 221

HCJ  5026/04                   Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd v. Rosenzweig [2005] (1) IsrLR 340

CrimA 1/52                      Deutsch v. Attorney-General [1954] IsrSC 8 456; IsrSJ 2 92

CrimA 44/52                    Diab v. Attorney-General [1952] IsrSC 6 922; IsrSJ 1 269

CrimA 126/62                  Dissenchick v. Attorney-General [1963] IsrSC 17 164; IsrSJ 5 152

HCJ 6163/92                    Eisenberg v. Minister of Housing [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 229; [1992-4] IsrLR 19

HCJ 721/94                      El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd v. Danielowitz [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 749; [1992-4] IsrLR 478

HCJ 282/61                      El-Saruji v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1963] IsrSC 17 188; IsrSJ 5 14

CA 86/63                         El-Zafdi v. Benjamin [1963] IsrSC 17 1419; IsrSJ 5 273

CA 140/00                       Estate of Ettinger v. Company for the Reconstruction and Development of the Jewish Quarter [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 486; [2004] IsrLR 101

CA 3912/90                     Eximin SA v. Itel Style Ferarri Textile and Shoes Ltd [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 64; [1992-4] IsrLR 129

CA 436/60                       Ezri v. Klein [1961] IsrSC 15(2) 1177; IsrSJ 4 301

HCJ 10223/02                  Fisch-Lifschitz v. Attorney-General [2003] IsrSC 57(3) 517; [2002-3] IsrLR 219

CrimA 71/83                    Flatto-Sharon v. State of Israel [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 757; IsrSJ 7 131

CrimA 11196/02              Frudenthal v. State of Israel [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 40; [2002-3] IsrLR 299

HCJ 5261/04                    Fuchs v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 446; [2004] IsrLR 466

HCJ 9098/01                    Ganis v. Ministry of Building and Housing [2005] IsrSC 59(4) 241; [2004] IsrLR 505

HCJ 316/63                      Gazit and Shehem Bldg. Ltd v. Ports Authority [1964] IsrSC 18(1) 174; IsrSJ 5 30

HCJ 279/60                      Gil Halls Ltd v. Yaari [1961] IsrSC 15(1) 673; IsrSJ 4 1

PPA 4463/94                   Golan v. Prisons Service [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 136; [1995-6] IsrLR 489

HCJ 94/62                        Gold v. Minister of Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(3) 1846; IsrSJ 4 175

CA 8/59                           Goldman v. Goldman [1959] IsrSC 13 1085; IsrSJ 3 313; IsrSJ 4 237

HCJ 2838/95                    Greenberg v. Katzrin Local Council [1999] IsrSC 53(1) 1; [1997] IsrLR 373

CA 723/74                       HaAretz Newspaper Ltd v. Israel Electric Corporation [1977] IsrSC 31(2) 281; IsrSJ 9 226

CA 65/57                         Ha-Etzni v. Ben-Gurion [1957] IsrSC 11 403; IsrSJ 3 365

CA 508/59                       Hapoel HaMizrachi Credit Fund Mutual Society Ltd v. Assessing Officer of Large Enterprises, Tel Aviv [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 2213; IsrSJ 4 254

HCJ 10356/02                  Hass v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 443; [2004] IsrLR 53

LCA 7092/94                   Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 625; [1997] IsrLR 403

CA 50/55                         Hershkovitz v. Greenberger [1955] IsrSC 9 791; IsrSJ 2 411

HCJ 5016/96                    Horev v. Minister of Transport [1997] IsrSC 51(4) 1; [1997] IsrLR 149

LCA 4716/04                   hotels.com  v.Zuz Tourism Ltd.  [2005] (2) 48

CA 345/87                       Hughes Aircraft Co. v. State of Israel [1990] IsrSC 345/87; IsrSJ 9 117

CA 776/80                       Israel British Bank [London] Ltd [in liquidation] v. Estate of Williams [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 645; IsrSJ 7 223

FH 9/77                           Israel Electric Corporation v. HaAretz Newspaper Ltd [1978] IsrSC 32(3) 337; IsrSJ 9 295

HCJ 243/62                      Israel Film Studios Ltd v. Geri [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2407; IsrSJ 4 208

HCJ 4885/03                    Israel Poultry Farmers Association v. Government of Israel [2005] IsrSC 59(2) 14; [2004] IsrLR 383

HCJ 453/94                      Israel Women’s Network v. Government of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(5) 501; [1992-4] IsrLR 425

HCJ 65/51                        Jabotinsky v. President of Israel [1951] IsrSC 5 801; IsrSJ 1 75

CA 3071/91                     Jabrin v. Jabrin [1993] IsrSC 47(3) 361; [1992-4] IsrLR 91

HCJ 101/54                      Jiday v. Chief Execution Officer [1955] IsrSC 9 135; IsrSJ 2 399

HCJ 241/60                      Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies [1961] IsrSC 15(2) 1151;IsrSJ 4 7

CrimA 242/63                  Kariti v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 477; IsrSJ 5 203

HCJ 4542/02                    Kav LaOved Worker’s Hotline v. Government of Israel [2006] (1) 260

HCJ 155/53                      Kiwaan v. Minister of Defence [1954] IsrSC 8 301; IsrSJ 2 320

HCJ 5319/97                    Kogen v. Chief Military Prosecutor [1997] IsrSC 51(5) 67; [1997] IsrLR 499

HCJ 73/53                        Kol HaAm Co. Ltd v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7 871; IsrSJ 1 90

CA 419/59                       Koren and Hammer v. Koren and Koren [1960] IsrSC 14 997; IsrSJ 3 419

CA 817/79                       Kossoy v. Bank Y.L. Feuchtwanger Ltd [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 253; IsrSJ 7 183

HCJ 27/48                        Lahisse v. Minister of Defence [1949] IsrSC 2 153; IsrSJ 1 136

HCJ 5936/97                    Lam v. Director-General of Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 673; [1998-9] IsrLR 537

HCJ 5/48                          Leon v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 58; IsrSJ 1 41

LCA 1684/96                   Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreational Enterprises [1997] IsrSC 51(3) 832; [1997] IsrLR 445

CrimA 6/50                      Levitt v. Angel [1950] IsrSC 4 459; IsrSJ 1 27

HCJ 10/59                        Levy v. District Rabbinical Court, Tel Aviv [1959] IsrSC 13 1182; IsrSJ 3 161

CA 1846/92                     Levy v. Mabat Building Ltd [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 49; [1992- 4] IsrLR 111

HCJ 153/83                      Levy v. Southern District Commissioner of Police [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 398; IsrSJ 7 109

CA 1212/91                     LIBI The Fund for Strengthening Israel’s Defence v. Binstock [1994] IsrSC 48(3) 705; [1992-4] IsrLR 369

HCJ 5131/03                    Litzman v. Knesset Speaker [2005] IsrSC 59(1) 577; [2004] IsrLR 363

HCJ 221/64                      Local Council of Pardess Hanna v. Minister of Agriculture [1964] IsrSC 18(4) 533; IsrSJ 5 81

CrimA 47/56                    Malka v. Attorney-General [1956] IsrSC 10 1543; IsrSJ 2 213

CrimA 118/53                  Mandelbrot v. Attorney-General [1956] IsrSC 10 281; IsrSJ 2116

CrimFH 532/93                                Manning v. Attorney-General [1993] IsrSC 47(4) 25; [1992- 4] IsrLR 96

HCJ 3239/02                    Marab v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 349; [2002-3] IsrLR 173

HCJ 7957/04                    Marabeh v. Prime Minister  [2005] (2) IsrLR 106

CA 634/61                       Mekitan v. Mekitan [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 945; IsrSJ 4 246

CA 9311/99                     Menorah Insurance Co. Ltd v. Jerusalem Candles Ilum (1987) Ltd [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 550; [2002-3] IsrLR 1

HCJ 4541/94                    Miller v. Minister of Defence [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94; [1995-6] IsrLR 178

CrimA 17/59                    Mizrachi v. Attorney-General [1960] IsrSC 14 1882; IsrSJ 3 266

HCJ 1993/03                    Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 817; [2002-3] IsrLR 311

HCJ 3094/93                    Movement for Quality in Government in Israel v. Government of Israel [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 404; IsrSJ 10 258

CA 124/87                       Nafsu v. Chief Military Advocate [1987] IsrSC 41(2) 631; IsrSJ 7 263

CA 5587/93                     Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 485 [1995-6] IsrLR 1

CFH 2401/95                   Nahmani v. Nahmani [1996] IsrSC 50(4) 661 [1995-6] IsrLR 320

CA 30/92                         Naiman v. Attorney-General [1993] IsrSC 47(2) 275; [1992-4] IsrLR 84

CrimA                              Najar  v. State of Israel  [2005]  (2) IsrLR 31

HCJ 3511/02                    Negev Coexistence Forum v. Ministry of Infrastructure [2003] IsrSC 57(2) 102; [2002-3] IsrLR 165

EA 2/84                           Neiman v. Chairman of Central Elections Committee for Tenth Knesset [1985] IsrSC 39(2) 225; IsrSJ 8 83

HCJ 1/48                          Neiman v. Military Governor of the Occupied Area of Jerusalem [1948] IsrSC 1, 50; IsrSJ 1 125

HCJ 104/87                      Nevo v. National Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4) 749; IsrSJ 10 136

CA 118/51                       New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd v. Youval [Salzman] [1953] IsrSC 7 518; IsrSJ 1 332

HCJ 9232/01                    Noah, the Israeli Federation of Animal Protection Organizations v. Attorney-General [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 212; [2002-3] IsrLR 225

HCJ 205/94                      Nof v. Ministry of Defence [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 449; [1997] IsrLR 1

CA 268/56                       Noy v. Hadera Municipality [1958] IsrSC 12 353; IsrSJ 3 147

CrimFH  2980/04             Oyco v. State of Israel  [2005] (2) 400

CA 36/62                         Ozri v. Galed [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1553; IsrSJ 4 347

HCJ 262/62                      Peretz v. Kfar Shmaryahu Local Council [1962] IsrSC 16(3) 2101; IsrSJ 4 191

HCJ 4764/04                    Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza [2004] IsrSC 58(4) 385; [2004] IsrLR 200

HCJ 2936/02                    Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in West Bank [2002] IsrSC 56(3) 3; [2002-3] IsrLR 35

HCJ 5100/94                    Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817; [1998-9] IsrLR 567

CrimA 7/53                      Rassi v. Attorney-General [1953] IsrSC 7 790; IsrSJ 1 239

HCJ 7351/03                    Rishon LeZion Municipal Parents Committee v. Minister of Education  [2005] (2) IsrLR 1

FH 16/61                         Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC 16(2) 1209; IsrSJ 4 32

HCJ 910/86                      Ressler v. Minister of Defence [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441; IsrSJ 10 1

CA 337/62                       Riezenfeld v. Jacobson [1963] IsrSC 17(2) 1009; IsrSJ 5 96

CA 337/62                       Riezenfeld v. Jacobson [1963] IsrSC 17(2) 1009; IsrSJ 5 96

HCJ   2597/99                  Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of  Interior [2005] IsrSC 58 (5) 412; [2005] (1) 268

CA 248/53                       Rosenbaum v. Zeger [1955] IsrSC 9 533; IsrSJ 2 10

CA 88/57                         Rosenberg v. Carmarj and Halperin [1958] IsrSC 12 1096; IsrSJ 3 393

CrimA  4596/05               Rosenstein v. State of Israel  [2005] (2)  232

CrimA 35/52                    Rotenstreich v. Attorney-General [1953] IsrSC 7 58; IsrSJ 1 202

CA 127/52                       Roznek v. Dawman [1952] IsrSC 6 722; IsrSJ 1 283

HCJ 141/82                      Rubinstein v. Knesset Speaker [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 141; IsrSJ 8 60

HCJ 3267/97                    Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 481; [1998-9] IsrLR 139

CA 108/60                       Sacks v. Mussary [1960] IsrSC 14 2252; IsrSJ 3 140

HCJ 5627/02                    Saif v. Government Press Office [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 70; [2004] IsrLR 191

HCJ 5784/03                    Salama v. IDF Commander in Judaea and Samaria [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 721; [2002-3] IsrSC 289

HCJ 268/52                      Sapoznikov v. Court of Discipline of the Israel Police [1953] IsrSC 7 656; IsrSJ 1 155

HCJ 652/81                      Sarid v. Knesset Speaker [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 197; IsrSJ 8 52

HCJ 680/88                      Schnitzer v. Chief Military Censor [1988] IsrSC 42(4) 617; IsrSJ 9 77

HCJ 156/56                      Schor v. Attorney-General [1957] IsrSC 11 285; IsrSJ 3 283

ST 1/50                            Seedis v. Chief Execution Officer [1955] IsrSC 8 1020; IsrSJ 2 382

HCJ 153/87                      Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 221; IsrSJ 8 186

HCJ 1601/90                    Shalit v. Peres [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 353; IsrSJ 10 204

 CA 6024/97                    Shavit v. Rishon LeZion Jewish Burial Society [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600; [1998-9] IsrLR 259

CA 506/88                       Shefer v. State of Israel [1994] IsrSC 48(1) 87; [1992-4] IsrLR 170

HCJ 144/50                      Sheib v Minister of Defence [1951] IsrSC 5 399; IsrSJ 1 1

CA 9796/03                     Shem Tov v. State of Israel [2005] IsrSC  59 (6) 397; IsrLR [2005] (1) 156

HCJ 85/47                        Shibli v. Shibli [1950] IsrSC 3 142; IsrSJ 1 252

CA 24/48                         Shimshon Palestine Portland Cement Factory Ltd v. Attorney- General [1950] IsrSC 4 143; IsrSJ 1 290

HCJ 5432/03                    SHIN, Israeli Movement for Equal Representation of Women v. Council for Cable TV and Satellite Broadcasting [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 65; [2004] IsrLR 20

HCJ 3315/04                    Shitrit  v. Jerusalem Distsrict Court  [2005] (2) 66

Mot 525/63                      Shmuel v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 452; IsrSJ 5 55

CA 7/64                           Shor v. State of Israel [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 341; IsrSJ 5 313

CA 191/51                       Skornik v. Skornik [1954] IsrSC 8 141; IsrSJ 2 327

CA 191/51                       Skornik v. Skornik [1954] IsrSC 8 141; IsrSJ 2 327

LCA 8925//04                  Solel Boneh Building and Infrastructure Ltd. Estate of Alhamid [2006] (1) IsrLR 201

HCJ 195/64                      Southern Company Ltd v. Chief Rabbinical Council [1964] IsrSC 18(2) 324; IsrSJ 5 43

CA 4628/93                     State of Israel v. Apropim Housing & Promotions (1991) Ltd [1995] IsrSC 49(2) 265; [1995-6] IsrLR 63

CSA 4790/04                   State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim [2005] (1) 376

CA 384/61                       State of Israel v. Fasler [1962] IsrSC 16(1) 102; IsrSJ 4 288

CA 421/61                       State of Israel v. Haas [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 2193; IsrSJ 4 80

HCJ 9264/04                    State of Israel v. Jerusalem Magistrate Court  [2005] (1) 400

CA 543/59                       State of Israel v. Kislug [1960] IsrSC 14 1165; IsrSJ 3 383

CA 338/60                       State of Israel v. Madar [1961[ IsrSC 15(2) 1569; IsrSJ 4 318

CrimFH  1187/03             State of Israel v.Peretz [2005] IsrSC 59 (6) 281; [2005] (1) 200

CA 362/63                       State of Israel v. Schwartz [1963] IsrSC 17 2894; IsrSJ 5 286

LCA 3202/03                   State of Israel v. Yosef [2004] IsrSC 58(3) 541; [2004] IsrLR 83

HCJ 4804/94                    Station Film Ltd v. Film and Play Review Board [1996] IsrSC 50(5) 661; [1997] IsrLR 23

CrimA 70/64                    Stroul v. Attorney-General [1964] IsrSC 18(3) 395; IsrSJ 5 194

CA 360/80                       Struski Ltd v. Whitman Ice Cream [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 340; IsrSJ 7 245

CA 360/80                       Struski Ltd v. Whitman Ice Cream [1986] IsrSC 40(3) 340; IsrSJ 7 245

HCJ 11163/03                  Supreme Monitoring Committee for Arab Affairs in Israel v. Prime Minister [2005] (1) IsrLR  105

HCJ 6055/95                    Tzemah v. Minister of Defence [1999] IsrSC 53(5) 241; [1998-9] IsrLR 635

HCJ 806/88                      Universal City Studios v. Film and Theatre Censorship Board [1989] IsrSC 43(2) 22; IsrSJ 10 229

HCJ 100/57                      Weiss v. Inspector-General of Police [1958] IsrSC 12 179; IsrSJ 2 73

CA 141/54                       Wolff-Block v. Jerusalem District Assessing Officer [1956] IsrSC 10 441; IsrSJ 2 309

HCJ 311/60                      Y. Miller Engineering (Agency and Import) Ltd v. Minister of Transport [1961] IsrSC 15(3) 1989; IsrSJ 4 55

CA 10280/01                   Yaros-Hakak v.Attorney General  [2005] IsrSC 59 (5) 64; [2005] (1) IsrLR 1

HCJ 2599/00                    Yated v. Ministry of Education [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 834; [2002-3] IsrLR 57

HCJ 176/54                      Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal [1955] IsrSC 9 617; IsrSJ 2 46

HCJ 176/54                      Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal [1955] IsrSC 9 617; IsrSJ 2 46

CrimA 5121/98                                Yissacharov  v. Chief Military Prosecutor  [2006] (1) 320

HCJ 10/48                        Zeev v. Acting District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv [1948] IsrSC 1 85; IsrSJ 1 68

CA 461/62                       Zim Israel Navigation Co. Ltd v. Maziar [1963] IsrSC 17 1319; IsrSJ 5 120

CrimA 6/59                      Zinger v. Attorney-General [1959] IsrSC 13 1457; IsrSJ 3 216

HCJ 7622/02                    Zonstein v. Chief Military Attorney [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 726;[2002-3] IsrLR 147

Weiss v. Prime Minister

Case/docket number: 
HCJ 5167/00
Date Decided: 
Thursday, January 25, 2001
Decision Type: 
Original
Abstract: 

Facts: The Prime Minister resigned, and he and the Ministers of the outgoing government continued to fulfill their duties as prime minister and ministers until the new government was to take office.  In this framework the outgoing government continued to conduct political negotiations with the Palestinian Authority with the aim of reaching an agreement before the elections. 

 

Held: The majority opinion was written by President Barak.  The petitioners claimed that the outgoing government was not authorized to conduct the political negotiation.  They asked the court to direct the government to end the political negotiation until the establishment of a new government following the special elections.  The basic issues that were addressed in this case were:  what is the scope of the authority and discretion of an outgoing government?  Is it permitted to conduct political negotiation and sign an agreement?  And what is the scope of judicial review of decisions of the outgoing government?  

Voting Justices: 
Primary Author
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
majority opinion
Author
concurrence
Author
concurrence
Author
dissent
Full text of the opinion: 

 

HCJ 5167/00

1              Professor Hillel Weiss, Esq.

2.            Moshe Feiglin, Chairman of ‘Zoh Artzeinu’ Organization

v.

1.            Prime Minister of Israel

2.            Government of Israel

3.            Israeli Knesset

HCJ 9607/00

1.            Yoram Sheftel, Esq.

2.            Doron Beckerman, Esq.

v.

1.            Ehud Barak, Prime Minister of Israel

2.            Government of Israel

3.            Elyakim Rubenstein, Attorney General

HCJ 84/01

1.            Akiva Nof

2.            Dov Shilansky

3.            Dr. Yosef Faber

4.            Yehiel Hazan

5.            Esther Shternberger

v.

1.            Ehud Barak in his Capacity as Prime Minister of Israel

2.            Government of Israel

HCJ 86/01

1.            Gabi Butbul

2.            Yossi Ben Shahar

v.

1.            Prime Minister and Minister of Defense – Ehud Barak

2.            Government of Israel

3.            The Attorney General – Elyakim Rubenstein

HCJ 147/01

1.            Yaakov Elias

v.

1.            Prime Minister, Ehud Barak

2.            Government of Israel

 

Formal Respondents

 

1.            The Attorney General – Elyakim Rubenstein

2.            Professor Daniel Friedman

3.            Professor Shimon Shetreet

4.            Professor Shlomo Avineri

5.            Moshe Negbi, Esq.

 

The Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice

[January 25th, 2001]

Before President A. Barak, Vice President S. Levin, Justices T. Or, E. Mazza, I. Zamir, J. Türkel and I. Englard.

 

Petitions to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice for an order nisi and an interlocutory order.

 

Facts: The Prime Minister resigned, and he and the Ministers of the outgoing government continued to fulfill their duties as prime minister and ministers until the new government was to take office.  In this framework the outgoing government continued to conduct political negotiations with the Palestinian Authority with the aim of reaching an agreement before the elections. 

 

Held: The majority opinion was written by President Barak.  The petitioners claimed that the outgoing government was not authorized to conduct the political negotiation.  They asked the court to direct the government to end the political negotiation until the establishment of a new government following the special elections.  The basic issues that were addressed in this case were:  what is the scope of the authority and discretion of an outgoing government?  Is it permitted to conduct political negotiation and sign an agreement?  And what is the scope of judicial review of decisions of the outgoing government? 

 

The petitions were denied.

 

Vice-President S. Levin and Justice Zamir wrote separate opinions supporting the majority conclusion.

 

Justice Türkel wrote a dissenting opinion.

 

Basic laws cited;

Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel (Amendment).

Basic Law: the Government

Basic Law: the Knesset

 

Legislation cited:

Government and Justice Arrangements Law (Revocation of Application of the Law, Judiciary, and Administration) 5759-1999.

Local Authorities (Election of the Head of the Authority and his Deputies and their Term in Office) Law 5735-1975, s. 27a

Transition Law, 5709-1949, s. 1.

 

Israeli Supreme Court cases cited:

[1]          HCJ 5/86 SHAS Party Association of Sephardim Shomrei Torah in the Knesset v. Minister of Religions, IsrSC 40(2)742.

[2]          HCJ 4676/96 Mitral Ltd. v. Knesset of Israel, IsrSC 50(5) 15.

[3]          HCJ 5621/96 Herman – Head of the Municipality Ofakim v. the Minister of Religious Affairs, IsrSC 51(5) 791.

[4]          HCJ 2533/97 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel and Others IsrSC 51(3) 46.

[5]          HCJ 2534/97, 2535/97, 2541/97 MK Yahav and Others v. State Attorney and Others IsrSC 51(3) 1.

[6]          PPA 7440/97 PPA 6172/97 State of Israel v. Golan IsrSC 52(1)1

[7]          HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. Prime Minister IsrSC 57 (1)37.

[8]          HCJ 6057/99 MMT Mateh Mutkafei Terror v. Prime Minister (unreported).

[9]          HCJ 7307/98 Polack v. Government of Israel (unreported).

[10]        HCJ 2455/94 ‘Betzedek’ Organization v. Government of Israel (unreported).

[11]        HCJ 4877/93 Irgun Nifgai Terror v. Government of Israel (unreported).

[12]        HCJ 3125/98 Abed Elaziz Muhammad Iyad v. IDF commander in Judea and Samaria (not yet reported).

[13]        HCJ 6924/00 Shtenger v. Prime Minister (not yet reported).

 

Israeli books cited:

[14]        A. Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in Israel 536 (vol. 2. 4th Expanded Edition, 1991).

[15]        Y. H. Klinghoffer Selected Material in Matters of the Day 1970-1979, 64, at 71 (1979).

[16]        A. Rubenstein and B. Medinah, Constitutional Law of the State of Israel, 91 (vol. A. 5th edition (1996).

 

Israeli articles cited:

[17]        Klein, ‘The Powers of the Caretaker Government: Are they Really Unlimited?’ 12 Isr. L. Rev. 271 (1977).

[18]        Shetreet ‘Custom in Public Law’ Klinghoffer Book on Public Law (edited by I. Zamir) 375 (1993

[19]        Shetreet, ‘The Knesset’s Role in Signing Treaties’ Hapraklit 36 at 349 [19] S. Shetreet

 

Foreign books cited:

[20]        T. Maunz, G. Drig Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (Mnchen).

[21]        J. Esensee, P. Kirchhof Handbuch des Staatsrechts (Heidelberg, Bd. II, 1987).

[22]        G. Burdeau, F. Hamon, M. Troper Droit Constitutionnel (Paris, 26טme ed., 1999).

 

Foreign articles cited:

[23]        Boston, Levine, McLeay, Roberts and Schmidt, ‘Caretaker Government and the Evolution of Caretaker Convention in New Zealand’, 28 VUWLR 629 (1998). 

 

Jewish law sources cited:

[24]        Proverbs 28:14

 

HCJ 5167/00

For petitioners – Dr. Chaim Misgav.; Howard Griff.

For respondent – Osnat Mendel.

 

HCJ 9607/00

For petitioners – Yoram Sheftel

For respondent–Osnat Mendel

 

HCJ 84/01

For petitioners – Akiva Nof

For respondent – Osnat Mendel

 

HCJ 86/01

For petitioners – Shmuel Lavi; Ran Shalish; Eiran Tzur

For respondent – Osnat Mendel

 

HCJ 147/01

For petitioners – Himself

For respondent – Osnat Mendel

For formal respondent no. 3 – Professor Shimon Shetreet

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

President Barak

The Prime Minister resigned.  He and the Ministers of the outgoing government continue to fulfill their duties until the prime minister and ministers of the new government take office.  In this framework the outgoing government is conducting negotiations for a political arrangement with the Palestinian Authority, with the aim of signing an agreement before the elections.  What is the scope of the authority and what is breadth of the discretion of the outgoing government?  Is it permitted to conduct the political negotiation and sign the agreement?  What is the scope of the judicial review of the decisions of the outgoing government?  These are the basic issues that have arisen before us in these petitions.  These are weighty questions.  In the normal course of events significant time is required for a judgment on such issues.  Such significant amount of time is not at our disposal, as the passage of time will undermine the rationale at the foundation of the petitions.  We have done all that we could to hear the petitioners arguments and to respond to them as speedily as possible.  We now present our judgment.  We have in all likelihood been brief where it would have been proper to expand.  We have tried to do the maximum possible in the brief time that was at our disposal.

The petitions and the responses to them

1.            The Government of Israel has been conducting negotiations for many months with the Palestinian Authority.  The Attorney General has explained the characterization of this negotiation in a memo (dated December 12, 2000) which was given to the Prime Minister:

‘The agreement that is now being negotiated is different from all of its predecessors ever, in every direction, as to its challenge and risks.  The challenge is ending the difficult conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, which all desire; the risk is the surgical operation, difficult beyond all difficulty, which the agreement demands.’

The negotiation and its content are a subject of sharp debate in Israel.  Against this background – and against the background of other internal matters – the Prime Minister, Mr. Ehud Barak, resigned from his position as Prime Minister (in effect as of December 12, 2000).  Special elections for Prime Minister were set for June 2, 2001.  The political negotiation with the Palestinian Authority continues to be conducted even after the resignation of the Prime Minister.  Against this background the petitions before us were submitted.  The petitioners are citizens who claim that the outgoing government is not authorized to conduct the political negotiation it is conducting.  They request that we direct the government to stop the political negotiation until the establishment of a new government after the special elections.

At the foundation of these petitions is the viewpoint that the outgoing government is a ‘transitional government’ whose authority is qualified, in the sense that it is entitled to deal only with ongoing matters.  This qualification, according to the petitioners claim, stems from the interpretation of the Basic Law: The Government and constitutional custom.  So too, this qualification is derived from the principle of reasonableness.  In these contexts the Government and Justice Arrangements Law (Revocation of Application of the Law, Judiciary, and Administration) 5759-1999 and the Basic Law: Jerusalem the Capital of Israel (Amendment), which require, as said in them, Knesset decisions for any territorial changes, were mentioned.  The outgoing government does not have a majority in the Knesset, and therefore could not fulfill these requirements.  Even this narrows the authority of the outgoing government.  This is primarily so, when the supervision by the Knesset – which is in recess – of the activities of the government, is not being implemented in actuality.

2.            In its response (from January 4, 2001) the Attorney General notes that the constitutional principle is of ‘continuity of government’.  The interpretation of the Basic Law: the Government does not lead to the application of limits on the authority of the outgoing government.  There is no basis to the claim as to the existence of a constitutional custom which limits the authority of such a government.  However, exercise of powers during a period of elections requires great caution.  The attorney general further added and noted that any agreement that would be reached, if it is reached, requires Knesset approval.  Every government decision, according to which the law, judiciary, and administration of the State of Israel will no longer apply on an area where it applies today, requires Knesset approval with a majority vote.   Every decision as to the transfer of powers in the area of Jerusalem to a foreign entity requires a basic law which is to be passed by a majority vote.  In a supplementary response (from January 17, 2001) – which followed questions we asked during the course of the petitions – the attorney general added that ‘the measure of caution is not a new legal standard, just like reasonableness or proportionality’.  In the opinion of the attorney general, ‘a determination on the question whether the government undertook proper caution is found . . .  in the public-parliamentary realm’.  The attorney general further added in response to our questions that ‘if an agreement is signed by the Prime Minister, in outline, or in another manner, its validation will be conditioned on the approval of the Government, and the required internal approvals, and this will be stated in the agreement itself.  As is common as to such agreements, this agreement will also be brought for Knesset approval.’

The normative framework

3.            With the resignation of the Prime Minister ‘special elections will be held’ (section 23(c) of the Basic Law: the Government).  What are the powers of the Prime Minister and the ministers upon the resignation of the Prime Minister and approaching the special elections?  Sections 31 and 32 of the Basic Law: Government address this:

‘Continued Functioning of the Prime Minister and Ministers

31(a) A Prime Minister who has resigned or in whom the Knesset expressed no confidence will continue in office until the newly elected Prime Minister assumes office.

(b) In the event of the Prime Minister’s death, permanent incapacitation, resignation, removal from office, or an expression of no confidence by the Knesset, the Ministers will continue in office until the newly-elected Prime Minister assumes office.

Continuity of Government

32. During the election period for the Knesset and the Prime Minister or during special elections, the Prime Minister and the ministers of the outgoing Knesset will continue in office until the Prime Minister and the ministers of the new Government assume office.’

Thus, the Basic Law: the Government establishes the principle of government continuity (section 32) ‘governments rise and fall, but the government forever stands.’(HCJ 5/86 SHAS Party Association of Sephardim Shomrei Torah in the Knesset v. Minister of Religions [1] at p.  751; and compare: section 37 of the Basic Law: the Knesset and HCJ 4676/96 Mitral Ltd. v. Knesset of Israel [2]). The resigning Prime Minister continues in office until the newly elected prime minister assumes office.  Upon his resignation, the ministers continue in office until the newly elected prime minister assumes office (section 31).  At the foundation of this provision is the approach that with the resignation of the Prime Minister a governmental ‘void’ is not created, and the government continues to function which serves as the executive branch.  The continuity and the stability are thereby ensured.  And note: the act of resignation of the Prime Minister, restores, in fact, the confidence that was given him, to the decision of the people, who are sovereign.  In this situation, he indeed continues to serve in office by authority of section 31 of the basic law, when the basis for his continuation in office is in the law’s provision.  This is so, until the newly elected prime minister, who won the public’s confidence in the special elections, assumes office.

4.            Indeed, in the case before us the Prime Minister has resigned.  He and the members of his cabinet continue to serve in office, by authority of section 31 (and 32) of the Basic Law: the Government.  Is there a formal limitation on their authority?  The answer is in the negative.  There is nothing in the Basic Law: the Government which narrows the formal authority of the resigning prime minister and the formal authority of the ministers, to ongoing activities only.  Justice M. Cheshin expressed this approach when noting:

‘The world-of-law acts according to its way and the powers of operation exist, whether in the days between one election and another and whether during the days of the election.  The authority of the government stands every day of the year and from year to year, so too regarding the powers of members of the cabinet.’ (HCJ 5621/96 Herman – Head of the Municipality Ofakim v. the Minister of Religious Affairs [3] at p. 804.)

5.            The petitioners have argued before us that indeed there is a limitation on the authority of the outgoing Prime Minister and government who continue in office after the special elections.  This limitation limits the bounds of authority of the government only to the government’s ‘ongoing operations’, and not to determination of matters of principle with far-reaching ramifications.  Indeed, the claim of ‘ongoing’ operations of the government (expedition des affaires courantes) is not an innovation of the petitioners.  This approach is common in a number of countries which have a parliamentary regime (see Klein, ‘The Powers of the Caretaker Government: Are They Really Unlimited?’[17]; Boston, Levine, McLeay, Roberts and Schmidt, ‘Caretaker Government and the Evolution of Caretaker Convention in New Zealand’ [23].  This approach was examined in Israel by a public committee (Justice Z. Berinson (Chairperson), S.Z. Abramov, Dr. A. Ankorin, Professor B. Aktzin, Professor Y. Dror, Y. Zamir, and Dr. A. Yadin).  This committee dealt with the scope of powers of a ‘transitional government’ (according to the prior Basic Law: the Government).  It examined the adoption of the ‘law of ongoing operations’ and decided not to adopt it.  In the committee’s report it was written:

‘The Committee weighed the question whether the powers of a transitional government are to be limited in any way.  Such as: limitation of powers to ongoing  matters or matters that cannot stand delay (similar to the law of ongoing  matters which is accepted in France, Italy and Belgium and other European countries) or limiting its operations in specific areas, subject to Knesset approval, or limiting its power to present draft laws in fundamental matters that are in dispute.  The Committee decided for reasons of practicality and in light of the special circumstances of the State, that reducing the functional areas in which a transitional government will be permitted to operate will cause too drastic a change from a regular government to a transitional government, will damage the proper functioning of the government and may damage vital activity of state institutions in the case of a sudden crisis.  Abstract formulations such as ‘ongoing matters’ cannot promise the degree of certainty needed for proper constitutional functioning.  In light of these rationales the Committee did not even see fit to recommend determining a period of time after which the transitional government would be limited in its powers or to recommend distinctions as to limitation of powers between different types of transitional governments’  (‘Report of the Committee on the Matter of Transitional Government’, p. 6)

In relating to cases in which the government left office under the prior Basic Law: the Government, Professor Rubinstein writes:

‘In all of these cases the outgoing government continues in it duties as usual.  Section 25 of the Basic Law establishes that the President will begin the processes to put together a new government but ‘the outgoing government will continue to fulfill its functions until the new government is established’.  The law does not determine a time frame for such a government which does not have the Knesset’s confidence.  In popular language such a government is called a ‘transitional government’ and this term indeed is fitting to describe the interim situation between one government and another.  In terms of its powers and role a transitional government is no different from a regular government which has the Knesset’s confidence.  An attempt has been made to give limited meaning to the term ‘will continue in its functions’, but it has failed.  A similar arrangement is practiced in England, where the resigning government stays in office during the period of elections until establishment of the new government after the elections, however, there the period of transition is shorter.’  (A. Rubinstein, Constitutional Law in Israel [14] 536).

In relating to the continental doctrine as to the power of an outgoing government to deal only with ongoing matters, Professor Klinghoffer has noted that in Israel ‘transitional governments have always seen themselves as permitted to exercise the full powers of a regular government, this position did not contradict explicit provisions in the written law’ (Y. H. Klinghoffer, Selected Material in Matters of the Day [15] at 71.  In relating to the nature of the continental doctrine as to ongoing powers of a transitional government, Professor Klinghoffer noted that: ‘there is much doubt if abstract formulas such as these, founded on the term ‘ongoing  matters’ can ensure the degree of certainty needed for sound constitutional life’ (Ibid, p. 71).

6.            Moreover: with the establishment of the Basic Law: the Government the Knesset decided to continue with the accepted practice, and refrained from making a formal change in the powers of the outgoing government.  Against this background we are of the opinion that it not proper now, by way of construction, to bring in to Israel the continental doctrine as to limitation of the powers of the outgoing government (as to a similar approach in Germany see Herzog, Maunz-Durig, Grundgesetz Kommentar, Art 69 III 46, 60 [20]; Schroeder, Handbuch des Staatsrechts, 43 (Band II, par. 51) [21]).  Of course the Knesset as an establishing authority may, after examining the issue as to all of its aspects, limit the powers of the outgoing government, if it sees fit (compare section 29(b) of the Basic Law: the Government as to the voiding of the powers of the acting prime minister to disperse the Knesset; compare also section 27a of the Local Authorities (Election of the Head of the Authority and his Deputies and their Term in Office) Law 5735-1975).  On this matter various ideas have been proposed for legislation, such as subjecting the government – which no longer has the confidence of the Knesset – to Knesset decisions (see Klein, Ibid, [17] p. 285; Rubenstein, Ibid, [14] p. 502; Klinghoffer, Ibid, [15] p. 71).

7.            It has been argued before us that there is a constitutional custom, according to which the outgoing government is limited to ongoing operations (‘maintenance’ operations) alone.  So too it was argued, that there is a constitutional custom, according to which international treaties of special importance that Israel is party to require Knesset ratification.  This constitutional custom, so it was argued, is not limited only to retroactive ratification by the Knesset but requires advance consent of the Knesset before the government signs them.  We cannot accept these arguments.  The question of the validity of constitutional custom in Israel has yet to be examined by this court.  For myself, I am prepared to presume, without making a judicial determination on the matter, that constitutional custom is a legal source for creating binding constitutional law in Israel (See Shetreet ‘Custom in Public Law’ Klinghoffer Book on Public Law [18] 375; A. Rubenstein and B. Medinah, Constitutional Law of the State of Israel [16] at pp. 95-96.  It will suffice for me to say, for purposes of the matter before us, that it has not been proven to us, in the accepted manner for the proving of (constitutional) customs, the existence of a constitutional custom according to which the outgoing government has only ongoing powers (or ‘maintenance’ powers).  As to the ratification of international treaties of special importance, the government accepts (as per the Attorney General before us) that any agreement that will be made in this matter will be brought before the Knesset for ratification (see also Shetreet, ‘the Knesset’s Role in Signing Treaties’ [19] at 349; Rubinstein, Ibid, Ibid [16]).  The existence of a constitutional custom by which the consent of the Knesset must be given in advance, has not been proven to us.

8.            From the above it can be seen that constitutional law in Israel does not recognize a special doctrine according to which with the resignation of the prime minister, his powers and the powers of the ministers – and for our matter we can say, the powers of the outgoing government – are limited to ongoing  operations (‘maintenance’ operations) alone.  However, the outgoing government, like every government in Israel, must act with reasonableness and proportionality, when the difference between it and a regular government is expressed in the scope of the coverage of the test of reasonableness.  Indeed, the principles of reasonableness and proportionality are general legal principles, which apply to the activities of every government, including an outgoing government.  The ‘range of reasonableness’ which determines the range of operations beyond which the action of the government is not reasonable, also applies to the operations of an outgoing government.  As is known, an outgoing government can be created in various forms (such as the resignation of the prime minister, expression of no-confidence in the prime minister by the Knesset, dispersal of the Knesset by the prime minister with the consent of the president, dissolution of the Knesset, and even a regular situation of a government that operates after timely elections).  We are dealing in the petitions before us with one of the forms of an outgoing government, which is, resignation of the prime minister.  The rest of the judgment is aimed at these circumstances.

9.            What do principles of reasonableness and proportionality tell us about the activities of an outgoing government where the prime minister resigns?  In answering this question we must return to the purpose at the core of the continuation in office of the prime minister and the ministers, despite the resignation of the prime minister.  This purpose is twofold: on the one hand it is intended to prevent a governmental ‘void’ and ensure stability and continuity.  On the other hand, the special status of the outgoing prime minister is to be taken into account, where ostensibly upon his resignation his role was meant to end, but he continues to fill it until the chosen prime minister enters office, and this by power of the provision of the basic law itself (compare Klein, Ibid [16] at p. 276).    Against the background of this double purpose the following conclusion arises: the prime minister who resigned and the ministers of his government must act out of awareness of this purpose.  On the one hand, they must act with restraint appropriate for the status of an outgoing government.  On the other hand they must ensure stability and continuity.  The duty of restraint does not exist where there is a vital public need to act.  It is self-evident that where such a vital need exists, it must be realized, in appropriate measure.  It is a matter, thus, of a flexible approach that balances between restraint and action, according to the circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the changing reality.  The question that the principles of reasonableness and proportionality pose is whether the action is ongoing or exceptional.  The correct question is, whether in the overall balance – which takes the totality of circumstances into account – restraint or action is required.

10.          Every entity operating by the law has a ‘range of reasonableness’ which reflects the range of legal actions which that entity may undertake.  The scope of the range as to the given matter is dependent on the characteristics of the power.  Justice Zamir writes:

‘The question as to whether an administrative decision suffers from extreme lack of reasonableness is dependent on the limits of the range of reasonableness, which is the range in which the administrative authority may decide according to its discretion: what is the language and the purpose of the authorizing statute; who is the authorizing entity; what is the matter administered by the authority; whether the authority is operated primarily on the basis of factual findings, on the basis of policy considerations, or on the basis of professional criteria, such as: medical or engineers criteria; and the like.  The range of reasonableness changes in accordance with these characteristics: at times it is broad and at times narrow’ (HCJ 2533/97 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Government of Israel and Others [4] at p. 57).

Justice Or wrote in a similar vein:

‘The range of reasonableness draws the area in which the authority’s decision will be reasonable, in the sense that there are no grounds to intervene in the decision.  But the range of deployment of this range is not uniform.  It may change in accordance with the circumstances of a given case.  It is derived from the quality of the operating values in a given matter.’ (HCJ 2534/97, 2535/97, 2541/97 MK Yahav and Others v. State Attorney and Others [5] at p. 58).

Against this background the conclusion is to be drawn that as to given matters the range of reasonableness of the prime minister who has resigned and the members of his cabinet is narrower than the range of reasonableness of a prime minister and government who are operating normally.  The reason for this is that the prime minister on the one hand and the outgoing government on the other must take into account the special criterion – a criterion that the government normally does not have to take into account – and that is the purpose and the source of its authority.  Moreover: the ‘range’ of reasonableness of such prime minister and government changes as the date of ending the time in office of the elected prime minister nears.  Therefore, the ‘range’ becomes narrower – and the need for restraint and reserve made more necessary – after the elections, and before the elected prime minister begins his term in office, and all subject to vital public needs?  Thus, for example, as a rule, it is appropriate in the framework of domestic policy, that the outgoing prime minister and the members of his cabinet not make appointments to senior positions, and leave the work of appointments to the elected prime minister and his government, unless, under the circumstances, the demands of the position create a vital public need to man the position without waiting for the beginning of the term of the elected prime minister, or where it is a matter of a professional appointment when there is not sufficient reason to postpone the appointment.  The same is true in the management of foreign policy or defense.  No one would think that the outgoing prime minister and his government cannot protect state security from a war that broke out just because the days are the final days of an outgoing government.  Defense of the State from war, certainly raises a vital public need, that every prime minister, including an outgoing prime minister must deal with.

Judicial review

11.          What is the scope of the judicial review of the decisions of the resigning prime minister and his ministers?  The answer is that such a government does not enjoy a special status as to judicial review.  Every government is subject to judicial review, and a prime minister who resigns and the ministers of his government do not have immunity from judicial review.  Therefore the court will ask itself – in the framework of the judicial review of the reasonableness of the decision and the proportionality of government decisions – whether the decision of the government is a decision which a reasonable government may make.  The court will not ask itself which decision it would have made if it was operating as the government.  This criterion also applies, of course, as to the review of the actions of a prime minister who resigned and the ministers of his government.  The court will ask himself if the balance the prime minister and his ministers made between the need for restraint and the need for action, is a balance a reasonable outgoing prime minister is permitted to make (compare Burdeau Hamon, Troper Droit Constitutionnel [22] at 633-634).  The court will not ask itself what the balance is that it would have made were it acting as a prime minister who has resigned.

12.          The scope of the judicial review will be influenced by the scope of the administrative power.  Although the grounds for review do not change, the scope of the power determines the limits of judicial review.  Justice Zamir explained this when he noted:

‘The essence of administrative power also impacts the scope of judicial review.  Indeed, the rules of review do not change from power to power: every power must be used in order to serve the purpose of the law, on the basis of relevant considerations, in a reasonable manner and to the extent necessary, however the content of the rules changes from power to power. And not only do the purpose of the law and relevant considerations change according to the essence of the power, broad or narrow.  The essence of the power to manage a prison, because it is so complex, requires the court to act with great care, so that it does not narrow the range of reasonableness of the Prison Services in a manner that will prevent orderly administration of the prison.’ (PPA 7440/97 (PPA 6172/97 State of Israel v. Golan [6] at p. 8).

If this is the case for the administration of a prison, all the more so as to fundamental questions of policy.  Thus, for example, the court will not direct the prime minister and the members of his cabinet whether to undertake a policy of privatization or a policy of nationalization.  In the framework of the power of government, it is a matter for the prime minister and his ministers, and not the court, to decide.  The Knesset oversees the prime minister and his ministers and review of the policy of a government operating within the range of reasonableness is in the hands of the Knesset.  This is so as to a regular prime minister and government; and it is so as to a prime minister who resigned and the ministers of his government.

From the general to the specific

13.          The government is the executive branch of the State (section 1 of the Basic Law: the Government).  Based on this power and additional powers given to it (see, for example, sections 40 and 41 of the Basic Law: the Government) it is empowered to administer the foreign and defense policies of the State.  The power of the one holding the power (the government) and the essence of the matter (foreign and defense affairs; peace or war) lead to the government having a broad range of reasonableness in these type of matters.  Within the bounds of that range the court will not replace its discretion with that of the government.  Supervision of the utilization of the powers of the government in these matters is in the hands of the Knesset.  Therefore, were these petitions filed prior to the resignation of the Prime Minister, we would more than likely have dismissed them.  One government has one policy.  Another government another policy.  Each is in the hands of the government.  The choice between the policy paths is a matter for the government and the supervision of the policy is purely a matter for the Knesset.  The choice within the bounds of the range of reasonableness is not to be made by the court.  Indeed, in a long line of decisions, we dismissed petitions which dealt with the government’s policy for resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict (HCJ 4354/92 Temple Mount Faithful v. Prime Minister [7] (negotiation with Syria in the matter of the Golan Heights); HCJ 6057/99 MMT Mateh Mutkafei Terror v. Prime Minister [8]; HCJ 7307/98 Polack v. Government of Israel [9]; HCJ 2455/94 ‘Betzedek’ Organization v. Government of Israel (release of hostages in the framework of a political agreement) [9]; HCJ 4877/93 Irgun Nifgai Terror v. Government of Israel [10] (negotiations over the Oslo Accords).

14.          Does the conclusion need to be different only because this is an outgoing government?  Our answer is in the negative.  The choice between the need for restraint (as the petitioners claim) and the need to act (as per the government’s stance) is entirely saturated with considerations of security and peace.  The Attorney General (in his supplementary response) rightfully noted that:

‘the negotiators see in it a rare window of opportunity and necessitated by reality at this time.  On the other hand, the petitioners raise various concerns lest the negotiation at this time will bring about damage in the future.  The arguments come from here and from there, and they are found within the political and parliamentary realm.  Determination as to specific arguments, in one direction or another, puts the court in the shoes of those making the political decisions.’

And in the letter of the Attorney General (from December 26, 2000) that was presented before us the Attorney General writes:

‘I am aware of the risks that you describe in the government, in the case that there is no agreement – risks toward neighboring states Egypt and Jordan – who have already made peace, risks toward the total Arab world and the like.  These are understood, although there will also be risks if an agreement is obtained which cannot be realized, even if ‘fortunate is the man who is anxious always’ (Proverbs 28:14 [24]), the question is reward versus loss, and that is the leadership’s decision.’

Thus, against the background of these matters, which are brought in the statements of the Attorney General, and according to the material before us, we have not been convinced that in the matter before us negotiation by the outgoing Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet deviates from the range of reasonableness, and that the hand of restraint or of action is supreme.  But it is natural that the degree of intervention in a matter such as this will take place in exceptional cases.  Beyond this, determination of this question – whose dominant elements are political, and which are found in the center of the social debate in Israel – must take place within the political dialogue in Israel, via the instruments of the Knesset or national vote (HCJ 3125/98 Abed Elaziz Muhammad Iyad v. IDF commander in Judea and Samaria [12].  Indeed in comparative literature, where the constitutional custom is occasionally accepted which limits the powers of the outgoing government, the emphasis is placed on political review of decisions of the outgoing government and not judicial review (see Klein, Ibid [17] p. 285; Boston and others, Ibid [23] p. 641).  And note: our approach is not that there is no place for judicial review.  Our approach is that in the framework of judicial review, and according to its worldview, it is appropriate in the state of affairs as it is before us, and according to the characteristics of the special questions before us, that the review of the decisions of the outgoing government will take place within the Knesset.

15.          It has been argued before us that the Knesset cannot act, and therefore this ‘alternate remedy’ no longer exists.  We cannot accept this position.  The 15th Knesset continues to serve.  It continues its legislative work.  It can continue its review of the actions of the outgoing government.  It has the necessary tools in its hands.  It has been said to us in this context that a draft Basic Law: the Government (Amendment – Qualification to Signing an Agreement) which has not been advanced in the legislative process has been proposed in the Knesset.  It is true, from the moment the Prime Minister announced his resignation the effectiveness of the supervision of his actions is weakened, to the extent it is a matter of the ability to bring about special elections.  At the same time, although the Prime Minister is elected in direct elections (section 3(b) of the Basic Law: the Government) the parliamentary principle of supervision of the Prime Minister and the government still stands (see HCJ 6924/00 Shtenger v. Prime Minister [13]).  Indeed, ‘the Knesset is the parliament of the State’ (section 1 of the Basic Law: the Knesset) and it is its ‘house of legislators’ (section 1 of the Transition Law, 5709-1949).  Despite the resignation of the Prime Minister the Knesset has broad power to supervise the Prime Minister and his cabinet.  This is so according to the existing law, and this is also possible if the existing law is changed – something that is in the establishment and legislative power of the Knesset.  It is found that, it has in its hands, the ability, if it sees fit (and we express no opinion on this), to decide whether the actions of the resigning Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet fit the purpose and the source of power of the outgoing government.

16.          Our conclusion is, therefore, that within the bounds of the petitions before us, and in accordance with the totality of the data before us, the review of the balance between the need for restraint and reserve and the need for action is in the hands of the Knesset.  This conclusion is based, inter alia, on the declaration of the Attorney General, that if any agreement is signed between the representatives of the outgoing government and the representatives of the Palestinian Authority, it will be established in the agreement itself that a condition for the validity of the agreement in the international arena is that the agreement receive the necessary approvals in accordance with domestic law, including the fact that it will be approved by the government and the Knesset.

The conclusion is that there is no legal basis to grant the petitions therefore they are denied.

 

Justice T. Or

I agree.

 

Justice E. Mazza

I agree.

 

Justice I. Englard

I agree.

 

 

Vice-President S. Levin

1.            I agree with my hon. colleague that the petitions are to be dismissed, but my path for reaching this conclusion is somewhat different from his.

2.            I agree that the outgoing government has not deviated from its formal power in negotiating with the Palestinian Authority and I also agree that it is within the power of the Court in principle to intervene in its action according to the rules of public law; according to these rules the Court may intervene in an act of an outgoing government that deviates significantly and categorically from the accepted area of operation of an outgoing government; indeed the question whether there has been such a deviation may also be subject to debate and on this matter there is a fairly wide range of discretion in which the Court will tend not to intervene.  Beyond this range the court may intervene.  However, this is not the only factor which may impact the willingness of this court to intervene.  Given that the subject of the petition is a matter of sharp public debate, the court may, by power of its discretion, refrain from intervening where the Knesset has the power to explicitly limit the power of the outgoing government to undertake an action which it is not proper to undertake.  From the material before us I have not been convinced that the Knesset does not have the power to intervene.  It has even done so in the past; were it not for this consideration I would have had to decide whether we have had placed before us a foundation which justifies the determination that the outgoing government deviated significantly and categorically from the range of activity of an outgoing government.  If I had found this to be so and were it not for the consideration which is similar to the quasi existence of an alternate remedy, which has moved me to dismiss the petition, I would make the orders nisi absolute; in light of said consideration, which in my view is of determinative weight, it is not necessary for me to express an opinion as to the existence of a factual foundation, as stated.

 

 

Justice  J. Türkel

1.            I agree with the mode of analysis of my hon. colleague President A. Barak.  I do not agree with his conclusion: that ‘we have not been convinced that in the matter before us negotiation by the outgoing Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet deviates from the range of reasonableness, and that the hand of restraint or of action is supreme’; and that ‘within the bounds of the petitions before us, and in accordance with the totality of the data before us, the review of the balance between the need for restraint and reserve and the need for action is in the hands of the Knesset’.  Due to the time constraints I will explain my position in a summary of a summary.

2.            I am of the opinion, generally, that the range of reasonableness of a prime minister that resigned and the ministers of his government is narrower than the range of reasonableness of a prime minister and ministers who serve regularly.  Moreover, this range becomes narrower and narrower – and the duty of restraint applicable to them continues to increase – from day to day and from hour to hour with the approach of the end of the term in office of the prime minister.  In this I am going – with a slight change in emphasis – in the path of the President.  However, in my opinion, the conclusion is also derived from this  that the weight of vital public need which is required according to the approach of the President – to which I also agree– in order to justify action by the resigning prime minister and the ministers of his government during the period of transition also continues to increase.  In other words, as the date of the conclusion of the term in office of the resigning prime minister approaches it is no longer sufficient that the public need is merely vital, but the public need must be very vital in order for it to cancel out the duty of restraint which is imposed on the resigning prime minister and the ministers of his government during the period of transition.  It may be possible to also say that as the days go past the ‘burden of proof’ that the prime minister and the ministers of his government are operating within the range of reasonableness, is transferred to their shoulders.  If in the beginning of the term the burden is on those who are challenging their actions to show that there is not a vital public need which justifies doing a specific action, then toward the end of the period the prime minister and the government must show that there is a very vital public need that justifies the action.

3.            I have been convinced that political negotiation between the government and the Palestinian Authority in and of itself – not to mention agreements and understandings that may be reached during its course – may tie the hands of the prime minister and the next government if another prime minister is chosen.  The special elections for prime minister will take place on February 6, 2001; meaning in another 12 days.  The question, which is before us for determination is not whether the negotiation that the government is engaged in with the Palestinian Authority – which is undoubtedly fateful as to the future of the State – is within the range of reasonableness.  The question is whether conducting negotiation in the period that is so close to date of the special elections is within the range of reasonableness.  As to this matter we are not required to make any determination as to the contents of the negotiation, the desired political arrangement, considerations of security and peace and the like.  In my view, the question that is to be determined is whether there still exists a vital public need – and in my view, whether it is a very vital public need – to conduct the negotiation in this time period particularly.  The representatives of the government have laid out many and varied reasons as to why the hands of the resigning prime minister and his government ministers are not to be tied, but they have not pointed to a vital public need – and in fact, have not shown any reason – that would justify conducting such an important and fateful negotiation, which in itself may tie the hands of the prime minister that will be elected (if the resigning Prime Minister is not re-elected) and his government ministers.  In the absence of such vital public need it is to be determined that continuation of the negotiation in the short time period that is left until the special elections deviates from the range of reasonableness and is to be terminated until the elected prime minister and the ministers of his government start their term in office.

4.            Who is meant to hold the sword of review of the policy and the actions of the government?

I also agree that, generally, review of the policy of the government operating within the range of reasonableness and the exercise of its power is placed in the hands of the Knesset.  I will add and say that – and this too is in general – it is better for the court to rarely intervene in such matters.  However, the matter before us is exceptional and unusual and requires us to move outside the area of the rule.

Indeed, in theory, the Knesset has in its hands the legal tools necessary to realize its power of review; however, I have been convinced that in actuality this is not the case.  As has been clarified it has not been possible for 61 members of the Knesset – despite the fact that they are a majority of the Knesset – to advance the legislation of the Draft Basic Law: the Government (Amendment – Qualification to Signing an Agreement), whose purpose is to prevent the progress of the political negotiation.  Without expressing an opinion as to the draft law itself and the question whether it was possible to advance it in the period that passed since it was submitted, in fact the draft law is ‘stuck’ in the depths of the Knesset and its committees.  Today the Knesset is not capable, for one reason or another, of realizing its power of review.

In this situation and when little time remains, therefore, the sword of review is in the hands of this court alone.  It is not entitled to spare itself from the law and withdraw its hands from the decision.  It appears that in such a situation the words of our national poet H.N. Bialik are appropriate.

‘And the hour was the hour of mayhem, of mixing of realms

of ending and beginning, of contradiction and building, of age and youth.

And we the children of the interim, knowingly and unknowingly,

bowed and thanked before both authorities at the same time;

hanging in the balance between these two magnets

all the emotions of our indecipherable hearts then asked the prophet;’

[C.N. Bialik ‘To Achad Ha’am’]

The hour has come for the Supreme Court to be the ‘prophet’ and say its word.

5.            If my opinion were heard I would grant the petitions in the sense that an order would be given which directs the Prime Minister and the government to refrain from reaching agreements, consents or understandings with the Palestinian Authority, whether in a document or whether by another means, and not to create obligations in any way, in the negotiation currently being conducted, which may tie the hands of the prime minister and the government that will be elected.

 

 

Justice I. Zamir

I agree with President Barak that the Basic Law: the Government does not state, neither explicitly nor impliedly, that an outgoing government (which is itself a vague term) is more limited in its powers than a regular government.  By law a government is a government, and the law does not create two types of governments, or more.  So too, after the prime minister resigns as well.  The law grants power to the institution, which is the government, and the change that takes place in the instrument of the institution, which is the prime minister, does not change the powers of the institution itself.

I also agree with President Barak that there is not a constitutional custom in Israel which limits the powers of the outgoing government.  A constitutional custom, like any custom, requires proof.  No proof has been brought for the existence of such a custom.  And the court is not meant to create a custom ex nihilo in a judgment.

Therefore, the question in this case is not a question of power, but a question of discretion.  In other words, according to the law the government today has power like the government of yesterday, including the power to conduct political negotiation, but the question is whether the discretion of the government, in conducting such negotiation, was lawfully exercised.  Is there a legal defect in the discretion of the government which justifies intervention by the court?

The discretion of the government, like the discretion of every minister in the government and every other authority, is limited and guided by the legal rules, and the court is in charge of the fulfilment of these rules.  Inter alia, the government must exercise its powers based on relevant considerations, and not on the basis of foreign considerations, in the framework of the range of reasonableness and in a proportional manner.  These rules apply to every government, including an outgoing government, and according to these rules the court is authorized to review decision of every government, including an outgoing government.

These rules do not change from authority to authority or from matter to matter.  However the application of the rules may change according to the authority and according to the matter.  In accordance with this, the application of the rule of reasonableness, for example, may change when a regular government becomes an outgoing government.  In an outgoing government the range of reasonableness may, in certain circumstances, be narrower.  As a result, the intervention of the court in the discretion of the outgoing government may be broader.  An outgoing government must take into account, daily, that the range of reasonableness which it has in application of its powers may be narrower, and plan its steps accordingly.  Thus, for example, in relating to the appointment of public servants to senior positions or in giving benefits that have no other reason except the reason of the upcoming elections.  It might be said in the language of President Barak that in certain matters the outgoing government must act with proportional restraint.

This is an important rule.  It is innovative, as to date the court has not had the opportunity to state that the range of reasonableness of the outgoing government can be narrower than the range of reasonableness of a regular government.  Time will tell where this rule will lead us.

These petitions do not contain the argument that negotiation by the outgoing government with the Palestinian Authority stems from alien considerations, and even if based on the substance of the matter there is no applicability to the test of proportionality.  However, the petitioners claim that in conducting the negotiation the government has crossed the boundary of the range of reasonableness.  Based on the claim, conducting the negotiation today, by the outgoing government, a short time before the elections is unreasonable to an extreme degree.  Therefore the court is asked to rule that conducting the negotiation, although it was considered lawful by all until a short time ago, has become unlawful after the Prime Minister resigned, and to issue an order which prohibits the government from continuing with the negotiation, or at the very least, to declare that the negotiation is not lawful.  Is it proper for the court to prevent the negotiation?

Before the court examines the discretion that the government exercises in conducting negotiation, and determines if it is unreasonable and unlawful, the court must exercise its own discretion, and decide if it is appropriate for the court to intervene in such a matter.  As is known, this court has discretion, and it is authorized to summarily dismiss a petition, without discussing it substantively, in accordance with certain rules.  Thus, inter alia, the court may and also will, according to its discretion, summarily dismiss a petition because of delay in filing or because an alternate remedy exists.  So too, in the case in which the petition raises a matter of a purely political nature, of the type of matters that are entrusted, by law, or by substance, in the hands of the government or the Knesset.  This case resembles a case where there is an alternate remedy: there are cases in which the alternate remedy is a suit in another court or appeal to a certain tribunal; and there are cases where the alternate remedy is the handling of the matter under discussion in the government or the Knesset, depending on the substance of the matter.  In such matter another entity is considered more appropriate and better suited than the court to handle the matter.  Foreign relations of the State are, and have always been, a classic example of such a matter.  Thus, as far as is known in every court and every state.  In Israel, as well, this court has handed down many decisions in which it summarily dismissed petitions because of the political nature of the petitions, and in all of this, many of the petitions dealt with relations between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.  And this is not because the court does not have the authority to intervene in such a matter.  It has the authority.  But the authority is entails discretion.  Indeed, the court can exercise its discretion, in a special case, even to intervene in a purely political matter.  But in each case the court must exercise its discretion and decide if it is proper, under the circumstances, to intervene in such a matter.  Meaning there are two stops on the pathway of the court, in these petitions as in every other petition: at the first stop it must exercise its discretion and decide if it is proper to intervene in the substance of the petition; at the second stop, it must examine the discretion of the government or of another authority, according to the issue.  The court must pass the first stop, before it reaches the second stop.  In these petitions the court still finds itself, in my opinion, at the first stop.

During the course of the proceedings, the court asked the petitioners if they know of another case in any state, at any time, where a court intervened in political negotiation which was being conducted by a government and prohibited it with an injunction from conducting the negotiation or declared that the negotiation is unlawful.  The petitioners’ response was, that they searched, but did not find.  I will risk surmising that they have not found it because it does not exist.  As far as is known, there was no such case even in the states where there exists a doctrine which establishes that the outgoing government only has the powers of a maintenance government.  And why? Because even in those countries it is accepted that the review of the conduct of negotiation by the outgoing government, even where the claim is made that the negotiation is unjustified and even unreasonable, is in the hands of the elected house, or directly in the hands of the public, and not in the hands of the court.  In a democracy the court has a very important role, but a limited role and it is not meant or able to solve every mishap and provide salvation for every crisis.

The petitioners ask that the law come out of Zion.  And I respond, not this law, as it is not the law of truth.  Generally, the court in Israel, like the court in other countries, does not have the capacity to assess whether this negotiation or another is reasonable or whether is crosses the boundaries of the range of reasonableness, and the court is not allowed to take upon itself the responsibility of granting an injunction proscribing the political negotiation.  A court injunction, which proscribes or terminates political negotiation, in itself may be unreasonable or irresponsible.

I do not find it necessary to provide a long explanation as to the significance and ramification of the court’s intervention in political negotiation, inter alia, in terms of the status and role of this court in society.  Those who need to comprehend, will comprehend.  However, in order to explain I will linger briefly on the central claim of the petitioners according to which the very conduct of negotiation by the outgoing government, even without signing an agreement, is unlawful.  Why? Because in such negotiation the government presents political positions, such as, willingness to concede on this matter or another, and this can make it more difficult for the next government.  However, if this is so, would it be unlawful if the prime minister of the outgoing government publicly declares, without negotiation, for example, during the election campaign, that the government is willing to make certain concessions?  Such a declaration, to the whole world, may also make it more difficult for the next government, just like presenting a position in the framework of political negotiation.  Is it proper therefore, for the court to issue an order which prohibits the prime minister of the outgoing government from presenting his policy before the broad public? The court too has a range of reasonableness.

In conclusion, these petitions deal with political negotiation, of a purely political nature, which divides the public in a sharp debate.  Whether it is appropriate to conduct such a negotiation or not, and in this matter each person lives by their own beliefs, in any event the government has notified the court that if the negotiation leads to an agreement, it will be explicitly stated in the agreement that it will not be valid unless it is approved by the government, and then is later approved by the Knesset, and will also fulfill all the conditions that were determined for such an agreement in the laws of Israel.  In such a case, the government and the Knesset will discuss the agreement substantively and before it is given any validity.  Moreover, even at this stage while the negotiation is going on, the Knesset can intervene in the negotiation as it sees fit.  That is its power.  Therefore, it is also its responsibility.  Therefore, this is also the right path to follow.  Under such circumstances and taking into account the rest of the circumstances of the case, I believe that no court in the world would take it upon itself to intervene and terminate the negotiation by way of order or declaration.  In these circumstances, this court also does not need to do so.  Therefore, I agree with President Barak that the petitions are to be denied.

 

It was decided as per the opinion of President A. Barak, and against the dissenting opinion of Justice J. Türkel.

 

Petitions denied.

 

1 Shvat 5761

 

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